A HISTORY OF ROME DURING THE LATER REPUBLIC AND EARLY PRINCIPATE BY A. H. J. GREENIDGE, M. A. , D. LITT. TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW OF HERTFORD COLLEGE AND LECTURER IN ANCIENT HISTORY AT BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD VOLUME I FROM THE TRIBUNATE OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS TO THE SECOND CONSULSHIP OF MARIUS B. C. 133-104 WITH TWO MAPS TO B. G. AND T. G. PREFACE This work will be comprised in six volumes. According to the plan whichI have provisionally laid down, the second volume will cover the periodfrom 104 to 70 B. C. , ending with the first consulship of Pompeius andCrassus; the third, the period from 70 to 44 B. C. , closing with thedeath of Caesar; the fourth volume will probably be occupied by theThird Civil War and the rule of Augustus, while the fifth and sixth willcover the reigns of the Emperors to the accession of Vespasian. The original sources, on which the greater part of the contents of thepresent volume is based, have been collected during the last few yearsby Miss Clay and myself, and have already been published in anabbreviated form. Some idea of the debt which I owe to modern authorsmay be gathered from the references in the footnotes. As I have often, for the sake of brevity, cited the works of these authors by shortenedand incomplete titles, I have thought it advisable to add to the volumea list of the full titles of the works referred to. But the list makesno pretence to be a full bibliography of the period of history withwhich this volume deals. The map of the Wäd Mellag and its surroundingterritory, which I have inserted to illustrate the probable site of thebattle of the Muthul, is taken from the map of the "Medjerda supérieure"which appears in M. Salomon Reinach's _Atlas de la Province Romained'Afrique_. I am very much indebted to my friend and former pupil, Mr. E. J. Harding, of Hertford College, for the ungrudging labour which he has bestowed onthe proofs of the whole of this volume. Many improvements in the form ofthe work are due to his perspicacity and judgment. A problem which confronts an author who plunges into the midst of thehistory of a nation (however complete may be the unity of the periodwith which he deals) is that of the amount of introductory informationwhich he feels bound to supply to his readers. In this case, I have feltneither obligation nor inclination to supply a sketch of the developmentof Rome or her constitution up to the period of the Gracchi. The amountof information on the general and political history of Rome which theaverage student must have acquired from any of the excellent text-booksnow in use, is quite sufficient to enable him to understand thetechnicalities of the politics of the period with which I deal; and Iwas very unwilling to burden the volume with a _précis_ of a subjectwhich I had already treated in another work. On the other hand, it isnot so easy to acquire information on the social and economic history ofRome, and consequently I have devoted the first hundred pages of thisbook to a detailed exposition of the conditions preceding anddetermining the great conflict of interests with which our story opens. A. H. J. G. OXFORD, _August_, 1904 CONTENTS CHAPTER I: Characteristics of the period. Recent changes in theconditions of Roman life. Close of the period of expansion by means ofcolonies or land assignments. Reasons for social discontent. The life ofthe wealthier classes. The expenses of political life. Attempts to checkluxury. Motives for gain amongst the upper classes. Means of acquiringwealth open to members of the nobility; those open to members of thecommercial class. The political influence of the Equites. The businesslife of Rome; finance and banking. Foreign trade. The condition of thesmall traders. Agriculture. Diminution in the numbers of peasantproprietors. The Latifundium and the new agricultural ideal. Growth ofpasturage. Causes of the changes in the tenure of land. The system ofpossession. Future prospects of agriculture. Slave labour; dangersattending its employment; revolts of slaves in Italy. The servile war inSicily (_circa_ 140-131 B. C. ). The need for reform. CHAPTER II: The sources from which reform might have come, too. Attitudeof Scipio Aemilianus. Tiberius Gracchus; his youth and early career. Theaffair of the Numantine Treaty. Motives that urged Tiberius Gracchus toreform. His tribunate (B. C. 133). Terms of the agrarian measure which heintroduced. Creation of a special agrarian commission. Opposition to thebill. Veto pronounced by Marcus Octavius. Tiberius Gracchus declares aJustitium. Fruitless reference to the senate. Deposition of Octavius. Passing of the agrarian law; appointment of the commissioners; judicialpower given to the commissioners. Employment of the bequest of Attalus. Attacks on Tiberius Gracchus. His defence of the deposition of Octavius. New programme of Tiberius Gracchus; suggestion of measures dealing withthe army, the law-courts and the Italians. Tiberius Gracchus's attemptat re-election to the tribunate. Riot at the election and death ofTiberius Gracchus, Consequences of his fall. CHAPTER III: Attitude of the senate after the fall of Tiberius Gracchus. Special commission appointed for the trial of his adherents (B. C. 132). Fate of Scipio Nasica. Permanence of the land commission andthoroughness of its work. Difficulties connected with jurisdiction ondisputed claims. The Italians appeal to Scipio Aemilianus. Hisintervention; judicial power taken from the commissioners (B. C. 129). Death of Scipio Aemilianus. Tribunate of Carbo (B. C. 131); ballot lawand attempt to make the tribune immediately re-eligible. The Italianclaims; negotiations for the extension of the franchise. Alien act ofPennus (B. C. 126). Proposal made by Flaccus to extend the franchise(B. C. 125). Revolt of Fregellae. Foundation of Fabrateria (B. C. 124). Foreign events during this period; the kingdom of Pergamon. Bequest ofAttains the Third (B. C. 133). Revolt of Aristonicus (B. C. 132-130). Organisation of the province of Asia (B. C. 129-126). Sardinian War (B. C. 126-125). Conquest and annexation of the Balearic Islands(B. C. 123-132). CHAPTER IV: The political situation at the time of the appearance ofCaius Gracchus as a candidate for the tribunate (B. C. 124). Early careerof Caius Gracchus. First tribunate of Caius Gracchus (B. C. 123). Lawspassed or proposed during this tribunate; law protecting the Caput of aRoman citizen. Impeachment of Popillius. Law concerning magistrates whohad been deposed by the people. Social reforms. Law providing for thecheapened sale of corn. Law mitigating the conditions of militaryservice, 208. Agrarian law. Judiciary law. Law permitting a criminalprosecution for corrupt judgments. Law concerning the province of Asia. The new balance of power created by these laws in favour of the Equites. Law about the consular provinces. Colonial schemes of Caius Gracchus. The Rubrian law for the renewal of Carthage. Law for the making ofroads. Election of Fannius to the consulship and of Caius Gracchus andFlaccus to the tribunate. Activity of Caius Gracchus during his secondtribunate (B. C. 122). The franchise bill. Opposition to the bill. Exclusion of Italians from Rome; threat of the veto, and suspension ofthe measure. Proposal for a change in the order of voting in the ComitiaCenturiata. New policy of the senate; counter-legislation of Drusus. Colonial proposals of Drusus. His measure for the protection of theLatins. The close of Caius Gracchus's second tribunate. His failure tobe elected tribune for the third time. Proposal for the repeal of theRubrian law. The meeting on the Capitol and its consequences (B. C. 121). Declaration of a state of siege. The seizure of the Aventine; defeat ofthe Gracchans; death of Caius Gracchus and Flaccus. Judicial prosecutionof the adherents of Caius Gracchus. Future judgments on the Gracchi. Theclosing years of Cornelia. Estimate of the character and consequences ofthe Gracchan reforms. CHAPTER V: The political situation after the fall of Caius Gracchus. Prosecution and acquittal of Opimius (B. C. 120). Publius Lentulus diesin exile. Prosecution and condemnation of Carbo (B. C. 119). LuciusCrassus. Policy of the senate towards the late schemes of reform. Twonew land laws (_circa_ 121-119 B. C. ). The settlement of the landquestion with respect to Ager Publicus in Italy (B. C. III). Limitationson the power of the nobility; the Equestrian courts; trials of Scaevola(B. C. 120) and Cato (B. C. 113). Consulship of Scaurus (B. C. 115); lawconcerning the voting power of freedmen. Sumptuary law; activity of thecensors Metellus and Domitius (B. C. 115). Triumphs of Domitius, Fabius(B. C. 120) and Scaurus (B. C. 115), for military successes. Confidence ofthe electors in the ancient houses. Recognition of talent by thenobility; career of Scaurus (B. C. 163-115). The rise of Marius; hisearly career (B. C. 157-119). Tribunate of Marius (B. C. 119). His lawabout the method of voting in the Comitia carried in spite of theopposition of the senate. He opposes a measure for the distribution ofcorn. Marius elected praetor; accused and acquitted of Ambitus (B. C. 116). His praetorship (B. C. 115), and pro-praetorship in Spain (B. C. 114). Further opposition to the senate; foundation of Narbo Martius(B. C. 118). Glaucia; his tribunate and his law of extortion (_circa_ 111B. C. ). The spirit of unrest; religious fears at Rome (B. C. 114). Firsttrial of the vestals (B. C. 114). Second trial of the vestals (B. C. 113). Human sacrifice. Great fire at Rome (B. C. III). CHAPTER VI: The kingdom of Numidia. The races of North Africa. TheNumidians. The Numidian monarchy. Reign of Micipsa (B. C. 148-118). Earlyyears of Jugurtha. Jugurtha at Numantia (B. C. 134-133). Joint rule ofJugurtha, Adherbal and Hiempsal (B. C. 118). Murder of Hiempsal (_circa_116 B. C. ); war between Jugurtha and Adherbal. Both kings send envoys toRome; the appeal of Adherbal. Decision of the senate. Numidia dividedbetween the claimants. Renewal of the war between Jugurtha and Adherbal(_circa_ 114 B. C. ). Siege of Cirta (B. C. 112). Embassy from Romeneglected by Jugurtha. Renewed appeal of Adherbal. Another commissionsent by Rome. Surrender of Cirta and murder of Adherbal. Massacre ofItalian traders. Its influence on the commercial classes at Rome;protest by Memmius. Declaration of war against Jugurtha. Command ofBestia in Numidia (B. C. III). Attitude of Bocchus of Mauretania. Negotiations of Bestia with Jugurtha; conclusion of peace. Excitement inRome on the news of the agreement with Jugurtha. Activity of Memmius. Jugurtha induced to come to Rome (B. C. III). Jugurtha at Rome; the sceneat the Contio. Murder of Massiva. Jugurtha leaves Rome and the war isrenewed, 365. Spurius Albinus in Numidia. He returns to Rome leavingAulus Albinus in command. Enterprise of Aulus Albinus; his defeat andcompact with Jugurtha (B. C. 109). Reception of the news at Rome; thesenate invalidates the treaty. Return of Spurius Albinus to Africa. TheMamilian Commission (B. C. 110). Metellus appointed to Numidia(B. C. 109). CHAPTER VII: Metellus restores discipline in the army. Jugurtha attemptsnegotiation; Metellus intrigues with the envoys. First campaign ofMetellus (B. C. 109). Seizure of Vaga. Battle of the Muthul. Reception ofthe news at Rome. Second campaign of Metellus (B. C. 108). Siege of Zama. Correspondence of Metellus with Bomilcar. Negotiations with Jugurtha. Discontent in the province of Africa at the progress of the war;ambitions of Marius. Plans for securing the command for Marius. Massacreof the Roman garrison at Vaga. Recovery of Vaga by Metellus. Trial andexecution of Turpilius, Intrigues of Bomilcar. Bomilcar put to death byJugurtha. Marius returns to Rome. His election to the consulship (B. C. 108 or 107); Numidia assigned as his province. Enrolment of the CapiteCensi in the legions. Metellus's expedition to Thala (B. C. 107); captureof the town, Leptis Major appeals for, and receives, Roman help. Jugurtha finds help amongst the Gaetulians. Junction of Jugurtha andBocchus. Metellus moves to Cirta. Close of Metellus's command. CHAPTER VIII: Marius arrives in Africa (B. C. 107). Return of Metellus toRome: his triumph. First campaign of Marius. Expedition to Capsa anddestruction of the town. Second campaign of Marius (B. C. 106);operations on the Muluccha. Arrival of Sulla with cavalry from Italy. Early career of Sulla. Renewed coalition of Jugurtha and Bocchus. Retirement of Marius on Cirta; battles on the route. Marius approachedby Bocchus; Sulla and Manlius sent to interview Bocchus. Envoys fromBocchus reach Sulla in the Roman winter-camp (B. C. 105). Armistice madewith Bocchus; he is then granted conditional terms of alliance by theRoman senate. The mission of Sulla to Bocchus. The advocates of Numidiaand Rome at the Mauretanian court. Sulla urges Bocchus to surrenderJugurtha. Betrayal of the Numidian king; conclusion of the war;settlement of Numidia. Fate of Jugurtha. Triumph of Marius. Lessons ofthe Numidian War. Growing rivalry between Marius and Sulla. Internalpolitics of Rome; reaction in favour of the nobility; election ofSerranus and Caepio (B. C. 107). The judiciary law of Caepio (B. C. 106). The measure supported by Crassus. Reaction against the proposal; victoryof the Equites; renewed coalition against the senate due to the conductof the campaign in the North. The consular elections for the year 105B. C. Effect of the defeat at Arausio (6th Oct. 105 B. C. ). Election ofMarius to a second consulship. MAPS The Wäd Mellag and the surrounding territory. Numidia and the Roman Province of Africa. Titles of modern works referred to in the notes. _Does the Eagle know what is in the pit? Or wilt thou go ask the Mole? Can Wisdom be put in a silver rod? Or Love in a golden bowl?_ BLAKE A HISTORY OF ROME CHAPTER I The period of Roman history on which we now enter is, like so many thathad preceded it, a period of revolt, directly aimed against the existingconditions of society and, through the means taken to satisfy the freshwants and to alleviate the suddenly realised, if not suddenly created, miseries of the time, indirectly affecting the structure of the bodypolitic. The difference between the social movement of the present andthat of the past may be justly described as one of degree, in so far asthere was not a single element of discontent visible in the revolutioncommencing with the Gracchi and ending with Caesar that had not beenpresent in the earlier epochs of social and political agitation. Theburden of military service, the curse of debt, the poverty of anagrarian proletariate, the hunger for land, the striving of the artisanand the merchant after better conditions of labour and of trade--theseparate cries of discontent that find their unison in a protest againstthe monopoly of office and the narrow or selfish rule of a dominantclass, and thus gain a significance as much political as social--allthese plaints had filled the air at the time when Caius Licinius nearthe middle of the fourth century, and Appius Claudius at its close, evolved their projects of reform. The cycle of a nation's history canindeed never be broken as long as the character of the nation remainsthe same. And the average Roman of the middle of the second centurybefore our era[1] was in all essential particulars the Roman of thetimes of Appius and of Licinius, or even of the epoch when the tencommissioners had published the Tables which were to stamp its perpetualcharacter on Roman law. He was in his business relations eitheroppressor or oppressed, either hammer or anvil. In his private life hewas an individualist whose sympathies were limited to the narrow circleof his dependants; he was a trader and a financier whose humanitarianinstincts were subordinated to a code of purely commercial morality, andwho valued equity chiefly because it presented the line of leastresistance and facilitated the conduct of his industrial operations. Like all individualists, he was something of an anarchist, filled withthe idea, which appeared on every page of the record of his ancestorsand the history of his State, that self-help was the divinely givenmeans of securing right, that true social order was the issue ofconflicting claims pushed to their breaking point until a temporarycompromise was agreed on by the weary combatants; but he was hampered inhis democratic leanings by the knowledge that democracy is the fruit ofindividual self-restraint and subordination to the commonwill--qualities of which he could not boast and symbols of a prize whichhe would not have cared to attain at the expense of his peculiar ideasof personal freedom--and he was forced, in consequence of thisabnegation, to submit to an executive government as strong, one mightalmost say as tyrannous, as any which a Republic has ever displayed--agovernment which was a product of the restless spirit of self-assertionand self-aggrandisement which the Roman felt in himself, and thereforehad sufficient reason to suspect in others. The Roman was the same; but his environment had changed more startlinglyduring the last fifty or sixty years than in all the centuries that hadpreceded them in the history of the Republic. The conquest of Italy had, it Is true, given to his city much that was new and fruitful in thedomains of religion, of art, of commerce and of law. Bat theseaccretions merely entailed the fuller realisation of a tendency whichhad been marked from the earliest stage of Republican history--thetendency to fit isolated elements in the marvellous discoveries made bythe heaven-gifted race of the Greeks into a framework that wasthoroughly national and Roman. Ideas had been borrowed, and these ideascertainly resulted in increased efficiency and therefore in increasedwealth. But the gross material of Hellenism, whether as realised inintellectual ideas or (the prize that appealed more immediately to thepractical Roman with his concrete mind) in tangible things, had not beenseized as a whole as the reward of victory: and no great attempt hadbeen made in former ages to assimilate the one or to enjoy the other. The nature of the material rewards which had been secured by the epochsof Italian conquest had indeed made such assimilation or enjoymentimpossible. They would have been practicable only in a state whichpossessed a fairly complete urban life; and the effect of the wars whichRome waged with her neighbours in the peninsula had been to make thelife of the average citizen more purely agricultural than it had been inthe early Republic, perhaps even in the epoch of the Kings. The courseof a nation's political, social and intellectual history is determinedvery largely by the methods which it adopts for its own expansion at theinevitable moment when its original limits are found to be too narrow tosatisfy even the most modest needs of a growing population. The methodchosen will depend chiefly on geographical circumstances and on themilitary characteristics of the people which are indissolubly connectedwith these. When the city of Old Greece began to feel the strength ofits growing manhood, and the developing hunger which was both the signand the source of that strength, it looked askance at the mountain linewhich cut it off from the inland regions, it turned hopeful eyes on thesea that sparkled along its coasts; it manned its ships and sent itsrestless youth to a new and distant home which was but a replica of theold. The results of this maritime adventure were the glories of urbanlife and the all-embracing sweep of Hellenism. The progress of Romanenterprise had been very different. Following the example of allconquering Italian peoples, [2] and especially of the Sabellian invaderswhose movements immediately preceded their own, the Romans adopted thecourse of inland expansion, and such urban unity as they had possessedwas dissipated over the vast tract of territory on which the legionswere settled, or to which the noble sent his armed retainers, nominallyto keep the land as the public domain of Rome, in reality to hold it forhimself and his descendants. At a given moment (which is as clearlymarked in Roman as in Hellenic history) the possibility of suchexpansion ceased, and the necessity for its cessation was as fullyexhibited in the policy of the government as in the tastes of thepeople. No Latin colony had been planted later than the year 181, noRoman colony later than 157, [3] and the senate showed no inclination torenew schemes for the further assignment of territory amongst thepeople. There were many reasons for this indifference to colonialenterprise. In the first place, although colonisation had always been arelief to the proletariate and one of the means regularly adopted bythose in power for assuaging its dangerous discontent, yet thegovernment had always regarded the social aspect of this method ofexpansion as subservient to the strategic. [4] This strategic motive nolonger existed, and a short-sighted policy, which looked to the present, not to the future, to men of the existing generation and not to theirsons, may easily have held that a colony, which was not needed for theprotection of the district in which it was settled, injuriously affectedthe fighting-strength of Rome. The maritime colonies which had beenestablished from the end of the great Latin war down to the close of thesecond struggle with Carthage claimed, at least in many cases, exemptionfrom military service, [5] and a tradition of this kind tends to lingerwhen its justification is a thing of the past. But, even if such a viewcould be repudiated by the government, it was certain that the levybecame a more serious business the greater the number of communities onwhich the recruiting commander had to call, and it was equally manifestthat the veteran who had just been given an allotment on which toestablish his household gods might be inclined to give a tardy responseto the call to arms. The Latin colony seemed a still greater anachronismthan the military colony of citizens. The member of such a community, although the state which he entered enjoyed large privileges ofautonomy, ceased to be a Roman citizen in respect to political rights, and even at a time when self-government had been valued almost more thancitizenship, the government had only been able to carry out its projectof pushing these half-independent settlements into the heart of Italy bythreatening with a pecuniary penalty the soldier who preferred hisrights as a citizen to the benefits which he might receive as anemigrant. [6] Now that the great wars had brought their dubious but atleast potential profits to every member of the Roman community, and thegulf between the full citizens and the members of the allied communitieswas ever widening, it was more than doubtful whether a member of theformer class, however desperate his plight, would readily condescend toenroll himself amongst the latter. But, even apart from theseconsiderations, it must have seemed very questionable to any one, whoheld the traditional view that colonisation should subserve the purposesof the State, whether the landless citizen of the time could be trustedto fulfil his duties as an emigrant. As early as the year 186 the consulSpurius Postumius, while making a judicial tour in Italy, had found tohis surprise that colonies on both the Italian coasts, Sipontum on theUpper, and Buxentum on the Lower Sea, had been abandoned by theirinhabitants: and a new levy had to be set on foot to replace thefaithless emigrants who had vanished into space. [7] As time went on therisk of such desertion became greater, partly from the growingdifficulty of maintaining an adequate living on the land, partly fromthe fact that the more energetic spirits, on whom alone the hopes ofpermanent settlement could depend, found a readier avenue to wealth anda more tempting sphere for the exercise of manly qualities in theattractions of a campaign that seemed to promise plunder and glory, especially when these prizes were accompanied by no exorbitant amount ofsuffering or toil. Thus when it had become known that Scipio Africanuswould accompany his brother in the expedition against Antiochus, fivethousand veterans, both citizens and allies, who had served their fulltime under the command of the former, offered their voluntary servicesto the departing consul, [8] and nineteen' years later the experiencewhich had been gained of the wealth that might be reaped from a campaignin Macedonia and Asia drew many willing recruits to the legions whichwere to be engaged in the struggle with Perseus. [9] Thesemi-professional soldier was in fact springing up, the man of a spiritadventurous and restless such as did not promise contentment with thesmall interests and small rewards of life in an Italian outpost. But, ifthe days of formal colonisation were over, why might not the concurrentsystem be adopted of dividing conquered lands amongst poorer citizenswithout the establishment of a new political settlement or any strictlimitation of the number of the recipients? This 'viritane' assignationhad always run parallel to that which assumed the form of colonisation;it merely required the existence of land capable of distribution, andthe allotments granted might be considered merely a means of affordingrelief to the poorer members of existing municipalities. The system wassupposed to have existed from the times of the Kings; it was believed tohave formed the basis of the first agrarian law, that of Spurius Cassiusin 486;[10] it had been employed after the conquest of the Volscians inthe fourth century and that of the Sabines in the third;[11] it hadanimated the agrarian legislation of Flaminius when in 232 he romanisedthe _ager Gallicus_ south of Ariminum without planting a single colonyin this region;[12] and a date preceding the Gracchan legislation byonly forty years had seen the resumption of the method, when some Gallicand Ligurian land, held to be the spoil of war and declared to beunoccupied, had been parcelled out into allotments, of ten _jugera_ toRoman citizens and of three to members of the Latin name. [13] But to thegovernment of the period with which we are concerned the continuedpursuance of such a course, if it suggested itself at all, appealed inthe light of a policy that was unfamiliar, difficult and objectionable. It is probable that this method of assignment, even in its later phases, had been tinctured with the belief that, like the colony, it secured asystem of military control over the occupied district: and that thepurely social object of land-distribution, if it had been advanced atall, was considered to be characteristic rather of the demagogue thanthe statesman. From a strategic point of view such a measure wasunnecessary; from an economic, it assumed, not only a craving forallotments amongst the poorer class, of which there was perhaps littleevidence, but a belief, which must have been held to be sanguine in theextreme, that these paupers, when provided for, would prove to beefficient farmers capable of maintaining a position which many of themhad already lost. Again, if such an assignment was to be made, it shouldbe made on land immediately after it had passed from the possession ofthe enemy to that of Rome; if time had elapsed since the date ofannexation, it was almost certain that claims of some kind had beenasserted over the territory, and shadowy as these claims might be, theRoman law had, in the interest of the State itself, always tended torecognise a _de facto_ as a _de jure_ right. The claims of the alliesand the municipalities had also to be considered; for assignments toRoman citizens on an extensive scale would inevitably lead to difficultquestions about the rights which many of these townships actuallypossessed to much of the territory whose revenue they enjoyed. If theallies and the municipal towns did not suffer, the loss must fall on theRoman State itself, which derived one of its chief sources of stable andpermanent revenue--the source which was supposed to meet the claims forItalian administration[14]--from its domains in Italy, on thecontractors who collected this revenue, and on the Enterprisingcapitalists who had put their wealth and energy into the waste places towhich they had been invited by the government, and who had given thesedevastated territories much of the value which they now possessed. Lastly, these enterprising possessors were strongly represented in thesenate; the leading members of the nobility had embarked on a new systemof agriculture, the results of which were inimical to the interest ofthe small farmer, and the conditions of which would be undermined by avast system of distribution such as could alone suffice to satisfy thepauper proletariate. The feeling that a future agrarian law was uselessfrom an economic and dangerous from a political point of view, wasstrengthened by the conviction that its proposal would initiate a waramongst classes, that its failure would exasperate the commons and thatits success would inflict heavy pecuniary damage on the guardians ofthe State. Thus the simple system of territorial expansion, which had continued inan uninterrupted course from the earliest days of conquest, might be nowheld to be closed for ever. From the point of view of the Italianneighbours of Rome it was indeed ample time that such a closing periodshould be reached. If we possessed a map of Italy which showed therelative proportions of land in Italy and Cisalpine Gaul which had beenseized by Rome or left to the native cities or tribes, we shouldprobably find that the possessions of the conquering State, whetheroccupied by colonies, absorbed by the gift of citizenship, or held aspublic domain, amounted to nearly one half of the territory of the wholepeninsula. [15] The extension of such progress was clearly impossibleunless war were to be provoked with the Confederacy which furnished solarge a proportion of the fighting strength of Rome; but, if it wasconfessed that extension on the old lines was now beyond reach ofattainment and yet it was agreed that the existing resources of Italydid not furnish an adequate livelihood to the majority of the citizensof Rome, but two methods of expansion could be thought of as practicablein the future. One was agrarian assignation at the expense either of theState or of the richer classes or of both; the other was enterprisebeyond the sea. But neither of these seemed to deserve governmentintervention, or regulation by a scheme which would satisfy eitherimmediate or future wants. The one was repudiated, as we have alreadyshown, on account of its novelty, its danger and its inconvenience; theother seemed emphatically a matter for private enterprise and above allfor private capital. It could never be available for the very poorunless it assumed the form of colonisation, and the senate looked ontransmarine colonisation with the eye of prejudice. [16] It took adifferent view of the enterprise of the foreign speculator and merchant;this it regarded with an air of easy indifference. Their wealth was apillar on which the State might lean in times of emergency, but, untilthe disastrous effects of commercial enterprise on foreign policy weremore clearly seen, it was considered to be no business of the governmenteither to help or to hinder the wealthy and enterprising Roman in hisdealings with the peoples of the subject or protected lands. Rome, if by this name we mean the great majority of Roman citizens, wasfor the first time for centuries in a situation in which all movementand all progress seemed to be denied. The force of the community seemedto have spent itself for the time; as a force proceeding from the wholecommunity it had perhaps spent itself for ever. A section of thenominally sovereign people might yet be welded into a mighty instrumentthat would carry victory to the ends of the earth, and open new channelsof enterprise both for the men who guided their movements and forthemselves. But for the moment the State was thrown back upon itself; itheld that an end had been attained, and the attainment naturallysuggested a pause, a long survey of the results which had been reachedby these long years of struggle with the hydra-headed enemy abroad. Theclose of the third Macedonian war is said by a contemporary to havebrought with it a restful sense of security such as Rome could not havefelt for centuries. [17] Such a security gave scope to the rich to enjoythe material advantages which their power had acquired; but it also gavescope to the poor to reflect on the strange harvest which the conquestof the great powers of the world had brought to the men whose stubbornpatience had secured the peace which they were given neither the meansnor the leisure to enjoy. The men who evaded or had completed theirservice in the legions lacked the means, although they had the leisure;the men who still obeyed the summons to arms lacked both, unless therespite between prolonged campaigns could be called leisure, or thebooty, hardly won and quickly squandered, could be described as means. Even after Carthage had been destroyed Rome, though doubly safe, wasstill busy enough with her legions; the government of Spain was oneprotracted war, and proconsuls were still striving to win triumphs forthemselves by improving on their predecessors' work. [18] But such warcould not absorb the energy or stimulate the interest of the people as awhole. The reaction which had so often followed a successful campaign, when the discipline of the camp had been shaken off and the duties ofthe soldier were replaced by the wants of the citizen, was renewed on ascale infinitely larger than before--a scale proportioned to themagnitude of the strain which had been removed and the greatness of thewants which had been revived. The cries for reform may have been of theold familiar type but their increased intensity and variety may almostbe held to have given them a difference of quality. There is a stage atwhich a difference of degree seems to amount to one of kind: and thisstage seems certainly to have been reached in the social problemspresented by the times. In the old days of the struggle between theorders the question of privilege had sometimes overshadowed the purelyeconomic issue, and although a close scrutiny of those days of turmoilshows that the dominant note in the conflict was often a mere pretextmeant to serve the personal ambition of the champions of the Plebs, yetthe appearance rather than the reality of an issue imposes on theimagination of the mob, and political emancipation had been thought aboon even when hard facts had shown that its greater prizes had fallento a small and selfish minority. Now, however, there could be noillusion. There was nothing but material wants on one side, there wasnothing but material power on the other. The intellectual claims whichmight be advanced to justify a monopoly of office and of wealth, couldbe met by an intellectual superiority on the part of a demagogueclamouring for confiscation. The ultimate basis of the life of the Statewas for the first time to be laid bare and subjected to a mercilessscrutiny; it remained to be seen which of the two great forces ofsociety would prevail; the force of habit which had so often blinded theRoman to his real needs; or the force of want which, because it soseldom won a victory over his innate conservatism, was wont, when thatvictory had been won, to sweep him farther on the path of reckless andinconsistent reform than it would have carried a race better endowedwith the gift of testing at every stage of progress the ends and needsof the social organism considered as a whole. An analysis of social discontent at any period of history must take theform of an examination of the wants engendered by the age, and of theadequacy or inadequacy of their means of satisfaction. If we turn ourattention first to the forces of society which were in possession of thefortress and were to be the object of attack, we shall find that theruling desires which animated these men of wealth and influence werechiefly the product of the new cosmopolitan culture which the victoriouscity had begun to absorb in the days when conquest and diplomacy hadfirst been carried across the seas. To this she fell a willing victimwhen the conquered peoples, bending before the rude force which had butsubstituted a new suzerainty for an old and had scarcely touched theirinner life, began to display before the eyes of their astonishedconquerors the material comfort and the spiritual charm which, in thecase of the contact of a potent but narrow civilisation with one that issuperbly elastic and strong in the very elegance of its physicaldebility, can always turn defeat into victory. But the student whobegins his investigation of the new Roman life with the study of Romansociety as it existed in the latter half of the second century beforeour era, cannot venture to gather up the threads of the purelyintellectual and moral influences which were created by the newHellenistic civilisation. He feels that he is only at the beginning of aprocess, that he lacks material for his picture, that the illustrativematter which he might employ is to be found mainly in the literaryrecords of a later age, and that his use of this matter would butinvolve him in the historical sins of anticipation and anachronism. Ofsome phases of the war between the old spirit and the new we shall findoccasion to speak; but the culminating point attained by the blend ofGreek with Roman elements is the only one which is clearly visible tomodern eyes. This point, however, was reached at the earliest only inthe second half of the next century. It was only then that the fusion ofthe seemingly discordant elements gave birth to the new "Romanism, "which was to be the ruling civilisation of Italy and the Westernprovinces and, in virtue of the completeness of the amalgamation and thenovelty of the product, was itself to be contrasted and to live forcenturies in friendly rivalry with the more uncompromising Hellenism ofEastern lands. But some of the economic effects of the new influencesclaim our immediate attention, for we are engaged in the study of thebeginnings of an economic revolution, and an analysis must therefore beattempted of some of the most pressing needs and some of the keenestdesires which were awakened by Hellenism, either in the purer dresswhich old Greece had given it or in the more gorgeous raiment which ithad assumed during its sojourn in the East. A tendency to treat the city as the home, the country only as a means ofrefreshment and a sphere of elegant retirement during that portion ofthe year when the excitement of the urban season, its business and itspleasure, were suspended, began to be a marked feature of the life ofthe upper classes. The man of affairs and the man of high finance wereboth compelled to have their domicile in the town, and, if agriculturewas still the staple or the supplement of their wealth, the needs of theestate had to be left to the supervision of the resident bailiff. [19]This concentration of the upper classes in the city necessarily entaileda great advance in the price and rental of house property within thewalls. It is true that the reckless prices paid for houses, especiallyfor country villas, by the grandees and millionaires of the nextgeneration, [20] had not yet been reached; but the indications with whichwe are furnished of the general rise of prices for everything in Romethat could be deemed desirable by a cultivated taste, [21] show that thebetter class of house property must already have yielded large returns, whether it were sold or let, and we know that poor scions of thenobility, if business or pleasure induced them to spend a portion of theyear in Rome, had soon to climb the stairs of flats or lodgings. [22] Thepressure for room led to the piling of storey on storey. On The roof ofold houses new chambers were raised, which could be reached by anoutside stair, and either served to accommodate the increased retinue ofthe town establishment or were let to strangers who possessed nodwelling of their own;[23] the still larger lodging-houses or "islands, "which derived their name from their lofty isolation from neighbouringbuildings, [24] continued to spring up, and even private houses soon cameto attain a height which had to be restrained by the intervention of thelaw. An ex-consul and augur was called on by the censors of 125 toexplain the magnitude of a villa which he had raised, and the altitudeof the structure exposed him not only to the strictures of the guardiansof morals but to a fine imposed by a public court. [25] Great changeswere effected in the interior structure of the houses of thewealthy--changes excused by a pardonable desire for greater comfort andrendered necessary both by the growing formality of life and the largeincrease in the numbers of the resident household, but tending, whenonce adopted, to draw the father of the family into that most uselesstype of extravagance which takes the form of a craze for building. TheHall or Atrium had once been practically the house. It opened on thestreet. It contained the family bed and the kitchen fire. The smokepassed through a hole in the roof and begrimed the family portraits thatlooked down on the members of the household gathered round the hearthfor their common meal. The Hall was the chief bedroom, the kitchen, thedining-room and the reception room, and it was also the only avenue fromthe street to the small courtyard at the back. The houses of the greathad hitherto differed from those of the poor chiefly in dimensions andbut very slightly in structure. The home of the wealthy patrician hadsimply been on a larger scale of primitive discomfort; and if his largeparlour built of timber could accommodate a vast host of clients, thebed and the cooking pots were still visible to every visitor. The chiefof the early innovations had been merely a low portico, borrowed fromthe Greeks by the Etruscans and transmitted by them to Rome, which ranround the courtyard, was divided into little cells and chambers, andserved to accommodate the servants of the house. [26] But now fashiondictated that the doorway should not front the street but should beparted from it by a vestibule, in which the early callers gatheredbefore they were admitted to the hall of audience. The floor of theAtrium was no longer the common passage to the regions at the back, buta special corridor lying either on one or on both sides of the Hall[27]led past the Study or Tablinum, immediately behind it, to the innercourt beyond. Even the sanctity of the nuptial couch could not continueto give it the publicity which was irksome to the taste of an age whichhad acquired notions of the dignity of seclusion, of the comfort thatwas to be found in retirement, and of the convenience of separating thechambers that were used for public from those which were employed formerely private purposes. The chief bedrooms were shifted to the back, and the sides of the courtyard were no longer the exclusive abode of thedependants of the household. The common hearth could no longer serve asthe sphere of the culinary operations of an expensive cook with hisretinue of menials; the cooking fire was removed to one of the roomsnear the back-gate of the house, which finally became an ample kitchenreplete with all the imported means of satisfying the growing luxury ofthe table; and the member of the family loitering in the hall, or thevisitor admitted through its portals, was spared the annoyances ofstrong smells and pungent smoke. The Roman family also discovered thediscomfort of dining in a large and scantily furnished room, not toowell lit and accessible to the intrusions of the chance domestic and thecaller. It was deemed preferable to take the common meal in a light andairy upper chamber, and the new type of Coenaculum satisfied at once thedesire for personal comfort and for that specialisation in the use ofapartments which is one of the chief signs of an advancing materialcivilisation. The great hall had become the show-room of the house, buteven for this purpose its dimensions proved too small. Such was thequantity of curios and works of art collected by the conquering ortravelled Roman that greater space was needed for the exhibition oftheir rarity or splendour. This space was gained by the removal from theAtrium of all the domestic obstacles with which it had once beencumbered. It might now be made slightly smaller in its proportion to therest of the house and yet appear far more ample than before. The spaceby which its sides were diminished could now be utilised for thebuilding of two wings or Alae, which served the threefold purpose oflighting the hall from the sides, of displaying to better advantage, asan oblong chamber always does, the works of art which the lord of themansion or his butler[28] displayed to visitor or client, and lastly ofserving as a gallery for the family portraits, which were finallyremoved from the Atrium, to be seen to greater advantage and in a betterlight on the walls of the wings. These now displayed the family treethrough painted lines which connected the little shrines holding theinscribed _imagines_ of the great ancestors of the house. [29] It is alsopossible that the Alae served as rooms for more private audiences thanwere possible in the Atrium. [30] From the early morning crowd whichthronged the hall individuals or groups might have been detached by thebutler, and led to the presence of the great statesman or pleader whopaced the floor in the retirement of one of these long side-galleries. [31] Business of a yet more private kind was transacted in the stillgreater security of the Tablinum, the archive room and study of thehouse. Here were kept, not only the family records and the familyaccounts, but such of the official registers and papers as a magistrateneeded to have at hand during his year of office. [32] The domestictransaction of official business was very large at Rome, for the Statehad given its administrators not even the skeleton of a civil service, and it was in this room that the consul locked himself up with hisquaestor and his scribes, as it was here that, as a good head of thefamily and a careful business man, he carefully perused the record ofincome and expenditure, of gains and losses, with his skilled Greekaccountant. The whole tendency of the reforms in domestic architecture was todifferentiate between the public and private life of the man of businessor affairs. His public activity was confined to the forepart of thehouse; his repose, his domestic joys, and his private pleasures wereindulged in the buildings which lay behind the Atrium and its wings. Aseach of the departments of life became more ambitious, the sphere forthe exercise of the one became more magnificent, and that which fosteredthe other the scene of a more perfect, because more quiet, luxury. TheAtrium was soon to become a palatial hall adorned with marblecolonnades;[33] the small yard with its humble portico at the back wasto be transformed into the Greek Peristyle, a court open to the sky andsurrounded by columns, which enclosed a greenery of shrubs and trees andan atmosphere cooled and freshened by the constant play of fountains. The final form of the Roman house was an admirable type of the newcivilisation. It was Roman and yet Greek[34]--Roman in the grand frontthat it, presented to the world, Greek in the quiet background ofthought and sentiment. The growing splendour of the house demanded a number and variety in itshuman servitors that had not been dreamed of in a simpler age. The slaveof the farm, with his hard hands and weather-beaten visage, could nolonger be brought by his elegant master to the town and exhibited to afastidious society as the type of servant that ministered to his dailyneeds. The urban and rustic family were now kept wholly distinct; it wasonly when some child of marked grace and beauty was born on the farm, that it was transferred to the mansion as containing a promise thatwould be wasted on rustic toil. [35] In every part of the establishmentthe taste and wealth of the owner might be tested by the courtliness andbeauty of its living instruments. The chained dog at the gate had beenreplaced by a human janitor, often himself in chains. [36] The visitor, when he had passed the porter, was received by the butler in the hall, and admitted to the master's presence by a series of footmen and ushers, the show servants of the fore-part of the house, men of the impassivedignity and obsequious repose that servitude but strengthens in theOriental mind. [37] In the penetralia of the household each need createdby the growing ideal of comfort and refinement required its separateband of ministers. The body of the bather was rubbed and perfumed byexperts in the art; the service of the table was in the hands of men whohad made catering and the preparation of delicate viands the solebusiness of their lives. The possession of a cook, who could answer tothe highest expectations of the age, was a prize beyond the reach of allbut the most wealthy; for such an expert the sum of four talents had tobe paid;[38] he was the prize of the millionaire, and families of moremoderate means, if they wished a banquet to be elegantly served, wereforced to hire the temporary services of an accomplished artist. [39] Thehousekeeper, [40] who supervised the resources of the pantry, guided thedestinies of the dinner in concert with the _chef_; and each had underhim a crowd of assistants of varied names and carefully differentiatedfunctions. [41] The business of the outer world demanded another class ofservitors. There were special valets charged with the functions oftaking notes and invitations to their masters' friends; there was thevalued attendant of quick eye and ready memory, an incredibly richstore-house of names and gossip, an impartial observer of the ways andweaknesses of every class, who could inform his master of the name andattributes of the approaching stranger. There were the lackeys whoformed the nucleus of the attendant retinue of clients for the man whenhe walked abroad, the boys of exquisite form with slender limbs andinnocent faces, who were the attendant spirits of the lady as she passedin her litter down the street. The muscles of the stouter slaves nowoffered facilities for easy journeying that had been before unknown. TheRoman official need not sit his horse during the hot hours of the day ashe passed through the hamlets of Italy, and the grinning rustic couldask, as he watched the solemn and noiseless transit of the bearers, whether the carefully drawn curtains did not conceal a corpse. [42] The internal luxury of the household was as fully exhibited in lifelessobjects as in living things. Rooms were scented with fragrant perfumesand hung with tapestries of great price and varied bloom. Tables wereset with works of silver, ivory and other precious material, wroughtwith the most delicate skill. Wine of moderate flavour was despised;Falernian and Chian were the only brands that the true connoisseur woulddeem worthy of his taste. A nice discrimination was made in thequalities of the rarer kinds of fish, and other delicacies of the tablewere sought in proportion to the difficulty of their attainment. Thefashions of dress followed the tendency of the age; the rarity of thematerial, its fineness of texture, the ease which it gave to the body, were the objects chiefly sought. Young men were seen in the Forum inrobes of a material as soft as that worn by women and almost transparentin its thinness. Since all these instruments of pleasure, and the luxurythat appealed to ambition even more keenly than to taste, were pursuedwith a ruinous competition, prices were forced up to an incredibledegree. An amphora of Falernian wine cost one hundred denarii, a jar ofPontic salt-fish four hundred; a young Roman would often give a talentfor a favourite, and boys who ranked in the highest class for beauty offace and elegance of form fetched even a higher price than this. [43] Fewcould have been inclined to contradict Cato when he said in thesenate-house that Rome was the only city in the world where a jar ofpreserved fish from the Black Sea cost more than a yoke of oxen, and aboy-favourite fetched a higher price than a yeoman's farm. [44] One ofthe great objects of social ambition was to have a heavier service ofsilver-plate than was possessed by any of one's neighbours. In the goodold days, --days not so long past, but severed from the present by a gulfthat circumstances had made deeper than the years--the Roman had had anofficial rather than a personal pride in the silver which he coulddisplay before the respectful eyes of the distinguished foreigner whowas the guest of the State; and the Carthaginian envoys had been struckby the similarity between the silver services which appeared at thetables of their various hosts. The experience led them to a higherestimate of Roman brotherhood than of Roman wealth, and the silver-platethat had done such varied duty was at least responsible for a moraltriumph. [45] Only a few years before the commencement of the first warwith Carthage Rufinus a consular had been expelled from the senate forhaving ten pounds of the wrought metal in his keeping, [46] and ScipioAemilianus, a man of the present age, but an adherent of the olderschool, left but thirty-two pounds' weight to his heir. Less than fortyyears later the younger Livius Drusus was known to be in possession ofplate that weighed ten thousand pounds, [47] and the accretions to theprimitive hoard which must have been made by but two or three members ofthis family may serve as an index of the extent to which this particularform of the passion for display had influenced the minds and practice ofthe better-class Romans of the day. There were other objects, valued for their intrinsic worth as much asfor the distinction conveyed by their possession, which attracted theambition and strained the revenues of the fashionable man. Works of artmust once have been cheap on the Roman market; for, even if we refuse tocredit the story of Mummius' estimate of the prize which fallen Corinthhad delivered into his hands, [48] yet the transhipment of cargoes of thepriceless treasures to Rome is at least an historic fact, and theGracchi must themselves have seen the trains of wagons bearing theirprecious freight along the Via Sacra to the Capitol. The spoils of thegenerous conqueror were lent to adorn the triumphs, the public buildingsand even the private houses, of others; but much that had been yieldedby Corinth had become the property neither of the general nor of theState. Polybius had seen the Roman legionaries playing at draughts onthe Dionysus of Aristeides and many another famous canvas which had beentorn from its place and thrown as a carpet upon the ground;[49] but manya camp follower must have had a better estimate of the material value ofthe paintings of the Hellenic masters, and the cupidity of the Romancollector must often have been satisfied at no great cost to hisresources. The extent to which a returning army could disseminate itsacquired tastes and distribute its captured goods had been shown someforty years before the fall of Corinth when Manlius brought his legionsback from the first exploration of the rich cities of Asia. Things andnames, of which the Roman had never dreamed, soon gratified the eye andstruck the ear with a familiar sound. He learnt to love the bronzecouches meant for the dining hall, the slender side tables with thestrange foreign name, the delicate tissues woven to form the hangings ofthe bed or litter, the notes struck from the psalter and the harp by thefingers of the dancing-women of the East. [50] This was the firstirruption of the efflorescent luxury of Eastern Hellenism; but somefive-and-twenty years before this date Rome had received her firstexperience of the purer taste of the Greek genius in the West. The wholeseries of the acts of artistic vandalism which marked the footsteps ofthe conquering state could be traced back to the measures taken byClaudius Marcellus after the fall of Syracuse. The systematic plunder ofworks of art was for the first time given an official sanction, and thepublic edifices of Rome were by no means the sole beneficiaries of thisnew interpretation of the rights of war. Much of the valuable plunderhad found its way into private houses, [51] to stimulate the enviouscupidity of many a future governor who, cursed with the taste of acollector and unblessed by the opportunity of a war, would make subtleraids on the artistic treasures of his province a secret article of hisadministration. When the ruling classes of a nation have beenfamiliarised for the larger part of a century with the easy acquisitionof the best material treasures of the world, things that have onceseemed luxuries come to fill an easy place in the category of acceptedwants. But the sudden supply has stopped; the market value, whichplunder has destroyed or lessened, has risen to its normal level;another burden has been added to life, there is one further stimulus towealth and, so pressing is the social need, that the means to itssatisfaction are not likely to be too diligently scrutinised before theyare adopted. More pardonable were the tastes that were associated with the morepurely intellectual elements in Hellenic culture--with the influencewhich the Greek rhetor or philosopher exercised in his converse with thestern but receptive minds of Rome, the love of books, the new lessonswhich were to be taught as to the rhythmic flow of language and therhythmic movement of the limbs. The Greek adventurer was one of the moststriking features of the epoch which immediately followed the close ofthe great wars. Later thinkers, generally of the resentfully national, academic and pseudo-historical type, who repudiated the amenities oflife which they continued to enjoy, and cherished the pleasing fictionof the exemplary _mores_ of the ancient times, could see little in himbut a source of unmixed evil;[52] and indeed the Oriental Greek of thecommoner type, let loose upon the society of the poorer quarters, orworming his way into the confidence of some rich but uneducated master, must often have been the vehicle of lessons that would better have beenunlearnt. But Italy also saw the advent of the best professors of theage, golden-mouthed men who spoke in the language of poetry, rhetoricand philosophy, and who turned from the wearisome competition of theirown circles and the barren fields of their former labours to find aflattering attention, a pleasing dignity, and the means of enjoying afull, peaceful and leisured life in the homes of Roman aristocrats, thirsting for knowledge and thirsting still more for the mastery of theunrivalled forms in which their own deeds might be preserved and throughwhich their own political and forensic triumphs might be won. Soon townsof Italy--especially those of the Hellenic South--would be vying witheach other to grant the freedom of their cities and other honours intheir gift to a young emigrant poet who hailed from Antioch, and membersof the noblest houses would be competing for the honour of hisfriendship and for the privilege of receiving him under their roof. [53]The stream of Greek learning was broad and strong;[54] it bore on itsbosom every man and woman who aimed at a reputation for elegance, forwit or for the deadly thrust in verbal fence which played so large apart in the game of politics; every one that refused to float was eitheran outcast from the best society, or was striving to win an eccentricreputation for national obscurantism and its imaginary accompaniment ofhonest rustic strength. Acquaintance with professors and poets led to a knowledge of books; andit was as necessary to store the latter as the former under thefashionable roof. The first private library in Rome was established byAemilius Paulus, when he brought home the books that had belonged to thevanquished Perseus;[55] and it became as much a feature of conquestamongst the highly cultured to bring home a goodly store of literatureas to gather objects of art which might merely please the sensuous tasteand touch only the outer surface of the mind. [56] But it was deemed by no means desirable to limit the influences of thenew culture to the minds of the mature. There was, indeed, a school ofcautious Hellenists that might have preferred this view, and would atany rate have exercised a careful discrimination between those elementsof the Greek training which would strengthen the young mind by giving ita wider range of vision and a new gallery of noble lives and those whichwould lead to mere display, to effeminacy, nay (who could tell?) topositive depravity. But this could not be the point of view of societyas a whole. If the elegant Roman was to be half a Greek, he must learnduring the tender and impressionable age to move his limbs and modulatehis voice in true Hellenic wise. Hence the picture which ScipioAemilianus, sane Hellenist and stout Roman, gazed at with astonishedeyes and described in the vigorous and uncompromising language suited toa former censor. "I was told, " he said, "that free-born boys and girlswent to a dancing school and moved amidst disreputable professors of theart. I could not bring my mind to believe it; but I was taken to such aschool myself, and Good Heavens! What did I see there! More than fiftyboys and girls, one of them, I am ashamed to say, the son of a candidatefor office, a boy wearing the golden boss, a lad not less than twelveyears of age. He was jingling a pair of castanets and dancing a stepwhich an immodest slave could not dance with decency. " [57] Such mighthave been the reflections of a puritan had he entered a moderndancing-academy. We may be permitted to question the immorality of theexhibition thus displayed, but there can be no doubt as to the socialambition which it reveals--an ambition which would be perpetuatedthroughout the whole of the life of the boy with the castanets, whichwould lead him to set a high value on the polish of everything he calledhis own--a polish determined by certain rigid external standards and tobe attained at any hazard, whether by the ruinous concealment of honestpoverty, or the struggle for affluence even by the mostquestionable means. But the burdens on the wealth of the great were by no means limited tothose imposed by merely social canons. Political life at Rome had alwaysbeen expensive in so far as office was unpaid and its tenure impliedleisure and a considerable degree of neglect of his own domesticconcerns in the patriot who was willing to accept it. But the State hadlately taken on itself to increase the financial expenditure which wasdue to the people without professing to meet the bill from the publicfunds. The 'State' at Rome did not mean what it would have meant in sucha context amongst the peoples of the Hellenic world. It did not meanthat the masses were preying on the richer classes, but that the richerclasses were preying on themselves; and this particular form ofvoluntary self-sacrifice amongst the influential families in the senatewas equivalent to the confession that Rome was ceasing to be anAristocracy and becoming an Oligarchy, was voluntarily placing theclaims of wealth on a par with those of birth and merit, or rather wasinsisting that the latter should not be valid unless they wereaccompanied by the former. The chief sign of the confession thatpolitical advancement might be purchased from the people in a legitimateway, was the adoption of a rule, which was established about the time ofthe First Punic War, that the cost of the public games should not bedefrayed exclusively by the treasury. [58] It was seldom that the peoplecould be brought to contribute to the expenses of the exhibitor bysubscriptions collected from amongst themselves;[59] they were therecipients, not the givers of the feast, and the actual donors knew thatthe exhibition was a contest for favour, that reputations were being wonor lost on the merits of the show, and that the successful competitorwas laying up a store-house of gratitude which would materially aid hisascent to the highest prizes in the State. The personal cost, if itcould not be wholly realised on the existing patrimony of themagistrate, must be assisted by gifts from friends, by loans frommoney-lenders at exorbitant rates of interest and, worst but readiest ofall methods, by contributions, nominally voluntary but really enforced, from the Italian allies and the provincials. As early as the year 180the senate had been forced to frame a strong resolution against theextravagance that implied oppression;[60] but the resolution was reallya criticism of the new methods of government; the roots of the evil (theburden on the magistracy, the increase in the number of the regularlyrecurring festivals) they neither cared nor ventured to remove. Theaedileship was the particular magistracy which was saddled with thisexpenditure on account of its traditional connection with the conduct ofthe public games; and although it was neither in its curule nor plebeianform an obligatory step in the scale of the magistracies, yet, as it washeld before the praetorship and the consulship, it was manifest that thebrilliant display given to the people by the occupant of this officemight render fruitless the efforts of a less wealthy competitor who hadshunned its burdens. [61] The games were given jointly by the respectivepairs of colleagues, [62] the _Ludi Romani_ being under the guidance ofthe curule, [63] the _Ludi Plebeii_ under that of the plebeianaediles. [64] Had these remained the only annual shows, the cost to theexhibitor, although great, would have been limited, But other festivals, which had once been occasional, had lately been made permanent. Thegames to Ceres (_Cerialia_), the remote origins of which may have datedback to the time of the monarchy, first appear as fully established inthe year 202;[65] the festival to Flora (_Floralia_) dates from but 238B. C. , [66] but probably did not become annual until 173;[67] while thegames to the Great Mother (_Megalesia_) followed by thirteen years theinvitation and hospitable reception of that Phrygian goddess by theRomans, and became a regular feature in their calendar in 191. [68] Thisincrease in the amenities of the people, every item of which fallswithin a term of fifty years, is a remarkable feature of the age whichfollowed Rome's assumption of imperial power. It proved that the Romanwas willing to bend his austere religion to the purposes ofgratification, when he could afford the luxury, that the enjoyment ofthis luxury was considered a happy means of keeping the people in goodtemper with itself and its rulers, and that the cost of providing it wasconsidered, not merely as compatible with the traditions of the existingregime, but as a means of strengthening those traditions by closing thegates of office to the poor. The types of spectacle, in which the masses took most delight, were alsonew and expensive creations. These types were chiefly furnished by thegladiatorial shows and the hunting of wild beasts. Even the former andearlier amusement had had a history of little more than a hundred years. It was believed to be a relic of that realistic view of the after lifewhich lingered in Italy long after it had passed from the more spiritualcivilisation of the Greeks. The men who put each other to the swordbefore the eyes of the sorrowing crowd were held to be the retinue whichpassed with the dead chieftain beyond the grave, and it was from thesombre rites of the Etruscans that this custom of ceremonial slaying wasbelieved to have been transferred to Rome. The first year of the FirstPunic War witnessed the earliest combat that accompanied a Romanfuneral, [69] and, although secular enjoyment rapidly took the place ofgrim funereal appreciation, and the religious belief that underlay thespectacle may soon have passed away, neither the State nor the relativeswere supposed to have done due honour to the illustrious dead if his owndecease were not followed by the death-struggle of champions from therival gladiatorial schools, and men who aspired to a decent funeral madedue provision for such combats in their wills. The Roman magistratebowed to the prevalent taste, and displays of gladiators became one ofthe most familiar features of the aediles' shows. Military sentiment wasin its favour, for it was believed to harden the nerves of the race thathad sprung from the loins of the god of war, [70] and humane sentimenthas never in any age been shocked at the contemporary barbarities whichit tolerates or enjoys. But a certain element of coarseness in thesport, and perhaps the very fact that it was of native Italian growth, might have given it a short shrift, had the cultured classes reallypossessed the power of regulating the amusements of the public. Leadersof society would have preferred the Greek _Agôn_ with its gracefulwrestling and its contests in the finer arts. But the Roman public wouldnot be hellenised in this particular, and showed their mood when amusical exhibition was attempted at the triumph of Lucius Anicius Gallusin 167. The audience insisted that the performers should drop theirinstruments and box with one another. [71] This, although not the best, was yet a more tolerable type of what a contest of skill should be. Itwas natural, therefore, that the professional fighting man should becomea far more inevitable condition of social and political success than thehunter or the race-horse has ever been with us. Some enterprisingmembers of the nobility soon came to prefer ownership to the hire systemand started schools of their own in which the _lanista_ was merely thetrainer. A stranger element was soon added to the possessions of a Romannoble by the growing craze for the combats of wild beasts. The firstrecorded "hunt" of the kind was that given in 186 by Marcus Fulvius atthe close of the Aetolian war when lions and panthers were exhibited tothe wondering gaze of the people. [72] Seventeen years later two curuleaediles furnished sixty-three African lions and forty bears andelephants for the Circensian games. [73] These menageries eventuallybecame a public danger and the curule aedile (himself one of the chiefoffenders) was forced to frame an edict specifying the compensation fordamage that might be committed by wild beasts in their transit throughItaly or their residence within the towns. [74] The obligation of wealthto supply luxuries for the poor--a splendid feature of ancientcivilisation in which it has ever taken precedence of that of the modernworld--was recognised with the utmost frankness in the Rome of the day;but it was an obligation that had passed the limits at which it could becheerfully performed as the duty of the patriot or the patron; it hadreached a stage when its demoralising effects, both to giver and toreceiver, were patent to every seeing eye, but when criticism of itsvices could be met by the conclusive rejoinder that it was a vitalnecessity of the existing political situation. [75] The review which we have given of the enormous expenditure created bythe social and political appetites of the day leads up to theconsideration of two questions which, though seldom formulated or facedin their naked form, were ever present in the minds of the classes whowere forced to deem themselves either the most responsible authors, orthe most illustrious victims, of the existing standards both of politicsand society. These questions were "Could the exhausting drain bestopped?" and "If it could not, how was it to be supplied?" A city in astate of high fever will always produce the would-be doctor; but thecurious fact about the Rome of this and other days is that the doctorwas so often the patient in another form. Just as in the government ofthe provinces the scandals of individual rule were often met by theseverest legislation proceeding from the very body which had producedthe evil-doers, so when remedies were suggested for the social evils ofthe city, the senate, in spite of its tendency to individualtransgression, generally displayed the possession of a collectiveconscience. The men who formulated the standard of purity andself-restraint might be few in number; but, except they displayed theirritating activity and the uncompromising methods of a Cato, theygenerally secured the support of their peers, and the sterner thecensor, the more gladly was he hailed as an ornament to the order. Thisguardian of morals still issued his edicts against delicacies of thetable, foreign perfumes and expensive houses;[76] as late as the year169 people would hastily put out their lights when it was reported thatTiberius Sempronius Graccus was coming up the street on his return fromsupper, lest they should fall under the suspicion of untimelyrevelry, [77] and the sporadic activity of the censorship will find ampleillustration in the future chapters of our work. Degradation from thevarious orders of the State was still a consequence of itsanimadversions; but a milder, more universal and probably far moreefficacious check on luxury--the system, pursued by Cato, of adopting anexcessive rating for articles of value[78] and thus of shifting theincidence of taxation from the artisan and farmer to the shoulders ofthe richest class[79]--had been taken out of its hands by the completecessation of direct imposts after the Third Macedonian War. [80] Meanwhile sumptuary laws continued to be promulgated from the Rostra andaccepted by the people. All that are known to have been initiated or tohave been considered valid after the close of the great wars have butone object--an attack on the expenses of the table, a form of sensuousenjoyment which, on account of the ease and barbaric abundance withwhich wealth may vaunt itself in this domain, was particularly in vogueamongst the upper classes in Rome. Other forms of extravagance seem forthe time to have been left untouched by legislation, for the Oppian lawwhich had been due to the strain of the Second Punic War had beenrepealed after a fierce struggle in 193, and the Roman ladies might nowadorn themselves with more than half an ounce of gold, wear robes ofdivers colours and ride in their carriages through any street theypleased. [81] The first enactment which attempted to control thewastefulness of the table was an Orchian law of 181, limiting the numberof guests that might be invited to entertainments. Cato was consistentin opposing the passing of the measure and in resisting its repeal. Herecognised a futile law when he saw it, but he did not wish thisfutility to be admitted. [82] Twenty years later[83] a Fannian law grewout of a decree of the senate which had enjoined that the chief men(_principes_) of the State should take an oath before the consuls not toexceed a certain limit of expense in the banquets given at theMegalesian Games. Strengthened with a measure which prescribed moreharassing details than the Orchian law. The new enactment actuallydetermined the value and nature of the eatables whose consumption wasallowed. It permitted one hundred asses to be spent on the days of theRoman Games, the Plebeian Games and the Saturnalia, thirty asses oncertain other festival occasions, and but ten asses (less than twice thedaily pay of a Roman soldier) on every other meal throughout the year;it forbade the serving of any fowl but a single hen, and that notfattened; it enjoined the exclusive consumption of native wine. [84] Thisenactment was strengthened eighteen years later by a Didian law, whichincluded in the threatened penalties not only the giver of the feastwhich violated the prescribed limits, but also the guests who werepresent at such a banquet. It also compelled or induced the Italianallies to accept the provisions of the Fannian law[85]--an unusual stepwhich may show the belief that a luxury similar to that of Rome wasweakening the resources of the confederacy, on whose strength theleading state was so dependent, or which may have been induced by theknowledge that members of the Roman nobility were taking holiday tripsto country towns, to enjoy the delights which were prohibited at homeand to waste their money on Italian caterers. [86] The frequency of such legislation, which we shall find renewed onceagain before the epoch of the reforms of Sulla[87] seems to prove itsineffectiveness, [88] and indeed the standard of comfort which it desiredto enjoin was wholly incompatible with the circumstances of the age. Thedesire to produce uniformity[89] of standard had always been an end ofRoman as of Greek sumptuary regulation, but what type of uniformitycould be looked for in a community where the extremes of wealth andpoverty were beginning to be so strongly marked, where capital wasaccumulating in the hands of the great noble and the great trader andbeing wholly withdrawn from those of the free-born peasant and artisan?The restriction of useless consumption was indeed favourable to the moreproductive employment of capital; but we shall soon see that thisproductive use, which had as its object the deterioration of land bypasturage and the purchase of servile labour, was as detrimental to thefree citizen as the most reckless extravagance could have been. There isno question, however, that both the sumptuary laws and the censorianordinances of the period did attempt to attain an economic as well as asocial end; and, however mistaken their methods may have been, theyshowed some appreciation of the industrial evils of the time. Theprovision of the Fannian law in favour of native wines suggests thedesire to help the small cultivator who had substituted vine-growing forthe cultivation of cereals, and foreshadows the protective legislationof the Ciceronian period. [90] Much of this legislation, too, wasanimated by the "mercantile" theory that a State is impoverished by theexport of the precious metals to foreign lands[91]--a view which foundexpression in a definite enactment of an earlier period which hadforbidden gold or silver to be paid to the Celtic tribes in the north ofItaly in exchange for the wares or slaves which they sold to Romanmerchants. [92] Another series of laws aimed at securing the purity of an electorateexposed to the danger of corruption by the overwhelming influence ofwealth. Laws against bribery, unknown in an earlier period, [93] becomepainfully frequent from the date at which Rome came into contact withthe riches of the East. Six years after the close of the great Asiaticcampaign the people were asked, on the authority of the senate, tosanction more than one act which was directed against the undueinfluence exercised at elections;[94] in 166 fresh scandals called forthe consideration of the Council of State;[95] and the year 159 saw thebirth of another enactment. [96] Yet the capital penalty, which seems tohave been the consequence of the transgression of at least one of theselaws, [97] did not deter candidates from staking their citizenship ontheir success. The still-surviving custom of clientship made the objectof largesses difficult to establish, and the secrecy of the ballot, which had been introduced for elections in 139, made it impossible toprove that the suspicious gift had been effective and thus to constructa convincing case against the donor. The moral control exercised by the magistrate and the sumptuary orcriminal ordinances expressed in acts of Parliament might serve astemporary palliatives to certain pronounced evils of the moment; butthey were powerless to check the extravagance of an expenditure whichwas sanctioned by custom and in some respects actually enforced by law. One of the greatest of the practical needs of the new Roman was toincrease his income in every way that might be deemed legitimate by asociety which, even in its best days, had never been overscrupulous inits exploitation of the poor and had been wont to illustrate thesanctity of contract by visible examples of grinding oppression. Thenature and intensity of the race for wealth differed with the needs ofthe anxious spendthrift; and in respect both to needs and to means ofsatisfaction the upper middle class was in a far more favourableposition than its noble governors. It could spend its unfetteredenergies in the pursuit of the profits which might be derived frompublic contracts, trade, banking and money-lending, while it was notforced to submit to the drain created by the canvass for office and theexorbitant demands made by the electorate on the pecuniary resources ofthe candidate. The brilliancy of the life of the mercantile class, withits careless luxury and easy indifference to expenditure, set a standardfor the nobility which was at once galling and degrading. They wereinduced to apply the measure of wealth even to members of their ownorder, and regarded it as inevitable that any one of their peers, whosepatrimony had dwindled, should fill but a subordinate place both inpolitics and society;[98] while the means which they were sometimesforced to adopt in order to vie with the wealth of the successfulcontractor and promoter were, if hardly less sound from a moral point ofview, at least far more questionable from a purely legal standpoint. A fraction of the present wealth which was in the possession of some ofthe leading families of the nobility may have been purely adventitious, the result of the lucky accident of command and conquest amidst awealthy and pliant people. The spoils of war were, it is true, not forthe general but for the State; yet he exercised great discretionarypower in dealing with the movable objects, which in the case of Hellenicor Asiatic conquest formed one of the richest elements in the prize, andthe average commander is not likely to have displayed the self-restraintand public spirit of the destroyer of Corinth. Public and militaryopinion would permit the victor to retain an ample share of the fruitsof his prowess, and this would be increased by a type of contribution towhich he had a peculiar and unquestioned claim. This consisted in thehonorary offerings made by states, who found themselves at the feet ofthe victor and were eager to attract his pity and to enlist on theirbehalf his influence with the Roman government. Instances of suchofferings are the hundred and fourteen golden crowns which were borne inthe triumph of Titus Quinctius Flamininus, [99] those of two hundred andtwelve pounds' weight shown in the triumph of Manlius, [100] and thegreat golden wreath of one hundred and fifty pounds which had beenpresented by the Ambraciots to Nobilior. [101] But the time had not yetbeen reached when the general on a campaign, or even the governor of adistrict which was merely disturbed by border raids, could calmly demandhard cash as the equivalent of the precious metal wrought into thisuseless form, and when the "coronary gold" was to be one of the regularperquisites of any Roman governor who claimed to have achieved militarysuccess. [102] Nor is it likely that the triumphant general of thisperiod melted down the offerings which he might dedicate in temples orreserve for the gallery of his house, and we must conclude that the fewmembers of the nobility who had conducted the great campaigns were butslightly enriched by the offerings which helpless peoples had laid attheir feet. It would be almost truer to say that the great influx of theprecious metals had increased the difficulties of their position; for, if the gold or silver took the form of artistic work which remained intheir possession, it but exaggerated the ideal to which their standardof life was expected to conform; and if it assumed the shape of theenormous amount of specie which was poured into the coffers of the Stateor distributed amongst the legionaries, its chief effects were theheightening of prices and a showy appearance of a vast increase ofwealth which corresponded to no real increase in production. But, whatever the effects of the metallic prizes of the great campaigns, these prizes could neither have benefited the members of the nobility asa whole nor, in the days of comparative peace which had followed thelong epoch of war with wealthy powers, could they be contemplated as apermanent source of future capital or income. When the representative ofthe official caste looked round for modes of fruitful investment whichmight increase his revenues, his chances at first sight appeared to belimited by legal restrictions which expressed the supposed principles ofhis class. A Clodian law enacted at the beginning of the Second PunicWar had provided that no senator or senator's son should own a ship of aburden greater than three hundred amphorae. The intention of the measurewas to prohibit members of the governing class from taking part inforeign trade, as carriers, as manufacturers, or as participants in thegreat business of the contract for corn which placed provincial grain onthe Roman market; and the ships of small tonnage which they were allowedto retain were intended to furnish them merely with the power oftransporting to a convenient market the produce of their own estates inItaly. [103] The restriction was not imposed in a self-regarding spirit;it was odious to the nobility, and, as it was supported by Flaminius, must have been popular with the masses, who were blind to the fact thatthe restriction of a senator's energies to agriculture would beinfinitely more disastrous to the well-being of the average citizen thanthe expenditure of those energies in trade. The restriction may havereceived the support of the growing merchant class, who were perhapspleased to be rid of the competition of powerful rivals, and itcertainly served, externally at least, to mark the distinction betweenthe man of large industrial enterprises and the man whose official rankwas supported by landed wealth--a distinction which, in the shape of thecontrast drawn between knights and senators, appears at every turn inthe history of the later Republic. But, whatever the immediate motivesfor the passing of the measure, a great and healthy principle lay behindit. It was the principle that considerations of foreign policy shouldnot be directly controlled or hampered by questions of trade, that thepolicy of the State should not become the sport of the selfish vagariesof capital. The spirit thus expressed was directly inimical to theinterests of the merchant, the contractor and the tax-farmer. Howinimical it was could not yet be clearly seen; for the transmarineinterests of Rome had not at the time attained a development whichinvited the mastery of conquered lands by the Roman capitalist. But, whether this Clodian law created or merely formulated the antithesisbetween land and trade, between Italian and provincial profits, it isyet certain that this antithesis was one of the most powerful of theanimating factors of Roman history for the better part of the twocenturies which were to follow the enactment. It produced the conflictbetween a policy of restricted enterprise, pursued for the good of theState and the subject, and a policy of expansion which obeyed theinterests of capital, between a policy of cautious protection and thatmadness of imperialism which is ever associated with barbarism, brigandage or trade. But, if we inquire whether this enactment attained its ostensible objectof completely shutting out senators from the profits of any enterprisethat could properly be described as commercial, we shall find anaffirmative answer to be more than dubious. The law was a dead letterwhen Cicero indicted Verres, [104] but its demise may have been reachedthrough a long and slow process of decline. But, even if the provisionsof the law had been adhered to throughout the period which we areconsidering, the avenue to wealth derived from business intercourse withthe provinces would not necessarily have been closed to the officialclass. We shall soon see that the companies which were formed forundertaking the state-contracts probably permitted shares to be held byindividuals who never appeared in the registered list of partners atall, and we know that to hold a share in a great public concern wasconsidered one of the methods of business which did not subject theparticipant to the taint of a vulgar commercialism. [105] And, if thesenator chose to indulge more directly in the profits of transmarinecommerce, to what extent was he really hindered by the provisions of thelaw? He might not own a ship of burden, but his freedmen might sail toany port on the largest vessels, and who could object if the returnswhich the dependant owed his lord were drawn from the profits ofcommerce? Again there was no prohibition against loans on bottomry, andCato had increased his wealth by becoming through his freedman a memberof a maritime company, each partner in which had but a limited liabilityand the prospect of enormous gains. [106] The example of this energeticmoney-getter also illustrates many ways in which the nobleman ofbusiness tastes could increase his profits without extending hisenterprises far from the capital. It was possible to exploit the growingtaste in country villas, in streams and lakes and natural woods; to buya likely spot for a small price, let it at a good rental, or sell it ata larger price. The ownership of house property within the town, whichgrew eventually into the monopoly of whole blocks and streets by such aman as Crassus, [107] was in every way consistent with the possession ofsenatorial rank. It was even possible to be a slave-dealer without lossof dignity, at least if one transacted the sordid details of thebusiness through a slave. The young and promising boy required but ayear's training in the arts to enable the careful buyer to make a largeprofit by his sale. [108] Yet such methods must have been regarded by thenobility as a whole as merely subsidiary means of increasing theirpatrimony: and, in spite of the fact that Cato took the view thatagriculture should be an amusement rather than a business, [109] therecan be no doubt that the staple of the wealth of the official class wasstill to be found in the acres of Italy. It was not, however, the wealthof the moderate homestead which was to be won from a careful tillage ofthe fields; it was the wealth which, as we shall soon see, wasassociated with the slave-capitalist, the overseer, a foreign method ofcultivation on the model of the grand plantation-systems of the East, and a belief in the superior value of pasturage to tillage which was toturn many a populous and fertile plain into a wilderness of danger anddesolation. But, strive as he would, there was many a nobleman who found that hisexpenditure could not be met by dabbling in trade where others plunged, or by the revenues yielded by the large tracts of Italian soil overwhich he claimed exclusive powers. The playwright of the age has figuredIndigence as the daughter of Luxury;[110] and a still more terriblechild was to be born in the Avarice which sprang from the uselesscravings and fierce competitions of the time. [111] The desire to get andto hold had ever been a Roman vice; but, it had also been the unvaryingassumption of the Roman State, and the conviction of the Romanofficial--a conviction so deeply seated and spontaneous as to form noground for self-congratulation that the lust for acquisition shouldlimit itself to the domain of private right, and never cross the rigidbarrier which divided that domain from the sphere of wealth and powerwhich the city had committed to its servant as a solemn trust. Thebetter sort of overseer was often found in the crabbed man ofbusiness--a Cato, for example--who would never waive a right of his ownand protected those of his dependants with similar tenacity and passion. The honour which prevailed in the commercial code at home was consideredso much a matter of course in all dealings with the foreign world, thatthe State scorned to scrutinise the expenditure of its ministers and wasspared the disgrace of a system of public audit. Even in this age, whichis regarded by the ancient historians as marking the beginning of thedecline in public virtue, Polybius could contrast the attitude ofsuspicion towards the guardians of the State, which was thecharacteristic of the official life of his own unhappy country, with thewell-founded confidence which Rome reposed in the honour of herministers, and could tell the world that "if but a talent of money wereentrusted to a magistrate of a Greek state, ten auditors, as many sealsand twice as many witnesses are required for the security of the bond;yet even so faith is not observed; while the Roman in an official ordiplomatic post, who handles vast sums of money, adheres to his dutythrough the mere moral obligation of the oath which he has sworn"; that"amongst the Romans the corrupt official is as rare a portent as is thefinancier with clean hands amongst other peoples". [112] When the elderAfricanus tore up the account books of his brother--books which recordedthe passage of eighteen thousand talents from an Asiatic king to a Romangeneral and from him to the Roman State[113]--he was imparting a lessonin confidence, which was immediately accepted by the senate and people. And it seems that, so far as the expenditure of public moneys wasconcerned, this confidence continued to be justified. It is true thatCato had furiously impugned the honour of commanders in the matter ofthe distribution of the prizes of war amongst the soldiers and had drawna bitter contrast between private and official thieves. "The former, " hesaid, "pass their lives in thongs and iron fetters, the latter in purpleand gold. " [114] But there were no fixed rules of practice which guidedsuch a distribution, and a commander, otherwise honest, might feel noqualms of conscience in exercising a selective taste on his own behalf. On the other hand, deliberate misappropriation of the public funds seemsto have been seldom suspected or at least seldom made the subject ofjudicial cognisance, and for many years after a standing court wasestablished for the trial of extortion no similar tribunal was thoughtnecessary for the crime of peculation. [115] Apart from the long, tortuous and ineffective trial of the Scipios, [116] no question of thekind is known to have been raised since Manius Acilius Glabrio, theconqueror of Antiochus and the Aetolians, competed for the censorship. Then a story, based on the existence of the indubitable wealth which hewas employing with a lavish hand to win the favour of the people, wasraked up against him by some jealous members of the nobility. It wasprofessed that some money and booty, found in the camp of the king, hadnever been exhibited in the triumph nor deposited in the treasury. Theevidence of legates and military tribunes was invited, and Cato, himselfa competitor for the censorship, was ready to testify that gold andsilver vases, which he had seen in the captured camp, had not beenvisible in the triumphal procession. Glabrio waived his candidature, butthe people were unwilling to convict and the prosecution wasabandoned. [117] Here again we are confronted by the old temptation ofcurio-hunting, which, the nobility deemed indecent in so "new" a man asGlabrio; the evidence of Cato--the only testimony which proveddangerous--did not establish the charge that money due to the State hadbeen intercepted by a Roman consul. But the regard for the property of the State was unfortunately notextended to the property of its clients. Even before the provinces hadyielded a prey rendered easy by distance and irresponsibility, Italiancities had been forced to complain of the violence and rapacity of Romancommanders quartered in their neighbourhood, [118] and the passivesilence with which the Praenestines bore the immoderate requisitions ofa consul, was a fatal guarantee of impunity which threatened to alterfor ever the relations of these free allies to the protectingpower. [119] But provincial commands offered greater temptations and afar more favourable field for capricious tyranny; for here the exactionsof the governor were neither repudiated by an oath of office nor atfirst even forbidden by the sanctions of a law. Requisitions could bemade to meet the needs of the moment, and these needs were naturallyinterpreted to suit the cravings and the tastes of the governor of themoment. [120] Cato not only cut down the expenses that had beenarbitrarily imposed on the unhappy natives of Sardinia, [121] but seemsto have been the author of a definite law which fixed a limit to suchrequisitions in the future. [122] But it was easier to frame an ordinancethan to guarantee its observation, and, at a time when the surroundingworld was seething with war, the regulations made for a peacefulprovince could not touch the actions of a victorious commander who wasfollowing up the results of conquest. Complaints began to pour in onevery hand--from the Ambraciots of Greece, the Cenomani of Gaul[123]--and the senate did its best, either by its own cognisance or by thecreation of a commission of investigation, to meet the claims of thedependent peoples. A kind of rude justice was the result, but it wasmuch too rude to meet an evil which was soon seen to be developing intoa trade of systematic oppression. A novel step was taken when in 171delegates from the two Spains appeared in the Curia to complain of theavarice and insolence of their Roman governors. A praetor wascommissioned to choose from the senatorial order five of such judges aswere wont to be selected for the settlement of international disputes(_recuperatores_), to sit in judgment on each of the indictedgovernors, [124] and the germ of a regular court for what had now becomea regular offence was thus developed. The further and more shamefulconfession, that the court should be permanent and interpret a definitestatute, was soon made, and the Calpurnian law of 149[125]was the firstof that long series of enactments for extortion which mark the futilityof corrective measures in the face of a weak system of legal, and astill weaker system of moral, control. Trials for extortion soon becamethe plaything of politics, the favourite arena for the exercise of theenergies of a young and rising politician, the favourite weapon withwhich old family feuds might be at once revenged and perpetuated. Theywere soon destined to gain a still greater significance as furnishingthe criteria of the methods of administration which the State wasexpected to employ, as determining the respective rights of theadministrator and the capitalist to guide the destinies of theinhabitants of a dependent district. Their manifold politicalsignificance destroys our confidence in their judgments, and we canseldom tell whether the acquittal or the condemnation which these courtspronounced was justified on the evidence adduced. But there can be noquestion of the evil that lay behind this legislative and judicialactivity. The motive which led men to assume administrative posts abroadwas in many cases thoroughly selfish and mean, --the desire to acquirewealth as rapidly as was consistent with keeping on the safe side of anot very exacting law. No motive of this kind can ever be universal in apolitical society, and in Rome we cannot even pronounce it to begeneral. Power and distinction attracted the Roman as much as wealth, and some governors were saved from temptation by the colossal fortuneswhich they already possessed. But how early it had begun to operate inthe minds of many is shown by the eagerness which, as we shall see, wassoon to be displayed by rival consuls for the conduct of a war thatmight give the victor a prolonged control over the rich cities which hadbelonged to the kingdom of Pergamon, if it is not proved by the strangeunwillingness which magistrates had long before exhibited to assume somecommands which had been entrusted to their charge. [126] A suspicion of another type of abuse of power, more degrading though notnecessarily more harmful than the plunder of subjects, had begun to beraised in the minds of the people and the government. It was held that aRoman might be found who would sell the supposed interests of hiscountry to a foreign potentate, or at any rate accept a present whichmight or might not influence his judgment, A commissioner to Illyria hadbeen suspected of pocketing money offered him by the potentates of thatdistrict in 171, [127] and the first hint was given of that shattering ofpublic confidence in the integrity of diplomatists which wrought suchhavoc in the foreign politics of the period which forms the immediatesubject of our work. The system of the Protectorate, which Rome had sowidely adopted, with its secret diplomatic dealings and its hiddenconferences with kings, offered greater facilities for secretenrichment, and greater security for the enjoyment of the acquiredwealth, even than the plunder of a province. The proof of the committalof the act was difficult, in most cases impossible. We must be contentto chronicle the suspicion of its growing frequency, and the suspicionis terrible enough. If the custom of wringing wealth from subjects andselling support to potentates continued to prevail, the stage might soonbe reached at which it could be said, with that element of exaggerationwhich lends emphasis to a truth, that a small group of men were drawingrevenues from every nation in the world. [128] Such were the sources of wealth that lay open to men, to whom commercewas officially barred and who were supposed to have no direct interestin financial operations. Far ampler spheres of pecuniary enrichment, more uniformly legal if sometimes as oppressive, were open to the classof men who by this time had been recognised as forming a kind of secondorder in the State. The citizens who had been proved by the returns atthe census to have a certain amount of realisable capital at theirdisposal--a class of citizens that ranged from the possessors of amoderate patrimony, such as society might employ as a line ofdemarcation between an upper and a lower middle class, to thecontrollers of the most gigantic fortunes--had been welded into a bodypossessing considerable social and political solidarity. This solidarityhad been attained chiefly through the community of interest derived fromthe similar methods of pecuniary investment which they employed, butalso through the circumstance (slight in itself but significant in anancient society which ever tended to fall into grades) that all themembers of this class could describe themselves by the courtesy title of"Knights"--a description justified by the right which they possessed ofserving on their own horses with the Roman cavalry instead of sharingthe foot-service of the legionary. A common designation was notinappropriate to men who were in a certain sense public servants andformed in a very real sense a branch of the administration. The knightmight have many avocations; he might be a money-lender, a banker, alarge importer; but he was preeminently a farmer of the taxes. Hisposition in the former cases was simply that of an individual, who mightor might not be temporarily associated with others; his position in thelatter case meant that he was a member of a powerful and permanentcorporation, one which served a government from which it might wringgreat profits or at whose hands it might suffer heavy loss--a governmentto be helped in its distress, to be fought when its demands wereoverbearing, to be encouraged when its measures seemed progressive, tobe hindered when they seemed reactionary from a commercial point ofview. A group of individuals or private firms could never have attainedthe consistency of organisation, or maintained the uniformity of policy, which was displayed by these societies of revenue-collectors; even acompany must have a long life before it can attain strength andconfidence sufficient to act in a spirited manner in opposition to theState; and it seems certain that these societies were wholly exemptedfrom the paralysing principle which the Roman law applied topartnership--a principle which dictated that every partnership should bedissolved by the death or retirement of one of the associates. [129] TheState, which possessed no civil service of its own worthy of the name, had taken pains to secure permanent organisations of privateshare-holders which should satisfy its needs, to give them something ofan official character, and to secure to each one of them as a result ofits permanence an individual strength which, in spite of the theory thatthe taxes and the public works were put up to auction, may have securedto some of these companies a practical monopoly of a definite sphere ofoperations. But a company, at Rome as elsewhere, is powerful inproportion to the breadth of its basis. A small ring of capitalists maytyrannise over society as long as they confine themselves to securing amonopoly over private enterprises, and as long as the law permits themto exercise this autocratic power without control; but such a ring isfar less capable of meeting the arbitrary dictation of an aristocraticbody of landholders, such as the senate, or of encountering theresentful opposition of a nominally all-powerful body of consumers, suchas the Comitia, than a corporation which has struck its roots deeply insociety by the wide distribution of its shares. We know from thepositive assurance of a skilled observer of Roman life that the numberof citizens who had an interest in these companies was particularlylarge. [130] This observer emphasises the fact in order to illustrate thedependence of a large section of society on the will of the senate, which possessed the power of controlling the terms of the agreementsboth for the public works which it placed in the hands of contractorsand for the sources of production which it put out to lease;[131] but itis equally obvious that the large size of the number of shareholdersmust have exercised a profoundly modifying influence on the arbitraryauthority of a body such as the senate which governed chiefly throughdeference to public opinion; and we know that, in the last resort, anappeal could be made to the sovereign assembly, if a magistrate could befound bold enough to carry to that quarter a proposal that had beendiscountenanced by the senate. [132] In such crises the strength of thecompanies depended mainly on the number of individual interests thatwere at stake; the shareholder is more likely to appear at suchgatherings than the man who is not profoundly affected by the issue, andit is very seldom that the average consumer has insight enough to see, or energy enough to resist, the sufferings and inconveniences whichspring from the machinations of capital. It may have been possible attimes to pack a legislative assembly with men who had some financialinterest, however slight, in a dispute arising from a contract callingfor decision; and the time was soon to come when such questions ofdetail would give place to far larger questions of policy, when theissues springing from a line of foreign activity which had been taken bythe government might be debated in the cold and glittering light of thegolden stakes the loss or gain of which depended upon the policypursued. Nor could it have been easy even for the experienced eye to seefrom the survey of such a gathering that it represented the army ofcapital. Research has rendered it probable that the companies of thetime were composed of an outer as well as of an inner circle; that themass of shareholders differed from those who were the promoters, managers and active agents in the concern, that the liability of theformer at least was limited and that their shares, whether small orgreat, were transmissible and subject to the fluctuations of themarket. [133] But, even if we do not believe that this distinctionbetween _socii_ and _participes_ was legally elaborated, yet there wereprobably means by which members of the outside public could enter intobusiness relations with the recognised partners in one of these concernsto share its profits and its losses. [134] The freedman, who had investedhis small savings in the business of an enterprising patron, wouldattach the same mercantile value to his own vote in the assembly aswould be given to his suffrage in the senate by some noble peer, who hadbartered the independence of his judgment for the acquisition of morerapid profits than could be drawn from land. The farmers of the revenue fell into three broad classes. First therewere the contractors for the creation, maintenance and repair of thepublic works possessed or projected by the State, such as roads, aqueducts, bridges, temples and other public buildings. Gigantic profitswere not possible in such an enterprise, if the censors and theiradvisers acted with knowledge, impartiality and discretion; for thelowest possible tender was obtained for such contracts and the resultsmight be repudiated if inspection proved them to be unsatisfactory. Secondly there were the companies which leased sources of productionthat were owned by the State such as fisheries, salt-works, mines andforest land. In some particular cases even arable land had been dealtwith in this way, and the confiscated territories of Capua and Corinthwere let on long leases to _publicani_. Thirdly there were thesocieties, which did not themselves acquire leases but acted as trueintermediaries between the State and individuals[135] who paid itrevenue whether as occupants of its territory, or as making use of siteswhich it claimed to control, or as owing dues which had been prescribedby agreement or by law. These classes of debtors to the State with whomthe middlemen came into contact may be illustrated respectively by theoccupants of the domain land of Italy, the ship-masters who touched atports, and the provincials such as those of Sicily or Sardinia who wereburdened with the payment of a tithe of the produce of their lands. [136]If we consider separately the characteristics of the three classes ofstate-farmers, we find that the first and the second are both directemployers of labour, the third reaping only indirect profits from theproduction controlled by others. It was in this respect, as employers oflabour, that the societies of the time were free from the anxieties andrestrictions that beset the modern employment of capital. Except in therare case where the contractors had leased arable land and sublet it toits original occupants, --the treatment which seems to have been adoptedfor the Campanian territory[137]--there can be no question that thework which they controlled was done mainly by the hands of slaves. Theywere therefore exempt from the annoyance and expense which might becaused by the competition and the organised resistance of free labour. The slaves employed in many of these industries must have been highlyskilled; for many of these spheres of wealth which the State haddelegated to contractors required peculiar industrial appliances andunusual knowledge in the foremen and leading artificers. The weakness ofslave-labour, --its lack of intelligence and spirit--could not have beenso keenly felt as it was on the great agricultural estates, whichoffered employment chiefly for the unskilled; and the difficulties thatmight arise from the lack of strength or interest, from the possessionof hands that were either feeble or inert, were probably overcome in thesame uncompromising manner in the workshop of the contractor and on thedomains of the landed gentry. The maxim that an aged slave should besold could not have been peculiar to the dabbler in agriculture, and the_ergastulum_ with its chained gangs must have been as familiar to themanufacturer as to the landed proprietor. [138] As to the promoters andthe shareholders of these companies, it could not be expected that theyshould trace in imagination, or tremble as they traced, the heartless, perhaps inhuman, means by which the regular returns on their capitalwere secured. [139] Nor is it probable that the government of this periodtook any great care to supervise the conditions of the work or the lotof the workman. The partner desired quick and great returns, the Statelarge rents and small tenders. The remorseless drain on human energy, the waste of human life, and the practical abeyance of free labour whichwas flooding the towns with idlers, were ideas which, if they everarose, were probably kept in the background by a government which wasgenerally in financial difficulties, and by individuals animated by allthe fierce commercial competition of the age. The desire of contractors and lessees for larger profits naturally tookthe form of an eagerness to extend their sphere of operations. Everyadvance in the Roman sphere of military occupation implied the making ofnew roads, bridges and aqueducts; every extension of this sphere waslikely to be followed by the confiscation of certain territories, whichthe State would declare to be public domains and hand over to thecompany that would guarantee the payment of the largest revenue. But thesordid imperialism which animated the contractor and lessee must havebeen as nothing to that which fed the dreams of the truestate-middleman, the individual who intervened between the taxpayer andthe State, the producer and the consumer. Conquest would mean freshlines of coast and frontier, on which would be set the toil-houses ofthe collectors with their local directors and their active "families" offreedmen and slaves. It might even mean that a more prolific source ofrevenue would be handed over to the care of the publican. The spectacleof the method in which the land-tax was assessed and collected in Sicilyand Sardinia may have already inspired the hope that the next instanceof provincial organisation might see greater justice done to thecapitalists of Rome. When Sicily had been brought under Roman sway, thealoofness of the government from financial interests, as well as itsinnate conservatism, justified by the success of Italian organisation, which dictated the view that local institutions should not be lightlychanged, had led it to accept the methods for the taxation of land whichit found prevalent in the island at the time of its annexation. Themethods implied assessment by local officials and collection by localcompanies or states. [140] It is true that neither consequence entirelyexcluded the enterprise of the Roman capitalists; they had crossed theStraits of Messina on many a private enterprise and had settled in suchlarge numbers in the business centres of the island that the chartergiven to the Sicilian cities after the first servile war made detailedprovision for the settlement of suits between Romans and natives. [141]It was not to be expected that they should refrain from joining in, orcompeting with, the local companies who bid for the Sicilian tithes, norwas such association or competition forbidden by the law. But thescattered groups of capitalists who came into contact with the Sicilianyeomen did not possess the official character and the official influenceof the great companies of Italy. No association, however powerful, couldboast a monopoly of the main source of revenue in the island. But whatthey had done was an index of what they might do, if another opportunityand a more complaisant government could be found. Any individual or anyparty which could promise the knights the unquestioned control of therevenues of a new province would be sure of their heartiest sympathyand support. And it would be worth the while of any individual or party whichventured to frame a programme traversing the lines of politicalorthodoxy, to bid for the co-operation of this class. For recent historyhad shown that the thorough organisation of capital, encouraged by theState to rid itself of a tiresome burden in times of peace and to secureitself a support in times of need, might become, as it pleased, abulwark or a menace to the government which had created it. The usefulmonster had begun to develop a self-consciousness of his own. He had hisamiable, even his patriotic moments; but his activity might beaccompanied by the grim demand for a price which his nominal master wasnot prepared to pay. The darkest and the brightest aspects of thecommercial spirit had been in turn exhibited during the Second PunicWar. On the one hand we find an organised band of publicans attemptingto break up an assembly before which a fraudulent contractor and wreckerwas to be tried;[142] on the other, we find them meeting the shock ofCannae with the offer of a large loan to the beggared treasury, lentwithout guarantee and on the bare word of a ruined government that itshould be met when there was money to meet it. [143] Other companies cameforward to put their hands to the public works, even the most necessaryof which had been suspended by the misery of the war, and told thebankrupt State that they would ask for their payment when the strugglehad completely closed. [144] A noble spectacle! and if the positions ofemployer and employed had been reversed only in such crises and in sucha way, no harm could come of the memory either of the obligation or theservice. But the strength shown by this beneficence sometimes exhibiteditself in unpleasant forms and led to unpleasant consequences. Thecensorships of Cato and of Gracchus had been fierce struggles ofconservative officialdom against the growing influence and (as thesemagistrates held) the swelling insolence of the public companies; and inboth cases the associations had sought and found assistance, either froma sympathetic party within the senate, or from the people. Cato'sregulations had been reversed and their vigorous author had beenthreatened with a tribunician prosecution before the Comitia;[145] whileGracchus and his colleague had actually been impeached before a popularcourt. [146] The reckless employment of servile labour by the companiesthat farmed the property of the State had already proved a danger topublic security. The society which had purchased from the censors theright of gathering pitch from the Bruttian forest of Sila had filled theneighbourhood with bands of fierce and uncontrolled dependants, chieflyslaves, but partly men of free birth who may have been drawn from thedesperate Bruttians whom Rome had driven from their homes. Theconsequences were deeds of violence and murder, which called for theintervention of the senate, and the consuls had been appointed as aspecial commission to inquire into the outrages. [147] Nor werecomplaints limited to Italy; provincial abuses had already called fordrastic remedies. A proof that this was the case is to be found in thestriking fact that on the renewed settlement of Macedonia in 167 it wasactually decreed that the working of the mines in that country, at leaston the extended scale which would have required a system of contract, should be given up. It was considered dangerous to entrust it to nativecompanies, and as to the Roman-their mere presence in the country wouldmean the surrender of all guarantees of the rule of public law or of theenjoyment of liberty by the provincials. [148] The State still preferredthe embarrassments of poverty to those of overbearing wealth; its choiceproved its weakness; but even the element of strength displayed in thesurrender might soon be missed, if capital obtained a wider influenceand a more definite political recognition. As things were, theseorganisations of capital were but just becoming conscious of theirstrength and had by no means reached even the prime of their vigour. Theopening up of the riches of the East were required to develop thegigantic manhood which should dwarf the petty figure of the agriculturalwealth of Italy. Had the state-contractors stood alone, or had not they engaged in variedenterprises for which their official character offered a favourablepoint of vantage, the numbers and influence of the individuals who hadembarked their capital in commercial enterprise would have been farsmaller than they actually were. But, in addition to the publican, wemust take account of the business man (_negotiator_) who lent money oninterest or exercised the profession of a banker. Such men had pecuniaryinterests which knew no geographical limits, and in all broad questionsof policy were likely to side with the state-contractor. [149] Themoney-lender (_fenerator_) represented one of the earliest, mostfamiliar and most courted forms of Roman enterprise--one whose intrinsicattractions for the grasping Roman mind had resisted every effort of thelegislature by engaging in its support the wealthiest landowner as wellas the smallest usurer. It is true that a taint clung to the trade--ataint which was not merely a product of the mistaken economic conceptionof the nature of the profits made by the lender, but was the moreimmediate outcome of social misery and the fulminations of thelegislature. Cato points to the fact that the Roman law had stamped theusurer as a greater curse to society than the common thief, and makesthe dishonesty of loans on interest a sufficient ground for declining aform of investment that was at once safe and profitable. [150] Usury, hehad also maintained, was a form of homicide. [151] But to the majority ofminds this feeling of dishonour had always been purely external andsuperficial. The proceedings were not repugnant to the finer sense ifthey were not made the object of a life-long profession and notblatantly exhibited to the eyes of the public. A taint clung to themoney-lender who sat in an office in the Forum, and handed his loans orreceived his interest over the counter;[152] it was not felt by thecapitalist who stood behind this small dealer, by the nobleman whoseagent lent seed-corn to the neighbouring yeomen, by the investor in thestate-contracts who perhaps hardly realised that his profits representedbut an indirect form of usury. But, whatever restrictions public opinionmay have imposed on the money-lender as a dealer in Rome and withRomans, such restrictions were not likely to be felt by the man who hadthe capital and the enterprise to carry his financial operations beyondthe sea. Not only was he dealing with provincials or foreigners, but hewas dealing on a scale so grand that the magnitude of the businessalmost concealed its shame. Cities and kings were now to be therecipients of loans and, if the lender occupied a political positionthat seemed inconsistent with the profession of a usurer, hispersonality might be successfully concealed under the name of some localagent, who was adequately rewarded for the obloquy which he incurred inthe eyes of the native populations, and the embarrassing conflicts withthe Roman government which were sometimes entailed by an excess of zeal. Cato had swept both principals and agents out of his province ofSardinia;[153] but he was a man who courted hostility, and he livedbefore the age when the enmity of capital would prove the certain ruinof the governor and a source of probable danger to the senate. In theoperations of the money-lender we find the most universal link betweenthe Forum and the provinces. There was no country so poor that it mightnot be successfully exploited, and indeed exploitation was oftenconditioned by simplicity of character, lack of familiarity with thedeveloped systems of finance, and the lack of thrift which amongstpeoples of low culture is the source of their constant need. Theemployment of capital for this purpose was always far in advance of thelimits of Roman dominion. A protectorate might be in the grasp of agroup of private individuals long before it was absorbed into theempire, the extension of the frontiers was conditioned by considerationsof pecuniary, not of political safety, and the government might at anymoment be forced into a war to protect the interests of capitalistswhom, in its collective capacity as a government, it regarded as thegreatest foes of its dominion. A more beneficent employment of capital was illustrated by theprofession of banking which, like most of the arts which exhibit thehighest refinement of the practical intellect, had been given to theRomans by the Greeks. [154] It had penetrated from Magna Graecia toLatium and from Latium to Rome, and had been fully established in thecity by the time of the Second Punic War. [155] The strangers, who hadintroduced an art which so greatly facilitated the conduct of businesstransactions, had been welcomed by the government, and were encouragedto ply their calling in the shops rented from the State on the north andsouth sides of the Forum. These _argentarii_ satisfied the two needs ofthe exchange of foreign money, and of advances in cash on easier termsthan could be gained from the professional or secret usurer, to citizensof every grade[156] who did not wish, or found it difficult, to turntheir real property into gold. Similar functions were at a somewhatlater period usurped by the money-testers (_nummularii_), who perhapsentered Rome shortly after the issue of the first native silver coinage, and competed with the earlier-established bankers in most of thebranches of their trade. [157] Ultimately there was no department ofbusiness connected with the transference and circulation of money whichthe joint profession did not embrace. Its representatives were concernedwith the purchase and sale of coin, and the equalisation of home withforeign rates of exchange; they lent on credit, gave security forothers' loans, and received money on deposit; they acted asintermediaries between creditors and debtors in the most distant placesand gave their travelling customers circular notes on associated housesin foreign lands; they were equally ready to dissipate by auction anestate that had become the property of a congress of creditors or anumber of legatees. Their carefully kept books improved even themethodical habits of the Romans in the matter of business entries, andintroduced the form of "contract by ledger" (_litterarum obligatio_), which greatly facilitated business operations on an extended scale bysubstituting the written record of obligation for other bonds moredifficult to conclude and more easy to evade. The business life of Rome was in every way worthy of her position as animperial city, and her business centre was becoming the greatestexchange of the commercial world of the day. The forum still drew itslargest crowds to listen to the voice of the lawyer or the orator; butthese attractions were occasional and the constant throng that any daymight witness was drawn thither by the enticements supplied by thespirit of adventure, the thirst for news and the strain of businesslife. The comic poet has drawn for us a picture of the shifting crowdand its chief elements, good and bad, honest and dishonest. He has shownus the man who mingles pleasure with his business, lingering under theBasilica in extremely doubtful company; there too is a certain class ofbusiness men giving or accepting verbal bonds. In the lower part of theForum stroll the lords of the exchange, rich and of high repute; underthe old shops on the north sit the bankers, giving and receiving loanson interest. [158] The Forum has become in common language the symbol of all the ups anddowns of business life, [159] and the moralist of later times could referall students, who wish to master the lore of the quest and investment ofmoney, to the excellent men who have their station by the temple ofJanus. [160] The aspect of the market place had altered greatly to meetthe growing needs. Great Basilicae--sheltered promenades which probablyderived their names from the Royal Courts of the Hellenic East--hadlately been erected. Two of the earliest, the Porcian and Sempronian, had been raised on the site of business premises which had been boughtup for the purpose, [161] and were meant to serve the purposes of amarket and an exchange. [162] Their sheltering roofs were soon employedto accommodate the courts of justice, but it was the business not thelegal life of Rome that called these grand edifices into existence. The financial activity which centred in the Forum was a consequence, notmerely of the contract-system encouraged by the State and of thebusiness of the banker and the money-lender, but of the great foreigntrade which supplied the wants and luxuries of Italy and Rome. This wasan import trade concerned partly with the supply of corn for a nationthat could no longer feed itself, partly with the supply of luxuriesfrom the East and of more necessary products, including instruments ofproduction, from the West. The Eastern trade touched the Euxine Sea atDioscurias, Asia Minor chiefly at Ephesus and Apamea, and Egypt atAlexandria. It brought Pontic fish, Hellenic wines, the spices andmedicaments of Asia and of the Eastern coast of Africa, and countlessother articles, chiefly of the type which creates the need to which itministers. More robust products were supplied by the West through thetrade-routes which came down to Gades, Genua and Aquileia. Hither werebrought slaves, cattle, horses and dogs; linen, canvas and wool; timberfor ships and houses, and raw metal for the manufacture of implementsand works of art. Neither in East nor West was the product brought bythe producer to the consumer. In accordance with the more recenttendencies of Hellenistic trade, great emporia had grown up in which thegoods were stored, until they were exported by the local dealers orsought by the wholesale merchant from an Italian port. As the TyrrhenianSea became the radius of the trade of the world, Puteoli became thegreatest staple to which this commerce centred; thence the goods whichwere destined for Rome were conveyed to Ostia by water or by land, andtaken by ships which drew no depth of water up the Tiber to thecity. [163] But it must not be supposed that this trade was firstcontrolled by Romans and Italians when it touched the shores of Italy. Groups of citizens and allies were to be found in the great staples ofthe world, receiving the products as they were brought down from theinterior and supplying the shipping by which they were transferred toRome. [164] They were not manufacturers, but intermediaries who reaped alarger profit from the carrying trade than could be gained by any formof production in their native land. The Roman and Italian trader was tobe inferior only to the money-lender as a stimulus and a stumbling-blockto the imperial government; he was, like the latter, to be a cause ofannexation and a fire-brand of war, and serves as an almost equalillustration of the truth that a government which does not control theoperations of capital is likely to become their instrument. [165] If we descend from the aristocracy of trade to its poorerrepresentatives, we find that time had wrought great changes in the lotof the smaller manufacturer and artisan. It is true that the oldtrade-gilds of Rome, which tradition carried back to the days of Numa, still maintained their existence. The goldsmiths, coppersmiths, builders, dyers, leather-workers, tanners and potters[166] still heldtheir regular meetings and celebrated their regular games. But it isquestionable whether even at this period their collegiate life was notrather concerned with ceremonial than with business, whether they didnot gather more frequently to discuss the prospects of their social andreligious functions than to consider the rules and methods of theirtrades. We shall soon see these gilds of artificers a great politicalpower in the State--one that often alarmed the government and sometimesparalysed its control of the streets of Rome. But their politicalactivity was connected with ceremonial rather than with trade; it was asreligious associations that they supported the demagogue of the momentand disturbed the peace of the city. They made war against anyaristocratic abuse that was dangled for the moment before their eyes;but they undertook no consistent campaign against the dominance ofcapital. Their activity was that of the radical caucus, not of thetrade-union. But, if even their industrial character had been fullymaintained and trade interests had occupied more of their attention thanstreet processions and political agitation, they could never have posedas the representatives of the interests of the free-born sons of Rome. The class of freedmen was freely admitted to their ranks, and thefreedman was from an economic point of view the greatest enemy of thepure-blooded Italian. We shall also see that the freedman was usuallynot an independent agent in the conduct of the trade which he professed. He owed duties to his patron which limited his industrial activity andrendered a whole-hearted co-operation with his brother-workersimpossible. It is questionable whether any gild organisation could havestood the shock of the immense development of industrial activity ofwhich the more fortunate classes at Rome were now reaping the fruits. The trades represented by Numa's colleges would at best have formed amere framework for a maze of instruments which formed the complexmechanism needed to satisfy the voracious wants of the new society. Thegold-smithery of early times was now complicated by the arts of chasingand engraving on precious stones; the primitive builder, if he werestill to ply his trade with profit, must associate it with the skill ofthe men who made the stuccoed ceilings, the mosaic pavements, thepainted walls. The leather-worker must have learnt to make many a kindof fashionable shoe, and the dyer to work in violet, scarlet or saffron, in any shade or colour to which fashion had given a temporary vogue. Tailoring had become a fine art, and the movable decorations of housesdemanded a host of skilled workmen, each of whom was devoted to thespeciality which he professed. It would seem as though the veryweaknesses of society might have benefited the lower middle class, andthe siftings of the harvest given by the spoils of empire might havemore than supplied the needs of a parasitic proletariate. It is anunquestioned fact that the growing luxury of the times did benefit tradewith that doubtful benefit which accompanies the diversion of capitalfrom purposes of permanent utility to objects of aesthetic admiration ortemporary display; but it is an equally unquestioned fact that thisunhealthy nutriment did not strengthen to any appreciable extent such ofthe lower classes as could boast pure Roman blood. The militaryconscription, to which the more prosperous of these classes wereexposed, was inimical to the constant pursuit of that technical skillwhich alone could enable its possessor to hold the market against freercompetitors. Such of the freedmen and the slaves as were trained tothese pursuits--men who would not have been so trained had they notpossessed higher artistic perception and greater deftness in executionthan their fellows--were wholly freed from the military burden whichabsorbed much of the leisure, and blunted much of the skill, possessedby their free-born rivals. The competition of slaves must have beenstill more cruel in the country districts and near the smaller countrytowns than in the capital itself. At Rome the limitations of space musthave hindered the development of home-industries in the houses of thenobles, and, although it is probable that much that was manufactured bythe slaves of the country estate was regularly supplied to the urbanvilla, yet for the purchase of articles of immediate use or of goodswhich showed the highest qualities of workmanship the aristocraticproprietor must have been dependent on the competition of the Romanmarket. But the rustic villa might be perfectly self-supporting, and thevillage artificer must have looked in vain for orders from the spaciousmansion, which, once a dwelling-house or farm, had become a factory aswell. Both in town and country the practice of manumission wasparalysing the energies of the free-born man who attempted to follow aprofitable profession. The frequency of the gift of liberty to slaves isone of the brightest aspects of the system of servitude as practised bythe Romans; but its very beneficence is an illustration of thearistocrat's contempt for the proletariate; for, where the ideal ofcitizenship is high, manumission--at least of such a kind as shall givepolitical rights, or any trading privileges, equivalent to those of thefree citizen--is infrequent. In the Rome of this period, however, theliberation of a slave showed something more than a mere negative neglectof the interests of the citizen. The gift of freedom was often grantedby the master in an interested, if not in a wholly selfish, spirit. Hewas freed from the duty of supporting his slave while he retained hisservices as a freedman. The performance of these services was, it istrue, not a legal condition of manumission; but it was the result of theagreement between master and slave on which the latter had attained hisfreedom. The nobleman who had granted liberty to his son's tutor, hisown doctor or his barber, might still bargain to be healed, shaved orhave his children instructed free of expense. The bargain was just in sofar as the master was losing services for which he had originally paid, and juster still when the freedman set up business on the _peculium_which his master had allowed him to acquire during the days of hisservitude. But the contracting parties were on an unequal footing, andthe burden enforced by the manumittor was at times so intolerable thattowards the close of the second century the praetor was forced tointervene and set limits to the personal service which might be expectedfrom the gratitude of the liberated slave. [167] The performance of suchgratuitous services necessarily diminished the demand for the labour ofthe free man who attempted to practise the pursuit of an art whichrequired skill and was dependent for its returns on the custom of thewealthier classes; and even such needs as could not be met by thegratuitous services of freedmen or the purchased labour of slaves, wereoften supplied, not by the labour of the free-born Roman, but by that ofthe immigrant _peregrinus_. The foreigner naturally reproduced the artsof his own country in a form more perfect than could be acquired by theRoman or Italian, and as Rome had acquired foreign wants it wasinevitable that they should be mainly supplied by foreign hands. Wecannot say that most of the new developments in trade and manufacturehad slipped from the hands of the free citizens; it would be truer tomaintain that they had never been grasped by them at all. And, worsethan this, we must admit that there was little effort to attain them. Both the cause and the consequence of the monopoly of trade andmanufacture of a petty kind by freedmen and foreigners is to be found inthe contempt felt by the free-born Roman for the "sordid and illiberalsources of livelihood. " [168] This prejudice was reflected in public law, for any one who exercised a trade or profession was debarred from officeat Rome. [169] As the magistracy had become the monopoly of a class, theprejudice might have been little more than one of the working principlesof an aristocratic government, had not the arts which supplied theamenities of life actually tended to drift into the hands of thenon-citizen or the man of defective citizenship. The most abject Romancould in his misery console himself with the thought that the hands, which should only touch the plough and the sword, had never been stainedby trade. His ideal was that of the nobleman in his palace. It differedin degree but not in kind. It centred round the Forum, the battlefieldand the farm. For even the most lofty aristocrat would have exempted agriculture fromthe ban of labour;[170] and, if the man of free birth could still havetoiled productively on his holding, his contempt for the rabble whichsupplied the wants of his richer fellow-citizens in the towns would havebeen justified on material, if not on moral, grounds. He would have heldthe real sources of wealth which had made the empire possible and stillmaintained the actual rulers of that empire. Italian agriculture wasstill the basis of the brilliant life of Rome. Had it not been so, theepoch of revolution could not have been ushered in by an agrarian law. Had the interest in the land been small, no fierce attack would havebeen made and no encroachment stoutly resisted. We are at thecommencement of the epoch of the dominance of trade, but we have notquitted the epoch of the supremacy of the landed interest. The vital question connected with agriculture was not that of itsfailure or success, but that of the individuals who did the work andshared the profits. The labourer, the soil, the market stand in suchclose relations to one another that it is possible for older types ofcultivation and tenure to be a failure while newer types are a brilliantsuccess. But an economic success may be a social failure. Thus it waswith the greater part of the Italian soil of the day which had passedinto Roman hands. Efficiency was secured by accumulation and the smallerholdings were falling into decay. A problem so complex as that of a change in tenure and in the type ofproductive activity employed on the soil is not likely to yield to theanalysis of any modern historian who deals with the events of theancient world. He is often uncertain whether he is describing causes orsymptoms, whether the primary evil was purely economic or mainly social, whether diminished activity was the result of poverty and decreasingnumbers, or whether pauperism and diminution of population were theeffects of a weakened nerve for labour and of a standard of comfort sofeverishly high that it declined the hard life of the fields and inducedits possessors to refuse to propagate their kind. But social andeconomic evils react so constantly on one another that the question ofthe priority of the one to the other is not always of primaryimportance. A picture has been conjured up by the slight sketches ofancient historians and the more prolonged laments of ancient writers onagriculture, which gives us broad outlines that we must accept as true, although we may refuse to join in the belief that these outlinesrepresent an unmixed and almost incurable evil. These writers evenattempt to assign causes, which convince by their probability, althoughthere is often a suspicion that the ultimate and elusive truth has notbeen grasped. The two great symptoms which immediately impress our imagination are adecline, real or apparent, in the numbers of the free population ofRome, and the introduction of new methods of agriculture which entaileda diminution in the class of freehold proprietors who had held estatesof small or moderate size. The evidence for an actual decline of thepopulation must be gathered exclusively from the Roman censuslists. [171] At first sight these seem to tell a startling tale. At thedate of the outbreak of the First Punic War (265 B. C. ) the roll of Romancitizens had been given as 382, 284, [172] at a census held but threeyears before the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus (136 B. C. ) the numberspresented by the list were 307, 833. [173] In 129 years the burgess rollhad shrunk by nearly 75, 000 heads of the population. The shrinkage hadnot always been steadily progressive; sometimes there is a sudden dropwhich tells of the terrible ravages of war. But the return of peacebrought no upward movement that was long maintained. In the interval ofcomparative rest which followed the Third Macedonian War the censusrolls showed a decrease of about 13, 000 in ten Years. [174] Seven yearslater 2, 000 more have disappeared, [175] and a slight increase at thenext _lustrum_ is followed by another drop of about 14, 000. [176] Theneeds of Rome had increased, and the means for meeting them weredwindling year by year. This must be admitted, however we interpret themeaning of these returns. A hasty generalisation might lead us to inferthat a wholesale diminution was taking place in the population of Romeand Italy. The returns may add weight to other evidence which pointsthis way; but, taken by themselves, they afford no warrant for such aconclusion. The census lists were concerned, not only purely with Romancitizens, but purely with Roman citizens of a certain type. It ispractically certain that they reproduce only the effective fightingstrength of Rome, [177] and take no account of those citizens whoseproperty did not entitle them to be placed amongst the _classes_. [178]But, if it is not necessary to believe that an actual diminution ofpopulation is attested by these declining numbers, the conclusion whichthey do exhibit is hardly less serious from an economic and politicalpoint of view. They show that portions of the well-to-do classes wereceasing to possess the property which entitled them to entrance into theregular army, and that the ranks of the poorer proletariate were beingswelled by their impoverishment. It is possible that such impoverishmentmay have been welcomed as a boon by the wearied veterans of Rome andtheir descendants. It meant exemption from the heavier burdens ofmilitary service, and, if it went further still, it implied immunityfrom the tribute as long as direct taxes were collected from Romancitizens. [179] As long as service remained a burden on wealth, howevermoderate, there could have been little inducement to the man of smallmeans to struggle up to a standard of moderately increased pecuniarycomfort, which would certainly be marred and might be lost by thepersonal inconvenience of the levy. The decline in the numbers of the wealthier classes is thus attested bythe census rolls. But indications can also be given which afford aslight probability that there was a positive diminution in the freepopulation of Rome and perhaps of Italy. The carnage of the Hannibalicwar may easily be overemphasised as a source of positive decline. Suchlosses are rapidly made good when war is followed by the normalindustrial conditions which success, or even failure, may bring. But, aswe shall soon see reason for believing that these industrial conditionswere not wholly resumed in Italy, the Second Punic War may be regardedas having produced a gap in the population which was never entirelyrefilled. We find evidences of tracts of country which were not annexedby the rich but could not be repeopled by the poor. The policy pursuedby the decaying Empire of settling foreign colonists on Italian soil hadalready occurred to the statesmen of Rome in the infancy of her imperialexpansion. In 180 B. C. 40, 000 Ligurians belonging to the Apuanian peoplewere dragged from their homes with their wives and children and settledon some public land of Rome which lay in the territory of the Samnites. The consuls were commissioned to divide up the land in allotments, andmoney was voted to the colonists to defray the expense of stocking theirnew farms. [180] Although the leading motive for this transference wasthe preservation of peace amongst the Ligurian tribes, yet it isimprobable that the senate would have preferred the stranger to itskindred had there been an outcry from the landless proletariate to beallowed to occupy and retain the devastated property of the State. But moral motives are stronger even than physical forces in checking thenumerical progress of a race. Amongst backward peoples unusualindulgence and consequent disease may lead to the diminution or evenextinction of the stock; amongst civilised peoples the motives whichattain this result are rather prudential, and are concerned with anideal of life which perhaps increases the efficiency of the individual, but builds up his healthy and pleasurable environment at the expense ofthe perpetuity of the race. The fact that the Roman and Italian physiquewas not degenerating is abundantly proved by the military history of thelast hundred years of the Republic. This is one of the greatest periodsof conquest in the history of the world. The Italy, whom we are ofteninclined to think of as exhausted, could still pour forth her myriads ofvaliant sons to the confines marked by the Rhine, the Euphrates and theSahara; and the struggle of the civil wars, which followed thisexpansion, was the clash of giants. But this vigour was accompanied byan ideal, whether of irresponsibility or of comfort, which gave rise tothe growing habit of celibacy--a habit which was to stir the eloquenceof many a patriotic statesman and finally lead to the intervention ofthe law. When the censor of 131 uttered the memorable exhortation "Sincenature has so ordained that we cannot live comfortably with a wife norlive at all without one, you should hold the eternal safety of the Statemore dear than your own brief pleasure, " [181] it is improbable that hewas indulging in conscious cynicism, although there may have been atrace of conscious humour in his words. He was simply bending to theideal of the people whom he saw, or imagined to be, before him. Theideal was not necessarily bad, as one that was concerned with individuallife. It implied thrift, forethought, comfort--even efficiency of akind, for the unmarried man was a more likely recruit than the father ofa family. But it sacrificed too much--the future to the present; itignored the undemonstrable duty which a man owes to the permanent ideaof the State through working for a future which he shall never see. Itrested partly on a conviction of security; but that feeling of securitywas the most perilous sign of all. The practice of celibacy generally leads to irregular attachmentsbetween the sexes. In a society ignorant of slavery, such attachments, as giving rise to social inconveniences far greater than those ofmarriage, are usually shunned on prudential grounds even where moralmotives are of no avail. But the existence in Italy of a large class offemale dependants, absolutely outside the social circle of the citizenbody, rendered the attachment of the master to his slave girl or to hisfreedwoman fatally easy and unembarrassing. It was unfortunately asattractive as it was easy. Amidst the mass of servile humanity that haddrifted to Italy from most of the quarters of the world there wasscarcely a type that might not reproduce some strange and wonderfulbeauty. And the charm of manner might be secured as readily as that offace and form. The Hellenic East must often have exhibited in its womenthat union of wit, grace and supple tact which made even its men soirresistible to their Roman masters. The courtesans of the capital, whether of high or low estate, [182] are from the point of view which weare considering not nearly so important as the permanent mistress or"concubine" of the man who might dwell in any part of Italy. It was thelatter, not the former, that was the true substitute for the wife. Thereis reason to believe that it was about this period that "concubinage"became an institution which was more than tolerated by society. [183] Therelation which it implied between the man and his companion, who wasgenerally one of his freedwomen, was sufficiently honourable. Itexcluded the idea of union with any other woman, whether by marriage ortemporary association; it might be more durable than actual wedlock, forfacilities for divorce were rapidly breaking the permanence of thelatter bond; it might satisfy the juristic condition of "maritalaffection" quite as fully as the type of union to which law or religiongave its blessing. But it differed from marriage in one point of vitalimportance for the welfare of the State. Children might be the issue of_concubinatus_, but they were not looked on as its end. Such unions werenot formed _liberûm quaerendorum causâ_. The decline, or at least the stationary character, of the population maythus be shown to be partly the result of a cause at once social andeconomic; for this particular social evil was the result of the economicexperiment of the extended use of slavery as a means of production. Thisextension was itself partly the result of the accidents of war andconquest, and in fact, throughout this picture of the change which waspassing over Italy, we can never free ourselves from the spectres ofmilitarism and hegemony. But an investigation of the more purelyeconomic aspects of the industrial life of the period affords a clearrevelation of the fact that the effects of war and conquest were merelythe foundation, accidentally presented, of a new method of production, which was the result of deliberate design and to some extent of aconscious imitation of systems which had in turn built up the colossalwealth, and assisted the political decay, of older civilisations withwhich Rome was now brought into contact. The new ideal was that of thelarge plantation or _latifundium_ supervised by skilled overseers, worked by gangs of slaves with carefully differentiated duties, guidedby scientific rules which the hoary experience of Asia and Carthage haddevised, but, in unskilled Roman hands, perhaps directed with a recklessenergy that, keeping in view the vast and speedy returns which couldonly be given by richer soils than that of Italy, was as exhaustive ofthe capacities of the land as it was prodigal of the human energy thatwas so cheaply acquired and so wastefully employed. The East, Carthageand Sicily had been the successive homes of this system, and the Punicideal reached Rome just at the moment when the tendency of the freepeasantry to quit their holdings as unprofitable, or to sell them to paytheir debts, opened the way for the organisation of husbandry on thegrand Carthaginian model. [184] The opportunity was naturally seized withthe utmost eagerness by men whose wants were increasing, whose incomesmust be made to keep pace with these wants, and whose wealth mustinevitably be dependent mainly on the produce of the soil. Yet we haveno warrant for accusing the members of the Roman nobility of adeliberate plan of campaign stimulated by conscious greed andselfishness. For a time they may not have known what they were doing. Land was falling in and they bought it up; domains belonging to theState were so unworked as to be falling into the condition of rankjungle and pestilent morass. They cleared and improved this land with aview to their own profit and the profit of the State. Free labour wasunattainable or, when attained, embarrassing. They therefore boughttheir labour in the cheapest market, this market being the product ofthe wars and slave-raids of the time. They acted, in fact, as everyenlightened capitalist would act under similar circumstances. It seemedan age of the revival of agriculture, not of its decay. The officialclass was filled with a positive enthusiasm for new and improvedagricultural methods. The great work of the Carthaginian Mago wastranslated by order of the senate. [185] Few of the members of that bodywould have cared to follow the opening maxim of the great expert, thatif a man meant to settle in the country he should begin by selling hishouse in town;[186] the men of affairs did not mean to become gentlemenfarmers, and it was the hope of profitable investment for the purpose ofmaintaining their dignity in the capital, not the rustic ideal of theprimitive Roman, that appealed to their souls. But they might have hopedthat most of the golden precepts of the twenty-eight books, whichunfolded every aspect of the science of the management of land, would beassimilated by the intelligent bailiff, and they may even have beeninfluenced by a patriotic desire to reveal to the small holderscientific methods of tillage, which might stave off the ruin that theydeplored as statesmen and exploited as individuals. But the lessons werethrown away on the small cultivator; they probably presupposed thepossession of capital and labour which were far beyond his reach; andscience may have played but little part even in the accumulations of therich, although the remarkable spectacle of small holdings, under thepersonal supervision of peasant proprietors, being unable to hold theirown against plantations and ranches managed by bailiffs and worked byslaves, does suggest that some improved methods of cultivation wereadopted on the larger estates. The rapidity with which the plantationsystem spread must have excited the astonishment even of its promoters. Etruria, in spite of the fact that three colonies of Roman citizens hadlately been founded within its borders, [187] soon showed one continuousseries of great domains stretching from town to town, with scarcely avillage to break the monotonous expanse of its self-tilled plains. Little more than forty years had elapsed since the final settlement ofthe last Roman colony of Luna when a young Roman noble, travelling alongthe Etruscan roads, strained his eyes in vain to find a free labourer, whether cultivator or shepherd. [188] In this part of Italy it isprobable that Roman enterprise was not the sole, or even the main, causeof the wreckage of the country folk. The territory had always beensubject to local influences of an aristocratic kind; but the Etruscannobles had stayed their hand as long as a free people might help them toregain their independence. [189] Now subjection had crushed all otherambition but that of gain and personal splendour, while the ravages ofthe Hannibalic war had made the peasantry an easy victim of thewholesale purchaser. Farther south, in Bruttii and Apulia, the hand ofRome had co-operated with the scourge of war to produce a like result. The confiscations effected in the former district as a punishment forits treasonable relations with Hannibal, the suitability of the latterfor grazing purposes, which had early made it the largest tract of landin Italy patrolled by the shepherd slave, [190] had swept village andcultivator away, and left through whole day's journeys but vaststretches of pasture between the decaying towns. For barrenness and desolation were often the results of the new andimproved system of management. There were tracts of country which couldnot produce cereals of an abundance and quality capable of competingwith the corn imported from the provinces; but even on territories wherecrops could be reared productively, it was tempting to substitute forthe arduous processes of sowing and reaping the cheaper and easierindustry of the pasturage of flocks. We do not know the extent to whicharable land in fair condition was deliberately turned into pasturage;but we can imagine many cases in which the land recently acquired bycapitalists, whether from the State or from smaller holders, was in sucha condition, either from an initial lack of cultivation or from neglector from the ravages of war, that the new proprietor may well have shrunkfrom the doubtful enterprise of sinking his capital in the soil, for thepurpose of testing its productive qualities. In such cases it wastempting to treat the great domain as a sheep-walk or cattle-ranch. Theinitial expenses of preparation were small, the labour to be employedwas reduced to a minimum, the returns in proportion to the expenses wereprobably far larger than could be gained from corn, even when grownunder the most favourable conditions. The great difficulty in the way ofcattle-rearing on a large scale in earlier times had been the treatmentof the flocks and herds during the winter months. The necessity forproviding stalls and fodder for this period must have caused theproprietor to limit the heads of cattle which he cared to possess. Butthis constraint had vanished at once when a stretch of warm coast-linecould be found, on which the flocks could pasture without feeling therigour of the winter season. Conversely, the cattle-rearer who possessedthe advantage of such a line of coast would feel his difficultiesbeginning when the summer months approached. The plains of the Campagnaand Apulia could have been good neither for man nor beast during thetorrid season. The full condition which freed a grazier from allembarrassment and rendered him careless of limiting the size of hisflocks, was the combined possession of pastures by the sea for winteruse, and of glades in the hills for pasturage in summer. [191] Neitherthe men of the hills nor the men of the plains, as long as they formedindependent communities, could become graziers on an extensive scale, and it has been pointed out that even a Greek settlement of the extentof Sybaris had been forced to import its wool from the Black Sea throughMiletus. [192] But when Rome had won the Apennines and extended herinfluence over the coast, there were no limits to the extent to whichcattle rearing could be carried. [193] It became perhaps the mostgigantic enterprise connected with the soil of Italy. Its cheapness andefficiency appealed to every practical mind. Cato, who had a sentimentalattachment to agriculture, was bound in honesty to reply to the question"What is the best manner of investment?" by the words "Good pasturage. "To the question as to the second-best means he answered "Tolerablepasturage. " When asked to declare the third, he replied "Bad pasturage. "To ploughing he would assign only the fourth place in the descendingScale. [194] Bruttii and Apulia were the chief homes of the ranch and thefold. The Lucanian conquest of the former country must, even at a timepreceding the Roman domination, have formed a connection between themountains and the plains, and pasturage on a large scale in the mountainglades of the Bruttian territory may have been an inheritance ratherthan a creation of the Romans; but the ruin caused in this district bythe Second Punic War, the annexation to the State of large tracts ofrebel land, [195] and the reduction of large portions of the populationto the miserable serf-like condition of _dediticii_, [196] must haveoffered the capitalists opportunities which they could not otherwisehave secured; and both here and in Apulia the tendency to extend thegrazing system to its utmost limits must have advanced with terriblerapidity since the close of the Hannibalic war. It was the East coast ofSouthern Italy that was chiefly surrendered to this new form ofindustry, and we may observe a somewhat sharp distinction between thepastoral activity of these regions and the agricultural life which stillcontinued, although on a diminished scale, in the Westerndistricts. [197] We have already made occasional reference to the accidents on which thenew industrial methods that created the _latifundia_ were designedlybased. It is now necessary to examine these accidents in greater detail, if only for the purpose of preparing the ground for a future estimate ofthe efficacy of the remedies suggested by statesmen for a condition ofthings which, however naturally and even honestly created, wasdeplorable both on social and political grounds. The causes which hadled to the change from one form of tenure and cultivation to another ofa widely different kind required to be carefully probed, if theHerculean task of a reversion to the earlier system was to be attempted. The men who essayed the task had unquestionably a more perfect knowledgeof the causes of the change than can ever be possessed by the student ofto-day; but criticism is easier than action, and if it is not to becomeshamelessly facile, every constraining element in the complicatedproblem which is at all recoverable (all those elements so clearly seenby the hard-headed and honest Roman reformers, but known by them topossess an invulnerability that we have forgotten) must be examined bythe historian in the blundering analysis which is all that is permittedby his imperfect information, and still more imperfect realisation, ofthe temporary forces that are the millstones of a scheme of reform. The havoc wrought by the Hannibalic invasion[198] had caused evengreater damage to the land than to the people. The latter had beenthinned but the former had been wasted, and in some cases wasted, asevents proved, almost beyond repair. The devastation had been especiallygreat in Southern Italy, the nations of which had clung to the Punicinvader to the end. But such results of war are transitory in theextreme, if the numbers and energy of the people who resume possessionof their wrecked homes are not exhausted, and if the conditions ofproduction and sale are as favourable after the calamity as they werebefore. The amount of wealth which an enemy can injure, lies on the meresurface of the soil, and is an insignificant fraction of that which isstored in the bosom of the earth, or guaranteed by a favourablecommercial situation and access to the sea. Carthage could pay her warindemnity and, in the course of half a century, affright Cato by herteeming wealth and fertility. Her people had resumed their old habits, bent wholeheartedly to the only life they loved, and the prizes of acrowded haven and bursting granaries were the result. If a nation doesnot recover from such a blow, there must be some permanent defect in itseconomic life or some fatal flaw in its administrative system. Thedevastation caused by war merely accelerates the process of decay bycreating a temporary impoverishment, which reveals the severity of thepreceding struggle for existence and renders hopeless its resumption. Certainly the great war of which Italy had been the theatre did marksuch an epoch in the history of its agricultural life. A lack ofproductivity began to be manifested, for which, however, subsequenteconomic causes were mainly responsible. The lack of intensity, which isa characteristic of slave labour, lessened the returns, while thesecondary importance attached to the manuring of the fields was avicious principle inherent in the agricultural precepts of thetime. [199] But it is probable that from this epoch there were largetracts of land the renewed cultivation of which was never attempted; andthese were soon increased by domains which yielded insufficient returnsand were gradually abandoned. The Italian peasant had ever had a hardfight with the insalubrity of his soil. Fever has always been thedreaded goddess of the environs of Rome. But constant labour andeffective drainage had kept the scourge at bay, until the evil momentcame when the time of the peasant was absorbed, and his energy spent, inthe toils of constant war, when his land was swallowed up in the vastestates that had rapid profits as their end and careless slaves as theircultivators. Then, the moist fields gave out their native pestilence, and malaria reigned unchecked over the fairest portion of the Italianplain. [200] One of the leading economic causes, which had led to the failure of acertain class of the Italian peasant-proprietors, was the competition towhich they were exposed from the provinces. Rome herself had begun torely for the subsistence of her increasing population on corn importedfrom abroad, and many of the large coast-towns may have been forced tofollow her example. The corn-producing powers of the Mediterranean landshad now definitely shifted from the regions of the East and North tothose of the South. [201] Greece, which had been barely able to feeditself during the most flourishing period of its history, could notunder any circumstances have possessed an importance as a country ofexport for Italy; but the economic evils which had fallen on thisunhappy land are worthy of observation, as presenting a forecast of thefate which was in store for Rome. The decline in population, which couldbe attributed neither to war nor pestilence, the growing celibacy andchildlessness of its sparse inhabitants, [202] must have been due to anagricultural revolution similar to that which was gradually beingeffected on Italian soil. The plantation system and the wholesaleemployment of slave labour must have swept across the Aegean from theirhomes in Asia Minor. Here their existence is sufficiently attested bythe servile rising which was to assume, shortly after the tribunate ofTiberius Gracchus, the pretended form of a dynastic war; and thetroubles which always attended the collection of the Asiatic tithes, inthe days when a Roman province had been established in those regions, give no favourable impression of the agricultural prosperity of thecountries which lay between the Taurus and the sea. As far south asSicily there was evidence of exhaustion of the land, and of unnaturalconditions of production, which excluded the mass of the freeinhabitants from participation both in labour and profits. But evenSicily had learned from Carthage the evil lesson that Greece hadacquired from Asia; the plantation system had made vast strides in theisland, and the condition of the _aratores_, whether free-holders orlessees, was not what it had been in the days of Diocles and Timoleon. The growing economic dependence of Rome on Sicily was by no means whollydue to any exceptional productive capacities in the latter, but wasmainly the result of proximity, and of administrative relations whichenabled the government and the speculator in corn to draw definite andcertain supplies of grain from the Sicilian cultivators. This was truealso, although to a smaller degree, of Sardinia. But Sicily and Sardiniado mark the beginning of the Southern zone of lands which were capableof filling the markets of the Western world. It was the Northern coastof Africa which rose supreme as the grain-producer of the time. In theCarthaginian territory the natural absence of an agricultural peasantryamidst a commercial folk, and the elaboration of a definite science ofagriculture, had neutralised the ill effects which accompanied theplantation system amongst other peoples less business-like andscientific; the cultivators had shown no signs of unrest and the soil notraces of exhaustion. It has been inferred with some probability thatthe hostility of Cato, the friend of agriculture and of the Italianyeoman, to the flourishing Punic state was directed to some extent bythe fear that the grain of Africa might one day drive from the marketthe produce of the Italian fields;[203] and, if this view entered intothe calculations which produced the final Punic War, the veryshort-sightedness of the policy which destroyed a state only to give itslands to African cities and potentates or to Roman speculators, whomight continue the methods of the extinct community, is only toocharacteristic of that type of economic jealousy which destroys anaccidental product and leaves the true cause of offence unassailed. Thedestruction of Carthage had, as a matter of fact, aggravated the danger;for the first use which Masinissa of Numidia made of the vast power withwhich Rome had entrusted him, was an attempt to civilise his people byturning them into cultivators;[204] and the virgin soil of the greatcountry which stretched from the new boundaries of Carthage to theconfines of the Moors, was soon reckoned amongst the competing elementswhich the Roman agriculturist had to fear. But the force of circumstances caused the Sicilian and Sardiniancultivator to be the most formidable of his immediate competitors. Thefacility of transport from Sicily to Rome rendered that island superioras a granary to even the more productive portions of the Italianmainland. Sicily could never have revealed the marvellous fertility ofthe valley of the Po, where a bushel and a half of wheat could bepurchased for five pence half-penny, and the same quantity of barley wassold for half this price;[205] but it was easier to get Sicilian corn toRome by sea than to get Gallic corn to Rome by land; and the system oftaxation and requisitions which had grown out of the provincialorganisation of the island, rendered it peculiarly easy to place greatmasses of corn on the Roman market at very short notice. Occasionallythe Roman government enforced a sale of corn from the province(_frumentum emptum_), [206] a reasonable price being paid for the grainthus demanded for the city or the army; but this was almost the onlycase in which the government intervened to regulate supplies. In theordinary course of things the right to collect the tithes of theprovince was purchased by public companies, who paid money, not grain, into the Roman treasury, and these companies placed their corn on themarket as best they could. The operations of the speculators in graindoubtless disturbed the price at times. But yet the certainty, theabundance and the facilities for transport of this supply were such aspractically to shut out from competition in the Roman market all but themost favourably situated districts of Italy. Their chance of competitiondepended mainly on their accidental possession of a good road, or theirneighbourhood to the sea or to a navigable river. [207] The largerproprietors in any part of Italy must have possessed greater facilitiesfor carrying their grain to a good market than were enjoyed by thesmaller holders. The Clodian law on trade permitted senators to ownsea-going ships of a certain tonnage; they could, therefore, exporttheir own produce without any dependence on the middle-man, while thesmaller cultivators would have been obliged to pay freight, or couldonly have avoided such payment by forming shipping-companies amongstthemselves. But such combination was not to be looked for amongst apeasant class, barely conscious even of the external symptoms of thegreat revolution which was dragging them to ruin, and perhaps almostwholly oblivious of its cause. It required less penetration to fathom the second of the great reasonsfor the accumulation of landed property in the hands of the few; forthis cause had been before the eyes of the Roman world, and had beenexpounded by the lips of Roman statesmen, for generations or, if wecredit a certain class of traditions, [208] even for centuries. Thiscause of the growing monopoly of the land by the few was the system ofpossession which the State had encouraged, for the purpose of securingthe use and cultivation of its public domain. The policy of the Stateseems to have changed from time to time with reference to its treatmentof this particular portion of its property, which it valued as the mostsecure of its assets and one that served, besides its financial end, thedesirable purpose of assisting it to maintain the influence of Romethroughout almost every part of Italy. When conquered domain had firstbeen declared "public, " the government had been indifferent to the typeof occupier which served it by squatting on this territory andreclaiming land that had not been divided or sold chiefly because itscondition was too unattractive to invite either of these processes. [209]It had probably extended its invitation even to Latin allies, [210] andlooked with approval on any member of the burgess body who showed hisenterprise and patriotism by the performance of this great publicservice. If the State had a partiality, it was probably for the richerand more powerful classes of its citizens. They could embrace a greaterquantity of land in their grasp, and so save the trouble which attendedan estimate of the returns of a great number of small holdings; theypossessed more effective means of reclaiming waste or devastated land, for they had a greater control of capital and labour; lastly, throughtheir large bands of clients and slaves, they had the means ofefficiently protecting the land which they had occupied, and this musthave been an important consideration at a time when large tracts of the_ager publicus_ lay amidst foreign territories which were barelypacified, and were owned by communities that often wavered in theirallegiance to Rome. But, whatever the views of the government, it istolerably clear that the original occupiers must have chieflyrepresented men of this stamp. These were the days when the urban andthe rustic tribes were sharply divided, as containing respectively themen of the town and the men of the country, and when there werecomparatively few of the latter folk that did not possess some holdingof their own. It was improbable that a townsman would often venture onthe unfamiliar task of taking up waste land; it was almost as improbablethat a small yeoman would find leisure to add to the unaided labour onhis own holding the toil of working on new and unpromising soil, exceptin the cases where some unclaimed portion of the public domain was inclose proximity to his estate. We may, therefore, infer that from very early times the wealthierclasses had asserted themselves as the chief occupiers of the publicdomain. And this condition of things continued to be unchallenged untila time came[211] when the small holders, yielding to the pressure ofdebt and bankruptcy, sought their champions amongst the tribunes of thePlebs. The absolute control of the public domain by the State, theabsolute insecurity of the tenure of its occupants, furnished anexcellent opportunity for staving off schemes of confiscation andredistribution of private property, such as had often shaken thecommunities of Greece, and even for refusing to tamper with the existinglaw of debtor and creditor. [212] It was imagined that bankrupt yeomenmight be relieved by being allowed to settle on the public domain, orthat the resumption or retention of a portion of this domain by theState might furnish an opportunity for the foundation of fresh colonies, and a law was passed limiting the amount of the _ager publicus_ that anyindividual might possess. The enactment, whatever its immediate resultsmay have been, proved ineffective as a means of checking the growth oflarge possessions. No special commission was appointed to enforceobedience to its terms, and their execution was neglected by theordinary magistrates. The provisions of the law were, indeed, neverforgotten, but as a rule they were remembered only to be evaded. Deviousmethods were adopted of holding public land through persons who seemedto be _bonâ fide_ possessors in their own right, but were in realitymerely agents of some planter who already held land up to the permittedlimit. [213] Then came the agricultural crisis which followed the PunicWars. The small freeholds, mortgaged, deserted or selling for a fractionof their value, began to fall into the meshes of the vast net which hadspread over the public domain. In some cases actual violence is said tohave been used to the smaller yeomen by their neighbouring tyrants, [214]and we can readily imagine that, when a holding had been deserted for atime through stress of war or military service, it might be difficult toresume possession in the face of effective occupation by the bailiff ofsome powerful neighbour. The _latifundium_--acquired, as it wasbelieved, in many cases by force, fraud and shameless violation of thelaw--was becoming the standard unit of cultivation throughoutItaly. [215] When we consider the general social and economiccircumstances of the time, it is possible to imagine that largeproperties would have grown in Italy, as in Greece, had Rome neverpossessed an inch of public domain; but the occupation of _agerpublicus_ by the rich is very important from two points of view. On theone hand, it unquestionably accelerated the process of the formation ofvast estates; and a renewed impulse had lately been given to thisprocess by the huge confiscations in the South of Italy, and perhaps bythe conquest of Cisalpine Gaul; for it is improbable that the domainpossessed by the State in this fertile country had been wholly parcelledout amongst the colonies of the northern frontier. [216] But on the otherhand, the fact that the kernel of these estates was composed of publicland in excess of the prescribed limit seemed to make resumption by theState and redistribution to the poor legally possible. The _agerpublicus_, therefore, formed the basis for future agitation and was therallying point for supporters and opponents of the proposed methods ofagricultural reform. But it was not merely the negligence of the State which led to thecrushing of the small man by the great; the positive burdens which thegovernment was forced to impose by the exigencies of the career ofconquest and hegemony into which Rome had drifted, rendered the formeran almost helpless competitor in the uneven struggle. The conscriptionhad from early days been a source of impoverishment for the commons andof opportunity for the rich. The former could obey the summons of theState only at the risk of pledging his credit, or at least of seeing hishomestead drift into a condition of neglect which would bring theinevitable day when it could only be rehabilitated by a loan of seed ormoney. The lot of the warrior of moderate means was illustrated by thelegend of Regulus. He was believed to have written home to the consulsasking to be relieved of his command in Africa. The bailiff whom he hadleft on his estate of seven _jugera_ was dead, the hired man had stolenthe implements of agriculture and run away; the farm lay desolate and, were its master not permitted to return, his wife and children wouldlack the barest necessaries of existence. [217] The struggle to maintaina household in the absence of its head was becoming more acute now thatcorn-land was ceasing to pay, except under the most favourableconditions, and now that the demand for conscripts was sometimes heavierand always more continuous than it had ever been before. Perhapsone-tenth of the adult male population of Rome was always in thefield;[218] the units came and went, but the men who bore the brunt ofthe long campaigns and of garrison duty in the provinces were those towhom leisure meant life--the yeomen who maintained their place in thecensus lists by hardy toil, and who risked their whole subsistencethrough the service that had been wrested from them as a reward for alaborious career. When they ceased to be owners of their land, theyfound it difficult to secure places even as labourers on some rich man'sproperty. The landholder preferred the services of slaves which couldnot be interrupted by the call of military duty. [219] The economic evils consequent on the conscription must have been feltwith hardly less severity by such of the Italian allies as lived in theregions within which the _latifundia_ were growing up. To these wereadded the pecuniary burdens which Rome had been forced to impose duringthe Second Punic War. These burdens were for the most part indirect, forRome did not tax her Italian _socii_, but they were none the lesssevere. Every contingent supplied from an allied community had itsexpenses, except that of food during service, defrayed from the treasuryof its own state, [220] and ten continuous years of conscription andrequisition had finally exhausted the loyalty even of Rome's Latinkindred. [221] It is true that the Italians were partially, although notwholly, free from the economic struggle between the possessors of thepublic land and the small freeholders; but there is no reason forsupposing that those of Western Italy were exempt from the consequencesof the reduction in price that followed the import of corn from abroad, and the drain on their incomes and services which had been caused by warcould scarcely have fitted them to stand this unexpected trial. Rome'sharsh dealings with the treasonable South, although adopted forpolitical motives, was almost unquestionably a political blunder. Sheconfiscated devastated lands, and so perpetuated their devastation. Sheleft ruined harbours and cities in decay. She crippled her own resourcesto add to the pastoral wealth of a handful of her citizens. In the Eastof Italy there was a far greater vitality than elsewhere in agricultureof the older type. The Samnites in their mountains, the Peligni, Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini between the Apennines and the sea stillkept to the system of small freeholds. Their peasantry had perhapsalways cultivated for consumption rather than for sale; theirinhabitants were rather beyond the reach of the ample supply from theSouth; and for these reasons the competition of Sicilian and Africancorn did not lead them to desert their fields. They were also lessexposed than the Romans and Latins to the aggressions of the great_possessor_; for, since they possessed no _commercium_ with Rome, theannexation of their property by legal means was beyond the reach even ofthe ingenious cupidity of the times. [222] The proof of the existence ofthe yeoman in these regions is the danger which he caused to Rome. Thespirit which had maintained his economic independence was to aim at ahigher goal, and the struggle for equality of political rights was toprove to the exclusive city the prowess of that class of peasantproprietors which she had sacrificed in her own domains. But, although this sacrifice had been great, we must not be led into thebelief that there was no hope for the agriculturist of moderate meanseither in the present or in the future. Even in the present there wereclear indications that estates of moderate size could under carefulcultivation hold their own. The estate of Lucius Manlius, which Catosketches in his work on agriculture, [223] was far from rivalling thegreat demesnes of the princes of the land. It consisted of 240 _jugera_devoted to the olive and of 100 _jugera_ reserved for the vine. Provision was made for a moderate supply of corn and for pasturage forthe cattle that worked upon the fields. But the farm was on the whole arepresentative of the new spirit, which saw in the vine and the olive apaying substitute for the decadent culture of grain. Even on an estateof this size we note as significant that the permanent and even thehigher personnel of the household (the latter being represented by the_villici_ and the _villicae_) was composed of slaves; yet hirelings wereneeded for the harvest and the corn was grown by cottagers who heldtheir land on a _métayer_ tenure. But such an estate demanded unusualcapital as well as unusual care. On the tiny holdings, which were allthat the poorest could afford, the scanty returns might be eked out bylabour on the fields of others, for the small allotment did not demandthe undivided energies of its holder. [224] There was besides a class of_politores_[225] similar to that figured as cultivating the Cornland onthe estate of Manlius, who received in kind a wage on which they couldat least exist. They were nominally _métayer_ tenants who were providedwith the implements of husbandry by their landlord; but the quantity ofgrain which they could reserve to their own use was so small, varying asit did from a ninth to a fifth of the whole of the crop which they hadreaped, [226] that their position was little better than that of thepoorest labourer by the day. [227] The humblest class of freemen mightstill make a living in districts where pasturage did not reign supreme. But it was a living that involved a sacrifice of independence and asubmission to sordid needs that were unworthy of the past ideal of Romancitizenship. It was a living too that conferred little benefit on theState; for the day-labourers and the _politores_ could scarcely havebeen in the position on the census list which rendered them liable tothe conscription. If it were possible to lessen the incidence of military service and tosecure land and a small amount of capital for the dispossessed, theprospects for the future were by no means hopeless. The smaller culture, especially the cultivation of the vine and the olive, is that to whichportions of Italy are eminently suited. This is especially true of thegreat volcanic plain of the West extending from the north of Etruria tothe south of Campania and comprising, besides these territories, thecountries of the Latins, the Sabines, the Volsci and the Hernici. Thelightness and richness of the alluvion of this volcanic soil is almostas suited to the production of cereals as to that of the vine and theolive or the growth of vegetables. [228] But, even on the assumption thatcorn-growing would not pay, there was nothing to prevent, and everythingto encourage the development of the olive plantation, the vineyard andthe market garden throughout this region. It was a country sown withtowns, and the vast throat of Rome alone would cry for the products ofendless labour. Even Cato can place the vine and the olive beforegrazing land and forest trees in the order of productivity, [229] andbefore the close of the Republic the government had learnt the lessonthat the salvation of the Italian peasantry depended on the cultivationof products like these. The conviction is attested by the protectiveedict that the culture of neither the vine nor the olive was to beextended in Transalpine Gaul. [230] Market gardening was also to have aconsiderable future, wherever the neighbourhood of the larger townscreated a demand for such supplies. [231] A new method of tenure alsogave opportunities to those whose capital or circumstances did notenable them to purchase a sufficient quantity of land of their own. Leaseholds became more frequent, and the _coloni_ thus created[232]began to take an active share in the agricultural life of Italy. Likethe _villici_, they were a product, of the tendency to live away fromthe estate; but they gained ground at the expense of the servilebailiffs, probably in consequence of their greater trustworthiness andkeener interest in the soil. But time was needed to effect these changes. For the present the reignof the capitalist was supreme, and the plantation system was dominantthroughout the greater part of Italy. The most essential ingredient inthis system was the slave, --an alien and a chattel, individually a thingof little account, but reckoned in his myriads the most powerful factorin the economic, and therefore in the political, life of the times, thegravest of the problems that startled the reformer. The soil of Italywas now peopled with widely varied types, and echoes of strange tonguesfrom West and East could be heard on every hand. Italy seemed a newlydiscovered country, on which the refuse of all lands had been thrown tobecome a people that could never be a nation. The home supply of slaves, so familiar as to seem a product of the land, was becoming a mere triflein comparison with the vast masses that were being thrust amongst thepeasantry by war and piracy. At the time of the protest of TiberiusGracchus against the dominance of slave labour in the fields scarcelytwo generations had elapsed since the great influx had begun. The SecondPunic War had spread to every quarter of the West; Sicily, Sardinia, Cisalpine Gaul and Spain all yielded their tribute in the form of humansouls that had passed from the victor to the dealer, from the dealer tothe country and the town. Only one generation had passed since a greatwave had swept from Epirus and Northern Greece over the shores of Italy. In Epirus alone one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners had beensold. [233] Later still the destruction of Carthage must have cast vastquantities of agricultural slaves upon the market. [234] Asia too hadyielded up her captives as the result of Roman victories; but theOriental visages that might be seen in the streets of Rome or the plainsof Sicily, were less often the gift of regular war than of the piracyand the systematised slave-hunting of the Eastern Mediterranean. Rome, who had crushed the rival maritime powers that had attempted, howeverimperfectly, to police the sea, had been content with the work ofdestruction, and seemed to care nothing for the enterprising buccaneerswho sailed with impunity as far west as Sicily. The pirates had alsomade themselves useful to the Oriental powers which still retained theirindependence; they had been tolerated, if they had not been employed, byCyprus and Egypt when these states were struggling against the Empire ofthe Seleucids. [235] But another reason for their immunity was the viewheld in the ancient world that slave-hunting was in itself a legitimateform of enterprise. [236] The pirate might easily be regarded as a meretrader in human merchandise. As such, he had perhaps been useful toCarthage;[237] and, as long as he abstained from attacking ports ornationalities under the protectorate of Rome, there was no reason whythe capitalists in power should frown on the trade by which theyprospered. For the pirates could probably bring better material to theslave market than was usually won in war. [238] A superior elegance andculture must often have been found in the helpless victims on whom theypounced; beauty and education were qualities that had a high marketablevalue, and by seizing on people of the better class they were sure ofone of two advantages--either of a ransom furnished by the friends ofthe captives, or of a better price paid by the dealer. There wasscarcely a pretence that the traders were mere intermediaries who boughtin a cheap market and sold in a dear. They were known to be raiders aswell, and numbers of the captives exhibited in the mart at Side inPamphylia were known to have been freemen up to the moment of theauction. [239] The facility for capture and the proximity of Delos, thegreatest of the slave markets which connected the East with the West, rendered the supply enormous; but it was equalled by the demand, andmyriads of captives are said to have been shipped to the island and tohave quitted it in a single day. The ease and rapidity of the businesstransacted by the master of a slave-ship became a proverb;[240] andhonest mercantile undertakings with their tardy gains must have seemedcontemptible in comparison with this facile source of wealth. An abundant supply and quick returns imply reasonable prices; and thecheapness of the labour supplied by the slave-trade, whether as aconsequence of war or piracy, was at once a necessary condition of thevitality of the plantation system and a cause of the recklessness andneglect with which the easily replaced instruments might be used. Cato, a shrewd man of business, never cared to pay more than fifteen hundreddenarii for his slaves. [241] This must have been the price of the besttype of labourer, of a man probably who was gifted with intelligence aswell as strength. Ordinary unskilled labour must have fetched a farsmaller sum; for the prices which are furnished by the comic poetry ofthe day--prices which are as a rule conditioned by the value of personalservices or qualities of a particular kind, by the attractions of sexand the competition for favours--do not on the average far exceed thelimit fixed by Cato. [242] For common work newly imported slaves wereactually preferred, and purchasers were shy of the _veterator_ who hadseen long service. [243] Employment in the fashionable circles of thetown doubtless enhanced the value of a slave, when he was known to havebeen in possession of some peculiar gift, whether it were for cookery, medicine or literature; but the labours of the country could easily bedrilled into the newest importation, and prices diminished instead ofrising with the advancing age and experience of the rustic slave. [244] The cheapened labour which was now spread over Italy presented as manyvarieties of moral as of physical type, and these came to be well knownto the prospective owner, not because he aimed at being a moralinfluence, but because he objected to being worried by the vagaries ofan eccentric type. Sardinians were always for sale, not because theywere specially abundant, but because they showed an indocility thatrendered them a sorry possession. [245] The passive Oriental, theSpaniard fierce and proud, required different methods of management andinspired different precautions; yet experience soon proved that thehellenised sons of the East had a better capacity for organising revoltthan their fellow-sufferers from the North and West, and much of theharshness of Roman slavery was prompted by the panic which is thenemesis of the man who deals in human lives. But more of it was due tothe indifference which springs from familiarity, and from the coldpractical spirit in which the Roman always tended to play with the pawnsof his business game, even when they were freemen and fellow-citizens. Aman like Cato, who had sense and honesty enough to look after his ownbusiness, elaborated a machine-like system for governing his household, the aim of which was the maximum of profit with the minimum amount ofhumanity which is consistent with the attainment of such an end. Theelement of humanity is, however, accidental. There is no consciousappeal to such a feeling. The slaves seem to be looked on rather asautomata who perform certain mental and physical processes analogous tothose of men. Cato's servants were never to enter another house exceptat his bidding or at that of his wife, and were to express utterignorance of his domestic history to all inquirers; their life was toalternate between working and sleeping, and the heavy sleeper was valuedas presumably a peaceful character; little bickerings between theservants were to be encouraged, for unanimity was a matter for suspicionand fear; the death sentence pronounced on any one of them by the lawwas carried out in the presence of the assembled household, so as tostrike a wholesome terror into the rest. If they wished to propagatetheir kind, they must pay for the privilege, and a fixed sum wasdemanded from the slave who desired to find a mate amongst hisfellow-servants. [246] The rations were fixed and only raised at thepeople's festivals of the Saturnalia and Compitalia;[247] a sick slavewas supposed to need less than his usual share[248]--perhaps anexcellent hygienic maxim, but one scarcely adopted on purely hygienicgrounds. Such a life was an emphatic protest against the indulgence ofthe city, the free and careless intercourse which often reversed theposition of master and slave and formed part of the stock-in-trade ofthe comedian. Yet, even when the bond between the man of fashion and hisartful Servants had merely a life of pleasure and of mischief as itsend, we Are at least lifted by such relations into a human sphere, andit is exceedingly questionable whether the warped humanity of the citydid mark so low a level as the brutalised life of the estate over whichCato's fostering genius was spread. If we develop Cato's methods but alittle, if we admit a little more rigour and a little lessdiscrimination, we get the dismal barrack-like system of the greatplantations--a barrack, or perhaps a prison, nominally ruled by agovernor who might live a hundred miles away, really under the controlof an anxious and terrified slave, who divided his fears between hismaster who wanted money and his servants who wanted freedom. The_villicus_ had been once the mere intendant of the estate on which hismaster lived; he was now sole manager of a vast domain for his absentlord, [249] sole keeper of the great _ergastulum_ which enclosed atnightfall the instruments of labour and disgorged them at daybreak overthe fields. The gloomy building in which they were herded for rest andsleep showed but its roof and a small portion of its walls above theearth; most of it lay beneath the ground, and the narrow windows were sohigh that they could not be reached by the hands of the inmates. [250]There was no inspection by the government, scarcely any by theowners. [251] There was no one to tell the secrets of these dens, and ifthe unwary traveller were trapped and hidden behind their walls, alltraces of him might be for ever lost. [252] When the slaves were turnedout into the fields, the safety of their drivers was secured by thechains which bound their limbs, but which were so adjusted as not tointerfere with the movements necessary to their work. [253] Some whosespirit had been broken might be left unbound, but for the majority bondswere the only security against escape or vengeance. [254] There was, however, one type of desperate character who was permitted toroam at large. This was the guardian of the flocks, who wanderedunrestrained over the mountains during the summer months and along theprairies in the winter season. These herdsmen formed small bands. It wasreckoned that there should be one for every eighty or hundred sheep andtwo for every troop of fifty horses. [255] It was sometimes foundconvenient that they should be accompanied by their women who preparedtheir meals--women of robust types like the Illyrian dames to whomchild-birth was a mere incident in the daily toils. [256] Such a life offreedom had its attractions for the slave, but it had its drawbacks too. The landowner who preferred pasturage to tillage, saved his capital, notonly by the small number of hands which the work demanded, but also bythe niggardly outlay which he expended on these errant serfs. It was notneedful to provide them with the necessaries of life when they couldtake them for themselves. When Damophilus of Enna was entreated by hisslaves to give them something better than the rags they wore, his answerwas: "Do travellers then travel naked through the land? Have theynothing for the man who wants a coat?" [257] Brigandage, in fact, was anestablished item In the economic creed of the day. The desolation of Italy was becoming dangerous, and the master of thelonely villa barred himself in at nights as though an enemy were at hisgates. On one occasion Scipio Africanus was disturbed in his retreat atLiternum by a troop of bandits. He placed his armed servants on the roofand made every preparation for repelling the assault. But the visitorsproved to be pacific. They were the very _élite_ of the fraternity ofbrigands and had merely come to do honour to the great man. They sentback their troops, threw down their arms, laid presents before his doorand departed in joyous mood. [258] The immunity of such bands proved thata slave revolt might at any moment imperil every life and every dwellingin some unprotected canton. It was indeed the epoch of peace, when Romanand Phoenician armies no longer held the field in Italy, that firstsuggested the hope of liberation to the slave. Hannibal would haveimperilled his character of a protector of Italian towns had heencouraged a slave revolt, even if the Phoenician had not shrunk from aprecedent so fatal to his native land. But one of the unexpected resultsof the Second Punic War was to kindle a rising in the very heart ofLatium, and it was the African slave, not the African freeman, thatstirred the last relics of the war in Italy. At Setia were guarded thenoble Carthaginians who were a pledge of the fidelity of their state. These hostages, the sons of merchant princes, were allowed to retain thedignity of their splendid homes, and a vast retinue of slaves fromAfrica attended on their wants. The number of these was swelled bycaptive members of the same nationalities whom the people of Setia hadacquired in the recent war. [259] A spirit of camaraderie sprung upamongst men who understood one another's language and had acquired thespurious nationality that comes from servitude in the same land. Theirnumbers were obvious, the paucity of the native Setians was equallyclear, and no military force was close at hand. They planned to increasetheir following by spreading disaffection amongst the servilepopulations of the neighbouring country towns, and emissaries were sentto Norba in the North and Circei in the South. Their project was to waitfor the rapidly approaching games of the Setian folk and to rush on theunarmed populace as they were gazing at the show; when Setia had beentaken, they meant to seize on Norba and Circei. But there was treason intheir ranks. The urban praetor was roused before dawn by two slaves whopoured the whole tale of the impending massacre into his ear. After ahasty consultation of the senate he rushed to the threatened district, gathering recruits as he swept with his legates through the countryside, binding them with the military oath, bidding them arm and followhim with all speed. A hasty force of about two thousand men was soongathered; none knew his destination till he reached the gates of Setia. The heads of the conspiracy were seized, and such of their followers aslearnt the fact fled incontinently from the town. From this point onwardit was only a matter of hunting down the refugees by patrols sent roundthe country districts. Southern Latium was freed from its terror; but itwas soon found that the evil had spread almost to the gates of Rome. Arumour had spread that Praeneste was to be seized by its slaves, and itwas sufficient to stimulate a praetor to execute nearly five hundred ofthe supposed delinquents. [260] Two years later a rising, which almost became a war, shook the greatplantation lands of Etruria. [261] Its suppression required a legion anda pitched battle. The leaders were crucified; others of the slaves whohad escaped the carnage were restored to their masters. But thesedisturbances, that may have seemed mere sporadic relics of the havoc andexhaustion left by the Hannibalic war, were only quelled for the moment. It was soon found that the seeds of insecurity were deeply planted inthe settlement that was called a peace. During the year 185 theshepherds of Apulia were found to have formed a great society ofplunder, and robbery with violence was of constant occurrence on thegrazing lands and public roads. The praetor who was in command atTarentum opened a commission which condemned seven thousand men. Manywere executed, although a large number of the criminals escaped to otherregions. [262] These movements in Italy were but the symptoms of a spirit that wasspreading over the Mediterranean lands. The rising of the serfs onlyjust preceded the great awakening of the masses of the freemen. [263]Both classes were ground down by capital; both would make an effort toshake the burden from their shoulders; and, as regards the methods ofassertion, it is a matter of little moment whether they took the form ofa national rising against a government or a protectorate, a sanguinarystruggle in the Forum against the dominance of a class, or an attack bychattels, not yet brutalised by serfdom but full of the traditions andspirit of freemen, against the cruelty and indifference of their owners. In one sense the servile movements were more universal, and perhapsbetter organised, than those of the men to whom, free birth gave anominal superiority. A sympathy for each other's sufferings pervaded theunits of the class who were scattered in distant lands. Sometimes it wasa sympathy based on a sense of nationality, and the Syrian and Cilicianin Asia would feel joy and hope stirring in his heart at the doings ofhis brethren who had been deported to the far West. The series oforganised revolts in the Roman provinces and protectorate which commenceshortly after the fall of Carthage and close for the moment with the warof resistance to the Romans in Asia, forms a single connected chain. Dangerous risings had to be repressed at the Italian coast towns ofMinturnae and Sinuessa; at the former place four hundred and fiftyslaves were crucified, at the latter four thousand were crushed by amilitary force; the mines of Athens, the slave market of Delos, witnessed similar outbreaks, [264] and we shall find a like wave ofdiscontent spreading over the serf populations of the countries of theMediterranean just before the second great outbreak in Sicily whichdarkens the close of the second century. The evil fate which made thisisland the theatre of the two greatest of the servile wars is explicableon many grounds. The opportunity offered by the sense of superiority innumbers was far ampler here than in any area of Italy of equal size. ForSicily was a wheat-growing country, and the cultivated plains demanded amass of labour which was not needed in more mountainous or less fertilelands, where pasturage yielded a surer return than the tilling of thesoil. The pasture lands of Sicily were indeed large, but they had notyet dwarfed the agriculture of the island. The labour of the fields wasin the hands of a vast horde of Asiatics, large numbers of whom mayconceivably have been shipped from Carthage across the narrow sea, whenthat great centre of the plantation system had been laid low and thefair estates of the Punic nobles had been seized and broken up by theirconquerors. [265] In the history of the great Sicilian outbreaks Syriansand Cilicians meet us at every turn. These Asiatic slaves had differentnationalities and they or their fathers had been citizens of widelyseparated towns. But there were bonds other than a common sufferingwhich produced a keen sense of national union and a consequent feelingof ideal patriotism in the hearts of all. They were the products of thecommon Hellenism of the East; they or their fathers could make a claimto have been subjects of the great Seleucid monarchy; many, perhaps mostof them, could assert freedom by right of birth and acknowledged slaveryonly as a consequence of the accidents of war or piracy. The mysticismof the Oriental, the political ideal of the Hellene, were interwoven intheir moral nature--a nature perhaps twisted by the brutalism of slaveryto superstition in the one direction, to licence in the other, but nonethe less capable of great conceptions and valiant deeds. The moment forboth would come when the prophet had appeared, and the prophet wouldsurely show himself when the cup of suffering had overflowed. [266] The masters who worked this human mechanism were driving it at a pacewhich must have seemed dangerous to any human being less greedy, vainand confident than themselves. The wealth of these potentates wascolossal, but it was equalled by their social rivalry and consequentneed of money. A contest in elegance was being fought between theSiceliot and the Italian. [267] The latter was the glass of fashion, andthe former attempted to rival, first his habits of domestic life and, asa consequence, the economic methods which rendered these habitspossible. Here too, as in Italy, whole gangs of slaves were purchasedlike cattle or sheep; some were weighed down with fetters, others groundinto subordination by the cruel severity of their tasks. All withoutexception were branded, and men who had been free citizens in theirnative towns, felt the touch of the burning iron and carried the stigmaof slavery to their graves. [268] Food was doled out in miserablequantities, [269] for the shattered instrument could so easily bereplaced. On the fields one could see little but abject helplessness, amisery that weakened while it tortured the soul. But in some parts ofSicily bodily want was combined with a wild daring that was fostered bythe reckless owners, whose greed had overcome all sense of their ownsecurity or that of their fellow-citizens. The treatment of pastoralslaves which had been adopted by the Roman graziers was imitatedfaithfully by the Italians and Siceliots of the island. These slaveswere turned loose with their flocks to find their food and clothingwhere and how they could. The youngest and stoutest were chosen for thishard, wild life: and their physical vigour was still further increasedby their exposure to every kind of weather, by their seldom finding orneeding the shelter of a roof, and by the milk and meat which formedtheir staple food. A band of these men presented a terrifying aspect, suggesting a scattered invasion of some warlike barbarian tribe. Theirbodies were clad in the skins of wolves and boars; slung at their sidesor poised in their hands were clubs, lances and long shepherds' staves. Each squadron was followed by a pack of large and powerful hounds. Strength, leisure, need, all suggested brigandage as an integral part oftheir profession. At first they murdered the wayfarer who went alone orwith but one companion. Then their courage rose and they concertednightly attacks on the villas of the weaker residents. These villas theystormed and plundered, slaying any one who attempted to bar their way. As their impunity increased, Sicily became impracticable to travellersby night, and residence in the country districts became a tempting ofprovidence. There was violence, brigandage or murder on every hand. Thegovernors of Sicily occasionally interposed, but they were almostpowerless to check the mischief. The influence of the slave-owners wassuch that it was dangerous to inflict an adequate punishment. [270] The proceedings of these militant shepherds must have opened the eyes ofthe mass of the slaves to the possibilities of the position. Secretmeetings began to be held at which the word "revolt" was breathed. Anoccasion, a leader, a divine sanction were for the moment lacking. Thefirst requisite would follow the other two, and these were soon foundcombined in the person of Eunus. This man was a Syrian by birth, anative of Apamea, and he served Antigenes of Enna. He was more than abeliever in the power of the gods to seize on men and make them thechannel of their will; he was a living witness to it in his own person. At first he saw shadows of superhuman form and heard their voices in hisdreams. Then there were moments when he would be seized with a trance;he was wrapt in contemplation of some divine being. Then the words ofprophecy would come; they were not his utterance but the bidding of thegreat Syrian goddess. Sometimes the words were preceded by a strangemanifestation of supernatural power; smoke, sparks or flame would issuefrom his open mouth. [271] The clairvoyance may have been a genuinemental experience, the thaumaturgy the type of fiction which the best of_media_ may be tempted to employ; but both won belief from his fellows, eager for any light in the darkness, and a laughing acceptance from hismaster, glad of a novelty that might amuse his leisure. As a matter offact, Eunus's predictions sometimes came true. People forgot (as peoplewill) the instances of their falsification, but applauded them heartilywhen they were fulfilled. Eunus was a good enough _medium_ to figure ata fashionable _séance_. His latest profession was the promise of akingdom to himself; it was the Syrian goddess who had held out thegolden prospect. The promise he declared boldly to his master, knowingperhaps the spirit in which the message would be received. Antigenes wasdelighted with his prophet king. He showed him at his own table, andtook him to the banquets given by his friends. There Eunus would bequestioned about his kingdom, and each of the guests would bespeak hispatronage and clemency. His answers as to his future conduct were givenwithout reserve. He promised a policy of mercy, and the quaintearnestness of the imposture would dissolve the company in laughter. Portions of food were handed him from the board, and the donors wouldask that he should remember their kindness when he came into hiskingdom. These were requests which Eunus did not forget. With such an influence in its centre, Enna seemed destined to be thespring of the revolt. But there was another reason which rendered it alikely theatre for a deed of daring. The broad plateau on which the townwas set was thronged with shepherds in the winter season, [272] and someof the great graziers of Enna owned herds of these bold and lawless men. Conspicuous amongst these graziers for his wealth, his luxury and hiscruelty was one Damophilus, the man who had formulated the theory thatthe shepherd slave should keep himself by robbing others. Damophilus wasa Siceliot, but none of the Roman magnates of the island could haveshown a grander state than that which he maintained. His finely bredhorses, his four-wheeled carriages, his bodyguard of slaves, hisbeautiful boys, his crowd of parasites, were known all over the broadacres and huge pasture lands which he controlled. His town house andvillas displayed chased silverwork, rich carpets of purple dye and atable of royal elegance. He surpassed Roman luxury in the lavishness ofhis expense, Roman pride in his sense of complete independence ofcircumstance, and Roman niggardliness and cruelty in his treatment ofhis slaves. Satiety had begotten a chronic callousness and even savagerythat showed itself, not merely in the now familiar use of the_ergastulum_ and the brand, but in arbitrary and cruel punishments whichwere part of the programme of almost every day. His wife Megallis, hardened by the same influences, was the torment of her maidens and ofsuch domestics as were more immediately under her control. The servantsof this household had one conviction in common--that nothing worse thantheir present evils could possibly be their lot. This is the conviction that inspires acts of frenzy; but the madness ofthese slaves was of the orderly, systematic and therefore dangeroustype. They would not act without a divine sanction to their whisperedplans. Some of them approached Eunus and asked him if their enterprisewas permitted by the gods. The prophet first produced the usualmanifestations which attested his inspiration and then replied that thegods assented, if the plan were taken in hand forthwith. Enna was thedestined place; it was the natural stronghold of the whole island; itwas foredoomed to be the capital of the new race that would rule overSicily. [273] Heartened by the belief that Heaven was aiding theirefforts, the leaders then set to work. They secretly released such ofDamophilus's household as were in bonds; they gathered others together, and soon a band to the number of about four hundred were mustered in afield in the neighbourhood of Enna. There in the early hours of thenight they offered a sacrifice and swore their solemn compact. They hadgathered everything which could serve as a weapon, and when midnight wasapproaching they were ready for the first attempt. They marched swiftlyto the sleeping town and broke its stillness with their cries ofexhortation. Eunus was at their head, fire streaming from his mouthagainst the darkness of the night. The streets and houses wereimmediately the scene of a pitiless massacre. The maddened slaves didnot even spare the children at the breast; they dragged them from theirmothers' arms and dashed them upon the ground. The women were thevictims of unspeakable insult and outrage. [274] Every slave had his ownwrongs to avenge, for the original assailants had now been joined by alarge number of the domestics of the town. Each of these wreaked his ownpeculiar vengeance and then turned to take his share in thegeneral massacre. Meanwhile Eunus and his immediate following had learnt news of thearch-enemy Damophilus, He was known to be staying in his pleasance nearto the city. Thence he and his wife were fetched with every mark ofignominy, and the unhappy pair were dragged into the town with theirhands bound behind their backs. The masters of the city now mustered inthe theatre for an act of justice; but Damophilus did not lose his witseven when he scanned that sea of hostile faces and accusing eyes. Heattempted a defence and was listened to in silence--nay, with approval, for many of his auditors were visibly stirred by his words. But somebolder spirits were tired of the show or fearful of its issue. Hermeiasand Zeuxis, two of his bitterest enemies, shouted out that he was anImpostor[275] and rushed upon him. One of the two thrust a sword throughhis side, the other smote his head off with an axe. It was then thewomen's turn. Megallis's female slaves were given the power to treat heras they would. They first tortured her, then led her up to a high placeand dashed her to the ground. Eunus avenged his private wrongs by thedeath of his own masters, Antigenes and Python. The scene in the theatrehad perhaps revealed more than the desire for a systematised revenge. Itmay have shown that there was some sense of justice, of order in thesavage multitude. And indeed vengeance was not wholly indiscriminate. Eunus concealed and sent secretly away the men who had given him meatfrom their tables. [276] Even the whole house of Damophilus did notperish. There was a daughter, a strange product of such a home, a maidenwith a pure simplicity of character and a heart that melted at the sightof pain. She had been used to soothe the anguish of those who had beenscourged by her parents and to relieve the necessities of such as wereput in bonds. Hence the abounding love felt for her by the slaves, thepity that thrilled them when her home was doomed. An escort was selectedto convey her in safety to some relatives at Catana. Its most devotedmember was Hermeias, [277] perhaps the very man whose hands were stainedby her father's blood. The next step in the progress of the revolt was to form a political andmilitary organisation that might command the respect of the countlessslaves who were soon to break their bonds in the other districts ofSicily. Eunus was elected king. His name became Antiochus, his subjectswere "Syrians. " [278] It was not the first time that a slave had assumedthe diadem; for was it not being worn for the moment by Diodotussurnamed Tryphon, the guardian and reputed murderer of Alexander ofSyria?[279] The elevation of Eunus to the throne was due to no belief inhis courage or his generalship. But he was the prophet of the movement, the cause of its inception, and his very name was considered to be ofgood omen for the harmony of his subjects. When he had bound the diademon his brow and adopted regal state, he elevated the woman who had beenhis companion (a Syrian and an Apamean like himself) to the rank ofqueen. He formed a council of such of his followers as were thought topossess wits above the average, and he set himself to make Enna theadequate centre of a lengthy war. He put to death all his captives inEnna who had no skill in fashioning arms; the residue he put in bondsand set to the task of forging weapons. Eunus was no warrior, but he had the regal gift of recognising merit. The soul of the military movement which spread from Enna wasAchaeus, [280] a man pre-eminent both in counsel and in action, [281] onewho did not permit his reason to be mastered by passion and whose angerwas chiefly kindled by the foolish atrocities committed by some of hisfollowers. [282] Under such a leader the cause rapidly advanced. Theoriginal four hundred had swelled in three days to six thousand; it soonbecame ten thousand. As Achaeus advanced, the _ergastula_ were brokenopen and each of these prison-houses furnished a new multitude ofrecruits. [283] Soon a vast addition to the available forces was effectedby a movement in another part of the island. In the territory ofAgrigentum one Cleon a Cilician suddenly arose as a leader of hisfellows. He was sprung from the regions about Mount Taurus and had beenhabituated from his youth to a life of brigandage. In Sicily he wassupposed to be a herdsman of horses. He was also a highwayman whocommanded the roads and was believed to have committed murders of variedtypes. When he heard of the success of Eunus, he deemed that the momenthad come for raising a revolt on his own account. He gathered a band offollowers, overwhelmed the city of Agrigentum and ravaged thesurrounding territory. [284] The terrified Siceliots, and perhaps some of the slaves themselves, believed that this dual movement might ruin the servile cause. Therewere daily expectations that the armies of Eunus and Cleon would meet inconflict. But such hopes or fears were disappointed. Cleon put himselfabsolutely under the authority of Eunus and performed the functions of ageneral to a king. The junction of the forces occurred about thirty daysafter the outbreak at Enna, and the Cilician brought five thousand mento the royal standard. The full complement of the slaves when first theyjoined battle with the Roman power amounted to twenty thousand men;before the close of the war their army numbered over sixtythousand. [285] The Roman government exhibited its usual slowness in realising thegravity of the situation; yet it may be excused for believing that ithad only to deal with local tumults such as those which had been soeasily suppressed in Italy. The force of eight thousand men which it putinto the field under the praetor Lucius Hypsaeus may have seemed morethan sufficient. Yet it was routed by the insurgent army, now numberingtwenty thousand men, and in the skirmishes which followed the balance ofsuccess inclined to the rebels. The immediate progress of the strugglecannot be traced in any detail, but there is a general record of thestorming of Roman camps and the flight of Roman generals. [286] The theatre of the war was certainly extending at an alarming rate. Therebels had first controlled the centre and some part of the SouthWestern portion of the island, the region between Enna and Agrigentum;but now they had pushed their conquests up to the East, had reached thecoast and had gained possession of Catana and Tauromenium. [287] Thedevastation of the conquered districts is said to have been moreterrible than that which followed on the Punic War. [288] But for thisthe slaves were not wholly, perhaps not mainly, responsible. The rebelarmies, looking to a settlement in the future when they should enjoy thefruit of their victories, left the villas standing, their furniture andstores uninjured, and did no harm to the implements of husbandry. It wasthe free peasantry of Sicily that now showed a savage resentment at theinequality of fortune and of life which severed them from the greatlandholders. Under pretext of the servile war[289] they sallied out, andnot only plundered the goods of the conquered, but even set fire totheir villas. The words of Eunus when, at the beginning of the revolt, he claimed Ennaas the metropolis of the new nation, and the conduct of his followers insparing the grandeur and comfort which had fallen into their hands, aresufficient proofs that the revolted slaves, in spite of their possessionof the seaports of Catana and Tauromenium, had no intention of escapingfrom Sicily. Perhaps even if they had willed it, such a course mighthave been impossible. They had no fleet of their own; the Cilicianpirates off the coast might have refused to accept such dangerouspassengers and to imperil their reputation as honest members of theslave trade. And, if the fugitives crossed the sea, what homes had theyto which they could return? To their own cities they were dead, and thelong arm of Rome stretched over her protectorates in the East. [290] It was therefore with a power which intended a permanent settlement inSicily, that the Roman government had to cope. Its sense of the gravityof the situation was seen in the despatch of consular armies. The firstunder Caius Fulvius Flaccus seems to have effected little. [291] Thesecond under Lucius Calpurnius Piso, the consul of the following year, laid siege to Enna, [292] and captured a stronghold of the rebels. Eightthousand of the slaves were slain by the sword, all who could be seizedwere nailed to the cross. [293] The crowning victories, and the nominalpacification of the island, remained for Piso's successor, PubliusRupilius. He drove the rebels into Tauromenium and sat down before thecity until they were reduced to unspeakable straits by famine. The townwas at length yielded through treachery; Sarapion a Syrian betrayed theacropolis, and the Roman commander found a multitude of starving men athis mercy, He was pitiless in his use of victory. The captives werefirst tortured, then taken up to a high place and dashed downwards tothe ground. The consul then moved on Enna. The rebels defended theirlast stronghold with the utmost courage and persistence. Achaeus seemsto have already fallen, but the brave Cilician leaders still held outwith all the native valour of their race. Cleon made a sortie from thetown and fought heroically until he fell covered with wounds. Cleon'sbrother Coma[294] was captured during the siege and brought beforeRupilius, who questioned him about the strength and the plans of theremaining fugitives. He asked for a moment to collect his thoughts, covered his head with his cloak, and died of suffocation, in the handsof his guard and in sight of the general, before a compromising word hadpassed his lips. King Eunus was not made of such stern stuff. When Enna, impregnable in its natural strength, had been taken by treachery, hefled with his bodyguard of a thousand men to still more precipitousregions. His companions, knowing that it was impossible to escape theirfate (for Rupilius was already moving) fell on each others swords. ButEunus could not face this death. He took refuge in a cave, from which hewas dragged with the last poor relics of his splendid court--his cook, his baker, his bath attendant and his buffoon. The Romans for somereason spared his life, or at least did not doom him to immediate death. He was kept a prisoner at Morgantia, where he died shortly afterwardsof disease. It is said that by the date of the fall of Enna more than twentythousand slaves had perished. [295] Even without this slaughter, thecapture of their seaport and their armoury would have been sufficient tobreak the back of the revolt. [296] It only remained to scour the countrywith picked bands of soldiers for organised resistance to be shattered, and even for the curse of brigandage to be rooted out for a while. Deathwas no longer meted out indiscriminately to the rebels. Such of theslave-owners as survived would probably have protested against wholesalecrucifixion, and the destruction of all of the fugitives would haveimpaired the resources of Sicily. Thus many were spared the cross andrestored to their bonds. [297] The extent to which reorganisation wasneeded before the province could resume its normal life, is shown by thefact that the senate thought it worth while to give Sicily a newprovincial charter. Ten commissioners were sent to assist Rupilius inthe work, which henceforth bore the proconsul's name. [298] The work, aswe know it, was of a conservative character; but it is possible that nocomplete charter had ever existed before, and the war may have revealeddefects in the arrangements of Sicily that had heretofore beenunsuspected. A climax of the type of the servile war in Sicily was perhaps needed tobring the social problem home to thinking men in Rome. Not that it byany means sufficed for all who pondered on the public welfare orlaboured at the business of the State. The men who measured happiness bywealth and empire might still have retained their unshaken confidence inthe Fortune of Rome. Had a Capys of this class arisen, he might havegiven a thrilling picture of the immediate future of his city, dark butgrimly national in its emergence from trial to triumph. He might haveseen her conquering arms expanding to the Euphrates and the Rhine, andundreamed sources of wealth pouring their streams into the treasury orthe coffers of the great. If there was blood in the picture, when had itbeen absent from the annals of Rome? Even civil strife and a new Italianwar might be a hard but a necessary price to pay for a strong governmentand a grand mission. If an antiquated constitution disappeared in thecourse of this glorious expansion, where was the loss? But there were men in Rome who measured human life by other canons: whobelieved that the State existed for the individual at least as much asthe individual for the State: who, even when they were imperialists, sawwith terror the rotten foundations on which the empire rested, and withindignation the miserable returns that had been made to the men who hadbought it with their blood. To them the brilliant present and theglorious future were veiled by a screen that showed the ghastly spectresof commercial imperialism. It showed luxury running riot amongst anobility already impoverished and ever more thievishly inclined, acolossal capitalism clutching at the land and stretching out itstentacles for every source of profitable trade, the middle class fleeingfrom the country districts and ousted from their living in the towns, and the fair island that was almost a part of their Italian home, itsgarden and its granary, in the throes of a great slave war. CHAPTER II A cause never lacks a champion, nor a great cause one whom it may rendergreat. Failure is in itself no sign of lack of spirit and ability, andwhen a vast reform is the product of a mean personality, the individualbecomes glorified by identification with his work. From this point ofview it mattered little who undertook the task of the economicregeneration of the Roman world. Any senator of respectable antecedentsand moderate ability, who had a stable following amongst the rulingclasses, might have succeeded where Tiberius Gracchus failed; it was atask in which authority was of more importance than ability, and thesense that the more numerous or powerful elements of society were unitedin the demand for reform, of more value than individual genius orhonesty of purpose. This was the very circumstance that foreshadowedfailure, for the men of wide connections and established fame had shrunkfrom an enterprise with which they sympathised in various degrees. Inthe proximate history of the Republic there had been three men whoshowed an unwavering belief in the Italian farmer and the blessings ofagriculture. These were M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. But the influence of Cato's house had becomeextinct with its first founder. The elder son, an amiable man and anaccomplished jurist, had not out-lived his father; the second stillsurvived, but seems to have inherited little of the fighting qualitiesof the terrible censor. The traditions of a Roman house needed to besustained by the efforts of its existing representative, and the"newness" of the Porcii might have necessitated generations of vigorousleaders to make them a power in the land. Scipionic traditions were nowrepresented by Aemilianus, and the glow of the luminary was reflected inpaler lights, who received their lustre from moving in that charmedorbit. One of these, the indefatigable henchman Laelius, had risen tothe rank of consul, and stimulated by the vigorous theorisings of hishellenised environment, he contemplated for a moment the formation of aplan which should deal with some of the worst evils of the agrarianquestion. But he looked at the problem only to start back in affright. The strength and truculency of the vested interests with which he wouldhave to deal were too much for a man whose nerve was weakened byphilosophy and experience, and Laelius by his retreat justified, if hedid not gain, the soubriquet which proclaimed his "sapience". [299] Butwhy was Scipio himself idle? The answer is to be found both in histemperament and in his circumstances. With all his dash and energy, hewas something of a healthy hedonist. As the chase had delighted him inhis youth, so did war in his manhood. While hating its cruelties, hegloried in its excitement, and the discipline of the camp was more tohis mind than the turbulence of an assembly. His mind, too, belonged tothat class which finds it almost impossible to emancipate itself fromtraditional politics. His vast knowledge of the history of othercivilisations may have taught him, as it taught Polybius, that Rome wassuccessful because she was unique. [300] Here there was to be no breakwith the past, no legislator posing as a demi-god, no obedience to thecries of the masses who, if they once got loose, might turn and rend theenlightened few, and reproduce on Italian soil the shocking scenes ofGreek socialistic enterprise. As things were, to be a reformer was to bea partisan, and Scipio loved the prospect of his probable supporters aslittle as that of his probable opponents. The fact of the Empire, too, must have weighed heavily with a man who was no blind imperialist. Eventhough economic reform might create an added efficiency in the army, Scipio must have known, as Polybius certainly knew, that soldiers arebut pawns in the great game, and that the controlling forces were thewisdom of the conservative senator, the ambition of the wealthy noble, and the capital of the enterprising knight. The wisdom of disturbingtheir influence, and awakening their resentment, could scarcely appealto a mind so perfectly balanced and practical as Scipio's. Circumstances, too, must have had their share in determining hisquiescence. The Scipios had been a power in Rome in spite of thenobility. They were used because they were needed, not because they wereloved, and the necessary man was never in much favour with the senate. Although there was no tie of blood between Aemilianus and the elderScipio, they were much alike both in fortune and in temperament. Theyhad both been called upon to save military situations that were thoughtdesperate; their reputation had been made by successful war; and thoughneither was a mere soldier, they lacked the taste and the patience forthe complicated political game, which alone made a man a power amidstthe noble circles and their immediate dependants at Rome. But the last generation had seen in Tiberius Gracchus a man whosepolitical influence had been vast, a noble with but scant respect forthe indefeasible rights of the nobility and as stern as Cato in hisanimadversions on the vices of his order, a man whose greatest successesabroad had been those of diplomacy rather than of war, one who hadestablished firm connections and a living memory of himself both in Westand East, whose name was known and loved in Spain, Sardinia, Asia andEgypt. It would have been too much to hope that this honest oldaristocrat would attempt to grapple with the evils which had firstbecome manifest during his own long lifetime; but it was not unnaturalthat people should look to a son of his for succour, especially as thisson represented the blood of the Scipios as well as of the Gracchi. Themarriage of the elderly Gracchus with the young Cornelia had marked theclosing of the feud, personal rather than political, which had longseparated him from the elder Scipio: and a further link between the twofamilies was subsequently forged by the marriage of Sempronia, adaughter of Cornelia, to Scipio Aemilianus. The young Tiberius Gracchusmay have been born during one of his father's frequent absences on theservice of the State. [301] Certainly the elder Gracchus could have seenlittle of his son during the years of his infancy. But the closing yearsof the old man's life seem to have been spent uninterruptedly in Italy, and Tiberius must have been profoundly influenced by the genial andstately presence that Rome loved and feared. But he was little more thana boy when his father died, and the early influences that moulded hisfuture career seem to have been due mainly to his mother. Cornelia wouldhave been the typical Roman matron, had she lived a hundred yearsearlier; she would then have trained sons for the battlefield, not forthe Forum. As it was, the softening influences of Greek culture hadtempered without impairing her strength of character, had substitutedrational for purely supernatural sanctions, and a wide political outlookfor a rude sense of civic duty. Herself the product of an education suchas ancient civilisations rarely bestowed upon their women, she wrote andspoke with a purity and grace which led to the belief that her sons hadlearnt from her lips and from her pen their first lessons in thateloquence which swayed the masses and altered the fortunes of Rome. [302]But her gifts had not impaired her tenderness. Her sons were her"Jewels, " and the successive loss of nine of the children which she hadborne to Gracchus must have made the three that remained doubly dear. The two boys had a narrow escape from becoming Eastern princes: for thehand of the widow Cornelia was sought in marriage by the King ofEgypt. [303] Such an alliance with the representative of the two housesof the Gracchi and the Scipios might easily seem desirable to aprotected king, although the attractions of Cornelia may also haveinfluenced his choice. She, however, had no aspirations to share thethrone of the Lagidae, and the hellenism of Tiberius and of his youngerbrother Caius, though deep and far-reaching, was of a kind less violentthan would have been gained by transportation to Alexandria. They weretrained in rhetoric by Diophanes an exile from Mitylene, and inphilosophy by Blossius of Cumae, a stoic of the school of Antipater ofTarsus. [304] Many held the belief that Tiberius was spurred to hispolitical enterprise by the direct exhortation of these teachers; but, even if their influence was not of this definite kind, there can belittle doubt that the teaching of the two Greeks exercised a powerfulinfluence on the political cast of his mind. Ideals of Greek liberty, speeches of Greek statesmen who had come forward as champions of theoppressed, stories of social ruin averted by the voice and hand of theheaven-sent legislator, pictures of self-sacrifice and of resignedsubmission to a standard of duty--these were lessons that may have beentaught both by rhetorician and philosopher. Nor was the teaching ofhistory different. In the literary environment in which the Gracchimoved, ready answers were being given to the most vital questions ofpolitics and social science. Every one must have felt that theapproaching struggle had a dual aspect, that it was political as well associal. For social conservatism was entrenched behind a politicalrampart: and if reform, neglected by the senate, was to come from thepeople, the question had first to be asked, Had the people a legal rightto initiate reform? The historians of that and of the precedinggeneration would have answered this question unhesitatingly in theaffirmative. The _de facto_ sovereignty of the senate had not evenreceived a sanction in contemporary literature, while to that of theimmediate past it was equally unknown. The Roman annalists from the timeof the Second Punic War had revealed the sovereignty of the people asthe basis of the Roman constitution, [305] and the history of the longstruggle of the Plebs for freedom made the protection of the commons thesole justification of the tribunate. From the lips of Polybius himselfTiberius may have heard the impression which the Roman polity made onthe mind of the educated Greek: and the fact that this was a Greekpicture did not lessen its validity; for the Greek was moulding theorthodox history of Rome, and the victims of his genius were the bestRoman intellects of the day. He might have learnt how in this mixedconstitution the people still retained their inalienable rights, howthey elected, ratified, and above all how they punished. [306] He mighthave gathered that the identification of the tribunate with theinterests of the nobility was a perversion of its true and vitalfunction: that the tribune exists but to assist the commons and can besubject to no authority but the people's will, whether expresseddirectly by them or indirectly through his colleagues. [307] The historyof the Punic wars did indeed reveal, in the fate of a Varro or aMinucius, how popular insubordination might be punished, when its endwas wrong. Polybius's own voice was raised in prophetic warning againsta possible demagogy of the future. [308] But that history showed thehealthy discipline of a healthy people--a people that had vanquishedgenius through subordination, a peasant class whose loyalty and tenacitywere as great as those of its leaders, and without whom those leaderswould have been helpless. Where was such a class to be found now? Changethe subject or turn the page, and the Greek statesman and historiancould point to the dreadful reverse of this picture. [309] He could showa Greek nation, gifted with political genius but doomed to politicaldecay--a nation whose sons accumulated money, lived in luxury withlittle forethought for the future, and refused to beget children for theState: a nation with a wealthy and cultured upper class, but one thatwas literally perishing for the lack of men. [310] Was this the fate instore for Rome? A temperament that was merely vigorous and keen mightnot have been affected by such reflections. One that was merelycontemplative might have regarded them only as a subject for curiousstudy. But Tiberius's mind ran to neither of these two extremes. He wasa thoughtful and sensitive man of action. Sweet in temper, staid indeportment, gentle in language, he attracted from his dependants aloyalty that knew no limits, and from his friends a devotion that didnot even shrink from death on his behalf. Even in his pure and polishedoratory passion revealed itself chiefly in appeals to pity, not in theharsher forms of invective or of scorn. His mode of life was simple andrestrained, but apparently with none of the pedantic austerity of thestoic. In an age that was becoming dissolute and frivolous he was moraland somewhat serious. [311] But his career is not that of the man whoburdens society with the impression that he has a solemn mission toperform. Such men are rarely taken as seriously as they take themselves;they do not win aged men of experience to support their cause; thedemeanour that wearies their friends is even likely to be found irksomeby the mob. Roman society must have seen much promise in his youth, for honours cameearly. A seat at the augural board was regarded as a tribute to hismerit rather than his birth;[312] and indeed the Roman aristocrats, whodispensed such favours, were too clever to be the slaves of a name, whenpolitical manipulation was in question and talent might be diverted tothe true cause. His marriage was a more important determinant in hiscareer. The bride who was offered him was the daughter of AppiusClaudius Pulcher, a man of consular and censorian rank and now Princepsof the senate, [313] a clever representative of that brilliant andeccentric house, that had always kept liberalism alive in Rome. Appiushad already displayed some of the restless individuality of hisancestors. When the senate had refused him a triumph after a war withthe Salassi, he had celebrated the pageant at his own expense, while hisdaughter, a vestal, walked beside the car to keep at bay the importunatetribune who attempted to drag him off. [314] A similar unconventionalitywas manifested in the present betrothal. The story runs that Appiusbroached the question to Tiberius at an augural banquet. The propositionwas readily accepted, and Appius in his joy shouted out the news to hiswife as he entered his own front door. The lady was more surprised thanannoyed. "What need for all this haste, " she said, "unless indeed youhave found Tiberius Gracchus for our girl?" [315] Appius, hasty as hewas, was probably in this case not the victim of a sudden inspiration. The restless old man doubtless pined for reform; but he was weighed downby years, honours and familiarity with the senate. He could not be theprotagonist in the coming struggle; but in Tiberius he saw the man ofthe future. The chances of the time favoured a military even more than a politicalcareer; the chief spheres of influence were the province and the camp, and it was in these that the earliest distinctions of Tiberius were won. When a lad of fifteen he had followed his brother-in-law Scipio toAfrica, and had been the first to mount the walls of Carthage in thevain assault on the fortress of Megara. [316] He had won the approval ofthe commander by his discipline and courage, and left general regretamongst the army when he quitted the camp before the close of thecampaign. But an experience as potent for the future as his first tasteof war, must have been those hours of leisure spent in Scipio'stent. [317] If contact with the great commander aroused emulation, thetalk on political questions of Scipio and his circle must have inspiredprofound reflection. Here he could find aspirations enough; all that waslacking was a leader to translate them into deeds. The quaestorship, thefirst round of the higher official ladder, found him attached to theconsul Mancinus and destined for the ever-turbulent province of Spain. It was a fortunate chance, for here was the scene of his father'smilitary and diplomatic triumphs. But the sequel was unexpected. He hadgone to fulfil the duties of a subordinate; he suddenly found himselfperforming those of a commander-in-chief or of an accreditedrepresentative of the Roman people. The Numantines would treat only witha Gracchus, and the treaty that saved Roman lives but not Roman honourwas felt to be really his work. In a moment he was involved in apolitical question that agitated the whole of Rome. The Numantine treatywas the topic of the day. Was it to be accepted or, if repudiated, should the authors of the disaster, the causes of the breach of faith, be surrendered in time-honoured fashion to the enemy as an expiation forthe violated pledge? On the first point there was little hesitation; thesenate decided for the nullity of the treaty, and it was likely thatthis view would be accepted by the people, if the measures against theratifying officials were not made too stringent. For on this point therewas a difference of opinion. The poorer classes, whose sons and brothershad been saved from death or captivity by the treaty, blamed Mancinus asthe cause of the disaster, but were grateful to Tiberius as the authorof the agreement. Others who had less to lose and could therefore affordto stand on principle, would have enforced the fullest rigour of theancient rules and have delivered up the quaestor and tribunes with thedefaulting general. [318] It was thought that the influence of Scipio, always great with the agricultural voters, might have availed to saveeven Mancinus, nay that, if he would, he might have got the peaceconfirmed. [319] But his efforts were believed to have been employed infavour of Tiberius. The matter ended in an illogical compromise. Thetreaty was repudiated, but it was decreed that the general alone shouldbe surrendered. [320] A breach in an ancient rule of religious law hadbeen made in favour of Tiberius. But, in spite of this mark of popular favour, the experience had beendisheartening and its effect was disturbing. Although it is impossibleto subscribe to the opinion of later writers, who, looking at the matterfrom a conservative and therefore unfavourable aspect, saw in this earlycheck the key to Tiberius's future action, [321] yet anger and fear leavetheir trace even on the best regulated minds. The senate had torn up histreaty and placed him for the moment in personal peril. It was to thepeople that he owed his salvation. If circumstances were to develop anopposition party in Rome, he was being pushed more and more into itsranks. And a coolness seems to have sprung up at this time between himand the man who had been his great _exemplar_. Tiberius took no counselof Scipio before embarking on his great enterprise; support and advicewere sought elsewhere. He may have already tested Scipio's lack ofsympathy with an active propaganda; shame might have kept back the hintof a plan that might seem to imply a claim to leadership. But it ispossible that there was some feeling of resentment against the warriornow before Numantia, who had done nothing to save the last Numantinetreaty and the honour of the name of Gracchus. His reticence could scarcely have been due to ignorance of his owndesigns; for his brother Caius left it on record that it was whilejourneying northward from Rome on his way to Numantia that Tiberius'seyes were first fully opened to the magnitude of the malady that criedaloud for cure. [322] It was in Etruria, the paradise of the capitalist, that he saw everywhere the imported slave and the barbarian who hadreplaced the freeman. It was this sight that first suggested somethinglike a definite scheme. A further stimulus was soon to be found inscraps of anonymous writing which appeared on porches, walls andmonuments, praying for his succour and entreating that the public landshould be recovered for the poor. [323] The voiceless Roman people wasseeking its only mode of utterance, a tribune who should be what thetribune had been of old, the servant of the many not the creature of thefew. To Gracchus's mother his plans could hardly have been veiled. Sheis even said to have stimulated a vague craving for action by theplayful remark that she was still known as the mother-in-law of Scipio, not as the mother of the Gracchi. [324] But there was need of serious counsel. Gracchus did not mean to be amere demagogue, coming before the people with a half-formed plan andstirring up an agitation which could end merely in some idle resolution. There were few to whom he could look for advice, but those few were ofthe best. Three venerable men, whose deeds and standing were evengreater than their names, were ready with their support. There was thechief pontiff, P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, the man who was said tocombine in a supreme degree the four great blessings of wealth, birth, eloquence and legal lore;[325] there was the brother of Crassus, P. Mucius Scaevola, [326] the greatest lawyer of his age and alreadydestined to the consulship for the following year; lastly there wasTiberius's father-in-law, the restless Appius, now eagerly awaiting thefulfilment of a cherished scheme by the man of his own choice. [327] Thus fortified, Tiberius Gracchus entered on his tribunate, andformulated the measure which was to leave large portions of the publicdomain open for distribution to the poor. In the popular gatherings withwhich he opened his campaign, he dwelt on the nature of the evils whichhe proposed to remedy. It was the interest of Italy, not merely of theRoman proletariate, that was at stake. [328] He pointed out how theItalian peasantry had dwindled in numbers, and how that portion of itwhich still survived had been reduced to a poverty that was irremediableby their own efforts. He showed that the slave gangs which worked thevast estates were a menace, not a help, to Rome. They could not beenlisted for service in the legions; their disaffection to their masterswas notorious; their danger was being proved even now by the horriblecondition of Sicily, the fate of its slave-owning landlords, the long, difficult and eventful war which had not even yet been brought to aclose. [329] Sometimes the language of passion replaced that of reason inhis harangues to the crowds that pressed round the Rostra. "The beaststhat prowl about Italy have holes and lurking-places where they may maketheir beds. You who fight and die for Italy enjoy but the blessings ofair and light. These alone are your heritage. Homeless, unsettled, youwander to and fro with your wives and children. Our generals are in thehabit of inspiring their soldiers to the combat by exhorting them torepel the enemy in defence of their tombs and ancestral shrines. Theappeal is idle and false. You cannot point to a paternal altar, you haveno ancestral tomb. No! you fight and die to give wealth and luxury toothers. You are called the masters of the world; yet there is no clod ofearth that you can call your own. " [330] The proposal, which was ushered in by these stirring appeals, seemed atfirst sight to be of a moderate and somewhat conservative character. Itprofessed to be the renewal of an older law, which had limited theamount of domain land which an individual might possess to five hundred_jugera_;[331] it professed, that is, to reinforce an injunction whichhad been persistently disobeyed, for this enactment restrictingpossession had never been repealed. The extent to which a proposal ofthis kind is a re-enactment, in the spirit as well as in the letter, depends entirely on the length of time which has elapsed since theoriginal proposal has begun to be violated. A political society, whichrecognises custom as one of the bases of law, must recognise desuetudeas equally valid. A law, which has not been enforced for centuries, would, by the common consent of the courts of such nations as favourprogressive legislation, be regarded as no law at all. Again, the age ofan ordinance determines its suitability to present conditions. It may bejustifiable to revive an enactment that is centuries old; but therevival should not necessarily dignify itself with that name. It must beregarded as a new departure, unless the circumstances of the old and thenew enactment can be proved to be approximately the same. Our attemptsto judge the Gracchan law by these considerations are baffled by ourignorance of the real date of the previous enactment, the stringency ofwhose measures he wished to renew. If it was the Licinian law of themiddle of the fourth century, [332] this law must have been renewed, ormust still have continued to be observed, at a period not very longanterior to the Gracchan proposal; for Cato could point his argumentagainst the declaration of war with Rhodes by an appeal to a provisionattributed to this measure[333]--an appeal which would have beenpointless, had the provision fallen into that oblivion which persistentneglect of an enactment must bring to all but the professed students oflaw. We can at least assert that the charge against Gracchus of revivingan enactment so hoary with age as to be absurdly obsolete, is not one ofthe charges to be found even in those literary records which were mostunfriendly to his legislation. [334] The general principle of the measure was, therefore, the limitation tofive hundred _jugera_ of the amount of public land that could be"possessed" by an individual. The very definition of the tenureimmediately exempted large portions of the State's domain from theoperation of this rule. [335] The Campanian land was leased by the Stateto individuals, not merely possessed by them as the result of anoccupation permitted by the government; it, therefore, fell outside thescope of the measure;[336] but, as it was technically public land andits ownership was vested in the State, it would have been hazardous topresume its exemption; it seems, therefore, to have been specificallyexcluded from the operation of the bill, and a similar exception wasprobably made in favour of many other tracts of territory held under asimilar tenure. [337] Either Gracchus declined to touch any interest thatcould properly describe itself as "vested, " even though it took merelythe form of a leasehold, or he valued the secure and abundant revenuewhich flowed into the coffers of the State from these domains. Therewere other lands strictly "public" where the claim of the holders wasstill stronger, and where dispossession without the fullest compensationmust have been regarded as mere robbery. We know from later legislationthat respect was had to such lands as the Trientabula, estates which hadbeen granted by the Roman government at a quit rent to its creditors, assecurity for that portion of a national debt which had never beenrepaid. It is less certain what happened in the case of lands of whichthe usufruct alone had been granted to communities of Roman citizens orLatin colonists. Ownership in this case still remained vested in theRoman people, and if the right of usufruct had been granted by law, itcould be removed by law. In the case of Latin communities, however, itwas probably guaranteed by treaty, which no mere law could touch: and sosimilar were the conditions of Roman and Latin communities in thisparticular, that it is probable that the land whose use was conferred onwhole communities by these ancient grants, was wholly spared by theGracchan legislation. In the case of those commons which were possessedby groups of villagers for the purposes of pasturage (_agercompascuus_), [338] it is not likely that the group was regarded as theunit: and therefore, even in the case of such an aggregate possessingover five hundred _jugera_, their occupation was probably leftundisturbed. All other possessors must vacate the land which exceeded the prescribedlimit. Such an ordinance would have been harsh, had no compensation beenallowed, and Gracchus proposed certain amends for the loss sustained. Inthe first place, the five hundred _jugera_ retained by each possessorwere to be increased by half as much again for each son that he mightpossess: although it seems that the amount retained was not to exceedone thousand _jugera_. [339] Secondly, the land so secured to existingpossessors was not to be held on a merely precarious tenure, and was notto be burdened by the payment of dues to the State; even if ownershipwas not vested in its holders, they were guaranteed gratuitousundisturbed possession in perpetuity. [340] Thirdly, the bill asoriginally drafted even suggested some monetary compensation for theland surrendered. [341] This compensation was probably based on avaluation of stock, buildings, and recent permanent improvements, whichwere to be found on the territory now reverting to the State. It musthave applied for the most part only to arable land, and practicallyamounted to a purchase by the State of items to which it could lay nolegal claim; for it was the soil alone, not the buildings on the soil, over which its lordship could properly be asserted. The object of reclaiming the public land was its future distributionamongst needy citizens. This distribution might have taken either of twoforms. Fresh colonies might have been planted, or the acquired landmight merely be assigned to settlers who were to belong to the existingpolitical organisations. It was the latter method of simple assignationthat Gracchus chose. There was felt to be no particular need for newpolitical creations; for the pacification of Italy seemed to beaccomplished, and the new farming class would perform their duty to theState equally well as members of the territory of Rome or of that of theexisting municipia and coloniae of Roman citizens. There is someevidence that the new proprietors were not all to be attached to thecity of Rome itself, but that many, perhaps most, were to be attributedto the existing colonies and municipia, in the neighbourhood of whichtheir allotments lay. [342] The size of the new allotments which Gracchusprojected is not known; it probably varied with the needs and status ofthe occupier, perhaps with the quality of the land, and there is someindication that the maximum was fixed at thirty _jugera_. [343] This isan amount that compares favourably with the two, three, seven or ten_jugera_ of similar assignments in earlier times, and is at once a proofof the decrease in the value of land--a decrease which had contributedto the formation of the large estates--and of the large amount ofterritory which was expected to be reclaimed by the provisions of thenew measure. The allotments thus assigned were not, however, to be thefreehold property of their recipients. They were, indeed, heritable andto be held on a perfectly secure tenure by the assignees and theirdescendants; but a revenue was to be paid to the State for their use:and they were to be inalienable--the latter provision being a desperateexpedient to check the land-hunger of the capitalist, and to save thenew settlers from obedience to the economic tendencies of thetimes. [344] It is doubtful whether the social object of Gracchus could have beenfully accomplished, had he confined his attention wholly to the existingcitizens of Rome. The area of economic distress was wider than thecitizen body, and it was the salvation of Italy as a whole that Gracchushad at heart. [345] There is much reason for supposing that some of theItalian allies were to be recipients of the benefits of themeasure. [346] In earlier assignations the Latins had not been excluded, and it is probable that at least these, whether members of oldcommunities or of colonies, were intended to have some share in thedistribution. There could be no legal hindrance to such participation. With respect to rights in land, the Latins were already on a level withRoman citizens, and their exclusion from the new allotments would havebeen due to a mere political prejudice which is not characteristiceither of Gracchus or his plans. The ineffectiveness of laws at Rome was due chiefly to the apathy of theexecutive authority. Gracchus saw clearly that his measure would, likeother social efforts of the past, become a mere pious resolution, if itsexecution were entrusted to the ordinary officials of the State. [347]But a special commission, which should effectually carry out the workwhich he contemplated, must be of a very unusual kind. The magnitude ofthe task, and the impossibility of assigning any precise limit of timeto its completion, made it essential that the Triumvirate which heestablished should bear the appearance of a regular but extraordinarymagistracy of the State. The three commissioners created by the billwere to be elected annually by the Comitia of the Tribes. [348]Re-election of the same individuals was possible, and the new magistracywas to come to an end only with the completion of its work. Itsoccupants, perhaps, possessed the Imperium from the date of the firstinstitution of the office; they certainly exercised it from the momentwhen, as we shall see, their functions of assignment were supplementedby the addition of judicial powers. Gracchus was doubtless led to thisnew creation purely by the needs of his measure; but he showed to laterpoliticians the possibility of creating a new and powerful magistracyunder the guise of an agrarian law. Such was the measure that seemed to its proposer a reasonable andequitable means of remedying a grave injustice and restoring rather thangiving rights to the poor. He might, if he would, have insisted onsimple restitution. Had he pressed the letter of the law, not an atom ofthe public domain need have been left to its present occupiers. Thepossessor had no rights against the State; he held on sufferance, andtechnically he might be supposed to be always waiting for his summons toejectment. To give such people something over and above the limit thatthe laws had so long prescribed, to give them further a security oftenure for the land retained which amounted almost to completeownership--were not these unexpected concessions that should be receivedwith gratitude? And even up to the eve of the polling the murmurs of theopposition were sometimes met by appeals to its nobler sentiments. Therich, said Gracchus, if they had the interests of Italy, its futurehopes and its unborn generations at heart, should make this land a freegift to the State; they were vexing themselves about small issues andrefusing to face the greater problems of the day. [349] But personal interests can never seem small, and the average man is moreconcerned with the present than with the future. The opposition wasgrowing in volume day by day, and the murmurs were rising into shrieks. The class immediately threatened must have been numerically small; butthey made up in combination and influence what they lacked in numbers. It was always easy to startle the solid commercial world of Rome by thecry of "confiscation". A movement in this direction might have nolimits; the socialistic device of a "re-division of land, " which had sooften thrown the Greek commonwealths into a ferment, was being importedinto Roman politics. All the forces of respectability should be alliedagainst this sinister innovation. It is probable that many whopropagated these views honestly believed that they exactly fitted thefacts of the case. The possessors did indeed know that they were notowners. They were reminded of the fact whenever they purchased the rightof occupation from a previous possessor, for such a title could not passby mancipation; or whenever they sued for the recovery of an estate fromwhich they had been ejected, for they could not make the plea before thepraetor that the land was theirs "according to the right of theQuirites, " but could rely only on the equitable assistance of themagistrate tendered through the use of the possessory interdicts; or, more frequently still, whenever they paid their dues to the Publicanus, that disinterested middle-man, who had no object in compromising withthe possessors, and could seldom have allowed an acre of land to escapehis watchful eye. But, in spite of these reminders, there was animpression that the tenure was perfectly secure, and that the Statewould never again re-assert its lordship in the extreme form ofdispensing entirely with its clients. Gracchus might talk ofcompensation, but was there any guarantee that it would be adequate, and, even supposing material compensation to be possible, what solacewas that to outraged feelings? Ancestral homes, and even ancestraltombs, were not grouped on one part of a domain, so that they could besaved by an owner when he retained his five hundred _jugera_; they werescattered all over the broad acres. Estates that technically belonged toa single man, and were therefore subject to the operation of the law, had practically ceased to confer any benefit on the owner, and werepledged to other purposes. They had been divided as the _peculia_ of hissons, they had been promised as the dowry of his daughters. Again thoseformer laws may have rightly forbidden the occupation of more than acertain proportion of land; but much of the soil now in possession hadnot been occupied by its present inhabitant; he had bought the right tobe there in hard cash from the former tenant. And think of the investedcapital! Dowries had been swallowed up in the soil, and the Gracchan lawwas confiscating personal as well as real property, taking the wife'sfortune as well as the husband's. Nay, if the history of the public landwere traced, could it not be shown that such value as it now possessedhad been given it by its occupiers or their ancestors? The land was notassigned in early times, simply because it was not worth assignation. Itwas land that had been reclaimed for use, and of this use the authors ofits value were now to be deprived. [350] Such was the plaint of the land-holders, one not devoid of equity and, therefore, awakening a response in the minds of timid and sober businessmen, who were as yet unaffected by the danger. But some of these foundtheir own personal interests at stake. So good had the tenure seemed, that it had been accepted as security for debt, [351] and the Gracchanattack united for once the usually hostile ranks of mortgagers andmortgagees. The alarm spread from Rome to the outlying municipalities. [352] Even in the city itself a very imperfect view of the scope of thebill was probably taken by the proletariate. We may imagine thedistorted form in which it reached the ears of the occupants of thecountry towns. "Was it true that the land which had been given them inusufruct was to be taken away?" was the type of question asked in themunicipia and in the colonies, whether Roman or Latin. The neediermembers of these towns received the news with very different feelings. They had every chance of sharing in the local division of the spoils, and their voices swelled the chorus of approval with which the poorerclasses everywhere received the Gracchan law. Amidst this proletariatecertain catch-words--well-remembered fragments of Gracchus's speeches--had begun to be the familiar currency of the day. "The numberlesscampaigns through which this land has been won, " "The iniquity ofexclusion from what is really the property of the State, " "The disgraceof employing the treacherous slave in place of the free-born citizen"--such was the type of remark with which the Roman working-man or idlernow entertained his fellow. All Roman Italy was in a blaze, and theremust have been a sense of insecurity and anxiety even in those alliedtowns whose interest in Roman domain-land was remote. Might not Stateinterests be as lightly violated as individual interests by a sovereignpeople: and was not the example of Rome almost as perilous as her action? The opponents of Gracchus had no illusions as to the numerical strengthwhich he could summon to his aid. If the battle were fought to a finishin the Comitia, there could be no doubt as to his triumphant victory. Open opposition could serve no purpose except to show what a remnant itwas that was opposing the people's wishes. But there was a means of atleast delaying the danger, of staving off the attack as long as Gracchusremained tribune, perhaps of giving the people an opportunity ofrecovering completely from their delirium. When the college of tribunesmoved as a united body, its force was irresistible; but now, as oftenbefore, there was some division in its ranks. It was not likely that tenmen, drawn from the order of the nobility, should view with equal favoursuch a radical proposal as that of Tiberius Gracchus. But the popularfeeling was so strong that for a time even the unsympathetic members ofthe board hesitated to protest, and no colleague of Tiberius is known tohave opposed the movement in its initial stages. Even the man who wassubsequently won over to the capitalist interest hesitated long beforetaking the formidable step: It was believed, however, that the hesitancyof Marcus Octavius was due more to his personal regard for Tiberius thanto respect for the people's wishes. [353] The tribune who was to scotchthe obnoxious measure was an excellent instrument for a dignifiedopposition. He was grave and discreet, a personal friend and intimate ofTiberius. [354] It is true that he was a large holder on the publicdomain, and that he would suffer by the operation of the new agrarianlaw. But it was fitting that the landlord class should be represented bya landlord, and, if there had been the least suspicion of sordidmotives, it would have been removed by Octavius's refusal to acceptprivate compensation for himself from the slender means of TiberiusGracchus. [355] The offer itself reads like an insult, but it wasprobably made in a moment of passionate and unreflecting fervour. Neither the profferer nor the refuser could have regarded it in thelight of a bribe. Even when the veto had been pronounced, the dailycontest between the two tribunes in the Forum never became a scene ofunseemly recrimination. The war of words revolved round the question ofprinciple. Both disputants were at white heat; yet not a word was saidby either which conveyed a reflection on character or motive. [356] These debates followed the first abortive meeting of the Assembly. Asthe decisive moment approached, streams of country folk had poured intoRome to register their votes in favour of the measure. [357] The Contiohad given way to the Comitia, the people had been ready to divide, andGracchus had ordered his scribe to read aloud the words of the bill. Octavius had bidden the scribe to be silent;[358] the vast meeting hadmelted away, and all the labours of the reformer seemed to have been invain. To accept a temporary defeat under such circumstances was inaccordance with the constitutional spirit of the times. The veto was amode of encouraging reflection; it might yield to a prolonged campaign, but it was regarded as a barrier against a hasty popular impulse which, if unchecked, might prove ruinous to some portion of the community. Gracchus, however, knew perfectly well that it was now being used in theinterest of a small minority, and he held the rights which it protectedto be non-existent; he believed the question of agrarian reform to bebound up with his own personality, and its postponement to be equivalentto its extinction; he had no intention of allowing his own politicallife to be a failure, and, instead of discarding his weapons of attack, he made them more formidable than before. Perhaps in obedience topopular outcries, he redrafted his bill in a form which rendered it moredrastic and less equitable. [359] It is possible that some of the_douceurs_ given to the possessors by his original proposal were notreally in accordance with his own judgment. They were meant to disarmopposition. Now that opposition had not been disarmed, they could beremoved without danger. The stricter measure had the same chance ofsuccess or failure as the less severe. We do not know the nature of thechanges which were now introduced; but it is possible that the pecuniarycompensation offered for improvements on the land to be resumed waseither abolished or rendered less adequate than before. But even the form of the law was unimportant in comparison with thequestion of the method by which the new opposition was to be met. Theveto, if persisted in by Octavius, would suspend the agrarian measureduring the whole of Tiberius's year of office. It could only becountered by a device which would make government so impossible that theopposition would be forced to come to terms. The means were to be foundin the prohibitive power of the tribunes, that right, which flowed fromtheir _major potestas_, of forbidding under threat of penalties theaction of all other magistrates. It was now rarely used except at thebidding of the senate and for certain specified purposes. It had become, in fact, little more than the means of enforcing obedience to atemporary suspension of business life decreed by the government. Butrecent events suggested a train of associations that brought back tomind the great political struggles of the past, and recalled the mode inwhich Licinius and Sextius had for five years sustained their anarchicaledict for the purpose of the emancipation of the Plebs. The differencebetween the conditions of life in primitive Rome and in the cosmopolitancapital of to-day did not appeal to Tiberius. The Justitium was aslegitimate a method of political warfare as the Intercessio. He issuedan edict which forbade all the other magistracies to perform theirofficial functions until the voting on the agrarian law should becarried through; he placed his own seals on the doors of the temple ofSaturn to prevent the quaestors from making payments to the treasury orwithdrawing money from it; he forbade the praetors to sit in the courtsof justice and announced that he would exact a fine from those whodisobeyed. The magistrates obeyed the edict, and most of the active lifeof the State was in suspense. [360] The fact of their obedience showedthe overwhelming power which Tiberius now had behind him; for anill-supported tribune, who adopted such an obsolete method of warfare, would have been unable to enforce his decrees and would merely haveappeared ridiculous. The opponents of the law were now genuinelyalarmed. Those who would be the chief sufferers put on garments ofmourning, and paced the silent Forum with gloom and despair written ontheir faces, as though they were the innocent victims of a great wrong. But, while they took this overt means of stirring the commiseration ofthe crowd, it was whispered that the last treacherous device foraverting the danger was being tried. The cause would perish with thedemagogue, and Tiberius might be secretly removed. Confidence in thisview was strengthened when it was known that the tribune carried adagger concealed about his person. [361] An attempt was now made to discover whether the pressure had beensufficient and whether the veto would be repeated. Gracchus againsummoned the assembly, the reading of the bill was again commenced andagain stopped at the instance of Octavius. [362] This seconddisappointment nearly led to open riot. The vast crowd did notimmediately disperse; it felt its great physical strength and the utterweakness of the regular organs of government. There were ominous signsof an appeal to force, when two men of consular rank, Manlius andFulvius, [363] intervened as peacemakers. They threw themselves at thefeet of Tiberius, they clasped his hands, they besought him with tearsto pause before he committed himself to an act of violence. Tiberius wasnot insensible to the appeal. The immediate future was dark enough, andthe entreaties of these revered men had saved an awkward situation. Heasked them what they held that he should do. They answered that theywere not equal to advise on a matter of such vast import; but that therewas the senate. Why not submit the whole matter to the judgment of thegreat council of the State? Tiberius's own attitude to this proposal mayhave been influenced by the fact that it was addressed to his colleaguesas well as to himself, [364] and that they apparently thought it areasonable means of relieving the present situation. It is difficult tobelieve that the man who had never taken the senate into his confidenceover so vital a matter as the agrarian law, could have had much hope ofits sympathy now. But his conviction of the inherent reasonableness ofhis proposal, [365] of his own power of stating the case convincingly, and his knowledge that the senate usually did yield at a crisis, thatits government was only possible because it consistently kept its fingeron the pulse of popular opinion, may have directed his acceptance of itsadvice. Immediate resort was had to the Curia. The business of the housemust have been immediately suspended to listen to a statement of themerits of the agrarian measure, and to a description of the politicalsituation which it had created. When the debate began, it was obviousthat there was nothing but humiliation in store for the leaders of thepopular movement. The capitalist class was represented by anoverwhelming majority; carping protests and riddling criticism wereheard on every side, and Tiberius probably had never been told so manyhome truths in his life. It was useless to prolong the discussion, andTiberius was glad to get into the open air of the Forum again. He hadformed his resolution, and now made a proposal which, if carriedthrough, might remove the deadlock by means that might be construed aslegitimate. The new device was nothing less than the removal of hiscolleague Octavius from office. He announced that at the next meeting ofthe Assembly two questions would be put before the Plebs, the acceptanceof the law and the continuance by Octavius of his tenure of thetribunate. [366] The latter question was to be raised on the generalissue whether a tribune who acted contrary to the interests of thepeople was to continue in office. At the appointed time[367] Octavius'sconstancy was again tested, and he again stood firm. Tiberius broke outinto one of his emotional outbursts, seizing his colleague's hands, entreating him to do this great favour to the people, reminding him thattheir claims were just, were nothing in proportion to their toils anddangers. When this appeal had been rejected, Tiberius summed up theimpossibility of the situation in terms which contained a condemnationof the whole growth and structure of the Roman constitution. It was notin human power, he said, to prevent open war between magistrates ofequal authority who were at variance on the gravest matters ofstate;[368] the only way which he saw of securing peace was thedeposition of one of them from office. He did not care in the presentinstance which it was. The people would be the arbiter. Let his owndeposition be proposed by Octavius; he would walk quietly away into aprivate station, if this were the will of the citizens. The man whospoke thus had more completely emancipated himself from Roman formulaethan any Roman of the past. To Octavius it must have seemed a mereoutburst of Greek demagogism. The offer too was an eminently safe one tomake under the circumstances. On no grounds could it be accepted. Atthis point the proceedings were adjourned to allow Octavius time fordeliberation. On the following day Gracchus announced that the question of depositionwould be taken first, and a fresh and equally vain appeal was made tothe feelings of the unshaken Octavius. [369] The question was then put, not as a vague and general resolution, but as a determinate motion thatOctavius be deprived of the tribunate. The thirty-five tribes voted, andwhen the votes of seventeen had been handed up and proclaimed, [370] andthe voice of but one was Lacking to make Octavius a private citizen, Tiberius as the presiding tribune stopped for a moment the machinery ofthe election. He again showed himself as a revolutionist unfortunate inthe possession of a political and personal conscience. The people werewitnessing a more passionate scene than ever, one that may appear as thelast effort of reconciliation between the two social forces that were tomeet in terrible conflict. Gracchus's arms were round his opponent'sneck; broken appeals fell from his lips--the old one that he should notbreak the heart of the people: the new one that he should not cause hisown degradation, and leave a bitter memory in the mind of the author ofhis fall. Observers saw that Octavius's heart was touched; his eyes werefilled with tears, and for some time he kept a troubled silence. But hesoon remembered his duty and his pledge. Tiberius might do with him whathe would. Gracchus called the gods to witness that he would willinglyhave saved his colleague from dishonour, and ordered the resumption ofthe announcement of the votes. The bill became law and Octavius wasstripped of his office. It was probably because he declined to recognisethe legality of the act that he still lingered on the Rostra. One of thetribunician _viatores_, a freedman of Gracchus, was commanded to fetchhim down. When he reached the ground, a rush was made at him by the mob;but his supporters rallied round him, and Tiberius himself rushed fromthe Rostra to prevent the act of violence. Soon he was lost in the crowdand hurried unobserved from the tumult. [371] His place in thetribunician college was filled up by the immediate election of oneQuintus Mummius. [372] The members of the assembly that deposed Octavius may have been thespectators and authors of a new precedent in Roman history, one that wasoften followed in the closing years of the Republic, but one that mayhave received no direct sanction from the records of the past. Theabrogation of the imperium of a proconsul had indeed been known, [373]but the deposition of a city magistrate during his year of office seemsto have been a hitherto untried experiment. We cannot on this groundalone pronounce it to have been illegal; for an act never attemptedbefore may have perfect legal validity, as the first occasion on which alegitimate deduction has been made from admitted principles of theconstitution. It had always been allowed that under certaincircumstances (chiefly the neglect of the proper formalities ofelection) a magistrate might be invited to abdicate his office; but thefact of this invitation is itself an evidence for the absence of anylegal power of suspension. Tradition, however, often supplemented thedefects of historical evidence, and one, perhaps the older, tale of theremoval of the first consul Collatinus stated that it was effected by apopular measure introduced by his colleague. [374] This story was afragment of that tradition of popular sovereignty which animated thehistorical literature of the age of the Gracchi: and one deduction fromthat theory may well have seemed to be that the sovereign people couldchange its ministers as it pleased. It was a deduction, however, thatwas not drawn even in the best period of democratic Athens; it ranwholly counter to the Roman conception of the magistracy as an authorityco-ordinate with the people and one that, if not divinely appointed, received at least something of a sacred character from the fact ofinvestiture with office. Even the prosecution of a magistrate for thegravest crime, although technically permissible during his year ofoffice, had as a rule been relegated to the time when he again became aprivate citizen; the tribunician college, in particular, had generallythrown its protecting shield around its offending members, and had thussustained its own dignity and that of the people. But, even if it besupposed that the sovereign could, at any moment and without any of thedue formalities, proclaim itself a competent court of justice, and eventhough removal from office might be improperly represented as apunishment, there was the question of the offence to be considered. Nocrime known to the law had been charged against Octavius. In theexercise of his admitted right, or, as he might have expressed it, ofhis sacred duty, he had offended against the will of a majority. Theanalogy of the criminal law was from this point of view hopeless, andwas therefore not pressed on this occasion. From another point of viewit was not quite so remote. The tumultuous popular assemblages that had, on the bidding of a prosecuting tribune, often condemned commanders forvague offences hardly formulated in any particular law, scarcelydiffered, except in the fact that no previous magisterial inquiry hadbeen conducted, from the meeting that deposed Octavius. The gulf thatlies between proceedings in a parliament and proceedings in a court oflaw, was far less in Rome than it would have been in those Helleniccommunities that possessed a developed system of criminal judicature. If criminal analogies failed, a purely political ground of defence mustbe adduced. This could hardly be based on considerations of abstractjustice, although, as we shall see, an attempt was made by TiberiusGracchus to give it even this foundation. Could it be based onconvenience? Obviously, as Gracchus saw, his act was the only effectivemeans of removing a deadlock created by a constitution which knew onlymagistrates and people and had effectively crippled both. So far, itmight be defended on grounds of temporary necessity. But an act of thiskind could not die. To what consequences might not its repetition lead?Imagine a less serious question, a less representative assembly. Thinkof the possibility of a few hundred desperate members of theproletariate gathering on the Capitoline hill and deposing a tribune whorepresented the interests of the vast outlying population of Rome. Thisis a consequence which, it is true, was not realised in the future. Butthat was only because the tribunate was more than Gracchus conceived it, and was too strong in tradition and associations of sanctity to bebroken even by his attack. The scruples which troubled him most arosefrom the suspicion that the sacred office itself might have been held tosuffer by the deposition of Octavius, and it was to a repudiation ofthis view that he subsequently devoted the larger part of his systematicdefence of his action. At the same meeting at which Octavius was deposed, the agrarian bill wasfor the first time read without interruption to the people andimmediately became law. Shortly after, the election of the commissionerswas proceeded with and resulted in the appointment of Tiberius Gracchushimself, of his father-in-law Appius Claudius and of Gracchus's youngerbrother Caius. [375] It was perhaps natural that the people should pintheir faith on the family of their champion; but it could hardly haveincreased the confidence of the community as a whole in the wisdom withwhich this delicate task would be executed, to find that it wasentrusted to a family party, one of which was a mere boy; and themistrust must have been increased when, somewhat later in the course ofthe year, the thorny questions which immediately encompassed the task ofdistribution led to the introduction by Tiberius of another law, whichgave judicial power to the triumvirs, for the purpose of determiningwhat was public land and what was private. [376] The fortunes of thericher classes seemed now to be entrusted to one man, who combined inhis own person the tribunician power and the imperium, whosejurisdiction must have seriously infringed that of the regular courts, and who was assisted in issuing his probably inappellable decrees by afather-in-law and a younger brother. But, although effective protest wasimpossible, the senate showed its resentment by acts that might appearpetty and spiteful, did we not remember that they were the only meansopen to this body of passing a vote of censure on the recentproceedings. The senate controlled every item of the expenditure; andwhen the commissioners appealed to it for their expenses, it refused atent and fixed the limit of supplies at a denarius and a half a day. Theinstigator of this decree was the ex-consul Scipio Nasica, a heavy loserby the agrarian law, a man of strong and passionate temper who was everyday becoming a more infuriated opponent of Tiberius Gracchus. [377] Meanwhile the latter had celebrated a peaceful triumph which fareclipsed the military pageants of the imperators of the past. Thecountry people, before they returned to their farms, had escorted him tohis house; they had hailed him as a greater than Romulus, as thefounder, not of a city nor of a nation, but of all the peoples ofItaly. [378] It is true that his escort was only the poor, rude mob. Stately nobles and clanking soldiers were not to be seen in theprocession. But they were better away. This was the true apotheosis of areal demagogism. And the suspicion of the masses was as readily fired astheir enthusiasm. A friend of Tiberius died suddenly and ugly marks wereseen upon the body. There was a cry of poison; the bier was caught up onthe shoulders of the crowd and borne to the place of burning. A vastthrong stood by to see the corpse consumed, and the ineffectiveness ofthe flames was held a thorough confirmation of the truth of theirsuspicions. [379] It remained to see how far this protective energy wouldserve to save their favourite when the day of reckoning came. Tiberius could hardly have shared in the general elation. To makepromises was one thing, to fulfil them another. Everything depended onthe effectiveness of the execution of the agrarian scheme; and, althoughthe mechanism for distribution was excellent, some of the materialnecessary for its successful fulfilment was sadly lacking. There werecandidates enough for land, and there was sufficient land for thecandidates. But whence were the means for starting these pennilesspeople on their new road to virtue and prosperity to be derived? To givean ardent settler thirty _jugera_ of soil and to withhold from him themeans of sowing his first crop or of making his first effort to turnpasture into arable land, was both useless and cruel; and we may imaginethat the evicted possessors had not left their relinquished estates in avery enviable condition. The doors of the Aerarium were closed, for itskey was in the hands of the senate; and Gracchus had to cast an anxiouseye around for means for satisfying the needs of his clients. The opportunity was presented when the Roman people came into theunexpected inheritance of Attalus the Third, king of Pergamon. Thetestament was brought to Rome by Eudemus the Pergamene, whose firstbusiness was with the senate. But, when Eudemus arrived in the city, hesaw a state of things which must have made him doubt whether the senatewas any longer the true director of the State. It sat passive andsullen, while an energetic _prostates_ of the Greek type was doing whathe liked with the land of Italy. No sane ambassador could have refusedto neglect Gracchus, and it is practically certain that Eudemusapproached him. This fact we may believe, even if we do not accept theversion that the envoy had taken the precaution of bringing in hisluggage a purple robe and a diadem, as symbols that might be necessaryfor a fitting recognition of Tiberius's future position. [380] It is alsopossible that suspicion of the rule of senators and capitalists may alsohave prompted the Greek to attempt to discover whether a more tolerablesettlement might not be gained for his country through the leader of thepopular party. [381] We cannot say whether Gracchus ever contemplated apolicy with respect to the province as a whole. His mind was probablyfull of his immediate needs. He saw in the treasures of Attalus morethan an equivalent for the revenues enclosed in the locked Aerarium, andhe announced his intention of promulgating a plebiscite that the moneyleft by the king should be assigned to the settlers provided for by hisagrarian law. [382] It is possible that he contemplated the applicationof the future revenues of the kingdom of Pergamon to this or somesimilar purpose; and it was perhaps partly for this reason, partly inanswer to the objection that the treasure could not be appropriatedwithout a senatorial decree, that he announced the novel doctrine thatit was no business of the senate to decide the fate of the cities whichhad belonged to the Attalid monarchy, and that he himself would preparefor the people a measure dealing with this question. [383] This was the fiercest challenge that he had yet flung to the senate. There might be a difference of opinion as to the right of a magistrateto put a question to the people without the guidance of a senatorialdecree; the assignment of land was unquestionably a popular right in sofar as it required ratification by the commons; even the deposition ofOctavius was a matter for the people and would avenge itself. But therewere two senatorial rights--the one usurped, the other created--whosevalidity had never been questioned. These were the control of financeand the direction of provincial administration. Were the possibilityonce admitted that these might be dealt with in the Comitia, themagistrates would cease to be ministers of the senate; for it waschiefly through a system of judicious prize-giving that the senateattached to itself the loyalty of the official class. There was perhapsless fear of what Gracchus himself might do than of the spectre which hewas raising for the future. For in Roman history the events of the pastmade those of the future; there were few isolated phenomena in itsdevelopment. From this time the attacks of individual senators on Gracchus becamemore vehement and direct. They proceeded from men of the highest rank. Acertain Pompeius, in whom we may probably see an ex-consul and a futurecensor, was not ashamed of raising the spectre of a coming monarchy byreference to the story of the sceptre and the purple robe, and is saidto have vowed to impeach Gracchus as soon as his year of magistracy hadexpired;[384] the ex-consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus, of Macedonianfame, reproached Tiberius with his rabble escort. He compared thedemeanour of the father and the son. In the censorship of the former thecitizens used to quench their lights at night, as they saw him pass upthe street to his house, that they might impress the censorial mind withthe ideas of early hours and orderly conduct; now the son of this manmight be seen returning home amidst the blaze of torches, held in thestout arms of a defiant body-guard drawn from the neediest classes. [385]These arrows may have Missed the mark; the one that hit was winged by anaged senator, Titus Annius Luscus, who had held the consulship twentyyears before. His wit is said to have been better established than hischaracter. He excelled in that form of ready altercation, of impalinghis opponent on the horns of a dilemma by means of some innocentquestion, which, both in the courts and the senate, was often moreeffective than the power of continuous oratory. He now challengedTiberius to a wager (_sponsio_), such as in the public life of Rome wasoften employed to settle a disputed point of honour or of fact, todetermine the question whether he had dishonoured a colleague, who washoly in virtue of his office and had been made sacrosanct by the laws. The proposal was received by the senators with loud cries ofacclamation. A glance at Tiberius would probably have shown that Anniushad found the weak spot, not merely in his defensive armour, but in hisvery soul. The deposition of Octavius was proving a very nemesis; it wasa democratic act that was in the highest degree undemocratic, anassertion and yet a gross violation of popular liberty. [386] Thesuperstitious masses were in the habit of washing their hands andpurifying their bodies before they entered into the presence of atribune. [387] Might there not be a thrill of awe and repentance when theidea was brought home to them that this holy temple had been violated:and must not this be followed by a sense of repugnance to the man whohad prompted them to the unhallowed deed? Tiberius sprang to his feet, quitted the senate-house and summoned the people. The majesty of thetribunate in his person had been outraged by Annius. He must answer forhis words. The aged senator appeared before the crowd; he knew hisdisadvantage if the ordinary weapons of comitial strife were employed. In power of words and in repute with the masses he stood far behindTiberius. But his presence of mind did not desert him. Might he ask afew questions before the regular proceedings began? The request wasallowed and there was a dead silence. "Now suppose, " said Annius, "you, Tiberius, were to wish to cover me with shame and abuse, and suppose Iwere to call on one of your colleagues for help, and he were to come uphere to offer me his assistance, and suppose further that this were toexcite your displeasure, would you deprive that colleague of yours ofhis office?" To answer that question in the affirmative was to admitthat the tribunician power was dead; to answer it in the negative was toinvite the retort that the _auxilium_ was only one form of the_intercessio_. The quick-witted southern crowd must have seen thedifficulty at once, and Tiberius himself, usually so ready and bold inspeech, could not face the dilemma. He remained silent and dismissed theassembly. [388] But matters could not remain as they were. This new aspect of Octavius'sdeposition was the talk of the town, and there were many troubledconsciences amongst the members of his own following. Something must bedone to quiet them; he must raise the question himself. The situationhad indeed changed rapidly. Tiberius Gracchus was on his defence. Neverdid his power of special pleading appear to greater advantage than inthe speech which followed. He had the gift which makes the mightyRadical, of diving down and seizing some fundamental truth of politicalscience, and then employing it with merciless logic for the illustrationor refutation of the practice of the present. The central idea here wasone gathered from the political science of the Greeks. The good of thecommunity is the only test of the rightness of an institution. It isjustified if it secures that end, unjustified if it does not: or, to usethe language of religion, holy in the one case, devoid of sanctity inthe other. And an institution is not a mere abstraction; we must judgeit by its use. We must, therefore, say that when it obeys the commoninterest, it is right: when it ceases to obey it, it is wrong. But theright must be preserved and the wrong plucked out. So Gracchusmaintained that the tribune was holy and sacrosanct because he had beensanctified to the people's service and was the people's head. If then hechange his character and do the people wrong, cutting down its strengthand silencing its voice as expressed through the suffrage, he hasdeprived himself of his office, for he has ceased to conform to theterms on which he received it. Should we leave a tribune alone who waspulling down the Capitolium or burning the docks? And yet a tribune whodid these things would remain a tribune, though a bad one. It is onlywhen a tribune is destroying the power of the people that he is nolonger a tribune at all. The laws give the tribune the power to arrestthe consul. It is a power given against a man elected by the people; forconsul and tribune are equally mandataries of the people. Shall not thenthe people have the right of depriving the tribune of his authority, when he uses this authority in a way prejudicial to the interests of thegiver? What does the history of the past teach us? Can anything havebeen more powerful or more sacred than the ancient monarchy of Rome? TheImperium of the king was unlimited, the highest priestly offices werehis. Yet the city expelled Tarquin for his crimes. The tyranny of asingle man was alone sufficient to bring to an end a government whichhad its roots in the most distant past, which had presided over the verybirth of the city. And, if sanctity alone is to be the ground ofimmunity, what are we to think of the punishment of a vestal virgin? Isthere anything in Rome more holy and awe-inspiring than the maidens whotend and guard the eternal flame? Yet their sin is visited by the mosthorrible of deaths. They hold their sacrosanct character through thegods; they lose it, therefore, when they sin against the gods. Shouldthe same not be true of the tribune? It is on account of the people thathe is sacred; he cannot retain this divine character when he wrongs thepeople; he is a man engaged in destroying the very power which is thesource of his strength. If the tribunate can justly be gained by afavourable vote of the majority of the tribes, can it not with greaterjustice be taken away by an adverse vote of all of them? Again, whatshould be the limits of our action in dealing with sacred things? Doessanctity mean immobility? By no means. What are more holy and inviolablethan things dedicated to the gods? Yet this character does not preventthe people from handling, moving, transferring them as it pleases. Inthe case of the tribunate, it is the office, not the man, that isinviolable; it may be treated as an object of dedication and transferredto another. The practice of our own State proves that the office is notinviolable in the sense of being inalienable, for its holders have oftenforsworn it and asked to be divested of it. [389] The strongest part of this utterance was that which dealt with thesacred character of office; it was a mere emanation from the performanceof certain functions; the protection, not the reality, of the thing. Gracchus might have added that even a treaty might under certaincircumstances be legitimately broken. The weakest, from a Romanstandpoint or indeed from that of any stable political society, was theidentification of the permanent and temporary character of aninstitution, the assumption that a meeting of the people was the people, that a tribune was the tribune. How far the speech was convincing we donot know; it certainly did not relieve Tiberius of his embarrassments, which were now thickening around him. Tiberius's success had been mainly due to the country voters. It is truethat he had a large following in the city; but this was numericallyinferior to a mass of urban folk, whose attitude was either indifferentor hostile. They were indifferent in so far as they did not wantagrarian assignments, and hostile in so far as they were clients of thenoble houses which opposed Tiberius's policy. This urban party was nowin the ascendant, for the country voters had scattered to theirhomes. [390] The situation demanded that he should work steadily for twoobjects, re-election to the tribunate and the support of the cityvoters. If, in addition to this support, he could hold out hopes thatwould attract the great capitalists to his side, his position would beimpregnable. Hence in his speeches he began to throw out hints of a newand wide programme of legislation. [391] There was first the militarygrievance. Recent regulations, by the large decrease which they made inthe property qualifications required for service, [392] had increased theliability to the conscription of the manufacturing and trading classesof Rome. Gracchus proposed that the period of service should beshortened--his suggestion probably being, not that the years ofliability to service (the seventeenth to the forty-sixth) should belessened, but that within these years a limited number of campaignsshould be agreed on, which should form the maximum amount of activeservice for every citizen. [393] Two other proposals dealt with thequestion of criminal jurisdiction. The first allowed an appeal to thepeople from the decision of _judices_. The form in which this proposalis stated by our authority, would lead us to suppose that the courts tobe rendered appellable were those constituted under standing laws. Thechief of these _quaestiones_ or _judicia publica_ was the court whichtried cases for extortion, established in the first instance by a LexCalpurnia, and possibly reconstituted before this epoch by a Junianlaw. [394] A permanent court for the trial of murder may also haveexisted at this time. [395] The judges of these standing commissions weredrawn from the senatorial order; and Gracchus, therefore, by suggestingan appeal from their judgment to the people, was attacking a senatorialmonopoly of the most important jurisdiction, and perhaps reflecting onthe conduct of senatorial _judices_, as displayed especially in relationto the grievances of distressed provincials. But it is probable that healso meant to strike a blow at a more extraordinary prerogative claimedby the senate, and to deny the right of that body to establish specialcommissions which could decide without appeal on the life and fortunesof Roman citizens. [396] So far his proposals, whether based on aconviction of their general utility or not, were a bid for the supportof the average citizen. But when he declared that the qualification forthe criminal judges of the time could not be allowed to stand, and thatthese judges should be taken either from a joint panel of senators andknights, or from the senate increased by the addition of a number ofmembers of the equestrian order equal to its present strength, he washolding out a bait to the wealthy middle class, who were perhaps alreadybeginning to feel senatorial jurisdiction in provincial matters irksomeand disadvantageous to their interests. We are told by one authoritythat Gracchus's eyes even ranged beyond the citizen body and that hecontemplated the possibility of the gift of citizenship to the whole ofItaly. [397] This was not in itself a measure likely to aid in hissalvation by the people; if it was not a disinterested effort offar-sighted genius, it may have been due to the gathering storm whichhis experience showed him the agrarian commission would soon be forcedto meet. [398] Certainly, if all these schemes are rightly attributed toTiberius Gracchus, it was he more than any man who projected the greatprogramme of reform that the future had in store. Unfortunately for Gracchus the time was short for nursing a newconstituency or spreading a new ideal. The time for the tribunicianelections was approaching, an active canvass was being carried on by thecandidates, and the aggrieved landowners were throwing the whole weightof their influence into the opposite scale. [399] Wild rumours of hisplans were being circulated. The family clique that filled the agrariancommission was to snatch at other offices; Gracchus's brother, a youthstill unqualified even for the quaestorship, [400] was to be thrust intothe tribunate, and his father-in-law Appius was destined for theconsulate. [401] Rome was to be ruled by a dynasty, and the tyranny ofthe commission was to extend to every department of the State. Gracchusfelt that the city-combination against him was too strong, and sent anearnest summons to his supporters in the country. But practical needswere stronger than gratitude; the farmers were busy with their harvest;and it was plain that on this occasion the man of the street was to havethe decisive voice. The result showed that even he was not unmoved byGracchus's services, and by his last appeal that a life risked on behalfof the people should be protected by a renewed investiture with thetribunate. [402] The day of the election arrived and the votes were taken. When they cameto be read out, it was found that the two first tribes had given theirvoice for Gracchus. Then there was a sudden uproar. The votes were goingagainst the landlords; a legal protest must be made. Men rose in theassembly, and shouted out that immediate re-election to the tribunatewas forbidden by the law. They were probably both right and wrong intheir protest, as men so often were who ventured to make a definiteassertion about the fluid public law of Rome. There was apparently noenactment forbidding the iteration of this office, and appointment tothe tribunate must have been governed by custom. But recent custom seemsto have been emphatically opposed to immediate re-election, and theappeal was justified on grounds of public practice. [403] It wouldprobably have been disregarded, had the Gracchan supporters been in anoverwhelming majority, or Gracchus's colleagues unanimous in theirsupport. But the people were divided, and the president was notenthusiastic enough in the cause to risk his future impeachment. Rubrius, to whom the lot had assigned the conduct of the proceedings onthat day, hesitated as to the course which he ought to follow. A bolderspirit Mummius, the man who had been made by the deposition of Octavius, asked that the conduct of the assembly should be handed over to him. Rubrius, glad to escape the difficulty, willingly yielded his place; butnow the other members of the college interposed. The forms of theComitia were being violated; a president could not be chosen without theuse of the lot. The resignation of Rubrius must be followed by anotherappeal to sortition. The point of order raised, as usual, a heateddiscussion; the tribunes gathered on the Rostra to argue the matter out. Nothing could be gained by keeping the people as the spectators of sucha scene, and Gracchus succeeded in getting the proceedings adjourned tothe following day. [404] The situation was becoming more desperate; for each delay was a triumphfor the opposition, and could only strengthen the belief in theillegality of Gracchus's claim. He now resorted to the last device ofthe Roman; he ceased to be a protector and became a suppliant. Althoughstill a magistrate, he assumed the garb of mourning, and with humbledand tearful mien begged the help of individuals in the marketplace. [405] He led his son by the hand; his children and their mother were to bewards of the people, for he had despaired of his own life. Many weretouched; to some the tribunate of Gracchus seemed like a rift in a darkcloud of oppression which would close around them at his fall, and theirhearts sank at the thought of a renewed triumph of the nobility. Otherswere moved chiefly by the fears and sufferings of Gracchus. Cries ofsympathy and defiance were raised in answer to his tears, and a largecrowd escorted him to his house at nightfall and bade him be confidentof their support on the following day. During his appeals he had hintedat the fear of a nocturnal attack by his foes: and this led many to forman encampment round his house and to remain as its vigilant defendersthroughout the night. [406] Before day-break he was up and engaged in hasty colloquy with hisfriends. The fear of force was certainly present; and definite plans mayhave been now made for its repulsion. Some even believed that a signalfor battle was agreed on by Gracchus, if matters should come to thatextreme. [407] With a true Roman's scruples he took the omens before heleft his house. They presaged ill. The keeper of the sacred chickens, which Gracchus's Imperium now permitted him to consult, could getnothing from the birds, even though he shook the cage. Only one of thefowls advanced, and even that would not touch the food. And the unsoughtomens were as evil as those invited. Snakes were found to have hatched abrood in his helmet, his foot stumbled on the threshold with suchviolence that blood flowed from his sandal; he had hardly advanced onhis way when crows were seen struggling on his left, and the true objectof the sign was pointed when a stone, dislodged by one of them from aroof, fell at his own feet. This concourse of ill-luck frightened hisboldest comrades; but his old teacher, Blossius of Cumae, vehementlyurged the prosecution of the task. Was a son of Gracchus, the grandsonof Africanus, chief minister of the Roman people, [408] to be deterred bya crow from listening to the summons of the citizens? If the disgrace ofhis absence amused his enemies, they would keep their laughter tothemselves. They would use that absence seriously, to denounce him tothe people as a king who was already aping the luxury of the tyrant. AsBlossius spoke, men were seen running from the direction of the Capitol;they came up, they bade him press on, as all was going well. And, infact, it seemed as if all might turn out brightly. The Capitolinetemple, and the level area before it, which was to be the scene of thevoting, were filled with his supporters. A hearty cheer greeted him ashe appeared, and a phalanx closed round him to prevent the approach ofany hostile element. Shortly after the proceedings began, the senate wassummoned by the consul to meet in the temple of Fides. [409] A few yardsof sloping ground was all that now separated the two hostile camps. [410] The interval for reflection had strengthened the belief of some of thetribunes that Gracchus's candidature was illegal, and they were ready tosupport the renewed protests of the rich. The election, however, began;for the faithful Mummius was now presiding, and he proceeded to call onthe tribes to vote. But the business of filing into their separatecompartments, always complicated, was now impossible. The fringe of thecrowd was in a continual uproar; from its extremities the opponents ofthe measure were wedging their way in. As his supporters squared theirshoulders, the whole mass rocked and swayed. There was no hope ofeliciting a decision from this scuffling and pushing throng. Everymoment brought the assembly nearer to open riot. Suddenly a man was seenat some distance from Tiberius gesticulating with his hand as though hehad something to impart. He was recognised as Fulvius Flaccus, asenator, a man perhaps already known as a sympathiser with schemes ofreform. Gracchus asked the crowd immediately around him to give way alittle, and Fulvius fought his way up to the tribune. His news was thatin the sitting of the senate the rich proprietors had asked the consulto use force, that he had declined, and that now they were preparing ontheir own motion to slay Tiberius. For this purpose they had collected alarge band of armed slaves and retainers. [411] Tiberius immediatelyimparted the news to his friends. Preparations for defence were hastilymade: an improvised body-guard was formed; togas were girt up, and thestaves of the lictors were broken into fragments to serve as clubs. TheGracchans more distant from the centre of the scene were meanwhilemarvelling at the strange preparations of which they caught butglimpses, and could be seen asking eager questions as to their meaning. To reach these distant supporters by his voice was impossible; Tiberiuscould but touch his forehead with his hand to indicate that his life wasin danger. Immediately a shout went up from the opposite side "Tiberiusis asking for the diadem, " and eager messengers sped with the news tothe senate. [412] There was probably a knowledge that physical supportfor their cause would be found in that quarter, and the exodus of theseexcited capitalists was apparently assisted by an onslaught from themob. A regular tumult was brewing, and the tribunes, instead of strivingto preserve order, or staying to interpose their sacred persons betweenthe enraged combatants, fled incontinently from the spot. Their fear wasnatural, for by remaining they might seem to be identifying themselveswith a cause that was either lost or lawless. With the tribunes vanishedthe last trace of legality. The priests closed the temple to keep itsprecincts from the mob. The more timorous of the crowd fled in wilddisorder, spreading wilder rumours. Tiberius was deposing the remainingtribunes from office; he was appointing himself to a further tribunatewithout the formalities of election. [413] Meanwhile the senate was deliberating in the temple of Fides. In the olddays their deliberations might have resulted in the appointment of adictator, and one of the historians who has handed down the record ofthese facts marvels that this was not the case now. [414] But thedictatorship had been weakened by submission to the appeal, and longbefore it became extinct had lost its significance as a means ofrepressing sedition within the city. The Roman constitution had now nomechanism for declaring a state of siege or martial law. From one pointof view the extinction of the dictatorship was to be regretted. Thenomination of this magistrate would have involved at least a day'sdelay;[415] some further time would have been necessary before he hadcollected round him a sufficient force in a city which had neitherpolice nor soldiers. Had it been decided to appoint a dictator, theoutrages of the next hour could never have occurred. As things were, itseemed as though the senate had to choose between impotence and murder. There was indeed another way. Such was the respect for members of thesenatorial order, that a deputation of that body, headed by the consul, would probably have led to the dispersal of the mob. But passions wereinflamed and it was no time for peaceful counsels. The advocate ofsummary measures was the impetuous Nasica. He urged the consul to savethe city and to put down the tyrant. He demanded that the sense of thehouse should be taken as to whether extreme measures were now necessary. Even at this time a tradition may have existed that a magic formula bywhich the senate advised the magistrates "to see to it that the Statetook no harm, " [416] could justify any act of violence in an emergency. The sense of the house was with Nasica, but a resolution could not beframed unless the consul put the question. The answer of Scaevola wasthat of a lawyer. He would commence no act of violence, he would put todeath no citizen uncondemned. If, however, the people, through thepersuasion or compulsion of Tiberius, should come to any illegaldecision, he would see that such a resolution was not observed. Nasicasprang to his feet. "The consul is betraying the city; those who wishthe salvation of the laws, follow me. " [417] With this he drew the hemof his toga over his head, [418] and rushed from the door in thedirection of the Capitoline temple. He was followed by a crowd ofsenators, all wrapping the folds of their togas round their left arms. Outside the door they were joined by their retainers armed with clubsand staves. [419] Meanwhile the proceedings in the Area Capitolii had been becomingsomewhat less turbulent. The turmoil had quieted down with the exclusionof the more violent members of the opposition. Gracchus had called aContio, for the purpose, it was said, of encouraging his supporters andasserting his own constancy and defiance of senatorial authority. Thegathering had become a mere partisan mass meeting, such as had oftenbeen seen in the course of the current year, and the herald was crying"Silence, " [420] when suddenly the men on the outskirts of the throngfell back to right and left. A long line of senators had been seenhastening up the hill. A deputation from the fathers had come. That musthave been the first impression: and the crowd fell back before itsmasters. But in a moment it was seen that the masters had come tochastise, not to plead. With set faces and blazing eyes Nasica and hisfollowing threw themselves on the yielding mass. The unarmed senatorssnatched at the first weapons that lay to hand, the fragments of theshattered furniture of the meeting, severed planks and legs of benches, while their retinue pressed on with clubs and sticks. The whole columnmade straight for Tiberius and his improvised body-guard. Resistance washopeless, and the tribune and his friends turned to flee. But the ideaof restoring order occupied but a small place in the minds of themaddened senators, The accumulated bitterness of a year found its outletin one moment of glorious vengeance. The fathers were behaving like aGreek street mob of the lowest type which had turned against anoppressive oligarchy. They were clubbing the Gracchans to death. Tiberius was in flight when some one seized his toga. He slipped it offand fled, clad only in his tunic, when he stumbled over a prostrate bodyand fell. As he rose, a rain of blows descended on his head. [421] Theman who was seen to strike the first blow is said to have been PubliusSaturius, one of his own colleagues. The glory of his death wasvehemently disputed; one Rufus, since he could not claim the first blow, is said to have boasted of being the author of the second. Tiberius issaid to have fallen by the very doors of the Capitoline temple, not farfrom the statues of the Kings. [422] The number of his adherents thatperished was over three hundred, and it was noted that not one of thesewas slain by the sword. [423] Their bodies were thrown into theTiber--not by the mob but by the magistrates; the hand of an aedilecommitted that of Tiberius to the stream. [424] The murder of a young man, who was still under thirty at the time of hisdeath, [425] and the slaughter of a few hundreds of his adherents, maynot seem to be an act of very great significance in the history of amighty empire. Yet ancient historians regarded the event asepoch-marking, as the turning point in the history of Rome, as thebeginning of the period of the civil wars. [426] To justify thisconclusion it is not enough to point to the fact that this was the firstblood shed in civic discord since the age of the Kings;[427] for itmight also have been the last. Though the vendetta is a naturaloutgrowth of Italian soil, yet masses of men are seldom, likeindividuals, animated solely by the spirit of revenge. The blood of theinnocent is a good battle-cry in politics, but it is little more; it isfar from being the mere pretext, but it is equally far from being thetrue cause, of future revolution. Familiarity with the use of force incivic strife is also a fatal cause of its perpetuation; but familiarityimplies its renewed employment: it can hardly be the result of the firstexperiment in murder. The repetition of this ghastly phenomenon in Romanpolitics can only be accounted for by the belief that the Gracchan_émeute_ was of its very nature an event that could not be isolated:that Gracchus was a pioneer in a hostile country, and that his opponentspreserved all their inherent weakness after the first abortivemanifestation of their pretended strength. A bad government may besecurely entrenched. The senate, whether good or bad, had no defences atall. Its weakness had in the old days been its pride. It ruled byinfluencing opinion. Now that it had ceased to influence, it ruled byinitiating a riot in the streets. It had no military support except suchas was given it by friendly magistrates, and this was a dangerous weaponwhich it hesitated to use. To ignore militarism was to be at the mercyof the demagogue of the street, to admit it was found subsequently to beequivalent to being at the mercy of the demagogue of the camp. In eithercase authority must be maintained at the cost of civil war. But thematerial helplessness of the senate was only one factor in the problem. More fatal flaws were its lack of insight to discover that there werenew problems to be faced, and lack of courage in facing them. This moralhelplessness was due partly to the selfishness of individuals, butpartly also to the fixity of political tradition. In spite of thebrilliancy and culture of some of its members, the senate in itscorporate capacity showed the possession of a narrow heart and aninexpansive intelligence. Its sympathies were limited to a class; itlearnt its new lessons slowly and did not see their bearing on thestudies of the future. Imperialism abroad and social contentment at homemight be preserved by the old methods which had worked so well in thepast. But to the mind of the masses the past did not exist, and to themind of the reformer it had buried its dead. The career of TiberiusGracchus was the first sign of a great awakening; and if we regard it asillogical, and indeed impossible, to pause here and estimate thecharacter of his reforms, it is because the more finished work of hisbrother was the completion of his efforts and followed them asinexorably as the daylight follows the dawn. CHAPTER III The attitude of the senate after the fall of Gracchus was not that of acombatant who had emerged secure from the throes of a great crisis. Aless experienced victor would have dwelt on the magnitude of themovement and been guilty of an attempt at its sudden reversal. But thegovernment pretended that there had been no revolution, merely an_émeute_. The wicked authors of the sedition must be punished; but theGracchan legislation might remain untouched. More than one motiveprobably contributed to shape this view. In the first place, thetraditional policy of Rome regarded reaction as equivalent torevolution. A rash move should be stopped in its inception; but, had itgone a little way and yielded fruit in the shape of some permanentorganisation, it would be well to accept and, if possible, to weakenthis product; it would be the height of rashness to attempt itsdestruction. The recognition of the _fait accompli_ had built up theRoman Empire, and the dreaded consequences had not come. Why should notthe same be true of a new twist in domestic policy? Secondly, theopposition of the senate to Gracchus's reforms was based far moredecidedly on political than on economic grounds. The frenzy which seizedthe fathers during the closing act of the tribune's life, was excited byhis comprehensive onslaught on their monopoly of provincial, fiscal andjudicial administration. His attempt to annex their lands had arousedthe resentment of individuals, but not the hatred of a corporation. Theindividual was always lost in the senate, and the wrongs of thelandowner could be ignored for the moment and their remedy left to time, if political prudence dictated a middle course. Again, reflection mayhave suggested the thought whether these wrongs were after all so greator so irremediable. The pastoral wealth of Italy was much; but it waslittle compared with the possibilities of enterprise in the provinces. Might not the bait of an agrarian law, whose chances of success weredoubtful and whose operation might in time be impeded by craftilydevised legislation, lull the people into an acceptance of thatsenatorial control of the foreign world, which had been so scandalouslythreatened by Gracchus? There was a danger in the very raising of thisquestion; there was further danger in its renewal. A party cry seldombecomes extinct; but its successful revival demands the sense of sometangible grievance. To remove the grievance was to silence thedemagogue; what the people wanted was comfort and not power. And lastly, the senate was not wholly composed of selfish or aggrieved land-holders. Amongst the sternest upholders of its traditions there were probablymany who were immensely relieved that the troublesome land question hadreceived some approach to a solution. There are always men hide-bound byconvention and unwilling to move hand or foot in aid of a remedialmeasure, who are yet profoundly grateful to the agitator whom theyrevile, and profoundly thankful that the antics which they deemgrotesque, have saved themselves from responsibility and their countryfrom a danger. It was with such mixed feelings that the senate viewed the Gracchan_débâcle_. It was impossible, however, to accept the situation in itsentirety; for to recognise the whole of Gracchus's career as legitimatewas to set a dangerous precedent for the future. The large army of therespectable, the bulwark of senatorial power, had not been sufficientlyalarmed. It was necessary to emphasise the fact that there had been anoutrageous sedition on the part of the lower classes. With this objectthe senate commanded that the new consuls Popillius and Rupilius shouldsit as a criminal commission for the purpose of investigating thecircumstances of the outbreak. [428] The commission was empowered toimpose any sentence, and it is practically certain that it judgedwithout appeal. The consuls, as usual, exercised their own discretion inthe choice of assessors. The extreme party was represented by Nasica. Laelius, who also occupied a place on the judgment-seat, might have beenregarded as a moderate;[429] although, as popular sedition and not theagrarian question was on its trial, there is no reason to suppose that amember of the Scipionic circle would be less severe than any of hiscolleagues in his animadversions on the wretched underlings of theGracchan movement whom it was his duty to convict of crime. It was infact the street cohort of Tiberius, men whose voices, torches and stickshad so long insulted the feelings of respectable citizens, that seems tohave been now visited with the penalties for high treason; for noillustrious name is found amongst the victims of the commission. On somethe ban of interdiction was pronounced, on others the death penalty wassummarily inflicted. Amongst the slain was Diophanes the rhetor; and oneCaius Villius, by some mysterious effort of interpretation which bafflesour analysis, was doomed to the parricide's death of the serpent and thesack. [430] Blossius of Cumae was also arraigned, and his answer to thecommission was subsequently regarded as expressing the deepest villainyand the most exalted devotion. His only defence was his attachment toGracchus, which made the tribune's word his law. "But what, " saidLaelius "if he had willed that you should fire the Capitol?" "That wouldnever have been the will of Gracchus, " was the reply, "but had he willedit, I should have obeyed". [431] Blossius escaped the immediate danger, but his fears soon led him to leave Rome, and now an exile from hisadopted as well as from his parent state, he could find no hope but inthe fortunes of Aristonicus, who was bravely battling with the Romans inAsia. On the collapse of that prince's power he put himself todeath. [432] The government may have succeeded in its immediate object of provingitself an effective policeman. The sense of order may have beensatisfied, and the spirit of turbulence, if it existed, may have beenfor the moment cowed. But the memory of the central act of the ghastlytragedy on the Capitoline hill could not be so easily obliterated, andthe chief actor was everywhere received with lowered brows andill-omened cries. [433] It was superstition as well as hatred thatsharpened the popular feeling against Nasica. A man was walking thestreets of Rome whose hands were stained by a tribune's blood. Hepolluted the city wherein he dwelt and the presence of all who met him. The convenient theory that a mere street riot had been suppressed mighthave been accepted but for the awkward fact that the sanctity of thetribunate had been trodden under foot by its would-be vindicators. Aprosecution of Nasica was threatened; and in such a case might not thearguments that vindicated Octavius be the doom of the accused? Popularhatred finds a convenient focus in a single man; it is easier to loathean individual than a group. But for this very reason the removal of theindividual may appease the resentment that the group deserves. Nasicawas an embarrassment to the senate and he might prove a convenientscapegoat. It was desirable that he should be at once rewarded andremoved; and the opportunity for an honourable banishment was easilyfound. The impending war with Aristonicus necessitated the sending of acommission to Asia, and Nasica was included amongst the five members ofthis embassy. [434] There was honour in the possession of such a post andwealth to be gained by its tenure; but the aristocracy had eventually topay a still higher price for keeping Nasica beyond the borders of Italy. When the chief pontificate was vacated by the fall of Crassus in 130B. C. , the refugee was invested with the office so ardently sought by thenobles of Rome. [435] He was forced to be contented with this shadow of asplendid prize, for he was destined never to exercise the high functionsof his office in the city. He seems never to have left Asia and, after arestless change of residence, he died near the city of Pergamon. [436] The permanence of the land commission was the most important result ofthe senate's determination to detach the political from the economicconsequences of the Gracchan movement. [437] But they tolerated ratherthan accepted it. Had they wished to make it their own, every nervewould have been strained to secure the three places at the annualelections for men who represented the true spirit of the nobility. Butthere was every reason for allowing the people's representatives tocontinue the people's work. The commission was an experiment, and thegovernment did not wish to participate in possible failure; a seasonableopportunity might arise for suspending or neutralising its activities, and the senate did not wish to reverse its own work; whether success orfailure attended its operations, the task of the commissioners was sureto arouse fears and excite odium, especially amongst the Italian allies;and the nobility were less inclined to excite such sentiments than toturn them to account. So the people were allowed year after year toperpetuate the Gracchan clique and to replace its members by avowedsympathisers with programmes of reform. Tiberius's place was filled byCrassus, whose daughter Licinia was wedded to Caius Gracchus. [438] Twoplaces were soon vacated by the fall of Crassus in Asia and the death ofAppius Claudius. They were filled by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and GaiusPapirius Carbo. [439] The Former had already proved his sympathy withGracchus, the latter had Just brought to an end an agitating tribunate, which had produced a successful ballot law and an abortive attempt torender the tribune re-eligible. The personnel of the commission was, therefore, a guarantee of its good faith. Its energy was on a level withits earnestness. The task of annexing and distributing the domain landwas strenuously undertaken, and other officials, on whom fell the purelyroutine function of enforcing the new limit of occupation, seem to havebeen equally faithful to their work. Even the consul Popillius, one ofthe presidents of the commission that tried the Gracchan rioters, hasleft a record of his activity in the words that he was "the first toexpel shepherds from their domains and install farmers in theirstead". [440] The boundary stones of the commissioners still survive tomark the care with which they defined the limits of occupied land and ofthe new allotments; and the great increase in the census roll betweenthe years 131 and 125 B. C. Finds its best explanation in the steadyincrease of small landholders effected by the agrarian law. In theformer year the register had shown rather less than 319, 000 citizens; inthe latter the number had risen to somewhat more than 394, 000. [441] Ifthis increase of nearly 76, 000 referred to the whole citizen body, itwould be difficult to connect it with the work of the commission, excepton the hypothesis that numerous vagrants, who did not as a rule appearat the census, now presented themselves for assessment; but, when it isremembered that the published census list of Rome merely contained thereturns of her effective military strength, and that this consistedmerely of the _assidui_, it is clear that a measure which elevated largeportions of the _capite censi_ to the position of yeoman farmers musthave had the effect of increasing the numbers on the register; and thissudden leap in the census roll may thus be attributed to the successfulworking of the new agrarian scheme. [442] A result such as this could nothave been wholly transitory; in tracing the agrarian legislation of thepost-Gracchan period we shall indeed find the trial of experiments whichprove that no final solution of the land question had been reached; weshall see the renewal of the process of land absorption which again ledto the formation of gigantic estates; but these tendencies may merelymark the inevitable weeding-out of the weaker of the Gracchan colonists;they do not prove that the sturdier folk failed to justify the scheme, to work their new holdings at a profit, and to hand them down to theirposterity. It is true that the landless proletariate of the citycontinued steadily to increase; but the causes which lead to theplethora of an imperial capital are too numerous to permit us to explainthis increase by the single hypothesis of a renewed depopulation of thecountry districts. The distribution of allotments, however, represented but the simplerelement of the scheme. The really arduous task was to determine in anygiven case what land could with justice be distributed. The judicialpowers of the triumvirs were taxed to the utmost to determine what landwas public, and what was private. The possessors would at times make noaccurate profession of their tenure; such as were made probably in manycases aroused distrust. Information was invited from third parties, andstraightway the land courts were the scene of harrowing litigation. [443]It could at times be vaguely ascertained that, while a portion of somegreat domain was held on occupation from the State, some other portionhad been acquired by purchase; but what particular part of the estatewas held on either tenure was undiscoverable, for titles had been lost, or, when preserved, did not furnish conclusive evidence of the justiceof the original transfer. Even the ascertainment of the fact that atract of land had once belonged to the State was no conclusive proofthat the State could still claim rights of ownership; for some of it hadin early times been assigned in allotments, and no historical recordsurvived to prove where the assignment had ended and the permission ofoccupation had begun. The holders of private estates had for purposes ofconvenience worked the public land immediately adjoining their owngrounds, the original landmarks had been swept away, and, although theyhad paid their dues for the possession of so many acres, it wasimpossible to say with precision which those acres were. The presentcondition of the land was no index; for some of the possessors hadraised their portion of the public domain to as high a pitch ofcultivation as their original patrimonies: and, as the commissionerswere naturally anxious to secure arable land in good condition for thenew settlers, the original occupiers sometimes found themselves in theenjoyment of marsh or swamp or barren soil, [444] which remained the solerelics of their splendid possessions. The judgments of the court weredissolving ancestral ties, destroying homesteads, and causing thetransference of household gods to distant dwellings. Such are theinevitable results of an attempt to pry into ancient titles, and toinvestigate claims the basis of which lies even a few decades from theperiod of the inquisition. But, while these consequences were unfortunate, they were not likely toproduce political complications so long as the grievances were confinedto members of the citizen body. The vested interests which had beenignored in the passing of the measure might be brushed aside in itsexecution. Had the territory of Italy belonged to Rome, there would havebeen much grumbling but no resistance; for effective resistance requireda shadow of legal right. But beyond the citizen body lay groups ofstates which were interested in varying degrees in the execution of theagrarian measure: and their grievances, whether legitimate or not, raised embarrassing questions of public law. The municipalities composedof Roman citizens or of half-burgesses had, as we saw, been alarmed atthe introduction of the measure, perhaps through a misunderstanding ofits import and from a suspicion that the land which had been given themin usufruct was to be resumed. Possibly the proceedings of thecommission may have done something to justify this fear, for the limitsof this land possessed by corporate bodies had probably become veryill-defined in the course of years. But, although a corporate wasstronger than an individual interest and rested on some publicguarantee, the complaints of these townships, composed as they were ofburgesses, were merely part of the civic question, and must have beennegligible in comparison with the protests of the federate cities ofItaly and the Latins. We cannot determine what grounds the Italian Sociihad either for fear or protest. It is not certain that land had beenassigned to them in usufruct, [445] and such portions of their conqueredterritories as had been restored to them by the Roman State were theirown property. But, whether the territories which they conceived to bethreatened were owned or possessed by these communities, such ownershipor possession was guaranteed to them by a sworn treaty, and it isinconceivable that the Gracchan legislation, the strongest and theweakest point of which was its strict legality, should have openlyviolated federative rights. When, however, we consider the way in whichthe public land of Rome ran in and out of the territories of theseallied communities, it is not wonderful that doubts should exist as tothe line of demarcation between state territories and the Roman domain. Vexed questions of boundaries might everywhere be raised, and thegovernment of an Italian community would probably find as muchdifficulty as a private possessor in furnishing documentary evidence oftitle. The fears of the Latin communities are far more comprehensible, and it was probably in these centres that the Italian revolt against theproceedings of the commission chiefly originated. The interests of theLatins in this matter were almost precisely similar to those of theRomans: and this identity of view arose from a similarity of status. TheLatin colonies had had their territories assigned by Romancommissioners: and it is probable, although it cannot be proved, thatdoubts arose as to the legitimate extent of these assignments inrelation to the neighbouring public land. Many of these territories mayhave grown mysteriously at the expense of Rome in districts far removedfrom the capital: and in Gaul especially encroachments on the Romandomain by municipalities or individuals of the Latin colonies mostrecently established may have been suspected. But the Latin communityhad another interest in the question, which bore a still closerresemblance to that shown by the Roman burgesses. As the individualLatin might be a recipient of the favour of the commissioners, so hemight be the victim of their legal claims. The fact that he shared theright of commerce with Rome and could acquire and sue for land by Romanforms, makes it practically certain that he could be a possessor of theRoman domain. So eager had been the government in early times to seewaste land reclaimed and defended, that it could hardly have failed towelcome the enterprising Latin who crossed his borders, threw hisenergies into the cultivation of the public land, and paid the requireddues. Many of the wealthier members of Latin communities may thus havebeen liable to the fate of the ejected possessors of Rome; but eventhose amongst them whose possessions did not exceed the prescribed limitof five hundred _jugera_, may have believed that their claims wouldreceive, or had received, too little attention from the Romancommission, while the difficulties resulting from the fusion of publicand private land in the same estates may have been as great in thesecommunities as they were in the territory of Rome. Such grievancespresented no feature of singularity; they were common to Italy, and onemight have thought that a Latin protest would have been weaker than aRoman. But there was one vital point of difference between the two. TheRoman could appeal only as an individual; the Latin appealed as a memberof a federate state. He did not pause to consider that his grievance wasdue to his being half a Roman and enjoying Roman rights. The truth thata suzerain cannot treat her subjects as badly as she treats her citizensmay be morally, but is not legally, a paradox. The subjects have acollective voice, the citizens have ceased to have one when their owngovernment has turned against them. The position of these Latins, illogical as it may have been, was strengthened by the extreme length towhich Rome had carried her principle of non-interference in ail dealingswith federate allies. The Roman Comitia did not legislate for suchstates, no Roman magistrate had jurisdiction in their internal concerns. By a false analogy it could easily be argued that no Roman commissionshould be allowed to disturb their peaceful agricultural relations andto produce a social revolution within their borders. The allies nowsought a champion for their cause, since the constitution supplied nomechanism for the direct expression of Italian grievances. Thecomplaints of individual cities had in the past been borne to the senateand voiced by the Roman patrons of these towns. Now that a champion forthe confederacy was needed, a common patron had to be created. He wasimmediately found in Scipio Aemilianus. [446] The choice was inevitable and was dictated by three potentconsiderations. There was the dignity of the man, recently raised to itsgreatest height by the capture of Numantia; there was his knowndetachment from the recent Gracchan policy and his forcibly expresseddislike of the means by which it had been carried through; there was thefurther conviction based on his recent utterances that he had littleliking for the Roman proletariate. The news of Gracchus's fall had beenbrought to Scipio in the camp before Numantia; his epitaph on themurdered tribune was that which the stern Hellenic goddess of justiceand truth breathes over the slain Aegisthus:-- So perish all who do the like again. [447] To Scipio Gracchus's undertaking must have seemed an act of impudentfolly, its conduct must have appeared something worse than madness. Inall probability it was not the agrarian movement which roused hisrighteous horror, but the gross violation of the constitution whichseemed to him to be involved in the inception and consequences of theplan. Of all political temperaments that of the Moderate is the leastforgiving, just because it is the most timorous. He sees the gulf thatyawns at his own feet, he lacks the courage to take the leap, and setsup his own halting attitude, of which he is secretly ashamed, as thecorrect demeanour for all sensible and patriotic men. The Conservativecan appreciate the efforts of the Radical, for each is ennobled by thepursuit of the impossible; but the man of half measures andindeterminate aims, while contemning both, will find the reaction fromviolent change a more potent sentiment even than his disgust at corruptimmobility. Probably Scipio had never entertained such a respect for theRoman constitution as during those busy days in camp, when the incidentsof the blockade were varied by messages describing the wild proceedingsof his brother-in-law at Rome. Yet Scipio must have known that anunreformed government could give him nothing corresponding to hishalf-shaped ideals of a happy peasantry, a disciplined and effectivesoldiery, an uncorrupt administration that would deal honestly andgently with the provincials. His own position was in itself a strongcondemnation of the powers at Rome. They were relying for militaryefficiency on a single man. Why should not they rely for politicalefficiency on another? But the latter question did not appeal to Scipio. To tread the beaten path was not the way to make an army; but it wasgood enough for politics. Scipio did not scorn the honours of a triumph, and the victory ofNumantia was followed by the usual pageant in the streets. [448] He wasunquestionably the foremost man of Rome, and senate and commons hung onhis lips to catch some definite expression of his attitude to recentevents, or to those which were stirring men's minds in the present. Theyhad not long to wait, for a test was soon presented. When in 131 Carbointroduced his bill permitting re-election to the tribunate, all theresources of Scipio's dignified oratory were at the disposal of thesenate, and the coalition of his admirers with the voters whom thesenate could dispose of, was fatal to the chances of the bill. [449] Suchan attitude need not have weakened his popularity; for excellent reasonscould be given, in the interest of popular government itself, againstpermitting any magistracy to become continuous, But his politicalenemies were on the watch, and in one of the debates on the measure carewas taken that a question should be put, the answer to which must eitheridentify or compromise him with the new radicalism. Carbo asked him whathe thought about the death of Tiberius Gracchus. Scipio's answer wascautious but precise; "If Gracchus had formed the intention of seizingon the administration of the State, he had been justly slain. " It wasmerely a restatement of the old constitutional theory that one who aimedat monarchy was by that very fact an outlaw. But the answer, hypothetical as was its expression, implied a suspicion of Gracchus'saims. It did not please the crowd; there was a roar of dissent. ThenScipio lost his temper. The contempt of the soldier for the civilian, ofthe Roman for the foreigner, of the man of pure for the man of mixedblood--a contempt inflamed to passion by the thought that men such as hewere often at the mercy of these wretches--broke through all reserve. "Ihave never been frightened by the clamour of the enemy in arms, " heshouted, "shall I be alarmed by your cries, ye step-sons of Italy?" Thisreflection on the lineage of his audience naturally aroused anotherprotest. It was met by the sharp rejoinder, "I brought you in chains toRome; you are freed now, but none the more terrible for that!" [450] Itwas a humiliating spectacle. The most respected man in Rome was usingthe vulgar abuse of the streets to the sovereign people; and the man whoused this language was so blinded by prejudice as not to see that theblood which he reviled gave the promise of a new race, that the mobwhich faced him was not a crowd of Italian peasants, willing victims ofthe martinet, that the Asiatic and the Greek, with their sordid clothesand doubtful occupations, possessed more intelligence than the Romanmembers of the Scipionic circle and might one day be the rulers of Rome. The new race was one of infinite possibilities. It needed guidance, notabuse. Carbo and his friends must have been delighted with the issue oftheir experiment. Scipio had paid the first instalment to that treasuryof hatred, which was soon to prove his ruin and to make his following athing of the past. Such was the position of Scipio when he was approached by the Italians. His interest in their fortunes was twofold. First he viewed them with asoldier's eye. [451] They were tending more and more to form the flowerof the Roman armies abroad: and, although in obedience to civicsentiment he had employed a heavier scourge on the backs of theauxiliaries than on those of the Roman troops before Numantia, [452] thechastisement, which he would have doubtless liked to inflict on all, wasbut an expression of his interest in their welfare. Next he admired thetype for its own sake. The sturdy peasant class was largely representedhere, and he probably had more faith in its permanence amongst thefederate cities than amongst the needy burgesses whom the commissionerswere attempting to restore to agriculture. He could not have seen themomentous consequences which would follow from a championship of theItalian allies against the interests of the urban proletariate; thatsuch a dualism of interests would lead to increased demands on the partof the one, to a sullen resistance on the part of the other; that inthis mere attempt to check the supposed iniquities of a too zealouscommission lay the germ of the franchise movement and the Social War. His protection was a matter of justice and of interest. The allies haddeserved well and should not be robbed; they were the true protectors ofRome and their loyalty must not be shaken. Scipio, therefore, took theirprotest to the senate. He respected the susceptibilities of the peopleso far as to utter no explicit word of adverse criticism on the Gracchanmeasure; but he dwelt on the difficulties which attended its execution, and he suggested that the commissioners were burdened with an invidioustask in having to decide the disputed questions connected with the landwhich they annexed. By the nature of the case their judgments mighteasily appear to the litigants as tinged with prejudice. It would bebetter, he suggested, if the functions of jurisdiction were separatedfrom those of distribution and the former duties given to some otherauthority. [453] The senate accepted the suggestion, and itsreasonableness must have appealed even to the people, for the measureembodying it must have passed the Comitia, which alone could abrogatethe Gracchan law. [454] Possibly some recent judgments of thecommissioners had produced a sense of uneasiness amongst large numbersof the citizen body, and there may have been a feeling that it would beto the advantage of all parties if the cause of scandal were removed. Perhaps none but the inner circle of statesmen could have predicted theconsequences of the change. The decision of the agrarian disputes wasnow entrusted to the consuls, who were the usual vehicles ofadministrative jurisdiction. The history of the past had proved over andover again the utter futility of entrusting the administration of anextraordinary and burdensome department to the regular magistrates. Theywere too busy to attend to it, even if they had the will. But in thiscase even the will was lacking. Of the two consuls Manius Aquillius wasdestined for the war in Asia, and his colleague Caius SemproniusTuditanus had no sooner put his hand to the new work than he saw thatthe difficulties of adjudication had been by no means the creation ofthe commissioners. He answered eagerly to the call of a convenientIllyrian war and quitted the judgment seat for the less harassinganxieties of the camp. [455] The functions of the commissioners wereparalysed; they seem now to have reached a limit where every particle ofland for distribution was the subject of dispute, and, as there was noauthority in existence to settle the contested claims, the work ofassignation was brought to a sudden close. The masses of eagerclaimants, that still remained unsatisfied, felt that they had beenbetrayed; the feeling spread amongst the urban populace, and the name ofScipio was a word that now awoke suspicion and even execration. [456] Itwas not merely the sense of betrayal that aroused this hostilesentiment; the people charged him with ingratitude. Masses of men, likeindividuals, love a _protégé_ more than a benefactor. They have a pridein looking at the colossal figure which they have helped to create. Andhad not they in a sense made Scipio? Their love had been quickened bythe sense of danger; they had braved the anger of the nobles to putpower into his hands; they had twice raised him to the consulship inviolation of the constitution. And now what was their reward? He haddeliberately chosen to espouse the cause of the allies and oppose theinterests of the Roman electorate. Scipio's enemies had good material towork upon. The casual grumblings of the streets were improved on, andformulated in the openly expressed belief that his real intention wasthe repeal of the Sempronian law, and in the more far-fetched suspicionthat he meant to bring a military force to bear on the Roman mob, withits attendant horrors of street massacre or hardly less bloodypersecution. [457] The attacks on Scipio were not confined to the informal language ofprivate intercourse. Hostile magistrates introduced his enemies to theRostra, and men like Fulvius Flaccus inveighed bitterly againsthim. [458] On the day when one of these attacks was made, Scipio wasdefending his position before the people; he had been stung by thecharge of ingratitude, for he retorted it on his accusers; he complainedthat an ill return was being made to him for his many services to theState. In the evening Scipio was escorted from the senate to his houseby a crowd of sympathisers. Besides senators and other Romans the escortcomprised representatives of his new clients, the Latins and the Italianallies. [459] His mind was full of the speech which he meant to deliverto the people on the following day. He retired early to his sleepingchamber and placed his writing tablet beside his bed, that he might fixthe sudden inspirations of his waking hours. When morning dawned, he wasfound lying on his couch but with every trace of life extinct. Thefamily inquisition on the slaves of the household was held as a matterof course. Their statements were never published to the world, but itwas believed that under torture they had confessed to seeing certain menintroduced stealthily during the night through the back part of thehouse; these, they thought, had strangled their master. [460] The reasonwhich they assigned for their reticence was their fear of the people;they knew that Scipio's death had not appeased the popular fury, thatthe news had been received with joy, and they did not wish by invidiousrevelations to become the victims of the people's hate. The fears of theslaves were subsequently reflected in the minds of those who would havebeen willing to push the investigation further. There was ground forsuspicion; for Scipio, although some believed him delicate, [461] hadshown no sign of recent illness. A scrutiny of the body is even said tohave revealed a livid impress near the throat. [462] The investigationwhich followed a sudden death within the walls of a Roman household, ifit revealed the suspicion of foul play, was usually the preliminary to apublic inquiry. The duty of revenge was sacred; it appealed to thefamily even more than to the public conscience. But there was no one toraise the cry for retribution. He had no sons, and his family wasrepresented but by his loveless wife Sempronia. His many friends mustindeed have talked of making the matter public, and perhaps began atonce to give vent to those dark suspicions which down to a late ageclouded the names of so many of the dead man's contemporaries. But theproject is said to have been immediately opposed by representatives ofthe popular party;[463] the crime, if crime there was, had been novulgar murder; a suspicion that violence had been used was an insult tothe men who had fought him fairly in the political field; a _quaestio_instituted by the senate might be a mere pretext for a judicial murder;it might be the ruse by which the nobles sought to compass the death ofthe people's new favourite and rising hope, Caius Gracchus. Ultimatelythose who believed in the murder and pined to avenge it, wereconstrained to admit that it was wiser to avoid a disgraceful politicalwrangle over the body of their dead hero. But, for the retreat to becovered, it must be publicly announced by those who had most authorityto speak, that Scipio had died a natural death. This was accordingly theline taken by Laelius, when he wrote the funeral oration which QuintusFabius Maximus delivered over the body of his uncle;[464] "We cannotsufficiently mourn this death by disease" were words purposely spoken tobe an index to the official version of the decease. The fear ofpolitical disturbance which veiled the details of the tragedy, alsodictated that the man, whom friends and enemies alike knew to have beenthe greatest of his age, should have no public funeral. [465] The government might well fear a scandalous scene--the Forum with itslanes and porticoes crowded by a snarling holiday crowd, the laudationof the speakers interrupted by gibes and howls, the free-fight thatwould probably follow the performance of the obsequies. But suppression means rumour. The mystery was profoundly enjoyed by thisand subsequent ages. Every name that political or domestic circumstancescould conveniently suggest, was brought into connection with Scipio'sdeath. Caius Gracchus, [466] Fulvius Flaccus, [467] Caius PapiriusCarbo[468] were all indifferently mentioned. Suspicion clung longest toCarbo, probably as the man who had lately come into the most directconflict with his supposed victim; even Carbo's subsequent conversion toconservatism could not clear his name, and his guilt seems to have beenalmost an article of faith amongst the optimates of the Ciceronianperiod. But there were other versions which hinted at domestic crime. Did not Cornelia have an interest in removing the man who was undoingthe work of her son, and might she not have had a willing accomplice inScipio's wife Sempronia?[469] It was believed that this marriage ofarrangement had never been sanctioned by love; Sempronia was plain andchildless, and the absence of a husband's affection may have led her tothink only of her duties as a daughter and a sister. [470] People whowere too sane for these extravagances, but were yet unwilling to acceptthe prosaic solution of a natural death and give up the pleasant task ofconjecture, suggested that Scipio had found death by his own hand. Themotive assigned was the sense of his inability to keep the promiseswhich he had made. [471] These promises may have been held to be certainsuggestions for the amelioration of the condition of the Latin andItalian allies. But it required no conjecture and no suspicion to emphasise the tragicnature of Scipio's death. He was but fifty-six; he was by far thegreatest general that Rome could command, a champion who could springinto the breach when all seemed lost, make an army out of a rabble andwin victory from defeat; he was a great moral force, the scourge of thenew vices, the enemy of the provincial oppressor; he was the greatestintellectual influence in aristocratic Rome, embellishing the staidrigour of the ancient Roman with something of the humanism of the Greek;Xenophon was the author who appealed most strongly to his simple andmanly tastes; and his purity of soul and clearness of intellect werefitly expressed in the chasteness and elegance of his Latin style. Themodern historian has not to tax his fancy in discovering great qualitiesin Scipio; the mind of every unprejudiced contemporary must have echoedthe thought of Laelius, when he wrote in his funeral speech "We cannotthank the gods enough that they gave to Rome in preference to otherstates a man with a heart and intellect like this". [472] But thedominant feeling amongst thinking men, who had any respect for theempire and the constitution, was that of panic at the loss. QuintusMetellus Macedonicus had been his political foe; but when the tidings ofdeath were brought him, he was like one distraught. "Citizens, " hewailed, "the walls of our city are in ruins. " [473] And that a greatbreach had been made in the political and military defences of Rome isagain the burden of Laelius's complaint, "He has perished at a time whena mighty man is needed by you and by all who wish the safety of thiscommonwealth. " These utterances were not merely a lament for a greatsoldier, but the mourning for a man who might have held the balancebetween classes and saved a situation that was becoming intolerable. Wecannot say whether any definite means of escape from the brewing stormwas present to Scipio's mind, or, if he had evolved a plan, whether hewas master of the means to render it even a temporary success. Perhapshe had meddled too little with politics to have acquired the dexterityrequisite for a reconciler. Possibly his pride and his belief in thearistocracy as an aggregate would have stood in his way. But he was aman of moderate views who led a middle party, and he attracted theanxious attention of men who believed that salvation would not come fromeither of the extremes. He had once been the favourite of the crowd, andmight be again, he commanded the distant respect of the nobility, and hehad all Italy at his side. Was there likely to be a man whose positionwas better suited to a reconciliation of the war of jarring interests?Perhaps not; but at the time of his death the first steps which he hadtaken had only widened the horizon of war. He found a struggle betweenthe commons and the nobles; he emphasised, although he had not created, the new struggle between the commons and Italy. His next step would havebeen decisive, but this he was not fated to take. When we turn from the history of the agrarian movement and itsunexpected consequences to other items in the internal fortunes of Romeduring this period, we find that Tiberius Gracchus had left anotherlegacy to the State. This was the idea of a magistracy which, freed fromthe restraint of consulting the senate, should busy itself withpolitical reform, remove on its own initiative the obstacles which theconstitution threw in the path of its progress, and effect theregeneration of Rome and even of Italy by means of ordinances elicitedfrom the people. The social question was here as elsewhere the efficientcause; but it left results which seemed strangely disproportionate totheir source. The career of Gracchus had shown that the leadership ofthe people was encumbered by two weaknesses. These were the packing ofassemblies by dependants of the rich, whose votes were known and whosevoices were therefore under control, and the impossibility ofre-election to office, which rendered a continuity of policy on the partof the demagogue impossible. It was the business of the tribunate ofCarbo to remove both these hindrances to popular power. His firstproposal was to introduce voting by ballot in the legislativeassemblies;[474] it was one that could not easily be resisted, since theprinciple of the ballot had already been recognised in elections, and inall judicial processes with the exception of trials for treason. Thesemeasures seem to have had the support of the party of moderate reform:and Scipio and his friends probably offered no resistance to the newapplication of the principle. Without their support, and unprovided witharguments which might excite the fears or jealousy of the people, thenobility was powerless: and the bill, therefore, easily became law. Thechange thus introduced was unquestionably a great one. Hitherto thecountry voters had been the most independent; now the members of theurban proletariate were equally free, and from this time forth the voiceof the city could find an expression uninfluenced by the smiles orfrowns of wealthy patrons. The ballot produced its intended effect morefully in legislation than in election; its introduction into the lattersphere caused the nobility to become purchasers instead of directors;but it was seldom that a law affected individual interests so directlyas to make a bargain for votes desirable. The chief bribery found in thelegislative assemblies was contained in the proposal submitted by thedemagogue. Carbo's second proposal, that immediate and indefinite re-election tothe tribunate should be permitted, was not recommended on the samegrounds of precedent or reason. The analogies of the Roman constitutionwere opposed to it, and the rules against the perpetuity of office whichlimited the patrician magistracies, and made even a single re-electionto the consulship illegal, [475] while framed in support of aristocraticgovernment, had had as their pretext the security of the Republic, andtherefore ostensibly of popular freedom and control. Again, the peoplemight be reminded that the tribunate was not always a power friendly totheir interests, and that the veto which blocked the expression of theirwill might be continued to a second year by the obstinate persistence ofa minority of voters. Excellent arguments of a popular kind could be, and probably were, employed against the proposal. Certainly thesentiment which really animated the opposition could have found littlefavour with the masses, who ultimately voted for the rejection of thebill. All adherents of senatorial government must have seen in thesuccess of the measure the threat of a permanent opposition, thepossibility of the rise of official demagogues of the Greek type, monarchs in reality though, not in name, the proximity of a Gracchanmovement unhampered by the weakness which had led to Gracchus's fall. Itis easier for an electorate to maintain a principle by the maintenanceof a personality than to show its fervour for a creed by submitting newand untried exponents to a rigid confession of faith. The senate knewthat causes wax and wane with the men who have formulated them, and ithad always been more afraid of individuals than of masses. Scipio's viewof the Gracchan movement and his acceptance of the cardinal maxims ofexisting statecraft, prepare us for the attitude which he assumed onthis occasion. His speech against the measure was believed to have beendecisive in turning the scale. He was supported by his henchmen, and thefaithful Laelius also gave utterance to the protests of the moderatesagainst the unwelcome innovation. This victory, if decisive, would havemade the career of Caius Gracchus impossible--a career which, while itfully justified the attitude of the opposition, more than fulfilled thedesigns of the advocates of the change. But the triumph was evanescent. Within the next eight years re-election to the tribunate was renderedpossible under certain circumstances. The successful proposal is said tohave taken the form of permitting any one to be chosen, if the number ofcandidates fell short of the ten places which were to be filled. [476]This arrangement was probably represented as a corollary of the ancientreligious injunction which forbade the outgoing tribunes to leave thePlebs unprovided with guardians; and this presentment of the caseprobably weakened the arguments of the opposition. The aristocraticparty could hardly have misconceived the import of the change. It wasintended that a party which desired the re-election of a tribune should, by withdrawing some of its candidates at the last moment, [477] qualifyhim for reinvestiture with the magistracy. The party of reform were rightly advised in attempting to secure anadequate mechanism for the fulfilment of a democratic programme beforethey put their wishes into shape. That they were less fortunate in theproposals that they formulated, was due to the fact that these proposalswere at least as much the result of necessity as of deliberate choice. The agrarian question was still working its wicked will. It hung like anincubus round the necks of democrats and forced them into mostundemocratic paths. The legacy left by Scipio had become the burdensomeinheritance of his foes. Italian claims were now the impasse whichstopped the present distribution and the future acquisition of land. Theminds of many were led to inquire whether it might not be possible tostrike a bargain with the allies, and thus began that mischievousco-operation between a party in Rome and the protected towns in Italy, which suggested hopes that could not be satisfied, led to open revolt asthe result of the disappointment engendered by failure, and might easilybe interpreted as veiling treasonable designs against the Roman State, The franchise was to be offered to the Italian towns on condition thatthey waived their rights in the public land. [478] The details of thebargain were probably unknown, even to contemporaries, for thenegotiations demanded secrecy; but it is clear that the arrangementsmust have been at once general and complex; for no organisation islikely to have existed that could bind each Italian township to theagreement, nor could any town have undertaken to prejudice all thevarying rights of its individual citizens. When the Italians eagerlyaccepted the offer, a pledge must have been got from their leading menthat the local governments would not press their claims to the disputedland as an international question; for it was under this aspect that thedispute presented the gravest difficulties. The commons of these statesmight be comforted by the assurance that, when they had become Romancitizens, they would themselves be entitled to share in theassignations. These negotiations, which may have extended over two orthree years, ended by bringing crowds of Italians to Rome. They had novotes; but the moral influence of their presence was very great. Theycould applaud or hiss the speakers in the informal gatherings of theContio; it was not impossible that in the last resort they might lendphysical aid to that section of the democrats which had advocated theircause. It might even have been possible to manufacture votes for some ofthese immigrants. A Latin domiciled in Rome always enjoyed a limitedsuffrage in the Comitia, and a pretended domicile might easily beinvented for a temporary resident. Nor was it even certain that thewholly unqualified foreigner might not give a surreptitious vote; forthe president of the assembly was the man interested in the passing ofthe bill, and his subordinates might be instructed not to submit thequalifications of the voters to too strict a scrutiny. It was underthese circumstances that the senate resorted to the device, rare but notunprecedented, of an alien act. Following its instructions, the tribuneMarcus Junius Pennus introduced a proposal that foreigners should beexcluded from the city. [479] We know nothing of the wording of the act. It may have made no specific mention of Italians, and its operation waspresumably limited to strangers not domiciled before a certain date. But, like all similar provisions, it must have contained furtherlimitations, for it is inconceivable that the foreign trader, engaged inlegitimate business, was hustled summarily from the city. But, howeverlimited its scope, its end was clear: and the fact that it passed theComitia shows that the franchise movement was by no means whollypopular. A crowd is not so easy of conversion as an individual. Recentevents must have caused large numbers of the urban proletariate to hatethe very name of the Italians, and the idea of sharing the privileges ofempire with the foreigner must already have been distasteful to theaverage Roman mind. It was in vain that Caius Gracchus, to whom thesuggestion of his brother was already becoming a precept, tried toemphasise the political ruin which the spirit of exclusiveness hadbrought to cities of the past. [480] The appeal to history and to noblermotives must have fallen on deaf ears. It is possible, however, that thepersonality of the speaker might have been of some avail, had he beenably supported, and had the people seen all their leaders united on thequestion of the day. But there is reason for supposing that seriousdifferences of opinion existed amongst these leaders as to the wisdom ofthe move. Some may have held that the party of reform had merely driftedin this direction, that the proposal for enfranchisement had never beenconsidered on its own merits, and that they had no mandate from thepeople for purchasing land at this costly price. It may have been atthis time that Carbo first showed his dissatisfaction with the party, ofwhich he had almost been the accepted leader. If he declined toaccompany his colleagues on this new and untried path, the first step inhis conversion to the party of the optimates betrays no inconsistencywith his former attitude; for he could maintain with justice that theproposal for enfranchising Italy was not a popular measure either inspirit or in fact. It was, therefore, with more than doubtful chances of success thatFulvius Flaccus, who was consul in the following year, attempted tobring the question to an issue by an actual proposal of citizenship forthe allies. The details of his scheme of enfranchisement have been veryimperfectly preserved. [481] We are unaware whether, like Caius Gracchussome three years later, he proposed to endow the Latins with higherprivileges than the other allies: and, although he contemplated thenon-acceptance of Roman citizenship by some of the allied communities, since he offered these cities the right of appeal to the people as asubstitute for the status which they declined, we do not know whetherhis bill granted citizenship at once to all accepting states, or merelyopened a way for a request for this right to come from individual citiesto the Roman people. But it is probable that the bill in some wayasserted the willingness of the people to confer the franchise, andthat, if any other steps were involved in the method of conferment, theywere little more than formal. The fact that the _provocatio_ wascontemplated as a substitute for citizenship is at once a proof that theold spirit of state life, which viewed absorption as extermination, wasknown still to be strong in some of the Italian communes, and that manyof the individual Italians were believed to value the citizenship mainlyas a means of protecting their persons against Roman officialdom. Thatthe democratic party was strong at the moment when this proposal wasgiven to the world is shown by the fact that Flaccus filled theconsulship; that it had little sympathy with his scheme is proved by theisolation of the proposer and by the manner in which the senate wasallowed to intervene. The conferment of the franchise had been proved tobe essentially a popular prerogative;[482] the consultation of thesenate on such a point might be advisable, but was by no meansnecessary; for, in spite of the ruling theory that the authority of thesenate should be respected in all matters of legislation, the complexRoman constitution recognised shades of difference, determined by thequality of the particular proposal, with respect to the observance ofthis rule. The position of Flaccus was legally stronger than that ofTiberius Gracchus had been. Had he been well supported by men ofinfluence or by the masses, the senate's judgment might have been set atnaught. But the people were cold, Carbo had probably turned away, andCaius Gracchus had gone as quaestor to Sardinia. The senate wasemboldened to adopt a firm attitude. They invited the consul to takethem into his confidence. After much delay he entered the senate house;but a stubborn silence was his only answer to the admonitions andentreaties of the fathers that he would desist from his purpose. [483]Flaccus knew the futility of arguing with people who had adopted aforegone conclusion; he would not even deign to accept a gracefulretreat from an impossible position. The matter must be dropped; but towithdraw it at the exhortation of the senate, although complimentary tohis peers and perhaps not unpleasing even to the people in their presenthumour, would prejudice the chances of the future. In view of betterdays it was wiser to shelve than to discard the measure. His attitudemay also have been influenced by pledges made to the allies; to these, helpless as he was, he would yet be personally faithful. His fidelitywould have been put to a severe test had he remained in Italy; but thesupreme magistrate at Rome had always a refuge from a perplexingsituation. The voice of duty called him abroad, [484] and Flaccus setforth to shelter Massilia from the Salluvii and to build up the Romanpower in Transalpine Gaul. [485] Perhaps only a few of the leadingdemocrats had knowledge enough to suspect the terrible consequences thatmight be involved in the failure of the proposal for conferring thefranchise. To the senate and the Roman world they must have caused asmuch astonishment as alarm. It could never have been dreamed that thewell-knit confederacy, which had known no spontaneous revolt since therising of Falerii in the middle of the third century, could again bedisturbed by internal war. Now the very centre of this confederacy, thatloyal nucleus which had been unshaken by the victories of Hannibal, wasto be the scene of an insurrection, the product of hope long deferred, of expectations recently kindled by injudicious promises, of resentmentat Pennus's success and Flaccus's failure. Fregellae, the town whichassumed the lead in the movement and either through overhaste or faultyinformation alone took the fatal step, [486] was a Latin colony which hadbeen planted by Rome in the territory of the Volsci in the year 328B. C. [487] The position of the town had ensured its prosperity evenbefore it fell into the hands of Rome. It lay on the Liris in a richvine-growing country, and within that circle of Latin and Campanianstates, which had now become the industrial centre of Italy. It wasitself the centre of the group of Latin colonies that lay as bulwarks ofRome between the Appian and Latin roads, and had in the Hannibalic warbeen chosen as the mouthpiece of the eighteen faithful cities, whentwelve of the Latin states grew weary of their burdens and wavered intheir allegiance. [488] The importance of the city was manifest and oflong-standing, its self-esteem was doubtless great, and it perhapsconsidered that its signal services had been inadequately recompensed byRome. But its peculiar grievances are unknown, or the particular reasonswhich gave Roman citizenship such an excessive value in its eyes. It ispossible that its thriving farmer class had been angered by the agrariancommission and by undue demands for military service, and, in spite ofthe commercial equality with the Romans which they enjoyed in virtue oftheir Latin rights, they may have compared their position unfavourablywith that of communities in the neighbourhood which had received theRoman franchise in full. Towns like Arpinum, Fundi and Formiae had beenadmitted to the citizen body without forfeiting their self-government. Absorption need not now entail the almost penal consequences of thedissolution of the constitution; while the possession of citizenshipensured the right of appeal and a full participation in the religiousfestivals and the amenities of the capital. It is also possible that, inthe case of a prosperous industrial and agricultural community situatedactually within Latium, the desire for actively participating in thedecisions of the sovereign people may have played its part. Butsentiment probably had in its councils as large a share as reason: andthe fact that this sentiment led to premature action, and that the fallof the state was due to treason, may lead as to suppose that the Romanshad to deal with a divided people and that one section of the community, perhaps represented by the upper or official class, although it may havesympathised with the general desire for the attainment of the franchise, was by no means prepared to stake the ample fortunes of the town on thedoubtful chance of successful rebellion. A prolonged resistance of thecitizens within their walls might have given the impulse to a generalrising of the Latins. Had Fregellae played the part of a secondNumantia, the Social War might have been anticipated by thirty-fiveyears. But the advantage to be gained from time was foiled by treason. Acertain Numitorius Pullus betrayed the state to the praetor LuciusOpimius, who had been sent with an army from Rome. Had Fregellae stoodalone, it might have been spared; but it was felt that some extrememeasure either of concession or of terrorism was necessary to keepdiscontent from assuming the same fiery form in other communities. Inthe later war with the allies a greater danger was bought off byconcession. But there the disease had run its course; here it was met inits earliest stage, and the familiar devise of excision was felt to bethe true remedy. The principle of the "awful warning, " which Alexanderhad applied to Thebes and Rome to Corinth, doomed the greatest of theLatin cities to destruction. Regardless of the past services ofFregellae and of the fact that the passion for the franchise was themost indubitable sign of the loyalty of the town, the government orderedthat the walls of the surrendered city should be razed and that the townshould become a mere open village undistinguished by any civicprivilege. [489] A portion of its territory was during the next yearemployed for the foundation of the citizen colony of Fabrateria. [490]The new settlement was the typical Roman garrison in a disaffectedcountry. But it proved the weakness of the present régime that such acrude and antiquated method should have to be employed in the heart ofLatium. Security, however, was perhaps not the sole object of thefoundation. The confiscated land of Fregellae was a boon to a governmentsadly in need of popularity at home. An excellent opportunity was now offered for impressing the people withthe enormity of the offence that had been committed by some of theirleaders, and prosecutions were directed against the men who had beenforemost in support of the movement for extending the franchise. It waspretended that they had suggested designs as well as kindled hopes. Thefate of the lesser advocates of the Italian cause is unknown; but CaiusGracchus, against whom an indictment was directed, cleared his name ofall complicity in the movement. [491] The effect of these measures ofsuppression was not to improve matters for the future. The allies wereburdened with a new and bitter memory; their friends at Rome werefurnished with a new cause for resentment. If the Roman people continuedselfish and apathetic, a leader might arise who would find the Italiansa better support for his position than the Roman mob. If he did notarise or if he failed, the sole but certain arbitrament was that ofthe sword. The foreign activity of Rome during this period did not reflect thetroubled spirit of the capital. It was of little moment that petty warswere being waged in East and West, and that bulletins sometimes broughtnews of a general's defeat. Rome was accustomed to these things; and herefforts were still marked by their usual characteristics of steadyexpansion and decorous success. To predicate failure of her foreignactivity for this period is to predicate it for all her history, fornever was an empire more slowly won or more painfully preserved. It istrue that at the commencement of this epoch an imperialist might havebeen justified in taking a gloomy view of the situation. In SpainNumantia was inflicting more injury on Roman prestige than on Romanpower, while the long and harassing slave-war was devastating Sicily. But these perils were ultimately overcome, and meanwhile circumstanceshad led to the first extension of provincial rule over the wealthy East. The kingdom of Pergamon had long been the mainstay of Rome's influencein the Orient. Her contact with the other protected princedoms wasdistant and fitful; but as long as her mandates could be issued throughthis faithful vassal, and he could rely on her whole-hearted support inmaking or meeting aggressions, the balance of power in the East wastolerably secure. It had been necessary to make Eumenes the Second seethat he was wholly in the power of Rome, her vassal and not her ally. Hehad been rewarded and strengthened, not for his own deserts, but that hemight be fitted to become the policeman of Western Asia, and it had beensuccessfully shown that the hand which gave could also take away. Thelesson was learnt by the Pergamene power, and fortunately the dynastywas too short-lived for a king to arise who should forget the crushingdisplay of Roman power which had followed the Third Macedonian War, orfor the realisation of that greater danger of a protectorate--a strugglefor the throne which should lead one of the pretenders to appeal to anational sentiment and embark on a national war. Eumenes at his deathhad left a direct successor in the person of his son Attalus, who hadbeen born to him by his wife Stratonice, the daughter of Ariarathes Kingof Cappadocia. [492] But Attalus was a mere boy at the time of hisfather's death, and the choice of a guardian was of vital importance forthe fortunes of the monarchy. Every consideration pointed to the uncleof the heir, and in the strong hands of Attalus the Second the regencybecame practically a monarchy. [493] The new ruler was a man of more thanmiddle age, of sober judgment, and deeply versed in all the mysteries ofkingcraft; for a mutual trust, rare amongst royal brethren in the East, had led Eumenes to treat him more as a colleague than as a lieutenant. He had none of the insane ambition which sees in the diadem the good towhich all other blessings may be fitly sacrificed, and had resisted theinvitation of a Roman coterie that he should thrust his suspectedbrother from the throne and reign himself as the acknowledged favouriteof Rome. In the case of Attalus familiarity with the suzerain power hadnot bred contempt. He had served with Manlius in Galatia[494] and withPaulus in Macedonia, [495] and had been sent at least five times as envoyto the capital itself. [496] The change from a private station to athrone did not alter his conviction that the best interests of hiscountry would be served by a steady adherence to the power, whosemarvellous development to be the mainspring of Eastern politics was amiracle which he had witnessed with his own eyes. He had grasped theessentials of the Roman character sufficiently to see that this was notone of the temporary waves of conquest that had so often swept over theunchangeable East and spent their strength in the very violence of theirflow, nor did he commit the error of mistaking self-restraint forweakness. Monarchs like himself were the necessary substitute for thedominion which the conquering State had been strong enough to spurn; andhe threw himself zealously into the task of forwarding the designs ofRome in the dynastic struggles of the neighbouring nations. He helped torestore Ariarathes the Fifth to his kingdom of Cappadocia, [497] andappealed to Rome against the aggressions of Prusias the Second ofBithynia. He was saved by the decisive intervention of the senate, butnot until he had been twice driven within the walls of his capital byhis victorious enemy. [498] His own peace and the interests of Rome werenow secured by his support of Nicomedes, the son of Prusias, who had wonthe favour of the Romans and was placed on the throne of his father. Hehad even interfered in the succession to the kingdom of the Seleucidae, when the Romans thought fit to support the pretensions of AlexanderBalas to the throne of Syria. [499] Lastly he had sent assistance to theRoman armies in the conflict which ended in the final reduction ofGreece. [500] There was no question of his abandoning his regency duringhis life-time. Rome could not have found a better instrument, and it wasperhaps in obedience to the wishes of the senate, and certainly inaccordance with their will, that he held the supreme power until hisreign of twenty-one years was closed by his death. [501] Possibly thequalities of the rightful heir may not have inspired confidence, for astrong as well as a faithful friend was needed on the throne ofPergamon. The new ruler, Attalus the Third, threatened only the dangerthat springs from weakness; but, had not his rule been ended by an earlydeath, it is possible that Roman intervention might have been called into save the monarchy from the despair of his subjects, to hand it overto some more worthy vassal, or, in default of a suitable ruler, toreduce it to the form of a province. The restraint under which Attalushad lived during his uncle's guardianship, had given him the sense ofimpotence that issues in bitterness of temper and reckless suspicion. The suspicion became a mania when the death of his mother and hisconsort created a void in his life which he persisted in believing to bedue to the criminal agency of man. Relatives and friends were now theimmediate victims of his disordered mind, [502] and the carnival ofslaughter was followed by an apathetic indifference to the things of theouter world. Dooming himself to a sordid seclusion, the king solaced hisgloomy leisure with pursuits that had perhaps become habitual during hisearly detachment from affairs. He passed his time in ornamentalgardening, modelling in wax, casting in bronze and working inmetal. [503] His last great object in life was to raise a stately tomb tohis mother Stratonice. It was while he was engaged in this pious taskthat exposure to the sun engendered an illness which caused his death. When the last of the legitimate Attalids had gone to his grave, it wasfound that the vacant kingdom had been disposed of by will, and that theRoman people was the nominated heir. [504] The genuineness of thisdocument was subsequently disputed by the enemies of Rome, and it waspronounced to be a forgery perpetrated by Roman diplomats. [505] Historyfurnishes evidence of the reality of the testament, but none of theinfluences under which it was made. [506] It is quite possible that thelast eccentric king was jealous enough to will that he should have nosuccessor on the throne, and cynical enough to see that it made littledifference whether the actual power of Rome was direct or indirect. Itis equally possible that the idea was suggested by the Romanising partyin his court; although, when we remember the extreme unwillingness thatRome had ever shown to accept a position of permanent responsibility inthe East, we can hardly imagine the plan to have received the directsanction of the senate. It is conceivable, however, that many leadingmembers of the government were growing doubtful of the success of merelydiplomatic interference with the troubled politics of the East; thatthey desired a nearer point of vantage from which to watch the movementsof its turbulent rulers; and that, if consulted on the chances ofsuccess which attended the new departure, they may have given afavourable reply. It was impossible by the nature of the case toquestion the validity of the act. The legatees were far too powerful tomake it possible for their living chattels to raise an effective protestexcept by actual rebellion. But, from a legal point of view, aprincipality like Pergamon that had grown out of the successful seizureof a royal estate by its steward some hundred and fifty years beforethis time, might easily be regarded as the property of its kings;[507]and certainly if any heirs outside the royal family were to be admittedto the bequest, these would naturally be sought in the power, which hadincreased its dominions, strengthened its position and made it one ofthe great powers of the world. Neglected by Rome the principality wouldhave become the prey of neighbouring powers; whilst the institution of anew prince, chosen from some royal house, would, have excited thejealousy and stimulated the rapacity of the others. The acceptance ofthe bequest was inevitable, although by this acceptance Rome wasdeparting from the beaten track of a carefully chosen policy. It ishinted that Attalus in his bequest, or the Romans in their acceptance, stipulated for the freedom of the dominion. [508] This freedom may bemerely a euphemism for provincial rule when contrasted with absolutedespotism; but we may read a truer meaning into the term. Rome had oftenguaranteed the liberty of Asiatic cities which she had wrested fromtheir overlord, she had once divided Macedonia into independentRepublics, she still maintained Achaea in a condition which allowed agreat deal of self-government to many of its towns, and the system ofRoman protectorate melted by insensible degrees into that of provincialgovernment. It is possible that her treatment of the bequeathedcommunities might have been marked by greater liberality than wasactually shown, had not the dominion been immediately convulsed by a warof independence. A pretender had appeared from the house of the Attalids. He could showno legitimate scutcheon; but this was a small matter. If there was achance of a national outbreak, it could best be fomented by a son ofEumenes. Aristonicus was believed to have been born of an Ephesianconcubine of the king. [509] We know nothing of his personality, but thehistory of his two years' conflict with the Roman power proves him tohave been no figure-head, but a man of ability, energy and resource. Astrictly national cause was impossible in the kingdom of Pergamon; forthere was little community of sentiment between the Greek coast line andthe barbaric interior. But the commercial prosperity of the one, and theagricultural horrors of the other, might justify an appeal to interestbased on different grounds. At first Aristonicus tried the sea. Withoutventuring at once into any of the great emporia, he raised his standardat Leucae, a small but strongly defended seaport lying almost midwaybetween Phocaea and Smyrna, and placed on a promontory just south of thepoint where the Hermus issues into its gulf. Some of the leading townsseem to have answered to his call. [510] But the Ephesians, not contentwith mere repudiation, manned a fleet, sailed against him, and inflicteda severe defeat on his naval force off Cyme. [511] Evidently thecommercial spirit had no liking for his schemes; it saw in the Romanprotectorate the promise of a wider commerce and a broader civicfreedom. Aristonicus moved into the interior, at first perhaps as arefugee, but soon as a liberator. There were men here desperate enoughto answer to any call, and miserable enough to face any danger. Sicilyhad shown that a slave-leader might become a king; Asia was now to provethat a king might come to his own by heading an army of theoutcasts. [512] The call to freedom met with an eager response, and thePergamene prince was soon marching to the coast at the head of "thecitizens of the City of the Sun, " the ideal polity which these remnantsof nationalities, without countries and without homes, seem to have madetheir own. [513] His success was instantaneous. First the inland towns ofNorthern Lydia, Thyatira, and Apollonis, fell into his hands. [514]Organised resistance was for the moment impossible. There were no Romantroops in Asia, and the protected kings, to whom Rome had sent an urgentsummons, could not have mustered their forces with sufficient speed toprevent Aristonicus sweeping towards the south. Here he threatened thecoast line of Ionia and Caria; Colophon and Myndus fell into his power:he must even have been able to muster something of a fleet; for theisland of Samos was soon joined to his possessions. [515] It is probablethat the co-operation of the slave populations in these various citiesadded greatly to his success. His conquests may have been somewhatsporadic, and there is no reason to suppose that he commanded all thecountry included in the wide range of his captured cities and extendingfrom Thyatira to the coast and from the Gulf of Hermus to that ofIassus. The forces which he could dispose of seem to have beensufficiently engaged in holding their southern conquests; there is notrace of his controlling the country north of Phocaea or of his evenattempting an attack on Pergamon the capital of his kingdom. His army, however, must have been increasing in dimensions as well as inexperience. Thracian mercenaries were added to his servile bands, [516]and the movement had assumed dimensions which convinced the Romans thatthis was not a tumult but a war. Their earlier efforts were apparentlybased on the belief that local forces would be sufficient to stem therising. Even after the revolt of Aristonicus was known, they persistedin the idea that the commission, which would doubtless in any case havebeen sent out to inspect the new dependency, was an adequate means ofmeeting the emergency. This commission of five, [517] which includedScipio Nasica, journeyed to Asia only to find that they were attendingon a civil war, not on a judicial dispute, and that the country whichwas to be organised required to be conquered. The client kings ofBithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and Pontus, all eager for praise orfor reward, had rallied loyally to the cause of Rome;[518] but theauxiliary forces that they brought were quite unable to pacify a countrynow in the throes of a servile war, and they lacked a commander-in-chiefwho would direct a series of ordered operations. Orders were given forthe raising of a regular army, and in accordance with the traditions ofthe State this force would be commanded by a consul. The heads of the State for this year were Lucius Valerius Flaccus andPublius Licinius Crassus. Each was covetous of the attractive command;for the Asiatic campaigns of the past had been easy, and there was noreason to suppose that a pretender who headed a multitude of slaveswould be more difficult to vanquish than a king like Antiochus who hadhad at his call all the forces of Asia. The chances of a triumph werebecoming scarcer; here was one that was almost within the commander'sgrasp. But there were even greater prizes in store. The happy conquerorwould be the first to touch the treasure of the Attalids, and secure forthe State a prize which had already been the source of political strife;he would reap for himself and his army a royal harvest from the bootytaken in the field or from the sack of towns, and he would almostindubitably remain in the conquered country to organise, perhaps togovern for years, the wealthiest domain that had fallen to the lot ofRome, and to treat like a king with the monarchs of the protected statesaround. These attractions were sufficient to overcome the religiousscruples of both the candidates; for it chanced that both Crassus andFlaccus were hampered by religious law from assuming a command abroad. The one was chief pontiff and the other the Flamen of Mars; and, if theobjections were felt or pressed, the obvious candidate for the Asiaticcampaign was Scipio Aemilianus, the only tried general of the time. ButScipio's chances were small. The nature of the struggle did not seem todemand extraordinary genius, and Scipio, although necessary in anemergency, could not be allowed to snatch the legitimate prizes of theholders of office. [519] So the contest lay between the pontiff and thepriest. The controversy was unequal, for, while the pontiff was thedisciplinary head of the state religion, the Flamen was in matters ofritual and in the rules appertaining to the observance of religious lawsubject to his jurisdiction. Crassus restrained the ardour of hiscolleague by announcing that he would impose a fine if the Flamenneglected his religious duties by quitting the shores of Italy. Thepecuniary penalty was only intended as a means of stating a test case tobe submitted, as similar cases had been twice before, [520] to thedecision of the people. Flaccus entered an appeal against the fine, andthe judgment of the Comitia was invited. The verdict of the people wasthat the fine should be remitted, but that the Flamen should obey thepontiff. [521] As Crassus had no superior in the religious world, it wasdifficult, if not impossible, for the objections against his own tenureof the foreign command to be pressed. [522] The people, perhaps gratefulfor the Gracchan sympathies of Crassus, felt no scruple about dismissingtheir pontiff to a foreign land, and readily voted him the conductof the war. The story of the campaign which followed is confined to a few personalanecdotes connected with the remarkable man who led the Roman armies. The learning of Crassus was attested by the fact that, when he held acourt in Asia, he could not only deliver his judgments in Greek, butadapt his discourse to the dialect of the different litigants. [523] Hisdiscipline was severe but indiscriminating; it displayed the rigour ofthe erudite martinet, not the insight of the born commander. Once heneeded a piece of timber for a battering ram, and wrote to the architectof a friendly town to send the larger of two pieces which he had seenthere. The trained eye of the expert immediately saw that the smallerwas the better suited to the purpose; and this was accordingly sent. Theintelligence of the architect was his ruin. The unhappy man was strippedand scourged, on the ground that the exercise of judgment by asubordinate was utterly subversive of a commander's authority. [524]Another account represents such generalship as he possessed as havingbeen diverted from its true aim by the ardour with which, in spite ofhis enormous wealth, he followed up the traces of the spoils ofwar. [525] But his death, which took place at the beginning of the secondyear of his command, [526] was not unworthy of one who had held theconsulship. He was conducting operations in the territory between Elaeaand Smyrna, probably in preparation for the siege of Leucae, [527] stilla stronghold of the pretender. Here he was suddenly surprised by theenemy. His hastily formed ranks were shattered, and the Romans were soonin full retreat for some friendly city of the north. But their lineswere broken by uneven ground and by the violence of the pursuit. Thegeneral was detached from the main body of his army and overtaken by atroop of Thracian horse. His captors were probably ignorant of the valueof their prize; and, even had they known that they held in their handsthe leader of the Roman host, the device of Crassus might still havesaved him from the triumph of a rebel prince and shameful exposure tothe insults of a servile crowd. He thrust his riding whip into the eyeof one of his captors. Frenzied with pain, the man buried his dagger inthe captive's side. [528] The death of Crassus created hardly a pause in the conduct of thecampaign; for Marcus Perperna, the consul for the year, was soon in thefield and organising vigorous measures against Aristonicus. The detailsof the campaign have not been preserved, but we are told that the firstserious encounter resulted in a decisive victory for the Romanarms. [529] The pretender fled, and was finally hunted down to thesouthern part of his dominions. His last stand was made at Stratoniceain Caria. The town was blockaded and reduced by famine, and Aristonicussurrendered unconditionally to the Roman power. [530] Perperna reservedthe captive for his triumph, he visited Pergamon and placed on shipboardthe treasures of Attalus for transport to Rome;[531] by these decisiveacts he was proving that the war was over, for yet a third eager consulwas straining every nerve to get his share of glory and of gain. ManiusAquillius was hastening to Asia to assume a command which might still beinterpreted as a reality;[532] the longer he allowed his predecessor toremain, the more unsubstantial would his own share in the enterprisebecome. A triumph would be the prize of the man who had finished thewar, and perhaps even Aristonicus's capture need not be interpreted asits close. A scene of angry recrimination might have been the result ofan encounter between the rival commanders; but this was avoided byPerperna's sudden death at Pergamon. [533] It is possible thatAristonicus was saved the shame of a Roman triumph, although onetradition affirms that he was reserved for the pageant which three yearslater commemorated Aquillius's success in Asia. [534] But he did notescape the doom which the State pronounced on rebel princes, and wasstrangled in the Tullianum by the orders of the senate. [535] Aquillius found in his province sufficient material for the prolongationof the war. Although the fall of Aristonicus had doubtless brought withit the dissolution of the regular armies of the rebels, yet isolatedcities, probably terrorised by revolted slaves who could expect no mercyfrom the conqueror, still offered a desperate resistance. In hiseagerness to end the struggle the Roman commander is said to have shedthe last vestiges of international morality, and the reduction of townsby the poisoning of the streams which provided them with water, [536]while it inflicted an indelible stain on Roman honour, was perhapsdefended as an inevitable accompaniment of an irregular servile war. Thework of organisation had been begun even before that of pacification hadbeen completed. The State had taken Perperna's success seriously enoughto send with Aquillius ten commissioners for the regulation of theaffairs of the new province, [537] and they seem to have entered on theirtask from the date of their arrival. [538] There was no reason for delay, since the kingdom of Pergamon had technically become a province with thedeath of Attalus the Third. [539] The Ephesians indeed even antedatedthis event, and adopted an era which commenced with the September of theyear 134, [540] the reason for this anticipation being the usual Asiaticcustom of beginning the civil year with the autumnal equinox. The realpoint of departure of this new era of Ephesus was either the death ofAttalus or the victory of the city over the fleet of Aristonicus. But, though the work of organisation could be entered on at once, itscompletion was a long and laborious task, and Aquillius himself seems tohave spent three years in Asia. [541] The limits of the province, which, like that of Africa, received the name of the continent to which itbelonged, required to be defined with reference to future possibilitiesand the rights of neighbouring kingdoms; the taxation of the country hadto be adjusted; and the privileges of the different cities proportionedto their capacity or merits. The law of Aquillius remained in essencethe charter of the province of Asia down to imperial times, althoughsubsequent modifications were introduced by Sulla and Pompeius. The newinheritance of the Romans comprised almost all the portion of Asia Minorlying north of the Taurus and west of Bithynia, Galatia and Cappadocia. Even Caria, which had been declared free after the war with Perseus, seems to have again fallen under the sway of the Attalid kings. Themonarchy also included the Thracian Chersonese and most of the Aegeanislands. [542] But the whole of this territory was not included in thenew province of Asia. The Chersonese was annexed to the province ofMacedonia, [543] a small district of Caria known as the Peraea andsituated opposite the island of Rhodes, became or remained the propertyof the latter state; in the same neighbourhood the port and town ofTelmissus, which had been given to Eumenes after the defeat ofAntiochus, were restored to the Lycian confederation. [544] Withcharacteristic caution Rome did not care to retain direct dominion overthe eastern portions of her new possessions, some of which, such asIsauria, Pisidia and perhaps the eastern portion of Cilicia, may haverendered a very nominal obedience to the throne of the Attalids. Shekept the rich, civilised and easily governed Hellenic lands for her own, but the barbarian interior, as too great and distant a burden for thehome government, was destined to enrich her loyal client states. Aquillius and his commissioners must have received definite instructionsnot to claim for Rome any territory lying east of Mysia, Lydia andCaria; but they seem to have had no instructions as to how the discardedterritories were to be disposed of. The consequence was that the kingsof the East were soon begging for territory from a Roman commander andhis assistants. Lycaonia was the reward of proved service; it was givento the sons of Ariarathes the Fifth, King of Cappadocia, who had fallenin the war. [545] Cilicia is also said to have accompanied this gift, butthis no man's land must have been regarded both by donor and recipientas but a nominal boon. For Phrygia proper, or the Greater Phrygia asthis country south of Bithynia and west of Galatia was called, [546]there were two claimants. [547] The kings of Pontus and Bithynia competedfor the prize, and each supported his petition by a reference to thehistory of the past. Nicomedes of Bithynia could urge that his grandsirePrusias had maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality during Rome'sstruggle with Antiochus. The Pontic king, Mithradates Euergetes, advanced a more specious pretext of hereditary right. Phrygia, healleged, had been his mother's dowry, and had been given her by herbrother, Seleucus Callinicus, King of Syria. [548] We do not know whatconsiderations influenced the judgment of Aquillius in preferring theclaim of Mithradates. He may have considered that the Pontic kingdom, asthe more distant, was the less dangerous, and he may have sought toattract the loyalty of its monarch by benefits such as had already beenheaped on Nicomedes of Bithynia. His political enemies and all who insubsequent times resisted the claim of the Pontic kings, alleged that hehad put Phrygia up to auction and that Mithradates had paid the higherprice; this transaction doubtless figured in the charges of corruption, on which he was accused and acquitted: and, doubtful as the verdictwhich absolved him seemed to his contemporaries and successors, we haveno proof that the desire for gain was the sole or even the main cause ofhis decision. Had he considered that the investiture of Nicomedes wouldhave been more acceptable to the home government, the King of Bithyniawould probably have been willing to pay an adequate sum for hisadvocacy. He may have been guilty of a wilful blunder in alienatingPhrygia at all. The senate soon discovered his and its own mistake. Thedisputed territory was soon seen to be worthy of Roman occupation. Strategically it was of the utmost importance for the security of theAsiatic coast, as commanding the heads of the river valleys whichstretched westward to the Aegean, while its thickly strewn townships, which opened up possibilities of inland trade, placed it on a differentplane to the desolate Lycaonia and Cilicia. It is possible that thecapitalist class, on whose support the senate was now relying for themaintenance of the political equilibrium in the capital, may have joinedin the protest against Aquillius's mistaken generosity. But, though thegovernment rapidly decided to rescind the decision of its commissioners, it had not the strength to settle the matter once for all by takingPhrygia for itself. A decree of the people was still technicallysuperior to a resolution of the senate; it was always possible fordissentients to urge that the people must be consulted on these greatquestions of international interest; and Phrygia became, like Pergamon ashort time before, the sport of party politics. The rival kingstransferred their claims, and possibly their pecuniary offers, from theprovince to the capital, and the network of intrigue which soon shroudedthe question was brutally exhibited by Caius Gracchus when, in his firstor second tribunate, he urged the people to reject an Aufeian law, whichbore on the dispute. "You will find, citizens, " he urged, "that each oneof us has his price. Even I am not disinterested, although it happensthat the particular object which I have in view is not money, but goodrepute and honour. But the advocates on both sides of this question arelooking to something else. Those who urge you to reject this bill areexpecting hard cash from Nicomedes; those who urge its acceptance arelooking for the price which Mithradates will pay for what he calls hisown; this will be their reward. And, as for the members of thegovernment who maintain a studious reserve on this question, they arethe keenest bargainers of all; their silence simply means that they arebeing paid by every one and cheating every one. " This cynicaldescription of the political situation was pointed by a quotation of theretort of Demades to the successful tragedian "Are you so proud ofhaving got a talent for speaking? why, I got ten talents from the kingfor holding my peace". [549] This sketch was probably more witty thantrue; condemnation, when it becomes universal, ceases to be convincing, and cynicism, when it exceeds a certain degree, is merely the revelationof a diseased or affected mental attitude. Gracchus was too good apleader to be a fair observer. But the suspicion revealed by thediatribe may have been based on fact; the envoys of the kings may havebrought something weightier than words or documents, only to find thatthe balance of their gilded arguments was so perfect that the originalobjection to Phrygia being given to any Eastern potentate was the onlyissue which could still be supported with conviction. Yet the governmentstill declined to annex. Its hesitancy was probably due to itsunwillingness to see a new Eastern province handed over to theequestrian tax-farmers, to whom Caius Gracchus had just given theprovince of Asia. The fall of Gracchus made an independent judgment bythe people impossible, and, even had it been practicable for the Comitiato decide, their judgment must have been so perplexed by rival interestsand arguments that they would probably have acquiesced in the equivocaldecision of the senate. This decision was that Phrygia should befree. [550] It was to be open to the Roman capitalist as a trader, butnot as a collector; it was not to be the scene of official corruption orregal aggrandisement. It was to be an aggregate of protected statespossessing no central government of its own. Yet some central controlwas essential; and this was perhaps secured by attaching Phrygia to theprovince of Asia in the same loose condition of dependence in whichAchaea had been attached to Macedonia. In one other particular thesettlement of Aquillius was not final. We shall find that motives ofmaritime security soon forced Rome to create a province of Cilicia, andit seems that for this purpose a portion of the gift which had been justmade to the kings of Cappadocia was subsequently resumed by Rome. Theold Pergamene possessions in Western Cilicia were probably joined tosome towns of Pamphylia to form the kernel of the new province. WhenRome had divested herself of the superfluous accessories of her bequest, a noble residue still remained. Mysia, Lydia and Caria with theirmagnificent coast cities, rich in art, and inexhaustible in wealth, formed, with most of the islands off the coast, [551] that "corrupting"province which became the Favourite resort of the refined and thedesperate resource of the needy. Its treasures were to add a new word tothe Roman vocabulary of wealth;[552] its luxury was to give a newstimulus to the art of living and to add a new craving or two to theinsatiable appetite for enjoyment; while the servility of its populationwas to create a new type of Roman ruler in the man who for one gloriousyear wielded the power of a Pergamene despot, without the restraint ofkingly traditions or the continence induced by an assured tenureof rule. The western world witnessed the beginning of an equally remarkablechange. On both sides of Italy accident was laying the foundation for asteady advance to the North, and forcing the Romans into contact withpeoples, whose subjection would never have been sought except frompurely defensive motives. The Iapudes and Histri at the head of theAdriatic were the objects of a campaign of the consul Tuditanus, [553]while four years later Fulvius Flaccus commenced operations amongst theGauls and Ligurians beyond the Alps, [554] which were to find theircompletion seventy-five years later in the conquests of Caesar. Butneither of these enterprises can be intelligently considered inisolation; their significance lies in the necessity of their renewal, and even the proximate results to which they led would carry us farbeyond the limits of the period which we are considering. The eventscompletely enclosed within these limits are of subordinate importance. They are a war in Sardinia and the conquest of the Balearic isles. Theformer engaged the attention of Lucius Aurelius Orestes as consul in 126and as proconsul in the following year. [555] It is perhaps only thefacts that a consul was deemed necessary for the administration of theisland, and that he attained a triumph for his deeds, [556] that justifyus in calling this Sardinian enterprise a war. It was a punitiveexpedition undertaken against some restless tribes, but it was renderedarduous by the unhealthiness of the climate and the difficulty ofprocuring adequate supplies for the suffering Roman troops. [557] Theannexation of the Balearic islands with their thirty thousandinhabitants[558] may have been regarded as a geographical necessity, andcertainly resulted in a military advantage. Although the Carthaginianshad had frequent intercourse with these islands and a Port of thesmaller of the two still bears a Punic name, [559] they had done littleto civilise the native inhabitants. Perhaps the value attached to themilitary gifts of the islanders contributed to preserve them in a stateof nature; for culture might have diminished that marvellous skill withthe sling, [560] which was once at the service of the Carthaginian, andafterwards of the Roman, armies. But, in spite of their prowess, theBaliares were not a fierce people. They would allow no gold or silver toenter their country, [561] probably in order that no temptation might beoffered to pirates or rapacious traders. [562] Their civilisationrepresented the matriarchal stage; their marriage customs expressed thesurvival of polyandric union; they were tenacious of the lives of theirwomen, and even invested the money which they gained on military servicein the purchase of female captives. [563] They made excellentmercenaries, but shunned either war or commerce with the neighbouringpeoples, and the only excuse for Roman aggression was that a smallproportion of the peaceful inhabitants had lent themselves to piraticalpursuits. [564] The expedition was led by the consul Quintus CaeciliusMetellus and resulted in a facile conquest. The ships of the invaderswere protected by hides stretched above the decks to guard against thecloud of well-directed missiles;[565] but, once a landing had beeneffected, the natives, clad only in skins, with small shields and lightjavelins as their sole defensive weapons, could offer no effectiveresistance at close quarters and were easily put to rout. For thesecurity of the new possessions Metellus adopted the device, still rarein the case of transmarine dependencies, of planting colonies on theconquered land. Palma and Pollentia were founded, as townships of Romancitizens, on the larger island; the new settlers being drawn from Romanswho were induced to leave their homes in the south of Spain. [566] Thisunusual effort in the direction of Romanisation was rendered necessaryby the wholly barbarous character of the country; and the introductioninto the Balearic isles of the Latin language and culture was a betterjustification than the easy victory for Metellus's triumph and hisassumption of the surname of "Baliaricus". [567] The islands flourishedunder Roman rule. They produced wine and wheat in abundance and werefamed for the excellence of their mules. But their chief value to Romemust have lain in their excellent harbours, and in the welcome additionto the light-armed forces of the empire which was found in their warlikeinhabitants. CHAPTER IV Rome had lived for nine years in a feverish atmosphere of projectedreform; yet not a single question raised by her bolder spirits hadreceived its final answer. The agrarian legislation had indeed run asuccessful course; yet the very hindrance to its operation at a criticalmoment had, in the eyes of the discontented, turned success into failureand left behind a bitter feeling of resentment at the treacherousdexterity of the government. The men, in whose imagined interests thepeople had been defrauded of their coveted land, had by a singular ironyof fortune been driven ignominiously from Rome and were now the victimsof graver suspicions on the part of the government than on that of theRoman mob. The effect of the late senatorial diplomacy had been tocreate two hostile classes instead of one. From both these classes thearistocrats drew their soldiers for the constant campaigns that theneeds of Empire involved: and both were equally resentful of the burdensand abuses of military service, for which no one was officially directedto suggest a cure. The poorest classes had been given the ballot whenthey wanted food and craved a less precarious sustenance than thatafforded by the capricious benevolence of the rich. The friction betweenthe senatorial government and the upper middle class was probablyincreasing. The equites must have been casting hungry eyes at the newprovince of Asia and asking themselves whether commercial interests werealways to be at the mercy of the nobility as represented by the senate, the provincial administrators and the courts of justice. It was believedthat governors, commissioners and senators were being bought by the goldof kings, and that mines of wealth were being lost to the honestcapitalist through the utter corruption of the governing few. The finalthreats of Tiberius Gracchus were still in the air, and a vast unworkedmaterial lay ready to the hand of the aspiring agitator. In an ancientmonarchy or aristocracy of the feudal type, where abuses have becomesanctified by tradition, or in a modern nation or state with itssplendid capacity for inertia due to the habitual somnolence of themajority of its electors, such questions may vaguely suggest themselvesfor half a century without ever receiving an answer. But Rome could onlyavoid a revolution by discarding her constitution. The sovereignty ofthe people was a thesis which the senate dared not attack; and thissovereignty had for the first time in Roman history become a sternreality. The city in its vastness now dominated the country districts:and the sovereign, now large, now small, now wild, now sober, but everthe sovereign in spite of his kaleidoscopic changes, could be summonedat any moment to the Forum. Democratic agitation was becoming habitual. It is true that it was also becoming unsafe. But a man who could holdthe wolf by the ears for a year or two might work a revolution in Romeand perhaps be her virtual master. It was no difficult task to find the man, for there was one who wasmarked out by birth, traditions, temperament and genius as the fittestexponent of a cause which, in spite of its intricate complications thatbaffled the analysis of the ordinary mind, could still in its essentialfeatures be described as the cause of the people. It is indeed singularthat, in a political civilisation so unkind as the Roman to the meritsof youth, hopes should be roused and fear inspired by a man so young andinexperienced as Caius Gracchus. But the popular fancy is often caughtby the immaturity that is as yet unhampered by caution and undimmed bydisillusion, and by the fresh young voice that has not yet been attunedto the poor half-truths which are the stock-in-trade of the worldlywise. And those who were about Gracchus must soon have seen that thetraces of youth were to be found only in his passion, his frankness, hisimpetuous vigour; no discerning eye could fail to be aware of the cool, calculating, intellect which unconsciously used emotion as its mask, ofa mind that could map and plan a political campaign in perfectself-confident security, view the country as a whole and yet masterevery detail, and then leave the issue of the fight to burning words andpassionate appeals. This supreme combination of emotional and artisticgifts, which made Gracchus so irresistible as a leader, was strikinglymanifested in his oratory. We are told of the intensity of his mien, theviolence of his gestures, the restlessness that forced him to pace theRostra and pluck the toga from his shoulder, of the language that rousedhis hearers to an almost intolerable tension of pity orindignation. [568] Nature had made him the sublimest, because the mostunconscious of actors; eyes, tone, gesture all answered the bidding ofthe magic words. [569] Sometimes the emotion was too highly strung; thewords would become coarser, the voice harsher, the faultless sentenceswould grow confused, until the soft tone of a flute blown by anattendant slave would recall his mind to reason and his voice to theaccustomed pitch. [570] Men contrasted him with his gentle and statelybrother Tiberius, endowed with all the quiet dignity of the Romanorator, and diverging only from the pure and polished exposition of hiscause to awake a feeling of commiseration for the wrongs which heunfolded. [571] Tiberius played but on a single chord; Caius on many. Tiberius appealed to noble instincts, Caius appealed to all and hisProtean manifestations were a symbol of a more complex creed, a widerknowledge of humanity, a greater recklessness as to his means, and ofthat burning consciousness, which Tiberius had not, that there werepersonal wrongs to be avenged as well as political ideas to be realised. To a narrow mind the vendetta is simply an act of justice; to anintellectual hater such as Gracchus it is also a work of reason. Thefolly of crime but exaggerates its grossness, and the hatred for thecriminal is merged in an exalting and inspiring contempt. Yet the manthus attuned to passion was, what every great orator must be, a painfulstudent of the most delicate of arts. The language of the successfuldemagogue seldom becomes the study of the schools; yet so it was withGracchus. The orators of a later age, whose critical appreciation waspurer than their practice, could find no better guide to the aspirantfor forensic fame than the speeches of the turbulent tribune. Cicerodwells on the fulness and richness of his flow of words, the grandeurand dignity of the expression, the acuteness of the thought. [572] Theyseemed to some to lack the finishing touch;[573] which is equivalent tosaying that with him oratory had not degenerated into rhetoric. The fewfragments that survive awaken our wonder, first for their marvelloussimplicity and clearness: then, for the dexterous perfection of theirform. The balance of the rhythmic clauses never obscures or overloadsthe sense. Gracchus could tell a tale, like that of the cruel wrongsinflicted on the allies, which could arouse a thrill of horror withoutalso awakening the reflection that the speaker was a man of greatsensibility and had a wonderful command of commiserative terminology. Hecould ask the crowd where he should fly, whether to the Capitol drippingwith a brother's blood, or to the home where the widowed mother sat inmisery and tears;[574] and no one thought that this was a mere figure ofspeech. It all seemed real, because Gracchus was a true artist as wellas a true man, and knew by an unerring instinct when to pause. This typeof objective oratory, with its simple and vivid pictures, its brilliantbut never laboured wit, its capacity for producing the illusion that theman is revealed in the utterance, its suggestion of something deeperthan that which the mere words convey--a suggestion which all feel butonly the learned understand--is equally pleasing to the trained and theunlettered mind. The polished weapon, which dazzled the eyes of thecrowd, was viewed with respect even by the cultured nobles against whomit was directed. Caius's qualities had been tested for some years before he attained thetribunate, and the promise given by his name, his attitude and hiseloquence was strengthened by the fact that he had no rival in thepopular favour. Carbo was probably on his way to the Optimates, andFlaccus's failure was too recent to make him valuable in any otherquality than that of an assistant. But Caius had risen through theopportunities given by the agitation which these men had sustained, although his advance to the foremost place seemed more like the work ofdestiny than of design. When a youth of twenty-one, he had found himselfelevated to the rank of a land commissioner;[575] but this accidentalidentification with Tiberius's policy was not immediately followed byany action which betrayed a craving for an active political career. Heis said to have shunned the Forum, that training school and advertisingarena where the aspiring youth of Rome practised their litigiouseloquence, and to have lived a life of calm retirement which someattributed to fear and others to resentment. It was even believed by afew that he doubted the wisdom of his brother's career. [576] But It wassoon found that the leisure which he cultivated was not that of easyenjoyment and did not promise prolonged repose. He was grappling withthe mysteries of language, and learning by patient study the art offinding the words that would give to thought both form and wings. Thethought, too, must have been taking a clearer shape: for Tiberius hadleft a heritage of crude ideas, and men were trying to introduce some ofthese into the region of practical politics. The first call to arms wasCarbo's proposal for legalising re-election to the tribunate. It drewfrom Gracchus a speech in its support, which contained a bitterindictment of those who had been the cause of the "human sacrifice"fulfilled in his brother's murder. [577] Five years later he was amongstthe foremost of the opponents of the alien-act of Pennus, and exposedthe dangerous folly involved in a jealous policy of exclusion. But thecourts of law are said to have given him the first great opportunity ofrevealing his extraordinary powers to the world. As an advocate for afriend called Vettius, he delivered a speech which seemed to lift him toa plane unapproachable by the other orators of the day. The spectacle ofthe crowd almost raving with joy and frantically applauding thenew-found hero, showed that a man had appeared who could really touchthe hearts of the people, and is said to have suggested to men ofaffairs that every means must be used to hinder Gracchus's accession tothe tribunate. [578] The chance of the lot sent him as quaestor with theconsul Orestes to Sardinia. It was with joyful hearts that his enemiessaw him depart to that unhealthy clime, [579] and to Caius himself thechange to the active life of the camp was not unpleasing. He is saidstill to have dreaded the plunge into the stormy sea of politics, and inSardinia he was safe from the appeals of the people and the entreatiesof his friends. [580] Yet already he had received a warning that therewas no escape. While wrestling with himself as to whether he should seekthe quaestorship, his fevered mind had conjured up a vision. The phantomof his brother had appeared and addressed him in these words "Why dostthou linger, Caius? It is not given thee to draw back. One life, onedeath is fated for us both, as defenders of the people's rights. " Hisbelief in the reality of this warning is amply attested;[581] but thesense that he was predestined and foredoomed, though it may have givenan added seriousness to his life, left him as calm and vigorous asbefore. Like Tiberius he was within a sphere of his father's influence, and this memory must have stimulated his devotion to his military andprovincial duties. He won distinction in the field and a repute forjustice in his dealings with the subject tribes, while his simplicity oflife and capacity for toil suggested the veteran campaigner, not thetyro from the most luxurious of cities. [582] The extent of the servicesin Sardinia and neighbouring lands which his name and character enabledhim to render to the State, has been perhaps exaggerated, or at leastfaultily stated, by our authority; but, in view of the unquestionedconfidence shown by the Numantines in his brother when as young a man, there is no reason to doubt their reality. It is said that, when thetreacherous winter of Sardinia had shaken the troops with chills, thecommander sent to the cities asking for a supply of clothing. Thesetowns, which were probably federate communities and exempt by treatyfrom the requisitions of Rome, appealed to the senate. They feared nodoubt the easy lapse of an act of kindness into a burden fixed byprecedent. The senate, as in duty bound, upheld their contention; andsuffering and disease would have reigned in the Roman camp, had notGracchus visited the cities in person and prevailed on them to send thenecessary help. [583] On another occasion envoys from Micipsa of Numidiaare said to have appeared at Rome and offered a supply of corn for theSardinian army. The request had perhaps been made by Gracchus. To theNumidian king he was simply the grandson of the elder Africanus: And theenvoys in their simplicity mentioned his name as the Intermediary of theroyal bounty. The senate, we are told, rejected the Proffered help. Thecurious parallelism between the present career of Caius and the earlyactivities of his brother must have struck many; to the senate theseproofs of energy and devotion seemed but the prelude to similaringenious attempts to capture public favour at home: and their fears aresaid to have helped them to the decision to keep Orestes for a furtheryear as proconsul in Sardinia. [584] It is possible that the resolutionwas partly due to military exigencies; the fact that the troops wererelieved was natural in consideration of the sufferings which they hadundergone, but the retention of the general to complete a desultorycampaign which chiefly demanded knowledge of the country, was a wise andnot unusual proceeding. It was, however, an advantage that, as customdictated, the quaestor must remain in the company of his commander. Gracchus's reappearance in Rome was postponed for a year. It was aslight grace, but much might happen in the time. It was in this latter sense that the move was interpreted by thequaestor. A trivial wrong inflamed the impetuous and resentful naturewhich expectation and entreaty had failed to move. Stung by the beliefthat he was the victim of a disgraceful subterfuge, Gracchus immediatelytook ship to Rome. His appearance in the capital was something of ashock even to his friends. [585] Public sentiment regarded a quaestor asholding an almost filial relation to his superior; the ties produced bytheir joint activity were held to be indissoluble, [586] and thevoluntary departure of the subordinate was deemed a breach of officialduty. Lapses in conduct on the part of citizens engaged in the publicservice, which fell short of being criminal, might be visited withvarying degrees of ignominy by the censorship: and it happened that thiscourt of morals was now in existence in the persons of the censors Cn. Servilius Caepio and L. Cassius Longinus, who had entered office in theprevious year. The censorian judgments, although arbitrary and as a rulespontaneous, were sometimes elicited by prosecution: and an accuser wasfound to bring the conduct of Gracchus formally before the notice of themagistrates. Had the review of the knights been in progress after hisarrival, his case would have been heard during the performance of thisceremony; for he was as yet but a member of the equestrian order, andthe slightest disability pronounced against him, had he been foundguilty, would have assumed the form of the deprivation of his publichorse and his exclusion from the eighteen centuries. But it is possiblethat, at this stage of the history of the censorship, penalties could beinflicted upon the members of all classes at any date preceding thelustral sacrifice, that the usual examination of the citizen body hadbeen completed, and that Gracchus appeared alone before the tribunal ofthe censors. His defence became famous;[587] its result is unknown. Thetrial probably ended in his acquittal, [588] although condemnation wouldhave exercised little influence on his subsequent career, for theignominy pronounced by the censors entailed no disability for holding amagistracy. But, whatever may have been the issue, Gracchus improved theoccasion by an harangue to the people, [589] in which he defended hisconduct as one of their representatives in Sardinia. The speech wasimportant for its caustic descriptions of the habits of the nobilitywhen freed from the moral atmosphere of Rome. With extreme ingenuity heworked into the description of the habits of his own official life ascathing indictment, expressed in the frankest terms, of theself-seeking, the luxury, the unnatural vices, the rampant robbery ofthe average provincial despot. His auditors learnt the details of acommander's environment--the elaborate cooking apparatus, the throng ofhandsome favourites, the jars of wine which, when emptied, returned toRome as receptacles of gold and silver mysteriously acquired. Gracchusmust have delighted his audience with a subject on which the masses loveto dwell, the vices of their superiors. The luridness of the picturemust have given it a false appearance of universal truth. It seemed tobe the indictment of a class, and suggested that the speaker stood alooffrom his own order and looked only to the pure judgment of the people. His enemies tried a new device. They knew that one flaw in his armourwas his sympathy with the claims of the allies. Could he be compromisedas an agent in that dark conspiracy which had prompted the impudentItalian claims and ended in open rebellion, his credit would be gone, even if his career were not closed by exile. He was accordinglythreatened with an impeachment for complicity in the movement which hadissued in the outbreak at Fregellae. It is uncertain whether he wasforced to submit to the judgment of a court; but we are told that hedissipated every suspicion, and surmounted the last and most dangerousof the obstacles with which his path was blocked. [590] Straightway heoffered himself for the tribunate, and, as the day of the electionapproached, every effort was made by the nobility to secure his defeat. Old differences were forgotten; a common panic produced harmony amongstthe cliques; it even seems as if his opponents agreed that no man ofextreme views should be advanced against him, for Gracchus in histribunate had to contend with no such hostile colleague as Octavius. Thecandidature of an extremist might mean votes for Gracchus: and it waspreferable to concentrate support on neutral men, or even on men ofliberal views who were known to be in favour with the crowd. The great_clientèle_ of the country districts was doubtless beaten up; and weknow that, on the other side, the hopes of the needy agriculturist, andthe gratitude of the newly established peasant farmer, brought many asupporter to Gracchus from distant Italian homesteads. The city was soflooded by the inrush of the country folk that many an elector foundhimself without a roof to shelter him, and the place of voting couldaccommodate only a portion of the crowd. The rest climbed on roofs andtiles, and filled the air with discordant party cries until space wasgiven for a descent to the voting enclosures. When the poll wasdeclared, it was found that the electoral manoeuvres of the nobility hadbeen so far successful that Gracchus occupied but the fourth place onthe list. [591] But, from the moment of his entrance on office, hispredominance was assured. We hear nothing of the colleagues whom heovershadowed. Some may have been caught in the stream of Gracchus'seloquence; others have found it useless or dangerous to oppose theenthusiasm which his proposals aroused, and the formidable combinationwhich he created by the alluring prospects that he held out to themembers of the equestrian order. The collegiate character of themagistracy practically sank into abeyance, and his rule was that of asingle man. First he gave vent to the passions of the mob by dwelling, as no one had yet dared to do, on the gloomy tragedy of his brother'sfall and the cruel persecution which had followed the catastrophe. Theblood of a murdered tribune was wholly unavenged in a state which hadonce waged war with Falerii to punish a mere insult to the holy office, and had condemned a citizen to death because he had not risen from hisplace while a tribune walked through the Forum. "Before your very eyes, "he said, "they beat Tiberius to death with cudgels; they dragged hisdead body from the Capitol through the midst of the city to cast it intothe river; those of his friends whom they seized, they put to deathuntried. And yet think how your constitution guards the citizen's life!If a man is accused on a capital charge and does not immediately obeythe summons, it is ordained that a trumpeter come at dawn before hisdoor and summon him by sound of trumpet; until this is done, no vote maybe pronounced against him. So carefully and watchfully did our ancestorsregulate the course of justice. " [592] A cry for vengeance is heremerged in a great constitutional principle; and these utterances pavedthe way for the measure immediately formulated that no court should beestablished to try a citizen on a capital charge, unless such a courthad received the sanction of the people. [593] The power of the Comitiato delegate its jurisdiction without appeal is here affirmed; the rightof the senate to institute an inquisition without appeal is here denied. The measure was a development of a suggestion which had been made byTiberius Gracchus, who had himself probably called attention to the factthat the establishment of capital commissions by the senate was aviolation of the principle of the _provocatio_ Caius Gracchus, however, did not attempt to ordain that an appeal should be possible from thejudgment of the standing commissions (_quaestiones perpetuae_); for, though the initiative in the creation of these courts had been taken bythe senate, they had long received the sanction of law, and theirself-sufficiency was perhaps covered by the principle that the people, in creating a commission, waived its own powers of final jurisdiction. But there were other technical as well as practical disadvantages ininstituting an appeal from these commissions. The _provocatio_ hadalways been the challenge to the decision of a magistrate; but in thesestanding courts the actions of the president and of the _judices_ whosat with him were practically indistinguishable, and the sentencepronounced was in no sense a magisterial decision. The courts had alsobeen instituted to avoid the clumsiness of popular jurisdiction; butthis clumsiness would be restored, if their decision was to be shaken bya further appeal to the Comitia. Gracchus, in fact, when he proposedthis law, was not thinking of the ordinary course of jurisdiction atall. He had before his mind the summary measures by which the senatetook on itself to visit such epidemics of crime as were held to bebeyond the strength of the regular courts, and more especially themanner in which this body had lately dealt with alleged cases ofsedition or treason. The investigation directed against the supportersof his brother was the crucial instance which he brought before thepeople, and it is possible that, at a still later date, the inquirywhich followed the fall of Fregellae had been instituted on the soleauthority of the senate and had found a certain number of victims in thecitizen body. Practically, therefore, Gracchus in this law whollydenied, either as the result of experience or by anticipation, thelegality of the summary jurisdiction which followed a declaration ofmartial law. In the creation of these extraordinary commissions the senate never tookupon itself the office of judge, nor was the commission itself composedof senators appointed by the house. The jurisdiction was exercised by amagistrate at the bidding of the senate, and the court thus constitutedselected its assessors, who formed a mere council for advice, at its owndiscretion. It was plain that, if the law was to be effective, its chiefsanction must be directed, not against the corporation which appointed, but against the judge. The responsibility of the individual is theeasiest to secure, and no precautions against martial law can beeffective if a division of authority, or even obedience to authority, isonce admitted. Gracchus, therefore, pronounced that criminal proceedingsshould be possible against the magistrate who had exercised thejurisdiction now pronounced illegal. [594] The common law of Rome wenteven further, and pronounced every individual responsible for illegalacts done at the bidding of a magistrate. The crime which the magistratehad committed by the exercise of this forbidden jurisdiction wasprobably declared to be treason: and, as there was no standing court atRome which took cognisance of this offence, the jurisdiction of theComitia was ordained. The penalty for the crime was doubtless a capitalone, and by ancient prescription such a punishment necessitated a trialbefore the Assembly of the Centuries. It is, however, possible thatGracchus rendered the plebeian assembly of the Tribes competent topronounce the capital sentence against the magistrate who had violatedthe prescriptions of his law. But, although the magistrate was thechief, he appears not to have been the sole offender under theprovisions of this bill. In spite of the fact that the senate as a wholewas incapable of being punished for the advice which had prompted themagistrate to an illegal course of action, it seems that the individualsenator who moved, or perhaps supported, the decree which led to theforbidden jurisdiction, was made liable to the penalties of thelaw. [595] The operation of the enactment was made retrospective, or wasperhaps conceived by its very nature to cover the past abuses which hadcalled it into being; for in a sense it created no new crime, but simplyrestated the principle of the appeal in a form suited to the proceedingsagainst which it wished to guard. It might have been argued thatcustomary law protected the consul who directed the proceedings of thecourt which doomed the supporters of Tiberius Gracchus; but theargument, if used, was of no avail. Popillius was to be the witness toall men of the reality of this reassertion of the palladium of Romanliberty. An impeachment was framed against him, and either before orafter his withdrawal from Rome, Caius Gracchus himself formulated andcarried through the Plebs the bill of interdiction which doomed him toexile. [596] It was in vain that Popillius's young sons and numerousrelatives besought the people for mercy. [597] The memory of the outragewas too recent, the joyful sense of the power of retaliation too noveland too strong. All that was possible was a counter demonstration whichshould emphasise the sympathy of loyalists with the illustrious victim, and Popillius was escorted to the gates by a weeping crowd. [598] We knowthat condemnation also overtook his colleague Rupilius, [599] and it isprobable that he too fell a victim to the sense of vengeance or ofjustice aroused by the Gracchan law. A less justifiable spirit of retaliation is exhibited by anotherenactment with which Gracchus inaugurated his tribunate, although inthis, as in ail his other acts, the blow levelled at his enemies was notdevoid of a deep political significance. He introduced a proposal that amagistrate who had been deposed by the people should not be allowed tohold any further office. [600] Octavius was the obvious victim, and themere personal significance of the measure does not necessarily implythat Gracchus was burning with resentment against a man, whoseopposition to his brother had rapidly been forgotten in the degradationwhich he had experienced at that brother's hands. Hatred to the injuredmay be a sentiment natural to the wrongdoer, but is not likely to beimparted even to the most ardent supporter of the author of themischief. It were better to forget Octavius, if Octavius would allowhimself to be forgotten; but the sturdy champion of the senate, still inthe middle of his career, may have been a future danger and a presenteyesore to the people: Gracchus's invectives probably carried him andhis auditors further than he intended, and the rehabilitation of hisbrother's tribunate in its integrity may have seemed to demand thisstrong assertion of the justice of his act. But the legality ofdeposition by the people was a still more important point. Merely toassert it would be to imply that Tiberius had been wrong. How could itbe more emphatically proclaimed than by making its consequencesperpetual and giving it a kind of penal character? But the personalaspect of the measure proved too invidious even for its proposer. Avoice that commanded his respect was raised against it: and Gracchus inwithdrawing the bill confessed that Octavius was spared through theintercession of Cornelia. [601] So far his legislation had but given an outlet to the justifiableresentment of the people, and a guarantee for the security of their mostprimitive rights. This was to be followed by an appeal to theirinterests and a measure for securing their permanent comfort. Thewonderful solidarity of Gracchus and his supporters, the crowningtriumph of the demagogue which is to make each man feel that he is anagent in his own salvation, have been traced to this constructivelegislation for the benefit of classes, which ancient authors, writingunder aristocratic prepossessions, have described by the ugly name ofbribery. [602] The poor of Rome, if we include in this designation thosewho lived on the margin as well as those who were sunk in the depths ofdestitution, probably included the majority of the inhabitants of thetown. The city had practically no organised industries. The retailtrader and the purveyor of luxuries doubtless flourished; but, in thescanty manufactures which the capital still provided, the army of freelabour must have been always worsted by the cruel competition of thecheaper and more skilful slave or freedman. But the poor of Rome did notform the cowed and shivering class that are seen on the streets of anorthern capital. They were the merry and vivacious lazzaroni of thepavement and the portico, composite products of many climes, with allthe lively endurance of the southerner and intellects sharpened by theingenious devices requisite for procuring the minimum sustenance oflife. Could they secure this by the desultory labour which alone wasprovided by the economic conditions of Rome, their lot was far fromunhappy. As in most ancient civilisations, the poor were better providedwith the amenities than with the bare necessities of existence. Althoughthe vast provision for the pleasures of the people, by which the Caesarsmaintained their popularity, was yet lacking, and even the erection of apermanent theatre was frowned on by the senate, [603] yet the capitalprovided endless excitement for the leisured mind and the observant eye. It was for their benefit that the gladiatorial show was provided by therich, and the gorgeous triumph by the State; but it was the antics ofthe nobility in the law courts and at the hustings that afforded themore constant and pleasing spectacle. Attendance at the Contiones andthe Comitia not only delighted the eye and ear, but filled the heartwith pride, and sometimes the purse with money. For here the units, inconsiderable in themselves, had become a collective power; they couldshout down the most dignified of the senators, exalt the favourite ofthe moment, reward a service or revenge a slight in the perfect securitygiven by the secrecy of the ballot. Large numbers of the poorer classwere attached to the great houses by ancestral ties; for the descendantsof freedmen, although they could make no legal claim on the house whichrepresented the patron of their ancestors, were too valuable as votingunits to be neglected by its representatives, even when the sense of theobligations of wealth, which was one of the best features of Romancivilisation, failed to provide an occasional alleviation for the miseryof dependants. From a political point of view, this dependence wasutterly demoralising; for it made the recipients of benefits eitherblind supporters of, or traitors to, the personal cause which theyprofessed. It was on the whole preferable that, if patronage wasessential, the State should take over this duty; the large body of theunattached proletariate would be placed on a level with their morefortunate brethren, and the latter would be freed from a dependencewhich merely served private and selfish interests. A semi-destituteproletariate can only be dealt with in three ways. They may be forced towork, encouraged to emigrate, or partially supported by the State. Thefirst device was impossible, for it was not a submerged fraction withwhich Rome had to deal, but the better part of the resident sovereignbody; the second, although discredited by the senate, had been tried inone form by Tiberius Gracchus and was to be attempted in another shapeby Caius; but it is a remedy that can never be perfect, for it does nottouch the class, more highly strung, more intelligent, and at the sametime more capable of degradation, which the luxury of the capitalenthrals. The last device had not yet been attempted. It remained forGracchus to try it. We have no analysis of his motives; but manyprovocatives to his modest attempt at state socialism may be suggested. There was first the Hellenic ideal of the leisured and independentcitizen, as exemplified by the state payments and the "distributions"which the great leaders of the old world had thought necessary for thefulfilment of democracy. There was secondly the very obvious fact thatthe government was reaping a golden harvest from the provinces andmerely scattering a few stray grains amongst its subjects. There wasthirdly the consideration that much had been done for the landed classand nothing for the city proletariate. Other considerations of a moreimmediate and economic character were doubtless present. The area ofcorn production was now small. Sicily was still perhaps beggared by itsservile war, and the granary of Rome was practically to be found inAfrica. The import of corn from this quarter, dependent as it was on theweather and controlled purely by considerations of the money-market, wasprobably fitful, and the price must have been subject to greatvariations. But, at this particular time, the supply must have beendiminished to an alarming extent, and the price proportionately raised, by the swarm of locusts which had lately made havoc of the crops ofAfrica. [604] Lastly, the purely personal advantage of securing asubsidised class for the political support of the demagogue of themoment--a consideration which is but a baser interpretation of theHellenic ideal--must have appealed to the practical politician inGracchus as the more impersonal view appealed to the statesman. He wouldsecure a permanent and stable constituency, and guard against thedanger, which had proved fatal to his brother, of the absence from Romeof the majority of his supporters at some critical moment. From the imperfect records of Gracchus's proposal we gather that acertain amount of corn was to be sold monthly at a reduced price to anycitizen who offered himself as a purchaser. [605] The rate was fixed at6-1/3 asses the modius, which is calculated to have been about half themarket-price. [606] The monthly distribution would practically haveexcluded all but the urban proletariate, and would thus have bothlimited the operation of the relief to the poor of the city and invitedan increase in its numbers. But the details of the measure, which wouldbe decisive as to its economic character, are unknown to us. We are nottold what proportion the monthly quantity of grain sold at this cheaprate bore to the total amount required for the support of a family;whether the relief was granted only to the head of a house or also tohis adult sons; whether any one who claimed the rights of citizenshipcould appear at the monthly sale, or only those who had registered theirnames at some given time. The fact of registration, if it existed, mighthave been regarded as a stigma and might thus have limited the number ofrecipients. Some of the economic objections to his scheme were notunknown to Gracchus; indeed they were pressed home vigorously by hisopponents. It was pointed out that he was enervating the labourer andexhausting the treasury, The validity of the first objection depends toa large extent on the unknown "data" which we have just mentioned. Gracchus may have maintained that a greater standard of comfort would besecured for the same amount of work. The second objection he was so farfrom admitting that he asserted that his proposal would really lightenthe burdens of the Aerarium. [607] He may have taken the view that amoderate, steady and calculable loss on corn purchased in largequantities, and therefore presumably at a reduced price, would becheaper in the end than the cost entailed by the spasmodic attemptswhich the State had to make in times of crisis to put grain upon themarket; and there may have been some truth in the idea that, when theState became for the first time a steady purchaser, competition betweenthe publicans of Sicily or the proprietors of Africa might greatlyreduce the normal market price. He does not seem to have been disturbedby the consideration that the sale of corn below the market price atRome was hardly the best way of helping the Italian farmer. The Statewould certainly buy in the cheapest market, and this was not to be foundin Italy. But it is probable that under no circumstances could Rome havebecome the usual market for the produce of the recently establishedproprietors, and that, except at times of unusual scarcity in thetransmarine provinces, imported corn could always have undersold thatwhich was grown in Italy. Under the new system the Italian husbandmanwould find a purchaser in the State, if Sicily and Africa were visitedby some injury to their crops. A vulnerable point in the Gracchan systemof sale was exhibited in the fact that no inquiry was instituted as tothe means of the applicants. This blemish was vigorously brought home tothe legislator when the aged noble, Calpurnius Piso surnamed "theFrugal, " the author of the first law that gave redress to theprovincials, and a vigorous opponent of Gracchus's scheme, gravelyadvanced on the occasion of the first distribution and demanded hisappropriate share. [608] The object lesson would be wasted on those whohold that the honourable acceptance of relief implies the universalityof the gift: that the restraining influences, if they exist, should bemoral and not the result of inquisition. But neither the possibility northe necessity of discrimination would probably have been allowed byGracchus. It would have been resented by the people, and did not appealto the statesmanship, widely spread in the Greek and not unknown in theRoman world, which regarded it as one of the duties of a State toprovide cheap food for its citizens. The lamentations of a later dayover a pauperised proletariate and an exhausted treasury[609] cannotstrictly be laid to the account of the original scheme, Except in so faras it served as a precedent; they were the consequence of the action oflater demagogues who, instructed by Gracchus as to the mode in which aneasy popularity might be secured, introduced laws which sanctioned analmost gratuitous distribution of grain. The Gracchan law contained aprovision for the building of additional store-houses for theaccumulation of the great reserve of corn, which was demanded by the newsystem of regular public sales, and the Sempronian granaries thuscreated remained as a witness of the originality and completeness of thetribune's work. [610] The Roman citizen was still frequently summoned from his work, or rousedfrom his lethargy, by the call of military service; and the practice ofthe conscription fostered a series of grievances, one of which hadalready attracted the attention of Tiberius Gracchus. Caius was bound todeal with the question: and the two provisions of his enactment whichare known to us, show a spirit of moderation which neither justifies thebelief that the demagogue was playing to the army, nor accredits theview that his interference relaxed the bonds of discipline amongst thelegions. [611] The most scandalous anomaly in the Roman army-system wasthe miserable pittance earned by the conscript when the legal deductionshad been made from his nominal rate of pay. His daily wage was butone-third of the denarius, or five and one-third asses a day, as it hadremained unaltered from the times of the Second Punic War, in spite ofthe fact that the conditions of service were now wholly different andthat garrison duty in the provinces for long periods of years hadreplaced the temporary call-to-arms which the average Italian campaignalone demanded; and from this quota was deducted the cost of theclothing which he wore and, as there is every reason to believe, of thewhole of the rations which he consumed. We should have expected aradical reformer to have raised his pay or at least to have given himfree food. But Gracchus contented himself with enacting that thesoldier's clothing should be given him free of charge by the State. [612]Another military abuse was due to the difficulty which commandersexperienced in finding efficient recruits. The young and adventuroussupplied better and more willing material than those already habituatedto the careless life of the streets, or already engaged in some settledoccupation: and, although it is scarcely credible that boys under theage of eighteen were forced to enlist, they were certainly permitted andperhaps encouraged to join the ranks. The law of Gracchus forbade theenlistment of a recruit at an age earlier than the completion of theseventeenth year. [613] These military measures, slight in themselves, were of importance as marking the beginning of the movement by which thewhole question of army reform, utterly neglected by the government, wastaken up and carried out by independent representatives of the people. But a Roman army was to a large extent the creation of the executivepower; and it required a military commander, not a tribune, to producethe radical alterations which alone could make the mighty instrument, which had won the empire, capable of defending it. The last boon of Gracchus to the citizen body as a whole was a newagrarian law. [614] The necessity of such a measure was chiefly due tothe suspension of the work of the agrarian commission, which had provedan obstacle to the continued execution of his brother's scheme; andthere is every reason for believing that the new Sempronian law restoredtheir judicial powers to the commissioners. But experience may haveshown that the substance of Tiberius's enactment required to besupplemented or modified; and Caius adopted the procedure usuallyfollowed by a Roman legislator when he renewed a measure which hadalready been in operation. His law was not a brief series of amendments, but a comprehensive statute, so completely covering the ground of theearlier Sempronian law that later legislation cites the law of Caius, and not that of Tiberius Gracchus, as the authority for the regulationswhich had revolutionised the tenure of the public land. [615] The newprovisions seem to have dealt with details rather than with principles, and there is no indication that they aimed at the acquisition ofterritory which had been exempted from the operation of the previousmeasure, or even touched the hazardous question of the rights of Rome tothe land claimed by the Italian allies. We cannot attempt to define theextent to which the executive power granted by the new agrarian law waseither necessary or effective. Certainly the returns of the censusduring the next ten years show no increase in the number of registeredcitizens;[616] but this circumstance may be due to the steps which weresoon to be taken by the opponents of the Gracchi to nullify the resultsof their legislation. It is possible, however, that the new corn law mayhave somewhat damped the ardour of the proletariate for a life ofagriculture which would have deprived them of its benefits. The first tribunate of Caius Gracchus doubtless witnessed the completionof these four acts of legislation, by which the debt to his supporterswas lavishly paid and their aid was enlisted for causes which could onlyindirectly be interpreted as their own. But this year probably witnessedas well the promulgation of the enactments which were to find theirfulfilment in a second tribunate. [617] Foremost amongst these was onewhich dealt with the tenure of the judicial power as exercised, not bythe magistrate, but by the panels of jurors who were interpreters bothof law and fact on the standing commissions which had recently beencreated by statute. The interest of the masses in this question wasremote. A permanent murder court seems indeed to have had its placeamongst the commissions; but, even though the corruption of itspresident had on one occasion been clearly proved, [618] it is not likelythat senatorial judges would have troubled to expose themselves to undueinfluences when pronouncing on the _caput_ of a citizen of the lowerclass. The fact that this justice was administered by the nobility mayhave excited a certain degree of popular interest; but the question ofthe transference of the courts from the hands of the senatorial_judices_ would probably never have been heard of, had not the largestitem in this judicial competence had a decisively political bearing. TheRoman State had been as unsuccessful as others of the ancient world inkeeping its judicial machinery free from the taint of party influences. It had been accounted one of the surest signs of popular sovereigntythat the people alone could give judgment on the gravest crimes andpronounce the capital penalty, [619] and recent political thought hadperhaps wholly adapted itself to the Hellenic view that the governmentof a state must be swayed by the body of men that enforces criminalresponsibility in political matters. This vital power was still retainedby the Comitia when criminal justice was concerned with those elementalfacts which are the condition of the existence of a state. The peoplestill took cognisance of treason in all its degrees--a conception whichto the Roman mind embraced almost every possible form of officialmaladministration--and the gloomy record of trials before the Comitia, from this time onward to the close of the Republic, shows that theweapon was exercised as the most forcible implement of politicalchastisement. But chance had lately presented the opportunity of makingthe interesting experiment of assimilating criminal jurisdiction in someof its branches to that of the civil courts. The president and jurors ofone of the newly established _quaestiones_ formed as isolated a group asthe _judex_ of civil justice with his assessors, or the greater panelsof Centumvirs and Decemvirs. They possessed no authority but that ofjurisdiction within their special department; there seemed no reason whythey should be influenced by considerations arising from issues whetherlegislative or administrative. But this appearance of detachment waswholly illusory, and the well-intentioned experiment was as vain as thatof Solon, when he carefully separated the administrative and judicialboards in the Athenian commonwealth and composed both bodies ofpractically identical individuals. The new court for the trial ofextortion, constituted by the Calpurnian and renewed later by a Junianlaw, was controlled by a detachment of the governing body which saw ineach impeachment a libel on its own system of administration, and ineach condemnation a new precedent for hampering the uncontrolled powerexercised in the past or coveted for the future by the individual juror. This class spirit may have been more powerful than bribery in itsproduction of suspicious acquittals; and the fact that prosecution wasfrankly recognised as the commonest of party weapons, and that speechesfor the prosecution and defence teemed with irrelevant politicalallusions, reduced the question of the guilt of the accused tosubordinate proportions in the eyes of all the participants in thisjudicial warfare. Charges of corruption were so recklessly hurled atRome that we can seldom estimate their validity; but the strongsuspicion of bribery is almost as bad for a government as the provedoffence; and it was certain that senatorial judges did not yield to theevidence which would have supplied conviction to the ordinary man. Somerecent acquittals furnished an excellent text to the reformer. L. Aurelius Cotta had emerged successfully from a trial, which had been amere duel between Scipio Aemilianus for the prosecution and MetellusMacedonicus for the defence. The judges had shown their resentment ofScipio's influence by acquitting Cotta; and few of the spectators of thestruggle seem even to have pretended to believe in the innocence of theaccused. [620] The whole settlement of Asia had been so tainted with thesuspicion of pecuniary influences that, when Manius Aquilliussuccessfully ran the gauntlet of the courts, [621] it was difficult tobelieve that the treasures of the East had not co-operated towards theresult, especially as the senate itself by no means favoured some of thefeatures of Aquillius's organisation of the province. The legates ofsome of the plundered dependencies were still in Rome, bemoaning theverdict and appealing for sympathy with their helpless fellowsubjects[622] Circumstances favoured the reformer; it was possible tobring a definite case and to produce actual sufferers before the people;while the senate, perhaps in consequence of the attitude of some honestdissentients, was unable to make any effectual resistance to the scandaland its consequences. Had Gracchus thought of restoring this jurisdiction to the Comitia, hewould have taken a step which had the theoretical justification that, ofall the powers at Rome, the people was the one which had least interestin provincial misgovernment. But it would have been a retrogrademovement from the point of view of procedure; it would not necessarilyhave abolished senatorial influence, and it would not have attained hisobject of holding the government permanently in check by the politicalrecognition of a class which rivalled the senate in the definiteness ofits organisation and surpassed it in the homogeneity of its interests. The body of capitalists who had assumed the titular designation ofknights, had long been chafing at the complete subjection of theircommercial interests to the caprice of the provincial governor and thearbitrary dispositions of the home government. Tiberius Gracchus, whenhe revealed the way to the promised land, had probably reflected ratherthan suggested the ambition of the great business men to have a moredefinite place in the administration assigned them. His appeal had cometoo late, or seemed too hopeless of success, to win their support for areformer who had outraged their feelings as capitalists; but since hisdeath ten years for reflection had elapsed, and they were years whichwitnessed a vast extension of their potential activity, and aroused anagonised feeling of helplessness at the subordinate part which theyplayed both to senate and people when the disposal of kingdoms was inquestion. The suggestions for giving them a share in the control of theprovincial world may have been numerous, and their variety is reflectedin the different plans which Caius Gracchus himself advanced. The systemat which his brother had hinted was that of a joint board composed ofthe existing senators with the addition of an equal number of equites;and we have already suggested the possibility that this House of SixHundred was intended to be the senate of the future, efficient for allpurposes and not exclusively devoted to the work of criminaljurisdiction. The same significance may attach to the scheme, whichseems to have been propounded by Caius Gracchus during, or perhaps evenbefore, his first tenure of the tribunate, and appears at intervals inproposals made by reformers down to the time of Sulla. Gracchus is saidto have suggested the increase of the senate by the addition of three, or, as one authority states, six hundred members of the equestrianorder. [623] The proposal, if it was one for an enlarged senate, and notfor a joint panel of _judices_, in which a changing body of equiteswould act as a check on the permanent senatorial jurors, must soon havebeen seen to be utterly unsuited to its purpose. It is a schemecharacteristic of the aristocrat who is posing as a friend of themercantile class and hopes to deceive the vigilance of that keen-sightedfraternity. To give the senate a permanent infusion of new blood wouldbe simply to strengthen its authority, while completely cutting away thelinks which bound the new members to their original class. Even theswamping of the existing body by a two-thirds majority of new memberswould have been transitory in its effects. The new member of the Curiawould soon have shed his old equestrian views and assumed the outlook ofhis older peers. It might indeed have been possible to devise a systemby which the senate would, at the recurring intervals of the _lustra_, have been filled up in equal proportions from ex-magistrates andknights: and in this way a constant supply of middle-class sentimentmight have been furnished to the governing body. But even this schemewould have secured to the elected a life-long tenure of power, and thiswas a fatal obstacle both to the intentions of the reformer and theaspirations of the equestrian order. While the former desired a balanceof power, the latter wished that the interests of their class should beenforced by its genuine representatives. Both knew that a participationin the executive power was immaterial, and that all that was neededmight be gained by the possession of judicial authority alone. Gracchus's final decision, therefore, was to create a wholly new panelof _judices_ which should be made up exclusively from the members of thetitular class of knights. [624] It was not necessary or desirable that the judiciary law should make anymention of a class, or employ the courtesy title of _equites_ todesignate the new judges. The effect might be less invidiously securedby demanding qualifications which were practically identical with thesocial conditions requisite for the possession of titular knighthood. One of the determining factors was a property qualification, and thiswas possibly placed at the modest total of four hundred thousandsesterces. [625] This was the amount of capital which seems at thisperiod to have given its possessor the right of serving on horseback inthe army and therefore the claim to the title of _eques_, but it was asum that did not convey alarming suggestions of government bymillionaires, but rather pointed to the upper middle class as thefittest depositaries of judicial power. Not only were magistrates andex-magistrates excluded from the Bench, but the disqualificationextended to the fathers, brothers and sons of magistrates and of past orpresent senators. The ostensible purpose of these provisions wasdoubtless to ensure that the selected jurors should be bound by no tieof kindred to the individuals who would appear before their judgmentseat; but they must have had the effect of excluding from the new panelmany of the true knights belonging to the eighteen centuries; for thisselect corps was largely composed of members of the noble families. Asimilar effect would have been produced by the age qualification. TheGracchan jurors were to be over thirty and under sixty, while a largenumber of the military _equites_ were under the former limit of age, inconsequence of the practice of retiring from the corps after theattainment of the quaestorship or selection into the senate. Thearistocratic element in the equestrian order, if this latter expressionbe used in its widest sense to include both the military and civilianknights, was thus rigorously excluded: and there remained but the menwhose business interests were in no way complicated by respect forsenatorial traditions. The official list of the new jurors _(albumjudicum)_ was probably to be made out annually; and there is everyreason to suppose that there was a considerable change of personnel ateach revision, since one of the conditions of membership of thepanel--residence within a mile of Rome--could hardly have been observedby business men with world-wide interests for any extended period. Theconception which still prevailed that judicial service was a burden_(munus)_, would alone have led the revising authority to free pastjurors from the service: and the practice must have been welcome to thecapitalists themselves, many of whom may well have desired the share ofpower and perhaps of profit which jurisdiction over their superiorsconferred. We are told that the selection of the first panel wasentrusted to the legislator himself;[626] for the future the ForeignPraetor was to draw up the annual list of four hundred and fifty whowere qualified to hear cases of extortion. [627] It is not known whetherthis was the full number of the new jurors, or whether there wereadditional members selected by a different authority for the trial ofother offences. It is not probable that the judiciary law of Gracchusimposed the new class of _judices_ directly on the civil courts. The_judex_ of private law still retained his character of an arbitratorappointed by the consent of the parties, and it would have been improperto restrict this choice to a class defined by statute. But the practicalmonopoly of jurisdiction in important cases, which senators seem to haveacquired, was henceforth broken through, and the _judex_ in civil suitswas sometimes taken from the equestrian order. [628] The superficial aspect of this great change seemed full of promise forthe future. The ample means of the new jurors might be taken as aguarantee of their purity; their selection from the middle class, as asecurity of the soundness and disinterestedness of their judgments. Perhaps Gracchus himself was the victim of this hope, and believed thatthe scourge of the nobility which he had placed in the hands of theknights, might at least be decorously wielded. The judgment of theafter-world varied as to the mode in which they exercised their power. Cicero, in advocating the claims of the order to a renewed tenure ofauthority, could urge that during their possession of the courts fornearly fifty years, their judgments had never been tainted by the leastsuspicion of corruption. [629] This was a safe assertion if suspicion isonly justified by proof; for the Gracchan jurors seem to have been fromthe first exempted from all prosecution for bribery. [630] This legalexemption is all the more remarkable as Gracchus himself was the authorof a law which permitted a criminal prosecution for a corruptjudgment. [631] It is difficult to understand the significance of thisenactment, for the magistrates, against whom it was directed, were infew cases judges of fact, except in the military domain. It could nothave referred to the president of a standing commission who was a merevehicle for the judgment of the jury; but Gracchus probably contemplatedthe occasional revival of special commissions sanctioned by the people, and it is possible that even the two praetors who presided over thecivil courts may have been subject to the operation of the law, whichmay not have been directed merely against corrupt sentences in criminalmatters, as was subsequently the case when the law was renewed by Sulla. It is even possible that the law dates from a period anterior to thecreation of the equestrian _judices_; but, even on this hypothesis, theexclusion of the latter from its operation was something of an anomaly;for even the civil _judex_ of Rome, on whose analogy the jurors of thestanding commissions had been created, was in early times criminally, and at a later period at least pecuniarily, liable for an unjustsentence. [632] We shall elsewhere have occasion to dwell on the valuewhich the equestrian order attached to this immunity, and we shall seethat its relief at the freedom from vexatious prosecution is of itselfno sign of corruption. One of our authorities does indeed emphaticallyassert the ultimate prevalence of bribery in the equestrian courts:[633]and circumstances may be easily imagined which would have made thisresort natural, if not inevitable. A band of capitalists eager to securea criminal verdict, which had a purely commercial significance, wouldscarcely be slow to employ commercial methods with their less wealthyrepresentatives on the Bench, and votes might have been purchased bytransactions in which cash payments played no part. But the corruptionof individuals was of far less moment than the solidarity of interestand collective cupidity of the mercantile order as a whole. The verdictsof the courts reflected the judgment of the Exchange. It was evenpossible to create a prosecution[634] simply for the purpose of damninga man who, in the exercise of his authority, had betrayed tendencieswhich were interpreted as hostile to capitalism. The future war between the senate and the equites would not have beenwaged so furiously, had not Gracchus given his favoured class the chanceof asserting a positive control, in virtue of an almost officialposition, over the richest domains of the Roman world. The fatal bequestof Attalus was still the plaything of parties; but the prize whichTiberius had destined for the people was used by Caius to seal hiscompact with the knights. The concession, which could not be openlyavowed, was accomplished by means so indirect that its meaning must haveescaped the majority of the voters who sanctioned it, and itsconsequences may not have been fully grasped by the legislator himself. The masses who applauded the new law about the province of Asia, mayhave seen in it but a promise of the increase of their revenues; whilethe desire of swelling the public finances, which he had so heavilyburdened, of putting an end to the anomalous condition of a districtwhich was neither free nor governed, neither protectorate nor province, perhaps even of meeting the wishes of some of the Asiatic provincials, who preferred regular to irregular exactions, may have been combined inthe mind of Gracchus with the wish to see the equites confront thesenate in yet another sphere. The change which he proposed was oneconcerned with the taxation of the province. It cannot be determined howfar he was responsible for the infliction of new burdens on Rome'sAsiatic subjects. The increase of the public revenue, of which heboasted in one of his speeches to the people, [635] the new harbour dueswith which he is credited, [636] may point to certain creations of hisown; but the end at which he aimed seems to have been mainly a revivalof the system of taxation which had been current in the kingdom of theAttalids, accompanied by a new and, as he possibly thought, bettersystem of collection. It could not have been he who first burdened thetaxpayer with the payment of tithes; for this method of revenue was ofimmense antiquity in all Hellenised lands and is not likely to have beenunknown to the kings of Pergamon. It is a method that, from its elasticnature, bears less heavily on the agriculturist than that of a directimpost; for the payment is conditioned by the size of the crops and isindependent of the changing value of money. The chief objection to thetax, considered in itself and apart from its accompanying circumstances, was the immensity of the revenue which it yielded; the sums exacted byan Oriental despot were unnecessary for the economical administration ofRome; and the Roman administration of half a century earlier might havereduced the tithe to a twentieth as it had actually cut down the taxesof Macedonia to one-half of their original amount. Sicily, indeed, furnished an example of the tithe system; but the expenses of agovernment decrease in proportion to the area of administration, andSicily could not furnish the ample harbour dues and other payments inmoney, which should have made the commercial wealth of Asia lighten theburden on the holder of land. The rating of the new province was, infact, an admission of a change in the theory of imperial taxation. Asiawas not merely to be self-supporting; her revenues were to yield asurplus which should supplement the deficit of other lands, or aid inthe support of the proletariate of the capital. The realisation of this principle may not have imposed heavier burdensthan Asia had known in the time of her kings. But the fiction that thenew dependency was to be maintained in a state of "freedom, " which evenafter the downfall of Aristonicus seems to have exercised some influenceon Roman policy, had led to a suspension of regular taxation for thepurposes of the central government, which caused the Gracchan proposalsto be regarded by certain political circles at Rome in the light of anovelty, and probably of a hardship. [637] They could hardly have borneeither character to the Asiatic provincials themselves. The warindemnities and exactions which followed the great struggle, must havebeen a more grievous burden than the system of taxation to which theywere inured: and it is incredible that during the six years which hadelapsed since the suppression of the revolt, or even the three yearsthat had passed since the completion of Aquillius's organisation, norevenues had been raised by Rome from her new subjects foradministrative purposes. They probably had been raised, but in a mannerexasperating because irregular. What was needed was a methodical system, which should abolish at once the fiction of "freedom" and the reality ofthe exactions meted out at the caprice of the governor of the moment. Such a system was supplied by Gracchus, and it was doubtless reached bythe application of the characteristic Roman method of maintaining, whether for good or ill, the principles of organisation which werealready in existence in the new dependency. The novelty of the Gracchan system lay, not in the manner of taxation, but in the method adopted for securing the returns. The greatestobstacle to the tithe system is the difficulty of instituting anefficient method of collection. To gather in taxes which are paid inkind and to dispose of them to the best advantage, is a heavy burden fora municipality. The desire for a system of contract is sure to arise, and in an Empire the efficient contractor is more likely to be found inthe central state than in any of its dependencies. It was of thisfeeling that Gracchus took advantage when he enacted that the taxes ofAsia should be put up for auction at Rome, [638] and that the wholeprovince should be regarded as a single area of taxation at the greatauction which the censor held in the capital. It was certain that noforeign competition could prevail in this sale of a kingdom's revenues. The right to gather in the tithes could be purchased only by a powerfulcompany of Roman capitalists. The Decumani of Asia would represent theheart and brain of the mercantile body; they would form a senate and aPrincipate amongst the Publicani. [639] They would flood the provincewith their local directors, their agents and their freedmen; and eachstation would become a centre for a banking business which would involveindividuals and cities in a debt, of which the tithe was but a fraction. Nor need their operations be confined to the dominions of Rome; theywould spread over Phrygia, rendered helpless by the gift of freedom, andcreep into the realms of the neighbouring protected kings, safe in theknowledge that the magic name of "citizen of Rome" was a cover to themost doubtful transaction and a safeguard against the slightestpunishment. The collectors were liable to no penalties for extortion, for that crime could be committed only by a Roman magistrate: and theirpossession of the courts enabled them to raise the spectre of convictionon this very charge before the eyes of any governor who might attempt tocheck the devastating march of the battalions of commerce. As merchants and bankers the Knights would be sufficiently protected bythe judicial powers of their class; but their operations as speculatorsin tithes needed another safeguard. The contracts made with the censorwould extend over a period of five years, and the keenness of thecompeting companies would generally ensure to the State the promise ofan enormous sum for the privilege of farming the taxes. But the tithemight be reduced in value by a bad harvest or the ravages of war, andthe successful company might overreach itself in its eagerness to securethe contract. The power of revising such bargains had once assured tothe senate the securest hold which it possessed over the mercantileclass. [640] This complete dependence was now to be removed, andGracchus, while not taking the power of decision from the senate, formulated in his law certain principles of remission which it wasexpected to observe. [641] By these indirect and seemingly innocent changes in the relations of themercantile order to the senate, a new balance of power had been createdin the State. The Republic, according to the reflection of a laterwriter, had been given two heads, [642] and this new Janus, more ominousthan the old, was believed to be the harbinger of deadly conflictbetween the rival powers. In moments of calm Gracchus may have believedthat his reforms were but a renewed illustration of that genius forcompromise out of which the Roman constitution had grown, and that hehad but created new and necessary defences against a recently developedabsolutism; but, in the heat of the conflict into which he was soonplunged, his vindictive fancy saw but the gloomier aspect of his newcreation, and he boasted that the struggle for the courts was a daggerwhich he had hurled into the Forum, an instrument which the possessorwould use to mangle the body of his opponent. [643] But even these limitations of senatorial prerogative were not deemedsufficient. A proposal was made which had the ingenious scope oflimiting the senate's control over the more important provinces infavour of the magistrates, the equestrian order and the people. One ofthe most valuable items of patronage which the senate possessed was theassignment of the consular provinces. They claimed the right of decidingwhich of the annual commands without the walls should be reserved forthe consuls of the year, and by their disposition in this matter couldreward a favourite with wealth or power, and condemn a politicalopponent to impotence or barren exile. This power had long been employedas a means of coercing the two chief magistrates into obedience to thesenate's will, and the equestrian order must have viewed with some alarmthe possibility of Asia becoming the prize of the candidates favoured bythe nobility. Had Gracchus declared that the direct election toprovincial commands should henceforth be in the hands of the people, thechange would have been but a slight departure from an admittedconstitutional precedent; for there is little more than a technicaldifference between electing a man for an already ascertained sphere ofoperations, as had been done in the cases of Terentius Varro and the twoScipios during the Punic wars, and attaching a special command to anindividual already elected. But Gracchus preferred the traditional andindirect method. He did not question the right of the senate to decidewhat provinces should be assigned to the consuls, but he enacted thatthis decision should be made before these magistrates were elected tooffice. [644] The people would thus, in their annual choice of thehighest magistrates, be electing not only to a sphere of administrationat home, but to definite foreign commands as well; the prize which thesenate had hitherto bestowed would be indirectly the people's gift, andthe nominees of the Comitia would find themselves in possession ofdepartments which were presumably the most important that lay at thedisposal of the senate. To secure the finality of the arrangement madeby the senate, and to prevent this body subsequently reversing anawkward assignment to which it had unwittingly committed itself, Gracchus ordained that the tribunician veto should not be employedagainst the senate's decision as to what provinces should be reservedfor the future consuls;[645] for he knew that the tribune was often theinstrument of the government, and that the suspensory veto of thismagistrate could cause the question of assignment to drag on until afterthe consuls were elected, and thus restore to the senate its ancientright of patronage. The change, although it produced the desired resultsof freeing the magistrates from subservience, the mercantile order froma reasonable fear, and the people from the pain of seeing theirfavourite nominee rendered useless for the purposes for which he wasappointed, cannot be said to have added anything to the efficiency ofprovincial administration. It may even be regarded as a retrograde step, as the commencement of that system of routine in provincialappointments, which regarded proved capacity for the government anddefence of the subjects of Rome as the last qualification necessary forforeign command. The senate in its award may often have been swayed byunworthy motives; but it was sometimes moved by patriotic fears. Of thetwo consuls it might send the one of tried military ability to aprovince threatened by war and dismiss the mere politician to a peacefuldistrict. But now, without any regard to present conditions or futurecontingencies, it was forced to assign departments to men whose verynames were unknown. The people, in the exercise of their elective power, were acting almost as blindly as the senate; for the issues of a Romanelection were often so ill-defined, its cross-currents, due to personalinfluence and the power of the canvass, so strong and perplexing, thatit was rarely possible to predict the issue of the poll. On the otherhand, if there was a candidate so eminent that his return could bepredicted as a certainty, the senate might assign some insignificantspheres of administration as the provinces of the future consuls; andthus, in the one case where the decision might be influenced byknowledge and reason, the Gracchan law was liable to defeat its ownends. A further weakness of the enactment, from the point of view ofefficiency, was that it made no attempt to alter the mode in which thedesignated provinces were to be occupied by their claimants. If theconsuls could not come to an agreement as to which _provincia_ eachshould hold, the chance of the lot still decided a question on which thefuture fortunes of the empire might turn. It is a relief to turn from this work of demolition, which in spite ofits many justifications is pervaded by a vindictive suspicion, to somegreat constructive efforts by which Gracchus proved himself anenlightened and disinterested social reformer. He did not view agrarianassignation as an alternative to colonisation, but recognised that theindustrial spirit might be awakened by new settlements on sitesfavourable to commerce, as the agricultural interest had been aroused bythe planting of settlers on the desolated lands. Gracchus was, indeed, not the first statesman to employ colonisation as a remedy for socialevils; for economic distress and the hunger for land had played theirpart from the earliest times in the military settlements which Rome hadscattered over Italy. But down to his time strategic had preponderatedover industrial motives, and he was the first to suggest thatcolonisation might be made a means of relief for the better classes ofthe urban proletariate, whose activities were cramped and whose energieswere stifled by the crowded life and heated atmosphere of the city. Hissettlers were to be carefully selected. They were actually to be men whocould stand the test of an investigation into character. [646] It seemsclear that the new opportunities were offered to men of the lower middleclass, to traders of cramped means or of broken fortunes. His otherprotégés had been cared for in other ways; the urban masses who lived onthe margin of destitution had been assisted by the corn law, and thesturdy son of toil could look for help to the agrarian commission. Ofthe many settlements which he projected for Italy, [647] two which wereactually established during his second tribunate[648] occupied maritimepositions favourable for commerce. Scylacium, on the bay which liessouthward of the Iapygian promontory, was intended to revivify a decayedGreek settlement and to reawaken the industries of the desolatedBruttian coast; while Neptunia was seemingly the name of the newentrepôt which he founded at the head of the Tarentine Gulf. It wasapparently established on the land which Rome had wrested from Tarentum, and may have originally formed a town distinct from this Greek city, once the great seaport of Calabria, but retaining little of its formergreatness since its partial destruction in the Punic wars. [649] ItsHellenism was on the wane, and this decline in its native civilisationmay account for the fact that the new and the old foundations seemeventually to have been merged into one, and that Tarentum could receivea purely Latin constitution after the close of the Social War. [650] Itspurple fisheries and rich wine-producing territory were worthy objectsof the enterprise of Gracchus. Capua was a still greater disgrace to theRoman administration than Tarentum. Its fertile lands were indeedcultivated by lessees of Rome and yielded a large annual produce to theState. But the unredeemed site, on which had stood the pride of SouthernItaly, was still a lamentable witness to the jealousy of the conqueror. Here Gracchus proposed to place a settlement[651] which through itscommercial promise might amply have compensated for a loss of a portionof the State's domain. Neither he nor his brother had ever threatenedthe distribution of the territory of Capua, and it is, therefore, probable that in this case he did not contemplate a large agriculturalfoundation, but rather one that might serve better than the existingvillage to focus the commerce of the Campanian plain. But the revenuefrom the domain, and the jealousy of Rome's old and powerful rival, which might be awakened in all classes, were strong weapons in the handsof his opponents, and the renewal of Capua was destined to be the workof a later and more fortunate leader of the party of reform. Thecolonising effort of Gracchus was plainly one that had the regenerationof Italy, as well as the satisfaction of distressed burgesses, as itsobject; none of the three sites, on which he proposed to establish hiscommunes of citizens, possessed at the time an urban centre capable ofutilising the vast possibilities of the area in which it was placed. Butthis twofold object was not to be limited to Italy. He dreamed oftransmarine enterprise taking a more solid and more generally usefulform than that furnished by the vagrant trader or the local agent of thecapitalist. [652] The idea and practice of colonisation across the seawere indeed no new ones; isolated foundations for military purposes, such as Palma and Pollentia in the Balearic Isles, were being planted bythe direction of the government. But these were small settlementsintended to serve a narrow purpose; they doubtless spread Roman customsand formed a basis for Roman trade; but, if these motives had enteredinto their foundation, the experiment would have been tried on a farlarger scale. In truth the idea of permanent settlement beyond the seasdid not appeal either to the Roman character or to the politicaltheories of the governing classes. It is questionable whether animperial people, forming but a tiny minority amongst its subjects, andeasily reaping the fruits of its conquests, could ever take kindly tothe adventure, the initial hardships, and the lasting exclusion from thedazzling life of the capital, which are implied in permanent residenceabroad. The Roman in pursuit of gain was a restless spirit, who wouldvoyage to any land that was, or was likely to be, under imperialcontrol, establish his banking house and villa under any clime, and becontent to spend the most active years of his life in the exploitationof the alien; but to him it was a living truth that all roads led toRome. The city was the nucleus of enterprise, the heart of commerce; andsuch sentiment as the trader possessed was centred on the commerciallife of the Forum and the political devices on which it fed. Such aspirit is not, favourable to true colonisation, which implies adetachment from the affairs of the mother city; and it was not by thismeans, but rather by the spontaneous evolution of natural centres forthe teeming Italian immigrants already settled in the provinces, thatthe Romanisation of the world was ultimately assisted. Consequently nogreat pressure had ever been put on the government to induce it to relaxthe principles which led it to look with indifference or disfavour onthe foundation of Roman settlements abroad. There was probably a fearthat the establishment of communities of Roman citizens in the provincesmight awaken the desire of the subject states to participate in Romanrights. It was deemed better that the highest goal of the provincial'sambition should be the freedom of his state, and that he should neverdream of that absorption into the ruling body to which the Italian alonewas permitted to aspire. Added to this maxim of statecraft was one ofthose curious superstitions which play so large a part in imperialpolitics and attain a show of truth from the superficial reading ofhistory. It was pointed out by the wise that colonies had often provedmore potent than their parent states, that Carthage had surpassed Tyre, Massilia Phocaea, Syracuse Corinth, and Cyzicus Miletus. In the same waya daughter of Rome might wax greater than her mother, and the city thatgoverned Italy might be powerless to cope with a rebellious dependencyin the provinces. [653] This was not altogether an idle fear in theearlier days of conquest; for at any period before the war with Pyrrhusa transmarine city of Italian blood and customs might have proved aformidable rival. Nor at the stage which the empire had reached at thetime of Gracchus was it without its justification; for Rome was by nomeans a convenient centre for a government that ruled in Asia as well asin Europe. It is more likely that the dread of rivalry was due to thesingular defects of the aspect and environment of Rome, of which itscitizens were acutely conscious, rather than to the awkwardness of itsgeographical position; but, had the latter deficiency been realised, itwould be unfair to criticise the narrowness of view which failed to seethat the change of a capital does not necessarily involve the surrenderof a government. But, whether the objections implied in thissuperstition were shadowy or well defined, they could not have beenlessened by the choice which was made by Gracchus and his friends of thesite for their new transmarine settlement. It was none other thanCarthage, the city which had been destroyed because the blessings ofnature had made a mockery of conquest, the city that, if revived, wouldbe the centre of the granary of Rome. A proposal for the renewal ofCarthage under the name of Junonia was formulated by Rubrius, one of thecolleagues of Gracchus in his first tribunate. [654] The number of thecolonists, which was less than six thousand, was specified in theenactment, and the proportion of the emigrants to the immense territoryat his disposal rendered it possible for the legislator to assignunusually large allotments of land. A better and an inferior class ofsettlers were apparently distinguished, the former of whom were to holdno less than two hundred _jugera_ apiece. [655] The recipients of allallotments were to maintain them in absolute ownership, a system oftenure which had hitherto been confined to Italy being thus extended toprovincial soil. [656] Caius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus were namedamongst the triumvirs who were to establish the new colony. [657] It isprobable that Roman citizens were alone considered eligible for thecolonies both in Italy and abroad, when these foundations were firstproposed, and that it was not until Gracchus had embarked on hisenterprise of enfranchising the Latins, that he allowed them toparticipate in the benefits of his colonial schemes and thus indirectlyacquire full Roman citizenship. But the commercial life of Italy might be quickened by other means thanthe establishment of colonies whether at home or abroad. Gracchus sawthat the question of rapid and easy communication between the existingtowns was all important. The great roads of Rome betrayed their militaryintent in the unswerving inflexibility of their course. The positionswhich they skirted were of strategic, but not necessarily of industrial, importance. To bring the hamlet into connection with the township, andthe township into touch with the capital, a series of good cross-roadswas needed; and it was probably to this object that the law ofGracchus[658] was directed. But ease of communication may serve apolitical as well as a commercial object. The representative characterof the Comitia would be increased by the provision of facilities for thejourney to Rome; and perhaps when Gracchus promulgated his measure, there was already before his mind the possibility of the extension ofthe franchise to the Latins, which would vastly increase the numbers ofthe rural electorate. In any case, the measure was one which tended topolitical centralisation, and Gracchus must have known that theattainment of this object was essential to the unity and stability of apopular government. The great enterprise was carried through with extraordinary rapidityduring his second tribunate. But the hastiness of the construction didnot impair the beauty of the work. We are told that the roads ranstraight and fair through the country districts, showing an even surfaceof quarried stone and tight-packed earth. Hollows were filled up, ravines and torrent beds were bridged, and mounting-blocks for horsemenlay at short and easy distances on both sides of the level course. [659]Although the initial expense of this construction may have borne heavilyon the finances of the State, it is probable that the future maintenanceof the roads was provided for in other ways. The commerce which theyfostered may have paid its dues at toll-gates erected for thepurpose:[660] and the ancient Roman device of creating a class ofsettlers on the line of a public road, for the purpose of keeping it inrepair, [661] was probably extended. Road-making was often the complementof agrarian assignation, [662] and the two may have been employedconcurrently by Gracchus. It was the custom to assign public land on theborders of a highway to settlers, the tenure of which was secured tothem and their heirs on condition of keeping the road in due repair. Sometimes their own labour and that of their slaves were reckoned theequivalent of the usual dues; at other times the dues themselves wereused by the public authorities for the purpose. Gracchus may thus haveturned his agrarian law to an end which was not contemplated by thatof Tiberius. The execution of the law must have been a heavy blow to the power andprestige of the senate. Its control of the purse was infringed and itceased to be the sole employer of public labour. For Gracchus, indefiance of the principle that the author of a measure should not be itsexecutant, [663] was his own road-maker, as his brother Tiberius had beenhis own land commissioner. He was the patron of the contractor and thebenefactor of the Italian artisan. The bounties which he now gave werethe reward of labour, and not subject to the criticism which hadattended his earlier efforts for the relief of poverty in Rome; but somepretended to take the sinister view that the bands of workmen by whichhe was surrounded might be employed for a less innocent purpose than themaking of roads. [664]. The proceedings of Gracchus during his first year of office had made itinevitable that he should hold the tribunate for a second time. Enoughhad been performed to win him the ardent support of the masses; enoughhad been promised to make his return to office desirable, not only tothe people, but to the expectant capitalists. The legal hindrances tore-election had been removed, or could be evaded, and the continuity ofpower, which was essential to the realisation of an adequate programmeof reform, could now for the first time be secured. In the present stateof public feeling there was little probability of the veto beingemployed by any one of his future colleagues, although some of thesewould inevitably be moderates or members of the senatorial party. ButGracchus was eager that his cause should be represented in anotherdepartment of the State, which presented possibilities of assistance orof mischief, and that the spectacle of the tribunate as the sole focusof democratic sentiment, exalting itself in opposition to the highermagistracies of the people, should, if possible, be averted. In one ofhis addresses to the commons he said he had to ask a favour of them. Were it granted, he would value it above all things; should they thinkgood to refuse, he would bear no grudge against them. Here he paused;the favour remained undisclosed; and he left popular imagination torevel in the possibilities of his claims. It was a happy stroke; for hehad filled the minds of his auditors with a gratifying sense of theirown boundless power, and with suspicions of illegal ambitions, withwhich it was well that they should become familiar, but which onedramatic moment would for the time dispel. His words were interpreted asa request for the consulship: and the prevalent opinion is said to havebeen that he desired to hold this office in combination with thetribunate. The time for the consular elections was approaching andexpectation was roused to its highest pitch, when Gracchus was seenconducting Gaius Fannius into the Forum and, with the assistance of hisown friends, accosting the electors in his behalf. [665] The candidatewas a man whose political temperament Caius had had full opportunitiesof studying. As a tribune he had been much under the influence of ScipioAemilianus, [666] and as he rose slowly through the grades of curulerank, [667] he must still have retained his character as a moderate. Hewas therefore preferable to any candidate put forward by the optimates:and the influence of Gracchus secured Fannius the consulship almost atthe moment when, without the trouble of a canvass or even of a formalcandidature, he himself secured his second term of office. His positionwas further strengthened by the return of the ex-consul Fulvius Flaccus, as one of his colleagues in the tribunate. It was now, when the grand programme was actually being carried through, and the execution of the most varied measures was being pressed on by asingle hand, that the possibilities of personal government were firstrevealed in Rome. The fiery orator was less to be dreaded than theunwearied man of action, whose restless energy was controlled by aclearness of judgment and concentration of purpose, which coulddistinguish every item of his vast sphere of administration and treatthe task of the moment as though it were the one nearest to his heart. Even those who hated and feared Gracchus were struck with amazement atthe practical genius which he revealed; while the sight of the leader inthe midst of his countless tasks, surrounded by the motley retinue whichthey involved, roused the wondering admiration of the masses. [668] Atone moment he was being interviewed by a contractor for public works, atanother by an envoy from some state eager to secure his mediation; themagistrate, the artisan, the soldier and the man of letters besieged hispresence chamber, and each was received with the appropriate word andthe kindly dignity, which kings may acquire from training, but men ofkingly nature receive from heaven as a seal of their fitness to rule. The impression of overbearing violence which had been given by hisspeeches, was immediately dispelled by contact with the man. The time ofstorm and stress had been passed for the moment, and in the fruition ofhis temporary power the true character of Gracchus was revealed. Thepure intellectual enjoyment which springs from the sense of efficiencyand the effective pursuit of a long-desired task, will not be shaken bythe awkward impediments of the moment. All the human instruments, whichthe work demands, reflect the value of the object to which theycontribute: and Gracchus was saved from the insolent pride of thepatrician ruler and the helpless peevishness of the mere agitator whomcircumstances have thrust into power, by the fact that his emotionalnature was mastered by an intellect which had outlived prejudice and hadnever known the sense of incapacity. By the very character of itscircumstances the regal nature was forced into a style of life whichresembled and foreshadowed that of the coming monarchy. Theaccessibility to his friends and clients of every grade was the pride ofthe Roman noble, and doubtless Gracchus would willingly have modelledhis receptions on the informal pattern which sufficed the proudestpatrician at the head of the largest _clientèle_. But Gracchus's callerswere not even limited to the whole of Rome; they came from Italy and theprovinces: and it was found to be essential to adopt some rules ofprecedence, which would produce a methodical approach to his presenceand secure each of his visitors an adequate hearing. He was the firstRoman, we are told, to observe certain rules of audience. Some membersof the crowd which thronged his ante-chamber, were received singly, others in smaller or in larger groups. [669] It is improbable that themode of reception varied wholly with the official or social rank ofthose admitted; the nature of the client's business must also havedictated the secrecy or publicity of the interview; but the system musthave seemed to his baffled enemies a welcome confirmation of their realor pretended fears--a symptom of the coming, if not actual, overthrow ofRepublicanism, the suspicion of which might one day be driven even intothe thick heads of the gaping crowds, who stood by the portals to gazeat the ever-shifting throng of callers and to marvel at the power andpopularity of their leader. Had Gracchus been content to live in thepresent and to regard his task as completed, it is just possible thatthe diverse interests which he had so dexterously welded together mighthave enabled him to secure, not indeed a continuity of power (for thatwould have been as strenuously resisted by the middle as by the upperclass), but immediate security from the gathering conspiracy, thepreservation of his life, and the probability of a subsequent politicalcareer. It is, however, difficult, to conceive that the position whichGracchus held could be either resigned or forgiven; and, although wecannot credit him with any conscious desire for holding a position notadmitted by the laws, yet his genius unconsciously led him to identifythe commonwealth with himself, while his mind, as receptive as it wasprogressive, would not have readily acquiesced in the view that apolitical creation can at any moment be called complete. Thedisinterested statesman will cling to power as tenaciously as onedevoured by the most sordid ambition: and even on the lowest ground ofpersonal security, the possession of authority is perhaps more necessaryto the one than to the other. So indissolubly blended are the power andthe projects of a leader, that it is idle to raise the question whetherpersonal motives played any part in the project with which Gracchus wasnow about to delight his enemies and alienate his friends. He took upanew the question of the enfranchisement of the Italians--a questionwhich the merest political tyro could have told him was enough to doomthe statesman who spoke even a word in its favour. But Caius's positionwas no ordinary one, and he may have regarded his present influence assufficient to induce the people to accept the unpalatable measure, thesuccess of which might win for himself and his successors a widerconstituency and a more stable following. The error in judgment isexcusable in one who had never veiled his sympathy with the Italiancause, and had hitherto found it no hindrance to his popularity; but soclear-sighted a man as Gracchus must have felt at times that he wasstaking, not only his own career, but the fate of the programme and theparty which he had built up, on the chance of securing an end, which hadceased to be regarded as the mere removal of an obstacle and had grownto be looked on as the coping-stone of a true reformer's work. The scope of his proposal[670] was more moderate than that which hadbeen put forward by Flaccus. He suggested the grant of the full rightsof citizenship to the Latins, and of Latin rights to the other Italianallies. [671] Italy was thus, from the point of view of private law, tobe Romanised almost up to the Alps;[672] while the cities already inenjoyment of some or all of the private privileges of the Roman, were tosee the one anomaly removed, which created an invidious distinctionbetween them and the burgess towns, hampered their commerce, andimperilled their landed possessions. The proposal had the furtheradvantage that it took account of the possible unwillingness of many ofthe federate cities to accept the Roman franchise; such a refusal wasnot likely to be made to the offer of Latin rights: for the Latincommunity was itself a federate city with its own laws, magistrates andcourts, and the sense of autonomy would be satisfied while many of thepositive benefits of Roman citizenship would be gained. Grades ofprivilege would still exist in Italy, and a healthy discontent might intime be fostered, which would lead all Italian communities to seekabsorption into the great city. Past methods of incorporation might beheld to furnish a precedent; the scheme proposed by Gracchus was hardlymore revolutionary than that which had, in the third and at thebeginning of the second centuries, resulted in the conferment of fullcitizenship on the municipalities of half-burgesses. It differed from itonly in extending the principle to federate towns; but the rights of themembers of the Latin cities bore a close resemblance to those of the old_municipes_, and they might easily be regarded as already enjoying thepartial citizenship of Rome. The conferment of this partial citizenshipon the other Italians, while in no way destroying local institutions orimpairing local privileges, would lead to the possibility of a commonlaw for the whole of Italy, would enable every Italian to share in thebenefits of Roman business life, and appear in the court of the urbanpraetor to defend such rights as he had acquired, by the use of theforms of Roman law. The tentativeness of the character of Gracchus'sproposal, while recommending it as in harmony with the cautious spiritof Roman development which had worked the great changes of the past, mayalso have been dictated by the feeling that the more moderate schemestood a better chance of acceptance by the mob of Rome. All he asked wasthat the grievances which had led to the revolt of Fregellae, and thedangers revealed by that revolt, should be removed. The numbers of theadded citizens would not be overwhelming; for the majority of Italiansall that was asked was the possession of certain private rights, whichhad been so ungrudgingly granted to communities in the past. Throughoutthe campaign he probably laid more stress on the duty of protecting theindividual than on the right of the individual to power. And the factthat the protection was demanded, not against the Roman State, butagainst an oppressive nobility that disgraced it by a misuse of itspowers, gave a democratic colouring to the demand, and suggested acommunity of suffering, and therefore of sympathy, between the donorsand recipients of the gift. Even before his franchise law was before theworld, he seems to have been engaged in educating his auditors up tothis view of the case; for it was probably in the speeches with which heintroduced his law for the better protection of the life of the Romancitizen, that he illustrated the cruel caprice of the nobility by grislystories of the sufferings of the Italians. He had told of the youthfullegate who had had a cow-herd of Venusia scourged to death, as an answerto the rustic's jesting query whether the bearers of the litter werecarrying a corpse: and of the consul who had scourged the quaestor ofTeanum Sidicinum, the man of noblest lineage in his state, because themen's baths, in which the consul's wife had elected to bathe, were notadequately prepared for her reception. [673] Since the objections of thepopulace to the extension of the franchise were the result of prejudicerather than of reason, they might be weakened if the sense of jealousyand distrust could be diverted from the people's possible rivals to thecommon oppressors of Rome and Italy. The appeal to sentiment might have been successful, had not the mostsordid passions of the mob been immediately inflamed by the oratory ofthe opponents of the measure. The most formidable of these opponents wasdrawn from the ranks of Gracchus's own supporters; for the franchisequestion had again proved a rock which could make shipwreck of the unityof the democratic party. His _protégé_, the consul Fannius, was notashamed to appeal to the most selfish instincts of the populace. "Do yousuppose, " he said, "that, when you have given citizenship to the Latins, there will be any room left for you at public gatherings, or that youwill find a place at the games or festivals? Will they not swampeverything with their numbers?" [674] Fannius, as a moderate, was an excellent exponent of senatorial views, and it was believed that many noble hands had collaborated in thecrushing speech which inflicted one of its death-blows on the Gracchanproposal. [675] The opportunity for active opposition had at last arrived, and thesenate was emboldened to repeat the measure which four years earlier hadswept the aliens out of Rome. Perhaps in consequence of powers given bythe law of Pennus, the consul Fannius was empowered to issue an edictthat no Italian, who did not possess a vote in the Roman assemblies, should be permitted within five miles of Rome at the time when theproposal about the franchise was to be submitted to the Comitia. [676]Caius answered this announcement with a fiery edict of his own, in whichhe inveighed against the consul and promised his tribunician help to anyof the allies who chose to remain in the city. [677] The power which hethreatened to exercise was probably legal, since there is no reason tosuppose that the tribunician _auxilium_ could be interposed solely forthe assistance of members of the citizen body;[678] but he must haveknown that the execution of this promise was impracticable, since theinjured party could be aided only by the personal interposition of thetribune, and it was clear that a single magistrate, burdened with manycares, and living a life of the most varied and strenuous activity, could not be present in every quarter of Rome and in a considerableportion of the surrounding territory. Even the cooperation of his ardentcolleague Flaccus could not have availed for the protection of many ofhis Italian friends, and the course of events so soon taught him thefutility of this means of struggling for Italian rights that when, somewhat later in the year, one of his Italian friends was seized by acreature of Fannius before his eyes, he passed by without an attempt ataid. His enemies, he knew, were at the time eager for a struggle inwhich, when they had isolated him from his Italian supporters, physicalviolence would decide the day: and he remarked that he did not wish togive them the pretext for the hand-to-hand combat which theydesired. [679] One motive, indeed, of the invidious edict issued by theconsul seems to have been to leave Gracchus to face the new positionwhich his latest proposal had created, without any external help; but asexternal help, if successfully asserted, could only have taken the formof physical violence, there was reasonable ground for holding that thedecree excluding the Italians was the only means of preventing a seriousriot or even a civil war. The senate could scarcely have feared themoral influence of the Italians on the voting populace of Rome, and theyknew that, in the present state of public sentiment, the constitutionalmeans of resistance which had failed against Tiberius Gracchus might besuccessfully employed against his brother. The whole history of thefirst tribunate of Caius Gracchus proves the frank recognition of thefact that the tribunician veto could no longer be employed against ameasure which enlisted anything like the united support of the people;but, like all other devices for suspending legislation, its employmentwas still possible for opponents, and welcome even to lukewarmsupporters, when the body politic was divided on an important measureand even the allies of its advocate felt their gratitude and theirloyalty submitted to an unwelcome strain. Resistance by means of theintercession did not now require the stolid courage of an Octavius, andwhen Livius Drusus threatened the veto, [680] there was no question ofhis deposition. Some nerve might have been required, had he made thisannouncement in the midst of an excited crowd of Italian postulants forthe franchise; but from this experience he was saved by theprecautionary measure taken by the senate. It is probable that Drusus'sannouncement caused an entire suspension of the legal machineryconnected with the franchise bill, and that its author never ventured tobring it to the vote. It is possible that to this stage of Gracchus's career belongs aproposal which he promulgated for a change in the order of voting at theComitia Centuriata. The alteration in the structure of this assembly, which had taken place about the middle of the third century, had indeeddone much to equalise the voting power of the upper and lower classes;but the first class and the knights of the eighteen centuries were stillcalled on to give their suffrage first, and the other classes doubtlessvoted in the order determined by the property qualification at whichthey were rated. As the votes of each century were separately taken andproclaimed, the absolute majority required for the decisions of theassembly might be attained without the inferior orders being called onto express their judgment, and it was notorious that the opinion oflater voters was profoundly influenced by the results already announced. Gracchus proposed that the votes of all the classes should be taken inan order determined solely by the lot. [681] His interest in the ComitiaCenturiata was probably due to the fact that it controlled the consularelections, and a democratic consulship, which he had vainly tried tosecure by his support of Fannius, might be rendered more attainable bythe adoption of the change which he advocated. The great danger of thecoming year was the election of a consul strongly identified with thesenatorial interest--of a man like Popillius who would be keen to seizesome moment of reaction and attempt to ruin the leaders of the reformmovement, even if he could not undo their work. It is practicallycertain that this proposal of Gracchus never passed into law, it isquestionable whether it was ever brought before the Comitia. Thereformer was immediately plunged into a struggle to maintain some of hisexisting enactments, and to keep the favour of the populace in the faceof insidious attempts which were being made to undermine theirconfidence in himself. The senate had struck out a new line of opposition, and they had found awilling, because a convinced, instrument for their schemes. It isinconceivable that a council, which reckoned within itselfrepresentatives of all the noblest houses at Rome, should not havepossessed a considerable number of members who were influenced by thepolitical views of a Cato or a Scipio, or by the lessons of thathumanism which had carried the Gracchi beyond the bounds of Romancaution, but which might suffuse a more conservative mind with justsufficient enlightenment to see that much was wrong, and that moderateremedies were not altogether beyond the limits of practicability. Butthis section of senatorial opinion could find no voice and take noindependent action. It was crushed by the reactionary spirit of themajority of the peers, and frightened at the results to which itstheories seem to lead, when their cautious qualifications, never likelyto find acceptance with the masses, were swept away by morethorough-going advocates. But the voice, which the senate kept stifledduring the security of its rule, might prove valuable in a crisis. Themoderate might be put forward to outbid the extremist; for hismoderation would certainly lead him to respect the prejudices of themob, while any excesses, which he was encouraged or instructed tocommit, need not touch the points essential to political salvation, andmight be corrected, or left to a natural dissolution, when the crisishad been passed and the demagogue overthrown. The instrument chosen bythe senate was Marcus Livius Drusus, [682] the tribune who had threatenedto interpose his veto on the franchise bill. There is no reason why thehistorian should not treat the political attitude of this rival ofGracchus as seriously as it seems to have been treated by Drusus'sillustrious son, who reproduced, and perhaps borrowed from his father'scareer, the combination of a democratic propaganda, which threw speciousunessentials to the people, with the design of maintaining andstrengthening the rule of the nobility. The younger Drusus was, it istrue, a convert to the Italian claims which his father had resisted; buteven this advocacy shows development rather than change, for the partyrepresented by the elder Drusus was by no means blind to the necessityfor a better security of Italian rights. The difference between thefather and the son was that the one was an instrument and the other anagent. But a man who is being consciously employed as an instrument, maynot only be thoroughly honest, but may reap a harvest of moral andmental satisfaction at the opportunities of self-fulfilment which chancehas thrown in his way. The position may argue a certain lack of thesense of humour, but is not necessarily accompanied by any conscioussacrifice of dignity. Certainly the public of Rome was not in the secretof the comedy that was being played. It saw only a man of high birth andaristocratic culture, gifted with all the authority which great wealthand a command of dignified oratory can give, [683] approaching them withbounties greater in appearance than those which Gracchus had recentlybeen willing to impart, attaching no conditions to the gift and, thoughspeaking in the name of the senate, conveying no hint of the deprivationof any of the privileges that had so recently been won. And the newlargess was for the Roman people alone; it was not depreciated by theknowledge that the blessings, which it conferred or to which it wasadded, would be shared by rivals from every part of Italy. An aspirant for favour, who wished to enter on a race with the recenttype of popular leader, must inevitably think of provision for the poor;but a mere copy or extension of the Gracchan proposals was impossible. No measure that had been fiercely opposed by the senate could bedefended with decency by the representative, and, as Drusus came inafter time to be styled, the "advocate" of that body. [684] Such a schemeas an extension of the system of corn distribution would besides haveshocked the political sense both of the patron and his clients, andwould not have served the political purposes of the latter, since such aconcession could not easily have been rescinded. The system of agrarianassignation, in the form in which it had been carried through by thehands of the Gracchi, had at the moment a complete machinery for itsexecution, and there was no plausible ground for extending this measureof benevolence. The older system of colonisation was the device whichnaturally occurred to Drusus and his advisers, and the choice was themore attractive in that it might be employed in a manner which wouldaccentuate certain elements in the Gracchan scheme of settlement thathad not commended themselves to public favour. The masses of Romedesired the monopoly of every prize which the favourite of the momenthad to bestow; but Gracchus's colonies were meant for the middle class, not for the very poor, and the preliminary to membership of thesettlements was an uncomfortable scrutiny into means, habits andcharacter. [685] The masses desired comfort. Capua may have pleased them, but they had little liking for a journey across the sea to the site ofdesolated Carthage. The very modesty of Gracchus's scheme, as shown inthe number of the settlements projected and of the colonists who were tofind a home in each, proved that it was not intended as a benefit to theproletariate as a whole. Drusus came forward with a proposal for twelvecolonies, all of which were probably to be settled on Italian andSicilian soil;[686] each of these foundations was to provide for threethousand settlers, and emigrants were not excluded on the ground ofpoverty. An oblique reflection on the disinterestedness of Gracchus'sefforts was further given in the clause which created the commissionersfor the foundation of these new colonies, Drusus's name did not appearin the list. He asked nothing for himself, nor would he touch the largesums of money which must flow through the hands of the commissioners forthe execution of so vast a scheme. [687] The suspicion of self-seeking orcorruption was easily aroused at Rome, as it must have been in any statewhere such large powers were possessed by the executive, and where nocontrol of the details of execution or expenditure had ever beenexercised by the people; and Gracchus's all-embracing energy hadbetrayed him into a position, which had been accepted in a moment ofenthusiasm, but which, disallowed as it was by current sentiment andperhaps by the law, might easily be shaken by the first suggestion ofmistrust. The scheme of Drusus, although it proved a phantom and perhapsalready possessed this elusive character when the senate pledged itscredit to the propounder of the measure, was of value as initiating anew departure in the history of Roman colonisation. Even Gracchus hadnot proposed to provide in this manner for the dregs of the city, andthe first suggestion for forming new foundations simply for the objectof depleting the plethora of Rome--the purpose real or professed of manylater advocates of colonisation--was due to the senate as an accident ina political game, to Drusus perhaps as the result of mature reflection. Since his proposal, which was really one for agrarian assignation on anenormous scale, was meant to compete with Gracchus's plan for thefounding of colonies, it was felt to be impossible to burden the newsettlers with the payment of dues for the enjoyment of their land. Gracchus's colonists were to have full ownership of the soil allotted tothem, and Drusus's could not be placed in an inferior position. But theexistence of thirty-six thousand settlers with free allotments wouldimmediately suggest a grievance to those citizens who, under theGracchan scheme of land-assignment, had received their lots subject tothe condition of the payment of annual dues to the State. If the newallotments were to be declared free, the burden must be removed fromthose which had already been distributed. [688] Drusus and the senatethus had a logical ground for the step which seems to have been taken, of relieving all the land which had been distributed since the tribunateof the elder Gracchus from the payment of _vectigal_. It was a popularmove, but it is strange that the senate, which was for the most partplaying with promises, should have made up its mind to a definite step, the taking of which must have seriously injured the revenues of theState. But perhaps they regarded even this concession as not beyondrecall, and they may have been already revolving in their minds thosetortuous schemes of land-legislation, which in the near future were togo far to undo the work of the reformers. The senate also permitted Drusus to propose a law for the protection ofthe Latins, which should prove that the worst abuses on which Gracchusdwelt might be removed without the gift of the franchise. The enactmentprovided that no Latin should be scourged by a Roman magistrate, even onmilitary service. [689] Such summary punishment must always have beenillegal when inflicted on a Latin who was not serving as a soldier underRoman command and was within the bounds of the jurisdiction of his ownstate; the only conceivable case in which he could have been legallyexposed to punishment at the hands of Roman officials in times of peace, was that of his committing a crime when resident or domiciled in Rome. In such circumstances the penalty may have been summarily inflicted, forthe Latins as a whole did not possess the right of appeal to the RomanComitia. [690] The extension of the magisterial right of coercion overthe inhabitants of Latin towns, and its application in a form from whichthe Roman citizen could appeal, were mere abuses of custom, whichviolated the treaties of the Latin states and were not first forbiddenby the Livian law. But the declaration that the Latin might not bescourged by a Roman commander even on military service, was a novelty, and must have seemed a somewhat startling concession at a time when theRoman citizen was himself subject to the fullest rigour of martial law. It was, however, one that would appeal readily to the legal mind ofRome, for it was a different matter for a Roman to be subject to themartial law of his own state, and for the member of a federate communityto be subjected to the code of this foreign power. It was intended thathenceforth the Latin should suffer at least the degrading punishment ofscourging only after the jurisdiction and on the bidding of his ownnative commander; but it cannot be determined whether he was completelyexempted from the military jurisdiction of the Roman commander-in-chief--an exemption which might under many circumstances have proved fatal tomilitary discipline and efficiency. There is every reason to supposethat this law of Drusus was passed, and some reason to believe that itcontinued valid until the close of the Social War destroyed thedistinctions between the rights of the Latin and the Roman. Its enactmentwas one of the cleverest strokes of policy effected by Drusus and thesenate; for it must have satisfied many of the Latins, who were eagerfor protection but not for incorporation, while it illustrated theweakness, and as it may have seemed to many, the dishonesty, ofGracchus's seeming contention that abuses could only be remedied by theconferment of full political rights. The whole enterprise of Drususfully attained the immediate effect desired by the senate. The peoplewere too habituated to the rule of the nobility to remember grievanceswhen approached as friends; the advances of the senate were received ingood faith, and Drusus might congratulate himself that a representativeof the Moderates had fulfilled the appropriate task of a mediatorbetween opposing factions. [691] We might have expected that Gracchus, in the face of such formidablecompetition, would have stood his ground in Rome and would haveexhausted every effort of his resistless oratory in exhibiting thedishonesty of his opponents and in seeking to reclaim the allegiance ofthe people. But perhaps he held that the effective accomplishment ofanother great design would be a better object-lesson of his power as abenefactor and a surer proof of the reality of his intentions, ascontrasted with the shadowy promises of Drusus. He availed himself ofhis position of triumvir for the foundation of the colony of Junonia--anoffice which the senate gladly allowed him to accept--and set sail forAfrica to superintend in person the initial steps in the creation of hisgreat transmarine settlement. [692] His original plan was soon modifiedby the opposition which it encountered; the promised number ofallotments was raised to six thousand, and Italians were now invited toshare in the foundation. [693] Both of these steps were doubtless theresult of the senate's dalliance with colonial schemes and with theLatins, but the latter may also be interpreted as a desperate effort toget the colony under weigh at any cost. Fulvius Flaccus, who was alsoone of the colonial commissioners, either stayed at Rome during theentire period of his colleague's absence or paid but the briefest visitto Africa; for he is mentioned as the representative of the party'sinterests in Rome during Gracchus's residence in the province. Thechoice of the delegate was a bad one. Not only was Flaccus hated by thesenate, but he was suspected by the people. These in electing him to thetribunate had forgiven his Italian leanings when the Italian cause washeld to be extinct; but now the odium of the franchise movement clung tohim afresh, and suspicion was rife that the secret dealings with theallies, which were believed to have led to the outbreak of Fregellae, had never been interrupted or had lately been renewed. The difficultiesof his position were aggravated by faults of manner. He possessedimmense courage and was an excellent fighter; but, like many men ofcombative disposition, he was tactless and turbulent. His recklessutterances increased the distrust with which he was regarded, andGracchus's popularity necessarily waned with that of hislieutenant. [694] Meanwhile the effort was being made to reawaken Carthage and to defy thecurse in which Scipio had declared that the soil of the fallen cityshould be trodden only by the feet of beasts. No scruple could bearoused by the division of the surrounding lands; the site whereCarthage had stood was alone under the ban, [695] and had Gracchus beencontent with mere agrarian assignment or had he established Junonia atsome neighbouring spot, his opponents would have been disarmed of thepotent weapon which superstition invariably supplied at Rome. As it was, alarming rumours soon began to spread of dreadful signs which hadaccompanied the inauguration of the colony. [696] When the colonistsaccording to ancient custom were marching to their destined home inmilitary order with standards flying, the ensign which headed the columnwas caught by a furious wind, torn from the grip of its resistingbearer, and shattered on the ground. When the altars had been raised andthe victims laid upon them, a sudden storm-blast caught the offeringsand hurled them beyond the boundaries of the projected city which hadrecently been cut by the share. The boundary-stones themselves werevisited by wolves, who seized them in their teeth and carried them offin headlong flight. The reality of the last alarming phenomenon, perhapsof all these omens, was vehemently denied by Gracchus and byFlaccus;[697] but, even if the reports now flying abroad in Rome had anybasis in fact, the circumstances of the foundation did not deter theleader nor frighten away his colonists. Gracchus proceeded with his workin an orderly and methodical manner, and when he deemed his personalsupervision no longer essential, returned to Rome after an absence ofseventy days. He was recalled by the news of the unequal contest thatwas being waged between the passionate Fulvius and the adroit Drusus. Clearly the circumstances required a cooler head than that possessed byFlaccus; and there was the threat of a still further danger whichrendered Gracchus's presence a necessity. The consulship for thefollowing year was likely to be gained by one of the most stalwartchampions of ultra-aristocratic views. Lucius Opimius had been defeatedwhen seeking that office in the preceding year, chiefly through thesupport which Gracchus's advocacy had secured to Fannius. Now there wasevery chance of his success;[698] for Opimius's chief claim todistinction was the prompt action which he had shown in the conquest ofFregellae, and the large numbers of the populace who detested theItalian cause were likely to aid his senatorial partisans in elevatinghim to the consulship. The consular elections might exercise areactionary influence on the tribunician; and, if Gracchus's candidaturewas a failure, he might be at the mercy of a resolute opponent, whowould regard his destruction as the justifiable act of a saviourof society. When Caius returned, the people as a whole seemed more apathetic thanhostile. They listened with a cold ear both to appeals and promises, andthis coldness was due to satiety rather than suspicion. They had beenpromised so much within the last few months that demagogism seemed to bea normal feature of existence, and no keen emotion was stirred by anynew appeal to their vanity or to their interests. Such apathy, althoughit may favour the military pretender, is more to be dreaded than actualdiscontent by the man who rules merely by the force of character andeloquence. Criticism may be met and faced, and, the keener it is, themore it shows the interest of the critics in their leader. Pericles washated one moment, deified the next; but no man could profess to beindifferent to his personality and designs. Gracchus took the lesson toheart, and concentrated his attention on the one class of his formersupporters, whose daily life recalled a signal benefit which he hadconferred, a class which might be moved by gratitude for the past andhope for the future. One of his first acts after his return was tochange his residence from the Palatine to a site lying below theForum. [699] Here he had the very poor as his neighbours, the true urbanproletariate which never dreamed of availing itself of agrarianassignments or colonial schemes, but set a very real value on thecorn-distributions, and may have believed that their continuance wouldbe threatened by Gracchus's fall from power. It is probable, however, that, even without this motive, the characteristic hatred which is feltby the partially destitute for the middle class, may have deepened theaffection with which Gracchus was regarded by the poorer of hisfollowers, when they saw him abandoned by the more outwardly respectableof his supporters. The present position of Gracchus showed clearly thatthe powerful coalition on which he had built up his influence hadcrumbled away. From a leader of the State he had become but the leaderof a faction, and of one which had hitherto proved itself powerless toresist unaided a sudden attack by the government. From this democratic stronghold he promulgated other laws, the tenor ofwhich is unknown, while he showed his sympathy with the lower orders ina practical way which roused the resentment of his fellow-magistrates. [700] A gladiatorial show was to be given in the Forum on a certain day, and most of the magistrates had erected stands, probably in the form ofa rude wooden amphitheatre, which they intended to let on hire. [701]Gracchus chose to consider this proceeding as an infringement of thepeople's rights. It was perhaps not only the admission by payment, butthe opinion that the enclosure unduly narrowed the area of observationand cut off all view of the performance from the surrounding crowd, [702]that aroused Gracchus's protest, and he bade the magistrates pull downthe erection that the poorer classes might have a free view of thespectacle. His request was disregarded, and Gracchus prepared a surprisefor the obstinate organisers. On the very night before the show hesallied out with the workmen that his official duties still placed at hisdisposal; the tiers of seats were utterly demolished, and when day dawnedthe people beheld a vacant site on which they might pack themselves asthey pleased. To the lower orders it seemed the act of a courageouschampion, to the officials the wild proceeding of a headstrongdemagogue. It could not have improved Gracchus's chances with themoneyed classes of any grade; he had merged their chances of enjoymentwith that of the crowd and violated their sense of the prerogativesof wealth. But, although Gracchus may have been acting violently, he was not actingblindly. He must have known that his cause was almost lost, but he mustalso have been aware that the one chance of success lay in creating asolidarity of feeling in the poorer classes, which could only beattained by action of a pronounced and vigorous type. To what extent hewas successful in reviving a following which furnished numerical supportsuperior, or even equivalent to, the classes alienated by his conduct orwon over by the intrigues of his opponents, is a fact on which we haveno certain information. Only one mention has been preserved of hiscandidature for a third tribunate: and this narrative, while assertingthe near approach which Gracchus made to victory, confesses theuncertainty of the accounts which had been handed down of the election. The story ran that he really gained a majority of the votes, but thatthe tribune who presided, with the connivance of some of his colleagues, basely falsified the returns. [703] It is a story that cannot be testedon account of our ignorance of the precautions taken, and therefore ofthe possibilities of fraud which might be exhibited, in the elections ofthis period. At a later period actual records of the voting were kept, in case a decision should be doubted;[704] and had an appeal to ascrutiny been possible at this time, Gracchus was not the man to let thedubious result remain unchallenged. But the story, even if we regard itas expressing a mere suspicion, suggests the profound disappointment ofa considerable class, which had given its favourite its united supportand received the news of his defeat with surprise and resentment. Itbreathes the poor man's suspicion of the chicanery of the rich, and maybe an index that Gracchus retained the confidence of his humblersupporters until the end. The defeat, although a terrible blow, did not crush the spirit ofGracchus; it only rendered it more bitter and defiant. It was now thathe exulted openly in the destructive character of his work, and he issaid to have answered the taunts of his enemies by telling them thattheir laughter had a painful ring, and that they did not yet know thegreat cloud of darkness which his political activity had wrapped aroundtheir lives. [705] The dreaded danger of Opimius's election was soonrealised, and members of the newly appointed tribunician college werewilling to put themselves at the orders of the senate. The surest proofthat Gracchus had fallen would be the immediate repeal of one of hislaws, and the enactment which was most assailable was that which, thoughpassed under another's name, embodied his project for the refoundationof Carthage. This Rubrian law might be attacked on the ground that itcontravened the rules of religious right, the violation of which mightrender any public act invalid;[706] and the stories which had beencirculated of the evil omens that had attended the establishment ofJunonia, were likely to cause the scruples of the senate to be supportedby the superstition of the people. Gracchus still held an officialposition as a commissioner for colonies, if not for land-distributionand the making of roads, but none of these positions gave him theauthority to approach the people or the power to offer effective legalresistance to the threatened measure; any further opposition mighteasily take the form of a breach of the peace by a private individualand give his enemies the opportunity for which they were watching; andit was therefore with good reason that Gracchus at first determined toadopt a passive attitude in the face of the proposal of the tribuneMinucius Rufus for the repeal of the Rubrian law. [707] Even Corneliaseems to have counselled prudence, and it was perhaps this crisis in herson's career which drew from her the passionate letter, in which themother triumphs over the patriot and she sees the ruin of the Republicand the madness of her house in the loss which would darken herdeclining years. [708] This protest is more than consistent with thestory that she sent country folk[709] to swell the following and protectthe person of her son, when she saw that he would not yield withoutanother effort to maintain his cause. The change of attitude is said tohave been forced on Gracchus by the exhortations of his friends andespecially of the impetuous Fulvius. The organisation of a band such asGracchus now gathered round him, although not in itself illegal, was aprovocation to riot; and a disastrous incident soon occurred which gavehis opponents the handle for which they had long been groping. At thedawn of the day, on which the meeting was to be held for the discussion, and perhaps for the voting, on the repeal of the threatened law, Gracchus and his followers ascended to the Capitol, where the oppositeparty was also gathering in strength. It seems that the consul Opimiushimself, although he could not preside at the final meeting of theassembly, which was purely plebeian, was about to hold a Contio[710] orto speak at one summoned by the tribunes. Gracchus himself did notimmediately enter the area in which the meeting was to be held, butpaced the portico of the temple buried in his thoughts. [711] Whatimmediately followed is differently told; but the leading facts are thesame in every version. [712] A certain Antullus or Antullius, spoken ofby some as a mere unit amongst the people, described by others as anattendant or herald of Opimius, spoke some words--the Gracchans said, ofinsolence: their opponents declared, of patriotic protest--to Gracchusor to Fulvius, at the same time stretching out his arm to the speakerwhom he addressed. The gesture was misinterpreted, and the unhappy manfell pierced with iron pens, the only weapons possessed by the unarmedcrowd. There could be no question that the first act of violence hadcome from Gracchus's supporters, and the end for which Opimius hadwaited had been gained. Even the eagerness with which the leader haddisclaimed the hasty action of his followers might be interpreted as arenewed infringement of law. He had hurried from the Capitol to theForum to explain to all who would listen the unpremeditated nature ofthe deed and his own innocence of the murder; but this very action was agrave breach of public law, implying as it did an insult to the majestyof the tribune in summoning away a section of the people whom he wasprepared to address. [713] The meeting on the Capitol was soon dissolved by a shower of rain, [714]and the tribunes adjourned the business to another day; while Gracchusand Fulvius Flaccus, whose half-formed plans had now been shattered, hastened to their respective homes. The weakness of their position hadbeen that they refused to regard themselves in their true light as theleaders of a revolution against the government. Whatever their ownintentions may have been, it is improbable that their supportersfollowed them to the Capitol simply with the design of giving peacefulvotes against the measure proposed: and, had Antullius not fallen, themeeting on the Capitol might have been broken up by a rush of Gracchans, as that which Tiberius once harangued had been invaded by a band ofsenators. Success and even salvation could now be attained solely by theuse of force; and the question of personal safety must have appealed tothe rank and file as well as to the leaders, for who could forget thejudicial massacre which had succeeded the downfall of Tiberius? But thesecurity of their own lives was probably not the only motive which lednumbers of their adherents to follow the two leaders to theirhomes. [715] Loyalty, and the keen activity of party spirit, whichstimulates faction into war, must also have led them to make a lastattempt to defend their patrons and their cause. The whole city was in astate of restless anticipation of the coming day; few could sleep, andfrom midnight the Forum began to be filled with a crowd excited butdepressed by the sense of some great impending evil. [716] At daybreak the consul Opimius sent a small force of armed men to theCapitol, evidently for the purpose of preventing the point of vantagebeing seized by the hostile democrats, and then he issued notices for ameeting of the senate. For the present he remained in the temple ofCastor and Pollux to watch events. When the fathers had obeyed hissummons, he crossed the Forum and met them in the Curia. Shortly aftertheir deliberations had begun, a scene, believed to have been carefullyprepared, began to be enacted in the Forum. [717] A band of mourners wasseen slowly making its way through the crowded market-place; conspicuouson its bier was the body of Antullius, stripped so that the wound whichwas the price of his loyalty might be seen by all. The bearers took theroute that led them past the senate-house, sobbing as they went andwailing out the mourning cry. The consul was duly startled, and curioussenators hastened to the door. The bier was then laid on the ground, andthe horrified aristocrats expressed their detestation of the dreadfulcrime of which it was a witness. Their indignation may have imposed onsome members of the crowd; others were inclined to mock this outburst ofoligarchic pathos, and to wonder that the men who had slain TiberiusGracchus and hurled his body into the Tiber, could find their heartsthus suddenly dissolved at the death of an unfortunate butundistinguished servant. The motive of the threnody was somewhat tooobvious, and many minds passed from the memory of Tiberius's death tothe thought of the doom which this little drama was meant to presage forhis brother. The senators returned to the Curia, and the final resolution was taken. Opimius was willing to venture on the step which Scaevola had declined, and a new principle of constitutional law was tentatively admitted. Astate of siege was declared in the terms that "the consul should seethat the State took no harm, " [718] and active measures were taken toprepare the force which this decree foreshadowed. Opimius bade thesenators see to their arms, and enjoined each of the members of theequestrian centuries to bring with him two slaves in full equipment atthe dawn of the next day. [719] But an attempt was made to avert theimmediate use of force by issuing a summons to Gracchus and Flaccus toattend at the senate and defend their conduct there. [720] The summonswas perfectly legal, since the consul had the right to demand thepresence of any citizen or even any inferior magistrate; but the twoleaders may well be excused for their act of contumacy in disobeying thecommand. They knew that they would merely be putting themselves asprisoners into the hands of a hostile force; nor, in the light of pastevents, was it probable that their surrender and punishment would savetheir followers from destruction. Preparations for defence, or acounter-demonstration which would prove the size and determination oftheir following, might lead the senate to think of negotiation. Itsmembers had an inducement to take this view. Their legal position, withrespect to the step which they were now contemplating, was unsound; andalthough they might claim that they had the government in the shape ofits chief executive officer on their side, and that their late policyhad attracted the support of the majority of the citizens, yet there wasno uncontested precedent for the legitimacy of waging war against afaction at Rome; they had no mandate to perform this mission, and itsexecution, which had lately been rendered illegal by statute law, mightsubsequently be repudiated even by many of those whom they now regardedas their supporters. Yet we cannot wonder at the uncompromising attitudeof the senate. They held themselves to be the legitimate government ofthe State; they had learnt the lesson that a government must rest eitheron its merits or on force; they were unwilling to repeat the scandalousscene which, on the occasion of Tiberius Gracchus's death, had provedtheir weakness, and were perhaps unable to resort to such unpremeditatedmeasures in the face of the larger following of Caius; they could enliston their side some members of the upper middle class who would share inthe guilt, if guilt there was: and lastly they had at their mercy twomen, of whom one had twice shaken the commonwealth and the other hadgloried in the prospect of its self-mutilation in the future. The wisdom and justice of resistance appealed immediately to the mind ofFlaccus, whose combative instincts found their natural satisfaction inthe prospect of an interchange of blows. The finer and more complexspirit of Gracchus issued in a more uncertain mood. The bane of thethinker and the patriot was upon him. Was a man who had led the State tofight against it, and the rule of reason to be exchanged for the basearbitrament of the sword? None knew the emotions with which he turnedfrom the Forum to gaze long and steadfastly at the statue of his fatherand to move away with a groan;[721] but the sight of his sorrow roused asympathy which the call to arms might not have stirred. Many of thebystanders were stung from their attitude of indifference to cursethemselves for their base abandonment of the man who had sacrificed somuch, to follow him to his house, and to keep a vigil before his doors. The night was passed in gloomy wakefulness, the spirits of the watcherswere filled with apprehension of the common sacrifice which the comingday might demand, and the silence was only broken when the voluntaryguard was at intervals relieved by those who had already slumbered. Meanwhile the neighbours of Flaccus were being startled by the sounds ofboisterous revelry that issued from his halls. The host was displayingan almost boyish exuberance of spirits, while his congenial comradesyelled and clapped as the wine and the jest went round. At daybreakFulvius was dragged from his heavy slumbers, and he and his companionsarmed themselves with the spoils of his consulship, the Gallic weaponsthat hung as trophies upon his walls. [722] They then set out withclamorous threats to take possession of the Aventine. The home thatIcilius had won for the Plebs was to be the scene of another strugglefor freedom. It was in later times pretended that Fulvius had taken thestep, from which even Catilina shrank, of calling the slaves to arms ona promise of freedom. [723] We have no means of disproving theallegation, which seems to have occurred with suspicious frequency inthe records left by aristocratic writers of the popular movements whichthey had assisted to crush. But it is easy to see that the devotion ofslaves to their own masters during such struggles, and the finding oftheir bodies amidst the slain, would be proof enough to a government, anxious to emphasise its merits as a saviour of society, that generalappeals had been made to the servile class. Such a deduction mightcertainly have been drawn from a view of the forces mustered underOpimius; for in these the slaves may have exceeded the citizens innumber. [724] Gracchus's mind was still divided between resistance and resignation. Heconsented to accompany his reckless friend to the Aventine, as the onlyplace of refuge; but he declined to don his armour, merely fasteningunder his toga a tiny dagger, [725] as a means of defence in the lastresort, or perhaps of salvation, did all other measures fail. Thepresage of his coming doom was shared by his wife Licinia who clung tohim at the door, and when he gently disengaged himself from her arms, made one more effort to grasp his robe and sank senseless on thethreshold. When Gracchus reached the Aventine with his friends, he foundthat Flaccus and his party had seized the temple of Diana and had madehasty preparations for fortifying it against attack. But Gracchus, impressed with the helplessness or the horror of the situation, persuaded him to make an effort at accommodation, and the younger son ofFlaccus, a boy of singular beauty, was despatched to the Curia on themission of peace. [726] With modest mien and tears streaming from hiseyes he gave his message to the consul. Many--perhaps most--of those wholistened were not averse to accept a compromise which would relieve theintolerable strain and avert a civil strife. But Opimius was inflexible;the senate, he said, could not be approached by deputy; the principalsmust descend from the Aventine, lay down their arms, deliver themselvesup to justice as citizens subject to the laws, and then they mightappeal to the senate's grace; he ended by forbidding the youth toreturn, if he could not bring with him an acceptance of these finalterms. The more pacific members of the senate could offer no effectiveobjection, for it was clear that the consul was acting within his legalrights. The coercion of a disobedient citizen was a matter for theexecutive power and, though Opimius had spoken in the name of thesenate, the authority and the responsibility were his. Retirement wouldhave been their only mode of protest; but this would have been aviolation of the discipline which bound the Council to its head, andwould have betrayed a suspicious indifference to the cause which wasregarded as that of the constitution. It is said that, on the return ofthe messenger, Gracchus expressed willingness to accept the consul'sterms and was prepared to enter the senate and there plead his own causeand that of his followers. [727] But none of his comrades would agree, and Flaccus again despatched his son with proposals similar to thosewhich had been rejected. Opimius carried out his injunction by detainingthe boy and, thirsting for battle to effect the end which delay wouldhave assured, advanced his armed forces against the position held byFlaccus. He was not wholly dependent on the improvised levies of theprevious day. There were in Rome at that moment some bands of Cretanarchers, [728] which had either just returned from service with thelegions or were destined to take part in some immediate campaign. It wasto their efforts that the success of the attack was mainly due. Thebarricade at the temple might have resisted the onslaught of theheavily-armed soldier; but its defenders were pierced by the arrows, theprecinct was strewn with wounded men, and the ranks were in utterdisorder when the final assault was made. There were names ofdistinction which lent a dignity to the massacre that followed. Men likePublius Lentulus, the venerable chief of the senate, gave a perpetualcolour of respectability to the action of Opimius by appearing in theirpanoplies amongst the forces that he led. [729] When the rout was complete and the whole crowd in full flight, Flaccussought escape in a workshop owned by a man of his acquaintance; but thecourse of his flight had been observed, the narrow court which led tothe house was soon crowded by pursuers, who, maddened by their ignoranceof the actual tenement that concealed the person of Flaccus, vowed thatthey would burn the whole alley to the ground if his hiding-place werenot revealed. [730] The trembling artisan who had befriended him did notdare to betray his suppliant, but relieved his scruples by whisperingthe secret to another. The hiding place was immediately revealed, andthe great ex-consul who had laid the foundations of Rome's dominion infarther Gaul, a man strenuous and enlightened, ardent and faithful butperhaps not overwise, was hacked to pieces by his own citizens in anobscure corner of the slums of Rome. His elder son fell fighting by hisside. To the younger, the fair ambassador of that day, now a prisoner ofthe consul, the favour was granted of choosing his own mode of death. Early Rome had repudiated the principle of visiting the sins of thefathers upon the children;[731] but the cold-blooded horrors of theOriental and Hellenic world were now becoming accepted maxims of stateto a government trembling for its safety and implacable in its revenge. Meanwhile Gracchus had been saved from both the stain of civil war andthe humiliation of capture by his foes. No man had seen him strike ablow throughout the contest. In sheer disgust at the appalling scene hehad withdrawn to the shrine of Diana, and was there prepared to compasshis own death. [732] His hand was stayed by two faithful friends, Pomponius and Laetorius, [733] who urged him to escape. Gracchus obeyed, but it was believed by some that, before he left the temple, hestretched forth his hand to the goddess and prayed that the Roman peoplemight never be quit of slavery as a reward for their ingratitude andtreachery. [734] This outburst of anger, a very natural consequence ofhis own humiliating plight, is said to have been kindled by theknowledge that the larger portion of the mob had already listened to apromise of amnesty and had joined the forces of Opimius. Unlike mostimprecations, that of Gracchus was destined to be fulfilled. The flight of Gracchus led him down the slope of the Aventine to thegate called Trigemina which stood near the Tiber's bank. In hasteningdown the hill he had sprained his ankle, and time for his escape wasonly gained by the devotion of Pomponius, [735] who turned, andsingle-handed kept the pursuing enemy at bay until trampling on hisprostrate body they rushed in the direction of the wooden bridge whichspanned the river. Here Laetorius imitated the heroism of his comrade. Standing with drawn sword at the head of the bridge, he thrust back allwho tried to pass until Gracchus had gained the other bank. Then he toofell, pierced with wounds. The fugitive had now but a single slave tobear him company in his flight; it led them through frequented streets, where the passers-by stopped on their way, cheered them on as thoughthey were witnessing a contest of speed, but gave no sign of help andturned deaf ears to Gracchus's pleading for a horse; for the pursuerswere close behind, and the dulled and panic-stricken mob had no thoughtbut for themselves. The grove of Furrina[736] received them just beforethey were overtaken by the pursuing band; and in the sacred precinct thelast act was accomplished. It was known only that master and slave hadbeen found lying side by side. Some believed that the faithful servanthad slain Gracchus and then pierced his own breast; others held thatthey were both living when the enemy came upon them, but that the slaveclung with such frantic devotion to his master that Gracchus's bodycould not be reached until the living shield had been pierced and tornaway. [737] The activity of the pursuers had been stimulated by greed, for Opimius had put a price upon the heads of both the leaders of thefaction on the Aventine. The bearers of these trophies of victory wereto receive their weight in gold. The humble citizens who produced thehead of Flaccus are said to have been defrauded of their reward; but theaction of the man who wrested the head of Gracchus from the firstpossessor of the prize and bore it on a javelin's point to Opimius, longfurnished a text to the moralist who discoursed on the madness of greedand the thirst of gold. Its unnatural weight is said to have revealedthe fact that the brain had been extracted and the cavity filled withmolten lead. [738] The bodies of the slain were for the most part throwninto the Tiber, but one account records that that of Gracchus was handedover to his mother for burial. [739] The number of the victims of thesiege, the pursuit and the subsequent judicial investigation is said tohave been three thousand. [740] The resistance to authority, which wasall that could be alleged against the followers of Gracchus, wastreated, not as a riot, but as a rebellion. The Tullianum saw its dailydole of victims, who were strangled by the executioner; the goods of thecondemned were confiscated by the State and sold at public auction. Allpublic signs of mourning were forbidden to their wives;[741] and theopinion of Scaevola, the greatest legal expert of the day, was that someproperty of his niece Licinia, which had been wrecked in the generaltumult, could be recovered only from the goods of her husband, to whomthe sedition was due. [742] The attitude of the government was, in fact, based on the view that the members of the defeated party, whether slainor executed, had been declared enemies of the State. Their action hadput them outside the pale of law, and the decree of the senate, whichhad assisted Opimius in the extreme course that he had taken, was anindex that the danger, which it vaguely specified, aimed at the actualexistence of the commonwealth and undermined the very foundations ofsociety. Such was the theory of martial law which Opimius's bold actiongave to his successors. Its weakness lay in the circumstance that it wasunknown to the statutes and to the courts; its plausibility was duepartly to the fact that, since the desuetude of the dictatorship, nopower actually existed in Rome which could legally employ force to crusheven the most dangerous popular rising, and partly to the peculiaritiesof the movement which witnessed the first exercise of this authority. The killing of Caius Gracchus and his followers, however useless andmischievous the act may have been, had about it an air of spuriouslegality, with which no ingenuity could invest the murder of Tiberiusand his adherents. The fallen chiefs were in enjoyment of no magisterialauthority that could justify either their initial action or theirsubsequent disobedience; they had fortified a position in the town, andhad certainly taken up arms, presumably for the purpose of inflictinggrievous harm on loyal fellow-citizens. As their opponents werecertainly the government, what could they be but declared foes who hadbeen caught red-handed in an act of treason so open and so violent thatthe old identity of "traitors" and "enemies" was alone applicable totheir case? Thus legal theory itself proclaimed the existence of civilwar, and handed on to future generations of party leaders an instrumentof massacre and extirpation which reached its culminating point in theproscription list of Sulla. Opimius, after he had ceased to preside at his death-dealing commission, expressed the view that he had removed the rabies of discord from theState by the foundation of a temple to Harmony. The bitter line whichsome unseen hand scribbled on the door, [743] expressed the doubt, whichmust soon have crept over many minds, whether the doctor had not beenmadder than the patient, and the view, which was soon destined to bewidely held, that the authors of the discord which had been professedlyhealed, the teachers who were educating Rome up to a higher ideal ofcivil strife, were the very men who were now in power. [744] We shall seein the sequel with what speed Time wrought his political revenge. In thehearts of men the Gracchi were even more speedily avenged. The Romanpeople often alternated between bursts of passionate sentiment andabject states of cowardly contentment; but through all these phases offeeling the memory of the two reformers grew and flourished. To acceptthe Gracchi was an article of faith impressed on the proudest noble andthe most bigoted optimate by the clamorous crowd which he addressed. Theman who aped them might be pronounced an impostor or a traitor; the menhe aped belonged almost to the distant world of the half-divine. Theirstatues were raised in public places, the sites on which they had mettheir death were accounted holy ground and were strewn with humbleofferings of the season's fruits. Many even offered to their images adaily sacrifice and sank on their knees before them as before those ofthe gods. [745] The quiet respect or ecstatic reverence with which thenames and memories of the Gracchi were treated, was partly due to avague sense in the mind of the common man that they were the authors ofthe happier aspects of the system under which he lived, of the brightergleams which occasionally pierced the clouds of oppression anddiscomfort; it was also due to the conviction in the mind of thestatesman, often resisted but always recurring, that their work wasunalterable. To undo it was to plunge into the dark ages, to attempt tomodify it was immediately to see the necessity of its renewal. At everyturn in the paths of political life the statesman was confronted by twofigures, whom fear or admiration raised to gigantic proportions. Theorthodox historian would angrily declare that they were but the figuresof two young men, whose intemperate action had thrown Rome intoconvulsion and who had met their fate, not undeserved howeverlamentable, the one in a street riot, the other while heading an armedsedition. But the criticism contained the elements of its ownrefutation. The youth, the brotherhood, the martyrdom of the men werethe very elements that gave a softening radiance to the hard contour oftheir lives. The Gracchi were a stern and ever-present reality; theywere also a bright and gracious memory. In either character they musthave lived; but the combination of both presentments has secured them animmortality which age, wisdom, experience and success have oftenstruggled vainly to secure. That strange feeling which a great andbeautiful life has often inspired, that it belongs to eternity ratherthan to the immediate past, and that it has few points of contact withthe prosaic round of present existence, had almost banished fromCornelia's mind the selfish instincts of her loss, and had perhaps evendulled the tender memories which cluster round the frailer rather thanthe stronger elements in the characters of those we love. Those whovisited her in her villa at Misenum, where she kept her intellectualcourt, surrounded by all that was best in letters, and exchanginggreetings or gifts with the potentates of the earth, were amazed at thecomposure with which she spoke of the lives and actions of hersons. [746] The memory drew no tear, her voice conveyed no intonation ofsorrow or regret. She spoke of them as though they were historicalfigures of the past, men too distant and too great to arouse the weakemotion which darkens contemplation. Some thought that her mind had beenshaken by age, or that her sensibility had been dulled by misfortune. "In this they proved their own utter lack of sensibility" says theloving biographer of the Gracchi: They did not know, he adds, the signsof that nobility of soul, which is sometimes given by birth and isalways perfected by culture, or the reasonable spirit of endurance whichmental and moral excellence supply. The calmness of Cornelia proved, aswell, that she was at one with her children after their death, and theiridentity with a mind so pure is as great a tribute to their motives asthe admiration or fear of the Romans is to their intellect and theirdeeds, Cornelia deserved a memorial in Rome for her own intrinsic worth;but the demeanour of her latter days justifies the legend engraved onthe statue which was to be seen in the portico of Metellus: "ToCornelia, the mother of the Gracchi". [747] We are now in a position to form some estimate of the political changeswhich had swept over Rome during the past twelve years. Therevolutionary legislation of this period was, strictly speaking, notitself the change, but merely the formula which marked an establishedgrowth; nor can any profit be derived from drawing a marked contrastbetween the aims and methods of the two men who were responsible for themost decisive of these reforms. A superficial view of the facts mightlead us to suppose that Tiberius Gracchus had bent his energies solelyto social amelioration, and that it was reserved for his brother Caiusto effect vast changes in the working, though not in the structure, ofthe constitution. But even a chronological survey of the actions ofthese two statesmen reveals the vast union of interests that suddenlythrust themselves forward, with a vehemence which demanded either such aresistance as no political society is homogeneous enough to maintain, orsuch concessions as may be graciously made by a government which afterthe grant may still retain most of the forms and much of the substanceof its former power. So closely interwoven were social and politicalquestions, so necessary was it for the attempted satisfaction of oneclass immediately to create the demand for the recognition orcompensation of another, that Tiberius Gracchus had no sooner formulatedhis agrarian proposals than he was beset with thoughts of legislatingfor the army, transferring some of the judicial power to the equestrianorder, and granting the franchise to the allies. Even the belief thatthese projects were merely a device for securing his own ascendency, does not prove that their announcement was due to a brilliant discoveryof their originator, or that he created wants which he thereuponproposed to satisfy. The desperate statesman seizes on the grievancewhich is nearest to hand; it is true that he may increase a want bygiving the first loud and clear expression to the low and confusedmurmurings of discontent; but a grievance that lives and gives violenttokens of its presence, as did that of the Italian allies in theFregellan revolt, must be real, not fictitious: and when it finds aremedy, as the needs of the poor and the political claims of the knightsdid under the régime of Caius Gracchus, the presumption is that thedisease has been of long standing, and that what it has for a long timelacked was not recognition, but the opportunity and the intelligencenecessary to secure redress. Caius Gracchus was as little of a politicalexplorer as his brother; it did not require the intuition of genius tosee facts which formed the normal environment of every prominentpolitician of the age. His claim to greatness rests, partly on themental and moral strength which he shared with Tiberius and which gavehim the power to counteract the force of inertia and transmute vaguethought, first into glowing words and then into vigorous action; partlyon the extraordinary ingenuity with which he balanced the interests andclaims of classes so as to form a coalition which was for the timeresistless: and partly on the finality with which he removed thejealousies of the hour from the idle arena of daily political strife, and gave them their place in the permanent machinery of theconstitution, there to remain as the necessary condition of theprecarious peace or the internecine war which the jarring elements of abalance of power bring in turn to its possessors. Since the reality of the problems with which the Gracchi dealt isundeniable, and since few would be inclined to admit that the mosteffective treatment of a problem, whether social or political, is torefuse it a solution, any reasonable criticism of their reforms must bebased solely on a consideration of their aims and methods. The landquestion, which was taken up by both these legislators, attracts ourfirst attention. The aim of the resumption and redistribution of thepublic domain had been the revival of the class of peasant holders, whomlegend declared, perhaps with a certain element of truth, to have formedthe flower of the civic population during the years when Rome wasstruggling for a place amongst the surrounding peoples and in thesubsequent period of her expansion over Italy. Such an aim may be lookedat from two points of view. It may be regarded as an end in itself, without any reference to its political results, or it may be looked onas an effort to increase the power and security of the State without anypeculiar consideration of the comfort and well-being of its individualmembers. The Gracchan scheme, regarded from the first point of view, can, with respect to its end as distinguished from its methods, becriticised unfavourably only by those who hold that an urban life doesunder all circumstances convey moral, mental and physical benefits whichare denied by the conditions of residence in country districts. It istrue that the objector may in turn point out that the question of thestandard of comfort to be attained in either sphere is here of supremeimportance; but such an issue brings us at once within the region ofmeans and not of ends, and an ideal of human life cannot be judgedsolely with reference to the practicability of its realisation. It isthe second point of view from which the aim of this land legislation maybe contemplated, which first gives the critic the opportunity of denyingthe validity of the end as well as the efficiency of the means. If thenew agriculturist was meant to be an element of strength to the RomanState, to save it from the selfishness of a narrow oligarchy, theinstability of a city mob and the corruption of both, to defend theconquests which the city had won or to push her empire further, it wasnecessary to prove that he could be of utility both as a voting unit andas a soldier in the legions. His capacity for performing the firstfunction efficiently was, at the very least, extremely questionable. Thereality of the farmer's vote obviously depended on the closeness of hisresidence to the capital, since there is not the least trace, at this orat any future time during the history of the Republic, of the formationof any design for modifying the rigidly primary character of the popularassemblies of Rome. The rights of the voter at a distance had alwaysbeen considered so purely potential, that the inland and northernsettlements which Rome established in Italy had generally been endowedwith Latin rights, while the colonies of Roman citizens clustered moreclosely round their mother; and men had always been found ready tosacrifice the active rights of Roman citizenship, on account of theworthlessness of their possession in a remote colony. It was evendifficult to reconcile the passive rights of Roman citizenship withresidence at a distance from the capital; for all the higherjurisdiction was centred in Rome and could not easily be sought by theinhabitants of distant settlements. [748] But, even if we exclude thequestion of relative distance from the centre of affairs, it was stillnot probable that the dweller in the country would be a good citizenaccording to the Hellenic comprehension of that phrase. When Aristotleapproves of a country democracy, simply because it is not strictly ademocracy at all, [749] he is thinking, not merely of the farmer's lackof interest in city politics, but of the incompatibility of theperpetual demands which rural pursuits make on time and energy withattendance on public business at the centre of affairs. The son of thesoil soon learns that he owes undivided allegiance to his mother: and hewill seldom be stirred by a political emotion strong enough to overcomethe practical appeals which are made by seed-time and harvest. But theopportunities for discarding civic obligations were far greater in Romethan in the Greek communities. The Roman assemblies had no stated daysof meeting, laws might be promulgated and passed at any period of theyear, their tenor was explained at public gatherings which were oftenannounced on the very morning of the day for which they were summoned, and could be attended only by those whom chance or leisure or thehabitual pursuit of political excitement had brought to the Capitol orthe Forum. There was not at this period a fixed date even for theelections of the higher magistrates. An attempt was perhaps made toarrange them for the summer, when the roads were passable, the laboursof spring were over, and the toils of harvest time had not yetcommenced. [750] But the creation of the magistrates with Imperiumdepended to a large extent on the convenience of the consuls, one ofwhom had sometimes to be summoned back from a campaign to preside at theComitia which were to elect his successors; while even the date of thetribunician elections might have been conditioned by politicalconsiderations. The closing events of the life of Tiberius Gracchusprove how difficult it was to secure the attendance of the country votereven when an election of known political import was in prospect; whileCaius realised that the best security for the popular leader, whether asa legislator or a candidate, was to attach the urban resident to himselfby the ties of gratitude and interest. We can scarcely admit, in theface of facts like these, that the agriculturist created by the Gracchanreforms was likely to render any signal political assistance to hiscity. It is true that the existence of a practically disfranchisedproletariate may have a modifying influence on politics. It could not inRome serve the purpose, which it sometimes fulfils in the modern world, of moulding the opinion of the voter; but even in Rome it suggested areserve that might be brought up on emergencies. A state, however, doesnot live on emergencies but on the constant and watchful activity of itsmembers. Such activity could be displayed at Rome only by the leisuredsenator or the leaders of the city mob. The forces that had worked foroligarchy in the past might under changed conditions produce a narrowtype of urban democracy; but they presented no hope of the realisationof a true popular government. It might be hoped, however, that the newly created farmer might add tothe military, if not the political, strength of the State. The hope, sofar as it rested on the agriculturist himself, was rendered something ofan anachronism by the present conditions of service. Even in the olddays a campaign prolonged beyond the ordinary duration of six months hadoften effected the ruin of the peasant proprietor; and now that thecautious policy of the protectorate had been so largely abandoned andRome's military efforts, no longer limited to wars of defence oraggression, were directed to securing her ascendency in distantdependencies by means of permanent garrisons, service in the legions wasa still more fatal impediment to industrial development. Rome had notyet learnt the lesson that an empire cannot be garrisoned by an army ofconscripts; but she was becoming conscious of the inadequacy of her ownmilitary system, and this consciousness led her to take the easy butfatal step of throwing far the larger burden of foreign service on theLatins and Italian allies. Any increase in the number and efficiency ofher own military forces would thus remove a dangerous grievance, whileit added to the strength which, in the last resort, could alone securethe permanence of her supremacy even in Italy. Such an increase wasfinally effected in the only possible manner--by the adoption of asystem of voluntary enlistment and by carrying still further theincreasing disregard for those antiquated conditions of wealth andstatus, which were a part of the theory that service was a burden andwholly inconsistent with the new requirement that it should become aprofession. Although it must be confessed that little assistance in thisdirection was directly tendered by the Gracchan legislation, yet itshould be remembered that, even if we exclude from consideration thesmall efforts made by Caius to render military service a more attractivecalling, the increase of the farmer class might of itself have done muchto solve the problem. Although the single occupant of a farm was clearlyincapable of taking his part in expeditions beyond the seas withoutserious injury to his own interests, yet the sons of such a man mighthave performed a considerable term of military service withoutdisastrous consequences to the estate, and where the inheritance hadremained undivided and several brothers held the land in common, theduties of the soldier and the farmer might have been alternated withoutleaving the homestead divested of its head. The recognition of themilitary life as a profession must have profited still more by thepolicy which encouraged the growth of the country population; for theenergy of the surplus members of the household, whose services were notneeded or could not be adequately rewarded on the farm, would find amore salutary outlet in the stirring life of the camp than in theenervating influences of the city. The country-side might still continueto supply a better physique and a finer morale than were likely to bediscovered in the poorer quarters of Rome. The objects aimed at in the Gracchan scheme of land-reform, although insome respects difficult of realisation, have aroused less hostilecriticism than the methods which were adopted for their fulfilment. Itmay be held that the scheme of practical confiscation, which, advocatedby Tiberius Gracchus, plunged him at once into a fierce politicalstruggle and encountered resistance which could only be overcome byunconstitutional means, might have been avoided had the reformer seenthat an economic remedy must be ultimate to be successful, and that aneconomic tendency can only be resisted by destroying the conditionswhich give it the false appearance of a law. The two conditions whichwere at the time fatal to the efforts of the moderate holder of land, are generally held to have been the cheapness and, under the inhumanecircumstances of its employment, even efficiency of slave labour, andthe competition of cheap corn from the provinces. The remedial measureswhich might immediately present themselves to the mind of a moderneconomist, who was unfettered by a belief in free trade or in thelegitimacy of securing the cheapest labour available, are theprohibition of, or restrictions on, the importation of slaves, and theimposition of a duty on foreign corn. The first device might in itsextreme form have been impracticable, for it would have been difficultto ensure such a supervision of the slave market as to discriminatebetween the sale of slaves for agricultural or pastoral work and theiracquirement for domestic purposes. A tax on servile labour employed onland, or the moderate regulation which Caesar subsequently enforced thata certain proportion of the herdsmen employed on the pasture landsshould be of free birth, [751] would have been more practicable measures, and perhaps, if presented as an alternative to confiscation, might nothave encountered an unconquerable resistance from the capitalists, although their very moderation might have won them but a lukewarmsupport from the people, and ensured the failure that attends onhalf-measures which do not carry their meaning on their face and lackthe boldness which excites enthusiasm. But the real objection which theGracchi and their circle would have had to legislation of this type, whether it had been suggested to them in its extreme shape or in somemodified form, would have been that it could not have secured the objectat which they aimed. Such measures would merely have revived the freelabourer, while their dream was to re-establish the peasant proprietor, or at least the occupant who held his land on a perfectly secure tenurefrom the State. And even the revival of the free labourer would onlyhave been exhibited on the most modest scale; for such legislation wouldhave done nothing to reclaim arable land which had degenerated intopasturage, and to reawaken life in the great deserted tracts, whosesolitude was only broken by the rare presence of the herdsman's cabin. To raise a cry for the restoration of free labour on this exiguous scalemight have exposed a legislator to the disappointment, if not derision, of his friends and invited the criticism, effective because popular, ofall his secret foes. The masters of the world were not likely to giveenthusiastic support to a leader who exhibited as their goal the lonely, barren and often dangerous life of sheep-driver to some greedycapitalist, and who offered them the companionship, and not the service, of the slaves that their victorious arms had won. The alternative of protective legislation for the defence of Italiangrain may be even more summarily dismissed. It was, in the first place, impossible from the point of view of political expediency. The Gracchi, or any other reforming legislators, had to depend for their main supporton the voting population of the city of Rome: and such a constituencywould never have dreamed for a moment of sanctioning a measure whichwould have made the price of corn dearer in the Roman market, even ifthe objections of the capitalists who placed the foreign grain on thatmarket could have been successfully overcome. So far from dreaming ofthe practicability of such a scheme, Caius Gracchus had been forced toallow the sale of corn at Rome at a cost below the current market-price. But, even had protection been possible, it must have come as the last, not as the first, of the constructive measures necessary for thesettlement of the agrarian question. It might have done something tokeep the small farms standing, but these farms had to be created beforetheir maintenance was secured; and if adopted, apart from some schemeaiming at a redivision of the land, such a protective measure wouldmerely have benefited such existing owners of the large estates as stillcontinued to devote a portion of their domains to agriculture. The fact, however, which may be regarded as certain, that foreign corn couldundersell that of Italy in the Roman market, and probably in that of allthe great towns within easy access of the sea, may seem a fatal flaw inthe agrarian projects of the Gracchi. What reason was there forsupposing that the tendencies which in the past had favoured the growthof large holdings and replaced agriculture by pasturage, should remaininoperative in the future? Tiberius Gracchus's own regulation about theinalienability of the lands which he assigned, seemed to reveal thesuspicion that the tendencies towards accumulation had not yet beenexhausted, and that the occupants of the newly created farms might notfind the pursuit of agriculture so profitable as to cling to them inscorn of the enticements of the encroaching capitalist. Doubtless theprohibition to sell revealed a weakness in the agricultural system ofthe times; but the regulation was probably framed, not in despair of thesmall holder securing a maintenance, but as a protection against themoney-lender, that curse of the peasant-proprietor, who might now beless willing to approach the peasant, when the security which heobtained could under no circumstances lead to his acquiring eventualownership. With respect to the future, there was reasonable hope thatthe farmer, if kept in tolerable security from the strategic advances ofhis wealthier neighbours, would be able to hold his own. In a modernstate, possessing a teeming population and a complex industrialorganisation, where the profits of a widely spread commercial life haveraised the standard of comfort and created a host of varied needs, theview may reasonably be taken that, before agriculture can declare itselfsuccessful, it must be able to point to some central market where itwill receive an adequate reward for the labour it entails. But this viewwas by no means so prevalent in the simpler societies of antiquity. Thedifficulties of communication, which, with reference to transport, musthave made Rome seem nearer to Africa than to Umbria, and must haveproduced a similar tendency to reliance on foreign imports in many ofthe great coast towns, would alone have been sufficient to weaken thereliance of the farmer on the consumption of his products by the largercities. The belief that the homestead might be almost self-sufficientprobably lingered on in remote country districts even in the days of theGracchi; or, if absolute self-existence was unattainable, thenecessities of life, which the home could not produce, might be procuredwithout effort by periodical visits to the market or fair, which formedthe industrial centre of a group of hamlets. The seemingly ample size ofthe Gracchan allotments, some of which were three times as great as thelarger of the colonial assignments of earlier days, [752] pointed to thepossibility of the support of a large family, if the simpler needs oflife were alone considered. The farmer's soul need not be vexed bycompetition if he was content to live and not to trade, and it mighthave been hoped that the devotion to the soil, which ownership inspires, might have worked its magic even on the lands left barren throughneglect. There might even be a hope for the cultivator who aimed at themarkets of the larger towns; for, if corn returned no profit, yet oiland wine were not yet undersold, and were both of them commodities whichwould bring better returns than grain to the minute and scrupulous carein which the smaller cultivator excels the owner of a great domain. Thefailure of corn-growing as a productive industry, perhaps thelegislation of the Gracchi itself, must have given a great impetus tothe cultivation of the vine and the olive, the value attached to whichduring the closing years of the Republic is, as we have seen, attestedby the fact that the extension of these products was prohibited in theTransalpine regions in order to protect the interests of theRoman producer. An agricultural revival was, therefore, possible; but its successdemanded a spirit that would enter readily into the work, and submitwithout a murmur to the conditions of life which the stern taskenjoined. It was here that the agrarian legislation of the Gracchi foundits obstacle. So far as it did fail--so far, that is, as it was notsufficient to prevent the renewed accumulation of the people in thetowns and the continued depopulation of the country districts--it failedbecause it offended against social ideals rather than against economictendencies. Many of the settlers whom it planted on the allotments, mustalready have been demoralised by the feverish atmosphere of Rome; whileothers of a saner and more vigorous type may have soon looked back onthe capital, not as the lounging-place of the idler, but as the exchangeof the world, or have turned their thoughts to the provinces as thesphere where energy was best rewarded and capital gave its speediestreturns. Of the other social measures of this period, colonisation, inso far as it had a purely agricultural object, is subject to thecriteria that have been applied to the agrarian movements of the time;although it is possible that the formation of new or the remodelling ofold political societies, which must have followed the scheme of Drusus, had this been ever realised, would have infused a more vigorous life inagricultural settlements of this type than was likely to be awakened inthose which formed a mere outlying part of Rome or some existingmunicipality. We have seen how the colonial plan of Drusus differed inits intention from that of Caius Gracchus; but the latter statesman had, in the settlement which he projected at Junonia, planned a foundationwhich would proximately have lived on the wealth of its territory ratherthan on its trade, and must always have been, like Carthage of old, asmuch an agricultural as a commercial state. To an agrarian project suchas this no economic objection could have been offered and, had thescheme of transmarine colonisation been fully carried out, the provincesthemselves might have been made to benefit the farming class of Italy, whose economic foes they had become. The distance also of suchsettlements from Rome would have blunted the craving for the life of thecapital, which beset the minds and paralysed the energies of theoccupants of Italian land. But, on the whole, the Gracchan scheme of colonisation was, as we haveseen, commercial rather than agricultural, and was probably intended tobenefit a class that was not adapted to rural occupations, either byassociation or training. By this enterprise Caius Gracchus showed thathe saw with perfect clearness the true reason, and the final evidence, of the stagnation of the middle class. A nation which has abandonedagriculture and allows itself to be fed by foreign hands, even by thoseof its own subjects, is exposed to military dangers which are obvious, and to political perils somewhat more obscure but bearing their evilfruit from time to time; but such treason to the soil is no sign ofnational decay, if the legions of workers have merely transferred theirallegiance from the country to the town, from agriculture to manufactureand commerce. In Italy this comforting explanation was impossible. Except perhaps in Latium and Campania, there were few industrialcentres; many of those that existed were in the hands of Greeks, manymore had sunk under the stress of war and had never been revived. Thegreat syndicates in which Roman capital was invested, employed slavesand freedmen as their agents; the operations of these great houses weredirected mainly to the provinces, and the Italian seaports were employedmerely as channels for a business which was speculative and financialand, so far as Italy was concerned, only to a very slight, if to any, degree productive. To re-establish the producer or the trader ofmoderate means, was to revive a stable element in the population, whoseexistence might soften the rugged asperity with which capital confrontedpower on the one hand and poverty on the other. But to revive it at Romewould have demanded artificial measures, which, attacking as they musthave done the monopolies possessed by the Equites, would have defeatedthe legislator's immediate object and probably proved impracticable, while such a revival would also have accentuated the centralisation, which might be useful to the politician but was deplored by the socialreformer. The debilitated class might, however, recover its elasticityif placed in congenial surroundings and invited to the sites which hadonce attracted the enterprise of the Greek trader; and Caius Gracchus'ssettlements in the south of Italy were means to this end. We have nowarrant for pronouncing the experiment an utter failure. Some of thesecolonies lived on, although in what guise is unknown. But even amoderate amount of success would have demanded a continuity in thescheme, which was rudely interrupted by the fall of its promoter, and itis not to be imagined that the larger capitalists, whose power thereformer had himself increased, looked with a friendly eye upon thesesmaller rivals. The scheme of social reform projected by Gracchus foundits completion in his law for the sale of corn. When he had madeprovision for the born agriculturist and the born tradesman, there stillremained a residuum of poorer citizens whose inclination and habitsprompted them to neither calling. It was for these men that the monthlygrant of cheapened grain was intended. Their bread was won by labour, but by a labour so fitful and precarious that it was known to be ofteninsufficient to secure the minimum means of subsistence, unless somehelp was furnished by the State. The healthier form of state-aid--theemployment of labour--was certainly practised by Caius Gracchus, andperhaps the extensive public works which he initiated and supervised, were intended to benefit the artisan who laboured in their constructionas well as the trader who would profit by their completion. Whatever may be our judgment on the merits and results of this socialprogramme, the importance of the political character which it was toassume, from the close of the career of Caius Gracchus to the downfallof the Republic, can hardly be exaggerated. The items of reform asembodied in his legislation became the constant factors in everydemocratic programme which was to be issued in the future. In these wesee the demand for land, for colonial assignations, for transmarinesettlements, for a renewal or extension of the corn law, perpetuallyrecurring. It is true that this recurrence may be in part due to thevery potency of the personality of the first reformer and to the magicof the memory which he left behind him. Party-cries tend to becomeshibboleths and it is difficult to unravel the web that has been spun bythe hand of a master. Even the hated cry for the Italian franchise, which had proved the undoing of Caius Gracchus, became acceptable toparty leaders and to an ever-growing section of their followers, largelybecause it had become entwined with his programme of reform. But thevigorous life of his great manifesto cannot be explained wholly on thisground. It is a greater exaltation of its author to believe that itslife was due to its intrinsic utility, and that Gracchus indicated realneeds which, because they remained unsatisfied until the birth of thePrincipate, were ever the occasion for the renewal of proposals soclosely modelled on his own. When we turn from the social to the political changes of this period, weare on far less debatable ground. Although there may be some doubt as tothe intention with which each reform was brought into existence by CaiusGracchus, its character as illustrated by its place in the economy ofthe commonwealth is so clearly stamped upon it and so potentlymanifested in the immediately following years, that a comprehensivediscussion of the nature of his single measures would be merely anunprofitable effort to recall the past or anticipate the future. But thecollective effect of his separate efforts has been subjected to verydifferent interpretations, and the question has been further complicatedby hazardous, and sometimes overconfident, attempts to determine how farthe legislator's intentions were fulfilled in the actual result of hisreforms. Because it can be shown that the changes introduced byGracchus, or, to be more strictly accurate, the symptoms which elicitedthese changes, ultimately led to monarchical rule, Gracchus has been attimes regarded as the conscious author and possessor of a personalsupremacy which he deliberately intended should replace the intricateand somewhat cumbrous mechanism which controlled the constitutionalgovernment of Rome; because he sowed the seeds of a discord so terribleas to be unendurable even in a state which had never known the absenceof faction and conflict, and had preserved its liberties throughcarefully regulated strife, his work has been held to be that of someavenging angel who came, not to renew, but to destroy. There is truth inboth these pictures; but the Gracchus whom they portray as the forcethat annihilated centuries of crafty workmanship, as the first precursorof the coming monarchy, is the Gracchus who rightly lives in thehistoric imagination which, unfettered by conditions of space or time, prefers the contemplation of the eternity of the work to that of theenvironment of the worker; it is a presentment which would be applicableto any man as able and as resolute as Gracchus, who attempted to meetthe evils created by a weak and irresponsible administration, partly bythe restoration of old forms, partly by the recognition of new andpressing claims. There is a point at which reform, except it go so faras to blot out a constitution and substitute another in its place, mustact as a weakening and dissolving force. That point is reached when anexisting government is effectually hampered from exercising theprerogatives of sovereignty and no other power is sufficientlystrengthened to act as its unquestioned substitute. The dissolution willbe easier if reform bears the not uncommon aspect of conservatism, and anominal sovereign, whose strength, never very great, has been sapped bydisuse and the habit of mechanical obedience, is placed in competitionwith a somewhat effete usurper. It is not, however, fair to regardGracchus as a radical reactionary who was the first to drag a prisonedand incapable sovereign into the light of day. Had he done this, hewould have been the author of a revolution and the creator of a newconstitution. But this he never attempted to be, and such a view of hiswork rests on the mistaken impression that, at the time of his reforms, the senate was recognised as the true government of Rome. Such apretension had never been published nor accepted. We are not concernedwith its reality as a fact; but no sound analysis, whether undertaken bylawyer or historian, would have admitted its theoretical truth. Theliterary atmosphere teemed with theories of popular sovereignty of alimited kind, and Gracchus, while recognising this sovereignty, didlittle to remove its limitations. It is true that, like his brother, helegislated without seeking the customary sanction of the senate; butinitial reforms could never have been carried through, had thelegislator waited for this sanction; and the future freedom of theComitia from senatorial control was at best guaranteed by the force ofthe example of the Gracchi, not by any new legal ordinances which theyordained. Earlier precedents of the same type had not been lacking, andit was only the comprehensiveness of the Gracchan legislation whichseemed to give a new impetus to the view that in all fundamentalmatters, which called for regulation by Act of Parliament, the peoplewas the single and uncontrolled sovereign. Thus was developed the ideaof the possibility of a new period of growth, which should refashion thedetails of the structure of the State into greater correspondence withthe changed conditions of the times. As the earlier process of changehad raised the senate to power, the latter might be interpreted ascontaining a promise that a new master was to be given to the Romanworld. But it is highly improbable that to Gracchus or to any of hiscontemporaries was the true nature of the prophecy revealed. For themoment a balance of power was established, and the moneyed class stoodmidway between the opposing factions of senate and people. Its newpowers were intended to constrain the senate into efficiency rather thanto reduce it to impotence, and to create these powers Gracchus hadendowed the equestrian order with that right of audit which, in theearlier theory of the constitution, had been held to be one of thesecurest guarantees of the power of the people. Gracchus predicted thestrife that was likely to follow this friction between the governmentand the courts; but this prediction, while it perhaps reveals the hopethat in the issues of the future the mercantile class would generally befound on the side of the people, betrays still more clearly the beliefthat the people, and their patron of the moment, were utterly incapableof standing alone, and that no true democratic government was possiblefor Rome. In spite of his Hellenism Gracchus betrayed twocharacteristics of the true Roman. He believed in the advisability ofcreating a political impasse, from which some mode of escape wouldultimately be devised by the wearied and lacerated combatants; and heheld firmly to the view that the people, considered strictly in itself, had no organic existence; that it never was, and never could be, a powerin its own right. He made no effort to give the Roman Comitia anorganisation which would have placed it on something like theindependent level of a Greek Ecclesia. Such an omission was perhaps theresult of neglect rather than of deliberation; but this very neglectproves that Gracchus had in no way emancipated himself from the typicalRoman idea that the people could find expression only through the voiceof a magistrate. This idea unquestionably made the leader of the momentthe practical head of the State during any crisis that called forconstant intervention on the part of the Comitia; but there is no reasonto suppose a belief on the part of Gracchus that such intervention wouldbe unremittingly demanded, would become as integral a part of theevery-day mechanism of government as the senate's direction of theprovinces or the knight's control of the courts. But even had he heldthis view, the situation which it conjured up need not have borne aclose resemblance to monarchy. The natural vehicle for the expression ofthe popular will would have been the tribunate--an office which by itsvery nature presented such obvious hindrances to personal rule as theexistence of colleagues armed with the power of veto, the short tenureof office, and the enjoyment of powers that were mainly negative. It istrue that the Gracchi themselves had shown how some of thesedifficulties might be overcome. The attempt at re-election, theaccumulation of offices, the disregard of the veto, were innovationsforced on them by the knowledge, gained from bitter experience, thatreform could proceed only from a power that was to some extent outsidethe constitution, and that the efficient execution of the contemplatedmeasures demanded the concentration of varied types of authority in asingle hand. Perhaps Caius faced the situation more frankly than hisbrother; but his consciousness of the necessity of such an occasionalpower in the State was accompanied by the belief that it would prove theruin of the man who grasped it, that the work might be done but that theworker would be doomed. These gloomy anticipations were not the resultof disordered nerves, but the natural fruit of the coldly calculatingintellect which saw that supremacy either of or through the people wasan illusion, that the power of the nobility must be resisted by keenerand more durable weapons than the Comitia and its temporary leaders, that the authority of the senate might yield to a slow process ofattrition, but would never be engulfed by any cataclysmic outburst ofpopular hostility. It was no part of the statesman's task to pry intothe future and vex himself with the query whether a new and permanentheadship of the State might not be created, to play the all-pervadingpart which destiny had assigned to the senate. The senate's power hadnot vanished, it was not even vanishing. It was a solid fact, fullyaccepted by the very masses who were howling against it. Its decadencewould be the work of time, and all the great Roman reformers of the pasthad left much to time and to fortune. The materials with which theGracchi worked were far too composite to enable them to forecast theshape of the structure of which they were laying the foundations. Theessential fact of the future monarchy, the growth of the military power, must have been almost completely hidden from their eyes. It is truethat, in relation to the fall of the Republic and the growth of themonarchical idea, the Gracchi were more than mere preparatory ordestructive forces. They furnished faint types, which were gladlywelcomed by subsequent pretenders, of what a constitutional monarchshould be. But it is ever hazardous to identify the destroyer with thecreator or the type with the prophet. CHAPTER V The common destiny which had attended the Gracchi was manifested even inthe consequences of their fall. At both crises a brilliant butdisturbing element had vanished, the work of the reformer remained, because it was the utterance of the people before whose sacred name thenobility continued to bow, the political atmosphere was cleared, thelegitimate organs of government resumed their acknowledged sway. Tospeak of a restoration of power to the nobility after the fall of CaiusGracchus is to belie both the facts of history and the impressions ofthe times. There is little probability that either the nobles or thecommons felt that the two years of successful agitation amounted to achange of government, or that the senate ever abandoned the convictionthat the reformer, embarrassing as his proceedings might be on accountof the obvious necessity for their acceptance, must succumb to thedevices which had long formed the stock-in-trade of a successfulsenatorial campaign; while the transition from the guidance of Gracchusto that of the accredited representatives of the nobility was renderedall the easier by the facts that the authority of the tribune had longbeen waning, and that, for some months before his death, a large sectionof the people had been greedily fixing its eyes on an attractiveprogramme which had been presented in the name of the senate. Thesuppression of the final movement had, it is true, been marked by anunexampled severity; but these stern measures had followed on an actualappeal to arms, which had elicited a response from the passive orquaking multitude and had made them in some sense participants in theslaughter. If it was terrible to think that three thousand citizens hadbeen butchered in the streets or in the Tullianum, it was comforting toremember that they had been officially denounced as public enemies bythe senate. There was no haunting sense of an inviolable wrong inflictedon the tribunate, for Caius Gracchus had not been tribune when he fell;there was no memory, half bitter, half grotesque, of indiscriminateslaughter dealt by a mob of infuriated senators, for this latter andgreater _émeute_ had been suppressed by the regular forces of the State, led by its highest magistrate. The position of the government was moresecure, the conscience of the people more easy than it had been afterthe massacre of Tiberius Gracchus and his followers. This feeling ofsecurity on the part of the government, and of acquiescence on that ofthe people, was soon put to the test by the prosecution of the ex-consulLucius Opimius. His impeachment before the people by the tribuneDecius[753] raised the vital question whether the novel powers which hehad exercised in crushing Gracchus and his adherents, could be justifiedon the ground that they were the necessary, and in fact the only, meansof maintaining public security. It was practically a question whether anew form of martial law should be admitted to recognition by the highestorgan of the State, the voice of the sovereign people itself; and thediscussion was rendered all the more piquant by the fact that that verysovereign was reminded that it had lately sanctioned an ordinance whichforbade a capital penalty to be pronounced against a Roman citizenexcept by consent of the people, The arguments used on either side wereof the most abstract and far-reaching character. [754] In answer toDecius's objection that the proceedings of Opimius were an obviouscontravention of statute law, and that the most wanton criminality didnot justify death without trial, the view, never unwelcome to the Romanmind, that there was a higher justice than law, was advanced by thechampions of the accused. It was maintained that an ultimate right ofself-defence was as necessary to a state as to an individual. The manwho attempted to overturn the foundations of society was a public enemybeyond the pale of law; the man who resisted his efforts by every meansthat lay to hand was merely fulfilling the duty to his country which wasincumbent on a citizen and a magistrate. If this view were accepted, thecomplex issue at law resolved itself into a simple question of fact. Hadthe leader and the party that had been crushed shown by their actionsthat they were overt enemies of the State? The majority which acquittedOpimius practically decided that Gracchus and his adherents had beenrendered outlaws by their deeds. The sentiment of the moment had beencleverly stirred by the nature of the issue which was put before them. Had the voters been Gracchans at heart, they would probably have paidbut little attention to these unusual appeals to the fundamentalprinciples of political life, and would have shown themselves supportersof the spirit, as well as of the letter, of the enactment whose authorthey had just pronounced an outlaw. For there could be no question thatthe Gracchan law, which no one dared assail, was meant to cover just thevery acts of which Opimius had been guilty after the slaughter of theGracchans in the streets had ended. The right to kill in an _émeute_might be a questionable point; but the power of establishing a militarycourt for the trial of captured offenders was notoriously illegal, andcould under very few circumstances have been justified even on theground of necessity. The decision of the people also seemed to give akind of recognition to the utterance of the senate which had precededOpimius's display of force. It is quite true that no successful defenceof violence could ever be rested on the formula itself. This "ultimatedecree of the senate" was valued as a weighty and emphatic declarationof the existence of a situation which demanded extreme measures, ratherthan as a legal permit which justified the disregard of the ordinaryrights of the citizen. But formulae often have a power far in excess oftheir true significance; they impose on the ignorant, and furnish both ashield and a weapon to their cunning framers. The armoury of the senate, or of any revolutionary who had the good fortune to overawe the senate, was materially strengthened by the people's judgment in Opimius'sfavour. [755] The favourable situation was immediately used to effect therecall of Publius Popillius Laenas. His restoration was proposed to thepeople by Lucius Bestia a tribune;[756] and the people which had justsanctioned Opimius's judicial severities, did not betray theinconsistency of continuing to resent the far more restrictedpersecution of Popillius. Yet the step was an advance on their previousaction; for they were now actually rescinding a legal judgment of theirown, and approving of the actions of a court which had been establishedby the senate on its own authority without any previous declaration ofthe outlawry of its victims--a court whose proceedings were known tohave directed the tenor of that law of Caius Gracchus, the validity ofwhich was still unquestioned. But even on the swell of this anti-Gracchan tide the nobility had stillto steer its course with caution and circumspection. Personal prejudiceswere stronger than principles with the masses. They might sanctionoutrages which already had the blessing of men who represented, externally at least, the more respectable portion of Roman society; butthey continued to detest individuals whose characters seemed to havegrown blacker rather than cleaner by participation in, or evenjustification of, the recent acts of violence. One of our authoritieswould have us believe that even the aged Publius Lentulus, once chief ofthe senate, was sacrificed by his peers to the fate which had attendedScipio Nasica. He had climbed the Aventine with Opimius's troops and hadbeen severely wounded in the ensuing struggle. [757] But neither his agenor his wounds sufficed to overcome the strange prejudice of the mob. Obloquy and abuse dogged his footsteps, until at length he was forced, in the interest of his own peace or security, to beg of the senate oneof those honorary embassies which covered the retirement of a senatoreither for private business or for leisure, and to seek a home inSicily. [758] His last public utterance was an impassioned prayer that hemight never return to his ungrateful country: and the gods granted himhis request. If this story is true, it proves that public opinion wasstronger even than the voice of the Comitia. Lentulus, if put on histrial, would probably have been acquitted; but the resentful minority, which was powerless in the assembly, may have been sufficiently strongto make life unbearable to its chosen victim by its demeanour at publicgatherings and in the streets. But even the Comitia had limits to itsendurance. During the year which followed Opimius's acquittal thereappeared before them a suppliant for their favour who had about equalclaims to the gratitude and the hatred of both sections of the people. They were the self-destructive or corroborative claims of the statesmanwho is called a convert by his friends and a renegade by his foes. Noliving man of the age had stood in a stronger political light thanCarbo. An active assistant of Tiberius Gracchus, and so embittered anopponent of Scipio Aemilianus as to be deemed the author of his death, he had severed his connection with the party of reform, probably inconsequence of the view that the extension of the franchise which hadbecome embedded in their programme was either impracticable orundesirable. He must have proved a welcome ally to the nobility in theirstruggle with Caius Gracchus, and their appreciation of his value seemsproved by the fact that he was elected to the consulship in the veryyear of the tribune's fall, when the influence of the senate, andtherefore in all probability their power of controlling the elections, had been fully re-established. The debt was paid by a vigorouschampionship of the cause of Opimius, which was heard during theconsulship of Carbo. [759] The chief magistrate spoke warmly in defenceof his accused predecessor in office, and declared that the action ofOpimius in succouring his country was an act incumbent on the consul asthe recognised guardian of the State. [760] No man had greater reason tofeel secure than Carbo, who had so lately tested the suffrages of thepeople as electors and as judges; yet no man was in greater peril. Itseems that, while exposed on the side of his former associates to theimpotent rage which is excited by the success of the convert, who isbelieved to have been rewarded for his treachery, he had not won theconfidence, or at least could not arouse the whole-hearted support, ofhis new associates and their following in the assembly. Perhaps thelandlords had not forgiven the agrarian commissioner, nor the moderatesthe vehement opponent of Scipio; to the senate he had served hispurpose, and they may not have thought him serviceable enough to deservethe effort which had rescued Opimius. Carbo was, in fact, an invitingobject of attack for any young political adventurer who wished toinaugurate his career by the overthrow of a distinguished politicalvictim, and to sound a note of liberalism which should not grate tooharshly in the ears of men of moderate views. The assailant was LuciusCrassus, [761] destined to be the greatest orator of his day, and a youthnow burning to test his eloquence in the greatest field afforded by thepublic life of Rome, but scrupulous enough to take no unfair advantageof the object of his attack. [762] We do not know the nature of thecharge on which Carbo was arraigned. It probably came under theexpansive conception of treason, and was possibly connected with thosevery proceedings in consequence of which Opimius had been accused andacquitted. [763] That the charge was of a character that had reference torecent political events, or at least that the prosecutor felt himselfbound to maintain some distinct political principle of a liberal kind, is proved by the regret which Crassus expressed in his maturer yearsthat the impetus of youth had led him to take a step which limited hisfreedom of action for the future. [764] Some compunction may also havebeen stirred by the unexpected consequence of his attack; for Carbo, perhaps realising the animosity of his judges and the weakness orcoldness of his friends, is said to have put an end to his life bypoison. [765] Voluntary exile always lay open to the Roman who dared notface the final verdict; and the suicide of Carbo cannot be held to havebeen the sole refuge of despair; it is rather a sign of the bitternessgreater than that of death, which may fall on the soul of a man who canappeal for sympathy to none, who knows that he has been abandoned andbelieves that he has been betrayed. The hostility of his countrymenpursued him beyond the grave; the aristocratic historian could notforget the seditious tribune, and the contemporary chronicles whichmoulded and handed on the conception of Carbo's life, showed the usualincapacity of such writings to appreciate the possibility of that honestmental detachment from a suspected cause which often leads, throughgrowing dissension with past colleagues and increasing co-operation withnew, to a more violent advocacy of a new faith than is often shown byits habitual possessors. The records of the political contests which occupied the two yearssucceeding the downfall of Caius Gracchus, are sufficient to prove thatpolitical thought was not stifled, that practically any politicalviews--saving perhaps such as expressed active sympathy with the finalefforts of Caius Gracchus and his friends--might be pronounced, and thatthe nobility could only maintain its influence by bending its ear to thechatter of the streets and employing its best instruments to mould theopinion of the Forum by a judicious mixture of deference andexhortation. The senate knew itself to be as weak as ever in materialresources; government could not be maintained for ever by a series of_coups d'état_, and the only method of securing the interests of therulers was to maintain the confidence of the majority and to presumeoccasionally on its apathy or blindness. This was the attitude adoptedwith reference to the proposals which had lately been before the people. Drusus's scheme of colonisation was not withdrawn, but its execution wasindefinitely postponed, [766] and the same treatment was meted out to thesimilar proposals of Caius Gracchus. Two of his Italian colonies, Neptunia near Tarentum and Scylacium, seem actually to have survived;but this may have been due to the fact that the work of settlement hadalready commenced on these sites, and that the government did notventure to rescind any measure which had been already put intoexecution. It was indeed possible to stifle the settlement on the siteof Carthage, for here the superstition of the people supported theobjections of the senate, and the question of the abrogation of thiscolony had been raised to such magnitude by the circumstances ofGracchus's fall that to withdraw would have been a sign of weakness. Buteven this objectionable settlement in Africa gave proof of the scruplesof the senate in dealing with an accomplished fact. When the Rubrian lawwas repealed, it was decided not to take from the _coloni_ the landswhich had already been assigned; no religious pretext could be given fortheir disturbance, for the land of Carthage was not under the ban thatdoomed the city to desolation; and the colonists remained in possessionof allotments, which were free from tribute, were held as privateproperty, and furnished one of the earliest examples of a Roman tenureof land on provincial soil. [767] The assignment was by the nature of thecase changed from that of the colonial to that of the purely agrariantype; the settlers were members of Rome alone and had no localcitizenship, although it is probable that some modest type of urbansettlement did grow up outside the ruined walls of Carthage to satisfythe most necessary requirements of the surrounding residents. The benefits conferred by the Gracchi on the poorer members of theproletariate were also respected. The corn law may have been leftuntouched for the time being[768]--a natural concession, for the senatecould only hope to rule by its influence with the urban mob, and, in thecase of so simple an institution, any modification would have been sopatent an infringement of the rights of the recipients as to haveimmediately excited suspicion and anger. With the agrarian law it wasdifferent. Its repeal was indeed impossible; but the land-hunger of thedispossessed capitalists might to some extent be appeased by a measurethat was not only tolerable, but welcome; and modifications, so gradualand subtle that their meaning would be unintelligible to the masses, might subsequently be introduced to remedy observed defects, to calm theapprehensions of the allies, and perhaps to secure the continuance oflarge holdings, if economic causes should lead to their revival. Theagrarian legislation of the ten years that followed the fall of CaiusGracchus, seems to have been guided by the wishes of the senate; butmuch of it does not bear on its surface the signs which we might expectof capitalistic influence or oligarchic neglect of the poor. Largeportions of it seem rather to reveal the desire of banishing for ever aharrowing question which was the opportunity of the demagogue; and thepeculiar mixture of prudence, liberality, and selfishness which thislegislation reveals, can only be appreciated by an examination of itsseparate stages. Shortly after the death of Caius Gracchus--perhaps in the very year ofhis fall--a law was passed permitting the alienation of theallotments. [769] This measure must have been as welcome to the latelyestablished possessors as it was to the large proprietors; it removedfrom the former a galling restraint which, like all such legalprohibitions, formed a sentimental rather than an actual grievance, butone that was none the less keenly felt on that account; while to thelatter it offered the opportunity of satisfying those expectations, which the initial struggles of the newly created farmers must in manycases have aroused. The natural consequence of the enactment was thatthe spurious element amongst the peasant-holders, represented by thosewhose tastes and capacities utterly unfitted them for agriculture, parted with their allotments, which went once more to swell the largedomains of their wealthier neighbours. [770] We do not know the extent orrapidity of this change, or the stage which it had reached when thegovernment thought fit to introduce a new agrarian law, which may havebeen two or three years later than the enactment which permittedalienation. [771] The new measure contained three importantprovisions. [772] Firstly, it forbade the further distribution of publicland, and thus put an end to the agrarian commission which had neverceased to exist, and had continued to enjoy, if not to exercise, itsfull powers since the restoration of its judicial functions by CaiusGracchus. We cannot say to what extent the commission was stillEncountering claims on its jurisdiction and powers of distribution atthe time of its disappearance; but fourteen years is a long term ofpower for such an extraordinary office, whose work was necessarily oneof perpetual unsettlement; and the disappearance of the triumvirs musthave been welcome, not only to the existing Roman occupants of landwhich still remained public, but to those of the Italians to whom thecommission had ever been a source of apprehension. The extinction of theoffice must have been regarded with indifference by those for whom thecommission had already provided, and by the large mass of the urbanproletariate which did not desire this type of provision. The residuumof citizens which still craved land may be conceived to have been small, for eagerness to become an agriculturist would have suggested an earlierclaim; and the passing of the commission was probably viewed with noregret by any large section of the community. The law then proceeded toestablish the rights of all the occupants of land in Italy that had oncebeen public and had been dealt with by the commission. To all existingoccupants of the land which had been assigned, perfect security oftenure was given, and this security may have been extended now, as itcertainly was later, to many of the occupants who still remained onpublic land which had not been subjected to distribution. So far as theland which had been assigned was concerned, this law could have made nospecification as to the size of the allotments, for the law permittingalienation had made it practically private property and given itspurchaser a perfectly secure title. Hence the accumulations whichfollowed the permit to alienate were secured to their existingpossessors, and a legal recognition was given to the formation of suchlarge estates as had come into existence during the last three years. But the security of tenure was conditioned by the reimposition of thedues payable to the State, which had been abolished by Drusus. We arenot informed whether these dues were to be henceforth paid only by thosewho had received allotments from the land commission, or by all in whosehands such allotments were at the moment to be found; perhaps theintention was to impose them on all lands that had been public beforethe tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus; although many of the largerproprietors, who had recently added to their holdings, might have urgedin their defence that they had acquired the land as private property andthat it was burdened by no dues at the time of its acquisition. But, even if this burden fell mainly on the class of smaller possessors, itcould scarcely be regarded as a grievance, for it had formed part of theGracchan scheme, and there was no legitimate reason why the newlyestablished class of cultivators should be placed in a better positionthan the older occupants of the public domain, who still paid dues bothon arable land and for the privilege of pasturing their flocks. Thetemporary motive which had led to their abolition had now ceased toexist, for the agricultural colonies of Drusus, who had promised landfree from all taxes, had not been established, and the chief, almost thesole, example of a recent assignment on such liberal principles was tobe discovered in distant Africa. But, even if the cultivators grumbled, their complaints were not dangerous to the government. They would havefound no echo at Rome, where the urban proletariate was content with theeasier provision which had been made for its support; and the newrevenues from the public land were made still more acceptable to theeyes of the masses by the provision contained in this agrarian law thatthey should be employed solely for the benefit of needier citizens. Theprecise nature of the promised employment is unhappily unknown, ourauthority merely informing us that "they were to be used for purposes ofdistribution". We cannot understand by these words free gifts either inmoney or corn; for such extreme measures never entered even into thesocial ideals of Caius Gracchus, and the senate to its credit neverdeigned to purchase popularity through the pauperising institutions bywhich the Caesars maintained the security of their rule in Rome. Thewords might imply an extension of the system of the sale of cheap corn, or a cheapening of the rates at which it was supplied; but the Gracchansystem seems hardly to have admitted of extension, so far as the numberof recipients was concerned, and cheaper sales would hardly have beenencouraged by a government, which, anxious as it was to securepopularity, was responsible for the financial administration of theState and looked with an anxious eye upon the existing drain on theresources of the treasury. [773] Perhaps the new revenues were held up tothe people as a guarantee that the sale of cheap corn would becontinued, and public confidence was increased when it was pointed outthat there was a special fund available for the purpose. If we abandonthe view that the promised employment of the revenues in the interest ofthe people referred to the distribution of corn, there remains thepossibility that it had reference to the acquisition of fresh land forassignation. This promise would indeed have rendered practicable thepartial realisation of the shadowy schemes of Drusus, which had neverbeen officially withdrawn; but it is doubtful whether it would have donemuch to strengthen the hold of the government upon the urban voter; forthe whole scheme of this new land law seems to prove that the agrarianquestion was viewed with indifference, and no pressure seems to havebeen put on the government to carry their earlier promises into effect. Apart from the welcome prospect implied in the abolition of the agrariancommission, no positive guarantee against disturbance had yet been givento the Latins and Italians. This was formally granted, in terms unknownto us, at the appropriate hands of Marcus Livius Drusus during histenure of the consulship. [774] The senate, now that it had satisfied thelarger proprietors and the urban proletariate, and could boast that ithad at least not injured the smaller cultivators, completed its work ofpacification by holding out the hand of fellowship to the allies. It wastacitly understood that the new friend was not to ask for more, but hemight be induced to look to the senate as his refuge against therapacity of the mob and the recklessness of its leaders. Shortly afterwards the tribune Spurius Thorius[775] carried a law whichagain abolished the _vectigal_ on the allotments. If we regard thismeasure as an independent effort on the part of the tribune, it may havebeen an answer to the protests of the smaller agriculturists stillstruggling for existence; if it was dictated by the senate, it may havebeen due to the absorption of the allotments by the larger proprietorsand their unwillingness to pay dues for land which they had added totheir private property. But, to whatever party we may assign it, we maysee in it also the desire to reach a final settlement of the agrarianquestion by abolishing all the invidious distinctions between thedifferent tenures of land which had once formed part of the publicdomain. It removed the injustice of burdening the small holding with arent which was not exacted from estates that had been partly formed byaccretions of such allotments; and by the abolition of all dues[776] ittended to remove all land which had been assigned, from the doubtfulcategory to which it had hitherto belonged of possessions which, thoughin a sense private, still recognised the overlordship of the State, andto revive in all its old sharpness the simple distinction between publicand private land. This tendency makes it probable that the law ofThorius is identical with one of which we possess considerablefragments; for this partially preserved enactment is certainly assweeping a measure as could have been devised by any one eager to seethe agrarian question, so far as it affected Italian soil, finallyremoved from the region of political strife. Internal evidence makes it probable that this law was passed in the year111 B. C. , [777] and consequently at the close of that period ofcomparative quiescence which was immediately followed by the politicalstorm raised by the conduct of the war in Numidia. It may, therefore, beregarded as a product of senatorial enlightenment, although itsprovisions would be quite as consistent with the views of a tolerablysober democrat. The main scope of the enactment is to give the characterof absolute private ownership, unburdened by any restrictions such asthe payment of dues to the State, to nearly all the land which had beenpublic at the time of the passing of the agrarian law of TiberiusGracchus. The first provisions refer to lands which had not been dealtwith by the agrarian commissioners. Any occupant of the public domain, who has been allowed to preserve his allotment intact, because it doesnot exceed the limit fixed by the earlier laws, and any one who hasreceived public land from the State in exchange for a freehold which hehas surrendered for the foundation of a colony, is henceforth to holdsuch portions of the public domain as his private property. The sameprovision holds for all land that has been assigned, whether by colonialor agrarian commissioners. The first class of assignments are thoseincidental to the one or two colonies of Caius Gracchus, and perhaps ofDrusus, that were actually established in Italy. Even at the time ofsettlement such land must have been made the private property of itsholders; and this law, therefore, but confirms the tenure, and impliesthe validity of the act of colonisation. Such land is mentioned ashaving been "given and assigned in accordance with a resolution of thepeople and the plebs, " and all eases in which recent colonial laws hadbeen repealed or dropped--cases which would include Caius Gracchus'sthreatened partition of the Campanian territory--are tacitly excluded. The second class of assignments refer to those made by theland-commissioners during the whole period of their chequered existence, and the land whose private character is thus confirmed, must havecovered much the larger part of what had once been the State's domainin Italy. A certain portion of this domain still remains, however, the property ofthe State and is not converted into private land. The whole of the soilwhich had been given in usufruct to colonies and municipal towns, isretained in its existing condition; the holders, whether Latin colonistsor Roman citizens, are confirmed in their possessions; but, as the landstill remains public, they are doubtless expected to continue to paytheir quit-rent to the State. Similar provision is made for a peculiarclass of land, which had been given by Rome as security for a nationaldebt. The debt had never been liquidated, probably because the creditorspreferred the land. This they were now to retain on condition ofcontinued payment of the quit-rent, which marked the fact that the Statewas still its nominal owner. A public character is also maintained forland which had been assigned for the maintenance of roads. Here we findthe only instance of an actual assignation of the Gracchan commissionerswhich was not converted, into private property; the obvious reason forthis exception being that these occupants performed a specific andnecessary duty, which would disappear if their tenure was converted intoabsolute ownership. Exception against ownership was also made for thosecommons on which the occupants of surrounding farms had an exclusiveright of sending their flocks to pasture;[778] for the conversion ofsuch grazing land into private lots would have injured the collectiveinterests, and conferred little benefit on the individuals of thegroup. [779] The remaining classes of land which still remain theproperty of the State, are the roads of Italy, such public land as hadbeen specially exempted from distribution by the legislation of theGracchi, and such as had remained public on other grounds. The onlyknown instance of the first class is the Campanian territory, whichcontinued to be let on leases by the State and to bring to the treasurya sure and considerable revenue; the second class was probablyrepresented by land which was not arable and had for this reason escapeddistribution. The law provides that it is not to be occupied but toserve the purposes of grazing-land, and a limit is fixed to the numberof cattle and sheep belonging to a single owner to which it is to affordfree pasturage. For the enjoyment of grazing-rights beyond this limitdues are to be paid to the contractors who have purchased the right ofcollection from the State. The law then quits the public domains of Italy for those of Africa andCorinth, partly for the purpose of specifying with exactitude the rightsof the various occupiers and tenants who were settled on theterritories, but chiefly with the object of effecting the sale of someof the public domain in the province of Africa and the dependency ofAchaea. This intention of alienation is perhaps the chief reason why thegreat varieties of tenure of the African soil are marshalled before uswith such detail and precision; for it was necessary, in view of thecontemplated sale, to re-assert the stability of rights that should besecure by their very nature or had been guaranteed by solemn compact. But the occasion of a comprehensive settlement of the agrarian questionin Italy was no doubt gladly seized as affording the right opportunityfor surveying, revising, and establishing the claims of those who werein enjoyment of what was, or had been, the provincial domain of Romeacross the seas. The rights of Roman citizens and subjects areindifferently considered, and amongst the former those of the settlerswho had journeyed to Africa in accordance with the promises of theRubrian law are fully recognised. The degree of permanence accorded tothe manifold kinds of tenure passed in review can not be determined fromour text; but, even when all claims that deserved a permanentrecognition had been subtracted, there still remained a residuum ofland, leased at quinquennial intervals by the censors, which might bealienated without the infliction of injury on established rights. We donot know to what extent this sale, the mechanism for which was minutelyprovided for in the law, was carried in Africa; its application to thedomain land of Corinth was either withdrawn or, if carried out, was butslight or temporary; for Corinthian land remained to be threatened bylater agrarian legislation. It is not easy to suggest a motive for thissale; for it would seem a short-sighted policy to part, on an extensivescale and therefore presumably at a cheapened rate, with some of themost productive land in the world, such as was the African domain of theperiod, in order to recoup the treasury for the immediate pecuniaryinjury which it was suffering in the loss of the revenues from thepublic land of Italy. Perhaps the government had grown suspicious of theoperations of the middle-men, and, since they had restricted theiractivity by limiting the amount of public land in Italy, deemed asimilar policy advisable in relation to some of their foreigndependencies. The length at which we have dwelt on this law is proportionate to itsimportance in the political history of the times, and if we possessedfuller knowledge of its effects, we should doubtless be able to add, intheir social history as well. Its economic results, however, areexceedingly obscure, and possibly it produced none worthy of seriousconsideration; for the artificial stability which it may have seemed togive to the existing tenure of land could in no way check the play ofeconomic forces. If these tendencies were still in favour of largeholdings, [780] the process of accumulation must have continued, and, aswe have before remarked, the accumulator was in a securer position whenpurchasing land which was admittedly the private property of its owner, than when buying allotments which might be held to be still liable tothe public dues. On the other hand, the remission of the impost musthave relieved, and the sense of private ownership inspired, the laboursof the smaller proprietors; and the perpetuation of a considerableproportion of the Gracchan settlers is probable on general grounds. Thereason why it is difficult to give specific reasons for this belief isthat, at the time when we next begin to get glimpses of the condition ofthe Italian peasant class, the great reform had been effected whichincorporated the nations of Italy into Rome. The existence of numeroussmall proprietors in the Ciceronian period is attested, but many ofthese may have been citizens recently given to Rome by the Italianstocks, amongst whom agriculture on a small scale had neverbecome extinct. But the political import of this measure is considerable. By restrictingto narrow limits all the land of Italy to which the State could make aclaim, it altered the character of agrarian agitation for the future. Itdid not indeed fulfil its possible object of obviating such measures;but it rendered the vested interests of all Italian cultivators secure, with the exception of the lessees of the leased domain, who perhaps hadno claim to permanence of tenure. This domain was represented chiefly bythe Campanian land: and the reformer who would make this territory hisprey, injured the finances of the State more than the interests of theindividual. If he desired more, he must seek it either in the foreigndomains of Rome or by the adoption of some scheme of land purchase. Assignment of lands in particular districts of Italy or in the provincesnaturally took the form of colonisation, and this is the favourite shapeassumed by the agrarian schemes of the future. Rome was still to witnessmany fierce controversies as to the merits of the policy of colonialexpansion, and as to the wisdom of employing public property and publicrevenues to this end; the rights of the conqueror to the lands of hisvanquished fellow-citizens were also to be cruelly asserted, and thecivil wars also invited a species of brigandage for the attainment ofpossession which too often replaced the judgments of the courts; butnever again do we find a regular political warfare waged between therich and the poor for the possession of territories to which each of thedisputants laid claim. The storm which had burst on the Roman world withthe land law of Tiberius Gracchus had now spent its force. It hadundoubtedly produced a great change on the face of Italy; but this wasperhaps more striking in appearance than in reality; neither the work ofdemolition, nor the opportunities offered for renewal, attained thecompleteness which they had presented in the reformer's dreams. But the peace of the citizen body was not the only blessing believed tobe secured by this removal of a temptation to tamper with Italian lands. The anxieties of the Latins and Italians were also quieted, although itmay be questioned whether the memory of past wrongs, now renderedirrevocable by the progress of recent agrarian experiments, did notenter into the agitation for the conferment of the franchise, which theystill continued to sustain. The last great law, following the spirit ofthe enactment of Drusus which had preceded it by about a year, doesindeed show traces of an anxiety to respect Italian claims. Apart fromthe fact, which we have already mentioned, that all lands which had beengranted in usufruct to colonists, were still to be public and were, therefore, in the case of Latin colonies, to be at the disposal of thecommunities to which they had been granted by treaty, the law contains aspecial provision for the maintenance of the rights of Latins andItalians, so far as they are in harmony with the rights allowed to Romancitizens by the enactment. [781] The guarantees which had been sanctionedby Drusus, were therefore respected; but their observance wasconditioned by the rule that all prohibitions now created for Romansshould be extended to the allies. As we do not know the purport ofDrusus's measure, or the practices current on the Roman domains occupiedby Latins, we cannot say whether this clause produced any derogation oftheir rights; but it must have limited the right of free pasturage onthe public commons, if they had possessed this in a higher degree thanwas now permitted, and the right to occupy public land was alsoforbidden them in the future. But it was from the negative point of viewthat the law might be interpreted as creating or perpetuating agrievance; for some of the positive benefits which it conferred seem tohave been limited to Romans. The land which it makes private property, is land which has been assigned by colonial or agrarian commissioners, or land which has been occupied up to a certain limit. If colonial landhad really been assigned to Latins by Caius Gracchus, their rights areretained by this law, if they had been made Roman citizens at the timeof the settlement; but if they had been admitted as participants in theagrarian distribution throughout Italy, their rights as owners are notconfirmed with those of Roman citizens; and the Latin who merelyoccupied land was not given the privilege of the Roman possessor ofbecoming the owner of the soil, if his occupation were restricted withina certain limit. [782] He still retained merely a precarious possession, for which dues to the State were probably exacted. It was something tohave rights confirmed, but they probably appeared less valuable whenthose of others were extended. A more generous treatment could hardlyhave been expected from a law of Rome dealing with her own domain, primarily in the interests of her own citizens; but the Italians weretending to forget their civic independence, and chose rather to comparetheir personal rights with those of the Roman burgesses. Such acomparison applied to the final agrarian settlement must have donesomething to emphasise their belief in the inferiority oftheir position. This review of the legislation on social questions which was initiatedor endured by the senate, shows the tentative attitude adopted by thenobility in their dealings with the people, and proves either astatesmanlike view of the needs of the situation or the entire lack of aproud consciousness of their own immunity from attack. Even had theypossessed the power to dictate to the Comitia, they were hemmed in onanother side; for they had not dared to raise a protest against the lawof Gracchus which transferred criminal jurisdiction over the members oftheir own order to the knights. The equestrian courts sat in judgment onthe noblest members of the aristocracy; for the political or personalmotives which urged to prosecution were stronger even than thecamaraderie of the order, and governors of provinces were still indanger of indictment by their peers. Within two years of thetransference of the courts, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, known in later lifeas "the Augur" and famed for his knowledge of the civil law, returnedfrom his province of Asia to meet the accusation of Titus Albucius. [783]The knights did not begin by a vindictive exercise of their authority. Although Asia was the most favoured sphere of their activity, Scaevolawas acquitted. Seven years later they gave a stern and perhaps righteousexample of their severity in the condemnation of Caius PorciusCato. [784] The accused when consul had obtained Macedonia as hisprovince, and had waged a frontier war with the Scordisci, which endedin the annihilation of his forces and his own narrow escape from thefield of battle. His ill-success perhaps deepened the impression made byhis extortions in Macedonia, and he was sentenced to the payment of afine. Neither in the case of the acquittal nor in that of thecondemnation does political bias seem to have influenced the judgment ofthe courts, and the equestrian jurors may have seemed for a time torealise the best hopes which had inspired their creation. The attention of the leading members of the nobility was probably tooabsorbed by the problem of adapting senatorial rule to alteredcircumstances to allow them the leisure or the inclination to embark onfresh legislative projects of their own. Our record of these years is soimperfect that it would be rash to conclude that the scanty proposals onnew subjects which it reveals exhausted the legislative activity of thesenate; but had they done so, the circumstance would be intelligible;for the work that invited the attention of the senate in its owninterest, was one of consolidation rather than of reform; the politicalfeeling of the time put measures of a distinctly reactionary character, such as might have been welcomed by the more conservative members of theorder, wholly out of the question; and the government was not likely, except under compulsion, to undertake legislation of a progressive type. The only important law of the period certainly proceeding fromgovernmental circles, and dealing with a question that was novel, in thesense that it had not been heard of for a considerable number of yearsand had played no part in the Gracchan movements, was one passed by theconsul Marcus Aemilius Scaurus. It dealt with the voting power of thefreedmen, [785] and probably confirmed its restriction to the four citytribes. It is difficult to assign a political meaning to this law, as wedo not know the practice which prevailed at the time of Scaurus'sintervention; but it is probable that the restriction imposed by thecensors of 169, who had confined the freedmen to a single tribe, [786]had not been observed, that great irregularity prevailed in the mannerof their registration, and that Scaurus's measure, which was a return tothe arrangement reached at the end of the fourth century, was intendedto restrict the voting privileges of the class. This interpretation ofhis intention would seem to show that the increasing liberality of theRoman master had created a class the larger portion of which was notdependent on the wealthier and more conservative section of the citizenbody, or was at least enabled to assert its freedom from control throughthe secrecy of the ballot. The interests of the class were almostidentical with those of the free proletariate, in which the descendantsof the freedmen were merged: and the law of Scaurus, which strengthenedthe country vote by preventing this urban influence spreading throughall the tribes, may be an evidence that the senate distrusted thepresent passivity of the urban folk, and looked forward withapprehension to a time when they might have to rely on the more stableelement which the country districts supplied. We shall see in the sequelthat this anticipation of the freedmen's attitude was not unjustified, and that the increase of their voting power still continued to be aneffective battle-cry for the demagogue who was eager to increase hisfollowing in the city. Scaurus was also the author of a sumptuary law. [787] It cameappropriately from a man who had been trained in a school of poverty, and shows the willingness of the nobility to submit, at least inappearance, to the discipline which would present it to the world as aself-sacrificing administration, reaping no selfish reward for itsintense labour, and submitting to that equality of life with the averagecitizen which is the best democratic concession that a powerfuloligarchy can make. The activity of the censorship was exhibited in thesame direction. Foreign and expensive dishes were prohibited by theguardians of public morals, as they were by Scaurus's sumptuarylaw:[788] and the censors of 115, Metellus and Domitius, undertook ascrutiny of the stage which resulted in the complete exclusion from Romeof all complex forms of the histrionic art and its reduction to thesimple Latin type of music and song. [789] Their energy was alsodisplayed in a destructive examination of the morals of their own order, and as a result of the scrutiny thirty-two senators were banished fromthe Curia. [790] To guard the senate-house from scandal was indeed thenecessary policy of a nobility which knew that its precarious powerrested on the opinion of the streets; and the efforts of the censors, directed like those of their predecessors, to a regeneration which had anational type as its goal, show that that opinion could not yet havebeen considered wholly cosmopolitan or corrupt. The frequent splendourof triumphal processions, such as those which celebrated the victoriesof Domitius and Fabius over the Allobroges, of Metellus over theDalmatians, and of Scaurus over the Ligurians, [791] produced acomfortable impression of the efficiency of the government in extendingor preserving the frontiers of the empire; the triumph itself was thesymbol of success, and few could have cared to question the extent andutility of the achievement. Satisfied with the belief that they werewitnessing the average type of successful administration, the electorspursued the course, from which they so seldom deflected, of giving theirunreserved confidence to the ancient houses; and this epoch witnessed astriking instance of hereditary influence, if not of hereditary talent, when Metellus Macedonicus was borne to his grave by sons, of whom fourhad held curule office, three had possessed the consulship, and one hadfulfilled in addition the lofty functions of the censor and enjoyed thehonour of a triumph. [792] Yet distinction without a certain degree of fitness was now, as at everyother time, an impossibility in Rome. The nobility, although it did notlove originality, extended a helping hand to the capacity that waswilling to support its cause and showed the likelihood of dignifying itsadministration; a career was still open to talent and address, if theywere held to be wisely directed; and the man of the period who bestdeserves the title of leader of the State, was one who had not evensprung from the second strata of Roman society, but had struggled with apoverty which would have condemned an ordinary man to devote suchleisure as he could spare for politics to swelling the babel of theForum and the streets. It is true that Marcus Aemilius Scaurus bore apatrician name, and was one of those potential kings who, once in thesenate, might assume the royal foot-gear and continue the holy task, which they had performed from the time of Romulus, of guarding andtransmitting the auspices of the Roman people. But the splendour of thename had long been dimmed. Even in the history of the great wars of thebeginning of the century but one Aemilius Scaurus appears, and he holdsbut a subordinate command as an officer of the Roman fleet. The fatherof the future chief of the senate had been forced to seek a livelihoodin the humble calling of a purveyor of charcoal. [793] The son, resolute, ambitious and conscious of great powers, long debated with himself thequestion of his future walk in life. [794] He might remain in the ranksof the business world, supply money to customers in place of coal, andseize the golden opportunities which were being presented by theextension of the banking industry in the provincial world. Had he chosenthis path, Scaurus might have been the chief of the knights and the mostresolute champion of equestrian claims against the government. But hiscourse was decided by the afterthought that the power of words wasgreater than that of gold, and that eloquence might secure, not onlywealth, but the influence which wealth alone cannot attain. The famewhich he gained in the Forum led inevitably to service in the field. Hereaped distinction in the Spanish campaigns and served under Orestes inSardinia. His narrow means rather than his principles may have been thereason why his aedileship was not marked by the generous shows to whichthe people were accustomed and by which their favour was usuallypurchased; in Scaurus's tenure of that office splendour was replaced bya rigorous performance of judicial duties;[795] but that such anequivalent could serve his purpose, that it should be even no hindranceto his career, proves the respect that his strenuous character had wonfrom the people, and the anticipation formed by the government of thevalue of his future services. Now, when he was nearing his fiftiethyear, he had secured the consulship, the bourne of most successfulcareers, but not to be the last or greatest prize of a man whose statelypresence, unbending dignity, and apparent simplicity of purpose, couldgenerally awe the people into respect, and whose keenness of vision andtalent for intrigue impressed the senatorial mind with a sense of hispower to save, when claims were pressing and difficulties acute. [796]His consulship, though without brilliancy, added to the respectablelaurels that he had already attained. A successful raid on some Illyriantribes[797] showed at least that he had retained the physical enduranceof his youth; while his legislation on sumptuary matters and thefreedman's vote showed the spirit of a milder Cato, and the moderateconservatism, not distasteful to the Roman of pure blood, which wouldpreserve the preponderance in political power to the citizen untaintedby the stain of servitude. A stormy event of his period of office gavethe crowd an opportunity of seeing the severity with which a magistrateof the older school could avenge an affront to the dignity of hisoffice. Publius Decius, who was believed to be a conscious imitator ofFulvius Flaccus in the exaggerated vehemence of his oratory, and who hadalready proved by his prosecution of Opimius that he was ready to defendcertain features of the Gracchan cause even when such championship wasfraught with danger, was in possession of the urban praetorship at thetime when Scaurus held the consulship. One day the consul passed theopen court of justice when the praetor was giving judgment from thecurule chair. Decius remained seated, either in feigned oblivion or inostentatious disregard of the presence of his superior. The politicwrath of Scaurus was aroused; an enemy had been delivered into hishands, and the people might be given an object-lesson of the way inwhich the most vehement champion of popular rights was, even whencovered with the dignity of a magistracy, but a straw in the iron graspof the higher Imperium. The consul ordered Decius to rise, his officialrobe to be rent, the chair of justice to be shattered in pieces, andpublished a warning that no future litigant should resort to the courtof the contumacious praetor. [798] The vulgar mind is impressed, when itis not angered, by such scenes of violence. A repute for sternness isthe best cloak for the flexibility which, if revealed, would excitesuspicion. Scaurus to the popular mind was an embodiment of stiffpatrician dignity, perhaps happily devoid of that touch of insolencewhich is often the mark of a career assured without a struggle; of aself-complacent dignity, quietly conscious of its own deserts anddemanding their due reward, of the calmness of a soul that is abovesuspicion and refuses to admit even in its inmost sanctuary the thoughtthat its motives can be impugned. Meanwhile certain disrespectfulonlookers were expressing wonder at his mysteriously growing wealth andmarvelling as to its source. But, marvel as they might, they never droveScaurus to the necessity of an explanation. We shall find him as an oldman repelling all attacks by the irresistible appeal to his services andhis career. The condemnation of Scaurus appealed to the conservative asa blow struck at the dignity of the State itself; to the man of a moreopen mind it was at least the shattering of a delightful illusion. The period which witnessed the crowning of the efforts of the poor andstruggling patrician was also sufficiently liberal, or sufficiently poorin aristocratic talent, to admit the initial steps in the officialcareer of a genuine son of the people. It was now that Caius Marius waslaboriously climbing the grades of curule rank, and showing in thepursuit of political influence at home the rugged determination whichhad already distinguished him in the field. A Volscian by descent, hebelonged to Rome through the accident of birth in the old municipalityof Arpinum, which since the early part of the second century had enjoyedfull Roman citizenship and therefore gave its citizens the right ofsuffrage and of honours in the capital. Born of good yeoman stock in thevillage of Cereatae in the Arpinate territory, [799] he had passed aboyhood which derived no polish from the refinements, and no taint fromthe corruptions, of city life. In his case there was no puzzlingdiscrepancy between the outer and the inner man. His frame and visagewere the true index of a mind, somewhat unhewn and uncouth, but with amassive reserve of strength, a persistence not blindly obstinate, apatience that could wear out the most brilliant efforts of his rivalsand opponents. He did not court hostility, but simply shouldered his waysturdily to the front, encouraged by Rome's better spirits, who saw inhim the excellent officer with qualities that might make the futuregeneral, and appealing to the people, when they gradually becamefamiliar with his presence, as a type of that venerable myth, the rusticstatesman of the past. The poverty of his early lot was perhapsexaggerated by historians[800] who wished to point the contrast betweenhis humble origin and his later glory, and to find a suitable cradle forhis rugged nature; even the initial stages of his career afford noevidence of a struggle against pressing want, nor is there any proofthat he was supported by the bounty of his powerful friends. Even if heentered the army as a common foot-soldier, he would merely have sharedthe lot of many a well-to-do yeoman who obeyed the call of theconscription. With Marius, however, military service was not to be anincident, but a profession. The needs of a widening empire were callingfor special capacities such as had never been demanded in the past. Thecareer of Scaurus had shown the successful pleader surmounting theobstacle of poverty; even the higher barrier of birth might be leapedamidst the democratising influences of the camp. The nobility was notsufficiently self-centred to be wholly blind to its own interests; andit was easier to patronise a soldier than a pleader. In the latter casethe aspirant's political creed must be examined; in the former the lastquestion that would be asked was whether the officer possessed anypolitical creed at all. It might be a question of importance for thefuture with respect to the candidature for those offices which aloneconferred high military command, even though there was as yet no dreamof the sword becoming the arbiter of political life; but the genuinecommander, engaged in the difficult task of remodelling an army, had noeye but for the bearing and qualities of the soldier, and would notscruple to cast aside his patrician prejudices in a despairing effort tofind the fittest instruments for the perfecting of his great design. Itwas Marius's fortunate lot to enter the field at a time of trial, and toserve his first campaign under a general, who was combating the adverseforces of influence, licence and incompetence in the official staffsupplied by the government and represented by the young scions of thenobility. To the camp before Numantia, where Scipio was scourging hismen into obedience, rooting out the amenities of life, and astonishinghis officers with new ideas of the meaning of a campaign, Marius broughtthe very qualities on which the general had set his heart. Anunflinching courage, shown on one occasion in single combat when heoverthrew a champion of the foe, a power of physical endurance whichcould submit to all changes of temperature and food, a minute precisionin the performance of the detailed duties of the camp, soon led to hisrapid advancement and to his selection as a member of the intimatecircle which surrounded the commander-in-chief. Every great specialisthas a small claim to the gift of prophecy; for he possesses an instinctwhich reveals more than his reason will permit him to prove; and we neednot wonder at the story that, when once the debate grew warm roundScipio's table as to who would succeed him as the chosen commander ofthe Roman host, he lightly touched the shoulder of Marius and answered"Perhaps we shall find him here". [801] The higher commands in the army could be sought only through a politicalcareer; and Marius, inspired with the highest hopes by Scipio'scommendation, was forced to breathe the uncongenial atmosphere of thecity and to fight his way upwards to the curule offices. There is noproof that he took advantage of the current of democratic feeling whichaccompanied the movements of the Gracchi. It was, perhaps, as well thathe did not; for such an association might have long delayed his higherpolitical career. The nobles who posed as democrats probably attachedmore importance to forensic skill than to military merit; and thesupport which Marius enjoyed was sought and found amongst therepresentatives of the opposite party. Scipio's death removed a man whomight have been a powerful advocate on his behalf; the vaguerelationship of clientship in which the family of Marius had stood tothe clan of the Herennii[802]--a relation common between Roman familiesand the members of Italian townships, and in this case probably datingfrom a time before Arpinum had received full Roman rights--seems neverto have led to active interference on his behalf on the part of therepresentatives of that ancient Samnite house. Perhaps the Herennii weretoo weak to assist the fortunes of their client; they certainly give nonames to the Fasti of this period. It is also possible that the proudsoldier was galled by the memory of the hereditary yoke, and soughtassistance where it would be given simply as a mark of merit, not as aduty conditioned by the claim to irksome reciprocal obligations. Theall-powerful family of the Caecilii Metelli, who were at this timevigorously fulfilling the destiny of office which heaven had prescribedfor their clan, stretched out a helping hand to the distinguishedsoldier;[803] a family born to military command might consult itsinterests, while it gratified its sympathies, by attaching to its_clientèle_ a warrior who had received the best training of the schoolof Africanus. After he had held the military tribunate and thequaestorship, [804] Marius attained the tribunate of the Plebs with theassistance of Lucius Caecilius Metellus. [805] He was in his thirty-ninthyear when he entered on the first office which gave him the opportunityof claiming the attention of the people by the initiation of legislativemeasures. The slowness of his rise may have led him to believe that hemight accelerate his career by taking his fortune into his own hands;certainly if the law which bore his name was not unwelcome to the betterportion of the nobility, the methods by which he forced it through didnot commend themselves even to his patron. His proposal was meant tolimit the exercise of undue influence at the Comitia, and although thelaw doubtless referred to legislative meetings summoned for everypurpose, it was chiefly directed to securing the independence of thevoter in such public trials as still took place before the people, [806]and was perhaps inspired by scenes that might have been witnessed at theacquittal of Opimius one year previously. One of the clauses of the billprovided that the exits to the galleries, through which the voters filedto give their suffrages to the tellers, should be narrowed, [807] theobject being to exclude the political agents who were accustomed tooccupy the sides of the passages, and influence or intimidate, by theirpresence if not by their words, the voting citizen at the criticalmoment when he was about to record his verdict. Such methods wereprobably found effective even where the ballot was used, but theirsuccess must have been even greater in trials for treason, at whichvoting by word of mouth was still employed. It was difficult for agovernment, which had accepted the ballot, to offer a decent resistanceto a measure of this kind. The proposal attacked indifferently politicalmethods which might be, and probably were, employed by both parties;and, although its success would no doubt inflict more injury on thegovernment than on the opposition, it could not be repudiated by thesenate on the ground that it was tainted by an aggressively "popular"character. The opposition which it actually encountered was apparentlybased on the formal ground that the heads of the administration had notbeen sufficiently consulted. The law was not the outcome of anysenatorial decree, nor had the senate's opinion been deliberately takenon the utility of the measure. The consul Cotta persuaded the house toframe a resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the proposal as itstood, and to summon Marius for an explanation. The summons was promptlyobeyed, but the expected scene of humiliation of the untried parvenu wasrudely interrupted at an early period of the debate. Marius knew that hehad the people and the tribunician college with him, and that even themost perverse ingenuity could never construe the measure as a factiousopposition to the interests of the State. Obedience to the senate wouldin this instance mean the sacrifice of a reputation for politicalhonesty and courage; it might be better to burn his boats and to trustfor the future to the generosity of the people for the gifts which thenobility so grudgingly bestowed. He chose to regard the controversy asone of those cases of hopeless conflict between the members of themagistracy, for the solution of which the law had provided regularthough exceptional means. He fell back on the majesty of the tribunicianpower, and threatened Cotta with imprisonment if he did not withdraw hisresolution. [808] It is probable that up to this point no decreeexpressing wholesale condemnation of the bill had been passed, and thesenate might therefore be coerced through the magistrate, without itsauthority being utterly disregarded. Cotta turned to his colleagueMetellus, known to be the friend of the obstinate tribune, and Metellusrising gave the consul his support. Marius, undaunted by the attitude ofhis patron, hurried matters to a close. He summoned his attendant to theCuria, and bade him take Metellus himself into custody and conduct himto a place of confinement. Metellus appealed to the other tribunes, butnone would offer his help; and the senate was forced to save thesituation by sacrificing its vote of censure. So rapid and complete avictory, even on an issue of no great importance, delighted the popularmind. The senate was then in good favour at Rome; but a chance forrealising their superiority over the greatest of their servants wasalways welcome to the people. They also loved those exhibitions ofphysical force by which the genius of Rome had solved the difficultiesof her constitution: and the violence of a tribune was as impressive nowas was that of a consul four years later. Marius had gained a characterfor sturdy independence and unshaken constancy, which was to produceunexpected results in the political world of the future, and was to beimmediately tested in a manner that must have proved profoundlydisappointing to many who acclaimed him. It seems as though this victoryover the resolution of the senate may have urged certain would-bereformers to believe that measures of a Gracchan type might win thefavour of the people, and secure the support of a tribunician collegewhich seemed to be out of sympathy with the government. Some proposaldealing with the distribution of corn, [809] perhaps an extension of theexisting scheme, was made. It found no more resolute opponent thanMarius, and his opposition helped to secure its utter defeat. In thisresistance we may perhaps see the genuinely neutral character of theman; for the attribution of interested motives, although the historian'sfavourite revenge for the difficulties of his task, endows hischaracters with a foresight which is as abnormal as their lack ofprinciple; although it is questionable whether Marius would have gainedby identifying himself with a cause which had not yet emerged from theruin of its failure. The lack of official support and the alienation of a section of thepeople may perhaps be traced in the successive defeats of hiscandidature for the curule and plebeian aedileships, [810] although inthe elections to these offices the attention of the people was so keenlydirected to the candidate's pecuniary means as a guarantee of theirgratification by brilliant shows, that the aedileship must have been ofall magistracies the most difficult of attainment by merit unsupportedby wealth. Even when the rejected candidate had won favour on othergrounds, the electors could salve their consciences with the reflectionthat the aedileship was no obligatory step in an official career, andthat, where merit and not money was in question, they could show theirappreciation of personal qualities in the elections to the praetorship. A year after his repulse Marius turned to the candidature for thisoffice, which conveyed the first opportunity of the tenure of anindependent military command. He was returned at the bottom of the poll, and even then had to fight hard to retain his place in the praetoriancollege. [811] A charge of undue influence was brought against the manwho had struggled successfully to preserve the purity of the Comitia, and it was pretended that a slave of one of his closest politicalassociates had been seen within the barriers mixing with the voters. That the charge was supported by powerful influences, or was generallybelieved to be correct, is perhaps shown by the conduct of the censorsof the succeeding year who expelled this associate from the senate. [812]The jurors[813] before whom the case was tried--representatives, as wemust suppose, of the equestrian order and therefore presumablyuninfluenced by senatorial hostility--were long perplexed by theconflict of evidence. During the first days of the trial it seemed asthough the doom of Marius was sealed, and his unexpected acquittal wasonly secured by the scrutiny of the tablets revealing an equality ofvotes, a condition which, according to the rules of Roman process, necessitated a favourable verdict. His praetorship, in accordance with the rules which now governed thismagistracy in consequence of the multiplication of the courts ofjustice, confined his energies to Rome. We do not know what departmentof this office he administered; but, as the charge of no departmentcould make an epoch in the career of any one but a lawyer gifted withoriginal ideas, we are not surprised to find that Marius's tenure ofthis magistracy, although creditable, did not excite any markedattention. [814] After his praetorship he obtained his first independentmilitary command in Farther Spain. Such a province had always its littleproblems of pacification to present to an energetic commander, andMarius's military talents were moderately exercised by the repression ofthe habitual brigandage of its inhabitants. [815] His tenure of a foreigncommand may have added to his wealth, for provincial government could bemade to increase the means of the most honest administrator. It wasstill more important that his tenure of the praetorship had added him tothe ranks of the official nobility. His birth was now no bar to anysocial distinction to which his simple and resolute soul might think itprofitable to aspire: and a family of the patrician Julii was notashamed to give one of its daughters to the adventurer fromArpinum. [816] Thus Marius remained for a while; to Roman society aninteresting specimen of the self-made man, marked by a bluntness anddirectness appropriate to the type and provocative of an amused regard;to the professed politician a man with a fairly successful but puzzlingpolitical career, and one that perhaps needed not to be too seriouslyconsidered. For to all who understood the existent conditions of Romanpublic life, his attainment of the consulship and of a dominant positionin the councils of the State must have seemed impossible. There was butone contingency that could make Marius a necessary man. This was war ona grand scale. But the contingency was distant, and, even if it arose, the government might employ his skill while keeping him in asubordinate position. The career of Marius is not the only proof that the tradition ofsuccessful opposition to the senate could be easily revived. In the yearfollowing his tribunate a new and successful effort was made in thedirection of transmarine colonisation. [817] The pretext for the measurewas the necessity for preserving command of the territory which had beenwon by the great victories of Domitius and Fabius on the farther side ofthe Alps; the strategic value of the foundation was undeniable, and theopposition of the government was probably directed by the form which itwas proposed that the new settlement should take. It was not to be amere fort in the enemy's country, like the already-established AquaeSextiae, [818] but a true _colonia_ of Roman citizens, [819] the creationof which was certain to lead to excessive complications in the foreignpolicy which dealt with the frontiers of the north. Such a colony wouldbecome the centre of an active trade with the surrounding tribes; thoughprofessedly founded in the people's interest, it would rapidly become amere feeler for extending the operations of the great mercantile class;the growth of Roman trade-interests would necessarily involve a policyof defence and probably of expansion, which would tell heavily on theresources of the State. The success of the government was dependent onthe restriction of its efforts, and there is nothing surprising in thehearty opposition which it offered to the projected colony of NarboMartius. Even after the original measure sanctioning the settlement hadpassed the Comitia, senatorial influence led to the promulgation of anew proposal in which the people was asked to reconsider itsdecision. [820] But the project had found an ardent champion in the youngLucius Crassus, who strengthened the position which he had won in theprevious year, by a speech weighty beyond the promise of his age. [821]In his successful advocacy of a national undertaking he was not afraidto impugn the authority of the senate, and reaped an immediate reward inbeing selected, despite his youth, as one of the commissioners forestablishing the settlement. [822] It is probable that without the support of the equestrian order theproject for the foundation of Narbo Martius might have fallen through. The man of popular sympathies whose measures attracted their support wastolerably certain of success, and the man who posed as the champion ofthe order was still more firmly placed. The latter position was occupiedfor a considerable time by Caius Servilius Glaucia, whose tribunateprobably belongs to the close of the period which we aredescribing. [823] Glaucia himself, probably one of those scions of thenobility whom an original bent of mind had alienated from the narrowinterests of his order, was a man who, lacking in the gift of passionatebut steadfast seriousness which makes the great reformer, possessedpowers admirably adapted for holding the popular ear and inspiring hisauditors with a kind of robust confidence in himself. Ready, acute andwitty, [824] he possessed the happy faculty of taking the Comitia, underthe guise of the plain and honest man, into his confidence. The veryignorance of his auditors became a respectable attribute, when it wasfigured as ingenuous simplicity which needed protection against thetortuous wiles of the legislator and the official draughtsman. On oneoccasion he told his audience that the essence of a law was itspreamble. If, when read to them, it was found to contain the words"dictator, consul, praetor or magister equitum, " the bill was no concernof theirs. But, if they caught the utterance "and whosoever after thisenactment, " then they must wake up, for some new fetter of law was beingforged to bind their limbs. [825] A man of this unconventional type wasnot likely to be popular in the senate, and the opprobrious name, whichhe subsequently bore in the Curia, [826] is a proof of the livelinesswhich he imparted to debate. At the time of Glaucia's tribunate some subtle movement seems to havebeen on foot for undoing the judiciary law of Caius Gracchus and oustingthe knights from their possession of the court before which senatorsmost frequently appeared. The law which dealt with the crime ofextortion by Roman officials had been frequently renewed, and, whenevera proposal was made for recasting the enactment with a view to effectingimprovements in procedure, the equestrian tenure of the court wasthreatened; for a new law might state qualifications for the jurorsdiffering from those which had given this department of jurisdiction tothe knights. The relief of the order was therefore great when thenecessary work of revision was undertaken by one who showed himself anardent champion of equestrian claims. [827] Glaucia's alteration inprocedure was thorough and permanent. He introduced the system of the"second hearing "--an obligatory renewal of the trial, which rendered itpossible for counsel to discuss evidence which had been already given, and for jurors to get a grasp of the mass of scattered data which hadbeen presented to their notice--[828] and he also made it possible torecover damages, not only from the chief malefactor, but from all whohad dishonestly shared his spoils. [829] These principles continued to beobserved in trials for extortion to the close of the Republic, and mayhave been the only permanent relic of Glaucia's feverish politicalcareer. But for the moment the clauses of his law which dealt with thequalifications of the jurors, were those most anxiously awaited and mostheartily acclaimed. He had stemmed a reaction and consolidated, beyondhope of alteration for a long term of years, the system of dual controlestablished by Caius Gracchus. The careers and successes of Marius, Crassus and Glaucia exhibit thespirit of unrest which broke at intervals through the apathetictolerance displayed by the people towards the rule of the nobility. These alternations of confidence and distrust find their counterpart inthe religious history of the times; but a panic springing from a beliefin the anger of the gods was even more difficult to control than thealarm excited by the attitude of the government. Such a panic knew nodistinctions of station, sex or age; it seized on citizens who carednothing for the problems of administration, it was strong in proportionto the weakness of its victims, and gathered from the dark thoughts andwild words of the imbecile the poison which infected the sober mind andassumed, from the very universality of the sickness, the guise of ahealthy effort at rooting out some deep-seated pollution from the State. The gloomy record of the religious persecutions of the past made itstill more difficult for a government, which prided itself on theretention of the ancient control of morals, which gloried in itsmonopoly of an historic priesthood that had often set its hand to thework of extirpation, to stifle such a cry. The demand for atonement wasthe voice of the conserver of Rome's moral life, of the patrioticdevotee who was striving earnestly to reclaim the waning favour of hertutelary gods. If it was further believed that the seat of thecorruption was to be found amidst the families of the nobility itself, the last barrier to resistance had been broken down, for even to seem toshield the unholy thing was to make its lurking place an object ofhorror and execration. The nerves of the people were first excited by various prodigies thathad appeared; a confirmation of their fears might have been found in theutter destruction of the army of Porcius Cato in Thrace;[830] and astrange calamity soon gave an index to the nature of the offence whichexcited the anger of the gods. When Helvius, a Roman knight, wasjourneying with his wife and daughter from Rome to Apulia, they wereenveloped in a sudden storm. The alarm of the girl urged the father toseek shelter with all speed. The horses were loosed from the vehicle, the maiden was placed on one, and the party was hastening along theroad, when suddenly there was a blinding flash and, when it had passed, the young Helvia and her horse were seen prone upon the ground. Theforce of the lightning had stripped every garment and ornament from herbody, and the dead steed lay a few paces off with its trappings rivenand scattered around it. [831] Death by a thunderbolt had always ameaning, which was sometimes hard to find; but here the gods had notleft the inquiring votary utterly in doubt. The nakedness of thestricken maiden was a riddle that the priests could read. It was amanifest sign that a virginal vow had been broken, and that some of thekeepers of the eternal fire were tainted with the sin of unchastity. Thedestruction of the horse seemed to portend that a knight would be foundto be a partner in the crime. [832] Evidence was invited and was soonforthcoming. The slave of a certain Barrus came forward and deposed tothe corruption of three of the vestal virgins, Aemilia, Licinia andMarcia. [833] He pretended that the incestuous intercourse had been oflong standing, and he named his own master amongst many other men whomhe declared to be the authors of the sacrilege. The maidens werebelieved to have added to their lovers to screen their first offence;the sacrifice of their honour became the price of silence; and theirfirst corrupters were forced to be dumb when jealousy was mastered byfear. The knowledge of the crime is believed to have been widely spreadamongst the circles of the better class, until the conspiracy of silencewas broken down by the action of a slave, [834] and all who would not bedeemed accomplices were forced to add their share to the weight of theaccusing testimony. A scandal of this magnitude called for a formal trial by the supremereligious tribunal, and towards the close of the year[835] LuciusMetellus, the chief pontiff, summoned the incriminated vestals beforethe college. Aemilia was condemned, but Licinia and Marcia wereacquitted. There was an immediate outcry; the pontiff's leniency wasseverely censured; and the anger and fear of the people emboldened atribune, Sextus Peducaeus, to propose for the first time that thesecular arm should wrest from the pontifical college the spiritualjurisdiction that it had abused. He carried a resolution that a specialcommission should be established by the people to continue theinvestigation. [836] The judges were probably Roman knights after themodel of the Gracchan jurors; the president was the terrible LuciusCassius Longinus, already known for his severity as a censor and famedfor his penetration as a criminal judge. This fatal penetration, whichhad endowed his tribunal with the nickname "the reef of theaccused, " [837] was now welcomed as a surety that the inquiry would besearching, and that the innocence which survived it would be so wellestablished that all doubt and fear would be dissolved. This commissioncondemned, not only the two vestals whom the pontiffs had acquitted, butmany of their female intermediaries as well. [838] Some of their supposedparamours must also have been convicted; amongst the accused was MarcusAntonius, who was in future days to share the realm of oratory withLucius Crassus. He was on the eve of his departure to Asia, where he wasto exercise the duties of a quaestor, when he was summoned to appearbefore the court over which Cassius presided. He might have pleaded thebenefit of his obligation to continue his official duties;[839] but hepreferred to waive his claim and face his judges. His escape wasbelieved to have been mainly due to the heroic conduct of a young slave, who, presented of his own free will to the torture, bore the anguish ofthe rack, the scourge and the fire without uttering a word that mightincriminate his master. [840] The free employment of such methods intrials for incest throws a grave doubt on the value of the judgmentwhich they elicited; and, when a court is established for the purpose ofappeasing the popular conscience, a part at least of its conduct may beeasily suspected of being preordained. Cassius's rigour in this matterwas thought excessive;[841] but, even had he and the jurors meted outnothing but the strictest justice, the memory of their sentence wouldlong have rankled in the minds of the influential families whose membersthey had condemned, and thus perpetuated the tradition of theirunnecessary severity. It may be doubted, however, whether a secularcourt was competent to inflict the horrible penalties of pontificaljurisdiction, to condemn the vestal to a living grave and her paramourto death by the scourge;[842] interdiction, and perhaps in the moreserious cases the death by strangling usually reserved for traitors, mayhave been meted out to the men, while the women may have been handedover to their relatives for execution. But even this exemplaryvisitation of the vices which lurked in the heart of the State was notdeemed sufficient to appease the gods or to quiet the popularconscience. To punish the guilty was to offer the barest satisfaction toheaven and to conscience; a fuller atonement was demanded, and theSibylline oracles, when consulted on the point, were understood toordain the cultivation of certain strange divinities by the livingsacrifice of four strangers, two of Hellenic and two of Gallicrace. [843] The accomplishment of this act must have been a severe strainon the reason and conscience of a government which sixteen years laterabsolutely prohibited the performance of human sacrifice[844] and soonmade efforts to stamp out the barbarous ritual even in its foreigndependencies. [845] Even this concession to the panic of the times couldnot be regarded as fraught with much worldly success. The gods seemedstill to retain an unkind feeling both to the city and the government. Two years later there was a return of dreadful prodigies, and a greatpart of Rome was laid waste by a terrible fire. A few months more andnews was brought from Africa which shook to its very foundations thefabric of senatorial rule. [846] CHAPTER VI The land, on which the eyes of the world were soon to be fastened, wasthe neglected protectorate which had been built up to secure thetemporary purpose of the overthrow of Carthage, and had since remainedin the undisturbed possession of the peaceful descendants of Masinissa. The fortunes of the kingdom of Numidia, so far as they affected thatkingdom itself, deserved to be neglected by its suzerain; for the powerwhich Masinissa had won by arms and diplomacy was more than sufficientto protect its own interests. The Numidia of the day formed interritorial extent one of the mightiest kingdoms of the world, andranked only second to Egypt amongst the client powers of Rome. [847] Itextended from Mauretania to Cyrenaica, [848] from the river Muluccha tothe greater Syrtis, thus touching on the west the Empire of the Moors, at that time confined to Tingitana, on the east almost penetrating toEgypt, and enjoying the best part of the fertile region which bordersthe coast of the Mediterranean. [849] For the Moroccan boundary of thekingdom--the river Muluccha or Molocath--see Göbel _Die WestküsteAfrikas im Altertum_ pp. 79, 80. From this vast tract of country Rome hadcut out for herself a small section on the north-east. In the creationof the province of Africa her moderation and forbearance must haveastonished her Numidian client; and, if Masinissa showed signs ofhesitancy in rousing himself for the destruction of Carthage, the fearsof his sons must have been immediately dispelled when they saw theslender profits which Rome meant to reap from the suppression of theirjoint rival. The Numidian kings were even allowed to keep the territorywhich had been wrested from Carthage between the Second and Third PunicWars. This comprised the region about the Tusca, which boasted not lessthan fifty towns, the district known as the Great Plains, [850] which hasbeen identified with the great basin of the Dakhla of theOulad-bon-Salem, and probably the plateau of Vaga (Bêdja) whichdominates this basin. [851] The Roman lines merely extended from theTusca (the Wäd El-Kebir) in the North, where that river flows into theMediterranean opposite the island of Thabraca (Tabarka) to Thenae(Henschir Tina) on the south-east. [852] But even the upper waters of theTusca belonged to Numidia, as did the towns of Vaga, Sicca Veneria andZama Regia. Consequently the Roman frontier must have curved eastwarduntil it reached the point where a rocky region separates the basin ofthe Bagradas (Medjerda) from the plains of the Sahel; thence it ran tothe neighbourhood of Aquae Regiae and thence, probably following theline of a ditch drawn between the two great depressions of Kairouan andEl-Gharra, to its ultimate bourne at Thenae. [853] It is clear that theRomans did not look on their province as an end desirable in itself. They had left in the hands of their Numidian friends some of the mostfertile lands, some of the richest commercial towns, situated in adistrict which they might easily have claimed. Against such annexationMasinissa could have uttered no word of legitimate protest. His kingdomhad already been almost doubled by the acquisition of the lands of hisrival Syphax, and his sons saw themselves through the aid of Rome inpossession of an artificially created kingdom, which was so entirely outof harmony with the traditions of Numidian life that it could scarcelyhave entered into the dreams of any prince of that race. But theconquering city reposed some faith in gratitude, and reposed still morein its habitual policy of caution. The province which it created wassimply a political and strategic necessity. It was intended to securethe negative object of preventing the reconstitution of the greatpolitical and commercial centre which had fallen. [854] If Carthage wasnever to rise again, a fragment of the coast-line must be kept in thehands of the possessors of its devastated site. It might have beenbetter for the peace of Africa had the Romans been a little moregrasping and had the Roman position been stronger than it was. ThePhoenicians scattered along the coast had become familiar objects to theBerber inhabitants and their kings; to the enlightened monarch they werea valuable addition to the population of any of his cities--all the morevaluable now that they were politically powerless. But with the Romanofficial and the Roman trader it was different. Here was an alien and(in spite of the restraint of the government) an encroachingcivilisation, utterly unfamiliar to the eyes of the natives, but knownto justify its lordly security by that dim background of power whichclung to the name of the paramount city of the West. The Romanpossessions were an ugly eyesore to a man who held that Africa should befor the Africans. The wise Masinissa might tolerate the spectacle, content (as, indeed, he should have been) with the power and securitywhich Rome's friendship had brought to her ally. But it remained to beseen whether his views would always be held by his own subjects or bysome less cautious or less happily placed successor of his own line. It was indeed possible that a hostile feeling of nationality might beawakened beyond the limits even of the great kingdom of Numidia. Thedesignations which the Romans employ for the natives of North Africaobscure the fact, which was recognised in later times by the Arabconquerors, of the unity of the great Berber folk. [855] Roman historiansand geographers speak of the Numidians and Mauretanians as though theywere distinct peoples; but there can be little doubt that, then asto-day, they were but two fractions of the same great race, and thateven the wild Gaetulians of the South are but representatives of theparent stock of this indigenous people. As in the case of nearly allraces which in default of historical data we are forced to callindigenous, two separate elements may be distinguished in this stock, anearlier and a later, and survivals of the original distinctions betweenthese elements were clearly discernible in many parts of NorthernAfrica; but, as the fusion between these stocks had been effected inprehistoric times, a common Berber nationality may be held to haveextended from the Atlantic almost to Egypt, at the time when the Romanswere added to the immigrant Semites and Greeks who had already sought todwell amidst its borders. The basis of this nationality is thought to befound in the aborigines of the Sahara who had gradually moved up fromthe desert to the present littoral. There they were joined by a race ofanother type who were wending their way from what is now the continentof Europe. The Saharic man was of a dark-brown colour but with no tracesof the negroid type. His European comrade was a man of fair complexionand light hair; and these curiously blended races continued to live sideby side and to form a single nation, preserving perhaps each some of itsown psychical characteristics, but speaking in common the language ofthe older Saharic stock. [856] But the two races were not uniformlydistributed over the various territories of Northern Africa. The whiterace was perhaps more in evidence in Mauretania, as it is in the Moroccoof to-day;[857] the dark race was probably most strongly representedamongst the Gaetulians of the South. There were, in short, in NorthernAfrica two zones, marked by differences of civilisation as well as ofethnic descent, which were clearly distinguished in antiquity. The firstis represented by the Afri, Numidians, and Moors, who inhabited thecoast region from East to West. These were early subjected to alieninfluences, the greatest of which, before the coming of the Roman, wasthe advent of the Semite. The second is shown by the vast aggregate oftribes which form a curve along the south from the ocean to theCyrenaica. These tribes, which were called by the common name ofGaetuli, were almost exempt from European influences in historic, andprobably in prehistoric, times. A few intermingled with the Aethiopiansof the Sahara, [858] but, taken as a whole, they are believed torepresent the primitive race of brown Saharic dwellers in allits purity. Had the term Nomad or Numidian been applied to the southern races, thedesignation might have been justified by the migratory character oftheir life. But it is more than questionable whether the designation isdefensible as applied to the people to whom it is usually attached. TheNumidians do not seem to have possessed either the character or habitsof a genuinely nomadic people such as the Arabs. [859] They lived in hutsand not in tents. These huts (_mapalia_), which had the form of anupturned boat, may have seemed a poor habitation to Phoenicians, Greeksand Romans; but, as habitations, they were meant to be permanent; theywere an index of the possession of property, of a lasting attachment tothe soil. The village formed by a group of these little homes clusteringround a steep height, was a still further index of a political andmilitary society that intended to maintain and defend the area on whichit had settled. The pages of Sallust give ample evidence of an activevillage life engrossed with the toils of agriculture, and the mass ofthe population of the region of the Tell must have been for a long timefixed to the soil which yielded it a livelihood. Elsewhere there wasindeed need of something like periodic migration. On the high plateauxpastoral life made the usual change from summer to winter stationsnecessary. But this regulated movement does not correspond strictly tothe desultory life of a truly nomadic people. Yet it is easy to see how, in contrast to the regular and often sedentary mercantile life of thePhoenician and the Greek, that of the Numidian might be considered wildand migratory. He was in truth a "trekker" rather than a nomad, and hepossessed the invaluable military attributes of the man unchained bycities and accustomed to wander far in a hard and bracing country. Askill in horsemanship that was the wonder of the world, the eye for acountry hastily traversed, the memory for the spot once seen, the powerof rapid mobilisation and of equally rapid disappearance, the gift ofbeing a knight one day, a shepherd or a peasant the next--these were theattributes that made a Roman conquest of Numidia so long impossible andrendered diplomacy imperative as a supplement to war. It is less easy to reconstruct the moral and political attributes ofthis people from the data which we at present possess, or to reconcilethe experience of to-day with the impressions of ancient historians. Butso permanent has been the great bulk of the population of NorthernAfrica that it is tempting to interpret the ancient Numidian in thelight of the modern Kabyle. One who has had experience of the latterendows him with an intelligent head, a frank and open physiognomy and alively eye, describes him as active and enterprising, lively andexcitable, possessed of moral pride, eminently truthful, a stern holderof his plighted word and a respecter of women--a respect shown by thegeneral practice of monogamy. [860] Even when stirred to war he is saidnot to lend himself to unnecessary cruelty. [861] The activity, liveliness and excitability of this people may be traced in the accountsof antiquity; but Roman records would add the impression of duplicity, treachery and cruelty as characteristics of the race. Yet as thesecharacteristics are exhibited in the record of a great national waragainst a hated invader, and are chiefly illustrated in the persons of aking or his ministers--individuals spoilt by power or maddened byfear--we need not perhaps attach too much importance to the discrepancybetween the evidence of the ancient and modern world. Much of the history of Numidia, especially during the epoch of the warof the Romans against Jugurtha, would be illuminated if we couldinterpret the political tendencies of its ancient inhabitants by thoseof the Kabyle of modern times. The latter is said to be a sturdydemocrat, founding his society on the ideas of equality andindividuality. Each member of this society enjoys the same rights and isbound down to the same duties. There is no military or religiousnobility, there are no hereditary chiefs. The affairs of the society, about which all can speak or vote, are administered by simpledelegates. [862] There is nothing in the history of the war with Jugurthato belie these characteristics, there is much which confirms them. Inthe narrative of that war there is no mention of a nobility. Theinfluential men described are simply those who have been elevated bywealth or familiarity with the king. The monarchy itself is a greatpower where the king is present, but the life of the community is notbroken when the king is a fugitive; and loyalty to the crown centresround a great personality, who is expected to drive the hated invadersinto the sea, not merely round the name of a legitimate dynasty. Monarchy, in fact, seems a kind of artificial product in Numidia; but, artificial as it may have been, it had done good work. An active reignof more than fifty years by a man who united the absolutism of thesavage potentate with the wisdom and experience of the civilised ruler, had produced effects in Numidia that could never die, Masinissa hadproved what Numidian agriculture might become under the guidance ofscientific rules by the creation of model farms, whose fertile acresshowed that cultivated plants of every kind could be grown on nativesoil;[863] while under his rule and that of his son Micipsa the life ofthe city showed the same progress as that of the country. Numidia couldnot become one of the granaries of the world without its capital risingto the rank of a great commercial city. Cirta, though situated someforty-eight Roman miles from the sea, [864] was soon sought by theGreeks, those ubiquitous bankers of the Mediterranean world, [865] whileRoman and Italian capitalists eagerly plied their business in this newand attractive sphere which had been presented to their efforts by theconquests of Rome and the civilising energy of its native rulers. The kingdom of Numidia suffered from a weakness common to monarchieswhere the strong spirits of subjects and local chiefs can be controlledonly by the still stronger hand of the central potentate, and where thepractice of polygamy and concubinage in the royal house sometimes gaverise to many pretenders but to no heir with an indefeasible claim torule. There was no settled principle of succession to the throne, andthe death of the sovereign for the time being threatened the peace orunity of the kingdom, while it entailed grave responsibilities upon itsnominal protector. Masinissa himself had been excluded from the throneby an uncle, [866] and but for his vigour and energy might have remainedthe subject of succeeding pretenders. A crisis was threatened at his own decease but was happily averted bythe prudence of the dying monarch. Loath as he probably was toacknowledge the supremacy of Rome, he thrust on her the invidious taskof deciding the succession to the throne. He felt that Roman authoritywould be more effective than paternal wishes; perhaps he saw thatamongst his sons there was not one who could be trusted alone andunaided to continue to build up the fortunes of the state and to claimrecognition from his brothers as their undisputed lord, while the showof submission to Rome might weaken the vigilance and disarm the jealousyof the protecting power. Scipio was summoned to his deathbed toapportion the kingdom between the legitimate sons who survived him, Micipsa, Gulussa and Mastanabal. [867] To Micipsa was given the capitalCirta, the royal palace and the general administration of the kingdom, the warlike Gulussa was made commander-in-chief, while to Mastanabal theyoungest was assigned the task of directing the judicial affairs of thedominion. [868] This division of authority was soon disturbed by thedeath of the two younger brothers, and Micipsa was left alone to indulgehis peaceful inclinations during a long and uneventful reign of nearlythirty years. The fall of Carthage had left him free from all irritatingexternal relations; for the King of Numidia was no longer required toact the part of a constant spy on the actions, and an occasionaltrespasser on the territory, of the greatest of African powers. Thenearest scene of disturbance was the opposite continent of Spain, andhere he did Rome good service by sending her assistance againstViriathus and the Numantines. [869] Unvexed by troubles within hisborders, Micipsa devoted his life to the arts of peace. He beautifiedCirta and attracted Greek settlers to the town, amongst them men of artsand learning, who delighted the king with their literary and philosophicdiscourse. [870] The period of rest fostered the resources of thekingdom, and in spite of a devastating pestilence which is said to haveswept off eight hundred thousand of the king's subjects, [871] the statecould boast at his death of a regular army of ten thousand cavalry andtwenty thousand foot. [872] This was but the nucleus of the host thatmight be raised in the interior, and swelled by the border tribes ofNumidia; and the man who could win the confidence of the soldiers andthe attachment of the peasantry held the fortune of Numidia in hishands. This reflection may have cast a shadow over the latter years ofMicipsa. Certainly the prospect of the succession was as dark to him asit had been to his father, Masinissa. Like his predecessor he believedthat a dynasty was stronger than an individual, and he deliberatelyimitated the work of Scipio by leaving a collegiate rule to hissuccessors. One of these successors, however, was not his own offspring. His brother Mastanabal had left behind him an illegitimate son namedJugurtha. The boy had been neglected during the lifetime of hisgrandfather, Masinissa; perhaps the hope that Mastanabal might yet begeta representative worthy of the succession caused little importance to beattached to the concubine's son, in spite of the fact that it was thepolicy of the Numidian monarchs to keep as many heirs in reserve as itwas possible for them to procure. But when Gauda, the only legitimateson of Mastanabal, proved to be weak in body and deficient in mind, [873]greater regard was paid to the vigorous boy who was now the soleefficient representative of one branch of the late dynasty. Even withoutthis motive the kindly nature of Micipsa would probably have led him tolook with favour on the orphan child of his brother; the young Jugurthawas reared in the palace and educated with the heirs presumptive, Adherbal and Hiempsal, the two sons of the reigning king. It soon becamemanifest that a very lion had been begotten and was growing to strengthin the precincts of the royal court. All the graces of the love-bornoffspring seem to have been present at Jugurtha's birth. A mighty frame, a handsome face, were amongst his lesser gifts. More remarkable were thevigour and acuteness of his mind, the moral strength which yielded to notemptation of ease or indolence, the keen zest for life which led him tothrow himself into the hardy sports of his youthful compeers, to run, toride, to hurl the javelin with a skill known only to the nomad, the_bonhomie_ and bright good temper which endeared him to the comradeswhom his skill had vanquished. Much of his leisure was passed intracking the wild beasts of the desert; his skill as a hunter wasmatchless, or was equalled only by his easy indifference to hissuccess. [874] The sight of these qualities gladdened Micipsa's heart; for the militaryleader, so essential to the safety of the Numidian monarchy, seemed tobe now assured. We are told that a shade of anxiety crossed his mindwhen he compared the youth of his own sons with the glorious manhood ofJugurtha, and thought of the temptations which the prospect of anundivided monarchy might present to a mind gradually weaned from loyaltyby the very sense of its own greatness;[875] but there is no reason tobelieve that the good old king allowed his imagination to embracevisions of the dagger or the poisoned bowl, and that the mysteriousdeath of his nephew was only hindered by the thought of the resentmentwhich it would arouse amongst the Numidian chiefs and their dependents. Certainly the mission with which Jugurtha was soon credited--the missionwhich was perhaps to alter the whole tone of his mind and to concentrateits energies on an unlawful end--was one which any Numidian king mighthave destined for the most favoured of his sons. Jugurtha was to be sentto Numantia to lead the Numidian auxiliaries of horse and foot, to be amember of the charmed circle that surrounded Scipio, to see, as he movedamongst the young nobility, the promise of greatness that was in storefor Rome in the field whether of politics or of war, to form perhapsbinding friendships and to lay up stores of gratitude for future use. Indismissing his nephew, Micipsa was putting the issue into the hands offate. Jugurtha might never return; but, if he did, it would be with anexperience and a prestige which would render him more than ever thecertain arbiter of the destinies of the kingdom. The advantage which Jugurtha took of this marvellous opportunity was aproduct of his nature and proves no ulterior design. Had he been thesimplest and most loyal of souls, he would have been forced to act as hedid. As a man of insight he soon learnt Scipio by heart, as a bornstrategist and trained hunter he soon saw through the tricks of theenemy, as a man devoid of the physical sense of fear he was foremost inevery action. He had grasped at once the secret of Roman discipline, andhis habit of implicit obedience to the word of command was as remarkableas his readiness in offering the right suggestion, when his opinion wasasked. Intelligence was not a striking feature in the mental equipmentof the staff which surrounded Scipio; it was grasped by the generalwherever found without respect to rank or nationality; and while Mariuswas rising step by step in virtue of his proved efficiency, the Numidianprince, who might have been merely an ornamental adjunct to the army, was made the leader or participant in almost every enterprise whichdemanded a shrewd head and a stout heart. The favour of Scipio increasedfrom day to day. [876] This was to be won by merit and success alone. With Romans of a weaker mould Jugurtha's wealth and social qualitiesproduced a similar result. He entertained lavishly, he was clever, good-natured and amusing. He charmed the Romans whom he excelled as inhis childish days he had charmed the Numidian boys whom he outraced. In these rare intervals of rest from warfare there was opportunity forconverse with men of influence and rank. Jugurtha's position and thefuture of Numidia were sometimes discussed, and the youthful wiseacreswho claimed his friendship would sometimes suggest, with the cheerfulcynicism which springs from a shallow dealing with imperial interests, that merit such as his could find its fitting sphere only if he were thesole occupant of the Numidian throne. [877] The words may often have beenspoken in jest or idle compliment; although some who used them may havemeant them to be an expression of the maxim that a protectorate is bestserved by a strong servant, and that a divided principality contains initself the seeds of disturbance. Others went so far as to suggest themeans as well as the end. Should difficulties arise with Rome, might notthe assent of the great powers be purchased with a price? Scipio had notbeen blind to the colloquies of his favourite. When Numantia had beendestroyed and the army was folding its tents, he gave Jugurtha thebenefit of a public ovation and a private admonition. Before thetribunal he decorated him with the prizes of war, and spoke fervidly inhis praise; then he invited him secretly to his tent and gave him hisword of warning. "The friendship of the Roman people should be soughtfrom the Roman people itself; no good could come of securing the supportof individuals by equivocal means; there was a danger in purchasingpublic interest from a handful of vendors who professed to have power tosell; Jugurtha's own qualities were his best asset; they would securehim glory and a crown; if he tried to hasten on the course of events, the material means on which he relied might themselves provoke his utterruin. " [878] On one point only Scipio seems to have been in agreement with the evilcounsellors of Jugurtha. He seems to have believed that the trueguardian of Numidia had been found, and the prince took with him asplendid testimonial to be presented to his uncle Micipsa. Scipio wrotein glowing terms of the great qualities which Jugurtha had displayedthroughout the war; he expressed his own delight at these services, hisown intention of making them known to the senate and Roman people, hissense of the joy that they must have brought to the monarch himself. Hisold friendship with Micipsa justified a word of congratulation; theprince was worthy of his uncle and of his grandfather Masinissa. [879] Whatever Micipsa's later intentions may have been, whether underordinary circumstances his natural benevolence and even his patriotismwould have continued to war with an undefined feeling of distrust, thisletter relieved his doubts, if only because it showed that Jugurthacould never fill a private station. The act of adoption was immediatelyaccomplished, and a testament was drawn up by which Jugurtha was namedjoint heir with Micipsa's own sons to the throne of Numidia. [880] A fewyears later the aged king lay on his deathbed. As he felt his endapproaching, he is said to have summoned his friends and relativestogether with his two sons, and in their presence to have made a partingappeal to Jugurtha. He reminded him of past kindnesses but acknowledgedthe ample return; he had made Jugurtha, but Jugurtha had made theNumidian name again glorious amongst the Romans and in Spain. Heexhorted him to protect the youthful princes who would be his colleagueson the throne, and reminded him that in the maintenance of concord laythe future strength of the kingdom. He appealed to Jugurtha as aguardian rather than as a mere co-regent; for the power and name of themature and distinguished ruler would render him chiefly responsible forharmony or discord; and he besought his sons to respect their cousin, toemulate his virtues, to prove to the world that their father was asfortunate in the children whom nature had given him as in the one whohad been the object of his adoption. [881] The appeal was answered byJugurtha with a goodly show of feeling and respect, and a few days laterthe old king passed away. The hour which closed his splendid obsequieswas the last in which even a show of concord was preserved between theill-assorted trio who were now the rulers of Numidia. The position ofJugurtha was difficult enough; for to rule would mean either thereduction of his cousins to impotence or the perpetual thwarting of hisplans by crude and suspicious counsels. For that these would besuspicious as well as crude, was soon revealed: and the situation wasimmediately rendered intolerable by the conduct of Hiempsal. Thisprince, the younger of the two brothers, was a headstrong boy filledwith a sense of resentment at Jugurtha's elevation to the throne andsmarting at the neglect of what he held to be the legitimate claim tothe succession. When the first meeting of the joint rulers was held inthe throne room, Hiempsal hurried to a seat at the right of Adherbal, that Jugurtha might not occupy the place of honour in the centre; it waswith difficulty that he was induced by the entreaties of his brother toyield to the claims of age and to move to the seat on the other side. This struggle for precedence heralded the coming storm. In the course ofa long discussion on the affairs of the kingdom Jugurtha threw out thesuggestion that it might be advisable to rescind the resolutions anddecrees of the last five years, since during that period age hadimpaired the faculties of Micipsa. Hiempsal said that he agreed, sinceit was within the last three years that Jugurtha had been adopted to ashare in the throne. The object of this remark betrayed little emotion;but it was believed that the peevish insult was the stimulus to ananxious train of thought which, as was to be expected from the resolutecharacter of the thinker, soon issued into action. To be a usurper wasbetter than to be thought one; the first situation entailed power, thesecond only danger. Anger played its part no doubt; but in a temperamentlike Jugurtha's such an emotion was more likely to be the justificationthan the cause of a crime. His thoughts from that moment were said tohave been bent on ensnaring the impetuous Hiempsal. But guile movesslowly, and Jugurtha would not wait. [882] The first meeting of the kings had given so thorough a proof of theimpossibility of united rule that a resolution was soon framed to dividethe treasures and territories of the monarchy. A time was fixed for thepartition of the domains, and a still earlier date for the division ofthe accumulated wealth. The kings meanwhile quitted the capital toreside in close propinquity to their cherished treasures. Hiempsal'stemporary home was in the fortified town of Thirmida, [883] and, aschance would have it, he occupied a house which belonged to a man whohad once been a confidential attendant on Jugurtha. [884] The innerhistory of the events which followed could never have been known withcertainty; but it was believed that Jugurtha induced this man to visitthe house under some pretext and bring back impressions of the keys. Thesecurity of Hiempsal's person and treasures was supposed to beguaranteed by his regularly receiving into his own hands the keys of thegates after they had been locked; but a night came in which the portalswere noiselessly opened and a band of soldiers burst into the house. They divided into parties, ranging each room in turn, prying into everyrecess, bursting doors that barred their entrance, stabbing theattendants, some in their sleep, others as they ran to meet theinvaders. At last Hiempsal was found crouching in a servant's room; hewas slain and beheaded, and those who held Jugurtha to be the author ofthe crime reported that the head of the murdered prince was brought tohim as a pledge of the accomplished act. [885] The news of the crime was soon spread through the whole of NorthernAfrica. It divided Numidia into two camps. Adherbal was forced by panicto arm in his own defence, and most of those who remained loyal to thememory of Micipsa gathered to the standard of the legitimate heir. ButJugurtha's fame amongst the fighting men of the kingdom stood him ingood stead. His adherents were the fewer in number, but they were themore effective warriors. [886] He rapidly gathered such forces as wereavailable, and dashed from city to city, capturing some by storm andreceiving the voluntary submission of others. He had plunged boldly intoa civil war, and by his action declared the coveted prize to be nothingless than the possession of the whole Numidian kingdom. But boldness washis best policy; Rome might more readily condone a conquest than arebellion, and be more willing to recognise a king than a claimant. Adherbal meanwhile had sent an embassy to the protecting State, toinform the senate of his brother's murder and his own evil plight. But, diffident as he was, he must have felt that a passive endurance of theoutrages inflicted by Jugurtha dimmed his prestige and imperilled hisposition; he found himself at the head of the larger army, and trustingto his superiority in numbers ventured to risk a battle with his veteranenemy. The first conflict was decisive; his forces were so utterlyrouted that he despaired of maintaining his position in any part of thekingdom. He fled from the battlefield to the province of Africa andthence took ship to Rome. [887] Jugurtha was now undisputed master of the whole of Numidia and hadleisure to think out the situation. It could not have needed muchreflection to show that the safer course lay in making an appeal toRome. It was no part of his plan to detach Numidia entirely from theimperial city; even if such an end were desirable, a national war couldnot be successfully waged by a people divided in allegiance, against astate whose tenacious policy and inexhaustible resources were only toowell known to Jugurtha. But he also knew that Rome, though tenacious, had the tolerance which springs from the unwillingness to waste bloodand treasure on a matter of such little importance as a change in theoccupancy of a subject throne, that a dynastic quarrel would seem tomany _blasé_ senators a part of the order of nature in a barbarianmonarchy, that it is usually to the interest of a protecting state torecognise a king in fact as one in law, and that he himself possessedmany powerful friends in the capital and had been told on good authoritythat royal presents judiciously distributed might confirm or even mouldopinion. Within a few days of his victory he had despatched to Rome anembassy well equipped with gold and silver. His ambassadors were toconfirm the affection of his old friends, to win new ones to his cause, and to spare no pains to gain any fraction of support that a bountifulgenerosity could buy. [888] Possibly few, who received courteous visitsor missives from these envoys, would have admitted that they had beenbribed. It was the custom of kings to send presents, and they did butanswer to the call of an old acquaintance and a man who had done signalservice to Rome. The news of Hiempsal's tragic end, the flight andarrival of his exiled brother, had at the moment caused a painfulsensation in Roman circles. Now many members of the nobility plucked upcourage to remark that there might be another side to the question. Thenewly gilded youth thronged their seniors in the senate and begged thatno inconsiderate resolution should be taken against Jugurtha. Theenvoys, as men conscious of their virtue, calmly expressed theirreadiness to await the senate's pleasure. The appointed day arrived, andAdherbal, who appeared in person, unfolded the tale of his wrongs. [889] Apart from the emotions of pity and consequent sympathy which may havebeen awakened in some breasts by the story of the ruined and exiledking, his appeal--passionate, vigorous and telling as it was--could nothave been listened to with any great degree of pleasure by the assembledfathers; for it brought home to the government of a protecting statethat most unpleasant of lessons, its duty to the protected. With theingenuity of despair Adherbal exaggerated the degree of Romangovernment, in order to emphasise the moral and political obligations ofthe rulers to their dependents. If the King of Numidia was a mere agentof the imperial[890] city, subordinating his wishes to her ends, seeingthe security of his own possessions in the extension of her influencealone, clinging to her friendship with a trust as firm as that inspiredby ties of blood, it was the duty of the mistress to protect such aservant, and to avenge an outrage which reflected alike on her gratitudeand her authority. It had been a maxim of Micipsa's that the clients ofRome supported a heavy burden, but were amply compensated by theimmunity from danger that they enjoyed. And, if Rome did not protect, towhom could a client-king look for aid? His very service to Rome had madehim the enemy of all neighbouring powers. It was true that Adherbalcould claim little in his own right; he was a suppliant before he couldbe a benefactor, stripped of all power of benefiting his great protectorbefore his devotion could be put to the test. Yet he could claim a debt;for he was the sole relic of a dynasty that had given their all to Rome. Jugurtha was destroying a family whose loyalty had stood every test, hewas committing horrid atrocities on the friends of Rome, his insolenceand impunity were inflicting as grave an injury on the Roman name as onthe wretched victims of his cruelty. Such was the current of subtle and cogent reasoning that ran through thepassionate address of the exiled king, crying for vengeance, but aboveall for justice. The answer of Jugurtha's envoys was brief and to thepoint. They had only to state their fictitious case. A plausible casewas all that was needed; their advocates would do the rest. Hiempsal, they urged, had been put to death by the Numidians in consequence of thecruelty of his rule. Adherbal had been the aggressor in the late war. Hehad suffered defeat, and was now petitioning for help because he hadfound himself unable to perpetrate the wrong which he had intended. Jugurtha entreated the senate to let the knowledge which had been gainedof him at Numantia guide their opinion of him now, and to set his ownpast deeds before the words of a personal enemy. [891] Both parties thenwithdrew and the senate fell to debate. It is sufficiently likely that, even had there been no corruption orsuspicion of corruption, the opinions of the House would have beendivided on the question that was put before them. Some minds naturallysuspicious might have been doubtful of the facts. Were Hiempsal's deathand Adherbal's flight due to national discontent or the unprovokedambition of Jugurtha? If the former was the case, was the restoration ofthe king to an unwilling people by an armed force a measure conducive tothe interest of the protecting state? But even some who acceptedAdherbal's statement of the case, may have doubted the wisdom of apolicy of armed intervention; for it was manifest that a considerabledegree of force would have to be employed to lead Jugurtha to relinquishhis claims and to stamp out the loyalty of his adherents. The senatecould have been in no humour for another African war; they regardedtheir policy as closed in that quarter of the world; they had shiftedthe burden of frontier defence on to the Kings of Numidia, and must haveviewed with alarm the prospect of something far worse than a frontierwar arising from the quarrels of those kings. It is probable, therefore, that proposals for a peaceful settlement would in any case havecommanded the respectful attention of the senate; had these been madewith a show of decency, with a general recognition of Adherbal's claims, and some censure of Jugurtha's overbearing conduct (for this must havebeen better attested than his share in Hiempsal's death), but littleadverse comment might have been excited by the tone of the debate. As itwas, when member after member rose, lauded Jugurtha's merits to theskies and poured contempt on the statements of Adherbal, [892] anunpleasant feeling was excited that this fervour was not wholly due to apatriotic interest in the security of the empire. The veryboisterousness of the championship induced a more rigorous attitude onthe part of those who had not been approached by Jugurtha's envoys orhad resisted their overtures. They maintained that Adherbal must behelped at all costs, and that strict punishment should be exacted forHiempsal's murder. This minority found an ardent advocate in Scaurus, the keeper of the conscience of the senate, the man who knew better thanany that an individual or a government lives by its reputation, who sawwith horror that no specious pretexts were being employed to clothe apolicy which the malevolent might interpret as a political crime, andthat the sinister rumours which had been current in Rome were findingtheir open verification in the senate. A vigorous championship of thecause of right from the foremost politician of the day, might notinfluence the decision of the House, and would certainly not lead to aquixotic policy of armed intervention; but it might prove to critics ofthe government that the inevitable decision had not been reached whollyin defiance of the claims of the suppliant and wholly in obedience tothe machinations of a usurper. The decision, which closed the unrealdebate, recognised Jugurtha and Adherbal as joint rulers of Numidia. Itwilfully ignored Hiempsal's death, it wantonly exposed the lamb to thewolf, it was worthless as a settlement of the dynastic question, unlessJugurtha's supporters entertained the pious hope that their favourite'sambition might be satisfied with the increase now granted to his wealthand territory, and that his prudence might withhold him from againtesting the forbearance of the protecting power. But those who possessedkeener insight or who knew Jugurtha better, must have foreseen theprobable result of the impunity which had been granted; they must havepresaged, with anxious foreboding or with patient cynicism, the finaldisappearance of Adherbal from the scene and a fresh request for thesettlement of the Numidian question, which would have become lesscomplex when there was but one candidate for the throne. The decree ofthe senate enjoined the creation of a commission of ten, which shouldvisit Numidia and divide the whole of the kingdom which had beenpossessed by Micipsa, between the rival chiefs. [893] The head of the commission was Lucius Opimius, whose influence amongstthe members of his order had never waned since he had exercised andproved his right of saving the State from the threatened dangers ofsedition. His selection on this occasion gave an air of impartiality tothe commission, for he was known to be no friend to Jugurtha. [894] That prince, however, did not allow his past relations to be an obstacleto his present enterprise. The conquest of Opimius was the immediateobject to which he devoted all his energies. As soon as thecommissioners had appeared on African soil, they and their chief werereceived with the utmost deference by the king. The frequent and secretcolloquies which took place between the arbitrators and one of theparties interested in their decision were not a happy omen for animpartial judgment, and, if the award could by the exercise ofmalevolent ingenuity be interpreted as unfair, would certainly breed thesuspicion, and, in case the matter was ever submitted to a hostile courtof law, the proof that the honour of the commissioners had succumbed tothe usual vulgar and universally accredited methods of corruption. Onthe face of it the award seemed eminently just. Numidia was becoming acommercial and agricultural state; but since commerce and agriculturedid not flourish in the same domains, it was impossible to endow each ofthe claimants equally with both these sources of wealth. To Adherbal wasgiven that part of the kingdom which in its external attributes seemedthe more desirable; he was to rule over the eastern half of Numidiawhich bordered on the Roman province, the portion of the country whichenjoyed a readier access to the sea and could boast of a fullerdevelopment of urban life. Cirta the capital lay within this sphere, andAdherbal could continue to give justice from the throne of his fathers. But those who held that the strength of a country depended mainly on itspeople and its soil, believed that Jugurtha had received the betterpart. The territories with which he was entrusted were those borderingon Mauretania, rich in the products of the soil and teeming with healthyhuman life. [895] From the point of view of military resources therecould be no question as to which of the two kings was the stronger. Thepeaceful character of Adherbal may have seemed a justification for hispeaceful sphere of rule; but the original aggressor was kept at hisnormal strength. Jugurtha ruled over the lands in which the nationalspirit, of which he was himself the embodiment, found its fullest andfiercest expression. He did not mean to acquiesce for a moment in thesettlement effected by the commission. No sooner had it completed itstask and returned home, than he began to devise a scheme which wouldlead to war between the two principalities and the consequentannihilation of Adherbal. He shrank at first from provoking the senateby a wanton attack on the neighbouring kingdom which they had justcreated; his design was rather to draw Adherbal into hostilities whichwould lead to a pitched battle, a certain victory, the disappearance ofthe last of Micipsa's race and the union of the two crowns. With thisobject he massed a considerable force on the boundary between the twokingdoms and suddenly crossed the frontier. His mounted raiders capturedshepherds with their flocks, ravaged the fields of the peasantry, lootedand burned their homes; then swept back within their own borders. [896]But Adherbal was not moved to reprisals. His circumstances no less thanhis temperament dictated methods of peace: and, if he could not keep hiscrown by diplomacy, he must have regarded it as lost. The Roman peoplewas a better safeguard than his Numidian subjects, and it was necessaryto temporise with Jugurtha until the senate could be moved by a strongappeal. Envoys were despatched to the court of the aggressor to complainof the recent outrage; they brought back an impudent reply; butAdherbal, steadfast in his pacific resolutions, still remainedquiescent, Jugurtha's plan had failed and he was in no mood for furtherdelay; he held now, as he had done once before, that his end could bestbe effected by vigorous and decisive action. The lapse of time could notimprove his own position but might strengthen that of Adherbal, and itwas advisable that a new Roman commission should witness an accomplishedfact and make the best of it rather than engage again in the settlementof a disputed claim. It was no longer a predatory band but a large andregular army that he now collected; his present purpose was not a foraybut a war. [897] He advanced into his rival's territory ravaging itsfields, harrying its cities and gathering booty as he went. At everystep the confidence of his own forces, the dismay of the enemyincreased. Adherbal was at last convinced that he must appeal to the sword for thesecurity of his crown. A second flight to Rome would have utterlydiscredited him in the eyes of his subjects, perhaps in those of theRoman government itself; yet, as his chief hope still lay in Rome, hehurriedly despatched an embassy to the suzerain city[898] while hehimself prepared to take the field. With unwilling energy he gatheredhis available forces and marched to oppose Jugurtha's triumphantprogress. The invading host had now skirted Cirta to the west and wasapparently attempting to cut off its communications with the sea. Thedisastrous results that would have followed the success of this attempt, may have been the final motive that spurred Adherbal to his appeal toarms; and it was somewhere within the fifty miles that intervenedbetween the capital and its port of Rusicade and at a spot nearer to thesea than to Cirta, [899] that the opposing armies met. The day wasalready far spent when Adherbal came into touch with his enemy: therewas no thought of a pitched battle in the gathering gloom, and eitherparty took up his quarters for the night. Towards the late watches ofthe night, in the doubtful light of the early dawn, the soldiers ofJugurtha crept up to the outposts of the enemy; at a given signal theyrushed on the camp and carried it by storm. Adherbal's soldiers, heavywith sleep and groping for their arms, were routed or slain; the princehimself sprang on his horse and with a handful of his knights sped forsafety to the walls of Cirta, Jugurtha's troops in hot pursuit. They hadalmost closed on the fugitive before the walls were reached; but therace had been watched from the battlements, and, as the flying Adherbalpassed the gates, the walls were manned by a volunteer body of Italianmerchants who kept the pursuing Numidians at bay. [900] It was themerchant class that had most to fear from the cruelty and cupidity ofthe nomad hordes that now beat against the fortress, and during thesiege that followed they controlled the course of events far moreeffectually than the unhappy king whom they had for the moment savedfrom destruction. Jugurtha's plans were foiled; Adherbal had escaped, and there lay beforehim the irksome prospect of a siege, of probable interference from Romeand, it might be, of the necessity of openly defying the senate'scommands. But it was now too late to draw back, and he set himselfvigorously to the work of reducing Cirta by assault or famine. The taskmust have been an arduous one. The town formed one of the strongestpositions for defence that could be found in the ancient world. It wasbuilt on an isolated cube of rock that towered above the vast cultivatedtracts of the surrounding plain. At its eastern extremity the precipicemade a sheer drop of six hundred feet, and was perhaps quiteinaccessible on this side, although it threw out spurs, whether naturalor of artificial construction, which formed a difficult and easilydefensible communication with the lower land around. Its naturalbastions were completed by a natural moat, for the river Ampsaga (theWäd Remel) almost encircled the town, and on the eastern side its deepand rushing waters could only be crossed by a ledge of rock, throughwhich it bored a subterranean channel and over which some kind of bridgeor causeway had probably been formed. [901] The natural and easy mode ofapproach to the city was to be found in the south-west, where a neck ofland of half a furlong's breadth led up to the principal gate. In spite of the formidable difficulties of the task Jugurtha attemptedan assault, for it was of the utmost importance that he should possessthe person of Adherbal before interference was felt from Rome. Mantlets, turrets and all the engines of siege warfare were vigorously employed tocarry the town by storm;[902] but the stout walls baffled every effort, and Jugurtha was forced to face as best he might another Roman embassywhich Adherbal's protests had brought to African soil. The senate, whenit had learnt the news of the renewed outbreak of the war, was asunwilling as ever to intervene as a third partner in a three-sidedconflict. To play the part of the policeman as well as of the judge wasno element in Roman policy; the very essence of a protectorate was thatit should take care of itself; were intervention necessary, it should bedecisive, and it would be a lengthy task and an arduous strain to gatherand transport to Africa a force sufficient to overawe Jugurtha. The easydevice of a new commission was therefore adopted. If its Suggestionswere obeyed, all would be well; if they were neglected, matters couldnot be much worse than they were at present. As the new commissionershad merely to take a message and were credited with no discretionarypower, it was thought unnecessary to burden the higher magnates of theState with the unenviable task, or to expose them to the undignifiedpredicament of finding their representations flouted by a rebel whomight have eventually to be recognised as a king. A chance was given toyounger members of the senatorial order, and the three who landed inAfrica were branded by the hostile criticism that was soon to findutterance and in the poverty of its indictment to catch at every straw, as lacking the age and dignity demanded by the mission--qualities which, had they been present, would probably have failed to make the leastimpression on Jugurtha's fixed resolve. The commissioners were toapproach both the kings and to bring to their notice the will andresolution of the Roman senate and people, which were to the effect thathostilities should be suspended and that the questions at issue betweenthe rivals should be submitted to peaceful arbitration. This conduct thesenate recommended as the only one worthy of its royal clients and ofitself. [903] The speed of the envoys was accelerated by the impression that theymight find but one king to be the recipient of their message. On the eveof their departure the news of the decisive battle and the siege ofCirta had reached their ears. Haste was imperative, if they were toretain their position as envoys, for the next despatch might bring newsof Adherbal's death. The actual news received fell short of thetruth, [904] and was perhaps still further softened for the public ear;the fact that the envoys had sailed was itself an official indicationthat all hope had not been abandoned. If they cherished a similarillusion themselves, it must almost have vanished before the sight thatmet their eyes in Numidia. They saw a closely beleaguered town in whichone of the kings, who were to be the recipients of their message, was soclosely hemmed that access to him was impossible. [905] The other, without abating one jot of his military preparations, met them with ananswer as uncompromising as it was courteous. Jugurtha held nothing moreprecious than the authority of the senate; from his youth up he hadstriven to meet the approbation of the good; it was by merit not byartifice, that he had gained the favour of Scipio; it was desert thathad won him a place amongst Micipsa's children and a share in theNumidian crown. But qualities carry their responsibilities; the verydistinction of his services made it the more incumbent on him to avengea wrong. Adherbal had treacherously plotted against his life; the crimehad been revealed and he had but taken steps to forestall it; the Romanpeople would not be acting justly or honourably, if they hindered himfrom taking such steps in his own defence as were the common right ofall men. [906] He would soon send envoys to Rome to deal with the whole question indispute. This answer showed the Roman commissioners the utter helplessness oftheir position. Their presence in Jugurtha's camp within sight of a cityin which a client king and a number of their own citizens wereimprisoned, was itself a stigma on the name of Rome. If they had prayedto see Adherbal, the request, must have been refused; to prolong thenegotiations was to court further insult, and they set their faces oncemore for Rome after faithfully performing the important mission ofrepeating a message of the senate with verbal correctness. Jugurthagranted them the courtesy of not renewing his active operations until hethought that they had quitted Africa. Then, despairing of carrying thetown by assault, he settled to the work of a regular siege. The natureof the ground must have made a complete investment impossible; but italso rendered it unnecessary. The cliffs and the river bed made escapeas difficult as attack. On some sides it was but necessary to maintain astrenuous watch on every possible egress; on others lines ofcircumvallation, with ramparts and ditches, kept the beleaguered withintheir walls. Siege-towers were raised to mate the height of thefortifications which they threatened, and manned with garrisons to harrythe town and repel all efforts of its citizens to escape. The blockadewas varied by a series of surprises, of sudden assaults by day or night;no method of force or fraud was left untried; the loyalty of thedefenders who appeared on the walls was assailed by threats or promises;the assailants were strenuously exhorted to effect a speedy entry. It would seem that Cirta was ill-provided with supplies. [907] Adherbal, who had made it the basis of his attack and must have foreseen theprobability of his defeat, should have seen that it was wellprovisioned; and the vast cisterns and granaries cut in the solid rock, that were in later times to be found within the city, should havesupplied water and food sufficient to prolong the siege to a degree thatmight have tried the senate's patience as sorely as Jugurtha's. Butneither the king nor his advisers were adepts in the art of war; it musthave been difficult to regulate the distribution of provisions amidstthe trading classes, of unsettled habits and mixed nationalities, thatwere crowded within the walls; discontent could not be restrained bydiscipline and might at any moment be a motive to surrender. Theimprisoned king saw no prospect of a prolongation of the war that couldsecure even his personal safety; no help could be looked for fromwithout and a ruthless enemy was battering at his gates. His only hope, a faint one, lay in a last appeal to Rome; but the invader's lines weredrawn so close that even a chance of communicating with the protectingcity seemed denied. At length, by urgent appeals to pity and to avarice, he induced two of the comrades who had joined his flight from the fieldof battle, to risk the venture of penetrating the enemy's lines andreaching the sea. [908] The venture, which was made by night, succeeded;the two bold messengers stole through the enclosing fortifications, rapidly made for the nearest port, and thence took ship to Rome. Withina few days they were in the presence of the senate, [909] and thedespairing cry of Adherbal was being read to an assembly, to whom itcould convey no new knowledge and on whom it could lay no added burdenof perplexity. But emotion, although it cannot teach, may focus thoughtand clarify the promptings of interest. To many a loose thinkerAdherbal's missive may have been the first revelation, not only of theshame, but of the possible danger of the situation. The facts were toowell known to require detailed treatment. It was sufficient to remindthe senate that for five months a friend and ally of the Roman peoplehad been blockaded in his own capital; his choice was merely one betweendeath by the sword and death by famine. Adherbal no longer asked for hiskingdom; nay, he barely ventured to ask for his life; but he deprecateda death by torture--a fate that would most certainly be his if he fellinto the hands of his implacable foe. The appeal to interest wasinterwoven with that made to pity and to honour. What were Jugurtha'sultimate motives? When he had consummated his crimes and absorbed thewhole of Numidia, did he mean to remain a peaceful client-king, afaithful vassal of Rome? His fidelity and obedience might be measured bythe treatment which he had already accorded to the mandate and theenvoys of the senate. The power of Rome in her African possessions wasat stake; and the majesty of the empire was appealed to no less than thesense of friendship, loyalty, and gratitude, as a ground for instantassistance which might yet save the suppliant from a terrible anddegrading end. The impression produced by this appeal was seen in the bolder attitudeadopted by that section of the senate which had from the first regardedJugurtha as a criminal at large, and had never approved the policy ofleaving Numidia to settle its own affairs. Voices were heard advocatingthe immediate despatch of an army to Africa, the speedy succour ofAdherbal, the consideration of an adequate punishment for the contumacyof Jugurtha in not obeying the express commands of Rome. [910] But theusual protests were heard from the other side, protests which wereinterpreted as a proof of the utter corruption of those who utteredthem, [911] but which were doubtless veiled in the decent language, andmay in some cases have been animated by the genuine spirit, of thecautious imperialist who prefers a crime to a blunder. The conflict ofopinion resulted in the usual compromise. A new commission was to bedespatched with a more strongly worded message from the senate; but, asrumour had apparently been busy with the adventures of the "three youngmen" whom Jugurtha had turned back, it was deemed advisable to selectthe present envoys from men whose age, birth and ample honours mightgive weight to a mission that was meant to avert a war. [912] Thesolemnity of the occasion was attested, and some feeling of assurancemay have been created, by the fact that there figured amongst thecommissioners no less a person than the chief of the senate MarcusAemilius Scaurus, beyond all question the foremost man of Rome, [913] thehighest embodiment of patrician dignity and astute diplomacy. Thepressing appeal of Adherbal's envoys, the ugly rumours which werecirculating in Rome, urged the commissioners to unwonted activity. Within three days they were on board, and after a short interval hadlanded at Utica in the African province. The experience of the formermission had taught them that their dignity might be utterly lost if theyquitted the territory of the Roman domain. They did not deign to setfoot in Numidia, but sent a message to Jugurtha informing him that theyhad a mandate from the senate and ordering him to come with all speed tothe Roman province. Jugurtha was for the moment torn by conflicting resolutions. The veryaudacity of his acts had been tempered and in part directed by a secretfear of Rome. Whether in any moments of ambitious imagination he haddreamed of throwing off the protectorate and asserting the unlimitedindependence of the Numidian kingdom, must remain uncertain; but in anycase that consummation must belong to the end, not to the intermediatestage, of his present enterprise. His immediate plan had been to win orpurchase recognition of an accomplished fact from the somnolence, caution or corruption of the government; and here was interventionassuming a more formidable shape while the fact was but halfaccomplished and he himself was but playing the part of the rebel, notof the king. The dignity of the commissioners, and the peremptory natureof their demand, seemed to show that negotiations with Rome were losingtheir character of a conventional game and assuming a more seriousaspect. It is possible that Jugurtha did not know the full extent of thedanger which he was running; it is possible that, like so many otherpotentates who had relations with the imperial city, he made the mistakeof imagining that the senate was in the fullest sense the government ofRome, and had no cognisance of the subtle forces whose equilibrium wasexpressed in a formal control by the nobility; but even what he saw wassufficient to alarm him and to lead him, in a moment of panic orprudence, to think of the possibility of obeying the commission. At thenext moment the new man, which the deliberate but almost frenziedpursuit of a single object had made of Jugurtha, was fullyreasserted. [914] But his passion was not blind; his recklessness stillveiled a plan; his one absorbing desire was to see Adherbal in his handsbefore he should himself be forced to meet the envoys. He gave ordersfor his whole force to encircle the walls of Cirta; a simultaneousassault was directed against every vulnerable point; the attention ofthe defenders was to be distracted by the ubiquitous nature of theattack; a failure of vigilance at any point might give him the desiredentry by force or fraud. But nothing came of the enterprise; theassailants were beaten back, and Jugurtha had another moment for coolreflection. He soon decided that further delay would not strengthen hisposition. The name of Scaurus weighed heavily on his mind. [915] He wasan untried element with respect to the details of the Numidian affair;but all that Jugurtha knew of him--his influence with the senate, hisuncompromising respectability, his earlier attitude on thequestion--inspired a feeling of fear. Obedience to the demand which thecommissioners had made for his presence might be the wiser course;whatever the result of the interview, such obedience might prolong theperiod of negotiation and delay armed intervention until his own greatobject was fulfilled. With a few of his knights Jugurtha crossed intothe Roman province and presented himself before the commissioners. Wehave no record of the discussion which ensued. The senate's message wasalmost an ultimatum; it threatened extreme measures if Jugurtha did notdesist from the siege of Cirta; but the peremptory nature of the missivedid not prevent close and lengthy discussions between the envoys and theking. The plausible personality of Jugurtha may have told in his favourand may have led to the hopes of a compromise; for it is not probablethat he ventured on a summary rejection of their orders or advice. Butthe commissioners could merely threaten or advise; they had no power towring promises from the king or to keep him to them when they were made. Thus when, at the close of the debates, Jugurtha returned to Numidia andthe envoys embarked at Utica, it was felt on all sides that nothing hadbeen accomplished. [916] The commissioners may have believed that theyhad made Jugurtha sensible of his true relations to Rome; they hadperhaps threatened open war as the result of disobedience; but they hadneither checked his progress nor stayed his hand; and the taint withwhich all dealings with the wealthy potentate infected his environment, clung even to this select body of distinguished men. The immediate effect of the fruitless negotiations was the disasterwhich every one must have foreseen. Cirta and her king had been utterlybetrayed by their protectress; and when the news of the departure of theenvoys and the return of Jugurtha penetrated within the walls, despairof further resistance gave substance to the hope of the possibility ofsurrender on tolerable terms. The hope was never present to the mind ofAdherbal; he knew his enemy too well. Nor could it have been entertainedin a very lively form by the king's Numidian councillors and subjects. But the Numidian was not the strongest element in Cirta. There themerchant class held sway. In the defence of their property and commerce, the organised business and the homes which they had established in thecivilised state, they had taken the lead in repelling the hordes ofWestern Numidians which Jugurtha led; and amongst the merchant classthose of Italian race had been the most active and efficient inrepelling the assaults of the besiegers. To these men the choice was notbetween famine and the sword; but merely between famine and the loss ofproperty or comfort. For what Roman or Italian could doubt that the mostperfect security for his life and person was still implicit in the magicname of Rome? Confident in their safety they advised Adherbal to handover the town to Jugurtha; the only condition which he needed to makewas the preservation of his own life and that of the besieged; all elsewas of less importance, for their future fortunes rested not withJugurtha but with the senate. [917] It is questionable whether theItalians were really inspired with this blind confidence in the senate'spower to restore as well as to save; even their ability to save was morethan doubtful to Adherbal; still more worthless was a promise made byhis enemy. The unhappy king would have preferred the most desperateresistance to a trust in Jugurtha's honour; but the advice of theItalians was equivalent to a command; and a gleam of hope, sufficient atleast to prevent him from taking his own life, may have buoyed him upwhen he yielded to their wishes and made the formal surrender. The hope, if it existed, was immediately dispelled. Adherbal was put to death withcruel tortures. [918] The Italians then had their proof of the presentvalue of the majesty of the name of Rome. Their calculations had beenvitiated by one fatal blunder. They forgot that they were letting intotheir stronghold an exasperated people drawn from the rudest parts ofNumidia--a people to whom the name of Rome was as nothing, to whom thename of merchant or foreigner was contemptible and hateful. As thesurging crowd of Jugurtha's soldiery swept over the doomed city, massacring every Numidian of adult age, the claim of nationality made bythe protesting merchants was not unnaturally met by a thrust from thesword. If even the assailants could distinguish them in the frenzy ofvictory, they knew them for men who had occupied the fighting line; andthis fact was alone sufficient to doom them to destruction. Jugurtha mayalso have made his blunder. Unless we suppose that his penetrating mindhad been, suddenly clouded by the senseless rage which prompts thehalf-savage man to a momentary act of demoniacal folly, he could neverhave willed the slaughter of the Roman and Italian merchants. [919] If hewilled it in cold blood, he was consciously making war on Rome anddeclaring the independence of Numidia. For, even with his limitedknowledge of the balance of interests in the capital, he must have seenthat the act was inexpiable. His true policy, now as before, was not tocross swords with Rome, but merely to wring from her indifference arecognition of a purely national crime. His wits had failed him if hehad ordered a deed which put indifference and recognition out of thequestion. It is probable that he did not calculate on the fury of histroops; it is possible that he had ceased to lead and was a mere unitswept along in the avalanche which sated its wrath at the prolongedresistance, and avenged the real or fancied crimes committed by themerchant class. The massacre of the merchants caused a complete change in the attitudewith which Numidian events were viewed at Rome. It cut the commercialclasses to the quick, and this third party which moulded the policy ofRome began closing up its ranks. The balance of power on which thenobility had rested its presidency since the fall of Caius Gracchus, began to be disturbed. It was possible again for a leader of the peopleto make his voice heard; not, however, because he was the leader of thepeople, but because he was the head of a coalition. The man of the hourwas Caius Memmius, who was tribune elect for the following year. He wasan orator, vehement rather than eloquent, of a mordant utterance, andfamed in the courts for his power of attack. [920] His criticaltemperament and keen eye for abuses had already led him to join thesparse ranks of politicians who tried still to keep alive the healthyflame of discontent, and to utter an occasional protest against themanner in which the nobility exercised their trust. [921] His influencemust have been increased by the growing suspicion of the last few yearsand the scandal that fed on tales of bribery in high places; it wasassured by the latest news which, through the illogical process ofreasoning out of which great causes grow, seemed to make rumour acertainty and to justify suspicion by the increased numbers andrespectability of the suspecting. A pretext for action was found in theshifty and dilatory proceedings of the senate. Even the latest phase ofthe Numidian affair was not powerful or horrible enough to crush allattempts at a temporising policy. [922] Men were still found to interruptthe course of a debate which promised to issue in some strong and speedyresolution, by raising counter-motions which the great names of themovers forced on the attention of the house; every artifice whichinfluence could command was employed to dull the pain of a woundedself-respect; and when this method failed, idle recrimination took theplace of argument as a means of consuming the time for action andpassing the point at which anger would have cooled into indifference, orat least into an emotion not stronger than regret. It was plain that thestimulus must be supplied from without; and Memmius provided it by goingstraight to the people and embodying their floating suspicions in a baldand uncompromising form. He told them[923] that the prolongedproceedings in the senate meant simply that the crime of Jugurtha waslikely to be condoned through the influence of a few ardent partisans ofthe king; and it is probable that he dealt frankly and in the true Romanmanner with the motives for this partisanship. The pressure waseffectual in bringing to a head the deliberations of the senate. Thecouncil as a whole did not need conversion on the main question atissue, for most of its members must have felt that it had exhausted theresources of peaceful diplomacy, and it showed its characteristicaversion to the provocation of a constitutional crisis, which mighteasily arise if the people chose to declare war on the motion of amagistrate without waiting for the advice of the fathers; while theobstructive minority may have been alarmed by the distant vision of atrial before the Assembly or before a commission of inquiry composed ofjudges taken from the angry Equites. The senate took the lead in aformal declaration of war; Numidia was named as one of the provinceswhich were to be assigned to the future consuls in accordance with theprovisions of the Sempronian law. The choice of the people fell onPublius Scipio Nasica and Lucius Calpurnius Bestia as consuls for thefollowing year. [924] The lot assigned the home government and theguardianship of Italy to Nasica, while Bestia gained the command in theimpending war. Military preparations were pushed on with all haste; anarmy was levied for service in Africa; pay and supplies were voted on anadequate scale. The news is said to have surprised Jugurtha. [925] Perhaps earliermessages of a more cheerful import had reached him from Rome during thedays when successful obstruction seemed to be achieving its end, and haddulled the fears which the massacre of Cirta most have aroused even in amind so familiar with the acquiescent policy of the senate. Yet even nowhe did not lose heart, nor did his courage take the form, prevalentamongst the lower types of mind, of a mere reliance on brute force, onthe resources of that Numidia of which he was now the undisputed lord. With a persistence born of successful experience he still attempted themethods of diplomacy-methods which prove a lack of insight only in thesense that Rome was an impossible sphere for their present exercise. Theking had not gauged the situation in the capital; but subsequent eventsproved that he still possessed a correct estimate of the realinclinations of the men who were chiefly responsible for Roman policy. The Numidian envoy was no less a person than the king's own son, and hewas supported by two trusty counsellors of Jugurtha. [926] As was usualin the case of a diplomatic mission arriving from a country which had notreaty relations, or was actually in a state of war, with Rome, theenvoys were not permitted to pass the gates until the will of the senatewas known. An excellent opportunity was given for proving the conversionof the senate. When the consul Bestia put the question "Is it thepleasure of the house that the envoys of Jugurtha be received within thewalls?" the firm answer was returned that "Unless these envoys had cometo surrender Numidia and its king to the absolute discretion of theRoman people, they must cross the borders of Italy within tendays". [927] The consul had this message conveyed to the prince, and heand his colleagues returned from their fruitless mission. Bestia meanwhile was consumed with military zeal. His army was ready, his staff was chosen, and he was evidently bent on an earnestprosecution of the war. He was in many respects as fit a man as couldhave been selected for the task. His powers of physical endurance andthe vigour of his intellect had already been tested in war; he possessedthe resolution and the foresight of a true general. But the canker ofthe age was supposed to have infected Bestia and neutralised hissplendid qualities. [928] The proof that he allowed greed to dominate hispublic conduct is indeed lacking; but he would have departed widely fromthe spirit of his time if he had allowed no thought of private gain toadd its quota to the joy of the soldier who finds himself for the firsttime in the untrammelled conduct of a war. To the commanders of the ageforeign service was as a matter of course a source of profit as well asa sphere of duty or of glory. To Bestia it was also to be a sphere fordiplomacy; and diplomacy and profit present an awkward combination, which gives room for much misinterpretation. Although the war was insome sense a concession to outside influences, the consul did notrepresent the spirit to which the senate had yielded. Nine years earlierhe had served the cause of the nobility by effecting the recall ofPopillius from exile, and was now a member of that inner circle of thegovernment whose cautious manipulation of foreign affairs was veiled ina secrecy which might easily rouse the suspicion, because it did notappeal to the intelligence, of the masses. How vital a part diplomacywas to play in the coming war, was shown by Bestia's selection of hisstaff. It was practically a committee of the inner ring of governingnobles, [929] and the importance attached to the purely political aspectof the African war was proved by the fact that Scaurus himself deignedto occupy a position amongst the legates of the commander. It was adifficult task which Bestia and his assistants had to perform. They wereto carry out the mandate of the people and pursue Jugurtha as acriminal; they were to follow out their own conviction as to the bestmeans of saving Rome from a prolonged and burdensome war with a wholenation-a conviction which might, force them to recognise Jugurtha as aking. To avenge honour and at the same time to secure peace was, in thepresent condition of the public mind, an almost impossible task. Itsgravity was increased by the fact that, through the method of selectionemployed for composing the general's council, a certain section of thenobility, already marked out for suspicion, would be held whollyresponsible for its failure. It was a gravity that was probablyundervalued by the leaders of the expedition, who could scarcely havelooked forward to the day when it might be said that Bestia had selectedhis legates with a view of hiding the misdeeds which, he meant to commitunder the authority of their names. [930] When the time for departure had arrived, the legions were marchedthrough Italy to Rhegium, were shipped thence to Sicily and from Sicilywere transferred to the African province. This was to be Bestia's basisof operations; and when he had gathered adequate supplies and organisedhis lines of communication, he entered Numidia. His march was from asuperficial point of view a complete success; large numbers of prisonerswere taken and several cities were carried by assault. [931] But thenature of the war in hand was soon made painfully manifest. It was a warwith a nation, not a mere hunting expedition for the purpose of trackingdown Jugurtha. The latter object could be successfully accomplished onlyif some assistance were secured from friendly portions of Numidia orfrom neighbouring powers. But there was no friendly portion of Numidia. The mercantile class had been wiped out, and though the Romans seem tohave regained possession of Cirta at an early period of the war, [932] itis not likely that it ever resumed the industrial life, which might havesupplied money and provisions, if not men; while the position of thetown rendered it useless as a basis of operations for expeditions intothat western portion of Numidia, from which the chief military strengthof Jugurtha was drawn. In these regions a possible ally was to be foundin Bocchus King of Mauretania; but his recent overtures to Rome had beendeliberately rejected by the senate. Nothing but the name of this greatKing of the Moors, who ruled over the territory stretching from theMuluccha to Tingis, had hitherto been known to the Roman people; eventhe proximity of a portion of his kingdom to the coast of Spain hadbrought him into no relations, either friendly or hostile, to theimperial government. [933] Bocchus had secured peace with his eastern neighbour by giving hisdaughter in marriage to Jugurtha; but he never allowed this familyconnection to disturb his ideas of political convenience and, as soon ashe heard that war had been declared against Jugurtha, he sent an embassyto Rome praying for a treaty with the Roman people and a recognition asone of the friends of the Republic. [934] This conduct may have been dueto the belief that a victory of the Romans over Jugurtha would entailthe destruction of the Numidian monarchy and the reduction of at least aportion of the territory to the condition of a province. In this caseMauretania would itself be the frontier kingdom, playing the part nowtaken by Numidia; and Bocchus may have wished to have some claim on Romebefore his eastern frontier was bordered, as his northern was commanded, by a Roman province. He may even have hoped to benefit by the spoils ofwar, as Masinissa had once benefited by those which fell from Syphax andfrom Carthage, and to increase his territories at the expense of hisson-in-law. There can be no better proof of the real intentions of thegovernment as regards Numidia, even after war had been declared, thanthe senate's rejection of the offer made by Bocchus. His aid would beinvaluable from a strategic point of view, if the aim of the expeditionwere to make Numidia a province or even to crush Jugurtha. But the mostconstant maxim of senatorial policy was to avoid an extension of thefrontiers, and this principle was accompanied by a strong objection toenter into close relations with any power that was not a frontier state. Such relations might involve awkward obligations, and were inconsistentwith the policy which devolved the whole obligation for frontier defenceand frontier relations on a friendly client prince. Whether themaintenance of the traditional scheme of administration in Africademanded the renewed recognition of Jugurtha as King of Numidia, was asubordinate question; its answer depended entirely on the possibility ofthe Numidians being induced to accept any other monarch. It must have required but a brief experience of the war to convinceBestia and his council that a Numidian kingdom without the recognitionof Jugurtha as king was almost unthinkable, unless Rome was prepared toenter on an arduous and harassing war for the piecemeal conquest of theland or (a task equally difficult) for the purpose of securing theperson of an elusive monarch, who could take every advantage of thenatural difficulties of his country and could find a refuge and readyassistance in every part of his dominions. The tentative approaches ofJugurtha, who negotiated while he fought, were therefore admitted bothby the consul and by Scaurus, who inevitably dominated the diplomaticrelations of the war. That Jugurtha sent money as well as proposals atthe hands of his envoys, was a fact subsequently approved by a Romancourt of law, and deserves such credence as can be attached to a verdictwhich was the final phase of a political agitation. That Bestia wasblinded by avarice and lost all sense of his own and his country'shonour, that Scaurus's sense of respectability and distrust of Jugurthawent down before the golden promises of the king, [935] were beliefswidely held, and perhaps universally, professed, by the democrats whowere soon thundering at the doors of the Curia--by men, that is, who didnot understand, or whose policy led them to profess misunderstanding of, the problem in statecraft, as dishonouring in some of its aspects assuch problems usually are, which was being faced by a general and astatesman who were pursuing a narrow and traditional but veryintelligible line of policy. The policy was indeed sufficiently uglyeven had there been no suspicion of personal corruption; its uglinesscould be tested by the fact that even the sanguine and cynical Jugurthacould hardly credit the extent of the good fortune revealed to him bythe progress of the negotiations. At first his diplomatic manoeuvres hadbeen adopted simply as a means of staying the progress of hostilities, of gaining a breathing space while he renewed his efforts at influencingopinion in the imperial city. But when he saw that the very agents ofwar were willing to be missionaries of peace, that the avengers sent outby an injured people were ready for conciliation before they hadinflicted punishment, he concentrated his efforts on an immediatesettlement of the question. [936] It was necessary for the enemy of theRoman people to pass through a preliminary stage of humiliation beforehe could be recognised as a friend; it was all the more imperative inthis case since a number of angry people in Rome were clamouring forJugurtha's punishment. It was also necessary to arrange a plan by whichthe humiliation might be effected with the least inconvenience to bothparties. An armistice had already been declared as a necessarypreliminary to effective negotiations for a surrender. This condition ofpeace rendered it possible for Jugurtha to be interviewed in person by aresponsible representative of the consul. [937] Both the king and theconsul were in close touch with one another near the north-western partof the Roman province, and Jugurtha was actually in possession of Vaga, a town only sixty miles south-west of Utica. The town, in spite of itsgeographical position, was an appanage[938] of the Numidian kingdom, andthe pretext under which Bestia sent his quaestor to the spot, was theacceptance of a supply of corn which had been demanded of the king as acondition of the truce granted by the consul. The presence of thequaestor at Vaga was really meant as a guarantee of good faith, andperhaps he was regarded as a hostage for the personal security ofJugurtha. [939] Shortly afterwards the king rode into the Roman camp andwas introduced to the consul and his council. He said a few words inextenuation of the hostile feeling with which his recent course ofaction had been received at Rome, and after this brief apology askedthat his surrender should be accepted. The conditions, it appeared, werenot for the full council; they were for the private ear of Bestia andScauras alone. [940] With these Jugurtha was soon closeted, and the finalprogramme was definitely arranged, On the following day the kingappeared again before the council of war; the consul pretended to takethe opinion of his advisers, but no clear issue for debate couldpossibly be put before the board; for the gist of the whole proceedings, the recognition of the right of Jugurtha to retain Numidia, was theresult of a secret understanding, not of a definite admission that couldbe blazoned to the world. There was some formal and desultorydiscussion, opinions on the question of surrender were elicited withoutany differentiation of the many issues that it might involve, and theconsul was able to announce in the end that his council sanctioned theacceptance of Jugurtha's submission. [941] The council, however, haddeemed it necessary that some visible proof, however slight, should begiven that a surrender had been effected; for it was necessary to conveyto the minds of critics at home the impression that some materialadvantage had been won and that Jugurtha had been humiliated. With thisobject in view the king was required to hand over something to the Romanauthorities. He kept his army, but solemnly transferred thirtyelephants, some large droves of cattle and horses, and a small sum ofmoney--the possessions, presumably, which he had ready at hand in hiscity of Vaga--to the custody of the quaestor of the Roman army. [942] Theyear meanwhile was drawing to a close, and the consul, now that peacehad been restored, quitted his province for Rome to preside at themagisterial elections. [943] The army still remained in the Romanprovince or in Numidia, but the cessation of hostilities reduced it to astate of inaction which augured ill for its future discipline should itagain be called upon to serve. The agreement itself must have seemed to its authors a triumph ofdiplomacy. They had secured peace with but an inconsiderable loss ofhonour; they had saved Rome from a long, difficult and costly war, whilst a modicum of punishment might with some ingenuity be held to havebeen inflicted on Jugurtha. They must have been astounded by the chorusof execration with which the news of the compact was received atRome. [944] Nor indeed can any single reason, adequate in itself andwithout reference to others, be assigned for this feeling of hostility. First, there was the idle gossip of the public places and theclubs--gossip which, in the unhealthy atmosphere of the time, loved tounveil the interested motives which were supposed to underlie the publicactions of all men of mark, and which exhibited moderation to an enemyas the crowning proof of its suspicions. Secondly there was the feelingthat had been stirred in the proletariate at Rome. The question ofJugurtha, little as they understood its merits, was still to them thegreat question of the hour, a matter of absorbing interest andexpectation. Their feelings had been harrowed by the story of hiscruelties, their fears excited by rumours of his power and intentions. They had roused the senate from its lethargy and forced that illustriousbody to pursue the great criminal; they had seen a great army quittingthe gates of Rome to execute the work of justice; their relatives andfriends had been subjected to the irksome duties of the conscription. Everywhere there had been a fervid blaze of patriotism, and this blazehad now ended in the thinnest curl of smoke. But to the masses theimagined shame of the Jugurthine War had now become but a single countin an indictment. The origin of the movement was now but its stimulus;as is the case with most of such popular awakenings, the agitation wasnow of a wholly illimitable character. The one vivid element in itscomposition was the memory of the recent past. It was easy to arouse thetrain of thought that centred round the two Gracchan movements and theterrible moments of their catastrophe. The new movement against thesenate was in fact but the old movement in another form. The senate hadbetrayed the interests of the people; now it was betraying the interestsof the empire; but to imagine that the form of the indictment as itappealed to the popular mind was even so definite as this, is to creditthe average mind with a power of analysis which it does not, andprobably would not wish to, possess. It is less easy to gauge theattitude of the commercial classes in this crisis. Their indignation atthe impunity given to Jugurtha after the massacre of the merchants atCirta is easily understood; but with this class sentiment was wont to beoutweighed by considerations of interest, and the preservation of peacein Numidia, and consequently of facilities for trade, must have been theend which they most desired. But perhaps they felt that the only peacewhich would serve their purposes was one based on a full reassertion ofRoman prestige, and perhaps they knew that Jugurtha, the reawakener ofthe national spirit of the Numidians, would show no friendship to theforeign trader. They must also have seen that, whatever the prospects ofthe mercantile class under Jugurtha's rule might be, the convention justconcluded could not be lasting. Their own previous action had determinedits transitory character. By their support of the agitation awakened byMemmius they had created a condition of feeling which could not restsatisfied with the present suspected compromise. But if satisfaction wasimpossible, a continuance of the war was inevitable. They had beforethem the prospect of continued unsettlement and insecurity in a fruitfulsphere of profit; and they intended to support the present agitation bytheir influence in the Comitia and, if necessary, by their verdicts inthe courts, until a strong policy had been asserted and a decisivesettlement attained. Even before the storm of criticism had again gathered strength, therewas great anxiety in the senate over the recent action in Numidia. Thatbody could doubtless read between the lines and see the real motives ofpolicy which had led up to the present compact; they could see that theagreement was a compromise between the views of two opposing sections oftheir own house; and they must have approved of it in their hearts in sofar as it expressed the characteristic objection of the senate as awhole to imperil the security of their imperial system, perhaps even toexpose the frontiers of their northern possessions now threatened bybarbarian hordes, through undertaking an unnecessary war in a southernprotectorate. But none the less they saw clearly the invidious elementsin the recent stroke of diplomacy, the combination of inconsistency anddishonesty exhibited in the comparison between the magnificentpreparations and the futile result--a result which, as interpreted bythe ordinary mind, made its authors seem corrupt and the senate lookridiculous. Their anxiety was increased by the fact that an immediatedecision on their part was imperative. Were they to sanction what hadbeen done, or to refuse to ratify the decision of the consul?[945] The latter was of itself an extreme step, but it was rendered still moredifficult by the fact that every one knew that Bestia would never haveventured on such a course had he not possessed the support ofScaurus. [946] To frame a decision which must be interpreted to mean avote of lack of confidence in Scaurus, was to unseat the head of theadministration, to abandon their ablest champion, perhaps to invite thesuccessful attacks of the leaders of the other camp who were lying inwait for the first false step of the powerful and crafty organiser. Again, as in the discussion which had followed the fall of Cirta, thedebates in the senate dragged on and there was a prospect of thequestion being indefinitely shelved--a result which, when the popularagitation had cooled, would have meant the acceptance of the existingstate of things. Again the stimulus to greater rapidity of decision wassupplied by Memmius. The leader of the agitation was now invested withthe tribunate, and his position gave him the opportunity of unfetteredintercourse with the people. His _Contiones_ were the feature of theday, [947] and these popular addresses culminated in the exhortationwhich he addressed to the crowd after the return of the unhappy Bestia. His speech[948] shows Memmius to be both the product and the author ofthe general character which had now been assumed by this long continuedagitation on a special point. The golden opportunity had been gained ofemphasising anew the fundamental differences of interest between thenobility and the people, of reviewing the conduct of the governing classin its continuous development during the last twenty years, [949] ofpointing out the miserable consequences of uncontrolled power, irresponsibility and impunity. For the purpose of investing an addresswith the dignity and authority which spring from distant historicalallusion, of brightening the prosaic present with something of theglamour of the half-mythical past, even of flattering his auditors withthe suggestion that they were the descendants and heirs of the men whohad seceded to the Aventine, it was necessary for a popular orator totouch on the great epoch of the struggle between the orders. ButMemmius, while satisfying the conditions of his art by the introductionof the subject, uses it only to point the contrast between the epochwhen liberty had been won and that wherein it had been lost, or toillustrate the uselessness of such heroic methods as the old secessionsas weapons against a nobility such as the present which was rushingheadlong to its own destruction. More important was the memory of thoserecent years which had seen the life of the people and of theirchampions become the plaything of a narrow oligarchy. The judicialmurders that had followed the overthrow of the Gracchi, the spirit ofabject patience with which they had been accepted and endured, were thesymbol of the absolute impunity of the oligarchy, the source of theirknowledge that they might use their power as they pleased. And how hadthey used it? A general category of their crimes would be misleading; itwas possible to exhibit an ascending scale of guilt. They had alwayspreyed on the commonwealth; but their earlier depredations might beborne in silence. Their earlier victims had been the allies anddependants of Rome; they had drawn revenues from kings and free peoples, they had pillaged the public treasury. But they had not yet begun to putup for sale the security of the empire and of Rome itself. Now this lastand monstrous stage had been reached. The authority of the senate, thepower which the people had delegated to its magistrate, had beenbetrayed to the most dangerous of foes; not satisfied with treating theallies of Rome as her enemies, the nobility were now treating herenemies as allies. [950] And what was the secret of the uncontrolledpower, the shameless indifference to opinion that made such misdeedspossible? It was to be found partly in the tolerance of the people--atolerance which was the result of the imposture which made ill-gainedobjects of plunder--consulships, priesthoods, triumphs--seem the proofof merit. But it was to be found chiefly in the fact that co-operationin crime had been raised to the dignity of a system which made for thesecurity of the criminal. The solidarity of the nobility, its verydetachment from the popular interest, was its main source of strength. It had ceased even to be a party; it had become a clique--a mere factionwhose community of hope, interest and fear had given it its presentposition of overweening strength. [951] This strength, which sprang fromperfect unity of design and action, could only be met and brokensuccessfully by a people fired with a common enthusiasm. But what formshould this enthusiasm assume? Should an adviser of the people advocatea violent resumption of its rights, the employment of force to punishthe men who have betrayed their country? No! Acts of violence mightindeed be the fitting reward for their conduct, but they are unworthyinstruments for the just vengeance of an outraged people. All that wedemand is full inquiry and publicity. The secrets of the recentnegotiations shall be probed. Jugurtha himself shall be the witness. Ifhe has surrendered to the Roman people, as we are told, he willimmediately obey your orders; if he despises your commands, you willhave an opportunity of knowing the true nature of that peace and thatsubmission which have brought to Jugurtha impunity for his crimes, to anarrow ring of oligarchs a large increase in their wealth, to the statea legacy of loss and shame. It was on this happily constructed dilemma that Memmius acted when hebrought his positive proposal before the people. It was to the effectthat the praetor Lucius Cassius Longinus should be sent to Jugurtha andbring him to Rome on the faith of a safe conduct granted by the State;Jugurtha's revelations were to be the key by which the secret chamber ofthe recent negotiations was to be unlocked, with the desired hope ofconvicting Scaurus and all others whose contact with the Numidian king, whether in the late or in past transactions, [952] had suggested theircorruption. The object of this mission had been rapidly regaining thecomplete control of Numidia, which had been momentarily shaken by theRoman invasion. The presence of the Roman army, some portion of whichwas still quartered in a part of his dominions, was no check on hisactivity; for the absence of the commander, the incapacity anddishonesty of the delegates whom he had left in his place, and thedemoralising indolence of the rank and file, had reduced the forces to acondition lower than that of mere ineffectiveness or lack of discipline. The desire of making a profit out of the situation pervaded every grade. The elephants which had been handed over by Jugurtha, were mysteriouslyrestored; Numidians who had espoused the cause of Rome and deserted fromthe army of the king--loyalists whom, whatever their motives andcharacter, Rome was bound to protect--were handed back to the king inexchange for a price;[953] districts already pacified were plundered bydesultory bands of soldiers. The Roman power in Numidia was completelybroken when Cassius arrived and revealed his mission to the king. Thestrange request would have alarmed a timid or ignorant ruler; Jugurthahimself wavered for a moment as to whether he should put himselfunreservedly into the power of a hostile people; but he had sufficientimagination and familiarity with Roman life to realise that theprinciples of international honour that prevailed amongst despoticmonarchies were not those of the great Republic even at its presentstage, and he professed himself encouraged by the words of the amiablepraetor that "since he had thrown himself on the mercy of the Romanpeople, he would do better to appeal to their pity than to challengetheir might". [954] His guide added his own word of honour to that of theRepublic, and such was the repute of Cassius that this assurance helpedto remove the momentary scruples of the king. Once he was assured ofpersonal safety, Jugurtha's visit to Rome became merely a matter ofpolicy, and his rapid mind must have surveyed every issue depending onhis acceptance or refusal before he committed himself to so doubtful astep. His real plan of action is unfortunately unknown; for we possessbut the barest outline of these incidents, and we have no information onthe really vital point whether communications had reached him from hissupporters in the capital, which enabled him to predict the courseevents would take if he obeyed the summons of Cassius. Had suchcommunications reached him, he might have known that the projectedinvestigation would be nugatory. But a failure in the purpose for whichhe was summoned could convey no benefit to Jugurtha or his supporters;it would simply incense the people and place both the king, and hisfriends amongst the nobility, in a worse position than before. Thecourse of action, by turns sullen, shifty and impudent, which he pursuedat Rome, must have been due to the exigencies of the moment and thefrantic promptings of his frightened friends; for it could scarcely haveappealed to a calculating mind as a procedure likely to lead to fruitfulresults. Its certain issue was war; but war could be had without thetrouble of a journey to Rome. He had but to stay where he was anddecline the people's request, and this policy of passive resistancewould have the further merit of saving his dignity as a king. It mayseem strange that he never adopted the bold but simple plan of standingup in Rome and telling the whole truth, or at least such portions of thetruth as might have satisfied the people. It was a course of action thatmight have secured him his crown. Doubtless if his transactions withRoman officials had been innocent, the truth, if he adhered to it, mightnot have been believed; but, if his evidence was damning, the peoplemight well have been turned from the insignificant question "Who was tobe King of Numidia?" to the supreme task of punishing the traitors whomhe denounced. But we have no right to read Jugurtha's character by thelight of the single motive of a self-interest which knew no scruples. Hemay have had his own ideas of honour and of the protection due to abenefactor or a trusty agent. Self-interest too might in this mattercome to the aid of sentiment; for it was at least possible that thepopular storm might spend its fury and leave the nobility still holdingtheir ground. So far as we with our imperfect knowledge can discern, Jugurtha could have had no definite plan of action when he consented totake the journey to Rome. But he had abundant prospects, if even hepossessed no plan. His presence in the capital was a decided advantage, in so far as it enabled him to confer with his leading supporters, andto attend to a matter affecting his dynastic interests which we shallsoon find arousing the destructive energy which was becoming habitual tohis jealous and impatient mind. When Jugurtha appeared in Rome under the guidance of Cassius, he hadlaid aside all the emblems of sovereignty and assumed the sordid garbthat befitted a suppliant for the mercy of the sovereign people. [955] Heseemed to have come, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as asuspected criminal who appeared in his own defence. He was still keepingup the part of one whom the fortune of war had thrown absolutely intothe power of the conquering state--a part perhaps suggested by thefriendly Cassius, but one that was perfectly in harmony with thepretensions of Bestia and Scaurus. But the heart beneath that miserabledress beat high with hope, and he was soon cheered by messages from thecircle of his friends at Rome and apprised of the means which had beentaken to baffle the threatened investigation, [956] The senate had, asusual, a tribune at its service. Caius Baebius was the name of the manwho was willing to play the part, so familiar to the practice of theconstitution, of supporter of the government against undue encroachmentson its power and dignity, or against over-hasty action by the leaders ofthe people. The government undoubtedly had a case. It was contrary toall accepted notions of order and decency that a protected king shouldbe used as a political instrument by a turbulent tribune. Memmius hadimpeached no one and had given no notice of a public trial; yet heintended to bring Jugurtha before a gathering of the rabble and ask himto blacken the names of the foremost men in Rome. It was exceedinglyprobable that the grotesque proceeding would lead to a breach of thepeace; the sooner it was stopped, the better; and, although it wasunfortunately impossible to prevent Memmius from initiating the drama bybringing forward his protagonist, the law had luckily provided means forending the performance before the climax had been reached. It wasbelieved that the sound constitutional views of Baebius werestrengthened by a great price paid by Jugurtha, [957] and, if we care tobelieve one more of those charges of corruption, the multitude of whichhad not palled even on the easily wearied mind of the lively Roman, itis possible to imagine that the implicated members of the senate, inwhose interest far more than in that of Jugurtha Baebius was acting, hadpersuaded the king that it was to his advantage to make the gift. The eagerly awaited day arrived, on which the scandal-loving ears of thepeople were to be filled to the full with the iniquities of theirrulers, on which their long-cherished suspicions should be changed to apleasantly anticipated certainty. Memmius summoned his Contio andproduced the king. Even the suppliant garb of Jugurtha did not save himfrom a howl of execration. From the tribunal, to which he had been ledby the tribune, he looked over a sea of angry faces and threateninghands, while his ears were deafened by the roar of fierce voices, somecrying that he should be put in bonds, others that he should suffer thedeath of the traitor if he failed to reveal the partners of hiscrimes. [958] Memmius, anxious for the dignity of his unusual proceedingswhich were being marred by this frantic outburst, used all his effortsto secure order and a patient hearing, and succeeded at length inimposing silence on the crowd--a silence which perhaps marked thatpsychological moment when pent up feeling had found its full expressionand passion had given way to curiosity. The tribune also vehementlyasserted his intention of preserving inviolate the safe conduct whichhad been granted by the State. He then led the king forward[959] andbegan a recital of the catalogue of his deeds. He spared him nothing;his criminal activity at Rome and in Numidia, his outrages on hisfamily--the whole history of that career, as it continued to live in theminds of democrats, was fully rehearsed. He concluded the story, whichhe assumed to be true, by a request for the important details of whichfull confirmation was lacking. "Although the Roman people understood bywhose assistance and ministry all this had been done, yet they wished tohave their suspicions finally attested by the king. If he revealed thetruth, he could repose abundant hope on the honour and clemency of theRoman people; if he refused to speak, he would not help the partners ofhis guilt, but his silence would ruin both himself and his future. "Memmius ceased and asked the king for a reply; Baebius stepped forwardand ordered the king to be silent. [960] The voice of Jugurtha couldlegally find utterance only through the will of the magistrate whocommanded; it was stifled by the prohibition of the colleague whoforbade. The people were in the presence of one of those gallingrestraints on their own liberty to which the jealousy of the magistracy, expressed in the constitutional creations of their ancestors, so oftenled. Baebius was immediately subjected to the terrorism which Octavius, his forerunner in tribunician constancy, had once withstood. The franticmob scowled, shouted, made rushes for the tribunal, and used everyeffort short of personal assault which anger could suggest, to break thespirit of the man who balked their will. But the resolution--or, as hisenemies said, the shamelessness[961]--of Baebius prevailed. Themultitude, tricked of its hopes, melted from the Forum in gloomydiscontent. It is said that the hopes of Bestia and his friends rosehigh. [962] Perhaps they had lived too long in security to realise thedanger threatened by a disappointed crowd that might meet to betterpurpose some future day; that had gained from the insulting scene itselfan embittered confirmation of its views, with none of the softeninginfluence which springs from a curiosity completely satiated; that, asan assembly of the sovereign people, might at any moment avenge thelatest outrage which had been inflicted on its dignity. Jugurtha had, perhaps through no fault of his own, sorely tried thepatience of the people on the one occasion on which, as a professedsuppliant, he had come into contact with his sovereign. He was now, onhis own initiative, to try it yet further, and to test it in a mannerwhich aroused the horror and resentment of many who did not share theviews of Memmius. The king was not the only representative ofMasinissa's house at present to be found in Rome. There resided in thecity, as a fugitive from his power, his cousin Massiva, son of Gulussaand grandson of Masinissa. It is not known why this scion of the royalhouse had been passed over in the regulation of the succession, althoughit is easily intelligible that Micipsa, with two sons of his own, mightnot have wished to increase the number of co-regents of Numidia byrecognising his brother's heirs, and would not have done so had he notbeen forced by circumstances to adopt Jugurtha. During the earlystruggles between the three kings, Massiva had attached himself to theparty of Hiempsal and Adherbal, and had thus incurred Jugurtha's enmity;but he had continued to live in Numidia as long as there was any hope ofthe continuance of the dual kingship. The fall of Cirta and the death ofAdherbal had forced him to find a refuge at Rome, where he continued toreside in peace until fate suddenly made him a pawn in the politicalgame. At last there had arisen a definite section amongst the nobilitywhich found it to its interest to offer an active opposition toJugurtha's claims. The consuls who succeeded Bestia and Nasica, wereSpurius Albinus and Quintus Minucius Rufus. The latter had won theprovince of Macedonia and the protection of the north-eastern frontier;to the former had fallen Numidia and the conduct of affairs in Africa. The fact that the senate had declared Numidia a consular province beforethe close of the previous year, was the ostensible proof that they hadyielded to the pressure applied by Memmius and nominally at leastrepudiated the pacification effected by Bestia and Scaurus. But therejection of this arrangement seems never to have been officiallydeclared; there was still a chance of the recognition of Jugurtha'sclaims, and of the governor of Numidia being assigned the ingloriousfunction of seeing to the restoration of the king and then evacuatinghis territory. Such a modest _rôle_ did not at all harmonise with theviews of Albinus. He wished a real command and a genuine war; but it wasnot easy to wage such a war as long as Jugurtha was the only candidatein the field. Even if his surrender were regarded as fictitious and thewar were resumed on that ground, it was difficult to assign it anultimate object, since the senate had no intention of making Numidia aprovince. But the object which would make the war a living reality couldbe secured, if a pretender were put forward for the Numidian crown; andsuch a pretender Albinus sought in the scion of Masinissa's race nowresident in Rome, whose birth gave him a better hereditary claim thanJugurtha himself. The consul approached Massiva and urged him to make acase out of the odium excited and the fears inspired by Jugurtha'scrimes, and to approach the senate with a request for the kingdom ofNumidia. [963] The prince caught at the suggestion, the petition wasprepared, and this new and unexpected movement began to make itselffelt. Jugurtha's fear and anger were increased by the sudden discoverythat his friends at Rome were almost powerless to help him. They couldnot parade a question of principle when it came to persons; a kingdom inNumidia was more easily defended than its king; every act of assistancewhich they rendered plunged them deeper in the mire of suspicion; it wasa time to walk warily, for those who had no judge in their ownconscience found one in the keen scrutiny of a hostile world. But thedanger was too great to permit Jugurtha to relax his efforts through thefailure of his friends. He appealed to his own resources, whichconsisted of the passive obedience of his immediate attendants and thepower of his purse. To Bomilcar his most trusted servant he gave themission of making one final effort with the gold which had already doneso much. Men might be hired who would lie in wait for Massiva. Ifpossible, the matter was to be effected secretly. If secrecy wasimpossible, the Numidian must yet be slain. His death was deserving ofany risk. Bomilcar was prompt in carrying out his mission. A band ofhired spies watched every movement of Massiva. They learnt the hours atwhich he left and returned to his home; the places he visited, the timesat which his visits were paid. When the seasonable hour arrived, theambush was set by Bomilcar. The elaborate precautions which had beentaken proved to have been thrown away; the assassin who struck the fatalblow was no adept in the art of secret killing. Hardly had Massivafallen when the alarm was given and the murderer seized. [964] The menwho had an interest in Massiva's life were too numerous and too great tomake it possible for the act to sink to the level of ordinary streetoutrages, or for the assassin caught red-handed to be regarded as thesole author of the crime. The consul Albinus amongst others pressed themurderer to reveal the instigator of the deed, and the senate must havepromised the immunity that was sometimes given to the criminal who namedhis accomplices. The man named Bomilcar, who was thereupon formallyarraigned of the murder and bound over to stand his trial before acriminal court. Even this step was taken with considerable hesitation, for it was admitted that the safe-conduct which protected Jugurthaextended to his retinue. [965] The king and his court were strictlyspeaking extra-territorial, and the strict letter of international lawwould have handed Bomilcar over for trial by his sovereign. But it wasfelt that a departure from custom was a less evil than to allow such anoutrage to remain unpunished, and it was easier to satisfy the popularconscience by finding Bomilcar guilty than to fix the crime on the manwhom every one named as its ultimate author. Jugurtha himself wasinclined for a time to acquiesce in this view; he regarded the trial ofhis favourite as inevitable and furnished fifty of his own acquaintanceswho were willing to give bail for the appearance of the accused. Butreflection convinced him that the sacrifice was unnecessary; his namecould not be saved by Bomilcar's doom, and no influence or wealth couldcreate even a pretence at belief in his own innocence. His standing inRome was gone, and this made him the more eager to consider his standingas King of Numidia. If Bomilcar were sacrificed, his powerlessness toprotect the chief member of his retinue might shake the allegiance ofhis own subjects. [966] He therefore smuggled his accused henchman fromRome and had him conveyed secretly to Numidia. This, of all Jugurtha'sacts of perfidy perhaps the mildest and most excusable, in spite of theawkward predicament in which it left the fifty securities, was the lastof the baffling incidents that had been crowded into his short sojournat Rome. His presence must have been an annoyance to every one. He hadexhausted his friends, had failed to serve the purposes of theopposition leader, and had inspired in the senate memories andanticipations which they were willing to forget. When that body orderedhim to quit Italy--it must have expressed the wish of every class. Within a few days of Bomilcar's disappearance the king himself wasleaving the gates. It is said that he often turned and took a long andsilent look at the distant town, and that at last the words broke fromhim "A city for sale and ripe for ruin, if only a purchaser can befound!" [967] The departure of Jugurtha implied the renewal of the war. The compactmade with Bestia and Scaurus had been tacitly, if not formally, repudiated by the senate, and the fiction that Jugurtha had surrendered, although it had played its part in the negotiations which brought him toRome, disappeared with the compact. Since, however, the right ofJugurtha to retain Numidia, which was the objectionable element in thelate agreement, seems to have been implied rather than expressed, it mayhave seemed possible to take the view that Jugurtha's surrender wasunconditional, and that the war was now the pursuit of an escapedprisoner of Rome. Such a conception was absolutely worthless so far asmost of the practical difficulties of the task were concerned; for, whether Jugurtha was an enemy or a rebel, he was equally difficult tosecure; but it may have had a considerable influence on the principleson which the Numidian war was now to be conducted, and we shall find onthe part of Rome a growing disinclination to give Jugurtha the benefitsof those rules of civilised warfare of which she generally professed ascrupulous observance in the letter if not in the spirit. The object ofthe war was, through its very simplicity, extraordinarily difficult ofattainment. It was neither more nor less than the seizure of the personof Jugurtha. Numidia had no common government and no unity but thosepersonified in its king, and the conquest of fragments of the countrywould be almost useless until the king was secured. The hope of settingup a rival pretender, whose recognition by Rome might have enabledorganisation to keep pace with conquest, had perished with the murder ofMassiva, [968] although it is very questionable whether the name even ofthe son of the warlike Gulussa would have detached any of the militarystrength of Numidia from a monarch who had stirred the fighting spiritof the nation and was regarded as the embodiment of its manliesttraditions. The outlook of the consul Albinus, the new organiser of thewar on the Roman side, was indeed a poor one, and it was made stillpoorer by the fact that a considerable portion of his year of office hadalready lapsed, and the events of his campaign must of necessity becrowded into the few remaining months of the summer and the earlyautumn. Had there been any spirit of self-sacrifice in Roman commanders, or any true continuity in Roman military policies, Albinus might haveset himself the useful task of organising victory for his successors;yet he cannot be wholly blamed for the hope, wild and foolish as itseems, of striking some decisive blow in the narrow time allowedhim. [969] The military operations of the war at this stage become almostwholly subordinate to political considerations. Senate and consuls werebeing swept off their feet and forced into a disastrous celerity orsuperficiality of action by the growing tide of indignation whichanimated commons and capitalists alike; and the feeling that somethingdecisive must be accomplished for the satisfaction of public opinion, was supplemented by the lower but very human consideration that ageneral must seem to have attained some success if he hoped to have hiscommand prolonged for another year. The senate, it is true, might haveinsight enough to see that success in a war such as that in Numidiacould not be gauged by the brilliance of the results obtained; but howwere they to defend their verdict to the people unless they could pointto exploits such as would dazzle the popular eye? But although afeverish policy seemed the readiest mode of escape from public suspicionor inglorious retirement, it had its own particular nemesis, of whichAlbinus seemed for the moment to be oblivious. To finish the war in ashort time meant to finish it by any means that came to hand. But, if astriking victory did not surrender Jugurtha into the hands of hisconqueror--and even the most glorious victory did not under thecircumstances of the war imply the capture of the vanquished--what meansremained except negotiation and the voluntary surrender of theking?[970] Such means had been employed by Bestia, and every one knewnow with what result. The policy of haste might breed more suspicion andbitterness than the most desultory conduct of the campaign. Albinus made rapid but ample preparation of supplies, money andmunitions of war, and hurried off to the scene of his intendedsuccesses. The army which he found must have been in a miserablecondition, if we may judge by the state which the last glimpse of itrevealed; but his fixed intention of accomplishing something, no matterwhat, must have rendered adequate re-organisation impossible, and hetook the field against Jugurtha with forces whose utter demoralisationwas soon to be put to a frightful test. The war immediately assumed thatcharacter of an unsuccessful hunt, varied by indecisive engagements andfruitless victories, which it was to retain even under the guidance ofthe ablest that Rome could furnish. Jugurtha adhered to his inevitableplan of a prolonged and desultory campaign over a vast area of country;the size and physical character of his kingdom, the extraordinarymobility of his troops, the credulity and anxious ambition of hisopponent, were all elements of strength which he used with consummateskill. He retired before the threatening column; then, that his menmight not lose heart, he threw himself with startling suddenness on thefoe; at other times he mocked the consul with hopes of peace, enteredinto negotiations for a surrender and, when he had disarmed hisadversary by hopes, suddenly drew back in a pretended access ofdistrust. The futility of Albinus's efforts was so pronounced--afutility all the more impressive from the intensity of his preparationsand his excessive eagerness to reach the field of action--that peopleignorant of the conditions of the campaign began again to whisper theperpetual suspicion of collusion with the king. [971] The suspicion mightnot have been avoided even by a commander who declined negotiation; butAlbinus's case had been rendered worse by his unsuccessful efforts toplay with a master of craft, and it was with a reputation greatlyweakened from a military, and slightly damaged from a moral, point ofview that he brought the campaign to a close, sent his army into winterquarters, and left for Rome to preside at the electoral meetings of thepeople. [972] The Comitia for the appointment of the consuls and thepraetors were at this time held during the latter half of the year, butat no regular date, the time for their summons depending on theconvenience of the presiding consul and on his freedom from other andmore pressing engagements. [973] Albinus may have arrived in Rome duringthe late autumn. Had he been able to get the business over and return toAfrica for the last month or two of the year, his conduct of the warmight have been considered ineffective but not disastrous, and thesenate might have been spared a problem more terrible than any that hadyet arisen out of its relations with Jugurtha. For Albinus, thoughsanguine and unpractical, seems to have been reasonably prudent, and hemight have handed over an army, unsuccessful but not disgraced, andrecruited in strength by its long winter quarters, to the care of a morefortunate successor. But, as it happened, every public department inRome was feeling the strain caused by a minor constitutional crisiswhich had arisen amongst the magistrates of the Plebs. The suddenrevival of the people's aspirations had doubtless led to a certainamount of misguided ambition on the part of some of its leaders, and thetribunate was now the centre of an agitation which was a faintcounterpart of the closing scenes in the Gracchan struggles. Twooccupants of the office, Publius Lucullus and Lucius Annius, wereattempting to secure re-election for another year. Their colleaguesresisted their effort, probably on the ground that the conditionsrequisite for re-election were not in existence, and this conflict notmerely prevented the appointment of plebeian magistrates from beingcompleted, but stayed the progress of the other elective Comitia aswell. [974] The tribunes, whether those who aimed at re-election or thosewho attempted to prevent it, had either declared a _justitium_ orthreatened to veto every attempt made by a magistrate of the people tohold an electoral assembly; and the consequence of this impasse wasthat, when the year drew to a close, [975] no new magistrates were inexistence and the consul Albinus was still absent from hisAfrican command. Unfortunately the absence of the proconsul, as Albinus had now become indefault of the appointment of a successor, did not have the effect ofchecking the enterprise of the army. It was now under the authority ofAulus Albinus, to whom his brother had delegated the command of theprovince and the forces during his stay at Rome. The stimulus whichmoved Aulus to action is not known. The unexpected duration of histemporary command may have familiarised him with power, stimulated hisundoubted confidence in himself, and suggested the hope that by one ofthose unexpected blows, with which the annals of strategic genius werefilled, he might redeem his brother's reputation and win lasting gloryfor himself. Others believed that the perpetually suspected motive ofcupidity was the basis of his enterprise, that he had no definitelyconceived plan of conquest, but intended by the terror of a militarydemonstration to exact money from Jugurtha. [976] If the latter view wascorrect, it is possible that Aulus imagined himself to be acting in theinterest of his army as well as of himself. The long winter quarters mayhave betrayed a deficiency in pay and provisions, and if Jugurthapurchased the security of a district, its immunity would be too publican event to make it possible for the commander of the attacking forcesto pocket the whole of the ransom. It was in the month of January, in the very heart of a severe winter, that Aulus summoned his troops from the security of their quarters to along and fatiguing march. His aim was Suthul, a strongly fortified poston the river Ubus, nearly forty miles south of Hippo Regius and the sea, and so short a distance from the larger and better-known town of Calama, the modern Gelma, that the latter name was sometimes used to describethe scene of the incidents that followed. [977] We are not told the siteof the winter quarters from which the march began; but theineffectiveness of the former campaign and the caution of Albinus, whodid not mean his legions to fight during his absence, might lead us tosuppose that the troops had been quartered in or near the Romanprovince; and in this case Aulus might have marched along the valley ofthe Bagradas to reach his destined goal, which would finally have beenapproached from the south through a narrow space between two ranges ofhills, the westernmost of which was crowned at its northern end by thefortifications of Suthul. This was reported to be the chieftreasure-city of Jugurtha; could Aulus capture it, or even bargain forits security with the king, he might cripple the resources of theNumidian monarch and win great wealth for himself and his army. By longand fatiguing marches he reached the object of his attack, only todiscover at the first glance that it was impregnable--nay even, as asoldier's eye would have seen, that an investment of the place wasutterly impossible. [978] The rigour of the season had aggravated thedifficulties presented by the site. Above towered the city walls perchedon their precipitous rock; below was the alluvial plain which thedeluging rains of a Numidian winter had turned into a swamp of liquidmud. Yet Aulus, either dazzled by the vision of the gold concealedwithin the fortress which it had caused him such labour to reach, orwith some vague idea that a pretence at an investment might alarm theking into coming to terms for the protection of his hoard, began to makeformal preparations for a siege, to bring up mantlets, to mark out hislines of circumvallation, [979] to deceive his enemy, if he could notdeceive himself, into a belief that the conditions rendered an attack onSuthul possible. It is needless to say that Jugurtha knew the possibilities of histreasure-city far better than its assailant. But the simple device ofAulus was admirably suited to his plans. Humble messages soon reachedthe camp of the legate; the missives of every successive envoy augmentedhis illusion and stirred his idle hopes to a higher pitch. Jugurtha'sown movements began to give proof of a state of abject terror. So farfrom coming to the relief of his threatened city, he drew his forcesfarther away into the most difficult country he could find, everywherequitting the open ground for sheltered spots and mountain paths. At lastfrom a distance he began to hold out definite hopes of an agreement withAulus. But it was one that must be transacted personally and in private. The plain round Suthul was much too public a spot; let the legate followthe king into the fastnesses of the desert and all would be arranged. The legate advanced as the king retired; but at every point of thedifficult march Numidian spies were hovering around the Roman column. The disgust of the soldiers at the hardships to which they had beensubmitted in the pursuit of this phantom gold, the last evidence ofwhich had vanished when their commander turned his back on the walls ofSuthul, now resulted in a frightful state of demoralisation. The lowerofficers in authority, centurions and commanders of squadrons of horse, stole from the camp to hold converse with Jugurtha's spies; some soldthemselves to desert to the Numidian army, others to quit their posts ata given signal. The mesh was at last prepared. On one dark night, at thehour of the first sleep when attack is least suspected, the camp ofAulus was suddenly surrounded by the Numidian host. The surprise wascomplete. The Roman soldiers, in the shock of the sudden din, wereutterly unnerved. Some groped for their arms; others cowered in theirtents; a few tried to create some order amongst their terror-strickencomrades. But nowhere could a real stand be made or real disciplineobserved. The blackness of the night and the heavy driving cloudsprevented the numbers of the enemy from being seen, and the size of theNumidian host, large in itself, was perhaps increased by a terrifiedimagination. It was difficult to say on which side the greater dangerlay. Was it safer to fly into darkness and some unknown ambush or tokeep one's ground and meet the approaching enemy? The evils ofpreconcerted treachery were soon added to those of surprise. Thedefections were greatest amongst the auxiliary forces. A cohort ofLigurian infantry with two squadrons of Thracian cavalry deserted to theking. Their example was followed by but a handful of the legionaries;but the fatal act of treason was committed by a Roman centurion of thefirst rank. He let the Numidians through the post which he had beengiven to defend, and through this ingress they poured to every part ofthe camp. The panic was now complete; most of the Romans threw theirarms away and fled from slaughter to the temporary safety of aneighbouring hill. The early hour at which the attack had been made, prevented an effective pursuit, for there was much of the night yet torun; and the Numidians were also busied with the plunder of the camp. The dawn of day revealed the hopelessness of the Roman position andforced Aulus into any terms that Jugurtha cared to grant. The latteradopted the language of humane condescension. He said that, although heheld the Roman army at his mercy, certain victims of famine or thesword, yet he was not unmindful of the mutability of human fortune, andwould spare the lives of all his prisoners, if the Roman commander wouldmake a treaty with him. [980] The army was to pass under the yoke; theRomans were to evacuate Numidia within ten days. The degrading termswere accepted: an army that before its defeat had numbered fortythousand men, [981] passed under the spear that symbolised theirsubmission and disgrace, and peace reigned in Numidia--a peace whichlacked no element of shame, dictated by a client king to the sovereignthat had decreed his chastisement. The Roman public had become so familiar with discredit as to be in thehabit of imagining it even when it did not exist; but humiliationexhibited in an actual disaster on this colossal scale was sufficientlynovel to stir the people to the profoundest depths of grief andfear. [982] To men who thought only of the empire, its glory seemed to beextinguished by the fearful blow; but many of the masses, who knewnothing of war or of Rome's relations with peoples beyond the seas, werefilled with a fear too personal to permit their thoughts to dwell solelyon the loss of honour. To yet another class, whose knowledge exemptedthem from such idle terror, the army seemed more than the empire. Romehad not yet learnt to fight with mercenary forces; and the men who hadseen service formed a considerable element in the Roman proletariate. Such veterans, especially those whose repute in war could give theirwords an added point, were unmeasured in their condemnation of theconduct of Aulus. The general had had a sword in his hand; yet he hadthought a disgraceful capitulation his only means of deliverance. On noside could a word be heard in defence of the action of the unhappycommander. The blessings of the wives and children of the men whomAulus's treaty had saved were, if breathed, apparently smothered under aweight of patriotic execration. The feeling of insecurity must have been rendered greater by the factthat the State still lacked an official head, and the Africandependencies possessed no governor in whom any confidence could bereposed. The year must have opened with a series of _interregna_, sinceno consuls had been elected to assume the government on the 1st ofJanuary; Numidia had again been made by senatorial decree a consularprovince; but since no consul existed to assume the administration, Albinus was still in command of the African army. [983] It was thepainful duty of the ex-consul to raise in the senate the question of theratification of his brother's treaty. Even he could never have attemptedto defend it; his dominant feeling was an overwhelming sense of theweight of undeserved ignominy under which he lay, tempered by anundercurrent of fear as to the danger that might follow in the track ofthe universal disfavour with which he and his brother were regarded. Theaction that he took even before the senate's opinion was known, was aproof that he regarded the continuance of the war as inevitable. Herelieved his mind and sought to restore his credit by pushing onmilitary preparations with a fevered energy; supplementary drafts forthe African army were raised from the citizens; auxiliary cohorts weredemanded of the Latins and Italian allies. While these measures were inprogress, the judgment of the senate was given to the world. It was ajudgment based on the often-repeated maxim that no legitimate treatycould be concluded without the consent of the senate and people. [984] Itwas a decision that recalled the days of Numantia or the more distanthistory of the Caudine Forks; but the formal sacrifice that followed andwas thought to justify those famous instances of breach of contract, wasno longer deemed worthy of observance, and Aulus was not surrendered tothe vengeance or mercy of the foe with whom he had involuntarily brokenfaith. This summary invalidation of the treaty may have been the resultof a deduction drawn from the peculiar circumstances which had precededthe renewal of the war--circumstances which, as we have seen, might betwisted to support the view that Jugurtha was not an independent enemyof Rome and was, therefore, not entitled to the full rights of abelligerent. The senate's decision left Albinus free to act and to make use of thenew military forces that he had so strenuously prepared. But a suddenhindrance came from another quarter. Some tribunes expressed the notunreasonable view that a commander of Albinus's record should not beallowed to expose Rome's last resources to destruction. Had they meanthim to remain in command, their attitude would have been indefensible;but, when they forbade him to take the new recruits to Africa, [985] theywere merely reserving them for a more worthy successor. Albinus, however, meant to make the most of his limited tenure. He had his ownand his brother's honour to avenge, and within a few days of thesenate's decree permitting a renewal of the war, he had taken ship forthe African province, where the whole army, withdrawn from Numidia inaccordance with the compact, was now stationed in winter quarters. For atime his burning desire to clear his name made him blind to the defectsof his forces; he thought only of the pursuit of Jugurtha, of somevigorous stroke that might erase the stain from the honour of hisfamily. But hard facts soon restored the equilibrium of his naturallyprudent soul. The worst feature of the army was not that it had beenbeaten, but that it had not been commanded. The reins of discipline hadbeen so slack that licence and indulgence had sapped its fightingstrength. The tyranny of circumstances demanded a peaceful sojourn inthe province, and Albinus resigned himself to the inevitable. At Rome meanwhile the movement for inquiry that had been stayed for themoment by the co-operation of Jugurtha and his senatorial friends, andby the obstructive attitude of Baebius, had been resumed with greaterintensity and promise of success. It did not need the disaster of Aulusto re-awaken it to new life. That disaster no doubt accelerated itscourse and invested it with an unscrupulous thoroughness of characterthat it might otherwise have lacked; but the movement itself had perhapstaken a definite shape a month before the result of Aulus's experimentin Numidia was known, and was the natural result of the feeling ofresentment which the conspiracy of silence had created. It now assumedthe exact and legal form of the demand for a commission which shouldinvestigate, adjudicate and punish. The leaders of the people hadconceived the bold and original design of wresting from the hands, anddirecting against the person, of the senate the powerful weapon withwhich that body had so often visited epidemics of crime or turbulencethat were supposed to have fastened on the helpless proletariate. Downto this time special commissions had either been set up by theco-operation of senate and people, or had, with questionable legality, been established by the senate alone. The commissioners, who weresometimes consuls, sometimes praetors, had, perhaps always but certainlyin recent history, judged without appeal; and in the judicialinvestigations which followed the fall of the Gracchi, the people hadhad no voice either in the appointment of the judge or in theratification of the sentence which he pronounced. Now the senate as awhole was to be equally voiceless; it was not to be asked to take theinitiative in the creation of the court, the penalties were to bedetermined without reference to its advice, and although the presidentswould naturally be selected from members of the senatorial order, ifthey were to be chosen from men of eminence at all, these presidentswere to be merely formal guides of the proceedings, like the praetor whosat in the court which tried cases of extortion, and the verdict was tobe pronounced by judges inspired by the prevailing feeling of hostilityto the crimes of the official class. Caius Mamilius Limetanus, who proposed and probably aided in draftingthis bill, was a tribune who belonged to the college which perhaps cameinto office towards the close of the month of December which hadpreceded the recent disaster in Numidia. The bill, the promulgation ofwhich was probably one of the first acts of his tribunate, proposed"that an inquiry should be directed into the conduct of all thoseindividuals, whose counsel had led Jugurtha to neglect the decrees ofthe senate, who had taken money from the king whether as members ofcommissions or as holders of military commands, who had handed over tohim elephants of war and deserters from his army; lastly, all who hadmade agreements with enemies of the State on matters of peace orwar". [986] The comprehensive nature of the threatened inquiry spreadterror amongst the ranks of the suspected. The panic was no sign ofguilt; a party warfare was to be waged with the most undisguised partyweapons: and mere membership of the suspected faction aroused fearsalmost as acute as those which were excited by the consciousness ofguilt, There was a prospect of rough and ready justice, where proofmight rest on prepossession and verdicts be considered preordained. Thebitterness of the situation was increased by the impossibility of openresistance to the measure; for such a resistance would imply anunwillingness to submit to inquiry, and such a refusal, invidious initself, would fix suspicion and be accepted as a confession of misdeedswhich could not bear the light of investigation. With the cityproletariate against them, the threatened members of the aristocracycould look merely to secret opposition by their own supporters, and tosuch moderate assistance as was secured by the friendly attitude whichtheir recent agrarian measures had awakened in the Latins and Italianallies. [987] But the latter support was moral rather than material, orif it became effective, could only secure this character by fraud. Theallies, whom the senate had driven from Rome by Pennus's law, wereapparently to be invited to flood the _contiones_ and raise cries ofprotest against the threatened indictment. But this device could only besuccessful in the preliminary stages of the agitation. The Latinspossessed but few votes, the Italians none, and personation, if resortedto, was not likely to elude the vigilance of the hostile presidents ofthe tribunician assembly, or, if undetected, to be powerful enough toturn the scale in favour of the aristocracy. For the unanimity ofopposition which the nobility now encountered in the citizen body, wasalmost unexampled. The differences of interest which sometimes separatedthe country from the city voters, seem now to have been forgotten. Thetribunes found no difficulty in keeping the agitation up to fever-heat, and its permanence was as marked as its intensity. The crowds thatacclaimed the proposal, were sufficiently in earnest to remain at Romeand vote for it; the emphasis with which the masses assembled at thefinal meeting, "ordered, decreed and willed" the measure submitted fortheir approval, was interpreted (perhaps rightly) as a shout oftriumphant defiance of the nobility, not as a vehement expression ofdisinterested affection for the State. [988] The two emotions were indeedblended; but the imperial sentiment is oftenest aroused by danger; andthe individuals who have worked the mischief are the concrete element ina situation, the reaction against which has roused the exaltation whichveils vengeance and hatred under the names of patriotism and justice. When the measure had been passed, it still remained to appoint thecommissioners. This also was to be effected by the people's vote, andnever perhaps was the effect of habit on the popular mind morestrikingly exhibited than when Scaurus, who was thought to be tremblingas a criminal, was chosen as a judge. [989] The large personal following, which he doubtless possessed amongst the people, must have remainedunshaken by the scandals against his name; but the reflection amongstall classes that any business would be incomplete which did not securethe co-operation of the head of the State, was perhaps a still morepotent factor in his election. Never was a more splendid testimonialgiven to a public man, and it accompanied, or prepared the way for, thegreatest of all honours that it was in the power of the Comitia tobestow--the control of morals which Scaurus was in that very year toexercise as censor. [990] The presence of the venerable statesman amongstthe three commissioners created under the Mamilian law, could not, however, exercise a controlling influence on the judgments of thespecial tribunal. Such an influence was provided against by the verystructure of the new courts. The three commissioners were not to judgebut merely to preside; for in the constitution of this commission thenew departure was taken of modelling it on the pattern of the newlyestablished standing courts, and the judges who gave an uncontrolled andfinal verdict were men selected on the same qualifications as thosewhich produced the Gracchan jurors, and were perhaps taken from the listalready in existence for the trial of cases of extortion. The knightswere, therefore, chosen as the vehicle for the popular indignation, andthe result justified the choice. The impatience of a hampered commerce, and perhaps of an outraged feeling of respectability, spent itselfwithout mercy on the devoted heads of some of the proudest leaders ofthe faction that had so long controlled the destinies of the State. Expedition in judgment was probably secured by dividing thecommissioners into three courts, each with his panel of _judices_ andall acting concurrently. It was still more effectually secured by themode in which evidence was heard, tested and accepted, and by thescandalous rapidity with which judgment was pronounced. The courts wereinfluenced by every chance rumour and swayed by the wild caprices ofpublic opinion. No sane democrat could in the future pretend to regardthe Mamilian commission as other than an outrage on the name of justice;to the philosophic mind it seemed that a sudden turn in fortune's wheelhad brought to the masses the same intoxication in the sense ofunbridled power that had but a moment before been the disgrace of thenobility. [991] An old score was wiped off when Lucius Opimius, theauthor of the downfall of Caius Gracchus, was condemned. Three othernames completed the tale of victims who had been rendered illustrious bythe possession of the consular _fasces_. Lucius Bestia was convicted forthe conclusion of that dark treaty with Jugurtha, although hiscounsellor Scaurus had been elevated to the Bench. Spurius Albinus fella victim to his own caution and the blunder of his too-enterprisingbrother; the caution was supposed to have been purchased by Jugurtha'sgold, and the absent pro-consul was perhaps held responsible for therashness or cupidity of his incompetent legate, who does not seem tohave been himself assailed. Caius Porcius Cato was emerging from thecloud of a recent conviction for extortion only to feel the weight of amore crushing judgment which drove him to seek a refuge on Spanish soil. Caius Sulpicius Galba, although he had held no dominant position in thesecular life of the State, was a distinguished member of the religioushierarchy; but even the memorable speech which he made in his defencedid not save him from being the first occupant of a priestly office tobe condemned in a criminal court at Rome. [992] We do not know the number of criminals discovered by the Mamiliancourts, and perhaps only the names of their more prominent victims havebeen preserved. The worldly position of these victims may, however, havesaved others of lesser note, and the dignity of the sacrifice may havebeen regarded in the fortunate light of a compensation for its limitedextent. The object of the people and of their present agents, theknights, so far as a rational object can be discerned in such a carnivalof rage and vengeance, was to teach a severe lesson to the governingclass. Their full purpose had been attained when the lesson had beentaught. It was not their intention, any more than it had been that ofCaius Gracchus, to usurp the administrative functions of government orto attempt to wrest the direction of foreign administration out of thesenate's hands. The time for that further step might not be long incoming; but for the present both the lower and middle classes haltedjust at the point where destructive might have given place toconstructive energy. The leaders of the people may have felt the entirelack of the organisation requisite for detailed administration, and theright man who might replace the machine had not yet been found; whilethe knights may, in addition to these convictions, have been influencedby their characteristic dislike of pushing a popular movement to anextreme which would remove it from the guidance of the middle class. The senate had indeed learnt a lesson, and from this time onward thehistory of the Numidian war is simplified by the fact that its progresswas determined by strategic, not by political, considerations. There isno thought of temporising with the enemy; the one idea is to reduce himto a condition of absolute submission--a submission which it was knowncould be secured only by the possession of his person. It is true thatthe conduct of the campaign became more than ever a party question; butthe party struggle turned almost wholly on the military merit of thecommander sent to the scene of action, and although there was asuspicion that the war was being needlessly prolonged for the purpose ofgratifying personal ambition, there was no hint of the secret operationof influences that were wholly corrupt. Such a suspicion was renderedimpossible by the personality of the man who now took over the conductof the campaign. The tardily elected consuls for the year were QuintusCaecilius Metellus and Marcus Junius Silanus. Of these Metellus was tohold Numidia and Silanus Gaul. [993] It is possible that, in the counselsof the previous year, considerations of the Numidian campaign may tosome extent have determined the election of Metellus; the senate mayhave welcomed the candidature of a man of approved probity, although notof approved military skill, for the purpose of obviating the chance ofanother scandal; and the people may in the same spirit have now ratifiedhis election. But, when we remember the almost mechanical system ofadvancement to the higher offices which prevailed at this time, it isequally possible that Metellus's day had come, that the senate wasfortunate rather than prescient in its choice of a servant, and that, although the people in their present temper would probably have rejecteda suspicious character, they accepted rather than chose Metellus. Theexisting system did not even make it possible to elect a man who wouldcertainly have the conduct of the African war; and if we suppose that inthis particular case the division of the consular provinces did notdepend on the unadulterated use of the lot, but was settled by agreementor by a mock sortition, [994] the probity rather than the genius ofMetellus must have determined the choice, for Silanus was assigned atask of far more vital importance to the welfare of Rome and Italy. The repute of Metellus was based on the fact that, although anaristocrat and a staunch upholder of the privileges of his order, he washonest in his motives and, so far at least as civic politics wereconcerned, straightforward in his methods. Rome was reaching a stage atwhich the dramatic probity of Hellenic annals, as exemplified by thenames of an Aristeides or a Xenocrates, could be employed as a measureto exalt one member of a government among his fellows; theincorruptibility which had so lately been the common property ofall, [995] had become the monopoly of a few, and Metellus was a witnessto the folly of a caste which had not recognised the policy of honesty. The completeness with which the prize for character might be won, wasshown by the attitude of a jury before which he had been impeached on acharge of extortion. Even the jealous _Equites_ did not deign to glanceat the account-books which were handed in, but pronounced an immediateverdict of acquittal. [996] But the merely negative virtue ofunassailability by grossly corrupting influences could not have been theonly source of the equable repute which Metellus enjoyed amongst themasses. It was but one of the signs of the self-sufficient directness, repose and courtesy, which marked the better type of the new nobility, of a life that held so much that it needed not to grasp at more, of theprotecting impulse and the generosity which, in the purer type of mindsconstricted by conservative prejudices, is an outcome of the convictionof the unbridgeable gulf that separates the classes. The nobility ofMetellus was wholly in his favour; it justified the senate while ithypnotised the people. The man who was now consul and would probablywithin a short space of time attach the name of a conquered nationalityto his own, was but fulfilling the accepted destiny of his family. Metellus could show a father, a brother, an uncle and four cousins, allof whom had held the consulship. Since the middle of the second centurytitles drawn from three conquered peoples had become appellatives ofbranches of his race. His uncle had derived a name from Macedon, acousin from the Baliares, his own elder brother from the Dalmatians. Itremained to see whether the best-loved member of this favoured racewould be in a position to add to the family names the imposingdesignation of Numidicus. Metellus was a man of intellect and energy as well as of character, [997]and he showed himself sufficiently exempt from the prejudices of hiscaste, and sufficiently conscious of the seriousness of the work inhand, to choose real soldiers, not diplomatists or ornamental warriors, as his lieutenants. If the restiveness of Marius had left a disturbingmemory behind, it was judiciously forgotten by the consul, who drew the_protégé_ of his family from the uncongenial atmosphere of the city torender services in the field, and to teach an ambitious and somewhatembittered man that each act of skill and gallantry was performed forthe glory of his superior. Another of his legates was Publius RutiliusRufus, who like Marius had held the praetorship, and was not only a manof known probity and firmness of character, but a scientific student oftactics with original ideas which were soon to be put to the test in thereorganisation of the army which followed the Numidian war. For thepresent it was necessary to create rather than reorganise an army, andMetellus in his haste had no time for the indulgence of original views. The reports of the forces at present quartered in the African provincewere not encouraging; and every means had to be taken to find newsoldiers and fresh supplies. A vigorous levy was cheerfully tolerated bythe enthusiasm of the community; the senate showed its earnestness byvoting ample sums for the purchase of arms, horses, siege implements andstores. Renewed assistance was sought from, and voluntarily rendered by, the Latins and Italian allies, while subject kings proved their loyaltyby sending auxiliary forces of their own free will. [998] When Metellusdeemed his preparations complete, he sailed for his province amidst thehighest hopes. They were hopes based on the probity of a single man; forthe impression still prevailed that Roman arms were invincible and hadbeen vanquished only by the new vices of the Roman character. Such hopesare not always the best omen for a commander to take with him; a joy inthe present, they are likely to prove an embarrassment in theimmediate future. CHAPTER VII The delay in his own appointment to the consulship, and the length oftime required for collecting his supplementary forces and theirsupplies, had robbed Metellus of some of the best months of the yearwhen he set foot on African soil; but his patience was to be put to afurther test, for the most casual survey of what had been the army ofthe proconsul Albinus showed the impossibility of taking the field forsome considerable time. [999] What he had heard was nothing to what hesaw. The military spirit had vanished with discipline, and its solesurvivals were a tendency to plunder the peaceful subjects of theprovince and a habit of bandying words with superior officers. The campestablished by Aulus for his beaten army had hardly ever been moved, except when sanitary reasons or a lack of forage rendered a shortmigration unavoidable. It had developed the character of a highlydisorderly town, the citizens of which had nothing to do except totraffic for the small luxuries of life, to enjoy them when they weresecured, and, in times when money and good things were scarce, to spreadin bands over the surrounding country, make predatory raids on thefields and villas of the neighbourhood, and return with the spoils ofwar, whether beasts or slaves, driven in flocks before them. The traderwho haunts the footsteps of the bandit was a familiar figure in thecamp; he could be found everywhere exchanging his foreign wine and theother amenities in which he dealt for the booty wrung from theprovincials. Since discipline was dead and there was no enemy to fear, even the most ordinary military precautions had ceased to be observed. The ramparts were falling to pieces, the regular appointment and reliefof sentries had been abandoned, and the common soldier absented himselffrom his company as often and for as long a period as he pleased. Metellus had to face the task which had confronted Scipio at Numantia. He performed it as effectually and perhaps with greater gentleness; forthe most singular feature in the methods by which he restored disciplinewas his avoidance of all attempts at terrorism. [1000] The moderation andrestraint, which had won the hearts of the citizens, worked their magiceven in the disorganised rabble which he was remodelling into an army. The habits of obedience were readily resumed when the tones of a truecommander were heard, and the way for their resumption was prepared bythe regulations which abolished all the incentives to the luxuriousindolence which he had found prevalent in the camp. The sale of cookedfood was forbidden, the camp followers were swept away, and no privatesoldier was allowed the use of a slave or beast of burden, whether inquarters or on the march. Other edicts of the same kind followed, andthen the work of active training began. Every day the camp was broken upand pitched again after a cross-country march; rampart and ditch wereformed and pickets set as though the enemy was hovering near, and thegeneral and staff went their rounds to see that every precaution of realwarfare was observed. On the line of march Metellus was everywhere, nowin the van, now with The rearguard, now with the central column. His eyecriticised every disposition and detected every departure from therules; he saw that each soldier kept his line, that he filled his dueplace in the serried ranks that gathered round a standard, that he borethe appropriate burden of his food and weapons. Metellus preferred theremoval of the opportunities for vice to the vindictive chastisement ofthe vicious; his wise and temperate measures produced a healthy state ofmind and body with no loss of self-respect, and in a short time hepossessed an army, strong in physique as in morale, which he might nowventure to move against the foe. Jugurtha had shown no inclination to follow up his success by activemeasures against the defeated Roman army, even after he had learnt therepudiation of his treaty with Aulus and knew that the state of war hadbeen resumed. The miserable condition of the forces in the Africanprovince, of which he must have been fully aware, must have offered aninviting object of attack, and a sudden raid across the borders mighthave enabled him to dissipate the last relics of Roman military power inAfrica. But he was now, as ever, averse to pushing matters to extremes, he declined to figure as an aggressive enemy of the Roman power; and togive a pretext for a war which could have no issue but his ownextinction, would be to surrender the chances of compromise which hisown position as a client king and the possibilities, however lessened, of working on the fears or cupidity of members of the Romanadministration still afforded him. His strength lay in defensiveoperations of an elusive kind, not in attack; the less cultivated andaccessible portions of his own country furnished the best field for adesultory and protracted war, and he seems still to have looked forwardto a compromise to which weariness of the wasteful struggle might in thecourse of time invite his enemies. He may even have had some knowledgeof the embarrassments of the Republic in other quarters of the world, and believed that both the unwillingness of Rome to enter into thestruggle, and her eagerness, when she had entered, to see it brought toa rapid close, were to some extent due to a feeling that an African warwould divert resources that were sorely needed for the defence of herEuropean possessions. The king's confidence in the weakness and half-heartedness of the Romanadministration is said to have been considerably shaken by the news thatMetellus was in command. [1001] During his own residence in Rome he mayhave heard of him as the prospective consul; he had at any rate learntthe very unusual foundations on which Metellus's influence with hispeers and with the people was based, and knew to his chagrin that thesewere unshakable. The later news from the province was equallydepressing. The new commander was not only honest but efficient, and theshattered forces of Rome were regaining the stability that had so oftenreplaced or worn out the efforts of genius. Delicate measures werenecessary to resist this combination of innocence and strength, andJugurtha began to throw out the tentacles of diplomacy. The impressionwhich he meant to produce, and actually did produce on the mind of thehistorian who has left us the fullest record of the war, was that of agenuine desire to effect a surrender of himself which should no longerbe fictitious, and to throw himself almost unreservedly on the mercy ofthe Roman people. [1002] But Jugurtha was in the habit of exhibiting themost expansive trust, based on a feeling of his own utter helplessness, at the beginning of his negotiations, and of then seeming to permit hisfears to get the better of his confidence. He was an experimentalpsychologist who held out vivid hopes in the belief that the cravingonce excited would be ultimately satisfied with less than the originaloffer, while the physical and mental retreat would meanwhile divert hisvictim from military preparations or lead him to incautious advances. Itmust have been in some such spirit that he assailed Metellus with offersso extreme in their humility that their good faith must have arousedsuspicion in any mind where innocence did not imply simplicity ofcharacter, as Jugurtha perhaps hoped that it did in the case of thisnovel type of Roman official. The Numidian envoys promised absolutesubmission; even the crown was to be surrendered, and they stipulatedonly for the bare life of the king and his children. [1003] Metellus, convinced of the unreality of the promise, matched his own treacheryagainst that of the king. He had not the least scruple in following thelead which the senate had given, and regarding Jugurtha as unworthy ofthe most rudimentary rights of a belligerent. Believing that he had seenenough of the Numidian type to be sure that its conduct was guided by noprinciples of honour or constancy, and that its shifty imagination couldbe influenced by the newest project that held out a hope of excitementor of gain, [1004] he began in secret interviews with each individualenvoy, to tamper with his fidelity to the king. The subjects of hisinterviews did not repudiate the suggestion, and adopted an attitude ofready attention which invited further confidences. It might have been anattitude which in these subtle minds denoted unswerving loyalty to theirmaster; but Metellus interpreted it in the light of his own desires, andproceeded to hold out hopes of great reward to each of the envoys ifJugurtha was handed over into his power; he would prefer to have theking alive; but, if that was impossible, the surrender of his dead bodywould be rewarded. He then gave in public a message which he thoughtmight be acceptable to their master. It is sufficiently probable thatthe private dialogues no less than the public message were imparted toJugurtha's ear by messengers who now had unexampled means of provingtheir fidelity and each of whom may have attempted to show that hisloyalty was superior to that of his fellows; incentives to frankness hadcertainly been supplied by Metellus; but this frankness may have beenitself of value to the Roman commander. It would prove to Jugurtha thepresence of a resolute and unscrupulous man who aimed at nothing lessthan his capture and with whom further parleyings would be wasteof time. A few days later Metellus entered Numidia with an army marching with allthe vigilance which a hostile territory demands, and prepared in theperfected carefulness of its organisation to meet the surprises whichthe enemy had in store. The surprise that did await it was of a novelcharacter. [1005] The grimly arrayed column found itself forging througha land which presented the undisturbed appearance of peace, security andcomfort. The confident peasant was found in his homestead or tilling hislands, the cattle grazed on the meadows; when an open village or afortified town was reached, the army was met by the headman or governorrepresenting the king. This obliging official was wholly at the disposalof the Roman general; he was ready to supply corn to the army or toaccumulate supplies at any base that might be chosen by the commander;any order that he gave would be faithfully carried out. But Metellus'svigilance was not for a moment shaken by this bloodless triumph. Heinterpreted the ostentatious submission as the first stage of anintended ambush, and he continued his cautious progress as though theenemy were hovering on his flank. His line of march was as jealouslyguarded as before, his scouts still rode abroad to examine and report onthe safety of the route. The general himself led the van, which wasformed of cohorts in light marching order and a select force of slingersand archers; Marius with the main body of cavalry brought up the rear, and either flank was protected by squadrons of auxiliary horse that hadbeen placed at the disposal of the tribunes in charge of the legions andthe prefects who commanded the divisions of the contingents from theallies. With these squadrons were mingled light-armed troops, theirjoint function being to repel any sudden assault from the mobileNumidian cavalry. Every forward step inspired new fears of Jugurtha'sstrategic craft and knowledge of the ground; wherever the king might be, his subtle influence oppressed the trespasser on any part of hisdomains, and the most peaceful scene appeared to the anxious eyes of theRoman commander to be fraught with the most terrible perils of war. The route taken by Metellus may have been the familiar line of advancefrom the Roman province, down the valley of the Bagradas. But beforefollowing the upper course of that river into the heart of Numidia, hedeemed it necessary to make a deflection to the north, and secure hiscommunications by seizing and garrisoning the town of Vaga, the mostimportant of the Eastern cities of Jugurtha. Its position near theborders of the Roman province had made it the greatest of Numidianmarket towns, and it had once been the home, and the seat of theindustry, of a great number of Italian traders. [1006] We may supposethat by this time the merchants had fled from the insecure locality andthat the foreign trade of the town had passed away; but both the site ofthe city and the character of its inhabitants attracted the attention ofMetellus. The latter, like the Eastern Numidians generally, were areceptive and industrious folk, who knew the benefits that peace andcontact with Rome conferred on commerce, and might therefore be inducedto throw off their allegiance to Jugurtha. The site suggested a suitablebasis for supplies and, if adequately protected, might again invite themerchant. Metellus, therefore, placed a garrison in the town, orderedcorn and other necessaries to be stored within its walls, and saw in theconcourse of the merchant class a promise of constant supplies for hisforces and a tower of strength for the maintenance of Roman influence inNumidia when the work of pacification had been done. The slight delaywas utilised by Jugurtha in his characteristic manner. The seizure ofone of his most important cities offered an occasion or pretext forfresh terrors. Metellus was beset by grovelling envoys with renewedentreaties; peace was sought at any price short of the life of the kingand his children; all else was to be surrendered. The consul stillpursued his cherished plan of tampering with the fidelity of themessengers and sending them home with vague promises. He would not cutoff Jugurtha from all hope of a compromise. He may have believed that hewas paralysing the king's efforts while he continued his steady advance, and turning his enemy's favourite weapon against that enemy himself. Perhaps he even let his thoughts dally with the hope that the envoys whohad proved such facile traitors might find some means of redeeming theirpromises. [1007] But, unless he committed the cardinal mistake ofmisreading or undervaluing his opponent, these could have been butsecondary hopes. He must have known that to penetrate into WesternNumidia without a serious battle, or at least without an effort ofJugurtha to harass his march or to cut his communications, was an eventbeyond the reach of purely human aspiration. Jugurtha had on his part framed a plan of resistance complete in everydetail. The site in which the attempt was to be made was visited and itsmilitary features were appraised in all their bearings; the events whichwould succeed each other in a few short hours could be predicted assurely as one could foretell the regular movements of a machine; theRoman general was walking into a trap from which there should be noescape but death. The framing of Jugurtha's scheme necessarily dependedon his knowledge of Metellus's line of march. We do not know how soonthe requisite data came to hand; but there is little reason forbelieving that his plan was a resolution of despair or forced on him asa last resort, except in the sense that he would always rather treatthan fight, and that to inflict disaster on a Roman army was no part ofthe policy which he deemed most desirable. But, since his ideal plan hadstumbled on the temperament of Metellus, a check to the invading armybecame imperative. [1008] The sacrifice of Vaga could scarcely haveweighed heavily on his mind, for it was an integral element in anyrational scheme of defence; but, even apart from the obviousconsideration that a king must fight if he cannot treat for his crown, the thought of his own prestige may now have urged him to combat. Unbounded as the faith of his Numidian subjects was, it might noteverywhere survive the impression made by the unimpeded and triumphantmarch of the Roman legions. Metellus when he quitted Vaga had continued to operate in the easternpart of Numidia. The theatre of his campaign was probably to be theterritory about the plateau of Vaga and the Great Plains, its ultimateprizes perhaps were to be the important Numidian towns of Sicca Veneriaand Zama Regia to the south. The nature of the country rendered itimpossible for him to enter the defiles of the Bagradas from thenorth-west, while it was equally impossible for him to march direct fromVaga to Sicca, for the road was blocked by the mountains whichintervened on his south-eastern side. To reach the neighbourhood ofSicca it was necessary to turn to the south-west and follow for a timethe upward course of the river Muthul (the Wäd Mellag). By this route hewould reach the high plateaux, which command on the south-east theplains of Sicca and Zama, on the north-west those of Naraggara andThagaste, on the south those of Thala and Theveste. [1009] Metellus'smarch led him over a mountain height which was some miles from theriver. [1010] The western side of this height, down which the Roman armymust descend, although of some steepness at the beginning of itsdeclivity, did not terminate in a plain, but was continued by a swellingrise, of vast and even slope, which found its eastern termination on theriver's bank. The greater portion of this great hill, and especiallythat part of it which lay nearest to the mountain, was covered by asparse and low vegetation, such as the wild olive and the myrtle, whichwas all that the parched and sandy soil would yield. There was no waternearer than the river, and this had made the hill a desert so far ashuman habitation was concerned. It was only on its eastern slope whichtouched the stream that the presence of man was again revealed bythick-set orchards and cattle grazing in the fields. [1011] Jugurtha's plan was based on the necessity which would confront theRomans of crossing this arid slope to reach the river. Could he springon them as they left the mountain chain and detain them in this torridwilderness, nature might do even more than the Numidian arms to secure avictory; meanwhile measures might be taken to close the passage to theriver, and to bring up fresh forces from the east to block the desiredroute while the ambushed army was harassed by attacks from the flankand rear. Jugurtha himself occupied the portion of the slope which lay justbeneath the mountain. He kept under his own command the whole of thecavalry and a select body of foot-soldiers, probably of a light andmobile character such as would assist the operations of the horse. Thesehe placed in an extended line on the flank of the route that must befollowed by an army descending from the mountain. The line was continuedby the forces which he had placed under the command of Bomilcar. Theseconsisted of the heavier elements of the Numidian army, the elephants ofwar and the major part of the foot soldiers. It is, however, probablethat there was a considerable interval between the end of Jugurtha's andthe beginning of Bomilcar's line. [1012] The latter on its eastern sideextended to a point at no great distance from the river; and accordingto the original scheme of the ambush the function assigned to Bomilcarmust have been that of executing a turning movement which would preventthe Roman forces from gaining the stream. As it was expected that theimpact of the heavy Roman troops would be chiefly felt in thisdirection, the sturdier and less mobile portions of the Numidian armyhad been placed under Bomilcar's command. Metellus was soon seen descending the mountain slope, [1013] and thereseemed at first a chance that the Roman column might be surprised alongits length by the sudden onset of Jugurtha's horse. But the vigilantprecautions which Metellus observed during his whole line of march, although they could not in this case avert a serious danger, possiblylessened the peril of the moment. His scouts seem to have done theirwork and spied the half-concealed Numidians amongst the low trees andbrushwood. The superior position of the Roman army must in any case soonhave made this knowledge the common property of all, unless we considerthat some ridge of the chain concealed Jugurtha's ambush from the viewof the Roman army until they should have almost left the mountain forthe lower hill beneath it. Jugurtha must in any case have calculated onthe probability of the forces under his own command soon becomingvisible to the enemy, for perfect concealment was impossible amidst thestunted trees which formed the only cover for his men. [1014] Theefficacy of his plan did not depend on the completeness or suddenness ofthe surprise; it depended still more on Jugurtha's knowledge of theneeds of a Roman army, and on the state of perplexity into which allthat was visible of the ambush would throw the commander. For the littlethat was seen made it difficult to interpret the size, equipment andintentions of the expectant force. Glimpses of horses and men could justbe caught over the crests of the low trees or between the interlacingboughs. Both men and horses were motionless, and the eye that strove tosee more was baffled by the scrub which concealed more than it revealed, and by the absence of the standards of war which might have affordedsome estimate of the nature and size of the force and had for thisreason been carefully hidden by Jugurtha. But enough was visible to prove the intended ambush. Metellus called ashort halt and rapidly changed his marching column to a battle formationcapable of resistance or attack. His right flank was the one immediatelythreatened. It was here accordingly that he formed the front of hisorder of battle, when he changed his marching column into a fightingline. [1015] The three ranks were formed in the traditional manner; thespaces between the maniples were filled by slingers and archers; thewhole of the cavalry was placed on the flanks. It is possible that atthis point the line of descent from the mountain would cause the Romanarmy to present an oblique front to the slope and the distantriver, [1016] and the cavalry on the left wing would be at the head ofthe marching column, if it descended into the lower ground. [1017] Such adescent was immediately resolved on by Metellus. To halt on the heightswas impossible, for the land was waterless; an orderly retreat wasperhaps discountenanced by the difficulties of the country over which hehad just passed and the distance of the last watering-place which he hadleft, while to retire at the first sight of the longed-for foe would nothave inspired his newly remodelled army with much confidence inthemselves or their general. When the army had quitted the foot of the mountain, a new problem facedits general. The Numidians remained motionless, [1018] and it becameclear that no rapid attack that could be as suddenly repulsed wascontemplated by their leader. Metellus saw instead the prospect of aseries of harassing assaults that would delay his progress, and hedreaded the fierceness of the season more than the weapons of the enemy. The day was still young, for Jugurtha had meant to call in the allianceof a torrid sun, and Metellus saw in his mind's eye his army, worn bythirst, heat and seven miles of harassing combat, still struggling withthe Numidian cavalry while they strove to form a camp at the river whichwas the bourne of their desires. It was all important that the extremeend of the slope which touched the river should be seized at once, and acamp be formed, or be in process of formation, by the time that histired army arrived. With this object in view he sent on his legateRutilius with some cohorts of foot soldiers in light marching order anda portion of the cavalry. The movement was well planned, for by thenature of the case it could not be disturbed by Jugurtha. His object wasto harry the main body of the army and especially the heavy infantry, and his refusal to detach any part of his force in pursuit of theswiftly moving Rutilius is easily understood, especially when it isremembered that Bomilcar was stationed near to the ground which theRoman legate was to seize. An attack on the flying column would alsohave led to the general engagement which Metellus wished to provoke. Thepresence of Bomilcar and his force was probably unknown to the Romans. He in his turn must have been surprised, and may have been somewhatembarrassed, by Rutilius's advance; but the movement did not induce himto abandon his position. To oppose Rutilius would have been to surrenderthe part assigned him in the intended operations against the main Romanforce; and, if this part was now rendered difficult or impossible by thepresence of the Romans in his rear, he might yet divide the forces ofthe enemy, and assist Jugurtha by keeping Rutilius and his valuablecontingents of cavalry in check. He therefore permitted the legate topass him[1019] and waited for the events which were to issue from thecombat farther up the field. Metellus meanwhile continued his slow advance, keeping the marchingorder which had been observed in the descent from the mountain. Hehimself headed the column, riding with the cavalry that covered the leftwing, while Marius, in command of the horsemen on the right, brought upthe rear. [1020] Jugurtha waited until the last man of the Roman columnhad crossed the beginning of his line, and then suddenly threw about twothousand of his infantry up the slope of the mountain at the point whereMetellus had made his descent. His idea was to cut off the retreat ofthe Romans and prevent their regaining the most commanding position inthe field. He then gave the signal for a general attack. The battlewhich followed had all the characteristic features of all such contestsbetween a light and active cavalry force and an army composed mainly ofheavy infantry, inferior in mobility but unshakable in its compactstrength. There was no possibility of the Numidians piercing the Romanranks, but there was more than a possibility of their wearing down thestrength of every Roman soldier before that weary march to the river hadeven neared its completion. The Roman defence must have been hampered bythe absence of that portion of the cavalry which had accompaniedRutilius; it was more sorely tried by the dazzling sun, the floatingdust and the intolerable heat. The Numidians hung on the rear and eitherflank, cutting down the stragglers and essaying to break the order ofthe Roman ranks on every side. It was of the utmost difficulty topreserve this order, and the braver spirits who preferred the securityof their ranks to reckless and indiscriminate assault, were maddened byblows, inflicted by the missiles of their adversaries, which they werepowerless to return. Nor could the repulse of the enemy be followed byan effective pursuit. Jugurtha had taught his cavalry to scatter intheir retreat when pursued by a hostile band; and thus, when unable tohold their ground in the first quarter which they had selected forattack, they melted away only to gather like clouds on the flank andrear of pursuers who had now severed themselves from the protectingstructure of their ranks. Even the difficulties of the ground favouredthe mobile tactics of the assailants; for the horses of the Numidians, accustomed to the hill forests, could thread their way through theundergrowth at points which offered an effective check to thepursuing Romans. It seemed as though Jugurtha's plan was nearing its fulfilment. Thesymmetry of the Roman column was giving place to a straggling lineshowing perceptible gaps through which the enemy had pierced. Theresistance was becoming individual; small companies pursued or retreatedin obedience to the dictates of their immediate danger; no single headcould grasp the varied situation nor, if it had had power to do so, could it have issued commands capable of giving uniformity to thesporadic combats in which attack and resistance seemed to be directed bythe blind chances of the moment. But every minute of effectualresistance had been a gain to the Romans. The ceaseless toil in thecruel heat was wearing down the powers even of the natives; theexertions of the latter, as the attacking force, must have been fargreater than those of the mass of the Roman infantry; and the Numidianfoot soldiers in particular, who were probably always of an inferiorquality to the cavalry and had been obliged to strain their physicalendurance to the utmost by emulating the horsemen in their lightningmethods of attack and retreat, had become so utterly exhausted that aconsiderable portion of them had practically retired from the field. They had climbed to the higher ground, perhaps to join the forces whichJugurtha had already placed near the foot of the mountain, and wereresting their weary limbs, probably not with any view of shirking theirarduous service but with a resolution of renewing the attack when theirvigour had been restored. This withdrawal of a large portion of theinfantry was a cause, or a part, of a general slackening of the Numidianattack; and it was the breathing space thus afforded which gave Metellushis great chance. Gradually he drew his straggling line together andrestored some order in the ranks; and then with the instinct of a truegeneral he took active measures to assail his enemy's weakest point. This point was represented by the Numidian infantry perched on theheight. Some of these were exhausted and perhaps dispirited, others itis true were as yet untouched by the toil of battle; but as a bodyMetellus believed them wholly incapable of standing the shock of a Romancharge. The confidence was almost forced on him by his despair of anyother solution of the intolerable situation. The evening was closing in, his army had no camp or shelter; even if it were possible to guardagainst the dangers of the night, morning would bring but a renewal ofthe same miserable toil to an army worn by thirst, sleeplessness andanxiety. He, therefore, massed four legionary cohorts against theNumidian infantry, [1021] and tried to revive their shattered confidenceby appealing at once to their courage and to their despair, by pointingto the enemy in retreat and by showing that their own safety restedwholly on the weapons in their hands. For some time the Roman soldierssurveyed their dangerous task and looked expectantly at the height thatthey were asked to storm. The vague hope that the enemy would come downfinally disappeared; the growing darkness filled them with resolutedespair; and, closing their ranks, they rushed for the higher ground. Ina moment the Numidians were scattered and the height was gained. Sorapidly did the enemy vanish that but few of them were slain; theirlightness of armour and knowledge of the ground saved them from theswords of the pursuing legionaries. The conquest of the height was the decisive incident of the battle, andit was clearly a success that, considered in itself, was due far more toradical and permanent military qualities than to tactical skill. It mayseem wholly a victory of the soldiers, in which the general played nopart, until we remember that strategic and tactical considerations aredependent on a knowledge of such permanent conditions, and that Metelluswas as right in forcing his Romans up the height as Jugurtha was wrongin believing that his Numidians could hold it. With respect to theevents occurring in this quarter of the field, Metellus had savedhimself from a strategic disadvantage by a tactical success; but eventhe strategic situation could not be estimated wholly by reference tothe events which had just occurred or to the position in which the twoarmies were now left. Had Bomilcar still been free to bar the passage tothe river and to join Jugurtha's forces during the night, the positionof the Romans would still have been exceedingly dangerous. But themission of Rutilius had successfully diverted that general's attentionfrom what had been the main purpose of the original plan. His leadingidea was now merely to separate the two divisions of the Roman army, andthe thought of blocking the passage of Metellus, although notnecessarily abandoned, must have become secondary to that of checkingthe advance of Rutilius when the legate should have become alarmed atthe delay in the progress of his commander. Bomilcar, after he hadpermitted the Roman force to pass him, slowly left the hill where he hadbeen posted and brought his men into more level ground, [1022] whileRutilius was making all speed for the river. Quietly he changed hiscolumn into a line of battle stretching across the slope which at thispoint melted into the plain, while he learnt by constant scouting everymovement of the enemy beyond. He heard at length that Rutilius hadreached his bourne and halted, and at the same time the din of thebattle between Jugurtha and Metellus came in louder volumes to his ear. The thought that Rutilius's attention was disengaged now that his mainobject had been accomplished, the fear that he might seek to bring helpto his labouring commander, led Bomilcar to take more active measures. His mind was now absorbed with the problem of preventing a junction ofthe Roman forces. His mistrust of the quality of the infantry under hiscommand had originally led him to form a line of considerable depth;this he now thought fit to extend with the idea of outflanking andcutting off all chance of egress from the enemy. When all was ready headvanced on Rutilius's camp. [1023] The Romans were suddenly aware of a great cloud of dust which hung overthe plantations on their landward side; but the intervening trees hidall prospect of the slope beyond: and for a time they looked on thepillar of dust as one of the strange sights of the desert, a meresand-cloud driven by the wind. Then they thought that it betrayed apeculiar steadiness in its advance; instead of sweeping down in a wildstorm it moved with the pace and regularity of an army on the march;and, in spite of its slow progress, it could be seen to be drawingnearer and nearer. The truth burst upon their minds; they seized theirweapons and, in obedience to the order of their commander, drew up inbattle formation before the camp. As Bomilcar's force approached, theRomans shouted and charged; the Numidians raised a counter cheer and metthe assault half-way. There was scarcely a moment when the issue seemedin doubt. The Romans, strong in cavalry, swept the untrained Numidianinfantry before them, and Bomilcar had by his incautious advance thrownaway the utility of that division of his army on which he and his menplaced their chief reliance. His elephants, which were capable ofmanoeuvring only on open ground, had now been advanced to the midst ofwooded plantations, and the huge animals were soon mixed up with thetrees, struggling through the branches and separated from theirfellows. [1024] The Numidians made a show of resistance until they sawthe line of elephants broken and the Roman soldiers in the rear of theprotecting beasts; then they threw away their heavy armour and vanishedfrom the spot, most of them seeking the cover of the hills and nearlyall secure in the shelter of the coming night. The elephants were thechief victims of the Roman pursuit; four were captured and the fortythat remained were killed. It had been a hard day's work for the victorious division. A forcedmarch had been followed by the labour of forming a camp and this in turnby the toil of battle. But it was impossible to think of rest. The delayof Metellus filled them with misgivings, and they advanced through thedarkness to seek news of the main division with a caution that bespokethe prudent view that their recent victory had not banished the evilpossibilities of Numidian guile. [1025] Metellus was advancing from theopposite direction and the two armies met. Each division was suddenlyaware of a force moving against it under cover of the night; with nervesso highly strung as to catch at any fear each fancied an enemy in theother. There was a shout and a clash of arms, as swords were drawn andshields unstrung. It was fortunate that mounted scouts were riding inadvance of either army. These soon saw the welcome truth and bore it totheir companions. Panic gave place to joy; as the combined forces movedinto camp, the soldiers' tongues were loosed, and pent up feelings foundexpression in wonderful stories of individual valour. Metellus, as in duty bound, gave the name of victory to his salvationfrom destruction. He was right in so far as an army that has vanishedmay be held to have been beaten; and his compliments to his soldierswere certainly well deserved; for the triumph, such as it was, had beenmainly that of the rank and file, and the Roman legionary had not merelygiven evidence of the old qualities of stubborn endurance whichMetellus's training had restored, but had proved himself vastly superiorto anything in the shape of a soldier of the line that Jugurtha couldput into the field. The commendation and thanks which the generalexpressed in his public address to the whole army, the individualdistinctions which he conferred on those whose peculiar merit in therecent combats was attested, were at once an apology for hardship, arecognition of desert and a means of inspiring self-respect and futureefficiency. If it is true that Metellus added that glory was nowsatisfied, and plunder should be their reward in future, [1026] he was atonce indulging in a pardonable hyperbole and veiling the unpleasanttruth that combats with Jugurtha were somewhat too expensive to attracthis future attention. His own private opinion of the recent events wasperhaps as carefully concealed in his despatches to the senate. It wasinevitable that a populace which had learnt to look on news from Numidiaas a record of compromise or disaster, should welcome and exaggerate thecheering intelligence; should not only glory in the indisputable fact ofthe renewed excellence of their army, but should regard Jugurtha as afugitive and Metellus as master of his land. [1027] It was equallynatural that the senate should embrace the chance of shaking off thelast relics of suspicion which clung to its honour and competency byexalting the success of its general. It decreed supplications to theimmortal gods, and thus produced the impression that a decisive victoryhad been won. Everywhere the State displayed a pardonable joy mingledwith a less justifiable expectation that this was the beginning ofthe end. The man who raises extravagant hopes is only less happy than the man whodashes them to the ground. The days that followed the battle of theMuthul must have been an anxious time for Metellus; for he had beentaught that it was necessary to change his plan of campaign into a shapewhich was not likely to secure a speedy termination of the war. For fourdays he did not leave his camp--a delay which may have had theostensible justification of the necessity of caring for his woundedsoldiers, [1028] and may even have been based on the hope thatnegotiations for surrender might reach him from the king, but which alsoproved his view that the pursuit of Jugurtha was wholly impracticable, and that in the case of a Numidian army capture or destruction was not anecessary consequence of defeat. He contented himself with makinginquiries of fugitives and others as to the present position andproceedings of the king, and received replies which may have containedsome elements of truth. He learnt that the Numidian army which hadfought at the Muthul had wholly broken up in accordance with the customof the race, that Jugurtha had left the field with his body-guard alone, that he had fled to wild and difficult country and was there raising asecond army--an army that promised to be larger than the first, but waslikely to be less efficient, composed as it was of shepherds andpeasants with little training in war. [1029] We cannot say whetherMetellus accepted the strange view that the vanished army, which had nowprobably returned to the peaceful pursuits of agriculture and pasturage, would not be reproduced in the new one; but certainly the news of thefuture weakness of Jugurtha's forces did not seem to him to justify anadvance into Western Numidia, then as ever the stronghold of the kingand the seat of that treasure of human life which was of more value thangold and silver. The Roman general, while recognising that thebelligerent aspect of the king made a renewal of the war inevitable, wasfully convinced that pitched battles were not the means of wearing downNumidian constancy. The pursuit of Jugurtha was impossible withoutconflicts, from which the vanquished emerged less scathed than thevictors, [1030] and even this primary object of the expedition was forthe time abandoned. He was forced to adopt the circuitous device ofattracting the presence of the king, and weakening the loyalty of hissubjects, by a series of mere plundering raids on the wealthiestportions of the country. It was a plan that in default of a reallyeffective occupation of the whole country, especially of some occupationof Western Numidia, implied a certain amount of self-contradiction andinconsistency. The plunder of the land was intended to secure the endwhich Metellus wished to avoid--a conflict with the king; and themobility which he so much dreaded could find no fairer field for itsexercise than the rapid marches across country which might secure a townfrom attack, undo the work of conquest which had just been effected insome other stronghold, or harass the route of the Roman forces as theymoved from point to point. Metellus was making himself into an admirabletarget for the most effective type of guerilla warfare; but the wholehistory of the struggle down to its close proves that this helplessnesswas due to the situation rather than to the man. The Roman forces werewholly inadequate to an effective occupation of Numidia; and a generalwho despaired of pushing on in an aimless and dangerous pursuit, had tobe content with the chances that might result from the capture of towns, the plunder of territories, and secret negotiations which might bringabout the death or surrender of the king. Neither the movements which followed the battle of the Muthul nor thesite of the winter quarters into which Metellus led his men, have beenrecorded. The campaign of the next year seems still to have beenconfined to the eastern portion of Numidia, its object being thesecurity of the country between Vaga and Zama. This rich country wascruelly ravaged, every fortified post that was taken was burnt, allNumidians of fighting age who offered resistance were put to the sword. This policy of terrorism produced some immediate results. The army waswell provisioned, the frightened natives bringing in corn and othernecessaries in abundance; towns and districts yielded hostages for theirgood behaviour; strong places were surrendered in which garrisons wereleft. [1031] But the presence of Jugurtha soon made itself felt. Theking, if he had collected an army, had left the major part of it behind. He was now at the head of a select body of light horse, and with thismobile force he followed in Metellus's tracks. The Romans feltthemselves haunted by a phantom enemy who passed with incrediblerapidity from point to point, whose stealthy advances were made undercover of the darkness and over trackless wastes, and whose proximity wasonly known by some sudden and terrible blow dealt at the stragglers fromthe camp. The death or capture of those who left the lines could neitherbe hindered nor avenged; for before reinforcements could be hurried up, the Numidians had vanished into the nearest range of hills. The mostordinary operations of the army were now being seriously hindered. Supply and foraging parties had to be protected by cohorts of infantryand the whole force of cavalry; plundering was impossible; and fire wasfound the readiest means of wasting country which could no longer beravaged for the benefit of the men. It was thought unsafe for the wholearmy to operate in two independent columns. Such columns were indeedformed, Metellus heading one and Marius the other; but it was necessaryfor them to keep the closest touch. Although they sometimes divided toextend the sphere of their work of terror and devastation, they oftenunited through the pressure of fear, and the two camps were never at agreat distance from each other. [1032] The king meanwhile followed themalong the hills, destroying the fodder and ruining the water supply onthe line of march; now he would swoop on Metellus, now on Marius, harassthe rear of the column and vanish again into his hiding places. The painful experiences of the later portion of this march convincedMetellus that some decisive effort should be made, which would crown hisearlier successes, give him some sort of command of the line of countrythrough which he had so perilously passed, and might, by the importanceof the attempt, force Jugurtha to a battle. The hilly country throughwhich he had just conducted his legions, was that which lay between thegreat towns of Sicca and Zama. [1033] The possession of both these placeswas absolutely essential if the southern district which he had terrifiedand garrisoned was to be kept permanently from the king. Sicca wasalready his, for it had been the first of the towns to throw off itsallegiance to Jugurtha after the battle on the Muthul had dissipated theNumidian army. [1034] He now turned his attention to the still moreimportant town of Zama, the true capital and stronghold of this southerndistrict, and prepared to master the position by assault or siege. Jugurtha was soon cognisant of his plan, and by long forced marchescrossed Metellus's line and entered Zama. [1035] He urged the citizens toa vigorous defence and promised that at the right moment he would cometo their aid with all his forces; he strengthened their garrison bydrafting into it a body of Roman deserters, whose circumstancesguaranteed their loyalty, and disappeared again from the vision offriends and foes. Shortly afterwards he learnt that Marius had left theline of march for Sicca, and that he had with him but a few cohortsintended to convoy to the army the corn which he hoped to acquire in thetown. In a moment Jugurtha was at the head of his chosen cavalry andmoving under cover of the night. He had hoped perhaps to find thedivision in the town, to turn the tide of feeling in Sicca by hispresence, and to see the ablest of his opponents trapped within thewalls. But, as he reached the gate, the Romans were leaving it. Heimmediately hurled his men upon them and shouted to the curious folk whowere watching the departure of the cohorts, to take the division in therear. Chance, he cried, had lent them the occasion of a glorious deed ofarms. Now was the time for them to recover freedom, for him to regainhis kingdom. The magic of the presence of the national hero had nearlyworked conversion to the Siccans and destruction to the Romans. Thefriendly city would have proved a hornets' nest, had not Marius bent allhis efforts to thrusting a passage through Jugurtha's men and gettingclear of the dangerous walls. In the more open ground the fighting wassharp but short. A few Numidians fell, the rest vanished from the field, and Marius came in safety to Zama, where he found Metellus contemplatinghis attack. The city lay in a plain and nature had contributed but little to itsdefence, [1036] but it was strong in all the means that art could supplyand well prepared to stand a siege. Metellus planned a general assaultand arranged his forces around the whole line of wall. The attack beganat every point at once; in the rear were the light-armed troops, shooting stones and metal balls at the defenders and covering theefforts of the active assailants, who pressed up to the walls and stroveto effect an entry by scaling ladders and by mines. The defending forcebetrayed no sign of terror or disordered haste. They calmly distributedtheir duties, and each party kept a watchful eye on the enemy whom itwas its function to repel; while some transfixed those farther from thewall with javelins thrown by the hand or shot from an engine, othersdealt destruction on those immediately beneath them, rolling heavystones upon their heads and showering down pointed stakes, heavymissiles and vessels full of blazing pine fed with pitch andsulphur. [1037] The battle raging round the walls may have absorbed the thoughts even ofthat section of the Roman army which had been left to guard the camp. Certainly they and their sentries were completely off their guard whenJugurtha with a large force dashed at the entrenchments and, so completewas the surprise, swept unhindered through the gate. [1038] The usualscene of panic followed with its flight, its hasty arming, the groans ofthe wounded, the silent falling of the slain. But the unusual degree ofthe recklessness of the garrison was witnessed by the fact that not morethan forty men were making a collective stand against the Numidianonset. The little band had seized a bit of high ground and no effort ofthe enemy could dislodge them. The missiles which had been aimed againstthem they hurled back with terrible effect into the dense masses around;and when the assailants essayed a closer combat, they struck them downor drove them back with the fury of their blows. Their resistance mayhave detained Jugurtha in the camp longer than he had intended; but theimmediate escape from the emergency was due to the cowards rather thanto the brave. Metellus was wrapt in contemplation of the efforts of hismen before the walls of Zama when he suddenly heard the roar of battlerepeated from another quarter. As he wheeled his horse, he saw a crowdof fugitives hurrying over the plain; since they made for him, he judgedthat they were his own men. It seems that the cavalry had been drawn upnear the walls, probably as a result of the impression that Jugurtha, ifhe attacked at all, would attempt to take the besiegers in the rear. Metellus now hastily sent the whole of this force to the camp, and badeMarius follow with all speed at the head of some cohorts of the allies. His anguish at the sullied honour of his troops was greater than hisfear. With tears streaming down his face he besought his legate to wipeout the stain which blurred the recent victory and not to permit theenemy to escape unpunished. Jugurtha had no intention of being caught in the Roman camp; but it wasnot so easy to get out as it had been to come in. Some of his men werejammed in the exits, while others threw themselves over the ramparts;Marius took full advantage of the rout, and it was with many losses thatJugurtha shook himself free of his pursuers and retreated to his ownfastnesses. Soon the approach of night brought the siege operations toan end. Metellus drew off his men and led them back to camp after aday's experience that did not leave a pleasant retrospect behind it. Warned by its incidents that the cavalry should be posted nearer to thecamp, he began the work of the following day by disposing the whole ofthis force over that quarter of the ground on which the king had madehis appearance;[1039] more definite arrangements were also made for thedetailed defence of the Roman lines, and the assault of the previous daywas renewed on the walls of Zama. Yet in spite of these elaborateprecautions Jugurtha's coming was in the nature of a surprise. Thesilence and swiftness of his onset threw the first contingents of Romanswhom he met into momentary panic and confusion; but reserves were soonmoved up and restored the fortune of the day. They might have turned itrapidly and wholly, but for a tactical device which Jugurtha had adoptedas a means of neutralising the superior stability of the Romans--a meanswhich permitted him to show a persistence of frontal attack unusual withthe Numidians. He had mingled light infantry with his cavalry; thelatter charged instead of merely skirmishing, and before the breacheswhich they had made in the enemy's ranks could be refilled, the footsoldiers made their attack on the disordered lines. [1040] Jugurtha's object was being fulfilled as long as he could remain in thefield to effect this type of diversion and draw off considerable forcesfrom the walls of Zama. But his ingenious efforts attracted theattention of the besieged as well as of the besiegers. It is true that, when the assault was hottest, the citizens of Zama did not permit theirminds or eyes to stray; but there were moments following the repulse ofsome great effort when the energy of the assailants flagged and therewas a lull in the storm of sound made by human voices and the clatter ofarms. Then the men on the walls would look with strained attention onthe cavalry battle in the plain, would follow the fortunes of the kingwith every alternation of joy or fear, and shout advice or exhortationas though their voices could reach their distant friends. [1041] Marius, who conducted the assault at that portion of the wall which commandedthis absorbing view, formed the idea of encouraging this distraction ofattention by a feint and seizing the momentary advantage which itafforded. A remissness and lack of confidence was soon visible in theefforts of his men, and the undisturbed interest of the Numidians wasspeedily directed to the manoeuvres of their monarch in the plain. Suddenly the assault burst on them in its fullest force; before theycould brace themselves to the surprise, the foremost Romans were morethan half-way up the scaling ladders. But the height was too great andthe time too short. Stones and fire were again poured on the heads ofthe assailants. It was some time before their confidence was shaken; butwhen one or two ladders had been shattered into fragments and theiroccupants dashed down, the rest--most of them already covered withwounds--glided to the ground and hastened from the walls. This was thelast effort. The night soon fell and brought with it, not merely theclose of the day's work, but the end of the siege of Zama. Metellus saw that neither of his objects could be fulfilled. The towncould not be taken nor would Jugurtha permit himself to be brought tothe test of a regular battle. [1042] The fighting season was now drawingto its close and he must think of winter quarters for his army. Hedetermined, not only to abandon the siege, but to quit Numidia and towinter in the Roman province. The sole relic of the fact that he hadmarched an army through the territory between Vaga and Zama were a fewgarrisons left in such of the surrendered cities as seemed capable ofdefence. The despatches of this winter would not cheer the people orencourage the senate. The policy of invasion had failed; and, if successwas to be won, it could be accomplished by intrigue alone. Metellus, when the leisure of winter quarters gave him time to think over thesituation, decided that scattered negotiations with lesser Numidianmagnates would prove as delusive in the future as they had in the past. The king's mind must be mastered if his body was to be enslaved; but itwas a mind that could be conquered only by confidence, and to securethis influence it was necessary to approach the monarch's right-handman. This man was Bomilcar, the most trusted general and adviser ofJugurtha--trusted all the more perhaps in consequence of the delusion, into which even a Numidian king might fall, that the man who owes hislife to another will owe him his life-long service as well. A morereasonable ground for Bomilcar's attachment might have been found in theconsideration that, in the eyes of Rome, he was as deeply compromised asJugurtha himself--from an official point of view, indeed, even moredeeply compromised; for to the Roman law he was an escaped criminal overwhose head still hung a capital charge of murder. [1043] But might notthat very fact urge the minister to make his own compact with Rome? Hislife depended on the king's success, or on the king's refusal tosurrender him if peace were made with Rome; it depended therefore on adouble element of doubt. Make that life a certainty, and would anyNumidian longer balance the doubt against the certainty? Such was thethought of Metellus when he opened correspondence with Bomilcar. Theminister wished to hear more, and Metellus arranged a secret interview. In this he gave his word of honour that, if Bomilcar handed overJugurtha to him living or dead, the senate would grant him impunity andthe continued possession of all that belonged to him. The Numidianaccepted the promise and the condition it involved; his mind was chieflyswayed by the fear that a continuance of the even struggle might resultin a compromise with Rome, and that his own death at the hands of theexecutioner would be one of the conditions of that compromise. What passed between Bomilcar and Jugurtha can never have been known. Theking had no reason to regret the exploits of the year, and an appeal tothe desperate nature of his position would have been somewhat out ofplace. But some of the reflections of Bomilcar, preserved or invented bytradition, [1044] which pointed to weakness and danger in the future, mayconceivably have been expressed. It was true that the war was wastingthe material strength of the kingdom; it might be true that it wouldwear out the constancy of the Numidians themselves and induce them toput their own interests before those of their king. Such arguments couldnever have weighed with Jugurtha had not his recent success suggestedthe hope of a compromise; as a beaten fugitive he would have had nothingto hope for; as a man who still held his own he might win much by aready compact with a Roman general in worse plight than himself. Itseems certain that Jugurtha was for the first time thoroughly deceived. His judgment, sound enough in its estimate of the general situation, must have been led astray by Bomilcar's representation of Metellus'sattitude, although the minister could not have hinted at a personalknowledge of the Roman's views; and his confidence in his adviser led tothis rare and signal instance of a total misconception of the characterand powers of his adversary. Some preliminary correspondence probably passed between Jugurtha andMetellus before the king sent his final message. [1045] It was to theeffect that all the demands would be complied with, and that the kingdomand its monarch would be surrendered unconditionally to therepresentative of Rome. Metellus immediately summoned a council, towhich he gave as representative a character as was possible under thecircumstances. The transaction of delicate business by a clique offriends had cast grave suspicions on the compact concluded by Bestia;and it was important that the witnesses to the fact that the transactionwith Jugurtha contained no secret clause or understanding, should be asnumerous and weighty as possible. This result could be easily secured bythe general's power to summon all the men of mark available; and thusMetellus called to the board not only every member of the senatorialorder whom he could find, but a certain number of distinguishedindividuals who did not belong to the governing class. [1046] The policyof the board was to make tentative and gradually increasing demands suchas had once tried the patience of the Carthaginians. [1047] Jugurthashould give a pledge of his good faith; and, if it was unredeemed, Romewould have the gain and he the loss. The king was now ordered tosurrender two hundred thousand pounds of silver, all his elephants and acertain quantity of horses and weapons. [1048] He was also required tofurnish three hundred hostages. [1049] The request, at least as regardsthe money and the materials for war, was immediately complied with. Thenthe demands increased. The deserters from the Roman army must be handedover. A few of these had fled from Jugurtha at the very first sign thata genuine submission was being made, and had sought refuge with BocchusKing of Mauretania;[1050] but the greater part, to the number of threethousand, [1051] were surrendered to Metellus. Most of these wereauxiliaries, Thracians and Ligurians such as had abandoned Aulus atSuthul; and the sense of the danger threatened by the treachery ofallies, who must form a vital element in all Roman armies, may have beenthe motive for the awful example now given to the empire of Rome'spunishment for breach of faith. Some of these prisoners had their handscut off; others were buried in the earth up to their waists, were thenmade a target for arrows and darts, and were finally burnt with firebefore the breath had left their bodies. [1052] The final order concernedJugurtha himself, He was required to repair to a place namedTisidium, [1053] there to wait for orders. The confidence of the king nowbegan to waver. He may have hoped to the last moment for some sign thathis cause was being viewed with a friendly eye; but none had come. Surrender to Rome was a thinkable position, while he was in a positionto bargain. It would be the counsel of a madman, if he put himselfwholly in the power of his enemy. He had sacrificed much; but the loss, except in money, was not irremediable. Elephants were of no avail inguerilla warfare, and Numidia, which was still his own, had horses andmen in abundance. He waited some days longer, probably more inexpectancy of a move by Metellus and in preparation of the step hehimself meant to take, than in doubt as to what that step should be;when no modification of the demand came from the Roman side, he brokeoff negotiations and continued the war. Metellus was still to be hisopponent; for earlier in the year the proconsulate of the commander hadbeen renewed. [1054] The events of the summer and the peace of winter-quarters had given foodfor reflection to others besides Metellus. We shall soon see what themerchant classes in Africa thought of the progress of the war; moreformidable still were the emotions that had lately been excited in therugged breast of the great legate Marius. There are probably fewlieutenants who do not think that they could do better than theircommanders. Whether Marius held this view is immaterial; he soon came tobelieve that he did, and expressed this belief with vigour. The reallyimportant fact was that a man who had been praetor seven years beforeand probably regarded himself as the greatest soldier of the age, wascarrying out the behests and correcting the blunders of a general whoowed his command to his aristocratic connections and blameless record incivil life. The subordination in this particular form seemed likely tobe perpetuated in Numidia, for Metellus was entering on his secondproconsulate and his third year of power; in other forms and in everysphere it was likely to be eternal, for it was an accepted axiom of theexisting regime that no "new man" could attain the consulship. [1055] Thecraving for this office was the new blight that had fallen on Marius'slife; for it is the ambition which is legitimate that spreads the mostmorbid influence on heart and brain. But the healthier part of his soul, which was to be found in that old-fashioned piety so often maligned bythe question-begging name of superstition, soon came to the help of theworldly impulse which the strong man might have doubted and crushed. Onone eventful day in Utica Marius was engaged in seeking the favour ofthe gods by means of sacrificial victims. The seer who was interpretingthe signs looked and exclaimed that great and wonderful things wereportended. Let the worshipper do whatsoever was in his mind; he had thesupport of the gods. Let him test fortune never so often, his heart'sdesire would be fulfilled. [1056] The gods had given a marvellous response in the only way in which thegods could answer. They did not suggest, but they could confirm, andnever was confirmation more emphatic. Marius's last doubts were removed, and he went straightway to his commander and asked for leave of absencethat he might canvass for the consulship in that very year. Metellus wasa good patron; that is, he was a bad friend. The aristocratic bristlesrose on the skin that had seemed so smooth. At first he expressed mildwonder at Marius's resolution--the wonder that is more contemptuous thana gibe--and exhorted him in words, the professedly friendly tone ofwhich must have been peculiarly irritating, not to let a distortedambition get the better of him; every one should see that his desireswere appropriate and limit them when they passed this stage; Marius hadreason to be satisfied with his position; he should be on his guardagainst asking the Roman people for a gift which they would have a rightto refuse. There was no suspicion of personal jealousy in theseutterances; they reflected the standard of a caste, not of a man. ButMarius had measured the situation, and was not to be deterred by itsbeing presented again in a galling but not novel form. A further requestwas met by the easy assumption that the matter was not so pressing as tobrook no delay; as soon as public business admitted of Marius'sdeparture, Metellus would grant his request. Still further entreatiesare said to have wrung from the impatient proconsul, whose good advicehad been wasted on a boor who did not know his place and could take nohints, the retort that Marius need not hurry; it would be time enoughfor him to canvass for the consulship when Metellus's own son should behis colleague. [1057] The boy was about twenty, Marius forty-nine. Theprospective consulship would come to the latter when he had reached themature age of seventy-two. The jest was a blessing, for anything thatjustified the whole-hearted renunciation of patronage, the dissolutionof the sense of obligation, was an avenue to freedom. Marius was now atliberty to go his own way, and he soon showed that there was enoughinflammable material in the African province to burn up the credit of agreater general than Metellus. It is said that the division of the army, commanded by Marius, soonfound itself enjoying a much easier time than before;[1058] the sternlegate had become placable, if not forgetful--a circumstance which maybe explained either by the view that a care greater than that ofmilitary discipline sat upon his mind, or by a belief that the new-borngraciousness was meant to offer a pleasing contrast to the rigour ofMetellus. But in this case the civilian element in the province was ofmore importance than the army. The merchant-princes of Utica, groaningover the vanished capital which they had invested in Numidian concerns, heard a criticism and a boast which appealed strongly to their impatientminds. Marius had said, or was believed to have said, that if but onehalf of the army were entrusted to him, he would have Jugurtha in chainsin a few days;[1059] that the war was being purposely prolonged tosatisfy the empty-headed pride which the commander felt in his position. The merchants had long been reflecting on the causes of the prolongationof the war with all the ignorance and impatience that greed supplies;now these causes seemed to be revealed in a simple and convincing light. The unfortunate house of Masinissa was also made to play its part in themovement. It was represented in the Roman camp by Gauda son ofMastanabal, a prince weak both in body and mind, but the legitimate heirto the Numidian crown, if it was taken from Jugurtha and Micipsa's lastwishes were fulfilled. For the old king in framing his testament hadnamed Gauda as heir in remainder to the kingdom, if his two sons andJugurtha should die without issue. [1060] The nearness of the succession, now that the reigning king of Numidia was an enemy of the Roman people, had prompted the prince to ask Metellus for the distinctions that hedeemed suited to his rank, a seat next that of the commander-in-chief, aguard of Roman knights[1061] for his person. Both requests had beenrefused--the place of honour because it belonged only to those whom theRoman people had addressed as kings, the guard, because it wasderogatory to the knights of Rome to act as escort to a Numidian. Theprince may have taken the refusal, not merely as an insult in itself, but as a hint that Metellus did not recognise him as a probablesuccessor to Jugurtha. He was in an anxious and moody frame of mind whenhe was approached by Marius and urged to lean on him, if he would gainsatisfaction for the commander's contumely. The glowing words of his newfriend made hope appeal to his weak mind almost with the strength ofcertainty. He was the grandson of Masinissa, the immediate occupant ofthe Numidian throne, should Jugurtha be captured or slain; the crownmight be his at no distant date, should Marius be made consul and sentto the war. He should make appeal to his friends in Rome to secure themeans which would lead to the desired end. The ship that bore theprince's letter to Rome took many other missives from far more importantmen--all of them with a strange unanimity breathing the same purport, "Metellus was mismanaging the war, Marius should be made commander". They were written by knights in the province--some of them officers inthe army, others heads of commercial houses[1062]--to their friends andagents in Rome. All of these correspondents had not been directlysolicited by Marius, but in some mysterious way the hope of peace inAfrica had become indissolubly associated with his name. The centralbureau of the great mercantile system would soon be working in hisfavour. Who would withstand it? Certainly not the senate still shaken bythe Mamilian law; still less the people who wanted but a new suggestionto change the character of their attack. All things seemed workingfor Marius. It was soon shown that, whoever the future commander of Numidia was tobe, he would have a real war on his hands; for the struggle had suddenlysprung into new and vigorous life, and one of the few permanentsuccesses of Rome was annihilated in a moment by the craft of thereawakened Jugurtha. The preparations of the king must have beenconjectured from their results; their first issue was a completesurprise; for few could have dreamed that the personal influence of themonarch, who had given away so much for an elusive hope of safety andhad almost been a prisoner in the Roman lines, should assert itself inthe very heart of the country believed to be pacified and now held byRoman garrisons. The town of Vaga, the intended basis of supplies for anarmy advancing to the south or west, the seat of an active commerce andthe home of merchants from many lands who traded under the aegis of theRoman peace and a Roman garrison perched on the citadel, was suddenlythrilled by a message from the king, and answered to the appeal with aburst of heartfelt loyalty--a loyalty perhaps quickened by the nativehatred of the ways of the foreign trader. The self-restraint of thepatriotic plotters was as admirable as their devotion to a cause sonearly lost. Many hundreds must have been cognisant of the scheme, yetnot a word reached the ears of those responsible for the security of thetown. Even the poorest conspirator did not dream of the fortune thatmight be reaped from the sale of so vast a secret, and the Roman was asignorant of the hidden significance of native demeanour as he was of thesubtleties of the native tongue. In eye and gesture he could readnothing but feelings of friendliness to himself, and he readily acceptedthe invitation to the social gathering which was to place him at themercy of his host. [1063] The third day from the date at which the plotwas first conceived offered a golden opportunity for an attack whichshould be unsuspected and resistless. It was the day of a great nationalfestival, on which leisured enjoyment took the place of work and everyone strove to banish for the time the promptings of anxiety and fear. The officers of the garrison had been invited by their acquaintanceswithin the town to share in their domestic celebrations. They and theircommandant, Titus Turpilius Silanus, were reclining at the feast in thehouses of their several hosts when the signal was given. The tribunesand centurions were massacred to a man; Turpilius alone was spared; thenthe conspirators turned on the rank and file of the Roman troops. Theposition of these was pitiable. Scattered in the streets, withoutweapons and without a leader, they saw the holiday throng around themsuddenly transformed into a ferocious mob. Even such of the meanerclasses as had up to this time been innocent of the murderous plot, weresoon baying at their heels; some of these were hounded on by theconspirators; others saw only that disturbance was on foot, and thewelcome knowledge of this fact alone served to spur them to a senselessfrenzy of assault. The Roman soldiers were merely victims; there wasnever a chance of a struggle which would make the sacrifice costly, oreven difficult. [1064] The citadel, in which their shields and standardshung, was in the occupation of the foe; when they sought the city gates, they found the portals closed; when they turned back upon the streets, the line of fury was deeper than before, for the women and the verychildren on the level housetops were hurling stones or any missiles thatcame to hand on the hated foreigners below. Strength and skill were ofno avail; such qualities could not even prolong the agony; the veteranand the tyro, the brave and the shrinking, were struck or cut down withequal ease and swiftness. Only one man succeeded in slipping through thegates. This was the commandant Turpilius himself. Even the lenient viewthat a lucky chance or the pity of his host had given him his freedom, did not clear him of the stain which the tyrannical tradition of Romanarms stamped on every commander who elected to survive the massacre ofthe division entrusted to his charge. [1065] When the news was brought to Metellus, the heart-sick general buriedhimself in his tent. [1066] But his first grief was soon spent, and histhoughts turned to a scheme of vengeance on the treacherous town. Rapidly and carefully the scheme was unfolded in his mind, and by thesetting of the sun the first steps towards the recovery of Vaga had beentaken. In the dusk he left his camp with the legion which had beenstationed in his own quarters and as large a force of Numidian cavalryas he could collect. Both horse and foot were slenderly equipped, for hewas bent on a surprise and a long and hard night's march lay before him. He was still speeding on three hours after the sun had risen on thefollowing day. The tired soldiers cried a halt, but Metellus spurredthem on by pointing to the nearness of their goal (Vaga, he showed, wasbut a mile distant, just beyond the line of hills which shut out theirview), the sanctity of the work of vengeance, the certainty of a richreward in plunder. He paused but to reform his men. The cavalry weredeployed in open order in the van; the infantry followed in a column sodense that nothing distinctive in their equipment or organisation couldbe discerned from afar, and the standards were carefullyconcealed. [1067] When the men of Vaga saw the force bearing down upontheir town, their first and right impression led them to close thegates; but two facts soon served to convince them of their error. Thesupposed enemy was not attempting to ravage their land, and the horsemenwho rode near the walls were clearly men of Numidian blood. It was theking himself, they cried, and with enthusiastic joy they poured from thegates to meet him. The Romans watched them come; then at a given signalthe closed ranks opened, as each division rushed to its appointed task. Some charged and cut in pieces the helpless multitude that had pouredupon the plain; others seized the gates, others again the now undefendedtowers on the walls. All sense of weariness had suddenly vanished fromlimbs now stimulated by the lust of vengeance and of plunder. Theslaughter was pitiless, the search for plunder as thorough as theslaughter. The war had not yet given such a prize as this great tradingtown. Its ruin was the general's loss as it was the soldiers' gain; butthe need for rapid vengeance vanquished every other sentiment inMetellus's mind. Roman punishment was as swift as it was sure, if buttwo days could elapse between the sin and the suffering of the men ofVaga. A gloomy task still remained. Inquiry must be made as to the modein which Turpilius the commandant had escaped unharmed from themassacre. The investigation was a bitter trial to Metellus; for theaccused was bound to him by close ties of hereditary friendship, and hadbeen accredited by him with the command of the corps of engineers. [1068]The command at Vaga had been a further mark of favour, and it wasbelieved by some that Turpilius had justified his commander's hopes onlytoo well, and that it was his very humanity and consideration for thetownsfolk under his command which had offered him means of escape suchas only the most resolute would have refused. [1069] But the scandal wastoo grave to admit of a private inquiry, in which the honour of the armymight seem to be sacrificed to the caprice of the friendly judgment ofMetellus. His very familiarity with the accused entailed the duty of acold impartiality, and Turpilius found little credence or excuse for thetale that he unfolded before the members of the court which adjudicatedon his case. The harsh view of Marius was particularly recalled in thelight of subsequent events. The fact or fancy that it was Marius who hadhimself condemned and had urged his brother judges to deliver an adversevote, was seized by the gatherers of gossip, ever ready to discover asinister motive in the actions of the man who never forgot, was embeddedin that prose epic of the "Wrath of Marius" which subsequently adornedthe memoirs of the great, and became a story of how the relentlesslieutenant had, in malignant disregard of his own convictions, causedMetellus to commit the inexpiable wrong of dooming a guest-friend to anunworthy death. [1070] The death was inflicted with all the barbarity ofRoman military law; Turpilius was scourged and beheaded, [1071] andthrough this final expiation the episode of Vaga remained to many mindsa still darker horror than before. But much had been gained by the recovery of the revolted town. It istrue that in its present condition it was almost useless to itspossessors; but its fate must have stayed the progress of revolt inother cities, and the rapidity of Metellus's movements had hamperedJugurtha's immediate plans. The king had probably intended that Vagashould be a second Zama, and that the Romans should be kept at bay byits strong walls while he himself harassed their rear or attacked theircamp. Now the scene of a successful guerilla warfare must be soughtelsewhere. Its choice depended on the movements of the Roman army; butthe time for the commencement of the new struggle was postponed longerthan it might have been by a domestic danger which, while it confirmedthe king in his resolution to struggle to the bitter end, absorbed hisattention for the moment and hampered his operations in the field. Bomilcar's negotiations with Rome were bearing their deadly fruit. [1072]The minister was a victim of that expectant anguish, which springs fromthe failure of a treacherous scheme, when the cause of that failure isunknown. Why had the king broken off the negotiations? Was he himselfsuspected? Would the danger be lessened, if he remained quiescent? Itmight be increased, for the peril from Rome still existed, and there wasthe new terror from the vengeance of a master, whose suspicion seemed tohis affrighted soul to be revealing itself in a cold neglect. Bomilcardetermined that he would face but a single peril, and plunged into acourse of intrigue far more dangerous than any which he had yet essayed. He no longer worked through underlings or appealed to the emissaries ofRome. He aimed at internal revolution, at the fall of the king by thehands of his servants--a stroke which he might exhibit to the suzerainpower as his own meritorious work--and he adopted as a confidant a manof his own rank and at the moment of greater influence than himself. Nabdalsa was the new favourite of Jugurtha. He was a man of high birth, of vast wealth, of great and good repute in the district of Numidiawhich he ruled. His fame and power had been increased by his appointmentto the command of such forces as the king could not lead in person, andhe was now operating with an army in the territory between thehead-quarters of Jugurtha and the Roman winter camp, his mission beingto prevent the country being overrun with complete impunity by theinvaders. His reason for listening to the overtures of Bomilcar isunknown; perhaps he knew too much of the military situation to believein his master's ultimate success, and aimed at securing his ownterritorial power by an appeal to the gratitude of Rome. But he had nothis associate's motive for hasty execution; and when Bomilcar warned himthat the time had come, his mind was appalled by the magnitude of a deedthat had only been prefigured in an ambiguous and uncertain shape. Thetime for meeting came and passed. Bomilcar was in an agony of impatientfear. The doubtful attitude of his associate opened new possibilities ofdanger; a new terror had been added to the old, and the motive fordespatch was doubled. His alarm found vent in a brief but frantic letterwhich mingled gloomy predictions of the consequences of delay withfierce protestations and appeals. Jugurtha, he urged, was doomed, thepromises of Metellus might at any moment work the ruin of them both, andNabdalsa's choice lay between reward and torture. [1073] When this missive was delivered by a faithful hand, the general, tiredin mind and body, had stretched himself upon a couch. The fiery wordsdid not stimulate his ardour; they plunged him still deeper in a trainof anxious thought, until utter weariness gave way to sleep. The letterrested on his pillow. Suddenly the covering of the tent door wasnoiselessly raised. His faithful secretary, who believed that he knewall his master's secrets, had heard of the arrival of a courier. Hishelp and skill would be needed, and he had anticipated Nabdalsa's demandfor his presence. The letter caught his eye; he lightly picked it up andread it, as in duty bound--for did he not deal with all letters, andcould there be aught of secrecy in a paper so carelessly laid down? Theplot now flashed across his eyes for the first time, and he slipped fromthe tent to hasten with the precious missive to the king. When Nabdalsaawoke, his thoughts turned to the letter which had harassed his lastwaking moments. It was gone, and he soon found that his secretary haddisappeared as well. A fruitless attempt to pursue the fugitiveconvinced him that his only hope lay in the clemency, prudence orcredulity of Jugurtha. Hastening to his master, he assured him that theservice which he had been on the eve of rendering had been anticipatedby the treachery of his dependent; let not the king forget their closefriendship, his proved fidelity; these should exempt him from suspicionof participation in such a horrid crime. Jugurtha replied in a conciliatory tone. [1074] Neither then norafterwards did he betray any trace of violent emotion. Bomilcar and manyof his accomplices were put to death swiftly and secretly; but it wasnot well that rumours of a widely spread treason should be noisedabroad. The pretence of security was a means of ensuring safety, and hehad to ask too much of his Numidians to indulge even the severity thathe held to be his due. Yet it was believed that the tenor of Jugurtha'slife was altered from that moment. It was whispered that the boldsoldier and intrepid ruler searched dark corners with his eyes andstarted at sudden sounds, that he would exchange his sleeping chamberfor some strange and often humble resting place at night, and thatsometimes in the darkness he would start from sleep, seize his sword andcry aloud, as though maddened by the terror of his dreams. The news of the fall of Bomilcar swept from Metellus's mind the lastfaint hope that the war might be brought to a speedy close by theimmediate surrender of Jugurtha, [1075] and he began to make earnestpreparations for a fresh campaign. In the new struggle he was to bedeprived of the services of his ablest officer, for Marius had at lengthgained his end and had won from his commander a tardy permit to speed toRome and seek the prize, which was doubtless still believed in theuninformed circles of the camp to be utterly beyond his grasp. Theconsent, though tardy, was finally given with a good will, for Metellushad begun to doubt the wisdom of keeping by his side a lieutenant whoserestless discontent and growing resentment to his superior were beyondall concealment. Marius must have wished that his general's choler hadbeen stirred at an earlier date, for the leave had been deferred to aseason which would have deterred a less strenuous mind, from allthoughts of a political campaign during the current year. Delay, however, might be fatal; the war might be brought to a dazzling closebefore the consular elections again came round; the political balance atRome might alter; it was necessary to reap at once the harvest ofmercantile greed and popular distrust that had been so carefullyprepared. It is possible that the usual date for the elections hadalready been passed and that It was only the postponement of the Comitiathat gave Marius a chance of success. [1076] Even then it was a slenderone, for it was believed in later times that his leave had been won onlytwelve days before the day fixed for the declaration of theconsuls. [1077] In two days and a night he had covered the ground thatlay between the camp and Utica. Here he paused to sacrifice beforetaking ship to Italy. The cheering words of the priest who read theomens[1078] seemed to be approved by the good fortune of his voyage. Afavourable wind bore him in four days across the sea, and he reachedRome to find men craving for his presence as the crowning factor in apopular movement, delightful in its novelty and entered into with agenuine enthusiasm by the masses, who were fully conscious that therewas a wrong of some undefined kind to be set right, and were as a wholeperhaps blissfully ignorant of the intrigues by which they were beingmoved. Yet the thinking portion of the community had some grounds forresentment and alarm. The Numidian was not merely injuring thoseinterested in African finance, but was engaging an army that was sadlyneeded elsewhere. The struggle in the North was going badly for Rome, and despatches had lately brought the news of the defeat of the consulSilanus by a vast and wandering horde known as the Cimbri, [1079] whohovered like a threatening cloud on the farther side of the Alps andmight at no distant date sweep past the barrier of Italy. The senatorialgovernment, although its position had not been formally assailed, hadbeen sufficiently shaken by the Mamilian commission to distrust itspower of stemming an adverse tide; and Scaurus, its chief bulwark, hadlately been so ill-advised as to force a conflict with constitutionalprocedure in a way which could not be approved by a class of men towhich the smallest precedent of political life that had once beenstereotyped, appealed as a vital element in administration. He hadspoilt a magnificent display of energy during his tenure of thecensorship--an energy that issued in the rebuilding of the Mulvianbridge[1080] and in the continuance of the great coast road[1081] fromEtruria past Genua to Dertona in the basin of the Po--by anunconstitutional attempt to continue in his office after the death ofhis colleague. His resignation had been enforced by some of thetribunes;[1082] and the great man seems still to have been under thepassing cloud engendered by his own obstinate ambition, when theintrigues of the ever-dreaded coalition of the mercantile classes andthe popular leaders were completed by the arrival of Marius. This new figurehead of the democracy had a comparatively easy partassigned him. Had it been necessary for him to persuade, he wouldprobably have failed, for he lacked the gifts of the orator and thesuppleness of the intriguer; but he was expected only to confirm, andbetter confirmation was to be gained from his martial bearing and hisrugged manner than from his halting words. The speaking might be done byothers more practised in the art; a few words of harsh verification fromthis living exemplar of the virtues of the people were all that wasdemanded. His censure of Metellus was followed by a promise that hewould take Jugurtha alive or dead. [1083] The censure and the promisegave the text for a fiery stream of opposition oratory. Threats ofprosecuting Metellus on a capital charge were mingled with passionateassertions of confidence in the true soldier who could vindicate thehonour of Rome. The excitement spread even beyond the lazier rabble ofthe city. Honest artisans, who were usually untouched by the deliriousforms of politics, and even thrifty country farmers, [1084] to whom timemeant money at this busy season of the year, were drawn into the throngthat gazed at Marius and listened to the burning words of hissupporters. Against such a concourse the nobility and its dependentscould make no head. The people who had come to listen stayed to vote, and the suffrage of the centuries gave the "new man" as a colleague toLucius Cassius Longinus. But this triumph was but the prelude toanother. The people, now assembled in the plebeian gathering of thetribes, were asked by the tribune Titus Manlius Mancinus whom theywilled to conduct the war against Jugurtha. The answer "Marius" wasgiven by overwhelming numbers, and the decision already reached by thesenate was brushed aside. That body had, in the exercise of its legalauthority, determined the provinces which should be administered by theconsuls of the coming year. [1085] Numidia had not been one of these, forit had unquestionably been destined for Metellus. Gaul, on the otherhand, called for the presence of a consul and a soldier; and the senate, although it had no power to make a definite appointment to thisprovince, had perhaps intended that Marius, if elected, should beentrusted with its defence. Had this resolution been adopted, the pathsof Marius and Metellus would have ceased to cross; the Numidian war, which demanded patience and diplomacy but not genius, might havedwindled gradually away; and the barbarians of the North might haveyielded to their future victor before they had established their gloomyrecord of triumphs over the arms of Rome. But this was not to be. Theparty triumph would be incomplete if the senate's nominee was not oustedfrom his command. We cannot say whether Marius shared in the blindnesswhich saw a more glorious field for military energy in Numidia than inGaul; personal rivalry and political passion may have already bluntedthe instincts of the soldier. But, whatever his thoughts may have been, his actions were determined by a superior force. He was but a pawn inthe hands of tribunes and capitalists; he had made promises which hadraised hopes, definitely commercial and vaguely political. These hopesit must be his mission to fulfil. Before quitting Rome he foundwords[1086] which vented all the spleen of the classes screened out ofoffice by the close-drawn ring of the nobility. The platitudes of merit, tested by honest service and approved by distinctions won in war, wereadvanced against the claims of birth; the luxurious life of the nobilitywas gibbeted on the ground that sensuality was a bar to energy andefficiency; even the elegant and conscientious taste of the culturedcommander, who supplied the defects of experience by the perusal ofGreek works on military tactics during his journey to the scene of war, was held up to criticism as a sign that the vain and ignorant amateurwas usurping the tasks that belonged to the tried and hardyexpert. [1087] Fortunately the energy of Marius was better expended ondeeds than words. Whether the African war really required a morevigorous army than that serving under Metellus, might be an openquestion. Marius pretended that the need was patent, and exhibited thegreatest energy in beating up veteran legionaries and attracting to hisstandard such of the Latin allies as had already approved their skill inservice. [1088] The senate lent a ready hand. Nothing was more unpopularthan a drastic levy, and the favourite might fail when he called for afulfilment of the brave language that had been heard on every side. Butthe confidence in the new commander baffled its hopes; the conscriptswere marching to glory not to danger, and the supplementary army, thatwas to avert a phantom peril and save an imaginary situation, was soonenrolled. Such a demonstration had often been seen before in Rome; theenergy of an ambitious commander had with lamentable frequency rebukedthe indolence or confidence of his predecessor, and Marius was butfollowing in the footsteps of Bestia and Albinus. The real merits of hislabours were due to his freedom from a strange superstition which hadhitherto clung to the minds even of the best commanders that the laterRepublic had produced. They had continued to hold the theory that theeffective soldier must be a man of means--a belief inherited from thesimple days of border warfare, when each conscript supplied his panoplyand the landless man could serve only as a half-armed skirmisher. Forages past the principle had been breaking down. The vast forces requiredfor foreign wars demanded a wider area for the conscription; but thisarea, as defined by the old conditions of service, so far fromincreasing, was ever becoming less. In the age of Polybius the minimumqualification requisite for service in the legions had sunk from eleventhousand to four thousand asses;[1089] later it had been reduced to ayet lower level;[1090] but, in spite of these concessions to necessity, the senate had refused to accept the lesson, taught by the militaryneeds of the State and the social condition of Italy, that an empirecannot be garrisoned by an army of conscripts. The legal power to effecta radical alteration had long been in their hands; for the poorerproletariate of Rome whom the law described as the men assessed "ontheir heads, " not on their holdings, had probably been liable tomilitary service of any kind in time of need. [1091] Perhaps it was mereconservatism, perhaps it was a faint perception of the truth that anarmed rabble is fonder of men than institutions, and an appreciation ofthe fact that the hold of the nobility over the capital would beweakened if their clients were allowed to don the armour which made themmen, that had kept the senate within the strait limits of the antiquatedrules. Fortunately, however, the methods of raising an army dependedalmost entirely on the discretion of the general engaged on the task. Did he employ the conscription in a manner not justified by convention, he might be met by resistance and appeals; but, if he chose to invite toservice, there was no power which could prescribe the particular modesin which he should employ the units that flocked to his standard. It wasthis latter method that was adopted by Marius. He did not strain hispopularity, and invite a conflict with senatorial tribunes, by forcingforeign service on the ragged freemen who had hailed him as the saviourof the State; but he invited their assistance in the glorious work andasked them to be his comrades in the triumphal progress that lay beforehim. [1092] The spirit of adventure, if not of patriotism, was touched:the call was readily answered, and the stalwart limbs that had loungedidly on the streets or striven vainly to secure the subsistence of thefavoured slave, became the instruments by which the State was to befirst protected and finally controlled. The conscription still remainedas the resort of necessity; but the creation of the first mercenary armyof Rome pointed to the mode in which any future commander could avoidthe friction and unpopularity which often attended the enforcement ofliability to service. The innovation of Marius was sufficientlystartling to attract comment and invite conjecture. Some held that thearmy had been democratised to suit the consulship, and that the masseswho had seen in Marius's elevation the realisation of the vague anddetached ambitions of the poor, would continue to furnish a sure supportto the power which they had created. [1093] It is not unlikely thatMarius, with his knowledge of the tone of the army of Metellus, may havewished to create for himself an environment that would mould the temperof his future officers; but those more friendly critics who held thatefficiency was his immediate aim, and that "the bad" were chosen onlybecause "the good" were scarce, [1094] suggested the reason that wasprobably dominant as a motive and was certainly adequate as a defence. No thought of the ultimate triumph of the individual over the State bythe help of a devoted soldiery could have crossed the mind either of theconsul or of his critics. The Republic was as yet sacred, howeverunhealthy its chief organs might be deemed; and although Marius was tolive to see the sinister fruit of his own reform, the harvest was to bereaped by a rival, and the first fruits enjoyed by the senate whom thatrival served. While the election of Marius, his appointment to Numidia, and hispreparations for the campaign were in progress, the war had been passingthrough its usual phases of skirmishes and sieges. For a time no certainnews could be had of the king; he was reported at one moment to be nearthe Roman lines, at another to be buried in the solitude of thedesert;[1095] the annoyance caused by his baffling changes of plan wasavenged by the interpretation that they were symptoms of a disorderedmind; his old counsellors were said to have been dispersed, his new onesto be distrusted; it was believed that he changed his route and hisofficers from day to day, and that he retreated or retraced his steps asthe terrors of suspicion and despair alternated with the faintlysurviving hope that a stand might yet be made. Only once did he comeinto conflict with Metellus. [1096] The site of the skirmish is unknown, and its result was indecisive. The Numidian army is said to have beensurprised and to have formed hastily for battle. The division led by theking offered a brief resistance; the rest of the line yielded at once tothe Roman onset. A few standards and arms, a handful of prisoners, wereall that the victors had to show for their triumph. The nimble enemy haddisappeared beyond all hope of capture or pursuit. After a time news was brought that the king had made for the southerndesert with a fraction of his mounted troops and the Roman deserters, whose despair ensured their loyalty. He had shut himself up inThala, [1097] a large and wealthy town to which his treasures and hischildren had already been transferred. This city lay some thirteen mileseast of the oasis of Capsa, and a dismal and waterless desert stretchedbetween the Romans and the refuge of the king. No Roman army had at anypart of the campaign attempted to penetrate such trackless regions, andthe court at Thala may have believed even this foretaste of the desertto be an adequate protection against an enemy which clung to towns andcultivated lands and relied, in the cumbrous manner of civilisedwarfare, on organised lines of communication. But the news that Jugurthahad at last occupied a position, the strength of which, together withthe presence of his family and treasures within its walls, might supplya motive for a lengthy residence within the town and even suggest theresolution of holding it against every hazard, fired Metellus with ahope which the awkward political situation at Rome must have made morereal than it deserved to be. The end of the war might be in sight, if hecould only cross that belt of burning land. His plan was rapidly formed. The burden of the baggage animals was reduced to ten days' supply ofcorn; skins of water were laid upon their backs; the domestic cattlefrom the fields were driven in, and they were laden with every kind ofvessel that could be gathered from the Numidian homesteads. Thevillagers in the neighbourhood of the recent victory, whom the flight ofthe king had made for the moment the humble servants of Rome, werebidden to bring water to a certain spot, and the day was named on whichthis mission was to be fulfilled. Metellus's own vessels were filledfrom the river, and the rapid march to Thala was begun. The restingplace was reached and the camp was entrenched; water was there ingreater abundance than had been asked or hoped, for a sharp downpour ofrain made the plethoric skins presented by the punctual Numidians almosta superfluous luxury and, as a happy omen, cheered the souls of thesoldiers as much as it refreshed their bodies. [1098] The devotedvillagers had also brought an unexpectedly large supply of corn, soeager were they to give emphatic proof of their newly acquired loyalty. But one day more and the walls of Thala came in sight. Its citizens weresurprised but not dismayed; they made preparations for the siege, whiletheir king vanished into the desert with his children and a largeportion of his hoarded wealth. It was too much to hope that Jugurthawould be caught in such a trap. The alternative prospects at Thala wereimmediate capture or a siege as protracted as the nature of theterritory would permit. In the latter case a cordon would be drawn roundthe town and a price would probably be put upon the rebel's head. It isstrange that the desperate band of deserters did not accompany the kingin his flight. There may have been no time for the retreat of so large aforce, or the strength and desolation of the site may have filled themwith confidence of success. But, if things came to the worst, they had asurprise in store for their former comrades who were now batteringagainst the walls. Metellus, in spite of the fact that he had lightened his baggage animalsof all the superfluities of the camp, must have brought his siege trainwith him; it would, indeed, have been madness to attempt an assault on afortified town without the necessary instruments of attack. He seems inhis lines round Thala to have had all that he needed for a blockade;even the planks for the great moving turrets were ready to hishand. [1099] The engines were soon in place on an artificial mound raisedby the labour of the troops, the soldiers advanced under cover of themantlets, and the rams began to batter against the walls. For forty daysthe courage of the besieged tried the patience of assailants alreadywearied with the toils of a long forced march. Had human endurance beenthe deciding factor, Metellus might have been forced to retire. But thewall of Thala was weaker than the spirit of its defenders; a portion ofthe rampart crumbled beneath the blows of the ram, and the victoriousRomans rushed in to seize the plunder of the treasure-city. They foundinstead a holocaust of wealth and human victims. The royal palace hadbeen invaded by the deserters from the Roman army whom Jugurtha had leftbehind. Thither they had borne the gold, the silver and the preciousstuffs which formed the glory of the town. A feast was spread andcontinued until the banqueters were heavy with meat and wine. The palacewas then fired, and when the plundering mob of Romans had made their wayto the centre of the city's wealth, they found but the smoulderingtraces of a baffled vengeance and a disappointed greed. The capture of Thala was one of those successes which might have beenimportant, had it been possible to limit the area of the war or to checkthe disaffection which was now spreading throughout almost the whole ofNorthern Africa. The fringe of the desert had but been reached; the kinghad fled beyond it; the south and west were soon to be in a blaze; weshall soon see Metellus forced to take up his position in the north; anda slight incident which occurred while Metellus was at Thala showed thateven cities of the distant east, which had never been under theimmediate sway of the Numidian power, were wavering in their attachmentto Rome. The Greater Leptis, situate in the territory of the ThreeCities between the gulfs which separated Roman Africa from the territoryof Cyrene, had sought the friendship and alliance of Rome from the verycommencement of the war. A Sidonian settlement, [1100] it had, like mostcommercial towns which sought a life of peace, preferred theprotectorate of Rome to that of the neighbouring dynasties, and hadreadily responded to the calls made on it by Bestia, Albinus andMetellus. [1101] Such assistance as it furnished must have been suppliedby sea, for it was more than four hundred miles by land from the usualsphere of Roman operations; but the commissariat of the Roman army wasso serious a problem that the ships of the men of Leptis must alwayshave been a welcome sight at the port of Utica. Now the stability oftheir constitution, and their service to Rome, were threatened by theambition of a powerful noble. This Hamilcar was defying the authorityboth of laws and magistrates, and Leptis, they wrote, would be lost, ifMetellus did not send timely help. Four cohorts of Ligurians with apraefect at their head were sent to the faithful state, and the Romangeneral turned to meet the graver dangers which were threatening inthe west. Jugurtha had crossed the desert with a handful of his men and was nowamongst the Gaetulian tribes, [1102] who stretched from the limits of hisown dominions far across the southern frontier of his brother king ofMauretania. His eyes were now turned to the west; the men of the desert, the King of the Moors, would be infallible means of prolonging the warwith Rome, if their help could be secured. No Roman army had yet daredto penetrate even into Western Numidia, and such a venture would be morehopeless than ever, if the nomad tribes of the desert frontier andBocchus of Mauretania enclosed that district with myriads of mounted menthat might sweep it at any time from point to point, and destroy in amoment the laborious efforts at occupation that might be made by Rome. The Gaetulians, although perhaps a nomad, were not a barbarian people. They plied with Mediterranean cities a trade in purple dye, the materialfor which was gathered on the Atlantic coast; and their merchants weresometimes seen in the marketplace at Cirta;[1103] but as fighting menthey lacked even the organisation to which the Numidians had attained, and Jugurtha, while he sought or purchased their help, was obliged toteach them the rudiments of disciplined warfare. Gradually they learntto keep the line, to follow the standards, to wait for the word ofcommand before they threw themselves upon the foe;[1104] these untrainedwarriors must have been fired mainly by the love of adventure, of pay orof plunder, or have been impressed by the greatness of the fugitive whohad suddenly appeared amongst their tribes; they had no hatred orprevious fear of the power of Rome, for most of the Gaetulian chiefswere ignorant even of the name of the imperial city. [1105] This name, however, had long been in the mind of the king who governedthe northern neighbours of the Gaetulians, and it was to the fears orhopes of Bocchus of Mauretania that Jugurtha now appealed with thedesign of gaining an auxiliary force greater than any which he himselfcould put into the field. He had a claim on the Mauretanian king whichmight have been valid in a land in which polygamy did not prevail, forhe was the husband of that monarch's daughter; but the dissipation ofaffection amongst a multitude of wives and their respective progeny didnot permit the connection with a son-in-law to be a particularly bindingtie. [1106] There were, however, other motives which might spur the kingto action. His early overtures to Rome had been rejected, and thisneglect must have aroused in his mind a feeling of anxiety as well as ofwounded pride. If Rome conquered Numidia, she might become hisneighbour. What in that case would be the position of Mauretania, connected as it would be by no previous ties of friendship or alliancewith the conquering state? If Bacchus joined Jugurtha, he wouldimmediately become a power with whom Rome would be forced to deal. Anally detached from her enemies had often become her most trusted friend;it was thus that the power of Masinissa had been secured and his kingdomhad been increased. If Jugurtha were victorious, the Romans would bekept at bay; if he showed signs of failure, the defection of Bocchusmight be bought at a great price. The game on which he had entered wasabsolutely safe; he could only be the loser if at the critical momentchivalry or national sentiment interfered with the designs of acalculating prudence. The great necessity of his position was to forcethe hand of the Roman general and the Roman senate; but meanwhile hewould keep an open mind and see whether the power which he dreaded mightnot be permanently kept at bay. It may have been with thoughts like these that Bocchus bowed to theteaching of his counsellors when they urged a meeting withJugurtha. [1107] The meeting was that of equals, not of a suppliant andhis protector. The Numidian king again headed an army of his own, and, after the oath of alliance had been given and received, exhorted hisfather-in-law in his own interest to join in a war that was as necessaryas it was just. The Romans, he pointed out, had been made by their lustfor conquest the common enemies of the human race. One had only to lookat their treatment of Perseus of Macedon, of Carthage, of himself. Whowas Bocchus that he alone should be immune from such a danger? The moodof the king responded to Jugurtha's words, and without an instant'sdelay they took the field together. Jugurtha was insistent on despatch, for he knew the varying temper of his relative and feared that even aslight delay would cool his resolve for decisive action. The scene of the war now shifts with amazing suddenness to the north andcentres for the first time round the walls of Cirta. [1108] Metellus hadevidently been drawn from the south by the news of the threatenedcoalition; for, if the territories near the coast were undefended, theMauretanians might sweep like a devastating storm over the land thatmight have been held with some show of justice to be in the possessionof Rome. Cirta now appears as within the pacified territory and, although we have no record as to the time when it was lost byJugurtha, [1109] its possession by the Romans need excite no surprise. Itmay have been lost at an early period of the war, for there is no signthat it was employed by Jugurtha either as a military or politicalcapital, and if, in spite of the massacre that had followed its capturefrom Adherbal, its cosmopolitan mercantile life had been revived, theattachment of the town to Rome would be assured on the news of thewaning fortunes of its king. Its surrender was certainly peaceful, andthe strength which might have defied the arms of Rome had rendered itincapable of recovery by its former owner. To Cirta Metellus hadtransferred his prisoners, his booty and his baggage, [1110] and it wasagainst Cirta that the two kings moved with their formidable force. Jugurtha was the moving spirit in the enterprise, his idea being that, even if the town could not be taken, the Romans would be forced to cometo its support and a battle would be fought beneath its walls. A battlewas now an issue to be courted, for never had he faced the enemy withgreater numbers on his side. Metellus was as fully conscious of the change in the situation. Latelyhe had been forcing himself on Jugurtha at every point; now he held backand waited for the favourable chance. He wished above all to learnsomething of the fighting spirit and methods of the Moors;[1111] theywere an untried foe, and Roman success was usually the fruit ofknowledge and not of experiment. He waited in his fortified camp nearCirta to watch events, when news was brought from Rome which proved tohis mind that cautious inaction was now not merely the wiser but theonly policy. The news that came by letter was of stunning force. Metellus had already learnt of Marius's election to the consulship. Thisknowledge should have prepared him for the worst; but a proud man, conscious of his deserts, will not meet in anticipation an event that, however probable, seems incredible. Yet here it was before him in blackand white. He had been superseded in his command and the province ofNumidia belonged to Marius. [1112] There was no pretence ofself-restraint; tears rose to his eyes, as bitter language flowed fromhis lips. It was disputed whether natural pride or the sense ofunmerited wrong was the secret of his wrath, or whether he held (as manythought) that a victory already won was being wrested from his grasp. But it was safely conjectured that his grief would not have been soviolent had any man but Marius been his successor. To risk a defeat at the moment when the command was slipping from hisgrasp seemed to Metellus the height of folly; but, even had he notpossessed this additional motive for inaction, the situation wouldprobably have forced him to temporise and to attempt to dissolve thehostile coalition by diplomacy. He therefore sent a message to Bocchusurging him to think seriously of the course of action which he hadadopted. [1113] An opportunity was still open to him of becoming thefriend and ally of Rome; why should he adopt this motiveless attitude ofhostility? The cause of Jugurtha was desperate; did the King ofMauretania wish to bring his own country into the same miserable plight?These were the first words that Bocchus had heard of a possibleconvention with Rome; he had scored the first point, but was much toowise to give away the game. Definite offers must be made and securelyguaranteed before he would withdraw the terror of his presence. Firmnessand conciliation must be blended in his answer, which, when delivered, was both gracious and chivalrous. He longed, he said, for peace, but wasstirred to pity for the fortunes of Jugurtha. If the latter were alsogiven the chance of making terms with Rome, all might be arranged. Metellus replied with another message framed to meet the position takenup by the king; the answer of Bocchus was a cautious mixture of assentand protest. As he showed no unwillingness to continue the discussion, Metellus occupied the remainder of his own tenure of the command infurther parleyings. Envoys came and went, and the war was practicallysuspended. A delicate and promising negotiation was on foot; it remainedto be seen whether it would be patiently continued or rudely interruptedby the new governor of Numidia. CHAPTER VIII The summer must have been well advanced when Marius landed at Utica withhis untried forces. The veterans were handed over to his care by thelegate Rutilius[1114] for Metellus had fled the sight of the man, whosesuccess had been based on a slanderous attack on his own reputation. Itmust have been with a heavy heart that he accomplished the voyage toRome; for the greatest expert in the moods of the people could scarcelyhave foretold the surprise that awaited him there. The popular passionwas spent; it was a feverish force that had burnt itself out; thecountry voters had at last bethought themselves of their work andreturned to their farms; many of the most active and disorderly spirits, the restless loud-voiced men who are the potent minority in anagitation, had been removed by the levy of Marius; with the city mobdocility generally alternated with revolution, and it was now inclinedto look to the verdict of the recognised heads of the State. In thismoment of reaction, too, many must have been inclined to wonder whatafter all could be said against this general who had never lost abattle, who had conquered cities and pitilessly revenged the onedisaster which was not his fault, who had constantly swept the terribleKing of Numidia as a helpless fugitive before him. The presence ofMetellus completed the work by giving stability to these half-formedviews. The common folk are the true idealists. They love a hero ratherbetter than a victim, although it often depends on the turn of a hairwhich part the object of their attentions is to play. Now they followedthe lead of the senate; the returned commander was the man of theday[1115] he had exalted the glory of the Roman name; and if there wasno fault, there could only have been misfortune; but misfortune might becompensated by honour. There was the prospect of a triumph in store, that mixed source of sensuous satisfaction and nationalself-congratulation. Thus Metellus won his prizes from the Numidian war, a parade through the streets to the Capitol and the addition of thesurname "Numidicus" to the already lengthy nomenclature of hishouse[1116] The war itself, under the guidance of Marius, soon assumed the characterwhich it had possessed under that of all his predecessors. Theoriginality of the new commander seemed to have spent itself in theselection of his troops; no new idea seems to have been introduced intothe conduct of operations, which resumed their old shapes of precautionsagainst surprise, weary marches from end to end of Numidia, and thesiege of strongholds which were no sooner taken than they proved to bebeyond the area of actual hostilities. Perhaps no new idea was possibleexcept one that exchanged the weapons of war for those of diplomacy; buteven the final attempt that had been made in this direction by Metelluswas not continued by Marius. Bocchus, unwilling to lose the chance whichhad been presented of a definite convention with Home, sent repeatedmessages to her new representative to the effect that he desired thefriendship of the Roman people, and that no acts of hostility on hispart need be feared[1117] but his protestations were received withdistrust, and Marius, accustomed to the duplicity of the African mindand rejecting the view that the king might really be wavering betweenwar and peace, chose to regard them as the treacherous cover for asudden attack. The desultory campaign which followed seems to have beendirected by two motives. The first was the training of the raw levieswhich had just been brought from Rome; the second the supposed necessityof cutting Jugurtha off from the strongholds which he still held at theextremities of his kingdom. As these extremities were now threatened orcommanded, on the south by the Gaetulians and on the west by theMauretanians, the area of the war was no less than that of Numidiaitself; and, as the occupation of such an area was impossible, thedestruction of these strongholds, which was little loss to a mobileself-supporting force such as that which Jugurtha had at his command, was the utmost end which could be secured. The practice of the untrained Roman levies was rendered easy by the factthat Jugurtha had resumed the offensive. He no longer had the help ofhis Mauretanian auxiliaries, for Bocchus had retired to his own kingdom, and he had therefore lost his desire for a pitched battle; but hisswarms of Gaetulian horse had enabled him to resume his old style ofguerilla fighting, and he had taken advantage of the practicalsuspension of hostilities which had accompanied the change in the Romancommand, to set on foot a series of raids against the friends of Romeand even to penetrate the borders of the Roman province itself. [1118]For some time the attention of Marius was absorbed in following hisdifficult tracks, in striving to anticipate his rapidly shifting plans, in creating in his own men the habits of endurance, the mobility and thestrained attention, which even a brief period of such a chase willrapidly engender in the rawest of recruits. The pursuit graduallyshifted to the west, and a series of sharp conflicts on the road endedfinally in the rout of the king in the neighbourhood of Cirta. Withtroops now seasoned to the toils of long marches and deliberate attack, Marius turned to the more definite, if not more effective, enterprise ofbeleaguering such fortified positions as were still strongly held, andby their position seemed to give a strategic advantage to the enemy. Hisobject was either to strip Jugurtha of these last garrisons or to forcehim to a battle if he came to their defence. At first he confined hisoperations within a narrow area; the best part of the summer monthsseems to have been spent in the territory lying east and south of Cirta, and within this region several fortresses and castles still adhering tothe king were reduced by persuasion or by force. [1119] Yet Jugurtha madeno move, and Marius gained a full experience of the helpless irritationof the commander who hears that his enemy is far away, neglectful of hisefforts and wholly absorbed in some deep-laid scheme the very rudimentsof which are beyond the reach of conjecture. His operations seem to havebrought him to a point somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sicca, and thisproximity to the southern regions of Numidia suggested the thought of anenterprise that might rival and even surpass Metellus's storm of Thala. About thirteen miles west of that town[1120] lay the strong city ofCapsa. [1121] It marked almost the extremest limit of Jugurtha's empirein this direction, placed as it was just north of the great lakes andwest of the deepest curve of the Lesser Syrtis. The town was the gift ofan oasis, which here broke the monotony of the desert with pleasantgroves of dates and olives and a perennial stream of water. The sourcesof this stream, which was formed by the union of two fountains, had beenenclosed within the walls, and supplied drinking water for the citybefore it passed beyond it to irrigate the land. Even this supply hardlysufficed for the moderate needs of the Numidians, who supplemented it byrain water[1122] which they caught and stored in cisterns. A siege ofCapsa in the dry season might therefore prove irksome to theinhabitants; but the invading army might be even less well supplied, foralthough four other springs outside the walls fed the canals whichserved the work of irrigation, they tended to run low when the season ofrain was past. The security of the city, although its defences and itsgarrison were strong, was thought to reside mainly in its desertbarrier. The waste through which an invading army would have to pass waswaterless and barren, while the multitude of snakes and scorpions thatfound a congenial home on the arid soil increased the horror, if not thedanger, of the route. [1123] Jugurtha had dealt kindly by the lonelycitizens of Capsa; they were free from taxes and had seldom to answer toany demand of the king: and this favour, which was perhaps as much theproduct of necessity as of policy, had strengthened their loyalty to theNumidian throne. It is probable that some strategic, or at leastmilitary, motive was mingled in the mind of Marius with the mere desireof excelling his predecessor and creating a deep impression in the mindsof the proletariate in his army and at home. Although Capsa, with itslimited resources, could hardly ever have served as the point ofdeparture for a large Numidian or Gaetulian host, it might have been ofvalue as a refuge for the king when he wished to vanish from the eyes ofhis enemies, and perhaps as a means of communication with friendlycities or peoples situated between the two Syrtes. To vanquish thedifficulties of such an enterprise might also strike terror into theNumidian garrisons of other towns, and the subjects of Jugurtha mightfeel that no stronghold was safe when the unapproachable Capsa had beentaken or destroyed. But the difficulties of the task were great. TheNumidians of these regions were more attached to a pastoral life than toagriculture; the stores of corn to be found along the route weretherefore scanty, and their scarcity was increased by the fact that theking, who seems but lately to have passed through these regions, hadordered that large supplies of grain should be conveyed from thedistrict and stored in the fortresses which his garrisons stillheld. [1124] Nothing could be got from the fields, which at this lateperiod of the autumn showed nothing but arid stubble. It was fortunatethat some stores still lay at Lares (Lorbeus), a town at a shortdistance to the south-east of his present base;[1125] these were to besupplemented by the cattle that the foraging parties had driven in, andthe Roman soldier would at least have his unwelcome supply of meattempered by a moderate allowance of meal. Yet the terrors of the journeywere so great that Marius thought it wise to conceal the object of hisenterprise even from his own men, and even when, after a six days' marchto the south, he had reached a stream called the Tana, [1126] the motiveof the expedition was still in all probability unknown. Here, as inMetellus's march on Thala, a large supply of water was drawn from theriver and stored in skins, all heavy baggage was discarded, and thelightened column prepared for its march across the desert. By day thesoldiers kept their camp and every stage of the journey was accomplishedbetween night-fall and dawn. On the morning of the third day they hadreached some rising ground not more than two miles from Capsa. [1127] Thesun had not yet risen when Marius halted his men in a hollow of thedunes, and watched the town to see whether his cautious plans had reallyeffected a surprise. Evidently they had; for, when day broke, the gateswere seen to open and large numbers of Numidians could be observedleaving the city for the business of the fields. The word was given, andin a moment the whole of the cavalry and the lightest of the infantrywere dashing on the town. They were meant to block the gates; whileMarius and the heavier troops followed as speedily as they could, driving the straggling Numidians before them. It was the possession ofthese hostages that decided the fate of the town. The commandantparleyed and agreed to admit the Romans within the walls, the condition, whether tacit or expressed, of this surrender being that the lives ofthe citizens should be spared. The condition was immediately broken. Thetown was given over to the flames, all the Numidians of full age wereput to the sword, the rest were sold into slavery, and the movableproperty which had been seized was divided amongst the soldiers. Thebreach of international custom was not denied; the only attempt atpalliation was drawn from the reflection that it was due neither tomotiveless treachery nor to greed; a position like Capsa, it wasurged, --difficult of approach, open to the enemy, the home of a racenotorious for its mobile cunning-could be held neither by leniency norby fear. [1128] The expedition had miscarried, if the town was notdestroyed; and, as frequently happens in the pursuit of wars withpeoples to whom the convenient epithet of "barbarian" can be applied, the successful fruit of cruelty and treachery was perhaps defended onthe ground that the obligations of international law must be eitherreciprocal or non-existent. The destruction of Capsa was followed by other successes of a similarthough less arduous kind. The event had served the purpose of Mariuswell in so far as it spread before him a name of terror which causedsome of the Numidian garrisons to flee their strong places without astruggle. In the few cases where resistance was met, it was beaten down, and the fortified places which Jugurtha's soldiers were not rash enoughto defend, were utterly destroyed by fire. [1129] Marius left awilderness behind him on his return march to winter quarters, [1130] andperhaps renewed his devastating course in the south-eastern parts ofNumidia during the spring of the following year, before his attentionwas suddenly called to another point in the vast area of the war. Thiseasy triumph which cost little Roman blood and enriched the soldierswith the spoils of war, created in his men a belief in his foresight andprowess which seemed sufficient to stand the severest strain. [1131] Agreat effort had now to be made in a quarter of Numidia which lay notless than seven hundred miles from the recent scene of operations. Asneither the site of Marius's recent winter quarters nor the base whichhe chose for his spring campaign are known to us, we cannot say whetherthe expedition which he now directed to the extreme west of Numidia wasan unpleasant diversion from a scheme already in operation, or whetherit was the result of a plan matured in the winter camp; but in eithercase this conviction of the necessity for sweeping the country in suchutterly diverse directions proves the full success of the plan whichJugurtha was pursuing. It is more difficult to determine whether Mariusincreased the success of this plan by a political blunder of his own. The point at which he is now found operating was near the river Mulucchaor Molocath, [1132] the dividing line between the kingdoms of Numidia andMauretania. If the incursion which he made into this region wasunprovoked, it was a challenge to King Bocchus and an impoliticdisturbance of the recent attitude of quiescence that had been assumedby that hesitating monarch; but it is possible that news had reachedMarius that a Mauretanian attack was impending, and that the same motivewhich had impelled Metellus to hasten from the south to the defence ofCirta, now urged his successor to push his army more than five hundredmiles farther to the west up to the very borders of Mauretania. Themovement seems to have been defensive, for at the moment when we catchsight of his efforts he had not attempted to cross the admittedfrontier, [1133] but was endeavouring to secure a strong position thatlay within what he conceived to be the Numidian territory. A giant rockrose sheer out of the plain, tapering into the narrow fortress whichcontinued by its walls an ascent so smoothly precipitous that it seemedas though the work of nature had been improved by the hand of man. [1134]But one narrow path led to the summit and was believed to be the onlyway, not merely to a position of supreme value for defensive purposes, but also to one of those rich deposits which the many-treasured king washeld to have laid up in the strongest parts of his dominions. Thedifficulties of a siege were almost insurmountable. The garrison wasstrong and well supplied with food and water; the only avenue for adirect assault upon the walls was narrow and dangerous; the site was asill-suited as it could be for the movement of the heavier engines ofwar. When the attack was made, the mantlets of the besiegers were easilydestroyed by fire and stones hurled from above; yet the soldiers couldnot leave cover, nor get a firm hold on the steeply sloping ground; theforemost amongst the storming party fell stricken with wounds, and apanic seemed likely to prevail amidst the ever-victorious army if itwere again urged to the attack. While Marius was brooding over thisunexpected check, and his mind was divided between the wisdom of aretreat and the chances that might be offered by delay, an accidentsupplied the defects of strength and counsel. [1135] A Ligurian in questof snails was tempted to pursue his search from ridge to ridge on thatside of the hill which lay away from the avenue of attack and hadhitherto been deemed inaccessible. He suddenly found that he had nearlyreached the summit; a spirit of emulation urged him to complete the workwhich he had unconsciously begun, and the branches of a giant holmoak, which twisted amongst the rocks, gave him a hold and footing when theperpendicular walls of the last ascent seemed to deny all chance offurther progress. When at length he craned over the edge of the highestridge, the interior of the fort lay spread before him. No member of thegarrison was to be seen, for every man was engaged in repelling theassault which had been renewed on the opposite side. A prolonged surveywas therefore possible, and all the important details of the fortresswere imprinted on the mind of the Ligurian before he began his leisurelydescent. The features of the slope he traversed were also morecautiously observed; the next ascent would be attempted by more thanone, and every irregularity that might give a foothold must be noted bythe man who would have to prove and illustrate his tale. When the storywas told to Marius he sent some of his retinue to view the spot; theirreports differed according to the character of their minds; some of theinvestigators were sanguine, others more than doubtful; but the consuleventually determined to make the experiment. The escalade was to beattempted by a band of ten; five of the trumpeters and buglemen wereselected and four centurions, the Ligurian was to be their guide. Withhead and feet bare, their only armour a sword and light leathern shieldslung across their backs, the soldiers painfully imitated the daringmovements of their active leader. But he was considerate as well asdaring. Sometimes he would weave a scaling ladder of the trailingcreepers; at others he would lend a helping hand; at others again hewould gather up their armour and send them on before him, then steprapidly aside and pass with his burden up and down their strugglingline. His cheery boldness kept them to their painful task until everyman had reached the level of the fort. It was as desolate as when firstseen by the Ligurian, for Marius had taken care that a frontal attackshould engage the attention of the garrison. The climb had been a longone, and the battle had now been raging many hours when news was broughtto the anxious commander that his men had gained the summit. [1136] Theassault was now renewed with a force that astonished the besieged, andsoon with a recklessness that led them to think the besiegers mad. Theycould see the Roman commander himself leaving the cover of the mantletsand advancing in the midst of his men up the perilous ascent under atortoise fence of uplifted shields. Over the heads of the advancingparty came a storm of missiles from the Roman lines below. Confident asthe Numidians were in the strength of their position, scornful as werethe gibes which a moment earlier they had been hurling against the foe, they could not think lightly of the serried mass that was moving up thehill and the rain of bullets that heralded its advance. Every hand wasbusy and every mind alert when suddenly the Roman trumpet call was heardupon their rear. The women and boys, who had crept out to watch thefight, were the first to take the alarm and to rush back to the shelterof the fort; most of the men were fighting in advance of their outerwalls; those nearest to the ramparts were the first to be seized withthe panic; but soon the whole garrison was surging backwards, whilethrough and over it pressed the long and narrow wedge of Romans, cuttingtheir way through the now defenceless mass until they had seized theoutworks of the fort. It is difficult to gauge the positive advantages secured by this feat ofarms; but it is probable that the capture of this particularhill-fortress, although its difficulty gave it undue prominence in theannals of the war, was not an isolated fact, but one of a series ofsuccessful attempts to establish a chain of posts upon the Mauretanianborder, which might bring King Bocchus to better counsels and interrupthis communications with Jugurtha. The enterprise may have been followedby a tolerably long campaign in these regions. This campaign has notbeen recorded, but that it was contemplated is proved by the fact thatMarius had ordered an enormous force of cavalry to meet him near theMuluccha. [1137] The force thus summoned actually served the purpose ofcovering a retirement that was practically a retreat; but this could nothave been the object which it was intended to fulfil when its presencewas commanded. A large force of horse was essential, if Bocchus was tobe paralysed and the border country swept clear of the enemy. The cloudthat was to burst from Mauretania was not the only chance that could beforetold; it was the issue to be dreaded, if all plans at preventionfailed; but it was one that might possibly be averted by the presence ofa commanding force in the border regions. It had taken nearly a year to collect and transport from Italy thecavalry force that now entered the camp of Marius. The reason why Italyand not Africa was chosen as the recruiting ground is probably to befound in the lack of confidence which the Romans felt even in thoseNumidians who professed a friendly attitude; otherwise cheapness andeven efficiency might seem to have dictated the choice of nativecontingents, although it is possible that, as a defensive force, thetactical solidarity of the Italians gave them an advantage even over theNumidian horse. The Latins and Italian allies had furnished the troopersthat had lately landed on African soil, [1138] perhaps not at the port ofUtica, but at some harbour on the west, for the time consumed by Mariusin the march to his present position, even had not his campaign beenplanned in winter quarters, would have given him an opportunity to sendnotice of his whereabouts to the leader of the auxiliary force. Thisleader was Lucius Cornelius Sulla, who had spent nearly the whole of thefirst year of his quaestorship in beating up on Italian soil the troopsof horsemen which he now led into the camp. In comparison with thearrival of the force that of the quaestor was as nothing; yet the adventof such a subordinate was always a matter of interest to a general. Tradition had determined that the ties between a commander and hisquaestor should be peculiarly close; the superior was responsible forevery act of the minor official whom the chance of the lot might thrustupon him; if his subordinate were capable, he was the chosen delegatefor every delicate operation in finance, diplomacy, jurisdiction, oreven war: if he were incapable, he might be dismissed, [1139] but couldnot be neglected, for he was besides the general the only man in theprovince holding the position of a magistrate, and was in titular ranksuperior even to the oldest and most distinguished of the legates. [1140]It was a matter of chance whether a government or a campaign was to behelped or hindered by the arrival of a new quaestor; and Marius, when hefirst heard of the man whom destiny had brought to his side, wasinclined to be sceptical as to the amount of assistance which waspromised by the new appointment. [1141] Apart from a remarkable personalappearance--an impression due to the keen blueness of the eyes, theclear pallor of the face, the sudden flush that spread at moments overthe cheeks as though the vigour of the mind could be seen pulsingbeneath the delicate skin[1142]--there was little to recommend Sulla tothe mind of a hard and stern man engaged in an arduous and disappointingtask. The new lieutenant had no military experience, he was the scion ofa ruined patrician family, and, if the gossip of Rome were true, hisprevious life suggested the light-hearted adventurer rather than thestudent of politics or war. In his early youth he seemed destined tocontinue the later traditions of his family--those of an unaspiringtemper or a careless indolence, which had allowed the consulship tobecome extinct in the annals of the race and had been long content withthe minor prize of the praetorship. Even this honour had been beyond thereach of the father of Sulla; the hereditary claim to office had beencompletely broken, and the family fortune had sunk so low that thereseemed little chance of the renewal of this claim. The present bearer ofthe name, the elder son of the house, had lived in hired rooms, and suchslender means as he could command seemed to be employed in gratifying apassion for the stage. [1143] Yet this taste was but one expression of agenuine thirst for culture;[1144] and, whatever the opinion of men mightbe, this youth whose most strenuous endeavours were strangely mingledwith a careless geniality and an appetite that never dulled for thepleasures of the senses and the flesh, had a wonderful faculty forwinning the love of women. His father had made a second marriage with alady of considerable means; and the affection of the step-mother, whoseems to have been herself childless, was soon centred on her husband'selder son. [1145] At her death he was found to be her heir, and thefortune thus acquired was added to or increased by another that had alsocome by way of legacy from a woman. This benefactress was Nicopolis, awoman of Greek birth, whose transitory loves, which had Brought herwealth, were closed by a lasting passion for the man to Whom this wealthwas given. [1146] The possession of this competence, which might havecompleted the wreck of the nerveless pleasure-seeker that Sulla seemedto be, proved the true steel of which the man was made. The first stepsin his political career gave the immediate lie to any theory of wastedopportunities. He had but exceeded by a year or two the minimum age foroffice when he was elected to the quaestorship; he was but thirty-onewhen he was scouring Italy for recruits;[1147] a year later he hadentered Marius's camp near the Muluccha with his host of cavalry. A verybrief experience was sufficient to convert the general's prejudice intothe heartiest approval of his new officer. Any spirit of emulation whichSulla possessed was but shown in action and counsel; none could outstriphim in prowess and forethought, yet all that he did seemed to be theeasy outcome either of opportunity or of a ready wit which charmedwithout startling: and he was never heard to breathe a word whichreflected on the conduct of the pro-consul or his staff. Over the pettyofficers and the soldiers he attained the immediate triumph whichattends supreme capacity combined with a facile temper and a sense ofhumour. His old companions of the stage had been perhaps his bestinstructors in the art of moulding the will of the common man. He hadthe right address for every one; a grumble was met by a few kind words;a roar of laughter was awakened by a ready jest, and its recipient wasthe happier for the day. When help was wanted, his resources seemedboundless; yet he never gave as though he expected a return, and theidea of obligation was dismissed with a shrug and a smile. [1148] Sullawas not one of the clumsy intriguers who laboriously lay up a store offavour and are easily detected in the attempt. He was a terrible manbecause his insight and his charm were a part of his very nature, aswere also the dark current of ambition, scarcely acknowledged even byits possessor, and the surging tides of passion, carefully dammed by anexquisitely balanced intellect into a level stream, on which crowdsmight float and believe themselves to be victims or agents of anovermastering principle, not of a single man's caprice. The capacity of every officer in Marius's army was soon to be put to aneffective test; for the coalition of Jugurtha and Bocchus, which thecampaign might have been meant to prevent, turned out to be itsimmediate result. The Moor was still hesitating between peace andwar--looking still, it may be, for another bid from the representativeof Rome, and waiting for the moment when he might compel the attentionof Metellus's rude successor, who preferred the precautions of war tothose of diplomacy--when the Numidian king, in despair at this ruinouspassivity and at the loss of the magnificent strategic chance that wasbeing offered by the enemy, approached his father-in-law with theproposal that the cession of one-third of Numidia should be the price ofhis assistance. The cession was to take effect, either if the Romanswere driven out of Africa, or if a settlement was reached with Romewhich left the boundaries of Numidia intact. [1149] Bocchus may not havecredited the likelihood of the realisation of the first alternative; butcombined action might render the second possible, and even if thatfailed, his chances of a bargain with Rome were not decreased byentering on a policy of hostility which might be closed at the opportunemoment. For the time, however, he played vigorously for Jugurtha'ssuccess. His troops of horsemen poured over the border to join theNumidian force, and the combined armies moved rapidly to the east toencompass the columns of Marius, that had just begun their long march tothe site which had been chosen for winter quarters. The object of the Roman general was to keep in touch with the sea forthe purpose of facilitating the supply of his army. But we cannot saywhether his original choice was a station so distant as theneighbourhood of Cirta, [1150] or whether his movement in this direction, which severed him by some hundreds of miles from the region which he hadlately commanded, was a measure forced on him by the danger to which hisarmy was exposed in the distant west from the overwhelming forces of theenemy. He had at any rate covered a great stretch of territory before heactually came into touch with the combined forces of Bocchus andJugurtha; for the almost continuous fighting that ensued, when once thearmies had come into contact, seems all to have been confined to thelast few days before Cirta was reached and to a period of time whichcould have formed but a small fraction of the whole duration of themarch. The first attack was planned for the closing hours of theday. [1151] The advent of night would be of advantage to the native forcewhether they were victorious or defeated. In the first case theirknowledge of the ground would enable them to follow up their success, inthe second their retreat would be secured. Under all circumstances astruggle in the darkness must increase the difficulties of the Romans. Acomplete surprise was impossible, for Marius's scouting was good, andfrom all directions horsemen dashed up to tell him the enemy was athand. But the quarter from which such an attack would be aimed could notbe determined, and so incredibly rapid were the movements of the Moorishand Gaetulian horse that scarcely had the last messenger ridden up whenthe Roman column was assailed on every side. The Roman army had no timeto form in line, and anything approaching battle array was scorned bythe enemy. They charged in separate squadrons, the formation of whichseemed to be due to chance as much as to design; this desultory mode ofattack enabled them to assail the Roman forces at every point and toprevent any portion of the men from acquiring the stability that mightsave the helplessness of the others; they harried the legionaries asthey shifted their heavy baggage, drew their swords and hurried intoline, and the cavalry soldiers as they strove to mount their frightenedhorses. Horse and foot were inextricably mixed, and no one could tellwhich was the van and which the rear of the surrounded army. The generalfought like a common soldier, but he did not forget the duties of acommander. With his chosen troop of horse he rode up and down the field, detecting the weak points of his own men, the strong points of theenemy, lending a timely succour to the first and throwing his weightagainst the second. [1152] But it was the experience of the well-trainedlegionaries that saved the day. Schooled in such surprises, they beganto form small solid squares, and against these barriers the impact ofthe light horsemen beat in vain. [1153] But night was drawing on--thehour which the allied kings had chosen as the crowning moment of theirattack--and Marius was as fully conscious as his enemies how helplessthe Roman force would be if such a struggle were protracted into thedarkness. Fortunately the place of the attack had been badly chosen; theneighbouring ground did not present a wholly level expanse on whichcavalry could operate at will. But a short distance from the scene ofthe fight two neighbouring hills could be seen to rise above the plain;the smaller possessed an abundant spring of water, the larger by itsrugged aspect seemed to promise an admirable rampart for defence. [1154]It was impossible to withdraw the whole army to the elevation whichcontained the welcome stream, for its space did not permit of anencampment; but Marius instructed Sulla to seize it with the cavalry. Hethen began to draw his scattered infantry together, taking advantage ofthe disorder in the enemy which the last sturdy stand of the veteranshad produced, and when the divisions were at last in touch with oneanother, he led the whole force at a quick march to the place which hehad chosen for its retreat. The kings soon recognised that this retreatwas unassailable; their plan of a night attack had failed; but they didnot lose the hope that they held the Romans at their mercy. The fighthad become a blockade; they would coop the Romans within their narrowlimits, or force them to straggle on their way under a renewal of thesame merciless assault. To have withstood the legions and occupied theirground, was itself a triumph for Gaetulians and Moors. They spread theirlong lines round either hill and lighted a great ring of watchfires; buttheir minds were set on passing the night in a manner conducive neitherto sleep nor vigilance. They threw away their victory in a manner commonto barbarism, which often lacks neither courage nor skill, but finds itsnemesis in an utter lack of self-restraint. From the silent darkness ofthe ridge above the Romans could see, in the circles of red light thrownby the blazing watch-fires, the forms of their enemies in every attitudeof careless and reckless joy; while the delirious howls of triumph whichreached their ears, were a source, not of terror, but of hope. In theRoman camp no sound was heard; even the call of the patrol was hushed bythe general's command. [1155] As the night wore on, the silence spread tothe Plain below, but here it was the silence of the deep and profoundsleep that comes on men wearied by the excesses of the night. Suddenlythere was a terrific uproar. Every horn and trumpet in the Roman linesseemed to be alive, every throat to be swelling the clamour withear-piercing yells. The Moors and Gaetulians, springing from the ground, found the enemy in their very midst. Where the slaughter ended, thepursuit began. No battle in the war had shown a larger amount of slain;for flight, which was the Numidian's salvation and the mockery of hisfoe, had been less possible in this conflict than in any which hadgone before. Marius continued his march, but with precautions even greater than thosewhich he had previously observed. He formed his whole army into a"hollow square" [1156]--in fact, a great oblong, arranged equally fordefence on front, flanks, and rear, while the baggage occupied thecentre. Sulla with the cavalry rode on the extreme right; on the leftwas Aulus Manlius with the slingers and archers and some cohorts ofLigurians; the front and rear were covered by light infantry selectedfrom the legions under the command of military tribunes. Numidianrefugees scoured the country around, their knowledge of the land givingthem a peculiar value as a scouting force. The camp was formed with thesame scrupulous care; whole cohorts formed from legionaries kept watchagainst the gates, fortified posts were manned at short distances alongthe enclosing mound, and squadrons of auxiliary cavalry moved all nightbefore the ramparts. Marius was to be seen at all points and at allhours, a living example of vigilance not of distrust, a master in theart of controlling men, not by terror but by sharing in their toils. Four days had the march progressed and Cirta was reported to be not fardistant, when suddenly an ominous but now familiar sight was seen. Scouts were riding in on every hand; all reported an enemy, but nonecould say with certainty the quarter from which he might appear. [1157]The present disposition of the Roman troops had made the direction ofthe attack a matter of comparatively little moment, and Marius called ahalt without making any change in the order of his march. Soon the enemycame down, and Jugurtha, when he saw the hollow square, knew that hisplan had been partly foiled. He had divided his own forces into fourdivisions; some of these were to engage the Roman van; but some at leastmight be able to throw themselves at the critical moment on theundefended rear of the Roman column, when its attention was fullyengaged by a frontal attack. [1158] As things were, the Roman army presented no one point that seemed moreassailable than another, and Jugurtha determined to engage with theRoman cavalry on the right, probably with the idea that by divertingthat portion of the Roman force which was under the circumstances itsstrongest protecting arm, he might give an opportunity to his ally tolead that attack upon the rear which was to be the crowning movement ofthe day. His assault, which was directed near to the angle which theright flank made with the van, was anticipated rather than received bySulla, who rapidly formed his force into two divisions, one for attack, the other for defence. The first he massed in dense squadrons, and atthe head of these he charged the Moorish horse; the second stood theirground, covering themselves as best they could from the clouds ofmissiles that rose from the enemy's ranks, and slaughtering the daringhorsemen that rode too near their lines. For a time it seemed as if theright flank and the van were to bear the brunt of the battle; the kingwas known to be there in person: and Marius, knowing what Jugurtha'spresence meant, himself hastened to the front. But suddenly the chief point of the attack was changed. Bocchus had beenjoined by a force of native infantry, which his son Volux had justbrought upon the field. It was a force that had not yet known defeat, for some delay upon the route had prevented it from taking part in theformer battle. With this infantry, and probably with a considerable bodyof Moorish horse, [1159] Bocchus threw himself upon the Roman rear. Neither the general nor his chief officers were present with thedivision that was thus attacked; Marius and Sulla were both engrossedwith the struggle at the other end of the right wing, and Manlius seemsstill to have kept his position on the left flank; the absence of aninspiring mind amongst the troops assailed, their ignorance of the fateof their distant comrades, moved Jugurtha to lend the weight of hispresence and his words to the efforts of his fellow king. With a handfulof horsemen he quitted the main force under his command and gallopeddown the whole length of the right wing, until he wheeled his horseamidst the front ranks of the struggling infantry. He raised a swordstreaming with blood and shouted in the Latin tongue that Marius hadalready fallen by his hand, that the Romans might now give up thestruggle. The suggestion conveyed by his words shook the nerves even ofthose who did not credit the horrifying news, [1160] while the presenceof the king, here as everywhere, stirred the Africans to their highestpitch of daring. They pressed the wavering Romans harder than before, the battle at this point had almost become a rout, when suddenly a largebody of Roman horse was seen to be bearing down on the right flank ofthe Moorish infantry. They were led by Sulla, whose vigorous attacks hadscattered the enemy on the right wing; he could now employ his cavalryfor other purposes, and the Moorish infantry shook beneath the flankattack, Jugurtha refused to see that the tide of victory had turned;with a reckless courage he still strove to weld together the shatteredforces of the Moors and to urge them against the Roman lines; his ownescape was a miracle; men fell to left and right of him, he was pressedon both sides by the Roman horse; at times he seemed almost alone amidsthis foes; yet at the last moment he vanished, and the capture whichwould have ended the war was still beyond the reach of Roman skill andprowess. [1161] Sulla had saved the day, the advent of Marius was butneeded to put the final touches to the victory. He had seen the cavalryon the right scatter beneath the charges of the Roman horse, and almostat the same moment news was brought him that his men were being drivenback upon the rear. His succour was scarcely needed, but his presencegave an impulse to pursuit. The sight of the field when that pursuit wasat its height, lived ever in the minds of those who shared in its gloryand its horror. The sickening spectacle which a hard fought battleyields, was protracted in this instance by the vast vista of the plains. Wherever the eye could reach there were prostrate bodies of men andhorses, whose only claim to life was the writhing agony of their wounds;on a stage dyed red with blood and strewn with the furniture ofshattered weapons little moving groups could be seen. The figures ofthese puppets showed all the phases of helpless flight, violent pursuit, and pitiless slaughter. In spite of the carnage of this battlefield, victory here, as elsewherethroughout the war, meant little more than driving off the foe. Wepossess but a fragmentary record of this terrible retreat to Cirta, butit is certain that its dangers and losses were by no means exhausted intwo pitched battles. A chance notice torn from its context[1162] tellsof a third great contest which closed a long period of harassingattacks. Close to the walls of Cirta the Roman army was met by the twokings at the head of sixty thousand horse. The combatants were swathedin a cloud raised by the dust of battle, the Roman soldiers massed in anarrow space were such helpless victims of the missiles of the enemythat the Numidian and Moorish horsemen ceased to single out theirtargets, and threw their javelins at random into the crowded ranks withthe certainty that each would find its mark. For three days was therunning fight continued. A charge was impossible against the volleys ofthe foe, and retreat was cut off by the multitude of light horsemen thathemmed the army in on every side. In the last desperate effort whichMarius made to free himself from the meshes of the kings, even thecentre of his column shook under the hail of missiles that assailed it, and to the weapons of the enemy were soon added the terrors of blindingheat and intolerable thirst. Suddenly a storm broke over the warringhosts. It cooled the throats of the Romans and refreshed their limbs, while it lessened the power of their foes. The strapless javelins[1163]of the Numidians could not be hurled when wet, for they slipped from thehands of the thrower; their shields of elephants' hide absorbed waterlike a sponge and weighed down the arms on which they hung. The Moorsand Numidians, seeing that even their means of defence had failed them, took to flight: but only to appear on another day with their army raisedto ninety thousand and to repeat the attempt to surround the Roman host. This last effort ended in a signal victory for Marius. The forces of thetwo kings were not only defeated but almost destroyed. The events thus recorded can scarcely be regarded as mere variants ofthe two battles which we have previously described. Vague and rhetoricalas is the account which sets them forth, it shows that there weretraditions of suffering and loss endured by the army of Marius such asfound no parallel in the campaign of his predecessor. Marius hadattempted what Metellus had never dared--a campaign in the far west ofNumidia. Its results were fruitless successes of the paladin typefollowed by a burdensome and disastrous retreat. The west was lost, theeast was threatened, yet the lesson was not without its fruit. Thegeneral when he reached the walls of Cirta had lost something of hishardy faith in the use of blood and iron; he was more ready to appeal tothe motives which make for peace, to pretend a trust he did not feel, tomake promises which might induce the fluid treachery of Bocchus toharden into a definite act of treason to his brother king, above all, tolean on some other man who could play the delicate game of diplomaticfence with a cunning which his own straightforward methods could notattain. Everything depended on the attitude of the King of Mauretania;and here again the campaign had not been without some healthfulconsequences. If the Romans had gained no material advantage, Bocchushad suffered some very material losses. His forces had been cut up, thestigma of failure attached (perhaps for the first time) to their leader, the first contact with the Romans had not been encouraging to hissubjects. And the campaign may also have revealed the difficulty, if notthe hopelessness, of Jugurtha's cause. The plan of driving the Romansfrom Africa could not be perfected even with the combined forces of thetwo kingdoms at their fullest strength; however much they might harass, they had proved themselves utterly unable to attain such a success aseven the most complacent patriotism could name a victory; while thesturdiness of the resistance of Rome seemed to banish the hypothesisthat Jugurtha would be included in any terms that might be made. Yet thecampaign had left Bocchus in an excellent position for negotiation. Hehad shown that Mauretania was a great make-weight in the scale againstRome; he had advertised his power as an enemy, his value as an ally; nowwas the time to see whether the power and the value, so long ignored, would be appreciated by Rome. But five days are said to have elapsed since the last great conflictwith the Moors when envoys from Bocchus waited on Marius in his winterquarters at Cirta. [1164] The request which they brought was that "two ofthe Roman general's most trusty friends should wait on the king, whodesired to speak with them on a matter of interest to himself and theRoman people". [1165] Marius forthwith singled out Sulla and Manlius, whofollowed the envoys to the place of meeting that had been arranged. Onthe way it was agreed by the representatives of Rome that they shouldnot wait for the king to open the discussion. Hitherto every proposalhad come from Bocchus; he had been played with, but never given astraightforward answer, still less a sign of real encouragement. Yet nogood could be gained by expecting the king to assume a grovellingattitude, by forcing him to begin proposals for peace with a confessionof his own humiliation. It would be far wiser if the commissionersopened with a few spontaneous remarks which might restore rest anddignity to the royal mind. Manlius the elder readily yielded the placeof first speaker to the more facile Sulla. If the words which historyhas attributed to the quaestor[1166] were really used by him, they are arecord of one of those rare instances in which a diplomatist is able totell the naked truth. Sulla began by dwelling on the joy which he andhis friends derived from the change in Bocchus's mind--from theheaven-sent inspiration which had taught the king that peace waspreferable to war. He then dwelt on the fact, which he might haveadduced the whole of his country's history to prove, that Rome had beenever keener in the search for friends than subjects, that the Republichad ever deemed voluntary allegiance safer than that compelled by force. He showed that Roman friendship might be a boon, not a burden, toBocchus; the distance of his kingdom from the capital would obviate aconflict of interests, but no distance was too great to be traversed bythe gratitude of Rome. Bocchus had already seen what Rome could do inwar; all that he needed to learn was the still greater lesson that hergenerosity was as unconquerable as her arms. Sulla's words were agenuine statement of the whole theory of the Protectorate, as it washeld and even acted on at this period of history. As a proof of theruinous lengths to which Roman generosity might proceed, he could havepointed to the Numidian war now in the sixth year of its disastrouscourse. The darker side of the Protectorate--the rapacity of theindividual adventurer--was no creation of the government, and needed notto be reproduced on the canvas of the bright picture which he drew. Thehopes held out to Bocchus were genuine enough; the burden of hisalliance was but slight, its security immense. The king seemed impressed by the gracious overtures of thecommissioners. His answer was not only friendly, but apologetic. [1167]He urged that he had not taken up arms in any spirit of hostility toRome, but simply for the purpose of defending his own frontiers. Heclaimed that the territory near the Muluccha, which had been harried byMarius, did not belong to Jugurtha at all. He had expelled the Numidianking from this region and it was his by the right of war. He appealedfinally to the fact of his own former embassy to Rome: he had made agenuine effort to secure her friendship, but this had beenrepulsed. [1168] He was, however, willing to forget the past; and, ifMarius permitted, he would like to send a fresh embassy to the senate. This last request was provisionally granted by the commissioners;Bocchus, in making it, showed a wise and, in consideration of some ofthe events of this very war, a natural sense of the insecurity of thepromises made by Roman commanders, at the same time as he exhibited ajustifiable faith in a word once given by the great organ of theRepublic. Yet, when the commissioners had taken their departure, his oldhesitancy seemed to revive. He consented at least to listen to those ofhis advisers who still urged the claims of Jugurtha. [1169] They hadraised their voices again, either at the time when the Romancommissioners were waiting on Bocchus, or immediately after theirdeparture; for Jugurtha had no sooner learnt of his father-in-law'srenewed negotiations with Rome than he had used every means (amongstothers, we are told, that of costly gifts) to induce his Mauretaniansupporters to advocate his cause. A further stage in the negotiations was reached before the winter seasonwas over, although it is probable that, at the time when this next stepwas taken by the Mauretanian king, the new year had been passed and theadvent of spring was not far off. Marius, who was not fettered in hisoperations by respect for the traditional seasons which were deemedsuitable to a campaign, had started with some flying columns of infantryand a portion of the cavalry to some desert spot, with a view to besiegea fortress still held by Jugurtha, and garrisoned by all the desertersfrom the Roman army who were now in the king's service. Sulla had beenleft with the usual title of pro-praetor to represent his absentcommander. To the headquarters of the winter camp[1170] Bocchus now sentfive of his closest friends, men chosen for their approved loyalty andability. [1171] His last access of hesitancy, if it were more than asemblance, had certainly been shortlived, and the envoys were given fullpowers to arrange the terms of peace. They had set out with all speed toreach the Roman winter camp, but their journey had been long andpainful. They had been seized and plundered on the route by Gaetulianbrigands, and now appeared panic-stricken and in miserable plight beforethe representative of Rome. Stripped of their credentials and thesymbols of their high office, they expected to be treated as vagrantimpostors from a hostile state; Sulla received them with the lavishdignity that might be the due of princes. The simple nomads felt thecharm and the surprise of this first glimpse of the public manners ofRome. Was it possible that these kindly and courteous men were thespoilers of the world? The rumour must be the false invention of theenemies of the bounteous Republic. The untrained mind rapidly arguesfrom the part to the whole, and Sulla's tact had done a great service tohis country. He had also established a claim on the Mauretanianking, [1172] and this personal tie was not to be without itsconsequences. The envoys revealed to the quaestor the instructions of their master, and asked his help and advice in the mission that lay before them. Theydwelt with pardonable pride on the wealth, the magnificence, and thehonour of their king, and dilated on every point in which the alliancewith such a potentate was likely to serve the cause of Rome. [1173] Sullapromised them the plenitude of his help; he instructed them in the modein which they should address Marius, in which they should approach thesenate, and continued to be their host for forty days, until hiscommander was ready to listen to their proposals and forward them ontheir way. When Marius returned to Cirta after the successful completionof his brief campaign, and heard of the arrival of the envoys, he askedSulla to bring them[1174] to his quarters, and made preparations forassembling as formal a council as the resources of the provincepermitted. A praetor happened to be within its limits and several men ofsenatorial rank. All these sat to listen to the proposals made byBocchus. The verdict of the council was in favour of the genuineness ofthe king's appeal, and the proconsul granted the envoys permission tomake their way to Rome. They asked an armistice for their king[1175]until the mission should be completed. Loud and angry voices were heardin protest--the voices of the narrow and suspicious men who are hauntedby the fixed conviction that a request for a cessation of hostilities isalways a treacherous attempt at renewed preparations for war. But Sullaand the majority of the board supported the request of the envoys, andthe wiser counsel at length prevailed. The embassy now divided; two ofits members returned to their king, while three were escorted to Rome byCnaeus Octavius Ruso, a quaestor who had brought the last instalment ofpay for the army and was ready for his return homewards. The language ofthe envoys before the Roman senate assumed the apologetic tone which hadbeen suggested by Sulla. Their king, they said, had erred; Jugurtha hadbeen the cause of this error. Their master asked that Rome should admithim to treaty relations with herself, that she should call him herfriend. It is not impossible that these negotiations had a secrethistory; that Bocchus was told of some very material reward that hemight expect, if Jugurtha were surrendered. But the assumption is notnecessary. The magic of the name of Rome had fired the imagination ofthe African king at the commencement of the struggle; now that his fearswere quieted, the end, in whatever form it was attained, may have seemedsupremely desirable in itself. His envoys had been schooled by Sulla toexpect much more than was promised and to read the senate's wordsaright. Certainly, if a prize had been offered for Bocchus's fidelity, the offer was carefully concealed. The official form in which thegovernment accepted the petitioner's request, granted a free pardon andexpressed a cold probation. "The senate and Roman people (so ran theresolution) are used to be mindful of good service and of wrongs. SinceBocchus is penitent for the past, they excuse his fault. He will begranted a treaty and the name of friend, when he has proved that hedeserves the grant. " [1176] When Bocchus received this answer, he despatched a letter to Mariusasking that Sulla should be sent to advise with him on the matters thattouched the common interests of himself and Rome. [1177] It was tolerablyclear what the subject of interest was. If it could be made "common, "the end of the war had been reached. Sulla was despatched, and the finaltriumph, if attained, would be that of the diplomatist, not of thesoldier. The quaestor was accompanied by an escort of cavalry, slingers, and archers, and a cohort of Italians bearing the weapons of askirmishing force; for the adventures of Bocchus's envoys had shown theinsecurity of the route. On the fifth day of the march, a large body ofhorse was seen approaching from a distance--a force that looked largerand more threatening than it afterwards proved to be; for it rode inopen order, and the wild evolutions of the horsemen seemed to be thepreliminary to an attack. Sulla's escort sprang to their arms; but thereturning scouts soon removed all sense of fear. The approaching band ofcavalry proved to be but a thousand strong and their leader to be Voluxthe son of Bocchus. The prince saluted Sulla and told him that he hadbeen sent to meet and escort him to the presence of the king. For twodays the combined forces advanced together, and there were no adventuresby the road; but on the evening of the second day, when their restingplace had been already chosen, the Moorish prince came hastily to Sullawith a look of perplexity on his face. He said that his scouts had justinformed him that Jugurtha was close at hand, he entreated Sulla to joinhim in flight from the camp while it was yet night. [1178] The requestwas met by an indignant refusal; Sulla pointed to his men, whose livesmight be sacrificed by the disgraceful disappearance of their leader. But, when Volux shifted his ground and merely insisted on the utility ofa march by night from the dangerous neighbourhood, the quaestor yieldedassent. He ordered that the soldiers should take their evening meal, andthat a large number of fires should be lit which were to be left burningin the deserted camp. At the first watch the Moors and Romans stolesilently from the lines. The dawn found them jaded, heavy with sleep, and longing for rest. Sulla was supervising the measurement of a camp, when some Moorish horsemen galloped up with the news that Jugurtha wasbut two miles in advance of their position. It was clear that theanxious Numidian was watching their every movement; the question to beanswered was "Was Prince Volux in the plot?" The facts seemed darkenough to justify any suspicion. The nerves of the Romans had beenshaken by the unknown danger which had forced them to leave their camp, by the night of sleepless watchfulness which had followed itsabandonment. A panic was the inevitable result, and panic leads to fury. Voices were raised that the Moorish traitor should be slain, and that, if the fruit of his treason was reaped, he at least should not beallowed to see it. Sulla himself was weighed down with the samesuspicion that animated his men, but he would not allow them to layviolent hands on the Moor. [1179] He encouraged them as best he might, then he turned with a passionate protest on his dubious companion. Hecalled the protecting god of his own race, the guardian of itsinternational honour, Jupiter Maximus, to witness the crime and perfidyof Bocchus, and he ordered Volux to leave his camp. The unhappy princewas probably in a state of genuine terror of Jugurtha, of completeuncertainty as to the intentions of that jealous kinsman and ally. Evenhad Volux known that his father Bocchus wished to play a double game, tobalance the helplessness of Sulla against that of Jugurtha, to hold twovaluable hostages in his hands at once, how could he be certain thatJugurtha would be content to play the part of a mere pawn in the king'sgame, to be dependent for his safety on the passing whim of a man whomhe distrusted? Jugurtha might have everything to gain by massacring theRomans and seizing Sulla. The act would compromise Bocchus hopelessly inthe eyes of the Roman government. There was hardly a man that would notbelieve in his treason, and from that time forth Bocchus would have nochoice but to be the firm ally of Numidia against the vengeance of Rome. Yet, if Volux acted or spoke as though he believed in the possibility ofthis issue, he might seem to be incriminating his father and himself, hemight seem to deserve the stern rebuke of Sulla and the order ofexpulsion from the Roman camp. His fears must therefore be concealed andhe must profess a confidence which he did not feel. With tears which mayhave expressed a genuine emotion, he entreated Sulla not to harbour theunworthy suspicion. There had been no preconcerted treachery; the dangerwas at the most the product of the cunning of Jugurtha, who haddiscovered their route. Volux implied that the object of the Numidian'smovement was to compromise the Moorish government in the eyes of Sulla;but he stated his emphatic belief that Jugurtha would, or could, do nopositive hurt to the Roman envoy or his retinue. He pointed out that theking had no great force at his command, and (what was more importantstill) that he was now wholly dependent on the favour of hisfather-in-law. It was incredible, he maintained, that Jugurtha wouldattempt any overt act of hostility, when the son of Bocchus was presentto be a witness to the crime. Their best plan would be to show theirindifference to his schemes, to ride in broad daylight through themiddle of his camp. If Sulla wished, he would send on the Moorishescort, or leave it where it was and ride with him alone. It was one of those situations which are the supreme tests of thequalities of a man. Sulla knew that his life depended on the caprice, orthe momentary sense of self-interest, of a barbarian who was believed tohave shrunk from no crime and on whose head Rome had put a price. Yet hedid not hesitate. He passed with Volux through the lines of Jugurtha'scamp, and the desperate Numidian never stirred. What motive held hishand was never known; it may have been that Jugurtha never intendedviolence; yet the failure of his plan of compromising Bocchus might wellhave stirred such a ready man to action; it may have been that he stillrelied on his influence with the Mauretanian king, which was perpetuatedby his agents at the court. But some believed that his inaction was dueto surprise, and that the transit of Sulla through the hostile camp wasone of those actions which are rendered safe by their veryboldness. [1180] In a few days the travellers had reached the spot where Bocchus held hiscourt. The secret advocates of Numidia and Rome were already inpossession of the king. [1181] Jugurtha's representative was Aspar, aNumidian subject who had been sent by his master as soon as the news hadbeen brought of Bocchus's demand for the presence of Sulla. He had beensent to watch the negotiations and, if possible, to plead his monarch'scause. The advocate of Rome was Dabar, also a Numidian but of the royalline and therefore hostile to Jugurtha. He was a grandson of Masinissa, but not by legitimate descent, for his father had been born of aconcubine of the king. [1182] His great parts had long recommended him toBocchus, and his known loyalty to Rome made him a useful intermediarywith the representative of that power. He was now sent to Sulla with theintimation that Bocchus was ready to meet the wishes of the Romanpeople; that he asked Sulla himself to choose a day, an hour and a placefor a conference; that the understanding, which already existed betweenthem, remained wholly unimpaired. The presence of a representative ofJugurtha at the court should cause no uneasiness. This representativewas only tolerated because there was no other means of lulling thesuspicion of the Numidian king. We do not know what Sulla made of thispresentment of the case; but somewhere in the annals of the time therewas to be found an emphatic conviction that Bocchus was still playing adouble game, that he was still revolving in his mind the respectivemerits of a surrender of Jugurtha to the Romans and of Sulla toJugurtha;[1183] that his fears prompted the first step, his inclinationsthe second, and that this internal struggle was waged throughout thewhole of the tortuous negotiations which ensued. Sulla, in accepting the promised interview, replied that he did notobject to the presence of Jugurtha's legate at the preliminaries; butthat most of what he wished to say was for the king's ear alone, or atleast for those of a very few of his most trusted counsellors. Hesuggested the reply that he expected from the king, and after a shortinterval was led into Bocchus's presence. At this meeting he gave thebarest intimation of his mission; he had been sent, he said, by theproconsul[1184] to ask the king whether he intended peace or war. It hadbeen arranged that Bocchus should make no immediate answer to thisquestion, but should reserve his reply for another date. The king nowadjourned the audience to the tenth day, intimating that on that day hisintention would be decided and his reply prepared. Sulla and Bocchusboth retired to their respective camps; but the king was restless, andat a late hour of that very night a message reached Sulla entreating animmediate and secret interview. No one was present but Dabar, the trustygo-between, and interpreters whose secrecy was assured. The narrative ofthis momentous meeting[1185] is therefore due to Sulla, whose fortunatepossession of literary tastes has revealed a bit of secret history tothe world. The king began with some complimentary references to hisvisitor, an acknowledgment of the great debt that he owed him, a hopethat his benefactor would never be weary of attempting to exhaust hisboundless gratitude. He then passed to the question of his own futurerelations with Rome. He repeated the assertion, which he had made on theoccasion of Sulla's earlier visit, that he had never made, or evenwished for, war with the people of Rome, that he had merely protectedhis frontiers against armed aggression. But he was willing to waive thepoint. He would impose no hindrance to the Romans waging war withJugurtha in any way they pleased. He would not press his claim to thedisputed territory east of the Muluccha. He would be content to regardthat river, which had been the boundary between his own kingdom and thatof Micipsa, as his future frontier. He would not cross it himself norpermit Jugurtha to pass within it. If Sulla had any further request tourge, which could be fairly made by the petitioner and honourablygranted by himself, he would not refuse it. A strict and safe neutrality was the tentacle put out by Bocchus. Theonly shadow of a positive service by which he proposed to deserve thealliance of Rome, was the abandonment of a highly disputable claim to apart of Jugurtha's possessions. It was certainly time to bring themonarch to the real point at issue, and Sulla pressed it home. He beganby a brief acknowledgment of the complimentary references which the kinghad made to himself, and then indulged in some plain speaking as to theexpectations which the Roman government had formed of their would-beally. [1186] He pointed out that the offers made by Bocchus were scarcelyneeded by Rome. A power that possessed her military strength would notbe likely to regard them in the light of favours. Something was expectedwhich could be seen to subserve the interests of Rome far more thanthose of the king himself. The service was patent. He had Jugurtha inhis power; if he handed him over to Rome, her debt would certainly begreat, and it would be paid. The recognition of friendship, the treatywhich he sought, and the portion of Numidia which he claimed--all thesewould be his for the asking. The king drew back; he urged the sacredbonds of relationship, the scarce less sacred tie of the treaty whichbound him to his son-in-law; he emphasised the danger to himself of sucha flagrant breach of faith. It might alienate the hearts of hissubjects, who loved Jugurtha and hated the name of Rome. [1187] But Sullacontinued to press the point; the king's resistance seemed to give way, and at last he promised to do everything that his persistent visitordemanded. It was agreed, however, between the two conspirators that itwas necessary to preserve a semblance of peaceful relations withJugurtha. A pretence must be made of admitting him to the terms of theconvention; this would be a ready bait, for he was thoroughly tired ofthe war. Sulla agreed to this arrangement as the only means ofentrapping his victim; to Bocchus it may have had another significanceas well; it still left his hands free. The next day witnessed the beginning of the machinations that were toend in the sacrifice of a Numidian king or a Roman magistrate. Bocchussummoned Aspar, the agent of Jugurtha, and told him that a communicationhad been received from Sulla to the effect that terms might beconsidered for bringing the war to a close; he therefore asked thelegate to ascertain the views of his sovereign. [1188] Aspar departedjoyfully to the headquarters of Jugurtha, who was now at a considerabledistance from the scene of the negotiations. Eight days later hereturned with all speed, bearing a message for the ear of Bocchus. Jugurtha, it appeared, was willing to submit to any conditions. But hehad little confidence in Marius. It had often happened that terms ofpeace sanctioned by Roman generals had been declared invalid. But therewas a way of obtaining a guarantee. If Bocchus wished to secure theircommon interests and to enjoy an undisputed peace, he should arrange ameeting of all the principals to the agreement, on the pretext ofdiscussing its terms. At that meeting Sulla should be handed over toJugurtha. There could be no doubt that the possession of such a hostagewould wring the consent of the senate and people to the terms of thetreaty; for it was incredible that the Roman government would leave amember of the nobility, who had been captured while performing a publicduty, in the power of his foes. Bocchus after some reflection consented to this course. Then, as later, it was a disputed question whether the king had even at this stage madeup his mind as to his final course of action. [1189] When the time andplace for the meeting had been arranged, the nature of the treachery wasstill uncertain. At one moment the king was holding smiling conversewith Sulla, at another with the envoy of Jugurtha. Precisely the samepromises were made to both; both were satisfied and eager for theappointed day. On the evening before the meeting Bocchus summoned acouncil of his friends; then the whim took him that they should bedismissed, and he passed some time in silent thought. Before the nightwas out he had sent for Sulla, and it was the cunning of the Roman thatset the final toils for the Numidian. At break of day the news wasbrought that Jugurtha was at hand. Bocchus, attended by a few friendsand the Roman quaestor, advanced as though to do him honour, and haltedon some rising ground which put the chief actors in the drama in fullview of the men who lay in ambush. Jugurtha proceeded to the same spotamidst a large retinue of his friends; it had been agreed that all thepartners to the conference should come unarmed. [1190] A sign was given, and the men of the ambuscade had sprung from every side upon the mound. Jugurtha's retinue was cut down to a man; the king himself was seized, bound and handed over to Sulla. In a short while he was the prisonerof Marius. Every one had long known that the war would be closed with the captureof the king. Marius could leave for other fields and dream other dreamsof glory. But even the utter collapse of resistance in Numidia did notobviate the necessity for a considerable amount of detailed labour, which absorbed the energy of the commander during the closing months ofthe year. Even when news had been brought from Rome that a gratefulpeople had raised him to the consulship for the second time, and that atask greater than that of the Numidian war had been entrusted to hishand, [1191] he did not immediately quit the African province, and it isprobable that at least the initial steps of the new settlement ofNumidia determined by the senate, were taken by him. The settlement wascharacteristic of the imperialism of the time. The government declinedto extend the evils of empire westward and southward, to make ofMauretania another Numidia, and to enter on a course of border warfarewith the tribes that fringed the desert. It therefore refused torecognise Numidia as a province. In default of an abler ruler, Gauda wasset upon the throne of his ancestors;[1192] he had long had the supportof Marius, and seems indeed to have been the only legitimate claimant. But he was not given the whole of the realm which had been swayed byMasinissa and Micipsa. The aspirations of Bocchus for an extension ofthe limits of Mauretania had to be satisfied, partly because it wouldhave been ungenerous and impolitic to deprive of a reward that had beenmore than hinted at, a man who had violated his own personalinclinations and the national traditions of the subjects over whom heruled, for the purpose of performing a signal service to Rome; partlybecause it would have been dangerous to the future peace of Numidia, andtherefore of Rome, to leave the question of Bocchus's claims toterritory east of the Muluccha unsettled, especially with such a ruleras Gauda on the throne. The western part of Numidia was thereforeattached to the kingdom of Mauretania; nearly five hundred miles ofcoast line may have been transferred, and the future boundary betweenthe two dominions may have been the port of Saldae on the west of theNumidian gulf. [1193] The wisdom of this settlement is proved by itssuccess. Until Rome herself becomes a victim to civil strife, and herexiles or conquerors play for the help of her own subjects, Numidiaceases to be a factor in Roman politics. The mischief of interfering indynastic questions had been made too patent to permit of the rashrepetition of the dangerous experiment. In comparison with the settlement of Numidia, the ultimate fate of itslate king was a matter of little concern. But Jugurtha had played toolarge a part in history to permit either the historian, or the loungerof the streets who jostled his neighbour for the privilege of gazingwith hungry eyes at the visage and bearing of the terrible warrior, tobe wholly indifferent to his end. The prisoner was foredoomed. Had henot for years been treated as an escaped criminal, not as a hostileking? If one ignored his outrages on his own race, had he not massacredRoman merchants, prompted the treacherous slaughter of a Roman garrison, and devised the murder of a client of the Roman people in the verystreets of Rome? In truth, a formidable indictment might be broughtagainst Jugurtha, nor was it the care of any one to discriminate whichof the counts referred to acts of war, and which must be classed in thecategory of merely private crimes. It was sufficient that he was anenemy (which to the Roman mind meant traitor) who had brought death tocitizens and humiliation to the State, and it is probable that, had theNumidian been the purest knight whose chivalrous warfare had shaken thepower of Rome, he would have taken that last journey to the Capitol. Itwas the custom of Rome, and any derogation of the iron rule was an actof singular grace. The stupidity of the mob, which is closely akin toits brutality, was utterly unable to distinguish between the differencesin conduct which are the result of the varying ethical standards of theraces of the world, or even to balance the enormities committed by theirown commanders against those which could be fastened on the enemy whomthey had seized. And this lack of imagination was reflected in acultured government, partly because their culture was superficial andthey were still the products of the grim old school which had producedtheir ferocious ancestors, partly for reasons that were purely politic. The light hold which Rome held over her dependants, could only berendered light by acts of occasional severity; the world must be made tosee the consequences of rebellion against a sovereign. But the truejustification for Roman rigour was not dependent on such considerations, which are often of a highly disputable kind, nearly so much as on thenormal attitude of the Roman mind itself. Cruelty was but an expressionof Roman patriotism; with characteristic consistency they applied muchthe same views to their citizens and their subjects, and their treatmentof captured enemies was but one expression of the spirit which foundutterance in their own terrible law of treason. When Marius celebrated his triumph on the 1st of January in the yearwhich followed the close of the Numidian war, [1194] Jugurtha and his twosons walked before his chariot. While the pageant lasted, the king stillwore his royal robes in mockery of his former state; when it had reachedits bourne on the Capitol, the degradation and the punishment werebegun. But it was believed by some that neither could now be felt, andthat it was a madman that was pushed down the narrow stair which leadsto the rock-hewn dungeon below the hill. [1195] His tunic was strippedfrom him, the golden rings wrested from his ears, and, as the son of thesouth[1196] stepped shivering into the well-like cavern, the cry "Oh!what a cold bath!" burst from his lips. Of the stories as to how the endwas reached, the more detailed speaks of a protracted agony of six daysuntil the prisoner had starved to death, his weakened mind clinging everto the hope that his life might yet be spared. [1197] The minor prize of the Numidian war was a quantity of treasure includingmore than three thousand pounds' weight of gold and over five thousandof silver[1198]--which was shown in the triumph of Marius before it wasdeposited in the treasury. It was indeed the only permanent prize of thewar which could be exhibited to the people; if one excepted two triumphsand the recognition of the merit of three officials, there was nothingelse to show. It was difficult to justify the war even on defensivegrounds, for it would have required a courageous advocate to maintainthat the mere recognition of Jugurtha as King of Numidia would haveimperilled the Roman possessions in Africa; and, if the struggle hadassumed an anti-Roman character, this result had been assisted, if notsecured, by the tactics of the opposition which had systematicallyfoiled every attempt at compromise. But a war, which it is difficult tojustify and still more difficult to remember with satisfaction, may bethe necessary result of a radically unsound system of administration:and the disasters which it entails may be equally the consequence of amilitary system, excellent in itself but ill-adapted to thecircumstances of the country in which the struggle is waged. These arethe only two points of view from which the Numidian war is remarkable onstrategic or administrative grounds. The strategic difficulties of thetask do nothing more than exhibit the wisdom of the majority of thesenate, and of the earlier generals engaged in the campaign, in seekingto avoid a struggle at almost any cost. A military system is conditionedby the necessities of its growth; even that of an empire is seldomsufficiently elastic to be equally adapted to every country and equallycapable of beating down every form of armed resistance. The Roman systemhad been evolved for the type of warfare which was common to thecivilised nations around the Mediterranean basin--nations which employedheavily armed and fully equipped soldiers as the main source of theirfighting strength, and which were forced to operate within a narrowarea, on account of the possession of great centres of civilisationwhich it was imperative to defend. Its mobility was simply the mobilityof a heavy force of infantry with a circumscribed range of action; inthe days of its highest development it was still strikingly weak incavalry. It had already shown itself an imperfect instrument for puttingdown the guerilla warfare of Spain; it had never been intended for thepurposes of desert warfare, or to effect the pacification of nomadtribes extending over a vast and desolate territory. Even as theParthian war of Trajan required the formation of what was practically anew army developed on unfamiliar lines, so the complete reorganisationof the Republican system would have been essential to the effectiveconquest of Numidia. The slight successes of this war, such as thetaking of Thala and of Capsa and the victories near Cirta, were attainedby judicious adaptations to the new conditions, by the employment oflight infantry and the increased use of cavalry; but even theseimprovements were of little avail, for effective pursuit was stillimpossible, and without pursuit the conflict could not be brought to aclose. The unkindness of the conditions almost exonerates the generalswho blundered during the struggle, and to an unprejudiced observer therecord of incompetence is slight. The fact that the inconclusiveproceedings of Metellus and Marius were deemed successes, almostjustifies the exploits of a Bestia, and even the crowning disaster ofthe war--the surprise of the army of Aulus Albinus--might have been thelot of a better commander opposed to an enemy so far superior inmobility and knowledge of the land. Most wars of this type aredestructive of military reputations; the general is fortunate who canemerge as the least incapable of the host of blunderers. If we adoptthis relative standard, one fortunate issue of the campaign may be heldto be the discovery that Marius was not unworthy of his militaryreputation. The verdict, it is true, was not justified by positiveresults; but it was the verdict of the army that he led and as incapableof being ignored as all such judgments are. His leadership had beencharacterised at least by efficiency in detail, and this efficiency hadbeen secured by gentle measures, by unceasing vigilance, by thecultivation of a true soldierly spirit, and by the untiring example ofthe commander. The courage of the innovator--a courage at once politicaland military--had also given Rome, in the mass of the unpropertiedclasses, a fathomless source from which she could draw an army ofprofessional soldiers, if she possessed the capacity to use heropportunities. The political issues of the war were bound up with those which werestrategic, both in so far as the hesitancy of the senate to enter onhostilities was based on a just estimate of the difficulties of thecampaign, and in so far as the policy of smoothing over difficulties ina client state by diplomatic means, in preference to stirring up ahornet's nest by the thrust of the sword, was one of the traditionalmaxims of the Roman protectorate. But this second issue raised the wholeof the great administrative question of the limits of the duties whichRome owed to her client kings. Such a question not infrequently suggestsa conflict of duty with interest. The claims of Adherbal for protectionagainst his aggressive cousin might be just, but even to many moderatemen, not wholly vitiated by the maxims of a Machiavellian policy, theymay have appeared intolerable. Was Rome to waste her own strength andstake the peace of the empire on a mere question of dynastic succession?Might it not be better to allow the rivals to fight out the questionamongst themselves, and then to see whether the man who emergedvictorious from the contest was likely to prove a client acceptable andobedient to Rome? There was danger in the course, no doubt: the dangerinherent in a vicious example which might spread to other protectedstates; but might it not be a slighter peril than that involved indethroning a ruler, who had proved his energy and ability, hisfamiliarity with Roman ways, and his knowledge of Roman methods, aboveall, his possession of the confidence of the great mass of the Numidianpeople? Nay, it might be argued that Adherbal had by his weakness provedhis unfitness to be an efficient agent of Rome. It might be askedwhether such a man was likely to be an adequate representative of Romaninterests in Africa, an adequate protector of the frontiers of theprovince. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the advocates ofinterference had something more than the claim of justice and the claimof prestige on their side. It was an undisputed fact that the divisionof power in Numidia, at the time when the question was presented toRome, showed that Adherbal stood for civilisation and Jugurtha forbarbarism. This was an issue that might not have been manifest at first, although any one who knew Numidia must have been aware that the militaryspirit of the country which was embodied in Jugurtha, was notrepresented in the coast cities with their trading populations drawnfrom many towns, but in the remote agricultural districts and thedeserts of the west and south; but it was an issue recognised by thecommissioners when they assigned the more civilised portion of thekingdom to Adherbal, and the territories, whose strength was the naturalwealth and the manhood which they yielded, to his energetic rival; andit was one that became painfully apparent when Jugurtha led hisbarbarous hordes against Cirta, and when these hordes in the hour ofvictory slew every merchant and money-lender whom they could find in thetown. It was this aspect of the question that ultimately proved thedecisive factor in bringing on the war; for the claims of justice couldnow be reinforced by those of interest, and the interest which was atstake was that of the powerful moneyed class at Rome. It was this classthat not only forced the government to war, but insisted on seeing thewar through to its bitter end. It was this class that systematicallyhindered all attempts at compromise, that brandished its control of thecourts in the face of every one who strove to temper war with hopes ofpeace, that tolerated Metellus until he proved too dilatory, and sentout Marius in the vain hope that he might show greater expedition. Theclose of the war was a singular satire on their policy, a remarkableproof of the justice of the official view. The end came throughdiplomacy, not through battle, through an unknown quaestor who belongedto the old nobility and possessed its best gifts of facile speech andsuppleness in intrigue, not through the great "new man" who was to be aliving example of what might be done, if the middle class had the makingof the ministers of the State. But the moneyed class could hardly have developed the power to force thehand of the council of state, had it not been in union with the thirdgreat factor in the commonwealth, that disorganised mass of fluctuatingopinion and dissipated voting power which was known as "the people. " Howcame the Populus Romanus to be stirred to action in this cause, with theresult that the balance of power projected by Caius Gracchus was againrestored? Much of their excitement may have been the result ofmisrepresentation, of the persistent efforts made by the opposition toprove that all parleying with the enemy was tantamount to treason; moremust have been due to the dishonouring news of positive disaster whichmarked a later stage of the war; but the mingled attitude of resentmentand suspicion with which the people was taught to regard its council andits ministers, seems to have been due to the genuine belief that many ofthe former and nearly all of the latter were hopelessly corrupt. Thisdarkest aspect of the Numidian war is none the less a reality if webelieve that the individual charges of corruption were not well founded, and that they were mere party devices meant to mask a policy which wouldhave been impossible without them. The proceedings of the Mamiliancommission certainly commanded little respect even from the democrat ofa later day; but it is with the suspicion of corruption, rather thanwith the justice of that suspicion in individual cases, that we are mostintimately concerned. A political society must be tainted to the core, if bribery can be given and accepted as a serious and adequateexplanation of the proceedings of its leading members. The suspicion wasa condemnation of the State rather than of a class. It might be temptingto suppose that the disease was confined to a narrow circle (by acurious accident to the circle actually in power); but of what proof didsuch a supposition admit? The leaders of the people were themselvesmembers of the senatorial order and scions of the nobility of office. Marius the "new man" might thunder his appeal for a purer atmosphere anda wider field; but it would be long, if ever, before the councils of theState would be administered by men who might be deemed virtuous becausetheir ancestors were unknown. But for a time the view prevailed that the interests of the State couldbest be served by a combination of powerful directors of financialcorporations with patriotic reformers, invested with the tribunate, struggling for higher office, and expressing their views of statecraftchiefly in the form of denunciations of the government. Such a coalitionmight form a powerful and healthy organ of criticism; but it could onlybecome more by serving as a mere basis for a new executive power. Asregards the nature of this power and even the necessity for itsexistence, the views of the discontented elements of the time wereprobably as indefinite as those of the adherents of Caius Gracchus. TheRepublican constitution was an accepted fact, and the senate must atleast be tolerated as a necessary element in that constitution; for noone could dream of finding a coherent administration either in theComitia or in the aggregate of the magistrates of the people. Now, as atall times since the Roman constitution had attained its fulldevelopment, the only mode of breaking with tradition in order to securea given end which the senate was supposed to have neglected, was toemploy the services of an individual. There was no danger in thisemployment if the individual could be overthrown when his work had beencompleted, or when the senate had regained its old prestige. The leaderelevated to a purely civil magistracy by the suffrages of the people wasever subject to this risk; if his personal influence outgrew thenecessities of his task, if he ceased to be an agent and threatened tobe a master, the mere suspicion of an aspiration after monarchy wouldsend a shudder of reaction through the mass of men which had given himhis greatness. As long as the cry for reform was based on the existenceof purely internal evils, which the temporary power of a domesticmagistracy such as the tribunate might heal, the breast even of the mosttimid constitutionalist did not deserve to be agitated by alarm for thesecurity of the Republican government. But what if external dangerscalled for settlement, if the eyes of the mercantile classes and theproletariate were turned on the spectacle of a foreign commerce in decayand an empire in disorder, if the grand justification for the senate'sauthority--its government of the foreign dependencies of Rome--werefirst questioned, then tossed aside? Would not the Individual makeshifthave in such a case as this to be invested with military authority?Might not his power be defended and perpetuated by a weapon mightierthan the voting tablet? Might not his supporters be a class of men, towhom the charms of civil life are few, whose habits have trained them tolook for inspiration to an individual, not to a corporation, still lessto that abstraction called a constitution--of men not subjected to thedividing influences, or swayed by the momentary passions, of theirfellows of the streets? In such a case might not the power of theindividual be made secure, and what was this but monarchy? Such were the reflections suggested to posterity by the power whichpopularly-elected generals began to hold from the time of the Numidianwar. But such were not the reflections of Marius and his contemporaries. There was no precedent and no contemporary circumstance which couldsuggest a belief in any danger arising from the military power. Theexperiment of bearding the senate by entrusting the conduct of acampaign to a popular favourite had been tried before, and, whether itsimmediate results were beneficial or the reverse, it had produced noulterior effects. Whether the people had pinned its faith on men of thenobility such as the two Scipios, or on a man of the people like Varro, such agents had either retired from public life, confessed theirincapacity, or returned to serve the State. The armies which suchgenerals had led were composed of well-to-do men who, apart from theannoyance of the levy, had no ground of complaint against thecommonwealth: and the change in the recruiting system which had beenintroduced by Marius, was much too novel and too partial for itsconsequences to be forecast. Nor could any one be expected to see thefundamental difference between the Rome of but two generations past andthe Rome of the day--the difference which sprang from the increasingdivergence of the interests of classes, and the consequent weakening ofconfidence in the one class which had "weathered the storm and beenwrecked in a calm". Aristocracy is the true leveller of merit, but, ifit lose that magic power by ceasing to be an aristocracy, then the turnof the individual has come. The fact that it was already coming may justify us in descending fromthe general to the particular and remarking that the question "Whodeserved the credit of bringing the war with Jugurtha to an end?" soonexcited an interest which appealed equally to the two parties in theState and the two personalities whom the close of the episode hadrevealed. It was natural that the success of Sulla should be exploitedby resentful members of the nobility as the triumph of the aristocratover the parvenu, of the old diplomacy and the old bureaucracy over thecoarse and childish methods of the opposition; it was tempting tocirculate the view that the humiliation of Metellus had been avenged, that the man who had slandered and superseded him had found an immediatenemesis in a youthful member of the aristocracy. [1199] Such a version, if it ever reached the ears of the masses, was heard only to berejected; the man who had brought Jugurtha in chains to Rome must be hisconqueror, and, even had this evidence been lacking, they did not intendto surrender the glory which was reflected from the champion whom theyhad created. Nor even in the circles of the governing class could thiscontroversy be for the moment more than a matter for idle or maliciousspeculation. Hard fighting had to be done against the barbarians of thenorth, a reorganisation of the army was essential, and for both thesepurposes even they admitted that Marius was the necessary man. Even thetwo men who were most interested in the verdict were content to stiflefor the time, the one the ambitious claim which was strengthened by abelief in its justice, the other the resentful repudiation, which wouldhave been rendered all the more emphatic from the galling sense that itcould not be absolute. In the coming campaigns against the Germans Sullaserved first as legate and afterwards as military tribune in the army ofhis old commander. [1200] But his own conviction of the part which he hadplayed in the Numidian war was expressed in a manner not the lessirritating because it gave no reasonable ground for offence. He beganwearing a signet ring, the seal of which showed Bocchus deliveringJugurtha into his hand. [1201] This emblem was destined to grate on thenerves of Marius in a still more offensive form, for thirteen yearslater, when his work had been done and his glory had begun to wane, Romewas given an unexpected confirmation of the truthfulness of the scenewhich it depicted. The King of Mauretania, eager to conciliate thepeople of Rome while he showed his gratitude to Sulla, sent as adedicatory offering to the Capitol a group of trophy-bearing Victorieswho guarded a device wrought in gold, which showed Bocchus surrenderingto Sulla the person of the Numidian king. Marius would have had itremoved, but Sulla's supporters could now loudly assert the claim, whichhad been only whispered when the dark cloud of barbaric invasion hungover the State and the loyal belief of the people in Marius wasquickened by their fears. [1202] Yet, although at the close of the Numidian war an appalling danger tothe empire tended to perpetuate the coalition that had been formedbetween the mercantile classes and the proletariate, and to wring fromthe senate an acceptance of the new military genius with his plans forreform, there are clear indications which prove that an ebb of politicalfeeling had been witnessed, even during the last three years--a turn ofthe tide which shows how utterly unstable the coalition against thesenate would have been, had it not been reinforced by the continuance ofdisasters abroad. The first sign of the reaction was the flatteringreception and the triumph of Metellus; and it may have been this currentof feeling which decided the consular elections for the following year. The successful candidates were Caius Atilius Serranus and QuintusServilius Caepio. Of these Serranus could trace his name back to thegreat Reguli of Carthaginian fame;[1203] the family to which hebelonged, although plebeian, had figured amongst the ranks of theofficial nobility since the close of the fourth century, although it isknown to have furnished the State with but five consuls since the timeof Caius Regulus. The merit which Serranus possessed in the eyes of thevoters who elevated him to his high office, was a puzzle to posterity;for such nobility as he could boast seemed the only compensation for thelack of intelligence which was supposed to characterise his utterancesand his conduct. [1204] But, if we may judge from the resolution which hesubsequently displayed in combating revolution at Rome, [1205] he wasknown to be a supporter of the authority of the senate, and hisaristocratic proclivities may have led to his association with his moredistinguished colleague Caepio. The latter belonged to a patrician clan, and to a branch of that clan which had lately clung to the highestpolitical prizes with a tenacity second only to that of the Metelli. Caepio's great-grandfather, his grandfather, his father and his twouncles had all filled the consulship; and his own hereditary claim tothat office had been rendered more secure by some good service inLusitania, which had secured him a military reputation and the triumphwhich he enjoyed in the very year that preceded his candidature. [1206]His political sentiments may have been known before his election; butthe very fact of his elevation to the consulship, and his appreciationof the direction in which the tide of public feeling seemed to berunning, gave a definiteness to his views and a courage to his reformingconservatism, which must have surprised his supporters as well as hisopponents, and may not have been altogether pleasing to the extrememembers of the former party. It must have been believed that a rift wasopening between the moneyed classes and the people, and that the latter, satisfied with their recent political triumph and reconciled by thehonest passivity of the senate, were content to resume their oldallegiance to the governing class. It must even have been held that aspirit of repentance and indignation could be awakened at the recklessand selfish use which the knights had made of the judicial powerentrusted to their keeping, that the Mamilian commission could berepresented as an outrage on the public conscience, and the ordinarycognisance of public crimes as a reign of terror intended merely toensure the security of investments. [1207] The knights were to beattacked in their stronghold, and Caepio came forward with a newjudiciary law. Two accounts of the scope of this measure have come downto us. According to the one, the bill proposed that jurisdiction in thestanding criminal courts should be shared between the senators and theequites;[1208] according to the other, this jurisdiction was to be givento the senate. [1209] That the latter result was meant to be attained insome way by the law, is perhaps shown by the intense dislike which theequestrian order entertained in later times to any laudatory referenceto the hated Servilian proposal:[1210] and, although a class which haspossessed and perhaps abused a monopoly of jurisdiction, may object toseeing even a share of it given to their enemies and their victims, yetthis resentment would be still more natural if the threatenedtransference of jurisdiction from their order was to be complete. But, in any case, we cannot afford to neglect the express testimony to thefact that the senate was to have possession of the courts; and the onlymethod of reconciling this view with the other tradition of a partitionof jurisdiction between the orders, is to suppose that Caepio attemptedthe effort suggested by Tiberius Gracchus, once advocated by his brotherCaius, [1211] and subsequently taken up by the younger Livius Drusus, ofincreasing the senate by admitting a certain number of knights into thatbody, and giving the control of the courts to the members of thisenlarged council. It may seem a strange and revolutionary step toattempt such a reform of the governing body of the State, whosemembership and whose privileges were so jealously guarded, for thepurpose of securing a single political end; it may seem at first sightas though the admission of a considerable number of the upper middleclass to the power and prizes possessed by the privileged few, would bea shock even to a mildly conservative mind that had fed upon thetraditions of the past. Yet a closer examination will reveal the truththat such a change would have meant a very slight modification in thetemper and tendencies of the senate, and would have insured a very greatincrease in its security, whether it meant to govern well or ill, tosecure its own advantages or those of its suffering subjects. In realitya very thin line parted the interests of the senators from those of themore distinguished members of the equestrian order. It was only whenofficial probity or official selfishness came into conflict withcapitalistic greed, that recrimination was aroused between the two headsof the body politic. But what if official power, under either of itsaspects, could make a compromise with greed? The rough features of bothmight be softened; but, at the worst, a stronger, more permanent and, inthe long run, more profitable monopoly of the good things of the empirewould be the result of the union. The admission of wealthy capitalistscould not be considered a very marked social detraction to the dignityof the order. The question of pedigree might be sunk in an amiablecommunity of taste. In point of lavish expenditure and exoticrefinement, in the taste that displayed itself in the patronage ofliterature, the collection of objects of art, the adornment of countryvillas, there was little to choose between the capitalist and the noble. And community of taste is an easy passage to community of politicalsentiment. Any one acquainted with the history of the past must haveknown that all efforts to temper the exclusiveness of the senatorialorder had but resulted in an increase of the spirit of exclusiveness. The patrician council had in old days been stormed by a horde ofplebeian chiefs; but these chiefs, when they had once stepped within themagic circle, had shown not the least inclination to permit their poorerfollowers to do the same. The successful Roman, practical, grasping, commercial and magnificently beneficent, ranking the glory of patronageas second only in point of worth to the possession and selfish use ofpower, scarcely attached a value even to the highest birth when deprivedof its brilliant accessories, and had always found his bond offellowship in a close community of interest with others, who helped himto hold a position which he might keep against the world. How much moresecure would this position be, if the front rank of the assailants wereenticed within the fortress and given strong positions upon the walls!They would soon drink into their lungs the strong air of possession, they would soon be stiffened by that electric rigidity which falls on aman when he becomes possessed of a vested interest. There was littleprobability that the knights admitted to the senate would continue to bein any real sense members of the equestrian order. But even to a senator who reckoned the increase of profit-sharers, whatever their present or future sentiments might be, as a loss tohimself, the sacrifice involved in the proposed increase of the membersof his order may have seemed well worthy of the cost. For how couldpower be exercised or enjoyed in the face of a hostile judicature? Theknights had recently made foreign administration on the accepted linesnot only impossible in itself, but positively dangerous to theadministrator, and in all the details of provincial policy they could, if they chose, enforce their views by means of the terrible instrumentwhich Caius Gracchus had committed to their hands. Even if the businessmen, shorn of their most distinguished members, might still have thepower to offer transitory opposition to the senate by coalition with themob, the more dangerous, because more permanent, possibilities of harmwhich the control of the courts afforded them, would be whollyswept away. The attraction of Caepio's proposal to the senatorial mind is, therefore, perfectly intelligible; but it is very probable that therewere many members of the nobility who were wholly insensible to thisattraction. The men who would descend a few steps in order to secure aprofitable concord between the orders, may have been in the majority;but there must have been a considerable number of stiff-backed nobleswho, even if they believed that concord could be secured by a measurewhich gave away privileges and did not conciliate hostility, wereexceedingly unwilling to descend at all. Caepio is the first exponent ofa fresh phase of the new conservatism which had animated the elderDrusus. That statesman had sought to win the people over to the side ofthe senate by a series of beneficent laws, which should be as attractiveas those of the demagogue and perhaps of more permanent utility than theblessings showered on them by the irresponsible favourite of the moment;but he had done nothing for the mercantile class; and his greater sonwas left to combine the scheme of conciliation transmitted to him by hisfather with that enunciated by Caepio. The moderation and the tactical utility of the new proposal fired theimagination of a man, whose support was of the utmost importance for thesuccess of a measure which was to be submitted to a popular body thatwas divided in its allegiance, uncertain in its views, and thereforeopen to conviction by rhetoric if not by argument. It was characteristicof the past career of the young orator Lucius Crassus that he should nowhave thrown himself wholly on the side of Caepio and the progressivemembers of the senate. [1212] His past career had committed him to noextremes. He had impeached Carbo, known to have been a radical andbelieved to be a renegade, and he had championed the policy ofprovincial colonisation as illustrated by the settlement of NarboMartius. His action in the former case might have been equally pleasingto either side; his action in the latter might have been construed asthe work, less of an advanced liberal, than of an imperialist moreenlightened than his peers. He had evidently not compromised his chancesof political success; he was still but thirty-four and had justconcluded his tenure of the tribunate. In the opposite camp stoodMemmius, striving with all his might to keep alive the coalition, whichhe had done so much to form, between the popular party and the merchantclass. The knights mustered readily under his banner, for they had noillusions as to the meaning of the bill; it was impossible to conciliatean order by the bribery of a few hundreds of its members, whose verynames were as yet unknown. To keep the people faithful to the coalitionwas a much more difficult task. It was soon patent to all that theagitators had not been wrong in supposing that a serious cleft hadopened between the late allies, and in the war of words with which theForum was soon filled, Memmius seems to have been no match for hisopponent. Crassus surpassed himself, and the keen but humorous invectivewith which he held Memmius up to the ridicule of his formerfollowers, [1213] was balanced by the grand periods in which heformulated his detailed indictment of the methods pursued by theexisting courts of justice, and of the terrible dangers to the publicsecurity produced by their methods of administration. He did not merelyimpugn the verdicts which were the issue of a jury system so degraded asto have become the sport of a political "faction, " but he dwelt on thepublic danger which sprang from the parasites of the courts, the gloomybrood of public accusers which is hatched by a rotten system, feeds onthe impurities of a diseased judicature, and terrifies the commonwealthby the peril that lurks in its poisonous sting. This speech was to bestudied by eager students for years to come as a master work in the artof declamatory argument. [1214] But its momentary efficacy seems to havebeen as great as its permanent value. Caepio's bill was acclaimed andcarried. [1215] Then began the turn of the tide. It is practicallycertain that the authors of the measure never had the courage, orperhaps the time, to carry a single one of its proposals Into effect. The senate was not enlarged, nor was the right of judicature wrestedfrom the hands of its existing holders. [1216] The bill may have beenrepealed within a few months of its acceptance by the people. Caepiowent to Gaul to stake his military reputation on a conflict with theGerman hordes; he was to return as the best hated man in Rome, toreceive no mercy from an indignant people. There was probably more thanone cause for this sudden change in political sentiment. The knights mayhave been thrown off their guard by the suddenness of Caepio's attackupon their privileges, and a few months of organisation and canvassingmay have been all that they needed to restore the majority required foreffacing the blot upon their name. But the chief reason is doubtless tobe sought in the external circumstances of the moment, and can only befully illustrated by the description which we shall soon be giving ofthe great events that were taking place on the northern frontiers of theempire. It is sufficient for the present to remember that, in the veryyear in which Caepio's measure had received the ratification of thepeople, Caius Popillius Laenas, a legate of one of the consuls of theprevious year, had been put on his trial before that very people formaking a treaty which was considered still more disgraceful than thedefeat which had preceded it. [1217] The Comitia now heard the wholestory of the conduct of the Roman arms against the barbarians of theNorth. The story immediately revived the coalition of the early days ofthe Numidian war, and there was no longer any hope for the success ofeven moderate counsels proceeding from the senate. Popillius was asecond Aulus Albinus, and a new Marius was required to restore thefortunes of the day. It was, however, certain that the only Marius couldnot be withdrawn from Africa, and men looked eagerly to see what theconsular elections for the next year would produce. We hear of nocandidate belonging to the highest ranks of the nobility who was deemedto have been defrauded of his birthright on this occasion; but thedisappointment of Quintus Lutatius Catulus was deemed wholly legitimate, when Cnaeus Mallius Maximus defeated him at the poll. Catulus belongedto a plebeian family that had been ennobled by the possession of theconsulship at least as early as the First Punic War; but the distinctionhad not been perpetuated in the later annals of the house, and ifCatulus received the support of the official nobility, it was becausehis tastes and temperament harmonised with theirs, and because it mayhave seemed impolitic to advance a man of better birth and morepronounced opinions in view of the prevailing temper of the people. Catulus was a man of elegant taste and polished learning, one of themost perfect Hellenists of the day, and distinguished for the grace andpurity of the Latin style that was exhibited in his writings andorations. [1218] He was one day to write the history of his own momentousconsulship and of the final struggle with the Cimbri, in which he playeda not ignoble part. Much of our knowledge of those days is due to hispen, and the modern historian is perhaps likely to congratulate himselfon the blindness of the people, which thrice refused Catulus theconsulship and reserved him to be an actor and a witness in the crowningvictory of the great year of deliverance. He had already been defeatedby Serranus; he was now subordinated to the claims of Maximus. But whatwere those claims? Posterity found it difficult to give an answer, [1219]and the reason for that difficulty was that this second experiment inthe virtues of a "new man" was anything but successful. The family towhich Maximus belonged seems to have been wholly undistinguished, and hehimself is the only member of his clan who is known to have attained theconsulship. An explanation of his present prominence could only begathered from a knowledge of his past career, and of this knowledge weare wholly deprived; but it is manifest that he must have done much, either in the way of positive service to the State in subordinatecapacities, or in the way of invective against its late administrators, which caused him to be regarded as a discovery by the leaders of themultitude. The colleague given to Maximus was a man such as the peoplein the present emergency could not well refuse. Publius Rutilius Rufuswas a kind of Cato with a deeper philosophy, a higher culture, and a farless bewildering activity. As a soldier he had been trained by Scipio inSpain, and he possessed a theoretical interest in military matters whichissued in practical results of the most important kind. [1220] His tenureof the urban praetorship seems to have been marked by reforms whichmaterially improved the condition of the freedmen in matters of privatelaw, and limited the right of patrons to impose burdensome conditions ofpersonal service as the price of manumission. [1221] It was he too whomay have introduced the humane system of granting the possession of adebtor's goods to a creditor, if that creditor was willing to waive hisclaim to the debtor's person. [1222] Rutilius, therefore, may have hadstrong claims on the gratitude of the lower orders; and his personalitywas one that could more readily command a grateful respect than a warmaffection. He was a learned adherent of the Stoic system, the cold andstern philosophy of which imbued his speeches, already rendered somewhatunattractive by their author's devotion to the forms of the civillaw. [1223] He was much in request as an advocate, his learning commandeddeep respect, but he lacked or would not condescend to the charm whichwould have made him a great personal force with the people at a timewhen there was a sore need of men who were at the same time greatand honest. By a singular irony of fortune it chanced that the province of Gaul fellto Maximus and not to Rutilius. The strong-headed soldier was left athome to indulge his schemes of army reform while the new man went to hispost in the north, to quarrel with the aristocratic Caepio, who was nowserving as proconsul in those regions, and to share in the crushingdisaster which this dissension drew upon their heads. The search forgenius had to be renewed at the close of this melancholy year. [1224]Another "new man" was found in Caius Flavius Fimbria, a product of theforensic activity of the age, a clever lawyer, a bitter and vehementspeaker, but with a power that secured his efforts a transitorycirculation as types of literary oratory. [1225] He is not known to haveshown any previous ability as a soldier, and his election, so far as itwas not due to his own unquestioned merit, may have been but a symbol ofthe continued prevalence of the distrust of the people in aristocraticinfluence and qualifications. His competitor was Catulus who was for thethird time defeated. For the other place in the consulship there couldbe no competition. The close of the Numidian war had freed the hands ofthe man who was still believed to be the greatest soldier of the day. There was, it is true, a legal difficulty in the way of the appointmentof Marius to the command in the north. Such a command should belong to aconsul, but nearly fifty years before this date a law had been passedabsolutely prohibiting re-election to the consulship. [1226] Yet thedispensation granted to the younger Africanus could be quoted as aprecedent, and indeed the danger that now threatened the very frontiersof Italy was an infinitely better argument for the suspension of the lawthan the reverses of the Numantine war. [1227] The people were in no moodto listen to legal quibbles. They drove the protestant minority from theassembly, and raised Marius to the position which they deemed necessaryfor the salvation of the State. [1228] The formal act of dispensation mayhave been passed by the Comitia either before or after the election, butthe senate must have been easily coerced into giving its assent, if itsadherence were thought requisite to the validity of the act. Theprovince of Gaul was assigned him as a matter of course, [1229] whetherby the senate or the people is a matter of indifference. For the Romanconstitution was again throwing off the mask of custom and uncoveringthe bold lineaments which spoke of the undisputed sovereignty of thepeople. Certainly, if a sovereign has a right to assert himself, it isone who is _in extremis_, who stands between death and revolution. Personality had again triumphed in spite of the meshes of Roman law andcustom. It remained to be seen whether the net could be woven again withas much cunning as before, or whether the rent made by Marius wasgreater than that which had been torn by the Gracchi. TITLES OF MODERN WORKS REFERRED TO IN THE NOTES L'ANNÉE ÉPIGRAPHIQUE; revue des publications épigraphiques relatives a l'antiquité Romaine (1896, pp. 30, 31, _Fragmentum Tarentinum_). BARDEY, E. --_Das sechste Consulat des Marius oder das Jahr 100 in der römischen Verfassungsgeschichte_. Brandenburg-a. -d. -H. , 1884. 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POEHLMANN, R. --_Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus_. München, 1893-1900. RAMSAY, W. M. --_The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia_. Oxford, 1895-7. REIN, W. --_Das Criminalrecht der Römer von Romulus bis auf Justinianus_, Leipzig, 1844. REINACH, TH. --_Mithridate Eupator, roi du Pont_. Paris, 1890. RICHTER, O. --_Topographie der Stadt Rom_. 2te Aufl. München, 1901. RUDORFF, A. A. F. --_Das Ackergesetz des Sp. Thorius wiederhergestellt und erläutert_ (Zeitschr. Für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. Bd. X. Berlin, 1839). SCHAEFER, A. --On Orosius, v. , 9, 6 (_Mamertium oppidum_) (Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, 1873, p. 71). ----On Plutarch, _Ti. Gracch_. II ([Greek: _Mallios kai phoulbios_]) (ibid. ). SCHMIDT, J. --_Zama_ (Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. N. F. Bd. Xliv. , 1889, p. 397). SMITH, W. And WILKINS, A. S. --_Frumentariae Leges_ (Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, 3rd. Ed. , i. P. 877. London, 1890). SOLTAU, W. --_Das Aechtheit des licinischen Ackergesetzes von 367 v. Chr_. (Hermes, xxx. , 1895), ---- _Roms Kultur_ (Kulturgeschichte des klassischen Altertums, p. 190. Leipzig, 1897). STEINWENDER, TH. --_Die Römische Bürgerschaft in ihrem Verhältniss zum Heere_. Danzig, 1888. STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, J. L. --_Appian, Civil Wars_. Book i. , edited with notes and map. Oxford, 1902. SUMMERS, W. C. --_C. Sallusti Crispi Jugurtha_, edited with introduction, notes and index. Cambridge, 1902. THÉDENAT, H. --_Ergastulum_ (Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines). TISSOT, C. --_Géographie comparée de la province Romaine d'Afrique_. Tome i. , Paris, 1884. Tome ii. (ouvrage publié d'après le manuscrit de l'auteur avec des notes, des additions et un atlas par Salomon Reinach), 1888. UNDERHILL, G. E. --_Plutarch's Lives of the Gracchi_, edited, with introduction, notes and indices. Oxford, 1892. USSING, J. L. --_Pergamos, seine Geschichte und Monumente_, nach der dänischen Ausgabe neu bearbeitet. Berlin, 1899. VOIGT, M. --_Ueber die Bankiers, die Buchführung und die Litteralobligation der Römer_ (Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. Bd. X. Leipzig, 1887). ---- _Ueber die staatsrechtliche Possessio und den Ager Compascuus der römischen Republik_ (ibid. ). ---- _Privataltertümer und Kulturgeschichte_ (Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, herausg. Von Iwan von Mueller. Bd. Iv. , abt. Ii. , 2te Aufl. München, 1893). WADDINGTON, W. H. --_Fastes des provinces Asiatiques de l'Empire Romain depuis leur origine jusqu'au règne de Dioclétien. Ch. Ii. , Province d'Asie_ (Voyage Archéologique en Grèce et en Asie Mineure, par P. Le Bas et W. H. Waddington. Vol. Iii. , p. 661. Paris, 1870). WALLON, H. --_Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité_. 2nd edit. Paris, 1879. WALTZING, J. P. --_Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains depuis les origines jusqu'à la chute de l'Empire d'Occident_. Louvain, 1899-1900. WILCKEN, U. --_Attalos III_. (Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, p. 2168). ZUMPT, A. W. --_Das Criminalrecht der römischen Republik_. Berlin, 1865-9. FOOTNOTES: [1] The average, or at least the most powerful, type of a race isstamped on its history. It is perhaps needless to say that nogeneralisations on character apply to all its individual members. [2] Even the Hellenes of the West are only a partial exception. It istrue that their cities clung to the coast; but the vast inlandpossessions of states like Sybaris are scarcely paralleled elsewhere inthe history of Greek colonisation. [3] The Latin colony of Aquileia was settled in the former year (Liv. Xl. 34 Vellei. 1. 15), the Roman colony of Auximum in the latter(Vellei. L. C. ). [4] Cic. _de Leg. Agr_. Ii. 27. 73 Est operae pretium diligentiammajorum recordari, qui colonias sic idoneis in locis contra suspicionempericuli collocarunt, ut esse non oppida Italiae, sed propugnaculaimperii viderentur. [5] Liv. Xxvii. 38; xxxvi. 3; cf. Marquardt _Staatsverwaltung_ 1. P. 51. [6] The Roman citizen, who entered his name for a Latin colony, sufferedthe derogation of _caput_ which was known to the later jurists as_capitis deminutio minor_ and expressed the loss of _civitas_ (Gaius i. 161; iii. 56). That a fine was the alternative of enrolment, henceconceived as voluntary, we are told by Cicero (_pro Caec_. 33. 98 Autsua voluntate aut legis multa profecti sunt: quam multam si sufferrevoluissent, manere in civitate potuissent. Cf. _pro Domo_ 30. 78 Quicives Romani in colonias Latinas proficiscebantur, fieri non poterantLatini, nisi erant auctores acti nomenque dederant). [7] Liv. Xxxix. 23. [8] Liv. Xxxvii. 4. [9] Liv. Xlii. 32 Multi voluntate nomina dabant, quia locupletesvidebant, qui priore Macedonico bello, aut adversus Antiochum in Asia, stipendia fecerant. [10] For the assignations _viritim_ in the times of the Kings see Varro_R. R_. I. 10 (Romulus); Cic. _de Rep_. Ii. 14. 26 (Numa); Liv. 1. 46(Servius Tullius). That the Cassian distribution was to be [Greek: _katandra_] is stated by Dionysius (viii. 72, 73). On the whole subject seeMommsen in C. I. L. I. P. 75. He has made out a good case for the landthus assigned being known by the technical name of _viritanus ager_. SeeFestus p. 373; Siculus Flaccus p. 154 Lachm. We shall find that this wasthe form of distribution effected by the Gracchi. [11] For the settlement in the land of the Volsci see Liv. V. 24; forthat made by M. Curius in the Sabine territory, Colum. I. Praef. 14;[Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 33. [12] Cato ap. Varr. _R. R_. I. 2. 7 Ager Gallicus Romanus vocatur, quiviritim cis Ariminum datus est ultra agrum Picentium; cf. Cic. _Brut_. 14. 57; _de Senect_. 4. 11; Val. Max. V. 4. 5. [13] Liv. Xlii. 4 (173 B. C. ); cf. Xli. 16. [14] The other sources were the _portoria_ and the _vicesima libertatis_. Even at a period when the revenues from the provinces were infinitelylarger than they were at the present time Cicero could write, withreference to Caesar's proposal for distributing the Campanian land, Portoriis Italiae sublatis, agro Campano divisor, quid vectigal superestdomesticum praeter vicensimam? (Cic. _ad Att_. Ii. 16. I). [15] See the map attempted by Beloch in his work _Der Italische Bundunter Roms Hegemonie_. [16] Vellei. Ii. 7. See ch. Iv. , where the attitude of the senatetowards the proposals for transmarine settlement made by Caius Gracchusis described. [17] Polyb. Xxxii. 11. [18] Besides the continued war in Spain from 145 to 133 there weretroubles in Macedonia (in 142) and in Sicily during this period ofcomparative peace. _Circa_ 140-135 commences the great slave rising inthat island, and in the latter year the long series of campaigns againstthe free Illyrian and Thracian peoples begins. [19] The _officia_ of the _villicus_ have become very extensive even inCato's time (Cato _R. R_. 5). Their extent implies the assumption ofvery prolonged absences on the part of the master. [20] Lucullus paid 500, 200 drachmae for the house at Misenum which hadonce belonged to Cornelia. She had purchased it for 75, 000 (Plut. _Mar_. 34). Marius had been its intermediate owner. Even during his occupancyit is described as [Greek: _polytelaes oikia tryphas echousa kai diaitasthaelyteras hae kat andra polemon tosouton kai strateion autourgon_. ] [21] Diod. Xxxvii. 3. [22] Sulla rented one of the lower floors for 3000 sesterces (Plut. _Sulla_ 1). [23] The _coenaculum_ is mentioned by Livy (xxxix. 14) in connectionwith the year 186 B. C. It is known both to Ennius (ap. Tertull. _adv_. Valent. 7) and to Plautus (_Amph_. Iii. 1. 3). [24] Festus p. 171. The _insula_ resembled a large hotel, with one ormore courts, and bounded on all sides by streets. See Smith _Dict. OfAntiq_. (3rd ed. ) i. P. 665. [25] Val. Max. Viii. 1. Damn. 7 Admodum severae notae et illud populijudicium, cum M. Aemilium Porcinam (consul 137 B. C. ) a L. Cassio (censor125 B. C. ) accusatum crimine nimis sublime extructae villae in Alsiensiagro gravi multa affecit. The author does not sufficiently distinguishbetween the censorian initiative and the operation of the law. Thepassage is important as showing the existence of an enactment on theheight of buildings. See Voigt in Iwan-Müller's _Handbuch_ iv. 2, p. 394, and cf. Vellei. Ii. 10. Augustus limited the height of houses to70 feet (Strabo v. P. 235). [26] Diodor. V. 40 (The Etruscans) [Greek: _en . .. Tais oikiais taperistoa pros tas ton therapeuonton ochlon tarachas exeuroneuchraestian_. ] See Krause _Deinokrates_ p. 528. [27] In spite of the plural form _fauces_ (Vitruv. Vi. 3. 6) may denoteonly a single passage. See Marquardt _Privatl_. P. 240; Smith andMiddleton in Smith _Dict. Of Antiq_. I. P. 671. [28] For this _atriensis_, the English butler, the continental porter, see the frequent references in Plautus (e. G. , _Asin_. Ii. 2. 80 and 101;_Pseud_. Ii. 2. 15), Krause _Deinokrates_ p. 534 and Marquardt_Privatl_. P. 140. [29] Plin. _H. N_. Xxxv. 6 Stemmata vero lineis discurrebant ad imaginespictas. It is not known at what period the _imagines_ were transferredfrom the Atrium to the Alae. [30] Overbeck _Pompeii_ p. 192; Krause _Deinokrates_ p. 539. [31] For the practice started, or developed, by Caius Gracchus ofreceiving visitors, some singly, others in smaller or larger groups, seeSeneca _de Ben_. Vi. 34. 2 and the description of Gracchus' tribunate inchapter iv. [32] Festus p. 357 (according to Mommsen, Abh. Der Berl. Akad. Phil. -hist. Classe, 1864 p. 68). Tablinum proxime atrium locus dicitur, quod antiqui magistratus in suo imperio tabulis rationum ibi habebantpublicarum rationum causa factum locum; Plin. _H. N_. Xxxv. 7 Tabulinacodicibus implebantur et monimentis rerum in magistratu gestarum. Marquardt, however (_Privatl_. P. 215) thinks that the name _tablinum_is derived from the fact that this chamber was originally made of planks(_tablinum_ from _tabula_, as _figlinum_ from _figulus_). [33] The earliest instances of extreme extravagance in the use ofbuilding material--of the use, for instance, of Hymettian and Numidianmarble--are furnished by the houses of the orator Lucius LiciniusCrassus (built about 92 B. C. ) and of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, consul in78 B. C. This growth of luxury will be treated when we come to deal withthe civilisation of the Ciceronian period. [34] As Krause expresses it (_Deinokrates_ p. 542), at the final stagewe find a Greek "Hinterhaus" standing behind an old Italian"Vorderhaus". [35] The case mentioned by Juvenal (xi. 151) Pastoris duri hic est filius, ille bubulci. Suspirat longo non visam tempore matrem, Et casulam, et notos tristis desiderat haedos, must have been of frequent occurrence as soon as the urban and rustic_familiae_ had been kept distinct. [36] Suetonius says (_de Rhet_. 3) of L. Voltacilius Pilutus, one of theteachers of Pompeius, Servisse dicitur atque etiam ostiarius vetere morein catena fuisse. [37] For these _atrienses, atriarii, admissionales, velarii_ see Wallon_Hist. De l'Esclavage_ ii. P. 108. [38] Diod. Xxxvii. 3; Sallust (_Jug_. 85) makes Marius say (107 B. C. )Neque pluris pretii coquum quam villicum habeo. Livy (xxxix. 6) remarkswith reference to the consequences of the return of Manlius' army fromAsia in 187 B. C. Tum coquus, vilissimum antiquis mancipium etaestimatione et usu, in pretio esse; et, quod ministerium fuerat, arshaberi coepta. [39] Plin. _H. N_. Xviii. 108 Nec coquos vero habebant in servitiiseosque ex macello conducebant. The practice is mentioned by Plautus(_Aul_. Ii. 4. 1; iii. 2. 15). [40] _Condus promus_ (Plaut. _Pseud_. Ii. 2. 14). [41] Wallon op. Cit. Ii. P. 111. [42] C. Gracchus ap. Gell. X. 3. 5. [43] Polyb. Xxxii. 11; Diodor. Xxxvii. 3. [44] Diod. L. C. [45] Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. 143 Invenimus legatos Carthaginiensiumdixisse nullos hominum inter se benignius vivere quam Romanos. Eodemenim argento apud omnes cenitavisse ipsos. [46] Val. Max. Ii. 9, 3. [47] Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. 141. [48] Vellei. I. 13. [49] Polyb. Xl. 7. [50] Liv. Xxxix. 6 Lectos aeratos . .. Plagulas . .. Monopodia et abacosRomam advexerunt. Tunc psaltriae sambucistriaeque et convivalia ludionumoblectamenta addita epulis. Cf. Plin, _H. N_. Xxxiv. 14. [51] Polyb. Ix. 10 [Greek: _Rhomaioi de metakomisantes ta proeiraemenatais men idiotikais kataskenais tous auton ekosmaesan bious, tais dedaemosiais ta koina taes poleos_. ] Another great raid was that made byFulvius Nobilior in 189 B. C. On the art treasures of the Ambraciots(Signa aenea marmoreaque et tabulae pictae, Liv. Xxxviii. 9). [52] Plin. _H. N_. Xv. 19 Graeci vitiorum omnium genitores. [53] Cic. _pro Arch_. 3. 5 Erat Italia tum plena Graecarum artium acdisciplinarum . .. Itaque hunc (Archiam) et Tarentini et Regini etNeapolitani civitate ceterisque praemiis donarunt: et omnes, qui aliquidde ingeniis poterant judicare, cognitione atque hospitio dignumexistimarunt. [54] Cic. _de Rep_. Ii. 19. 34 Videtur insitiva quadam disciplinadoctior facta esse civitas. Influxit enim non tenuis quidam e Graeciarivulus in hanc urbem, sed abundantissimus amnis illarum disciplinarumet artium. Cicero is speaking of the very earliest Hellenic influenceson Rome, but his description is just as appropriate to the period whichwe are considering. [55] Plut. _Paul_. 28. [56] Sulla brought back the library of Apellicon of Teos, Lucullus thevery large one of the kings of Pontus (Plut. _Sulla_ 26; _Luc_. 42;Isid. _Orig_. Vi. 5). Lucullus allowed free access to his books. Here weget the germ of the public library. The first that was genuinely publicbelongs to the close of the Republican era. It was founded by AsiniusPollio in the Atrium Libertatis on the Aventine (Plin. _H. N_. Vii. 45;Isid. _Orig_. Vi. 5). [57] Macrob. _Sat_. Iii. 14. 7. [58] Dionys. Vii. 71. [59] They had made contributions in 186 B. C. Towards the games of ScipioAsiaticus (Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. 138). [60] Livy (xl. 44) after describing the _senatus consultum_, in whichoccur the words Neve quid ad eos ludos arcesseret, cogeret, acciperet, faceret adversus id senatus consultum, quod L. Aemilio Cn. Baebioconsulibus de ludis factum esset, adds Decreverat id senatus proptereffusos sumptus, factos in ludos Ti. Sempronii aedilis, qui graves nonmodo Italiae ac sociis Latini nominis sed etiam provinciisexternis fuerant. [61] The effect was still worse when a rich man avoided it. Cic. _deOff_. Ii. 17. 58. Vitanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. Mamerco, hominidivitissimo, praetermissio aedilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit. Sulla said that the people would not give him the praetorship becausethey wished him to be aedile first. They knew that he could obtainAfrican animals for exhibition (Plut. _Sulla_ 5). [62] Cic. _in Verr_. V. 14. 36. [63] Liv. X. 47; xxvii. 6. [64] Liv. Xxiii. 30. [65] Liv. Xxx. 39. [66] Plin. _H. N_. Xviii. 286. [67] Mommsen _Röm. Münzw_. P. 645. [68] Liv. Xxxvi. 36. On these festivals see Warde Fowler _The RomanFestivals_ pp. 72. 91. 70. The _Megalesia_ seem to have fallen to thelot of the curule aediles (Dio. Cass. Xliii. 48), the others to havebeen given indifferently by either pair. [69] Val. Max. Ii. 4-7; Liv. _Ep_. Xvi. It was exhibited in the ForumBoarium by Marcus and Decimus Brutus at the funeral of their father. [70] Compare Livy's description (xli. 20) of the adoption of Romangladiatorial shows by Antiochus Epiphanes--Armorum studium plerisquejuvenum accendit. [71] Polyb. Xxx. 13. [72] Liv. Xxxix. 22. [73] Liv. Xliv. 18. [74] Dig. 21. 1. 40-42 (from the edict of the curule aediles) Ne quiscanem, verrem vel minorem aprum, lupum, ursum, pantheram, leonem . .. Quavulgo iter fiet, ita habuisse velit, ut cuiquam nocere damnumvedare possit. [75] Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 17. 60 Tota igitur ratio talium largitionumgenere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria. He adds the pious butunattainable wish Tamen ipsa et ad facultates accomodanda etmediocritate moderanda est. Compare the remarks of Pöhlmann on thesubject in his _Geschichte des antiken Communismus und Sozialismus_ ii. 2. P. 471. [76] Mommsen _Staatsr_. Ii. , p. 382. [77] Plut, _Ti. Gracch_. 14. [78] Liv. Xxxix. 44; Plut, _Cat. Maj_. 18. [79] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_, p. 128. [80] Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 22. 76 (Paullus) tantum in aerarium pecuniaeinvexit, ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. Adeterrent to luxury could still have been created by imposing heavyharbour-dues on articles of value; but this would have requiredlegislation. Nothing is known about the Republican tariff at Italianports. The percentage may have been uniform for all articles. [81] Liv. Xxxiv. Cc. 1-8; Val. Max. Ix. 1. 3; Tac. _Ann_. Iii. 33. [82] Macrob. _Sat_. Iii. 17; Festus pp. 201, 242; Schol. Bob. P. 310;Meyer _Orat. Rom. Fragm_. P. 91. [83] This date (161) is given by Pliny (_H. N_. X. 139); Macrobius(_Sat_. Iii. 17. 3) places the law in 159. [84] Gell. Ii. 24; Macrob. _Sat_. Iii. 17; Plin. _H. N_. X. 139;Tertull. _Apol_. Vi. The ten asses of this law are the Fanni centussismisellus of Lucilius. [85] It seems that we must assume formal acceptance on the part of theallies in accordance with the principle that Rome could not legislatefor her confederacy, a principle analogous to that which forbade her toforce her franchise on its members (Cic. _pro Balbo_ 8, 20 and 21). [86] We may compare the enactment of 193 B. C. , which was produced by thediscovery that Roman creditors escaped the usury laws by using Italiansas their agents (Liv. Xxxv. 7 M. Sempronius tribunus plebis . .. Plebemrogavit plebesque scivit ut cum sociis ac nomine Latino creditaepecuniae jus idem quod cum civibus Romanis esset). [87] The _Lex Licinia_, which is attributed by Macrobius (l. C. ) to P. Licinius Crassus Dives, perhaps belongs either to his praetorship (104B. C. ) or to his consulship (97 B. C. ). [88] Gellius (ii. 24), in speaking of Sulla's experiments, says of theolder laws Legibus istis situ atque senio obliteratis. [89] _Exaequatio_ (Liv. Xxxiv. 4). [90] Cic. _de Rep_. Iii. G. 16; see p. 80. [91] Compare Tac. _Ann_. Iii. 53. The Emperor Tiberius here speaks ofIlla feminarum propria, quis lapidum causa pecuniae nostrae ad externasaut hostilis gentes transferuntur. [92] The prohibition belongs to the year 229 B. C. (Zonar. Viii. 19). Forother prohibitions of the same kind dating from, a period later thanthat which we are considering see Voigt in Iwan-Müller's _Handbuch_ iv. 2, p. 376 n. 95. [93] Earlier enactments had been directed against canvassing, but notagainst bribery. The simplicity of the fifth century B. C. Wasillustrated by the law that a candidate should not whiten his toga withchalk (Liv. Iv. 25; 433 B. C. ). The _Lex Poetelia_ of 358 B. C. (Liv. Vii. 16) was directed against personal solicitation by _novi homines_. Somelaw of _ambitus_ is known to Plautus (_Amph. Prol. 73; cf. Trinumm_. Iv. 3. 26), See Rein _Criminalrecht_ p. 706 [94] Liv. Xl. 19 Leges de ambitu consules ex auctoritate senatus adpopulum tulerunt. This was the _lex Cornelia Baebia_ and that itreferred to pecuniary corruption is known from a fragment of Cato (ap. _Non_. Vii. 19, s. V. Largi, Cato lege Baebia: pecuniam inlargibo tibi). [95] Obsequens lxxi. [96] Liv. _Ep_. Xlvii. [97] Polyb. Vi. 56 [Greek: _para men Karchaedoniois dora phanerosdidontes lambanousi tas archas, para de Rhomaiois thanatos esti peritouto prostimon_. ] [98] The position of the ruined patrician will be fully illustrated inthe following pages when we deal with the careers of Scaurus andof Sulla. [99] Liv. Xxxiv. 52. [100] Liv. Xxxix. 7. [101] Liv. Xxxviii. 9. [102] For the later history of the _aurum coronarium_ see Marquardt_Staatsverw_. Ii. P. 295. It was developed from the _triumphalescoronae_ (Festus p. 367) and is described as gold Quod triumphantibus. .. A victis gentibus datur and as imposed by commanders Propterconcessam vitam (_al_. Immunitatem) (Serv. _Ad. Aen_. Viii. 721). [103] Liv. Xxi. 63 (218 B. C. ) Id satis habitum ad fructus ex agrisvectandos; quaestus omnis patribus indecorus visus. [104] It was antiqua et mortua (Cic. _in Verr_. V. 18. 45). [105] Cicero (_Parad_. 6. 46) speaks of those Qui honeste rem quaeruntmercaturis faciendis, operis dandis, publicis sumendis. Compare thecategory of banausic trades in _de Off_, 1. 42. 150, although in the_Paradoxa_ the contrast is rather that between honest and viciousmethods of money-making. Deloume (_Les manieurs d'argent à Rome_pp. 58 ff. ) believes that the fortune of Cicero swelled throughparticipation in _publica_. [106] Plut. _Cato Maj_. 21. [107] Plut. _Crass_. 2. [108] Plut. _Cato Maj_. 21. Cato employed this method of training as ameans of increasing the _peculium_ of his own slaves. But even the_peculium_ technically belonged to the master, and it is obvious thatthe slave-trainer might have been used by others as a mere instrumentfor the master's gain. [109] Plat. L. C. [Greek: _haptomenos de syntonoteron porismou taen mengeorgian mallon haegeito diagogaen hae prosodon_. ] [110] Plaut. _Trinumm. Prol_. 8: Primum mihi Plautus nomen Luxuriae indidit: Tum hanc mihi gnatam esse voluit Inopiam. [111] Liv. Xxxiv. 4 (Cato's speech in defence of the Oppian law) Saepeme querentem de feminarum, saepe de virorum, nec de privatorum modo, sedetiam magistratuum sumptibus audistis; diversisque duobus vitiis, avaritia et luxuria, civitatem laborare. Compare Sallust's impressionsof a later age (_Cat_. 3) Pro pudore, pro abstinentia, pro virtute, audacia, largitio, avaritia vigebant. [112] Polyb. Vi. 56. [113] Polyb. Xxiv. 9. [114] Cato ap. Gell. Xi. 18. 18. The speech was one De praedamilitibus dividenda. [115] We first hear of a standing court for _peculatus_ in 66 B. C. (Cic. _pro Cluent_. 53. 147). It was probably established by Sulla. [116] Rein _Criminalr_. Pp. 680 ff. ; Mommsen _Röm. Forsch_. Ii. Pp. 437 ff. [117] Liv. Xxxvii. 57 and 58 (190 B. C. ). [118] See especially the case of Pleminius, Scipio's lieutenant at Locri(204 B. C. ), who, after a committee had reported on the charge, wasconveyed to Rome but died in bonds before the popular court hadpronounced judgment (Liv. Xxix. 16-22). [119] Liv. Xlii. 1 (173 B. C. ) Silentium, nimis aut modestum aut timidumPraenestinorum, jus, velut probato exemplo, magistratibus fecitgraviorum in dies talis generis imperiorum. [120] For such requisitions see Plut. _Cato Maj_ 6 (of Cato's governmentof Sardinia) [Greek: _ton pro autou strataegon eiothoton chraesthai kaiskaenomasi daemosiois kai klinais kai himatiois, pollae de therapeia kaiphilon plaethei kai peri deipna dapanais kai paraskeuais barhynonton_. ] [121] Liv. Xxxii. 27 Sumptus, quos in cultum praetorum socii faceresoliti erant, circumcisi aut sublati (198 B. C. ). [122] The _Lex de Termessibus_ (a charter of freedom given to Termessusin Pisidia in 71 B. C. ) enjoins (ii. L. 15) Nei . .. Quis magistratus . .. Inperato, quo quid magis iei dent praebeant ab ieisve auferatur niseiquod eos ex lege Porcia dare praebere oportet oportebit. This Porcianlaw was probably the work of Cato (Rein _Criminalr_. P. 607). [123] Liv. Xxxviii. 43; xxxix. 3; Rein, l. C. [124] Liv. Xliii. 2. [125] Cic. _Brut_. 27. 106; _de Off_. Ii. 21. 75; cf. _in Verr_. Iii. 84. 195; iv. 25. 56. [126] Liv. Xli. 15. (176 B. C. ) Duo (praetores) deprecati sunt ne inprovincias irent, M. Popillius in Sardiniam: Gracchum eam provinciampacare &c. .. . Probata Popillii excusatio est. P. Licinius Crassussacrificiis se impediri sollemnibus excusabat, ne in provinciam iret. Citerior Hispania obvenerat. Ceterum aut ire jussus aut jurare procontione sollemni sacrificio se prohiberi. .. . Praetores ambo in eademverba jurarunt. I have seen the passage cited as a proof that governorswould not go to unproductive provinces; but Sardinia was a fruitfulsphere for plunder, and the excuses may have been genuine. That ofPopillius seems to have been positively patriotic. [127] Liv. Xlii. 45 Decimius unus sine ullo effectu, captarum etiampecuniarum ab regibus Illyriorum suspicione infamis, Romam rediit. [128] Cic. _in Verr_. V. 48. 126 (70 B. C. ) Patimur . .. Multos jam annoset silemus cum videamus ad paucos homines omnes omnium nationum pecuniaspervenisse. [129] For the principle see Gaius iii. 151-153. [130] Polybius (vi. 17), after speaking of various kinds of propertybelonging to the state, adds [Greek: _panta cheirizesthai symbainei taproeiraemena dia tou plaethous, kai schedon hos epos eipein pantasendedesthai tais onais kai tais ergasiais tais ek touton_]. [131] Polyb. Vi. 17. The senate can [Greek: _symptomatos genomenoukouphisai kai to parapan adynatou tinos symbantos apolysai taesergonias_]. Thus the senate invalidated the _locationes_ of the censorsof 184 B. C. (Liv. Xxxix. 44 Locationes cum senatus precibus et lacrimispublicanorum victus induci et de integro locari jussisset. ) [132] In 169 B. C. It was the people that released from an oppressiveregulation (Liv. Xliii. 16). In this case a tribune answered thecensor's intimation, that none of the former state-contractors shouldappear at the auction, by promulgating the resolution Quae publicavectigalia, ultro tributa C. Claudius et Ti. Sempronius locassent, earata locatio ne esset. Ab integro locarentur, et ut omnibus redimendi etconducendi promiscue jus esset. [133] Deloume op. Cit. Pp. 119 ff. Polybius (vi. 17) has been quotedas an authority for the distinction between these two classes. He says[Greek: _oi men gar agorazousi para ton timaeton autoi tas ekdoseis, oide koinonousi toutois, oi d' enguontai tous aegorakotas, oi de tasousias didoasi peri touton eis to daemosion_. ] The first three classesare the _mancipes, socii and praedes_. In the fourth the shareholders(_participes_ or perhaps _adfines_, cf. Liv. Xliii. 16) are found byDeloume (p. 120); but the identification is very uncertain. The wordsmay denote either real as opposed to formal security or the finalpayment of the _vectigal_ into the treasury. A better evidence for thedistinction between _socii_ and shareholders is found in thePseudo-Asconius (in Cic. _in Verr_. P. 197 Or. ) Aliud enim socius, Aliudparticeps qui certam habet partem et non _in_divise agit ut socius. The_magnas partes_ (Cic. _pro Rab_. Post. 2. 4) and the _particulam_ (Val. Max. Vi. 9. 7) of a _publicum_, need only denote large or small sharesheld by the _socii_. _Dare partes_ (Cic. L. C. ) is to "allot shares, " butnot necessarily to outside members. Apart from the testimony of thePseudo-Asconius and the mention of _adfines_ in Livy the evidence forthe ordinary shareholder is slight but by no means fatal to hisexistence. [134] E. G. By loan to a _socius_ at a rate of interest dependent on hisreturns, perhaps with a _pactum de non petendo_ in certaincontingencies. [135] These are, in strict legal language, the true _publicani_; thelessees of state property are _publicanorum loco_ (Dig. 39. 4, 12and 13). [136] Later legal theory assimilated the third with the first class. Gaius says (ii. 7) In eo (provinciali) solo dominium populi Romani estvel Caesaris, nos autem possessionem tantum vel usumfructum haberevidemur. But the theory is not ancient-perhaps not older than theGracchan period. See Greenidge _Roman Public Life_ p. 320. From a broadstandpoint the first and second classes may be assimilated, since thepayment of harbour dues (_portoria_) is based on the idea of the use ofpublic ground by a private occupant. [137] _Cic. De Leg. Agr_. Ii. 31. 84. [138] Thédenat in Daremberg-Saglio _Dict. Des Antiq. S. V_. Ergastulum. [139] Compare Cunningham _Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects_vol. I. P. 162. [140] Cic. _in Verr_. Ii. 55. 137; iii. 33. 77; ii. 13. 32; 26. 63. [141] Ibid. Ii. 13. 32. [142] Liv. Xxv. 3. [143] Liv. Xxiii. 49. [144] Liv. Xxiv. 18; Val. Max. V. 6. 8. [145] Plut. _Cato Maj_. 19. [146] Liv. Xliii. 16. [147] Cic. _Brut_. 22. 85 Cum in silva Sila facta caedes esset notiquehomines interfecti insimulareturque familia, partim etiam liberi, societatis ejus, quae picarias de P. Cornelio, L. Mummio censoribusredemisset, decrevisse senatum ut de ea re cognoscerent et statuerentconsules. For the value of the pine-woods of Sila see Strabo vi. 1. 9. [148] Liv. Xlv. 18 Metalli quoque Macedonici, quod ingens vectigal erat, locationesque praediorum rusticorum tolli placebat. Nam neque sinepublicano exerceri posse, et, ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut jus publicumvanum aut libertatem sociis nullam esse. The _praedia rustica_ wereprobably public domains, that might have formed part of the crown landsof the Macedonian Kings and would now, in the natural course of events, have been leased to _publicani_. [149] It might happen that the interest of the _negotiator_ was opposedto that of the _publicanus_. The former, for instance, might wish_portoria_ to be lessened, the latter to be increased (Cic. _ad Att_. Ii. 16. 4). But such a conflict was unusual. [150] Cato _R. R_. Pr. 1. Est interdum praestare mercaturis remquaerere, nisi tam periculosum sit, et item fenerari, si tam honestumsit. Majores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt, furemdupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli. Quanto pejorem civemexistimarint feneratorem quam furem, hinc licet existimare. Cf. Cic. _de Off_. I. 42. 150. Improbantur ii quaestus, qui in odia hominumincurrunt, ut portitorum, ut feneratorum. [151] Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 25. 89. Cum ille . .. Dixisset "Quid fenerari?"tum Cato "Quid hominem, " inquit, "occidere?" [152] For such professional money-lenders see Plaut. _Most_. Iii. 1. 2ff. ; _Curc_. Iv. 1. 19. [153] Liv. Xxxii. 27. [154] On the history and functions of the bankers see Voigt _Ueber dieBankiers, die Buchführung und die Litteralobligation der Römer_ (Abh. D. Königl. Sächs. Gesell. D. Wissench. ; Phil. Hist. Classe, Bd. X);Marquardt Staatsverw, ii. Pp. 64 ff. ; Deloume _Les manieurs d'argent àRome_, pp. 146 ff. [155] Plin. _H. N_. Xxi. 3. 8. [156] Cf. Cic. _de Off_, iii. 14. 58. Pythius, qui esset utargentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus. .. . [157] Yet the two never became thoroughly assimilated. The_argentarius_, for instance, was not an official tester of money, andthe _nummularii_ appear not to have performed certain functions usual tothe banker, e. G. Sales by auction. See Voigt op. Cit. Pp. 521. 522. [158] Plaut. _Cure_. Iv. 1. 6 ff. Commonstrabo, quo in quemque hominem facile inveniatis loco. * * * * * Ditis damnosos maritos sub basilica quaerito. Ibidem erunt scorta exoleta, quique stipulari solent. * * * * * In foro infumo boni homines, atque dites ambulant. Sub veteribus, ibi sunt qui dant quique accipiunt faenore. [159] To be bankrupt is _foro mergi_ (Plaut. _Ep_. I. 2. 16), _a forofugere, abire_ (Plaut. _Pers_. Iii. 3. 31 and 38). [160] Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 24. 87. Toto hoc de genere, de quaerenda, decollocanda pecunia, vellem etiam de utenda, commodius a quibusdamoptumis viris ad Janum medium sedentibus . .. Disputatur. For _Janusmedius_ and the question whether it means an arch or a street seeRichter _Topogr. Der Stadt Rom_. Pp. 106. 107. [161] Liv. Xxxix. 44; xliv. 16. The Porcian was followed by the FulvianBasilica (Liv. Xl. 51). The dates of the three were 184, 179, 169 B. C. Respectively. [162] Deloume op. Cit. Pp. 320 ff. ; Guadet in Daremberg-Saglio _Dict. Des Antiq. S. V_. Basilicae. [163] Large transport ships could themselves come to Rome if their buildwas suited to river navigation. In 167 B. C. Aemilius Paulus astonishedthe city with the size of a ship (once belonging to the Macedonian King)on which he arrived (Liv. Xlv. 35). On the whole question of thisforeign trade see Voigt in Iwan-Müller's _Handbuch_ iv. 2, pp. 373-378. [164] Voigt op. Cit. P. 377 n. 99. [165] Compare Cunningham _Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects_vol. I. P. 165, "It is only under very special conditions, including theexistence of a strong government to exercise a constant control, thatfree play for the formation of associations of capitalists bent onsecuring profit, is anything but a public danger. The landed interest inEngland has hitherto been strong enough to bring legislative control tobear on the moneyed men from time to time. .. . The problem of leavingsufficient liberty for the formation of capital and for enterprise inthe use of it, without allowing it licence to exhaust the nationalresources, has not been solved. " [166] Plut. Numa 17. On the history of these gilds see Waltzing_Corporations professionelles chez les Remains_ pp. 61-78. [167] The praetor was Rutilius (Ulpian in Dig. 38. 2. 1. 1), perhaps P. Rutilius Rufus, the consul of 105 B. C. (Mommsen Staatsr. In. P. 433). See the last chapter of this volume. For the principle on which such_operae_ were exacted from freedmen see Mommsen l. C. [168] Inliberales ac sordidi quaestus (Cic. _de Off_. I. 42. 150). [169] Gell. Vii. (vi. ) 9; Liv. Ix. 46; Mommsen _Staatsr_. I. P. 497. [170] Cf. Cic. _de Off_. I. 42. 151 Omnium autem rerum, ex quibusaliquid adquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nihil uberius, nihildulcius, nihil homine libero dignius. [171] See de Boor _Fasti Censorii_. A disturbing element in thisenumeration is the uncertainty of numerals in ancient manuscripts. Butthe fact of the progressive decline is beyond all question. Noaccidental errors of transcription could have produced this result inthe text of Livy's epitome. [172] Liv. _Ep_. Xvi. [173] Ibid. Lvi. [174] Ibid. Xlvi. Xlviii. [175] Euseb. Arm. A. Abr. 1870 Ol. 158. 3 (Hieron. Ol. 158. 2 = 608A. U. C. ). [176] Liv. _Ep_. Lvi. [177] Eorum qui arma ferre possent (Liv. I. 44); [Greek: _ton echontontaen strateusimon haelikian] (Dionys. Xi. 63); [Greek: ton en taishaelikiais_] (Polyb. Ii. 23). [178] Besides the _proletarii_ all under military age would be excludedfrom these lists. Mommsen (_Staatsr_. Ii. P. 411) goes further andthinks that the _seniores_ are not included in our lists. [179] The limit to the incidence of taxation was a property of 1500asses (Cic. _de Rep_. Ii. 22. 40), the limit of census for militaryservice was by the time of Polybius reduced to 4000 asses (Polyb. Vi. 19). Gellius (xvi. 10. 10) gives a reduction to 375 asses at a dateunknown but preceding the Marian reform. Perhaps the numerals areincorrect and should be 3, 750. [180] Liv. Xl. 38. [181] Gell. I. 6. Cf. Liv. _Ep_. Lix. [182] See Wallon _Hist. De l'Esclavage_ ii. P. 276. [183] _Concubinatus_ could not, by the nature of the case, become alegal conception until the Emperor Augustus had devised penalties for_stuprum_. It was then necessary to determine what kind of _stuprum_ wasnot punishable. But the social institution and its ethicalcharacteristics, although they may have been made more definite by legalregulations, could not have originated in the time of the Principate. For the meaning of _paelex_ in Republican times see Meyer _Der römischeKonkubinat_ and a notice of that work in the _English Historical Review_for July 1896. [184] Cunningham _Western Civilisation_ p. 156. Cf. Soltau in_Kulturgesch. Des klass. Altertums_ p. 318. [185] Plin. _H. N_. Xviii. 3. 22; Varro _R. R_. I. 1. 10. [186] Colum. 1. 1. 18. The Latin translation was probably made shortlyafter the destruction of Carthage, _circa_ 140 B. C. (Mahaffy _The Workof Mago on Agriculture_ in _Hermathena_ vol. Vii. 1890). Mahaffybelieves that the Greek translation by Cassius Dionysius (Varro _R. R_. I. 1. 10) was later, and he associates it with the colonies planted byC. Gracchus in Southern Italy. [187] Saturnia in 183 (Liv. Xxxix. 55), Graviscae in 181 (Liv. Xl. 29), Luna in 180 and again in 177 (Liv. Xli. 13; Mommsen in C. I. L. I. N. 539). See Marquardt _Staatsverw_, i. P. 39. [188] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 8; Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 198. [189] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 198. [190] Liv. Xxxix. 29. [191] Varro _R. R_. Ii. 5. II Pascuntur armenta commodissime innemoribus, ubi virgulta et frons multa. Hieme secundum mare, aestuabiguntur in montes frondosos. [192] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 16. [193] Nitzsch op. Cit. P. 17. [194] Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 25. 89. So in Cato's more reasoned estimate(_R. R_. I. 7) of the relative degrees of productivity, although _vinea_comes first (cf. P. 80) yet _pratum_ precedes _campus frumentarius_. [195] App. _Hannib_. 61. [196] App. L. C. ; Gell. X. 3. 19. [197] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 193 So zerfiel denn Mittelitalien inzwei scharf-getheilte Hälften, den ackerbauenden Westen und denviehzuchttreibenden Osten; jener reich an Häfen, von Landstrassendurchschnitten, in einer Menge von Colonien oder einzelnen Gehöften vonRömischen Ackerbürgern bewohnt; dieser fast ohne Häfen, nur von einerKüstenstrasse durchschnitten, für den grossen Römer der rechte Sitzseiner Sclaven und Heerden. Cf. P. 21. For the pasturage in Calabriaand Apulia see op. Cit. Pp. 13 and 193. [198] Liv. Xxviii. II; cf. Luc. _Phars_. I. 30. [199] Dureau de la Malle (Économie Politique ii. P. 38) compares theprecept of the Roman "Quid est agrum bene colere? bene arare. Quidsecundum? arare. Tertio stercorare" with the adage of the French farmer"Fumez bien, labourez mal, vous recueillerez plus qu'en fumant mal et enlabourant bien". [200] See Dreyfus _Les lois agraires_ p. 97. Varro (_R. R_. I. 12. 2) issingularly correct in his account of the nature of the disease thatarose from the _loca palustria_:--Crescunt animalia quaedam minuta, quaenon possunt oculi consequi, et per aera intus in corpus per os ac naresperveniunt atque efficiunt difficilis morbos. The passage is cited byVoigt (Iwan-Müller's _Handbuch_ iv. 2. P. 358) who gives a good sketchof the evils consequent on neglect of drainage. [201] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 228. [202] Polyb. Xxxvii. 4. [203] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 237. [204] Polyb. Xxxvii. 3. [205] Polyb. Ii. 15. [206] For such purchases from Sardinia see Liv. Xxxvi. 2, from Sicily(at a period later than that which we are considering) Cic. _in Verr_. Iii. 70, 163. [207] Cf. Cato _R. R_. I. 3 (In choosing the situation of one'sestate) oppidum validum prope siet aut mare aut amnis, qua navesambulant, aut via bona celebrisque. [208] For the traditions which assign a very early date for laws dealingwith the _ager publicus_ see the following chapter, which treats of thelegislation of Tiberius Gracchus. [209] App, _Bell. Civ_. I. 7 [Greek: _taes de gaes taes doriktaetousphisin ekastote gignomenaes taen men exeirgasmenaen autika toisoikizomenois epidiaeroun hae epipraskon hae exemisthoun, taen d' argonek tou polemou tote ousan, hae dae kai malista eplaethyen, ouk agontes poscholaen dialachein, epekaerytton en tosode tois ethelousin ekponein epitelei ton etaesion karpon_]. [210] For the evidence for this and other statements connected with the_ager publicus_ see the citations in the next chapter. [211] In consequence of the doubtfulness of the traditions concerningearly agrarian laws this time cannot even be approximately specified. See the next chapter. [212] Tradition represents the first laws dealing with the _agerpublicus (e. G_. The supposed _lex Licinia_) as earlier than the _lexPoetelia_ of 326 B. C. , which abolished the contract of _nexum_. [213] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 8 [Greek: _hysteron de ton geitnionton plousionhypoblaetois prosopois metapheronton tas misthoseis eis eautous_. ] [214] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 7 [Greek: _oi gar plousioi . .. Ta . .. Anchousphisin, osa te haen alla brachea penaeton, ta men onoumenoi peithoi tade bia lambanontes, pedia makra anti chorion egeorgoun_. ] Cf. Seneca_Ep_. Xiv. 2 (90). 39 Licet agros agris adjiciat vicinum vel pretiopellens vel injuria. [215] [Greek: _pedia makra_] (App. L. C. ), Plin. _H. N_. Xviii. 6. 35Verumque confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam. (For the expression_lati fundi_ see Siculus Flaccus pp. 157, 161). Frontinus p. 53 Perlongum enim tempus attigui possessores vacantia loca quasi invitanteotiosi soli opportunitate invaserunt, et per longum tempus inpunecommalleaverunt. For the invasion of pasturage see Frontinus p. 48 Haecfere pascua certis personis data sunt depascenda tunc cum agri adsignatisunt. Haec pascua multi per inpotentiam invaserunt et colunt. [216] In spite of the fertility of the land, the native Gallicpopulation had vanished from most of the districts of this region asearly as Polybius' time (Polyb. Ii. 35). Cf. Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_p. 60. [217] Val. Max. Iv. 4. 6. [218] Steinwender _Die römische Bürgerschaft in ihrem Verhältnis zumHeere_ p. 28. [219] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 7. [220] Polyb. Vi. 39. [221] Liv. Xxvii. 9 (209 B. C. ) Fremitus enim inter Latinos sociosque inconciliis ortus:--Decimum annum dilectibus, stipendiis se exhaustos esse. .. Duodecim (coloniae) . .. Negaverunt consulibus esse unde militespecuniamque darent. [222] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 194. [223] Cato _R. R_. 144 etc. [224] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 187. [225] Cato _R. R_. 5. 136. [226] Cato _R. R_. 136 Politionem quo pacto _partiario_ dari oporteat. In agro Casinate et Venafro in loco bono parti octava corbi dividat, satis bono septima, tertio loco sexta; si granum modio dividet, partiquinta. In Venafro ager optimus nona parti corbi dividat . .. Hordeumquinta modio, fabam quinta modio dividat. [227] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 188. [228] Dureau de la Malle _Économie Politique_ ii. Pp. 225, 226. [229] Cato _R. R_. I. 7 Vinea est prima, . .. Secundo loco hortusinriguus, tertio salictum, quarto oletum, quinto pratum, sexto campusfrumentarius, septimo silva caedua, octavo arbustum, nono glandariasilva. [230] Cic. _de Rep_. Iii. 9. 16 Nos vero justissimi homines, quiTransalpinas gentis oleam et vitem serere non sinimus, quo pluris sintnostra oliveta nostraeque vineae. Cf. Colum. Iii. 3. 11. [231] See Cato _R. R_. 7, 8 for the produce of the _fundus suburbanus_. Cf. C. 1 (note 2) for the value of the _hortus inriguus_. [232] See the citations in Voigt (Iwan-Müller's _Handbuch_ iv. 2 p. 370). Communities and corporations employed _coloni_ on their _agrivectigales_ (Cic. _ad Fam_. Xiii. 11, 1; Hygin. _de Cond. Agr_. P. 117. 11; Voigt l. C. ). [233] Liv. Xlv. 34. [234] Mahaffy ("The Slave Wars against Rome" in _Hermathena_ no. Xvi. 1890) believes that the majority of these were shipped to Sicily. [235] Strabo xiv. 5. 2. [236] Cf. Arist. _Pol_. I. 8. 12 [Greek: _hae polemikae physei ktaetikaepos estai; hae gar thaereutikae meros autaes, hae dei chraesthai pros teta thaeria kai ton anthropon hosoi pephykotes archesthai mae thelousin, hos physei dikaion touton onta ton polemon_. ] [237] Mahaffy (l. C. ) thinks that the Syrians and Cilicians of thefirst slave war in Sicily, whom he believes to have been transferredfrom Carthage, had been secured by that state in a trade with theEast--the trade which perhaps took the Southern Mediterranean route fromMalta past Crete and Cyprus. [238] Wallon _Histoire de l'Esclavage_ ii. P, 45. [239] Strabo xiv, 3. 2 [Greek: _en Sidae goun polei taes Pamphylias tanaupaegia synistato tois Kilixin, hypo kaeruka te epoloun ekei toushalontas eleutherous homologountes_. ] [240] Strabo (xiv. 5. 2), after describing the slave market at Delos, continues [Greek: _hoste kai paroimian genesthai dia touto; hempore, katapleuson, exelou, panta pepratai_. ] [241] Plut. _Cato Maj_. 4. [242] If we make the denarius a rough equivalent of the drachma, some ofthe prices given in Plautus are as follows:--A child, 600 denarii, anurse and two female children, 1800, a young girl, 2000, another 3000. Here we seem to get the average prices for valuable and refineddomestics. Elsewhere special circumstances might increase the value; afemale lyrist fetches 5000 denarii, a girl of remarkable attractions6000. See Wallon _Hist. De l'Esclavage ii. Pp. 160 ff. [243] Ter. _Andria_ ii. 6. 26. [244] It is probable, however, that in the case of superintendents(_villici, villicae, procuratores_) experience may have been an elementin the prices which they fetched. [245] Festus p. 332 Sardi venales, alius alio nequior. [246] Plut. _Cato Maj_. 21. [247] Cato _R. R_. 56, 57. [248] Ibid. 2. [249] At the close of this period a division took place between thefunctions of _villicus_ and those of _procurator_. The former stillcontrolled the economy of the estate and administered its goods; thelatter was the business agent and entered into legal relations withother parties. See Voigt in Iwan-Müller's _Handbuch_ iv. 2 p. 368. [250] Colum. I. 6. [251] An inspection of all the _ergastula_ of Italy was ordered byAugustus (Suet. _Aug_. 32) and Tiberius (Suet. _Tib_. 8). Columella (i. 8) recommends inspection by the master. [252] Kidnapping became very frequent after the civil wars. It was toprevent this evil that inspection was ordered by the Emperors (note 3). See Thédenat in Daremberg-Saglio _Dict. Des Antiq. S. V_. Ergastulum. [253] Plaut. _Most_. I. 1. 18; Florus iii. 19. [254] For the distinction between the _vincti_ and _soluti_ see Colum. I. 7. [255] Varro _R. R_. Ii. 2 10 The proportion is larger than would bedemanded in modern times, but Mahaffy (l. C. ) remarks that we do nothear of the work of guardianship being shared by trained dogs, and thatthe danger from wild beasts and lawless classes was considerable. Asregards the first point, however, we do hear of packs of hounds whichfollowed the Sicilian shepherds (Diod. Xxxiv. 2), and it is difficult tobelieve that these had not developed some kind of training. [256] Varro _R. R_. Ii. 10. 7. [257] Diod, xxxiv. 2. 38. [258] Val. Max. Ii. 10. 2. [259] Livy (xxxii. 26) speaks of them as _nationis eius_. He has justmentioned the slaves of the Carthaginian hostages. But it does notfollow that either class was composed of native Africans. They may havebeen imported Asiatics, as in Sicily. [260] Liv. Xxxii. 26. [261] Liv. Xxxiii. 36 Etruriam infestam prope conjuratio servorum fecit. [262] Liv. Xxxix. 29. [263] Bücher _Die Aufstände der unfreien Arbeiter_ p. 34. Cf. Soltauin _Kulturgesch. Des klass. Altertums_ p. 326. [264] Oros. V. 9 Diodor. Xxxiv. 2. 19. [265] Mahaffy l. C. [266] Cf. Bücher op. Cit. P. 79. [267] Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 27. For the large number of Roman proprietors inSicily see Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19) 3--(Sicilia) terra frugum ferax etquodam modo suburbana provincia latifundis civium Romanorum tenebatur. [268] Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 32. 36. [269] Diod. L. C. [270] Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 31. This may have been true of the time of whichwe are speaking; for the influence of the Roman residents in Sicily onthe administration of the island must always have been great. ButDiodorus assigns an incorrect reason when he states that the Romanknights of Sicily were judges of the governors of the provinces. This istrue only of the period preceding the second servile war. [271] Historians profess to tell the mechanism by which this device wassecured. A spark of fire was placed with inflammable material in ahollow nut or some similar small object, which was perforated. Thereceptacle was placed in the mouth, and judicious breathing did therest. See Diodorus xxxiv, 2. 7; Floras ii. 7 (iii. 19). [272] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 228. [273] Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 24 [Greek: _hypo gar taes pepromenaes autoiskekyrosthai taen patrida taen Ennan, ousan akropolin holaestaes naesou_. ] [274] Ibid. 2. 12 [Greek: _oud estin eipein . .. Hosa enybrizon te kaienaeselgainon_. ] [275] [Greek: _planon te apekaloun_] (Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 14). [276] Diodor. Xxxiv. 3. 41. [277] Ibid. 2. 39. [278] Ibid. , 2, 24. [279] Liv. _Ep_. Lv. ; App. _Syr_. 68. Cf. Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 288. [280] Diodorus describes him as an Achaean. Mahaffy (l. C. ) suspectsthat he came from Eastern Asia Minor or Syria, where Achaeus occurs as aroyal name. But the name also occurs in old Greece. One may instance thetragic poet of Eretria. [281] [Greek: _kai boulae kai cheiri diapheron_] (Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 16). [282] Ibid. 2. 42. [283] Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19). 6. [284] Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 43. [285] Ibid. 2. 18; Florus l. C. [286] Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19). 7 Quin illud quoque ultimum dedecus belli, capta sunt castra praetorum--nec nominare ipsos pudebit--castra ManliLentuli, Pisonis Hypsaei. Itaque qui per fugitivarios abstrahidebuissent praetorios duces profugos praelio ipsi sequebantur. P. Popillius Laenas, the consul of 132 B. C. , was praetor in Sicily eitherimmediately before, or during the revolt (C. I. L. I. N. 351. L. G). [287] Strabo vi. 2. 6. For the question whether they held Messanasee p. 98. [288] Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19). 2 Quis crederet Siciliam multo cruentiusservili quam Punico bello esse vastatam? [289] [Greek: _epi tae prophasei ton drapeton_] (Diodor. Xxxiv. 2. 48). Wallon (_Hist. De l'Esclavage_ ii. P. 307) takes these words to meanthat the peasantry professed to be marching against the slaves. [290] Mahaffy (l. C. ) has raised and discussed this question. Hisconclusions are (i) that the pirates may have been influenced by a senseof business honour to the effect that the man-stealer should abide byhis bargain, (ii) that these pirates may have received some large bribe, direct or indirect, from Rome, (iii) that the natural enmity between theslaves and the pirates may have hindered an agreement for transport, (iv) that the Cilician slaves, accustomed to permanent robber-bands, mayhave not held it impossible that Rome would acquiesce in such a creationin Sicily, (v) that the Syrian towns would not have troubled about therestoration of such of their members as had become slaves, even had theynot feared to offend Rome. He remarks that the return of even freeexiles to a Hellenistic city was a cause of great disturbance. [291] Liv. _Ep_. Lvi. ; Oros. V. 9. [292] C. I. L. I. Nn. 642, 643. [293] Oros. V. 9. This _Mamertium oppidum_ of Orosius has often beeninterpreted as Messana (_Mamertinorum oppidum_, Bücher, p. 68); for, although the slaves of this town had not revolted (Oros. V. 6. 4), itmight have been captured by the rebels. Schäfer, however (_Jahrb. F. Class. Philol_. 1873 p. 71) explains Mamertium as Morgantia(_Murgentinum oppidum_). [294] Val. Max. Ix. 12 _ext_. 1. Diodorus (xxxiv. 2. 20) calls himComanus and speaks of his being captured during the siege ofTauromenium. [295] Oros. V. 9. [296] Wallon _Hist. De l'Esclavage_ ii. P. 308. [297] Florus ii. 7 (iii. 19). 8. [298] For the _lex Rupilia_ see Cic. _in Verr_. Ii. 13. 32; 15. 37; 16. 39; 24. 59. [299] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 8. Plutarch speaks of an "attempt" ([Greek:_epecheiraese men oun tae diorthosei_]); but the effort perhaps went nofurther than the testing of opinion to discover the probability ofsupport. The enterprise may have belonged to the praetorship of Laelius(145 B. C. ). [300] Polyb. Vi. 11. [301] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 203. [302] Cic. _Brut_. 27. 104 Fuit Gracchus diligentia Corneliae matris apuero doctus et Graecis litteris eruditus. Id. Ib. 58. 211 Legimusepistulas Corneliae matris Gracchorum: apparet filios non tam in gremioeducatos quam in sermone matris. Cf. Quinctil. _Inst. Or_. I. 1. 6;Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 1. [303] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 1. The King referred to in this story isperhaps Ptolemy Euergetes, who reigned from 146 to 117 B. C. [304] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 8. [305] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ pp. 208 foll. , 258. [306] Polyb. Vi. 14 [Greek: _krinei men oun ho daemos kai diaphorou_](money penalties) [Greek: _pollakis . .. Thanatou de krinei monos_]. [307] Polyb. Vi. 16 [Greek: _opheilousi d' aei poiein oi daemarchoi todokoun to daemo kai malista stochazesthai taes toutou boulaeseos_]. [308] Polyb. Vi. 57. [309] Polyb. Xxxvii. 4. [310] Ibid. [311] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 2. [312] Ibid. , 4 [Greek: _outos haen periboaetos hoste taes ton Augouronlegomenaes hierosonaes axiothaenai di' aretaen mallon hae dia taeneugeneian_. ] Tiberius may have filled the place vacated by the death ofhis father (_circa_ 148 B. C. ). He would have been barely sixteen; andPlutarch says (l. C. ) that he had but just emerged from boyhood. Election to the augural college at this time was effected byco-optation. See Underhill in loc. [313] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 4. [314] Cic. _pro Cael_. 14. 34; Suet. _Tib_. 2. [315] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 4. The story is also told of the betrothal ofCornelia herself to the elder Gracchus (Liv. Xxxviii. 57; Val. Max. Iv. 2. 3; Gell. Xii. 8); but Plutarch records a statement of Polybius thatCornelia was not betrothed until after her father's death, and Livy(l. C. ) is conscious of this version. [316] Fannius ap. Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 4 [Greek: _tou ge teichousepebae ton polemion protos_]. As the context seems to show that Tiberiusdid not remain until the end of the siege, the _teichos_ was probablythat of Megara, the suburb of Carthage (Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 244);cf. App. _Lib_. 117. [317] Plut. L. C. [318] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 7; cf. App. _Iber_. 83; Nitzsch _DieGracchen_ p. 280; Long _Decline of Rom. Rep_. I. P. 83. [319] Plut. L. C. [320] Vellei. Ii. 1 Mancinum verecundia, poenam non recusando, perduxithuc, ut per fetialis nudus ac post tergam religatis manibus dedereturhostibus. Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 7 [Greek: _ton men gar hypatonepsaephisanto gymnon kai dedemenon paradounai tois Nomantinois, ton d'allon epheisanto panton dia Tiberion_. ] Cf. Cic. _de Off_. Iii. 30. 109. [321] Cic. _Brut_. 27. 103 (Ti. Gracchus) propter turbulentissimumtribunatum, ad quem ex invidia foederis Numantini bonis iratusaccesserat, ab ipsa re publica est interfectus. Id. _de Har. Resp_. 20. 43 Ti. Graccho invidia Numantini foederis, cui feriendo, quaestor C. Mancini consulis cum esset, interfuerat, et in eo foedere improbandosenatus severitas dolori et timori fuit, eaque res illum fortem etclarum virum a gravitate patrum desciscere coegit. The same motive issuggested by Vellei. Ii. 2; Quinctil. _Inst. Or_. Vii. 4. 13; Dio Cass. _frg_. 82; Oros. V. 8. 3; Florus ii. 2 (iii. 14). [322] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 8. [323] Plut. L. C. [324] Plut. L. C. [325] Gell. I. 13. 10 Is Crassas a Sempronio Asellione et plerisquealiis historiae Romanae scriptoribus traditur habuisse quinque rerumbonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod jurisconsultissimus, quod pontifex maximus. [326] Cic. _Acad. Prior_. Ii. 5. 13 Duo . .. Sapientissimos etclarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt Ti. Gracchoauctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam; alterum, utsuspicantur, obscurius. [327] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 9. [328] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 9 [Greek: _esemnologaese peri tou Italikougenous_]. The expression suggests the further question whether Gracchusintended Italians, as well as Romans, to benefit by his law. On thisquestion see p. 115. But, whatever our opinion on this point, thewidening of the issue by an appeal to Italian interests was natural, ifnot inevitable. [329] App. L. C. [330] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 9. [331] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 9; cf. Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 8. [332] The most respectable of the authorities for the Licinian lawhaving dealt with the land question is Varro (_R. R_. 1. 2. 9 Stolonisilla lex, quae vetat plus D jugera habere civem R). A similar account isfound in many other authors (Liv. Vi. 35; Vellei. Ii. 6; Plut. _Cam_. 39; Gell. Vi. 3. 40; Val. Max. Viii. 6. 3). A variant in the maximumamount permitted to a single holder is given by [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 20 [(Licinius Stolo) legem scivit, ne cui plebeio plus centum jugeraagri habere liceret]; or the word "plebeio, " if not a mistake, maysuggest another clause in the supposed law. [333] Cato ap. Gell. Vi. (vii. ) 3. 37. Cato asks whether any enactmentpunishes _intent_ (for the Rhodians were charged with having _intended_hostility to Rome), and points his argument by the following _reductioad absurdum_ of legislation conceived in this spirit, Si quis plusquingenta jugera habere voluerit, tanta poena esto: si quis majorempecuum numerum habere voluerit, tantum damnas esto. [334] On this subject see Niese _Das sogenannte Licinisch-sextischeAckergesetz_ (Hermes xxiii. 1888), Soltau _Das Aechtheit des licinischenAckergesetzes von_ 367 v. Chr. (Hermes xxx. 1895). [335] Mommsen in C. I. L. I. Pp. 75 ff. [336] Cic. _de Leg. Agr_. Ii. 29. 81 Nec duo Gracchi, qui de plebisRomanae commodis plurimum cogitaverunt, nec L. Sulla . .. Agrum Campanumattingere ausus est. Cf. I. 7. 21. [337] Exemptions were specified in the agrarian law of C. Gracchus, which must have appeared in that of his elder brother. They are noticedin the extant _Lex agraria_ (C. I. L. 1. N. 200; Bruns _Fontes_ 1. 3. 11) l. 6 Extra eum agrum, quei ager ex lege plebive scito, quod C. Sempronius Ti. F. Tr. Pl. Rog(avit), exceptum cavitumve est neidivideretur. .. . The law of C. Gracchus is here mentioned as being thelater enactment. Cicero, when he writes (_ad Att_. 1. 19. 4) of his ownattitude to the Flavian agrarian law of 60 B. C. Liberabam agrum eum, quiP. Mucio L. Calpurnio consulibus publicus fuisset, is probably referringto land that, public in 133 B. C. , still remained public in his own day. [338] See Voigt _Ueber die staatsrechtliche Possessio und den AgerCompascuus_ p. 229. [339] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 9 [Greek: _anekainize ton nomon maedena tonpentakosion plethron pleon hechein, paisi d' auton hyper ton palaionnomon prosetithei ta haemisea touton_]. Liv. _Ep_. Lviii. Ne quis expublico agro plus quam mille jugera possideret, cf. [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 64. The conclusion stated in the text, which is gained by acombination of these passages, is, however, somewhat hazardous. [340] App, _Bell, Civ_. 1. 11 [Greek: _ekeleue tous plousious . .. Mae, en ho peri mikron diapherontai, ton pleonon hyperidein, misthon hamataes peponaemenaes exergasias autarkae pheromenous taen exaireton aneutimaes ktaesin es aei bebaion hekasto pentakosion plethron, kai paisin, ois eisi paides, ekasto kai touton ta haemisea_]. If [Greek: _aneutimaes_] means "without paying for it, " the phrase has no relation tothe _timae_ mentioned by Plutarch (see the next note) which was avaluation to be _received_ by the dispossessed. It can scarcely mean"without further compensation"; but, if interpreted in this way, the twoaccounts can be brought into some relation with each other. [341] Plut, _Ti. Gracch_. 9 [Greek: _ekeleuse timaen proslambanontasekbainein hon adikos ekektaento_]. [342] Siculus Flaccus (p. 136 Lachm. ); cf. Mommsen l. C. [343] There is a reference to this limit in the extant _Lex Agraria_ (C. I. L. I. N. 200; Bruns _Fontes_ 1. 3. 11) l. 14 Sei quis . .. Agri jugraNon amplius xxx possidebit habebitve, but there is no direct evidence toconnect it with the Gracchan legislation. [344] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 10. [345] Cf. P. 110. [346] Mommsen l. C. [347] App, _Bell. Civ_. I. 10 [348] Cic. _de Leg. Agr_. Ii. 12. 31 Audes etiam, Rulle, mentionemfacere legis Semproniae, nec te ea lex ipsa commonet III viros illosXXXV tribuum suffragio creatos esse? App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 9 [Greek:_prosetithei . .. Taen loipaen treis airetous andras, henallassomenouskat' hetos, dianemein tois penaesin_]. Strachan-Davidson (in loc. )doubts this latter characteristic of the magistracy. The history of theland-commission proves at least that the occupants of the post wereperpetually re-eligible and could be chosen in their absence. ThusGracchus, in spite of his two years' quaestorship in Sardinia, was stilla commissioner in 124 B. C. (App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 21). See Mommsen_Staatsr_. Ii. I. P. 632. The electing body was doubtless the _plebeian_assembly of the tribes under the guidance of a tribune. This was themode prescribed by Rullus's law of 63 B. C. (Cic. _de Leg. Agr_, ii. 7. 16). [349] App. _Bell, Civ_. I. 11. [350] Cf. App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 10. [351] App. L. C. [Greek: _daneistai te chrea kai tautaes epedeiknuon_. ] [352] App. L. C. [Greek: _plaethos hallo hoson en tais apoikois polesinhae tais isopolitisin hae hallos ekoinonei taesde taes gaes, dedioteshomoios epaeesan kai es hekaterous auton diemerizonto. Isopolitides_]would naturally be the _municipia (c. F. Lex Agraria_ l. 31); butStrachan-Davidson (in loc. ) thinks that the _civitates foederatae_ arehere intended. There is a possibility that Appian has used the termvaguely: but there is no real difficulty in conceiving the _municipia_to be meant. Even the majority, that had received Roman citizenship, still continued to bear the name, and they may have continued to enjoymunicipal rights in public land. The wealthier classes in these townswere therefore alarmed; the poorer classes (possessed of Romancitizenship) hoped for a share in the assignment. [353] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 10. [354] Plut. L. C. [355] Plut. L. C. [356] Plut. L. C. [Greek: _ouden eipein legontai peri allaelon phlauron, oude rhaema prospesein thaterou pros ton heteron di' horgaenanepitaedeion_. ] [357] Diod. Xxxiv 6 [Greek: _synerreon eis taen Rhomaen oi hochloi apotaes choras hosperei potamoi tines eis taen panta dynamenaen dechesthaithalattan_. ] [358] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 12. [359] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 10 [Greek: _paroxyntheis ho Tiberios ton menphilanthropon epaneileto nomon, ton d' haedio te tois pollois kaisphodroteron epi tous adikountas eisepheren haedae, keleuon existasthaitaes choras haen ekektaento para tous proterous nomous_]. Plutarch isapparently thinking of the abolition of what he calls the _timae_(c. 9. ); but his words do not necessarily imply that the originalconcessions mentioned by Appian (p. 114) were removed. [360] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 10. [361] Plut. L. C. [362] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 12. Plutarch (_Ti. Gracch_. 11) preserves atradition that the meeting was practically broken up by the adherents ofthe _possessores_ who, to prevent the passing of an illegal decree, carried off the voting urns. [363] [Greek: _Mallios kai phoulbios_] (Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 11). Schäfer(_Jahrb. F. Class. Philol_. 1873 p. 71) thinks that the first name is amistake for that of Manilius the jurist, consul in 149 B. C. , and thatthe second refers to Ser. Fulvius Flaccus, consul in 135 B. C. [364] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 12 _oi dunatoi tous daemarchous aexiounhepitrepsai tae boulae peri hon diapherontai_. [365] App. _l. C_. [366] App. _l. C_. [367] Or in _contio_ held before the meeting. The scene is described inPlut. _Ti. Gracch_, 11. [368] Plut. L. C. [Greek: _hypeipon ho Tiberios hos ouk estin archontasamphoterous kai peri pragmaton megalon ap' isaes exousias diapheromenousaneu polemou diexelthein ton chronon_. ] [369] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 12. [370] Cf. Mommsen _Staatsr_. Iii. P. 409, note 1. [371] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 12. [372] This is the name given by Appian (_Bell. Civ_. 1. 13); Plutarch(_Ti. Gracch_. 13) calls him Mucius; Orosius (v. 8. 3) Minucius. [373] App. _Iber_. 83. Cf. Liv. Xxvii. 20, xxix. 19. See Mommsen_Staatsr_. I. P. 629. [374] Mommsen l. C. [375] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 13; Plut. _Ti. Gracch. 13. [376] Liv. _Ep_. Lviii Promulgavit et aliam legem agrariam, qua sibilatius agrum patefaceret, ut iidem triumviri judicarent qua publicusager, qua privatus esset. The titles borne by the commissioners appearas III vir a. D. A. (_Lex Latina Tabulae Bantinae_, C. I. L. 1. 197;Bruns _Fontes_ i. 3. 9; cf. _Lex Acilia Repetundarum_ 1. 13, C. I. L. I. 198; Bruns _Fontes_ i. 3. 10): III vir a. I. A. (C. I. L. I. Nn. 552-555); III vir a. D. A. I. (C. I. L. I. N. 583). [377] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 13. [378] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 13. [379] Plut. L. C. [380] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 14. [381] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 315. [382] Liv. _Ep_. Lviii Deinde, cum minus agri esset quam quod dividiposset sine offensa etiam plebis, quoniam eos ad cupiditatem amplummodum sperandi incitaverat, legem se promulgaturum ostendit, ut iis, quiSempronia lege agrum accipere deberent, pecunia quae regia Attalifuisset divideretur. [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 64 Tulit ut ea familia quaeex Attali hereditate erat ageretur et populo divideretur, Cf. Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 14; Oros. V. 8. 4. [383] Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14. [384] Ibid. ; Oros. V. 8. 4. [385] Plut. L. C. . Cicero (_Brut_. 21. 81) speaks of a speech ofMetellus "contra Ti. Gracchum". Plutarch's citation may be fromthis speech. [386] Cicero regarded Octavius's deposition as the ruin of Gracchus. _Brut_. 25. 95 Injuria accepta fregit Ti. Gracchum patientia civis inrebus optimis constantissimus M. Octavius. _De Leg_. Iii. 10. 24 IpsumTi. Gracchum non solum neglectus sed etiam sublatus intercessor evertit;quid enim illum aliud perculit, nisi quod potestatem intercedenticollegae abrogavit? The deposition was an act of "seditio" (_proMil_. 27. 72). [387] Plut. _Quaest. Rom_. Section 81. [388] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 14. [389] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 15. [390] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 14. [391] Plut. Ti. Gracch. 16 [Greek: _authis allois nomois anelambane toplaethos, tou te chronou ton strateion aphairon, kai didousepikaleisthai ton daepon apo ton dikaston kai tois krinousi totesynklaetikois ousi [triakosiois] katamignus ek ton hippeon ton isonarithmon_. ] Dio Cass. _Frg_. 88 [Greek: _ta dikastaeria apo taes boulaesepi tous hippeas metaege_] (Cf. Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. 34). [392] Polyb. Vi. 19. [393] There was already such a maximum according to Polybius (vi. 19). What it precisely was, is uncertain, as the passage is corrupt. According to Lipsius's reading, it was twenty years, according toCasaubon's, sixteen under ordinary conditions, twenty in emergencies. The knights were required to serve ten campaigns. See Marquardt_Staatsverw_. Ii. P. 381. The nature of the reduction proposed byGracchus is unknown. [394] _Lex Acilia_ ll. 23 and 74. [395] Cic. _de Fin_. Ii. 16. 54. [396] No mention is made of the appeal in five cases in which criminalcommissions had been established by the senate. The dates of thesecommissions are B. C. 331 (Liv. Viii. 18; Val. Max. Ii. 5. 3), 314 (Liv. Ix. 26), 186 (Liv. Xxxix. 8-19), 184 (Liv. Xxxix. 41) and 180 (Liv. Xl. 37). [397] Vellei. Ii. 2 (Tiberius Gracchus) pollicitus toti Italiaecivitatem. [398] Cicero is perhaps stating the result, rather than the intention, of the Gracchan legislation when he says (_de Rep_. Iii. 29. 41) Ti. Gracchus perseveravit in civibus, sociorum nominisque Latini juraneglexit ac foedera. No point in the Gracchan agrarian law is moreremarkable than its strict, perhaps inequitable, legality. That itsauthor consciously violated treaty relations is improbable. [399] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 14. [400] For the qualifications at this period see Mommsen _Staatsr_. I. P. 505. [401] Dio Cass. _frg_. 88 [Greek: _epecheiraese kai es to epion etos metatou adelphou daemarchaesai kai ton pentheron hypaton apodeixai_]. [402] App. L. C. [403] Mommsen _Staatsr_. I. P. 523. Dio Cassius indeed says (_fr_. 22)[Greek: _koluphen to tina dis taen archaen lambanein_]; but tradition heldthat the proviso had been violated in the early plebeian agitations. [404] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 14. [405] App. L. C. ; Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 13. The scene is thus describedby Asellio (a contemporary):--Orare coepit, id quidem ut se defenderentliberosque suos, eumque, quem virile secus tum in eo tempore habebat, produci jussit populoque commendavit prope flens (Gell. Ii. 13. 5). Appian also speaks of a son, Plutarch of children. [406] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. , 16. [407] App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 15. [408] [Greek: _prostataes de tou Rhomaion daemou_] (Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 17). [409] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 16. [410] Richter _Topographie_ p. 128. [411] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 18. [412] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 19. [413] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 15. [414] Ibid. 16. [415] The dictator was usually nominated by the consul between midnightand morning (Liv. Viii. 23), for the purpose of the avoidance ofunfavourable omens. [416] Tradition ultimately carried it back to the fourth century B. C. Inthe revolution threatened by Manlius Capitolinus (384 B. C. , Liv. Vi. 19)the phrase Ut videant magistrates ne quid . .. Res publica detrimenticapiat was believed to have been employed. [417] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 19 [Greek: _epei . .. Prodidosin ho archontaen polin, oi boulomenoi tois nomois boaethein akoloutheite_. ] Themost specific and juristically exact account of these proceedings (oneprobably drawn from Livy) is preserved by Valerius Maximus (iii. 2. L7):--In aedem Fidei publicae convocati patres conscripti a consule MucioScaevola quidnam in tali tempestate faciendum esset deliberabant, cunctisque censentibus ut consul armis rem publicam tueretur, Scaevolanegavit se quicquam vi esse acturum. Tum Scipio Nasica Quoniam, inquit, consul dum juris ordinem sequitur id agit ut cum omnibus legibus Romanumimperium corruat, egomet me privatus voluntati vestrae ducem offero. .. . Qui rem publicam salvam esse volunt me sequantur. [418] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 16; Plut. L. C. Appian speculates as to themeaning of the act. It may have been meant to attract the attention ofhis supporters, it may have been a signal of war, it may have beenintended to veil the impending deed of horror from the eyes of the gods. Cf. Vellei. Ii. 3. [419] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 19. [420] [Cic. ] _ad Herenn_, iv. 55. 68. [421] In the highly rhetorical exercise contained in [Cic. ] _ad Herenn_. Iv. 55. 68 is to be found the following picture:--Iste spumans ex orescelus, anhelans ex infirmo pectore crudelitatem, contorquet brachium etdubitanti Graccho quid esset, neque tamen locum, in quo constiterat, relinquenti, percutit tempus. [422] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 16. [423] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 19. [424] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 16 [Greek: _kai pantas autous nyktosexerripsan es to rheuma ton potamou_]. [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 64(Gracchi) corpus Lucretii aedilis manu in Tiberim missum; unde illeVespillo dictus. [425] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 1. [426] Vellei. Ii. 3. 3 Hoc initium in urbe Roma civilis sanguinisgladiorumque impunitatis fuit. Inde jus vi obrutum potentiorque habitusprior, discordiaeque civium antea condicionibus sanari solitae ferrodijudicatae (cf. Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 20; App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 17). Cic. _de Rep_. I. 19. 31 Mors Tiberii Gracchi et jam ante tota illiusratio tribunatus divisit populum unum in duas partes. [427] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 20 [Greek: _tautaen protaen historousin enRhomae stasin, aph' ou to basileuesthai katelysan, aimati kai phonopoliton diakrithaenai_. ] [428] Sall. _Jug_. 31. 7 Occiso Ti. Graccho, quem regnum parare aiebant, in plebem Romanam quaestiones habitae sunt. Val. Max. Iv. 7, 1 Cumsenatus Rupilio et Laenati consulibus mandasset ut in eos, qui cumGraccho consenserant, more majorum animadverterent . .. Cf. Vellei. Ii. 7. 4. [429] Cic. _de Amic_. 11. 37. [430] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 20. [431] Cic. _de Amic_. Ii. 37; Val. Max. Iv. 7. 1. [432] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 20. [433] Ibid. 21. [434] Val Max. V. 3. 2 e Is quoque (Scipio Nasica) propter iniquissimamvirtutum suarum apud cives aestimationem sub titulo legationis Pergamumsecessit et quod vitae superfuit ibi sine ullo ingratae patriaedesiderio peregit. Cf. Plut. L. C. ; Strabo xiv. 1. 38. See Waddington_Fastes_ p. 662. [435] Vellei. Ii. 3. 1 P. Scipio Nasica . .. Ob eas virtutes primusomnium absens pontifex maximus factus est. The other view, that Nasicawas already pontifex maximus before his exile, was widely prevalent andis stated by nearly all our authorities (Cic. _in Cat_. I. 1. 3; Val. Max. 1. 4. 1; Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 21; App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 16). [436] Plut. L. C. [437] Val. Max. Vii. 2, 6 Par illa sapientia senatus. Ti. Gracchumtribunum pl. Agrariam legem promulgare ausum morte multavit. Idem utsecundum legem ejus per triumviros ager populo viritim dividereturegregie censuit. [438] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 21, C. I. L. I. N. 552 C. Sempronius _Ti. F. Grac_. , Ap. Claudius C. F. Pulc. , P. Licinius P. F. Crass. III vir. A. I. A. (Cf. Nn. 553. 1504), n. 583 (82-81 B. C. ) M. Terentius M. F. Varro Lucullus Pro Pr. Terminos restituendos ex s. C. Coeravit qua P. Licinius Ap. Claudius C. Graccus III vir A. D. A. I. Statuerunt. These_termini_ suggest the _limites Graccani_ of the _Liber Coloniarum(Gromatici_ ed. Lachmann, pp. 209. 210) which may refer to the agrarianassignments under the _leges Semproniae_ (of Ti. And C. Gracchus) ratherthan to the colonial foundations of the younger brother. [439] Liv. _Ep_. Lix. Seditiones a triumviris Fulvio Flacco etC. Graccho et C. Papirio Carbone agro dividendo creatis excitatae. App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 18. C. I. L. I. N. 554 M. Folvios M. F. Flac. , C. Sempronius Ti. F. Grac. , C. Paperius C. F. Carb. III vire. A. I. A. (cf. N. 555). [440] C. I. L. I. 551 (Wilmanns 797) Primus fecei ut de agro poplicoaratoribus cederent pastores. [441] Liv. _Ep_. Lix. (131 B. C. ) Censa sunt civium capita CCCXVIII miliaDCCCXXIII praeter pupillos et viduas. Ib. Lx. (125 B. C. ) Censa suntcivium capita CCCLXXXXIIII milia DCCXXVI. See de Boor _Fasti Censorii_. [442] Mommsen _Hist. Of Rome_ bk. Iv. C. 3. [443] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 18 [Greek: _amelounton de ton kektaemenonautaen (sc. Taen gaen) apographesthai, kataegorous ekaeryttonendeiknynai; kai tachy plaethos haen dikon chalepon_]. [444] App. L. C. [445] Unless we take such to be the meaning of Hyginus (_de Condic. Agr_. P. 116) Vectigales autem agri sunt obligati, quidam r. P. P. R. , quidam coloniarum aut municipiorum aut civitatium aliquarum. Qui et ipsiplerique ad populum Romanum pertinentes. .. . The passage seems to statethat some _agri_ which owed _vectigal_ to communities belonged to theRoman people. There might therefore be a fear of their resumption, although it should have been remote, since these lands, as the contextshows, were dealt with by a system of lease (for its nature see Mitteis_Zur Gesch. Der Erbpacht im Alterthum_ pp. 13 foll. ), and leaseholds donot seem to have been threatened by Gracchus. [446] App. _Bell. Civ_. I 19. [447] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 21. Hom. _Od_. I. 47. [448] Cic. _Phil_. Xi. 8. 18; Liv. _Ep_. Lix. ; Eutrop. Iv. 19. [449] Liv. _Ep_. Lix. Cum Carbo tribunus plebis rogationem tulisset, uteundem tribunum plebi, quoties vellet, creare liceret, rogationem ejusP. Africanus gravissima oratione dissuasit. Cic. _de Amic_. 25. 95Dissuasimus nos (Laelius), sed nihil de me: de Scipione dicam libentius. Quanta illi, dii immortales! fuit gravitas! quanta in oratione majestas!. .. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Cf. Cic. _deOr_. Ii. 40. 170. [450] Vellei. Ii. 4. 4 Hic, eum interrogante tribuno Carbone quid de Ti. Gracchi caede sentiret, respondit, si is occupandae rei publicae animumhabuisset, jure caesum. Et cum omnis contio adclamasset, "Hostium, "inquit, "armatorum totiens clamore non territus, qui possum vestromoveri, quorum noverca est Italia?" Val. Max. Vi. 2. 3 Orto deindemurmure "Non efficietis, " ait, "ut solutos verear quos alligatosadduxi. " Cf. Cic, _pro Mil_. 3. 8; Liv. _Ep_. Lix; Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 21. [451] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 19 [Greek: _ho d' es tous polemous autoiskechraemenos prothymotatois hyperidein . .. Oknaese_. ] [452] Liv. _Ep_. Lvii. [453] App. _Bell. Civ_. I 19. [454] Liv. _Ep_. Lviii (p. 127). [455] App. L. C. [456] App. L. C. [457] App. L. C. [458] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 10. [459] Oros. V. 10. 9; Cic. _de Amic_. 3. 12. [460] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 20. [461] Plut. _Rom_. 27 [Greek: _oi men automatos onta physei nosodaekamein legousin_. ] [462] Villei. Ii. 4 Mane in lectulo repertus est mortuus, ita ut quaedamelisarum faucium in cervice reperirentur notae. [463] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 10 [Greek: _kai deinon outos ergon ep' andrito proto kai megisto Rhomaion tolmaethen ouk etyche dikaes oud' eiselenchon proaelthen; enestaesan gar oi polloi kai katelysan taen krisinhyper tou Gaiou phobaethentes, mae peripetaes tae aitia tou phonouzaetoumenou genaetai_. ] Vellei. Ii. 4 De tanti viri morte nulla habitaest quaestio. Cf. Liv. _Ep_. Lix. [464] Schol. Bob. _ad Cic. Milon_. 7. P. 383. [465] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 20. [466] Schol. Bob. L. C. ; cf. Plut. _C. Gracch_. 10. [467] Plut. L. C. [468] Cic. _ad Fam_. Ix. 21. 3, _ad Q. Fr_. Ii 3. 3, _de Or_. Ii. 40. 170. Cf. _de Amic_. 12. 41. [469] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 20. [470] App. L. C. [471] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 20 [Greek: _hos enioi dokousin, ekon apethanesynidon hoti ouk esoito dynatos kataschein hon hyposchoito_. ] For thetheory of suicide cf. Plut. _Rom_. 27 [Greek: _oi d' auton hyph' eautoupharmakois apothanein (legousin)_. ] [472] Schol. Bob. _in Milon_, l. C. [473] Val. Max. Iv. 1. 12. [474] Cic. _de Leg_. Iii. 16. 35 Carbonis est tertia (lex tabellaria) dejubendis legibus ac vetandis. [475] Liv. _Ep_. Lvi. [476] App. Bell. _Civ_. I. 21 [Greek: _kai gar tis haedae nomosekekyroto, ei daemarchos endeoi tais parangeliais, ton daemon ekpanton epilegesthai_. ] It is possible that Appian has misconstruedthe provision that, if enough candidates did not receive the absolutemajority required for election (_explere tribus_), any one--even atribune already in office--should be eligible. See Strachan-Davidsonin loc. [477] Or possibly by securing that some of its candidates should notreceive the number of votes requisite for election. See the last note. [478] App. _Bell. Civ_. I 21 [Greek: _kai tines esaegounto toussymmachous hapantas, oi dae teri taes gaes malista antelegon, es taenRhomaion politeian anagrapsai, os meizoni chariti peri taes gaes oudioisomenous; kai edechonto hasmenoi touth' oi Italiotai, protithenteston chorion taen politeian_. ] [479] Cic. _de Off_. Iii. 11. 47 Male etiam qui peregrinos urbibus utiprohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros. .. . Nam essepro cive qui civis non sit rectum est non licere; quam legem tuleruntsapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola (95 B. C. ); usu vero urbisprohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est. For the date of Pennus's lawsee Cic. _Brut_. 28. 109:--Fuit . .. M. Lepido et L. Oreste consulibusquaestor Gracchus, tribunus Pennus. [480] Festus p. 286 Resp. Multarum civitatum pluraliter dixit C. Gracchus in ea, quam conscripsit de lege p. Enni (Penni _Müller_) etperegrinis, cum ait: "eae nationes, cum aliis rebus, per avaritiam atquestultitiam res publicas suas amiserunt". [481] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 34 [Greek: _Phoulouios phlakkos hypateionmalista dae protos ode es to phanerotaton haerethize tous Italiotasepithymein taes Rhomaion politeias hos koinonous taes haegemonias antihypaekoon esomenous_]. (Cf. I. 21), Val. Max. Ix. 5. 1 M. FulviusFlaccus consul, . .. Cum perniciosissimas rei publicae leges introduceretde civitate Italiae danda et de provocatione ad populum eorum, quicivitatem mutare noluissent, aegre compulsus est ut in Curiam veniret. [482] Liv. Xxxviii. 36. Four tribunes vetoed a _rogatio_ to grant votingrights to the _municipia_ of Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum in 188 B. C. Onthe ground that the senate's judgment had not been taken, but Edoctipopuli esse, non senatus jus, suffragium quibus velit impertire, destiterunt incepto. [483] Val. Max. Ix. 5, 1 Deinde partim monenti, partim oranti senatui utincepto desisteret, responsum non dedit . .. Flaccus in totius amplissimiordinis contemnenda majestate versatus est. Cf. App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 21. [484] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 34 [Greek: _esaegoumenos de taen gnomaenkai epimenon autae karteros, upa taes boulaes epi tina strateianexepemphthae dia tode_]. [485] Liv. _Ep_. Lx; Ammian, xv. 12. 5. [486] An isolated notice speaks of a rising at Asculum. [Victor] _deVir. Ill_. 65 (C. Gracchus) Asculanae et Fregellanae defectionisinvidiam sustinuit. [487] Liv. Viii. 22. [488] Liv. Xxvii. 10. [489] Liv. _Ep_. Lx L. Opimius praetor Fregellanos, qui defecerant, indeditionem accepit; Fregellas diruit. Cf. Vellei. Ii. 6; Obsequens 90;Plut. _C. Gracch_. 3; [Cic. ] _ad Herenn_. Iv. 15. 22. [490] Vellei. I. 15 Cassio autem Longino et Sextio Calvino . .. Consulibus Fabrateria deducta est. [491] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 3. [492] It has been supposed that this boy may really have been the son ofAttalus brother of Eumenes, a fruit of the transitory connection betweenthis prince and Stratonice, which followed the false news of Eumenes'sdeath in 172 B. C. See F. Köpp _De Attali III patre_ in _Rhein. Mus_. Xlviii. Pp. 154 ff. ; Wilcken in Pauly-Wissowa _Real, Enc_. P. 2170, andfor the temporary marriage of Attalus with Stratonice Plut. _de Frat. Amor_. 18; Polyb. Xxx. 2. 6. Livy (xlii. 16) and perhaps Diodorus (xxix. 34) speak only of Attalus's wooing, not of his marriage. If Attalus theThird was not the son of Eumenes, he was at least adopted by the kingand was clearly recognised as his heir. The official view made therelationship between the Attali that of uncle and nephew. [493] For the guardianship of the younger Attalus see Strabo xiii. 4. 2. The recognition of the regent as king is clearly attested byinscriptions (Fränkel _Inschriften von Pergamon_ nn. 214 ff. , 224, 225, 248. In n. 248. ) the future Attalus the Third is called by the king[Greek: _ho tadelphon nios_] (l. 18, cf. L. 32 [Greek: _ho theiosmon_] used by Attalus the Third) and has some power of appointment tothe priesthood. There is no sign that the nephew was in any otherrespect a co-regent of the uncle. See Fränkel op. Cit. P. 169. [494] Liv. Xxxviii. Cc. 12, 23, 25; Polyb. Xxi. 39. [495] Liv. Xliv. 36; xlv. 19. [496] Wilcken in Pauly-Wissowa _Real. Enc_. P. 2168 foll. [497] Polyb. Xxxii. 22; Diod. Xxxi. 32 b. [498] For the details of this struggle see Wilcken l. C. P. 2172;Ussing _Pergamos_ p. 50. [499] Ussing op. Cit. P. 51. [500] Strabo xiii. 4. 2. [501] Strabo l. C. ; Lucian. _Macrob_. 12. He was sixty-one years old athis accession and eighty-two years old at the time of his death. [502] Justin. Xxxvi. 4; Diod. Xxxiv. 3. [503] Once, indeed, he seems to have taken the field with some success, as is proved by a decree in honour of a victory (Fränkel _Inschr. VonPergamon_ n. 246). A vote of the town of Elaea honours the king [Greek:_aretaes heneken kai andragathias taes kata polemon, krataesanta tonhupenantion_] (l. 22). The victory is also mentioned in n. 249. [504] Liv. _Ep_. Lviii. Heredem autem populum Romanum reliqueratAttalus, rex Pergami, Eumenis filius. Cf. Ib. Lix; Strabo xiii. 4. 2;Vellei. Ii. 4; Val. Max. V. 2, ext. 3; Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 14; Eutrop. Iv. 18; Justin. Xxxvi. 4. 5; Florus ii. 3 (iii. 15); Oros. V. 8; App. _Mithr_. 62. [505] Sall. _Hist_. Iv. 69 Maur. (Epistula Mithridatis) Eumenen, cujusamicitiam gloriose ostentant, initio prodidere (Romani) Antiocho, pacismercedem; post habitum custodiae agri captivi sumptibus et contumeliisex rege miserrimum servorum effecere, simulatoque impio testamentofilium ejus Aristonicum, quia patrium regnum petiverat, hostium more pertriumphum duxere. [506] The reality of the will is attested by a Pergamene inscription(Fränkel _Inschr. Von Pergamon_ n. 249). The inscription records aresolution taken by the [Greek: _daemos_] on the proposal of the [Greek:_strataegoi_]. The resolution is elicited after the will has becomeknown and in view of its ratification by Rome (l. 7 [_Greek: dei deepicurothaenai taen diathaekaen hupo Rhomaion_]). Pergamon has by thedeath of the king, and perhaps in accordance with the will (see p. 177), been left "free" (l. 5 Attalus by passing away [Greek: _apoleloipen taenpatrida haemon eleutheran_)]. The first result of this freedom is thatthe people extends the privileges of its citizenship. Full civic rightsare given to Paroeci (i. E. _incolae_) and (mercenary) soldiers; therights of Paroeci are given to other classes:--freedmen, royal andpublic slaves. The motive assigned for the conferment is publicsecurity, and the extension of rights seems to be justified (l. 6) bythe liberal spirit shown by the late king in the organisation of hisconquests (see p. 175 note 2). The ruling idea seems to be that, ifPergamon was to be free, she must be strong. See Frankel in loc. , Ussing _Pergamos_ p. 55. [507] At the same time the self-governing character of the civiccorporation might be recognised: and Attalus, if he made the will, mayhave been courteous enough to recognise the "freedom" of the city fromthis point of view. See p. 177. [508] Liv. _Ep_. Lix. Cum testamento Attali regis legata populo Romanolibera esse deberet (Asia). Cf. Pp. 175, 176, notes 5 and 1. [509] Justin. Xxxvi. 4. 6 Sed erat ex Eumene Aristonicus, non justomatrimonio, sed ex paelice Ephesia, citharistae cujusdam filia, genitus, qui post mortem Attali velut paternum regnum Asiam invasit. Theepitomator of Livy (lix. ) speaks of him as "Eumenis filius". Strabo(xiv. 1. 38) describes him as [Greek: _dokon tou genous einai tou tonbasileon_]. [510] Florus i. 35 (ii. 20). [511] Strabo xiv. 1. 38. [512] Diod. Xxxiv. 2. 26 [Greek: _to paraplaesion de_] (to the slaverevolt in Sicily) [Greek: _gegone kai kata taen Asian kata tous autouskairous, Aristonikou men antipoiaesamenou taes mae prosaekousaesbasileias, ton de doulon dia tas ek ton despoton kakouchiassynaponoaesamenon ekeino kai megalois atychaemasi pollas poleisperibalonton_]. [513] Strabo l. C. [Greek: _eis de taen mesogaian anion haethroisedia tacheon plaethos aporon te anthropon kai doulon ep' eleutheriakatakeklaemenon, ous Haeliopolitas ekalese_]. For the view thatHeliopolis was a merely ideal city deriving its name from the sun-godof Syria, see Mommsen _Hist. Of Rome_ bk. Iv. C. 1; Bücher op. Cit. Pp. 105 foll. For the hopes of divine deliverance which pervade theslave revolts, see Mahaffy in _Hermathena_ xvi. 1890, and cf. P. 89. [514] Strabo l. C. [515] Florus i. 35 (ii. 20). [516] Val. Max. Iii. 2. 12. [517] Strabo xiv. I. 38. [518] Strabo l. C. [Greek: _euthus ai te poleis hepempsan plaethos, kaiNikomaedaes ho Bithynos epekouraese kai oi ton Kappadokon basileis_]. Eutrop. Iv. 20 P. Licinius Crassus infinita regum habuit auxilia. Nam etBithyniae rex Nicomedes Romanos juvit et Mithridates Ponticus, cum quobellum postea gravissimum fuit, et Ariarathes Cappadox et PylaemenesPaphlagon. The Pontic king was Mithradates Euergetes, not Eupator. [519] Cic. _Phil_. Xi. 8. 18 Populus Romanus consuli potius Crasso quamprivato Africano bellum gerendum dedit. [520] In B. C. 189 (Liv. Xxxvii. 51) and 180 (Liv. Xi. 42). [521] Cic. L. C. Rogatus est populus quem id bellum gerere placeret. Crassus consul, pontifex maximus, Flacco collegae, flamini Martiali, multam dixit si a sacris discessisset; quam multam populus remisit, pontifici tamen flaminem parere jussit. [522] Cf. Liv. _Ep_. Lix. Adversus eum (Aristonicum) P. LiciniusCrassus consul, cum idem pontifex maximus esset, quod numquam anteafactum erat, extra Italiam profectus. .. . [523] Quinctil, _Inst. Or_. Xi. 2. 50. [524] Gell. I. 13. [525] Intentior Attalicae praedae quam bello (Justin. Xxxvi. 4. 8). [526] Cf. Eutrop. Iv. 20 Perperna, consul Romanus (130 B. C. ) quisuccessor Crasso veniebat. [527] Val. Max. Iii. 2. 12; Strabo xiv. I. 38. [528] Val. Max. _l. C. Cf_. Oros. V. 10; Florus i. 34 (ii. 20). Eutropius(iv. 20) states that Crassus's head was taken to Aristonicus, his bodyburied at Smyrna. [529] Justin. Xxxvi. 4 Prima congressione Aristonicum superatum inpotestatem suam redegit. [530] Eutrop. Iv. 20. Cf. Liv. _Ep_. Lix. [531] Justin. L. C. [532] Justin. Xxxvi. 4 M. Aquilius consul ad eripiendum AristonicumPerpernae, veluti sui potius triumphi munus esse deberet, festinatavelocitate contendit. [533] Eutrop. Iv. 20; Justin. Xxxvi. 4. [534] Vellei. Ii. 4. [535] Eutrop. L. C. Aristonicus jussu senatus Romae in carcerestrangulatus est. According to Strabo (xiv. I. 38) he had been sent toRome by Perperna. [536] Florus i. 35 (ii. 20) Aquillius Asiatici belli reliquias confecit, mixtis-nefas-veneno fontibus ad deditionem quarundam urbium. Quae res utmaturam ita infamem fecit victoriam, quippe cum contra fas deum moresquemajorum medicaminibus impuris in id tempus sacrosancta Romana armaviolasset. [537] Strabo xiv. 1. 38 [Greek: _Manion d' Akyllios, epelthon hypatosmeta deka presbeuton, dietaxe taen eparchian eis to nyn eti symmenontaes politeias schaema_. ] [538] An inscription with the words [Greek: _Man(i)os Aky(l)ios Man(i)ouhypato(s) Rhomaion_] has been found near Tralles. It probably belongs toa milestone (C. I. L. I. N. 557 = C. I. Gr. N. 2920). [539] Where the rights of _city-states_ were in question the lines ofdemarcation between "province" and "protectorate" were necessarilyvague. Even a protectorate over small political units would demandorganisation and justify the appointment of a commission. [540] The evidence is furnished by a Cistophorus of 77 B. C. Struck atEphesus. See Waddington _Fastes_ p. 674. [541] His triumph is dated to 126 B. C. (628 A. U. C. , 627 according tothe reckoning of the _Fasti_). See _Fasti triumph_, in C. I. L. I. [542] Waddington _Fastes_ pp. 662 foll. Caria belongs to the province ofAsia in 76 B. C. (Le Bas-Waddington, no. 409). [543] It is dependent on this province in the time of Cicero (_in Pis_. 35. 86). [544] Strabo xiv. 3. 4. [545] Justin. Xxxvii. I. Cf. Bergmann in _Philologus_ 1847 p. 642. [546] Forbiger _Handb. Der All. Geogr_. Ii. P. 338. [547] Reinach _Mithridate Eupator_ p. 43. [548] Justin. Xxxviii. 5. [549] C. Gracchus ap. Gell. Xi. 10. Cf. Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. Ii. 148 Asia primum devicta luxuriam misit in Italiam. .. . At eadem Asiadonata multo etiam gravius adflixit mores, inutiliorque victoria illahereditas Attalo rege mortuo fuit. Tum enim haec emendi Romae inauctionibus regiis verecundia exempta est. [550] Ramsay, _Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia_ i. 2, pp. 423, 762;Reinach. _Mithridate Eupator_ p. 457. [551] For the evidence as to the islands, see Waddington _Fastes l. C_. [552] Regni attalici opes (Justin. Xxxviii. 7. 7); Attalicae conditiones(Hor, _Od_. I. 1. 12); Attalicae vestes (Prop. Iii. 18. 19) etc. (fromIhne _Rom. Gesch_. V. , p. 76). [553] Liv. _Ep_. Lix; App. _Illyr_. 10, _Bell. Civ_. I. 19; Plin. _H. N_. Iii. 19. 129; _Fasti triumph_. C. Sempronius C. F. C. N. Tuditan. A. Dcxxivcos. De Iapudibus k. Oct. [554] Liv. _Ep_. Lx; Florus i. 37 (iii. 2); Obsequens 90 (28); Ammian. Xv. 12. 5. [555] Liv. _Ep_. Lx; Plut. _C. Gracch_. 1. 2. [556] _Fasti Triumph_. L. Aurelius L. F. L. N. Orestes pro an. Dcxxi cos. Ex Sardinia vi Idus Dec. (123 B. C. ) [557] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 2. [558] Diod. V. 17, 2. [559] Besides Mago (Mahon), Bocchori and Guiuntum on Majorca, Iamo onMinorca are supposed to be Punic names. See Hübner in Pauly-Wissowa_Real. Enc_. P. 2823. On the islands generally (Baliares, later Balearesof the Romans, [Greek: _Gymnaesiai, Baliareis_] of the Greeks) see thesame author's _Römische Heerschaft in Westeuropa_ 208 ff. [560] Strabo iii. V. 1. [561] Diod. V. 17. 4. [562] Hübner in Pauly-Wissowa _Real. Enc. L. C_. [563] They also purchased wine. They were so [Greek: _philogynai_] thatthey would give pirates three or four men as a ransom for one woman(Diod. V. 17). [564] Strabo l. C. [Greek: _oi katoikountes eiraenaioi . .. Kakourgon detinon oligon koinonias systaesamenon pros tous en tois pelagesi laestas, dieblaethaesan hapantes, kai diebae Metellos ep' autous ho Baliarikosprosagoreutheis_. ] [565] Strabo l. C. [566] Strabo l. C. [Greek: _eisaegage de (Metellos) epoikous trischiliouston ek taes Ibaerias Rhomaion_. ] [567] _Fasti Triumph_. (121 B. C. ) Q. Caecilius Q. F. Q. N. Metellusa. Dcxxxii Baliaric. Procos. De Baliarib. [568] Plut. _Ti. Gracch_. 2. [569] Quae sic ab illo acta esse constabat oculis, voce, gestu, inimiciut lacrimas tenere non possent (Cic. _de Or_, iii. 56. 214). [570] Plut. L. C. [571] Plut. L. C. [572] Cic. _Brut_, 33. 125 Sed ecce in manibus vir et praestantissimoingenio et flagranti studio et doctus a puero, C. Gracchus. .. . Grandisest verbis, sapiens sententiis, genere toto gravis. His "impetus" isdwelt on in Tac. _de Orat_. 26. [573] Cic. _Brut_. 33. 126 Manus extrema non accessit operibus ejus:praeclare inchoata multa, perfecta non plane. Cf. Tac. _de Orat_. 18Sic Catoni seni comparatus C. Gracchus plenior et uberior; sic Gracchopolitior et ornatior Crassus. [574] Cic, _de Or_. Iii. 56. 214. [575] P. 127 [576] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 1. [577] C. Gracchus ap. Charis. Ii. P. 177 Qui sapientem eum faciet? Quiet vobis et rei publicae et sibi communiter prospiciat, non qui prosuilla humanam trucidet. [578] Plut. L. C. [579] Ibid. Cf. [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 65 Pestilentem Sardiniamquaestor sortitus. [580] Plut. L. C. [581] Cic. _de Div_. I. 26. 56 C. Vero Gracchus multis dixit, utscriptum apud eundem Coelium est, sibi in somniis quaesturam peteredubitanti Ti. Fratrem visum esse dicere, quam vellet cunctaretur, tameneodem sibi leto quo ipse interisset esse pereundum. Hoc, ante quamtribunus plebi C. Gracchus factus esset, et se audisse scribit Coeliuset dixisse eum multis. Cf. Plut. L. C. [582] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 2. [583] Plut. L. C. [584] Plut. L. C. [585] Ibid. [Greek: _alla kai pollois allokotom edokei to tamian ontaproapostaenai tou archontos_]. [586] Cic. _Div. In Caec_. 19. 61 Sic enim a majoribus nostris accepimuspraetorem quaestori suo parentis loco esse oportere: nullam nequejustiorem neque graviorem causam necessitudinis posse reperiri quamconjunctionem sortis, quam provinciae, quam officii, quam publicimuneris societatem. [587] A passage from Caius's speech "apud censores" is quoted by Cicero_Orat_. 70. 233. [588] Plutarch says (C. _Gracch_. 2) that Caius [Greek: _aitaesamenoslogon outo metestaese tas gnomes ton akousanton, hos apeltheinhaedikaesthai ta megista doxas_]. The passage seems to imply acquittalby the censors, although [Greek: _ton akousanton_] suggests the largeraudience. The arguments cited by Plutarch as developed by Caiusappeared, or were repeated, in the speech that he subsequently madebefore the people. [589] Gell. Xv. 12. [590] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 3; [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 65. [591] Plut. L. C. [592] Plut. L. C. [593] Cic. _pro Rab_. 4. 12 C. Gracchus legem tulit ne de capite civiumRomanorum injussu vestro (sc. Populi) judicaretur. Plut. _C. Gracch. 4[Greek: _(nomon eisepheren) ei tis archon akriton ekpekaerychoi politaen, kat' auton didonta krisin to daemo_. ] Schol. Ambros. P. 370 Quiasententiam tulerat Gracchus, ut ne quis in civem Romanum capitalemsententiam diceret. Cic. _in Cat_. Iv. 5. 10; _in Verr_. V. 63. 163. Cf. Cic. _pro Sest_. 28. 61; Dio Cass. Xxxviii. 14. [594] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 4. [595] Schol. Ambros. P. 370. Cf. Cic. _pro Sest_. 28, 61 Consule me, cum esset designatus (Cato) tribunus plebis (63 B. C. ), obtulit indiscrimen vitam suam: dixit eam sententiam cujus invidiam capitispericulo sibi praestandam videbat. Dio Cass. Xxxviii. 14. [596] Cic. _pro Domo_ 31. 82 Ubi enim tuleras ut mihi aqua et igniinterdiceretur? quod C. Gracchus de P. Popilio . .. Tulit. _de Leg_. Iii. 11. 26 Si nos multitudinis furentis inflammata invidia pepulissettribuniciaque vis in me populum, sicut Gracchus in Laenatem . .. Incitasset, ferremus. Cf. _pro Cluent_. 35. 95; _de Rep_. I. 3. 6. Forthe speeches of Caius Gracchus on Popillius see Gell. 1. 7. 7; xi. 13. 1. 5. [597] Cic. _post Red. In Sen_. 15. 37 Pro me non ut pro P. Popilio, nobilissimo homine, adulescentes filii, non propinquorum multitudopopulum Romanum est deprecata. [598] Diod. Xxxv. 26 [Greek: _ho Popillios meta dakruon hypo ton ochlonproepemphthae ekballomenos ek taes poleos_. ] Cf. Plut. _C. Gracch_. 4. [599] Vellei. Ii. 7 Rupilium Popiliumque, qui consules asperrime inTiberii Gracchi amicos saevierant, postea judiciorum publicorum meritooppressit invidia. It is a little difficult to harmonise Fannius'saccount of Rupilius's death (ap. Cic. _Tusc_. Iv. 17. 40) with thiscondemnation. Here Rupilius is said to have died of grief at hisbrother's failure to obtain the consulship, and this failure happenedbefore Scipio's death (Cic. _de Am_ 20. 73). But his brother may havecontinued his unsuccessful efforts up to the time of Rupilius'scondemnation. [600] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 4 [Greek: _(nomon) eisephere . .. Ei tinosarchontos aphaeraeto ton archaen ho daemos, ouk eonta touto deuterasarchaes metousian einai_. ] Cf. Diod. Xxxv. 25. Magistrates who had beendeposed, or compelled to abdicate, were known as _abacti_ (Festus p. 23Abacti magistratus dicebantur, qui coacti deposuerant imperium). [601] Plut. L. C. [602] Diod. Xxxv. 25 [Greek: _ho Grakchos daemaegoraesas peri toukatalysai aristokratian, daemokratian de systaesai, kai ephikomenos taeshapanton euchraestias ton meron, ouketi synagonistas alla kathaperauthentas eiche toutous hyper taes idias tolmaes; dedekasmenos garhekastos tais idiais elpisin hos hyper idion agathon ton eispheromenonnomon hetoimos haen panta kindynon hypomenein_. ] [603] Liv. _Ep_. Xlviii (155 B. C. ) Cum locatum a censoribus theatrumexstrueretur; P. Cornelio Nasica auctore, tanquam inutile et nociturumpublicis moribus, ex senatus consulto destructum est, populusquealiquamdiu stans ludos spectavit. [604] Liv. _Ep_. Lx. ; Oros. V. II; Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 393. [605] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 5 [Greek: _ho de sitikos (nomos) epeuonizontois penaesi taen agoran_. ] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 21 [Greek:_sitaeresion hemmaenon horisas hekasto ton daemoton apo ton koinonchraematon, ou proteron eiothos diadidosthai_. ] Vellei. Ii. 6 Frumentumplebi dari instituerat. Liv. _Ep_. Lx Leges tulit, inter quasfrumentariam, ut senis et triente frumentum plebi daretur. Schol. Bob. P. 303 Ut senis aeris et trientibus modios singulos populus acciperet. Cf. Mommsen _Die römischen Tribus_ pp. 179 and 182. [606] Mommsen (_Hist. Of Rome_ bk. Iv. C. 3) considers it rather lessthan half. The average market-price of the _modius_ is difficult to fix. A low price seems to have been about 12 asses the _modius_. See Smithand Wilkins in Smith _Dict. Of _Antiq_. I. P. 877. For occasional salesbelow the market-price at an earlier period see Plin. _H. N_. Xviii. 3. 17 M. Varro auctor est, cum L. Metellus (cos. 251 B. C. ) in triumphoplurimos duxit elephantos, assibus singulis farris modios fuisse. [607] Cic. _Tusc. Disp_. Iii. 20. 48 C. Gracchus, cum largitionesmaximas fecisset et effudisset aerarium, verbis ramen defendebataerarium. [608] Cic. _Tusc. Disp_. Iii. 20. 48. [609] Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 21. 72 C. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio;exhauriebat igitur aerarium: _pro Sest_. 48. 103 Frumentariam legem C. Gracchus ferebat. Jucunda res plebei; victus enim suppeditabatur largesine labore. Cf. _Brut_. 62. 222. Diod. Xxxv. 25 [Greek: _to koinontamieion eis aischras kai akairous dapanas kai charitas analiskon eisheauton pantas apoblepein epoiaese_. ] Cf. Oros. V. 12. [610] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 6 [Greek: _egrapse de kai . .. Kataskeuazesthaisitobolia_. ] Festus p. 290 Sempronia horrea qui locus dicitur, in eofuerunt lege Gracchi, ad custodiam frumenti publici. [611] This view is represented in a criticism preserved by Diodorusxxxv. 25 [Greek: _tois stratiotais dia ton nomon ta taes archaias agogaesaustaera katacharisamenos apeithian kai anarchian eisaegagen eis taenpoliteian_]. [612] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 5 [Greek: _ho de stratiotikos (nomos) esthaetate keleuon daemosia choraegeisthai kai maeden eis touto taesmisthophoras hyphaireisthai ton stratenomenon_]. [613] [Greek: _kai neoteron eton heptakaideka mae katalegesthaistratiotaen_] (Plut. L. C. ). [614] Plut. L. C. [Greek: _ton de nomon . .. Ho men haen klaerouchikoshama nemon tois penaesi taen daemosian_. ] Liv. _Ep_. Lx Tulit . .. Legemagrariam, quam et frater ejus tulerat. Vellei. Ii. 6 (C. Gracchus)dividebat agros, vetabat quemquam civem plus quingentis jugeribushabere, quod aliquando lege Licinia cautum erat. Cf. Cic. _de Leg. Agr_. I. 7. 21; ii. 5. 10; Oros. V. 12; Florus ii. 3 (iii. 15). [615] _Lex Agraria_ (C. I. L. I. N. 200; Bruns _Fontes_ 1. 3. 11) 1. 6. See p. 113, note 2. [616] In 125 B. C. The census had been 394, 726 (Liv. _Ep_. Lx), in 115it was 394, 336 (Liv. _Ep_. Lxiii). See de Boor _Fasti Censorii_. [617] Herzog _Staatsverf_. I. P. 466. [618] In 142 B. C. (Cic. _de Fin_. Ii. 16. 54). [619] Polyb. Vi. 14. [620] Cic. _pro Mur_. 28. 58; _pro Font_. 13. 38; _Brut_. 21. 81; _Div. In Caec_. 21. 69; Tac_. Ann_ 111. 66. Valerius Maximus (viii. 1. 11) canscarcely be correct in saying that the trial took place _apud populum_. It seems to have been a trial for extortion. [621] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 22. Cf. Cic. _Div. In Caec_. 21. 69[Ascon. ] in loc. ; App. _Mithr_. 57. [622] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 22 [Greek: _oi te presbeis oi kat auton etiparontes syn phthono tauta permontes ekekragesan_. ] [623] Plut, _C. Gracch_. 5 [Greek: _ho de dikastikos (nomos) ho topleiston apekopse taes ton synklaetikon dynameos . .. Ho de priakosiouston hippeon proskatelexen antois ousi triakosiois kai tas kriseis koinaston hexakosion epoiaese_]. Cf. _Compar_. 2. Liv. _Ep_. Lx Tertiam (legemtulit) qua equestrem ordinem, tunc cum senatu consentientem, corrumperet: "ut sexcenti ex equitibus in curiam sublegerentur: et quiaillis temporibus trecenti tantum senatores erant, sexcenti equitestrecentis senatoribus admiscerentur": id est, ut equester ordo bistantum virium in senatu haberet. [624] Vellei. Ii. 6 C. Gracchus . .. Judicia a senatu transferebat adequites. (Cf. Ii. 13. 32). Tac. _Ann_. Xii. 60 Cum Semproniisrogationibus equester ordo in possessione judiciorum locaretur. Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. 34 Judicum autem appellatione separare eum (equestrem)ordinem primi omnium instituere Gracchi, discordi popularitate incontumeliam senatus. Cf. Diod. Xxxv. 25; xxxvii. 9; App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 22. [625] The qualifications of the Gracchan jurors were probably identicalwith those required for jurors under the extant _lex Repetundarum_ (C. I. L. I. N. 198; Bruns _Fontes_ i. 3. 10) which is probably the _lexAcilia_ (Cic. _in Verr_. Act. I. 17. 51; cf. Mommsen in C. I. L. L. C. ). The conditions fixed by this law are as follows (ll. 12, l3):--Praetorquei inter peregrinos jous deicet, is in diebus x proxumeis, quibus h. L. Populus plebesve jouserit, facito utei CDL viros legat, quei in haccivit[ate . .. Dum nei quem eorum legat, quei tr. Pl. , q. , iii vir cap. , tr. Mil. L. Iv primis aliqua earum, iii vi]rum a. D. A. Siet fueri[tve, queive mercede conductus depugnavit depugnaverit, queive quaestionejoudicioque puplico conde]mnatus siet quod circa eum in senatum legeinon liceat, queive minor anneis xxx majorve annos lx gnatus siet, queivein u[rbem Romam propiusve urbem Romam passus M domicilium non habeat, queive ejus magistratus, quei supra scriptus est, pater frater filiusvesiet, queive ejus, quei in senatu siet fueritve, pater frater filiusvesiet, queive trans mar]e erit. (Cf. Ll. 16, 17). Unfortunately the mainqualification for the jurors, which was stated after the words "in haccivitate, " has been lost. [626] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 6 [Greek: _kakeino tous krinountas ek tonhippeon hedoken (ho daemos) katalexai_]. [627] The _lex Acilia_ says "within ten days of its becoming law" (p. 214, note 2). If Plutarch _(l. C. )_ is right about Gracchus selecting theoriginal judices, the provision of this _lex_ shows that it cannot be, as some have thought, the law which first _created_ the Gracchan jurors. It must have been passed subsequently to Gracchus's own _lexjudiciaria_. [628] In the Ciceronian period we find a knight as a _judex_ in a civilcase (Cic. _pro Rosc. Com_. 14. 42), but it is not probable thatsenators were ever excluded from the civil bench. See Greenidge _LegalProcedure of Cicero's Time_ p. 265. [629] Cic. _in Verr_. Act. I. 13. 38. [630] Cic. _pro Cluent_. 56. 154 Lege . .. Quae tum erat Sempronia, nuncest Cornelia (i. E. The law mentioned in note 4) . .. Intellegebant . .. Ea lege equestrem ordinem non teneri. Livius Drusus in 91 B. C. Attemptedto fix a retrospective liability on the equestrian jurors (Cic. _proRab. Post_ 7. 16). Cf. App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 35. Yet Appian elsewhere(_Bell. Civ_. I. 22) says that the equites obviated trials for bribery[Greek: _synistamenoi sphisin autois kai biazomenoi_]. It is possiblethat prosecutions for corruption before the _judicia populi_ are meant. See Strachan-Davidson in loc. [631] Cic. _pro Cluent_. 55. 151 Hanc ipsam legem NE QUIS JUDICIOCIRCUMVENIRETUR C. Gracchus tulit; eam legem pro plebe, non in plebemtulit. Postea L. Sulla . .. Cum ejus rei quaestionem hac ipsa legeconstitueret, . .. Populum Romanum . .. Alligare novo quaestionis genereausus non est. 56. 154 Illi non hoc recusabant, ea ne lege accusarentur. .. Quae tum erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia . .. Intellegebant enim ealege equestrem ordinem non teneri. [632] Gell. 1. Xx. 7; Justin. _Inst_. Iv. 5. 2. [633] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 22. [634] App. L. C. [Greek: _kataegorous te enetous epi tois plousioisepaegonto_]. [635] C. Gracchus ap. Gell. Xi. 10 Ego ipse, qui aput vos verba facio, uti vectigalia vestra augeatis, quo facilius vestra commoda et rempublicam administrare possitis, non gratis prodeo. [636] Vellei. Ii. 6. 3 Nova constituebat portoria. [637] Cf. App. _Bell. Civ_. V. 4 (M. Antonius to the Asiatics) [Greek:_ous . .. Eteleite phorous Attalo, methaekamen hymin, mechri, daemokoponandron kai par' haemin genomenon, edeaese phoron, epei de edeaesen . .. Merae pherein ton ekastote karpon epetazamen_]. [638] Fronto _ad Verum_ p. 125 (Naber) Gracchus locabat Asiam. Cic. _in Verr_. Iii. 6. 12 Inter Siciliam ceterasque provincias, judices, inagrorum vectigalium ratione hoc interest, quod ceteris aut impositumvectigal est certum . .. Aut censoria locatio constituta est, ut Asiaelege Sempronia. [639] Decumani, hoc est, principes et quasi senatores publicanorum (Cic. _in Verr_. Ii. 71. 175). [640] Polyb. Vi. 17. [641] Schol. Bob. P. 259 Cum princeps esset publicanorum Cn. Planciipater, et societas eadem in exercendis vectigalibus gravissimo damnovideretur adfecta, desideratum est in senatu nomine publicanorum ut cumiis ratio putaretur lege Sempronia, et remissionis tantum fieret desumma pecunia, quantum aequitas postularet, pro quantitate damnorumquibus fuerant hostili incursione vexati (60 B. C. ; cf. Cic. _ad Att_. I. 17. 9). [642] Varro ap. Non. P. 308 G. Equestri ordini judicia tradidit acbicipitem civitatem fecit discordiarum civilium fontem. Cf. Florus ii. 5(iii. 17). [643] Diod. Xxxvii. 9 [Greek: _apeilousaes taes synklaetou polemon toGrakcho dia taen metathesin ton kritaerion, tetharraekotos outos eipenhoti kan apothano, ou dialeipso to eiphos apo taes pleuras tonsynklaetikon diaeraemenos_. ] Diodorus has preserved the utterance in amore intelligible form than Cicero (_de Leg_. Iii. 9. 20 C. VeroGracchus . .. Sicis iis, quas ipse se projecisse in forum dixit, quibusdigladiarentur inter se cives, nonne omnem rei publicae statumpermutavit?). [644] Cic. _pro Domo_ 9, 24 Tu provincias consulares, quas C. Gracchus, qui unus maxime popularis fuit, non modo non abstulit a senatu, sedetiam, ut necesse esset quotannis constitui per senatum decretas legesanxit, eas lege Sempronia per senatum decretas rescidisti. Sall, _Fug_. 27 Lege Sempronia provinciae futuris consulibus Numidia atque Italiadecretae. Cic. _de Prov. Cons_. 2. 3 Decernendae nobis sunt legeSempronia duae (provinciae). Cf. _ad Fam_. I. 7. 10; _pro Balbo_ 27. 61. [645] Cic. _de Prov. Cons_. 7. 17. [646] The colonists were to be [Greek: _oi chariestatoi ton politon_](Plut. _C. Gracch_. 9). [647] Liv. _Ep_. Lx Legibus agrariis latis effecit ut complures coloniaein Italia deducerentur. Cf. Plut. _C. Gracch_, 6. App. _Bell. Civ_. 1. 23; Foundations at Abellinum, Cadatia, Suessa Aurunca etc. Areattributed to a _lex Sempronia_ or _lex Graccana_ in _Liber Coloniarum_(_Gromatici_ Lachmann) pp. 229, 233, 237, 238; cf. Pp. 216, 219, 228, 255. It is difficult to say whether they were products of the Gracchanagrarian or colonial law. In either case, these foundations may havebeen subsequent to his death, as neither law was repealed. [648] Vellei. 1. 15 Et post annum (i. E. A year after the foundationof Fabrateria, see p. 171) Scolacium Minervium, Tarentum Neptunia(coloniae conditae sunt). [649] Forbiger _Handb. Der Alt. Geogr_. Ii. P. 503. [650] L'Année _Epigraphique_, 1896, pp. 30, 31. [651] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 8. [652] Vellei. Ii. 6 Novis coloniis replebat provincias. This may bewrong as a fact but true as an intention. [653] Vellei. Ii. 7. [654] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 10 [Greek: _Rhoubrion ton synarchonton henosoikizesthai Karchaedona grapsantos anaeraemenaen hypo Skaepionos_]. .. . _Lex Acilia_ 1. 22 Queive 1. Rubria in. Vir col. Ded. Creatus sietfueritve. Cf. _Lex Agraria_ 1. 59. Oros. V. 12 L. Caecilio Metello et Q. Titio (_Scr_. T. Quinctio) Flaminino coss. Carthago in Africa restituijussa vicensimo secundo demum anno quam fuerat eversa deductis civiumRomanorum familiis, quae eam incolerent, restituta et repleta est. Cf. Eutrop. Iv. 21. [655] Mommsen in C. I. L. I. Pp. 75 ff. [656] Mommsen l. C. This was the tenure afterwards called that of the_jus Italicum_. [657] Liv. _Ep_. Ix; App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 24. [658] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 6; App, _Bell. Civ_, i. 23. [659] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 7. [660] Nitzsch _Die Gracchen_ p. 402. [661] These are apparently the _Viasii vicani_ of the _lex Agraria_. Sometimes the service was performed by personal labour (_operae_), atother times a _vectigal_ was demanded. See Mommsen in C. I. L. L. C. [662] Cic. _ad Fam_. Viii. 6. 5; cf. Mommsen l. C. [663] This was prohibited by a _lex Licinia_ and a _lex Aebutia_ whichCicero (_de Leg. Agr_. Ii. 8. 21) calls _veteres tribuniciae_. But it ispossible that they were post-Gracchan. See Mommsen _Staatsr_. Ii. P. 630. [664] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 23 [Greek: _ho de Grakchos kai hodous etemnenana ten Italian makras, plaethos ergolabon kai cheirotechnon hyph' eautopoionmenos, hetoimon es ho ti keleuoi_] [665] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 8. [666] Cic. _Brut_. 26, 100. [667] Mommsen in C. I. L. I. P. 158. [668] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 6. [669] Seneca _de Ben_, vi. 34. 2 Apud nos primi omnium Gracchus et moxLivius Drusus instituerunt segregate turbam suam et alios in secretumrecipere, alios cum pluribus, alios universos. Habuerunt itaque istiamicos primos, habuerunt secundos, numquam veros. [670] The name of the law was probably _lex de sociis et nomine Latino_. See Cic. _Brut_. 26. 99. [671] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 23 [Greek: _kai tous Latinous epi pantaekalei ta Rhomaion, hos ouk euprepos sygnenesi taes boulaes antistaenaidynamenaes; ton de heteron symmachon hois ouk ezaen psaephon en taisRhomaion cheirotoniais pherein, edidous pherein apo toude, epi to echeinkai tousde en tais cherotioniais ton nomon auto syntelountas_]. Thewords [Greek: _psaephon k. T. L. _] refer to the limited suffrage granted toLatin _incolae_ (Liv. Xxv. 3. 16); but the voting power of his newLatins would be so small that the motive attributed to this measure byAppian is improbable. See Strachan-Davidson in loc. Other accounts ofGracchus's proposal ignore this distinction between Latins and Italians, e. G. Plutarch (_C. Gracch_. 5) describes his law as [Greek: _isopsaephoustoion tois politais tous Italiotas_] and Velleius says (ii. 6) Dabatcivitatem omnibus Italicis. [672] If we may trust Velleius (ii. 6) Dabat civitatem omnibus Italicis, extendebat eam paene usque Alpis. Cisalpine Gaul was not yet a separateprovince, but it was not regarded as a part of Italy. The Latin coloniesbetween the Padus and the Rubicon would certainly have received Romanrights, and this may have been the case with a Latin township north ofthe Padus such as Aquileia. But it is doubtful whether Latin rightswould have been given to the towns between the Padus and the Alps. These_Transpadani_ received _Latinitas_ in 89 B. C. (Ascon. _in Pisonian_. P. 3). [673] C. Gracch. Ap, Gell. X. 3. 3. [674] Fann. Ap. Jul. Victor 6. 6. A speech of Fannius as consul againstCaius Gracchus is also mentioned by Charisius p. 143 Keil. [675] Cic. Brut. 26. 99. [676] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 23. [677] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 12 [Greek: _antexethaeken ho Gaios diagrammakataegoron ton hypaton, kai tois symmachois, an menosi, boaethaeseinepangellomenos_. ] The invective may have been directed against Fannius, According to Appian (l. C. ) both consuls had been instructed by thesenate to issue the edict. [678] If it had been hampered in this way, the judicial protection of_peregrini_ against the judgments of the Praetor Peregrinus would havebeen impossible. [679] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 12. [680] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 23. [681] [Sall. ] _de Rep. Ord_. Ii. 8 Magistratibus creandis haud mihiquidem apsurde placet lex quam C. Gracchus in tribunatu promulgaverat, ut ex confusis quinque classibus sorte centuriae vocarentur. Itacoaequatus dignitate pecunia, virtute anteire alius alium properabit. [682] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 8. [683] Vir et oratione gravis et auctoritate (Cic. _Brut_. 28. 109)[Greek: _haethei de kai logo kai plouto tois malista timomenois kaidynamenois apo touton enamillos_] (Plut. _C. Gracch_. 8). [684] Suet. _Tib_. 3 Ob eximiam adversus Gracchos operam "patronussenatus" dictus. [685] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 9. [686] App. _Bell. Civ_ i. 35. [687] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 10. [688] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 9 [Greek: _Libios de kai taen apophorantautaen_] (which had been imposed by the Gracchan laws) [Greek: _tonneimamenon aphairon haeresken autois_]. The tense of _neimamenon_ seemsto show that the Gracchan as well as the Livian settlers are meant. SeeUnderhill in loc. In any case, the reimposition of the _vectigal_ onthe allotments by the law of 119 (App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 27) proves thatit had been remitted before this date. [689] [Greek: _hopos maed' epi strateias exae tina Latinon rhabdoisaikisasthai_] (Plut. _C. Gracch_. 9). [690] The _lex Acilia Repetundarum_ grants them the right of appeal asan alternative to citizenship as a reward for successful prosecution. Cf. The similar provision in the franchise law of Flaccus (p. 168). [691] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 9. [692] Appian (_Bell. Civ_. I. 24) says that Gracchus was accompanied byFulvius Flaccus. Plutarch (_C. Gracch_. 10) implies that the latterstayed at Rome. [693] App. L. C. Appian represents this measure as having been proposedafter the return of the commissioners to Rome. The words of Plutarch(_C. Gracch_. 8) [Greek: _apaertaesato to plaethos . .. Kakon . .. Epikoinoniai politeias tous Latinous_] probably refer to an invitation ofthe Latins to share in these citizen colonies. [694] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 10. [695] Mommsen in C. I. L. L. C. [696] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 11. [697] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 24. According to Appian, the wolf eventoccurred after Gracchus had quitted Africa. [698] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 11. [699] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 12. [700] Ibid. [Greek: _synetyche d' auto kai pros tous synarchontas enorgae genesthai. Synarchontas_] here is not limited to his colleaguesin the tribunate. [701] [Greek: _exemisthoun_] (Plut. L. C. ), probably to contractors whowould sublet the seats. [702] Beesly _The Gracchi, Marius and Sulla_ p. 53. [703] [Greek: _psaephon men auto pleiston genomenon, adikos de kaikakourgos ton synarchonton poiaesamenon taen anagoreusin kai anadeixin_]. (Plut. L. C. ) [704] Cic. _in Pis_. 15. 36; Varro _R. R_. Iii. 5. 18. [705] [Greek: _hos Sardonion gelota gelosin, ou gignoskontes hosonautois skotos ek ton auton perikechytai politeumaton_. ] (Plut. L. C. ) [706] Cic. _pro Caec_. 33. 95; _pro Domo_ 40. 106. [707] [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 65. [708] Cornelia ap. Corn. Nep. Fr. 16 Ne id quidem tam breve spatium(sc. Vitae) potest opitulari quin et mihi adversere et rem publicamprofliges? Denique quae pausa erit? Ecquando desinet familia nostrainsanire? Ecquando modus ei rei haberi poterit? Ecquando desinemus ethabentes et praebentes molestiis insistere? Ecquando perpudescetmiscenda atque perturbanda re publica? [709] [Greek: _hos dae theristas_] (Plut. _C. Gracch_. 13). [710] Plutarch (l. C. ) says that the consul had "sacrificed" [Greek:(_thysantos_)] and, if this is correct, Opimius must have summonedthe meeting. [711] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 25. [712] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 13; App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 25; [Victor] _de Vir. III_. 65. The last author calls the slain man Attilius and describes himas "praeco Opimii consulis". Cf. Ihne _Röm. Gesch_. V. P. 103. [713] [Victor] l. C. Imprudens contionem a tribuno plebis avocavit. Cf. App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 25. [714] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 14. [715] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 25. [716] App. L. C. [717] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 14. [718] Cic. _Phil_. Viii. 4. 14 Quod L. Opimius consul verba fecit de republica, de ea re ita censuerunt, uti L. Opimius consul rem publicamdefenderet. Senatus haec verbis, Opimius armis. Cf. _in Cat_. I. 2. 4;iv. 5. 10. Plut. _C. Gracch_. 14 [Greek: _eis to bouleutaerionapelthontes epsaephisanto kai prosetaxan Opimio to hypato sozein taenpolin hopos dynaito kai katalyein tous tyrannous_. ] [719] Plut. L. C. [720] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 26. [721] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 14. [722] Ibid. 15. [723] App. _Bell. Civ. I_. 26. [724] Cf. Bardey _Das sechste Consulat des Marius_ p. 61. [725] Plut. L. C. [726] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 16; App. L. C. [727] Plut. L. C. [728] Plut. L. C. [729] Cic. _in Cat_. Iv. 6. 13. [730] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 26. Plut. (_C. Gracch_. 16) states thatFlaccus fled to a bathroom ([Greek: _eis ti balaneion_]). [731] Dionys. Viii. 80. [732] Plut. L. C. [733] Val. Max. Iv. 7. 2; [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 65; Oros, v. 12. Plutarch (l. C. ) gives he second name as Licinius. [734] Plut. L. C. [735] [Victor] l. C. [736] Translated "Grove of the Furies" by Plutarch; cf. Cic. _de Nat. Deor_. Iii. 18. 46. The true name of the grove was Lucus Furrinae, namedafter some goddess, whose significance was forgotten (Varro _L. L_. Vi. 19 Nunc vix nomen notum paucis). See Richter _Topographie_ p. 271. [737] Plut. _C. Gracch_. 17. Cf. Val. Max. Vi. 8. 3. [738] Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiii. 3. 48. Cf. Plut. L. C. ; [Victor] l. C. ;Florus ii. 3 (iii. 15). [739] Oros. V. 12. [740] Oros. L. C. Opimius consul sicut in bello fortis fuit ita inquaestione crudelis. Nam amplius tria milia hominum suppliciis necavit, ex quibus plurimi ne dicta quidem causa innocentes interfecti sunt. Plutarch (l. C. ) gives three thousand as the number actually slain inthe tumult. Orosius (l. C. ) gives the number slain on the Aventine astwo hundred and fifty. For the severity with which Opimius conducted the_quaestio_ see Sall. _Jug_. 16. 2, 31. 7; Vellei. Ii. 7. [741] Plut. L. C. [742] Dig. Xxiv. 3. 66. The passage speaks of Licinia's dowry; yetPlutarch (l. C. ) says that this was confiscated. [743] In Plutarch's Greek version (C. Gracch, 17) [Greek: _ergonaponoias_] (vecordiae) [Greek: _naon homonoias_] (concordiae)[Greek: _poiei_]. [744] Cf. Neumann _Geschichte Roms_. P. 259. [745] Plut, _C. Gracch_, 18. [746] Plut. _C, Gracch_, 19. [747] Plin. _H. N_. Xxxiv. 6. 31. [748] Hence the establishment of the _praefecti jure dicundo_, sent tothe burgess colonies and _municipia_. [749] Arist. _Pol_. Iv. 6, p. 1292 b. [750] The choice of the month of July as the date for elections seems tobe post-Sullan. See Mommsen _Staatsr_. I. P. 583. During the JugurthineWar consular elections took place, as we shall see, in the late autumnor even in the winter. [751] Suet. _Caes_. 42. [752] If some of the Gracchan assignments were thirty _jugera_ each (p. 115). The larger assignments of earlier times had been from seven to ten_jugera_. See Mommsen in C. I. L. I. Pp. 75 foll. [753] Liv. _Ep_. Lxi L. Opimius accusatus apud populum a Q. Deciotribuno plebis quod indemnatos cives in carcerem conjecisset, absolutusest. "In carcerem conjicere" does not express the whole truth. Amagistrate could imprison in preparation for a trial. The words mustimply imprisonment preparatory to execution and probably refer to deathin the Tullianum. [754] Cic. _de Orat_. Ii. 30. 132; _Part. Orat_. 30, 104. In the latterpassage Opimius is supposed to say "Jure feci, salutis omnium etconservandae rei publicae causa. " Decius is supposed to answer "Nesceleratissimum quidem civem sine judicio jure ullo necare potuisti. "The cardinal question therefore is "Potueritne recte salutis reipublicae causa civem eversorem civitatis indemnatum necare?" Cf. Cic. _de Orat_. Ii. 39. 165 Si ex vocabulo, ut Carbo: Sei consul est quiconsuluit patriae, quid aliud fecit Opimius? [755] Cf. Cic. _pro Sest_. 67. 140 (Opimium) flagrantem invidiapropter interitum C. Gracchi semper ipse populus Romanus periculoliberavit. [756] Cic. _Brut_. 34. 128 L. Bestia . .. P. Popillium vi C. Gracchiexpulsum sua rogatione restituit. Cf. _post Red. In Sen_. 15. 38; _postRed. Ad Quir_. 4. 10. [757] Cic. _in Cat_. Iv. 6, 13; _Phil_. Viii. 4. 14. [758] Val. Max. V. 3. 2. The colouring of the story is doubted by Ihne(_Rom. Gesch_. V. P. 111). He thinks that perhaps Lentulus went toSicily to restore his shattered health. [759] Cic. _de Orat_. Ii. 25. 106; 39. 165; 40. 170. [760] Ibid. Ii. 39. 165. [761] Cic. _Brut_. 43. 159 Crassus . .. Accusavit C. Carbonem, eloquentissimum hominem, admodum adulescens. Cf. _de Orat_. I. 10. 39. [762] Valerius Maximus (vi. 5. 6) tells the story that a slave ofCarbo's brought Crassus a letter-case (_scrinium_) full of compromisingpapers. Crassus sent back the case still sealed and the slave inchains to Carbo. [763] Mommsen, _Hist. Of Rome_ bk. Iv. C. 4. [764] Cic. _in Verr_. Iii. I. 3 Itaque hoc, judices, ex . .. L. Crassosaepe auditum est, cum se nullius rei tam paenitere diceret quam quodC. Carbonem unquam in judicium vocavisset. [765] Cic. _ad Fam_. Ix. 21. 3 (C. Carbo) accusante L. Crassocantharidas sumpsisse dicitur. Valerius Maximus (iii. 7. 6) implies thatCarbo was sent into exile. But the two stories are not necessarilyinconsistent. [766] Appian (_Bell. Civ_. I. 35) says that the younger Livius Drusus(91 B. C. ) [Greek: _ton daemon . .. Hypaegeto apoikiais pollais es te taenItalian kai Sikelian epsaephismenais men ek pollou, gegonuiais de oupo_]. These colonies could only have been those proposed by his father. [767] Mommsen in C. I. L. 1 pp. 75 ff. Cf. P. 227. We have no recordof the tenure by which Romans held their lands in such settlements asPalma and Pollentia (p. 189). They too may have been illustrations ofwhat was known later as the _jus Italicum_. [768] We know that the corn law of C. Gracchus was repealed or modifiedby a _lex Octavia_. Cic. _Brut_. 62. 222 (M. Octavius) tantumauctoritate dicendoque valuit, ut legem Semproniam frumentariam populifrequentis suffragiis abrogaverit. Cf. _de Off_. Ii. 21. 72. But thedate of this alteration is unknown and it may not have been immediate. If it was a consequence of Gracchus's fall, as is thought by Peter(_Gesch. Roms_. Ii. P. 41), the distributions may have been restored_circa_ 119 B. C. (see p. 287). We shall see that in the tribunate ofMarius during this year some proposal about corn was before the people(Plut. _Mar_. 4). [769] App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 27 [Greek: _nomos te ou poly hysteronekyrhothae, taen gaen, hyper haes dietheronto, exeinai pipraskein toisechousin_. ] [770] App. L. C. [Greek: _kai euthus oi plousioi para ton penaetoneonounto, hae taisde tais prophasesin ebiazonto_. ] [771] The law permitting alienation may have been in 121 B. C. The year119 or 118 B. C. ([Greek: _pentekaideka maliosta etesin apo taes Grakchounomothesias_]) is given by Appian (l. C. ) for one of the two subsequentlaws which he speaks of. It is probably the date of the first of these, the one which we are now considering. [772] App. L. C. [Greek: _Sporios Thorios daemarchon esaegaesato nomon, taen men gaen maeketi sianemein, all' einai ton echonton, kai phoroushyper autaes to daemo katatithesthai, kai tade ta chrhaemata chorein esdianomas_. ] [773] If Gracchus's corn law was abolished or modified immediately afterhis fall, the corn largesses may now have been restored or extended. Cf. P. 306. [774] Some such guarantee may be inferred from a passage in the _lexAgraria_ (l. 29) Item Latino peregrinoque, quibus M. Livio L. Calpurnio[cos. In eis agris id facere . .. Ex lege plebeive sc(ito) exvefoedere licuit. ] [775] Cic. _Brut_. 36. 136 Sp. Thorius satis valuit in populari generedicendi, is qui agrum publicum vitiosa et inutili lege vectigalilevavit. Cf. _de Orat_. Ii. 70. 284. Appian, on the other hand; makesSp. Thorius the author of the law preceding this (p. 285). It ispossible that Cicero may be mistaken, but, if he is correct, thefragments of the agrarian law which we possess may be those of the _lexThoria_, the name given to it by its earlier editors. For a differentview see Mommsen in C. I. L. I. Pp. 75 ff. [776] App. _Bell Civ_. I. 27 [Greek: _tous phorous ou poly hysterondielyse daemarchos heteros_. ] [777] The latest years to which it refers are those of the censors of115 and the consuls of 113, 112 and 111. The harvest and future vintageof 111 are referred to (1. 95), and it has, therefore, been assigned tosome period between January 1 and the summer of this year. See Rudorff_Das Ackergesetz des Sp. Thorius_ and cf. Mommsen l. C. It is acurious fact, however, that a law dealing with African land amongstothers should have been passed in the first year of active hostilitieswith Jugurtha. From this point of view the date which marks the close ofthe Jugurthine war, suggested by Kiene (_Bundesgenossenkrieg_ p. 125), i. E. , 106 or 105 B. C. , is more probable. But the objection to thisview is that the law contains no reference to the censors of 109. SeeMommsen l. C. [778] _Ager compascuus_. See Mommsen l. C. And Voigt _Ueber diestaatsrechtliche possessio und den ager compascuus der röm. Republik_. [779] The _pastores_ also must often have been too indefinite a body tomake it possible to treat them as joint owners. [780] The tribune L. Marcius Philippus, when introducing an agrarian lawin 104 B. C. , made the startling statement "Non esse in civitate duomilia hominum, qui rem haberent" (Cic. _de Off_. Ii. 21, 73). If therewas even a minimum of truth in his words, the expression "qui remhaberent" must mean "moneyed men, " "people comfortably off. " [781] Mommsen in C. I. L. L. C. [782] Kiene also thinks (_Bundesgenossenkrieg_ p. 146) that the rightgiven by the law of exchanging a bit of one's own land for an equivalentbit of the public domain, which became private property, was reservedsolely for the citizen. [783] Cic. _Brut_. 26. 102; _de Orat_. Ii. 70. 281; _de Fin_. I. 3. 8. [784] Vellei. Ii. 8; Cic. _in Verr_. Iii 80. 184; iv. 10. 22. [785] [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 72 Consul legem de sumptibus etlibertinorum suffragiis tulit. [786] Liv. Xlv, 15. [787] [Victor] l. C. . [788] Plin. _H. N_. Viii. 57. 223. [789] Cassiodor. _Chron_. L. Metellus et Cn. Domitius censores artemludicram ex urbe removerunt praeter Latinum tibicinem cum cantore etludum talarium. The _ludus talarius_ in its chief form was a game ofskill, not of chance. The reference here may be to juggling with the_tali_ on the stage, not to the pursuit of the game in domestic life. [790] Liv. _Ep_. Lxiii. [791] _Fast. Triumph_. ; [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 72. [792] Val. Max. Vii. 1. 1. [793] [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 72. [794] [Victor] l. C. Ipse primo dubitavit honores peteret anargentariam faceret. [795] [Victor] l. C. Aedilis juri reddendo magis quam muneri edendostuduit. [796] Sallust (_Jug_. 15) gives the following somewhat unkind sketch ofthe great senatorial champion, "Aemilius Scaurus, homo nobilis, inpiger, factiosus, avidus potentiae, honoris, divitiarum, ceterum vitia suacallide occultans". "Inpiger, factiosus" are testimonies of his value tohis party. The last words of the sketch are a confession that hisreputation may have been blemished by suspicion, but never by proof. [797] [Victor] l. C. Consul Ligures et Gantiscos domuit, atque de histriumphavit. Cf. _Fast. Triumph_. [798] [Victor] l. C. [799] Plut. _Mar_. 3. [800] In Velleius ii. 11 the manuscript reading _natus equestri loco_(corrected into _agresti_) may be correct. [801] Plut. _Mar_. 3. [802] Plut. _Mar_. 5. [803] Ibid. 4. [804] His military reputation amongst old soldiers had led to his easyattainment of the military tribunate. Sall. _Jug_. 63 Ubi primumtribunatum militarem a populo petit, plerisque faciem ejus ignorantibus, facile notus per omnis tribus declaratur. Deinde ab eo magistratu aliumpost alium sibi peperit. [805] Plut. _Mar_. 4. [806] Plut. L. C. [Greek: _nomon tina peri psaephophorias graphontosautou dokounta ton dynaton aphaireisthai taen peri tas kriseis ischyn_]. It is possible, however, that _kriseis_ may simply mean "decisions". [807] Cic. _de Leg_. Iii. 17. 38 Pontes . .. Lex Maria fecit angustos. [808] Plut. L. C. [Greek: _ei me diagrapseie to dogma_. ] [809] Plut. L. C. [Greek: _nomou . .. Eispheromenou peri sitoudianomaes_]. See p. 284. [810] Plut. _Mar_ 5. Cf. Cic. _pro Planc_. 21, 51; Val. Max. Vi. 9. 14. [811] Val. Max. Vi. 9. 14. [812] Plut. _Mar_. 5. [813] [Greek: _dikastai_] (Plut. L. C. ). It seems, therefore, that aspecial _quaestio de ambitu_ existed at this time. Otherwise, the casewould naturally have gone before the Comitia. We can hardly think of aSpecial Commission. [814] Plut. _Mar_. 6 [Greek: _en men oun tae strataegia metriosepainoumenon heauton paresche_]. [815] Plut. L. C. [816] Plut. L. C. [817] Vellei. Ii. 7 Porcio Marcioque consulibus deducta colonia NarboMartius. Cf. I. 15. [818] This was but a [Greek: _phroura Rhomaion_] (Strabo iv. 1. 5). Ithad been established in 122 B. C. [819] Cic. _pro Font_. 5. 13 Narbo Martius, colonia nostrorum civium, specula populi Romani ac propugnaculum istis ipsis nationibus oppositumet objectum. [820] This fact appears from Cic. _pro Cluent_. 51. 140 (Crassus) indissuasione rogationis ejus quae contra coloniam Narbonensem ferebatur, quantum potest, de auctoritate senatus detrahit. A _rogatio_ against aproject implies something more than opposition to a bill. [821] Cic. _Brut_. 43. 160 Exstat in eam legem senior ut ita dicam quamilla aetas ferebat oratio. [822] Cic. _Brut. L. C. Cf. Pro Cluent_. 51. 140; _de Orat_. Ii. 55. 223;Quinctil. _Inst. Or_. Vi. 3. 44. [823] The date is unknown, but the _lex Servilia repetundarum_ wasprobably a product of this tribunate. An approximate date can beassigned to this law, if we believe that it immediately superseded the_lex Acilia_ as the law of extortion, and that the _lex Acilia_ is the_lex repetundarum_ which has come down to us on a bronze tablet (see p. 214); for the latter law must have been abrogated by 111 B. C. , since theback of the tablet on which it is inscribed is used for the _lexagraria_ of this year. The side containing the _lex Acilia_ must havebeen turned to the wall, and this fact seems to prove the supersessionof this law by a later one on the same subject. See Mommsen in C. I. L. I. P. 56. [824] Peracutus et callidus cum primisque ridiculus (Cic. _Brut_. 62. 224). [825] Cic. _pro Rab. Post, 6, 14. [826] Stercus Curiae (Cic. _de Orat_. Iii. 41. 164). [827] Cic. _Brut_. 62. 224 Is . .. Equestrem ordinem beneficio legisdevinxerat. Cf. _pro Scauro_ 1. 2. But the law of Glaucia was a _lexrepetundarum_ (Ascon. _in Scaurian_. P. 21; Val. Max. Viii. 1. 8; cf. Notes 4 and 5), not a _lex judiciaria_. [828] Cic. _in Verr_. I. 9. 26. [829] Cic. _pro Rab. Post_. 4. 8. The granting of the _civitas_ toLatins, as a reward for successful prosecution (Cic. _pro Balbo_ 24. 54), was not an innovation due to Glaucia. It appears already in the_lex Acilia_. [830] Liv. _Ep_. Lxiii; Florus i. 39 (iii. 4); Eutrop. Iv. 24. [831] Oros. V. 15. [832] Plut. _Quaest. Rom_. 83. [833] Plut. _Quaest. Rom_. 83. The manuscript reading is [Greek:_barbarou tinos hippikou therapon_]. I have adopted Ihne's suggestionof _Barrou_, which he supports by a reference to Porphyrio _ad Hor. Sat_. 1. 6. 30--Hic Barrus vilisimmae libidinosaeque admodum vitae fuit, adeo ut Aemiliam virginem Vestae incestasse dictus sit. [834] Dio Cass. _fr_. 92. [835] Macrob. _Sat_. I. 10. 5. [836] Ascon. _in Milonian_. P. 46. Cf. Cic. _de Nat. Deor_. Iii. 30. 74. [837] Scopulus reorum (Val. Max. Iii. 7. 9). [838] Ascon. L. C. [839] Val. Max. L. C. Cum id vitare beneficio legis Memmiae liceret, quae eorum, qui rei publicae causa abessent, recipi nomina vetabat. [840] Val. Max. Vi. 8. 1. [841] Ascon. L. C. Nimia etiam, ut existimatio est, asperitate usus. [842] Zumpt _Criminalrecht_ i. P. 117. [843] Plut. _Quaest. Rom_. , 83 [Greek: _duo en andras duo de gynaikas entae boon agorai legomenae tous men Hellaenas, tous de Galatas, zontaskatorhyxan_]. [844] Plin. _H. N_. Xxx. 1. 12 DCLVII demum anno urbis Cn. CorneliaLentulo P. Licinio Crasso consulibus (97 B. C. ) senatus consultum factumest ne homo immolaretur. [845] Plut. L. C. [846] Obsequens 99 (37) (111 B. C. ) Maxima pars urbis exusta cum aedeMatris Magnae; lacte per triduum pluit, hostiisque expiatum majoribus, Jugurthinum bellum exortum. The war had been determined on theyear before. [847] Boissière _Esquisse d'une histoire de la conquête et del'administration Romaines dans le Nord de l'Afrique_ p. 41. [848] App. _Lib_. [Greek: _apo Maurousion ton okeanoi mechri taesKyraenaion archaes es ta mesogeia_. ] [849] Boissière l. C. [850] [Greek: _ton legomenon Megalon Pedion_] (App. _Lib_. 68). [851] Tissot _Géographie comparée de la province Romaine d'Afrique_ ii. P. 5. [852] Plin. _H. N_. V. 3. 22; v. 4. 25; Ptol. Iv. 3. 7. [853] Tissot op. Cit. Ii. Pp. 1-20. [854] Ibid. Ii. P. 20. [855] Mercier _La population indigène de L'Afrique_ pp. 129, 130;Boissière op. Cit. P. 39. [856] Tissot op. Cit. I. Pp. 400 foll. For the extension of the nativeLibyan language cf. Boissière, _L'Afrique Romaine_ p. 6. [857] Tissot op. Cit. Pp. 403, 404. [858] Hence the [Greek: _Melanogatouloi_] and the [Greek: _Lenkaithiopes_]of Ptolemy (iv. 6. 5 and 6. ) See Tissot op. Cit. P. 447. [859] Mercier op. Cit. P. 136. [860] Tissot op. Cit. I. Pp. 414-17. [861] Boissière (op. Cit. P. 101) cites an interesting description ofthe Kabyle from _Le capitaine Rinn_. In it occur the followingwords:--La guerre pour lui (le Kabyle) est une affaire de devoir, denécessité, de point d'honneur ou de vengeance; ce n'est jamais ni unplaisir, ni une distraction, ni même un état normal; il ne la faitqu'après prévenu son ennemi, et, dans le combat ou après la victoire, iln'a pas de cruauté inutile. [862] Tissot op. Cit. I. Pp. 417-18. [863] Polyb. Xxxvii. 3; Diod. Xxxii. 17. [864] Plin. _H. N_. V. 3 22. [865] Strabo xvii. 3. 13. [866] Livy says (xxix. 29) that this was the admitted order ofsuccession (ita mos apud Numidas est). The brother of a late king wasprobably considered to be the most capable successor. An immature sonwould be passed over. Cf. Biereye _Res Numidarum et Maurorum_ p. 18. [867] Liv. _Ep_. 1. ; Val. Max. V. 2, ext. 4; Oros. Iv. 22. [868] App. _Lib_. 106. [869] App. _Hisp_. 67; Sall. _Jug_. 7. [870] Strabo. Xvii. 3. 13; Diod. Xxxiv. 35. [871] Oros. V, 11. [872] Strabo l. C. [873] Sall. _Jug_. 65. 1 Morbis confectus et ob eam causam mente pauluminminuta. We are not told that he was in this condition before Micipsa'sdeath; but it is perhaps the reason why the king left him only "heir inremainder" (secundum heredem) to the crown. Another aspirant appearslater on in the person of Massiva son of Gulussa (Sall. _Jug_. 35. I), but this prince may not have been born, or may have been an infant, atthe time when Jugurtha was recognised as a possible successor. It ispossible that Massiva may have been mentioned as one of thesupplementary heirs in Micipsa's will, although Sallust does not informus of the fact. [874] Sall. _Jug_. 6. 1. [875] Sall. _Jug_. 6. 2. [876] Ibid. 7. 6. [877] Sall. _Jug_. 8. 1. [878] Ibid. 8. 2. [879] Sall. _Jug_. 9. 1. [880] Statimque eum adoptavit et testamento pariter cum filiis heredeminstituit (Ibid. 9. 3). [881] Ibid. 10. [882] Sall. _Jug_. 11. [883] Ibid. 12. 3. The site of Thirmida is unknown. [884] Sallust, using Roman phraseology, says that he had been "proxumuslictor Jugurthae" (_l c_. ). Such a lictor would stand nearest themagistrate, receive his immediate orders and be, therefore, presumably amore trusted and intimate servant. [885] Sall. _Jug_. 12. [886] In duas partis discedunt Numidae; plures Adherbalem secuntur, sedillum alterum bello meliores (Ibid. 13. 1). [887] Sall. _Jug_. 13. 4. [888] Ibid. 13. 6. [889] Ibid. 14. [890] Sallust (l. C. ) makes Adherbal say "Micipsa pater meus moriensmihi praecepit, ut regni Numidiae tantum modo procurationem existumaremmeam, ceterum jus et imperium ejus penes vos esse". The "jus etimperium" have no true application to a protectorate. [891] Sall. _Jug_. 15. 1. [892] Ibid. 15. 2. [893] Sall. _Jug_. 16. 2. [894] Ibid. 16. 3. [895] Sall. _Jug_. 16. 5. [896] Sall. _Jug_. 20. 4. [897] Ibid. 20. 7 Itaque non uti antea cum praedatoria manu, sed magnoexercitu conparato bellum gerere coepit et aperte totius Numidiaeimperium petere. [898] Ibid. 21. 3. [899] Sallust says (_Jug_. 21. 2): Haud longe a mari prope Cirtamoppidum utriusque exercitus consedit. He apparently underestimates thedistance of Cirta from the sea. [900] Ibid. 21. 2 Ni multitude togatorum fuisset, quae Numidasinsequentis moenibus prohibuit, uno die inter duos reges coeptum atquepatratum bellum foret. [901] The bridge described by Shaw, constructed on one of the naturalarches which connect the two sides of the river bed and presenting tworanges of superposed arcades, is no longer in existence. This bridgeattached the south-eastern angle of the town to the heights of Mansoura. See Tissot _Géographie comparée_ ii. P. 393. [902] Sall. _Jug_. 21. 3. [903] Sall. _Jug_. 21. 4 Postquam senatus de bello eorum accepit, tresadulescentes in Africam legantur, qui ambos reges adeant, senatuspopulique Romani verbis nuntient velle et censere eos ab armisdiscedere, de controvorsiis suis jure potius quam bello disceptare: itaseque illisque dignum esse. [904] Is rumor clemens erat (Ibid. 22. 1). [905] Adherbalis adpellandi copia non fuit (Ibid. 22. 5). [906] Si ab jure gentium sese prohibuerit (Sail. _Jug_. 22. 4). [907] Ibid, 23. 2 Adherbal . .. Intellegit . .. Penuria rerumnecessariarum bellum trahi non posse. [908] Sall. _Jug_. 23. 2. [909] Ibid. 24. [910] Sall. _Jug_. 25. 1. [911] Ibid. 25. 3 Ita bonum publicum, ut in plerisque negotiis solet, privata gratia devictum. [912] Ibid. 25. 4 Legantur tamen in Africam majores natu nobiles, amplis honoribus usi. [913] Cujus . .. Nutu prope terrarum orbis regebatur (Cic. _pro Font_. 7, 24). [914] Sall. _Jug_. 25. 6 Primo commotus metu atque lubidine divorsusagitabatur. Timebat iram senatus, ni paruisset legatis: porro animuscupidine caecus ad inceptum scelus rapiebatur. [915] Sall, _Jug_. 25. 10. [916] Ibid. 25. 11. [917] Sall. _Jug_. 26. 1 Italici, quorum virtute moenia defensabantur, confisi deditione facta propter magnitudinem populi Romani inviolatossese fore, Adherbali suadent uti seque et oppidum Jugurthae tradat, tantum ab eo vitam paciscatur: de ceteris senatui curae fore. [918] Ibid. 26. 3 Jugurtha in primis Adherbalem excruciatum necat. [919] Sallust (l. C. ) represents him as the author of this massacre;(Jugurtha) omnis puberes Numidas atque negotiatores promiscue, utiquisque armatus obvius fuerat, interficit. But the attribution may bedue to the brevity of the narrative. The leader of a murderous host mayeasily be credited with the outrages which it commits. [920] Cic. _Brut_. 36. 136 Tum etiam C. L. Memmii fuerunt oratoresmediocres, accusatores acres atque acerbi. Itaque in judicium capitismultos vocaverunt, pro reis non saepe dixerunt. For his mordant stylesee Cic. _de Orat_. Ii. 59, 240. The lofty opinion which he was supposedto hold of himself is illustrated in Cic. _de Orat_. Ii. 66, 267 Veluttu, Crasse, in contione "ita sibi ipsum magnum videri Memmium ut inforum descendens caput ad fornicem Fabianum demitteret". [921] He was already "vir acer et infestus potentiae nobilitatis" (Sall. _Jug_. 27. 2). [922] Ibid. 27. 1. [923] Ibid. 27. 2. [924] Sall. _Jug_. 27. 3 Lege Sempronia provinciae futuris consulibusNumidia atque Italia decretae. Consules declarati P. Scipio Nasica, L. Bestia: Calpurnio Numidia, Scipioni Italia obvenit. [925] Jugurtha, contra spem nuntio accepto, quippe cui Romae omnia venumire in animo haeserat (Ibid, 28. 1). [926] Ibid. [927] Sall. _Jug_. 28. 2. [928] In consule nostro multae bonaeque artes animi et corporis erant, quas omnis avaritia praepediebat: patiens laborum, acri ingenio, satisprovidens, belli haud ignarus, firmissumus contra pericula et insidias(Ibid. 28. 5). [929] Sall. _Jug_. 28. 4 Calpurnius parato exercitu legal sibi hominesnobilis, factiosos, quorum auctoritate quae deliquisset munitafore sperabat. [930] Sall. _l. C_. [931] The only record of this campaign is contained in the few words ofSallust (Ibid, 28. 7) Acriter Numidiam ingressus est multosquemortalis et urbis aliquot pugnando cepit. [932] Possibly not at this time, but the date of its recovery isunknown. The town is in the hands of Metellus during the closing monthsof his campaign (Sall. _Jug_. 81. 2). Cf. P. 431. [933] Sall. _Jug_. 19. 7 Mauris omnibus rex Bocchus imperitabat, praeternomen cetera ignarus populi Romani, itemque nobis neque bello neque paceantea cognitus. Practically nothing is known of the predecessors of thisking. Livy (xxix. 30) mentions an earlier Baga of Mauretania, andperhaps this name is identical with that of Bocchus or [Greek: _Bogos_]. See Biereye _Res Numidarum et Maurorum_. For the earlier history ofMauretania see also Göbel _Die Westküste Afrikas im Altertum_. Theboundaries of the kingdom were the Atlantic and the Muluccha on the westand east respectively (Liv. Xxiv. 49, xxi. 22; Sall. _Jug_. 110). Thesouthern boundary naturally shifted. At times the Mauretanian kingsruled over some of the Gaetulian tribes, and Strabo (ii. 3. 4) makes thekingdom extend at one time to tribes akin to the Aethiopians--presumablyto the Atlas range. Elsewhere (xvii. 3. 2) he speaks of it as extendingover the Rif to the Gaetulians. See Göbel op. Cit. Pp. 79-82. [934] Ibid. 80. 4 Bocchus initio hujusce belli legatos Romam miseratfoedus et amicitiam petitum. [935] Sall. _Jug_. 29. 2 Scaurus . .. Tametsi a principio, plerisque exfactione ejus conruptis, acerrume regem inpugnaverat, tamen magnitudinepecuniae a bono honestoque in pravom abstractus est. [936] Sall. _Jug_. 29. 3. [937] Ibid. 29. 4 Interea fidei causa mittitur a consule Sextiusquaestor in oppidum Jugurthae Vagam. [938] Vaga (Bêdja) marks the frontier between the Numidian kingdom andthe Roman province--the frontier created in 172 B. C. By the invasions ofMasinissa and finally fixed in 146 B. C. The town lay on the west of theWad Bédja, which joins the Medjerda, and on the right of the road fromCarthage to Bulla Regia. There was another Vaga in the heart of Numidia, between the Ampsaga and Thabraca. See Tissot _Géographie comparée_ii. Pp. 6, 302; Wilmanns in C. I. L. Viii. P. 154. [939] Long _Decline of the Rom. Republic_ i. P. 400. [940] Sall. _Jug_, 29, 5 Rex . .. Pauca praesenti consilio locutus deinvidia fact! sui atque uti in deditionem acciperetur, reliqua cumBestia et Scauro secreta transigit. [941] Ibid. (Rex) quasi per saturam sententiis exquisitis indeditionem accipitur. [942] Ibid. 29. 6. [943] Bestia's presence was necessary at Rome as his colleague Nasicahad died during his tenure of the consulship (Cic. _Brut_. 34. 128). [944] Sall. _Jug_. 30. I Postquam res in Africa gestas, quoque modoactae forent fama divolgavit, Romae per omnis locos et conventus defacto consulis agitari. Apud plebem gravis invidia. [945] Sall. _Jug_. 30. 1 Patres solliciti erant: probarentne tantumflagitium an decretum consulis subvorterent parum constabat. [946] Ibid. 30. 2 Maxume eos potentia Scauri, quod is auctor et sociusBestiae ferebatur, a vero bonoque inpediebat. [947] Ibid. 30. 3. [948] Ibid. 31. [949] The best manuscripts read _his annis xv_ in Sall, _Jug_ 31. 2, butxv may be a mistake for xx, which is the reading of some good ones. Twenty years would carry us back to 131 B. C. , approximately the date ofthe fall of Tiberius Gracchus. The year 126 B. C. Which the reading xvgives, can hardly be said to mark an epoch in the decline of theliberties of the people. [950] Sociis nostris veluti hostibus, hostibus pro sociis utuntur (Sall. _Jug_. 31. 23). [951] Metum ab scelere suo ad ignaviam vostram transtulere, quos omniseadem cupere, eadem odisse, eadem metuere in unum coegit. Sed haec interbonos amicitia, inter malos factio est (Sall_. Jug_. 31. 14. ) [952] Quo facilius indicio regis Scauri et reliquorum, quos pecuniaecaptae accersebat (Memmius), delicta patefierent (Ibid. 33. I). [953] Alii perfugas vendere (Sall, _Jug_, 32. 3). Long (_Decline of theRom. Rep. I. P_. 406) thinks that this means that they were sold asslaves. But the words are probably to be brought into connection withthe terms of the Mamilian commission (Sall. _Jug_. 40. 1) "qui elephantosquique perfugas tradidissent". Ihne (_Röm. Gesch. V. P_. 131) seems toregard these _perfugae_ as Roman subjects who had been handed overby Jugurtha. [954] Quoniam se populo Romano dedisset, ne vim quam misericordiam ejusexperiri mallet (Sall. _Jug_. 32. 5). [955] Sall. _Jug_, 33. 7. [956] Confirmatus ab omnibus, quorum potentia aut scelere cuncta eagesserat quae supra diximus (Ibid. 33. 2). [957] Ibid. 33. 2 (Jugurtha) C. Baebium tribunum plebis magna mercedeparat, cujus inpudentia contra jus et injurias omnis munitus foret. [958] Sall. _Jug_. 33. 3. [959] Producto Jugurtha (Ibid, 33. 4) i. E. Led him to the front ofthe tribunal, or the Rostra if the scene took place in the Forum. [960] Regem tacere jubet (Sall. _Jug_. 34. 1). [961] Vicit tamen inpudentia (Ibid. ). [962] Ibid. 34. 2. [963] Sall. _Jug_. 35. 2. It is not impossible that he may have beenmentioned as one of the supplementary heirs in Micipsa's will. Seep. 323. [964] Sall. _Jug_. 35. 6. [965] Ibid. 35. 7 Fit reus magis ex aequo bonoque quam ex jure gentiumBomilcar, comes ejus qui Romam fide publica venerat. [966] Sall. _Jug_. 35. 9. [967] Urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit! (Ibid. 35. 10). [968] There was still an heir in Gauda--one too who had been recognisedin the testament of Micipsa (p. 323); but he may not have been regardedas a suitable candidate. [969] Sall. _Jug_. 36. 1 Albinus renovato bello commeatum, stipendium, aliaque, quae militibus usui forent, maturat in Africam portare, acstatim ipse profectus, uti ante comitia, quod tempus haud longe aberat, armis aut deditione aut quovis modo bellum conficeret. [970] Cf. Sall. _Jug_. 36. 1 Armis aut deditione aut quovis modo. [971] Sall. _Jug_. 36. 3 Ac fuere qui tum Albinum haud ignarum consiliregis existumarent, neque ex tanta properantia tam facile tractum bellumsocordia magis quam dolo crederent. [972] His colleague Quintus Minucius Rufus was making war with thebarbarians of Thrace (Liv. _Ep_. Lxv; Vellei. Ii. 8; Florus i. 39 (iii. 4); Eutrop. Iv. 27). [973] See cf. Meinel _Zur Chronologie des Jug. Krieges_ p. 11. [974] Quae dissensio totius anni comitia inpediebat (Sall. _Jug_. 37. 2). [975] The tribunician year ended with 9th December, but it is not likelythat the consuls of 109, Metellus and Silanus, were elected between thisdate and 1st January of 109. Had they been, Metellus would have heldNumidia and Sp. Albinus would not have been allowed to return there. [976] Sall. _Jug_. 37. 3. [977] There is little probability that the Calama (Gelma) of Orosius (v. 15) and the Suthul of Sallust are identical. Those who have visited thesite of Gelma deny that Sallust's description suits this region andthink that Suthul was a place near by. Grellois (_Ghelma_ pp. 263 foll. )thinks that Suthul may be placed on a site where now stands the villageof Henschir Ain Neschma, one hour's distance from Gelma. See Wilmanns inC. I. L. Viii. P. 521. [978] Sall. _Jug_. 37. 4. [979] Vineas agere, aggerem jacere, aliaque quae incepto usui forentproperare (Sall. _Jug_. 37. 4). [980] Sall. _Jug. 38. 9. The treaty perhaps gave to Jugurtha a specificguarantee of the undisturbed possession of Numidia. [981] Oros. V. 15. [982] Sail. _Jug_. 39. 1. [983] Sallust (_Jug_. 39. 2) improperly calls him _consul_. The onlyposition which he held now was that of proconsul of Numidia. [984] Senatus ita uti par fuerat decernit, suo atque populi injussunullum potuisse foedus fieri (Sall. _Jug_. 39. 3). [985] Sall. _Jug_. 39. 4. [986] Sall. _Jug_. 40. 1. [987] Occulte per amicos ac maxume per homines nominis Latini et sociosItalicos inpedimenta parabant (Ibid. 40. 2). For the later relationsof the government with the Latins and allies see p. 288. [988] Sed plebes incredibile memoratu est quam intenta fuerit quantaquevi rogationem jusserit, magis odio nobilitatis cui mala illa parabantur, quam cura rei publicae: tanta lubido in partibus erat (Sall. _Jug_. 40. 3). [989] Ibid. 40. 4. [990] [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 72; Plut. _Quaest. Rom_. 50. [991] Sall. _Jug_. 40. 5 Sed quaestio exercita aspere violenterque exrumore et lubidine plebis. Ut saepe nobilitatem, sic ea tempestateplebem ex secundis rebus insolentia ceperat. [992] Cic. _Brut_. 34. 128 Invidiosa lege Mamilia quaestio C. Galbamsacerdotem et quattuor consulates, L. Bestiam, C. Catonem, Sp. Albinumcivemque praestantissimum L. Opimium, Gracchi interfectorem, a populoabsolutum, cum is contra populi studium stetisset. Gracchani judicessustulerunt. For the condemnation of Opimius cf. _pro Sest_. 67, 140;for that of Galba, _Brut_. 33. 127. Here honour is paid to Galba'sspeech in his defence (Extat ejus peroratio, qui epilogus dicitur: quitanto in honore pueris nobis erat, ut eum etiam edisceremus). Of Galbait is said (l. C. ) Hic, qui in collegio sacerdotum esset, primus postRomam conditam judicio publico est condemnatus. He was perhaps a memberof the college of pontiffs (Long _Decline of the Rom. Rep_. I. P. 415). (For the exile of Cato at Tarraco see _pro Balbo_ 11. 28). [993] Sall. _Jug_. 43. I; Liv. _Ep_. Lxv. [994] Sallust's language (_Jug_. 43. 1) is indeterminate, but suggeststhe use of the lot--Metellus et Silanus consules designati provinciasinter se partiverant, Metelloque Numidia evenerat. There are instancesin later times of a manipulation of the _sortitio_. See Cic. _ad Fam_. V. 2. 3; _ad Att_. I. 16. 8. This assignment of the provinces followedthe treaty of Aulus (l. C. ), i. E. It took place early in 109, but notin the very first months of that year, as Spurius Albinus had gone backto Africa as proconsul (p. 373). As we have seen (p. 369) there is noprobability that the consuls of 109 were elected in 110. Sallust's words(l. C. ) "consules designati" simply mean "appointed consuls" and haveno reference to the usual status of "consuls designate". [995] Polyb. Vi. 56. [996] Cic. _pro Balbo_ 5. 11; _ad Att_. I. 16. 4; Val. Max. Ii. 10. 1. It is supposed that Sicily may have been the province, which he hadgoverned as propraetor, and from which he had returned when he wassubjected to this trial. See Drumann _Gesch. Roms_. Ii. P. 31. [997] Acri viro et, quamquam advorso populi partium, fama tamenaequabili et inviolata (Sall. _Jug_. 43. 1). [998] Ibid. 43. 4. [999] Sall. _Jug_. 44. Cf. Val. Max. Ii. 7. 2; Frontin. _Strat_. Iv. 1. 2. [1000] Sed in ea difficultate Metellum non minus quam in rebushostilibus magnum et sapientem virum fuisse conperior: tanta temperantiainter ambitionem saevitiamque moderatum. .. . Ita prohibendo a delictismagis quam vindicando exercitum brevi confirmavit (Sall. _Jug_. 45). [1001] Sall. _Jug_. 46. 1. [1002] Jugurtha . .. Diffidere suis rebus ac tum demum veram deditionemfacere conatus est (Ibid. ). [1003] Sall. _Jug_. 46. 2. [1004] Sed Metello jam antea experimentis cognitum erat genus Numidaruminfidum, ingenio mobili, novarum rerum avidum esse (Ibid. 46. 3). [1005] Sall. _Jug_. 46. 5. [1006] Sall. _Jug_. 47. 1 Oppidum Numidarum nomine Vaga, forum rerumvenalium totius regni maxume celebratum, ubi et incolere et mercariconsueverant Italici generis multi mortales. Sallust does not say thatItalian merchants were still in the town. Their presence in Numidiancities since the massacre at Cirta may be doubted, although the factthat the town was so near the province may have mastered the fears ofsome of the traders. [1007] Sall. _Jug_. 47. 4. [1008] Ibid. 48. 1 Coactus rerum necessitudine statuit armis certare. [1009] Tissot _Géographie comparée_ 1. Pp. 67-68. I have followed Tissotin his identification of the Muthul with the Wäd Mellag. This view makesMetellus's efforts concentrate for the time on S. E. Numidia. He intendedto secure his communications before proceeding farther, whether south orwest. The older view, which identified the Muthul with the Ubus (Mannertand Forbiger) would represent Metellus as opening his campaign in thedirection of Hippo Regius--Western Numidia would thus be his object andthe subsequent campaign about Zama would indicate a change of plan. Thisis not an impossible view; but there are other indications which favourthe hypothesis that the Muthul is the Wäd Mellag. One is that Sicca inits neighbourhood veered round to the Romans after the battle (Sall. _Jug_. 56. 3). The other is the alleged suitability of this region tothe topographical description given by Sallust. Tissot believed thatevery step in the great battle could be traced on the ground. The "monstractu pari" is the Djebel Hemeur mta Ouargha, parallel to the course ofthe Wäd Mellag and extending from the Djebel Sara to the Wäd Zouatin. The hill projected by this chain perpendicularly to the river is theKoudiat Abd Allah, which detaches itself from the central block of theDjebel Hemeur and the direction of which is perpendicular both to themountain and to the Wäd Mellag. The plain, waterless and desert in theangle formed by the hill and the mountain but inhabited and cultivatedin the neighbourhood of the Muthul, is the Fëid-es-Smar, watered in itslower part by two streams which empty into the Wäd Mellag. The distance, however, which separates Djebel Hemeur from the left bank of the WädMellag, is not twenty (the number given by the MSS. Of Sallust) butabout seven miles. S. Reinach in his edition of Tissot has notreproduced the author's own sketch of the battle of the Muthul, but amap of the district will be found in the Atlas appended to the work (Mapxviii. , Medjerda supérieure). This map forms the basis of the one whichI have given. [1010] See note 1. One must agree with Tissot that the "ferme miliapassuum viginti" of Sallust (_Jug_. 48. 3) cannot be accepted. Such adistance is impossible from a strategic point of view, as Metellus couldnever have sent his vanguard such a distance in advance, when he himselfwas engaged with the enemy. It is also inconsistent with the account ofthe battle, the details of which obviously show that it took place in amuch smaller area. The actual distance between the conjectured sites isabout seven Roman miles (note 1. See Tissot op. Cit. I. P. 71). [1011] Sall. _Jug_. 48. [1012] This appears from the narrative in Ibid. 52. 5. Even whenJugurtha had advanced some distance to the river, Bomilcar was notactually in touch with the king's forces. [1013] Sall. _Jug_. 49. 4. [1014] Sall. _Jug_. 49. 4. [1015] Ibid. 49. 6 Ibi conmutatis ordinibus in dextero latere, quodproxumum hostis erat, triplicibus subsidies aciem instruxit. [1016] Sall. _Jug_. 49. 6 Sicuti instruxerat, transvorsis principiis inplanum deducit. The word "transvorsis" here probably refers to thedirection in which the front rank faced the enemy, and the position maybe described in another way by saying that Metellus marched with hisfront rank sideways to Jugurtha. See Summers in loc. [1017] Ibid. 50. 2. [1018] Ibid. 50. 1. [1019] Sall. _Jug_. 52. 5. [1020] Ibid. 50. 2. [1021] Sall. _Jug_. 51. 3. [1022] Sall. _Jug_. 52. 5. [1023] Aciem quam diffidens virtuti militum arte statuerat, quo hostiumitineri officeret, latius porrigit eoque modo ad Rutili castra procedit(Ibid. 52. 6). [1024] Sall. _Jug_. 53. 3. [1025] Ibid. 53. 5 Instructi intentique obviam procedunt. Nam dolusNumidarum nihil languidi neque remissi patiebatur. [1026] Pro victoria satis jam pugnatum, reliquos labores pro praeda fore(Sall. _Jug_. 54. 1). [1027] Interim Romae gaudium ingens ortum cognitis Metelli rebus, utseque et exercitum more majorum gereret, in advorso loco victor tamenvirtute fuisset, hostium agro potiretur, Jugurtham magnificum ex Albinisocordia spem salutis in solitudine aut fuga coegisset habere(Ibid. 55. 1). [1028] Sall. _Jug_. 54. 1. [1029] Ibid. 54. 3. [1030] Metellus, ubi videt . .. Minore detrimento illos vinci quam suosvincere, statuit non proeliis neque in acie, sed alio more bellumgerundum (Ibid. 54. 5). [1031] Sall. _Jug_. 54. 6. [1032] Sall. _Jug_. 55. 5. [1033] Sicca is the modern El Kef, but is still called by itsinhabitants by its old name of Sicca Veneria (Schak Benar), The name_Veneria_ was derived from a temple of the Punic Aphrodite (cf. Val. Max. Ii. 6. 15). Of its strategic importance Tissot says "El Kef isstill regarded as the strongest place in Tunis. .. . The town dominatesthe great plains of Es-sers, Zanfour, Lorbeus and of the Wäd Mellag, atthe same time that it commands one of the principal ways ofcommunication leading from Tunis to Algiers. " See Wilmanns in C. I. L. Viii. P. 197; Tissot _Géogr. Comp_. Ii. P. 378. Zama Regia is nowidentified, not with the place called Lehs, El-Lehs or Eliès (Wilmannsop. Cit. P. 210), but with Djiâma. See Tissot op. Cit. Ii. Pp. 571, 577-79; Mommsen in _Hermes_ xx. Pp. 144-56; Schmidt in _Rhein. Mus_. 1889 (N. F. 44) pp. 397 foll. [1034] Sall. _Jug_. 56. 3. [1035] Ibid. 56. 2. [1036] Id oppidum in campo situm magis opere quam natura munitum erat(Ibid. 57. 1). [1037] Contra ea oppidani in proxumos saxa volvere, sudes, pila, praeterea picem sulphure et taeda mixtam ardentia mittere (Sall. _Jug_. 57. 5). If _ardentia_ is correct, the _sudes_ and _pila_ must also havebeen winged with fire. I have interpreted the passage as though_ardenti_ (suggested by Herzog) were the true reading. Summers suggests"picem sulphure mixtam et tela ardentia. " [1038] Ibid. 58. 1. [1039] Sall. _Jug_. 59. 1. [1040] Ibid. 59. 3. [1041] Sall. _Jug_. 60. 4. [1042] Ibid. 61. 1. [1043] Sall. _Jug_. 61. 4. [1044] Sall. _Jug_. 62, 1. [1045] Mittuntur ad imperatorem legati, qui Jugurtham imperata facturumdice rent (Ibid. 62. 3). The word _imperata_ implies previousnegotiations. [1046] Metellus proper cantos senatorial ordinis ex Hibernia accursejubet; eorum et variorum, quos ironers defeat, console habet(Ibid. 62. 4). [1047] Ihne _Röm. Gesch_. V. P. 146. [1048] Sall. _Jug_. 62. 5. Orosius (v. 15. 7) adds that Jugurthapromised corn and other supplies. [1049] Oros. L. C. [1050] Sall. _Jug_. 62. 7. [1051] Oros. L. C. [1052] App. _Num_. 3. [1053] Its site is unknown. [1054] Romae senatus de provinciis consults Numidiam Metello decelerare(Sall. _Jug_. 62. 10). It is possible that the senate merely abstainedfrom making Numidia a consular province. See Summers in loc. And cf. P. 222. [1055] Etiam tum alios magistratus plebs, consulate nobilities inter seper manus trade bat. Novas memo tam claries neque tam egregious factserat, quin is indigenous illo honore et quasi pollutes aerator(Ibid. 63. 6). [1056] Ibid. 63. 1. [1057] Sall. _Jug_. 64. 4. [1058] Milites quibus in Hibernia preheat lax ore imperio quam anteahabere (Ibid. 64. 5). [1059] Sall. _Jug_. 64. 5. [1060] Ibid. 65. 1 Erat praeterea in exercitu nostro Unmade quidamnomine Gauda, Mastanabalis filius, Masinissae nepos, quem Micipsatestamento secundum heredem scripserat, morbis confectus et ob eamcausam mente paulum inminuta. [1061] Turmam equitum Romanorum (Ibid. 65. 2). It appears, therefore, that _equites equo publico_, although seldom (if ever) used as cavalryat this time, still formed the escort of generals or princes. [1062] Equites Romanos, milites et negotiatores (Sall. _Jug_. 65. 4). [1063] Sall. _Jug_. 66. 3. [1064] Ibid. 67. [1065] Sall. _Jug_. 67. 3 Turpilius praefectus unus ex omnibus Italicisintactus profugit. Id misericordiane hospitis an pactione an casu itaevenerit, parum comperimus: nisi, quia illi in tanto malo turpis vitaintegra fama potior fuit, inprobus intestabilisque videtur. [1066] Ibid. 68. 1. [1067] Ibid. 68. 4 Equites in primo late, pedites quam artissume ireet signa occultare jubet. [1068] Plut. _Mar_. 8 outos gar ho anaer aen men ek poteron xenos toiMetello kai tote taen epi ton tektonon echon archaen synestrateue. [1069] Plut. L. C. [1070] Plut. L. C. [1071] Sall. _Jug_. 69. 4 Turpilius . .. Condemnatus verberatusque capitepoenas solvit: nam is civis e Latio erat. If the last words mean thatTurpilius was a Latin, they may show that the law of Drusus (p. 242), ifpassed, was no longer respected. If they mean that he was a Romancitizen from a Latin town, they illustrate this law. Appian (_Num_. 3)says that Turpilius was a Roman ([Greek: _andra Rhomaion_]). [1072] Sall. _Jug_. 70. [1073] Proinde reputaret cum animo suo, praemia an cruciatum mallet(Sall. _Jug_. 70. 6). [1074] Sall. _Jug_. 72. [1075] Ibid. 73. [1076] Meinel (_Zur Chronologie des Jugurth. Krieges p. 13_) thinks thatthe consular elections of 108 did not take place before the winter, andthat they may even have drifted over into the following year. [1077] Plut, _Mar_. 8. [1078] Plut. L. C. It is possible that this story and that of Sallust(_Jug_. 63 see p. 410) about the sacrifice at Utica belong to the sameincident. But it is not probable. A man such as Marius would oftenapproach a favourite shrine. [1079] Liv. _Ep_. Lxv. [1080] [Victor] _de Vir. Ill_. 72; Ammian. Xxvii. 3. 9. [1081] The _via Aemilia_ ([Victor] l. C. ; Strabo v. 1. 11). [1082] Plut. _Quaest. Rom_. 50. [1083] Plut. _Mar_. 8. [1084] Sall. _Jug_. 73. 6 Denique plebes sic accensa, uti opificesagrestesque omnes, quorum res fidesque in manibus sitae erant, relictisoperibus frequentarent Marium et sua necessaria post illius honoremducerent. The labours, from which the _agrestes_ were drawn, may havebeen those of early spring, if the elections were delayed until theearly part of 107 B. C. (See p. 420, Meinel l. C. ) [1085] Ibid. 73. 7 Sed paulo _ante senatus Metello Numidiam_decreverat: ea res frustra fuit. The words in italics are not given bythe good manuscripts; they are perhaps an interpolation drawn from ch. 62. See Summers in loc. It is possible that some mention of theprovinces which the senate had decreed to the new consuls stood here. Mommsen (_Hist. Of Rome_ bk. Iv. C. 4) thinks that the passage may havecontained a statement that the senate had destined Gaul and Italy forthe consuls. [1086] Sall. _Fug_. 85. [1087] Ibid. 85. 12 Atque ego scio, Quirites, qui, postquam consulesfacti sunt, et acta majorum et Graecorum militaria praecepta legerecoeperint--praeposteri homines: nam gerere quam fieri tempore posterius, re atque usu prius est. [1088] Ibid. 84. 2. [1089] Polyb. Vi. 19. 2. [1090] According to Gellius (xvi. 10, 10) 375 asses:--Qui . .. Nullo autperquam parvo aere censebantur, "capite censi" vocabantur, extremusautem census capite censorum aeris fuit trecentis septuaginta quinque. But this decline from the Polybian census seems incredibly rapid. Perhaps the figure should be 3, 750--one closely resembling that given byPolybius. Cf. P. 61. [1091] Cf. Liv. X. 21 (cited by Ihne _Röm. Gesch_. V. P. 154)Senatus . .. Delectum omnis generis hominum haberi jussit. See also Gell. L. C. 13. Polybius vi. 19. 3, according to Casaubon's reading (p. 135), cannot be cited in illustration of this point. [1092] Sall. _Jug_. 86 2 Ipse interea milites scribere, non more majorumneque ex classibus, sed uti cujusque lubido erat, capite censosplerosque. Val. Max. Ii. 3. 1 Fastidiosum dilectus genus in exercitibusRomanis oblitterandum duxit. Cf. Florus i. 36 (iii. 1). 13. Thetradition preserved by Plutarch (_Mar. 9_) that Marius enrolled slavesas well ([Greek: _polyn ton aporon kai doulon katagraphon_]), isapparently an echo from the time of the civil wars. Plutarch may meanmen of servile birth and, though it is noted that freedmen were notemployed even on occasional service until 90 B. C. (App. _Bell. Civ_. I. 49), yet it is possible that Marius's hasty levy may have swept in somemen of this standing. But after, as before the time of Marius, free-birth (_ingenuitas_) continued to be a necessary qualification forservice in the legions. [1093] Sall. _Jug_. 86. 3. [1094] Sall. _Jug_. 86. 3. [1095] Sall. _Jug_. 74. 1. [1096] Ibid. 74. 2. [1097] Ibid. 75. 1. There are two Thalas in Numidia. The one withwhich we are here concerned is believed to be that lying east of Capsa(Khafsa), not that near Ammaedara (the latter is probably the Thala ofTac. _Ann_. Iii. 21). Its identification was due to Pelissier whovisited the site. It has one of the characteristics mentioned bySallust, for the existing ruins are situated in a region destitute ofwater except for one neighbouring fountain. The river from which theRomans drew water and filled their vessels might be the one now calledthe Wäd Lebem or Leben--the only one in this part of Tunis which doesnot run dry even in summer. The ruins are of small extent andunimposing, but this feature agrees with the statement of Strabo (xvii. 3. 12) that Thala was one of the towns blotted out by continuous wars inAfrica. It was, therefore, not restored by the Romans. It has beendoubted whether the name Thala is a proof of the identity of the sitewith that described by Sallust, since Pelissier says (_Rev. Arch_. 1847, p. 399) that the place is surrounded by a grove of trees, of the kindknown as _mimosa gummifera_ and called _thala_ by the Arabs. The ruinsmay have drawn their name from these trees. See Wilmanns in C. I. L. Viii. P. 28 and cf. Tissot _Géogr. Comp_. Ii. P. 635. [1098] Sall. _Jug_. 75. 9. [1099] Sall. _Jug_. 76. 3 Deinde locis ex copia maxume idoneis vineasagere, aggerem jacere et super aggerem inpositis turribus opus etadministros tutari. [1102] The name appears on coins in Punic letters as L B Q I (Movers_Die Phönizer_ II 2. P. 486; Müller _Numismatique de l'Afrique_ II p. 10). Greek writers also call it Neapolis, probably because it was notfar from an older town at the mouth of the Cinyps (the WädMghar-el-Ghrin), although others hold that this name designated aparticular quarter of the town. The three cities of the Syrtis--Sabrata, Oea and Leptis--were called Tripolis, but do not seem to have beenpolitically connected with one another. Leptis had been stipendiary toCarthage (Liv. Xxxiv. 62) and had subsequently been occupied byMasinissa (Liv. L. C. ; cf. App. _Lib_. 106). But the occupation wasnot permanent or effective. Sallust notes (_Jug_. 78) that its situationhad enabled it to escape Numidian influence. [1101] Sall. _Jug_. 77. 3. [1102] Ibid. 80. 1. [1103] Forbiger _Handb. Der alt. Geogr_. Ii. P. 885. [1104] Sall. _Jug_. 80. 2. [1105] Ibid. 80. 1. [1106] Ibid. 80. 6 Ea necessitudo apud Numidas Maurosque levisducitur, quia singuli pro opibus quisque quam plurumas uxores, denasalii, alii pluris habent, sed reges eo amplius. Ita animus multitudinedistrahitur: nulla pro socia optinet, pariter omnes viles sunt. [1107] Sall. _Jug_. 81. 1. [1108] Ibid. 82. 1. [1109] Cf. P. 349. [1110] Sall. _Jug_. 81. 2. [1111] Ibid. 82. 1. [1112] Ibid. 82. 2. [1113] Sall. _Jug_. 83. 1. [1114] Sall, _Jug_. 86. 5. [1115] Ibid. 88. 1. [1116] Vellei. Ii. II Metelli . .. Et triumphus fuit clarissimus etmeritum ex virtute ei cognomen Numidici inditum. Cf. Eutrop. Iv. 27. [1117] Sall. _Jug_. 88. 5. [1118] Sall. _Jug_. 88. 3. [1119] Sallust uses the historic infinitive (Ibid, 89. 1 Consul, utistatuerat, oppida castellaque munita adire, partim vi, alia metu autpraemia ostentando avortere ab hostibus), but the reduction of some ofthese places may perhaps be assumed. [1120] Cf. P. 426. [1121] Capsa (Kafsa or Gafsa) may have been once subject to Carthage andhave been added to the kingdom of Masinissa after the Hannibalic war. Strabo (xvii. 3. 12) mentions it amongst the ruined towns of Africa, butit revived later on, received a Latin form of constitution underHadrian, and was ultimately the seat of a bishopric. See Wilmanns in C. I. L. Viii. P. 22. Its commercial importance was very great. It was, asTissot says (_Géogr. Comp_. Ii. P. 664), placed on the threshold of thedesert at the head of the three great valleys which lead, the one to thebottom of the Gulf of Kabes, the other to Tebessa, the third to thecentre of the regency of Tunis. He describes it as one of the gates ofthe Sahara and one of the keys of Tell, the necessary point of transitof the caravans of the Soudan and the advanced post of the high plateauagainst the incursions of the nomads. Strabo (l. C. ) describes Capsa asa treasure-house of Jugurtha, but it has been questioned whether thisdescription is not due to a confusion with Thala (Wilmanns l. C. ). [1122] Sall. _Jug_. 89. 6. [1123] Ibid. 89. 5 Nam, praeter oppido propinqua, alia omnia vasta, inculta, egentia aquae, infesta serpentibus, quarum vis sicuti omniumferarum inopia cibi acrior. Ad hoc natura serpentium, ipsa perniciosa, siti magis quam alia re accenditur. Tissot says (op. Cit. Ii. P. 669)that the solitudes which surround the oasis make a veritable "belt ofsands and snakes" (cf. Florus iii. 1. 14 Anguibus harenisquevallatam). [1124] Sal. _Jug_. 90. 1. [1125] Aulus Manlius was sent with some light cohorts to protect thestores at Lares (Ibid. 90. 2). These stores were, therefore, notexhausted. [1126] The Tana has often been identified with the Wäd Tina, but thisidentification would take Marius along the coast by Thenae--a coursewhich he almost certainly did not follow. Tissot holds (_Géogr. Comp_. I. P. 85) that Tana is only a generic Libyan name for a water-course. Hethinks that the river in question is the Wäd-ed-Derb. (Ibid. P. 86). [1127] This _locus tumulosus_ (Sall. _Jug_. 91. 3) is identified byTissot (op. Cit. Ii. P 669) with a spur of the Djebel Beni-Younèswhich dominates Kafsa on the northeast at the distance indicatedby Sallust. [1128] Ibid. 91. 7. [1129] Sall. _Jug_. 92. 3. [1130] Sallust omits all mention of these winter quarters. Such anomission does not prove that he is a bad military historian, but simplythat he never meant his sketch to be a military history. But he hasperhaps freed himself too completely from the annalistic methods of mostRoman historians. [1131] Sall. _Jug_. 92. 2. [1132] The Wäd Muluja. It is called Muluccha by Sallust, [Greek:_Molochath_] by Strabo (xvii. 3, 9). Other names given to it byancient authorities are Malvane, [Greek: _Maloua_], Malva. See Göbel_Die Westküste Afrikas im Altertum_ pp. 79, 80. [1133] Bocchus, however, claimed the territory within which Marius wasoperating (Sall. _Jug_. 102). [1134] Ibid. 92. 5. [1135] Ibid. 93. [1136] Sall. _Jug_. 94. 3. [1137] Sall. _Jug_. 95. 1. [1138] Sall, _Jug_. 95. 1 L. Sulla quaestor cum magno equitatu in castravenit, quos uti ex Latio et a sociis cogeret Romae relictus erat. [1139] Cic. _in Verr_. Iii. 58. 134. [1140] Cf. Cic. _ad Att_. Vi. 6. 3 and 4. [1141] Val. Max. Vi. 9. 6 C. Marius consul moleste tulisse traditur quodsibi asperrimum in Africa bellum gerenti tam delicatus quaestor sorteobvenisset. [1142] Plut. _Sulla_ 2. [1143] Val. Max. L. C. ; Plut. _Sulla_ 2. [1144] Litteris Graecis atque Latinis juxta, atque doctissume, eruditus(Sall. _Jug_. 95. 3). [1145] Plut. L. C. [1146] Plut. L. C. [1147] He was born in 138 B. C. He was entering on his sixtieth year atthe time of his death in 78 B. C. (Val. Max. Ix. 3. 8). Cf. Vellei. Ii. 17 and see Lau _Lucius Cornelius Sulla_ p. 25. [1148] Sall. _Jug_. 96. [1149] Sall. _Jug_. 97. 2. [1150] Sallust states later that Cirta was his original aim (Ibid. 102. 1 Pervenit in oppidum Cirtam, quo initio profectus intenderat); butMarius's plans may have been modified by intervening events. [1151] Vix decuma parte die reliqua (Ibid. 97. 3). [1152] Sall, _Jug_. 98. 1. [1153] Ibid. 97. 5 Denique Romani . .. Orbis facere, atque ita abomnibus partibus simul tecti et instructi hostium vim sustentabant. [1154] Ibid. 98. 3. [1155] Sall. _Jug_. 99. 1. [1156] Pariter atque in conspectu hostium quadrato agmine incedere(Ibid. 100. 1). For the nature and growth of this tactical formationamongst the Romans see Marquardt _Staatsverw. Ii. P. 423. [1157] Sall. _Jug_. 101. 2. [1158] It is possible that Jugurtha intentionally let his approach beknown, so that the Romans might form in their usual battle order. [1159] This force is not mentioned by Sallust (Sall. _Jug_. 101. 5), butit seems implied in the junction of Bocchus with Volux. [1160] Quod ubi milites accepere, magis atrocitate rei quam fide nuntiiterrentur (Ibid. 101. 7). [1161] Sall. _Jug_. 101. 9. [1162] Oros. V. 15. 9 foll. This account in Orosius corresponds tonothing in Sallust and is clearly drawn from other sources. The attemptof the Romans to storm Cirta (Section 10) must be a mistake, unless itrefers to some earlier and unrecorded operation of the war. Some detailsof Section 14 bear a shadowy resemblance to points in the first of therecent battles described by Sallust; but there are other details whichmake the identification impossible. [1163] Hastilia telorum, quae manu intorquere sine ammentis solent(Oros. V. 15. 16). [1164] According to Sallust (_Jug_. 102. 2. ); but the fight which hedescribes may not have been the final battle. See p. 452. [1165] Ibid. 102. 2. [1166] Sall. _Jug_. 102. 5. [1167] Ibid. 102. 12. [1168] Cf. Sall. _Jug_. 80. 4. See p. 349. [1169] Sall. _Jug_. 102. 15. [1170] The headquarters were doubtless Cirta, to which we find Mariusreturning (Ibid. 104. 1); but shortly afterwards we find Sulla and theenvoys coming to Cirta from a place which, according to one reading, iscalled Tucca (see p. 457). All the troops were probably not concentratedat Cirta, as Marius meant to quarter them in the coast-towns(Ibid. 100. 1). [1171] Ibid. 103. 2. [1172] Sall. _Jug_. 104. 3. [1173] Ibid. 103. 7. [1174] Sulla and the envoys were now at a place which variant readingsmake either Tucca or Utica (Ibid. 104. 1 Illosque et Sullam [ab Tucca_or_ Utica] venire jubet, item L. Bellienum praetorem Utica). Utica isrendered improbable by its mention a few words later, although it ispossible that the name of this town has been duplicated in the sentence. If we keep Tucca, it cannot be Thugga (Dugga) in Numidia, which is somedistance from the coast. It may be the town which Pliny (_Hist. Nat_. V. 2. 21) calls "oppidum Tucca inpositum mari et flumini Ampsagae". [1175] It is possible that this armistice included Jugurtha as well, although this is not stated by Sallust (Sall. _Jug_. 104. 2). [1176] Ibid. 104. 5. [1177] Sall. _Jug_. 105. 1. [1178] Ibid. 106. 2. [1179] Sall. _Jug_. 107, 1. [1180] Sall. _Jug_. 107. 6. Cf. Plut. _Sulla_ 3. [1181] Ibid. 108. [1182] This is apparently the meaning of Sallust (Ibid. 108. 1) whenhe describes Dabar as Massugradae filius, ex gente Masinissae, ceterummaterno genere inpar (nam pater ejus ex concubina ortus erat). [1183] Sall. _Jug_. 108. 3 Sed ego conperior Bocchum magis Punica fidequam ob ea, quae praedicabat, simul Romanos et Numidam spe pacisattinuisse, multumque cum animo suo volvere solitum, Jugurtham Romanisan illi Sullam traderet; lubidinem advorsum nos, metum pronobis suasisse. [1184] Ibid. 109, 2 Dicit se missum a consule. Marius was reallyproconsul. [1185] Ibid. 110. [1186] Sall. _Jug_. 111. [1187] Sall. _Jug_. 111. 2 [1188] Ibid. 112. 1. [1189] Haec Maurus secum ipse diu volvens tandem promisit, ceterum doloan vere cunctatus parum comperimus (Ibid. 113. 1). [1190] This must have been the agreement, although Sallust says onlyEodem Numida cum plerisque necessariis inermis, uti dictum erat, adcedit(Sall. _Jug_. 113. 6). [1191] Ibid. 114. 3. [1192] Gauda is called king in an inscription which gives the wholehouse of Juba II. The inscription (C. I. L. II. N. 3417) runs:--RegiJubae reg(is) Jubae filio regi(s) Iempsalis n. Regis Gau(dae) pronepotiregis Masiniss(ae) pronepotis nepoti IIvir quinq. Patrono coloni (the_coloni_, who set up the inscription, having made Juba II IIvirquinquennalis _honoris causa_). The only doubt which affects the beliefin Gauda's succession arises from a passage in Cic. _post Red. Ad Quir_. 8. 20. Cicero here says (Marius) cum parva navicula pervectus inAfricam, quibus regna ipse dederat, ad eos inops supplexque venisset. There can be no doubt that Marius fled to Hiempsal, not to Gauda. But ithas been pointed out that Cicero's expression is "ad eos, " not "ad eum. "The plural probably refers to the whole "domus" of the monarch and wouldinclude both Gauda and Hiempsal. See Biereye _Res Numidarum etMaurorum_ p. 7. [1193] Mauretania subsequently includes the region of Caesariensis, butit has been thought probable that the territory of Sitifis on the eastwas not added until the new settlement in 46 B. C. (Mommsen _Hist. OfRome_ bk. Iv. C. 4). The territory between the Muluccha and Saldaemight, therefore, have been added after the close of the war withJugurtha. See Müller _Numismatique de l'Afrique_. P. 4; Mommsen l. C. ;Göbel _Die Westküste Afrikas im Altertum_ p. 93; Biereye op. Cit. P. 6. It is very questionable whether the limits of the Roman province werein any way extended at the expense of Numidia. Such additions as Vagaand Sicca probably belong to the settlement of 46 B. C. See Tissot_Géogr. Comp_. Ii. Pp. 21 foll. It has sometimes been thought that theattachment of Leptis Magna to Rome (p. 429) was permanent (Wilmanns inC. I. L. Viii. P. 2) and that Tripolis became a part of the Romanprovince (Marquardt _Staatsverw_. I. P. 465), but Tissot (op. Cit. Ii. P. 22) believes that Leptis remained a free city. [1194] Sall. _Jug_. 114. 3; Liv. _Ep_. Lxvii; C. I. L. I. N. Xxxiii p. 290Eum (Jugurtham) cepit et triumphans in secundo consulatu ante currumsuum duci jussit . .. Veste triumphali calceis patriciis [? _in senatumvenit_]. It is questionable, however, whether the last words of thisArretine inscription (words which do not immediately follow the accountof the Numidian triumph) can be brought into connection with the storytold by Plutarch (_Mar_. 12) that Marius, either through forgetfulnessor clumsiness, entered the senate in his triumphal dress. They seem torefer to some special honours conferred after the defeat of the Germanictribes. It is possible that the conferment of this honour gave rise tothe malicious story, which became not only distorted but misplaced. [1195] Plut. _Mar_. 12. [1196] Ihne _Röm. Gesch_. V. P. 164 Wo dem Sohn des Südens derSchmerzenschrei entfuhr. [1197] Plut. _Mar_. 12. The epitomator of Livy (lxvii. ) says in carcerenecatus est. The word _necatus_ is quite consistent with a death such asthat described by Plutarch. See Festus, pp. 162, 178. [1198] Plut. L. C. [1199] Plut. _Mar_. 10. [1200] Plut. _Sulla_ 4. [1201] Plut. _Mar_. 10; _Sulla_ 3. [1202] Plut. _Sulla_ 6. [1203] Ancient writers derive the name from _serere_ and connect it witha story of the family of the Reguli (Plin. _Hist. Nat_. Xviii. 3, 20;Verg. _Aen_. Vi. 844; Val. Max. Iv. 4. 5). But the name appears on coinsas "Saranus" (Eckhel v. P. 146). It seems, however, to be true that thename was borne by, or applied to, C. Atilius Regulus, the consul of 257B. C. See Klebs in Pauly-Wissowa R. E. P. 2095. [1204] Cic. _pro Planc_. 5. 12. [1205] In the movement connected with the proceedings of Saturninus in100 B. C. (Cic. _pro Rab_. 7. 21). [1206] Eutrop. Iv. 27; Val. Max. Vi. 9. 13; _Fast. Triumph_. [1207] Yet no very recent cases _repetundarum_ are known. The last seemsto have been the accusation of M. Valerius Messala (Gell. Xv. 14). Aboutthis time C. Flavius Fimbria was accused by M. Gratidius and acquittedin spite of the hostile evidence of M. Aemilius Scaurus (Cic. _proFont_. 11. 24; _Brut_. 45. 168; Val. Max. Viii. 5. 2; Rein_Criminalrecht_ p. 649); but even if, with Rein, we assign this case to106 and not to a time later than Fimbria's consulship, the judiciary lawmust have been prepared before the trial. [1208] Cassiodor. _Chron_. Per Servilium Caepionem consulem judiciaequitibus et senatoribus communicata. Obsequens 101 (39) Per Caepionemcos. Senatorum et equitum judicia communicata. [1209] Tac. _Ann_. Xii. 60 Cum . .. Serviliae leges senatui judiciaredderent. [1210] Cic. _de Inv_. I. 49. 92 Offensum est quod corum qui audiuntvoluntatem laedit: ut si quis apud equites Romanos cupidos judicandiCaepionis legem judiciariam laudet. [1211] Pp. 135, 213. [1212] Cic. _Brut_. 43, 161; _pro Cluent_. 51, 140. [1213] Cic. _de Or_. Ii. 59. 240, 66. 264. It is very probable that thisattack on Memmius belongs to the speech on the Servilian law. [1214] Cic. _Brut_. 44. 164 Mihi (Ciceroni) quidem a pueritia quasimagistra fuit, inquam, illa in legem Caepionis oratio. [1215] Cassiod. _Chron_. ; Obsequens 101 (39) (quoted p, 478). [1216] Cicero, speaking in 70 B. C. , says that the Equites had held thecourts for nearly fifty years, i. E. Up to the date of the _lexCornelia_ of 81 B. C. (Cic. _in Verr_. Act. I. 13. 38). [1217] [Cic. ] _ad Herenn_. I. 15, 25, iv. 24. 34; _de Rep_. I. 3. 6;_pro Balbo_ II. 28. [1218] Cic. _de Orat_. Iii. 8. 29; _Brut_. 35. 132. [1219] Cicero, in speaking of the successive defeats of Catulus at thepolls, says Praeposuisse (populum Romanum) Q. Catulo, summa in familianato, sapientissimo et sanctissimo viro, non dico C. Serranum, stultissimum hominem, (fuit enim tamen nobilis, ) non C. Fimbriam, novumhominem, (fuit enim et animi satis magni et consilii, ) sed Cn. Mallium, non solum ignobilem, verum sine virtute, sine ingenio, vita etiamcontempta ac sordida (_pro Planc_. 5. 12). [1220] Val. Max. Ii. 3. 2. The changes introduced into the militarysystem by Rutilius will be explained in the next chapter. [1221] Ulp. In _Dig_. Xxxviii. 2, i. I. Mommsen (_Staatsr_. Iii. P. 433)thinks that the consul of 105 is the "praetor Rutilius" ofUlpian's account. [1222] Gaius iv, 35 (Praetor Publius Rutilius), qui et bonorumvenditionem introduxisse dicitur. See Bethmann-Hollweg _Civilprozess_ii. P. 671. Here again the consul of 105 is probably meant. [1223] Cic. _Brut_. 30. 113, 114. [1224] The disaster at Arausio took place on 6th October (Plut. _Luc_. 27). The consuls for the next year may not yet have been elected, asthere was at this time no fixed date for the consular Comitia. Cf. P. 364 and see Sall. _Jug_. 114. [1225] Cic. _Brut_. 34. 129; _de Orat_. Ii. 22. 91. [1226] Liv. _Ep_. Lvi. (see the next note). For the probable date ofthis enactment (151 B. C. ) see Mommsen _Staatsrecht_ i. P. 521. [1227] Liv. _Ep_. Lvi Cum bellum Numantinum vitio ducum non sine pudorepublico duraret, delatus est ultro Scipioni Africano a senatu populoqueRomano consulatus; quem cum illi capere ob legem, quae vetabat quemquamiterum consulem fieri, non liceret, sicut priori consulatu, legibussolutus est. [1228] Plut. _Mar_. 12 [Greek: _kai to deuteron hypatos apedeichthae, tou men nomou koluontos aponta kai mae dialiponta chronon horismenonauthis aireisthai, tou de daemou tous antilegontas ekbalontos_. ]Plutarch adds that the people recalled the dispensation granted toScipio when the annihilation of the Carthaginian power was planned. This is perhaps a mistaken reference to the dispensation granted toScipio in the Numantine war. See Liv. _Ep_. Lvi. (quoted in the lastnote); Cic. _pro Leg. Man_. 20. 60 and Mommsen _Staatsr_. L. C. As tothe irregularity involved in Marius's absence, it is questionablewhether Plutarch is right in supposing that a personal _professio_ wasrequired at this time. See Mommsen _Staatsr_. I. P. 504. Possibly theirregularity consisted in the fact that there had been no formalcandidature at all. Other references to this election of Marius are tobe found in Sall. _Jug_. 114; Vellei. Ii. 12; Liv. _Ep_. Lxvii. [1229] Sall. _Jug_. 114, Marius consul absens factus est, et ei decretaprovincia Gallia.