nikhilam anujachittaM jńānasūtrair naverya@h sajabhiva kusumānāM kālandhhrair vidhatte/ sa laghum api mamaitaM prAchyavijńānatantuMupah@rtamatibhaktyā modatāM mai g@rhītvā//

May He, who links the minds of all people, through the apertures of time, with new threadsof knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleasedto accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered, though it be small, with the greatest devotion. 

A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

VOLUME I

First Edition: Cambridge, 1922

DEDICATION

The work and ambition of a life-time is herein humblydedicated with supreme reverence to the great sagesof India, who, for the first time in history, formulatedthe true principles of freedom and devoted themselvesto the holy quest of truth and the final assessmentand discovery of the ultimate spiritual essence ofman through their concrete lives, critical thought, dominant will and self-denial. 

NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OFTRANSLITERATED SANSKRITAND PĀLI WORDS

The vowels are pronounced almost in the same wayas in Italian, except that the sound of _a_ approachesthat of _o_ in _bond_ or _u_ in _but_, and _ā_ that of _a_ as in _army_. The consonants are as in English, except _c_, _ch_ in church;_@t_, _@d_, _@n_ are cerebrals, to which English _t_, _d_, _n_ almostcorrespond; _t_, _d_, _n_ are pure dentals; _kh_, _gh_, _ch_, _jh_, _@th_, _@dh_, _th_, _dh_, _ph_, _bh_ are the simple sounds plus anaspiration; _ń_ is the French _gn_; _@r_ is usually pronouncedas _ri_, and _s'_, _@s_ as _sh_. 

PREFACE

The old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sideddevelopments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, andscience so far as it was understood in those days. But the most importantachievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goalof all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicatedthe point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complexgrowth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced. 

It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independentkingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarchthat the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one ofspiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which wereregarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all thepolitical changes through which India passed. 

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls whooccupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruledthe minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanesor the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical orderwhich never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If aftera passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative itis mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress andcivilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from othercountries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those whowish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culturethat they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophicalthought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest inIndia has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation ofopinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract. It is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoplesshould become more and more acquainted with the true characteristicsof the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of itsspecial features. 

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of India

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that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the pastthoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated inmodern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent formsto the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties andsolutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of ourown times may throw light on the course of the process of the futurereconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important featuresof Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their fullsignificance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy asthe discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modernphilological researches. It is unfortunate that the task ofre-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet beenundertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very fewexceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most ofthese scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, andhistory than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done inthe way of the publication of a large number of important texts, andtranslations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to thepresence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophicalliterature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible tothose who are not familiar with the texts themselves. 

A work containing some general account of the mutual relations of thechief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the studyof a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interestedin philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclinationor time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same timeinterested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books_The Study of Patanjali_ and _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other IndianSystems of Thought_ I have attempted to interpret the Sämkhya and Yogasystems both from their inner point of view and from the point of viewof their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals withthe important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeksto show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regardto the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful tothe original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pālitechnical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide

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for further study. To understand something of these terms is indeedessential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actualcourse of the thoughts. 

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating thedifferent topics are altogether different from what we find in any modernwork of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a largenumber of works on each system and these have been knit together andgiven a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to peopleunacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time Iconsidered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughtsin order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of whatmight appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all thethoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrangethem in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictlyfaithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in veryfew places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms ofEnglish philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that thosewere approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term. In all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been madedangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however isdifficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquiresome sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers totake those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them withsuch meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in whichthey are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may Ihope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, forunfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. ButI may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many placeswhere condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have alsosometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is withoutits dark and uncomfortable corners. 

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brāhma@nic stage, mytreatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of theevolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in thelater Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic. 

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More is found in the Brāhmanas, but I do not think it worth while toelaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealtwith the Upani@sad period more fully, but many works on the subject havealready been published in Europe and those who wish to go into detailswill certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominantcurrent flowing through the earlier Upani@sads. Notices of other currentsof thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systemsin the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. Itwill be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places ofan inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusivecharacter of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddhain the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness requiredin philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number oftheories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of earlyBuddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy todecide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic;and the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge invery elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I alsohave in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are rightor wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for enteringinto any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of thesystems are different in some cases from those offered by some Europeanscholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who areacquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us maybe in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school ofLogic (Navya-Nyāya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of thecontributions of this school consist in the invention of technicalexpressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitudeand absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and theseare almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have howeverincorporated what important differences of philosophical points of viewI could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could notbe very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of thedifferent Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive butconsists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted inthe writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the

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texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where adifference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt thata reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where theopinions of modern writers have been incorporated. 

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulnessto the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K. C. I. E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of thepublication of both volumes of the present work. 

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal forthe magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes. Up till now he has made a total gift of about £300, 000, of which thosedevoted to education come to about £200, 000. But the man himself is farabove the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathyand friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritableBodhisattva--one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like manyother scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for theencouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies andresearches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him aretoo deep for utterance. 

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E. J. Thomas of the CambridgeUniversity Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising theproofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English inmany places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to thetransliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for thewhole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted mewith his advice on many points of detail, in particular the expositionof the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of itstreatment to repeated discussions with him. 

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N. K. Siddhanta, M. A. , late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Poviefor the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. Myobligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Pressfor the honour they have done me in publishing this work. 

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading mybook and who may be impressed with its inevitable

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shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:

 Pramā@nasiddhāntaviruddham atra Yatkińciduktam matimāndyado@sāt Mātsaryyam utsāryya tadāryyacittā@h Prasādam ādhāya vis'odhayantu. [Footnote ref 1]

S. D. 

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 

_February_, 1922. 

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing illfeeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed throughthe dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations andmisstatements. ]

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY..................................................... 1

CHAPTER II

THE VEDAS, BRĀHMA@NAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

 1 The Vedas and their antiquity................................. 10 2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind...................... 10 3 Classification of the Vedic literature........................ 11 4 The Sa@mhitās................................................. 12 5 The Brāhma@nas................................................ 13 6 The Āra@nyakas................................................ 14 7 The @Rg-Veda, its civilization................................ 14 8 The Vedic gods................................................ 16 9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism........................ 1710 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajāpati, Vis'vakarma..... 1911 Brahma........................................................ 2012 Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma............ 2113 Cosmogony--Mythological and Philosophical..................... 2314 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Ātman............................ 2515 Conclusion.................................................... 26

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS (700 B. C. -600 B. C. )

 1 The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature............... 28 2 The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence.......... 30 3 Brāhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads........................... 31 4 The meaning of the word Upani@sad............................. 38 5 The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads.............. 38 6 Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times.................. 39 7 The Upani@sads and their interpretations...................... 41 8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures........ 42 9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.............. 4410 The Ātman doctrine............................................ 4511 Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads............................ 4812 The World..................................................... 5113 The World-Soul................................................ 5214 The Theory of Causation....................................... 5215 Doctrine of Transmigration.................................... 5316 Emancipation.................................................. 58

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1 In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?...... 622 Growth of the Philosophic Literature........................... 653 The Indian systems of Philosophy............................... 674 Some fundamental points of agreement........................... 71 1 _The Karma theory_......................................... 71 2 _The Doctrine of Mukti_.................................... 74 3 _The Doctrine of Soul_..................................... 755 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end............................................... 756 Unity in Indian Sādhana (philosophical, religious and ethical endeavours).................................................... 77

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CHAPTER V

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

 1 The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha................. 78 2 Buddha: his Life............................................... 81 3 Early Buddhist Literature...................................... 82 4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism............ 84 5 The Khandhas................................................... 93 6 Avijjā and Āsava............................................... 99 7 Sīla and Samādhi.............................................. 100 8 Kamma......................................................... 106 9 Upani@sads and Buddhism....................................... 10910 The Schools of Theravāda Buddhism............................. 11211 Mahāyānism.................................................... 12512 The Tathatā Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A. D. )............... 12913 The Mādhyamika or the Sūnyavāda school--Nihilism.............. 13814 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijńānavāda Buddhism. 14515 Sautrāntika theory of Perception.............................. 15116 Sautrāntika theory of Inference............................... 15517 The Doctrine of Momentariness................................. 15818 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyākāritva).................................. 16319 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems diverged........................................................ 16420 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought............. 166

CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

 1 The Origin of Jainism......................................... 169 2 Two Sects of Jainism.......................................... 170 3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains............... 171 4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains..................... 172 5 Life of Mahāvīra.............................................. 173 6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology....................... 173 7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekāntavāda)............. 175 8 The Doctrine of Nāyas......................................... 176 9 The Doctrine of Syādvāda...................................... 17910 Knowledge, its value for us................................... 18111 Theory of Perception.......................................... 18312 Non-Perceptual knowledge...................................... 18513 Knowledge as Revelation....................................... 18614 The Jīvas..................................................... 18815 Karma Theory.................................................. 19016 Karma, Āsrava and Nirjarā..................................... 19217 Pudgala....................................................... 19518 Dharma, Adharma, Ākās'a....................................... 19719 Kāla and Samaya............................................... 19820 Jaina Cosmography............................................. 19921 Jaina Yoga.................................................... 19922 Jaina Atheism................................................. 20323 Mok@sa (emancipation)......................................... 207

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CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PĀTAŃJALA SĀ@MKHYA (YOGA)

 1 A Review...................................................... 208 2 The Germs of Sā@mkhya in the Upani@sads....................... 211 3 Sā@mkhya and Yoga Literature.................................. 212 4 An Early School of Sā@mkhya................................... 213 5 Sā@mkhya kārikā, Sā@mkhya sūtra, Vācaspati Mis'ra and Vijńāna Bhiksu.......................................................... 222 6 Yoga and Patańjali............................................ 226 7 The Sā@mkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa.......... 238 8 Thought and Matter............................................ 241 9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances............................. 24210 The Gunas..................................................... 24311 Prak@@rti and its evolution................................... 24512 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium....... 24713 Mahat and Ahamkāra............................................ 24814 The Tanmātras and the Paramāńus............................... 25115 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy............. 25416 Change as the formation of new collocations................... 25517 Causation as Satkāryavāda (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause)................................................... 25718 Sā@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.............................. 25819 Buddhi and Purusa............................................. 25920 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta....... 26121 Sorrow and its Dissolution.................................... 26422 Citta......................................................... 26823 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma)....................... 27024 The Yoga Meditation........................................... 271

CHAPTER VIII

THE NYĀYA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Sā@mkhya from the Nyāya standpoint... 2742 Nyāya and Vais'e@sika sūtras................................... 2763 Does Vais'e@sika represent an old school of Mīmā@msā?.......... 2804 Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sūtras........................... 2855 Philosophy in the Nyāya sūtras................................. 2946 Philosophy of Nyāya sūtras and Vais'e@sika sūtras.............. 3017 The Vais'e@sika and Nyāya Literature........................... 3058 The main doctrine of the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy.......... 3109 The six Padārthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sāmānya, Vis'e@sa, Samavāya........................................................ 31310 The Theory of Causation....................................... 31911 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti)................. 32312 Proof of the Existence of Is'vara............................. 32513 The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika Physics................................. 32614 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramā@na)............................ 33015 The four Pramā@nas of Nyāya................................... 33216 Perception (Pratyak@sa)....................................... 33317 Inference..................................................... 34318 Upamāna and S'abda............................................ 35419 Negation in Nyāya-Vais'e@sika................................. 35520 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation......................................... 36021 The Doctrine of Soul.......................................... 36222 Īs'vara and Salvation......................................... 363

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CHAPTER IX

MĪMĀ@MSĀ PHILOSOPHY

1 A Comparative Review........................................... 3672 The Mīmā@msā Literature........................................ 3693 The Parata@h-prāmā@nya doctrine of Nyāya and the Svata@h-prāmā@nya doctrine of Mīmā@msā.......................... 3724 The place of Sense-organs in Perception........................ 3755 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception....................... 3786 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception...................................................... 3797 The Nature of Knowledge........................................ 3828 The Psychology of Illusion..................................... 3849 Inference...................................................... 38710 Upamāna, Arthāpatti........................................... 39111 S'abda-pramā@na............................................... 39412 The Pramā@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).................. 39713 Self, Salvation, and God...................................... 39914 Mīmā@msā as Philosophy and Mimā@msā as Ritualism.............. 403

CHAPTER X

THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA

1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of Controversy.................................... 4062 The philosophical situation: a Review.......................... 4083 Vedānta Literature............................................. 4184 Vedānta in Gau@dapāda.......................................... 4205 Vedānta and Sa@nkara (788-820 A. D. )............................ 4296 The main idea of the Vedānta philosophy........................ 4397 In what sense is the world-appearance false?................... 4438 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.................. 4459 The Definition of Ajńāna (nescience)........................... 45210 Ajńāna established by Perception and Inference................ 45411 Locus and Object of Ajńāna, Aha@mkāra and Anta@hkara@na....... 45712 Anirvācyavāda and the Vedānta dialectic....................... 46113 The Theory of Causation....................................... 46514 Vedānta theory of Perception and Inference.................... 47015 Ātman, Jīva, Is'vara, Ekajīvavāda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivāda.... 47416 Vedānta theory of Illusion.................................... 48517 Vedānta Ethics and Vedānta Emancipation....................... 48918 Vedānta and other Indian systems.............................. 492

INDEX............................................................ 495

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy arebut very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunatethat the condition is no better even in India. There is a small bodyof Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, whoare well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English andare not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they oughtto write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject doesnot appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies andprivate individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers ofphilosophical works in Sanskrit and Pāli have been published, as well astranslations of a few of them, but there has been as yet littlesystematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge theirvalue. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems ofIndian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated. Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophicalterms are so different from those of European thought, that they canhardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficultfor a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophicalthought in its true bearing from translations. Pāli is a much easierlanguage than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pāli is helpful inunderstanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in itssemi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficultlanguage. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literarySanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruseparts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easilyunderstand the Vedas. The Upani@sads, the Purānas, the Law Books andthe literary works, and is also well acquainted with Europeanphilosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understandeven small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or thedialectical Vedānta. This is due to two reasons, the use oftechnical terms and of great condensation in expression, andthe hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The

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tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguousmanner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought, but from the ninthcentury onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and preciseexpressions, began to develop in a very striking manner, and as a resultof that a large number of technical terms began to be invented. Theseterms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the readerwho wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one inolden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to doso with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himselfhad got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency topopularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only thechosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to becomefit students (_adhikārī_) of philosophy, under the direction of ateacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devotetheir whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and therebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophywere allowed to study it. 

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimesthe same technical terms are used in extremely different senses indifferent systems. The student must know the meaning of each technicalterm with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionarywill enlighten him much about the matter [Footnote ref 1]. He will haveto pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to thedoctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussionsof similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often verypuzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected toknow all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, andso it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers andrefutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions. There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of someof the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. The_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, and the _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ ofHaribhadra with the commentary of Gu@naratna; but the former is verysketchy and can throw very little light on the understandingof the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of thesystems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technicalphilosophical terms called Nyāyakos'a has been prepared by M. M. Bhīmācārya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press. ]

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am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. Gu@naratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is concerned, and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but itseldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrinesor discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of anyof the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a bookwhich could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, andpsychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even fora good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophicalterms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indianphilosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technicalterms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and theirmodes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. Thetechnical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, areof inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definitemeaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpretingor misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I thinkwell-known that avoidance of technical terms has often renderedphilosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosophercannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properlyformed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early daysof Buddhist philosophy in the Pāli literature, this difficulty is greatlyfelt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic andtheir repetition in different places in more or less different sensesheighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to beconveyed. 

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should bewritten? There are some people who think that the Indians never rosebeyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot haveany philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus ProfessorFrank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his _History of Philosophy_[Footnote ref 1], "A universal history of philosophy would includethe philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: New York, 1914, p. 3. ]

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have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only afew can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond themythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethicaldoctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shotthrough with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves tothe study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of theancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests. "There are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed anduntrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters. It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views, for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. Ifthey are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaboratelyabout the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will haveto go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices ofthe chapters. 

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attemptto write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are givenfrom two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indianphilosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of thesystems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materialsdirectly from the original sources, before separate accounts are preparedby specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is sometruth in this objection, but although in some of the important systemsthe literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are moreor less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection oftwenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainlybe made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my ownundertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from theoriginal texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from thosesources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limitedand I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the mostimportant. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problemsand diverse important bearings of each of the systems to manyinteresting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excusedin a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and

5

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than thepresent one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of thepresent attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and morecompetent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be calledimpossible on account of its imperfections. 

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper andaccurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossibleto write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partiallyvalid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at firstsight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are veryobscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some datesand to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries theirmutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. Thespecial nature of this development has been touched on in the fourthchapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuouscourse of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is notpossible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system ata particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at alater time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true tothe original system but was more determinate. Evolution through historyhas in Western countries often brought forth the development of morecoherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the typesremained the same, their development through history made them more andmore coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existentin the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; throughthe criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by sidethe parts of each of the systems of thought became more and moredifferentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this developmenthas been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms havebeen lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could bemade out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be madein the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But Ihave never considered it desirable that the philosophical interestshould be subordinated to the chronological. It is no

6

doubt true that more definite chronological information would bea very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the littlechronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forminga general notion about the growth and development of the differentsystems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of thedevelopment of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be considered much moreindispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it isindispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and whichsucceeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and whenwe are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest withregard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early originhas rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried asbest I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlierstages of some of the systems, but though the various features ofthese systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable, yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating thewhole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct datesof the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating thesame thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and moredeterminate forms. 

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly ofhymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting insome of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about 1000B. C. ), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophicalquestions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in termsof poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called theBrāhmaf@nas and the Āra@nyakas written mostly in prose, which followedthe Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. One that sought toestablish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other whichindulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. Thislatter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it mightappear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up whatlittle of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were tryingto express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency

7

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in proseand verse called the Upani@sads, which contain various sorts ofphilosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also somepluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, bututterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably realand indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness withthem. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of thisliterature are as old as 500 B. C. To 700 B. C. Buddhist philosophy beganwith the Buddha from some time about 500 B. C. There is reason to believethat Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other ofits vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A. D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also tobe sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B. C. Jainaphilosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlierdays, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, itdoes not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact withother systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vai@s@navathought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hinduwriters or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra andGu@naratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. Thenon-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certainextent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it isdifficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though therehave been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or lessdiffering from one another as Buddhist thought did. 

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophyand the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodoxHindu thought are the Sā@mkhya, the Yoga, the Nyāya, the Vais'e@sika, the Mimā@msā (generally known as Pūrva Mimā@msā), and the Vedānta (knownalso as Uttara Mimā@msā). Of these what is differently known as Sā@mkhyaand Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vais'e@sika andthe Nyāya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early timesthe similarity of the former with Mimā@msā was greater than thatwith Nyāya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost thesame systems. Nyāya and Vais'e@sika have therefore been treated

8

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems beganto grow prominent from the ninth century A. D. They also probablyhad their early beginnings at the time of the Upani@sads. But atthat time their interest was probably concentrated on problemsof morality and religion. It is not improbable that these wereassociated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no workstreating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their mostimportant early works is the _Bhagavadgātā_. This book is rightlyregarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It iswritten in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysicalproblems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method whichgives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upani@sadsthan to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninthcentury onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theisticideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religiouscreeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic andpluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as differentschools of Vai@s@nava philosophy. Most of the Vai@s@nava thinkers wishedto show that their systems were taught in the Upani@sads, and thuswrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrotecommentaries on the _Brahmasūtra_, the classical exposition of thephilosophy of the Upani@sads. In addition to the works of these Vai@s@navathinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of amore eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as oldas the Upani@sads. They are known as the S'aiva and Tantra thought, and aredealt with in the second volume of this work. 

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thoughtcan be traced to some time between 600 B. C. To 100 or 200 B. C. It isextremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of thesystems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts havebeen made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how farthey are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover duringthe earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only aretraceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to developside by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which theywere first conceived to about the seventeenth century A. D. In anunbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system ofHindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now

9

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth ofany system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as newproblems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistentlywith its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken thephilosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thusthough it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form ofSā@mkhya, Yoga, and Mīmā@msā were prior to Buddhism yet they have beentreated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of thesesystems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion theVais'e@sika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has beentreated later, partly on account of its association with Nyāya, andpartly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a muchlater date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities ofold philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could havebeen of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systemsand their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to besatisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawnmy materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of theliterature of each system which I have put in before beginning the studyof any particular system of thought. 

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sourcesas accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliarmodes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable tothe adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indianideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of themodern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modesof rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indianthought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my presentattempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I mightsay that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy areessentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The maindifference is often the difference of the point of view from which thesame problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophicaldevelopment will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the secondvolume of the present work. 

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CHAPTER II

THE VEDAS, BRĀHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

The Vedas and their antiquity. 

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be theearliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeeddifficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions cameinto existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of themcan be proved to be incontestably true. Max Müller supposed the date tobe 1200 B. C. , Haug 2400 B. C. And Bāl Ga@ngādhar Tilak 4000 B. C. Theancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down frommouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindusgenerally believed that they were never composed by men. It wastherefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to thesages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the"seers" (_mantradra@s@tā_) of the hymns. Thus we find that when sometime had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come tolook upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believedto have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning ofeach creation. 

The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind. 

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writingprevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from theirpreceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us throughthe course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolationsat all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changesin the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but suchwas the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained asthe highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus atall times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindusat birth, marriage, death, etc. , are performed according to the old

11

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a dayare the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer versestwo or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of anordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system ofimage-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regularobligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of moneyfor the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedasbase upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with othersand maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alonewas the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly theirviews. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religiouscustoms and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to bebut mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held tobe obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, inthe inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legaltransactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authorityfrom the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it tosay that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of thepast, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost allliteratures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we maysay that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodoxHindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of theVedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past. 

Classification of the Vedic literature. 

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the studyof later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confusedwhen he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport andsubjects having the same generic name "Veda" or "S'ruti" (from_s'ru_ to hear); for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any

12

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extendingover a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literaturerepresents the total achievements of the Indian people in differentdirections for such a long period, it must of necessity be of adiversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature fromthe points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point outfour different types, namely the Sa@mhitā or collection of verses (_sam_together, _hita_ put), Brāhma@nas, Āra@nyakas ("forest treatises")and the Upani@sads. All these literatures, both prose and verse, were looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thoughtalmost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt byheart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors andwere hence called _s'ruti_ (literally anything heard)[Footnote ref 1]. 

The Sa@mhitās. 

There are four collections or Sa@mhitās, namely @Rg-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the @Rg-Veda is probably theearliest. The Sāma-Veda has practically no independent value, forit consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the@Rg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, andmay thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however containsin addition to the verses taken from the @Rg-Veda many original proseformulas. The arrangement of the verses of the Sāma-Veda is solely withreference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contentsof the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses wereactually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is thereforecalled the Veda of Yajus--sacrificial prayers. These may be contrastedwith the arrangement in the @Rg-Veda in this, that there the verses aregenerally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or theFire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourthcollection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present formconsiderably later than the @Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as ProfessorMacdonell says, "It is not only entirely different from the _Rigveda_but represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the_Rigveda_ deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a

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[Footnote 1: Pā@nini, III. Iii. 94. ]

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comparatively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the _Atharva-Veda_is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demonworld, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lowergrades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. Thesetwo, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the mostimportant of the four Vedas [Footnote ref 1]. "

The Brāhma@nas. [Footnote ref 2]

After the Sa@mhitās there grew up the theological treatises called theBrāhma@nas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. Theyare written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of thedifferent rituals to those who are not already familiar with them. "They reflect, " says Professor Macdonell, "the spirit of an age inwhich all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice, describing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on itsorigin and significance. " These works are full of dogmatic assertions, fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in thefield of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probablynever so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed. But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generationto generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thusthere came about the necessity of the distribution of the differentsacrificial functions among several distinct classes of priests. We mayassume that this was a period when the caste system was becomingestablished, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religiousminds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinkingwas thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the resultwas the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic

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[Footnote 1: A. A. Macdonell's _History of Sanskrit Literature_, p. 31. ]

[Footnote 2: Weber (_Hist. Ind. Lit_. , p. 11, note) says that the wordBrāhma@na signifies "that which relates to prayer _brahman_. " Max Muller(_S. B. E. _, I. P. Lxvi) says that Brāhma@na meant "originally the sayingsof Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the morespecial sense of Brahman-priests. " Eggeling (S. B. E. XII. Introd. P. Xxii)says that the Brhāma@nas were so called "probably either becausethey were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman)generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritativeutterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificiallore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests. " Butin view of the fact that the Brāhma@nas were also supposed to be asmuch revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's viewis the correct one. ]

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system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is nowgenerally believed that the close of the Brāhma@na period was not laterthan 500 B. C. 

The Āra@nyakas. 

As a further development of the Brāhma@nas however we get the Āra@nyakasor forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men whohad retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaboratesacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which couldnot be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbolswere supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplantthe sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we findthat amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideasbegan to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature oftruth became gradually substituted in their place. To take anillustration from the beginning of the B@rhadāra@nyaka we find thatinstead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (_as'vamedha_)there are directions for meditating upon the dawn (_U@sas_) as the headof the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, andso on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculationor meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonialsof sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capableof bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession ofVedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophicmeditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thuswe find that the Āra@nyaka age was a period during which free thinkingtried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fetteredit for a long time. It was thus that the Āra@nyakas could pave the wayfor the Upani@sads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in theVedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upani@sads the sourceof all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought. 

The @Rg-Veda, its civilization. 

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda are neither the productions of asingle hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. Theywere composed probably at different periods by different sages, and it is not improbable that some of them were composed

15

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handeddown from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additionsthat were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when thecollection had increased to a very considerable extent that it wasprobably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous formsto which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflectthe civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquitybefore and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a longvanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that isgenuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitivesociety which produced it--the oldest book of the Aryan race. The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and thecultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals. "The chief food consists, " as Kaegi says, "together with bread, of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, manysorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts andfamily gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more importantpart than eating [Footnote ref 1]. " The wood-worker built war-chariotsand wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups. Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. Thewomen understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing;they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for menand covering for animals. The group of individuals forming atribe was the highest political unit; each of the different familiesforming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head ofthe family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some caseselectoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by thewill of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right andlaw, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, "the hymnsstrongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the peoplewere persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of theworld were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in therealm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious, was punished and the sin expiated. "[Footnote ref 2] Thus it is only rightand proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree

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[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. P. 18. ]

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of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryansmore manifested than in religion, which was the most essential anddominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secularones. Thus Kaegi says, "The whole significance of the Rigvedain reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedlybeen pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presentsto us the development of religious conceptions from the earliestbeginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and itsrelation to man [Footnote ref 1]. "

The Vedic Gods. 

The hymns of the @Rg-Veda were almost all composed inpraise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondaryimportance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentallyin giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god. The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diversepowers of nature or forming their very essence. They havetherefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like theGreek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, thePurā@nas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, thethunder, are closely associated with one another, and the godsassociated with them are also similar in character. The sameepithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a fewspecific qualities that they differ from one another. In the latermythological compositions of the Purā@nas the gods lost theircharacter as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actualpersonalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrowlike the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrastedwith them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as thecharacters they display are mostly but expressions of the powersof nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, asKaegi has it, as one that "lies concealed in the softer wood, asin a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the earlymorning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness. The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priestspour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighinglike a horse--he whom men love to see increasing like their ownprosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with

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[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 26. ]

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changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, hepresents to all sides his front. 

 "All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light, His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance, The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream, So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease. "

[Footnote ref 1] R. V. I. 143. 3. 

They would describe the wind (Vāta) and adore him and say

 "In what place was he born, and from whence comes he? The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring, The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure: His rushing sound we hear--what his appearance, no one. "

[Footnote ref 2] R. V. X. 168. 3, 4. 

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earthhere, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heavenbeyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion andimagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of afew abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and somedual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as theterrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial. 

Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism. 

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirerto think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligentreader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simpleprimitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owetheir origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as ina polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificanceor shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not. The Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenonexcited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struckwith wonder that "the rough red cow gives soft white milk. " The appearanceor the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedicsage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:

 "Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it That downward turned he falls not downward? The guide of his ascending path, --who saw it?"

[Footnote Ref 1] R. V. IV. 13. 5. 

The sages wonder how "the sparkling waters of all rivers flowinto one ocean without ever filling it. " The minds of the Vedic

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[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 35. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_, p. 38. ]

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people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable andfresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them toaccord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitudeof gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. Theyhypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawedthem or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent oraesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotionor admiration of their mind was the most supreme for thetime. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has calledHenotheism or Kathenotheism: "a belief in single gods, each in turnstanding out as the highest. And since the gods are thought ofas specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their specialconcerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom theyascribe the most power in the matter, --to whose department if Imay say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mindof the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everythingthat can be said of a divine being;--he is the highest, the onlygod, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, no offence or depreciation of any other god [Footnote ref 1]. " "Againstthis theory it has been urged, " as Macdonell rightly says in his _VedicMythology_ [Footnote ref 2], "that Vedic deities are not represented as'independent of all the rest, ' since no religion brings its gods intomore frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that eventhe mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. ThusVaru@na and Sūrya are subordinate to Indra (I. 101), Varu@na andthe As'vins submit to the power of Vi@s@nu (I. 156).... Even when agod is spoken of as unique or chief (_eka_), as is natural enough inlaudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheisticforce, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the contextor even by the same verse [Footnote Ref 3]. "Henotheism is therefore anappearance, " says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearanceproduced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as theconstant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priestor singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatnessand to ignore other gods, and by the

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[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 27. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Ibid. _ p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for otherreferences to Henotheism. ]

[Footnote 3: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 16, 17. ]

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growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. The refrain of 3, 35)each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine [Footnote ref 1]. "But whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggerationof the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that thisstage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic, but one which had a tendency towards them both, although itwas not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them. The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called amonotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of differentdeities as independent of one another and yet existing side by sidewas a tendency towards polytheism. 

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajāpati, Vis'vakarma. 

This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest andhighest gradually brought forth the conception of a supremeLord of all beings (Prajāpati), not by a process of consciousgeneralization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind, able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral andphysical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived. Thus the epithet Prajāpati or the Lord of beings, whichwas originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognizedas a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is saidin R. V. X. 121 [Footnote Ref 2]:

 In the beginning rose Hira@nyagarbha, Born as the only lord of all existence. This earth he settled firm and heaven established: What god shall we adore with our oblations? Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding All creatures must obey, the bright gods even; Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal: What god shall we adore with our oblations? Who by his might alone became the monarch Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers, Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal: What god shall we adore with our oblations? Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains, The ocean and the distant stream exhibit; Whose arms extended are these spreading regions: What god shall we adore with our oblations? Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring, Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens; Who measured out the air's extended spaces: What god shall we adore with our oblations?

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17. ]

[Footnote 2: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89. ]

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Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Vis'vakarma(All-creator) [Footnote ref 1]. He is said to be father and procreator ofall beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters. It is to him that the sage says, Who is our father, our creator, maker, Who every place doth know and every creature, By whom alone to gods their names were given, To him all other creatures go to ask him [Footnote ref 2] R. V. X. 82. 3. 

Brahma. 

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest gloryfor the Vedānta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged inthe @Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. Themeanings that Sāya@na the celebrated commentator of the Vedasgives of the word as collected by Haug are: (_a_) food, food offering, (_b_) the chant of the sāma-singer, (_c_) magical formula or text, (_d_) duly completed ceremonies, (_e_) the chant and sacrificial gifttogether, (_f_) the recitation of the hot@r priest, (_g_) great. Rothsays that it also means "the devotion which manifests itself aslonging and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to thegods. " But it is only in the S'atapatha Brāhma@na that the conceptionof Brahman has acquired a great significance as thesupreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. Thus the S'atapatha says, "Verily in the beginning this (universe)was the Brahman (neut. ). It created the gods; and, havingcreated the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this(terrestrial) world, Vāyu the air, and Sūrya the sky.... Then theBrahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone upto the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend againinto these worlds?' It then descended again by means of thesetwo, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; andthat again which has no name and which one knows by its form, 'this is (of a certain) form, ' that is form: as far as there are Formand Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeedare the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knowsthese two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force [Footnoteref 3]. In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in theUniverse and is identified with Prajāpati, Puru@sa and Prā@na

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[Footnote 1: See _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's _SanskritTexts_, vol. IV. Pp. 5-11. ]

[Footnote 2: Kaegi's translation. ]

[Footnote 3: See Eggeling's translation of S'atapatha Brāhmana _S. B. E. _vol. XLIV. Pp. 27, 28. ]

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(the vital air [Footnote ref 1]). In another place Brahman is described asbeing the Svayambhū (self-born) performing austerities, who offeredhis own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self, and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship overall creatures [Footnote ref 2]. The conception of the supreme man (Puru@sa)in the @Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades theworld with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remainingthree parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once thepresent, past and future [Footnote ref 3]. 

Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma. 

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistictendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were graduallygrowing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growthcontributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportantposition, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristicsof the sacrifice as an institution which could give thedesired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were notdictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christianor Vai@s@nava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceivedas Haug notes "to be a kind of machinery in which everypiece must tally with the other, " the slightest discrepancy in theperformance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouringof the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensilsemployed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere strawcontrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the wholesacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed. Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful resultsmight follow. Thus when Tva@s@t@r performed a sacrifice for theproduction of a demon who would be able to kill his enemyIndra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the objectwas reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But ifthe sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutestdetail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruitionof the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled notby the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice. The performance of the rituals invariably produced certainmystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired

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[Footnote 1: See _S. B. E. _ XLIII. Pp. 59, 60, 400 and XLIV. P. 409. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Ibid_. , XLIV, p. 418. ]

[Footnote 3: R. V. X. 90, Puru@sa Sūkta. ]

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by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment ofa natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believedto have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation ofthe world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performedby the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says "as an invisible thing atall times and is like the latent power of electricity in anelectrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitableapparatus in order to be elicited. " The sacrifice is not offeredto a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfareon earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced bythe sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicatedand interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Thoughin each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings, the gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrificeor in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior evento the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rankby means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the onlykind of duty, and it was also called _karma_ or _kriyā_ (action) andthe unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for goodor for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds ofsacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies orgaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others)were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here thatthe first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in natureunder the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in theuse of the word @Rta (literally the course of things). This wordwas also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the "'order'in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religiousworld as sacrifice or 'rite'[Footnote ref 1]" and its unalterable law ofproducing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that itis here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercisessuch a dominating control over Indian thought up to the presentday. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedichymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complexsystem of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their coursetowards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimatereality of the universe. 

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11. ]

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Cosmogony--Mythological and philosophical. 

The cosmogony of the @Rg-Veda may be looked at from twoaspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythologicalaspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, "The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production, the work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the otherrepresents it as the result of natural generation [Footnote ref. 1]. "Thus in the @Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, "what wasthe wood and what was the tree out of which they built heavenand earth [Footnote ref. 2]?" The answer given to this question inTaittirīya-Brāhma@na is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree fromwhich the heaven and earth were made [Footnote ref 3]. " Heaven and Earthare sometimes described as having been supported with posts [Footnoteref 4]. They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, andparentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Dak@sa. 

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn[Footnote ref 5] attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have alreadynoticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whateverhas been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has becomediffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, andall beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere;from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; fromhis ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in whichthe Sun is called the soul (_ātman_) of all that is movable andall that is immovable [Footnote ref 6]. There are also statements to theeffect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by thesages [Footnote ref 7]. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as thesupreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hira@nyagarbha [Footnoteref 8]). In some passages it is said "Brahma@naspati blew forth thesebirths like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existentsprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, theexistent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regionssprang, thereafter, from Uttānapada [Footnote ref 9]. " The most remarkableand sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11. ]

[Footnote 2: R. V. X. 81. 4. ]

[Footnote 3: Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6. ]

[Footnote 4: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 11; also R. V. II. 15 and IV. 56. ]

[Footnote 5: R. V. X. 90. ]

[Footnote 6: R. V. I. 115. ]

[Footnote 7: R. V. I. 164. 46. ]

[Footnote 8: R. V. X. 121. ]

[Footnote 9: Muir's translation of R. V. X. 72; Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. V. P. 48. ]

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with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the worldare found is the 129th hymn of R. V. X. 

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being. The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it. What covered all? and where? by what protected? Was there the fathomless abyss of waters?

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed; Of day and night there was yet no distinction. Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported, Other than It was none, nor aught above It. 

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden; The universe was undistinguished water. That which in void and emptiness lay hidden Alone by power of fervor was developed. 

4. Then for the first time there arose desire, Which was the primal germ of mind, within it. And sages, searching in their heart, discovered In Nothing the connecting bond of Being. 

6. Who is it knows? Who here can tell us surely From what and how this universe has risen? And whether not till after it the gods lived? Who then can know from what it has arisen?

7. The source from which this universe has risen, And whether it was made, or uncreated, He only knows, who from the highest heaven Rules, the all-seeing lord--or does not He know [Footnote ref 1]?

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in theS'atapatha Brāhma@na (x. 5. 3. I) which says that "in the beginningthis (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent;in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and didnot exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has beendeclared by the Rishi (@Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neitherthe non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neitherexistent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished tobecome manifest, --more defined, more substantial: it sought aftera self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency [Footnoteref 2]. " In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms ofthe universe were comprehended within the god Skambha [Footnote ref 3]. 

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprangforth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could

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[Footnote 1: _The Rigveda_, by Kaegi, p. 90. R. V. X. 129. ]

[Footnote 2: See Eggeling's translation of _S'. B. , S. B. E. _ vol. XLIII. Pp. 374, 375. ]

[Footnote 3: _A. V. _ x. 7. 10. ]

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question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, whichcould think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in themystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being;and which could think that it was the primal One which by itsinherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the firstmanifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprangforth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In theBrāhma@nas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generallyrequires the agency of a creator, who is not however always thestarting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combinedwith the theory of creation, so that Prajāpati is sometimesspoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is saidto have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg. 

Eschatology; the Doctrine of Ātman. 

There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul couldbe separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it couldexist after death, though we do not find there any trace of thedoctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the S'atapathaBrāhma@na it is said that those who do not perform rites withcorrect knowledge are born again after death and suffer deathagain. In a hymn of the @Rg-Veda (X. 58) the soul (_manas_) of a manapparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from thetrees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns thereis also the belief in the existence of another world, where thehighest material joys are attained as a result of the performanceof the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneathwhere the evil-doers are punished. In the S'atapathaBrāhma@na we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn theevil-doers, but let the good go by [Footnote ref 1]; it is also saidthere that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance, and receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad. It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard tothe destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that heperforms or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments ofthe later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoysor suffers, either in another world or by being born in this worldaccording to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of themoral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were

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[Footnote 1: See _S. B. _ I. 9. 3, and also Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, pp. 166, 167. ]

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more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary goodworks. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connectionof the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and badworks when combined with the notion of an inviolable law ororder, which we have already seen was gradually growing withthe conception of @rta, and the unalterable law which producesthe effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and thedoctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the@Rg-Veda are _manas_, _ātman_ and _asu_. The word _ātman_ howeverwhich became famous in later Indian thought is generally usedto mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thoughtand emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, asdwelling in the heart[Footnote ref 1]. It is however difficult tounderstand how ātman as vital breath, or as a separable part of mangoing out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essenceor reality in man and the universe. There is however at least onepassage in the @Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper anddeeper passes from the vital breath (_asu_) to the blood, and thenceto ātman as the inmost self of the world; "Who has seen howthe first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), wasborn from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vitalbreath, the blood, the Self (_ātman_) of the world? Who went toask him that knows it [Footnote ref 2]?" In Taittīrya Āra@nyaka I. 23, however, it is said that Prajāpati after having created his self (asthe world) with his own self entered into it. In Taittīrya Brāhma@nathe ātman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knowshim is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in thepre-Upani@sad Vedic literature ātman probably was first used todenote "vital breath" in man, then the self of the world, and thenthe self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the tracesof a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresentsupreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of whichmakes a man sinless and pure. 

Conclusion. 

Looking at the advancement of thought in the @Rg-Veda wefind first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing whichnot only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a

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[Footnote 1: Macdonell's _Vedic Mythology_, p. 166 and R. V. Viii. 89. ]

[Footnote 2: R. V. I. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on Ātman in_Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics_. 

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construction made of them, but sought to explain it as havingemanated from one great being who is sometimes described asone with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times asbeing separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the motherof philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to expressdoubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation--"Whoknows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondlythe growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterablenature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced theireffects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deitiesas being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and thetendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiplecharacter and advanced the monotheistic tendency in somequarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separablefrom his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in anotherworld according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that thesoul of man could go to plants, etc. , or that it could again be rebornon earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this maybe regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine oftransmigration. The self (_ātman_) is spoken of in one place as theessence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brāhma@nasand the Āra@nyakas we see that ātman has begun to mean thesupreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thusapproached the great Ātman doctrine of the Upani@sads. 

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER UPANI@SADS [Footnote ref 1]. (700 B. C. -600 B. C. )

The place of the Upani@sads in Vedic literature. 

Though it is generally held that the Upani@sads are usuallyattached as appendices to the Āra@nyakas which are again attachedto the Brāhma@nas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction asseparate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some casesthat subjects which we should expect to be discussed in a Brāhma@naare introduced into the Āra@nyakas and the Āra@nyaka materialsare sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upani@sad teaching. This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one

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[Footnote 1: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published bythe "Nir@naya-Sāgara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Ķsā, 2 Kena, 3 Katha, 4 Pras'na, 5 Mun@daka, 6 Mā@n@dukya, 7 Taittirīya, 7 Aitareya, 9 Chāndogya, 10 B@rhadāra@nyaka, 11 S'vetās'vatara, 12 Kau@sitaki, 13 Maitreyī, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jābāla, 16 Brahmabindu, 17 Ha@msa, 18 Āru@nika, 19 Garbha, 20 Nārāya@na, 21 Nārāya@na, 22 Paramaha@msa, 23 Brahma, 24 Am@rtanāda, 25 Atharvas'iras, 26 Atharvas'ikhā, 27 Maitrāya@nī, 28 B@rhajjābāla, 29 N@rsi@mhapūrvatāpinī, 30 N@rsi@mhottaratāpinī, 31 Kālāgnirudra, 32 Subāla, 33 K@surikā, 34 Yantrikā, 35 Sarvasāra, 36 Nirālamba, 37 S'ukarahasya, 38 Vajrasūcikā, 39 Tejobindu, 40 Nādabindu, 41 Dhyānabindu, 42 Brahmavidyā, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Atmabodha, 45 Nāradaparivrājaka, 46 Tris'ikhibrāhma@na, 47 Sītā, 48 Yogacū@dama@ni, 49 Nirvāna, 50 Ma@ndalabrāhma@na, 51 Dak@si@nāmūrtti, 52 S'arabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripādvibhūtimahānārya@na, 55 Advayatāraka, 56 Ramarahasya, 57 Rāmapūrvatāpinī, 58 Rāmottaratāpinī, 59 Vāsudeva, 60 Mudgala, 61 Sā@n@dilya, 62 Pai@ngala, 63 Bhik@suka, Mahā, 65 S'ārīraka, 66 Yogas'ikhā, 67 Turiyātīta, 68 Sa@mnyāsa, 69 Paramaha@msaparivrājaka, 70 Ak@samālā, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekāk@sara, 73 Annapūrnā, 74 Sūrya, 75 Aksi, 76 Adhyātma, 77 Ku@n@dika, 78 Sāvitrī, 79 Ātman, 80 Pā'supatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhūta, 83 Tripurārāpini, 84 Devī, 85 Tripurā, 86 Ka@tharudra, 87 Bhāvanā, 88 Rudrah@rdaya, 89 Yogaku@n@dali, 90 Bhasmajābāla, 91 Rudrāk@sajābāla, 92 Ga@napati, 93 Jābāladars'ana, 94 Tāiasāra, 95 Mahāvakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97 Prā@nāgnihotra, 98 Gopālapūrvatāpinī, 99 Gopālottaratāpinī, 100 K@r@s@na, 101 Yājńavalkya, 102 Varāha, 103 S'āthyāyanīya, 104 Hayagrīva, 105 Dattātreya, 106 Garu@da, 107 Kalisantara@na, 108 Jābāli, 109 Saubhāgyalak@smī, 110 Sarasvatīrahasya, 111 Bahvrca, 112 Muktika. 

The collection of Upani@sads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother, contained 50 Upani@sads. The Muktika Upani@sad gives a list of 108Upani@sads. With the exception of the first 13 Upani@sads most of them areof more or less later date. The Upani@sads dealt with in this chapter arethe earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat thepurport of these, there are others which deal with the S'aiva, S'ākta, the Yoga and the Vai@s@nava doctrines. These will be referred to inconnection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. Thelater Upani@sads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in thischapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upani@sads werecomposed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century. ]

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process of development and they were probably regarded as partsof one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter. Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to befound in this, that the Brāhma@nas were intended for the householders, the Āra@nyakas for those who in their old age withdrewinto the solitude of the forests and the Upani@sads for those whorenounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation. Whatever might be said about these literary classifications theancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upani@sads as beingof an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literatureas dictating the path of knowledge (_jńāna-mārga_) as opposedto the path of works (_karma-mārga_) which forms the contentof the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that theorthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in theVeda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certainactions (_vidhi_) or prohibitions against committing certain others(_ni@sedha_). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpretedthat the real objects of their insertion might appear as only topraise the performance of the commandments and to blame thecommission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to arguewhy any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for noreason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason failsto find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect thatthe Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitionsto show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongstherefore to that of the Karma-mārga or the performance of Vedicduties of sacrifice, etc. The Upani@sads however do not requirethe performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truthand reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man. Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strongcontroversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedānta(_Upani@sads_) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogyto the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principlethat the Upani@sads should not be regarded as an exception, butthat they should also be so interpreted that they might also beheld out as commending the performance of duties; but theformer dissociate the Upani@sads from the rest of the Vedic literatureand assert that they do not make the slightest reference toany Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality whichreveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving. 

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S'a@nkara the most eminent exponent of the Upani@sads holds thatthey are meant for such superior men who are already aboveworldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic dutieshave ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may besuch a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or anascetic, for him the Upani@sads have been revealed for his ultimateemancipation and the true knowledge. Those who perform theVedic duties belong to a stage inferior to those who no longercare for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for finalemancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear theUpani@sads [Footnote ref 1]. 

The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence. 

The Upani@sads are also known by another name Vedānta, asthey are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas (_veda-anta_, end); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upani@sads, the Vedānta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern studentknows that in language the Upani@sads approach the classicalSanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culminationof the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As theythus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained theirVedic names which they took from the name of the differentschools or branches (_s'ākhā_) among which the Vedas were studied[Footnote ref 2]. Thus the Upani@sads attached to the Brāhma@nasof the Aitareya and Kau@sītaki schools are called respectivelyAitareya and Kau@sītaki Upani@sads. Those of the Tā@n@dins andTalavakāras of the Sāma-veda are called the Chāndogya and Talavakāra(or Kena) Upani@sads. Those of the Taittirļya school of the Yajurveda

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[Footnote 1: This is what is called the difference of fitness(_adhikāribheda_). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit tohear the Upani@sads and those who are fit to hear the Upani@sadshave no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties. ]

[Footnote 2: When the Sa@mhitā texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed to memory in different parts of the country andtransmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for thepractical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed thematter of prose compositions, the Brāhma@nas. These however weregradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to thespecial tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings ofthe texts of the Brāhma@nas even of the same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name of particular S'ākhās(e. G. Aitareya, Kau@sītaki) with which the Brāhma@nas were associatedor named. According to the divergence of the Brāhma@nas of the differentS'ākhās there occurred the divergences of content and the length of theUpani@sads associated with them. ]

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form the Taittirīya and Mahānāraya@na, of the Ka@tha schoolthe Kā@thaka, of the Maitrāya@nī school the Maitrāya@nī. TheB@rhadāra@nyaka Upani@sad forms part of the S'atapatha Brāhma@naof the Vājasaneyi schools. The Īs'ā Upani@sad also belongs to thelatter school. But the school to which the S'vetās'vatara belongscannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumptionwith regard to these Upani@sads is that they represent theenlightened views of the particular schools among which theyflourished, and under whose names they passed. A large numberof Upani@sads of a comparatively later age were attached to theAtharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to theVedic schools but according to the subject-matter with whichthey dealt [Footnote ref 1]. 

It may not be out of place here to mention that from thefrequent episodes in the Upani@sads in which the Brahmins aredescribed as having gone to the K@sattriyas for the highest knowledgeof philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of theUpani@sad teachings from that of the general doctrines of theBrāhma@nas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophicalspeculations amongst the people in Pāli works, it may beinferred that among the K@sattriyas in general there existed earnestphilosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exertedan important influence in the formation of the Upani@sad doctrines. There is thus some probability in the supposition that though theUpani@sads are found directly incorporated with the Brāhma@nasit was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmasalone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have eitherset the Upani@sad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistanceto their formulation and cultivation, though they achievedtheir culmination in the hands of the Brahmins. 

Brāhma@nas and the Early Upani@sads. 

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brāhmanic to theUpani@sad thought is probably the most remarkable event in thehistory of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedichymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence weredeveloped, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism ofthe Upani@sads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican

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[Footnote 1: Garbha Upani@sad, Ātman Upani@sad, Pras'na Upani@sad, etc. There were however some exceptions such as the Mā@n@dūkya, Jābāla, Pai@ngala, S'aunaka, etc. ]

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systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Vis'vakarman orHira@nyagarbha into the ātman and the Brahman of the Upani@sadsseems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willingto admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the ātmandoctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughoutthe earlier Upani@sads no mention is to be found of Vis'vakarman, Hira@nyagarbha or Brahma@naspati and no reference of such anature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upani@sadideas with those conceptions [Footnote ref l]. The word puru@sa no doubtoccurs frequently in the Upani@sads, but the sense and the associationthat come along with it are widely different from that of thepuru@sa of the Puru@sasūkta of the @Rg-Veda. 

When the @Rg-Veda describes Vis'vakarman it describes himas a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom they pray for worldly benefits. "What was the position, whichand whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Vis'vakarmanproduced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? Theone god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on everyside arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, shapes them with his arms and with his wings.... Do thou, Vis'vakarman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, and the lowest, and the middle... May a generous son remain hereto us [Footnote ref 2]"; again in R. V. X. 82 we find "Vis'vakarman iswise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object ofintuition.... He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knowsall spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the other creatures resort for instruction [Footnote ref 3]. "Again about Hira@nyagarbha we find in R. V. I. 121, "Hira@nyagarbha arosein the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. Heestablished the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer ouroblation?... May he not injure us, he who is the generator of theearth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, whoproduced the great and brilliant waters!--to what god, etc. ? Prajāpati, no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may weobtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may webecome masters of riches [Footnote ref 4]. " Speaking of the puru@sa the@Rg-Veda

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[Footnote 1: The name Vis'vakarma appears in S'vet. IV. 17. Hira@nyagarbha appears in S'vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as thefirst created being. The phrase Sarvāhammānī Hira@nyagarbha whichDeussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The wordBrahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads. ]

[Footnote 2: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. Pp. 6, 7. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _ p, 7. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid. _ pp. 16, 17. ]

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says "Purusha has a thousand heads... A thousand eyes, and a thousandfeet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it]by a space of ten fingers.... He formed those aerial creatures, andthe animals, both wild and tame [Footnote ref 1], " etc. Even thatfamous hymn (R. V. X. 129) which begins with "There was then neitherbeing nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above" ends with saying"From whence this creation came into being, whether it wascreated or not--he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probablyknows or does not know. "

In the Upani@sads however, the position is entirely changed, and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outsidebut in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic positionof the Vedas could have grown into some form of developedtheism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only realityand that everything else was far below it. There is no relationhere of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers areoffered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the trueself of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change ofphilosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective doesnot carry with it in the Upani@sads any elaborate philosophicaldiscussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matterof direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth hasbeen grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of theapparently meaningless speculations of the Brāhma@nas this doctrinecould have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbableto be believed. 

On the strength of the stories of Bālāki Ga'rgya and Ajātas'atru(B@rh. II. I), S'vetaketu and Pravāha@na Jaibali (Chā. V. 3 and B@rh. VI. 2) and Āru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Chā. V. 11) Garbe thinks"that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, thedoctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influenceon the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its originin the circle of Brahmans at all [Footnote ref 2]" and that "it tookits rise in the ranks of the warrior caste [Footnote ref 3]. " Thisif true would of course lead the development of the Upani@sads awayfrom the influence of the Veda, Brāhma@nas and the Āra@nyakas. But dothe facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbehimself

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[Footnote 1: Muir's _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. V. Pp. 368, 371. ]

[Footnote 2: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_, " p. 68. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _ p. 78. 

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self has produced. In the story of Bālāki Gārgya and Ajātas'atru(B@rh. II. 1) referred to by him, Bālāki Gārgya is a boastful manwho wants to teach the K@sattriya Ajātas'atru the true Brahman, but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To thisAjātas'atru replies (following Garbe's own translation) "it iscontrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instructionfrom a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman tohim [Footnote ref l]. " Does this not imply that in the natural order ofthings a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to theK@sattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking aK@sattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginningof the conversation, Ajātas'atru had promised to pay Bālāki onethousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all peopleused to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. Thesecond story of S'vetaketu and Pravāha@na Jaibali seems to be fairlyconclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, the way of the gods (_devayāna_) and the way of the fathers(_pit@ryāna_) had originated among the K@sattriyas, but it is withoutany relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledgeof Brahman as the true self. 

The third story of Āru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Chā. V. 11)is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing toknow what the Brahman and the self were, went to UddālakaĀru@ni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompaniedthem to the K@sattriya king As'vapati Kaikeya who was studyingthe subject. But As'vapati ends the conversation by giving themcertain instructions about the fire doctrine (_vaisvānara agni_) andthe import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about thetrue self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there areonly the few exceptional cases where K@sattriya kings were instructingthe Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins werediscussing and instructing the ātman knowledge. I am thus ledto think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against theBrahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had beentoo hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to havebeen shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the referencesgiven by him to the Upani@sad passages are also the same as we

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[Footnote 1: Garbe's article, "_Hindu Monism_, " p. 74. ]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. , compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Yājńavalkyaspeaks to Janaka about the _brahmavidyā_. ]

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just examined [Footnote ref 1]. The truth seems to me to be this, thatthe K@sattriyas and even some women took interest in thereligio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upani@sads. The enquirerswere so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahmanor in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex andbirth [Footnote ref 2]; and there seems to be no definite evidence forthinking that the Upani@sad philosophy originated among the K@sattriyasor that the germs of its growth could not be traced in theBrāhma@nas and the Āra@nyakas which were the productions ofthe Brahmins. 

The change of the Brāhma@na into the Āra@nyaka thought issignified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices totheir symbolic representations and meditations which were regardedas being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus wefind in the B@rhadāra@nyaka (I. 1) that instead of a horse sacrificethe visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditatedupon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is theeye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what goodcan its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which ismost significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such isthe most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mereanimal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the placeof an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The materialsubstances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial ritualslost their value and bare meditations took their place. Sideby side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of theBrahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolicmeditations were taking the place of gross matter andaction involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not onlychosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc. , fromthe body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, buteven arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed thatthe meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productiveof great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losingvalue in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significancesand imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth[Footnote ref 3]. 

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[Footnote 1: Winternitz's _Geschichte der indischen Litteratur_, I. Pp. 197 ff. ]

[Footnote 2: The story of Maitryī and Yājńavalikya (B@rh. II. 4)and that of Satyakāma son of Jabālā and his teacher (Chā. IV. 4). ]

[Footnote 3: Chā. V. II. ]

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The Uktha (verse) of @Rg-Veda was identified in the AitareyaĀra@nyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prā@na [Footnoteref 1], the Udgītha of the Sāmaveda was identified with Om, Prā@na, sun and eye; in Chāndogya II. The Sāman was identified with Om, rain, water, seasons, Prā@na, etc. , in Chāndogya III. 16-17 man wasidentified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation;laughing, eating, etc. , with the utterance of the Mantras;and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, withsacrificial fees (_dak@si@nā_). The gifted mind of these cultured VedicIndians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precisionof thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in theĀra@nyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of thingswhich to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind ofinstrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pureidentity. Thus in Ait. Āra@n. II. 1. 3 we find "Then comes the originof food. The seed of Prajāpati are the gods. The seed of the godsis rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. Theseed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed ofcreatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seedof the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act doneis this man the abode of Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. "

The word Brahman according to Sāya@na meant mantras(magical verses), the ceremonies, the hot@r priest, the great. Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R. V. As being new, "as not having hitherto existed, " and as "coming into being fromthe fathers. " It originates from the seat of the @Rta, springs forthat the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the somajuice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is itsguardian (R. V. VIII. 37. I, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, 1. 47. 2, VII. 22. 9, VI. 52. 3, etc. ). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies theconjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which canbe called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, asthe magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation ofthe hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts [Footnote ref 3]. I amdisposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with themeaning as we find it in many passages in the Āra@nyakas and theUpani@sads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between

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[Footnote 1: Ait. Āra@n. II 1-3. ]

[Footnote 2: Keith's _Translation of Aitareya Āranyaka_. ]

[Footnote 3: Hillebrandt's article on Brahman, _E. R. E. _. ]

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"magical force" and "great, " transition between which israther easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced bymeditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices stillremained, and as a result of that we find that in many passagesof the Upani@sads people are thinking of meditating upon thisgreat force "Brahman" as being identified with diverse symbols, natural objects, parts and functions of the body. 

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from itsactual performance in the external world to certain forms ofmeditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegoriesof sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functionswas regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothingcould be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretationsof the Pańcāgnividyā are so much referred to in the Upani@sadsas a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think thatthe real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he isreally ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, theythought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so thegods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for aman if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant forthe gods that men should know this great truth. [Footnote ref 1]. 

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers ofthe gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vāyu (wind) toblow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahmanthat all the gods and all the senses of man could work. Thewhole process of Upani@sad thought shows that the magic powerof sacrifices as associated with @Rta (unalterable law) was beingabstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. There are many stories in the Upani@sads of the search after thenature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first onlyimperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating powerof the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. Withbodily and mental functions and with various symbolicalrepresentations, and deluded themselves for a time with the ideathat these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually foundinadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine ofthe inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahmanoriginated. 

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[Footnote 1: B@rh. I. 4. 10. ]

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The meaning of the word Upani@sad. 

The word Upani@sad is derived from the root _sad_ with the prefix_ni_ (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant theact of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening tohim. In his introduction to the Upani@sads he says, "The historyand the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt thatUpani@sad meant originally session, particularly a session consistingof pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher[Footnote ref 1]. " Deussen points out that the word means "secret" or"secret instruction, " and this is borne out by many of the passages ofthe Upani@sads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was usedin this sense in the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 2]. There we find thatgreat injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communicationof the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to astudent or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desiresproves himself deserving to hear them. S'ankara however, thegreat Indian exponent of the Upani@sads, derives the word fromthe root _sad_ to destroy and supposes that it is so called because itdestroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing theright knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which theword Upani@sad occurs in the Upani@sads themselves it seems thatDeussen's meaning is fully justified [Footnote ref 3]. 

The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads. 

The oldest Upani@sads are written in prose. Next to these wehave some in verses very similar to those that are to be found inclassical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upani@sad themore archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upani@sads havean almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least toIndian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. We can read and read them over again without getting tired. The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charmapart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The wordUpani@sad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secretdoctrine or instruction"; the Upani@sad teachings were also intendedto be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers ofhigh morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving

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[Footnote 1: Max Muller's _Translation of the Upanishads, S. B. E. _ vol. I. P. Lxxxi. ]

[Footnote 2: _S. B. E. _ vol. I, p lxxxi. ]

[Footnote 3: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads, _ pp. 10-15. ]

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emancipation. It was thus that the Upani@sad style of expression, when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm andattraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that wefind that even when other forms of prose and verse had beenadapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upani@sad form of compositionhad not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upani@sadswere compiled by 500 B C. , they continued to be written even solate as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. Theearliest and most important are probably those that have beencommented upon by S'ankara namely B@rhadāra@nyaka, Chāndogya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Īs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mundaka andMāndūkya [Footnote ref 1]. It is important to note in this connectionthat the separate Upani@sads differ much from one another with regardto their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some ofthem are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine ofthe self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress uponthe practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of S'iva, of Visnu andthe philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus berespectively called the Yoga, S'aiva, Visnu and S'ārīra Upani@sads. These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight. 

Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times. 

How the Upani@sads came to be introduced into Europe is aninteresting story Dāra Shiko the eldest son of the EmperorShah Jahan heard of the Upani@sads during his stay in Kashmirin 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, whoundertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend Avesta, receiveda manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, theFrench resident in Faizabad at the court of Shujā-uddaulah. Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read bySchopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauerhimself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he

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[Footnote 1: Deussen supposes that Kausītaki is also one of the earliest. Max Müller and Schroeder think that Maitrāy@anī also belongs to theearliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively laterproduction. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. Inthe first period he includes B@rhadāra@nyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Kausītaki and Kena. In that second he includes Kā@thaka, Ķs'ā, S'vetās'vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mahānārāyana, and in the third period heincludes Pras'na, Maitrāya@nī and Mān@dūkya. The rest of the Upani@sadshe includes in the fourth period. ]

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writes in the preface to his _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_[Footnote ref 1], "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partakerof the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened tous through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage whichthis still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believethat the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not lessdeeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenthcentury: if, I say, the reader has also already received andassimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he bestof all prepared to hear what I have to say to him.... I might expressthe opinion that each one of the individual and disconnectedaphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced asa consequence from the thought I am going to impart, thoughthe converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishadsis by no means the case. " Again, "How does every line displayits firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From everysentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the wholeis pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit.... In the wholeworld there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficialand so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solaceof my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]" ThroughSchopenhauer the study of the Upani@sads attracted much attention inGermany and with the growth of a general interest in the studyof Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe aswell. 

The study of the Upani@sads has however gained a greatimpetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy whonot only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English andpublished them at his own expense, but founded the BrahmaSamaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which werederived directly from the Upani@sads. 

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[Footnote 1: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. Pp. Xii and xiii. ]

[Footnote 2: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada(­_S. B. E. _ I p. Lxii; see also pp. Lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer shouldhave spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'... Thathe should have placed the pantheism there taught high above thepantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as broughtto light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more consideratereception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I couldsay in their favour. "]

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The Upani@sads and their interpretations. 

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upani@sads it maybe worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverseand even contradictory explanations as to the real import of theUpani@sads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of pasttimes. The Upani@sads, as we have seen, formed the concludingportion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called theVedānta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus thatthe highest truths could only be found in the revelation of theVedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparativelysubservient place, and its proper use was to be found in itsjudicious employment in getting out the real meaning of theapparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledgeof ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as havingbeen once for all declared in the Upani@sads. Reason had only tounravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readersof Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that itpresents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truthsare discovered by reason and experience every day, and even inthose cases where the old truths remain, they change their hueand character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths nofinality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with asmuch as comes before the purview of our reason and experienceat the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audaciousthat any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might beshould have any right to say anything regarding the highesttruths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasonsthat he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessaryfor him to show from the texts of the Upani@sads that theysupported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thusit was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of theirprincipal duties to interpret the Upani@sads in order to show thatthey alone represented the true Vedānta doctrines. Any onewho should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of anyparticular school might say that in following that school he wasfollowing the Vedānta. 

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation isabsolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs ofdiverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upani@sads

42

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus eachinterpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his owndoctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and triedto repress others or explain them away. But comparing thevarious systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that theinterpretation offered by S'a@nkara very largely represents the viewof the general body of the earlier Upani@sad doctrines, thoughthere are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of othersystems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedāntais generally associated with the interpretation of S'a@nkara andS'a@nkara's system of thought is called the Vedānta system, thoughthere are many other systems which put forth their claim as representingthe true Vedānta doctrines. 

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreterof the Upani@sads should turn a deaf ear to the absoluteclaims of these exponents, and look upon the Upani@sads not asa systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents ofthought--the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas werestill in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of S'a@nkara, or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport ofby far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that amodern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancientsthat all the Upani@sads represent a connected system, but take thetexts independently and separately and determine their meanings, though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which theyappear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs ofthe thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upani@sads, and thusfind in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts. 

The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures. 

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upani@sadsis that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeablereality which is identical with that which underliesthe essence in man [Footnote ref 1]. If we look at Greek philosophy inParmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find thesame tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as thereality or the essence. I have said above that the Upani@sads are

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[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22. 

43

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collationsor compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but thereis no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casualreader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasmof the sages. They run from place to place with great eagernessin search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the natureof Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Sa@mhitāthere were people who had risen to the conception of a singlecreator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajāpati, Vis'vakarman, Puru@sa, Brahma@naspati and Brahman. But thisdivine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to thenature of this deity began in the Upani@sads. Many visible objectsof nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the variouspsychological functions in man were tried, but none could rendersatisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sagesin the Upani@sad had already started with the idea that there wasa supreme controller or essence presiding over man and theuniverse. But what was its nature? Could it be identified withany of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deityat all? The Upani@sads present to us the history of this quest andthe results that were achieved. 

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have notyet gone out of the Āra@nyaka ideas and of symbolic (_pratīka_)forms of worship. _Prā@na_ (vital breath) was regarded as the mostessential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes arerelated to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as theeye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. Thisrecognition of the superiority of prā@na brings us to the meditationson prā@na as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. So also we find that owing to the presence of the exaltingcharacters of omnipresence and eternality _ākās'a_ (space) ismeditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Āditya (sun)are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with thevisible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vāyu, or the sun and the immaterial representation as ākās'a, manas orprā@na, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutesfor actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest questafter the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought

44

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualisticassociations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrificeyet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment ofBrahman. 

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice thehistory of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought toidentify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc. , and failed; for none ofthese could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It isindeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they aretiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the originalas well. They are of value only in this that they indicate howtoilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associationscould be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had toundergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature ofBrahman. 

Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method. 

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in thedischarge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolicworship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worshipdeities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with theidea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also manysymbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. Theydid not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only adim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their soulswhich could not be translated into permanent terms. But thiswas enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not besatisfied with anything short of the highest. 

They found that by whatever means they tried to give apositive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could notpoint out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utteranceto that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was notlike aught that we find in experience. Yājńavalkya said "Hethe ātman is not this, nor this (_neti neti_). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke

45

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury [Footnote ref 1]. " He is_asat_, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to beunderstood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he isbeing, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists byhim. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whateverwe can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is theunlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (_mahat_), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death [Footnote ref 2]. "Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once formstheir essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yetthe smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; nocharacterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denialto him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. Heis independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause whichrules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empiricaluniverse. When Bāhva was questioned by Va@skali, he expoundedthe nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence--"Teachme, " said Va@skali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman. "Bāhva however remained silent. But when the question was putforth a second or third time he answered, "I teach you indeed butyou do not understand; the Ātman is silence [Footnote ref 3]. " The wayto indicate it is thus by _neti neti_, it is not this, it is not this. We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limitedby conceptual thought. 

The Ātman doctrine. 

The sum and substance of the Upani@sad teaching is involvedin the equation Ātman=Brahman. We have already seen that theword Ātman was used in the @Rg-Veda to denote on the one handthe ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vitalbreath in man. Later on in the Upani@sads we see that the wordBrahman is generally used in the former sense, while the wordĀtman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the

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[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have allmisinterpreted this passage; _asito_ has been interpreted as anadjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced;it is evidently the ablative of _asi_, a sword. ]

[Footnote 2: Ka@tha III. 15. ]

[Footnote 3: Sa@nkara on _Brahmasūtra_, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen, _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 156. ]

46

Upani@sads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are oneand the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The selfof man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i. E. The physicalparts of man) he is called _annamaya_. But behind the sheath ofthis body there is the other self consisting of the vital breathwhich is called the self as vital breath (_prā@namaya ātman_). Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" calledthe _manomaya ātman_. This again contains within it the self"consisting of consciousness" called the _vijńānamaya ātman_. Butbehind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the_ānandamaya ātman_). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture;for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who couldlive, who could breathe if this space (_ākās'a_) was not bliss? Forit is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, hereally becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, between himself and this Ātman there is fear for him [Footnote ref 1]. "

Again in another place we find that Prajāpati said: "The self(_ātman_) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death andgrief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitationsare true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired;he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self [Footnoteref 2]. " The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra andVirocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this selffrom Prajāpati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to lookinto a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they couldfind. They answered: "We see, this our whole self, even to thehair, and to the nails. " And he said, "Well, that is the self, thatis the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman. " They wentaway pleased, but Prajāpati thought, "There they go away, without having discovered, without having realized the self. "Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was theself; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid andpestered with doubts and came back to Prajāpati and said, "justas the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressedwhen the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when thebody is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind whenthe body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured inone eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes

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[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7. ]

[Footnote 2: Chā. VIII. 7. 1. ]

47

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory. "Prajāpati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, andsaid, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, thisis the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman. " Indra departedbut was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and cameback and said "that though the dream self does not become blindwhen the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body isso injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed byits destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if itsuffered and as if it wept--in this I see no good. " Prajāpati gave astill higher instruction: "When a man, fast asleep, in totalcontentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is thedeathless, the fearless, this is Brahman. " Indra departed but wasagain filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "theself in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor doeshe know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. I see no good in this. " And now Prajāpati after having given acourse of successively higher instructions as self as the body, asthe self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, andhaving found that the enquirer in each case could find out that thiswas not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about thefull truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of thedeathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affectedby pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannotget rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do nottouch the bodiless self [Footnote ref 1]. "

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeableessence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. This inmost essence has sometimes been described as puresubject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He isthe seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of allknowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knowsbut is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lumpof salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and throughentirely of savour; as in truth this Ātman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss isnot an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahmanis thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he whohas reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than

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[Footnote 1: Chā. VIII. 7-12. ]

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son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for itand by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest _parexcellence_, our inmost Ātman. All limitation is fraught with pain;it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a manreceives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (_ākās'a_)? It is hewho behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearlesssupport in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakableone, then has he attained peace. 

Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads. 

There is the ātman not in man alone but in all objects of theuniverse, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this ātman. There is nothing outside the ātman, and therefore there is noplurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clayis known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made ofblack iron is known, so when this ātman the Brahman is knowneverything else is known. The essence in man and the essenceof the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman. 

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the natureof the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. Butwe must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent somuch a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seerswho are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do notnotice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity andnature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversityattracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is allBrahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will itreturn. He has himself created it out of himself and then enteredinto it as its inner controller (_antaryāmin_). Here is thus a glaringdualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically thatthese are but names and forms, and when Brahman is knowneverything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are madefor the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, asS'a@nkara the great professor of Vedānta does by explaining awaythe dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but thereal in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman thatthe fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle inthe entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The

49

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all, wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent andunaffected [Footnote ref 1]. " He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south and in the north, he is all this [Footnote ref 2]. " Theserivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, returnback into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not knowthat they are so. So also all these people coming into being from theBeing do not know that they have come from the Being... That whichis the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that selfthou art O S'vetaketu [Footnote ref 3]. " "Brahman, " as Deussen points out, "was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universeas the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of theuniverse on Brahman and its essential identity with him wasrepresented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman. "Thus it is said in Mund. I. I. 7:

 As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads), As the plants shoot forth on the earth, As the hairs on the head and body of the living man, So from the imperishable all that is here. As the sparks from the well-kindled fire, In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands, So, my dear sir, from the imperishable Living beings of many kinds go forth, And again return into him [Footnote ref 4]. 

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highestteaching of the Upani@sads is "That art thou. "

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "innercontroller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind asthe ātman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are theresult of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to atheistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standingaloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, itis said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky andearth stand held together [Footnote ref 5]. God and soul are distinguishedagain in the famous verse of S'vetās'vatara [Footnote ref 6]:

 Two bright-feathered bosom friends Flit around one and the same tree; One of them tastes the sweet berries, The other without eating merely gazes down. 

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[Footnote 1: Chā. III. 14. 4. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ VII. 25. I; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. Ii. ]

[Footnote 3: Chā. VI. 10. ]

[Footnote 4: Deussen's translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 164. ]

[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. I. ]

[Footnote 6: S'vetās'vatara IV. 6, and Mu@n@daka III. I, 1, also Deussen'stranslation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 177. ]

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But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasionaluse of the word _Īs'a_ or _Īs'āna_, there seems to be no doubtthat theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgementof a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exaltedposition of the ātman as the supreme principle. Thus we read inKau@sītaki Upani@sad 3. 9, "He is not great by good deeds nor lowby evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom hewants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wantsto lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is themaster of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (_ātman_). "Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There areagain other passages which regard Brahman as being at onceimmanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is thateternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whosebranches grow downward. All the universes are supported in itand no one can transcend it. This is that, "... From its fear the fireburns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vāyu and Deaththe fifth (with the other two) run on [Footnote ref 1]. "

If we overlook the different shades in the development of theconception of Brahman in the Upani@sads and look to the maincurrents, we find that the strongest current of thought which hasfound expression in the majority of the texts is this that theĀtman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides thiseverything else is unreal. The other current of thought which isto be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed thatidentifies the universe with the Ātman or Brahman. The thirdcurrent is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lordcontrolling the world. It is because these ideas were still in themelting pot, in which none of them were systematically workedout, that the later exponents of Vedānta, S'a@nkara, Rāmānuja, and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order todevelop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus itis that the doctrine of Māyā which is slightly hinted at once inB@rhadāra@nyaka and thrice in S'vetās'vatara, becomes the foundationof S'a@nkara's philosophy of the Vedānta in which Brahmanalone is real and all else beside him is unreal [Footnote ref 2]. 

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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3. ]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S'vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10. ]

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The World. 

We have already seen that the universe has come out ofBrahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return backto it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character asrepresented to experience could not be denied. S'a@nkara heldthat the Upani@sads referred to the external world and accordeda reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merelyrelatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soonas the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This howeverremains to be modified to this extent that the sages had notprobably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality tothe phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as thehighest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exteriorworld, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of thisreality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and onlyreality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holdingthat this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, itis maintained in him and it will return back to him. 

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, theorganic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, animals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be manycreated fire (_tejas_), water (_ap_) and earth (_k@siti_). Then theself-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by theircombination that all other bodies are formed [Footnote ref 2]. So allother things are produced as a result of an alloying or compoundingof the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefolddivision of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the laterdistinction (especially in the Sā@mkhya school) of pure infinitesimalsubstances (_tanmātra_) and gross elements, and the theory that eachgross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. Andin Pras'na IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from theirsubtler natures, e. G. Earth (_p@rthivī_), and the subtler state of earth(_p@rthivīmātra_). In the Taittirīya, II. 1, however, ether (_ākās'a_)is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceedingdirectly from the one which directly preceded it. 

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[Footnote 1: Chā. VI. 11. ]

[Footnote 2: _ibid. _ VI. 2, 3, 4. ]

52

The World-Soul. 

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as thesoul of man to his body is found for the first time in R. V. X. 121. I, where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creationfrom the primeval waters. This being has twice been referredto in the S'vetās'vatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strangethat this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upani@sads. In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythicalcharacter is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlierproducts in the process of cosmic creation, but his importancefrom the point of view of the development of the theory ofBrahman or Ātman is almost nothing. The fact that neither thePuru@sa, nor the Vis'vakarma, nor the Hira@nyagarbha played animportant part in the earlier development of the Upani@sadsleads me to think that the Upani@sad doctrines were not directlydeveloped from the monotheistic tendencies of the later @Rg-Vedaspeculations. The passages in S'vetās'vatara clearly show how fromthe supreme eminence that he had in R. V. X. 121, Hira@nyagarbhahad been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussenin explaining the philosophical significance of the Hira@nyagarbhadoctrine of the Upani@sads says that the "entire objective universe ispossible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. Thissubject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested inall individual objects but is by no means identical with them. Forthe individual objects pass away but the objective universe continuesto exist without them; there exists therefore the eternalknowing subject also (_hira@nyagarbha_) by whom it is sustained. Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordinglynot in space and does not belong to time, and thereforefrom an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; ithas no empirical but only a metaphysical reality [Footnote ref 1]. " Thishowever seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hira@nyagarbhadoctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importancein the Upani@sads. 

The Theory of Causation. 

There was practically no systematic theory of causation in theUpani@sads. S'a@nkara, the later exponent of Vedānta philosophy, always tried to show that the Upani@sads looked upon the cause

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[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 201. ]

53

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself inreality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he didon the strength of a series of examples in the ChāndogyaUpani@sad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e. G. The clay, isspoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so manydiversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other thepot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions ofname and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth whichin its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, plate, or Jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeableBrahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to sufferchange as the manifold world outside. This world is thus onlyan unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, the real _par excellence_. 

It seems however that though such a view may be regardedas having been expounded in the Upani@sads in an imperfectmanner, there is also side by side the other view which looksupon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in thecause itself through the action and combination of the elementsof diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature havebeen spoken of in one place as the product of the combinationof the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a realchange produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as weshall see hereafter) the Pari@nāma theory of causation advocatedby the Sā@mkhya school [Footnote ref 1]. 

Doctrine of Transmigration. 

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead bodythey supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breathto the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different partsof the universe. They also believed as we have already seen inthe recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than ourown, and though we hear of such things as the passage of thehuman soul into trees, etc. , the tendency towards transmigrationhad but little developed at the time. 

In the Upani@sads however we find a clear development inthe direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the onethe Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with

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[Footnote 1: Chā. VI. 2-4. ]

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the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrineof transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of theidea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said thatthose who performed charitable deeds or such public works as thedigging of wells, etc. , follow after death the way of the fathers(_pit@ryāna_), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, then into night, the dark half of the month, etc. , and at last reachesthe moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of hisgood deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilationof food by man he enters the womb of the mother and isborn again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompensein the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world [Footnoteref 1]. 

The other way is the way of gods (_devayāna_), meant for thosewho cultivate faith and asceticism (_tapas_). These souls at deathenter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, brighthalf of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally intoBrahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning ofthe whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regionsof ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is brightand radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light oflights'" (_jyoti@sā@m jyoti@h_) [Footnote ref 2]. 

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrineof transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits ofhis deeds (_karma_) by passing through the other worlds and withoutreference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, the _Yānas_. Thus Yājńavalkya says, "when the soul becomesweak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body withwhich it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these sensesgo towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself andcentres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eyeturns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) becomeone (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses)become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) becomeone (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (withhim), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), hedoes not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does notthink, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (thesenses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The

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[Footnote 1: Chā. V. 10. ]

[Footnote 2: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 335. ]

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tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by anyother part of the body, the vital function (_prā@na_) follows and allthe senses follow the vital function (_prā@na_) in coming out. Heis then with determinate consciousness and as such he comesout. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (_prajńā_)accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a bladeof grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, sothis self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by aseparate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking asmall bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soulafter destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions anewer and fairer form as of the Pit@rs, the Gandharvas, the gods, of Prajāpati or Brahma or of any other being.... As he acts andbehaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is fullof desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, asthe work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, beingattached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which hewas attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. Gone to theend) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to thisworld for doing karma [Footnote ref 1]. So it is the case with those whohave desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who hasfreed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and inhimself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attainsBrahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that arein his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal andattains Brahma here" (B@rh. IV. Iv. 1-7). 

A close consideration of the above passage shows that theself itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairerframe by its own activity when it reached the end of the presentlife. At the time of death, the self collected within itself allsenses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of thebody at the time of death is only for the building of a newerbody either in this world or in the other worlds. The self whichthus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding, __________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure referencehere to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in otherworlds. ]

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of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, ofthe essence of the five elements (which would make up thephysical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, ofthe essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this(manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (B@rh. IV. Iv. 5). The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moraland psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements whichcompose the physical world. The whole process of his changesfollows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he willsand whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his actsthe fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma andits fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moraland psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements ofthe physical world on the other. 

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diversepsychological and moral tendencies and the physical elementsholds within itself the principle of all its transformations. Theroot of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruitionof it through will and act. When the self continues to desire andact, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performingacts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performingkarma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where thefruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. Butthere is no emphasis in the Upani@sads on this point. The Pit@ryānatheory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a partin the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes inthis world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by theself itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers norebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature ofthis doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirthand not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link betweendesires and rebirth--for it is said that whatever a man desires hewills, and whatever he wills he acts. 

Thus it is said in another place "he who knowingly desires isborn by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whosedesires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all hisdesires vanish here" (Mu@n@d III. 2. 2). This destruction of desiresis effected by the right knowledge of the self. "He who knows

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his self as 'I am the person' for what wish and for what desirewill he trouble the body, ... Even being here if we know it, well ifwe do not, what a great destruction" (B@rh. IV. Iv. 12 and 14). "Informer times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking whatshall we do with sons since this our self is the universe" (B@rh. IV. Iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine whichwe find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thoughtcan be found in the Upani@sads. The whole scheme is workedout on the principle of desire (_kāma_) and karma only serves asthe link between it and the actual effects desired and willed bythe person. 

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistentlywith the idea that desires (_kāma_) led to rebirth, we find thatin some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of awoman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth ofman, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birthelsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it issaid, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which isbut the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts ofhis body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is putin a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomespart of the woman's self like any part of her body; it thereforedoes not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo withinherself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should beprotected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth)but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, heis taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone thatthe continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. Thisis his second birth. He makes this self of his a representativefor performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his afterrealizing himself and attaining age goes away and when goingaway he is born again that is his third birth" (Aitareya, II. 1-4)[Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads tothe sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called kāma, whateverwas the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and thedesire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh. IV. Iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as anyother desire. 

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[Footnote 1: See also Kau@sītaki, II. 15. ]

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Emancipation. 

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connectionis that of emancipation (_mukti_). Already we know that thedoctrine of Devayāna held that those who were faithful and performedasceticism (_tapas_) went by the way of the gods throughsuccessive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (_pit@ryāna_)where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world andthen had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithfuland perform _s'raddhā_ had a distinctly different type of goal fromthose who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a generalaltruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest developmentin the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti meansin the Upani@sads the state of infiniteness that a man attainswhen he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. Theceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who areignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of allpassions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomesBrahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him. 

 He who beholds that loftiest and deepest, For him the fetters of the heart break asunder, For him all doubts are solved, And his works become nothingness [Footnote ref 1]. 

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passionsand antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that isignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us isfalse. We "do not know" but are "pure knowledge" ourselves. We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we donot suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is nota new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, butit always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are alwaysemancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so andseem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only becausewe do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that thetrue knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but isemancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true onlyso long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the naturaland only goal of man simply because it represents the true natureand essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

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[Footnote 1: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 352. ]

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is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always inour own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thingnecessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is thereforethe only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@thaUpani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended withhim, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forgethis anger against me. " This being granted Naciketas asked thesecond boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should bemade known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, "There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the deathof man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to knowinstructed by thee. This is my third boon. " Yama said, "It wasinquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understandit. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do notcompel me to this. " Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was itinquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easyto understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found likethee. There is no other boon like this. " Yama said, "Choose sonsand grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds ofcattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wideexpanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest. Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealthand far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will makethee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficultto gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure;those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments;the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will givethem to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death. "Naciketas replied, "All those enjoyments are of to-morrow andthey only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee thedance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we couldobtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only aslong as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said. "Yama said, "One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed ishe who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant losesthe object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

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what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. Believing that this world exists and not the other, the carelessyouth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hastasked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happinessis transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by whatis not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing himwhom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. TheeO Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open toBrahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtainswhatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die;he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul isnot slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm amongfleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannotbe gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. Itcan be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it revealsits own nature [Footnote ref 1]. " So long as the Self identifies itselfwith its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps thefruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know thehighest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principleof the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to havedesires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truthof himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitomeof the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituentsof the gross body (_annamaya ko@sa_), the vital functions (_prā@namayako@sa_) of life, the will and desire (_manomaya_) and thethoughts and ideas (_vijńānamaya_), and so long as he keeps himselfin these spheres and passes through a series of experiencesin the present life and in other lives to come, these experiencesare willed by him and in that sense created by him. He sufferspleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires fromthese into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where heis one with his experience and there is no change and no movement. What this state is cannot be explained by the use ofconcepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it isnot any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are someparts in the extract which may be differently interpreted. ]

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whatever one knows as this and this (_neti neti_). In this infiniteand true self there is no difference, no diversity, no _meum_ and_tuum_. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existencewill dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when putin water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separatelybut in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyī, does this great reality infinite and limitless consistingonly of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenalexistences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge"(B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all theprocesses of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when itretires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is astate of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, andpure blessedness. 

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CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMSOF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?

It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophyin the manner in which the histories of European philosophy havebeen written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers cameone after another and offered their independent speculationson philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists inchronologically arranging these views and in commenting uponthe influence of one school upon another or upon the generalchange from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy hadtheir beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, andit is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so manydivergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability thesewere formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composedor arranged. 

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnanthalf-sentences (_sūtras_) which did not elaborate the subject indetail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threadsof memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was alreadythoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentenceswere like lecture hints, intended for those who had haddirect elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeeddifficult to guess from the sūtras the extent of their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days wereoriginally intended by them. The sūtras of the Vedānta system, known as the S'ārīraka-sūtras or Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāya@nafor example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave riseto more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each oneof which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the highesteem and respect in which these writers of the sūtras were heldby later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

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offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other ofthe existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations ofthe system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold ofthese systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers sincethe foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one orother of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally broughtup in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independenceof their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the schoolto which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession offree-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionaryviews of particular systems from generation to generation, who explainedand expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of otherrival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establishthe superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take anexample, the Nyāya system of philosophy consisting of a numberof half-sentences or sūtras is attributed to Gautama, also calledAk@sapāda. The earliest commentary on these sūtras, called the_Vātsyāyana bhā@sya_, was written by Vātsyāyana. This work wassharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnāga, and to answer thesecriticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentarycalled the _Bhā@syavāttika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the originalforce of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity ofthe school. At this Vācaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called_Vārttika-tātparya@tīkā_ on this second commentary, where he triedto refute all objections against the Nyāya system made by otherrival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called _Nyāya-tātparya@tīkā_, had another commentary called_Nyāya-tātparya@tīkā-paris'uddhi_ written by the great Udayana. Thiscommentary had another commentary called _Nyāya-nibandha-prakās'a_written by Varddhamāna the son of the illustrious Ga@nges'a. Thisagain had another commentary called _Varddha-mānendu_ upon it byPadmanābha Mis'ra, and this again had another named_Nyāya-tātparyama@n@dana_ by S'a@nkara Mis'ra. The names ofVātsyāyana, Vācaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great, but even they contented themselves by writing commentarieson commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

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[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnāga after Vācaspati's_Tātparyatīkā_ (p. I) and not Dignnāga as it is generally spelt. ]

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original system. Even S'a@nkara, probably the greatest man ofIndia after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the_Brahma-sūtras_, the Upani@sads, and the _Bhagavadgītā_. 

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponentsand troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity andsubtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover thedefects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it wasoriginally formulated in the sūtras had probably but few problemsto solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition ofother schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problemsin which the original views were more or less involved but towhich no attention had been given before. 

The contributions of the successive commentators served tomake each system more and more complete in all its parts, andstronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfullyagainst the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A systemin the sūtras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but ifwe take it along with its developments down to the beginningof the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed manstrong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possibleto write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it isnecessity that each system should be studied and interpreted inall the growth it has acquired through the successive ages ofhistory from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnoteref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systemswhich had their importance only so long as they lived and werethen forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Eachsystem grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherentsthrough all the successive ages of history, and a history of thisgrowth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian systemis therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growthit attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whoseselfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history. 

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[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggestone or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot becarried all through, for the supplementary information and argumentsgiven by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborationsof the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them. ]

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Growth of the Philosophic Literature. 

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know that aspirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of theearliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the finalessence or truth was the ātman, that a search after it was ourhighest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it wecan only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everythingelse and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth wewant (_neti neti_). Philosophical enquires were however continuingin circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddhawho closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumeratedsixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly betraced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probablygoing on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no referenceto these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that therewere different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other thanthose of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records. It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originatedamong the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sadcircles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonisticand heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of thesesages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probablydiscussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some timewhen some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautamaor Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on varioustopics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classifiedand arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy andrecorded it in sūtras. These sūtras were intended probably forpeople who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thuscould easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases containedin the aphorisms. The sūtras thus contain sometimesallusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way inwhich they could be refuted. The commentators were possessedof the general drift of the different discussions alluded to andconveyed from generation to generation through an unbrokenchain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were howeverfree to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

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[Footnote 1: _Brahmajāla-sutta, Dīgha_, 1. P. 12 ff. ]

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views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionaryviews with which they did not agree or which they found it difficultto maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schoolsoften made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problemsunthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherentof a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions withthe other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated tooffer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonizethem into a complete whole. These elaborations or modificationsgenerally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect anyserious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanationsof the older teachers and never contradicted them. Theywould only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new thingsonly in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any systemby treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Exceptwhen there is a specially new development, the system is to beinterpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentatorstreating their contributions as forming one whole. 

The fact that each system had to contend with other rivalsystems in order to hold its own has left its permanent markupon all the philosophic literatures of India which are alwayswritten in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed tobe always faced with objections from rival schools to whateverhe has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objectionsput forth against him which he answers, and points out the defectsof the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. Itis thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objectionsand their answers that the writer can wend his way to hisdestination. Most often the objections of the rival schools arereferred to in so brief a manner that those only who know theviews can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskritstyle of most of the commentaries is so condensed and differentfrom literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aidof an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are notwidely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

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work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particularsystem are expressed in such close interconnection withthe views of other systems that these can hardly be understoodwithout them. Each system of India has grown (at least inparticular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growthof other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indianphilosophy one should study all the systems in their mutualopposition and relation from the earliest times to a period atwhich they ceased to grow and came to a stop--a purpose forwhich a work like the present one may only be regarded asforming a preliminary introduction. 

Besides the sūtras and their commentaries there are also independenttreatises on the systems in verse called _kārikās_, whichtry to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinctmanner; the _Sā@mkhya kārikā_ may be mentioned as a work of thiskind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written inverses called the vārttikas; the _S'lokavārttika_, of Kumarila or the_Vārttika_ of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All theseof course had their commentaries to explain them. In additionto these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prosein which the writers either nominally followed some selectedsūtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former classthe _Nyāyamańjarī_ of Jayanta may be mentioned as an exampleand of the latter the _Pras'astapāda bhā@sya_, the _Advaitasiddhi_ ofMadhusūdana Sarasvatī or the _Vedānta-paribhā@sā_ of Dharmarājādhvarīndra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature inwhich the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highlyforcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powersand genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaboratethem. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of Indiabegins from about 500 B. C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practicallyends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now someminor publications are seen to come out. 

The Indian Systems of Philosophy. 

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the _nāstika_ and the _āstika_. The nāstika (_na asti_ "it isnot") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

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nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These areprincipally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cārvāka. The āstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sā@mkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Mīmā@msā, Nyāya and Vais'e@sika, generally knownas the six systems (_@sa@ddars'ana_ [Footnote ref 1]). 

The Sā@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kāpila, but theearliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yogasystem is attributed to Patańjali and the original sūtras are calledthe _Pātańjala Yoga sūtras_. The general metaphysical positionof these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology andthe final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in thisthat the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_Īs'vara_) as distinctfrom Ātman and lays much importance on certain mysticalpractices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievementof liberation, whereas the Sā@mkhya denies the existence ofĪs'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and cultureare sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth andthereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the systemof Sā@mkhya associated with Kāpila and the Yoga systemassociated with Patańjali are but two divergent modifications ofan original Sā@mkhya school, of which we now get only referenceshere and there. These systems therefore though generally countedas two should more properly be looked upon as two differentschools of the same Sā@mkhya system--one may be called theKāpila Sā@mkhya and the other Pātańjala Sā@mkhya. 

The Pūrva Mīmā@msā (from the root _man_ to think--rationalconclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance withwhich the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices. 

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[Footnote 1: The word "_dars'ana_" in the sense of true philosophicknowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ of Ka@nāda(IX. Ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas(400 B. C. ) called the heretical opinions "_ditthi_" (Sanskrit--dr@stifrom the same root _d@rs'_ from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra(fifth century A. D. ) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems ofphilosophy (_sarvadars'anavācyo' rtha@h--@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ I. ). Ratnakīrtti (end of the tenth century A. D. ) uses the word also in thesame sense ("_Yadi nāma dars'ane dars'ane nānāprakāram sattvatak-@sanamuktamasti. _" _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts_, p. 20). Mādhava (1331 A. D. ) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, _Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_. The word "_mata_" (opinion or view) was alsofreely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no wordto denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to callthose who held heretical views "_tairthika. _" The words "siddha, ""_jńānin_, " etc. Do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they areused rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects. "]

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The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in asentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to thegeneral drift of the sentence. There were also differences of viewwith regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it maybe applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exactnature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complexVedic context. The Mīmā@msā formulated some principles accordingto which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutionsfor all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, itindulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for inorder that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definiteorder of the universe and its relation to man or the position andnature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated andestablished. Though its interest in such abstract speculations isbut secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare arational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practicalutility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminarydiscussions in the Mīmā@msā that it may be called a system ofphilosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation ofthe import of words and sentences have a legal value even to thisday. The sūtras of Mīmā@msā are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abarawrote a bhā@sya upon it. The two great names in the history ofMīmā@msā literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumārila Bha@t@taand his pupil Prabhākara, who criticized the opinions of his masterso much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, and to this day his opinions pass as _guru-mata_, whereas the viewsof Kumārila Bha@t@ta pass as _bha@t@ta-mata_ [Footnote ref 1]. It may notbe out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (_sm@rti_) accepts withoutany reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulatedby the Mīmā@msā. 

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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumārila could not understand themeaning of a Sanskrit sentence "_Atra tunoktam tatrāpinoktam itipaunaraktam_" (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits oftwo combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tunāuktam_ (said bythe particle _tu_) and _tatrāpi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (notsaid also there) and _tatra apinā uktam_ (said there by the particle_api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, "Notspoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice. " This puzzledKumārila, when Prabhākara taking the second meaning pointed out to himthat the meaning was "here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api, _and so it is indicated twice. " Kumārila was so pleased that he calledhis pupil "Guru" (master) at this. ]

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The _Vedānta sūtras_, also called Uttara Mīmā@msā, written byBādarāya@na, otherwise known as the _Brahma-sūtras_, form theoriginal authoritative work of Vedānta. The word Vedānta means"end of the Veda, " i. E. The Upani@sads, and the _Vedānta sūtras_ areso called as they are but a summarized statement of the generalviews of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books oradhyāyas and each adhyāya is divided into four pādas or chapters. The first four sūtras of the work commonly known as _Catu@hsūtrī_are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birthand decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, (4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads. The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted tojustifying the position of the Vedānta against the attacks of therival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy indealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book aredevoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individualUpani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thuslimited to the first four sūtras and the first and second chaptersof the second book. The other portions are like commentariesto the Upani@sads, which however contain many theologicalviews of the system. The first commentary of the _Brahma-sūtra_was probably written by Baudhāyana, which however is notavailable now. The earliest commentary that is now found is thatof the great S'a@nkara. His interpretations of the _Brahma-sūtras_together with all the commentaries and other works that followhis views are popularly known as Vedānta philosophy, thoughthis philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis'uddhādvaitavādaschool of Vedānta philosophy (i. E. The Vedānta philosophyof the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualisticphilosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S'aivas, Rāmāyatas, etc. , also claim to express the original purport of the Brahmasūtras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such asRāmānuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S'rīka@n@tha, Baladeva, etc. , havewritten independent commentaries on the _Brahma-sūtra_ to showthat the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view ofthe Upani@sads and as summarized in the _Brahma-sūtras_. Thesediffered largely and often vehemently attacked S'a@nkara's interpretationsof the same sūtras. These systems as expounded by them also pass bythe name of Vedānta as these are also claimed to be the realinterpretations intended by the Vedānta (Upani@sads)

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and the _Vedānta sūtras_. Of these the system of Rāmānuja hasgreat philosophical importance. 

The _Nyāya sūtras_ attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapāda, and the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ attributed to Ka@nāda, called also Ulūka, represent the same system for all practical purposes. They arein later times considered to differ only in a few points of minorimportance. So far as the sūtras are concerned the _Nyāya sūtras_lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, whilethe _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophiesof their own, which however may generally be looked uponlargely as modifications of the Sā@mkhya and Vedānta systems, though their own contributions are also noteworthy. 

Some fundamental Points of Agreement. 

I. _The Karma Theory. _

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of theCārvāka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamentalpoints of importance. The systems of philosophy in Indiawere not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of thehuman mind which has a natural inclination for indulging inabstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization ofthe religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that thepostulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were foundto be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may betheir differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the generalpostulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the _summumbonum_ of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically inthorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of themat this stage. 

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systemsagree in believing that whatever action is done by an individualleaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power toordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is goodor bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannotbe enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individualhas to take another birth as a man or any other being in order tosuffer them. 

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accentat the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic

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details, exactly according to the directions without the slightesterror even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magicalvirtue automatically to produce the desired object immediatelyor after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of theKarma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certainmystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effectswithout the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visibleagents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, calledthe _ad@r@s@ta_ (the unseen) or the _apūrva_ (new), that by it the desiredobject will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the _modusoperandi_ of the _apūrva_ is unknown. There is also the notionprevalent in the Sa@mhitās, as we have already noticed, that hewho commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas hewho performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of _@rta_, theinviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elementswhich built up the Karma theory which we find pretty wellestablished but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is saidthat according to good or bad actions men will have good or badbirths. 

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karmadoctrine as established in the āstika systems we find that it wasbelieved that the unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_) potency of the action generallyrequired some time before it could be fit for giving the doer themerited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulateand prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer inhis next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremelywicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. Thenature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature ofpleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready forhim by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determinedfor him by his action are such that they are possible to berealized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as agoat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this worldprocess, so there is no time at which any person first began hisactions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of pastlives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind oflife exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus wheneverhe has any particular birth as this or that animal or man, 73

the special instincts of that life (technically called _vāsanā_) comeforth. In accordance with these vāsanās the person passes throughthe painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him byhis action. The length of life is also determined by the numberand duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifyingactions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit forgiving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but thoseactions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if theperson attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. Buteven such an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass throughthe pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by theactions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kindsof actions, white or virtuous (_s'ukla_), black or wicked (_k@r@s@na_), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s'ukla-k@r@s@na_) asmost of our actions are, neither black nor white (_as'uklāk@r@s@na_), i. E. Those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are notassociated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a personcan so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of actionthat he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas whichhave ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains trueknowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, and as his acts are only of the as'uklāk@r@s@na type no fresh karmafor ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of allkarma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone. 

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speechand mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance thatattracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul andsticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soulduring the infinite number of past lives is technically called_kārmas'arīra_, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birthto birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripensand exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoymentof pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is beingexpended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating byhis activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process ofsuffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulatedin the soul produces a kind of coloration called _les'yā_, such aswhite, black, etc. , which marks the character of the soul. The

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idea of the s'ukla and k@r@s@na karmas of the Yoga system was probablysuggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free frompassions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and isthen annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previouslyearned has its predestined limits within which it must take effectand be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strictadherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, andwhen all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of theperson rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage ofcontemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activitieshaving ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the topof the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever. 

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karmatheory which however being intimately connected with theirmetaphysics will be treated later on. 

2. _The Doctrine of Mukti_. 

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of theinequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the caseof different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of birthsand rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on thebasis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with thehappenings of the world, but they also agree in believing thatthis beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths, this running on from beginningless time has somewhereits end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time orin some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karmaleads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves ofall such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we shouldfind within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, weariedby the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for andbelieved that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, theygenerally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul couldbe realized in some stage as being permanently divested of allaction, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that theconnection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouchedby the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance

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and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginninglesstime that we connect it with these. The realization of thistranscendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endlesscycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists didnot admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the finalrealization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimatedissolution called Nirvā@na, the nature of which we shall discusslater on. 

3. _The Doctrine of Soul_. 

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existenceof a permanent entity variously called atman, puru@sa or jīva. As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergencesof view. Thus while the Nyāya calls it absolutelyqualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, Sā@mkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness, the Vedānta says that it is that fundamental point of unityimplied in pure consciousness (_cit_), pure bliss (_ānanda_), and purebeing (_sat_). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsulliedin its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do notform a real part of it. The _summum bonum_ of life is attainedwhen all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the selfis thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneousconnections with it are absolutely dissociated. 

The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and theOptimistic Faith in the end. 

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not beenequally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may beconsidered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongestutterance in Sā@mkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminablechain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon asnearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in themeshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasuresare but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady ispainful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we areanxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associatedwith pains they are but pains themselves. We are but dupedwhen we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. Allour experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the

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world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurableappears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision aspainful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitivenessto sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yoginis like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain ofdisturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannotbe removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannotalso be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continuallybeing forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead toanother life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid ofit is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledgewhich uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the selfis intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoymentof pleasures and other emotions and activities. Throughthe highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassiontowards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speechfrom all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the selfshines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. When this is once done the self can never again be associatedwith passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimatelydissociated from _citta_ which contains within it the root of allemotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for everconquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in thisconnection that emancipation is not based on a general aversionto intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointedperson may have, but on the appreciation of the state of muktias the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimisticcreed of each system have developed from the logical necessitypeculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendencyto shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them throughright performance and right understanding. It is only when aman rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit foraspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with whichall worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not onlyshrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character assorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned fromall ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some

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ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamentalfact from which not only her philosophy but many of thecomplex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logicallydeduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we rememberthat we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. Thepessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimisticconfidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal ofemancipation. 

Unity in Indian Sādhana (philosophical, religiousand ethical endeavours). 

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed uponthe general principles of ethical conduct which must be followedfor the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that alldesire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which arealmost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a veryhigh degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and preparehis mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainmentof his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous withregard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There areindeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but themeans to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentiallythe same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is onlyin later times that devotion (_bhakti_) is seen to occupy a moreprominent place specially in Vai@s@nava schools of thought. Thusit was that though there were many differences among the varioussystems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world andthe means fur the attainment of the goal (_sādhana_) being fundamentallythe same, there was a unique unity in the practical sādhanaof almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has beenuniversal in India and this uniformity of sādhana has thereforesecured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings. 

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CHAPTER V

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Many scholars are of opinion that the Sā@mkhya and the Yogarepresent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is alsosuggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but thesystematic Sā@mkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them haddecidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-knownto every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with theBuddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most ofthe systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism istherefore indispensable for a right understanding of the differentsystems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. Itseems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhismfirst. 

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha. 

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the differentphilosophical speculations that were prevalent in India beforeBuddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, andthese have already been briefly described. But these were not theonly ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverseatheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We find there that the origin of theworld and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thoughtthat "time" was the ultimate cause of all, others that all thesehad sprung forth by their own nature (_svabhāva_), others thateverything had come forth in accordance with an inexorabledestiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, orthrough matter combinations in general. References to diversekinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but nodetailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upani@sadtype of materialists the two schools of Cārvākas (Dhūrttaand Sus'ik@sita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in which these flourished cannot rightlybe discovered [Footnote ref 2]. But it seems

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[Footnote 1: S'vetās'vatara, I. 2, _kāla@h svabhābo niyatiryad@rcchābhutāni yoni@h puru@sa iti cintyam. _]

[Footnote 2: Lokāyata (literally, that which is found among people ingeneral) seems to have been the name by which all carvāka doctrineswere generally known. See Gu@naratna on the Lokāyatas. ]

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probable however that the allusion to the materialists containedin the Upani@sads refers to these or to similar schools. TheCārvākas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or anyother holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Lifeand consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, just as red colour was the result of mixing up white withyellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses(_madas'akti_). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, asthere is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. Solong as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everythingwill end with death, for when at death the body is burntto ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe inthe validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what canbe directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that thedistribution of the middle term (_hetu_) has not depended uponsome extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroythe validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any caseany inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact andthere is no certitude about it. They were called Cārvāka becausethey would only eat but would not accept any other religious ormoral responsibility. The word comes from _carv_ to eat. TheDhūrtta Cārvākas held that there was nothing but the fourelements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but theresult of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, novirtue or vice. The Sus'ik@sita Cārvākas held that there wasa soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed withthe destruction of the body. The original work of the Cārvākaswas written in sūtras probably by B@rhaspati. Jayanta and Gu@naratnaquote two sūtras from it. Short accounts of this school may befound in Jayanta's _Nyāyamańjarī_, Mādhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_and Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_. _Mahābhārata_ givesan account of a man called Cārvāka meeting Yudhi@s@thira. 

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cārvāka materialists weare reminded of the Ājīvakas of which Makkhali Gosāla, probablya renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahāvīra and a contemporaryof Buddha and Mahāvīra, was the leader. This was a thorough-goingdeterminism denying the free will of man and his moralresponsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence ofMakkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximateor remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

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become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one'sown efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing dependson any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are dueto fate, to their environment and their own nature [Footnote ref 1]. "

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taughtthat there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds; there is noother world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor anyformer lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing thatwe can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought toan end at death [Footnote ref 2]. 

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly thesacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which anyperson could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upani@sadteaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality andbeing, and all else but name and form which pass away but donot abide. That which permanently abides without change is thereal and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptionsthat there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comesinto being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by someunknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probablycome to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent inthe country and these were accepted partly on the strength oftraditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtueof the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which theygave to those who performed them. But these had no rationalbasis behind them on which they could lean for support. Thesewere probably then just tending towards being affiliated to thenebulous Sā@mkhya doctrines which had grown up among certainsections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erectinga new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines whichthenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterityto come. If the Being of the Upani@sads, the superlatively motionless, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further newspeculations, as it had already discarded all other matters ofinterest? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourseof circumstances, reason could not proceed further in thedirection to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

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[Footnote 1: _Sāmańńaphala-sutta_, _Dīgha_, II. 20. Hoernlé's article onthe Ājīvakas, E. R. E. ]

[Footnote 2: _Sāmańńaphala-sutta_, II. 23. ]

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force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little thatwas inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take intoaccount the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhisticcontribution to philosophy. 

Buddha: his Life. 

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B. C. In the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu inthe now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, a prince of the Sākya clan, and his mother Queen Mahāmāyā. According to the legends it was foretold of him that he wouldenter upon the ascetic life when he should see "A decrepit oldman, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk. " His father triedhis best to keep him away from these by marrying him andsurrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those fourthings, which filled him with amazement and distress, andrealizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined toforsake his home and try if he could to discover some means toimmortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his "GreatRenunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelledon foot to Rājag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvelā, where incompany with other five ascetics he entered upon a course ofextreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a lengththat his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senselessand was believed to be dead. After six years of this greatstruggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won bythe way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary courseof life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafterthe Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years intravelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine toall who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddharealized that the time drew near for him to die. He then enteredinto Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attainednirvāna [Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of thisgreat teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and inother countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it willprobably take yet many years more before even the materials for

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[Footnote 1: _Mahāparinibbānasuttanta_, _Dīgha_, XVI. 6, 8, 9. ]

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such a study can be collected. But from what we now possessit is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful andsubtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimatethe debt that the philosophy, culture and civilizationof India owe to it in all her developments for many succeedingcenturies. 

Early Buddhist Literature. 

The Buddhist Pāli Scriptures contain three different collections:the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to thediscipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generallyto the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in ascholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religioushistory of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite datesfor the collection or composition of the different parts of theaforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas werehowever composed before the Abhidhamma and it is veryprobable that almost the whole of the canonical works werecompleted before 241 B. C. , the date of the third council duringthe reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine(Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya dealsonly with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as thatof the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. Buddhaghos@a in his introduction to _Atthasālinī_, the commentaryon the _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, says that the Abhidhamma is so called(_abhi_ and _dhamma_) because it describes the same Dhammas as arerelated in the suttas in a more intensified (_dhammātireka_) andspecialized (_dhammavisesatthena_) manner. The Abhidhammasdo not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, butthey deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already foundin the suttas. Buddhagho@sa in distinguishing the special featuresof the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirementof the former leads one to attain meditation (_samādhi_) whereasthe latter leads one to attain wisdom (_pańńāsampadam_). The forceof this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of thesuttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which isnot to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves inenumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in atechnical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

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insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a cravingfor following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. The Abhidhamma known as the _Kathāvatthu_ differs from theother Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the viewsof the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceedin the form of questions and answers, and the answers of theopponents are often shown to be based on contradictoryassumptions. 

The suttas contain five groups of collections called the Nikāyas. These are (1) _Dīgha Nikāya_, called so on account of the lengthof the suttas contained in it; (2) _Majjhima Nikāya_ (middlingNikāya), called so on account of the middling extent of thesuttas contained in it; (3) _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (Nikāyas relatingto special meetings), called sa@myutta on account of their beingdelivered owing to the meetings (_sa@myoga_) of special persons whichwere the occasions for them; (4) _A@nguttara Nikāya_, so called becausein each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussionincrease by one [Footnote ref 1]; (5) _Khuddaka Nikāya_ containing_Khuddaka pā@tha, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Sutta Nipāta, Vimāna-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathā, Therīgathā, Jātaka, Niddesa, Pa@tisambhidāmagga, Apadāna, Buddhava@msa, Caryāpi@taka. _

The Abhidhammas are _Pa@t@thāna, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhātukathā, Puggalapańńatti, Vibha@nga, Yamaka_ and _Kathāvatthu_. There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse partsof the above works known as atthakathā. The work known as_Milinda Pańha_ (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, isof considerable philosophical value. 

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literatureis generally now known as Sthaviravāda or Theravāda. On theorigin of the name Theravāda (the doctrine of the elders)_Dīpava@msa_ says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council)and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vāda [Footnote ref2]. It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pāli literaturedeveloped much since the time of Buddhagho@sa (4OO A. D. ), thewriter of _Visuddhimagga_ (a compendium of theravāda doctrines)and the commentator of _Dīghanikāya, Dhammasa@nga@ni_, etc. 

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influencedby the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, butit does not appear that Pāli Buddhism had any share in it. I

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[Footnote 1: See Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasālini_, p. 25. ]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Dīpava@msa_, p. 31. ]

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have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who couldbe considered as being acquainted with Pāli. 

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism [Footnote ref 1]. 

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generallyin four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (_gu@na_), (3) cause(_hetu_) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (_nissatta nijjīva_ [Footnoteref 2]). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important, from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhistphilosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining allreality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomenaand these were called dhammas. The question arises thatif there is no substance or reality how are we to account for thephenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passingaway and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to findout "What being what else is, " "What happening what elsehappens" and "What not being what else is not. " The phenomenaare happening in a series and we see that there beingcertain phenomena there become some others; by the happeningof some events others also are produced. This is called(_pa@ticca-samuppāda_) dependent origination. But it is difficult tounderstand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as_Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha startedbefore attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable conditionare the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass awayand are born again; and they do not know the path of escapefrom this decay, death and misery. 

How to know the Way to escape from this misery of decayand death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decayand death, depending on what do they come? As he thoughtdeeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decayand death can only occur when there is birth (_jāti_), so they depend

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[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one couldtake the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the_Sa@myutta Nikāya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does notrepresent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of thetwelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine andas it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enterinto conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E. J. Thomas drewmy attention to this fact. ]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasātinī_, p. 38. There are also other senses in whichthe word is used, as _dhamma-desanā_ where it means religious teaching. The _La@nkāvatāra_ described Dharmma as _gu@nadravyapūrvakā dharmmā_, i. E. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances. ]

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on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birthdepend? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be ifthere were previous existence (_bhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. But on what doesthis existence depend, or what being there is there _bhava_. Then itoccurred to him that there could not be existence unless therewere holding fast (_upādāna_) [Footnote ref 2]. But on what did upādānadepend? It occurred to him that it was desire (_ta@nhā_) on which upādānadepended. There can be upādāna if there is desire (_tanhā_) [Footnote ref3]. But what being there, can there be desire? To this question itoccurred to him that there must be feeling (_vedanā_) in order thatthere may be desire. But on what does vedanā depend, or ratherwhat must be there, that there may be feeling (_vedanā_)? To thisit occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (_phassa_)in order that there may be feeling [Footnote ref 4]. If there should be nosense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contactdepend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts, there are the six fields of contact (_āyatana_) [Footnote ref 5]. But onwhat do the six āyatanas depend? It occurred to him thatthere must be the mind and body (_nāmarūpa_) in order that theremay be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what doesnāmarūpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness(_vińńāna_) there could be no nāmarūpa [Footnote ref 8]. But what being there would there

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[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakīrtti in his_Mādhyamīka v@rtti, _ p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deedwhich brought about rebirth (_punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthāpayalikāyena vācā manasā ca_). ]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasālinī_, p. 385, upādānantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakīrttiin explaining upādāna says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fastto the materials necessary for attaining it (_yatra vastunisat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanāya vi@dhapanāya upādānamupādatte tatratatra prārthayate_). _Mādhyamīka v@rtti_, p. 565. ]

[Footnote 3: Candrakīrtti describes t@r@s@nā as_āsvadanābhinandanādhyavasānasthānādātmapriyarūpairviyogo mā bhūt, nityamaparityāgo bhavediti, yeyam prārthanā_--the desire that theremay not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc. , whichare dear to us. _Ibid. _ 565. ]

[Footnote 4: We read also of phassāyatana and phassakāya. _M. N. _ II. 261, III. 280, etc. Candrakīrtti says that _@sa@dbhirāyatanadvārai@hk@rtyaprak@riyā@h pravarttante prajńāyante. Tannāmarūpapratyaya@m@sa@dāyatanamucyate. Sa@dbhyas`cāyatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akāyā@hpravarttante. M. V. _ 565. ]

[Footnote 5: Āyatana means the six senses together with their objects. Āyatana literally is "Field of operation. " Sa@lāyatana means six sensesas six fields of operation. Candrakīrtti has _āyatanadvārai@h_. ]

[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering nāmarūpaas mind and body, _Compendium_, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairlycorrect. The four skandhas are called nāma in each birth. These togetherwith rūpa (matter) give us nāmarūpa (mind and body) which being developedrender the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that theremay be knowledge. Cf. _M. V. _ 564. Govindānanda, the commentator onS'a@nkara's bhāsya on the _Brahma sūtras_ (II. Ii. 19), gives a differentinterpretation of Namarūpa which may probably refer to the Vijńanavadaview though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To thinkthe momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskarasof attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the firstvijńana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama)are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semenand blood called rūpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree withGovindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovumwhile rūpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijńańaentered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced throughthe association of previous karma. See _Vedantakalpataru_, pp 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijńańa into the womb compare_D N_ II. 63. ]

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be vińńāna. Here it occurred to him that in order that theremight be vińńāna there must be the conformations (_sa@nkhāra_) [Footnoteref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkhāras? Here it occurredto him that the sa@nkhāras can only be if there is ignorance(_avijjā_). If avijjā could be stopped then the sa@nkhāras will bestopped, and if the sa@nkhāras could be stopped vińńāna could bestopped and so on [Footnote ref 2]. 

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddhaactually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existencesometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay anddeath (_jarāmarana_) could not have happened if there was nobirth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point thedifficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

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[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the wordhere. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduceproper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophicalmethod and he had often to use the same word in more or less differentsenses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore ratherelastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaningwhich we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in _S N_ III. P. 87, "_Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta_, " sa@nkhara means that which synthesisesthe complexes. In the _Compendium_ it is translated as will, action. Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here usedin a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhāta khandha(viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhātakhandha in _Dhamma Sangam_, p 18, and another different set of 40 mentalstates in _Dharmasamgraha_, p. 6. In addition to these forty_cittasamprayuktasa@mskāra_, it also counts thirteen_cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaningattachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, thecommentator on S'a@nkara's _Brahma sutra_ (II. Ii. 19), also interpretsthe word in connection with the doctrine of _Pratityasamutpada_ asattachment, antipathy and infatuation. ]

[Footnote 2: _Samyutta Nikaya_, II. 7-8. ]

[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevanā(lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchednessand miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) atthe prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. Allthese make up suffering and are the results of jāti (birth). _M. V. _(B. T. S. P. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhāsya counted all the terms fromjarā, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representingthe entirety of duhkhaskandha. ]

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enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadāra@nyaka says that justas an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effortcollects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end ofthis life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposesanother existence. So far as I remember there has seldom beenbefore or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprovethe doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophyexcept the Cārvākas believed in it and so little is known to us ofthe Cārvāka sūtras that it is difficult to say what they did torefute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and doesnot criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had aninfinite number of lives before, and which except in the case ofa few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of themin the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and theBuddha also, when he came to think to what our present birthmight be due, had to fall back upon another existence (_bhava_). If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakīrtti takesit to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could onlytake place on account of the works of a previous existence whichdetermined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note"as a man does so will he be born" (_Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate_, Brh IV. Iv. 5). Candrakīrtti's interpretation of "bhava"as Karma (_punarbhavajanakam karma_) seems to me to suitbetter than "existence. " The word was probably used ratherloosely for _kammabhava_. The word bhava is not found in theearlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pāli scriptures for thefirst time as a philosophical term. But on what does thisbhava depend? There could not have been a previous existenceif people had not betaken themselves to things or works theydesired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordancewith desire is called upādāna. In the Upani@sads we read, "whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (_Yatkraturbhavatitatkarmma kurute_, B@rh. IV. Iv. 5). As this betaking tothe thing depends upon desire {_t@r@s@nā_}, it is said that in orderthat there may be upādāna there must be tanhā. In the Upani@sadsalso we read "Whatever one desires so does he betakehimself to" (_sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati_). Neitherthe word upādāna nor t@rs@nā (the Sanskrit word corresponding

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[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hinduphilosophical works such as the Nyāya, etc. , are slight and inadequate. ]

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to ta@nhā) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas containedin them are similar to the words "_kratu_" and "_kāma_. " Desire(ta@nhā) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnoteref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose thewhole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together)called nāmarūpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sadsbut there it is used in the sense of determinate forms andnames as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinablereality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Visuddhimagga_ says that by"Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation(i. E. Sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form"the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnoteref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physicalchanges, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. Soform also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But likethe cripple and the blind they mutually help one another andeffectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap orcollection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but justas when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound;and when the sound comes into existence it does not come fromany such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of thecardinal or intermediate points of the compass;... In exactly thesame way all the elements of being both those with form andthose without, come into existence after having previously beennon-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]. "Nāmarūpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind andbody, but only the sense functions and the body which are foundto operate in the six doors of sense (_sa@lāyatana_). If we takenāmarūpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to dependupon the vińńāna (consciousness). Consciousness has been comparedin the _Milinda Pańha_ with a watchman at the middle of

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[Footnote 1: The word āyatana is found in many places in the earlierUpani@sads in the sense of "field or place, " Chā. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9. 10, but @sa@dāyatana does not occur. ]

[Footnote 2: Candrakīrtti interprets nāma as _Vedanādayo'rūpi@nas'catvāra@h skandhāstatra tatra bhave nāmayantīli nāma. Saharūpaskandhena ca nāma rūpam ceti nāmarūpamucyate. _ The four skandhasin each specific birth act as name. These together with rūpa makenāmarūpa. _M. V. _ 564. ]

[Footnote 3: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 184. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid. _ p. 185, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII. ]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid. _ pp. 185-186, _Visuddhimagga_, Ch. XVII. ]

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the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref1]. Buddhagho@sa in the _Atthasālinī_ also says that consciousness meansthat which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristicswe must say that it knows (_vijānana_), goes in advance (_pubba@ngama_), connects (_sandhāna_), and stands on nāmarūpa (_nāmarūpapada@t@thānam_). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of senseare discerned (_ārammana-vibhāvana@t@thāne_) and it goes first as theprecursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known onlyby the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of(mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the _Milinda Pańha_we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when statesof consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap betweenthe previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appearsas connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas itis lost; but there are the four aggregates as nāmarūpa, it stands onnāma and therefore it is said that it stands on nāmarūpa. He furtherasks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness ordifferent from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun showsitself with all its colours, etc. , but he is not different from thosein truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collectedheat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean thatthe sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousnesstakes the phenomena of contact, etc. , and cognizes them. Sothough it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is differentfrom them [Footnote ref 3]. 

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jāti (birth)is the cause of decay and death, _jarāmara@na_, etc. Jāti is theappearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnoteref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jāti, I cannot think of anybetter rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

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[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 182, _Milinda Pańha_(628). ]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasālinī_, p. 112... ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _ p. 113, _Yathā hi rūpādīni upādāya pańńattāsuriyādayo na atthato rūpādīhi ańńe honti ten' eva yasmin samayesuriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tejā-sa@nkhātam rūpa@m pīti eva@mvuccamāne pi na rūpādihi ańńo suriyo nāma atthi. Tathā cittamphassādayo dhamme upādāya pańńapiyati. Atthato pan' ettha tehiańńam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppanna@m hoti eka@msen evatasmin samaye phassādihi atthato ańńad eva hotī ti_. ]

[Footnote 4: "_Jātirdehajanma pańcaskandhasamudāya@h, _" Govindānanda's_Ratnaprabhā_ on S'a@nkara's bhā@sya, II. Ii. 19. ]

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suggested, namely, the works (_karma_) which produce the birth [Footnoteref 1]. Upādāna is an advanced t@r@s@nā leading to positive clinging[Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@nā (desire) which again isthe result of vedanā (pleasure and pain). But this vedanā is of coursevedanā with ignorance (_avidyā_), for an Arhat may have also vedanābut as he has no avidyā, the vedanā cannot produce t@r@s@nā in turn. Onits development it immediately passes into upādāna. Vedanā meanspleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leadsto t@r@s@nā (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact(_spars'a_). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rīlābha distinguishesthree processes in the production of vedanā. Thus first there is thecontact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledgeof the object, and then there is the vedanā. Depending on _MajjhimaNikāya_, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as inthe case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also vedanā takes place simultaneously with spars'a for theyare "produits par un mźme complexe de causes (_sāmagrī_) [Footnoteref 3]. "

Spars'a is produced by @sa@dāyatana, @sa@dāyatana by nāmarūpa, and nāmarūpa by vijńāna, and is said to descend in the wombof the mother and produce the five skandhas as nāmarūpa, outof which the six senses are specialized. 

Vijńāna in this connection probably means the principle orgerm of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding thefive elements of the new body there. It is the product of thepast karmas (_sa@nkhāra_) of the dying man and of his pastconsciousness too. 

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the lastthoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

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[Footnote 1: Govindananda in his _Ratnaprabhā_ on S'a@nkara's bhā@sya, II. Ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as meritand demerit (_dharmādi_). See also _Vibhanga_, p. 137 and Warren's_Buddhism in Translations_, p. 201. Mr Aung says in_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (theactive side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of "_kammabhava_"or Karma-becoming i. E. Karmic activity. ]

[Footnote 2: Prof. De la Vallée Poussin in his _Théoric des Douze Causes_, p. 26, says that _S'ālistambhasūtra_ explains the word "upādāna" as"t@r@s@nāvaipulya" or hyper-t@r@s@nā and Candrakīrtti also gives thesame meaning, _M. V. _ (B. T. S. P. 210). Govmdānanda explains "upādāna"as prav@rtti (movement) generated by t@r@s@nā (desire), i. E. The activetendency in pursuance of desire. But if upādāna means "support" it woulddenote all the five skandhas. Thus _Madhyamaka v@rtti_ says _upādānampańcaskandhalak@sa@nam... Pańcopādānaskandhākhyam upādānam. M. V. _ XXVII. 6. ]

[Footnote 3: Poussin's _Théorie des Douze Causes_, p. 23. 

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birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijńāna produced in thewomb is determined by the past vijńāna of the previous existence isaccording to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impressof a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scalepans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lampis lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man thevijńāna resulting from his previous karmas and vijńānas entersinto the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in whichthe next skandhas are to be matured. This vijńāna thus formsthe principle of the new life. It is in this vijńāna that name(_nāma_) and form (_rūpa_) become associated. 

The vijńāna is indeed a direct product of the sa@mskāras andthe sort of birth in which vijńāna should bring down (_nāmayati_)the new existence (_upapatti_) is determined by the sa@mskāras [Footnoteref 2], for in reality the happening of death (_mara@nabhava_) and theinstillation of the vijńāna as the beginning of the new life(_upapattibhava_) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds justat the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession thatthey are said to be simultaneous. If the vijńāna had not enteredthe womb then no nāmarūpa could have appeared [Footnote ref 3]. 

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thusavidyā and sa@mskāra of the past life produce the vijńāna, nāmarupa, _____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and theplants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said "make yourresolution, 'May I be a cakravarttī king in a next existence, '"_Sa@myutta_, IV. 303. ]

[Footnote 2: "_sa cedānandavijńāna@m mātu@hkuk@sim nāvakrāmeta, na tatkalalam kalalatvāya sannivartteta_, " _M. V. _ 552. Compare _Caraka, S'ārīra_, III. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapīduka sattva" whichconnects the soul with body and by the absence of which the characteris changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it isin a pure condition one can remember even the previous births;character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mentalqualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by thecombination of many elements, so is the foetus. ]

[Footnote 3: _Madhyamaka v@riti_ (B. T. S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from_Dīgha_, II. 63, "si le vijńāna ne descendait pas dans le sein maternella namarupa s'y constituerait-il?" Govindānanda on S'a@nkara's commentaryon the _Brahma-sūtras_ (II. Ii. 19) says that the first consciousness(vijńāna) of the foetus is produced by the sa@mskāras of the previousbirth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nāma) and from thatthe white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus(_kalala-budbudāvasthā_} is produced. ]

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@sa@dāyatana, spars'a, vedanā, t@r@s@nā, upādāna and the bhava(leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhavaproduces the jāti and jarāmara@na of the next life [Footnote ref l]. 

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chainextending in three sections over three lives are all but themanifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturallydetermine one another. Thus _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_says "each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the compositeterm 'sorrow, ' etc. Is only meant to show incidental consequencesof birth. Again when 'ignorance' and 'the actions of themind' have been taken into account, craving (_t@r@s@nā_), grasping(_upādāna_) and (_karma_) becoming (_bhava_) are implicitly accountedfor also. In the same manner when craving, graspingand (_karma_) becoming have been taken into account, ignoranceand the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also;and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, eventhe fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest areaccounted for. And thus:

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold 'fruit. '

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make upthe Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. Sa@nkhāra andvińńāna, 2. Vedanā and tanhā, 3. Bhava and jāti) and the fourgroups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in thePresent, one causal group in the Present and one resultantgroup in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) [Footnote ref2]. "

These twelve interdependent links (_dvādas'ā@nga_) representthe pa@ticcasamuppāda (_pratātyasamutpāda_) doctrines (dependentorigination) [Footnote ref 3] which are themselves but sorrow and lead tocycles of sorrow. The term pa@ticcasamuppāda or pratītyasamutpāda hasbeen differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature [Footnote ref4]. 

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[Footnote 1: This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pālitexts; but Buddhagho@sa mentions it in _Suma@ngalavilāsinī_ on _Mahānidānasuttanta_. We find it also in _Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, VIII. 3. Ignoranceand the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth, " "decay and death"to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled astri@kā@n@daka (having three branches) in _Abhidkarmakos'a_, III. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "_sapratītyasamutpādo dvādas'ā@ngastrikā@n@daka@h pūrvāparāntayordve dvemadhye@s@tau_. "]

[Footnote 2: Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_, pp. 189-190. ]

[Footnote 3: The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the listgiven in the _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. 23 f. , avijjā and sa@nkhārahave been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and ithas been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goesnot beyond. "]

[Footnote 4: _M. V. _ p. 5 f. ]

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Samutpāda means appearance or arising (_prādurbhdāva_) and pratītyameans after getting (_prati+i+ya_); combining the two wefind, arising after getting (something). The elements, dependingon which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) andpaccaya (ground). These two words however are often used inthe same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is alsoused in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijjā is thepaccaya of sa@nkhāra it is meant that avijjā is the ground (_@thiti_)of the origin of the sa@nkhāras, is the ground of their movement, of the instrument through which they stand (_nimitta@t@thiti_), oftheir ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of theirintelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as causeand of their function as the ground with reference to those whichare determined by them. Avijjā in all these nine ways isthe ground of sa@nkhāra both in the past and also in the future, though avijjā itself is determined in its turn by other grounds [Footnoteref 1]. When we take the betu aspect of the causal chain, we cannotthink of anything else but succession, but when we take thepaccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of thecause as ground. Thus when avijjā is said to be the groundof the sa@nkhāras in the nine ways mentioned above, it seemsreasonable to think that the sa@nkhāras were in some senseregarded as special manifestations of avijjā [Footnote ref 2]. But as thispoint was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it wouldbe unwise to proceed further with it. 

The Khandhas. 

The word khandha (Skr. Skandha) means the trunk of a treeand is generally used to mean group or aggregate [Footnote ref 3]. Wehave seen that Buddha said that there was no ātman (soul). He saidthat when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found the five khandhas together or any one ofthem. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychicalstates which are immediate with us and are divided into five

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[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhidāmagga_, vol. I. P. 50; see also _MajjhimaNikāya_, I. 67, _sa@nkhāra... Avijjānidānā avijjāsamudayā avijjājātikāavijjāpabhavā_. ]

[Footnote 2: In the Yoga derivation of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy) and abhinives'a (self love) from avidyā we find alsothat all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growthof avidyā (_pańcaparvī avidyā_). ]

[Footnote 3: The word skandha is used in Chāndogya, II. 23 (_trayodharmaskandhā@h yajńa@h adhyayanam dānam_) in the sense of branchesand in almost the same sense in Maitrī, VII. II. ]

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classes: (1) rūpa (four elements, the body, the senses), sensedata, etc. , (2) vedanā (feeling--pleasurable, painful and indifferent), (3) sańńā (conceptual knowledge), (4) sa@nkhāra (syntheticmental states and the synthetic functioning of compoundsense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), (5) vińńāna (consciousness) [Footnote ref 1]. 

All these states rise depending one upon the other (_pa@ticcasamuppanna_)and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rūpa in rūpakhandhastands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sensedata [Footnote ref 2]. But "rūpa" is also used in the sense of pureorganic affections or states of mind as we find in the _Khandha Yamaka_, I. P. 16, and also in _Sa@myutta Nikāya_, III. 86. Rūpaskandha accordingto _Dharmasa@mgraha_ means the aggregate of five senses, the fivesensations, and the implicatory communications associated in senseperceptions _vijńapti_). 

The elaborate discussion of _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ begins by definingrūpa as "_cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnańca mahābhntanamupādāya rūpam_" (the four mahābhūtas or elements and thatproceeding from the grasping of that is called rūpa) [Footnote ref 3]. Buddhagho@sa explains it by saying that rūpa means the four mahābhūtasand those which arise depending (_nissāya_) on them asa modification of them. In the rūpa the six senses includingtheir affections are also included. In explaining why the fourelements are called mahābhūtas, Buddhagho@sa says: "Just as amagician (_māyākāra_) makes the water which is not hard appearas hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold;just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himselfappear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselvesblue make themselves appear as blue (_nīlam upādā rūpam_), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, redor white (odātam upādārūpam), so on account of their similarityto the appearances created by the magician they are calledmahābhūta [Footnote ref 4]. "

In the _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ we find that the Buddha says, "OBhikkhus it is called rūpam because it manifests (_rūpyati_); how

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[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikāya_, III. 86, etc. ]

[Footnote 2: _Abhidhammatthasangaha_, J. P. T. S. 1884, p. 27 ff. ]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, pp. 124-179. ]

[Footnote 4: _Atthasālinī_, p. 299. ]

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does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger andas thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, thesun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rūpa[Footnote ref 1]. "

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to abovefor our consideration and try to combine them so as to understandwhat is meant by rūpa, I think we find that that which manifesteditself to the senses and organs was called rūpa. No distinctionseems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc. , as existing in the physical world and their appearance assensations. They were only numerically different and the appearanceof the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the sensesbut the sense-data and the sensations were "rūpa. " Under certainconditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhismdid not probably start with the same kind of division of matter andmind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention thatsuch an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upani@sadsnor in the Sā@mkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms andwere therefore called rūpa; the forms of affection that appearedwere also called rūpa; many other mental states or featureswhich appeared with them were also called rūpa [Footnote ref 2]. Theāyatanas or the senses were also called rūpa [Footnote ref 3]. Themahābhūtas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them werecalled rūpa and formed the rūpa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations). 

In _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (III. 101) it is said that "the fourmahābhūtas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communicationof the rūpakkhandha (_rūpakkhandhassa pańńāpanāya_). Contact(sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication offeelings (_vedanā_); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccayafor the communication of the sańńākkhandha; sense-contact isalso the hetu and paccaya for the communication of thesa@nkhārakkhandha. But nāmarūpa is the hetu and the paccaya forthe communication of the vińńānakkhandha. " Thus not only feelingsarise on account of the sense-contact but sańńā and sa@nkhāraalso arise therefrom. Sańńā is that where specific knowing or

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[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikāya_, III. 86. ]

[Footnote 2: _Khandhayamaka_. ]

[Footnote 3: _Dhammasanga@ni_, p. 124 ff. ]

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conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctiveknowledge as the yellow or the red takes place. 

Mrs. Rhys Davids writing on sańńā says: "In editing thesecond book of the Abhidhamma pi@taka I found a classificationdistinguishing between sańńā as cognitive assimilation on occasionof sense, and sańńā as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way ofnaming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition(_patigha-sańńā_). This, writes Buddhagho@sa, is perception onoccasion of sight, hearing, etc. , when consciousness is aware of theimpact of impressions; of external things as different, we mightsay. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word orname (_adhivachānā-sańńā_) and is exercised by the _sensus communis_(mano), when e. G. 'one is seated... And asks another whois thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives throughhis speech. ' Thus there are two stages of sańńā-consciousness, 1. Contemplating sense-impressions, 2. Ability to know what theyare by naming [Footnote ref 1]. "

About sa@nkhāra we read in _Sa@myutta Nikāya_ (III. 87) that itis called sa@nkhāra because it synthesises (_abhisa@nkharonti_), it isthat which conglomerated rūpa as rūpa, conglomerated sańńāas sańńā, sa@nkhāra as sa@nkhāra and consciousness (_vińńāna_)as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhāra because it synthesisesthe conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus asynthetic function which synthesises the passive rūpa, sańńā, sa@nkhāra and vińńāna elements. The fact that we hear of 52sa@nkhāra states and also that the sa@nkhāra exercises its syntheticactivity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to showthat probably the word sa@nkhāra is used in two senses, as mentalstates and as synthetic activity. 

Vińńāna or consciousness meant according to Buddhagho@sa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stageat which the intellectual process started and also the finalresulting consciousness. 

Buddhagho@sa in explaining the process of Buddhist psychologysays that "consciousness(_citta_)first comes into touch (_phassa_) withits object (_āramma@na_) and thereafter feeling, conception (_sańńā_)and volition (_cetanā_) come in. This contact is like the pillars ofa palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it(_dabbasambhārasadisā_). But it should not be thought that contact

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[Footnote 1: _Buddhist Psychology_, pp. 49, 50. ]

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is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one wholeconsciousness (_ekacittasmi@m_) it cannot be said that this comesfirst and that comes after, so we can take contact in associationwith feeling (_vedanā_), conceiving (_sańńā_) or volition (_cetanā_);it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehendsobjects it is called contact. " "There is no impinging on one sideof the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causesconsciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object andvisual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is its _function_; orit has impact as its _essential property_ in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:--"contact in the four planes ofexistence is never without the characteristic of touch with theobject; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having thecharacteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact. 'But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristicof touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta isquoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to representthe eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, ortwo hands were to clap against each other; one hand wouldrepresent the eye, the second the visible object and their collisioncontact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and thefunction of impact [Footnote ref 1]'. Contact is the manifestation of theunion of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and itseffect is feeling (_vedanā_); though it is generated by the objectsit is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing(_anubhava_) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the tasteof an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it onlypartially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the merecoordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feelingalone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the tasteof an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining statesare like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food ofdiverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soupand curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out

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[Footnote 1: _Atthasālinī_, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144. ]

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whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food ofvarious excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tastingof the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the objectby the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of thefood, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, andas the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal accordingto his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoysthe taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment orexperience is its function [Footnote ref 1]. "

The special feature of sańńā is said to be the recognizing(_paccabhińńā_) by means of a sign (_abhińńānena_). According toanother explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusionof the totality (of aspects)--_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_. The work ofvolition (_cetanā_) is said to be coordination or binding together(_abhisandahana_). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makesa double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who takingfifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He wasexceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled hisstrength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed outthe portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc. , and took an equal share of the work. ' The simile should bethus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moralstates which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-fivestrong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effortby the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort ofvolition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts [Footnote ref 2]. "It seems that probably the active side operating in sa@nkhāra wasseparately designated as cetanā (volition). 

"When one says 'I, ' what he does is that he refers either toall the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himselfthat that was 'I. ' Just as one could not say that thefragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or thepollen, so one could not say that the rūpa was 'I' or that thevedanā was 'I' or any of the other khandhas was 'I. ' There isnowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am [Footnote ref 3]'. "

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[Footnote 1: _Atthasālinī_, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ p. 111; translation, pp. 147-148. ]

[Footnote 3: _Samyutta Nikāya_, III. 130. ]

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Avijjā and Āsava. 

As to the question how the avijjā (ignorance) first startedthere can be no answer, for we could never say that eitherignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning [Footnote ref 1]. Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comesin its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as wecan never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elementswhich bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined bycertain others. This mutual determination can only take placein and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, forthere is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priorityin time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming intobeing of the āsavas or depravities that the avijjā came intobeing, and that through the destruction of the depravities (_āsava_)the avijjā was destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. These āsavas are classified inthe _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ as kāmāsava, bhavāsava, di@t@thāsava and avijjāsava. Kāmāsava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirstafter the qualities associated with the senses; bhavāsava meansdesire, attachment and will for existence or birth; di@t@thāsavameans the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternalor non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will notcome to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or aredifferent; avijjāsava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, itsextinction and its means of extinction. _Dhammasa@nga@ni_ addsfour more supplementary ones, viz. Ignorance about the nature ofanterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anteriorand posterior together, and their mutual dependence [Footnote ref 3]. Kāmāsava and bhavāsava can as Buddhagho@sa says be counted as one, forthey are both but depravities due to attachment [Footnote ref 4]. 

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[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap. XVII. ), p. 175. ]

[Footnote 2: _M. N. _ I. P. 54. Childers translates "āsava" as "depravities"and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants. " The word "āsava" in Skr. Means"old wine. " It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhagho@sa and themeaning that he gives to it is "_cira pārivāsika@t@thena_" (on accountof its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through theeye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. As those wines which are kept long are called "āsavas" so these are alsocalled āsavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative thatBuddhagho@sa gives is that they are called āsava on account of theirproducing sa@msāradukkha (sorrows of the world), _Atthasālinī_, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina āsrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding itdifficult to translate it in one word after Buddhagho@sa, I havetranslated it as "depravities, " after Childers. ]

[Footnote 3: See _Dhammasa@nga@ni_, p. 195. ]

[Footnote 4: Buddhagho@sa's _Atthasālinī_, p. 371. ]

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The di@t@thāsavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysicalviews stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines. The kāmasāvas stand in the way of one's entering intothe way of Nirvā@na (_anāgāmimagga_) and the bhavāsavas andavijjāsavas stand in the way of one's attaining arha or finalemancipation. When the _Majjhima Nikāya_ says that from therise of the āsavas avijjā rises, it evidently counts avijjā there asin some sense separate from the other āsavas, such as those ofattachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledgeabout sorrow. 

The afflictions (_kilesas_) do not differ much from the āsavasfor they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiarto us, such as covetousness (_lobha_), anger or hatred (_dosa_), infatuation (_moha_), arrogance, pride or vanity (_māna_), heresy(_di@t@thi_), doubt or uncertainty (_vicikicchā_), idleness (_thīna_), boastfulness (_udhacca_), shamelessness (_ahirika_) and hardness of heart_anottapa_); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the āsavas. In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They areassociated with the vedanākkhandha, sańńākkhandha, sa@nkhārakkhandhaand vińńānakkhandha. From these arise the three kindsof actions, of speech, of body, and of mind [Footnote ref 1]. 

Sīla and Samādhi. 

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by thetangles of desire (_ta@nhā ja@tā_), and the only way by which thesemay be loosened is by the practice of right discipline (_sīla_), concentration (_samādhi_) and wisdom (_pańńā_). Sīla briefly meansthe desisting from committing all sinful deeds (_sabbapāpassaakara@nam_). With sīla therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desiresand thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performanceof the sīla would lead one to the first two successivestages of sainthood, viz. The sotāpannabhāva (the stage in whichone is put in the right current) and the sakadāgāmibhāva (thestage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samādhiis a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the oldkilesas are destroyed and the ta@nhā or desire is removed and

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[Footnote 1: _Dhammasa@nga@ni, _ p. 180. ]

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by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. Itdirectly brings in pańńā (true wisdom) and by pańńā the saintachieves final emancipation and becomes what is called anarhat [Footnote ref 1]. Wisdom (_pańńā_) is right knowledge about thefour āriya saccas, viz. Sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its causeof destruction. 

Sīla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. By which a man who desists from committing sinful actionsmaintains himself on the right path. Sīla thus means 1. Rightvolition (_cetanā_), 2. The associated mental states (_cetasika_), 3. Mental control (_sa@mvara_) and 4. The actual non-transgression(in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mindby the preceding three sīlas called avītikkama. Sa@mvara isspoken of as being of five kinds, 1. Pā@timokkhasa@mvara (thecontrol which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisa@mvara (thecontrol of mindfulness), 3. Ńānasa@mvara (the control of knowledge), 4. Khantisa@mvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriyasa@mvara(the control of active self-restraint). Pā@timokkhasa@mvarameans all self-control in general. Satisa@mvara meansthe mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and goodassociations when using one's cognitive senses. Even whenlooking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness(_sati_) control himself from being tempted by avoiding tothink of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of itas may lead in the right direction. Khantisa@mvara is that bywhich one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By theproper adherence to sīla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities(_kamma_) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (_samādhānam, upadhāra@na@m, pati@t@thā_) [Footnote ref 2]. 

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow anumber of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, dining, etc. , which are called the dhūta@ngas or pure disciplinaryparts [Footnote ref 3]. The practice of sīla and the dhūtangas help thesage to adopt the course of samādhi. Samādhi as we have seen meansthe concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (_kusalacittekaggatāsamādhi@h_) together with its states upon one particularobject (_ekāramma@na_) so that they may completely cease toshift and change (_sammā ca avikkhipamānā_) [Footnote ref 4]. 

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[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga Nidānādikathā_. ]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga-sīlaniddeso_, pp. 7 and 8. ]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, II. ]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 84-85. ]

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The man who has practised sīla must train his mind firstin particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquirethe chief concentration of meditation called jhāna (fixed andsteady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mindfor the acquirement of jhānasamādhi eventually lead to itand are called upacāra samādhi (preliminary samādhi) as distinguishedfrom the jhānasamādhi called the appanāsamādhi (achieved samādhi)[Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly hehas to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitivedesires for eating and drinking (_āhāre pa@tikkūlasańńā_) byemphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associatedin seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformationsas various nauseating bodily elements. When a mancontinually habituates himself to emphasize the disgustingassociations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachmentto them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrowswill come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to theidea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcaseof a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically calledcatudhātuvavatthānabhāvanā (the meditation of the body as beingmade up of the four elements) [Footnote ref 3]. Thirdly he has tohabituate his mind to think again and again (_anussati_) about thevirtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sa@ngha (the monks followingthe Buddha), the gods and the law (_dhamma_) of the Buddha, aboutthe good effects of sīla, and the making of gifts (_cāgānussati_), about the nature of death (_mara@nānussati_) and aboutthe deep nature and qualities of the final extinctionof all phenomena (_upasamānussati_) [Footnote ref 4]. 

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[Footnote 1: As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I followwhat appears to me to be the main line of division showing theinterconnection of jhāna (Skr. _dhyāna_) with its accessory stagescalled parikammas (_Visuddhimagga, _ pp. 85 f. ). ]

[Footnote 2: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimisticattitude, "_Imań ca pana āhāre pa@tikulasańńā@m anuyuttassa bhikkhu@norasata@nhāya cittam pa@tilīyati, pa@tiku@t@tati, pa@tiva@t@tati; so, kantāranitthara@na@t@thiko viya puttama@msa@m vigatamado āhāra@m āhāretiyāvad eva dukkhassa ni@t@thara@natthāya_, " p. 347. The mind of him whoinspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free fromall desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies offfrom them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his foodwithout any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son tosustain himself in crossing a forest. ]

[Footnote 3: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 347-370. ]

[Footnote 4: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 197-294. ]

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Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparationscalled the upacāra samādhi we come to those othersources of concentration and meditation called the appanāsamādhiwhich directly lead to the achievement of the highest samādhi. The processes of purification and strengthening of the mindcontinue in this stage also, but these represent the last attemptswhich lead the mind to its final goal Nibbāna. In the first partof this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds andnotice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases andthink how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodiesand convince himself that they being in essence the same as thedead carcases are as loathsome as they [Footnote ref. 1] This is calledasubhakamma@t@thāna or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of ourbodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of thebody as well as their processes, and this will help him to enterinto the first jhāna by leading his mind away from his body. This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulnessabout the nature of the body [Footnote ref 2]. As an aid to concentrationthe sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling(_passāsa_) and the exhaling (_āssāsa_) of his breath, so that insteadof breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may beaware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought tomark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing hismind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the wholeprocess of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. This is called the anapānasati or the mindfulness of inhalationand exhalation [Footnote ref 3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihāra, the fourfold meditationof metta (universal friendship), karu@nā (universal pity), muditā (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) andupekkhā (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, hisfriend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself tothe meditation on universal friendship, one should start with thinkinghow he should himself like to root out all misery and becomehappy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would alsohave the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to thinkthat his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

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[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga, _ VI. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ pp. 239-266. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _ pp. 266-292. ]

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connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himselfto such an extent in this meditation that he would not find anydifference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. He should never become angry with any person. Should he at anytime feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted onhim by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doublinghis sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. Heshould think that if he should allow himself to be affected byanger, he would spoil all his sīla which he was so carefully practising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, should he himself also do the same by being angry at it? If hewere finding fault with others for being angry, could he himselfindulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammasare momentary (_kha@nikattā_); that there no longer existed thekhandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the inflictionof any injury being only a joint product, the man who wasinjured was himself an indispensable element in the productionof the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, andthere could not thus be any special reason for making him responsibleand of being angry with him. If even after thinkingin this way the anger does not subside, he should think that byindulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself throughhis bad deeds, and he should further think that the other manby being angry was only producing mischief to himself but notto him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able tofree his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himselfin an attitude of universal friendship [Footnote ref 1]. This is calledthe mettā-bhāvana. In the meditation of universal pity (_karu@nā_)also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends andfoes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity forthose who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neitheracquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way toNibbāna, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow [Footnoteref 2]. 

We next come to the jhānas with the help of material thingsas objects of concentration called the Kasi@nam. These objects ofconcentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space(_parīcchinnākāsa_). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earthand concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

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[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 295-314. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ pp. 314-315. ]

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with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he findsthat even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in hismind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place toconcentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind. 

In the first stages of the first meditation (_pathamam jhānam_)the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understandingit with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverserelations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursivemeditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that inwhich the mind does not move in the object in relational termsbut becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it withoutany quivering. This state is called vicāra (steadily moving). Thefirst stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhagho@sa's _Visuddhimagga_to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereasthe second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without theleast quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated witha buoyant exaltation (_pīti_) and a steady inward bliss called sukha[Footnote ref 1] instilling the mind. The formation of this firstjhāna roots out five ties of avijjā, kamacchando (dallying withdesires), vyāpādo (hatred), thinamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikicchā (doubt). The five elements of which this jhāna is constituted are vitakka, vicāra, plti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness). 

When the sage masters the first jhāna he finds it defectiveand wants to enter into the second meditation (_dutiyam jhānam_), where there is neither any vitakka nor vicāra of the first jhāna, but the mind is in one unruffled state (_ekodibhāvam_). It is amuch steadier state and does not possess the movement whichcharacterized the vitakka and the vicāra stages of the first jhānaand is therefore a very placid state (_vitakka-vicārakkhobha-virahe@naativiya acalatā suppasannatā ca_). It is however associatedwith pīti, sukha and ekaggatā as the first jhāna was. 

When the second jhāna is mastered the sage becomes disinclinedtowards the enjoyment of the pīti of that stage and becomesindifferent to them (_upekkhako_). A sage in this stage sees theobjects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage allthe āsavas of the sage become loosened (khī@nāsava). Theenjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

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[Footnote 1: Where there is pīti there is sukha, but where there is sukhathere may not necessarily be pīti. _Vīsuddhimagga_, p. 145. ]

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mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimesto turn back to the enjoyment of pīti again. The two characteristicsof this jhāna are sukha and ekaggatā. It should howeverbe noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it(_atimadhhurasukhe sukhapāramippatte pi tatiyajjhāne upekkhako, na tattha sukhābhisangena āka@d@dhiyati_) [Footnote ref 1]. The earthball (_pa@thavī_) is however still the object of the jhāna. 

In the fourth or the last jhāna both the sukha (happiness) andthe dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachmentand antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized bysupreme and absolute indifference (_upekkhā_) which was slowlygrowing in all the various stages of the jhānas. The characteristicsof this jhāna are therefore upekkhā and ekaggatā. With themastery of this jhāna comes final perfection and total extinctionof the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby anarhat [Footnote ref 2]. There is no further production of the khandhas, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows andsufferings--Nibbāna. 

Kamma. 

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blindedwith the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; hethinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus hecomes again and again within my grasp. " In the Digha Nikāyaalso we read how Pāyāsi was trying to give his reasons in supportof his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are therebeings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit orresult of deeds well done or ill done [Footnote ref 3]. " Some of hisarguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tellus that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, thatif the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believedin it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it atthe earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautionswe do not find at the time of the death of any person thathis soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account ofthe departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his argumentswith apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

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[Footnote 1: _Visuddhimagga_, p. 163. ]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikāya_, I. P. 296, and _Visuddhimagga_, pp. 167-168. ]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. P. 349; _D. N. _ II. Pp. 317ff. ]

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Pāyāsi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrineof rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in theUpani@sads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. Inthe _Milinda Pańha_, we find Nāgasena saying "it is through adifference in their karma that men are not all alike, but somelong lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, somehandsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, somerich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish [Footnote ref 1]. " We have seen inthe third chapter that the same soil of views was enunciated by theUpani@sad sages. 

But karma could produce its effect in this life or anyother life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But "when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arisewithout covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, theninasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existentand not liable to spring up again in the future [Footnote ref 2]. "Karma by itself without craving (_ta@nhā_) is incapable of bearing goodor bad fruits. Thus we read in the _Mahāsatipa@t@thāna sutta_, "eventhis craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust andself-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewedlife) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) [Footnoteref 3]. " "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things inmemory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does itdwell [Footnote ref 4]. " Pre-occupation and deliberation of sensualgratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first ārya satya (noble truth). 

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with "the uttercessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, givingit up, renouncing it and emancipation from it [Footnote ref 5]. "

When the desire or craving (_ta@nhā_) has once ceased thesage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do afterthat will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

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[Footnote 1: Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, p. 215. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ pp. 216-217. ]

[Footnote 3: _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II. P. 340. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid. _ p. 341. ]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid. _ p. 341. ]

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fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karmafinds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire allignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently thereis nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer theeffects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just asMoggallāna did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karmaan arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation ofhis desire [Footnote ref 1]. 

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech andmind (_kāyika_, _vācika_ and _mānasika_). The root of this kammais however volition (_cetanā_) and the states associated with it[Footnote ref 2]. If a man wishing to kill animals goes out intothe forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them thereeven after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, forhe could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he givesan order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actuallycarried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (_vācika_)and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whethercarried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (_mānasika_)[Footnote ref 3]. But the mental kamma must be present as the root ofall bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the caseof an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him. 

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects intofour classes, viz. (1) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) thosewhich are partly good and partly bad and thus productive ofboth purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good norbad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but whichcontribute to the destruction of kammas [Footnote ref 4]. 

Final extinction of sorrow (_nibbāna_) takes place as the naturalresult of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism havetried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, andvarious interpretations have been offered. Professor De la ValléePoussin has pointed out that in the Pāli texts Nibbāna hassometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state [Footnote ref 5]. 

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[Footnote 1: See _Kathāvatthu_ and Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_, pp, 221 ff. ]

[Footnote 2: _Atthasālinī_, p. 88. ]

[Footnote 3: See _Atthasālinī_, p. 90. ]

[Footnote 4: See _Atthasālinī_, p. 89. ]

[Footnote 5: Prof. De la Vallįe Poussin's article in the _E. R. E. _ onNirvā@na. See also _Cullavagga_, IX. I. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's _Psalmsof the early Buddhists_, I. And II. , Introduction, p. Xxxvii; _Dīgha_, II. 15; _Udāna_, VIII. ; _Sa@myutta_, III. 109. ]

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Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbāna in _Pali Text Society Journal_, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to becomeidentified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space(_ākāsa_) or consciousness (_vińńāna_) attained to a state in whichthey had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without havingreally lost their individuality. This latter interpretation ofNibbāna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spiritof the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless taskto explain Nibbāna in terms of worldly experience, and thereis no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying thatit is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldlyexperiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positiveor negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do notexist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy tothink of a Tathāgata as existing eternally (_s'ās'vata_) or not-existing(_as'ās'vata_) or whether he is existing as well as notexisting or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Anyone who seeks to discuss whether Nibbāna is either a positiveand eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, forwe want to know what it all means. But it is not possible togive any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions asillegitimate. 

Later Buddhistic writers like Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrttitook advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpretedit as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existenceor non-existence of anything would be meaningless. Thereis no difference between the worldly stage (_sa@msāra_) and Nibbāna, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed duringthe sa@msāra so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbāna. 

Upani@sads and Buddhism. 

The Upani@sads had discovered that the true self was ānanda(bliss) [Footnote ref 1]. We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitlypresupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there wasthe self (_attā_) it must be bliss. The Upani@sads had asserted thatthe self(_ātman_) was indestructible and eternal [Footnote ref 2]. If weare allowed

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[Footnote 1: Tait, II. 5. ]

[Footnote 2: B@rh. IV. 5. 14. Ka@tha V. 13. ]

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to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we couldconceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeedbeen anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upani@sads, but hewho carefully reads the Upani@sads cannot but think that thereason why the Upani@sads speak of the self as bliss is that it iseternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternalwas sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in theUpani@sads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that thatwhich is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self[Footnote ref 1]. The point at which Buddhism parted from theUpani@sads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upani@sadsdoubtless considered that there were many experiences which we oftenidentify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief isfound in the Upani@sads that there was associated with these apermanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essencewhich was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They consideredthat this permanent self as pure bliss could not be definedas this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this (_netineti_) [Footnote ref 2]. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we couldnowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in ourchanging experiences. All were but changing phenomena andtherefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-selfwas not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to meas my self [Footnote ref 3]. 

The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendentalexperience as it were, for they said that it could notbe described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed outas "there, " behind all the changing mental categories. TheBuddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. Buthow was it that the existence of this self was so widely spokenof as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of theBuddha was that what people perceived there when they saidthat they perceived the self was but the mental experienceseither individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man didnot know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wisemen, and considered himself to be endowed with form (_rūpa_)or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

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[Footnote 1: _Sa@myutta Nikūya_, III. Pp. 44-45 ff. ]

[Footnote 2: See B@rh. IV. Iv. Chāndogya, VIII. 7-12. ]

[Footnote 3: _Sa@myutta Nikaya_, III 45. ]

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experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self orexperienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thoughtin the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds ofexperiences that he considered as the perception of the self[Footnote ref 1]. 

The Upani@sads did not try to establish any school of disciplineor systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of anexperience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the onlyabiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that thisimmutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignoranceabout the means of bringing about this extinction representthe fourfold ignorance (_avijjā_) [Footnote ref 2]. The avidyā, whichis equivalent to the Pāli word avijjā, occurs in the Upani@sads also, but there it means ignorance about the ātman doctrine, and it issometimes contrasted with vidyā or true knowledge about the self(_ātman_) [Footnote ref 3]. With the Upani@sads the highest truthwas the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there wasnothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanencewas sorrow [Footnote ref 4]. This is, then, the cardinal truth ofBuddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold waysrepresented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of theright comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (_āriyasacca_)--sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction ofsorrow, and the means thereto. 

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and noself, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as wemay ordinarily be led to suppose. 

Thus it is said in the _Visuddhimagga_ "inasmuch howeveras ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a cominginto existence and a disappearing from existence... And is emptyof a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence, --... Orin other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, andsimilarly with reference to Karma and the rest--therefore is itto be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty witha twelvefold emptiness [Footnote ref 5]. "

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[Footnote 1: _Samyutta Nikāya_, II. 46. ]

[Footnote 2: _Majjhima Nikāya_, I. P. 54. ]

[Footnote 3: Chā. I. I. 10. B@rh. IV. 3. 20. There are some passages wherevidyā and avidyā have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, I's'ā 9-11. ]

[Footnote 4: _A@ng. Nikāya_, III. 85. ]

[Footnote 5 Warren's _Buddhism in Translations_ (_Visuddhimagga_, chap. XVII. ), p. 175. ]

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The Schools of Theravāda Buddhism. 

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of theBuddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongstthe successive generations of the disciples of his disciples abouthis doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoinedupon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesālidecided against the V@rjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahāsa@ngha) andcame to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thuscame to be called as the Mahāsa@nghikas [Footnote ref 1]. According toVasumitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahāsa@nghikas seceded in400 B. C. And during the next one hundred years they gave risefirst to the three schools Ekavyavahārikas, Lokottaravādins, andKukkulikas and after that the Bahus'rutīyas. In the course of thenext one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely thePrajńaptivādins, Caittikas, Aparas'ailas and Uttaras'ailas. TheTheravāda or the Sthaviravāda school which had convened thecouncil of Vesāli developed during the second and first century B. C. Into a number of schools, viz. The Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, Mahīs'āsakas, Kās'yapīyas, Sa@nkrāntikas (more well known asSautrāntikas) and the Vātsiputtrīyas which latter was again split upinto the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Sammitīyas and Channāgarikas. The main branch of the Theravāda school was fromthe second century downwards known as the Hetuvādins orSarvāstivādins [Footnote ref 2]. The _Mahābodhiva@msa_ identifies theTheravāda school with the Vibhajjavādins. The commentator of the_Kathāvatthu_ who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometimein the fifth century A. D. Mentions a few other schools ofBuddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. Vasumitra (100 A. D. ) gives us some very meagre accounts of

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[Footnote 1: The _Mahāva@msa_ differs from _Dīpava@msa_ in holding thatthe Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahāsa@nghikas, but it wasthe Mahāsa@nghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas secededindependently of them. The _Mahābodhiva@msa_, which according toProfessor Geiger was composed 975 A. D. --1000 A. D. , follows theMahava@msa in holding the Mahāsa@nghikas to be the first secedersand Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently. 

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council ofPā@taliputra. See introduction to translation of _Kathāvatthu_ byMrs Rhys Davids. ]

[Footnote 2: For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs RhysDavids's translation of _Kathāvatthu_, pp. Xxxvi-xlv. ]

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certain schools, of the Mahāsa@nghikas, Lokottaravādins, Ekavyavahārikas, Kakkulikas, Prajńaptivādins and Sarvāstivādins, butthese accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophicalimportance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that theMahāsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled withmind (_citta_) which was represented as sitting, (2) that thePrajńaptivādins held that there was no agent in man, that there wasno untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvāstivādins believed that everything existed. Fromthe discussions found in the _Kathāvatthu_ also we may know theviews of some of the schools on some points which are not alwaysdevoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be foundby which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. Itis quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhismwere not so many different systems but only differed from oneanother on some points of dogma or practice which were consideredas being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us nowappear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of theirliteratures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of laterIndian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in anyof the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhismwith which other schools of philosophical thought came in directcontact, are the Sarvāstivādins including the Sautrāntikas andthe Vaibhā@sikas, the Yogācāra or the Vijńānavādins and theMādhyamikas or the S'ūnyavādins. We do not know which of thediverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrāntika, Vaibhā@sika, Yogācāra and the Mādhyamikaschools. But as these schools were most important in relationto the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we canabout these systems of Buddhistic thought. 

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine ingeneral terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling themthe Vijńānavādins or the Yogācāras and the S'ūnyavādins, they often refer to the Sarvūstivūdins by which they meanboth the Sautrūntikas and the Vaibhū@sikas, ignoring the differencethat exists between these two schools. It is well tomention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that theHindu writers were acquainted with the Theravūda doctrines

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as expressed in the Pāli works. The Vaibhā@sikas and the Sautrāntikashave been more or less associated with each other. Thusthe _Abhidharmakos'as'āstra_ of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhā@sikawas commented upon by Yas'omitra who was a Sautrāntika. Thedifference between the Vaibhā@sikas and the Sautrāntikas thatattracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the formerbelieved that external objects were directly perceived, whereasthe latter believed that the existence of the external objects couldonly be inferred from our diversified knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A. D. ) in his commentary_Tarkarahasyadīpikā on @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ says that the Vaibhāsikawas but another name of the Āryasammitīya school. According toGu@naratna the Vaibhā@sikas held that things existed for four moments, the moment of production, the moment of existence, the moment ofdecay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed outin Vastlbandhu's _Abhidharmakos'a_ that the Vaibhā@sikas believedthese to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combinationwith the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanentmanifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translationof Yas'omitra on _Abhidharmakos'a kārikā_, V. 25). The self calledpudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge wasformless and was produced along with its object by the verysame conditions (_arthasahabhāsī ekasamāgryadhīnah_). The Sautrāntikasaccording to Gu@naratna held that there was no soul butonly the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, ākās'a and pudgalaare but names (_sa@mjńāmātram_), mere assertions (_pratijńāmātram_), mere limitations (_samv@rtamātram_) and mere phenomena (_vyavahāramātram_). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternaland all pervasive soul. External objects are never directlyperceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining thediversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; allcompounded things are momentary (_k@sa@nikāh sarvasa@mskārāh_). 

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[Footnote 1: Mādhavācārya's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_, chapter II. _S'āstradīpikā_, the discussions on Pratyak@sa, Amalańanda's commentary(on _Bhāmatī_) _Vedāntakalpataru_, p 286. "_vaibhā@sikasya bāhyo'rtha@hpratyak@sa@h, sautrāntikasya jńānagatākāravaicitrye@n anumeya@h_. " Thenature of the inference of the Sautrāntikas is shown thus byAmalānanda (1247-1260 A. D. ) "_ye yasmin satyapi kādācitkā@h tetadatiriktāpek@sā@h_" (those [i. E. Cognitions] which in spite of certainunvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on otherthings in addition to these, i. E. The external objects)_Vedāntakalpataru_, p. 289. ]

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The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition arebeing destroyed every moment. The meanings of words alwaysimply the negations of all other things, excepting that which isintended to be signified by that word (_anyāpoha@h s'abdārtha@h_). Salvation (_mok@sa_) comes as the result of the destruction of theprocess of knowledge through continual meditation that thereis no soul [Footnote ref 1]. 

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavādins, Sautrāntikasand the Vaibhā@sikas or the Sarvāstivādins appears torefer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interestwith Buddhist philosophy. Thus _Abhidharmakos'a_ (v. 24... )describes the Sarvāstivādins as those who maintain the universalexistence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavādinsare those "who maintain that the present elements andthose among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones andof those among the past that have already produced fruition. "There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrāta, Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrāta maintainedthat when an element enters different times, its existencechanges but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curdor a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changesthough the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "whenan element appears at different times, the past one retains itspast aspects without being severed from its future and presentaspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect withoutcompletely losing its past and future aspects, " just as a man inpassionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to loveother women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitraheld that an entity is called present, past and future accordingas it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after havingonce produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadevamaintained the view that just as the same woman maybe called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may becalled present, past or future in accordance with its relation to thepreceding or the succeeding moment. 

All these schools are in some sense Sarvāstivādins, for theymaintain universal existence. But the Vaibhā@sika finds them alldefective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrāta's

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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_, pp. 46-47. ]

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view is only a veiled Sā@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa isa confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistenceof all the aspects of an entity at the same time, andthat of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it wouldsuppose that all the three times were found together and includedin one of them. The Vaibhā@sika finds himself in agreementwith Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in timedepends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at thetime when an entity does not actually produce its function it isfuture; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after havingproduced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existenceof the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinksthat if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it couldnot have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done inpast times could not have produced its effects in the presenttime. The Sautrāntika however thought that the Vaibhā@sika'sdoctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-differenceappeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appearedfrom non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased toexist. He objected to the Vaibhā@sika view that the past is tobe regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringingabout the present on the ground that in that case there shouldbe no difference between the past and the present, since bothexerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, presentand future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then weshould have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. Wecan know non-existent entities as much as we can know existentones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not implythat the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction ismade between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason whyefficiency started at any particular time and ceased at anotherwould be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no differencebetween efficiency and the entity, you at once find thatthere is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and themoment are all one and the same. When we remember a thingof the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in thesame way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

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never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhā@sika suggests, butpast passions leave residues which become the causes of newpassions of the present moment [Footnote ref. 1]. 

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions ofthe Vātsiputtrīyas and the Sarvāstivādins as represented byVasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject ofthe existence of soul in _Abhidharmakos'a_. The argument ofVasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that thoughit is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determiningcause of perception, no such cause can be found whichmay render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own andmust be something different from the elements or entities of apersonal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchangingbeing would be without any practical efficiency (_arthakriyākāritva_)which alone determines or proves existence. Thesoul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as amere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there areonly the elements of a personal life. But the Vātsiputtrīyaschool held that just as fire could not be said to be either thesame as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it isseparate from it, so the soul is an individual (_pudgala_) which hasa separate existence, though we could not say that it wasaltogether different from the elements of a personal life or thesame as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elementsof personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existencecannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there mustbe an agent (e. G. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewisean action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of aperson) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbrokencontinuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), whichsimple people believe to be a unity and to which they give thename Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly movingfrom one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

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[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublishedtranslation from Tibetan of a small portion of _Abhidharmakoia_ bymy esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am gratefulto him that he allowed me to utilize it. ]

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belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productionsin different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves, ''sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productionsin new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadattacognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes placein the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being calledDevadatta). "

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it producesits recollections when connected with a previous knowledge ofthe remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc. , and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains orviolent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena ofmemory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mindand nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories sayingthat he was such and such in such and such a life, he onlymeant that his past and his present belonged to one and thesame lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say"this same fire which had been consuming that has reached thisobject, " we know that the fire is not identical at any twomoments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it isthe same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only beknown by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having thisname, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eatingsuch food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of suchan age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass awayhaving reached an age. " Only so much description can beunderstood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with theindividual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements ofsensations, images, feelings, etc. , and these happening at theformer moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individualis thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a merething of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot begrasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from otherfields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e. G. Milk, wesometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, butwhat really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc. , fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

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conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for somecolour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation'individual' but a common name for the different elementsof which it is composed. "

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the questionwhether the "living being is identical with the body or not" isjust because there did not exist any living being as "individual, "as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the livingbeing did not exist, because in that case the questioner wouldhave thought that the continuity of the elements of a life wasalso denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventionalname for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1]. 

The only book of the Sammitīyas known to us and that byname only is the _Sammitīyas'āstra_ translated into Chinese between350 A. D. To 431 A. D. ; the original Sanskrit works are howeverprobably lost [Footnote ref 2]. 

The Vaibhā@sikas are identified with the Sarvāstivādins whoaccording to _Dīpava@msa_ V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahīs'āsakas, who in their turn hadseparated from the Theravāda school. 

From the _Kathāvatthu_ we know (1) that the Sabbatthivādinsbelieved that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainmentwas not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradualprocess, (3) that consciousness or even samādhi was nothing but

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[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of_A@s@tamakos'asthānanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h_, a special appendixto the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, _Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie_, 1919. ]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of thepoints of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitīyas in the _E. R. E. _He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avyākhyā_ the Sammitīyas havebeen identified with the Vātsīputtrīyas and that many of its texts wereadmitted by the Vaibhā@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are asfollows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvāna can fall away; (2) there isan intermediate state between death and rebirth called _antarābhava_; (3)merit accrues not only by gift (_tyagānvaya_) but also by the fact of theactual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given(_paribhogānvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but adeclaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5)they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas fromwhich it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgalacannot be said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since ittransmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_) shouldering a new burden;it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitoryconstituents. " This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitīyas as sketched byProfessor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgaladoctrine of the Sammitīyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we havenoticed above. ]

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a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1]. The Sabbatthivādins or Sarvāstivādins have a vast Abhidharma literaturestill existing in Chinese translations which is different from theAbhidharma of the Theravāda school which we have already mentioned[Footnote ref 2]. These are 1. _Jńānaprasthāna S'āstra_ ofKātyāyanīputtra which passed by the name of _Mahā Vibhā@sā_ from whichthe Sabbatthivādins who followed it are called Vaibhā@sikas [Footnote ref3]. This work is said to have been given a literary form by As'vagho@sa. 2. _Dharmaskandha_ by S'āriputtra. 3. _Dhātukāya_ by Pūr@na. 4. _Prajńaptis'āstra_ by Maudgalyāyana. 5. _Vijńānakāya_ by Devak@sema. 6. _Sa@ngītiparyyāya_ by Sāriputtra and _Prakara@napāda_ by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A. D. -500 A. D. ) wrote a work on the Vaibhā@sika [Footnoteref 4] system in verses (_kārikā_) known as the _Abhidharmakos'a_, to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name_Abhidharma Kos'abhā@sya_ in which he pointed out some of the defectsof the Vaibhā@sika school from the Sautrāntika point of view [Footnoteref 5]. This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gu@namati andlater on by Yas'omitra who was himself a Sautrāntika and called hiswork _Abhidharmakos'a vyākhyā_; Sa@nghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhuwrote _Samayapradipa_ and _Nyāyānusāra_ (Chinese translations of whichare available) on strict Vaibhā@sika lines. We hear also of otherVaibhā@sika writers such as Dharmatrāta, Gho@saka, Vasumitra andBhadanta, the writer of _Sa@myuktābhidharmas'āstra_ and _Mahāvibhā@sā_. Di@nnāga(480 A. D. ), the celebrated logician, a Vaibhā@sikaor a Sautrāntika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous work _Pramā@nasamuccaya_ in which heestablished Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vātsyāyanathe celebrated commentator of the _Nyāya sūtras_; but we regret

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[Footnote 1: See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation _Kathāvatthu_, p. Xix, and Sections I. 6, 7; II. 9 and XI. 6. ]

[Footnote 2: _Mahāvyutpatti_ gives two names for Sarvāstivāda, viz. Mūlasarvāstivāda and Āryyasarvāstivāda. Itsing (671-695 A. D. ) speaksof Āryyamūlasarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda. In his time he foundit prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakususays (_P. T. S. _ 1904-1905) that Paramārtha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there. ]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu says (_P. T. S. _ 1904-1905) that Kātyāyanīputtra's workwas probably a compilation from other Vibhā@sās which existed before theChinese translations and Vibhā@sā texts dated 383 A. D. ]

[Footnote 4: See Takakusu's article _J. R. A. S. _ 1905. ]

[Footnote 5: The Sautrāntikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of theVaibhā@sikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrinesas given in the Suttapi@taka. ]

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to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan intoany of the modern European or Indian languages. 

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer atCalcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivādinsfrom the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, Mahāvibhā@sās'āstra_, etc. , rather elaborately [Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen. 

The Sabbatthivādins admitted the five skandhas, twelveāyatanas, eighteen dhātus, the three asa@msk@rta dharmas ofpratisa@mkhyānirodha apratisa@mkhyānirodha and ākās'a, and thesa@msk@rta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rūpa(matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental)[Footnote ref 2]. All effects are produced by the coming together(sa@msk@rta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and therūpa, citta, etc. , are thus called sa@msk@rta dharmas (compositethings or collocations--_sambhūyakāri_). The rūpa dharmas areeleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14cittaviprayukta sa@mskāra dharmas (non-mental composite things);adding to these the three asa@msk@rta dharmas we have the seventy-fivedharmas. Rūpa is that which has the capacity to obstruct thesense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism orcollocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratumis known as paramā@nu, which is the minutest form of rūpa. Itcannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It isindivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentaryflash into being. The simple atoms are called _dravyaparamā@nu_and the compound ones _sa@mghātaparamā@nu_. In the words ofProf. Stcherbatsky "the universal elements of matter are manifestedin their actions or functions. They are consequently moreenergies than substances. " The organs of sense are also regardedas modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramā@nus combinetogether to form an a@nu, and it is in this combined formonly that they become perceptible. The combination takesplace in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and

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[Footnote 1: _Systems of Buddhistic Thought_, published by the CalcuttaUniversity. ]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of theSarvāstivādins in his bhā@sya on the _Brahma-sūtras_ II. 2 notices someof the categories mentioned by Sogen. ]

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others around it. The point which must be remembered in connectionwith the conception of matter is this, that the qualitiesof all the mahābhūtas are inherent in the paramā@nus. The specialcharacteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belongingto fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together toform each of the elements; the difference between the differentelements consists only in this, that in each of them its own specialcharacteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristicsthough present remained only in a potential form. Themutual resistance of material things is due to the quality ofearth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction ofthings is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (1) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such asactivity, moisture, etc. ), and (3) function (such as _dh@rti_ orattraction, _sa@mgraha_ or cohesion, _pakti_ or chemical heat, and_vyūhana_ or clustering and collecting). These combine togethernaturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinctionbetween the Vaibhā@sika Sarvāstivadins and other forms of Buddhismis this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regardedas permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentaryonly in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidyā is notregarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series ofpratītyasamutpāda; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with "moha" or delusion andrepresents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidyā, which through sa@mskāra, etc. , produces nāmarūpa in the case ofa particular individual, is not his avidyā in the present existencebut the avidyā of his past existence bearing fruit in the presentlife. 

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, whenit becomes an effect, having changed its state. " For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case thename clay is lost and the name jar arises [Footnote ref 1]. TheSarvāstivādins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only inthe case of composite things (_sa@mprayukta hetu_) and in the case of

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[Footnote 1: Sogen's quotation from Kumārajīva's Chinese version ofĀryyadeva's commentary on the _Mādhyamika s'āstra_ (chapter XX. Kārikā 9). ]

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the interaction of mental and material things. The substratumof "vijńāna" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent andthe aggregate of the five senses (_indriyas_) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had apermanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also asubstratum formed of them. 

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms ofappearance (_sa@msthāna_) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (_kāyendriya_) has forits object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. Thesequalities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings bythe objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc. , and are also countedunder it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touchwhich excites the physical frame at a time when the energy ofwind becomes active in our body and predominates over otherenergies; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch whichexcites the physical frame when the energy of the element of firebecomes active and predominates over the other energies. Theindriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arousethought (_vijńāna_); each of the five senses is an agent withoutwhich none of the five vijńānas would become capable of perceivingan external object. The essence of the senses is entirelymaterial. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principalsense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principalsenses consists of a combination of paramā@nus, which are extremelypure and minute, while the substratum of the latter isthe flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ fromone another with respect to the manner and form of their respectiveatomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act isperformed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressedon our person which is designated as avijńapti rūpa. It is calledrūpa because it is a result or effect of rūpa-contact; it is calledavijńapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energyis bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and isthe only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karmadone by body or speech. Karma in this school is consideredas twofold, namely, that as thought (_cetana karma_) and that asactivity (_caitasika karma_). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz. 

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that due to body-motion (_kāyika karma_) and speech (_vācikakarma_). Both these may again be latent (_avijńapti_) and patent(_vijńapti_), giving us the kāyika-vijnńpti karma, kāyikāvijńaptikarma, vācika-vijńapti karma and vācikāvijńapti karma. Avijńaptirūpa and avijńapti karma are what we should call in modernphraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Correspondingto each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activitythere is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itselfin future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known butare similar to those which are known, they are called avijńapti. 

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because itwills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and vijńānabecause it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may beof three kinds: (1) svabhāva nirdes'a (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusm@rti nirdes'a (reminiscent discriminationreferring only to the past). The senses only possess the_svabhāva nirdes'a_, the other two belong exclusively to manovijńāna. Each of the vijńānas as associated with its specific sense discriminatesits particular object and perceives its general characteristics;the six vijńānas combine to form what is known as theVijńānaskandha, which is presided over by mind (_mano_). Thereare forty-six caitta sa@msk@rta dharmas. Of the three asa@msk@rtadharmas ākās'a (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance(_nīrūpākhya_, non-rūpa). The second asa@msk@rta dharma, apratisa@mkhyānirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas causedby the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix myattention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not becausethey are non-existent but because the conditions which wouldhave made them visible were absent. The third asa@msk@rtadharma, pratisa@mkhyā nirodha, is the final deliverance frombondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. Theseare called asa@msk@rta because being of the nature of negationthey are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of rightviews, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture [Footnote ref 1]. 

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[Footnote 1: Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hīnayānathinker (about 250 A. D. ), Harivarman, who founded a school known asSatyasiddhi school, which propounded the same sort of doctrines asthose preached by Nāgārjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskritand I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers. ]

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Mahāyānism. 

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahāyānism tookits rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahāsa@nghikasseparated themselves from the Theravādins probably some time in400 B. C. And split themselves up into eight different schools, thoseelements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to belabelled as Mahāyāna were gradually on the way to taking theirfirst inception. We hear in about 100 A. D. Of a number of workswhich are regarded as various Mahāyāna sūtras, some of whichare probably as old as at least 100 B. C. (if not earlier) and othersas late as 300 or 400 A. D. [Footnote ref 1]. These Mahāyānasūtras, alsocalled the Vaipulyasūtras, are generally all in the form of instructionsgiven by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors orcompilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit andwere probably written by those who seceded from the Theravādaschool. 

The word Hīnayāna refers to the schools of Theravāda, andas such it is contrasted with Mahāyāna. The words are generallytranslated as small vehicle (_hīna_ = small, _yāna_ = vehicle) and greatvehicle (_mahā_ = great, _yāna_ = vehicle). But this translation byno means expresses what is meant by Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna[Footnote ref 2]. Asa@nga (480 A. D. ) in his _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_ gives

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[Footnote 1: Quotations and references to many of these sūtras are found inCandrakīrtti's commentary on the _Mādhyamīka kārikās_ of Nāgārjuna; some ofthese are the following: _A@s@tasāhasrikāprajńāpāramitā_ (translated intoChinese 164 A. D. -167 A. D. ), _S'atasāhasrikāprajńāpāramitā, Gaganagańja, Samādhisūtra, Tathāgataguhyasūtra, D@r@dhādhyās'ayasańcodanāsūtra, Dhyāyitamu@s@tisūtra, Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra, Mahāyānasūtra, Māradamanasūtra, Ratnakū@tasūtra, Ratnacū@dāparip@rcchāsūtra, Ratnameghasūtra, Ratnarās`isūtra, Ratnākarasūtra, Rā@s@trapālaparip@rcchāsūtra, La@nkāvatārasūtra, Lalitavistarasūtra, Vajracchedikāsūtra, Vimalakīrttinirdes'asūtra, S'ālistambhasūtra, Samādhirajasutra, Sukhāvatīvyūha, Suvar@naprabhāsasūtra, Saddharmapu@n@darika (translated into Chinese A. D. 255), Amitāyurdhyānasūtra, Hastikākhyasūtra, etc. ]

[Footnote 2: The word Yāna is generally translated as vehicle, but aconsideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems tosuggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle(_Lalitavistara_, pp. 25, 38; _Prajńāpāramitā_, pp. 24, 319;_Samādhirājasūtra_, p. 1; _Karu@nāpu@ndarīka_, p. 67; _La@nkāvatārasūtra_, pp. 68, 108, 132). The word Yāna is as old as the Upani@sads where we readof Devayāna and Pit@ryāna. There is no reason why this word should betaken in a different sense. We hear in _La@nkāvatāra_ of S'rāvakayāna(career of the S'rāvakas or the Theravādin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayāna(the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddhayāna (career of the Buddhas), Ekayāna (one career), Devayāna (career ofthe gods), Brahmayāna (career of becoming a Brahmā), Tathāgatayāna(career of a Tathāgata). In one place _Lankāvatāra_ says that ordinarilydistinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (_Lankāvatāra_, p. 68). ]

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us the reason why one school was called Hīnayāna whereas theother, which he professed, was called Mahāyāna. He says that, considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hīnayānaoccupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Mahā(great) Yāna, and hence it is branded as Hīna (small, or low). This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinctionbetween Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The ultimate good of anadherent of the Hīnayāna is to attain his own nirvā@na or salvation, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahāyānacreed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek thesalvation of all beings. So the Hīnayāna goal was lower, and inconsequence of that the instructions that its followers received, the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved werenarrower than that of the Mahāyāna adherents. A Hīnayāna manhad only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and thiscould be done in three lives, whereas a Mahāyāna adherent wasprepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attainsalvation. So the Hīnayana adherents required only a short periodof work and may from that point of view also be called _hīna, _ orlower. 

This point, though important from the point of view of thedifference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the pointof view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Mahāyānistswhich distinguishes them from the Hīnayānists from thephilosophical point of view. The Mahāyānists believed that allthings were of a non-essential and indefinable character andvoid at bottom, whereas the Hīnayānists only believed in theimpermanence of all things, but did not proceed further thanthat. 

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nāgārjuna firstpreached the doctrine of S'ūnyavāda (essencelessness or voidnessof all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahāyāna sūtraseither definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if wetake some of those sūtras which were in all probability earlier thanNāgārjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nāgārjuna expounded

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with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly acceptedas an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhūti saying tothe Buddha that vedanā (feeling), samjńā (concepts) and thesa@mskāras (conformations) are all māyā (illusion) [Footnote ref 1]. Allthe skandhas, dhätus (elements) and āyatanas are void and absolutecessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure voidis not different from the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, and thisabsolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge(_prajńāpāramitā_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void there is inreality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal(_s'ās'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as'ās'vata_) but pure void. It shouldbe the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness"(_tathatā_) and consider all things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_)has to establish himself in all the virtues (_pāramitā_), benevolence(_dānapāramitā_), the virtue of character (_s'īlapāramitā_), the virtueof forbearance (_k@sāntipāramitā_), the virtue of tenacity and strength(_vīryyapāramitā_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhyānapāramitā_). The saint (_bodhisattva_) is firmly determined that he willhelp an infinite number of souls to attain nirvā@na. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation;and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraidof this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining forall illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in hiswork on the strength of his pāramitās, though in reality thereis no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one whois to help him to attain it [Footnote ref 3]. The true prajńapāramitā isthe absolute cessation of all appearance (_ya@h anupalambha@hsarvadharmā@nām sa prajńāpāramitā ityucyate_) [Footnote ref 4]. 

The Mahāyāna doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. Thatof S'ūnyavāda or the Mādhyamika doctrine and Vijńānavāda. The difference between S'ūnyavāda and Vijńānavāda (the theorythat there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness)is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of themagree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everythingis only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. Butwhile the S'ūnyavādins were more busy in showing thisindefinableness of all phenomena, the Vijńānavādins, tacitly accepting

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[Footnote 1: _A@s@tesāhasiihāprajńāpāramita_, p. 16. ]

[Footnote 2: Ibid p. 177. ]

[Footnote 3: Ibid p. 21. ]

[Footnote 4: Ibid p. 177. ]

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the truth preached by the S'ūnyavādins, interested themselves inexplaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory ofbeginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind (_vāsanā_). 

As'vagho@sa (100 A. D. ) seems to have been the greatest teacherof a new type of idealism (_vijńānavāda_) known as the Tathatāphilosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation inAs'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpādas'āstra_ as being made from_La@nkāvatārasūtra_, we should think of the _La@nkāvatārasūtra_ asbeing one of the early works of the Vijńānavādins [Footnote ref 1]. The greatest later writer of the Vijńānavāda school was Asa@nga(400 A. D. ), to whom are attributed the _Saptadas'abhūmi sūtra, Mahāyāna sūtra, Upades'a, Mahāyānasamparigraha s'āstra, Yogācārabhūmis'āstra_ and _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_. None of these works excepting thelast one is available to readers who have no access to theChinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals arein all probability lost. The Vijńānavāda school is known toHindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogācāra, and it doesnot seem an improbable supposition that Asa@nga's _Yogācārabhūmis'āstra_ was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, a younger brother of Asa@nga, was, as Paramārtha (499-569) tellsus, at first a liberal Sarvāstivādin, but was converted to Vijńānavāda, late in his life, by Asa@nga. Thus Vasubandhu, whowrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvāstivādins, _Abhidharmakos'a_, devoted himself in his later life to Vijńānavāda[Footnote ref 2]. He is said to have commented upon a number ofMahāyāna sūtras, such as _Avata@msaka, Nirvā@na, Saddharmapu@n@darīka, Prajńāpāramitā, Vimalakīrtti_ and _S'rīmālāsi@mhanāda_, andcompiled some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as _Vijńānamātrasiddhi, Ratnatraya_, etc. The school of Vijńānavāda continued for atleast a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not inpossession of any work of great fame of this school after him. 

We have already noticed that the S'ūnyavāda formed the fundamentalprinciple of all schools of Mahāyāna. The most powerfulexponent of this doctrine was Nāgārjuna (1OO A. D. ), a brief accountof whose system will be given in its proper place. Nāgārjuna'skārikās (verses) were commented upon by Āryyadeva, a discipleof his, Kumārajīva (383 A. D. ). Buddhapālita and Candrakīrtti(550 A. D. ). Āryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

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[Footnote 1: Dr S. C. Vidyābhūshana thinks that _Lankāvatāna_ belongs toabout 300 A. D. ]

[Footnote 2: Takakusu's "A study of the Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu, "_J. R. A. S_. 1905. ]

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least three other books, viz. _Catu@hs'ataka, Hastabālaprakara@nav@rtti_and _Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_ [Footnote ref 1]. In the small work called_Hastabālaprakara@nav@rtti_ Āryyadeva says that whatever dependsfor its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory;all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptionsand notions of part and whole and should therefore be regardedas mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependenton others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise manshould feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenalappearances. In his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_ he saysthat just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflectionof a coloured object, even so the mind though in itselfcolourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination(_vikalpa_). In reality the mind (_citta_) without a touchof imagination (_kalpanā_) in it is the pure reality. 

It does not seem however that the S'ūnyavādins could produceany great writers after Candrakīrtti. References to S'ūnyavādashow that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writersuntil the time of the great Mīmā@msā authority Kumārila whoflourished in the eighth century; but in later times the S'ūnyavādinswere no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants. 

The Tathataā Philosophy of As'vagho@sa (80 A. D. ) [Footnote ref 2]. 

As'vagho@sa was the son of a Brahmin named Sai@mhaguhyawho spent his early days in travelling over the different parts ofIndia and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probablyconverted to Buddhism by Pār@sva who was an importantperson in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmereand according to other authorities by Pu@nyayas'as [Footnote ref 3]. 

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[Footnote 1: Āryyadeva's _Hastabālaprakara@nav@rtti_ has been reclaimed byDr. F. W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his _Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_were published by Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda s'āstrī in the BengalAsiatic Society's journal, 1898. ]

[Footnote 2: The above section is based on the _Awakening of Faith_, anEnglish translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of_S'raddhotpādas`āstra_ by As'vagho@sa, the Sanskrit original of whichappears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidenceto show that As'vagho@sa was a contemporary of Kani@ska. ]

[Footnote 3: Tāranātha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a discipleof Nāgārjuna, _Geschichte des Buddhismus_, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's _Awakening of Faith_, pp. 24-32. As'vagho@sa wrotethe _Buddhacaritakāvya_, of great poetical excellence, and the_Mahāla@mkāras'āstra_. He was also a musician and had invented a musicalinstrument called Rāstavara that he might by that means convert thepeople of the city. "Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-ātmannessof life. " Suzuki, p. 35. ]

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He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished--the aspect as thatness (_bhūtatathatā_) and the aspect as the cycleof birth and death (_sa@msāra_). The soul as bhūtatathatā meansthe oneness of the totality of all things (_dharmadhātu_). Its essentialnature is uncreate and external. All things simply on accountof the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconsciousmemory of our past experiences of many previous lives (_sm@rti_)appear under the forms of individuation [Footnote ref 1]. If we couldovercome this sm@rti "the signs of individuation would disappear andthere would be no trace of a world of objects. " "All things in theirfundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannotbe adequately expressed in any form of language. Theypossess absolute sameness (_samatā_). They are subject neither totransformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul"--thatness (_bhūtatathatā_). This "thatness" has no attribute andit can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness. "As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence isspoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks northat which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks northat which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness. " Thisbhūtatathatā is neither that which is existence, nor that which isnon-existence, nor that which is at once existence and non-existence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence;it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which isat once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unityand plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it isbeyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive conceptin the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehendedby any kind of particularization or distinction. It isonly by transcending the range of our intellectual categories ofthe comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena thatwe can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by theparticularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may callit negation, "s'ūnyatā, " in this sense. The truth is that which

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[Footnote 1: I have ventured to translate "_sm@rti_" in the sense of vāsanāin preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because sm@rti in thesense of vāsanā is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist worksas _La@nkāvatāra_. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European aterm to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense. ]

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subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (_s'ūnyatā_) isalso void (_s'ūnya_) in its nature, that neither that which is negatednor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the puresoul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, andcompletely holds all things within it. On that account it may becalled affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory(_sm@rti_) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping thetruth--the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations. 

"The soul as birth and death (_sa@msāra_) comes forth fromthe Tathāgata womb (_tathāgatagarbha_), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thuswhen the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmationit is called the all-conserving mind (_ālayavijńāna_). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it isfree from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipientmemory (_sm@rti_). It penetrates all and is the unity of all(_dharmadhātu_). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakāya of allTathāgatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence. 

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamentaltruth, it should not be thought that consciousness had anyreal origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginarycreation of the perceivers under the influence of thedelusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to belacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (_avidyā_) prevailsthere from all eternity, because there is a constant succession ofsm@rti (past confused memory working as instinct) from whichthey have never been emancipated. But when they are divestedof this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. Their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, haveany reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relationwith the one soul, for they are not self-existent. 

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corruptedphenomenal experience as prajńā (wisdom) and karma(incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understandthat when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma, disciplines himself truthfully (i. E. According to the dharma), andaccomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i. E. The _ālayavijńāna_)

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which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken downand the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, andthe pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakāya will manifestitself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation aremere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature isidentical and non-identical with enlightenment; and thereforeignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another senseit is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of thewater and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Herethe water can be said to be both identical and non-identicalwith the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but thewater remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion ofthe waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewisewhen the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure andclean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (_avidyā_), the wavesof mentality (_vijńāna_) make their appearance. These three (i. E. The mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance isannihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst theessence of the wisdom remains unmolested. " The truth or theenlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativityor by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events inthe phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that theyneither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappearnor are destroyed. " It is for ever cut off from the hindrances bothaffectional (_kles'āvara@na_) and intellectual (_jńeyāvara@na_), as wellas from the mind (i. E. _ālayavijńāna_) which implicates itself withbirth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transformsand unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the formof a tathāgata or in some other forms, in order that all beingsmay be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity. 

"Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from itsrelation with enlightenment _a priori_. " But enlightenment _a priori_is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and asnon-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn losesits significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relationas enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestationsof non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbanceof the mind (_ālayavijńāna_), by the avidyākarma (ignorant

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action), producing misery (_du@hkha_); (2) by the appearance of anego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external worldwhich does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditionedby the unreal external world six kinds of phenomenaarise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation);being affected by the external world the mind becomesconscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable. The second phenomenon is succession. Following uponintelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as wellas disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention andsuccession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, therearises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachmentto names or ideas (_sa@mjńā_), etc. By clinging the mindhypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (_karma_). Onaccount of attachment to names, etc. , there arise all the variationsof deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenonis the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds sufferingarises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed ofits freedom. " All these phenomena have thus sprung forth throughavidyā. 

The relation between this truth and avidyā is in one sensea mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kindsof pottery which though different are all made of the same clay[Footnote ref 1]. Likewise the undefiled (_anāsrava_) and ignorance(_avidyā_) and their various transient forms all come from one and thesame entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from alleternity abiding in Nirvā@na. 

It is by the touch of ignorance (_avidyā_) that this truth assumesall the phenomenal forms of existence. 

In the all-conserving mind (_ālayavijńāna_) ignorance manifestsitself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, thatwhich represents, that which apprehends an objective world, andthat which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (_manas_). Five different names are given to the ego (according to its differentmodes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness(_karmavijńāna_) in the sense that through the agency ofignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or

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[Footnote 1: Compare Chāndogya, VI. 1. 4. ]

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awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (_prav@rttiivijńāna_)in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, thereevolves that which sees an external world. The third name isrepresentation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (_manas_}represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirrorreflects the images of all description, it is even so with therepresentation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneouslyand without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiledas well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in thesense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousnessof attention (_manaskāra_) it (_manas_) retains all experiences andnever loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as wellas evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the presentor in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciouslyrecollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates thingsto come. Therefore the three domains (_kāmaloka_, domain offeeling--_rūpaloka_, domain of bodily existence--_arūpaloka_, domainof incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of themind (i. E. _ālayavijńāna_ which is practically identical with_bhūtatathatā_). Since all things, owing the principle of theirexistence to the mind (_ālayavijńāna_), are produced by sm@rti, all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizationsof the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free fromall attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusionthat all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatizedand established only through ignorance (_avidyā_) and memory(_sm@rti_), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. Theyarise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. Whenthe mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; butwhen the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. By ego-consciousness (_manovijńāna_) we mean the ignorant mindwhich by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception ofI and Not-I and misapprehends the nature of the six objects ofsense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of theprejudices (_āsrava_), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believingin the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

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oblivious of the principle of sameness (_samatā_) that underlies allthings which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show nosign of becoming. 

Non-enlightenment is the _raison d'étre_ of samsāra. Whenthis is annihilated the conditions--the external world--are alsoannihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is alsoannihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilationof the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffledsea when all winds which were disturbing it and producingthe waves have been annihilated. 

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidyā (ignorance), karmavijńāna (activity-consciousness--the subjective mind), vi@saya (external world--represented by the senses) and the tathatā(suchness), As'vaghosa says that there is an interperfuming ofthese elements. Thus As'vaghosa says, "By perfuming we meanthat while our worldly clothes (viz. Those which we wear) have noodour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yetacquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substancewith which they are perfumed. Suchness (_tathatā_) is likewisea pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfumingpower of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing todo with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do thework of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the _raison d'étre_ ofall forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchnessand produces sm@rti. This sm@rti in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood an external worldof subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfumingpower of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we sufferas the result miseries mentally as well as bodily. " Again "suchnessperfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfumingthe individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery ofbirth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvāna. Thislonging and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turnperfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence weare enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselvesof suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; andwe also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

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but the illusory manifestations of the mind (_ālayavijńāna_) andhave no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understandthe truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can performthose actions which are in accordance with the dharma. Weshould neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. Byvirtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerableāsa@nkhyeyakalpas [Footnote ref 1] we get ignorance annihilated. Asignorance is thus annihilated, the mind (_ālayavijńāna_) is no longerdisturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is nolonger disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding worldis annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the conditionof defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are allannihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvā@na and that variousspontaneous displays of activity are accomplished. " The Nirvā@naof the tathatā philosophy is not nothingness, but tathatā (suchnessor thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbancewhich produces all the diversity of experience. 

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possessionof suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is itthat there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, As'vagho@sa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly inpossession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principleof individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in suchmanifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, andhence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principlein one's own being which, embraced and protected by the love(_maitrī_) and compassion (_karu@nā_) of all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believein nirvā@na, to cultivate the root of merit (_kus'alamūla_), to habituateoneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequenceof this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receivinginstructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and inducedto practise good deeds, etc. , till one can attain to Buddhahood andenter into Nirvā@na. This implies that all beings have such perfumingpower in them that they may be affected by the good wishesof the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the pathof virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvasand sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual)benefits (_hitatā_)" and "entering into the samādhi of purity, they

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[Footnote 1: Technical name for a very vast period of time. ]

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destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetratinginsight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness(_samatā_) of the universe (_sarvaloka_) and to see innumerable Buddhasand Bodhisattvas. "

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not inunison with suchness, as in the case of s'rāvakas (theravādinmonks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who onlycontinue their religious discipline but do not attain to the stateof non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison withsuchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allowthemselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance fromall eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood oneat once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma(i. E. Suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of greatwisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhātu (universe), the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in itsown nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and thepure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is calledthe tathāgatagarbha or the dharmakāya. It may be objected thatsince thatness or suchness has been described as being withoutcharacteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracingall merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because allobjects in the world are of one and the same taste; and beingof one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of particularizationor of dualistic character. "Though all things in their(metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth arefree from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenmentthere originates a subjective mind (_ālayavijńāna_) that becomesconscious of an external world. " This is called ignorance oravidyā. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectlypure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assignto suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It iscalled universal illumination, because there is nothing for it toillumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, though the stage of the perfuming of avidyā comes to an end withthe Buddhas when they attain to nirvā@na. All Buddhas while at

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the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (_mahākaru@nā_) for allbeings, practise all virtues (_pāramitās_) and many other meritoriousdeeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out auniversal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitlessnumbers of _kalpas_, recognize truthfully and adequately theprinciple of equality (_samatā_)among people; and do not clingto the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what ismeant by the activity of tathatā. The main idea of this tathatāphilosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" isat once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidyā veilsit or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as thepure thatness also perfumes the avidyā there is a striving for thegood as well. As the stage of avidyā is passed its luminouscharacter shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which onlyillusorily appeared as the many of the world. 

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the viewof an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth thanthat of the nihilistic idealism of _La@nkāvatāra_. Considering thefact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his earlylife, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence inthis interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourablywith the Vedānta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The _La@nkāvatāra_admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas(heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self(_ātman_). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable realityas the ultimate truth. Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika doctrines whicheclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be morefaithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijńānavādacreed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkāvatāra [Footnote ref 1]. 

The Mādhyamika or the S'ūntavāda school. --Nihilism. 

Candrakīrtti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna's verses known as"_Mādhyamika kārikā_, " in explaining the doctrine of dependentorigination (_pratītyasamutpāda_) as described by Nāgārjuna startswith two interpretations of the word. According to one the wordpratītyasamutpāda means the origination (_utpāda_) of the nonexistent(_abhāva_) depending on (_pratītya_) reasons and causes

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[Footnote 1: As I have no access to the Chinese translation ofAs'vagho@sa's _S'raddhotpāda S'āstra_, I had to depend entirely onSuzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation. ]

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(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratītyameans each and every destructible individual and pratītyasamutpādameans the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning doesnot suit the context in which the Pāli Scriptures generally speakof pratītyasamutpāda (e. G. _cak@su@h pratītya rūpāni ca utpadyantecak@survijńānam_) for it does not mean the origination of each andevery destructible individual, but the originating of specificindividual phenomena (e. G. Perception of form by the operation inconnection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions. 

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for exampleif we take the case of any origination, e. G. That of the visual percept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visualknowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not beintelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If weinterpret the maxim of pratītyasamutpāda as this happening thathappens, that would not explain any specific origination. Allorigination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself norby others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. To suppose that it is originated by others would also meanthat the origination was of a thing already existing. If againwithout any further qualification it is said that depending onone the other comes into being, then depending on anything anyother thing could come into being--from light we could have darkness!Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of themtogether. A thing also could not originate without any cause, for then all things could come into being at all times. It is thereforeto be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of thisso-called dependent origination (_pratītyasamutpāda_) it was referredto as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects andsenses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination isnot thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance(_avidyā_). The only thing which is not lost (_amo@sadharma_) isnirvā@na; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena(_sa@mskāra_) are false and are lost with their appearances(_sarvasa@mskārās'ca m@r@sāmo@sadharmā@na@h_). 

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appearances

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are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then nogood or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is thecase, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussionshould be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that thenihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidenceof the people that things are true. Those who are reallywise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearlythey do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves withthe question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thusthere are neither works nor cycles of births (_sa@msāra_) and also hedoes not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence ofany of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakū@tasūtra thathowsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness(_citta_); what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, and what does not exist is neither past, nor future, nor present, andas such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that whichhas no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. He who through his false knowledge (_viparyyāsa_) does not comprehendthe falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to bereal, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth (_sa@msāra_). Like allillusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harmof rebirth and sorrow. 

It may again be objected that if there is nothing trueaccording to the nihilists (_s'ūnyavādins_), then their statement thatthere is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candrakirttiin replying to this says that with s'ūnyavādins the truth is absolutesilence. When the S'ūnyavādin sages argue, they only accept forthe moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal withthem in their own manner to help them to come to a rightcomprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spiteof all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing thatwe call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as thesephenomena have no true essence. 

When the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda is described as "thisbeing that is, " what is really meant is that things can only beindicated as mere appearances one after another, for they haveno essence or true nature. Nihilism (_s'ūnyavāda_) also means justthis. The true meaning of pratītyasamutpāda or s'ūnyavāda isthis, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

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appear [Footnote ref 1]. As the phenomena have no essence they are neitherproduced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. Theyare merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (_s'ūnya_)does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind ofposition. It simply means that none of the appearances have anyintrinsic nature of their own (_ni@hsvabhāvatvam_). 

The Madhyamaka or S'ūnya system does not hold that anythinghas any essence or nature (svabhāva) of its own; evenheat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heatand the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be thenature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be thetrue essence or nature of anything which does not depend onanything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointedout which stands independently by itself we cannot say that itexists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannotaffirm the essence of other things to it (_parabhāva_). If wecannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequentlyassert anything of anything as negative. If anyone firstbelieves in things positive and afterwards discovers that they arenot so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (_abhāva_), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannotspeak of anything negative either [Footnote ref 2]. 

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a processgoing on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process ofchange could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But wecan hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things;for those which are momentary are destroyed the next momentafter they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue tojustify a process. That which appears as being neither comesfrom anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyedalso does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (_sa@msāra_) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannotbe that when the second moment arose, the first moment hadsuffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as thesecond, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In factthere being no relation between the two, the temporal determinationas prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is aself which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

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[Footnote 1: See _Mādhyamikav@rtti_ (B. T. S. ), p. 50. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. Pp. 93-100. ]

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may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover ifthe soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one characterand takes up another at the same identical moment which isinconceivable [Footnote ref 1]. 

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, whatis then the nirvā@na which is described as the final extinction ofall afflictions (_kles'a_)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it doesnot agree to such a definition of nirvā@na. Nirvā@na on the Madhyamakatheory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, thatwhich cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceasedor as anything which is produced (_aniruddham anntpannam_}. Innirvā@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena ceaseto exist in nirvā@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope theynever existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirvā@na cannot be any positive thing orany sort of state of being (_bhāva_), for all positive states or thingsare joint products of combined causes (_sa@msk@rta_) and are liable todecay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for sincewe cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of anegative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena arecommunicated as being in a state of change and process comingone after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truthcan be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to beproduced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot bedetermined as existent or non-existent. Nirvā@na is merely thecessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (_prapańcaprav@rtti_). Itcannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative forthese conceptions belong to phenomena (_na cāprav@rttimatrambhāvābhāveti parikalpitum pāryyate evam na bhāvābhāvanirvā@nam_, M. V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased toappear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3]. 

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist anybondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, likethe mirage, the dream, the māyā, and the magic without any realnature (_ni@hsvabhāva_). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

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[Footnote 1: See _Madhyamikav@rtti_ (B. T. S. ), pp. 101-102. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. P. 194. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid_. Pp. 162 and 201. ]

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one is trying to win a real nirvā@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this falseegoism that is to be considered as avidyā. When considered deeply it isfound that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (_avidyā_), therewould have been no conformations (_sa@mskāras_), and if there wereno conformations there would have been no consciousness, and soon; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating thesa@mskāras, " and it can be said of the sa@mskāras "we are beingproduced by the avidyā. " But there being avidyā, there come thesa@mskarās and so on with other categories too. This character ofthe pratītyasamutpāda is known as the coming of the consequentdepending on an antecedent reason (_hetūpanibandha_). 

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependenceon conglomeration or combination (_pratyayopanibandh_). It is by the combination (_samavāya_) of the four elements, space(_ākās'a_) and consciousness (_vijńāna_) that a man is made. It isdue to earth (_p@rthivī_) that the body becomes solid, it is due towater that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there isdigestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is dueto ākās'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijńāna thatthere is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combinationthat we find a man as he is. But none of these elements thinkthat they have done any of the functions that are considered to beallotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings orsouls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents andattachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus comethe sa@mskāras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness(_rāga, dve@sa, moha_); from these proceed the vijńāna andthe four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about nameand form (_nāmarūpa_), from these proceed the senses (_@sa@dayatana_), from the coming together of those three comes contact (_spars'a_);from that feelings, from that comes desire (_tr@s@nā_) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essenceor truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2]. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent ornon-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism(_s'ās'vatavāda_) or nihilism (_ucchedavāda_), and it is for this reason

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[Footnote 1: See _Mādhyamikav@rtti_ (B. T. S. ), pp. 101-108. ]

[Footnote: _Ibid. _ pp. 209-211, quoted from _Sālistambhasūtra_. Vācaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his _Bhāmatī_ onS'a@nkara's _Brahma-sūtra_. ]

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that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (_madhyamaka_) [Footnoteref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth(_samv@rtisatya_) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no truereality (_paramārthasatya_) in them or anything else. Moralityplays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in anyother Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nāgārjuna's_Suk@rllekha_ as translated by Wenzel (P. T. S. 1886) fromthe Tibetan translation. 

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (_asāra_) give according tothe moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for thereis no better friend than giving. 

7. Exhibit morality (_s'īla_) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is ofthe moving and immovable. 

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, havingreached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jinaprince. 

9. View as enemies, avarice (_mātsaryya_), deceit (_s'ā@thya_), duplicity(_māyā_), lust, indolence (_kausīdya_), pride (_māna_), greed (_rāga_), hatred (_dve@sa_) and pride (_mada_) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power. 

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no doorfor anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shallattain the degree of an anāgāmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth). 

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her, according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister. 

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of thesix senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, thewise praise the first as the greater hero. 

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldlyconditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts. 

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (youmust) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family. 

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you(certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (_brahmavihāra_). 

41. By the four dhyānas completely abandoning desire (_kāma_), reflection(_vicāra_), joy (_prīti_), and happiness and pain (_sukha, du@hkha_) youwill obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman. 

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I amnot endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell inme; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other fouraggregates. "

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

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[Footnote 1: See _Mādhyamikav@rtti_ (B. T. S. ), p. 160. ]

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nature (_prak@rti_), not from themselves (_svabhāvāt_), nor from the Lord(_īs'vara_), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise fromignorance (_avidyā_) and desire (_t@r@s@nā_). 

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (_s'īlabrataparāmars'a_), wrong views (_mithyād@r@s@ti_) and doubt (_vicikitsā_) are the threefetters. 

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty onerules (of the _prātimok@sa_) are combined perfectly in these three. 

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (_anitya_) withoutsubstance (_anātma_) without help (_as'ara@na_) without protector(_anātha_) and without abode (_asthāna_) thou O Lord of men must becomediscontented with this worthless (_asāra_) kadali-tree of the orb. 

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguishand subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is noother higher necessity than this. 

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignityof the quieting and the subduing nirvā@na not subject to age, death ordecay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon. 

107. Where there is no wisdom (_prajńā_) there is also no contemplation(_dhyana_), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; butknow that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like agrove. 

Uncompromising Idealism or the Schoolof Vijńānavāda Buddhism. 

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijńānavādaor Yogācāra has often been referred to by such prominent teachersof Hindu thought as Kumārila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a greatextent with the S'ūnyavādins whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginaryconstructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in theso-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. Weconstruct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it existsby itself (_nirmmitapratimohi_) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functionsinvolved in our consciousness, viz. That which holds the perceptions(_khyāti vijńāna_), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions(_vastuprativikalpavijńāna_). The two functions however mutuallydetermine each other and cannot be separately distinguished(_abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke_). These functions are set to workon account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherentin them in relation to the world of appearance(_anādikāla-prapańca-vāsanahetukańca_) [Footnote ref 2]. 

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

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[Footnote 1: _Lankāvatārasūtra_, pp. 21-22. ]

[Footnote 2 _Ibid. _ p. 44. ]

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unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped(_abhūta-parikalpa-vāsanā-vaicitra-nirodha_)[Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledgeis without any essence or truth (_nihsvabhāva_) and is but acreation of māyā, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing whichmay be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of themind (_svacitta_), which has been accustomed to create imaginaryappearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movementthese creations take place as subject and object has noappearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existenceand extinction (_utpādasthitibha@ngavarjjam_) and is called theālayavijńāna. The reason why this ālayavijńāna itself is said to bewithout origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains allthe phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existencein the sense in which the term is used and we could notaffirm any special essence of it. 

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothingexternal but of our own mind (_svacitta_), and there is also thebeginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal worldof appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (whichtakes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is alsothe instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On accountof these four reasons there are produced in the ālayavijńāna (mind)the ripples of our sense experiences (_prav@rttivijńana_) as in a lake, and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skandhascalled _pańchavijńānakāya_ thus appear in a proper syntheticform. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is eitheridentical or different from the ālayavijńāna just as the waves cannotbe said to be either identical or different from the ocean. Asthe ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the ālayavijńānais also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (_v@rtti_). Ascitta it collects all movements (_karma_) within it, as manas itsynthesizes (_vidhīyate_) and as vijńāna it constructs the fivefoldperceptions (_vijńānān vijānāti d@rs'yam kalpate pańcabhi@h_) [Footnoteref 2]. 

It is only due to māyā (illusion) that the phenomena appear in theirtwofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded asan appearance (_samv@rtisatyatā_) whereas in the real aspect we couldnever say whether they existed (_bhāva_) or did not exist [Footnote ref 3]. 

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[Footnote 1: _Pańcāvatārasūtra_, p. 44. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. , pp. 50-55. ]

[Footnote 3: Asa@nga's _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_, pp. 58-59. ]

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All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory (_sadasanta@hmāyopamā@h_). When we look deeply into them we find thatthere is an absolute negation of all appearances, including evenall negations, for they are also appearances. This would make theultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in whichthe positive and negative are one and the same (_bhāvābhāvasamānatā_)[Footnote ref 1]. Such a state which is complete in itself and has noname and no substance had been described in the La@nkāvatārasūtraas thatness (_tathatā_) [Footnote ref 2]. This state is also described inanother place in the _La@nkāvatāra_ as voidness (_s'ūnyatā_) which is oneand has no origination and no essence [Footnote ref 3]. In another placeit is also designated as tathāgatagarbha [Footnote ref 4]. 

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualifiedultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic ātman or Brahmanlike the tathatā doctrine of As'vagho@sa; and we find in La@nkavatārathat Rāva@na asks the Buddha "How can you say thatyour doctrine of tathāgatagarbha was not the same as the ātmandoctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those hereticsalso consider the ātman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all pervadingand unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to replythus--"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of thoseheretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instructionof a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substancein anything (nairatmya) would frighten the disciples, thatI say that all things are in reality the tathāgatagarbha. Thisshould not be regarded as ātman. Just as a lump of clay is madeinto various shapes, so it is the non-essential natureof all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics(_sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam_) that is variously described asthe garbha or the nairātmya (essencelessness). This explanation oftathāgatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order toattract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiouslyinclined to believe in the ātman doctrine [Footnote ref 5]. "

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned, the idealistic Buddhists (_vijńānavādins_) agreed to the doctrine ofpratītyasamutpāda with certain modifications. There was withthem an external pratītyasamutpāda just as it appeared in the

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[Footnote 1: Asa@nga's _Mahāyānasūtrāla@mkāra_, p. 65. ]

[Footnote 2: _Lankāvatārasūtra_, p. 70. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _ p. 78. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid. _ p. 80. ]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid. _ pp. 80-81. ]

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objective aspect and an internal pratītyasamutpāda. The externalpratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) is represented in theway in which material things (e. G. A jug) came into being by theco-operation of diverse elements--the lump of clay, the potter, the wheel, etc. The internal (_ādhyātmika_) pratītyasamutpādawas represented by avidyā, t@r@s@nā, karma, the skandhas, and theāyatanas produced out of them [Footnote ref 1]. 

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the_pravichayabuddhi_ and the_vikalpalak@sa@nagrahābhinives'aprati@s@thapikābuddhi_. Thepravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in eitherof the following four ways, that they are either this or the other(_ekatvānyaiva_); either both or not both (_ubhayānubhaya_), eitherare or are not (_astināsti_), either eternal or non-eternal (_nityānitya_). But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The secondcategory consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which itconstructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn byits own constructive activity--_parikalpa_) in a logical order of diverserelations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He whoknows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that thereis no external world of matter and that they are all experienced onlyin the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction ofsmoothness (_sneha_) that constructs the water as an external substance;it is the sense construction of activity or energy thatconstructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense constructionof movement that constructs the external substance of air. In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as thereal (_mithyāsatyābhinives'a_) five skandhas appear. If these wereto appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causalrelations, and if they appeared in succession there could beno connection between them, as there is nothing to bind themtogether. In reality there is nothing which is produced ordestroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds upthings as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves asperceivers. It is simply a convention (_vyavahāra_) to speak of thingsas known [Footnote ref 2]. Whatever we designate by speech is merespeech-construction (_vāgvikalpa_) and unreal. In speech one could notspeak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

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[Footnote 1: _La@nkāvatārasūtra_, p. 85. ]

[Footnote 2: _Lankāvatārasūtra_, p. 87, compare the term "vyavahārika" asused of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the samesense by S'a@nkara. ]

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relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true;the real truth (_paramartha_) can never be referred to by suchspeech-construction. 

The nothingness (_s'ūnyata_) of things may be viewed fromseven aspects--(1) that they are always interdependent, and hencehave no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannotbe determined in themselves they cannot be determined in termsof others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a referenceto an "other" is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable(_laksanas'ūnyata_); (2) that they have no positive essence(_bhāvasvabhāvas'ūnyatā_), since they spring up from a naturalnon-existence (_svabhāvābhāvotpatti_); (3) that they are of an unknowntype of non-existence (_apracaritas'ūnyatā_), since all the skandhasvanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connectedthough non-existent (_pracaritas'ūnyatā_), for their skandhashave no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, butyet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that noneof the things can be described as having any definite nature, they are all undemonstrable by language (_nirabhilapyas'ūnyatā_);(6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except thatwhich is brought about by the long-standing defects of desireswhich pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existentin the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place andtime in which they are not (_itaretaras'ūnyatā_). 

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternalnor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a māyā; thetwo kinds of negation (_nirodha_) are ākās'a (space) and nirvana;things which are neither existent nor non-existent are onlyimagined to be existent by fools. 

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine ofthis school, that the reality is called the tathāgatagarbha (thewomb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenalappearances of the clusters (_skandhas_), elements (_dhātus_), andfields of sense operation (_āyatanas_) only serve to veil it withimpurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of auniversal soul as the reality. But the _La@nkāvatāra_ attempts toexplain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference tothe tathāgatagarbha as the reality is only a sort offalse bait to attract those who are afraid of listeningto the nairātmya (non-soul doctrine) [Footnote ref 1]. 

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[Footnote 1: _La@nkāvatārasūtra_, p. 80. 

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The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfoldknowledge of (1) _svacittad@rs'hyabhāvanā_, (2)_utpādasthitibha@ngavivarjjanatā_, (3) _bāhyabhāvābhāvopalak@sa@natā_ and(4) _svapratyāryyajńānādhigamābhinnalak@sa@natā_. The first meansthat all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one shouldknow the distinctive sense in which all external things are saideither to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merelylike the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire(_vāsanā_) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings usto the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of thenature of all things. 

The four dhyānas spoken of in the _Lankāvatāra_ seem to bedifferent from those which have been described in connection withthe Theravāda Buddhism. These dhyānas are called (1) _bālopacārika_, (2) _arthapravichaya_, (3) _tathatālambana_ and (4) _tathāgata_. The first one is said to be that practised by the s'rāvakasand the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon thedoctrine that there is no soul (_pudgalanairātmya_), and that everythingis transitory, miserable and impure. When considering allthings in this way from beginning to end the sage advances ontill all conceptual knowing ceases (_āsa@mjńānirodhāt_); we havewhat is called the vālopacārika dhyāna (the meditation for beginners). 

The second is the advanced state where not only there isfull consciousness that there is no self, but there is also thecomprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other hereticsmay be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas thatappears. This is called the _arthapravicayadhyāna_, for the sageconcentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out(_pravichaya_) the nature of all things (_artha_). 

The third dhyāna, that in which the mind realizes that thethought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness(_tathatā_). This dhyāna is called _tathatālambana_, because it has forits object tathatā or thatness. 

The last or the fourth dhyāna is that in which the lapse ofthe mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingnessand incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

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and nirvāna is that in which all root desires (_vāsanā_) manifestingthemselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledgeand perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. Thiscannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannotbe called destruction, for only compounded things (_sa@msk@rta_)suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death ordestruction. This nirvāna is different from that of the s'rāvakasand the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that statenirvā@na, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristicsof all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached tothings and cease to make erroneous judgments [Footnote ref 1]. 

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground)of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it issaid that the world is māyā or illusion, what is meant to beemphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomenathat seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mereconstructions of tainted imagination, and the tathatā or thatnessis nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity ornature of the imagination (_vikalpa_) tainted with the associationsof beginningless root desires (_vāsanā_) [Footnote ref 2]. The tathatā hasno separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when thecourse of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is thereforealso spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind(_cittavimukta_), for here there is no construction of imagination(_sarvakalpanavirahitam_) [Footnote ref 3]. 

Sautrāntika Theory of Perception. 

Dharmottara (847 A. D. ), a commentator of Dharmakīrtti's [Footnote ref 4](about 635 A. D. ) _Nyāyabindu_, a Sautrantika logical and epistemologicalwork, describes right knowledge (_samyagjńāna_) as aninvariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

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[Footnote 1: _Lankāvatarasūtra_, p. 100. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ p. 109. ]

[Footnote 3: This account of the Vijńanavada school is collected mainlyfrom _Lankāvatārasūtra_, as no other authentic work of the Vijńānavādaschool is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may behad in such books as Kumarila's _S'loka vārttika_ or S'a@nkara's bhasya, II. Ii, etc. Asak@nga's _Mahāyānasūtralamkāra_ deals more with the dutiesconcerning the career of a saint (_Bodhisattva_) than with the metaphysicsof the system. ]

[Footnote 4: Dharmakīrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijńanavāda in his_Santānāntarasiddhi_, a treatise on solipsism, but his _Nyāyabindu_ seemsrightly to have been considered by the author of _Nyāyabindu@tīkā@tippani_(p. 19) as being written from the Sautrāntika point of view. ]

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desires to have (_samyagjńānapūrvikā sarvapuru@sārthasiddhi_) [Footnoteref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of anyknowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it rightknowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which onecan practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arthādhigati_). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptualpresentation and ends with the attainment of the thingrepresented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it(_arthādhigamāt samāpta@h pramā@navyāpārah_). Thus there arethree moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge:(1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance withour endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inferenceis also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practicalneed by representing the presence of objects in certain connectionsand helping us to realize them. In perception this presentationis direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectlythrough the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for therealization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussedin philosophical works only because knowledge is soughtby men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us tothe realization of the object represented by it could not be calledright knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as theperception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realizationof such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubtthat since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceivedat the moment of perception was not the same as thatwhich was realized at a later moment. But the series of existentswhich started with the first perception of a blue object finds itselfrealized by the realization of other existents of the same series(_nīlādau ya eva santāna@h paricchinno nilajńānena sa eva tenaprāpita@h tena nilajńānam pramā@nam_) [Footnote ref 2]. 

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedentof the realization of any desirable thing or the retardingof any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

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[Footnote 1: Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of_Nyāyaybindu_, Vinītadeva and S'antabhadra (seventh century), are found in_Nyāyabindu@tīkātippanī_, a commentary of _Nyayabindutikā_ of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us. ]

[Footnote 2: _Nyāyabindu@tīkā@tippanī_, p. 11. ]

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that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the riseof any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences, desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance withit is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of theobject of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, rightknowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, theobject of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation itis not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only inconnection with our achieving the object presented by perception. 

Perception (_pratyaks'a_) has been defined by Dharmakīrtti asa presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unassociatedby any names or relations (_kalpanā_) and which is not erroneous(_kalpanāpo@dhamabhrāntam_) [Footnote ref 1]. This definition does notindeed represent the actual nature (_svarūpa_) of perception, but onlyshows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anythingmay be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perceptionis not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such thatif one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to himby his perception (_tasmādgrāhye arthe vasturūpe yadaviparyastamtadabhrāntamiha veditavyam_}. It is said that a right perceptioncould not be associated with names (_kalpanā_ or _abhilāpa_). Thisqualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is notdirectly generated by the object. A name is given to a thingonly when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as beingthe same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regardedas being produced by the object of perception. The senses presentthe objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects alsomust of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they arewhen they are in contact with the proper senses. But the workof recognition or giving names is not what is directly producedby the objects themselves, for this involves the unification ofprevious experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

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[Footnote 1: The definition first given in the _Pramānasamucaya_ (notavailable in Sanskrit) of Di@nnāga (500 A. D. ) was "_Kalpanāpodham_. "According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (_nirvikalpajńāna_) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the sensesthat constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinateknowledge (_savikalpa jńāna_), as formed by the conceptual activity ofthe mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented tothe senses. ]

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to the sense(_pūrvad@r@s@tāparad@r@s@tańcārthamekīkurvadvijńānamasannihitavi@sayampūrvad@r@s@tasyāsannihitatvāt_). In all illusory perceptions it is thesense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiologicalcauses. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present theobject correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation throughthe senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only thosefeatures which are its and its alone (_svalak@sa@nam_). The validity ofknowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presentedby it (_arthena saha yatsārūpyam sād@rs'yamasya jńānasya tatpramā@namiha_). But the objection here is that if our percept is onlysimilar to the external object then this similarity is a thing whichis different from the presentation, and thus perception becomesinvalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept whichappears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of theirsameness that we refer to the object by the percept (_taditi sārūpyamtasya vas'āt_) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak ofhaving perceived a blue object. The relation, however, betweenthe notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object andthe indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one ofcausation but of a determinant and a determinate(_vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvena_). Thus it is the same cognitionwhich in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the objectof perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as thepercept (_tata ekasya vastuna@h kińcidrūpam pramā@nam kińcitpramā@naphalamna virudhyate_). It is on account of this similaritywith the object that a cognition can be a determinant of thedefinite awareness (_vyavasthāpanaheturhi sārūpyam_), so that bythe determinate we know the determinant and thus by thesimilarity of the sense-datum with the object {_pramā@na_) we cometo think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue"(_pramā@naphala_). If this sameness between the knowledge and itsobject was not felt we could not have spoken of the object fromthe awareness (_sārūpyamanubhūtam vyavasthāpanahetu@h_). Theobject generates an awareness similar to itself, andit is this correspondence that can lead us to the realizationof the object so presented by right knowledge [Footnote ref l]. 

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[Footnote 1: See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, exceptingthe _Nyāyabindu, Nyāyabindu@tīkā, Nyāyabindu@tīkā@tippanī_ (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perceptionare available to us. _Nyāyabindu_ is probably one of the earliest works inwhich we hear of the doctrine of _arthakriyākāritva_ (practical fulfilmentof our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regardedas a criterion of existence, as Ratnakīrtti's works and the profusereferences by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word_arthakriyā_ is found in Candrakīrtti's commentary on Nāgārjuna and alsoin such early works as _Lalitavistara_ (pointed out to me by Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has nophilosophical significance there. ]

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Sautrāntika theory of Inference [Footnote ref 1]. 

According to the Sautrāntika doctrine of Buddhism as describedby Dharmakīrtti and Dharmmottara which is probably theonly account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available tous in Sanskrit, inference (_anumāna_) is divided into two classes, called svārthānumāna (inferential knowledge attained by a personarguing in his own mind or judgments), and parārthānumāna (inferencethrough the help of articulated propositions for convincingothers in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like thevalidity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts ofthe external world. Inference copied external realities as muchas perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perceptionof blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thingperceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to theexternal fact thus inferred (_sārūpyavas'āddhi tannīlapratītirūpamsidhyati_). 

The reason by which an inference is made should be suchthat it may be present only in those cases where the thing tobe inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does notexist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these jointconditions that an unfailing connection (_pratibandha_) betweenthe reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It isnot enough that the reason should be present in all cases wherethe thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does notexist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in theabove case. This law (_niyama_) is essential for establishing theunfailing condition necessary for inference [Footnote ref 2]. Thisunfailing natural connection (_svabhāvapratibandha_) is found in two types

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[Footnote 1: As the _Pramā@nasamuccaya_ of Dińnāga is not available inSanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic exceptwhat can be got from the _Nyāyabindu@tīkā_ of Dharmmottara. ]

[Footnote 2: _tasmāt niyamavatorevānvayavyatirekayo@h prayoga@h karttavya@hyena pratibandho gamyeta sādhanyasa sādhyena. Nyāyabindu@tīkā_, p. 24. ]

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of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is containedin the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i. E. Wherethe reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferredis a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pinesmay come to think that pines are called trees because they aretall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a smallpine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pinenessforms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former beinga species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of thespecies being identical with the nature of the genus, one couldinfer the latter from the former but not _vice versa_; this is calledthe unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (_tādātmya_). The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effectwhich stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smokethe fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground ofthese inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connectedwith the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, noinference is warrantable. 

This natural indissoluble connection (_svabhāvapratibandha_), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in thegenus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, isthe ground of all inference [Footnote ref 1]. The svabhāvapratibandhadetermines the inseparability of connection (avinābhāvaniyama) andthe inference is made not through a series of premisses, butdirectly by the li@nga (reason) which has the inseparable connection[Footnote ref 2]. 

The second type of inference known as parārthānumānaagrees with svārthānumāna in all essential characteristics; themain difference between the two is this, that in the case ofparārthānumāna, the inferential process has to be put verbally inpremisses. 

Pandit Ratnākarasānti, probably of the ninth or the tenth centuryA. D. , wrote a paper named _Antarvyāptisamarthana_ in which

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[Footnote 1: _na hi yo yatra svabhāvena na pratibaddha@h sa tamapratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yameva na vyabhicaratīti nāstitayoravyabhicāraniyama. Nyāyabindu@tīkā_, p. 29. ]

[Footnote 2: The inseparable connection determining inference is onlypossible when the li@nga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) pak@sasattva (existence of the li@nga in the pak@sa--the thingabout which something is inferred); (2) sapak@sasattva (existence of theli@nga in those cases where the sādhya oc probandum existed), and(3) vipak@sāsattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sādhyadid not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e. G. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlikea lake. ]

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he tried to show that the concomitance is not between thosecases which possess the li@nga or reason with the cases whichpossess the sādhya (probandum) but between that which has thecharacteristics of the li@nga with that which has the characteristicsof the sādhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitanceis not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc. , and the places containing fire but between that which has thecharacteristic of the li@nga, viz. The smoke, and that which has thecharacteristic of the sādhya, viz. The fire. This view of the natureof concomitance is known as inner concomitance (_antarvyāpti_), whereas the former, viz. The concomitance between the thingpossessing li@nga and that possessing sādhya, is known as outerconcomitance (_bahirvyāpti_) and generally accepted by the Nyāyaschool of thought. This antarvyāpti doctrine of concomitance isindeed a later Buddhist doctrine. 

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences ofsome form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as earlyas the _Kathāvatthu_ (200 B. C. ). Thus Aung on the evidence ofthe _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka"was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the processof conversion. He further points out that the logical premissessuch as the udāhara@na (_Yo yo aggimā so so dhūmavā_--whatever isfiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dhūmavā_--thishill is smoky) and the niggama (_tasmādayam aggimā_--thereforethat is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up themethod of the arguments which are found in the _Kathāvatthu_ asfollows:

"Adherent. Is _A B_? (_@thāpanā_). Opponent. Yes. 

Adherent. Is _C D_? (_pāpanā_). Opponent. No. 

Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_. That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false. Hence your first answer is refuted. ")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thāpanā, because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionallyestablished for the purpose of refutation. 

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termedpāpanā because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

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is termed ropa@na because the regulation is placed on theopponent. Next:

 "If _D_ be derived of _C_. Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_. But you affirmed _B_ of _A_. (therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is wrong. "

This is the pa@tiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrastedwith the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods theconsequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical majorin the latter method we get

 "If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_. But _A_ is _B_. Therefore _C_ is _D_. 

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished[Footnote ref 1]. "

The Doctrine of Momentariness. 

Ratnakīrtti (950 A. D. ) sought to prove the momentariness ofall existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by themethod of agreement in presence (_anvayavyāpti_), and then by themethod of difference by proving that the production of effectscould not be justified on the assumption of things being permanentand hence accepting the doctrine of momentarinessas the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity ofproducing anything (_arthakriyākāritva_). The form of the firsttype of argument by anvayavyāpti may be given thus: "Whateverexists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for examplethe jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussingare existents and are therefore momentary. " It cannotbe said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of anexistent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certaineffects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that theseare all identical in the past and the future or that it is producingno effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in thefuture; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

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[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of _Kathāvatthu_(_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids. ]

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produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case onemight as well expect that there should not be any effect even atthe present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producinganything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produceat one moment and does not produce at another, thiscontradiction will prove the supposition that the things weredifferent at the different moments. If it is held that the natureof production varies at different moments, then also the thing atthose two moments must be different, for a thing could not havein it two contradictory capacities. 

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment thework of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently doso, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in thefuture, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not thecapacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the twomoments (_s'aktās'aktasvabhavatayā pratik@sa@nam bheda@h_). Thecapacity of producing effects (_arthakriyās'akti_), which is but theother name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness(_k@sa@nikatvavyāpta_). 

The Nyāya school of philosophy objects to this view and saysthat the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effectproduced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regardedas existence or being, then the being or existence of the effectcannot be known, until that has produced another effect andthat another _ad infinitum_. Since there can be no being that hasnot capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity candemonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossibleto know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effectsas the definition of existence. Moreover if all things weremomentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observethe change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly beany means even of taking to any kind of inference. To thisRatnakirtti replies that capacity (_saāmarthya_) cannot be denied, for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observationof any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement inabsence, does not require any permanent observer, for undercertain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of theconcomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditionsthere is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. Thisknowledge of concomitance at the succeeding moment holds within

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itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment, and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer. 

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (_sattva_) isindeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed thatin all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined ofbeing;--seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, andeven if this capacity should require further capacity to produceeffects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. Thatthe existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producingthe shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite [Footnote ref l]. Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance betweenthings only so long as their apparent forms are not different(_atadrūpaparāv@rttayoreva sādhyasādhanayo@h pratyak@se@navyāptigraha@nāt_). The vyāpti or concomitance of any two things(e. G. The fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and noton identity. 

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentarinessis this, that a cause (e. G. Seed) must wait for a number of othercollocations of earth, water, etc. , before it can produce the effect(e. G. The shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratnakīrttireplies that the seed does not exist before and produce theeffect when joined by other collocations, but such is the specialeffectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces boththe collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. How a special seed-moment became endowed with such specialeffectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments whichpreceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnakīrtti wishes todraw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment revealsa number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a numberof effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever hasbeing is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy. 

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part ofRatnakīrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the productionof effects could not be explained if we did not suppose

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[Footnote 1: The distinction between vicious and harmless infiniteswas known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventhcentury. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly(_Nyāyamańjarī_, p. 22):

"_mūlak@satikarīmāhuranavasthām hi dū@sa@nam. Mūlasiddhau tvarucyāpi nānavasthā nivāryate. _"

The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arriveat the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hencevicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regressthough one may not be willing to have it. ]

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all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refutethe doctrines of Nyāya than an elaboration of the Buddhistprinciples. 

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollaryof the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though alldharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were allstrictly momentary (_k@sa@nika_--i. E. Existing only for one moment)was not emphasized in early Pāli literature. As'vagho@sa in his_S'raddhotpādas'āstra_ speaks of all skandhas as k@sa@nika (Suzuki'stranslation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditationof the khandhas as kha@nika in his _Visuddhimagga. _ But from theseventh century A. D. Till the tenth century this doctrine togetherwith the doctrine of arthakriyākāritva received great attention atthe hands of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhā@sikas. All theNyāya and Vedānta literature of this period is full of refutationsand criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist accountavailable of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen ofRatnakīrtti. Some of the general features of his argument infavour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of itmay be found in any of the important Nyāya works of this periodsuch as _Nynyamanjari, Tātparyya@tīkā_ of Vācaspati Mis'ra, etc. 

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent. With the development of this doctrine they gave greatemphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment andthe next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent ismomentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derivedfrom the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism deniedthe existence of any such permanent selves. What appears asself is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendenciesmanifesting at any particular moment. The next moment thesedissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding onesappear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker. Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannotdiscover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product ofthese ideas, emotions, etc. , that yield the illusory appearance ofself at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant productas it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc. , at anyparticular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc. , change everymoment there is no such thing as a permanent self. 

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

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a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has beenexisting for such a long period. When I say this is that book, Iperceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that"this book" is the same as "that book" (i. E. The book arising inmemory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evidentthat the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in thepast, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is beforemy eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanenceis thus due to a confusion between an object of memoryreferring to a past and different object with the object as perceivedat the present moment by the senses [Footnote ref 1]. This is true not onlyof all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects butalso of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception ofself-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotionsarising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. Butsince memory points to an object of past perception, and the perceptionto another object of the present moment, identity cannotbe proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objectsof the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yetthings appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that wehave the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of oldhairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leavethe impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is thatthough things are destroyed every moment, others similar tothese often rise into being and are destroyed the next momentand so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series producethe impression that it is one and the same thing which has beenpersisting through all the passing moments [Footnote ref 2]. Just as theflame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us asif we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, soall our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc. , all external objectsaround us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones arebeing generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as theobjects of the succeeding moments are similar to thoseof the preceding moments, it appears to us that thingshave remained the same and no destruction has taken place. 

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[Footnote 1: See pratyabhijńānirāsa of the Buddhists, _Nyāyamańjarī_, V. S. Series, pp. 449, etc. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also_Nyāyamańjarī, _ V. S. Edition, p. 450. ]

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The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrineof Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyākāritva). 

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined fromthe Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diversecharacteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but aconglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient oras inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming theelements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, theconglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any ofthese characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence orbeing of things means the work that any conglomeration does orthe influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This inSanskrit is called _arthakriyākāritva_ which literally translatedmeans--the power of performing actions and purposes of somekind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is theperformance of certain specific actions, or rather existence meansthat a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or _sat_. Any change in the effect thus produced means a correspondingchange of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

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[Footnote 1: Compare _Milindapańha, _ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile. ]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_ of Gu@naratna, A. S. 's edition, pp. 24, 28 and _Nyāyamańjarī, _ V. S. Edition, pp. 445, etc. , and also thepaper on _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ by Ratnakīrtti in _Six Buddhist Nyāyatracts_. ]

[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyākāritva" is differentfrom the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrāntikatheory of perception. " But we find the development of this meaning bothin Ratnakīrtti as well as in Nyāya writers who referred to this doctrine. With Vinītadeva (seventh century A. D. ) the word "_arthakrīyāsiddhi_"meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire(_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m dārupākāditasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need ofman such as cooking by logs, etc. ; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later_arthasiddhi_ means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirableand desirable objects (_heyopādeyārthavi@sayā_). But with Ratnakīrtti(950 A. D. ) the word _arthakriyākāritva_ has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and assuch it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence_sattva_). Thus he says in his _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi, _ pp. 20, 21, thatthough in different philosophies there are different definitions ofexistence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepteddefinition of existence as _arthakriyākāritva_ (efficiency of causing anyaction or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakīrtti refer to theBuddhist doctrine of _arthakriyākāritva_ they usually refer to thisdoctrine in Ratnakīrtti's sense. ]

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which is produced now was never produced before, and cannotbe repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is onceproduced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced inus by objects at different moments of time may be similar butcannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effectand each new effect thus produced means in each case the cominginto being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If thingswere permanent there would be no reason why they should beperforming different effects at different points of time. Anydifference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itselfor its combination with other accessories, justifies us in assertingthat the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power ithas of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such powerthen we could not have said that it existed. We can have nonotion of the meaning of existence other than the impressionproduced on us; this impression is nothing else but the powerexerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one shouldhold that beyond such powers as are associated with the productionof impressions or effects there should be some otherpermanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existedeven when the power was not exerted. We perceive the powerof producing effects and define each unit of such power asamounting to a unit of existence. And as there would bedifferent units of power at different moments, there should alsobe as many new existences, i. E. Existents must be regarded asmomentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine ofmomentariness shown by Ratnakīrtti. 

Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged. 

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophywithout briefly referring to its views on some ontological problemswhich were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophicalcircles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation ofcause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (_avayavi_) and thepart (_avayava_), (3) the relation of generality (_samanya_) to thespecific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities andthe substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the

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relation of power (_s'akti_) to the power-possessor (_s'aktimān_). Thuson the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alonewas permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanentillusions due to ignorance, Sā@mkhya held that there was nodifference between cause and effect, except that the former wasonly the earlier stage which when transformed through certainchanges became the effect. The history of any causal activity isthe history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause noreffect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentaryexistence has been determined by the destruction of its momentaryantecedent called the cause. There is no permanent realitywhich undergoes the change, but one change is determined byanother and this determination is nothing more than "thathappening, this happened. " On the relation of parts to whole, Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. Accordingto it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, theindividual atoms rise into being and die the next moment andthus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhistshold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alonewhich come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but thereis no such thing as fingerness (_a@ngulitva_) as the abstract universalof the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance weknow that the Sautrāntika Buddhists did not believe in the existenceof any substance apart from its attributes; what we call asubstance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. In the external world there are as many individual simple units(atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to eachunit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objectiveworld. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of theassemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also thereare no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit ofsensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the nextmoment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relationas that of inherence (_samavāya_) in which relation the attributesare said to exist in the substance, for since there are noseparate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relationof inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

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believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from thepower. 

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought. 

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paidto the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. Whatwas sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessationof sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of _pa@ticcasamuppāda_was offered only to explain how sorrow came in andnot with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. Thediscussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whetherthe world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathāgataexisted after death or not, were considered as heresies in earlyBuddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sīla, samādhi and pańńāand the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammashardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained inthe Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas withenumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahāyānascriptures from some time about 200 B. C. The doctrine of thenon-essentialness and voidness of all _dhammas_ began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagārjuna, Āryyadeva, Kumārajīva and Candrakīrtti, is more or less a corollaryfrom the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could notsay whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether aTathāgata existed or did not exist after death, and if there wasno permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the onlylegitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be tothink of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. Theseappearances appear as being mutually related but apart fromtheir appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. The Tathatā doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillatedbetween the position of this absolute non-essentialness of alldhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as thebackground of all these non-essential dhammas. This he calledtathatā, but he could not consistently say that any such permanententity could exist. The Vijńānavāda doctrine which alsotook its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of theS'ūnyavāda doctrine and the Tathatā doctrine; but when carefullyexamined it seems to be nothing but S'ūnyavāda, with an attemptat explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

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non-essential how did it originate? Vijńānavāda proposes to give ananswer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mindgenerated by the beginningless vāsanā (desire) of the mind. Thedifficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathatā doctrine thatthere must be some reality which is generating all these ideasappearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijńānavādadoctrine. The Vijńānavādins could not admit the existence of sucha reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could notproperly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine wassome sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines ofheresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make thedoctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the realityassumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijńānavādaliterature that is available to us is very scanty and from that weare not in a position to judge what answers Vijńānavāda could giveon the point. These three doctrines developed almost about thesame time and the difficulty of conceiving s'ūnya (void), tathatā, (thatness) and the ālayavijńāna of Vijńānavāda is more or lessthe same. 

The Tathatā doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased withhim. But the S'ūnyavāda and the Vijńānavāda doctrines whichoriginated probably about 200 B. C. Continued to develop probablytill the eighth century A. D. Vigorous disputes with S'ūnyavādadoctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hinduphilosophy, after Kumārila and S'a@nkara. From the third orthe fourth century A. D. Some Buddhists took to the study ofsystematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindulogicians. Di@nnāga the Buddhist logician (500 A. D. ) probablystarted these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrinesof the great Hindu logician Vātsyāyana, in his Pramā@nasamuccaya. In association with this logical activity we find theactivity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. The Sarvāstivādins(known also as Vaibhā@sikas) and the Sautrāntikas. Both theVaibhā@sikas and the Sautrāntikas accepted the existence of theexternal world, and they were generally in conflict with theHindu schools of thought Nyāya-Vais'e@sika and Sā@mkhya whichalso admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu(420-500 A. D. ) was one of the most illustrious names of this school. We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhistthinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work), 168

Dharmmakīrtti (writer of Nyāyabindu 635 A. D. ), Vinītadeva andS'āntabhadra (commentators of Nyāyabindu), Dharmmottara(commentator of Nyāyabindu 847 A. D. ), Ratnakīrtti (950 A. D. ), Pa@n@dita As'oka, and Ratnākara S'ānti, some of whose contributionshave been published in the _Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts_, publishedin Calcutta in the _Bibliotheca Indica_ series. These Buddhistwriters were mainly interested in discussions regarding the natureof perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, andthe doctrine of causal efficiency (_arthakriyākāritva_) as demonstratingthe nature of existence. On the negative side they wereinterested in denying the ontological theories of Nyāya andSā@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. Theseproblems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrāntika andnon-Vaibhā@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They ofcourse agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existenceof a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of theirdoctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement betweenHindu thought up to S'a@nkara (800 A. D. ) and Buddhist thoughttill the time of S'a@nkara consisted mainly in the denial by theBuddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world. For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even theVedānta of S'a@nkara admitted the existence of the permanentexternal world in some sense. With S'a@nkara the forms of theexternal world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanentbackground in the Brahman, which was the only realitybehind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrāntikasadmitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrelwith Nyāya and Sā@mkhya was with regard to their doctrineof momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on thedifferent ontological problems were in accordance with theirdoctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do nothear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From thistime the disputes were mainly between the different systems ofHindu philosophers, viz. Nyāya, the Vedānta of the school ofS'a@nkara and the Theistic Vedānta of Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc. 

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CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Origin of Jainism. 

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophicalnotions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both ordersof monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblancein outward appearance, and some European scholarswho became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samplesof Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshootof Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jainaliterature are often found to commit the same mistake. But ithas now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrongand Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhistworks frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under theirold name Nigantha and their leader Nātaputta VarddhamānaMahāvīra, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books ofthe Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahāvīra the same kingsas reigned during Buddha's career. 

Thus Mahāvīra was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlikeBuddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founderof the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creedafterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tļrtha@nkara) ofJainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pārs'va, the last Tīrtha@nkara butone, is said to have died 250 years before Mahāvīra, while Pārs'va'spredecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84, 000 years beforeMahāvīra's Nirvā@na. The story in _Uttarādhyayanasūtra_ that adisciple of Pārs'va met a disciple of Mahāvīra and brought aboutthe union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahāvīraseems to suggest that this Pārs'va was probably a historical person. 

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religionis eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every oneof the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerableTirthankaras. In the present period the first Tīrtha@nkara was@R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. All

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R. E. _]

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Tīrtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and theyneither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yetthey are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref1]. 

Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2]. 

There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetāmbaras (wearers ofwhite cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generallyagreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenetspeculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such asthe Tīrtha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo ofMahāvīra was not removed from the womb of Devanandā to thatof Tris'alā as the S'vetāmbaras contend, thirdly that a monkwho owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa, fourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambarasdeny the canonical works of the S'vetāmbaras and assert thatthese had been lost immediately after Mahāvīra. The origin ofthe Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhūti (A. D. 83) by theS'vetāmbaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetāmbara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven otherschisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say thatthey themselves alone have preserved the original practices, andthat under Bhadrabāhu, the eighth sage after Mahāvīra, the lastTīrtha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphālakas with laxerprinciples, from which developed the present sect of S'vetāmbaras(A. D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early timesfrom the S'vetāmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies oftheir own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskritworks of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity thanthose of the S'vetāmbaras, if we except the canonical books ofthe latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developedin later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing fromone another only in minute details of conduct. These were called_gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

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[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459"of J. Burgess, and Būhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathurā, "in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. Pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article onJainism, _E. R. E. _]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R. E. _]

[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_. ]

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preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahāvīra(_sthavirāvali, pa@t@tāvali, gurvāvali_) and also many legends aboutthem such as those in the _Kalpasūtra_, the _Paris'i@s@ta-parvan_ ofHemacandra, etc. 

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains. 

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds ofsacred books, the fourteen Pūrvas and the eleven A@ngas. ThePūrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but weregradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are nowthe oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of theseare _Ācāra, Sūtrak@rta, Sthāna, Samavāya Bhagavatī, Jńātadharmakathās, Upāsakadas'ās, Antak@rtadas'ās Anuttaraupapātikadas'ās, Pras'navyākara@na, Vipāka_. In addition to these there are the twelve_Upā@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prakīr@nas_ [Footnote ref 2], six_Chedasūtras_ [Footnote ref 3], _Nāndī_ and _Anuyogadvāra_and four _Mūlasūtras_ (_Uttarādhyayana, Āvas'yaka, Das'avaikālika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras howeverassert that these original works have all been lost, and that thepresent works which pass by the old names are spurious. Theoriginal language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamāgadhī, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is bestto call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prākrit and thatof the later works Jaina Mahārā@s@trī. A large literature of glossesand commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. Andbesides these, the Jains possess separate works, which containsystematic expositions of their faith in Prākrit and Sanskrit. Many commentaries have also been written upon these independenttreatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umāsvāti's_Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_(1-85 A. D. ). Some of the most importantlater Jaina works on which this chapter is based are_Vis'e@sāvas'yakabhā@sya_, Jaina _Tarkavārttika_, with the commentaryof S'āntyācāryya, _Dravyasa@mgraha_ of Nemicandra (1150 A. D. ), _Syādvādamańjarī_ of Malli@sena (1292 A. D. ), _Nyāyāvatāra_ ofSiddhasena Divākara (533 A. D. ), _Parīk@sāmukhasūtralaghuv@rtti_ ofAnantavīryya (1039 A. D. ), _Prameyakamalamārta@n@da_ of Prabhācandra

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[Footnote 1: _Aupapātika, Rājapras'nīya, Jīvābhigama, Prajńāpanā, Jambudvīpaprajńapti, Candraprajńapti, Sūryaprajńapti, Nirayāvali, Kalpāvata@msikā, Pu@spikā, Pu@spacūlikā, V@r@s@nida@sās_. ]

[Footnote 2: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mstāra, Āturapratyākhyāna, Bhaktāparijńā, Ta@ndulavaiyālī, Ca@n@dāvīja, Devendrastava, Ga@nivīja, Mahāpratyākhyāna, Vīrastava_. ]

[Footnote 3: _Nis'ītha, Mahānis'ītha, Vyavahāra, Das'as'rutaskandha, B@rhatkalpa, Pańcakalpa_. ]

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(825 A. D. ), _Yogas'āstra_ of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A. D. ), and_Pramā@nanayatattvālokāla@mkāra_ of Deva Sūri (1086-1169 A. D. ). I am indebted for these dates to Vidyābhū@sa@na's _Indian Logic_. 

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secularliterature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit andPrākrit. There are also many moral tales (e. G. _Samarāicca-kahā, Upamitabhavaprapańca-kathā_ in Prākrit, and the _Yas'astilaka_ ofSomadeva and Dhanapāla's _Tilakamańjarī_); Jaina Sanskrit poemsboth in the Purā@na and Kāvya style and hymns in Prākrit andSanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jainadramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literatureof India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logicdeserve special notice [Footnote ref 1]. 

Some General Characteristics of the Jains. 

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little lessthan a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly inSouthern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces, Eastern Rājputāna and the Punjab. The head-quarters ofthe S'vetāmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Rājputāna, but theyare to be found also all over Northern and Central India. 

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted tobare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to coverhis mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it [Footnote ref 2]. Theoutfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. TheDigambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use broomsof peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (_cāmara_) [Footnoteref 3]. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out. The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and isregarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monksare very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spendthe rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection oftheir clothes and other things for the removal of insects. Thelaymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E. R. E. _]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi, _loc. Cat. _]

[Footnote 3: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV. ]

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by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks arerequired to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts inthe upās'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhistvihāras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy anyliving being has been in monastic life carried out to its verylast consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in agreat measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefullywithout hurting it. The principle of not hurting any livingbeing thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, etc. , and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1]. 

Life of Mahāvīra. 

Mahāvīra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya ofthe Jńāta clan and a native of Vais'āli (modern Besarh, 27 milesnorth of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhārtha and Trīs'alā. The S'vetāmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tīrtha@nkarawhich first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandāwas then transferred to the womb of Trīs'alā. This story theDigambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parentswere the worshippers of Pārs'va and gave him the name Varddhamāna(Vīra or Mahāvīra). He married Yas'odā and had a daughterby her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permissionof his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. Aftertwelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attainedomniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived topreach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation)some years before Buddha in about 480 B. C. [Footnote ref 2]. 

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology. 

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes andto undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, orpan, etc. ), and we have seen that the Chāndogya Upani@sad heldthat since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and statewere but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R. E. _]

[Footnote 2: See Hoernlé's translation of _Uvāsagadasāo_, Jacobi, _loc. Cit_. , and Hoernlé's article on the Ājīvakas, _E. R. E. _ The S'vetāmbaras, however, say that this date was 527 B. C. And the Digambaras place iteighteen years later. ]

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demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e. G. The clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mereillusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_nāma-rūpa_) [Footnote ref1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like merephantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason. 

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceivedand that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what weperceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualitieswe do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sadsregard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanentand unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualitiesdo not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neitherbe perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only themomentary passing qualities. We should regard each change ofquality as a new existence. 

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha andpossibly of some of the Upani@sads too, and they had also a solutionto offer. They held that it was not true that substancealone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said thatthere was no permanent substance but merely the change ofpassing qualities, for both these represent two extreme viewsand are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, containsome elements of truth but not the whole truth as given inexperience. Experience shows that in all changes there arethree elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appearto remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated;(3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualitiesof things are changing every minute, but all qualities are notchanging. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lumphas been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay ispermanent, i. E. All production means that some old qualities havebeen lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part init which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

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[Footnote 1: See Chāndogya, VI. 1. ]

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another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that athing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thuswhen a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specificqualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold"are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and somenew ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes tothis, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by thepermanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance inspite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (_sat_) then isneither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changingqualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as istestified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities andgaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent(_dhruva_) accession of some new qualities (_utpāda_) and loss ofsome old qualities (_vyaya_) [Footnote ref. 1]. The solution of Jainism isthus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism ongrounds of common-sense experience. 

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekāntavāda). 

This conception of being as the union of the permanent andchange brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekāntavāda orwhat we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutismof the Upani@sads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. The Jains regarded all things as _anekānta_ (_na-ekānta_), or inother words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions andlimitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existenceas a substance (_dravya_) is of the nature of a collocationof atoms and not as any other substance such as space (_ākās'a_), i. E. A gold jug is a _dravya_ only in one sense of the term andnot in every sense; so it is a _dravya_ in the sense that it is acollocation of atoms and not a _dravya_ in the sense of space ortime (_kāla_). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at oneand the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is acomposite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

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[Footnote: 1: See _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment ofJainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_. ]

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not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atomsonly in the sense that gold is a metallic modification ofearth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sensethat it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. Itis made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsulliedgold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is againmade up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammeredand shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajńadatta. Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again onlytrue in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jugand not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar mannerthe Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in acertain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinitenumber of qualities (_anantadharmātmaka@m vastu_), each of whichcan only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thingas a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number ofaffirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualitiesfrom infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restrictedsenses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relationriches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation suchan affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has noriches. " The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but ina negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may beaffirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the verysame thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpointsfrom which things (though possessed of infinite determinations)can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearingin relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref2]. 

The Doctrine of Nayas. 

In framing judgments about things there are two ways opento us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristicsof anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus whenwe say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristicqualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities orcharacteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

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[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp. 211. Etc. , and also _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_, and _Vis'e@sāvalyaka bhā@sya_, pp. 895-923. ]

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the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately andregard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. The Buddhistview); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the bookseparately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptibleand the book apart from these cannot be found. These twopoints of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _paryāyanaya_[Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is importantfor our purposes, the other three being important rather from thepoint of view of grammar and language had better be omittedhere. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, sa@mgraha-naya and vyavahāra-naya. 

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense pointof view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I mayhold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands areempty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answerI looked at the book from the widest and most general point ofview as a "thing, " whereas in the second I looked at it in itsspecial existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page ofa book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I wasreading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribblingon loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loosesheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, in which we do not consider them from the point of view of theirmost general characteristic as "being" or as any of their specialcharacteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technicallycalled the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probablyproceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the mostgeneral as well as the most special qualities, and hence we maylay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the otherones. This is the point of view from which according to theJains the Nyāya and Vais'e@sika schools interpret experience. 

Sa@mgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from themost general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individualthings from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being. "This according to the Jains is the Vedānta way of looking at things. 

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[Footnote 1: _Syādvādama@njarī_, pp. 171-173. ]

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The vyavahāra-naya standpoint holds that the real essenceof things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practicalexperience of the thing, which unifies within it some generalas well as some special traits, which has been existing from pasttimes and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changesall the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousandways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, sharedby all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms arecontinually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, butyet it has been existing as a book for some time past and willexist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience, and none of these can be separated and held up as beingthe concept of a "book. " This according to the Jains is theSā@mkhya way of looking at things. 

The first view of paryāya-naya called _@rjusūtra_ is the Buddhistview which does not believe in the existence of the thing in thepast or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomerationof characteristics which may be said to produce effects atany given moment. At each new moment there are new collocationsof new qualities and it is these which may be regarded asthe true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1]. 

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, oraspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. The above four represent only a broad classification of these. TheJains hold that the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika, the Vedānta, the Sā@mkhya, and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematizeexperience from one of the above four points of view, and each regardsthe interpretation from his point of view as being absolutelytrue to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error(_nayābhāsa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the manypoints of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmationsfrom any point of view are thus true in a limited sense andunder limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations maybe made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations orjudgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot thereforebe absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame

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[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryāya-naya, which representgrammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya, samabhirū@dha-naya_, and _evambhūla-naya_. See _Vis'e@sāvas'yakabhā@sya_, pp. 895-923. ]

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things may be held to be true from other points of view. Thetruth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivablefrom the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctnesstherefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syāt_(may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservationsand not in any sense absolute. There is no judgmentwhich is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutelyfalse. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda [Footnote ref 1]. 

The Doctrine of Syādvāda. 

The doctrine of Syādvāda holds that since the most contrarycharacteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regardedas absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syādasti_ or"may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense;all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense(_syādavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in somesense (_syādasti syānnāsti_); all affirmations are true as well asindefinite (_syādasti cāvaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false aswell as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinitein some sense (_syādasti syānnāsti syādavaktavyas'ca_). Thus we maysay "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct tosay explicitly that "may be (syāt) that the jug is, " otherwise if"being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or acloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and definedby the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absoluteexistence but a limited kind of existence as determined by theform of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind ofexistence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existencein general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence"the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is, " "the tree is, " "thecloth is, " etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by thenegation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic(such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and definedby the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, golden), etc. , of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all

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[Footnote 1: See _Vis'e@sāvas'yaka bhā@sya_, pp. 895, etc. , and_Syādvādamańjarī_, pp. 170, etc. ]

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the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than thoseconstituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all therest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of viewthe judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, lookedat from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being(of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one maysay, may be it is an affirmation of being (_syādasti_), may be it is anegation of being (_syānnāsti_); or I may proceed in quite anotherway and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here, " whichnaturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment"the jug is" (i. E. Is here) also means that "the jug is notthere, " and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jugis true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies usin saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is, " and "maybe in some sense that the jug is not. " Combining these twoaspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is, "and in some sense "may be that the jug is not. " We understoodhere that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristicsconstituting being, we may say "the jug is, " but if we put emphasison the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not. " Both theaffirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis isput on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we tryto comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgmentsregarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existenceof the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya, _ forhow can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yetsuch is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus allaffirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and arethus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these fouragain we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be thatthe jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not andis unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in itsnature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one ofthem any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ngī_holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems eachfrom its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

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[Footnote 1: See _Syādvādamańjarī_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166, etc. ]

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point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of realityis such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, orsenses (_upādhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmationwhich is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary orcontradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good ofany judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partlypermanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losingand gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanentand changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are alsoonly relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some senseor other in all their permutations for any and every kind ofjudgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation ofthe naya doctrine with the syādvāda doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are asmany alternatives as are indicated by syādvāda. The validity ofsuch a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is bornein mind when making any judgment according to any naya, the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutelyaccording to any particular naya without any reference toother nayas as required by the syādvāda doctrine the nayas arewrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then suchjudgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas(_nayābhāsa_) [Footnote ref 1]. 

Knowledge, its value for us. 

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Nyāyabindu_says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end inwhich they are interested, value the knowledge which helps themto attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus foundto be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it thetask of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagjńāna_ or_pramā@na_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps usto attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with theabove view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also

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[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syādvāda andsaptabha@ngī probably occurs in Bhadrabāhu's (433-357 B. C. ) commentary_Sūtrak@rtānganiryukti_. 

[Footnote 2: See _Pramā@na-naya-tattvālokāla@mkāra_ (Benares), p. 16; also_Parīk@sā-mukha-sūira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I. ]

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say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. Thevalidity (_prāmā@nya_) of anything consists in this, that it directlyhelps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is badfor us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we canadapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire whatis good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions thatlead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presenceof full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing anobject by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition isproduced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. It is enough for us to know that external objects under certainconditions assume such a special fitness (_yogyatā_) that we canhave knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that theygenerate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that undercertain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditionswe do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of thespecial fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possibledoes not concern us. Those conditions which confer sucha special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have butlittle to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in theacquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served byknowledge and not by those conditions of external objects. 

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as wellas the objects that are known by us. We have no reason tosuppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception ofexternal objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and othercharacteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptualexperience, but are derived only by imagination (_utprek@sā_), andthat therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validityof the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpajńāna_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one handreveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand givesa correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity oftheir characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is ourimmediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes. 

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[Footnote 1: _Pramā@na-naya-tattvālokāla@mkāra, _ p. 26. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Parī@sa-mukha-sūtra, _ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also theconcluding v@rtti of ch. II. ]

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Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring tous the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to usthe nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for theattainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for ifknowledge did not possess these functions, this would have beenimpossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, thatit is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means forserving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradictedit should be held as true. False knowledge is that which representsthings in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in abadly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusionconsists in taking the rope to be a snake, i. E. Perceiving a snakewhere it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there isno untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of asnake under relations and environments in which it was not then existingis what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snakewas later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood thereforeconsists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. Trueknowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithfulrepresentation of its object as is never afterwards found to becontradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in associationwith the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, anddistinct, and is called perceptional (_pratyak@sa_); when attainedotherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is thencalled non-perceptional (_parok@sa_ [Footnote ref 2]). 

Theory of Perception. 

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in thetheory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that theJains think that perception (_pratyak@sa_) reveals to us the externalobjects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics ofcolour, form, etc. , and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

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[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal orother kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actuallyexist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. WhenI mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though itsrelationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for thesnake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called_satkhyāti_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)]. 

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-vārttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I. , and v@rttiby S'antyācārya, Pramā@nanayatattvālokāla@mkāra, ch. I. , _Parīksā-mukha-sūtra-v@rtti, _ ch. I. ]

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from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering itbefore. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the VijńānavādinBuddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledgeof external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguishedfrom the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, whichalone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitivesenses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we areonly aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to thefive senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gainsof itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association withthose exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on accountof the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itselfbefore. The process of external perception does not thus involvethe exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the riseof the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association withthe particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touchwith all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledgewhich is generated in the soul through that part of it which isassociated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledgeof rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, andhence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at therose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and intomyself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledgeof rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, thishappens in association with the eye; I say that I see throughthe visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I haveonly a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). Asexperience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantableto assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceedingin a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas(mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and thehypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serveits purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means

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[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu ātmā caindriyam... Anupahatacak@surādides'e@su eva ātmana@hkarmak@sayopas'amaslenāsthagitagavāk@satulyāni cak@surādīniupakara@nāni. Jaina-Vāttika-V@rtti, _ II. P. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc. , are mentioned assenses, and living beings are often classified according to the numberof senses they possess. (See _Pramā@namīmā@msā. _ See also_Tattvārthā-dhigamasūtra_, ch. II. Etc. ) But this is with reference tothe sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference toadmitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separatecategory of existence from the soul. The sense organs are likewindows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify thesense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination;for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means thatthe veil which as observing it is removed. ]

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that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object hasbeen removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by thekarma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presenceof the object of perception, light, the capacity of the senseorgans, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhistsand many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existenceof any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa(determinate) stage of perception. There was a directrevelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materialswere necessary for the development of determinateperceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists whoregarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation ofindeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the applicationof mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc. , and hencedoes not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1]. 

Non-Perceptual Knowledge. 

Non-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sain this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as thelatter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any functionin determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinctionthey could draw between perception and other forms of knowledgewas that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave usclearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Parok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc. ; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception. 

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary tohave five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery, " (2) "becauseof smoke, " (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as thekitchen, " (4) "this hill is smoky, " (5) "therefore it is fiery, " calledrespectively _pratijńā, hetu, drs@tānta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, exceptfor the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first twopropositions which actually enter into the inferential process(_Prameyakamalamārta@n@da, _ pp. 108, 109). When we make an

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[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamārta@n@da, _ pp. 8-11. ]

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inference we do not proceed through the five propositions asabove. They who know that the reason is inseparably connectedwith the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhāva_) or as invariableantecedence (_kramabhāva_) will from the mere statementof the existence of the reason (e. G. Smoke) in the hill jump to theconclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting offive propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a childthan for representing the actual state of the mind in making aninference [Footnote ref 1]. 

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit theauthority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures giveus right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons whohave lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions andright knowledge have conquered all passions and removed allignorance [Footnote ref 2]. 

Knowledge as Revelation. 

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence ofanything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

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[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyāpti_) some of the Jaina logicianslike the Buddhists prefer _antarvyāpti_ (between smoke and fire) tobahirvyāptī (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svārthānumāna for one's ownself and _parārthānumāna_ for convincing others. It may not be out ofplace to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabāhuin his Das'avaikālikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions formaking an inference; (1) _Pratijńā_ (e. G. Non-injury to life is thegreatest virtue), (2) _Pratijńāvibhakti_ (non-injury to life is thegreatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (becausethose who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritoriousto do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the onlypersons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_(but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jainascriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that thosewho despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deservehonour), (7) _D@r@s@ānta_ (the Arhats take food from householders asthey do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) _Ās'a@nkā (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) _Ās'a@nkāprati@sedha_ (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not besaid that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_(non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyābhū@sa@na's _IndianLogic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actuallyadopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of theseare irrelevant. When Vātsyāyana in his _Nyāyasūtrabhā@sya_, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions asagainst the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, heprobably had this Jaina view in his mind. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavārttika_, and _Parīk@sāmukhasūtrav@rtti_, and_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism. ]

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which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect waswith them the only definition of existence (being). Theoreticallyeach unit of effect being different from any other unit of effectthey supposed that there was a succession of different units ofeffect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession ofnew substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effectmay be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assertonly that thing the existence of which is indicated by a correspondingexperience. When we have a unit of experience wesuppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effectproduced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experienceshows that not all of an object is found to be changingevery moment; some part of it (e. G. Gold in a gold ornament) isfound to remain permanent while other parts (e. G. Its form as earringsor bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the faceof such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishesevery moment and that new things are being renewed at eachsucceeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract andunfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that theconception of being or existence involves a notion of permanenceassociated with change--_paryāya_ (acquirement of new qualitiesand the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of othersystems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from oneparticular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weighexperience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truthsindicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations andlimitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of_arthakriyākāritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of startingon their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon theybecame one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantableabstract speculations which went directly against experience. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self northe external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge whichreveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifiesat the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myselfas the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of myown self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

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in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us therise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objectivecollocations of things which somehow have the special fitnessthat they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centredin ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to usas modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a characterof the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independentof the senses. No distinction should be made between a consciousand an unconscious element in knowledge as Sā@mkhya does. Norshould knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which itreveals, as the Sautrāntikas think, for then by copying the materialityof the object, knowledge would itself become material. Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of theself revealing all objects by itself. But the Mīmā@msā view that thevalidity (_prāmā@nya_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself_svata@hprāmā@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologicallythe validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence(sa@mvāda) with facts. But in those cases where by previousknowledge of correspondence a right belief has been producedthere may be a psychological ascertainment of validity withoutreference to objective facts (_prāmā@nyamutpattau parata evajńaptau svakārye ca svata@h paratas'ca. Abhyāsānabhyāsāpek@sayā_) [Footnoteref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. Butthat it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. Thisbrings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics. 

The Jīvas. 

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may bedivided into the living (_jīva_) and the non-living (_ajīva_). Theprinciple of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is mosterroneous to think that life is either the product or the propertyof the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle thatthe body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul isdirectly perceived (by introspection) just as the external thingsare. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

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[Footnote 1: _Prameyakamalamārta@n@da, _ pp. 38-43. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina Vārttika, _ p. 60. ]

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a description. This is directly against the view of the greatMīmā@msa authority Prabhākara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure stateis possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infiniteknowledge (_ananta-jńāna_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinitepower (_ananta-vīrya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarilyhowever, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jīva_)all the other jīvas (_sa@msārin_) have all their purity and powercovered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulatingin them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerablespace-points in our mundane world (_lokākās`a_), have a limitedsize (_madhyama-parimā@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_)nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jīva_ is called_Jivāstikāya_. The word _astikāya_ means anything that occupiesspace or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand andcontract themselves according to the dimensions of the bodywhich they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant andsmaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according tothe Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which itlives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feelit. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explainedas being similar to the manner in which a lamp illuminesthe whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. TheJains divide the jīvas according to the number of sense-organsthey possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possessonly the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is thatof worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc. , which possess touch, taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc. , possessing vision inaddition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess allthe five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namelymen, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to thesean inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are

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[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamārta@nda, _ p. 33. ]

[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jńāna_. Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e. G. I seea cloth. Jńāna means the knowledge of details, e. G. I not only see thecloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where itwas prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana andthen jńāna. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of allthings as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details. ]

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called rational (_sa@mjńin_) while the lower animals have no reasonand are called _asamjnin_. 

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jainsregard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animatedby souls. Thus particles of earth, etc. , are the bodies ofsouls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives;they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter casethey are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of otherplants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have allthe functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; theyexist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plantsof which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle andinvisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. The whole universe is full of minute beings called _nigodas_; theyare groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extremepains. The whole space of the world is closely packed withthem like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supplyof souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But aninfinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed toreplace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all thesouls that have been liberated from beginningless past down tothe present. Thus it is evident the sa@msāra will never be emptyof living beings. Those of the _nigodas_ who long for developmentcome out and continue their course of progress through successivestages [Footnote ref 1]. 

Karma Theory. 

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jīvas areborn as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have alreadynoticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soulis the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections ofthe pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. Those which obscure right knowledge of details (_jńāna_) arecalled _jńānāvara@nīya_, those which obscure right perception(_dars'ana_) as in sleep are called _dars'anāvaranīya_, those which

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R. E. _, and_Lokaprakās'a_, VI. Pp. 31 ff. ]

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obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure andpain are _vedanīya_, and those which obscure the right attitude of thesoul towards faith and right conduct _mohanīya_ [Footnote ref 1]. Inaddition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karmawhich determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar bodywith its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc. , (4) the inborn energy of thesoul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a goodaction when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called(1) _āyu@ska karma_, (2) _nāma karma_, (3) _gotra karma_, (4) _antarāyakarma_. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continuallyproducing certain subtle karma matter which in the firstinstance is called _bhāva karma_, which transforms itself into _dravyakarma_ and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by cominginto contact with the passions (_ka@sāya_) of the soul. These act likeviscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. Thismatter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly dividedinto eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is thecause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karmamatter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively asgolden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they arecalled the _les'yās_. The feelings generated by the accumulation ofthe karma-matter are called _bhāva-les'yā_ and the actual colorationof the soul by it is called _dravya-les'yā_. According as any karmamatter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, itgives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledgethat we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc. , is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with whichthe particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kindof knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledgeof a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over ourknowledge, feeling, etc. , are so removed that we have just thatkind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. Allknowledge, feeling, etc. , are thus in one sense generated fromwithin, the external objects which are ordinarily said to begenerating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions. 

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[Footnote 1: The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) _matijńāna_(ordinary cognition), (2) _s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) _avadhi_ (supernaturalcognition), (4) _mana@hparyāya_ (thought-reading), (5) _kevala-jńāna_(omniscience). ]

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After the effect of a particular karma matter (_karma-varga@nā_)is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul. This process of purging off the karmas is called _nirjarā_. If nonew karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purgingoff of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but asit is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karmamatter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging andbinding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul tocontinue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth. After the death of each individual his soul, together withits karmic body (_kārma@nas'arīra_), goes in a few moments to theplace of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expandingor contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter. 

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces itsproper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the_audayika_ state. By proper efforts karma may however be preventedfrom taking effect, though it still continues to exist, andthis is said to be the _aupas'amika_ state of the soul. When karmais not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soulis said to be in the _k@sāyika_ state, and it is from this state thatMok@sa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinarygood men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized, and some active (_k@sāyopas'amika_) [Footnote ref 1]. 

Karma, Āsrava and Nirjarā. 

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer allthe experiences of this world process, including births and rebirthsin diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter(_karma-varga@nā_}. The influx of these karma particles into thesoul is called āsrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced bybody, mind, and speech. The āsravas represent the channels ormodes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like thechannels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jainsdistinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually

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[Footnote 1: The stages through which a developing soul passes aretechnically called _gu@nasthānas_ which are fourteen in number. Thefirst three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the nextfive stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, inthe next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all hiskarmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but hestill practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation(see Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti, 13th verse). ]

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enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kindsof āsravas, bhāvāsrava and karmāsrava. Bhāvāsrava means thethought activities of the soul through which or on account ofwhich the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandrasays that bhāvāsrava is that kind of change in the soul (whichis the contrary to what can destroy the karmāsrava), by whichthe karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karmāsrava, however, means theactual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. Thesebhāvāsravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion(_mithyātva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pramāda_), the activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions(_ka@sāyas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ekānta_(a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), _viparīta_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_(retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit), _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _ajńāna_ (want of anybelief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@msā_), falsehood (_an@rta_), stealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to havethings which one does not already possess (_parigrahākā@nk@sā_). Pramāda or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation(_vikathā_), passions (_ka@sāya_), bad use of the five senses(_indriya_), sleep (_nidrā_), attachment (_rāga_) [Footnote ref 3]. 

Coming to dravyāsrava we find that it means that actual influxof karma which affects the soul in eight different mannersin accordance with which these karmas are classed into eightdifferent kinds, namely jńānāvara@nīya, dars'anāvara@nīya, vedanīya, mohanīya, āyu, nāma, gotra and antarāya. These actualinfluxes take place only as a result of the bhāvāsrava or the reprehensiblethought activities, or changes (_pari@nāma_) of the soul. The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmasis called bhāvabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by theactual impure connections of the karmas is technically calleddravyabandha. It is on account of bhāvabandha that the actualconnection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4]. The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking

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[Footnote 1: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29. ]

[Footnote 2: Nemicandra's commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S'I. 29, editedby S. C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917. ]

[Footnote 3: See Nemicandra's commentary on S'I. 30. ]

[Footnote 4: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardhamānapurā@na_ XVI. 44, quoted byGhoshal. ]

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of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over withoil. Thus Gunaratna says "The influx of karma means thecontact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with theparticular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking ofdust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts ofthe soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomesso completely covered with them that in some sense when lookedat from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as amaterial body during its sa@msāra stage [Footnote ref 1]. " From onepoint of view the bondage of karma is only of _puf@nya_ and _pāpa_(good and bad karmas) [Footnote ref 2]. From another this bondage is offour kinds, according to the nature of karma (_prak@rti_) duration ofbondage (_sthiti_), intensity (_anubhāga_) and extension (_prades'a_). The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma alreadymentioned, namely the jńanavaraniya karma which obscures theinfinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail, dars'anāvara@nīya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledgeof the soul, vedanīya karma which produces the feelings ofpleasure and pain in the soul, mohanīya karma, which so infatuatessouls that they fail to distinguish what is right fromwhat is wrong, āyu karma, which determines the tenure of anyparticular life, nāma karma which gives them personalities, gotrakarma which brings about a particular kind of social surroundingfor the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performanceof right actions by the soul. The duration of the stayof any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may beintense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principleof division, anubhāga. Prades'a refers to the different parts ofthe soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. Theduration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are dueto the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas thedifferent classification of karmas as jńānāvaranīya, etc. , are due tothe nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter [Footnoteref 3]. 

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhāvāsrava anddravyāsrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush, by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by theactual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these arerespectively called bhāvasa@mvara and dravyasa@mvara [Footnote ref 4]. 

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[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 3: Nemicandra, 33. ]

[Footnote 4: _Varddhamā@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_S'I. 35. ]

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The bhāvasa@mvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness, abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objectsof desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in orderto avoid injury to insects (_īryā_), gentle and holy talk (_bhā@sa_), receiving proper alms (_e@sa@nā_), etc, (3) _guptis_ or restraints ofbody, speech and mind, (4) _dharmas_ consisting of habits of forgiveness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss, and supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@sā_ consisting ofmeditation about the transient character of the world, about ourhelplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about thedifference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanlinessof our body and all that is associated with it, about the influxof karma and its stoppage and the destruction of thosekarmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matterand the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attainingtrue knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principlesof the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the _parī@sahajaya_ consisting of theconquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, andof feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) _cāritra_ or rightconduct. 

Next to this we come to nirjarā or the purging off of thekarmas or rather their destruction. This nirjarā also is of twokinds bhāvanirjarā and dravyanirjarā. Bhāvanirjarā means thatchange in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles aredestroyed. Dravyanirjarā means the actual destruction of thesekarma particles either by the reaping of their effects or bypenances before their time of fruition, called savipāka and avipākanirjarās respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mok@saor liberation is effected. 

Pudgala. 

The _ajīva_ (non-living) is divided into _pudgalāstikāya, dharmastikāya, adharmāstikāya, ākās'āstikāya, kāla, pu@nya, pāpa_. The word _pudgala_means matter [Footnote ref 3], and it is called _astikāya_in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms

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[Footnote 1: _Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. ]

[Footnote 3: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With theBuddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person. ]

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which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in twostates, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (suchas the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material thingsare ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. Thesmallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (_a@nu_). The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The formation of different substances is due to thedifferent geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combinationof the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangementand to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomicspace (_ghanapratarabhedena_). Some combinations take place bysimple mutual contact at two points (_yugmaprades'a_) whereasin others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractiveforce (_oja@hprades'a_) (_Prajńāpanopā@ngasūtra_, pp. 10-12). Two atoms form a compound (_skandha_), when the one is viscousand the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity ordryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought thatthere was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regardedthe contact as essential and as testified by experience. Thesecompounds combine with other compounds and thus producethe gross things of the world. There are, however, liable toconstant change (_pari@nāma_) by which they lose some of theirold qualities (_gu@nas_) and acquire new ones. There are fourelements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all theseare alike in character. The perception of grossness howeveris not an error which is imposed upon the perception of theatoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to theperception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise(as the Sā@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession ofa similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combinedatoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is givenin the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thingappears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there haveall acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of thedars'anavara@nīya and jńānavara@nīya veil, there arises in the soulthe perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness(_samāna-rūpatā_) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate ofatoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e. G. A cow)is technically called _tiryaksāmānya_. This sāmānya or generalityis thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity

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(as maintained by the Naiyāyikas) but represents only the accessionof similar qualities by a similar development of qualitiesof atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity ofqualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same andto continue for some length of time. When we think of a thingto be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in thedeveloping tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in therelative permanence of similar qualities in them. According tothe Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss ofsome old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing asa whole may remain more or less the same for some time. Thissameness of qualities in time is technically called _ūrdhvasāmānya_[Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point ofview of the change and accession of new qualities, they may beregarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at fromthe point of view of substance (_dravya_) they are eternal. 

Dharma, Adharma, Ākās'a. 

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism isabsolutely different from what they mean in other systems ofIndian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe(_lokākās'a_) and pervades every part of it. The term _astikāya_is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanyingcircumstance or cause which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive conditionor circumstance of the movement of a fish, i. E. It is indifferentor passive (_udāsīna_) and not an active or solicitous (_preraka_)cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but ifthe fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to itsmotion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; butif they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence ofdharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (_loka_)in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, theliberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move therebecause there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2]. Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which

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[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamārta@n@da_, pp. 136-143;_Jainatarkavārttika_, p. 106. ]

[Footnote 2: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20. ]

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helps jīvas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substancecould move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest ifthere were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these twocategories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains onaccount of their notion that the inner activity of the jīva or theatoms required for its exterior realization the help of some otherextraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformedinto actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jīvaswere regarded as having activity inherent in them they would befound to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), whichwas undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion requiredfor its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absentin the region of the liberated souls. 

The category of ākās'a is that subtle entity which pervadesthe mundane universe (_loka_) and the transcendent region ofliberated souls (_aloka_) which allows the subsistence of all othersubstances such as dharma, adharma, jīva, pudgala. It is not amere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness, but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrateit. On account of its pervasive character it is called_ākās'āstikāya_ [Footnote ref 1]. 

Kāla and Samaya. 

Time (_kāla_) in reality consists of those innumerable particleswhich never mix with one another, but which help the happeningof the modification or accession of new qualities and the changeof qualities of the atoms. Kāla does not bring about the changesof qualities, in things, but just as ākas'a helps interpenetrationand dharma motion, so also kāla helps the action of the transformationof new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments, hours, days, etc. , is called _samaya_. This is the appearance of theunchangeable kāla in so many forms. Kāla thus not only aids themodifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications asmoments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments, hours, etc. , are its paryāyas. The unit of samaya is the timerequired by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement. 

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[Footnote 1: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19. ]

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Jaina Cosmography. 

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginningor end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experiencedas results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts, _ūrdhva_ (where the gods reside), _madhya_ (this world of ours), and_adho_ (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe(_lokākas'a_) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movementpossible. Beyond the lokākas'a there is no dharma and thereforeno movement, but only space (_ākas'a_). Surrounding this lokakās'aare three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight overthe ūrdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakās'a and (there beingno dharma) remains motionless there. 

Jaina Yoga. 

Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation). This yoga consists of jńana (knowledge of reality as it is), s'raddhā(faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation fromdoing all that is evil). This caritra consists of _ahi@msā_ (nottaking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), _sūn@rta_(speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), _asteya_(not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya(abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech andbody), and _aparigraha_ (abandoning attachment for all things) [Footnoteref 1]. 

These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are benton attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinaryhouseholders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra, that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, shouldfollow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl froma good family, should follow the customs of the country and soforth. These are just what we should expect from any good and

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[Footnote 1: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra. These are: _Īryyā_ (to go by the path already trodden by others andilluminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be takenwhile walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc. , whichmay be lying on the way), _bhasā_ (to speak well and pleasantly to allbeings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), _dānasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressionswhen taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodilyrefuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_(to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and holdall people to be the same in mind), _vāggupti_ (absolute silence), and_kāyagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kindsof caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35. ]

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honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid uponthe virtues of ahi@msā, sūn@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but theroot of all these is ahi@msā. The virtues of sūn@rta, asteya andbrahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollariesof ahi@msā. Ahi@msā may thus be generalized as the fundamentalethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may bepassed in accordance with the standard of ahi@msā; sūn@rta, asteyaand brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgressionleads to hi@msā (injury to beings). A milder form of the practiceof these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and thisis called anubrata (small vows). But those who are strugglingfor the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtuesaccording to the highest and strictest standard, and this is calledmahābrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for ahouseholder according to the anubrata standard would be merecessation from adultery, whereas according to mahābrata it wouldbe absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts. Ahi@msā according to a householder, according to anubrata, would require abstinence from killing any animals, but accordingto mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness toprevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury toany living being in any way. 

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, allof which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahi@msā. Theseare (1) _digvirati_ (to carry out activities within a restricted areaand thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places), (2) _bhogopabhogamāna_ (to desist from drinking liquors, takingflesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, andvegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regardingtime and place of taking meals), (3) _anarthada@n@da_ consisting of(a) _apadhyāna_ (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries, killing of one's enemies, etc. ), (b) _pāpopades'a_ (desisting fromadvising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killingof so many insects), (c) _hi@msopakāridāna_ (desisting fromgiving implements of agriculture to people which will leadto the injury of insects), (d) _pramādacara@na_ (to desistfrom attending musical parties, theatres, or readingsex-literature, gambling, etc. ), (4) _s'ik@sāpadabrata_consisting of (a) _sāmayikabrata_ (to try to treat all beingsequally), (b) des'āvakās'ikabrata (gradually to practisethe _digviratibrata_ more and more extensively), (c) _po@sadhabrata_

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(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) _atithisa@mvibhāgabrata (tomake gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called_aticāra_, should be carefully avoided. 

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and toknow the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of thesoul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge canbe removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself ispure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only onaccount of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas areburnt (_dhyānāgnidagdhakarma_) the self becomes purified. Thesoul is itself the sa@msāra (the cycle of rebirths) when it isoverpowered by the four ka@sāyas (passions) and the senses. The fourka@sāyas are _krodha_ (anger), _māna_ (vanity and pride), _māyā_(insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and _lobha_ (greed). These ka@sāyas cannot be removed except by a control of thesenses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind(_mana@hs'uddhi_). Without the control of the mind no one canproceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled whenthe mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation shouldmake every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism(_tapas_) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachmentand antipathy (_rāgadvc@sa_) can be removed only by thepurification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy thatman loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin(sage) that he should be free from them and become independentin the real sense of the term When a man learns to look uponall beings with equality (_samatva_) he can effect such a conquestover rāga and dve@sa as one could never do even by the strictestasceticism through millions of years. In order to effect thissamatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds ofmeditation (_bhāvanā_):

We should think of the transitoriness (_anityatā_) of all things, that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day, what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things aretransitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure, wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particlesin a whirlwind. 

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives willby their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full ofmisery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in

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whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, wefind that it fails us. This is called as'ara@nabhāvanā (the meditationof helplessness). 

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruitsof the karma done in another life. We are all different from oneanother by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies andby all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditateon these aspects is called ekatvabhāvanā and anyatvabhāvanā. 

To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh, blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called as'ucibhāvanā(meditation of the impurity of the body). 

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universalfriendship and compassion and the passions are removed, then only will good {_s'ubha_) accrue to me, but if on the contraryI commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evilwill befall me, is called āsravabhāvanā (meditation of the befallingof evil). By the control of the āsrava (inrush of karma)comes the sa@mvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and thedestruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nīrjarā(decay and destruction of karma matter). 

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas(virtues) of self control (_sa@myama_), truthfulness (_sūn@rta_), purity(_s'auca_), chastity (_brahma_), absolute want of greed (_akińcanatā_), asceticism (_tapas_), forbearance, patience (_ks'ānti_), mildness(_mārdava_), sincerity (_@rjutā_), and freedom or emancipation fromall sins (_mukti_} can alone help us in the achievement of thehighest goal. These are the only supports to which we canlook. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is calleddharmasvākhyātatābhāvanā. 

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and alsoof the nature of the influence of karma in producing all thediverse conditions of men. These two are called _lokabhāvanā_and _bodhibhāvanā_. 

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts manbecomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with amind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he shouldtake to the performance of dhyāna or meditation by deep concentration. The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyānaare interdependent, so that without dhyāna there is no samatva

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and without samatva there is no dhyāna. In order to make themind steady by dhyāna one should think of _maitrī_ (universalfriendship), _pramoda_ (the habit of emphasizing the good sides ofmen), _karu@nā_ (universal compassion) and _mādhyastha_ (indifferenceto the wickedness of people, i. E. The habit of not taking anynote of sinners). The Jaina dhyāna consists in concentratingthe mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. Thedhyāna however as we have seen is only practised as an aid tomaking the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbedtowards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of thefinal extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a completecourse of moral discipline which leads to the purificationof the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hinduyoga of Patańjali or even of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. 

Jaina Atheism [Footnote ref 2]. 

The Naiyāyikas assert that as the world is of the nature ofan effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent andthis agent is Īs'vara (God). To this the Jain replies, "What doesthe Naiyāyika mean when he says that the world is of the natureof an effect"? Does he mean by "effect, " (1) that which is madeup of parts (_sāvayava_), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of anon-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone ashaving been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (_vikāritvam_). Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts"? If itmeans existence in parts, then the class-concepts (_sāmānya_)existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hencedestructible, but these the Naiyāyikas regard as being partless andeternal. If it means "that which has parts, " then even "space"(_ākās'a_) has to be regarded as "effect, " but the Naiyāyika regardsit as eternal. 

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of athing which were previously non-existent, " for in that case onecould not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of theelements of earth, etc. , are regarded as eternal. 

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as

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[Footnote 1:_Yogas'āstra, _ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in_Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874, and _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917. ]

[Footnote 2: See Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_. ]

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having been made, " then it would apply even to space, for whena man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space inthe hollow which he dug. 

If it means "that which is liable to change, " then one couldsuppose that God was also liable to change and he would requireanother creator to create him and he another, and so on _adinfinitum_. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable tochange with reference to his creative activity. 

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at sometime and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects. "But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that thingscontained within it such as trees, plants, etc. , are "effects, " thenthat would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will andthought must be diversely operating at diverse times and theseare contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtueof that. And even atoms would be "effects, " for they also undergochanges of colour by heat. 

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as awhole is an "effect. " And every effect has a cause, and so theworld as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that thecause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it isargued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of humancausation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as humanbeings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactlyan effect of the type of effects produced by human beingsbut is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Becausewater-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified ininferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke. If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it theinference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to producesuch an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeingold houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were producedby intelligent agents. For these are also effects of whichwe do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it issaid that the world is such that we have a sense that it has beenmade by some one, then the question will be, whether you inferthe agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its havingbeen made from the fact of its being made by God, and you havea vicious circle (_anyonyās'raya_). 

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Again, even if we should grant that the world was created byan agent, then such an agent should have a body for we havenever seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is heldthat we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be thatthis is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kindof body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects suchas the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found thatthese had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If itis said that these are also made by God, then you have anargument in a circle (_cakraka_), for this was the very matter whichyou sought to prove. 

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, inthat case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create theworld, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Doeshe produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without abody. Does he produce the world by physical movement or anyother kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for therecannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose thathe is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove thathe can be all-creator. 

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodilessGod can create the world by his will and activity. Did he taketo creation through a personal whim? In that case there wouldbe no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to itin accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Thenhe is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is itthrough mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we supposethere should have been only happiness in the world and nothingelse. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that theysuffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do viciousactions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then sucha blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He tookto creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did thingswithout a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certainpeople and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritismon behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation tookplace simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of

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admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world cameinto being out of its own nature. 

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the helpof any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could createthis world. This is against all experience. 

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish toqualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he hasno body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the productionof diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varieda nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, thenthere could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of oneunchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the characterof knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in whichknowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are notaware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God isomniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have anyknowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have anyperception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannothave any inference either. If it is said that without the suppositionof a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, thisalso is not true, for this implication would only be justified ifthere were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositionsalso. Even without an omniscient God you could explainall things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law ofkarma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Godstoo. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would bequarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story ofa miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons andwife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees canco-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that ifthere were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicatethat in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you thinkhis nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whicheverway one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that itis absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispensewith the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1]. 

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[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, _ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124. ]

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Mok@sa (emancipation). 

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (_mok@sa_) isthe avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for thestate of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It isalso a state of pure and infinite knowledge (_anantajńāna_) and infiniteperception (_anantadars'ana_). In the sa@msāra state on accountof the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only wornout imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this andthat time as ordinary knowledge (_mati_), testimony (_s'ruta_), supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (_avadhi_), and directknowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (_mana@hparyāya_). In the state of release however there is omniscience(_kevala-jńāna_) and all things are simultaneously known to theperfect (_kevalin_) as they are. In the sa@msāra stage the soul alwaysacquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change thoughremaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stagethe changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thusit is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substanceas well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc. , the changemeaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities. 

It may not be out of place to mention here that though thekarmas of man are constantly determining him in various waysyet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action(_anantavīrya_), so that karma can never subdue this freedom andinfinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to timeby the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of thispower man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. If man had not this anantavīrya in him he might have been eternallyunder the sway of the accumulated karma which securedhis bondage (_bandha_). But since man is the repository of thisindomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles andproduce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining hishighest good. 

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CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PĀTAŃJALA SA@MKHYA (YOGA) [Footnote ref 1]. 

A Review. 

The examination of the two ancient Nāstika schools ofBuddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convinceus that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, incircles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certainpractices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst thewise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in someof the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nāstika schoolsof Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from thepoint of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nāstika schoolsappear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificialdisciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated withthe K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against thetaking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animalsat the sacrifices. 

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combinationof rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magicalpower of producing the desired effect--a shower of rain, thebirth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrificeswere enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, asfor the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedaswere the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictatea detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on acertain course of action and refrain from other injurious coursesin such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desiredby the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to definetruth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualisticculture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance withwhich we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truthof Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our

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[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, publishedby the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to otherIndian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works. ]

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objects. Truth cannot be determined _a priori_ but depends uponthe test of experience [Footnote ref l]. 

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism thoughprobably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificialcreed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamentalprinciples which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were atleast tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we seethat Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as beingdue to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as thatwhich could produce any effect. But to such a logical extremedid the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended informulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2]. Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value ofknowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing whatis good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such anaccount of things that on proceeding according to its directionswe may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correctestimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is goodand avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changeswere produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did notcarry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change inthe world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone sofar that they had even denied the existence of any permanentsoul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absoluteview of things could be taken, and held that not only the happeningof events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are trueonly in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere _a priori_ abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By theassemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, newqualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But thiscommon-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinaryexperience, could not satisfy our inner _a priori_ demands forfinding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively butabsolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism

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[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mīmā@msā ofKumārila and Prabhākara holds the opposite view. Truth according to themis determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience. ]

[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably priorto the doctrine of _arthakriyākāritva. _ But the later Buddhists soughtto prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of_arthakriyākāritva_. ]

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would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, butuntrue from that point of view, while that is also true from sucha point of view and untrue from another. " But such an answercannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment. 

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhismfrom the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried toformulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position ofsentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed wasbusy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principlesor maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performancesof sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not meansacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actionswere here considered bad or good according as they broughtabout our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificialcreed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personaldegradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruthshould not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. Thesacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in theother world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turnedtheir backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate andunchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for everdissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely forthe moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificialcreed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followedonly if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit ofkarma (_karmaphala_) only meant the karma of sacrifice and itsfruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruitof sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge ofsacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these weretaken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness orabsolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was nonarrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happinessor destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but notsacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actionsperformed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truthor reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice. 

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads

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which had anticipated the new systems in all thesedirections. The pioneers of these new systems probably drewtheir suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from theUpani@sads, and built their systems independently by their ownrational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads werethus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu campsuch germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt toharmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificialcreed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistentand well-worked system of thought. Our expectations areindeed fulfilled in the Sā@mkhya philosophy, germs of which maybe discovered in the Upani@sads. 

The Germs of Sā@mkhya in the Upani@sads. 

It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large numberof texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, theinfinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changingforms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in theearliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result[Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appearsas the universal and supreme principle from which all others derivedtheir powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passagesfor personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process ofdevelopment the conception of Brahman reached a superior levelin which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as theonly Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into themonistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there wasanother line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being madeup of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vataraand particularly in Maitrāya@nī from which it appearsthat the Sāmkhya line of thought had considerably developed, andmany of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But thedate of Maitrāya@nī has not yet been definitely settled, and the details

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[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R. E. _). ]

[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. Thishas been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to otherIndian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter. ]

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found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notionof the Sā@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It isnot improbable that at this stage of development it also gavesome suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sā@mkhya-Yogaphilosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found allthe results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that itunites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with thedoctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine ofrelativism of the Jains. 

Sā@mkhya and Yoga Literature. 

The main exposition of the system of Sā@mkhya and Yoga inthis section has been based on the _Sā@mkhya kārikā_, the _Sā@mkhyasūtras_, and the _Yoga sūtras_ of Patańjali with their commentariesand sub-commentaries. The _Sā@mkhya kārikā_ (about200 A. D. ) was written by Īs'varak@r@s@na. The account of Sā@mkhyagiven by Caraka (78 A. D. ) represents probably an earlier school andthis has been treated separately. Vācaspati Mis'ra (ninth centuryA. D. ) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudī_. Butbefore him Gaudapāda and Rājā wrote commentaries on the_Sā@mkhya kārikā_ [Footnote ref 1]. Nārāyanatīrtha wrote his _Candrikā_ onGaudapāda's commentary. The _Sā@mkhya sūtras_ which have been commentedon by Vijńāna Bhik@su (called _Pravacanabhā@sya_) of thesixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown authorafter the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of thefifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the_Sā@mkhya sūtras_. Vijńāna Bhiksu wrote also another elementarywork on Sā@mkhya known as _Sā@mkhyasāra_. Another short workof late origin is _Tattvasamāsa_ (probably fourteenth century). Twoother works on Sām@khya, viz Sīmānanda's _Sāmkhyatattvavivecana_and Bhāvāga@nes'a's _Sā@mkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana_ (both laterthan Vijńānabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also beenfreely consulted. Patańjali's _Yoga sūtra_ (not earlier than 147 B. C. )was commented on by Vāysa (400 A. D. ) and Vyāsa's bhāsyacommented on by Vācaspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'āradī_, by Vijńāna Bhik@su _Yogavārttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century_Bhojav@rtti_, and by Nāges'a (seventeenth century) _Chāyāvyākhyā_. 

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[Footnote 1: I suppose that Rājā's commentary on the _Kārikā_ was the sameas _Rājavārttika_ quoted by Vācaspati. Rājā's commentary on the _Kārikā_has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyāyamańjarī_, p. 109. This bookis probably now lost. ]

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Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I maymention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theoriesof the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_by Dr B. N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ publishedby the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relationto other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published, and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publicationwith the Calcutta University. 

Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sā@mkhya works, viz. _Mā@tharabhā@sya_ and _Ātreyatantra_. Of these the second isprobably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sā@mkhya, for we knowthat the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that itwas called Ātreyasa@mhitā or Ātreyatantra. Nothing is knownof the Mātharabhāsya [Footnote ref 1]. 

An Early School of Sā@mkhya. 

It is important for the history of Sā@mkhya philosophy thatCaraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never beendealt with in any of the modern studies of Sā@mkhya, shouldbe brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhātus_), viz. Thefive elements such as ākās'a, vāyu etc. And cetanā, called alsopuru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said tobe twenty-four only, viz. The ten senses (five cognitive and fiveconative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfoldprak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkāra and the five elements)[Footnote ref2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existenceis proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the sensesthere cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch withthem. There are two movements of manas as indeterminatesensing (_ūha_) and conceiving (_vicāra_) before definite understanding(_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of thecombination of five elements but the auditory sense is made witha preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance

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[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sā@mkhya-Yoga may omit the followingthree sections at the time of first reading. ]

[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapā@ni, thecommentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatiriktańcodāsīna@mpuru@samavyaktatvasādharmyāt avyaktāyām prak@rtāveva prak@sipyaavyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nāti. _ Harinātha Vis'ārada's edition of_Caraka, S'ārīra_, p. 4. ]

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of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste witha preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderanceof earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmātras at all [Footnote ref 1]. The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyārtha_) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhūtas and prak@rti, mahatand aha@mkāra taking place through rajas make up what we callman. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is alsothe puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the ātman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If apermanent self were not recognized, then for the work of oneothers would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also _paramātman_, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is initself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to itthrough its connection with the sense organs and manas. Byignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@saand the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effectsare due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, butall destruction comes naturally and without cause. That whichis eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies theavyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category. The vikāra or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra, whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajńa(_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajńam@r@sayo viduh_). This avyaktaand cetanā are one and the same entity. From this unmanifestedprak@rti or cetanā is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi isderived the ego (_aha@mkāra_) and from the aha@mkāra the fiveelements and the senses are produced, and when this productionis complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the timeof pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes returnback to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at thetime of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (_avyakta_), all the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkāra, ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as havingeight elements in it _prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhātuki_), viz. Avyakta, mahat, aha@mkāra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements formingpart of the prak@rti we hear of indriyārthā, the five sense objectswhich have evolved out of the prak@rti. ]

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etc. --appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or ofdissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas andtamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again sufferthis revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active inassociation with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itselftakes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free willand reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they areassociated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and painsare felt by the conglomeration (_rās'i_), and not by the ātman presidingover it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure andpain comes desire (_t@r@s@nā_) consisting of wish and antipathy, andfrom desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means completecessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the associationof the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If themanas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga whenthere is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawnsthat "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and donot belong to me the self, " the self transcends all. This is the lastrenunciation when all affections and knowledge become finallyextinct. There remains no indication of any positive existenceof the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnoteref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call thisstate the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of anycharacteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sā@mkhyas as theirgoal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas arerooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to beenjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth, ____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentaryprevious to Cakrapā@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolveback into the prak@rti--the puru@sa--and at the time of rebirth theybecome manifest again. See Cakrapā@ni on s'ārīra, I. 46. ]

[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhūta, it is not in anysense like the Brahman of Vedānta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more likeabsolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_), resembling Nāgārjuna's Nirvā@na. Thus Carakawrites:--_tasmi@ms'caramasannyāse samūlāh@hsarvavedanā@hasa@mjńājńānavijńānā niv@rtti@m yāntyas'e@sata@h. Ata@hpara@mbrahmabhūto bhūtātmā nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhāvebhya@h cihna@myasya na vidyate. Gatirbrahmavidā@m brahma taccāk@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka, S'ārīra_ 1. 98-100. ]

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the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavoursin the shape of association with good people, abandoningof desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixedattention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva)thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] andthis will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature orcharacter, this state can only be described as absolute cessation(_mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@sā_). 

The main features of the Sā@mkhya doctrine as given by Carakaare thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomeraof this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formedwhich generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmātras arenot mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states ofthe mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state ofemancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absoluteexistence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there isno consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to theconglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkāra etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_). 

This account of Sā@mkhya agrees with the system of Sā@mkhyapropounded by Pańcas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil ofĀsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in theMahābhārata XII. 219. Pańcas'ikha of course does not describethe system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from whatlittle he says it may be supposed that the system of Sā@mkhyahe sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pańcas'ikhaspeaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in allSā@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa(_purusāvasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combinationof the different elements, then one may assume that all ceaseswith death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces adiscussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self asthe postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Pańcas'ikha also, and the proofs

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[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory:(1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt toremember. ]

[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficultyin accepting Pańcas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sā@mkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sā@mkhya doctrines sketchedin _Caraka_ did not attract their notice. ]

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for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka againPańcas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditionsof the conglomeration of our physical body mind, --and theelement of "cetas. " They are mutually independent, and by suchindependence carry on the process of life and work. None of thephenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All oursuffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sais realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of thesephenomena. The gu@nas described by Pańcas'ikha are the differentkinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, asCaraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and thelast state is described as being like that when all rivers losethemselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without anycharacteristic)--a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sā@mkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciationwhich is also called the doctrine of complete destruction(_samyagbadha_). 

Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A. D. ), a commentator of_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sā@mkhya, theMaulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of thesethe doctrine of the Maulikya Sā@mkhya is said to be that whichbelieved that there was a separate pradhāna for each ātman(_maulikyasā@mkhyā hyātmānamātmānam prati p@rthak pradhānamvadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sā@mkhya doctrineI have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that thisrepresents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sā@mkhya. 

In _Mahābhārata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sā@mkhya arementioned, viz. Those who admitted twenty-four categories (theschool I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five(the well-known orthodox Sā@mkhya system) and those whoadmitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted asupreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixthprinciple. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and theform of Sā@mkhya advocated in the _Mahābhārata_. The schools ofSā@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are heredenounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school ofSā@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the

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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_, p. 99. ]

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other chapters of the _Mahābhārata_ (XII. 203, 204). The selfapart from the body is described as the moon of the new moonday; it is said that as Rāhu (the shadow on the sun during aneclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot beseen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'arīri@na@h_) are spoken of asmanifesting from prak@rti. 

We do not know anything about Āsuri the direct discipleof Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system ofSā@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the sameform in the _Mahābhārata_ and has been attributed there to Pańcas'ikhais probably the earliest form of Sā@mkhya available to usin a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to theschool of Maulikya Sā@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka(78 A. U. ) does not refer to the Sā@mkhya as described by Īs'varak@r@s@naand referred to in other parts of _Mahābhārata_ is a definiteproof that Īs'varak@r@s@na's Sā@mkhya is a later modification, whichwas either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded asan authoritative old Sā@mkhya view. 

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavāsin alteredthe Sā@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinksthat Vindhyavāsin was a title of Īs'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbeholds that the date of Īs'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A. D. It seems to be avery plausible view that Īs'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his kārikās toanother work, which was probably written in a style differentfrom what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Kārikā_ seems tobe in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the

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[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Āsuri is quoted by Gu@naratna(_Tarkarahasyadīpikā, _ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that whenbuddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water. ]

[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus, _ p. 240. ]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu, " _J. R. A. S. _, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to beextremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Īs'varak@r@s@na andVindhyavāsin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadīpikā, _pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavāsin (p. 104) inanu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Īs'varak@r@s@nā. Itappears that Īs'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _Sā@mkhyakārikā_ and another an independent work on Sā@mkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:

 "_Pratiniyatādhyavasāya@h s'rotrādisamuttha adhyak@sam_" (p. 108). 

If Vācaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumāna in his_Tattvakaumudī_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sā@mkhyakārikā_ then Īs'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavāsinwhose views on anumāna as referred to in _S'lokavārttika, _ p. 393, arealtogether different. But Vācaspati's own statement in the_Tātparyya@tīkā_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was notfaithful. ]

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_Mahābhāsya_ of Patańjali the grammarian (147 B. C. ) [Footnote ref 1]. The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons whichfrustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concernedwith the strictly technical part of Sā@mkhya, and it is just possiblethat the book from which Patańjali quoted the passage, and whichwas probably paraphrased in the Āryā metre by Īs'varak@r@s@nawas not a Sā@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of theverse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sā@mkhya, yetsince such an enumeration is not seen in any other system ofIndian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguardagainst certain objections against the Sā@mkhya doctrine ofprak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was theverse of a Sā@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Īs'varak@r@s@na. 

The earliest descriptions of a Sā@mkhya which agrees withĪs'varak@r@s@na's Sā@mkhya (but with an addition of Īs'vara) are to befound in Patańjali's _Yoga sūtras_ and in the _Mahābhārata;_ but weare pretty certain that the Sā@mkhya of Caraka we have sketchedhere was known to Patańjali, for in _Yoga sūtra_ I. 19 a reference ismade to a view of Sā@mkhya similar to this. 

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sā@mkhyaof Caraka and Pańcas'ikha is very important; for it shows atransitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas andthe orthodox Sā@mkhya doctrine as represented by Īs'varak@r@s@na. On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, andthat effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and thatthe puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyāya, and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearerthan the orthodox Sā@mkhya. 

We hear of a _Sa@s@titantras'āstra_ as being one of the oldest Sā@mkhyaworks. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitā_ ascontaining two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnoteref 2]. A quotation from _Rājavārttika_ (a work about which there is nodefinite information) in Vācaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sā@mkhyakārika_(72) says that it was called the _@Sa@s@titantra becauseit dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its differencefrom puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity ofpuru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of

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[Footnote 1: Patańjali's Mahābhā@sya, IV. I. 3. _Atisannikar@sādativiprakar@sāt mūrttyantaravyavadhānāttamasāv@rtatvāt indriyadaurvalyādatipramādāt, _ etc. (Benares edition. )]

[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitā, _ pp. 108, 110. ]

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the categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five _viparyyayas_, nine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and theeight siddhis [Footnote ref 1]. 

But the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _AhirbudhnyaSa@mhitā_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sā@mkhyaof the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitā_ was ofa theistic character resembling the doctrine of the PańcarātraVai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitā_ says that Kapila'stheory of Sā@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijńāna Bhiksu, thegreatest expounder of Sā@mkhya, says in many places of his work_Vijńānām@rta Bhā@sya_ that Sā@mkhya was originally theistic, and thatthe atheistic Sā@mkhya is only a _prau@dhivāda_ (an exaggeratedattempt to show that no supposition of Īs'vara is necessary toexplain the world process) though the _Mahābhārata_ points outthat the difference between Sā@mkhya and Yoga is this, that theformer is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancybetween the two accounts of _@Sa@s@titantra_ suggests that the original_Sa@s@titantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitā_ wassubsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition iscorroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention amongthe important Sā@mkhya works _@Sa@s@titantra_ but _@Sa@s@titantroddhāra_

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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs, and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karikā_ of Is'varakr@sna, but Ihave omitted them in my account of Sāmkhya as these have littlephilosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five, viz. Avidyā (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa(antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo, moha, mahāmoha, tamisrā_, and _andhatāmisra_. These are of nine kindsof tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rtiwill herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessaryto meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder'slife (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time(_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhāgya_), andthe contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds ofcauses, e. G. The troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles ofprotecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of thingsearned by enjoyment (_parāpara_), increase of desires leading to greaterdisappointments (_anuttamāmbhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others(_uttamāmbhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerationswith those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. Thesiddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading ofscriptures (_tāra_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutāra_), (3) proper reasoning (_tāratāra_), (4) corroborating one's own ideaswith the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field(_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice(_sadāmudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, andmodamāna lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven sensesand seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to theabsence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stisand the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of theachievement of the Sā@mkhya goal. ]

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(revised edition of _@Sa@s@titantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably theearlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before Vācaspati's time. 

If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _AhirbudhnyaSa@mhitā_ to be in all essential parts the same work which wascomposed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then ithas to be assumed that Kapila's Sā@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. Itseems probable that his disciple Āsuri tried to popularise it. But itseems that a great change occurred when Pańcas'ikha the disciple ofĀsuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrinediffered from the traditional one in many important respects. Itis said in _Sā@mkhya kārikā_ (70) that the literature was divided byhim into many parts (_tena bahudhāk@rtam tantram_). The exactmeaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean thatthe original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navasaccepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essentialparts as the Sā@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumptionthat Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there area few other points of difference between the Kapila and thePātańjala Sā@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that maybe ventured is that Pańcas'ikha probably modified Kapila'swork in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If thissupposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata ofSā@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, butwhich is kept in a modified form by the Pātańjala school of Sā@mkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Pańcas'ikha, anda third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sā@mkhya system. An important change in the Sā@mkhya doctrine seems to havebeen introduced by Vijńāna Bhik@su (sixteenth century A. D. ) by histreatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted thisinterpretation of Sā@mkhya as the most rational and philosophicalone, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected systemof the accepted Kapila and the Pātańjala school of Sā@mkhya. Butit must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas wasapplied to different types of good and bad mental states, and thenthey were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increaseand decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the

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[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadīpikā_, p. 109. ]

[Footnote 2: _eva@m sa@dvims'akam prāhah s'arīramth mānavāh sā@mkhyamsa@mkhyātmakatvācca kapilādibhirucyate. Matsyapurāna_, IV. 28. ]

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totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanationof the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijńāna Bhik@suand the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yogaphilosophy compiled by Patańjali and commented on by Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Vijń@ana Bhik@su, agree with the Sā@mkhya doctrineas explained by Vācaspati and Vijńana Bhik@su in most points Ihave preferred to call them the Kapila and the Pātańjala schoolsof Sā@mkhya and have treated them together--a principle whichwas followed by Haribhadra in his _@Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya_. 

The other important Sā@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapādaare Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana and Vo@dhu. Nothing isknown about their historicity or doctrines. 

Sā@mkhya kārikā, Sā@mkhya sūtra, Vācaspati Mis'ra andVijńāna Bhik@su. 

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretationof the Sā@mkhya-Yoga system. The _Sā@mkhya kārikā_ isthe oldest Sā@mkhya text on which we have commentaries bylater writers. The _Sā@mkhya sūtra_ was not referred to by anywriter until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenthcentury A. D. ). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. Whomade allusions to a number of Sā@mkhya works, did not make anyreference to the _Sā@mkhya sūtra_, and no other writer who is knownto have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made anyreference to the _Sā@mkhya sūtra_. The natural conclusion thereforeis that these sūtras were probably written some time afterthe fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence toprove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It issaid at the end of the _Sā@mkhya kārikā_ of Īs'varak@r@s@na that thekārikās give an exposition of the Sā@mkhya doctrine excludingthe refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding theparables attached to the original Sā@mkhya works--the_@Sa@s@titantras'āstra_. The _Sā@mkhya sūtras_ contain refutationsof other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbablethat these were collected from some earlier Sā@mkhya work which isnow lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later editionof the _@Sa@s@titantras'āstra_ (_@Sa@s@titantroddhāra_ as mentioned by

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[Footnote 1: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volumeof the present work. ]

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Gū@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason tosuppose that the Sā@mkhya doctrine found in the sūtras differs inany important way from the Sā@mkhya doctrine as found in the_Sā@mkhya kārikā_. The only point of importance is this, that the_Sā@mkhya sūtras_ hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolutepure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involvedin the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class ofthe gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence, they were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all formthe category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in somesense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found inthe _Sā@mkhya kārikā_. This is, however, a case of omission and notof difference. Vijńāna Bhik@su, the commentator of the _Sā@mkhyasūtra_, was more inclined to theistic Sā@mkhya or Yoga thanto atheistic Sā@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks inhis _Sāmkhyapravacanabhā@sya, Yogavārttika_, and _Vijńānām@rtabhasya_(an independent commentary on the Brahmasūtras ofBādarāyana on theistic Sā@mkhya lines). Vijńāna Bhiksu's ownview could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for heagreed more with the views of the Sā@mkhya doctrine of thePura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are saidto be merged in the end in Īs'vara, by whose will the creativeprocess again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the_Sā@mkhya sūtras_, but he remarked that these were used only witha view to showing that the Sā@mkhya system gave such a rationalexplanation that even without the intervention of an Īs'vara it couldexplain all facts. Vijńāna Bhik@su in his interpretation of Sā@mkhyadiffered on many points from those of Vācaspati, and it is difficultto say who is right. Vijńāna Bhik@su has this advantage thathe has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult pointson which Vācaspati remained silent. I refer principally to thenature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the mostimportant thing in Sā@mkhya. Vijńāna Bhik@su described thegu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vācaspati andGau@dapāda (the other commentator of the _Sā@mkhya kārikā_)remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in theirinterpretations which would militate against the interpretation ofVijńāna Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definiteexplanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely

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came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretationof their nature. 

Since no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in anyother work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this mattermay not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Carakanor the _Mahābhārata_ explains the nature of the gu@nas. ButBhik@su's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is knownof the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all earlydocuments. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@suin giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The _Kārikā_speaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, anddullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva asbeing light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy andcausing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vācaspatimerely paraphrases this statement of the _Kārikā_ but does not enterinto any further explanations. Bhik@su's interpretation fits in wellwith all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possiblethat this view might not have been known before, and when theoriginal Sā@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vaguenessas to the conception of the gu@nas. 

There are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretationdiffers from that of Vācaspati. The most important of these maybe mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection ofthe buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vācaspati holds that there isno contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but thata reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi byvirtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformedinto consciousness. But this view is open to the objectionthat it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be theexperiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflectionin the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience(_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without anyactual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer ofVācaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in spaceand time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specifickind of fitness (_yogyatā_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though itremains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribedto a person. Vijńāna Bhik@su differs from Vācaspati and says thatif such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

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reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the timeof emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented inthe buddhi for ever. Vijńana Bhik@su thus holds that there is areal contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitivestate. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does notnecessarily mean that the former will be liable to change onaccount of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Changemeans the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which sufferschanges, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, thereis the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and whenthe puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appearsas a conscious state. The second, is the difference betweenVācaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptualprocess. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive thedeterminate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vācaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging thesense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminatesense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition isthe stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, atthe next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and associationby which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classifiedby the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates theindeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual andconceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things isdirectly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinateposition to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination. 

It may not be out of place to mention here that there areone or two passages in Vācaspati's commentary on the _Sā@mkhyakārikā_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_aha@mkāra_)as producing the subjective series of the senses and theobjective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore notnecessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of viewwith regard to the evolution of the tanmātras from the mahat;for contrary to the view of _Vyāsabhā@sya_ and Vijńāna Bhik@su etc. Vācaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkāra and

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from aha@mkāra the tanmātras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijńāna Bhik@su howeverholds that both the separation of aha@mkāra and the evolution of thetanmātras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be morereasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are someother minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines betweenVācaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophicalimportance. 

Yoga and Patańjali. 

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses suchas yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as theother senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word wasused in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works asthe S'atapatha Brāhmana and the B@rhadāra@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2]. The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature[Footnote ref 3]. 

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the@Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally verymuch valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vowof celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtuesand considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4]. 

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the forceof the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that ofa spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originallyapplied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the controlof the senses [Footnote ref 5]. 

In Pā@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technicalmeaning, and he distinguished this root "_yuj samādhau_" (_yuj_in the sense of concentration) from "_yujir yoge_" (root _yujir_ inthe sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used asa verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymologicalderivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6]. 

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[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff. ]

[Footnote 2: Compare R. V. I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114. 9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II. ]

[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare GermanJoch, A. S. Geoc. L atm jugum. ]

[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10;Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brāh, II. 2. 3. 3; R. V. X. 129;S'atap. Brāh. XI. 5. 8. 1. ]

[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriyā@ni hayānāhu@h vi@sayāte@sugocarān_. The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriyā@nyasya hayā@h_ the conative senses are itshorses. ]

[Footnote 6: _Yugya@h_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from_yuja samādhau_. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam, "V. I. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour whichpassed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time(Pā@nini as Goldstūcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated withthese had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed bythe name of Yoga. ]

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In the _Bhagavadgītā_, we find that the word yoga has beenused not only in conformity with the root "_yuj-samādhau_" butalso with "_yujir yoge_" This has been the source of some confusionto the readers of the _Bhagavadgītā. _ "Yogin" in the senseof a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regardedwith extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use ofthis word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgītā_ tried to mark out amiddle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstractionon the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial actionof a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidentlyfrom _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself thebest parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yetabstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires. 

Kau@tilya in his _Arthas'āstra_ when enumerating the philosophicsciences of study names Sā@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata. Theoldest Buddhist sūtras (e. G. The _Satipa@t@thāna sutta_) are fullyfamiliar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thusinfer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technicalmethod of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha. 

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sā@mkhya, as we findit in the _Yoga sūtras_ of Patańjali, it is indeed difficult to come toany definite conclusion. The science of breath had attractednotice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had notprobably developed any systematic form of prā@nāyāma (a systemof breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when wecome to Maitrāya@nī that we find that the Yoga method had attaineda systematic development. The other two Upani@sads inwhich the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetās'vatara andthe Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these threeUpani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yogamethods, are the only ones where we find clear references also tothe Sā@mkhya tenets, though the Sā@mkhya and Yoga ideas do notappear there as related to each other or associated as parts ofthe same system. But there is a remarkable passage in theMaitrāya@nī in the conversation between S'ākyāyana and B@rhadratha where we find that the Sā@mkhya metaphysics was offered

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in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of theSā@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was thework of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequentlysystematized by Patańjali. Thus S'ākyāyana says: "Here somesay it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goesinto bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place whenthe fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by themind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is butmind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened inhis imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillatinghe enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, andhe binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, aman being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a manstand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign ofliberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the openingof the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote averse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still togetherwith the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is calledthe highest state [Footnote ref 1]. '"

An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'ā@n@dilya, Yogatattva, Dhyānabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanāda, Varāha, Ma@n@dalaBrāhma@na, Nādabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalū, shows that the Yogapractices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, butnone of these show any predilection for the Sā@mkhya. Thus theYoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the

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[Footnote 1: Vātsyāyana, however, in his bhā@sya on _Nyāya sūtra_, I. I 29, distinguishes Sā@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sā@mkhya holdsthat nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be anychange in the pure intelligence (_niratis'ayā@h cetanā@h_). All changesare due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa. Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Nonbeing can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The lastview is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyāsabhā@sya, _ It iscloser to Nyāya in its doctrines. If Vātsyāyana's statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose increation was borrowed by Sā@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on thesame sūtra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sā@mkhyaand Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being "_abhautika. _" Curiouslyenough Vātsyāyana quotes a passage from _Vyāsabhā@sya, _ III. 13, in hisbhā@sya, I. Ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_). ]

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S'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga;they grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga whichwas supposed to produce mystic and magical feats throughconstant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were alsoassociated with healing and other supernatural powers. TheYogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, theMantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Rājayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In somecases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedāntismwith these mystic practices. The influence of these practices inthe development of Tantra and other modes of worship was alsovery great, but we have to leave out these from our presentconsideration as they have little philosophic importance and asthey are not connected with our present endeavour. 

Of the Pātańjala school of Sā@mkhya, which forms the subject ofthe Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patańjali was probablythe most notable person for he not only collected the differentforms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas whichwere or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them allon the Sā@mkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in whichthey have been handed down to us. Vācaspati and VijńānaBhik@su, the two great commentators on the _Vyāsabhā@sya_, agreewith us in holding that Patańjali was not the founder of Yoga, but an editor. Analytic study of the sūtras brings the convictionthat the sūtras do not show any original attempt, but amasterly and systematic compilation which was also supplementedby fitting contributions. The systematic manner alsoin which the first three chapters are written by way of definitionand classification shows that the materials were already inexistence and that Patańjali systematized them. There wasno missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines ofother systems, except as far as they might come in by way ofexplaining the system. Patańjal is not even anxious to establishthe system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the factsas he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhistsoccur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga aredescribed in the first three chapters, and this part is separatedfrom the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are

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[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigī@savya wrote "_Dhāranās'āstra_" whichdealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patańjali. He mentions different places in the body (e. G. Heart, throat, tip of thenose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memorywhere concentration is to be made. See Vācaspati's _Tātparya@tīkā_ orVātsyāyana's bhā@sya on _Nyāya sūtra_, III. Ii. 43. ]

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criticized; the putting of an "_iti_" (the word to denote the conclusionof any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently todenote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of courseanother "_iti_" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote theconclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesisseems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by ahand other than that of Patańjali who was anxious to supplysome new links of argument which were felt to be necessary forthe strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point ofview, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from thesupposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also amarked change (due either to its supplementary character orto the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the lastchapter as compared with the style of the other three. 

The sūtras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat whathas already been said in the second chapter and some of thetopics introduced are such that they could well have beendealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similardiscussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapteris also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sūtras, whereas the average number of sūtras in other chapters is between51 to 55. 

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable dateof this famous Yoga author Patańjali. Weber had tried to connecthim with Kāpya Pata@mchala of S'atapatha Brāhma@na [Footnote ref l]; inKātyāyana's _Varttika_ we get the name Patańjali which is explainedby later commentators as _patanta@h ańjalaya@h yasmai_ (forwhom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeeddifficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity ofnames. There is however another theory which identifies thewriter of the great commentary on Pā@nini called the _Mahābhā@sya_with the Patańjali of the _Yoga sūtra_. This theory has beenaccepted by many western scholars probably on the strength ofsome Indian commentators who identified the two Patańjalis. Of these one is the writer of the _Patańjalicarita_ (RāmabhadraDīk@sīta) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenthcentury. The other is that cited in S'ivarāma's commentary on_Vāsavadattā_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. The other two are king Bhoja of Dhār and Cakrapā@nidatta, __________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Weber's _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n. ]

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the commentator of _Caraka, _ who belonged to the eleventhcentury A. D. Thus Cakrapā@ni says that he adores the Ahipati(mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speechand body by his _Pātańjala mahābhā@sya_ and the revision of_Caraka. _ Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words ofthat illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing hisgrammar, by writing his commentary on the Patańjala and byproducing a treatise on medicine called _Rājam@rgā@nka_ has like thelord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, mind and body. " The adoration hymn of Vyāsa (which is consideredto be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is alsobased upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore thatthe later Indian commentators might have made some confusionbetween the three Patańjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as_Pātańjalatantra, _ and who has been quoted by S'ivadāsa in hiscommentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating ofmetals. 

Professor J. H. Woods of Harvard University is thereforein a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarianand the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of thesecommentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the greatcommentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta, Vāmana, Jayāditya, Nāges'a, etc. Are silent on this point. This is indeed a point against the identification of the twoPatańjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a laterage. And if other proofs are available which go against suchan identification, we could not think the grammarian and theYoga writer to be the same person. 

Let us now see if Patańjali's grammatical work contains anythingwhich may lead us to think that he was not the sameperson as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that thephilosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patańjalisdiffers and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds thatdravya is described in _Vyāsabhā@sya_ in one place as being theunity of species and qualities (_sāmānyavis'e@sātmaka_), whereasthe _Mahābhā@sya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and alsospecific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid oneither side. I fail to see how these ideas are totallyantagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by

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Vyā@di and Vājapyāyana (Vyā@di holding that words denotedqualities or dravya and Vājapyāyana holding that words denotedspecies [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pā@nini had these two different ideas in"_jātyākhyāyāmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyām_" and"_sarūpānamekas'e@samekavibhaktau_, " and Patańjali the writer ofthe _Mahābhā@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not showthat he opposes the view of _Vyāsabhā@sya_, though we must rememberthat even if he did, that would not prove anything with regardto the writer of the sūtras. Moreover, when we read that dravyais spoken of in the _Mahābhā@sya_ as that object which is thespecific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow isof its tail, hoofs, horns, etc. --"_yatsāsnālā@ngulakakudakhuravi@sā@nyartharūpam_, " we are reminded ofits similarity with "_ayutasiddhāvayavabhedānugata@h samūha@h dravyam_"(a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the_Vyāsabhāsya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahābhā@sya_ I havenot been able to discover anything there which can warrant usin holding that the two Patańjalis cannot be identified. Thereare no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but evenin these it is only the traditional views of the old grammariansthat are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantablefor us to judge anything about the personal viewsof the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that thewriter of the _Mahābhā@sya_ knew most of the important points ofthe Sā@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may referto the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sā@mkhya dictum of exnihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), theidea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea ofchange _vikāra_ as production of new qualities _gu@nāntarādhāna_(5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the _Mahābhā@sya_ agrees with the Yogaview as regards the Spho@tavāda, which is not held in commonby any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also thisexternal similarity, that unlike any other work they both begintheir works in a similar manner (_atha yogānus'āsanam_ and_athas'ābdānus'āsanam_)--"now begins the compilation of theinstructions on Yoga" (_Yoga sūtrā_)--and "now begins the compilationof the instructions of words" (_Mahābhā@sya_). 

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments

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[Footnote 1: Patańjali's _Mahābhā@sya, _ 1. 2. 64. ]

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which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the_Yoga sūtra_ between 300 and 500 A. D. Are not at all conclusive, as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patańjaliscannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of theYoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposedBuddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if theywere written by Patańjali it cannot be inferred that becauseVācaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijńāna-vāditype, we are to infer that the sūtras refer to Vasubandhu oreven to Nāgārjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sūtrashad been developing long before the time of Nāgārjuna. 

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentatorsmay not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the twoPatańjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparativecritical study of the _Yoga sūtras_ and the text of the _Mahābhā@sya, _which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yogasūtras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patańjali. 

Postponing our views about the time of Patańjali the Yogaeditor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducingthe other work _Kitāb Pātanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, forour consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famousone and he translates it along with another book called _Sānka_(Sā@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in theform of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain thatthis book was not the present _Yoga sūtra_ of Patańjali, though ithad the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberationand for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. The book was called by Alberuni _Kitāb Pātanjal_, which is tobe translated as the book of Pātańjala, because in another place, speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which whentranslated stands as "the author of the book of Pātanjal. " Ithad also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotesmany extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. Ittreats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc. , as we find inthe _Yoga sūtra_, but the manner in which these are described (so

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[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhistreference _naraika-cittatantram vastu tadapramā@nakam tadā kim syāt_(IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyāsabhā@sya, as Bhoja, who hadconsulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not countit as sūtra. ]

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far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied byAlberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some changefrom what we find in the _Yoga sūtra_. Following the idea of Godin Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timelessemancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas andshows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that theycould obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The nameof God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything ofwhich the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceiveshim and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identicalwith worshipping him exclusively, and by practising ituninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorptionwith him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1]. 

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the _Yoga sūtra. _The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of theeight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditationon the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditationcorresponding to the four stages we have as in the _Yogasūtra. _ He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is the _abhyāsa_ (habit) of Patańjali, and theobject of this abhyāsa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The secondstands for vairāgya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seekhis favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. _Yoga sūtra, _ I. 23 andI. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasāyanaor alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost thesame as in the _Yoga sūtra, _ II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberatedstate is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or beingone with him. The Brahman is conceived as an _urddhvamūlaavāks'ākha as'vattha_ (a tree with roots upwards and branchesbelow), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pureBrahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the differentdoctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes ofinterpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the

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[Footnote 1: Cf. _Yoga sūtra_ I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The _Yoga sūtras_speak of Is'vāra (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of theobstacles such as illness, etc. , which stand in the way of Yoga practiceare removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects ofconcentration. The commentator Vyāsa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so willsthat he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. Noargument is given in the _Yoga sūtras_ of the existence of God. ]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1. ]

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object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to theroots. 

The difference of this system from that of the _Yoga sūtra_ is:(1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importancethat he has become the only object of meditation, and absorptionin him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] andthe niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of theYoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from anyconnection with God as we find in the _Yoga sūtra_ has been lostsight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption inGod; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significanceof Yoga as control of mental states (_citta@rttinirodha_) is lostsight of, and (7) rasāyana (alchemy) is introduced as one of themeans of salvation. 

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modificationof the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patańjali's _Yoga sūtra_ inthe direction of Vedānta and Tantra, and as such itprobably stands as the transition link through which the Yogadoctrine of the sūtras entered into a new channel in such a waythat it could be easily assimilated from there by later developmentsof Vedānta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the authormentions rasāyana as a means of salvation, it is very probablethat he flourished after Nāgarjuna and was probably the sameperson who wrote _Pātańjala tantra_, who has been quoted byS'ivadāsa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken ofby Nāges'a as "_Carake_ Patańjali@h. " We can also assume with somedegree of probability that it is with reference to this man thatCakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him withthe writer of the _Mahābhā@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrapā@niby his line "_pātańjalamahābhā@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h_"refers to this work which was called "Pātańjala. " The commentatorof this work gives some description of the lokas, dvīpas andthe sāgaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the_Vyāsabhā@sya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probablywritten at a time when the _Vyāsabhā@sya_ was not writtenor had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni

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[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sā@mkhya, givesa list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation. ]

[Footnote 2: Cf. The account of _Pās'upatadars'ana_ in_Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha_. ]

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also described the book as being very famous at the time, andBhoja and Cakrapā@ni also probably confused him with Patańjalithe grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this bookof Patańjali was probably written by some other Patańjali withinthe first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may notbe improbable that when _Vyāsabhā@sya_ quotes in III. 44 as "_iti_Patańjali@h, " he refers to this Patańjali. 

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrāya@naUpani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely prā@nāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhyāna, dhara@nā, tarka and samādhi [Footnote ref 1]. Comparing this list with that of the list in the _Yoga sūtras_ we findthat two new elements have been added, and tarka has beenreplaced by āsana. Now from the account of the sixty-twoheresies given in the _Brahmajāla sutta_ we know that there werepeople who either from meditation of three degrees or throughlogic and reasoning had come to believe that both the externalworld as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From theassociation of this last mentioned logical school with the Samādhior Dhyāna school as belonging to one class of thinkers calleds'ās'vatavāda, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga insamādhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given inMaitrāya@nī Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Sā@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of beinggrafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussiondid not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. Thesubstitution of āsana for tarka in the list of Patańjali shows thatthe Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya. The introduction of ahi@msā (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha(want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment)as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga isdeemed impossible (for the first time in the sūtras), probablymarks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and theBuddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrī, karu@nā, muditā, upek@sā is also equally significant, as we do notfind them mentioned in such a prominent form in any otherliterature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from the _Ācārā@ngasūtra, Uttarādhyayanasūtra_, ____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _prā@nāyāmah pratyāhārah dhyānam dhara@nā tarkah samādhihsa@da@nga ityucyate yoga_ (Maitr. 6 8). ]

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the _Sūtrak@rtā@ngasūtra, _ etc. , and passing through Umāsvati's_Tattvārthādhigamasūtra_ to Hemacandra's _Yogas'āstra_ we find thatthe Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on thebasis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and theopinion expressed in Alberuni's _Pātanjal_ that these cannot givesalvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days fromthe Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is itsthoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connectionwith the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is thesame as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namelysuffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of thepath to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysicsof the sa@msāra (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. Is described with a remarkable degree ofsimilarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidyā is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidyā shouldnot be confused with the Vedānta avidyā of S'a@nkara, as it is anavidyā of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusionnor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within therange of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidyā is the ignoranceof the four sacred truths, as we have in the sūtra"_anityās'ucidu@hkhānātmasu nityas'ucidu@hkhātmakhyātiravidyā_" (II. 5). 

The ground of our existing is our will to live (_abhinives'a_). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to beourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kindsof existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cutsoff being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]. " This is true as much ofBuddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used inthe Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which hasnever been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hinduliterature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these thingsin this section is to show that the _Yoga sūtras_ proper (first threechapters) were composed at a time when the later forms ofBuddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels betweenthe Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such

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[Footnote 1: _Yoga sūtra, _ II. 15, 16. 17. _Yathācikitsās'āstra@mcaturvyūha@m rogo rogahetuh ārogya@m bhais'ajyamiti evamidamapis'āstram caturvyūhameva; tadyathā sa@msāra@h, sa@msārahetu@h mok@sa@hmok@sopāya@h; duhkhabahula@h sa@msāro heya@h, pradhānapuru@sayo@hsa@myogo heyahetu@h, sa@myogasyātyantikī niv@rttirhāna@m hanopāya@hsamyagdar`sanam, Vyāsabhā@sya_, II. 15]

[Footnote 2: Oldenberg's _Buddhism_ [Footnote ref 1]. ]

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a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposedto think that the date of the first three chapters of the _Yogasūtras_ must be placed about the second century B. C. Since thereis no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying thegrammarian Patańjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we maytake them as being identical [Footnote ref 1]. 

The Sā@mkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Puru@sa. 

The Sā@mkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and _prak@rti_, the root principle of matter. Souls aremany, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand according as they occupy asmaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and arenot contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. Butthe relation between body or rather the mind associated with itand soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in themind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls aremany, and had it not been so (the Sā@mkhya argues) with thebirth of one all would have been born and with the death of oneall would have died [Footnote ref 2]. 

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughlygrasp in order to understand the Sā@mkhya philosophy. Unlikethe Jaina soul possessing _anantajńāna, anantadars'ana, anantasukha_, and _anantavīryya_, the Sā@mkhya soul is described as beingdevoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolutepure consciousness (_cit_). The Sā@mkhya view differs fromthe Vedānta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul tobe of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (_ānanda_) [Footnote ref3]. Bliss with Sā@mkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such itbelongs to prak@rti and does not constitute the nature of soul;secondly, according to Vedānta the individual souls (_Jīva_) are

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[Footnote 1: See S. N. Das Gupta, _Yoga Philosophy in relation to otherIndian systems of thought, _ ch. II. The most important point in favourof this identification seems to be that both the Patańjalis as againstthe other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of _spho@ta_ which wasdenied even by Sā@mkhya. On the doctrine of Spho@ta see my _Studyof Patanjali_, Appendix I. ]

[Footnote 2: _Kārikā_, 18. ]

[Footnote 3: See Citsukha's _Tattvapradīpikā, _ IV. ]

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but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness theBrahman, but according to Sā@mkhya they are all real and many. 

The most interesting feature of Sā@mkhya as of Vedānta isthe analysis of knowledge. Sā@mkhya holds that our knowledgeof things are mere ideational pictures or images. External thingsare indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also insome sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their naturelike the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connectionwith which the whole conscious plane could be interpretedas the experience of a person [Footnote ref 1]. We know that theUpani@sads consider the soul or atman as pure and infiniteconsciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do notdetect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principlewhich has no change, no form, but which is like a light whichillumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes. The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self"but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of otherthings, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. TheJains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, andevery act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of theveil. Sā@mkhya says that the self cannot be found as an imageof knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendentprinciple, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtlematter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere formsor images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersedin darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, the pictures appear one by one before the light and arc illuminated. So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristicof self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge wouldbe blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and

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[Footnote 1: _Tattakaumudī_ 5; _Yogavārttika_, IV. 22;_Vijńānām@rtabhā@sya_, p. 74; _Yogavārttika_ and _Tattvavais'āradī_, I. 4, II. 6, 18, 20; _Vyāsabhā@sya, _ I. 6, 7. ]

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so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is thesame as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivensthese knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious. This principle of consciousness (_cit_) cannot indeed beseparately perceived _per se_, but the presence of this principle inall our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity [Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takesplace in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it, and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changesof knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each itemof knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort isbut a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by theprinciple of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledgecarries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness, it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness. Knowledge-revelation is not just the unveiling or revelation of aparticular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelationof the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image isconcerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blindknowledge-stuff. 

The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituentparts, and had held that the coming together of thesebrought about the conscious states. This coming together wasto them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unityor coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentarycollocation. With Sć@mkhya however the self, the pure _cit_, isneither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent. Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movementsof the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwisehave remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming intoconnection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpretedas the systematic and coherent experience of a person, andmay thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means theexpression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of

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[Footnote 1: It is important to note that Sā@mkhya has two terms to denotethe two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. The relating element ofawareness as such (_cit_) and the content (_buddhi_) which is the formof the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognitiontakes place by the reflection of the former in the latter. ]

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knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them asystem of experience. This principle of intelligence is calledpuru@sa. There is a separate puru@sa in Sā@mkhya for each individual, and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedāntaātman however is different from the Sā@mkhya puru@sa in this thatit is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory māyā itappears as many. 

Thought and Matter. 

A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms aremade up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matterare, why then should the puru@sa illuminate it and not externalmaterial objects. The answer that Sā@mkhya gives is that theknowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objectsin this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderanceof a special quality of plasticity and translucence (_sattva_), whichresembles the light of puru@sa, and is thus fit for reflecting andabsorbing the light of the puru@sa. The two principal characteristicsof external gross matter are mass and energy. But ithas also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographedby our mind; this thought-photograph of matter hasagain the special privilege of being so translucent as to be ableto catch the reflection of the _cit_--the super-translucent transcendentprinciple of intelligence. The fundamental characteristicof external gross matter is its mass; energy is common toboth gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass isat its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacityof translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as theintelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if thegross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence thatthought possesses, it could not have made itself an object ofthought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour, and other characteristics of the thing which has been made itsobject. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matterdid not possess some of the essential substances of which thecopy was made up. But this plastic entity (_sattva_) which isso predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordinationin matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but somesuch notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in

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thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, havemovement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The imagesdo not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucentand plastic element of thought (_sattva_) in association withmovement (_rajas_) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelationof all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction(_tamas_) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and disclosesthings in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff)holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness, and actual knowledge comes before our view as thoughby the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of thelight of the puru@sa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all itsstores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one pictureor idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstratesthat in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifestsitself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus boththought and gross matter are made up of three elements, aplasticity of intelligence-stuff (_sattva_), energy-stuff (_rajas_), andmass-stuff (_tamas_), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the lasttwo are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought. 

Feelings, the Ultimate Substances [Footnote ref 1]. 

Another question that arises in this connection is the positionof feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Sāmkhyaholds that the three characteristic constituents that we haveanalyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the mostinteresting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings thatwe think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If weshould analyze any percept into the crude and undevelopedsensations of which it is composed at the first moment of itsappearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, andwe find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image. Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act ofknowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower downthe scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations ofmatter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feelingwhich never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scaleof evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last therecomes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling

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[Footnote 1: _Kārikā_, 12, with Gau@dpāda and Nārāya@natīrtha. ]

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reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus markthe earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from thepoint of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness inordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certainstage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes ata certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes withmatter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and grossmatter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt intaking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which grossmatter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomedto take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we rememberthe Sā@mkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought andmatter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substanceswhich are in essence but three types of feeling entities. The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that wehave noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestationsof three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelingsthat we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings thatwe call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neithersorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression(_vi@sāda_) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types ofmanifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially asshining (_prakās'a_), energy (_prav@rtti_), obstruction (_niyama_), thereare three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded asthe ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of grossmatter and thought by their varying modifications. 

The Gu@nas [Footnote ref 1]. 

These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technicallycalled _gu@na_ in Sā@mkhya philosophy. Gu@na in Sanskrit has threemeanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. Theseentities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But itmay be mentioned in this connection that in Sā@mkhya philosophythere is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that eachand every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. Whatwe call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearanceof a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality

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[Footnote 1: _Yogavārttika_, II. 18; Bhāvāga@nes'a's_Tattvayāthārthyadīpana_, pp. 1-3; _Vijńānām@rtabhā@sya_, p. 100; _Tattvakaumudī_, 13; also Gau@dapāda and Nārāya@natīrtha, 13. ]

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signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts; anyobject we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Sā@mkhyaholds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality, however fine and subtle it may be, there is a correspondingsubtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as aquality. This is true not only of qualities of external objectsbut also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entitieswere thus called gu@nas probably to suggest that they are theentities which by their various modifications manifest themselvesas gu@nas or qualities. These subtle entities may also becalled gu@nas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropesby which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought andmatter. These may also be called gu@nas as things of secondaryimportance, because though permanent and indestructible, theycontinually suffer modifications and changes by their mutualgroupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterablyconstant like the souls (_puru@sa_). Moreover the object of theworld process being the enjoyment and salvation of the puru@sas, the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being ofprimary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclinedto justify the name gu@na as applied to these subtle entities, itshould be borne in mind that they are substantive entities orsubtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gu@nas areinfinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristicsas described above they have been arranged in three classes or typescalled _sattva_ (intelligence-stuff), _rajas_ (energy-stuff) and _tamas_(mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree incertain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the_sattva-gu@nas_ and those which behave as units of activity are calledthe _rajo-gu@nas_ and those which behave as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are called _tamo-gu@nas_. These subtle gu@nasubstances are united in different proportions (e. G. A larger numberof sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or alarger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas andsattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a resultof this, different substances with different qualities come into being. Though attached to one another when united in different proportions, they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combinedresultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There ishowever

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one and only one stage in which the gu@nas are not compoundedin varying proportions. In this state each of the gu@nasubstances is opposed by each of the other gu@na substances, andthus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, inwhich none of the characters of the gu@nas manifest themselves. This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristicsthat it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. Itis a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being whichis as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibriumof the gu@nas is called prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state whichcannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose, but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however theearliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modificationstake place. 

Prak@rti and its Evolution. 

Sā@mkhya believes that before this world came into being therewas such a state of dissolution--a state in which the gu@na compoundshad disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by theirmutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prak@rti. Thenlater on disturbance arose in the prak@rti, and as a result of that aprocess of unequal aggregation of the gu@nas in varying proportionstook place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold. Prak@rti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of thegu@nas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate, differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gu@nas arealways uniting, separating, and uniting again [Footnote ref 2]. Varyingqualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on oneanother and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolvefrom the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite orqualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to producethe world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendenciesnever coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energythere is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter, resistance, stability, is due to tamas, and all conscious manifestationto sattva. The particular gu@na which happens to be predominantin any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon andothers become latent, though their presence is inferred by their

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[Footnote 1: _Yogavārttika, _ II. 19, and _Pravacanabhā@sya, _ I. 61. ]

[Footnote 2: _Kaumudī_ 13-16; _Tattvavais'āradī_ II. 20, IV. 13, 14; also_Yogavārttika, _ IV. 13, 14. ]

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effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energylatent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In amoving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass ispartially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings ofthe gu@nas in different proportions presuppose the state of prak@rtias the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies toconscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, areexactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass, and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibriumis once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a naturalaffinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for otherreals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, therearises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at differentmoments. When one gu@na is preponderant in any particularcollocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary seriesbeginning from the first disturbance of the prak@rti to the finaltransformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite lawwhich it cannot overstep. " In the words of Dr B. N. Seal [Footnote ref 1], "the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated(_vai@samya_) within the undifferentiated (_sāmyāvasthā_) of thedeterminate (_vies'a_) within the indeterminate (_avis'esa_) of thecoherent (_yutasiddha_) within the incoherent (_ayutasiddha_). Theorder of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to theparts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole. " The meaning of suchan evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications inthe shape of the evolving collocations of gu@na reals take placewithin the body of the prak@rti. Prak@rti consisting of the infinitereals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does notmean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, orthat the totality of the gu@nas in the prak@rti has been unhingedfrom a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vastnumber of gu@nas constituting the worlds of thought and matterhas been upset. These gu@nas once thrown out of balance begin togroup themselves together first in one form, then in another, thenin another, and so on. But such a change in the formation ofaggregates should not be thought to take place in such a waythat the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist. 

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[Footnote 1: Dr B. N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, 1915, p. 7. ]

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For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; thissecond stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of thereals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the firststage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as thesecond stage is made good by a refilling from the prak@rti. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the realsof the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stageis made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of thefirst stage from the prak@rti. Thus by a succession of refillings theprocess of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, wherethere is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemicaland physical changes of qualities in things which had alreadyevolved. Evolution (_tattvāntarapari@nāma_) in Sā@mkhya means thedevelopment of categories of existence and not mere changes ofqualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanentcategory of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiatedand coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thusit is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiationof new stages as integrated in previous stages (_sa@ms@rstaviveka_). 

Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prak@rti Equilibrium. 

But how or rather why prak@rti should be disturbed is the mostknotty point in Sā@mkhya. It is postulated that the prak@rti or thesum-total of the gu@nas is so connected with the puru@sas, and thereis such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prak@rti, that all its evolution and transformations tike place for the sakeof the diverse puru@sas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures andsufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading themto absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold worldinto the quiescent state (_pralaya_) of prak@rti takes place when thekarmas of all puru@sas collectively require that there should besuch a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a momentthe gu@na compounds are gradually broken, and there is a backwardmovement (_pratisańcara_) till everything is reduced, to the gu@nas intheir elementary disintegrated state when their mutual oppositionbrings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not amere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intenseactivity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation ofnew things and qualities (_visad@rs'a-pari@nāma_); this course of new

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production being suspended, the activity here repeats the samestate (_sad@rs'a-pari@nāma_) of equilibrium, so that there is no changeor new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspensionof the teleology or purpose of the gu@nas, or an absolute break ofthe course of gu@na evolution; for the state of pralaya, since ithas been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulatedkarmas of puru@sas, and since there is still the activity of thegu@nas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production, is also a stage of the sa@msāra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation)is of course quite different, for in that stage the movementof the gu@nas ceases forever with reference to the liberated soul. But still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium?The Sā@mkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental(non-mechanical) influence of the puru@sa [Footnote ref 1]. Thisinfluence of the puru@sa again, if it means anything, means that thereis inherent in the gu@nas a teleology that all their movements ormodifications should take place in such a way that these may serve thepurposes of the puru@sas. Thus when the karmas of the puru@sas had demandedthat there should be a suspension of all experience, for a periodthere was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purposeof the prak@rti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitableworld for the experiences of the puru@sas by which its quiescentstate is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at theinherent teleology of the prak@rti, which demands that a state ofpralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity shouldbegin. Since there is a purpose in the gu@nas which broughtthem to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposesthat it also may be broken up again when the purposeso demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prak@rti broughtabout the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creativework again, and it is this natural change in the prak@rti that maybe regarded from another point of view as the transcendentalinfluence of the puru@sas. 

Mahat and Aha@mkāra. 

The first evolute of the prak@rti is generated by a preponderanceof the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest statefrom which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is astate in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds

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[Footnote 1: The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that thedisturbance of the equilibrium of prak@rti for new creation takes place bythe will of Īs'vara (God). ]

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within it the minds (_buddhi_) of all puru@sas which were lost in theprak@rti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolutionof prak@rti to serve the puru@sas is thus manifested by the separatingout of the old buddhis or minds (of the puru@sas) which hold withinthemselves the old specific ignorance (_avidyā_) inherent in themwith reference to each puru@sa with which any particular buddhiis associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. Thisstate of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi)or all the puru@sas is therefore called _buddhitattva. _ It is a statewhich holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals. The individual buddhis of individual puru@sas are on onehand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associatedwith their specific puru@sas. When some buddhis once begin tobe separated from the prak@rti, other buddhi evolutions takeplace. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformationof buddhis is effected for the service of the puru@sas, all the other direct transformations that take place from theprak@rti take the same line, i. E. A preponderance of sattva beingonce created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformationsof prak@rti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as thefirst buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prak@rti becomesbuddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regardedas the most universal stage, which comprehends within itall the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter ofwhich the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point ofview it has the widest and most universal existence comprisingall creation, and is thus called _mahat_ (the great one). It is called_li@nga_ (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us theground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguishedfrom the prak@rti which is called _ali@nga, _ i. E. Of which noli@nga or characterise may be affirmed. 

This mahat-tatva being once produced, further modificationsbegin to take place in three lines by three different kinds ofundulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderanceand tama preponderance. This state when the mahatis disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance oftamas, rajas and sattva's called _aha@mkāra, _ and the above threetendencies are respectiviy called _tāmasika aha@mkāra_ or _bhūtādi_, _rājasika_ or _taijasa aha@māra, _ and _vaikārika aha@mkāra. _ The rājasikaaha@mkāra cannot make a new preponderance by itself; it only

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helps (_sahakāri_) the transformations of the sattva preponderanceand the tamas preponderance. The development of the formerpreponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a moreand more determinate character of the buddhi, for we rememberthat buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattvapreponderance. Further development with the help of rajas onthe line of sattva development could only take place when thebuddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The firstdevelopment of the buddhi on this line is called _sāttvika_ or _vaikārikaaha@mkāra_. This aha@mkāra represents the developmentin buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine, "and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi thefunction of which is a mere understanding and general datun asthisness. 

The ego or aha@mkāra (_abhimāna-dravya_) is the specific expressionof the general consciousness which takes experience as mine. The function of the ego is therefore called _abhimāna_ (self-assertion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision, touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five cognitive senses of speech, handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generativesense; the _prā@nas_ (bio-motor force) which help both conation andcognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individualaha@mkāras and senses are related to the individual buddhisby the developing sattva determinations from which they had comeinto being. Each buddhi with its own group of aka@mkāra (ego)and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similarother buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore asknowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is differentfor each individual, but so far as a general mind (_kāra@na buddhi_)apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community ofall buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhiis separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associatedignorance (_avidyā_). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of aha@mkāraand the senses are so related that though they are differentfrom buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in thebuddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. Wemust again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling, for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to aha@mkāra, the deficiencyof buddhi is made good by prak@rti; again as aha@mkārapartially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the deficiency

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is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus thechange and wastage of each of the stadia are always made goodand kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher stateand finally from prak@rti. 

The Tanmātras and the Paramā@nus [Footnote ref 1]. 

The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helpedby the liberated rajas of aha@mkāra, in order to make itself preponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcomingthe sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, is called _bhūtādi. _ From this bhūtādi with the help of rajas aregenerated the _tanmātras, _ the immediately preceding causes of thegross elements. The bhūtādi thus represents only the intermediatestage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamasreals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmātras. There has been some controversy between Sā@mkhya and Yogaas to whether the tanmātras are generated from the mahat or fromaha@mkāra. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember thatevolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasingdifferentiation in integration within the evolving whole. Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiationwhich takes place within the mahat but through its stage asbhūtādi. Bhūtādi is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoidof all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass. The second stadium tanmātra represents subtle matter, vibratory, impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "potentials"arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-unitsin different proportions and collocations with an unequal distributionof the original energy (_rajas_). The tanmātras possess somethingmore than quantum of mass and energy; they possessphysical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers ofimpact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability ofviscous and cohesive attraction [Footnote ref. 2]. 

In intimate relation with those physical characters they alsopossess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid

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[Footnote 1: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of thetranslations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largelyindebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as givenin Ray's _Hindu Chemistry. _ The credit of explaining Sā@mkhya physics, in the light of the text belongs entirely to him. ]

[Footnote 2: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_. ]

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of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particlesof gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In otherwords, the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiartransformations by new groupings or collocations before they canact as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutestparticles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (_atīndriya_but not _anudbhūta_) [Footnote ref 1]. 

Of the tanmatras the _s'abda_ or _ākās'a tanmātra_ (the sound-potential)is first generated directly from the bhūtādi. Nextcomes the _spars'a_ or the _vāyu tanmātra_ (touch-potential) which isgenerated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhūtādi with theākās'a tanmātra. The _rūpa tanmātra_ (colour-potential) is generatedsimilarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhūtādi; the_rasa tanmātra_ (taste-potential) or the _ap tunmātra_ is also similarlyformed. This ap tanmātra again by its union with a unit of tamasfrom bhūtādi produces the _gāndha tanmātra_ (smell-potential) orthe _k@siti tanmātra_ [Footnote ref 2]. The difference of tanmātras orinfra-atomic units and atoms (_paramā@nu_) is this, that the tanmātrashave only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must begrouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existenceas atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses. It is important in this connection to point out that the classificationof all gross objects as k@siti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman isnot based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of viewof the five senses through which knowledge of them could bebrought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend aparticular quality and thus five different ultimate substances aresaid to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may begrasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence ofthese five elements, the existence of the five potential states ortanmātras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the fivegross forms. 

The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmātras asfollows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matterfrom bhūtādi generates the ākāsa-atom. The touch-potentials combinewith the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the

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[Footnote 1: Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_. ]

[Footnote 2: There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmātras andatoms were explained in literatures other than Sā@mkhya; for some accountof it see Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_. ]

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vāyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentialsand sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. Thetaste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentialsand sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and thesmell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generatethe earth-atom. The ākās'a-atom possesses penetrability, the vāyu-atomimpact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heatand light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atomcohesive attraction. The ākāsa we have seen forms the transitionlink from the bhūtādi to the tanmātra and from the tanmātra tothe atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice atthis stage. Sā@mkhya distinguishes between a kāra@na-ākās'a andkāryākās'a. The kāra@na-ākās'a (non-atomic and all-pervasive)is the formless tamas--the mass in prak@rti or bhūtādi; it isindeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness(_āvara@nābhāva_) or vacuum [Footnote ref 1]. When energy is firstassociated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential;the atomic ākās'a is the result of the integration of theoriginal mass-units from bhūtādi with this sound-potential (_s'abdatanmātra_). Such an ākās'a-atom is called the kāryākās'a; it isformed everywhere and held up in the original kāra@na ākās'a asthe medium for the development of vāyu atoms. Being atomicit occupies limited space. 

The aha@mkāra and the five tanmātras are technically called_avis'e@sa_ or indeterminate, for further determinations ordifferentiations of them for the formation of newer categories ofexistence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called_vis'e@sa, _ i. E. Determinate, for they cannot further be so determinedas to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the courseof evolution which started in the prak@rti reaches its furthest limitin the production of the senses on the one side and the atomson the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies havingatomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality dueto spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introductionof new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these arenot such that a newer category of existence could be formed bythem which was substantially different from the combined atoms. 

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[Footnote 1: Dr B. N. Seal in describing this ākās'a says "Ākās'acorresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists andin others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle). " Ray's _Historyof Hindu Chemistry_, p. 88. ]

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The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of thingscertainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, itwill be better to enquire about the principle of causation accordingto which the Sā@mkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehendedor interpreted. 

Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy [Footnote ref 1]. 

The question is raised, how can the prak@rti supply the deficienciesmade in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutesfrom them? When from mahat some tanmātras have evolved, orwhen from the tanmātras some atoms have evolved, how can thedeficiency in mahat and the tanmātras be made good by theprak@rti?

Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformationsthat take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? Sā@mkhya says that "as the totalenergy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the sameultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causesin a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of thegu@nas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the(material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the productionor rather the vehicle of the power. This power is theunmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (_udbhūta-v@rtti_)in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessaryto call forth the so-called material cause into activity [Footnote ref 2]. "The appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figureof the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of thesculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actualityand the concomitant conditions (_sahakāri-s'akti_) or efficient cause(_nimitta-kāra@na_, such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanicalhelp or instrumental help to this passage or the transition [Footnote ref3]. The refilling from prak@rti thus means nothing more than this, thatby the inherent teleology of the prak@rti, the reals there are socollocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahathave been collocated to form the bhūtādi or the tanmātras. 

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[Footnote 1: _Vyāsabhā@sya_ and _Yogavārttika_, IV. 3; _Tattvavais'āradī_, IV. 3. ]

[Footnote 2: Ray, _History of Hindu Chemistry_, p. 72. ]

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _ p. 73. ]

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Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis oftransformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum ofmaterial causes potentially contains the energy manifested in thesum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to thesum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happensis that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbsthe relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation ofenergy together with a fresh collocation(_gu@nasannives'avis'e@sa_). As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from onefield to another of the same or lower level has only to removethe obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itselfto the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes(such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in anycollocation against its transformation into any other collocation, the energy from that collocation flows out in a correspondingmanner and determines the collocation. Thus for example theenergy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in astate of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes thisbarrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in acorresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly forthe formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removedfrom the prak@rti, guided by the constant will of Īs'vara, the realsin equilibrium in the state of prak@rti leave their state of arrestand evolve themselves into mahat, etc. 

Change as the formation of new collocations. 

It is easy to see from what we have already said that anycollocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of thepresent collocation could be removed by some other extraneousinstrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocationof the five atoms of k@siti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. Thedifference between one thing and another is simply this, that itscollocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atomsis different from that in another. The formation of a collocationhas an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps thatcollocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see thatthese barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the otherinfinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrieris removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the

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formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barrierscould be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing. And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers bywhich they can remove any barriers, and thus make anything out ofany other thing. But generally in the normal course of events theline of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be overstepped"(_pari@nāmakramaniyama_) or in other words there aresome natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus theevolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of thoselines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron growsin countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation ofcountries (_des'āpabandha_); certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainyseason only, this is limitation of season or time (_kālāpabandha_);deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (_ākārāpabandha_);curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes(_nimittāpabandha_). The evolutionary course can thus follow only thatpath which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or naturalobstructions [Footnote ref 1]. 

Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and leastto the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating andchanging places in any and every object. At each moment thewhole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atomsat any moment is different from what it was at the previousmoment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceivedas _dharmapari@nāma_ or changes of _dharma_ or quality; but perceivedor unperceived the changes are continually going on. Thischange of appearance may be viewed from another aspect byvirtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new, and these are respectively called the _lak@sa@napari@nāma_ and_avasthāpari@nāma_. At every moment every object of the world isundergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future, as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential statewe call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latentagain it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential, manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future, present and past [Footnote ref 2]. 

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[Footnote 1: _Vyāsabhā@sya, Tattvavais'āradī_ and _Yogavārttika, _ III. 14. ]

[Footnote 2: It is well to note in this connection that Sā@mkhya-yoga doesnot admit the existence of time as an independent entity like theNyāya-Vais'e@sika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mindgrasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind(_buddhi-nirmā@na_). The time required by an atom to move its own measureof space is called a moment (_k@sa@na_) or one unit of time. VijńānaBhik@su regards one unit movement of the gu@nas or reals as a moment. Whenby true wisdom the gu@nas are perceived as they are both the illusorynotions of time and space vanish. _Vyāsabhā@sya, Tattvavais'āradī_, and_Yogavārttika_, III. 52 and III. 13. ]

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Causation as Satkāryavāda (the theory that the effect potentiallyexists before it is generated by the movement of the cause). 

The above consideration brings us to an important aspect ofthe Sā@mkhya view of causation as _satkāryavāda_. Sā@mkhya holdsthat there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent;causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality dueto certain changes of collocations in the causes which were alreadyheld in them in a potential form. Production of effect only meansan internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, andthis exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening ofthe barrier which was standing in the way of the happening ofsuch a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation--theeffect. This doctrine is called _satkāryavāda, _ i. E. That the kārya or effect is _sat_ or existent even before the causaloperation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists inthe sesarnum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk, Thecausal operation (_kārakaiyāpāra_) only renders that manifest(_āvirbhūta_) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition(_tirohita_) [Footnote ref 1]. 

The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Sā@mkhyadid, but with them there was no background to the change;every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it waspast, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. Therewere only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms andqualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance. Sā@mkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas, but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditionsof the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the realschange constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable. The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it cameinto being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theoryof causation and also on account of their doctrine of s'ūnya, theywere called _vainās'ikas_ (nihilists) by the Vedāntins. This doctrineis therefore contrasted to Sā@mkhya doctrine as _asatkāryavāda. _

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[Footnote 1: _Tattvakaumudī, _ 9. ]

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The jain view holds that both these views are relatively true andthat from one point of view satkāryavāda is true and from anotherasatkāryavāda. The Sā@mkhya view that the cause is continuallytransforming itself into its effects is technically called _pari@nāmavāda_as against the Vedānta view called the _vivarttavāda_: thatcause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are butillusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form--mereMaya [Footnote ref. 1]. 

Sā@mkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism. 

Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinitenumber of reals produce all the world and its transformations;whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order ofcause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers whichprevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or thefirst disturbance of the equilibrium of the prak@rti? Sā@mkhyadenies the existence of Īs'vara (God) or any other exterior influence, and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals whichguides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demandsthat the movements of the reals should be in such a manner thatthey may render some service to the souls either in the directionof enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such atendency that prak@rti is disturbed, and the gu@nas develop on twolines--on the mental plane, _citta_ or mind comprising the sensefaculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it isin fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the onehand take place subjective experiences as the changes of thebuddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objectivethings. It is this tendency to be of service to the puru@sas(_puru@sārthatā_) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrainsall disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, andfinally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attainliberation from the association of prak@rti and its gratuitous service, which causes us all this trouble of sa@msāra. 

Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent

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[Footnote 1: Both the Vedānta and the Sā@mkhya theories of causation aresometimes loosely called _satkāryyavāda. _ But correctly speaking as somediscerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedānta theory of causationshould be called satkāra@navāda for according to it the _kāra@na_ (cause)alone exists (_sat_) and all _kāryyas, _ (effects) are illusory appearancesof the kāra@na; but according to Sā@mkhya the kāryya exists ina potential state in the kāra@na and is hence always existing and real. ]

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prak@rti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the bestservice to the puru@sas, how can it remove its own barriers andlend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prak@rtiequilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate theevolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according totheir bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones?There must be some intelligent Being who should help the courseof evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmonymay be attained. This Being is Īs'vara. Īs'vara is a puru@sa whohad never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. Hisbody is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched byignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanentwish that those barriers in the course of the evolution ofthe reals by which the evolution of the gu@nas may best serve thedouble interest of the puru@sa's experience (_bhoga_) and liberation(_apavarga_) should be removed. It is according to this permanentwill of Īs'vara that the proper barriers are removed and thegu@nas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for theservice of the best interests of the puru@sas. Īs'vara has not createdthe prak@rti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prak@rti in itsquiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent orderby which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the orderof the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of Īs'varain Yoga and its denial by Sā@mkhya marks the main theoreticdifference between the two according to which the Yoga andSā@mkhya are distinguished as Ses'vara Sā@mkhya (Sā@mkhya withĪs'vara) and Nirīs'vara Sā@mkhya (Atheistic Sā@mkhya) [Footnote ref 1]. 

Buddhi and Puru@sa. 

The question again arises that though puru@sa is pure intelligence, the gu@nas are non-intelligent subtle substances, howcan the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover, the puru@sa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch ofimpurity and what service or need can such a puru@sa have ofthe gu@nas? This difficulty is anticipated by Sā@mkhya, which hasalready made room for its answer by assuming that one class ofthe gu@nas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity andthe intelligence of the puru@sa to a very high degree, so much so

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[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'āradī, _ IV. 3; _Yogavārttika, _ I. 24; and_Pravavanabhāsya, _ V. 1-12. ]

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that it can reflect the intelligence of the puru@sa, and thus renderits non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent. Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitionaloperations are really the non-intelligent transformations of thebuddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtueof the reflection of the puru@sa in the buddhi, these appear as ifthey are intelligent. The self (puru@sa) according to Sā@mkhya-Yogais not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Itsexistence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds andgrounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directlynoticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Throughbeginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changingstates of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changesare further so associated with the reflection of the puru@sa in thebuddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the puru@sa. This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the puru@sain the buddhi has such a special fitness (_yogyatā_) that it is interpretedas the experience of the puru@sa. This explanation ofVācaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijńāna Bhik@su. Vijńāna Bhik@su says that the association of the buddhi with theimage of the puru@sa cannot give us the notion of a real personwho undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed thereforethat when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the puru@sa, it is then superimposed upon the puru@sa, and we have the notionof an abiding person who experiences [Footnote ref 1]. Whatever may be theexplanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the puru@sais somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of _cit_ onbuddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the puru@sa cannotrealize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own. Buddhi resembles puru@sa in transparency, and the puru@sa fails todifferentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and asa result of this non-distinction the puru@sa becomes bound downto the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that thebuddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinctionof puru@sa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhiis what is meant by _avidyā_ (non-knowledge) in Sā@mkhya, and isthe root of all experience and all misery [Footnote ref 2]. 

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[Footnote 1: _Tattvavais'āradī_ and _Yogavārttika_, I. 4. ]

[Footnote 2: This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion withSā@mkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things(e. G. The snake and the rope) that is the cause of illusion; it istherefore called the _akhyāti_ (non-apprehension) theory of illusionwhich must be distinguished from the _anyathākhyāti_ (misapprehension)theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehendingone (e. G. The rope) for the other (e. G. Snake). _Yogavārttika, _ I. 8. ]

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Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that thepuru@sa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itselfand the buddhi but positively takes the transformations ofbuddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the differencebut positively false knowledge, that we take the puru@sa to bethat which it is not (_anyathākhyāti_). It takes the changing, impure, sorrowful, and objective prak@rti or buddhi to be thechangeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinksbuddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent andcapable of giving us happiness. This is the avidyā of Yoga. A buddhi associated with a puru@sa is dominated by such anavidyā, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associatedwith the same puru@sa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidyā. If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submergedin the prak@rti, and the avidyā also sleeps with it. When at thebeginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associatedwith the puru@sas emerge, the old avidyās also become manifestby virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with thepuru@sas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thusproceeds the course of sa@msāra. When the avidyā of a personis rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails toattach itself to the puru@sa and is forever dissociated from it, andthis is the state of mukti. 

The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta. 

It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects haveevolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the puru@sa. What is the process of this experience? Sā@mkhya (as explainedby Vācaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comesinto touch with external objects. At the first moment of thistouch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particularsof the thing cannot be noticed. This is called _nirvikalpapratyak@sa_ (indeterminate perception). At the next moment bythe function of the _sa@mkalpa_ (synthesis) and _vikalpa_ (abstractionor imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived inall its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates, and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and

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thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligizedby the puru@sa and associated with it becomes interpreted as theexperience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamkāra, and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at othertimes as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijńāna Bhik@sudiffers from this view of Vācaspati, and denies the syntheticactivity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhidirectly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate, but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate [Footnote ref 1]. It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reducedto a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination. 

Buddhi, including ahamkāra and the senses, often called _citta_in Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flameof a lamp, it is made up of a large preponderance of the puresattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one contentto another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhiand puru@sa are constantly becoming conscious, and are beinginterpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of thepuru@sa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination ofconsciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour. The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by itsfunctions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Sā@mkhyadoes not admit any separate prana vāyu (vital breath) to keep thebody living. What are called _vāyus_ (bio-motor force) in Vedāntaare but the different modes of operation of this category ofbuddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movementsperforms the life-functions and sense-functions of the body. 

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[Footnote 1: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takesplace through the senses, the sense data of colours, etc. , are modifiedby the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things arehowever perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a schemeof the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the externalobjects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which theyare reflected, like trees in a lake

 "_tasmims'ca darpane sphāre samasta vastudrstayah imāstāh pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadrumāh_" _Yogavarttika_, I. 4. 

The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it bythe senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to theexternal objects and assumes their forms: "_indriyānyeva pranālikācittasancaranamargah taih samyujya tadgola kadvārā bāhyavastusūparaktasyacittasyendryasahityenaivārthakarah parināmo bhavati_" _Yogavārttika_, I. VI. 7. Contrast _Tattvakaumudī_, 27 and 30. ]

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Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, orrather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions(_sa@mskāras_) and the tastes and instincts or tendenciesof all past lives (_vāsanā_) [Footnote ref 1]. These sa@mskāras are revivedunder suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of birthsin their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives thesame citta was always following him. The citta has thus collectedwithin itself the instincts and tendencies of all those differentanimal lives. It is knotted with these vāsanās like a net. If a manpasses into a dog life by rebirth, the vāsanās of a dog life, whichthe man must have had in some of his previous infinite number ofbirths, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those ofa dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomesattached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revivalof the vāsanā suitable to each particular birth that there cannot beany collision such as might have occurred if the instincts andtendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one wasborn as man. 

The sa@mskāras represent the root impressions by which anyhabit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure inwhich he took delight for some time, or any passions which were

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[Footnote 1: The word sa@mskāra is used by Pā@nini who probably precededBuddha in three different senses (1) improving a thing as distinguishedfrom generating a new quality (_Sata utkar@sādhāna@m sa@mskāra@h_, Kās'ilaon Pā@nini, VI. Ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and(3) adornment (Pā@nini, VI. I. 137, 138). In the Pi@takas the wordsa@nkhāra is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas(collected by Childers). In fact sa@nkhāra stands for almost anythingof which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so manydiversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning ofaggregation (_samavāya_ of Pā@nini) is prominent. The word _sa@mskaroti_is used in Kau@sītaki, II. 6, Chāndogya IV. Xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, andB@rhadāra@nyaka, VI. Iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yetcome across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. Themeaning of sa@mskāra in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It meansthe impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objectsexperienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conativeexist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions bereproduced as memory (sm@rti). The word vāsanā (_Yoga sūtra_, IV. 24)seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanis@sads do not mention it andso far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pāli pi@takas. _Abhidhānappadīpikā_ of Moggallāna mentions it, and it occurs inthe Muktika Upani@sad. It comes from the root "_vas_" to stay. It isoften loosely used in the sense of sa@mskāra, and in _Vyāsabhā@sya_ theyare identified in IV. 9. But vāsanā generally refers to the tendencies ofpast lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear whichcan find scope in this life. But sa@mskāras are the sub-conscious stateswhich are being constantly generated by experience. Vāsanās are innatesa@mskāras not acquired in this life. See _Vyāsabhā@sya, Tattvāvais'āradī_and _Yogavārttika_, II. 13. ]

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engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these mightnot now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experiencedbefore has so moulded and given shape to the citta that thecitta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even withoutany such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival ofany undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that itsroots as already left in the citta in the form of sa@mskāras shouldbe eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrarytendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its ownsa@mskāra naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirablesa@mskāras. 

Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (ce@s@tā)by which the conative senses are brought into relation to theirobjects. There is also the reserved potent power (s'akti) of citta, by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continueto persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involvedin the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yogamethod of practice, which consists in steadying a particular stateof mind to the exclusion of others. 

Merit or demerit (_pu@nya, pāpa_) also is imbedded in the cittaas its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, andgiving pleasures and pains in accordance with it. 

Sorrow and its Dissolution [Footnote ref 1]. 

Sā@mkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that allexperience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the painsubstance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations, all intellectual operations are fraught with some degreeof painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure, we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicitedit, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have thefear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus muchgreater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen thekeenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is hiscapacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all fullof sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth thatall is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated byordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiencesthrough the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to

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[Footnote 1: Tattavais'āradī and Yogavārttika, II. 15, and Tattvakaumudī, I. ]

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eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti orthe final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasureslead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removingsorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately;he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on thepleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices accordingto the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involvethe sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence alsosome pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regardedas desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasuresthat he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow. Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes, what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it isuprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns tophilosophy to find out the means of doing it. 

The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practicalenquiry of the Sā@mkhya philosophy [Footnote ref 1]. All experiences aresorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiencesmay be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for afterdeath we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and puru@saare associated with each other, the sufferings will continue. Citta must be dissociated from puru@sa. Citta or buddhi, Sā@mkhyasays, is associated with puru@sa because of the non-distinctionof itself from buddhi [Footnote ref 2]. It is necessary therefore that inbuddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of thenature of puru@sa; when this true conception of puru@sa arises inthe buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, fromand quite unrelated to puru@sa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. Asa result of that, buddhi turns its back on puru@sa and can nolonger bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connectedwith sorrow, and thus the puru@sa remains in its trueform. This according to Sā@mkhya philosophy is alone adequateto being about the liberation of the puru@sa. Prak@rti which wasleading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfilsits final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating

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[Footnote 1: Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is thecessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow{_du@hkhabahla@h sa@msārah heya@h_). ]

[Footnote 2: The word _citta_ is a Yoga term. It is so called because it isthe repository of all sub-conscious states. Sāmkhyn generally uses, theword buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but theyemphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection. ]

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puru@sa from prak@rti. This final purpose being attained theprak@rti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whomthis right knowledge was generated; for other puru@sas howeverthe bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiencesfrom one birth to another in an endless cycle. 

Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient. In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a trueknowledge differentiating puru@sa and buddhi should arise, but itis necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, allits samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revivedagain. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its pureststate, reflecting steadily the true nature of the puru@sa. This isthe _kevala_ (oneness) state of existence after which (all sa@mskāras, all avidyā being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent anylonger to hold on to the puru@sa, and like a stone hurled from amountain top, gravitates back into the prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. Todestroy the old sa@mskāras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, agraduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice shouldbe so arranged that by generating the practice of living higherand better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtlerstates, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yoginadvances he has to give up what he had adopted as good andtry for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches thestate when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity. At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the puru@sa, andfinal liberation takes place. 

Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (1) _s'ukla_ orwhite (_pu@nya_, those that produce happiness), (2) _k@r@s@na_ or black(_pāpa_, those that produce sorrow), (3) _s'ukla-k@r@s@na_ (_pu@nya-pāpa_, most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly viciousas they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of manyinsects), (4) _as'uklāk@r@s@na_ (those inner acts of self-abnegation, andmeditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains). All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in theworld and avoid taking the lives of insects [Footnote ref 2]. All karmas

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[Footnote 1: Both Sā@mkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state a_Kaivalya_ (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have beenabsolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because atthis state puru@sa remains for ever alone without any associationwith buddhi, see _Sā@mkhya kārikā_, 68 and _Yoga sūtras_, IV. 34. ]

[Footnote 2: _Vyāsabhā@sya_ and _Tattvavais'āradī_, IV. 7. ]

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proceed from the five-fold afflictions (_kles'as_), namely _avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dve@sa_ and _abhinives'a_. 

We have already noticed what was meant by avidyā. It consistsgenerally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking itas permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledgewhile remaining in this form further manifests itself in the otherfour forms of asmitā, etc. Asmitā means the thinking of worldlyobjects and our experiences as really belonging to us--thesense of "mine" or "I" to things that really are the qualities ortransformations of the gu@nas. Rāga means the consequent attachmentto pleasures and things. Dve@sa means aversion or antipathyto unpleasant things. Abhinives'a is the desire for life or love oflife--the will to be. We proceed to work because we think ourexperiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our familyto be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we areattached to these; because we feel great antipathy against anymischief that might befall them, and also because we love ourlife and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These allproceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidyā, which consistsin the false identification of buddhi with puru@sa. These five, avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dve@sa and abhinives'a, permeate our buddhi, and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These togetherwith the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi asa particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birthto birth, and it is hard to get rid of them [Footnote ref 1]. The karma inthe aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification ofit is called _karmās'aya_. (the bed of karma for the puru@sa to lie in). We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (_kles'a_) ofthe buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain ormodification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to theteleology of the prak@rti and the removal of obstacles in the courseof its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will ofĪs'vara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuousone pleasure. 

The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, sucha life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready forhim according to the evolution of prak@rti as shall make it possiblefor him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the

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[Footnote 1: _Vyāsabhā@sya_ and _Tattvavais'āradī_, II. 3-9. ]

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present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth(as this or that animal or man), the period of life (_āyu@s_) and thepainful or pleasurable experiences (_bhoga_) destined for that life. Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often producetheir effects in this life. It may also happen that a man hasdone certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of whichhe requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of whichhe requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remainin abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life firstand then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his goodactions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions, all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannotagain be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of thosekarmas which have already ripened. This is the _jīvanmukti_ stage, when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet sufferingmundane life in order to experience the karmas that have alreadyripened (_ti@s@thati sa@mskāravas'āt cakrabhramivaddh@rtas'arīra@h_). 

Citta. 

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literaturein the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patańjali inhis _Yoga sūtra_ in the sense of the partial or full restraint orsteadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration maybe brought about by violent passions, as when fighting againsta mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct. The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called_k@sipta_ (wild) and of the latter type _pramū@dha_ (ignorant). Thereis another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in whichconcentration is only possible for a time, the mind remainingsteady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings toanother thing and so on. This is called the _vik@sipta_ (unsteady)stage of mind (_cittabhūmi_). As distinguished from these there isan advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily onan object for a long time. This is the _ekāgra_ (one-pointed) stage. There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processesare absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti, and is called the _nirodha_ (cessation) state of citta. The purpose ofYoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta. 

The cittas have five processes (_v@rtti_), (1) _pramā@na_ [Footnote ref 1](valid

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[Footnote 1: Sā@mkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of anycognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not oncorrespondence with external facts or objects (_svata@h prāmā@nya@msvata@h aprāmā@nya@m_). The contribution of Sā@mkhya to the doctrineof inference is not definitely known. What little Vācaspati says on thesubject has been borrowed from Vātsyāyana such as the _pūrvavat, s'e@savat_and _sāmānyatodr@s@ta_ types of inference, and these may better beconsulted in our chapter on Nyāya or in the Tātparya@tīkā_ of Vācaspati. Sā@mkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on theground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kindsof inference "_mātrānimittasa@myogivirodhisahacāribhi@h. Svasvāmibadhyaghātādyai@h sā@mkhyānā@m saptadhānumā_" (_Tātparya@tīkā_, p. 109). Sā@mkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I. I. V) is"_sambandhādekasmāt pratyak@sacche@sasiddhiranumānam_. "]

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cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inferenceand scriptural testimony), (2) _viparyaya_ (false knowledge, illusion, etc. ), (3) _vikalpa_ (abstraction, construction and different kinds ofimagination), (4) _nidrā_ (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in whichtamas tends to predominate), (5) _sm@rti_ (memory). 

These states of mind (_v@rtti_) comprise our inner experience. When they lead us towards sā@msara into the course of passionsand their satisfactions, they are said to be _kli@s@ta_ (afflicted orleading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, theyare called _akli@s@ta_ (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towardssa@msara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states ofmind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states, and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation)must be regarded as good. 

This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta, that it sometimes tends towards good (i. E. Liberation) and sometimestowards bad (sā@msara). It is like a river, as the _Vyāsabhā@syasays, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards thegood. The teleology of prak@rti requires that it should producein man the sā@msara as well as the liberation tendency. 

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughtsand bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also badthoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is thereforenever lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which isas strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is ratherremarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and showsthat our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonisticattraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by aninnate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation[Footnote ref 1]. Removal of pains

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[Footnote 1: Sā@mkhya however makes the absolute and complete destructionof three kinds of sorrows, _ādhyātmika_ (generated internally by theillness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind), _ādhibhautika_ (generated externally by the injuries inflicted byother men, beasts, etc. ) and _ādhidaivika_ (generated by the injuriesinflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours(_puru@sārtha_). ]

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is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, butstill the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistibletendency of the mind. Man has power (_s'akti_) stored up in hiscitta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency maygradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot theother. He must succeed in this, since prak@rti wants liberation forher final realization [Footnote ref 1]. 

Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma). 

The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind onthe gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation, so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and moreweakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mindcan be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it shouldbe purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yoginshould practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (_ahi@msā_), absolute and strict truthfulness (_satya_), non-stealing (_asteya_), absolute sexual restraint (_brahmacarya_) and the acceptance ofnothing but that which is absolutely necessary (_aparigraha_). These are collectively called _yama_. Again side by side with theseabstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutionsand inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, thehabit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping thebody unmoved and remaining silent in speech (_tapas_), the studyof philosophy (_svādhyāya_) and meditation on Īs'vara(_Īs'varapra@nidhāna_). These are collectively called _niyamas_. To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as_pratipak@sa-bhāvanā, maitrī, karu@nā, muditā_ and _upek@sā_. Pratipak@sa-bhāvanā means that whenever a bad thought (e. G. Selfishmotive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought(self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope. Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relationswith our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mereabstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one shouldhabituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations withour fellow-beings. The practice of maitrī means to think ofall beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves tothink this, we can never be displeased with them. So too oneshould practise karu@nā or kindly feeling for sufferers, muditā

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[Footnote 1: See my "_Yoga Psychology_, " _Quest_, October, 1921. ]

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or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upek@sāor a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any noteof the vices of vicious men. 

When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures(_vairāgya_) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performancesof Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its drossand made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin mayattain liberation by a constant practice (_abhyāsa_) attended withfaith, confidence (_s'raddhā_), strength of purpose and execution(_vīrya_) arid wisdom (_prajńā_) attained at each advance. 

The Yoga Meditation. 

When the mind has become pure the chances of its beingruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At sucha stage the yogin takes a firm posture (_āsana_) and fixes his mindon any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he shouldfix it on Īs'vara, for in that case Īs'vara being pleased removesmany of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier forhim to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice, and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration(_samādhi_) of his mind. There are four states of this unifyingconcentration namely _vitarka, vicāra, ānanda_ and _asmitā_. Ofthese vitarka and vicāra have each two varieties, _savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra, nirvicāra_ [Footnote ref 1]. When the mind concentrates onobjects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarkastage; when on the five tanmātras with a remembrance of theirqualities it is called savicāra, and when it is one with the tanmātraswithout any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicāra. Higher than these are the ānanda and the asmitā states. In theānanda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functionsof the senses causing pleasure. In the asmitā stage buddhiconcentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications. In all these stages there are objects on which the mindconsciously concentrates, these are therefore called the _samprajńāta_(with knowledge of objects) types of samādhi. Next to this comesthe last stage of samādhi called the _asamprajńāta_ or nirodhasamādhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining

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[Footnote 1: Vācaspati, however, thinks that ānanda and asmitā have alsotwo other varieties, which is denied by Bhik@su. ]

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long in this stage the old potencies (sa@mskāras) or impressionsdue to the continued experience of worldly events tending towardsthe objective world or towards any process of experiencing innerthinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of thenirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when thebuddhi becomes as pure as the puru@sa, and after that the citta notbeing able to bind the puru@sa any longer returns back to prak@rti. 

In order to practise this concentration one has to see thatthere may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select aquiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstaclesis, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. Thishas to be stopped by the practice of _prā@nāyāma_. Prā@nāyāmaconsists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and thengiving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily forhours, days, months and even years. When there is no needof taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retainedsteady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed. 

The process of practising concentration is begun by sittingin a steady posture, holding the breath by prā@nāyāma, excludingall other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (_dhāra@nā_). At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the samethought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called_dhyāna. _ After sufficient practice in dhyāna the mind attains thepower of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes onewith its object and there is no change or repetition. There isno consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mindbecomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called_samādhi_ [Footnote ref 1]. We have already described the six stages ofsamādhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samādhi, he passeson to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwardshe attains miraculous powers (_vibhūti_) and his faith and hopein the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with themmany temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and eventhough the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax. His wisdom (_prajńā_) also increases at each step. Prajńā knowledgeis as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to

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[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the word _samādhi_ cannot properly betranslated either by "concentration" or by "meditation. " It means thatpeculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomesone with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passingstates. ]

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certain gross things and certain gross qualities [Footnote ref 1] prajńāhas no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, thetanmātras, the gu@nas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all theirsubtle conditions and qualities [Footnote ref 2]. As the potencies(_sa@mskāra_) of the prajńā wisdom grow in strength the potencies ofordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remainalways in his prajńā wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajńā thatit leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to sa@msāra. The final prajńās which lead to liberation are of seven kinds, namely, (1) I have known the world, the object of suffering andmisery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds androots of sa@msāra have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing moreof it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact ofdirect cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledgein the shape of a discrimination of puru@sa from prak@rti has beenunderstood. The other three are not psychological but are rathermetaphysical processes associated with the situation. They areas follows: (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience andemancipation (_bhoga_ and _apavarga_) has been realized. (6) Thestrong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gu@nas drivesthem into prak@rti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops. (7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gu@nasbecome merged in the prak@rti and remain there for ever. Thepuru@sa having passed beyond the bondage of the gu@nas shinesforth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness inthis Sā@mkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prak@rti. Itis thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Sā@mkhya tries toachieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfecteddiscipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states. 

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[Footnote 1: The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the_Kārikā_ as follows: Extreme remoteness (e. G. A lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e. G. Collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ(e. G. A blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object(e. G. Atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e. G. Bywalls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e. G. Water throwninto a lake). ]

[Footnote 2: Though all things are but the modifications of gu@nas yet thereal nature of the gu@nas is never revealed by the sense knowledge. Whatappears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic(māyā):

 "_Gunānā@m parama@m rūpam na d@r@s@tipatham@rcchati Yattu d@rs@tipatham prāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakam. _"

 _Vyāsabhā@sya_, IV. 13. 

The real nature of the gu@nas is thus revealed only by _prajńā. _]

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CHAPTER VIII

THE NYĀYA-VAIS'E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY

Criticism of Buddhism and Sā@mkhya from theNyāya standpoint. 

The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions ofsubstance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence ofthings, on the ground that all collocations are momentary;each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise toanother group and that to another and so on. But if a collocationrepresenting milk generates the collocation of curdit is said to be due to a joint action of the elements formingthe cause-collocation and the _modus operandi_ is unintelligible;the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separatelygenerate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for onsuch a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrineof momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influenceon the part of the cause-elements and their coordinationand manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment. The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is theresult of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation isagainst our universal uncontradicted experience that specificelements constituting the cause (e. G. The whiteness of milk) arethe cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e. G. Thewhiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lumpstate should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities inthe iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience. Moreover there would be no difference between material (_upādāna_, e. G. Clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (_nimitta_and _sahakāri_, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. Informing the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, andthere was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumentalcauses, as such. 

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation isbrought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its

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effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take thecause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influenceto produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed themoment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is thatcausal elements remain and when they are properly collocatedthe effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that weperceive things as existing from a past time. The past time isperceived by us as past, the present as present and the future asfuture and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards. 

The Sā@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualizedstates of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holdswithin it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect isalready existent even before the causal movement for the productionof the effect, is also baseless. Sā@mkhya says that theoil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, andthat it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from thestone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consistsonly in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent ina potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump ofclay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is itto say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can nevercarry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug. What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or wasin a potential state before, and that it has now become manifestor actual? What does potential state mean? The potential stateof the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual stateof the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it ismeant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) ofwhich the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this doesnot mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lumpof clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which itcan expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as thepotter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as theeffect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have saidthat the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sā@mkhyathat the substance and attribute have the same reality is alsoagainst all experience, for we all perceive that movement andattribute belong to substance and not to attribute. AgainSā@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different

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from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhinon-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fussthat the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again onbuddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul(_ātman_) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand whySā@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again inorder to explain experience it brought forth a theory of doublereflection. Again Sā@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and whereis the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise againand will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa becomebound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment bythe infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (asSā@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@saashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure(_sukha_), sorrow (_du@hkha_) and a blinding feeling through ignorance(_moha_) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with whatimpudence could Sā@mkhya think of these as material substances?Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkāra, the tanmātras, is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience norby reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders. The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstructionin the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in othersystems. (See _Nyāyamańjarī, _ pp. 452-466 and 490-496. )

Nyāya and Vais'e@sika sūtras. 

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyāya areto be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholarstrying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for usein sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place betweenthe adherents of different schools of thought trying todefeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred inthe days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regardedeven then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then bythe name _vākovākya_. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Āpastambawho according to Bühler lived before the third century B. C. Used theword Nyāya in the sense of Mīmā@msā [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyāyaderived

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[Footnote 1 _Āpastamba, _ trans. By Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII. , andBodas's article on the _Historical Survey of Indian Logic_ in the BombayBranch of J. R. A. S. , vol. XIX. ]

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from the root _nī_ is sometimes explained as that by which sentencesand words could be interpreted as having one particular meaningand not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents ofwords (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointingout the particular kind of compound in which the words enteredinto combination) were called Nyāya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on thestrength of Kau@tilya's enumeration of the _vidyā_ (sciences) as Ānvīk@sikī(the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledgeby further scrutiny), _trayī_ (the three Vedas), _vārttā_ (the sciencesof agriculture, cattle keeping etc. ), and _da@n@danīti_ (polity), and theenumeration of the philosophies as Sā@mkhya, Yoga, Lokāyataand Ānvīk@sikī, supposes that the _Nyāya sūtra_ was not in existencein Kau@tilya's time 300 B. C. ) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya's reference toNyāya as Ānvīk@sikī only suggests that the word Nyāya was not a familiarname for Ānvīk@sikī in Kau@tilya's time. He seems to misunderstandVātsyāyana in thinking that Vātsyāyana distinguishes Nyāyafrom the Ānvīk@sikī in holding that while the latter only meansthe science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. What appears from Vātsyāyana's statement in _Nyāya sūtra_ I. I. 1is this that he points out that the science which was known in histime as Nyāya was the same as was referred to as Ānvīk@sikī byKau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyāyavidyā with Ānvīk@sikī, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categoriessuch as _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt) etc. , though these were already containedwithin the first two terms _pramā@na_ (means of cognition) and_prameya_ (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these itsspecial and separate branches (_p@rthakprasthāna_) were treated, Nyāyavidyā would simply become metaphysics (_adhyātmavidyā_)like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyāya as the means of determiningthe right meaning or the right thing is also agreed uponby Vātsyāyana and is sanctioned by Vācaspati in his_Nyāyavārttikatātparya@tīkā_ I. I. 1). He compares the meaning of theword Nyāya (_pramā@nairarthaparīk@sa@nam_--to scrutinize an object bymeans of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the wordānvīk@sikī (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perceptionand scriptures). Vātsyāyana of course points out that so far asthis logical side of Nyāya is concerned it has the widest scope for

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[Footnote 1: Kālidāsa's _Kumārasambhava "Udghāto pra@navayāsāmnyāyaistribhirudīra@nam_, " also Mallinātha's gloss on it. ]

[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi's "_The early history of Indian Philosophy, "Indian Antiquary_, 1918. ]

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itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences[Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyāyais like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In itscapacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show theway to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point thatthe metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for thisseems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vātsyāyana himselfdesignates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthāna (separatebranch). But I do not find that any statement of Vātsyāyana orKau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was madeafter Kau@tilya. Vātsyāyana has no doubt put more stress on theimportance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of thatseems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or_adhyātmavidyā_ was acknowledged by all. But the importance ofthe mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None ofthe dharmas'āstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lendany support to it, and Vātsyāyana had to seek the support ofKau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilyawas not satisfied by counting Ānvīk@sikī as one of the fourvidyās but also named it as one of the philosophies side by sidewith Sā@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probablyeven in Kau@tilya's time Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as adhyātmavidyā and another as a science of logic or ratherof debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was addedto increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself mightnot attract sufficient attention. Mahāmahopādhyāya HaraprasādaS'āstrī in an article in the _Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society_1905 says that as Vācaspati made two attempts to collect the_Nyāya sūtras_, one as _Nyāyasūci_ and the other as _Nyāyasūtroddhāra_, it seems that even in Vācaspati's time he was not certain as tothe authenticity of many of the _Nyāya sūtras_. He further pointsout that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sūtraswere interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from Chinaand Japan that Mirok mingled Nyāya and Yoga. He also

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[Footnote 1: _Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam_ (that by whichone is led to act is called _prayojanam_); _yamartham abhīpsan jihāsanvā karma ārabhate tenānena sarve prā@nina@h sarvā@ni karmā@ni sarvās'cavidyā@h vyāptā@h tadās'rayās'ca nyāya@h pravarttate_ (all those whichone tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore allbeings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these depend on Nyāya). _Vātsyāyana bhās'ya_, I. I. 1. ]

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thinks that the sūtras underwent two additions, one at the handsof some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu whoput in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. Thesesuggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, butwe have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when suchadditions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofsof the interpolation of many of the sūtras makes the fixing ofthe date of the original part of the _Nyāya sūtras_ still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, andProf. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the _Nyāya sūtras_ on thebasis of references to S'ūnyavāda naturally loses its value, excepton the supposition that all references to S'ūnyavāda must be laterthan Nāgārjuna, which is not correct, since the _Mahāyāna sūtras_written before Nāgārjuna also held the S'ūnyavāda doctrine. 

The late Dr S. C. Vidyābhū@sa@na in _J. R. A. S. _ 1918 thinksthat the earlier part of Nyāya was written by Gautama about550 B. C. Whereas the _Nyāya sūtras_ of Ak@sapāda were writtenabout 150 A. D. And says that the use of the word Nyāya in thesense of logic in _Mahābhārata_ I. I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must beregarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give anyreasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatmentof the subject that the fixing of the date of Ak@sapāda was madeto fit in somehow with his idea that Ak@sapāda wrote his _Nyāyasūtras_ under the influence of Aristotle--a supposition which doesnot require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyābhū@sa@nahas proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanceda step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original partof the Nyāya. Goldstücker says that both Patańjali (140 B. C. )and Kātyāyana (fourth century B. C. ) knew the _Nyāya sūtras_ [Footnote ref1]. We know that Kau@tilya knew the Nyāya in some form as Ānvīk@sikīin 300 B. C. , and on the strength of this we may venture to saythat the Nyāya existed in some form as early as the fourthcentury B. C. But there are other reasons which lead me to thinkthat at least some of the present sūtras were written some timein the second century A. D. Bodas points out that Bādarāya@na'ssūtras make allusions to the Vais'e@sika doctrines and not to Nyāya. On this ground he thinks that _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ were written beforeBādarāyana's _Brahma-sūtras_, whereas the Nyāya sūtras werewritten later. Candrakānta Tarkāla@mkāra also contends in his

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[Footnote 1: Goldstücker's _Pā@nini_, p. 157. ]

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edition of Vais'e@sika that the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ were earlier than theNyāya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the _Vais'e@sikasūtras_ were written before Caraka (80 A. D. ); for he not only quotesone of the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_, but the whole foundation of his medicalphysics is based on the Vais`e@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The_La@nkāvatāra sūtra_ (which as it was quoted by As'vagho@sa is earlierthan 80 A. D. ) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There areother weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposingthat the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2]. 

It is certain that even the logical part of the present _Nyāyasūtras_ was preceded by previous speculations on the subject bythinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I. I. 32 in whichthe sūtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_)Vātsyāyana says that this sūtra was written to refute the viewsof those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The_Vais'e@sika sūtras_ also give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyāyadoctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4]. 

Does Vais'e@sika represent an Old School of Mīmā@msā?

The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyāya by traditionthat it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposedto represent an old school of Mīmā@msā, older than that representedin the _Mīmā@msā sūtras. _ But a closer inspection of the _Vais'e@sikasūtras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkableway. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotesa _Vais'e@sika sūtra. _ An examination of Caraka's _Sūtrasthāna_ (I. 35-38)leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had somecompendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the _Bhā@sāpariccheda_before him. _Caraka sūtra_ or _kārikā_ (I. I. 36) says that the gu@nasare those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc. , cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "_para_" (universality)and end with "_prayatna_" (effort) together with the sense-qualities(_sārthā_). It seems that this is a reference to some well-knownenumeration. But this enumeration is not to be foundin the _Vais'e@sika sūtra_ (I. I. 6) which leaves out the six gu@nas, ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Caraka, S'ārīra_, 39. ]

[Footnote 2: See the next section. ]

[Footnote 3: Vātsyāyana's Bhā@sya on the _Nyāya sūtras, _ I. I. 32. This isundoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in_Das'avaikālikaniryukti_ as noted before. ]

[Footnote 4: _Nyāya sūtra_ I. I. 5, and _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ IX. Ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. I. 8-17. ]

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heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskāra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_);in one part of the sūtra the enumeration begins with "para"(universality) and ends in "prayatna, " but buddhi (cognition)comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending inprayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the listand is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka'ssūtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in theVais'e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, andcompendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. _Bhā@sāpariccheda_ (a later Vais'e@sika compendium), is a compilationfrom some very old kārikās which are referred to by Vis'vanāthaas being collected from "_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_"--(fromvery ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka's definition of sāmānyaand vis'e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separatecategories as in later Nyāya-Vais'e@sika doctrines; but thoughslightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definitionone finds in the _Vais'e@sika sūtra_ that sāmānya (generality) andvi'se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka's sūtras weretherefore probably written at a time when the Vais'e@sika doctrines wereundergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginningto be written on them. 

The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ seem to be ignorant of the Buddhistdoctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there isno reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but theargument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be anobject of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I. " Thereis also no other reference to any other systems except to someMīmā@msā doctrines and occasionally to Sā@mkhya. There is noreason to suppose that the Mīmā@msā doctrines referred to alludeto the _Mīmā@msā sūtras_ of Jaimini. The manner in which thenature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyāyaphraseology of "_pūrvavat_" and "_s'e@savat_" was not known. _Vais'e@sikasūtras_ in more than one place refer to time as the ultimatecause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S'vetās'vatara Upani@sad refers tothose who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamālī Vedāntatīrtha's article in _J. A. S. B. _, 1908. ]

[Footnote 2: Caraka (I. I. 33) says that sāmānya is that which producesunity and vis'e@sa is that which separates. V. S. II. Ii. 7. Sāmānya andvis'e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate). ]

[Footnote 3: _Vais'e@sika sūtra_ (II. Ii. 9 and V. Ii. 26). ]

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systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancientview [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style ofthe work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that thesesūtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probabilityare pre-Buddhistic. 

The _Vais'e@sika sūtra_ begins with the statement that its objectis to explain virtue, "dharma" This is we know the manifest dutyof Mīmā@msā and we know that unlike any other system Jaiminibegins his _Mīmā@msā sūtras_ by defining "dharma". This at firstseems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais'e@sika, viz, the descriptionof the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma asthat which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) andsays that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictatethis. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions(of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motivesbestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to usthrough our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda mustbe regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3]. The fact that the Vais'e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharmaand after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actionsand also the _ad@r@s@ta_ (unknown virtue) due to dharma (meritaccruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which manyof our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his bookby saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produceany direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, showsthat Ka@nāda's method of explaining dharma has been by showingthat physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, andactions can only be explained up to a certain extent while agood number cannot be explained at all except on the assumptionof ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

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[Footnote 1: S'vetās'vatara I. I. 2]

[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the _KalāpaVyākara@na_, in which it is said that the description of the six categoriesby Ka@nāda in his _Vais'e@sika sūtras_, after having proposed to describethe nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea whileintending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himālaya). 

"_Dnarma@m vyākhyātukāmasya @sa@tpadārthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukāmasyasāgaragamanopamam_. "]

[Footnote 3: The sutra "_Tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmā@nyam_ (I. I. 3 andX. Ii. 9) has been explained by _Upaskāra_ as meaning "The Veda being theword of Īs'vara (God) must be regarded as valid, " but since there is nomention of Īs'vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the laterNyāya ideas into the Vais'e@sika. Sūtra X. Ii. 8 is only a repetition ofVI. Ii. 1. ]

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description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, butis the means of proving that our ordinary experience of thesecannot explain many facts which are only to be explained onthe supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performanceof Vedic deeds. In V. I. 15 the movement of needles towardsmagnets, in V. Ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. Ii. 13 and IV. Ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motionof air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinationshave taken place), and the original movement of themind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. Ii. 17 the movementof the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, theassimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (themovement and development of the foetus as enumerated in_Upaskara_) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) issaid to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to theannihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirthsVais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced)and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are foundedon drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experienceare due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend alllife-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms orthe construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. Ii. 15) and even the physical phenomenaby which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. Ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Ka@nāda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regardingsubstances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues ofmetaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer tothis, Ka@nāda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous orsinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_), fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the houseof the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_), sacrifice (_yajńa_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificialsprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to theprescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras)(VI. Ii. 2). 

He described what is pure and what is impure food, purefood being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. Ii. 5) the contrarybeing impure, and he says that the taking of pure foodleads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how

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feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. I Ka@nāda is busy in showingthe special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A referenceto our chapter on Mīmā@msā will show that the later Mīmā@msāwriters agreed with the Nyāya-Vais`e@sika doctrines in most of theirviews regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main pointsin which Mīmā@msā differs from Nyāya-Vais`e@sika are (1) self-validityof the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbeliefin any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s'abda), (5) (accordingto Kumārila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subjectof discussion in the Vais'e@sika. But as no Īs'vara is mentioned, and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, wemay assume that Vais'e@sika had no dispute with Mīmā@msā. Thefact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably dueto the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the_Vais`e@sika sūtras. _ It is probable that Ka@nāda believed that theVedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. I. 18, VI. I. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict withMīmā@msā suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were neverwritten by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas inthe days of the _Vais'e@sika sūtras, _ the view was probably what isrepresented in the _Vais'e@sika sūtras. _ As there is no reference toĪs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actionsin accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of allatomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais'e@sika wasas atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mīmā@msā philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was oneof the main points of quarrel between the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika andthe Mīmā@msā, we find that in II. Ii. 25-32, Ka@nāda gives reasonsin favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. Ii. 33till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of theeternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mīmā@msā view as we knowfrom the later Mīmā@msā writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the questionof the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyāya view is

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[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sūtras II. Ii. 36 and 37 are in myopinion wrongly interpreted by S'a@nkara Mis'ra in his _Upaskāra_ (II. Ii. 36 by adding an "_api_" to the sūtra and thereby changing the issue, andII. Ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyabhava" assā@mkhya and bhava instead of sā@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinionis the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of soundas we find in the later Nyāya Vais'e@sika view. ]

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that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as theseat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionallythis is regarded as the Vais'e@sika view as well. But in Vais'e@sikaIII. Ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of itsactivity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc. , in III. Ii. 6-7 thisinference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that theactivity, etc. Belongs to the soul and not to the body and so nocertainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. Ii. 8 it issuggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be acceptedon the authority of the scriptures (_āgama_). To this the finalVais'e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the selfin our feeling as "I" (_aham_), and we have therefore not to dependon the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thusthe inference of the existence of the self is only an additionalproof of what we already find in perception as "I" (_aham_) (III. Ii. 10-18, also IX. I. 11). 

These considerations lead me to think that the Vais'e@sikarepresented a school of Mīmā@msā thought which supplementeda metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas. 

Philosophy in the Vais'e@sika sūtras. 

The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ begin with the ostensible purpose of explainingvirtue (_dharma_) (I. I. 1) and dharma according to it isthat by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_ni@hs'reyasa_)are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of theVedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity andsalvation. Then it turns back to the second sūtra and says thatsalvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by specialexcellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories ofsubstance (_dravya_), quality (_gu@na_), class concept (_sāmdānya_), particularity (_vis'e@sa_), and inherence (_samavāyay_) [Footnote ref 1]. The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, andmind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or tospecies [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement

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[Footnote 1: _Upaskāra_ notes that vis'e@sa here refers to the ultimatedifferences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of thissystem is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the sameelement has specific features of difference. ]

[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskāra_), merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vais'e@sika commentaries and compendiums. It must be noted that "_gu@na_" in Vas'e@sika means qualities and notsubtle reals or substances as in Sā@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas'e@sika wouldbe akin to what Yoga would call _dharma_. ]

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downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontalmovement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karmaare that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces otherdravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarilyproduced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause orits effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and bythe effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesseskarma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause. Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and arenot by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma isdevoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than oneobject, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause ofcontact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi)of (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-materialcause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karmais the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion(_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may beproduced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effectof dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not producekarma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contactand disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karmanot being connected with more than one thing is not producedby more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of manycontacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of manycolours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort andcontact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. Indenying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not thecause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3]. 

In the second chapter of the first book Ka@nāda first says thatif there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the causeeven though there may not be the effect. He next says thatgenus (_samanya_) and species (_visesa_) are relative to the understanding;

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[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See_Upaskara_ I. I. 22. ]

[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with themovement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving. ]

[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite differentfrom the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious actionwhich is the cause of rebirth. ]

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being (_bhāva_) indicates continuity only and is henceonly a genus. The universals of substance, quality and actionmaybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimatedifferences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient). In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being(_sattā_) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all othergenera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera orspecies. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since itis different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them, and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that somethingis and must be regarded as a category existing as oneidentical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universalnature as being it has no special characteristics in thedifferent objects in which it inheres. The specific universals ofthingness (_dravyatva_) qualitiness (_gu@natva_) or actionness (_karmatva_)are also categories which are separate from universal being(_bhāva_ or _sattā_) for they also have no separate genus or speciesand yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhāva orbeing was the same in all. 

In the first chapter of the second book Ka@nāda deals withsubstances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water, colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (_snigdha_), fire, colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can befound in ether (_ākās'a_). Liquidity is a special quality of waterbecause butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquidsonly when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnoteref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred bytouch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferredfrom the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferredfrom touch possesses motion and quality, and does notitself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya)and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type ofinference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristicscalled _sāmānyato d@r@s@ta_. The name of air "_vāyu_" is derivedfrom the scriptures. The existence of others different from ushas (_asmadvis'i@s@tānā@m_) to be admitted for accounting for the

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[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This isimportant for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka. ]

[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. Itshould be noted that the word "_adravyatvena_" in II. I. 13 has beeninterpreted by me as "_adravyavattvena_. "]

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giving of names to things (_sa@mjńākarma_). Because we findthat the giving of names is already in usage (and not inventedby us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only inone thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupiedspace, would not lead us to infer the existence of ākās'a(ether). Ākās'a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substancein which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (aquality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And thissubstance is ākās'a. It is a substance and eternal like air. Asbeing is one so ākās'a is one [Footnote ref 2]. 

In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nāda tries toprove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives thenotion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It isone like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, becausethe notion of time is absent in eternal things. Spacesupplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so muchnearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to havediverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of thesun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether soundis eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which ariseswhen a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular featurescoming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles someother attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one waybut appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitelygrasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the questionwhether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasonsto show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion witha number of other reasons proving that it is eternal. 

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to theinference of the existence of soul from the fact that there mustbe some substance in which knowledge produced by the contactof the senses and their object inheres. 

The knowledge of sense-objects (_indriyārtha_) is the reason by

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[Footnote 1: I have differed from _Upaskāra_ in interpreting"_sa@mjńākarma_" in II. I. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while_Upaskāra_ makes it a _dvandva_ compound. Upaskāra's interpretationseems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument forthe existence of God. ]

[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S'a@nkara Mis'ra's_Upaskāra. _]

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which we can infer the existence of something different from thesenses and the objects which appear in connection with them. Thetypes of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence ofsome things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existenceof some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of theexistence of some things from the existence of others. In allthese cases inference is possible only when the two are known tobe connected with each other (_prasiddhipūrvakatvāt apades'asya_) [Footnoteref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have_anapades'a_ (fallacious middle) and _sandigdha_ (doubtful middle);thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because ithas a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference ofsoul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, sensesand objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference ofthe existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar wayin which the existence of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i. E. By virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. Inthe second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition onlywhen there is contact between the self, the senses and the objectsproves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substanceand eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneityof production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; itmay also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person). 

The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinklingof the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affectionspleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substanceand eternal can be proved after the manner of vāyu. An objectoris supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see hissoul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _sāmānyatod@r@s@ta_inference, i. E. , from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognitionto infer an unknown entity to which they belong, butthat this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence ofsoul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. Butthe Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self towhich the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need offalling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But

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[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to themethods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inferenceare only pointed out as the basis. ]

[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nāda was probably notaware of Gautama's terminology. ]

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then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiencesas "I am Yajńadatta" or "I am Devadatta, " what is thegood of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inferencelending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajńadatta goes, there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajńadatta thebody alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we thinkthat the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is manyby special limitations as individuals and this is also proved onthe strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1]. 

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that thatwhich is existent, but yet has no cause, should be consideredeternal (_nitya_). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect canonly take place because of the cause. When we speak of anythingas non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so thatalso proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternalis ignorance (_avidyā_) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thingwhich is great (_mahat_) and compounded. Air (_vāyu_) is not perceived tohave colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has notthe actuality of colour (_rūpasamskāra_--i. E. In air there is onlycolour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible onlywhen there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnoteref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is alsoexplained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, thequality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as theyabide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. Thenumber etc. Of those which have no colour are not perceived by theeye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)

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[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upaskāra_. Ithink the three sūtras "_Sukhaduhkhajńananispattyavis'esadekatmyam, ""vyavasthato nana, "_ and _"vastrasāmarthyat ca"_ originally meant thatthe self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and alsobecause of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many. ]

[Footnote 2: I have differed here also in my meaning from the _Upaskāra, _which regards this sūtra "_avidya_" to mean that we do not know of anyreasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms. ]

[Footnote 3: This is what is meant in the later distinctions of_udbhūtarūpavattva_ and _anudbhūtarūpavattva_. The word _samskāra_ inVais'e@sika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection(_samavaya_), production (_udbhava_) and not being overcome(_anabhibhava_). For the last three senses see _Upaskāra_ IV. I. 7. ]

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are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. By the manas and number etc. By the visual and the tactilesense) [Footnote ref 1]. 

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that theearth, etc. Exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. Therecannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of thethree, but the atoms of different elements may combine when oneof them acts as the central radicle (_upa@s@tambhaka_). Bodies are oftwo kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwiseproduced by the combination of the atoms in accordancewith special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are dueto special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are tobe admitted for explaining the fact that things must have beengiven names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, andalso on account of the authority of the Vedas. 

In the first chapter of the fifth book action (_karma_) is discussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is saidthat the movement of the hand is due to its contact with thesoul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is dueto its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising ofthe flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement isnot due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of thehand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with thesoul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account ofheaviness (_gurutva_) the flail will fall when not held by the hand. Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directedmotions (_nodanavis'e@sa_) which are generated by special kinds ofefforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep. The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknowncause (_adr@s@takāranaka_). The arrow first acquires motion byspecially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia(_vegasamskāra_) keeps on moving and when that ceases it fallsdown through heaviness. 

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations

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[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the _Upaskāra_ of S'ankaraMis'ra on the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ of Ka@nāda. It must be noted herethat the notion of number according to Vais'e@sika is due to mentalrelativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mentalrelativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen ortouched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to dependon the visual or the tactual sense. ]

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of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophicalimportance. All the special phenomena of nature are explainedas being due to unknown cause (_ad@r@s@takāritam_) and no explanationis given as to the nature of this unknown (_ad@r@s@ta_). It is however said that with the absence of _ad@r@s@ta_ there is no contactof body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and thereforemok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of theself, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mindis in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomessteady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, ākās'a areregarded as inactive. 

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that giftsare made to proper persons not through sympathy but on accountof the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certainVedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impuritiesof things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta, how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@satakes place as a result of the work of the soul. 

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternalthings are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. Thechange of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginningin the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great sizeis visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of manycauses [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from thosethat have great size. The same thing may be called great and smallrelatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) andmahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. Theeternal size of _parima@n@dala_ (round) belongs to the atoms. Ākās'aand ātman are called _mahān_ or _paramamahān_ (the supremelygreat or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measureit is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as beingof the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat), Atomic size(parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) andthe supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether(ākās'a) are regarded as eternal. 

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unityand separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct fromother qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are

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[Footnote 1: I have differed from the _Upaskāra_ in the interpretation ofthis sūtra. ]

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neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (_ekap@rthaktva_). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or theeffect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neithercontact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not existindependently (_yutasiddhyabhāvāt_). In the eighth book it is saidthat soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehensionof qualities, action, generality, and particularityperception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is thecause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are thecause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth booknegation is described; non-existence (_asat_) is defined as that towhich neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent thingsmay become non-existent and that which is existent in oneway may be non-existent in another; but there is another kindof non-existence which is different from the above kinds ofexistence and non-existence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directlyperceived through the help of the memory which keeps before themind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is alsomade in this connection to the special perceptual powers of theyogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices). 

In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or themiddle term is described. It is said that anything connectedwith any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contraryor as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this, " or"these two are related as cause and effect, " and since this mayalso be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogismfrom propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbalcognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidyā_) isdue to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observationdue to wrong expectant impressions. The oppositeof this is true knowledge (_vidyā_). In the tenth it is said thatpleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related todoubt and certainty. 

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[Footnote 1: _Upaskāra_ here explains that it is intended that the sensesare produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in thesūtras. ]

[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of non-existence, _prāgabhāva_(negation before production), _dhvamsābhāva_ (negation after destruction), and _anyonyabhava_ (mutual negation of each other in each other), havebeen described. The fourth one is _sāmānyābhāva_ (general negation). ]

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A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, forbecause of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contactis also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact whichinheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the productionof the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat offire is also a cause. 

Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since theyhave no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because theVedas direct them, they have validity. 

Philosophy in the Nyāya sūtras [Footnote ref 1]. 

The _Nyāya sūtras_ begin with an enumeration of the sixteensubjects, viz. Means of right knowledge (_pramā@na_), object of rightknowledge (_prameya_), doubt (_sa@ms'aya_), purpose (_prayojana_), illustrative instances (_d@r@s@tānta_), accepted conclusions (_siddhānta_), premisses (_avayava_), argumentation (_tarka_), ascertainment (_nir@naya_), debates (_vāda_), disputations (_jalpa_), destructive criticisms(_vita@n@dā_), fallacy (_hetvābhāsa_), quibble (_chala_), refutations(_jāti_), points of opponent's defeat (_nigrahasthāna_), and hold thatby a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (_nihs'reyasa_), isattained. In the second sūtra it is said that salvation (_apavarga_)is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge(_mithyājńāna_), defects (_do@sa_), endeavours (_prav@rtti_, birth(_janma_), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are saidto be of four kinds, perception (_pratyak@sa_), inference (_anumāna_), analogy (_upamana_), and testimony (_s'abda_). Perception is definedas uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with namesproceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of threekinds, from cause to effect (_pūrvavat_), effect to cause (_s'e@savat_), and inference from common characteristics (_sāmānyato d@r@s@ta_). Upamāna is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-knownthing. 

S'abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (āpta)[Footnote ref 2]. 

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[Footnote 1: This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in _Nyāyasūtras_, supplemented here and there with the views of Vātsyāyana, thecommentator. This follows the order of the sūtras, and tries to presenttheir ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyāya aspossible. The general treatment of Nyāya-Vais'e@sika expounds the twosystems in the light of later writers and commentators. ]

[Footnote 2: It is curious to notice that Vātsyāyana says that an ārya, a@r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an āpta (reliable authority). ]

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Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experiencedand which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledgeare said to be self (_ātman_), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (_buddhi_), mind (_manas_}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow andsalvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (_prayatna_), pleasure, pain, andknowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that whichupholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and painas arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects [Footnote ref l];the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivi, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākās'a; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound arethe qualities of the above five elements, and these are also theobjects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannotoccur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (_manas_). Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, andbody. Do@sas (attachment, antipathy, etc) are those which leadmen to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering [Footnote ref2]. Ultimate cessation from pain is called _apavarga_ [Footnote ref 3]. Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflictingopinions etc. , one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. Thatfor attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to workis called _prayojana_. 

Illustrative example (_d@r@s@tānta_) is that on which both thecommon man and the expert (_parīk@saka_) hold the same opinion. Established texts or conclusions (_siddhānta_) are of four kinds, viz (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought calledthe _sarvatantrasiddhānta_; (2) those which are held by one schoolor similar schools but opposed by others called the _pratitantrasiddhānta_;(3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturallyfollow called _adhikara@nasiddhānta_; (4) those of the opponent's viewswhich are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refutethe consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill andbring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (_abhyupagamasiddhānta_)[Footnote ref 4]. The premisses are five:

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[Footnote 1: Here I have followed Vātsyāyana's meaning. ]

[Footnote 2: Vātsyāyana comments here that when one finds all things fullof misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associatedwith pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated. ]

[Footnote 3: Vātsyāyana wants to emphasise that there is no bliss insalvation, but only cessation from pain. ]

[Footnote 4: I have followed Vātsyāyana's interpretation here. ]

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(1) _pratijńā_ (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);(2) _hetu_ (the reason which establishes the conclusion on thestrength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examplesor negative instances); (3) _udāhara@na_ (positive or negativeillustrative instances); (4) _upanaya_ (corroboration by the instance);(5) _nigamana_ (to reach the conclusion which has been proved). Then come the definitions of tarka, nir@naya, vāda, jalpa, vita@n@dā, the fallacies (hetvābhāsa), chala, jāti, and nigrahasthāna, whichhave been enumerated in the first sūtra. 

The second book deals with the refutations of objectionsagainst the means of right knowledge (pramāna). In refutationof certain objections against the possibility of the happeningof doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since therewas always a difference between the two things regarding whichdoubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiatingcharacteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to objectto the validity of the pramā@na in general and particularly ofperceptions on the ground that if they were generated beforethe sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, theycould not establish the nature of the objects, and if the twohappened together then there would be no notion of successionin our cognitions. To this the Nyāya reply is that if there wereno means of right knowledge, then there would be no means ofknowledge by means of which the objector would refute allmeans of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have anymeans of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are nomeans of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kindsof sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previousexistence of those different kinds of musical instruments, so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existenceof those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. 

The same things (e. G. The senses, etc. ) which are regarded asinstruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognitionof other things may themselves be the objects of right

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[Footnote 1: _Yathāpas'cātsiddhena s'abdena pūrvasiddham ātodyamanumīyatesādhyam ca ātodyam sādhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyātodye svanata@hanumānam bhavatīti, vī@nā vādyate ve@nu@h pūryyate iti svanavis'e@se@naātodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tathā pūrvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayampas'cātsiddhena upalabdhihetunā pratipadyate. Vātsyāyana bhā@sya, _ II. I. 15. ]

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knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those whichare instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mereinstruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge. The means of right knowledge (pramā@na) do not requireother sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light ofa lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselvesas well. 

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definitionof perception, it is held that the definition includes the contactof the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though weperceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perceptionof the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since wecan pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is notmerely the parts collected together, for were it so one couldsay that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2]. Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it iswrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To thisthe Nyįya answer is that there is always such a difference in thespecific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particulareffect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particularcause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence oftime on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present timedid not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible. The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not haveperceived things as being done in the past or as going to bedone in the future. The validity of analogy (upamįna) as ameans of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved. The four pramā@nas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture

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[Footnote 1: Here the sūtras, II. I. 20-28, are probably laterinterpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyāya doctrineof perception, but against the wording of the definitionof perception as given in the, _Nyāya sūtra_, II. I. 4. ]

[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, whorejected the existence of wholes (avayavī). On this subject a laterBuddhist monograph by Pandita As'oka (9th century A. D. ), _Avayavinirākara@na_ in _Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts_, may be referredto. ]

[Footnote 3: _Pūrvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'īghrataram srotasābahutaraphenaphalapar@nakās@thādivahanańcopalabhamāna@h pūr@natvena, nadya upari v@r@sto deva ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimātre@na. V@atsyāyanabhā@sya_, II. I. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the riveris not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwateraugmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its currentlarge quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise ofwater, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river]. 

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are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthāpatti (implication), aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understoodin terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it isalso understood--if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywherewe understand that the same contains eight gallons ofcorn as well) and abhāva (non-existence) as separate pramā@nasfor the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthāpatti, sambhava and abhāva are included within inference. 

The validity of these as pramā@nas is recognized, but they aresaid to be included in the four pramā@nas mentioned before. Thetheory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternityproved in great detail. The meaning of words is said torefer to class-notions (_jāti_), individuals (_vyakti_), and the specificposition of the limbs (_āk@rti_), by which the class notion is manifested. Class (_jāti_} is defined as that which produces the notionof sameness (_samānaprasavātmikā jāti@h_). 

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence ofthe self or ātman. It is said that each of the senses is associatedwith its own specific object, but there must exist some other entityin us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions andproduced the perception of the total object as distinguished fromthe separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then therewould be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if therewere no permanent self, no one would be able to recognizethings as having seen them before; the two images produced bythe eyes in visual perception could not also have been unitedtogether as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreoverif there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sourfruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousnessbelonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another. If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effectedby manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purposeas self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for thisentity the knower would require some instrument by which itwould co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas isadmitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though thesense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the

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[Footnote 1: According to Vātsyāyana, in the two eyes we have two differentsenses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense whichworks in both eyes. ]

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senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc. , could not be explained. Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infantsshow signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancyand this could not be due to anything but similar experiences inprevious lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachmentsand desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it isargued that desires in infants are due to their experience inprevious existences. 

The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual senseis material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentallythe view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensationis also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, and touch which are made respectively by the four elements ofearth, etc. , can only grasp the distinctive features of the elementsof which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is madeby earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctivequality of earth, viz. Smell. 

Against the Sā@mkhya distinction of _buddhi_ (cognition) and_cit_ (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference betweenthe _buddhi_ and _cit_. We do not find in our consciousness twoelements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sā@mkhyaepistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms incognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the suppositionof contacts of manas with the senses, ātman and externalobjects. The Buddhist objection against the Sā@mkhya explanationthat the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the externalworld just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that maylie near it, that there were really momentary productions ofcrystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections atdifferent times is refuted by Nyāya; for it says that it cannot besaid that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed toin those cases where momentariness was actually experienced. In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is nocoming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but

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[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sā@mkhya did not believe that thesenses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sā@mkhya-Yoga viewrepresented in _Ātreya-sa@mhitā_ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautikaor constituted of the gross elements. ]

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the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. Thecontact of manas with soul (_ātman_) takes place within the bodyand not in that part of ātman which is outside the body; knowledgebelongs to the self and not to the senses or the object foreven when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitionsdestroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous. Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None ofthese can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas). Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Againif it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to beborne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions ofanother. The causes of recollection on the part of self are givenas follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, (5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessorand the possessed or master and servant, or things whichare generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as ofhusband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, (11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) coverand covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of thatwhich caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action suchas that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, (19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge doesnot belong to body, and then the question of the production of the bodyas due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (_apavarga_) is effected bythe manas being permanently separated from the soul (ātman)through the destruction of karma. 

In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of allother defects such as rāga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy). As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced bydestruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in theprocess of origination. Īs'vara is regarded as the cause of theproduction of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, forman is not always found to attain success according to his efforts. A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that allthings have come into being by no-cause (_animitta_), for thenno-cause would be the cause, which is impossible. 

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refutedon the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed. 

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[Footnote 1: _Nyāya sūtra_ III. Ii. 44. ]

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The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'ūnyavādin Bauddhas)that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations toother things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there aremerely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, arethen refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being likethe fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen. Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth meanssorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormentedby many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains forpleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamlesssleep, so there is no affliction (_kles'a_) in the man who attainsapavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained allefforts (_prav@rtti_) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginninglesswith us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Thenthere are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism(_aha@mkāra_) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects(_do@sa_); about the nature of whole and parts and about thenature of atoms (_a@nus_) which cannot further be divided. A discussionis then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijńānavādinsthat nothing can be regarded as having any reality whenseparated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned asleading to right knowledge. 

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later additionis devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations(_nigrahasthāna_) and futilities (_jāti_). 

Caraka, Nyāya sūtras and Vais'e@sika sūtras. 

When we compare the _Nyāya sūtras_ with the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposeshave met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The largeamount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical artfor defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it wasprobably originally compiled from some other existing treatiseswhich were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for renderingthemselves fit to hold their own in debates with theiropponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when

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[Footnote 1: Vātsyāyana notes that this is the salvation of him who hasknown Brahman, IV. I. 63. ]

[Footnote 2: A reference to the _Suvar@naprabhāsa sūtra_ shows that theBuddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improvingtheir voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took tothe worship of Sarasvatī (goddess of learning), who they supposed wouldhelp them in bringing readily before their mind all the informationand ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates. ]

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we compare the futilities (jāti) quibbles (chala), etc. , relating todisputations as found in the _Nyāya sūtra_ with those that arefound in the medical work of Caraka (78 A. D. ), III. Viii. Thereare no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the_Nyāya sūtra_ and _Caraka-sa@mhitā_ which have treated of thesematters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e. G. D@r@s@tānta, prayojana, pratijńā and vita@n@dā) follows very closelythe definitions given of those in the _Nyāya sūtras_. There areothers such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthāna, etc. , where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There aresome other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e. G. _prati@s@thāpanā, jijńāsā, vyavasāya, vākyado@sa, vākyapras'a@msā, upalambha, parihāra, abhyanujńā_, etc. ) which are not found in the_Nyāya sūtra_ [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities(jāti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthāna) mentioned inthe _Nyāya sūtra_ are not found in _Caraka_. There are some terms whichare found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e. G. _aupamya_ in_Caraka, upamāna_ in _Nyāya sūtra, arthāpatti_ in _Nyāya sūtra_ and_arthaprāpti_ in _Caraka_. Caraka does not seem to know anythingabout the Nyāya work on this subject, and it is plain that thetreatment of these terms of disputations in the _Caraka_ is muchsimpler and less technical than what we find in the _Nyāya sūtras_. If we leave out the varieties of jāti and nigrahasthāna of thefifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between thetreatment of Caraka and that of the _Nyāya sūtras_. It seems thereforein a high degree probable that both Caraka and the _Nyāyasūtras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputationto some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilationwas earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Nyāya sūtras_ representsa later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations hadnecessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodiedin this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could havebeen earlier than the second century A. D. Another stream flowingthrough the _Nyāya sūtras_ is that of a polemic against the doctrineswhich could be attributed to the Sautrāntika Buddhists, theVijńānavāda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sā@mkhya, the Cārvāka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

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[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold divisionof inference (_anumāna_) as _pūrvavat, s'e@savat and sāmānyatod@r@s@ta_. ]

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further allusion elsewhere. The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ as we have alreadyseen had argued only against the Mīmā@msā, and ultimately agreedwith them on most points. The dispute with Mīmā@msā in the_Nyāya sūtras_ is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the questionof the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of theself-validity of knowledge (_svata@h prāmā@nyavāda_)and the akhyātidoctrine of illusion of the Mīmā@msists, which form the two chiefpoints of discussion between later Mīmā@msā and later Nyāya, are never alluded to in the _Nyāya sūtras_. The advocacy of Yogamethods (_Nyāya sūtras_, IV. Ii. 38-42 and 46) seems also to bean alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not inkeeping with the general tendency of the _Nyāya sūtras_, and theJapanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as MahāmahopādhyāyaHaraprasāda S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable. 

The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_, III. I. 18 and III. Ii. 1, describe perceptionalknowledge as produced by the close proximity of theself (ātman), the senses and the objects of sense, and theyalso adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceivedunder special conditions of sa@mskāra (conglomeration etc. ). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almostthe same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyāya. The _Nyāya sūtras_give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bringin the questions of sa@mskāra or udbhūtarūpavattva which Vais'e@sikadoes. On the question of inference Nyāya gives threeclassifications as pūrvavat, s'e@savat and samānyatod@r@s@ta, but nodefinition. The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference(V. S. III. I. 7-17, IX. Ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be madewhen a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relationof inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kindof effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, andso on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inferencewithout reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyāpti(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sādhya_ (probandum)) which becameso important in later Nyāya has never been properly formulatedeither in the _Nyāya sūtras_ or in the Vais'e@sika. _Vais'e@sikasutra_, III. I. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitancebetween hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipūrvakatvāt apades'asya_), ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _J. A. S. B. _ 1905. ]

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but the technical vyāpti is not known, and the connotation ofthe term _prasiddhipūrvakatva_ of Vais'e@sika seems to be moreloose than the term _vyāpti_ as we know it in the later Nyāya. The_Vais'e@sika sūtras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separatepramā@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With _Nyāya sūtras_ s'abda as a pramā@na applies not only to theVedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, andVātsyāyana says that trustworthy persons may be of threekinds _@r@si, ārya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamāna which isregarded as a means of right cognition in Nyāya is not evenreferred to in the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_. The _Nyāya sūtras_ know ofother pramā@nas, such as _arthāpatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, butinclude them within the pramā@nas admitted by them, but the_Vais'e@sika sūtras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The_Vais'e@sika sūtras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhāva) throughthe perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. I. 1-10). The _Nyāya sūtras_ (II. Ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhāva asnon-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks anotherto "bring the clothes which are not marked, " he finds that marksare absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued thatabsence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Thoughthere is thus an agreement between the Nyāya and the _Vais'e@sikasūtras_ about the acceptance of abhāva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyāyasūtras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma, vis'e@sa_ and _samavāya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'e@skadiscussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyāya sūtras_ take much pains to provethe materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to havebeen important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to thisquestion in VIII. Ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ do not mention the name of "Īs'vara, " whereasthe _Nyāya sūtras_ try to prove his existence on eschatologicalgrounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of selfin the _Nyāya sūtras_ are mainly on the ground of the unity ofsense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

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[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramā@nas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different fromNyāya and calls _arthāpatti arthaprāpti_ (_Caraka_ III. Viii. ). ]

[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vātsyāyana'scommentary. ]

[Footnote 3: The _Nyāya sūtra_ no doubt incidentally gives a definition ofjāti as "_samānaprasavātmikā jāti@h_" (II. Ii. 71). ]

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Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a factof knowledge. Both the Nyāya and the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ admitthe existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine ofatomic structure in later Nyāya-Vais'e@sika are absent there. TheVai'se@sika calls salvation _ni@hs'reyasa_ or _mok@sa_ and the Nyāya_apavarga_. Mok@sa with Vais'e@sika is the permanent cessation ofconnection with body; the apavarga with Nyāya is cessation ofpain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference betweenthe Vais'e@sika and Nyāya are said to lie with regard to theory of thenotion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by whichcognitions of number arose in the mind (e. G. At the first momentthere is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness--apek@sābuddhi--notionof two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of twothings); again, the doctrine of pilupāka (changes of qualities byheat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyāya held)was held by Vais'e@sika, which the Naiyāyikas did not admit [Footnote ref2]. But as the _Nyāya sūtras_ are silent on these points, it is notpossible to say that such were really the differences between earlyNyāya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold betweenthe later interpreters of Vais'e@sika and the later interpreters ofNyāya. The Vais'e@sika as we find it in the commentary ofPras'astapāda (probably sixth century A. D. ), and the Nyāya fromthe time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almostthe same system with slight variations only. I have thereforepreferred to treat them together. The main presentation of theNyāya-Vais'e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is foundfrom the sixth century onwards. 

The Vais'e@sika and Nyāya Literature. 

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'e@sikasūtras_ by Ka@nāda, also called Aulūkya the son of Ulūka, thoughthere is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

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[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamālī Vedāntatīrtha quotes a passage from_Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_, XVI. 68-69 in _J. A. S. B. _, 1905, and anotherpassage from a Nyāya writer Bhāsarvajńa, pp. 39-41, in _J. A. S. B. _, 1914, to show that the old Naiyāyikas considered that there was an elementof happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which theVais'e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is foundin the Nyāya or the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_, unless the cessation of painwith Nyāya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of blissor happiness. ]

[Footnote 2: See Mādhava's _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha-Aulūkyadars'ana_. ]

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appears from the _Vāyu purāna_ that he was born in Prabhāsa nearDvārakā, and was the disciple of Somas'armā. The time ofPras'astapāda who wrote a bhā@sya (commentary) of the _Vais'e@sikasūtras_ cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarityof Pras'astapāda's bhā@sya is this that unlike other bhā@syas(which first give brief explanations of the text of the sūtras andthen continue to elaborate independent explanations by explainingthe first brief comments), it does not follow the sūtras butis an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnoteref 1]. There were two other bhā@syas on the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_, namely _Rāva@na-bhā@sya_ and _Bharādvāja-v@rtti_, but these are nowprobably lost. References to the former are found in_Kira@nāvalībhāskara_ of Padmanābha Mis'ra and also in _Ratnaprabhā_2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhā@sya, namely_Vyomavatī_ by Vyomas'ekharācārya, _Nyāyakandalī_ by S'ridhara, _Kira@nāvalī_ by Udayana (984 A. D. ) and _Līlāvatī_ S'rīvatsācārya. In addition to these Jagadīs'a Bha@t@tācārya of Navadvīpa and S'a@nkaraMis'ra wrote two other commentaries on the _Pras'astapāda-bhāsya_, namely _Bhāsyasūkti_ and _Ka@nāda-rahasya_. S'a@nkara Mis'ra (1425A. D. ) also wrote a commentary on the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ called the_Upaskāra_. Of these _Nyāya-kandalī_ of S'rīdhara on account of itssimplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probablythe best for a modern student of Vais'e@sika. Its author was anative of the village of Bhūris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Rā@dha). His father'sname was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchokā and hewrote his work in 913 S'aka era (990 A. D. ) as he himself writesat the end of his work. 

The _Nyāya sūtra_ was written by Ak@sapāda or Gautama, andthe earliest commentary on it written by Vātsyāyana is knownas the _Vātsyāyana-bhā@sya_. The date of Vātsyāyana has not

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[Footnote 1: The bhā@sya of Pras'astapāda can hardly he called abhā@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim andcalls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories(_Padārthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma, sāmānya, vis'e@sa_ and _samavāya_ in order and withoutraising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say onthem. Some of the doctrines which are important in laterNyāya-Vais'e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation anddissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atomscontributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine ofpilupāka in connection with the transformation of colours by heatoccur in his narration for the first time as the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his datedefinitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais'e@sika available to usafter Ka@nāda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6thcentury A. D. ]

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been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that helived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A. D. Jacobiplaces him in 300 A. D. Udyotakara (about 635 A. D. ) wrote a_Vārttika_ on Vātsyāyana's bhā@sya to establish the Nyāya viewsand to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnāga(about 500 A. D. ) in his _Pramā@nasamuccaya_. Vācaspatimis'ra(840 A. D. ) wrote a sub-commentary on the _Nyāyavārttika_ ofUdyotakara called _Nyāyavārttikatātparya@tīkā_ in order to makeclear the right meanings of Udyotakara's _Vārttika_ which was sinkingin the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings(_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnānām_). Udayana (984 A. D. ) wrotea sub-commentary on the _Tātparya@tīkā_ called_Tātparya@tīkāparis'uddhi_. Varddhamāna (1225 A. D. ) wrote asub-commentary on that called the _Nyāyanibandhaprakās'a_. Padmanābhawrote a sub-commentary on that called _Varddhamānendu_ and S'a@nkaraMis'ra (1425 A. D. ) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the_Nyāyatātparyama@n@dana_. In the seventeenth century Vis'vanāthawrote an independent short commentary known as _Vis'vanāthav@rtti_, on the _Nyāya sūtra_, and Rādhāmohana wrote a separatecommentary on the _Nyāya sūtras_ known as _Nyāyasūtravivara@na_. In addition to these works on the _Nyāya sūtras_ many otherindependent works of great philosophical value have been writtenon the Nyāya system. The most important of these in medievaltimes is the _Nyāyamańjari_ of Jayanta (880 A. D. ), who flourishedshortly after Vācaspatimis'ra. Jayanta chooses some of the _Nyāyasūtras_ for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyāya views quiteindependently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indianthought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vācaspati's_Tātparya@tīkā_, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Anotherimportant work is Udayana's _Kusumāńjali_ in which he tries toprove the existence of Īs'vara (God). This work ought to be readwith its commentary _Prakās'a_ by Varddhamāna (1225 A. D. ) and itssub-commentary _Makaranda_ by Rucidatta (1275 A. D. ). Udayana's_Ātmatattvaviveka_ is a polemical work against the Buddhists, inwhich he tries to establish the Nyāya doctrine of soul. In additionto these we have a number of useful works on Nyāya in latertimes. Of these the following deserve special mention in connectionwith the present work. _Bhā@sāpariccheda_ by Vis'vanātha withits commentaries _Muktāvalī, Dinakarī_ and _Rāmarudrī, Tarkasamgraha_with _Nyāyanir@naya, Tarkabkā@sā_ of Kes'ava Mis'ra with

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the commentary _Nyāyapradīpa, Saptapadārthī_ of S'ivāditya, _Tārkikarak@sā_ of Varadarāja with the commentary _Ni@ska@n@taka_of Mallinātha, _Nyāyasāra_ of Mādhava Deva of the city of Dhāra and_Nyāyasiddhāntamańjarī_ of Jānakinātha Bha@t@tācarya with the_Nyāyamanjarisara_ by Yādavācārya, and _Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa_ ofS'a@sadhara with _Prabhā_ by S'e@sānantācārya. 

The new school of Nyāya philosophy known as Navya-Nyāyabegan with Ga@nges'a Upādhyāya of Mithilā, about1200 A. D. Ga@nges'a wrote only on the four pramā@nas admitted by theNyāya, viz. Pratyak@sa, anumāna, upamāna, and s'abda, and not on any ofthe topics of Nyāya metaphysics. But it so happened that hisdiscussions on anumāna (inference) attracted unusually great attentionin Navadvīpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries andcommentaries of commentaries were written on the anumānaportion of his work _Tattvacintāma@ni, and many independenttreatises on sabda and anumāna were also written by the scholarsof Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the homeof Nyāya studies. The commentaries of Raghunātha S'iroma@ni(1500 A. D. ), Mathurā Bha@t@tācārya (1580 A. D. ), Gadādhara Bha@t@tācārya(1650 A. D. ) and Jagadīsa Bha@t@tācārya (1590 A. D. ), commentarieson S'iroma@ni's commentary on _Tattvacintāmani, had beenvery widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyāya became themost important study in Navadvīpa and there appeared a seriesof thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject[Footnote ref l]. The contribution was not in the direction ofmetaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainlyin developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accuratelyand precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnoteref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely thenature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e. G. Smokeand fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact natureof the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that thereshould be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analyticthinking and the development of a system of highly technical

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[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the thirdquarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyāya was startedin Mithilā (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuryBengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyāya studies. See MrCakravarttī's paper, _J. A. S. B. _ 1915. I am indebted to it for someof the dates mentioned in this section. ]

[Footnote 2: _Īs'varānumāna_ of Raghunatha as well as his_Padārthatattvanirūpa@na_ are, however, notable exceptions. ]

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expressions mark the development of this literature. The technicalexpressions invented by this school were thus generally acceptedeven by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurateand subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskritceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India theimportance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and itcan hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position byattracting enthusiastic students in large numbers. 

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact thatso far as the logical portion of the Nyāya system is concerned, though Ak@sapāda was the first to write a comprehensive accountof it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independentlyworked at this subject and had criticized the Nyāya accountof logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic_Das'avaikālikaniryukti_ of Bhadrabāhu (357 B. C. ), Umāsvāti's_Tattvārthādhigama sūtra_, _Nyāyāvatāra_ of Siddhasena Divākara(533 A. D. ) Mā@nikya Nandi's (800 A. D. ) _Parīk@sāmukha sūtra_, and_Pramā@nanayatattvālokāla@mkāra_ of Deva Sūri (1159 A. D. ) and_Prameyakamalamārta@n@da_ of Prabhācandra deserve special notice. _Pramā@nasamuccaya_ and _Nyāyapraves'a_ of Di@nnāga (500 A. D. ), _Pramā@nayārttika kārikā_ and _Nyāyabindu_ of Dharmakīrtti(650 A. D. ) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the mostinteresting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l]. The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain andBuddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work onIndian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of thepresent volume. 

It is interesting to notice that between the _Vātsyāyanabhā@sya_ and the Udyotakara's _Vārttika_ no Hindu work on logicof importance seems to have been written: it appears that thescience of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains andthe Buddhists; and it was Di@nnāga's criticism of Hindu Nyāyathat roused Udyotakara to write the _Vārttika_. The Buddhist andthe Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysicsas an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till wecome to Ga@nges'a, and there is probably only one Hindu work ofimportance on Nyāya in the Buddhist style namely _Nyāyasāra_of Bhāsarvajńa. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

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[Footnote 1: See _Indian Logic Medieval School_, by Dr S. C. Vidyābhū@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic. ]

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inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyāyainterest [Footnote ref 1]. 

The main doctrine of the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2]. 

The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentarinesstook a common-sense view of things, and held thatthings remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrangethemselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continuesto remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces bythe stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can producean impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly orthrough knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existenceis one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiverdid not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surroundingenvironments is immaterial. Existence is the most generalcharacteristic of things, and it is on account of this that thingsare testified by experience to be existing. 

As the Nyāya-Vais'e@sikas depended solely on experience andon valid reasons, they dismissed the Sā@mkhya cosmology, butaccepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (_bhūtas_), earth(_k@siti_), water (_ap_), fire (_tejas_), and air (_marut_). These atomsare eternal; the fifth substance (_ākās'a_) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervadingand thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifestssound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it showsitself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deservesto hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deafman though he has the ākās'a as his sense of hearing, cannot hearon account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that senseorgan [Footnote ref 3]. In addition to these they admitted the existenceof time (_kāla_) as extending from the past through the present to the

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[Footnote 1: Almost all the books on Nyāya and Vais'e@sika referred tohave been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to beacquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic shouldrefer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyāya in Bengal, " by Mr. Cakravarttī in _J. A. S. B. _ 1915. ]

[Footnote 2: I have treated Nyāya and Vais'e@sika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regardedsince about 600 A. D. As being in complete agreement except in someminor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by thoseof the other. The original character of the two systems has alreadybeen treated. ]

[Footnote 3: See _Nyāyakandalī_, pp. 59-64. ]

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endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we couldhave no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to accountfor our time-notions associated with all changes. The Sā@mkhyadid not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unitof kāla is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse itsown unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atomsand their movements. The appearance of kāla as a separate entityis a creation of our buddhi _(buddhinirmā@na) as it represents theorder or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. Butkāla in Nyāya-Vais'e@sika is regarded as a substance existing byitself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itselfas past, present, and future. Sā@mkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the thingsin its different manifesting stages of evolution _(adhvan)_. Theastronomers regarded it as being clue to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika conceptionof kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partlesssubstance which appears as many in association with the changesrelated to it [Footnote ref l]. 

The seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substanceby virtue of which things are perceived as being on theright, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kāla like dik isalso one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eightdirections and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighthsubstance is the soul _(ātman)_ which is all-pervading. There areseparate ātmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelingsof pleasure and pain, desire, etc. Belong to _ātman_. Manas (mind) isthe ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory;all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, aregenerated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and theobjects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul withthe senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we havea separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experienceis conducted in a series, one coming after another and notsimultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyakandalī, _ pp. 64-66, and _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 136-139. The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ regarded time as the cause of thingswhich suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyāyakandalī, _ pp. 66-69, and _Nyayamańjarī_, p. 140. ]

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of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereasthe other things such as quality (_gu@na_), action (_karma_), samenessor generality (_sāmānya_), speciality or specific individuality(_vis'e@sa_) and the relation of inherence (_samavāya_) cannot showthemselves without the help of substance (_dravya_). Dravya is thus theplace of rest (_ās'rayā_) on which all the others depend (_ās'@rta_). Dravya, gu@na, karma, sāmānya, vis'e@sa, and samavāya are the six originalentities of which all things in the world are made up [Footnote ref 1]. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason anda thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the wayof right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristicsand differences of the above entities, he ceases to have anypassions and to work in accordance with their promptings andattains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated [Footnote ref2]. The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika is a pluralistic system which neither tries toreduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nordismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demandsof the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. Theentities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlyingprinciple is that at the root of each kind of perception theremust be something to which the perception is due. It classified thepercepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate typesor categories (_padārtha_), and held that the notion of each typewas due to the presence of that entity. These types are six innumber--dravya, gu@na, etc. If we take a percept "I see a redbook, " the book appears to be an independent entity on whichrests the concept of "redness" and "oneness, " and we thus call thebook a substance (_dravya_); dravya is thus defined as that whichhas the characteristic of a dravya (_dravyatva_). So also gu@na andkarma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also thesame principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it withSā@mkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

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[Footnote 1: _Abhāva_ (negation) as dependent on bhāva (position) ismentioned in the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_. Later Nyāya writers such asUdayana include _abhāva_ as a separate category, but S'rīdhara acontemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhāva was notcounted by Pras'astapāda as it was dependent on bhāva--"_abhāvasyaprthaganupades'a@h bhāvapāratantryāt na tvabhāvāt_. " _Nyāyakandalī_, p. 6, and _Lak@sa@nāvalī_, p. 2. ]

[Footnote 2: "_Tattvato jńāte@su bāhyādhyātmike@su vi@saye@sudo@sadars'anāt viraktasya samīhāniv@rttau ātmajńasya tadarthānikarmānyakurvatah tatparityāgasādhanāni s'rutism@rtyuditāniasa@nkalpitaphalāni upādadānasya ātmajńānamabhyasyata@hprak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacaye satiparipakvātmajńānasyātyantikas'arīraviyogasya bhāvāt. _" _Ibid. _ p. 7. ]

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whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, butNyāya-Vais'e@sika would collect "all whiteness" under the nameof "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed [Footnote ref l]. They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimatemode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notionscould be regarded as the modification of some other notion ornot; but whenever they found that there were some experienceswhich were similar and universal, they classed them as separateentities or categories. 

The six Padārthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Sāmānya, Vis'e@sa, Samavāya. 

Of the six classes of entities or categories (_padārtha_) we havealready given some account of dravya [Footnote ref 2]. Let us now turn tothe others. Of the qualities (_gu@na_) the first one called _rūpa_(colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye aloneand not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (_citra_). Colours arefound only in k@siti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas arepermanent (_nitya_}, but the colour of k@siti changes when heatis applied, and this, S'rīdhara holds, is due to the fact thatheat changes the atomic structure of k@siti (earth) and thus theold constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colouris also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rūpa is the generalname for the specific individual colours. There is the genus _rūpatva_(colourness), and the rūpa gu@na (quality) is that on whichrests this genus; rūpa is not itself a genus and can be apprehendedby the eye. 

The second is _rasa_ (taste), that quality of things which can beapprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent(_ka@tu_), astringent (ka@sāya) and bitter (tikta). Only k@siti and aphave taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa likerūpa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality mustbe distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them areapprehended by the tongue. 

The third is _gandha_ (odour), that quality which can beapprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to k@siti alone. Water

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[Footnote 1: The reference is to Sautrāntika Buddhism, "yo yovruddhādhyāsavān nāsāveka@h. " See Pa@n@ditās'oka's _Avayavinirākarana, Six Buddhist Nyāya tracts_. 

[Footnote 2: The word "padārtha" literally means denotations of words. ]

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or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presenceof earth materials. 

The fourth is _spars'a_ (touch), that quality which can be apprehendedonly by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. Spars'a belongs to k@siti; ap, tejas, andvāyu. The fifth _s'abda_ (sound) is an attribute of ākās'a. Had therebeen no ākās'a there would have been no sound. 

The sixth is sa@mkhyā (number), that entity of quality belongingto things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. Is due to a relativeoscillatory state of the mind (_apek@sābuddhi_); thus when there aretwo jugs before my eyes, I have the notion--This is one jug andthat is another jug. This is called apek@sābuddhi; then in thetwo jugs there arises the quality of twoness (_dvitva_) and then anindeterminate perception (_nirvikalpa-dvitva-gu@na_) of dvitva in usand then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in asimilar manner [Footnote ref 1]. 

The seventh is _parimiti_ (measure), that entity of quality inthings by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small andspeak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms iscalled _parima@n@dala parimā@na_; it is eternal, and it cannot generatethe measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely;when two atoms generate a dyad (_dvya@nuka_) it is notthe measure of the atom that generates the a@nu (atomic) andthe _hrasva_ (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_), for then the size (_parimā@na_) of it would have been still smallerthan the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas themeasure of the dya@nuka is of a different kind, namely thesmall (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, butthen the number (sa@mkhyā) of the atom should be regarded asbringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_)measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka)compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure "small"

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[Footnote 1: This is distinctively a Vais'e@sika view introduced byPras'astapāda. Nyāya seems to be silent on this matter. See S'a@nkaraMis'ra's _Upaskāra_, VII. Ii. 8. ]

[Footnote 2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two formsas eternal as in "paramā@nus" and non-eternal as in the dvya@nuka. Theparima@n@dala parimā@na is thus a variety of a@nuparimā@na. Thea@nuparimā@na and the hrasvaparimā@na represent the two dimensions ofthe measure of dvya@nukas as mahat and dīrgha are with referenceto trya@nukas. See _Nyāyakandalī_, p. 133. ]

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(_hrasva_) of the dyad is the cause of the measure "great" (_mahat_)of the trya@nuka. But when we come to the region of these grosstrya@nukas we find that the "great" measure of the trya@nukas isthe cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed bythem. For as many trya@nukas constitute a gross body, so muchbigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the trya@nukasof mahat parimā@na makes things of still more mahat parimā@na. The measure of trya@nukas is not only regarded as mahatbut also as dīrgha (long) and this dīrgha parimā@na has to be admittedas coexisting with mahat parimā@na but not identical, forthings not only appear as great but also as long (_dīrgha_). Herewe find that the accumulation of trya@nukas means the accumulationof "great" (_mahat_) and "long" (_dīrgha_) parimā@na, and hencethe thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greaterand longer than the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parimā@na of the dyads is not regarded as havinga lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distincttype of measure which is called small (_hrasva_). As accumulationof grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of thehrasva (small) parim_a@na ought to generate still more hrasvaparim_a@na, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure ofthe dyads was the cause of the measure of the trya@nukas, thetrya@nukas should be even smaller than the dya@nukas. So also ifthe atomic and circular (_parima@n@dala_) size of the atoms is regardedas generating by their measure the measure of the dya@nukas, then the measure of the dya@nukas ought to be more atomicthan the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures shouldnot be regarded as representing successively bigger measures producedby the mere cumulation of measures, but each should beregarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreignto the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in thecause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallnessand the parima@n@dala measure of the dyads and atoms ought togenerate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the trya@nuka molecules are seen tobe constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet arenot found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be arguedthat the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate themeasure of their effects, but it is their _number_ which is the cause

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of the measure of the latter. This explains a@nuparimā@na, hrasvaparimā@na, mahat parimā@na, and dīrgha parimā@na. The parimā@naof ākās'a, kāla, dik and ātman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimā@nasof the atoms, ākās'a, kāla, dik, manas, and ātman are regardedas eternal (nitya). All other kinds of parimā@nas as belonging tonon-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal. 

The eighth is _p@rthaktva_ (mutual difference or separateness ofthings), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which thingsappear as different (e. G. This is different from that). Difference isperceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negationsuch as this jug is not this pot. 

The ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na byvirtue of which things appear to us as connected. 

The tenth is _vibhāga_ (separation), that entity of gu@na whichdestroys the connection or contact of things. 

The eleventh and twelfth gu@nas, _paratva_ and _aparatva_, giverise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remoteand near. 

The other gu@nas such as _buddhi_(knowledge), _sukha_ (happiness), _du@hkha_ (sorrow), _icchā_ (will), _dve@sa_ (antipathy or hatred) and_yatna_ (effort) can occur only with reference to soul. 

The characteristic of _gurutva_ (heaviness) is that by virtue ofwhich things fall to the ground. The gu@na of _sneha_ (oiliness)belongs to water. The gu@na of _sa@mskāra_ is of three kinds, (i) _vega_(velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) _sthiti-sthāpaka_ (elasticity) on account of which a gross thingtries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) _bhāvanā_is that quality of ātman by which things are constantly practised or bywhich things experienced are remembered and recognized [Footnote ref l]. _Dharma_ is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoyhappiness or to attain salvation [Footnote ref 2]. _Adharma_ is

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[Footnote 1: Pras'astapāda says that bhāvanā is a special characteristicof the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by whichthings seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Throughunexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc. ) and intensity of interest, thesa@mskāra becomes particularly strong. See _Nyāyakandalī_, p. 167. Ka@nāda however is silent on these points. He only says that by aspecial kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the sa@mskāra, memory (sm@rti) is produced (ix. 2. 6). ]

[Footnote 2: Pras'astapāda speaks of _dharma_ (merit) as being a qualityof the soul. Thereupon S'ridhara points out that this view does not admitthat dharma is a power of karma (_nakarmasāmarthyam_). Sacrifice etc. Cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary they cannot generatethe effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the actionis destroyed its power (_sāmarthya_) cannot last. So dharma is to beadmitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conductwhich produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditionsof time, place, etc. Faith (_s'raddhā_), non-injury, doing good to allbeings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control ofanger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance ofduties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated byPras'astapāda as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres tothese duties and the _yamas_ and _niyamas_ (cf. Patańjali's Yoga) andattains Yoga by a meditation on the six padārthas attains a dharmawhich brings liberation (_mok@sa_). S'rīdhara refers to the Sā@mkhya-Yogaaccount of the method of attaining salvation (_Nyāyakandalī_, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's _Nyāyalilāvatī_, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915. )]

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the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads aman to suffer. _Ad@r@s@ta_ or destiny is that unknown quality ofthings and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, andarranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance withtheir merits or demerits. 

_Karma_ means movement; it is the third thing which mustbe held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or gu@na. Thereare five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds ofkarmas rest on substances just, as the gu@nas do, and cause thethings to which they belong to move. 

_Sāmānya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspectof generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spiteof the difference of colour between one cow and another, both ofthem are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are allperceived as _sat_ or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na, and karma. This sameness is called _sāmānya_ or _jāti_, and it isregarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, orkarma. This highest genus _sattā_ (being) is called _parajāti_ (highestuniversal), the other intermediate jātis are called aparajāti (loweruniversals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, orstill more intermediate jātis such as _gotvājāti_ (the genus cow), _nīlatvajāti_ (the genus blue). The intermediate jātis or generasometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as_pas'utva_ (animal jāti) and _gotva_ (the cow jāti); here howevergotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jāti. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jāti whichfrom one aspect appears as genus and from another as species. 

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This jāti or _sāmānya_ thus must be regarded as having a separateindependent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na andkarma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independentreality of sāmānya, but said that the sameness as cowwas really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perceptionof cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and thisis represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He whoshould regard this sameness to be a separate and independentreality perceived in experience might also discover two hornson his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika said that negationof non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceivedas cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explainedby the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sāmānya hasthus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception assameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in thatobject [Footnote ref l]. This jāti is eternal or non-destructible, for evenwith the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jāti, thelatter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2]. 

Through _vis'e@sa_ things are perceived as diverse. No singlesensation that we receive from the external world probably agreeswith any other sensation, and this difference must be due to theexistence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The, specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipatedsouls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

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[Footnote 1: The Buddhist Panditās'oka says that there is no single thingrunning through different individuals (e. G. Cooks) by virtue of which thesāmānya could be established, for if it did exist then we could haveknown it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his actionof cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. Ifthere is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establishjāti in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. Theaction of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow shouldrequire one common factor to hold them together, then these shouldrequire another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent(_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat_). Sāmānya issuch, therefore sāmānya is non existent. No sāmānya can be admitted toexist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of pastexperiences of existence and non existence that this notion is formed andtransferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no sāmānyacan be pointed out as being externally perceptible--_Sāmānyadūsanadikprasaritā_--in _Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts_. The Vedantaalso does not think that either by perception or by inference we can knowjāti as a separate substance. So it discards jāti. See _Vedāntaparibhāsā_, _Sikhamani_ and _Mamprabhā_, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's_Khan@danakhandakhadya, pp 1079-1086. ]

[Footnote 2: Similarity (sādrs'ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (_tadbhinnatve satitadgatabhūyodharmavattvam_). ]

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is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to theyogins who can perceive them. 

_Samavāya_, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relationby virtue of which two different things such as substance andattribute, substance and karma, substance and sāmānya, karana(cause) and kārya (effect), atoms and vis'e@sa, appear so unifiedthat they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause whysubstance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jāti in substanceand attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if theyare one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take placebetween two things of the same nature which exist as disconnectedand may later on be connected (_yutasiddha_), such as when I putmy pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substancesand were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na byvirtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavāyahowever makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya andgu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear asone inseparable whole (_ayutasiddha_). This relation is thus aseparate and independent category. This is not regarded asmany like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal becauseit has no cause. This or that object (eg. Jug) may be destroyedbut the samavāya relation which was never brought into beingby anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1]. 

These six things are called the six padārthas or independentrealities experienced in perception and expressed in language. 

The Theory of Causation. 

The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika in most of its speculations took thatview of things which finds expression in our language, and whichwe tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

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[Footnote 1: The Vedānta does not admit the existence of the relation ofsamavāya as subsisting between two different entities (e. G. Substanceand qualities). Thus S'a@nkara says (_Brahma-sūtrabhā@sya II. Ii. 13_)that if a samavāya relation is to be admitted to connect two differentthings, then another samavāya would be necessary to connect it witheither of the two entities that it intended to connect, and thatanother, and so there will be a vicious infinite (_anavasthā_). Nyāya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well toremember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of_anavasthā_--_prāmā@nikī_ (valid infinite, as in case of the questionof the seed and the tree, or of the avidyā and the passions), and another_aprāmā@nikī anavasthā_ (vicious infinite) as when the admission ofanything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed. ]

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they admitted dravya, gu@na, karma and sāmānya, Vis'e@sa theyhad to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they didnot admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by achange of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that theeffect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held thatthe material cause (e. G. Clay) had some power within it, and theaccessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, thewheel etc. ) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyedthe cause, and produced the effect which was not existentbefore but was newly produced. This is what is called thedoctrine of _asatkāryavāda_. This is just the opposite of theSā@mkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed _nābhāvovidyate sata@h_) and that the non-existent could never beproduced (_nāsato vidyate bhāvah_). The objection to this view isthat if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossiblethings as the hare's horn could also be produced. TheNyāya-Vais'e@sika answer is that the view is not that anythingthat is non-existent can be produced, but that which is producedwas non-existent [Footnote ref 1]. 

It is held by Mīmā@msā that an unseen power resides in thecause which produces the effect. To this Nyāya objects that thisis neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, forthere is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendentaloperation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explainedby molecular movement (_parispanda_). There is nothingexcept the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence)between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness ofan antecedent does not suffice to make it the cause of whatsucceeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well(_anyathāsiddhis'ūnyasya niyatāpūrvavarttitā_). Unconditionalityand invariability are indispensable for _kāryakāra@na-bhāva_ orcause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential oradventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may alsobe invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, onlycollateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditionalupon something else (_na svātantrye@na_). The potter's stick is anunconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

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[Footnote 1: _Nyāyamuńjari_, p. 494. ]

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of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompanimentor accident which does not contribute to the work done, isnot an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore beregarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariableantecedents or what enters into the production of theirco-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but theyare not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by thoseof the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, thesound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariablyprecedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and ākās'a (ether) as thesubstrate and vāyu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter intothe production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditionalantecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumerationof conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of theconditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedentof the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to thepotter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only beunconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finallyall seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed withor left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regardedas causal conditions. Thus Dr. Seal in describing it rightlyremarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary tocomplete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i. E. Of the relevant from theirrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure ofenergy. This test the Nyāya would accept only in the sense ofan operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (_parispandaeva bhautiko vyāpāra@h karotyartha@h atīndriyastu vyāparonāsti. _ Jayanta's Mańjari Āhnika I), but would emphaticallyreject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysteriouscausal power or efficiency (_s'akti_) [Footnote ref 1]. " With Nyāya allenergy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyāya--itsinsisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operationsof the different causal conditions--that these operations are ofthe nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holdsto the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i. E. A redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutelyrepudiates the Sā@mkhya conception of power or productive

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[Footnote 1: Dr P. C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250. ]

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efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_atīndriya_) and findsnothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complementsof operative conditions (_kāra@na-sāmagrī_), and nothingin the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which resultsfrom the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1]. Certain general conditions such as relative space (_dik_), time(_kāla_), the will of Īs'vara, destiny (_ad@r@s@ta_) are regardedas the common cause of all effects (_kāryatva-prayojaka_). Those arecalled _sādhāra@na-kāra@na_ (common cause) as distinguished from thespecific causes which determine the specific effects which are called_sādhāra@na kāra@na_. It may not be out of place here to notice thatNyāya while repudiating transcendental power (_s'akti_) in the mechanismof nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence ofmetaphysical conditions like merit (_dharma_), which constitutes asystem of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanicalsystems and order of nature. 

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertainedonly by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement inpresence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction froma certain _a priori_ principle like that of causality or identity ofessence [Footnote ref 2]. 

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the_samavāyi-kāra@na_ of the jug. _Samavāya_ means as we have seenan intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A kāra@na is called_samavāyi_ when its materials are found inseparably connectedwith the materials of the effect. Asamavāyi-kāra@na is that whichproduces its characteristics in the effect through the medium ofthe samavāyi or material cause, e. G. The clay is not the cause ofthe colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of thecolour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clayin inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. Thiscolour of the clay is thus called the asamavāyi cause of the jug. Any quality (_gu@na_) or movement which existing in the samavāyacause in the samavāya relation determines the characteristics ofthe effect is called the asamavāyi-kāra@na. The instrumental

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[Footnote 1: Dr P. C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, 1909, pp. 249-250. ]

[Footnote 2: See for this portion Dr B. N. Seal's _Positive Sciences of theAncient Hindus_, pp. 263-266. _Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_ on Buddhism. _Nyāyamańjarī Bhā@sā-pariccheda_, with _Muktāvalī_ and _Dinakarī_, and_Tarkas@mgraha_. The doctrine of Anyathāsiddhi was systematicallydeveloped from the time of Ga@nges'a. ]

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_nimitta_ and accessory (_sahakāri_) causes are those which help thematerial cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheeland the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakćricauses of the effect. 

We know that the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika regards the effect as nonexistent, before the operation of the cause in producing it, but itholds that the gu@nas in the cause are the causes of the gu@nas inthe effect, e. G. The black colour of the clay is the cause of theblack colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as anextraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clayjug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though thecolour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another importantexception is to be found in the case of the production ofthe parimā@nas of dvya@nukas and trasare@nus which are not producedby the parimā@nas of an a@nu or a dya@nuka, but by theirnumber as we have already seen. 

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (S@r@s@ti). 

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systemsexcept the Mīmā@msā [Footnote ref 1]. According to the Nyāya-Vais'e@sikaview Īs'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beingsdesires to bring about dissolution (_sa@mhāreccho bhavati_). Simultaneouslywith it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls andforming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act(_s'akti-pratibandha_). As a result of this no further bodies, senses, or other products come into being. Then for the bringing aboutof the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Īs'vara)the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinationsas bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced tothe disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and thenall vāyu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associatedwith dharma, adharma and past impressions (_sa@mskāra_) remainsuspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know thatsouls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless, non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connectedwith bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity ofmanas. In the state of pralaya owing to the ad@r@s@ta of souls the

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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of pralaya and s@r@s@ti is found only in laterNyāya-Vais'e@sika works, but the sūtras of both the systems seem to besilent on the matter. ]

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atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on thepart of Īs'vara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it togive some rest to the sufferings of the living beings. 

At the time of creation, Īs'vara wishes to create and this desireof Īs'vara works in all the souls as ad@r@s@ta. This one eternaldesire of Īs'vara under certain conditions of time (e. G. Of pralaya)as accessory causes (_sahakāri_) helps the disintegration of atomsand at other times (e. G. That of creation) the constructive processof integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation. When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is calledad@r@s@ta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of thisad@r@s@ta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play. At the time of creation action first begins in the vāyu atoms bythe kinetic function of this ad@r@s@ta, by the contact of the soulswith the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contactwith one another and the dvya@nukas are formed and then in asimilar way the trya@nukas are formed, and thus vāyu originates. After vāyu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of wateratoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earthatoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in thegross form, the god Brahmā and all the worlds are created byĪs'vara and Brahmā is directed by Īs'vara to do the rest of thework. Brahmā thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering ofthe fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Īs'vara bringsabout this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the goodof all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that theymay lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try forthe attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Īs'varaarranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering ofpains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as inour ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizesor punishments according to good or bad deeds [Footnote ref 1]. Many Nyāyabooks do not speak of the appointment of a Brahmā as deputyfor supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karmaaccording to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya andcreation were brought about in accordance with the karma ofmen, or that it may be due to a mere play (_līlā_) of Īs'vara. Īs'vara is one, for if there were many Īs'varas they might quarrel. The will of Īs'vara not only brings about dissolution and creation, __________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyakandalī_, pp. 48-54. ]

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but also acts always among us in a general way, for without itour karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal ofpleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in theexterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen. The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions. Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modificationstake place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire(_icchā_) of Īs'vara may thus be compared with the _icchā_ of Īs'varaas we find it in the Yoga system. 

Proof of the Existence of Īs'vara. 

Sā@mkhya asserts that the teleology of the prak@rti is sufficientto explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. TheMīmā@msakas, the Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Jains alldeny the existence of Īs'vara (God). Nyāya believes that Īs'varahas fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existingatoms. For every effect (e. G. A jug) must have its cause. Ifthis be so, then this world with all its order and arrangementmust also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause isĪs'vara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose, but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is acollocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individualobjects (e. G. Jug, etc. ), which we call effects. The worldbeing an effect like any other effect must have a cause like anyother effect. The objection made against this view is that sucheffects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agentsas their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers, oceans etc. Is so utterly different in form from ordinary effectsthat we notice every day, that the law that every effect must havea cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. Theanswer that Nyāya gives is that the concomitance between twothings must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specificpeculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I hadseen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and hadthence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there isfire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and smallfires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could leadus to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore largevolumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not besufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?

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Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effectsare preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariablyand unconditionally preceded by causes. This world thereforebeing an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause isĪs'vara. This cause we cannot see, because Īs'vara has no visiblebody, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said thatwe see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they arenot produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyāyaanswer is that even they are created by God, for they are alsoeffects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is notbecause there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannotbe seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there wasno invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he pointto it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not doneit is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimatefor us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shootsas well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause. This cause is Īs'vara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful. At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like ourfather who is always engaged in doing us good [Footnote ref 1]. 

Tht Nyāya-Vais'e@sika Physics. 

The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms. These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity(or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour, taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation ofheat. Ākās'a (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less beingonly as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travelwave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combinationis only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannotexist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmosphericair however consists of atoms in an uncombined state. 

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule (_dvya@nuka_). Two, three, four, or five dvya@nukas form themselves into grosser moleculesof trya@nuka, catura@nuka, etc. [Footnote ref 2]. Though this was thegenerally current view, there was also another view as has been pointedout by Dr B. N. Seal in his _Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_, thatthe "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite, " and that

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[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's _Nyāyamańjarī, _ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's_Kusumāńjali_ with _Prakās'a_ and _Īs'varānumāna_ of Raghunātha. ]

[Footnote 2: _Kadācit tribhirārabhyate iti trya@nukamityucyate, kadācitcaturbhirārabhyate kadācit pańcabhiriti yathe@s@ta@m kalpanā. Nyāyakandalī_, p. 32. ]

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they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling intogroups of threes, fours, etc. , directly, or by the successive additionof one atom to each preceding aggregate [Footnote ref l]. " Of course theatoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. Itmust however be noted in this connection that behind thisphysical explanation of the union of atoms there is the ad@r@s@ta, thewill of Īs'vara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmonywith the principle of a "moral government of the universe, "so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for thedue disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substancethus produced by primary atomic combination may however sufferqualitative changes under the influence of heat (_pākajotpatti_)"The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvya@nuka into theatoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determiningthem all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impingereunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or othermolecules in different orders or arrangements, which account forthe specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vais'e@sikaholds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, thenchange of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination, under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrineof _pīlupāka_ (heating of atoms). Nyāya on the other hand thinksthat no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities, but it is the molecules which assume new characters under theinfluence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyāya directly affectsthe characters of the molecules and changes their qualities withouteffecting a change in the atoms. Nyāya holds that theheat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object andthereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole isnot disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, forsuch a procedure is never experienced by observation. This iscalled the doctrine of _pi@tharapāka_ (heating of molecules). Thisis one of the few points of difference between the later Nyāyaand Vais'e@sika systems [Footnote ref 2]. 

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the

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[Footnote 1: Utpala's commentary on _Brhatsamh@itā_ I. 7. ]

[Footnote 2: See Dr B. N. Seal in P. C. Ray's _Hindu Chemistry_, pp. 190-191, _Nyāyamańjarī_, p 438, and Udyotakara's _Vārttika_. There is very littleindication in the Nyāya and _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ that they had any ofthose differences indicated here. Though there are slight indications ofthese matters in the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ (VII. 1), the _Nyāya sūtras_ arealmost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theoryof creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place afterVātsyāyana. ]

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atoms of the same bhūta or of many bhūtas. According to theNyāya view there are no differences in the atoms of the samebhūta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of thecompound of the same bhūta are due only to diverse collocationsof those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. I. 4) that there is nodifference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed, since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impactof heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat andheat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastesetc. In the original bhūta atoms. The change of these physicalcharacters depends on the colours etc. Of the constituent substancesin contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on thespecies of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaksbodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and formsseparate bodies with them. 

Pras'astapāda (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that inthe higher compounds of the same bhūta the transformation takesplace (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compoundmolecules, atoms specially determined as the compoundand not in the original atoms of the bhūta entering into the compositionof the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd, the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determinedas milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that themilk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of theoriginal bhūta of which the milk is a modification. The changeas curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk moleculehas not to be disintegrated into k@siti or ap atoms. So again inthe fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which inthe Vais'e@sika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompanimentsof other bhūtas) are broken up into homogeneous earthatoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animalheat and biomotor force vāyu to form the germ (_kalala_). Butwhen the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from theblood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules ofthe germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i. E. Atoms specificallydetermined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm. These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms ofthe food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues [Footnote ref 1]. This atomic contact is called _ārambhaka-sa@myoga_. 

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[Footnote 1: See Dr B. N. Seal's _Positive Sciences, _ pp. 104-108, and_Nyāyakandalī_, pp. 33-34, "_S'arīrārambhe paramānava eva kāra@nam nas'ukra-s'onitasannipāta@h kriyāvibhāgādinyāyena tayorvinās'e satiutpannapākajai@h paramā@nubhirārambhāt, na ca s'ukras'onitaparamā@nūnā@mkas'cidvis'e@sa@h pārthivatvāvis'e@sāt.... Pitu@h s'ukra@m mātuh s'onita@mtayos sannipātānantara@m ja@tharānalasambandhāt s'ukra-s'onitārambhake@suparamā@nu@su pūrvarūpādivinās'e samā@nagu@nāntarotpattaudvya@nukādikrame@na kalalas'arirotpatti@h tatrāntahkara@napraves'o... Tatramāturāhāraraso mātrayā sa@mkrāmate, ad@r@s@tavas'āttatrapunarja@tharānalasambandhāt kalalārambhakaparamā@nu@sukriyāvibhāgadinyāyena kalalas'arīre na@s@te samutpannapākajai@hkalalārambhakaparamā@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'ādupajātakriyairāhāraparamā@nitbhi@h saha sambhūyas'arīrāntaramārakkyate. "_. ]

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In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there isanother kind of contact called _upa@s@tambha_. Thus in the case ofsuch compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atomscannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded bythe water atoms which congregate round the former, and by theinfra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiarqualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compoundsare also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vāyu atoms form theinner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e. G. Gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surroundingupa@s@tambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap)are regarded as physical mixtures. 

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all thestores of heat required for chemical change. But there aredifferences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind ofcontact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemicalaction which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from whattransforms flavour or taste. 

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitelysmall particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions rectilineallywith inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate throughthe interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, aswhen water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparencylight rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with _parispanda_of the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-gamana_). In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and reboundback--which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike theatoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transformthe physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recombinethem, all by means of continual impact with inconceivablevelocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemicalcombination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyāya writer says thatpāka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that

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[Footnote 1: See Dr Seal's _Positive Sciences of the Hindus_. ]

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changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generatesor changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain thesame a particular kind of heat may change the smell. Whengrass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds ofheat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell intosuch forms as those that belong to milk [Footnote ref 1]. 

In the Nyāya-Vais`e@sika system all action of matter on matteris thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (_prayatna_) isdistinguished from all forms of motion as against the Sā@mkhyadoctrine which considered everything other than puru@sa (intelligence)to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and thereforeto be subject to vibratory motion. 

The Origin of Knowledge (Pramā@na). 

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of themost favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. Wehave already seen that Sā@mkhya-Yoga explained it by supposingthat the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of theobject of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed wasthen intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or puru@sa. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due toa withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligenceof the self. 

Nyāya-Vais`e@sika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblageof certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (_sāmagrī_)which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as wellas intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradictedand determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thuscalled pramā@na or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge[Footnote ref 2]. None of the separate elements composing

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[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Nyāyabodhinī_ on _Tarkasa@mgraha_, pp. 9, 10. ]

[Footnote 2: "_Avyabhicārinīmasandigdhārthopalabdhi@m vidadhatībodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramā@nam. _" _Nyāyamańjarī_, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "pramā@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause ofknowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I havefollowed, but it emphasizes the side of vyāpāra or movement ofthe senses, etc. By virtue of which the objects come in contact withthem and knowledge is produced. Thus Vācaspati says: "_siddhamindriyādi, asiddhańca tatsannikar@sādi vyāpārayannutpādayan kara@na eva caritārtha@hkar@na@m tvindriyādi tatsannikar@sādi vā nānyatra caritarthamitisāk@sādupalabdhāveva phale vyāprīyate. _" _Tātparya@tīkā_, p. 15. Thus itis the action of the senses as pramā@na which is the direct cause ofthe production of knowledge, but as this production could not have takenplace without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded ascauses in some sense. _"Pramāt@rprameyayo@h. Pramānecaritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h. Pramāt@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetū kathańcit. "Ibid. _ p. 16. ]

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the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is onlytheir joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, forsometimes the absence of a single element composing the causalcollocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Ofcourse the collocation or combination is not an entity separatedfrom the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is thepreceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly. These involve not only intellectual elements (e. G. Indeterminatecognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things inupamāna, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblageof such physical things (e. G. Proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc. ), which are all indispensable forthe origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elementsall co-operate in the same plane, combine together and producefurther determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocationsthat is called pramā@na. 

Nyāya argues that in the Sā@mkhya view knowledge originatesby the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particularstate of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge doesnot belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it containswithin it the content and the form of the concept or the percept(knowledge). The puru@sa to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, asit always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendentalcontact of the puru@sa with buddhi is but a mere semblanceor appearance or illusion, then the Sā@mkhya has to admitthat there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledgeis false. And since all knowledge is false, the Sā@mkhyists haveprecious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge. 

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrinethat simultaneously with the generation of an object there is theknowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to therise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neitheris the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by theknowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It isevident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

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express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object areboth but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comesthis correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate theobject. The doctrine of the Vijńāna vādins, that it is knowledgealone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is alsoirrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and objectin such a manner that knowledge as object should requirethe knowledge as subject to illuminate it? If this be the case wemight again expect that knowledge as knowledge should alsorequire another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on_ad infinitum_. Again if pramā@na be defined as _prāpa@na_ (capacityof being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things beingmomentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannotbe realized, so there would be nothing which could be calledpramā@na. These views moreover do not explain the origin ofknowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect likeany other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the sameway as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causesintellectual and physical [Footnote ref 1]. There is no transcendentelement involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a productionon the same plane as that in which many physical phenomenaare produced [Footnote ref 2]. 

The four Pramā@nas of Nyāya. 

We know that the Carvākas admitted perception (_pratyak@sa_)alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and theVais'e@sika admitted two sources, pratyak@sa and inference (_anumāna_);Sā@mkhya added _s'abda_ (testimony) as the third source;

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 12-26. ]

[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gańges'a, a later naiyāyika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result ofour inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing withthe activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us tosuccessful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am surethat if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall besuccessful, I call it valid knowledge. _Tattvacintāma@ni_, K. Tarkavāgīs'a's edition, _Prāmā@nyavāda_. 

"The _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramā@na. The viewthat Vais'e@sika only admitted two pramā@nas, perception and inference, istraditionally accepted, _"pratyak@sameka@mcārvākā@h ka@nādasugatau puna@hanumānańca taccāpi, _ etc. " Pras'astapāda divides all cognition (_buddhi_)as _vidyā_ (right knowledge) and _avidyā_ (ignorance). Under _avidyā_ hecounts _sa@ms'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion orerror), _anadhyavasāya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man whohad never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what itmay be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidyā_) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages(_ār@sa_). Interpreting the _Vais'e@sika sūtras_ I. I. 3, VI. I. 1, and VI. I. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthycharacter of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid inthemselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from thetrustworthy character of their author. _Arthāpatti_ (implication) and_anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also classed as inference and _upamāna_(analogy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same asfaith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference. ]

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Nyāya adds a fourth, _upamāna_ (analogy). The principle on whichthe four-fold division of pramā@nas depends is that the causalcollocation which generates the knowledge as well as the natureor characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases isdifferent. The same thing which appears to us as the object ofour perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda(testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledgebeing different in each case, and the manner or conditionsproducing knowledge being different in each case, it is to beadmitted that inference and s'abda are different pramā@nas, thoughthey point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyāyathus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamānawithin inference, on the ground that since the mode of productionof knowledge is different, these are to be held as differentpramā@nas [Footnote ref 1]. 

Perception (Pratyak@sa). 

The naiyāyikas admitted only the five cognitive senses whichthey believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristicof that element of which they were composed. Thus theear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute ofākās'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. Theeye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc. , of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objectsby going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The cognitive senses (_vāk, pāni, pāda, pāyu_, and _upastha_) recognizedin Sā@mkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as suchfor the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by thegeneral motor functions of the body. 

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by thecontact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and errornot associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

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[Footnote 1:

 _Sāmagrībhedāi phalabhedācca pramā@nabheda@h Anye eva hi sāmagrīphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h Anye eva ca sāmagrīphale s'abdopamānayo@h. Nyāyamańjari_, p. 33. ]

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as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, justat the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate[Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot becounted as perception but as sound-knowledge (_s'abda-pramā@na_). That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contactof the senses with the object is said to be the product ofthe perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate(_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perceptionis that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment ofperception in which it appears without any association with name. Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stageis just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristicsand qualities and names just as we find in all our concreteexperience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with theircharacteristics and universals, but at this stage there being noassociation of name it is more or less indistinct. When once thenames are connected with the percept it forms the determinateperception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyak@sa. If at the timeof having the perception of a thing of which the name is not knownto me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that shouldbe regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only thatproduct is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which resultsfrom the perceiving process of the contact of the senses withthe object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it isheld by the later naiyāyikas that we are not conscious of itdirectly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary firststage without which the determinate consciousness could notarise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stagein the process of perception. At the second stage it joins theother conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception. The contact of the sense with the object is regardedas being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) calledsa@myoga, (2) contact with the gu@nas (qualities) through the thing(_sa@myukta-samavāya_) in which they inhere in samavāya (inseparable)relation, (3) contact with the gu@nas (such as colour etc. ) inthe generic character as universals of those qualities, e. G. Colourness(rūpatva), which inhere in the gu@nas in the samavāya relation. 

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[Footnote 1: Gańges'a, a later naiyāyika of great reputation, describesperception as immediate awareness (_pratyak@sasya sāk@sātkāritvamlak@sa@nam_). ]

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This species of contact is called sa@myukta-samaveta-samavāya, for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colouris in samavāya relation, and in the specific colour there is thecolour universal or the generic character of colour in samavāyarelation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavāyaby which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditorysense is ākās'a and the sound exists in ākās'a in the samavāyarelation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiarkind of contact called samaveta-samavāya. (5) The genericcharacter of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceivedby the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavāya. (6) There isanother kind of contact by which negation (_abhāva_) is perceived, namely sa@myukta vis'e@sa@na (as qualifying contact). This is socalled because the eye perceives only the empty space which isqualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation. Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye inthis case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jugis only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived alongwith the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seenthat Nyāya admits not only the substances and qualities but allkinds of relations as real and existing and as being directlyapprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented). 

The most important thing about the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika theoryof perception is this that the whole process beginning from thecontact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perceptionof the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of itsusefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perceptionand its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses andthe objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contactbetween which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledgeis indeed _arthaprakās'a, _ revelation of objects, and it is calledperception when the sense factors are the instruments of itsproduction and the knowledge produced is of the objects withwhich the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses withthe objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Notonly in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact withthe objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well. The senses according to Nyāya-Vais`e@sika are material and we haveseen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental(_atīndriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory

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movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1]. The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced bythe conglomeration and movements of physical causes. WhenI perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touchnot only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with theuniversals associated with them in a relation of inherence and alsowith the object itself of which the colour etc. Are predicated. Theresult of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _ālocanajńāna_(sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused thememory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character(_sukhasādhanatvasm@rti_) and as a result of that I perceive theorange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurableobject should also be regarded as a direct result of perceptionthrough the action of the memory operating as a concomitantcause (sahakāri). I perceive the orange with the eye and understandthe pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereuponunderstand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So thoughthis perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact andhence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successiveintermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contactand if it appertains to the object with which the sense isin contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensablecondition of all perceptions and not only can the sensesbe in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universalsassociated with them but also with negation. A perception iserroneous when it presents an object in a character which it doesnot possess (_atasmi@mstaditi_) and right knowledge (_pramā_) is thatwhich presents an object with a character which it really has

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[Footnote 1:

 _Na khalvatīndriyā s'aktirasmābhirupagamyate yayā saha na kāryyasya sambandhajńānasambhava@h. 

 Nyāyamańjarī_, p. 69. ]

[Footnote 2:

 _Sukhādi manasā buddhvā kapitthādi ca cak@su@sā tasya karanatā tatra manasaivāvagamyate... ... Sambandhagraha@nakāle yattatkapitthādivi@sayamak@sajam jńānam tadupādeyādijńānaphalamiti bhā@syak@rtas'cetasi sthitam sukhasādhanatvajńānamupādeyajńānam. 

 _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71. ]

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(_tadvati tatprakārakānubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases ofperceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditionsthat it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended asa different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in adesert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminatestage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thusfar there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object isconcerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to thesimilarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a streamthat it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observesthat on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousingof the memory of similar objects, the object with which the senseis in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with thecharacteristics of other objects and this is what is meant byillusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there isno sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevantmemories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. Thisdoctrine of illusion is known as _viparītakhyāti_ or _anyathākhyāti. _ Whatexisted in the mind appeared as the object before us (_h@rdayeparisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhāsanam_) [Footnote ref 5]. Later Vais'e@sikaas interpreted by Pras'astapāda and S'rīdhara is in full agreementwith Nyāya in this doctrine of illusion (_bhrama_ or as Vais'e@sikacalls it _viparyaya_) that the object of illusion is always the rightthing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusionconsists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6]. 

I have pointed out above that Nyāya divided perception intotwo classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate)according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vācaspatisays, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as aparticular; the perception of an orange at this _avikalpika_ or_nirvikalpika_ stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also theuniversal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal

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[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's _Nyāyavārttika_, p. 37, and Ga@nges'a's_Tattvacintāma@ni, _ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_. ]

[Footnote 2: "_Indriye@nālocya marīcīn uccāvacamuccalato nirvikalpenag@rhītvā pas'cāttatropaghātado@sāt viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayobhrānto jāyate tasmādvijńānasya uvabhicāro nārthasya, _ Vācaspati's_Tātparyatīkā_, " p. 87. ]

[Footnote 3: _Nyāyamańjarī, _ p. 88. ]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid. _ pp. 89 and 184. ]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid. _ p. 184. ]

[Footnote 6: _Nyāyakandalī, _ pp. 177-181, "_S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@nado@sasahakārinā rajatasa@mskārasacivena sād@rs'yamanurundhatās'uktikāvi@sayo rajatādhyavasāya@h k@rta@h. _"]

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it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange. "The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated withthe particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and notas terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance andattribute (_jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi na tu jātyādīnā@m mithovis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhāvāvagāhīti yāvat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinksthat such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associatedwith name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished inperception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that donot know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinarypersons, for the association of the names and relations could bedistinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2]. S'rīdhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems to be largelyin agreement with the above view of Vācaspati. Thus S'rīdhara saysthat in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceivedbut the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memoryof other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unificationsuch as can only result by comparison. But the differences and theuniversals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are notconsciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this, "which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3]. Vācaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definitesubject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyāyawriters however, following Ga@nges'a, hold an altogether differentopinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledgemeans the knowledge of mere predication without any associationwith the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpastage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptualcognition and not a psychological stage. They would

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[Footnote 1: _Tātparya@tikā_, p. 81, also _ibid. _ p. 91, "_prathamamālocito'rtha@h sāmānyavis'e@savān. _"]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid. _ p. 84, "_tasmādvyutpannasyāpi nāmadheyasmara@nāyapūrvame@sitavyo vinaiva nāmadheyamarthapratyaya@h. _"]

[Footnote 3: _Nyāyakandalī, _p. 189 ff. , "_ata@h savikalpakamicchatānirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam, tacca na sāmānyamātram g@rh@nāti bhedasyāpipratibhāsanāt nāpi svalak@sa@namātram sāmānyākārasyāpi sa@mvedanātvyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhānācca, kintu sāmānya@mvis'e@sańcobhayamapi g@rh@nāti yadi paramida@m sāmānyamayam vis'e@sa@hityeva@m vivicya na pratyeti vastvantarānusandhānavirahāt, pi@ndāntarānuv@rttigraha@nāddhi sāmānya@m vivicyate, vyāv@rttigraha@nādvis'e@soyamiti viveka@h. _"]

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not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossibleto have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or aquality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate(_vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajńānam prati hi vis'e@sa@natāvacchedakaprakāra@mjńāna@m kāra@na@m_) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledgesuch as "I see a cow, " "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it mustbe preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only theindeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnectedwith universality or any other relations (_jātyādiyojanārahita@mvais'i@s@tyānavagāhi ni@sprakārakam nirvikalpaka@m_) [Footnote ref 2]. But this stage is never psychologically experienced (_atīndriya_)and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their syntheticconception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicatewith a subject. Thus Vis'vanātha says in his Siddhāntamuktāvalī, "the cognition which does not involve relationingcannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I knowthe jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content ofjugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms thepredicative quality (_vis'e@sa@natāvacchedaka_) of the predicate 'jug'which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have theknowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicativequality, the content [Footnote ref 3]. " But in order that the knowledgeof the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage atwhich the universal or the pure predication should be knownand this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which thoughnot testified by experience is after all logically indispensablynecessary. In the proposition "It is a cow, " the cow is anuniversal, and this must be intuited directly before it could berelated to the particular with which it is associated. 

But both the old and the new schools of Nyāya and Vais'e@sikaadmitted the validity of the savikalpa perception whichthe Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentaryparticulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universalsand thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by theperception of objects is not erroneous and is directly producedby objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perceptionconsists in the attribution of jāti (universal), gu@na (quality), ____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tattvacintāma@ni_ p. 812. ]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. P. 809. ]

[Footnote 3: _Siddhāntamuktāvalī_ on _Bhā@sāpariccheda kārikā_, 58. ]

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kriyā (action), nāma (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated arenot different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predicationof an universal in the savikalpa perception involves thefalse creation of a difference where there was none. So also thequality is not different from the substance and to speak of athing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. Thesame remark applies to action, for motion is not something differentfrom that which moves. But name is completely differentfrom the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if itwas a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" arealtogether different and there is no unity between them. Nowas regards the first three objections it is a question of the differenceof the Nyāya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyāya and Vais'e@sika believe jāti, gu@naand kriyā to be different from substance and therefore the predicatingof them of substance as different categories related to itat the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded aserroneous. As to the fourth objection Vācaspati replies that thememory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot makethe perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannotin any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associateduntil the second stage through the joint action of memoryis easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary inorder to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne inmind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associatedwith it as being the same as was previously acquired, therecannot be any objection to the association of the name. But theBuddhists further object that there is no reason why one shouldidentify a thing seen at the present moment as being that whichwas seen before, for this identity is never the object of visualperception. To this Vācaspati says that through the help ofmemory or past impressions (_sa@mskāra_) this can be consideredas being directly the object of perception, for whatever may bethe concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

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[Footnote 1: _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 93-100, "_Pańca caite kalpanā bhavantijātikalpanā, gu@nakalpanā, kriyākalpanā, nāmakalpanā dravyakalpanā ceti, tās'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanāt kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanātkalpanā ucyante. _" See Dharmakīrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book. ]

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present, this perception of identity should be regarded as aneffect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that anobject of past experience refers to a past time and place andis not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified withan object which is experienced at the present moment. Ithas to be admitted that Vācaspati's answer is not very satisfactoryfor it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perceptionwhich was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to seethat early Nyāya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perceptionas invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa anddiffered from it only in this, that a name was associated withthe thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradualdevelopment of perception as the progressive effects of causaloperations continued through the contacts of the mind with theself and the object under the influence of various intellectual(e. G. Memory) and physical (e. G. Light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedānta, require that right perception should onlygive knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variationas well as production of knowledge in the soul depends uponthe variety of causal collocations. 

Mind according to Nyāya is regarded as a separate senseand can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathyand will. The later Nyāya writers speak of three other kindsof contact of a transcendental nature called _sāmānyalak@sa@na, jńānalak@sa@na_ and _yogaja_ (miraculous). The contact sāmānyalak@sa@nais that by virtue of which by coming in contact with aparticular we are transcendentally (_alaukika_) in contact with allthe particulars (in a general way) of which the correspondinguniversal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke andthrough it my sense is in contact with the universal associatedwith smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with allsmoke in general. Jńānalak@sa@na contact is that by virtue of whichwe can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceivingby any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece ofsandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contactof the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendentalcontact (_alaukika sannikar@sa_) by virtue of which this is rendered

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[Footnote 1: _Tātparya@tīkā_, pp. 88-95. ]

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possible is called jńānalak@sa@na. But the knowledge acquired bythese two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l]. 

Pleasures and pains (_sukha_ and _du@hkha_) are held by Nyāyato be different from knowledge (jńāna). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. Are never found toappear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feelthat we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannotbe self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, thenthat experience which generates sukha in one should have generatedthe same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it shouldhave manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does nothappen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one mightnot do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument'ssake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between thepleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one casewas associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha, This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge. Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generatedby the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested throughor in association with other objects either in direct perception orin memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated inthe self as a result of causal operation. It should however beremembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causesin their production. 

The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the mostdistant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this powerby gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceivethe subtlest and most distant objects directly by theirmind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notionsof future events which come to be true, e. G. Sometimes I mayhave the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come, "

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[Footnote 1:_Siddhāntamuktāvalī_ on _Kārikā_ 63 and 64. We must rememberthat Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the_Nyāya sūtra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perceptionshould be defined as that cognition which has the special class-characterof direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perceptionas the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle(_Tattvacintāma@ni_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by himas the cause of perception, but it should not be included in thedefinition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first byUdyotakara as mentioned above. ]

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and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhānajńāna, which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directlyby the mind. This is of course different from the other formof perception called mānasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories ofpast perceptions by other senses are associated with a perceptvisualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceivethat it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by theeye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visualpercept with it. According to Vedānta this acquired perceptionis only a case of inference. The prātibha-pratyak@sa however isthat which is with reference to the happening of a future event. When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objectivecognition, e. G. This is a pot, but after this it is again related tothe self by the mind as "I know this pot. " This is effected bythe mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognitionwhich had already been generated in the soul. This secondreperception is called anuvyavasāya, and all practical work canproceed as a result of this anuvyavasāya [Footnote ref. L]. 

Inference. 

Inference (_anumāna_) is the second means of proof (prāmā@na)and the most valuable contribution that Nyāya has made hasbeen on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about athing on the strength of the mark or lińga which is associatedwith it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we rememberthat since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be firein yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technicallycalled lińga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has beenmade (the hill in this example) is called pak@sa, and the term"fire" is called sādhya. To make a correct inference it isnecessary that the hetu or lińga must be present in the pak@sa, ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This later Nyāya doctrine that the cognition of self inassociation with cognition is produced at a later moment must becontrasted with the _triputīpratyak@sa_ doctrine of Prabhākara, whichholds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneouslyin knowledge. Vyavasāya (determinate cognition), according to Ga@nges'a, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I amaware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeedingthe former one and is called anu (after) vyavasāya (cognition), "_idamaha@mjānāmīti vyavasāye na bhāsate taddhakendriyasannikar@sābhāvātkintvida@mvi@sayakajńānatvavis'i@s@tasya jńānasya vais'i@styamātmanibhāsate; na ca svaprakās'e vyavasāya tād@rs'a@m svasya vais'i@s@tya@mbhāsitumarhati, pūrva@m vis'e@sa@nasya tasyājńānāt, tasmādidamaha@mjānāmiti na vyavasāya@h kintu anuvyavasāyah. " _Tattvacintāma@ni_, p. 795. ]

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and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having thesādhya in it (sapak@sa-sattā), i. E. , which are known to possess thesādhya (possessing fire in the present example). The lińga mustnot be present in any such object as does not possess thesādhya (_vipak@sa-vyāv@rtti_ absent from vipak@sa or that which doesnot possess the sādhya). The inferred assertion should not besuch that it is invalidated by direct perception {_pratyak@sa_) orthe testimony of the s'āstra (_abādhita-vi@sayatva_). The lińgashould not be such that by it an inference in the opposite waycould also be possible (_asat-pratipak@sa_). The violation of anyone of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetuas determining the inference, and thus would only make thehetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvābhāsa orseeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visibleis fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here thepak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvābhāsa is technicallycalled _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvābhāsa of the second type, technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the casethat sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "beingcreated" is present in the opposite of sādhya {_vipak@sa_), namelynon-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a qualitywhich belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called _anaikāntika-hetu_, is found in the case thatsound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "beingan object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it ispresent in things eternal (i. E. Things possessing sādhya), as wellas in things that are not eternal (i. E. Which do not possess thesādhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with thesādhya is not absolute (_anaikāntika_). A fallacy of the fourthtype, technically called _kālātyayāpadi@s@ta_, may be found in theexample--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu isfallacious. The fifth fallacy, called _prakara@nasama_, is to befound in cases where opposite hetus are available at the sametime for opposite conclusions, e. G. Sound like a jug is non-eternal, ____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyāya did not believe in thedoctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mīmā@msā did. Eternalityof sound meant with Mīmā@msā the theory that sounds existed as eternalindestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears undercertain conditions, e. G. The stroke of a drum or a particular kind ofmovement of the vocal muscles. ]

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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound likeākās'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it. 

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised againstinference by the Cārvākas, that inferential arguments arevalid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformityof nature in two relations, viz. _tādātmya_ (essentialidentity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause andeffect). Tādātmya is a relation of genus and species and notof causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and inferthat this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are relatedto each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence ofthe generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of apine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity(_tādātmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity ofsuccession of cause and effect, e. G. Of smoke to fire. 

Nyāya holds that inference is made because of the invariableassociation (_niyama_) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance ofwhich with the sādhya has been safeguarded by the five conditionsnoted above) with the sādhya, and not because of such specificrelations as tādātmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that theinference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to theessential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argumentthat it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same bothways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of apine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree withthose of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essentialidentity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark)with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama. The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)is also really due to invariable association, for it explains thecase of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as ofother types of inference, where the association as cause andeffect is not available (e. G. From sunset the rise of stars isinferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of theli@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions notedabove, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l]. 

We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e. G. Smoke) wasassociated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamańjari_ on anumāna. ]

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that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when weperceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we rememberedthe concomitance (_vyāpti_) of smoke and fire which we hadobserved before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, weconcluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of theli@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of itsconcomitance with fire (_t@rtīya-li@nga-parāmars'a) is thus the cause(_anumitikara@na_ or _anumāna_) of the inference (_anumiti_). Theconcomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyāpti. _ Whenthis refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke withthose having fire, it is called _bahirvyāpti_; and when it refers to theconviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without anyrelation to the circumstances under which the concomitance wasobserved, it is called _antarvyāpti. _ The Buddhists since they didnot admit the notions of generality, etc. Preferred antarvyāptiview of concomitance to bahirvyāpti as a means of inference [Footnote ref1]. 

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inferencewill depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign(_hetu_) with the signate (_sādhya_), how are we to assure ourselves ineach case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyāptigraha_)had been correct, and the observation of concomitancehad been valid. The Mīmā@msā school held, as we shall see inthe next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such casein which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the casesI knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke therewas fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyāya holds that it is not enough that in all cases wherethere is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that inall those cases where there is no fire there should not be anysmoke, i. E. Not only every case of the existence of smoke shouldbe a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fireshould be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technicallycalled _anvayavyāpti_ and the latter _vyatirekavyāpti. _ But even thisis not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in ahundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might havebeen a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, butit cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance, ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Antarvyāptisamarthana, _ by Ratnākaras'ānti in the _SixBuddhist Nyāya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910. ]

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or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. Itmay be that one might never have observed smoke without anantecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but eventhat is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced ina very large number of cases that the introduction of the assproduced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remainedthe same, the disappearance of the ass was immediatelyfollowed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanamyato vinā na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyāyamańjarī, _p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation ofconcomitance (_vyāpti_} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. Butof course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by theabove observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (_upādhi_) associatedwith the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that firein green wood (_ārdrendhana_) produced smoke, but one mightdoubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that producedsmoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulgedin them, all our work endeavour and practical activities wouldhave to be dispensed with (_vyāghāta_). Thus such doubts aslead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb orunsettle the notion of vyāpti or concomitance at which wehad arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. TheBuddhists and the naiyāyikas generally agreed as to the methodof forming the notion of concomitance or vyāpti (_vyāptigraha_), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitancealways depended on a relation of cause and effector of identity of essence, whereas Nyāya held that neither therelations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity ofgenus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there wasquite a number of other types of inference which could not bebrought under either of them (e. G. The rise of the moon and thetide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happeningother things would happen could certainly exist, evenwithout the supposition of an identity of essence. 

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes oftenhave the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to

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[Footnote 1: See _Tātparya@tīkā_ on anumāna and vyāptigraha. ]

[Footnote 2: _Tātparya@tīkā_ on vyāptigraha, and _Tattvacintāma@ni_ ofGa@nges'a on vyāptigraha. ]

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infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyāya holds howeverthat though different causes are often found to producethe same effect, yet there must be some difference between oneeffect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with itsother attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be foundthat it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar othereffects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavydownpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the waterof the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding ofthe street due to rain will be found to have such special traitsthat it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to therise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the streetof a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances, the special manner in which the water flows by smallrivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood wasdue to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus wesee that Nyāya relied on empirical induction based on uniformand uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhistsassumed _a priori_ principles of causality or identity of essence. It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyāyaworks great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselvesassured that there was no such upādhi (condition) associated withthe hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, butthat the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sādhya ina relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not producesmoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order toproduce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition(_upādhi_) without which, no smoke could be produced. It is onaccount of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; andso we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But inthe concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and soin every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of thevalidity of vyāpti, it is necessary that we must be assured thatthere should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditionedthe concomitance, and this must be settled by wideexperience (_bhūyodars'ana_). 

Pras'astapāda in defining inference as the "knowledge of that(e. G. Fire) associated with the reason (e. G. Smoke) by the sight ofthe reason" described a valid reason (_li@nga_) as that which is connectedwith the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which existswherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases

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where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyāyaqualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and _vipak@sāsattva_ ofa valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapāda further quotes a verse to saythat this is the same as what Kās'yapa (believed to be the familyname of Ka@nāda) said. Ka@nāda says that we can infer a causefrom the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer onething by another when they are mutually connected, or in oppositionor in a relation of inherence (IX. Ii. 1 and III. I. 9). Wecan infer by a reason because it is duly associated(_prasiddhipūrvakatva_) with the object of inference. What thisassociation was according to Ka@nāda can also be understood forhe tells us (III. I. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferredor it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtfulexistence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it hashorns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, forthere is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and thougha cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. Thefirst fallacy is a combination of pak@sāsattva and sapak@sāsattva, for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but nohorses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva, for those which are not cows (e. G. Buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Pras'astapāda says that he is giving us the viewof Ka@nāda he is faithful to it. Pras'astapāda says that whereverthere is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives thesmoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain thatthere is fire. But with regard to Ka@nāda's enumeration of types ofinference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effectfrom the cause, " etc. , Pras'astapāda holds that these are not theonly types of inference, but are only some examples for showingthe general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connectionsuch that from this that can be inferred. He then dividesinference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristicsof one member of a class to another member of the sameclass), and sāmānyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) isthat where the previously known case and the inferred case isexactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can pointout that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass offlesh on its neck (_sāsnā_), I can whenever I see the same hanging

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mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. Butwhen on the strength of a common quality the inference is extendedto a different class of objects, it is called sāmānyato d@r@s@ta. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewardedwith a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded withthe objects for which they are performed (i. E. The attainment ofheaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'citārtha_)is expressed in five premisses for convincing otherswho are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, thenthe inference is called parārthānumāna. We know that the distinctionof svārthānumāna (inference for oneself) and parārthānumāna(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. Pras'astapāda does not make a sharp distinction of two classesof inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can beconveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it iscalled parārthānumāna. But this need not be considered as anentirely new innovation of Pras'astapāda, for in IX. 2, Ka@nādahimself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyeda@mkāryyakāra@nasambandhas'cāvayavādbhavati_). The five premisses which arecalled in Nyāya _pratijńā, hetu d@r@s@tānta, upanaya, _ and _nigamana_are called in Vais'e@sika _pratijńā, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhāna_, and _pratyāmnāya_. Ka@nāda however does not mention the nameof any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a. " Pratijńā isof course the same as we have in Nyāya, and the term nidars'ana isvery similar to Nyāya d@r@s@tānta, but the last two are entirelydifferent. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence(e. G. That which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case ofan arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e. G. What is not a substance hasno motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

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{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyābhū@sa@na says that "An example before the time ofDignāga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help theunderstanding of the listener, e. G. The hill is fiery; because it hassmoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceableto reasoning, but Dignāga converted it into a universal proposition, thatis a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connectionbetween the middle term and the major term, e. G. The hill is fiery; becauseit has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (_Indian Logic_, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vātsyāyana had an imperfect exampleas "like a kitchen" (_s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvādanuya@h sthālyādivat_, I. I. 36), but Pras'astapāda has it in the proper form. WhetherPras'astapāda borrowed it from Dig@nnāga or Dig@nnāga from Pras'astapādacannot be easily settled. ]

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(_nidars'anābhāsa_). Pras'astapāda's contribution thus seems to consistof the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy ofthe nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are sodifferent from what are current in other systems that it is reasonableto suppose that he collected them from some other traditionalVais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitelyindicates that the study of the problem of inference was beingpursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyāya. There isno reason however to suppose that Pras'astapāda borrowed anythingfrom Di@nnāga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapāda's apparent innovationsare all definitely alluded to by Ka@nāda himself, andProfessor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On thequestion of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely provedthat Di@nnāga preceded Pras'astapāda, there is no reason whateverto suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1]. 

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the mostimportant part of inference. Vātsyāyana says that an inferencecan be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) throughthe memory of the connection between the middle and the majorpreviously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether itis the present perception of the middle or the memory of theconnection of the middle with the major that should be regardedas leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead toinference, but that which immediately leads to inference is_li@ngaparāmars'a_, i. E. The present perception of the middle in theminor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated withthe memory of the connection (_sm@rtyanug@rhīto li@ngaparāmars'o_). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnāga as shown by Vācaspati haveno reference to this point The doctrine of _tādātmya_ and _tadutpatti_was therefore in all probability a new contribution toBuddhist logic by Dharmakīrtti. Dharmakīrtti's contention wasthat the root principle of the connection between the middle andthe major was that the former was either identical in essencewith the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped amere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

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[Footnote 1: Pras'astapāda's bhā@sya with _Nyāyakandalī_, pp. 200-255. ]

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the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vācaspati in his refutation ofthis view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as aseparate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedencesuch that there being fire there is smoke and there beingno fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained withperfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case thesmoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unlessit can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediatelypreceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake ofargument that causality can be determined, then also cause isknown to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smokecan only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding timeand not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are manycases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of causeand effect or of identity of essence (e. G. The sunrise of thismorning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case ofidentity of essence (_tādātmya_ as in the case of the pine and thetree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to beinferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be anyinference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be describedin either of these ways. Some things (e. G. Smoke) arenaturally connected with some other things (e. G. Fire) and whensuch is the case, though we may not know any further about thenature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the formerand not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only undercertain conditions (e. G. Green wood). It may be argued that theremay always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiatethe validity of inference. To this Vācaspati's answer is that ifeven after observing a large number of cases and careful searchsuch conditions (_upādhi_) cannot be discovered, we have to takeit for granted that they do not exist and that there is a naturalconnection between the middle and the major. The laterBuddhists introduced the method of _Pańcakāra@nī_ in order todetermine effectively the causal relation. These five conditionsdetermining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor theeffect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediatesuccession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in

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[Footnote 1: _Kāryyakāra@nubhāvādvā svabhāvādva niyāmakāt avinābhāvaniyamo'dars'anānna na dars'anāt. Tātparya@tīkā_, p. 105. ]

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immediate succession the effect disappears. But this methodcannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of causeand effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effectrelation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is betterto accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effectrelation [Footnote ref 1]. 

In early Nyāya books three kinds of inference are described, namely pūrvavat, s'e@savat, and sāmānyato-d@r@s@ta. Pūrvavat is theinference of effects from causes, e. G. That of impending rain fromheavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects, e. G. That of rain from the rise of water in the river; sāmānyato-d@r@s@tarefers to the inference in all cases other than those ofcause and effect, e. G. The inference of the sour taste of thetamarind from its form and colour. _Nyāyamańjarī_ mentionsanother form of anumāna, namely paris'e@samāna (_reductio adabsurdum_), which consists in asserting anything (e. G. Consciousness)of any other thing (e. G. ātman), because it was alreadydefinitely found out that consciousness was not produced in anyother part of man. Since consciousness could not belong toanything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite ofthese variant forms they are all however of one kind, namelythat of the inference of the probandum (_sādhya_) by virtue of theunconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, calledthe vyāpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyāya (Navya-Nyāya)a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies animportant place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalānvayi, andkevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where thevyāpti has been observed by a combination of a large number ofinstances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (whereverthere is smoke there is fire (_anvaya_), and where there is no fire, there is no smoke (_vyatireka_)). An inference could be for one'sown self (_svārthānumāna_) or for the sake of convincing others(_parārthānumāna_). In the latter case, when it was necessary thatan inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner, live propositions (_avayavas_) were regarded as necessary, namelypratijńa (e. G. The hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udāhara@na(where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got

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[Footnote 1: Vātsyāya@na's bhāsya, Udyotakara's _Vārttika_ and_Tātparyya@tīkā, _ I. I. 5. ]

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fire). Kevalānvayi is that type of inference, the vyāpti of whichcould not be based on any negative instance, as in the case"this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge(_ida@m, vācyam prameyatvāt_). " Now no such case is known whichis not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of anycase where there was no object of knowledge (_prameyatva_) andno name (_vācyatva_); the vyāpti here has therefore to be basednecessarily on cases of agreement--wherever there is prameyatvaor an object of knowledge, there is vācyatva or name. The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instancesin agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of theinference that earth differs from other elements in possessingthe specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ fromother elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evidentthat there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and theconcomitance has to be taken from negative instances. Thereis only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of ourinference--earth differs from other elements, since it has thespecial qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only inthose cases where we had to infer anything by reason of suchspecial traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone. 

Upamāna and S'abda. 

The third pramā@na, which is admitted by Nyāya and not byVais'e@sika, is _upamāna_, and consists in associating a thing unknownbefore with its name by virtue of its similarity with someother known thing. Thus a man of the city who has neverseen a wild ox (_gavaya_) goes to the forest, asks a forester--"whatis gavaya?" and the forester replies--"oh, you do notknow it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from theforester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it tobe similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of itssimilarity to a known thing is called _upamāna_. If some foresterhad pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told himthat it was called a gavaya, then also the man would haveknown the animal by the name gavaya, but then this wouldhave been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge issaid to be generated by the upamāna process when the associationof the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

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on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknownanimal to a known one. The naiyāyikas are thoroughrealists, and as such they do not regard the observation ofsimilarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet theassociation of the name in accordance with the perception ofsimilarity and the instruction received is a separate act and iscalled _upamāna_ [Footnote ref 1]. 

S'abda-pramā@na or testimony is the right knowledge whichwe derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthfulpersons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for theVedas were uttered by Īs'vara himself. The Vedas give usright knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as theutterances of the infallible Īs'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admits'abda as a separate pramā@na, but they sought to establish thevalidity of testimony (_s'abda_) on the strength of inference (_anumiti_)on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallibleperson. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardlycorroborated by the Vais'e@sika sūtras, which tacitly admit thevalidity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow thiswas how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times. 

Negation in Nyāya-Vais'e@sika. 

The problem of negation or non-existence (_abhāva_) is of great interestin Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature onlyfrom the point of view of perceptibility. Kumārila [Footnote ref 2]

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamańjarī_ on upamāna. The oldest Nyāya view was thatthe instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the associationof the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself"upamāna. " When Pras'astapāda held that upamāna should be treated as acase of testimony (_āptavacana_), he had probably this interpretationin view. But Udyotakara and Vācaspati hold that it was not by theinstruction alone of the forester that the association of the name"wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, andthe memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is theperception of similarity with the other two factors as accessoriesthat lead us to this association called upamāna. What Vātsyāya@nameant is not very clear, but Di@nnāga supposes that according tohim the result of upamāna was the knowledge of similarity or theknowledge of a thing having similarity. Vācaspati of course holds thathe has correctly interpreted Vātsyāya@na's intention. It is howeverdefinite that upamāna means the associating of a name to a new object(_samākhyāsambandhapratipattirupamānārtha@h_, Vātsyāya@na). Jayantapoints out that it is the preception of similarity which directlyleads to the association of the name and hence the instruction ofthe forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequentlyit cannot be classed under testimony (_s'abda_). See Pras'astapādaand _Nyāyakandalī, _ pp. 220-22, Vātsyāya@na, Udyotakara, Vācaspati andJayanta on _Upamāna_. ]

[Footnote 2: See Kumārila's treatment of abhāva in the _S'lokavārttika_, pp. 473-492. ]

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and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in thenext chapter, hold that negation (_abhāva_) appears as an intuition(_mānam_) with reference to the object negated where there are nomeans of ordinary cognition (_pramā@na_) leading to prove the existence(_satparicchedakam_) of that thing. They held that the notion"it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is nocontact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that whenwe turn our eyes (e. G. In the case of the perception of the non-existenceof a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground andthe non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can seeneither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urgedthat if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could saythe same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But eventhen since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never saythat both are grasped by perception. We see the ground andremember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind risesthe notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visualperception. A man may be sitting in a place where there wereno tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existenceat the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on heis asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place wherehe was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes awareof the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, evenwithout perceiving the place and without any operation of thememory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question ofthere being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence, for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind, and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug couldbe regarded as a reason (_li@nga_), for the non-perception of the jugis related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and noconcomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug andits non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance ofnon-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficultyabout the notion of non-existence (_abhāva_) which was soughtto be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to beadmitted as cognized by a separate and independent processof knowledge. Nyāya however says that the perception ofnon-existence (e. G. There is no jug here) is a unitary perceptionof one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e. G. 

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there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of theground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jugarise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, andthere is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the groundshould be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge ofthe negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be dueto a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jugis taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principlethat in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contactwith it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation ornon-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized evenwithout any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is requiredin apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negationor non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessarythat the place where it exists must be perceived. We know athing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can onlybe taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case aswell. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehensionof its locus. In the case when non-existence is said tobe apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existencebut a memory of non-existence (e. G. Of jug) perceivedbefore along with the perception of the locus of non-existence(e. G. Ground). Negation or non-existence (_abhāva_) can thus, accordingto Nyāya, generate its cognition just as any positiveexistence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or merevacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not, "as position (_bhāva_) is what generates the cognition "it is. "

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They holdthat when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended withspecific time and space conditions (e. G. This is not here now);but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never thinkthat negation could thus be associated with them in anyrelation. There is also no relation between the negation and its_pratiyogi_ (thing negated--e. G. Jug in the negation of jug), forwhen there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when thereis the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even therelation of opposition (_virodha_), for we could have admitted it, if

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the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, withouteffecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negationis to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of thenature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative itwill be like any other positive existents, and in the second case itwill be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this orthat particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception, e. G. (1) svabhāvānupalabdhi (natural non-perception--thereis no jug because none is perceived); (2) kāra@nānupalabdhi(non-perception of cause--there is no smoke here, since there isno fire); (3) vyāpakānupalabdhi (non-perception of the species--thereis no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kāryānupalabdhi(non-perception of effects--there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi (perceptionof contradictory natures--there is no cold touch here becauseof fire); (6) viruddhakāryopalabdhi (perception of contradictoryeffects--there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7)virudhavyāptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance--past is not of necessitydestructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kāryyaviruddhopalabdhi(opposition of effects--there is not here the causeswhich can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi(opposite concomitants--there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) kāra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes--thereis no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire);(11) kāra@naviruddhakāryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes--thisplace is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for itis full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]). 

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for thecognition of negation (_heturnābhāvasamvida@h_). All that we cansay is this that there are certain situations which justify the use(_yogyatā_) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatāis positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usageas non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence ofnegation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptionswhich are only interpreted in that way. It is the positiveperception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyabindu_, p. 11, and _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 53-7. ]

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leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug(_anupalambha@h abhāva@m vyavahārayati_) [Footnote ref 1]. 

The Nyāya reply against this is that the perception of positiveexistents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and wehave no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is saidthat the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perceptionof the ground without the jug. But is this being withoutthe jug identical with the ground or different? If identical thenit is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it evenwhen the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only overthe name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be adistinct category. If some difference is noted between the groundwith the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, without the jugness" or "the negation of jug, " it does not mattermuch, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negationis apprehended by perception as much as any positiveexistent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different;just as even in the perception of positive sense-objectsthere are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation ofnegation with space and time with which it appears associated isthe relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality(_vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na_). The relation between the negation and itspratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one isthe other is not. The _Vais'e@sika sūtra_ (IX. I. 6) seems to take abhāvain a similar way as Kumārila the Mima@msist does, though thecommentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sikathe four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _prāgabhāva_ (thenegation preceding the production of an object--e. G. Of the jugbefore it is made by the potter); (2) _dhva@msābhāva_ (the negationfollowing the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it isdestroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyonyābhāva_ (mutualnegation--e. G. In the cow there is the negation of the horse and

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyabindu@tīkā_, pp. 34 ff. , and also _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 48-63. ]

[Footnote 2 Pras'astapāda says that as the production of an effect is thesign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the signof its non-existence, S'rīdbara in commenting upon it says that thenon-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of itsnon-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view forhe says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses(_bhāvavad abhāvo'pīndriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actualsense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of thepreception of non-existence (_abhāvendriyasannikar@so'piabhāvagraha@nasāmagrī_), Nyāyakandalī_, pp. 225-30. ]

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in the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyantābhāva_ (a negation whichalways exists--e. G. Even when there is a jug here, its negation inother places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1]. 

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devicesfor the seeker of Salvation. 

It is probable that the Nyāya philosophy arose in an atmosphereof continued disputes and debates; as a consequenceof this we find here many terms related to debates which we donot notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are_tarka_, _nir@naya_, _vāda_, _jalpa_, _vita@n@dā_, _hetvābhāsa_, _chala_, _jāti_ and _nigrahasthāna_. 

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discernits real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour ofsome supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is notinference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a rightconclusion. When there is doubt (_sa@ms'aya_) about the specificnature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means theconclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When twoopposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as thedoctrines that there is or is not an ātman, in which each of themtries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses iscalled a _vāda_. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputantsgive wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A jalpa is called a _vita@n@dā_ when it is only a destructivecriticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine withoutseeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvābhāsasare those which appear as hetus but are really not so. _Nyāya_sūtras enumerate five fallacies (_hetvābhāsas_) of the middle (hetu):_savyabhicāra_ (erratic), _viruddha_ (contradictory), _prakara@nasama_(tautology), _sāddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _kālātīta _(inopportune). Savyabhicāra is that where the same reason may proveopposite conclusions (e. G. Sound is eternal because it is intangiblelike the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal becauseit is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddhais that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e. G. Ajug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that

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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value withreference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this. ]

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where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form(e. G. Sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality ofeternality); sādhyasama is that where the reason itself requiresto be proved (e. G. Shadow is a substance because it has motion, but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not);kālātīta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does nottally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue thatsound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and thedrum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light andthe object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colouris simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what wasalready there and only manifested by the light, whereas in thecase of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of thestick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal. The later Nyāya works divide savyabhicāra into three classes, (1) sādhāra@na or common (e. G. The mountain is fiery because it isan object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fireis also an object of knowledge), (2) asādhāra@na or too restricted(e. G. Sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; thiscannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in thesound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mhārin or unsubsuming(e. G. Everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects ofknowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can befound which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusionmay also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipak@sa_ is that inwhich there is a contrary reason which may prove the oppositeconclusion (e. G. Sound is eternal because it is audible, sound isnon-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal)is of three kinds (i) _ās'rayāsiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrantbecause it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus inthe sky), (2) _svarūpāsiddha_ (sound is a quality because it isvisible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyāpyatvāsiddha_ is thatwhere the concomitance between the middle and the consequenceis not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill becausethere is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a redhot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associatedwith smoke. The fallacy _bādhita_ is that which pretends to provea thesis which is against direct experience, e. G. Fire is not hotbecause it is a substance. We have already enumerated thefallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyāya practice

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Pras'astapāda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnāga alsocounted fallacies of example (e. G. Sound is eternal, because it isincorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakīrtti counted also thefallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyāya rightly considers thatthe fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguardinference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means theintentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for thepurpose of defeating him. Jāti consists in the drawing of contradictoryconclusions, the raising of false issues or the like withthe deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthānameans the exposure of the opponent's argument as involvingself-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat isconclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victoriousopponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debatingtricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysicalwork, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead toemancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyāyamańjarī_ that thesehad to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogantdisputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils. If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of thepupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was ploddingonward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devicesfor the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledgeof these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyāya sūtra asbeing necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l]. 

The doctrine of Soul. 

Dhūrtta Cārvākas denied the existence of soul and regardedconsciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there wereother Cārvākas called Sus'ik@sita Cārvākas who admitted theexistence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self. The naiyāyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysicsmainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience. They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, etc. Could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 586-659, and _Tārkikarak@sā_ ofVaradarāja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallinātha, pp. 185 ff. ]

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some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the selfis not proved according to Nyāya merely by the notion of ourself-consciousness, as in the case of Mīmā@msā, for Nyāya holdsthat we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it maybe erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white orI am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannotbe relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So wecannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon theinference that the self has to be admitted as that entity towhich consciousness, emotion, etc. Adhere when they are producedas a result of collocations. Never has the production ofātman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer anydestruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is notlocated in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i. E. Exists atthe same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel withthe body but exists everywhere at the same time. But thoughātman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions areseen in the body because it is with the help of the collocationof bodily limbs, etc. That action in the self can be manifestedor produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousnessas a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l]. 

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their differentfacial features, and this could not be due to anything else thanthe memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures andpains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasuresand pains and of successes and failures prove that these must bedue to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performedin their past lives. Since the inequality of the worldmust have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma asthe determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance. 

Īs'vara and Salvation. 

Nyāya seeks to establish the existence of Īs'vara on the basis ofinference. We know that the Jains, the Sā@mkhya and the Buddhists didnot believe in the existence of Īs'vara and offered many antitheisticarguments. Nyāya wanted to refute these and prove the existenceof Is'vara by an inference of the sāmānyato-d@r@s@ta type. 

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[Footnote 1:_Jńānasamavāyanibandhanamevātmanas'cetayit@rtvam_, &c. See_Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 432 ff. ]

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The Jains and other atheists held that though things in theworld have production and decay, the world as a whole was neverproduced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast tothis view the Nyāya holds that the world as a whole is also aneffect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslipsoccur, and from these destructive operations proceeding innature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but aresult of production. But even if this is not admitted by theatheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order ofthe universe. But they would argue that there was certainly adifference between the order and arrangement of human productions(e. G. A jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe;and therefore from the order and arrangement(_sannives'a-vis'i@s@tatā_)of the universe it could not be argued that the universe wasproduced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order andarrangement that is found in human productions that a creatoror producer could be inferred. To this, Nyāya answers that theconcomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement"in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not withspecific cases of "order and arrangement, " for each specific casemay have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similarother specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the samekind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregardthe specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and considerthe concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general. So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order andarrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator, " andthus though the order and arrangement of the world may bedifferent from the order and arrangement of things produced byman, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator wouldnot be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see manyeffects (e. G. Trees) which are daily shooting forth from the groundwithout any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually createdby a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world hasa creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement inits construction. Everything that is an effect and has an orderand arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is aneffect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator. Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes, 365

so Īs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thusomniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does notrequire memory; all things are perceived by him directly withoutany intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He isalways happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with thekarma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, orprotects the world, in the order by which each man reaps theresults of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodilesscan by its will produce changes in our body and through it inthe external world, so Īs'vara also can by his will create theuniverse though he has no body. Some, however, say that if anyassociation of body with Īs'vara is indispensable for our conceptionof him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement ofour body take place, so also by his will changes and movementsare produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l]. 

The naiyāyikas in common with most other systems of Indianphilosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and thatthe small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force ofsorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (_sarva@mdu@hkha@m vivekina@h_); the wise therefore is never attached to theso-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows. 

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithyājńāna_)which consists in thinking as my own self that whichis not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge;when once the true knowledge of the six padārthas andas Nyāya says, of the proofs (_pramā@na_), the objects of knowledge(_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference isattained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge canbe removed by constant thinking of its opposite (_pratipak@sabhāvanā_), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when anypleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality butpain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and itwill never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destructionof false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things andignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. The kles'a ofPatańjali) are also destroyed. 

With the destruction of attachment actions (_prav@rtti_) for the

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[Footnote:1: See _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 190-204, _ Īs'varānumāna_ of RaghunāthaS'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's _Kusumāńjalī_. ]

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fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and withit sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to theproduction of body and its experiences. With the cessation ofsorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of allits qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc. ) and remainsin its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyāya-Vais'e@sikais neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but astate of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself inits own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessnessin mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolutehappiness (_ānanda_), though really speaking the state of muktican never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self inits original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1]. 

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[Footnote 1: _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 499-533. ]

CHAPTER IX

MĪMĀ@MSĀ PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]

A Comparative Review. 

The Nyāya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience froma purely common sense point of view and did not work with anysuch monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of ourcommon sense experience should be considered as coming out ofan original universal (e. G. Prak@rti of the Sām@khya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. Convey the impression that they aresubstantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the materialthings as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. Is regarded as so manyentities which have distinct and separate existence but whichmanifest themselves in connection with the substances. So alsokarma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and eventhe class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering insubstances. Knowledge (_jńāna_) which illuminates all things isregarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there areother qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merelyas the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge isalso viewed as similar in nature to the production of any otherphysical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physicalcircumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by thecombination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, andthe objects of sense, knowledge (_jńāna_) is produced. Soul withNyāya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc. Inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action, class notion, etc. Has also to be admitted as a separate entity, aswithout it the different entities being without any principle ofrelation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction. 

Sā@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of aninfinite number of reals of three different types, which by theircombination were conceived to be able to produce all substances, qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to existbetween substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived

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[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word Mīmā@msā see Chapter IV. ]

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that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the threetypes of reals in different proportions. The reals contained withinthem the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge, willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantlyand new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocationsdid not bring about any new thing but brought about aphenomenon which was already there in its causes in anotherform. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with themmerely a form of subtle illuminating matter stuff. Sā@mkhya holdshowever that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousnessand that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contactthis pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matterinto conscious thought or experience of a person. 

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct andseparate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardlybe demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this hasbeen pointed out by the Nyāya school in a very strong andemphatic manner. Even Sā@mkhya did not try to prove that theexistence of its transcendent puru@sa could be demonstrated inexperience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of theexistence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need ofa permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing statesof knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggletowards virtue and emancipation. Sā@mkhya had first supposedknowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, andthen had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle aspuru@sa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus herein some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left bythe inadequate analysis of consciousness (_buddhi_) as beingnon-intelligent and incessantly changing. 

Nyāya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate selfon the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesisis again based upon another uncritical assumption that substancesand attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the natureof the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge wasa quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substancein which to inhere. None of them could take their stand uponthe self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw theirconclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-conscious

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thought. Of course it is true that Sā@mkhya had approachednearer to this view than Nyāya, but it had separatedthe content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that itthreatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quiteunwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seemto reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unificationof the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and thiscould not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift--atranscendent illusion running on from beginninglesstime. These difficulties occurred because Sā@mkhya soared to aregion which was not directly illuminated by the light of commonsense experience. The Nyāya position is of course much worseas a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which couldnot be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately ona one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical commonsense experience that substances are different from qualities andactions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base thewhole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessarythat the importance of the self-revealing thought must be broughtto the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, andan account of experience should be given according to its verdict. No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignoresthe direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It isa relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this directionis ushered in by the Mīmā@msā system. The _Mīmā@msā sūtras_were written by Jaimini and the commentary (_bhā@sya_) on it waswritten by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was madeby Kumārila, who preceded the great S'a@nkarācārya, and a discipleof Kumārila, Prabhākara. 

The Mīmā@msā Literature. 

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grewin India in the Brāhma@nas. This system once set up graduallybegan to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the detailsof which were probably taken note of by the priests. As somegenerations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts ofIndia and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the oldrules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

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had it, and this it seems gave rise to the sm@rti literature. Discussionsand doubts became more common about the manyintricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiriesinto them were begun in different circles by different scholars andpriests. These represent the beginnings of Mīmā@msā (lit. Attemptsat rational enquiry), and it is probable that there weredifferent schools of this thought. That Jaimini's _Mīmā@msā sūtras_(which are with us the foundations of Mīmā@msā) are only a comprehensiveand systematic compilation of one school is evident fromthe references he gives to the views in different matters of otherpreceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are notavailable now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini haswritten is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But itmay be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed somasterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all otherattempts that were made before him. Jaimini's _Mīmā@msā sūtras_were probably written about 200 B. C. And are now the ground workof the Mīmā@msā system. Commentaries were written on it byvarious persons such as Bhart@rmitra (alluded to in _Nyāyaratnākara_verse 10 of _S'lokavārttika_), Bhavadāsa {_Pratijńasūtra_ 63}, Hari andUpavar@sa (mentioned in _S'āstradīpikā_). It is probable that at leastsome of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentaryknown as the _S'abara-bhā@sya_. It is difficult to say anythingabout the time in which he flourished. Dr Ga@ngānāthaJhā would have him about 57 B. C. On the evidence of a currentverse which speaks of King Vikramāditya as being the sonof S'abarasvāmin by a K@sattriya wife. This bhā@sya of S'abarais the basis of the later Mīmā@msā works. It was commentedupon by an unknown person alluded to as Vārttikakāra byPrabhākara and merely referred to as "yathāhu@h" (as they say)by Kumārila. Dr Ga@nganātha Jhā says that Prabhākara's commentary_B@rhatī_ on the _S'abara-bhā@sya_ was based upon the workof this Vārttikakāra. This _B@rhatī_ of Prabhākara had anothercommentary on it--_@Rjuvimālā_ by S'alikanātha Mis'ra, who alsowrote a compendium on the Prabhākara interpretation of Mīmā@msācalled _Prakara@napańcikā_. Tradition says that Prabhākara(often referred to as Nibandhakāra), whose views areoften alluded to as "gurumata, " was a pupil of Kumārila. KumārilaBha@t@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporaryof S'a@nkara (788 A. D. ), wrote his celebrated independent

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exposition of S'abara's bhā@sya in three parts known as _S'lokavārttika_(dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara'swork as contained in the first chapter of the first book known asTarkapāda), _Tantravārttika_ (dealing with the remaining threechapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and_@Tup@tīkā_ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books)[Footnote ref 1]. Kumārila is referred to by his later followersas Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapāda, and Vārttikakāra. The next great Mīmā@msāscholar and follower of Kumārila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of_Vidhiviveka, Mīmā@msānukrama@nī_ and the commentator of _Tantravārttika, _who became later on converted by S'a@nkara to Vedantism. PārthasārathiMis'ra (about ninth century A. D. ) wrote his _S'āstradīpikā, Tantraratna, _ and _Nyāyaratnamālā_ following the footprintsof Kumārila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumārila, the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _Kās'ikā_ and Somes'varathe author of _Nyāyasudhā_ deserve special notice. Rāmak@r@s@naBha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkapāda_ of_S'āstradīpikā_ called the _Yuktisnehapūra@nī-siddhānta-candrikā_ andSomanātha wrote his _Mayūkhamālikā_ on the remaining chaptersof _S'āstradīpikā_. Other important current Mīmā@msā works whichdeserve notice are such as _Nyāyamālāvistara_ of Mādhava, _Subodhinī, Mīmā@msābālaprakās'a_ of S'a@nkara Bha@t@ta, _Nyāyaka@nikā_ ofVācaspati Mis'ra, _Mīmā@msāparibhā@sa_ by K@r@s@nayajvan, _Mīmā@msānyāyaprakās'a_ by Anantadeva, Gāgā Bha@t@ta's_Bha@t@tacintāma@ni, _ etc. Most of the books mentioned here have beenconsulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of theMīmā@msā literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are allVedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even thesm@rti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and ritualsof Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explainedby them. The legal side of the sm@rtis consisting of inheritance, proprietory rights, adoption, etc. Which guide Hindu civil life evenunder the British administration is explained according to theMīmā@msā maxims. Its relations to the Vedānta philosophy willbe briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations withNyāya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of thischapter. The views of the two schools of Mīmā@msā as propoundedby Prabhākara and Kumārila on all the important topics have

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[Footnote 1: Mahāmahopadhyāya Haraprasāda S'āstrī says, in hisintroduction to _Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts_, that "Kumārila precededSa@nkara by two generations. "]

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also been pointed out. Prabhākara's views however could notwin many followers in later times, but while living it is said thathe was regarded by Kumārila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardlyany new contribution has been made to the Mīmā@msā philosophyafter Kumārila and Prabhākara. The _Mīmā@msā sūtras_ deal mostlywith the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts inconnection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can begleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight andvague. Vārttikakāra's views also can only be gathered from thereferences to them by Kumārila and Prabhākara. What we knowof Mīmā@msā philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone. It did not develop any further after them. Works written on thesubject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I donot know of any work on Mīmā@msā written in English exceptthe excellent one by Dr Ga@ngānātha Jhā on the PrabhākaraMīmā@msā to which I have frequently referred. 

The Parata@h-prāmā@nya doctrine of Nyāya and theSvata@h-prāmā@nya doctrine of Mīmā@msā. 

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge(_svata@h-prāmā@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structureof the Mīmā@msā philosophy is based. Validity means the certitudeof truth. The Mīmā@msā philosophy asserts that all knowledgeexcepting the action of remembering (_sm@rti_) or memory isvalid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neitherdepends on any other extraneous condition nor on any otherknowledge for its validity. But Nyāya holds that this self-validityof knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledgeis produced in us, but what is meant by saying that thisknowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceiveanything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and thisvisual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated istrue, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge

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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumārila, not being able to convertPrabhākara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretendedthat he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhākara whether his burialrites should be performed according to Kumārila's views or Prabhākara's. Prabhākara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held byhim only to rouse up Kumārila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumārila's viewswere the right ones. Kumārila then rose up and said that Prabhākarawas defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he wasalive. But this has of course no historic value. ]

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it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair andhow can it certify the objective truth of its representation? Inother words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guaranteethat what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectivelyas well? After my perception of anything as blue we do nothave any such perception that what I have perceived as blueis really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannotbe testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certainthat knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, butthere is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its objectfrom which we can infer that the perception is also objectivelyvalid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certifyits validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we shouldnever come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow thedirections of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perceptionwith what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, andhence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, forvalidity always refers to objective realization of our desires andattempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. Peopleonly declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practicallyin accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception ofa mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance withour perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposesof water (e. G. Drinking, bathing). The validity or truth ofknowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of theobject and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyājńāna_or _phalajńāna_) just as perception or knowledge representedthem to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity ofknowledge (_svata@h-prāmā@nya_), but validity is ascertained by_sa@mvāda_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnoteref l]. 

It is easy to see that this Nyāya objection is based on thesupposition that knowledge is generated by certain objectivecollocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 160-173. ]

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only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But thistheory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never beexperienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations;we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certainobjective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of theobjective world and this is experienced by us always. But thatthe objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesiswhich can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supremeprerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not aphenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When wesay that knowledge has been produced in us by the externalcollocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarrantedby experience; knowledge only photographs theobjective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show thatknowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This isonly a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causationto knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge isnot like any other phenomena for it stands above them andinterprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity inthings, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. Whatwe call agreement with facts by practical experience is but theagreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objectivefacts never come to us directly, they are always takenon the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certaintythan what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeeddifferent kinds of knowledge revealing different things, butthese latter do not on that account generate the former, for thisis never experienced; we are never aware of any objective factbefore it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makesdifferent kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, forexperience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts andnot why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived byus to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective factsare dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This iswhat is said to be the self-validity (_svata@h-prāmā@ya_) of knowledgein its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate linkbetween the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects onwhich knowledge depends for producing its action of revealingor illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent

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of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well(_svakāryakara@ne svata@h prāmā@nya@m jńānasya_). Whenever thereis any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it iscertain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work(_prav@rtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision inour mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctnessof knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries withit the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in casesof illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn whichcarry with them the notion that our original knowledge was notvalid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appearto us by later experience, and in accordance with which wereject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealeditself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty whichgoaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a manworks according to his knowledge, he does so with the convictionthat his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temperof mind. This is what Mīmā@msa means when it says that thevalidity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, thoughits invalidity may be derived from later experience or some otherdata (_jńānasya prā@mā@nyam svata@h aprāmā@nya@m parata@h_). Knowledgeattained is proved invalid when later on a contradictoryexperience (_bādhakajńāna_) comes in or when our organs etc. Areknown to be faulty and defective (_kara@nado@sajńāna). It is fromthese that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; whenwe take all necessary care to look for these and yet find themnot, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity ofknowledge certified at the moment of its production need notbe doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not findany defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. Allknowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independentlyby itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memoryis excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upona previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, andcannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself. 

The place of sense organs in perception. 

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that itcould not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in

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face of the Nyāya philosophy explaining all perceptions on theground of diverse sense-contact the Mīmā@msā probably could notafford to remain silent on such an important point. It thereforeaccepted the Nyāya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledgewith slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine ofsvata@h-prāmā@nya. It does not appear to have been conscious ofa conflict between these two different principles of the productionof knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it lookedat it was that the fact that there were the senses and contactsof them with the objects, or such special capacities in them byvirtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us amatter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledgeare never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, butwhen the knowledge arises we argue that such and such sensesmust have acted. The only case where knowledge is found tobe dependent on anything else seems to be the case where oneknowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledgeas in the case of memory. In other cases the dependenceof the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for thephysical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to beoperating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferredlater on in accordance with the nature and characteristicof knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledgewhich is directly experienced from which we may proceed lateron to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it. Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objectsmay later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet therise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes usas original, underived, immediate, and first-hand. 

Prabhākara gives us a sketch as to how the existence ofthe senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects arephenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen alwaysin the same manner, for these vary differently at different moments;the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thusbe regarded as the material cause (_samavāyikāra@na_); but theremust be some such movements or other specific associations(_asamavāyikāra@na_) which render the production of this orthat specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsisteither in the cause of the material cause (e. G. In the case of thecolouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which

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is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns whichform the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself(e. G. In the case of a new form of smell being produced in asubstance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterialcause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is putin the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul iseternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed thatthe immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition mustinhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then againaccepting the Nyāya conclusions we know that the rise of qualitiesin an eternal thing can only take place by contact with someother substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soulacquires would naturally require the contact of such substances. Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere inother substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There arethree eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time andspace being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them. Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional riseof different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kindof atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul. This atom may be called _manas_ (mind). This manas alone byitself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoidof any such qualities as colour, smell, etc. , and as such cannotlead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; henceit stands in need of such other organs as may be characterizedby these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind willneed the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristicquality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorouscharacteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we knowthat the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature mustbe one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light, and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye--for the cognitionof colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthlyorgan (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), theākās'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ oftouch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of theseorgans is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts haveto be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of thesense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas

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with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. Theobjects of perception are of three kinds, (1) substances, (2) qualities, (3) jāti or class. The material substances are tangible objects ofearth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomicstates they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, andeffort [Footnote ref l]. 

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion thatKumārila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the nature of thesenses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says thatthe senses may be conceived either as certain functions oractivities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing thingswithout coming into actual contact with them, or that they mightbe entities which actually come in contact with their objects [Footnote ref2], and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory. 

Indeterminate and determinate perception. 

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the firststage is called _nirvikalpa_ (indeterminate) and the second _savikalpa_(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perceptionat the first moment of the association of the senses andtheir objects. Thus Kumārila says that the cognition that appearsfirst is a mere _ālocana_ or simple perception, called non-determinatepertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resemblingthe cognitions that the new-born infant has of things aroundhimself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia ispresented to consciousness; all that is present there is theindividual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminateperception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhistview which defines it as being merely the specific individuality(_svalak@sa@na_} and regards it as being the only valid element inperception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary

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[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napańcikā_, pp. 53 etc. , and Dr Ga@ngānātha Jhā's_Prabhākaramimā@msā_, pp. 35 etc. ]

[Footnote 2: _S'lokavārttika_, see _Pratyak@sasūtra_, 40 etc. , and_Nyāyaratnākara_ on it. It may be noted in this connection thatSā@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyāya that the senses actually wentout to meet the objects (_prāpyakāritva_) but held that there wasa special kind of functioning (_v@rtti_) by virtue of which thesenses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars. It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The natureof the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and Pārthasārathi objectsto it as being almost a different category (_tattvāntara_). ]

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impositions. But both Kumārila and Prabhākara think that boththe genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminatestage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only becausewe do not remember the other things in relation to which, or incontrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus ordifferentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only incomparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-definedcharacters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to aclass only when it is found to possess certain characteristic featuresin common with some other things; so we see that as other thingsare not presented to consciousness through memory, the perceptat the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as anindividual belonging to a class, though the data constituting thecharacteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceivedat the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1]. So long as other things arenot remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, andhence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the firststage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressionsbrings the present perception in relation to past onesand realizes its character as involving universal and particular. Itis thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminateand the determinate perception is this, that in the latter casememory of other things creeps in, but this association of memoryin the determinate perception refers to those other objects ofmemory and not to the percept. It is also held that though thedeterminate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yetsince the former also apprehends certain such factors as did notenter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded asa valid cognition. Kumārila also agrees with Prabhākara inholding both the indeterminate and the determinate perceptionvalid [Footnote ref 2]. 

Some Ontological Problems connected with theDoctrine of Perception. 

The perception of the class (_jāti_) of a percept in relation toother things may thus be regarded in the main as a differencebetween determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problemsof jāti and avayavāvayavī (part and whole notion) were

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[Footnote 1: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted byS'rīdhara. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Prakara@napańcikā_ and _S'āstradīpikā_. ]

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the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before enteringinto discussion about jāti, Prabhākara first introduced theproblem of _avayava_ (part) and _avayavī_ (whole). He argues asan exponent of svata@h-prāmā@nyavāda that the proof of the trueexistence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousnessmust be admitted to have its existence established. Followingthis canon Prabhākara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the materialcause and their connection (_sa@myoga_) is the immaterial cause(_asamavāyikāra@na_), and it is the latter which renders the wholealtogether different from the parts of which it is composed; andit is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before thewhole is perceived. Kumārila holds that it is due to the point ofview from which we look at a thing that we call it a separatewhole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thingappears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at itfrom the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thingappears to be a whole of which there are parts (see _S'lokavārttika, Vanavāda_) [Footnote ref 1]. 

Jāti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, isdifferent from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in itsentirety in each individual constituting that jāti (_vyās'ajyav@rtti_), ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Sā@mkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unityof the universal and the particular (_sāmānyavis'esasamudāyo dravyam, Vyāsabhāsya_, III. 44), for there is no other separate entity which isdifferent from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the partsexist at a distance from one another (e. G. A forest), and those in whichthey exist close together (_mrantarā hi tadavayavāh_), and it is thislatter combination (_ayutasiddhāvayava_) which is called a dravya, buthere also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is theparts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible spacebetween them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists asPanditās'oka has shown did not believe in any whole (_avayavi_), itis the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a wholeoccupying space (_paramānava eva hi pararūpades'aparihārenotpannāhparasparasahitā avabhāsamānā desavitānavanto bhavanti_). The wholeis thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see _Avayavinirākarana, SixBuddhist Nyāya Tracts_). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless_(niravayava}_ and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see anobject we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from theparts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no validreason against it:

 "_adustakaranodbhūtamanāvirbhūtabādhakam asandigdańca vijńānam katham mithyeti kathyate. _"

_Nyāyamańjarī_, pp. 550 ff. ]

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but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes theargument that jāti should be denied, because it involves the conceptionof a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). Theclass character or jāti exists because it is distinctly perceived byus in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternalin the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, evenwhen one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individualof that class (e g. Cow class) comes into being, a newrelation of inherence is generated by which the individual isbrought into relation with the class-character existing in otherindividuals, for inherence (_samavāya_) according to Prabhākarais not an eternal entity but an entity which is both producedand not produced according as the thing in which it exists isnon-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyāyaholds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number ofthings in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, theclass-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual, nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence ofclass-character with that individual that ceases to exist. Withthe destruction of an individual or its production it is a newrelation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But theclass-character or jāti has no separate existence apart from theindividuals as Nyāya supposes. Apprehension of jāti is essentiallythe apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation toother similar things of that class by the perception of the commoncharacteristics. But Prabhākara would not admit the existence ofa highest genus sattā (being) as acknowledged by Nyāya. Heargues that the existence of class-character is apprehended becausewe find that the individuals of a class possess some commoncharacteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparatethings of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separatejāti as sattā, as demanded by the naiyāyikas. That all things aresaid to be _sat_ (existing) is more or less a word or a name withoutthe corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experiencealways gives us concrete existing individuals, but wecan never experience such a highest genus as pure existence orbeing, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. Whenwe speak of a thing as _sat_, we do not mean that it is possessedof any such class-characters as sattā (being); what we meanis simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarūpasattā. 

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Thus the Nyāya view of perception as taking only thething in its pure being apart from qualities, etc, (_sanmātra-vi@sayampratyak@sa@m_) is made untenable by Prabhākara, as according tohim the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. Accordingto Kumārila however jāti is not something different from theindividuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived. Kumārila's view of jāti is thus similar to that held by Sā@mkhya, namely that when we look at an individual from one point ofview (jāti as identical with the individual), it is the individual thatlays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jāti becomeslatent, but when we look at it from another point of view(the individual as identical with jāti) it is the jāti which presentsitself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent. The apprehension as jāti or as individual is thus only a matterof different points of view or angles of vision from which we lookat a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jāti, Kumārilaholds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinctfrom the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves(_S'lokavārttika, Pratyak@sasūtra_, 149, 150, _abhedāt samavāyo'stusvarūpam dharmadharmi@no@h_), Kumārila agrees with Prabhākarathat jāti is perceived by the senses (_tatraikabuddhinirgrāhyājātirindriyagocarā_). 

It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence ofPrabhākara we find that the category of vis'e@sa admitted by theKa@nāda school is not accepted as a separate category by theMīmā@msā on the ground that the differentiation of eternalthings from one another, for which the category of vis'e@sa isadmitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinaryqualities of these things. The quality of p@rthaktva or specificdifferences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things theyconstitute, can very well serve the purposes of vis'e@sa. 

The nature of knowledge. 

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and theknowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whetherperceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily revealthe self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the selfis directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regardedas perception from the point of view of self. The division

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of the pramā@nas as pratyak@sa (perception), anumāna (inference), etc. Is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge withreference to the varying modes in which they are brought withinthe purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illuminingor revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could haveknowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by theremembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (_sa@mvid_) that revealsby its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects. It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character ofknowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects theyare said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rathersay that they have the same identical reality too. The Mīmā@msāanswer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and thecognized were not different from one another, they could nothave been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it isby cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. Thecognition (_sa@mvedana_) of a person simply means that such aspecial kind of quality (_dharma_) has been manifested in theself by virtue of which his active operation with reference toa certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognitionis that with reference to which the active operation of theself has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless, for they have the cognitional character by which things areillumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character thanthis, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only arebelieved to have forms and only such forms as knowledge revealto us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference toobjects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressionswere left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency(_ad@r@s@ta_). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembranceof that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressionsof cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just thatamount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with theoperation of ad@r@s@ta, as the person deserves to have in accordancewith his previous merit or demerit. 

The Prabhākara Mīmā@msā, in refuting the arguments of thosewho hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognizedby some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since wedo not experience any such double cognition and also because itwould lead us to a _regressus ad infinitum, _ for if a second cognition

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is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a thirdand so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition, then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknownto us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, andreveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From theillumination of objects also we can infer the presence of thisself-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferredand not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate thepresence of an object and not in the form in which it can beapprehended by perception (_pratyak@sa_). Prabhākara draws asubtle distinction between perceptuality (_sa@mvedyatva_) and beingobject of knowledge (_prameyatva_). A thing can only be apprehended(_sa@mvedyate_) by perception, whereas inference can onlyindicate the presence of an object without apprehending theobject itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any othercognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existenceof knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself [Footnote ref 1]. 

Kumārila also agrees with Prabhākara in holding that perceptionis never the object of another perception and that it endsin the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But hesays that every perception involves a relationship between theperceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves asthe agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition. This is indeed different from the Prabhākara view, thatin one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, andthe knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of_tripu@tīpratyak@sa_) [Footnote ref 2]. 

The Psychology of Illusion. 

The question however arises that if all apprehensions arevalid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannotbe regarded as valid? The problem of illusory perception andits psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indianphilosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called_satkhyāti_ which we have described before, and of the Vedāntists, which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are threedifferent theories of illusion, viz. (1) _ātmakhyāti_, (2) _viparītakhyātī_or _anyathākhyāti_, and (3) _akhyāti_ of the Mīmā@msā school. The

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[Footnote 1: See _Prabhākaramīmā@msā, _ by Dr Ga@nganātha Jhā. ]

[Footnote 2: _loc. Cit. _ pp. 26-28. ]

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viparītākhyāti or anyathākhyāti theory of illusion is accepted bythe Nyāya, Vais'e@sika and the Yoga, the ākhyāti theory byMīmā@msā and Sā@mkhya and the ātmakhyāti by the Buddhists. 

The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy isthe illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a pieceof silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experiencedby all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regardto its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who denythe existence of the external world and think that there are onlythe forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma ofpast lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, soalso in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledgewhich must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on accountof the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generatessometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrongperception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-calledexternal data. For they do not exist, and even if they didexist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the rightperception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledgecreates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. Thisis true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception. Nyāya objects to the above view, and says that, ifknowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes uponitself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perceptionought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver. "Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a falsehypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as comingfrom outside and that the external as such does not exist. 

The viparītakhyāti or the anyathākhyāti theory supposes thatthe illusion takes place because on account of malobservation wedo not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguishedfrom the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. Of theconch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhereis remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. Inillusion the object before us with which our eye is associated isnot conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, itis merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for itexists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced beforethat creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell assilver. This school agrees with the akhyāti school that the fact

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that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time ofillusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enoughto account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definitepositive aspect associated with it, viz. The false identification ofsilver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us. 

The ākhyāti theory of Mīmā@msā holds that since the specialpeculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneousto say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell asthe silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognizedat all. What happens here is simply this, that only thefeatures common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiverfails to apprehend the difference between these two things, and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certainweakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by thecommon features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended, and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some pasttime that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is asa result of this non-apprehension of the difference between thesilver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusiontakes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of adual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such isdifferent from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly amatter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as thedifference between the remembrance of silver and the sight ofthe present object is not apprehended, the illusory perceptionappears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a realvalid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity onthe part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiverwould be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the caseof a real perception. Kumārila agrees with this view as expoundedby Prabhākara, and further says that the illusory judgment is asvalid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as anyreal judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, thatdoes not matter, for it is admitted in Mīmā@msā that when laterexperience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidatethe original perception which was self-valid at the time of itsproduction [Footnote Ref. 1]. It is easy to see that the Mīmā@msā had toadopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognitionat the moment of its production is valid. The ākhyāti theory

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[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napańcikā, S'āstradīpikā_, and _S'lokavārttika_, sūtra 2. ]

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tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to anypositive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehensiondue to certain weakness of mind. So it is thatthough illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition, is made up of two elements, the present perception andmemory, both of which are true so far as they are individuallypresent to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics ofany other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognitionis its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also, as in the case "Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceivedis some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when thisperception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (ofthe pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehensioninvolved in doubtful cognitions should be regardedas self-valid as any other cognition. 

Inference. 

S'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relationhas been known to exist between two things, we can have theidea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kindof knowledge is called inference. Kumārila on the basis of thistries to show that inference is only possible when we noticethat in a large number of cases two things (e. G. Smoke and fire)subsist together in a third thing (e. G. Kitchen, etc. ) in some independentrelation, i. E. When their coexistence does not dependupon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessarythat the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a thirdthing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence ofone thing should also be cases involving the existence of theother, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e. G. Fire), though including all the cases of the existence of the other(smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whetherit be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity ofthe constellation of K@rttikā with Rohi@nī, where, by the rise of theformer the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case ofidentity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), ora case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things anda third thing which had been apprehended in a large number ofcases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming

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one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of theone (e. G. Smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer theexistence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In allsuch cases the thing (e. G. Fire) which has a sphere extendingbeyond that in which the other (e. G. Smoke) can exist is called_gamya_ or _vyāpaka_ and the other (e. G. Smoke) _vyāpya_ or _gamaka_and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e. G. Hill, the pak@sa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may beinferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of thegamaka with the gamya (e. G. Wherever there is smoke there isfire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a caseof inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanentrelation subsisting between two things (e. G. Smoke and fire) in athird thing (e g. Kitchen); but the third thing is remembered onlyin a general way that the coexisting things must have a placewhere they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memorythat the direct perception of a basis (e. G. Hill) with the gamakathing (e. G. Smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind thatthe same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i. E. Fire) also. Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perceptionand not from any universal general proposition. Kumārila holdsthat the inference gives us the minor as associated with the majorand not of the major alone, i. E. Of the fiery mountain and not offire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it wasknown in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessorof fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipatedand the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly newknowledge (_des'akālādhikyādyuktamag@rhītagrāhitvam anumānasya, Nyāyaratnākara_, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that informing the notion of the permanent relation between two things, a third thing in which these two subsist is always rememberedand for the conception of this permanent relation it is enoughthat in the large number of cases where the concomitance wasnoted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitancefailed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instancesin which the absence of the gamya or vyāpaka was marked by an

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[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumārilawas indebted to Di@nnāga for this; for Di@nnāga's main contention is that"it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it isthe fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give usno new knowledge see Vidyābhū@sa@na's _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and_Tātparya@tikā_, p. 120. ]

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absence of the gamaka or vyāpya, should also be noted, for aknowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable forthe forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. Theexperience of a large number of particular cases in which any twothings were found to coexist together in another thing in somerelation associated with the non-perception of any case of failurecreates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of thegamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to existin exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where thecircle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of theexistence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other. It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all casesof cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases ofcoexistence as well. 

The question arises that if no inference is possible withouta memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validityof inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regardedas self-valid. To this Kumārila's answer is that memoryis not invalid, but it has not the status of pramāna, as it doesnot bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves theacquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistenceof two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamyain a thing is known from the perception of the existence of thegamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is notperception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not thegamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all. 

As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicitstatement of the process of inference for convincing others(_pārārthānumāna_) both Kumārila and Prabhākara hold that threepremisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first threepremisses pratijńā, hetu and d@rstānta may quite serve the purposeof an anumāna. 

There are two kinds of anumāna according to Kumārilaviz. Pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and sāmānyatod@r@s@tasambandha. The former is that kind of inference where the permanent

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[Footnote 1: Kumārila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance(_vyāpti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by thepositive ones. ]

[Footnote 2: "_tasmādanavagate'pi sarvatrānvaye sarvatas'ca vyatirekebahus'ah sāhityāvagamamātrādevavyabhicārādars'anasanāthādanumānotpattira@ngīkartavya@h. _"_Nyāyaratnākara_, p. 288. ]

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relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke andfire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference wherethe permanent relation is observed not between two concretethings but between two general notions, as in the case of movementand change of place, e. G. The perceived cases where there ischange of place there is also motion involved with it; so from thechange of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is heldthat this general notion is directly perceived like all universals[Footnote ref 1]. 

Prabhākara recognizes the need of forming the notion of thepermanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the factthat this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke)is taken in connection with a third thing in which they bothsubsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation betweentwo things is the main point, whereas in all other associationsof time and place the things in which these two subsisttogether are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things(e. G. Fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact thatthough the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, theconcomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnoteref 2]. When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind thatthe concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of thepresence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as anysmoke is seen. Prabhākara counts separately the fallacies of theminor (_pak@sābhāsa_), of the enunciation (_pratijńābhāsa_) and ofthe example (_d@r@s@tāntābhāsa_) along with the fallacies of the middleand this seems to indicate that the Mīmā@msā logic was not altogetherfree from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smokeincludes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus therewould be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferentialcognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhākara, for he does not admit that a pramā@na should necessarily bringus any new knowledge, for pramā@na is simply defined as "apprehension. "So though the inferential cognition always pertains tothings already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramā@na, since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension. 

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[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavārttika, Nyāyaratnākara, S'āstradīpikā, Yuktisnehapūra@nī, Siddhāntacandrikā_ on anumāna. ]

[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there isno condition (_upādhi_) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhākara hasnothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry ina large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must saythat it does not exist (_prayatnenānvi@syamā@ne aupādhikatvānavagamāt_, see _Prakara@napańcikā_, p. 71). ]

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Upamāna, Arthāpatti. 

Analogy (_upamāna_) is accepted by Mīmā@msā in a sense whichis different from that in which Nyāya took it. The man whohas seen a cow (_go_) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox(_gavaya_), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya withthe _go, _ and then cognizes the similarity of the _go_ (which is notwithin the limits of his perception then) with the _gavaya. _ Thecognition of this similarity of the _gavaya_ in the _go, _ as it followsdirectly from the perception of the similarity of the _go_ in the_gavaya, _ is called upamāna (analogy). It is regarded as a separatepramā@na, because by it we can apprehend the similarityexisting in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It isnot mere remembrance, for at the time the _go_ was seen the_gavaya_ was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen, and what was not seen could not be remembered. The differenceof Prabhākara and Kumārila on this point is that while thelatter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the factof more than one object having the same set of qualities, theformer regards it as a distinct category. 

_Arthāpatti_ (implication) is a new pramā@na which is admittedby the Mīmā@msā. Thus when we know that a person Devadattais alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcilethese two facts, viz. His remaining alive and his not beingin the house without presuming his existence somewhere outsidethe house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadattaoutside the house is called _arthāpatti_ (presumption orimplication). 

The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arthāpatticognition is a matter on which Prabhākara and Kumāriladisagree. Prabhākara holds that when a man knows that Devadattahabitually resides in his house but yet does not find himthere, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquiredpreviously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, andthe cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at hishouse. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the causeof implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta, and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remainsomewhere outside. That can only be found by implication, without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed. The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for

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making the presumption that he is outside the house, for hemight also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living andalso that he was not at home; this perception of his absence fromhome creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he isliving, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps inthe presumption that he must be living somewhere else. Theperception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediatelink of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that hemust then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no elementof doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to existbeyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fireis possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in thehouse leads to the presumption of an external existence onlywhen it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubtand uncertainty [Footnote ref 1]. 

Kumārila however objects to this explanation of Prabhākara, and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtfulby the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubtmay as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta isdead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the lifeof Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the suppositionof his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removedwhen the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does notfollow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he isliving. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and hisabsence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the veryfact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause ofdoubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedureof the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt aboutthe life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge orby some other means, we may presume that he must be outsidethe house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannotbe any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certaintyof his life associated with the perception of his absence from thehouse that leads us to the presumption of his external existence. There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and hisabsence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest withoutthe presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillatesbetween two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but

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[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napańcikā_, pp. 113-115. ]

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cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and areconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadattamust be found outside the house. 

Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpretedas presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever thereis smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smokein the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomesirreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitanceof smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumptionthat there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right ifthe universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be knownotherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitancewas seen only in individual cases, and from that came theinference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannotbe said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases sufferedany contradiction without the presumption of the universalproposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arthāpattiis of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Nowwhen it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inferencecannot be served by arthāpatti, the validity of inferenceas a means of proof becomes established. That being done weadmit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to useither by inference or by arthāpatti. 

So inference also cannot serve the purpose of arthāpatti, forin inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, andlater on from that the sādhya (what is to be proved); both ofthem however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, andit is exactly this that distinguishes arthāpatti from anumāna. For arthāpatti takes place where, without the presumption ofDevadatta's external existence, the absence from the house ofDevadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta isliving he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannotswallow a contradiction, and hence without presuming the externalexistence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannotbe comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved bypresuming his existence outside the house. Arthāpatti is thusthe result of arthānupapatti or the contradiction of the presentperception with a previously acquired certain knowledge. 

It is by this arthāpattipramā@na that we have to admit thatthere is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the

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shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrificesby which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some suchbeneficent state of existence. 

S'abda pramā@na. 

S'abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof bymost of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting theJaina, Buddhist, Cārvāka and Vais`e@sika. A discussion on thistopic however has but little philosophical value and I have thereforeomitted to give any attention to it in connection with theNyāya, and the Sā@mkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authorityof the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers andthey had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who deniedit. Some sought to establish this authority on the suppositionthat they were the word of God, while others, particularly theMīmā@msists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone, and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal. Their authority was not derived from the authority of anytrustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves. Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value withus, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the olddays of India. It was in fact the most important subject forMīmā@msā, for the _Mīmā@msā sūtras_ were written for the purposeof laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas. The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemologicaldoctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundationof its structure of interpretative maxims, and not towriting philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so muchupon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as arational compendium of maxims with the help of which theVedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed. But a brief examination of the doctrine of word (_s'abda_)as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection withMīmā@msā as it is its very soul. 

S'abda (word) as a pramā@na means the knowledge that weget about things (not within the purview of our perception) fromrelevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words ofwhich they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds, viz. Those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas. The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not

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uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid initself. The meanings of words are of course known to usbefore, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof;but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of therelations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledgedmeans of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept s`abdaas a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that thevalidity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of itsbeing uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would notexplain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for wheneven the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known, we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of anysentence. 

Prabhākara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters, or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituentletters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and arethus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception whichserve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. Thereason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to befound in a separate potency existing in the letters by which thedenotation of the word may be comprehended. The perceptionof each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, butleaves behind an impression which combines with the impressionsof the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this bringsabout the whole word which contains the potency of bringingabout the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearinga word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admittedthat the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for thepurpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separatepotencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter isthe direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhākara andKumārila agree on this point. 

Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all wordshave natural denotative powers by which they themselves out oftheir own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of theircomprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer willnot understand the meaning unless it is known to him that theword in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaningand it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to

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understand the meaning of a word. Mīmāmsā does not thinkthat the association of a particular meaning with a word is dueto conventions among people who introduce and give meaningsto the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus acknowledged to be denotativeof themselves. It is only about proper names that conventionis admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to seethe bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vediccommandments, by the performance of which such results wouldarise as could not have been predicted by any other person. Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but thoughthey are ever present some manifestive agency is required bywhich they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consistsof the effort put forth by the man who pronounces theword. Nyāya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the causethat produces the word while Mīmām@sā thinks that it only manifeststo the hearer the ever-existing word. 

The process by which according to Prabhākara the meaningsof words are acquired maybe exemplified thus: a senior commandsa junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and thechild on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to thesenior's commands comes to understand the meaning of "cow"and "horse. " Thus according to him the meanings of words canonly be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; hededuces from this the conclusion that words must denote thingsonly as related to the other factors of the injunction (_anvitābhidhānavāda_), and no word can be comprehended as having anydenotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrineholds that each word yields its meaning only as being generallyrelated to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word _gām_ accusative case of _go_ (cow) means that it isintended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovinegenus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind ofaction, viz. Bringing in the sentence _gām ānaya_--bring the cow. Kumārila however thinks that words independently expressseparate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentenceexpressing one connected idea (_abhihitānvayavāda_). Thusin _gām ānaya_, according to Kumārila, _gām_ means the bovineclass in the accusative character and _ānaya_ independently means

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyāya God created all words and associated themwith their meanings. ]

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bring; these two are then combined into the meaning "bring thecow. " But on the former theory the word _gām_ means that it isconnected with some kind of action, and the particular sentenceonly shows what the special kind of action is, as in the abovesentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannothave any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumārilawhich is also the Nyāya theory is called abhihitānvayavāda [Footnote ref1]. 

Lastly according to Prabhākara it is only the Veda that canbe called s'abda-pramā@na, and only those sentences of it whichcontain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this waywith these things). In all other cases the validity of words isonly inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of thespeaker. But Kumārila considers the words of all trustworthypersons as s'abda-pramā@na. 

The Pramā@na of Non-perception (anupalabdhi). 

In addition to the above pramā@nas Kumārila admits a fifthkind of pramā@na, viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of thenon-existence of a thing. Kumārila argues that the non-existence ofa thing (e. G. There is no jug in this room) cannot be perceivedby the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses couldcome into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Somepeople prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumāna. They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible objectthere is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no visionof a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easyto see that such an inference presupposes the perception of wantof vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptionsare to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. Howcan the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramā@nanamely anupalabdhi. 

All things exist in places either in a positive (_sadrūpa_) or ina negative relation (_asadrūpa_), and it is only in the former case

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[Footnote 1: See _Prabhākaramīmā@msā_ by Dr Ga@ngānātha Jhā and S. N. Dasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in thisconnection that Mīmā@msā did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of soundwhich consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds ofletters composing a word, there was a complete word form which wasmanifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of thesyllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project thisword manifestation. See Vācaspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokavārttika_and _Prakara@napańcikā_. For the doctrine of anvitābhidhāna seeSāhkanātha's _Vākyārthamāt@rkāv@rttī_. ]

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that they come within the purview of the senses, while in thelatter case the perception of the negative existence can only behad by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which wedesignate as a separate pramā@na as anupalabdhi. Prabhākaraholds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only theperception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no needof admitting a separate pramā@na as anupalabdhi. For what ismeant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perceptionof the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely emptyspace before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we oughtnot to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as theplace is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as thatwhich is not associated with the jug, then the category of negationis practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception ofempty space is defined as the perception of space at the momentwhich we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, thenalso want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want ornegation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explainthe notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at bestbe an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to substitute for the place of the externalabsence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about thething (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally endsin failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admittedeither in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negationor abhāva as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted. It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen withoutany knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the nextmoment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug. But this also means that the moment of the perception of theground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug orits negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admissionof negation as a separate category, for what other meaning canthere be in the perception of "only the ground" if it is not meantthat it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualifiedby the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception ofthe ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence ofthe jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived. The qualifying phrase that "only the ground is perceived" becomes

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meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are notspecified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of theground. And this would require that we had already the notionof negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a specialmanner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should alsobe noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates thenotion of negation immediately and not through other negations, and this is true not only of things of the present moment but alsoof the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when weremember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus aseparate pramā@na by which the absence or want of a sensibleobject--the negation of a thing--can be comprehended. 

Self, Salvation, God. 

Mīmā@msā has to accept the existence of soul, for without itwho would perform the Vedic commandments, and what wouldbe the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performingsacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul isthus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, thesense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhākara thinks that it is manifested to us inall cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existenceof self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all ourcognitions--even in those where there is no perception of the body?Kumārila however differs from Prabhākara about this analysis ofthe consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that eventhough we may not have any notion of the parts of our body ortheir specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodiedbeings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in ourcognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of theself as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is differentfrom the body on the ground that the consciousness of self ispresent in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized inmany of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting thatthe self is different from the body is this, that movement orwilling, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. , cannot be attributed tothe body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then befound. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to someother entity owing to the association with which the body appears

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to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. Though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceivedby others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc. , are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causationthat the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impartthemselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the bodyis made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc. , andthis also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as thevehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised thatif the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or amover? But Mīmā@msā does not admit that movement meansatomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy whichmoves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul. It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the lattermoves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called anagent on account of the fact that it causes the movement ofthe body. The self must also be understood as being differentfrom the senses, for even when one loses some of the senseshe continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting allthrough. 

The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhākaraholds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from thecognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizorentering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both theself and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge inwhat we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyāk@sa (perceptionas three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined butknowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self andthe object in one operation. But just as in the case of a manwho walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he isregarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in thecase of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yetit appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is notsoul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparablefrom all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object iscognized the self also is not cognized. 

Kumārila however thinks that the soul which is distinct fromthe body is perceived by a mental perception (_mānasa-pratyak@sa_as the substratum of the notion of "I, " or in other words the selfperceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its

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own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I. " The objectionthat the self cannot itself be both subject and object to itsown operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhākara'stheory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yetconsiders it as the subject of the operation. The analogy oflinguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yethe is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge, for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Thoughat the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet itdoes not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, butreveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception whichis distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubtknown as the substratum of "I, " but the knowledge of this selfdoes not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge ofobjects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuitionwhich we represent as the "I. " The self does not reveal itself asthe knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of themind. This is indeed different from Prabhākara's analysis, whoregarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition, both being the result of the illumination of knowledge. Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara however in holding that soulis not self-illuminating (_svayamprakās'a_), for then even in deepsleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no suchmanifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as anunconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for hadit been so people would not have regretted that they had missedsensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that"I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreoverthe opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also foundwhen a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long withoutknowing anything not even my own self. " The self is notatomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the headas well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size ofthe body which contracts and expands according to the body itoccupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul shouldbe regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. Thisself must also be different in different persons for otherwise theirindividual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannotbe explained [Footnote ref 1]. ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavārttika_, ātmavāda _S'āstra-dīpikā_, ātmavāda andmok@savāda. ]

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Kumārila considered the self to be merely the potency ofknowledge (jńānas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognitions of things weregenerated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This selfitself can only be cognized by mental perception, Or at thetime of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manasthe self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledgewithout any actual expression or manifestation. So the state ofsalvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of anyof its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. , for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it blissor ānanda as Vedānta supposes; but these are generated in it byits energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divestedof all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of theenergy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvationis accepted in the main by Prabhākara also. 

Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffersthe fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts themand stops the further generation of new effects by refraining fromthe performance of kāmya-karmas (sacrifices etc. Performed forthe attainment of certain beneficent results) and guaranteeshimself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performingthe nitya-karmas (such as the sandhyā prayers etc. , by the performanceof which there is no benefit but the non-performanceof which produces sins). This state is characterized by thedissolution of the body and the non-production of any furtherbody or rebirth. 

Mīmā@msā does not admit the existence of any God as thecreator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe ismade up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that theuniverse had ever any beginning in time, or that any God createdit. Every day animals and men are coming into being by theaction of the parents without the operation of any God. Neitheris it necessary as Nyāya supposes that dharma and adharmashould have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and

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[Footnote 1: It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike NyāyaMīmā@msā did not consider all activity as being only of the nature ofmolecular vibration (_parispanda_). It admitted the existence of energy(_s'akti_) as a separate category which manifested itself in actualmovements. The self being considered as a s'akti can move the body andyet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means therelationing of the energy with a thing. Nyāya strongly opposes thisdoctrine of a non-sensible (atīndriya) energy and seeks to explain allaction by actual molecular motion. ]

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no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannotbe any contact (_sa@myoga_) or inherence (_samavāya_) of dharmaand adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannothave any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world likethe carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create theworld either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in thebeginning there were no beings towards whom should he beactuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himselfrequire a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator, no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever beenrunning the same, without any new creation or dissolution, s@r@s@tior pralaya. 

Mīmā@msā as philosophy and Mīmā@msā as ritualism. 

From what we have said before it will be easy to see thatMīmā@msā agrees in the main with Vais'e@sika about the existenceof the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rūpa, rasa, etc. Kumārila's differences on the points of jāti, samavāya, etc. And Prabhākara's peculiarities have also beenmentioned before. On some of these points it appears thatKumārila was influenced by Sā@mkhya thought rather than byNyāya. Sā@mkhya and Vais'e@sika are the only Hindu systems whichhave tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics;other systems have generally followed them or have differed fromthem only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhākara andKumārila have thus but little importance, as they agree ingeneral with the Vais'e@sika view. In fact they were justified in notlaying any special stress on this part, because for the performanceof sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyāya-Vais'e@sika aboutthe world was most suitable. 

The main difference of Mīmā@msā with Nyāya consists of thetheory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that theVeda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity fromGod, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by anyother means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validityof all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda theadvantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicatedto us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, andthere being nothing to contradict them later on there would benothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions

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invalid. The other pramā@nas such as perception, inference, etc. Were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to ushow dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existingthing which could be perceived by the other pramā@nas, buta thing which could only be produced by acting according tothe injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharmaand adharma therefore the s'abdapramā@na of the Veda was ouronly source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have aknowledge of the different means of cognition, as without themit would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatableVedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolutionwhich is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not beacknowledged by the Mīmā@msā as it would have endangered theeternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with onthat account. 

The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brāhma@nas(also called the _vidhis_ or injunctive sentences). There arethree classes of injunctions (1) apūrva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and(3) parisa@nkhyā-vidhi. Apūrva-vidhi is an order which enjoinssomething not otherwise known, e. G. The grains should be washed(we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for thesacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is thatwhere when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to followingsome definite alternative (e. G. Though the chaff from the corncould be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn shouldbe threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as theonly course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhithat which is ordered is already known as possible but only asan alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods asthe only one. In apūrva-vidhi the thing to be done would haveremained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi. In parisa@nkhyā-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known butnot necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra "I takeup the rein" (_imām ag@rbhnā@m ras'anā@m_) which could be used ina number of cases should not however be used at the time ofholding the reins of an ass. 

There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedicsentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectivelythey yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be

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taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentencescan however yield meanings separately by themselves theyshould not be connected together. (3) In the case of certainsentences which are incomplete suitable words from the contextof immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied. 

The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deitiesor powers are to be taken as being for the specification of thedeity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be rememberedthat as dharma can only be acquired by followingthe injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted asgiving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedaswhich cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as formingpart of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas whichdescribe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction(called the _arthavādas_) should be interpreted as forming partof a vidhi-vākya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Eventhose expressions which give reasons for the performance ofcertain actions are to be treated as mere arthavādas and interpretedas praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only asmandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired. 

When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions ofthe Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existenceis proved by the authority of the scriptures is generatedeither in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positiveforce called _apūrva_ produces in time the beneficent results of thesacrifice (e. G. Leads the performer to Heaven). This apūrva is likea potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until thedesired results follow [Footnote ref 1]. 

It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous worksof S'abara and Kumārila make an elaborate research into thenature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in greatdetail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a studentof philosophy. 

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[Footnote 1: See Dr Ga@ngānātha Jhā's _Prabhākaramīmā@msā_ and Mādhava's_Nyāyamālāvistara_. ]

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CHAPTER X

THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA

Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essentialthan the Dialectic of controversy. 

_Pramā@na_ in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movementby which knowledge is acquired, _pramātā_ means the subject orthe knower who cognizes, _pramā_ the result of pramā@na--rightknowledge, _prameya_ the object of knowledge, and _prāmā@nya_ thevalidity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge issometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge toits object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion ofvalidity in the mind of the subject--the knower (that his perceptionsare true), which moves him to work in accordance withhis perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for theattainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things. The question wherein consists the prāmā@nya of knowledge hasnot only an epistemological and psychological bearing but ametaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledgebased on an analysis of psychological experience, and onthe other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with thetheory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justifya theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretationof experience which the others sometimes ignored orsometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of differentschools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat oneanother in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequentlyvery important in determining the prestige of any schoolof thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyāyaor Mīmā@msā thinker in a great public debate attended by manylearned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame atonce spread all over the country and he could probably secure alarge number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputationwere often undertaken by great masters all over the countryfor the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schoolsand of securing adherents to their own. These debates were thereforenot generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical

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mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order toinflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency ofsome particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personalvictory and of the victory of the school of thought to which thedebater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. AdvancedSanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitudeof mind of these debaters and we find that most of thesedebates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers byexposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by closedialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent, asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving thathis theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposedto the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work onIndian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through aninterminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms(to thwart opponents) sometimes called _vita@n@dā_, before he cancome to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence. All the resources of the arts of controversy find full playfor silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answeris given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs tono party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victoryof either side, the most important thing is the comprehension ofthe different aspects from which the problem of the theory ofknowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked atby the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiencyof each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculationson the experience of each school, their analysis, and theirnet contribution to philosophy. With Vedānta we come to anend of the present volume, and it may not be out of place hereto make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from thepoint of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate theposition of the Vedānta of the S'a@nkara school in the field ofIndian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall thereforenow try to lay before my readers the solution of the theoryof knowledge (_pramā@navāda_) reached by some of the mainschools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered bythe S'a@nkara Vedānta will also be dealt with, as we shall attemptto sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter. 

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The philosophical situation. A Review. 

Before dealing with the Vedānta system it seems advisableto review the general attitude of the schools already discussed tothe main philosophical and epistemological questions which determinethe position of the Vedānta as taught by S'a@nkara andhis school. 

The Sautrāntika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man isconcerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (_puru@sādrtka_). This however cannot be done without right knowledge (_samyagjńāna_)which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is saidto be right when we can get things just as we perceived them. So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and thereforethis does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry aboutknowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification orcontradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know howfar our perceptions of things which invariably precede all ouractions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to getin our practical experience (_arthaprādpakatva_). The perception isright (_abhrānta_ non-illusory) when following its representation wecan get in the external world such things as were represented byit (_sa@mvādakatva_). That perception alone can be right which isgenerated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination. When I say "this is the cow I had seen, " what I see is theobject with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc. , but the fact thatthis is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, isnot perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated bythe visual object. For all things are momentary, and that whichI see now never existed before so as to be invested with thisor that permanent name. This association of name and permanenceto objects perceived is called _kaipanā_ or _abhilāpa_. Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilāpaassociation (_kalpanāpo@dha_), for though this is taken as a part ofour perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, andhence its association with the object is an evident error. Theobject as unassociated with name--the nirvikalpa--is thus whatis perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijńāna orthought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is alsodetermined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an

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object of knowledge (_grāhya_), and by the fact of the riseof such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thingrealizable or attainable in the external world. The specialfeatures of the object undefinable in themselves as beingwhat they are in themselves (_svalak@sa@na_) are what isactually perceived (_pratyak@savi@saya_) [Footnote ref 1]. The _pramā@naphala_ (result of perception) is the

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[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word"svalak@sa@na" of Dharmakīrtti between ray esteemed friend ProfessorStcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakīrtti heldthat the content of the presentative element at the moment of perceptionwas almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to yourinterpretation svalak@sa@na mean, --the object (or idea with Vijńānavādin)_from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated_, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past andfuture has been taken away, what remains? _The present_ and the presentis a _k@sa@na_ i. E. Nothing.... The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtānaor simply sa@mtāna and in every sa@mtāna there is a synthesis ekībhāvaof moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis'caya =kalpana = adhyavasāya)... There is in the perception of a jug _something_(a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the _idea_ ofa jug (which is always a sa@mtāna, always vikalpita), and if you takethe idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains:k@sanasya jńānena prāpayitumas'akyatvāt. This is absolutely the Kantianteaching about _Synthesis of Apprehension_. Accordingly pratyak@sa is a_transcendental_ source of knowledge, because practically speaking itgives no knowledge at all. This _pramā@na_ is _asatkalpa_. Kant saysthat without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa =kalpanāpo@dha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements ofintellect (kalpanā = buddhi = synthesis = ekībhāva) they would be blind. Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory ofDharmakīrtti. He is a Vijńānavādī as I understand, because he maintainsthe cognizability of ideas (vijńāna) alone, but the reality is anincognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bāhya, it isartha, it is arthakriyāk@sa@na = svalak@sa@na; that is the reason forwhich he sometimes is called Sautrāntika and this school is sometimescalled Sautranta-vijńānavāda, as opposed to the Vijńānavāda of As'vagho@saand Āryāsanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug asit exists in our representation were the svalak@sa@na and paramārthasat, what would remain of Vijńānavāda? But there is the perception of the jugas opposed to the _pure idea_ of a jug (s'uddhā kalpanā), an element ofreality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by senseknowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an elementof sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakīrttihas also _s'uddhā kalpanā_ and _s'uddham pratyak@sam_. ... And veryinteresting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumāna, the firstmoves from k@sa@na to sa@mtāna and the second from sa@mtāna to k@sa@na, that is the reason that although bhrānta the anumāna is neverthelesspramā@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, thearthakriyāk@sa@na. It is bhrānta directly and pramā@na indirectly;pratyak@sa is pramā@na directly and bhrānta (asatkalpa) indirectly... . "So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers areconcerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushesthe interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this isblue, " the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentativeelement of sense-knowledge (_svalak@sa@na_) and the affirmation(_nis'caya_). So far we are in complete agreement. But ProfessorStcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment)and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothingonly in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involvingaffirmation such as "this is blue. " The affirmative processoccurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentativeelement of the first moment (_pratyak@sabalotpanna_ N. T. , p. 20) butthis presentative element divested from the product of the affirmativeprocess of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannotexpress its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and otherideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not forma part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be itsown specific nature (_svalak@sa@na_). But what is this specific nature?Dharmakīrtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he meansthose specific characteristics of the object which appear clear whenthe object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (_yasyārthasyasannidhānāsannidhānābkyām jńānapratibhāsabhedastat svalak@sa@nam_ N. , p. 1 and N. T. , p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specificcharacteristics of the object, and this has the same form as theobject itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specificcharacter in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmativeor ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue"(_nīlasarūpa@m pratyak@samanubhūyamāna@m nīlabodharūpamavasthāpyate ... Nīlasārūpyamasya pramā@nam nīlavikalpanarūpa@m tvasya pramā@naphalam_, N. T. P. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue(_nīlanirbhāsa@m hi vijńānam_, N. T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance(_yatkińcit arthasya sāk@sātkārijńānam tatpratyak@samucyate_, N. T. 7) andthis is real (_paramārthasat_) and valid. This blue sensation isdifferent from the idea "this is blue" (_nīlabodha_, N. T. 22) which isthe result of the former (_pramā@naphala_) through the association ofthe affirmative process (_adhyavasāya_) and is regarded as invalid forit contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and isa _vikalpapratyaya_. In my opinion _svalak@sa@na_ therefore means puresensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the objectand with Dharmakīrtti this is the only thing which is valid in perceptionand vikalpapratyaya or pramānaphala is the idea or concept which followsit. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being theconstruction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stageof the first moment of sensation-presentation (_k@sa@nasyaprāpayitumas'akyatvāt_, N. T. 16). N. T. = _Nyāyabindu@tīkā_, N = _Nyāyabindu (Peterson's edition). ]

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ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showingthe means which being followed the thing can be got (_yena k@rtenaartha@h prāpito bhavati_). Pramā@na then is the similarity of theknowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which weassure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it isperceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pramā@naphala and not pramā@na whichconsists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towardsthe perceived object. The pramā@na therefore only refersto the newly-acquired knowledge (_anadhigatādhigant@r_) as this isof use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objectiveworld. This account of perception leaves out the realepistemological question as to how the knowledge is generatedby the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks tothe correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object andits value for us in the practical realization of our ends. Thequestion of the relation of the external world with knowledge asdetermining the latter is regarded as unimportant. 

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The Yogācāras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue fromthe above-mentioned Sautrāntika Buddhists, and say that sincewe can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone, what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as thedata of sensation determining our knowledge? You say thatsensations are copies of the external world, but why should yousay that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never comeinto touch with objects in themselves; these can only be graspedby us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must thereforebe the same as knowledge (_sahopalambhaniyamāt abhedonīlataddhiyo@h_); for it is in and through knowledge that externalobjects can appear to us, and without knowledge weare not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it isknowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself insuch a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects. We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no externalobjects, but even there we have knowledge. The questionwhy then if there are no external objects, there should be somuch diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solvedby the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption, the external objects have to be admitted as possessing theinfinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determiningour knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that inthe beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-momentsby virtue of their inherent specific qualities determinethe succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledgealone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion ofknowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire(_vāsanā_) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determinesthe succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. Are not qualities requiring a permanent entityas soul in which they may inhere, but are the various formsin which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive ablue thing, " is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneouslyinterpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Thoughthe cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long asthe series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person, say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. Canhappen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusorycognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects

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believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments, whatever they may be, are destroyed the nextmoment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as perceiveror knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once theknowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoingidealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience, interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knowerand the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers theflow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successiveobjective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought, Nyāya, Sā@mkhya, and the Mīmā@msā, accept the duality of souland matter, and attempt to explain the relation between thetwo. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility ofknowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature ofknowledge and the manner in which it came into being were alsoenquired after and considered important. 

Pramā@na is defined by Nyāya as the collocation of instrumentsby which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being. The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledgeconsists partly of consciousness (_bodha_) and partly of materialfactors (_bodhābodhasvabhāva_). Thus in perception theproper contact of the visual sense with the object (e. G. Jug) firstbrings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminateconsciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this lateron combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contactetc. Produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug. The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as afactor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot ofcourse be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from thefact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of thequalifying factor (_vis'e@sanajńāna_ as jugness) he could not havecomprehended the qualified object (_vis'i@s@tabuddhi_} the jug (i. E. The object which possesses jugness). In inference (_anumā@na_)knowledge of the li@nga takes part, and in upamāna the sightof similarity with other material conglomerations. In the caseof the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramā@na;even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world, right knowledge was called pramā@na, because it was of the sameform as the external objects it represented, and it was by the formof the knowledge (e. G. Blue) that we could apprehend that the

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external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine theexternal world but simply enforces our convictions about the externalworld. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictionsof the external world it is pramā@na, and so far as it determines ourattitude towards the external world it is pramā@naphala. Thequestion how knowledge is generated had little importance withthem, but how with knowledge we could form convictions ofthe external world was the most important thing. Knowledgewas called pramā@na, because it was the means by which wecould form convictions (_adhyavasāya_) about the external world. Nyāya sought to answer the question how knowledge wasgenerated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was nota mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, butthought that though as a gu@na (quality) it was external like othergu@nas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocationslike any other happening in the material world. Pramā@nadoes not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (_anadhigatādhi-gant@r_)as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there werecollocations of pramā@na, knowledge was produced, no matterwhether the object was previously unknown or known. Even theknowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitablecollocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is producedwhenever the cause of it namely the pramā@na collocationis present. Categories which are merely mental such as class(_sāmānya_), inherence (_samavāya_), etc. , were considered as havingas much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements. The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thusconceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of thecolour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element ofindeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining withthe sense contact, the object, etc. To produce the determinateconsciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement thanthe molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certaincollocation of things ended in a certain result (_phala_). Jńāna(knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations(_sāmagrī_) and their movements (e. G. Contact of manas with soul, of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc. ). Thisconfusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophicaldistinction between knowledge and an external eventof the objective world. Nyāya thus fails to explain the cause

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of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objectiveworld. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. Were regarded as qualitieswhich belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regardedas a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directlybut was inferred as that in which the qualities of jńāna, sukha(pleasure), etc. Inhered. Qualities had independent existenceas much as substances, but when any new substances wereproduced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. Itis very probable that in Nyāya the cultivation of the art of inferencewas originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deducedlater by an application of the inferential method which gavethe introspective method but little scope for its application, so that inference came in to explain even perception (e. G. This isa jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychologicalexperience was taken only as a supplement to corroboratethe results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it[Footnote ref 1]. 

Sā@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge andmaterial events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being thecopy of external things, it could not be absolutely different fromthe objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucentsort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the externalobjects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objectsmakes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substancesthough in a subtler form as that of which the objects weremade. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed theform of the objects with which it came in touch, was probablythus a subtler combination of the same elementary substancesof which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element, viz. Intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterlydifferent from material combinations. This element of intelligenceis indeed different from the substances or content ofthe knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like astationary light, "the self, " which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form inaccordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. Thislight of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation inconsciousness as the "I, " the changeless entity amidst all thefluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How thiselement of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamańjarī_ on pramā@na. ]

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relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it upinto itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult pointof the Sā@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substanceof knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape ofknowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (_puru@sa_)when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shapeof knowledge is thus the pramā@na (instrument and process ofknowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapesis criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by theexternal objects (_svata@h-prāmā@nya_ and _svata@h-aprāmā@nya_). Thepramā@na however can lead to a pramā or right knowledge onlywhen it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touchwith buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact butby what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact. It is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motionthe original prak@rti in Sā@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the sametranscendent touch (call it yogyatā according to Vācaspati orsamyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity ofpuru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi intoconsciousness. The Vijńānavādin Buddhist did not make anydistinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (_ākāra_)and did not therefore agree that the ākāra of knowledge wasdue to its copying the objects. Sā@mkhya was however a realistwho admitted the external world and regarded the forms asall due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance(_sattva_) which could assume the shape of the objects. But Sā@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did notthink like Nyāya that the ākāra of knowledge was all that knowledgehad to show; it held that there was a transcendent elementwhich shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. WithNyāya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi andthe intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost likea physical event. With Sā@mkhya however so far as the contentand the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it wasindeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing elementof consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendentaffair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise ofconsciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical. 

The Mīmā@msist Prabhākara agreed with Nyāya in generalas regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact

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induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as aunique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knowerand the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which revealsthings--the direct apprehension that should be called the pramā@na. Pramā@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pramā, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramā@na may also indeedmean the collocations so far as they induce the pramā. Forpramā or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances. The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specificattitude that is generated in us with reference to the objectiveworld. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in theobjective field (_sa@mvādin_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate)means the whole knowledge of the object and not merelya non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyāyaholds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishesthe knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects asrepresented by memory [Footnote ref 1]. 

Prabhākara rejected the Sā@mkhya conception of a dual elementin consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) anda material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as anunique thing which by itself in one flash represented both theknower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not dependupon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars'akatva_)external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension(_anubhūti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world;knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all itsself-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apartfrom its self-revealing character Prabhākara did not enquire. 

Kumārila declared that jńāna (knowledge) was a movementbrought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producingconsciousness (_jńātatā_) of objective things. Jńāna itselfcannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movementnecessary for producing the jńātatā or consciousness of things. Movement with Kumārila was not a mere atomic vibration, butwas a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

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[Footnote 1: Sā@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of thefirst moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the nextmoment, was called savikalpa. ]

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was sometimes the result. Jńāna was a movement and not theresult of causal operation as Nyāya supposed. Nyāya wouldnot also admit any movement on the part of the self, but itwould hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc. , it becomes an instrument for the accomplishmentof a physical movement. Kumārila accords the sameself-validity to knowledge that Prabhākara gives. Later knowledgeby experience is not endowed with any special qualitywhich should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of theprevious movement. For what is called sa@mvādi or later testimonyof experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. Theself is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but wecan know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It isthe movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstancesleading to cognition of things that is called jńāna [Footnote ref 2]. Here Kumārila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledgeas objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement wasbeyond sense perception and could only be inferred. 

The idealistic tendency of Vijńānavāda Buddhism, Sā@mkhya, and Mīmā@msā was manifest in its attempt at establishing the uniquecharacter of knowledge as being that with which alone we are intouch. But Vijńānavāda denied the external world, and therebydid violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sā@mkhya admittedthe external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledgeand pure intelligence; Prabhākara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledgewas such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower andthe known, Kumārila however admitted a transcendent elementof movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the questionremained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character ofknowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could beregarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objectiveworld, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, thesuitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyaratnamāla_, svata@h-prāmā@nya-nir@naya. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyāyamańjari_ on Pramā@na, _S'lokavārttika_ onPratyak@sa, and Gāgā Bha@t@ta's _Bha@t@tācintama@ni_ on Pratyak@sa. ]

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uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whetherany absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledgeand matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regardedas the real. But the question was not asked, whetherthere was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. Thisphilosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for theHindu mind. 

Vedānta Literature. 

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the _Brahma-sūtras_were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all theother Indian systems, even of the S'ūnyavāda Buddhism (of courseaccording to S'a@nkara's interpretation), they cannot have beenwritten very early. I think it may not be far from the truth insupposing that they were written some time in the second centuryB. C. About the period 780 A. D. Gau@dapāda revived the monisticteaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the Mā@n@dūkyaUpani@sad in verse called _Mā@n@dūkyakārikā_. His disciple Govindawas the teacher of S'a@nkara (788--820 A. D. ). S'a@nkara's commentaryon the _Brahma-sūtras_ is the root from which sprangforth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedāntism of greatoriginality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ānandagiri, adisciple of S'a@nkara, wrote a commentary called _Nyāyanir@naya_, and Govindānanda wrote another commentary named _Ratna-prabhā_. Vācaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A. D. , wroteanother commentary on it called the _Bhāmati. _ Amalānanda(1247--1260 A. D. ) wrote his _Kalpataru_ on it, and Apyayadik@sita(1550 A. D. ) son of Ra@ngarājadhvarīndra of Kāńcī wrote his_Kalpataruparimala_ on the _Kalpataru. _ Another disciple of S'a@nkara, Padmapāda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on itknown as _Pańcapādikā_. From the manner in which the book isbegun one would expect that it was to be a running commentaryon the whole of S'a@nkara's bhāsya, but it ends abruptly at theend of the fourth sūtra. Mādhava (1350), in his _S'a@nkaravijaya, _recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara receivedS'a@nkara's permission to write a vārttika on the bhāsya. But other pupils objected to S'a@nkara that since Sures'vara wasformerly a great Mīmā@msist (Ma@n@dana Misra was called Sures'varaafter his conversion to Vedāntism) he was not competent to write

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a good _vārttika_ on the bhā@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrotea treatise called _Nai@skarmyasiddhi. _ Padmapāda wrote a @tīkābut this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had onceseen it, recited it from memory and Padmapāda wrote it down. Prakās'ātman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapāda's _Pańcapādikā_known as _Pańcapādikāvivara@na. _Akha@n@dānanda wrotehis _Tattvadīpana, _ and the famous N@rsi@mhās'rama Muni (1500)wrote his _Vivara@nabhāvaprakās'ikā_ on it. Amalānanda andVidyasāgara also wrote commentaries on _Pańcapādikā, _ named_Pańcapādikādarpa@na_ and _Pańcapādikā@tīkā_ respectively, butthe _Pańcapādikāvivara@na_ had by far the greatest reputation. Vidyāra@nya who is generally identified by some with Mādhava(1350) wrote his famous work _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1], elaborating the ideas of _Pańcapādikāvivara@na_; Vidyāra@nyawrote also another excellent work named _Jīvanmuktiviveka_ onthe Vedānta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A. D. )excellent work _Nai@skarmyasiddhi_ is probably the earliest independenttreatise on S'a@nkara's philosophy as expressed in hisbhā@sya. It has been commented upon by Jńānottama Mis'ra. Vidyāra@nya also wrote another work of great merit known as_Pańcadas'ī, _ which is a very popular and illuminating treatise inverse on Vedānta. Another important work written in verse onthe main teachings of S'a@nkara's bhā@sya is _Sa@mk@sepas'arīraka_, written by Sarvajńātma Muni (900 A. D. ). This has also beencommented upon by Rāmatīrtha. S'rīhar@sa (1190 A. D. ) wrotehis _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhādya_, the most celebrated work on theVedānta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortlyafter S'rīhar@sa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote anindependent work on Vedānta dialectic known as _Tattvadīpikā_which has also a commentary called _Nayanaprasādinī_ writtenby Pratyagrūpa. S'a@nkara Mis'ra and Raghunātha also wrotecommentaries on _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhādya. _ A work on Vedāntaepistemology and the principal topics of Vedānta ofgreat originality and merit known as _Vedāntaparibhā@sā_ waswritten by Dharmarājādhvarīndra (about 155OA. D. ). His sonRāmak@r@snādhvarin wrote his _S'ikhāma@ni_ on it and Amaradāsa his_Ma@niprabhā. _ The _Vedāntaparibhā@sā_ with these two commentariesforms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamentalprinciples of Vedānta. Another work of supreme importance

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[Footnote 1: See Narasi@mhācārya's article in the _Indian Antiquary_, 1916. ]

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(though probably the last great work on Vedānta) is the_Advaitasiddhi_ of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who followed Dharmarājādhvarīndra. This has three commentaries known as _Gau@dabrahmānandī_, _Vi@t@thales'opadhyāyī_ and _Siddhivyākhyā_. SadānandaVyāsa wrote also a summary of it known as _Advaitasiddhisiddhāntasāra_. Sadānanda wrote also an excellent elementary worknamed _Vedāntasāra_ which has also two commentaries _Subodhinī_and _Vidvanmanorańjinī_. The _Advaitabrahmasiddhi_ of SadānandaYati though much inferior to _Advaitasiddhi_ is important, as ittouches on many points of Vedānta interest which are not dealtwith in other Vedānta works. The _Nyāyamakaranda_ of ĀnandabodhaBha@t@tārakācāryya treats of the doctrines of illusion verywell, as also some other important points of Vedānta interest. _Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī_ of Prakās'ānanda discusses many ofthe subtle points regarding the nature of ajńāna and its relationsto cit, the doctrine of _d@r@stis@r@stivāda_, etc. , with great clearness. _Siddhāntales'a by Apyayadīk@sita is very important as a summaryof the divergent views of different writers on many points ofinterest. _Vedāntatattvadīpikā_ and _Siddhāntatattva_ are also goodas well as deep in their general summary of the Vedānta system. _Bhedadhikkāra_ of Nrsi@mhās'rama Muni also is to be regarded asan important work on the Vedānta dialectic. 

The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedāntaworks on which the present chapter has been based. 

Vedānta in Gau@dapāda. 

It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning ofthe Vedānta thought as contained in the _Brahma-sūtras_ withoutmaking any reference to the commentary of S'a@nkara or anyother commentator. There is reason to believe that the _Brahma-sūtras_were first commented upon by some Vai@s@nava writers whoheld some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been morethan a half dozen Vai@s@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sūtras_who not only differed from S'a@nkara's interpretation, but alsodiffered largely amongst themselves in accordance with thedifferent degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects oftheir dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretationwas the only one that was faithful to the sūtras and to

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[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shalldeal with the systems expounded by the Vai@s@nava commentators of the_Brahma-sūtras_. ]

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the Upani@sads. Should I attempt to give an interpretationmyself and claim that to be the right one, it would be onlyjust one additional view. But however that may be, I ammyself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the_Brahma-sūtras_ were probably more faithful to the sūtras than theinterpretations of S'ańkara. 

The _S'rīmadbhagavadgītā_, which itself was a work of theEkānti (singularistic) Vai@s@navas, mentions the _Brahma-sūtras_ ashaving the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1]. Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophicalsūtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhismfound in the _Brahma-sūtras_ are not with regard to the Vijńāna-vadaof Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'ūnyavāda, but he regardsthe composition of the _Brahma-sūtras_ to be later than Nāgārjuna. I agree with the late Dr S. C. Vidyābhū@shana in holding thatboth the Yogācāra system and the system of Nāgārjuna evolvedfrom the _Prajńāpāramitā_ [Footnote ref 2]. Nāgārjuna's meritconsisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in supportof S'unyavāda; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavāda areconcerned I believe that the Tathatā philosophy of As'vagho@saand the philosophy of the _Prajńāpāramitā_ contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nāgārjuna werebetter known to the Hindu writers than the _Mahāyāna sūtras_. Even in such later times as that of Vācaspati Mis'ra, we findhim quoting a passage of the _S'ālistambha sūtra_ to give an accountof the Buddhist doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda [Footnote ref 3]. We could interpret any reference to S'ūnyavāda as pointing toNāgārjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methodswere referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference inthe _Bhagavadgītā_ to the _Brahma-sūtras_ clearly points out a dateprior to that of Nāgārjuna; though we may be slow to believe suchan early date as has been assigned to the _Bhagavadgītā_ by Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far backas the first half of the first century B. C. Or the last partof the second century B. C. The _Brahma-sūtras_ could thus beplaced slightly earlier than the date of the _Bhagavadgītā_. 

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[Footnote 1: "Brahmasūtrapadais'caiva hetumadbhirvinis'cita@h"_Bhagavadgītā_. The proofs in support of the view that the_Bhagavadgītā_ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2ndvolume of the present work in the section on _Bhagavadgītā_ andits philosophy. ]

[Footnote 2: _Indian Antiquary_, 1915. ]

[Footnote 3: See Vācaspati Mis'ra's _Bhāmatī_ on S'a@nkara's bhāsya on_Brahma-sūtra_, II. Ii. ]

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I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict withthis supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hinduwriter who held such monistic views as Gau@dapāda or S'a@nkara, and who interpreted the _Brahma-sūtras_ in accordance with thosemonistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualistshad been writing commentaries on the _Brahma-sūtras_, goes toshow that the _Brahma-sūtras_ were originally regarded as anauthoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact thatthe _Bhagavadgītā_, the canonical work of the Ekānti Vai@s@navas, should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previousto Gau@dapāda who attempted to give an exposition of themonistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writinga commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an independentwork as did Gau@dapāda. I am inclined to think therefore thatas the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in acoherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, itwas dealt with by people who had sympathies with some formof dualism which was already developing in the later days ofthe Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of suchUpani@sads as the S'vetās'vatara, and the like. The epic S'a@mkhyawas also the result of this dualistic development. 

It seems that Bādarāya@na, the writer of the _Brahma-sūtras_, was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentatorS'a@nkara. Gau@dapāda seems to be the most importantman, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendenciesof the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried toformulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significantthat no other kārikās on the Upani@sads were interpreted, except the _Mān@dūkyakārikā_ by Gau@dapāda, who did not himselfmake any reference to any other writer of the monisticschool, not even Bādarāya@na. S'a@nkara himself makes the confessionthat the absolutist (_advaita_) creed was recovered fromthe Vedas by Gau@dapāda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentaryon Gau@dapāda's kārikā, he says that "he adores byfalling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of hisadored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean madedreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for allpeople, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his greatchurning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heartof the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal

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gods [Footnote ref l]. " It seems particularly significant that S'a@nkarashould credit Gau@dapāda and not Bādarāya@na with recovering theUpani@sad creed. Gau@dapāda was the teacher of Govinda, theteacher of S'a@nkara; but he was probably living when S'a@nkarawas a student, for S'a@nkara says that he was directly influenced byhis great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-controland modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapāda [Footnote ref 2]. There issome dispute about the date of S'a@nkara, but accepting the date proposedby Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may considerit to be 788 A. D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able toteach S'a@nkara, Gau@dapāda must have been living till at least 800 A. D. 

Gau@dapāda thus flourished after all the great Buddhistteachers As'vagho@sa, Nāgārjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; andI believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kārikās for thinkingthat he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered thatthe teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kārikās hesays that he adores that great man (_dvipadām varam_) who by knowledgeas wide as the sky realized (_sambuddha_) that all appearances(_dharma_) were like the vacuous sky (_gaganopamam_ [Footnote ref 4]. Hethen goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (_des'ita_)that the touch of untouch (_aspars'ayoga_--probably referring toNirvā@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings, and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine norfound any contradiction in it (_avivāda@h aviruddhas'ca_). Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (_jāta_)is of non-existents (_abhūtasya_); there are others who quarrelwith them and say that neither the existents nor non-existentsare liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being(_advayamajātim_). He agrees with those who hold that thereis no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of hiskārikā he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there wasno coming into being in any way (_sarvathā Buddhairajāti@h paridīpita@h_). 

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[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's bhā@sya on Gau@dapāda's kārikā, Anandās'ramaedition, p. 214. ]

[Footnote 2: Anandās'rama edition of S'a@nkara's bhā@sya on Gau@dapāda'skārikā, p. 21. ]

[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S'a@nkara's date somewhere in the 8thcentury, and Ve@nkates'vara would have him in 805 A. D. -897 A. D. , as hedid not believe that S'a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years. _J. R. A. S. _ 1916. ]

[Footnote 4: Compare _Lankāvatāra_, p. 29, _Katha@m ca gaganopamam_. ]

[Footnote 5: Gau@dapāda's kārikā, IV. 2, 4. ]

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Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (_vastuvādi_), who since they found things and could deal with them andwere afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken oforigination (_jāti_). In IV. 90 he refers to _agrayāna_ which weknow to be a name of _Mahāyāna_. Again, in IV. 98 and 99he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature. These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (_mukta_) and the leadersknow first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances(_dharma_) were knowledge. He then closes the kārikās with anadoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref1]. 

Gau@dapāda's work is divided into four chapters: (i) Āgama(scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4)Alātas'ānti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter ismore in the way of explaining the Mā@n@dūkya Upani@sad byvirtue of which the entire work is known as _Mā@n@dūkyakārikā_. The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive partsof Gau@dapāda's work, not particularly connected with the Mā@n@dūkyaUpani@sad. 

In the first chapter Gau@dapāda begins with the three apparentmanifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of theexternal world while we are awake (_vis'va_ or _vais'vānara ātmā_), (2) as the experiencer in the dream state (_taijasa ātmā_), (3) as theexperiencer in deep sleep (_su@supti_), called the _prājńa_ when thereis no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and purebliss (_ānanda_). He who knows these three as one is neverattached to his experiences. Gau@dapāda then enumerates sometheories of creation: some think that the world has proceededas a creation from the prā@na (vital activity), othersconsider creation as an expansion (_vibhūti_) of that causefrom which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation islike dream (_svapna_) and magic (_māyā_); others, that creationproceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceedsfrom time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord(_bhogārtham_) or for his play only (_kri@dārtham_), for suchis the nature (_svabhāva_) of the Lord, that he creates, but hecannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment. 

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[Footnote 1: Gau@dapāda's kārikā IV. 100. In my translation I have notfollowed S'a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explainaway even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism inGau@dapāda's kārikā. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly asGau@dapāda's kārikās seemed to indicate. I have followed thesame principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapāda'sphilosophy below. ]

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Gau@dapāda does not indicate his preference one way or theother, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_), unrelationable (_avyavahāryam_), ungraspable (_agrāhyam_), indefinable(_alak@sa@na_), unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades'ya_), the essence as oneness with the self (_ekātmapratyayasāra_), as the extinction of the appearance (_prapańcopas'ama_), the quiescent (_s'āntam_), the good (_s'ivam_), the one (_advaita_)[Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (_prapańca_) would have ceasedif it had existed, but all this duality is mere māyā (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (_paramārthata@h_). In the second chapterGau@dapāda says that what is meant by calling the world adream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither existsin the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in thepresent. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearancehas a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreamsthings are imagined internally, and in the experience that wehave when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at themoment of perception only; external objects are supposed tohave two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mereimagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and thatwhich appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginaryproductions in association with the sense faculties. There is firstthe imagination of a perceiver or soul (_jīva_) and then along withit the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the externalworld. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms. There is neither any production nor any destruction (_na nirodho, na cotpatti@h_), there is no one who is enchained, no one who isstriving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imaginationfinds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense

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[Footnote 1: Compare in Nāgārjuna's first kārikā the idea of_prapańcopas'amam s'ivam. Anirodhamanutpādamanucchedamas'ās'vatamanekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam ya@h pratītyasamutpādamprapańcopas'amam s'ivam des'ayāmāva sambuddhastam vande vadatāmvaram_. Compare also Nāgārjuna's Chapter on _Nirvā@naparīk@sā, Pūrvopalambhopas'ama@h prapańcopas'ama@h s'iva@h na kvacit kasyacitkas'cit dharmmo buddhenades'ita@h_. So far as I know the Buddhistswere the first to use the words _prapańcopas'aman s'ivam_. ]

[Footnote 2: Compare Nāgārjuna's k@arikā, "anirodhamanutpādam" in_Mādhyamikav@rtti, B. T. S. _, p. 3. ]

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of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_)is false; it is only the oneness (_advayatā_) that is good. Thereis no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na nānedam... Na p@rthag nāp@rthak_) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcendedattachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of theVedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of allappearance (nirvikalpa@h prapańcopas'ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2]. 

In the third chapter Gau@dapāda says that truth is like thevoid(_ākās'a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birthand death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; buthowsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different fromākās'a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams(_svapna_) and māyā (magic). Duality is a distinction imposedupon the one (_advaita_) by māyā. The truth is immortal, it cannottherefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. Allbirth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an impositionof māyā upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream, as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when themind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearlessstate, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everythingto be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stopall desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has anybirth he should not see any production at all. He should awakenthe mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify itwhen distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objectswhen it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and bywisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionlessand still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction;when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfectBrahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come intobeing, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvajńa_). 

In the fourth chapter, called the Alats'ānti, Gau@dapāda further

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[Footnote 1: Compare _Mādhyamikakārikā, _B. T. S. _, p. 3 _anekārthamanānārtham_, etc. ]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Lankāvatārasūtra_, p. 78, _Advayāsamsāraparinirvā@nvatsarvadharmā@h tasmāt tarhi mahāmateS'unyatānutpādādvayani@hsvabhāvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h_;also 8, 46, _Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyānavabodhanāt vijńānānāmsvacittad@r@s@tyamātrānavatāre@na mahāmate vālaprthagjanā@hbhāvābhāvasvabhāvaparamārthad@r@s@tidvayvādino bhavanti_. ]

[Footnote 3: Compare Nāgārjuna's kārikā, _B. T. S. _ p. 196, _Ākās'ams'as'as'@r@ngańca bandhyāyā@h putra eva ca asantas'cābhivyajyantetathābhāvena kalpanā_, with Gau@dapāda's kārikā, III. 28, _Asatomāyayā janma tatvato naiva jāyate bandhyāputro na tattvena māyāyavāpi jāyate_. ]

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describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas(appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2]. Gau@dapāda then follows a dialectical form of argument whichreminds us of Nāgārjuna. Gau@dapāda continues thus: Those whoregard kāra@na (cause) as the kāryya (effect in a potential form)cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for itsuffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing?If it is said that things come into being from that which has noproduction, there is no example with which such a case may beillustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from thatwhich has itself suffered production. How again can one come to aright conclusion about the _regressus ad infinitum_ of cause andeffect (_hetu_ and _phala_)? Without reference to the effect thereis no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it eitherbeing, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature(_svabhāvatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannotbe said to have a production. All experience (_prajńapti_) isdependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and therewould be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles'a_) that we suffer. Whenwe look at all things in a connected manner they seem to bedependent, but when we look at them from the point of view ofreality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_)does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifestthem, for since things do not exist they are not different fromtheir manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particularcase that the mind produces the manifestations of objects whilethey do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for inpresent, past, and future the mind never comes in touch withobjects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it areever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production arereally traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all productionis but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn isperceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

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[Footnote 1: The very name Alāta@sānti is absolutely Buddhistic. CompareNāgārjuna's kārikā, _B. T. S. _, p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the_S'ataka_. ]

[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance orentity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, "Codanālak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah. " Dharma is determined by the injunctionsof the Vedas. ]

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production, for it being of the nature of absence of production itcould never change its nature. Everything has a beginning andan end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is likea magical or illusory elephant (_māyāhastī_) and exists only as faras it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thusthe appearance of production, movement and things, but the oneknowledge (_vijńāna_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness(_avastutva_), the cessation (s'āntam). As the movement ofburning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is themovement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceivingand the perceived. All the attributes (e. G. Straight orcurved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality itdoes not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposedupon consciousness, though in reality they do not possessthem. We could never indicate any kind of causal relationbetween the consciousness and its appearance, which are thereforeto be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing(_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is nota thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but allthe appearances are neither things nor those which are notthings, so neither are appearances produced from the mind(_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long asone thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle ofexistence (_sa@msāra_), but when that notion ceases there is nosa@msāra. All things are regarded as being produced from arelative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothingpermanent (_s'ās'vata_). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances(_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; theircoming into being is like māyā, and that māyā again does notexist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out ofseeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are allappearances. That which appears as existing from animaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is notso in reality (_para-mārtha_), for the existence depending onothers, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all nota real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do existand not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving orsteady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded. 

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It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from theMādhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nāgārjuna's kārikās andthe Vijńānavāda doctrines, as found in _La@nkāvatāra_, that it isneedless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapāda assimilated all theBuddhist S'ūnyavāda and Vijńānavāda teachings, and thought thatthese held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so longas we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha andfor the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapāda tookthe smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because hewished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitationsof the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truththat he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggestedthat the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakablevijńāna or vacuity would hold good of the highest ātman of theUpani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of theUpani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sadsguaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapāda's views it was leftfor his disciple, the great S'a@nkara, to examine and explain. 

Vedānta and S“a@nkara (788-820 A. D. ). 

Vedānta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to bethe exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads andsummarized in the _Brahma-sūtras_ of Bādarāya@na. The Upani@sadsform the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy istherefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mīmā@msā or theMīmāmsā (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguishedfrom the Mīmā@msā of the previous part of the Vedas and theBrāhma@nas as incorporated in the _Pūrvamīmā@msā sūtras_ ofJaimini. Though these _Brahma-sūtras_ were differently interpretedby different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentaryon them now available, written by S'a@nkarācārya, haveattained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle anddeep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of theillustrious personality of S'a@nkara. So great is the influence of thephilosophy propounded by S“a@nkara and elaborated by his illustriousfollowers, that whenever we speak of the Vedānta philosophywe mean the philosophy that was propounded by S'a@nkara. Ifother expositions are intended the names of the exponents haveto be mentioned (e. G. Rāmānuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc. ), In this

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chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedāntaphilosophy as elaborated by S'a@nkara and his followers. In S'a@nkara'swork (the commentaries on the _Brahma-sūtra_ and the tenUpani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which asfound in S'a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but aremore intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is thereforebetter to take up the Vedānta system, not as we find it in S'a@nkara, but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declarethat they are true to their master's philosophy. 

For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sūtras (_Jaiminisūtra, Nyāya sūtra, _ etc. ) are the only original treatises, and nofoundation other than these is available. In the case of theVedānta however the original source is the Upani@sads, andthe sūtras are but an extremely condensed summary in asystematic form. S'a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor orexpounder of an original system, but interpreted the sūtrasand the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connectedand systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was alsoenunciated in the sūtras of Bādarāya@na. The Upani@sads were apart of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by theHindus. If S'a@nkara could only show that his exposition of themwas the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon thehighest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The mostformidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task werethe Mīma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach anyphilosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to beinterpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this orthat action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahmanand demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mereexaggerations intended to put the commandment of performingsome kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form. S'a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as foundin the Brāhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declaredby the Mīmā@msā, but he sought to prove that such couldnot be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truestand the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wisecould attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da--the(sacrificial injunctions) Brāhma@nas of the Vedas--the purport ofthe Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intendedfor ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure, 431

and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolutetruth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise whohad controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthlyjoys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahmanas the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedaswere intended for two classes of persons. S'a@nkara thus did notbegin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical andpsychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to showby textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by referenceto the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that theywere concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as heunderstood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show thatthe uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favourof the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful andapparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of thetexts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. Of theSā@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideasabout physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. That are found in theUpani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In orderto show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded itwas a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections thathis opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, tocriticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them tobe self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of theUpani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent andwrong. This he did not only in his bhāsya on the _Brahma-sūtras_but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with himhad a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aidwhich it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of theUpani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradictedtestimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth. His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in greatdetail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradictedeither in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and thatall the realistic categories which Nyāya and other systemshad put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They alsosupplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedānta epistemology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the māyā, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevanttopics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which

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had been left out or slightly touched by S'a@nkara were discussedfully by his followers. But it should always be remembered thatphilosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be takenas but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening ourfaith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work oflogic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsettingthe instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Manylives of S'a@nkarācārya were written in Sanskrit such as the_S'a@nkaradigvijaya_, _S'a@nkara-vijaya-vilāsa_, _S'a@nkara-jaya_, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700and 800 A. D. In the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S'ivaguruwas a Yajurvedi Brāhmin of the Taittirīya branch. Many miraclesare related of S'a@nkara, and he is believed to have been theincarnation of S'iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year andbecame the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing ina mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came overto Benares and thence went to Badarikās'rama. It is said thathe wrote his illustrious bhā@sya on the _Brahma-sūtra_ in his twelfthyear. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads. He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided totravel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of otherschools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went tomeet Kumārila, but Kumārila was then at the point of death, andhe advised him to meet Kumārila's disciple. He defeated Ma@n@danaand converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He thentravelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywherehe established his Vedānta philosophy, which from that time forthacquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life ofIndia. 

S'a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapāda andby writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sūtras_tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one whichwas intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the _Brahma-sūtras_[Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the _Brahma-sūtras_, there is ample evidence that he was contending against someother rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which heldthat the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sā@mkhya cosmology

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[Footnote 1: The main works of S'a@nkara are his commentaries (bhā@sya) onthe ten Upani@sads (Īs'a, Kena, Katha, Pras'na, Mu@ndaka, Mā@n@dūkya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, B@rhadāra@nyaka, and Chāndogya), and on the_Brahma-sūtra_. ]

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of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textualinterpretations of the _Brahma-sūtras_ is proved by the fact thatS'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructionswere faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one place he says that others (referringaccording to Vācaspati to the Mīmā@msā) and some ofus (referring probably to those who interpreted the sūtras andthe Upani@sads from the Vedānta point of view) think that thesoul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposedto the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unityof the self (_ātmaikatva_) that this S'ārīraka commentary ofmine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Rāmānuja, in the introductoryportion of his bhā@sya on the _Brahma-sūtra, _ says that the views ofBodhāyana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the _Brahma-sūtra_were summarized by previous teachers, and that he wasfollowing this Bodhāyana bhā@sya in writing his commentary. Inthe _Vedārthasa@mgraha_ of Rāmānuja mention is made of Bodhāyana, Tanka, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhāruci as Vedāntic authorities, and Dravi@dācāryya is referred to as the "bhā@syakāra" commentator. In Chāndogya III. X. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmologyappeared to be different from the _Vi@s@nupurana_ cosmology, S'a@nkararefers to an explanation offered on the point by one whomhe calls "ācāryya" (_atrokta@h parihārah ācāryyaih_) and Ānandagirisays that "ācāryya" there refers to Dravi@dācāryya. This Dravi@dācāryyais known to us from Rāmānuja's statement as being acommentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence herethat he had written a commentary on the Chāndogya Upani@sad. 

A study of the extant commentaries on the _Brahma-sūtras_ ofBādarāya@na by the adherents of different schools of thoughtleaves us convinced that these sūtras were regarded by all ascondensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differencesof opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sūtras andthe Upani@sad texts to which references were made by themin each particular case. The _Brahma-sūtra_ is divided into fouradhyāyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chaptersor pādas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion(_adhikara@na_) which are composed of a number of sūtras, whichraise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt anduncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour

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[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432. ]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bhā@sya on the _Brahma-sūtras_, I. Iii. 19. ]

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a particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of thesesūtras except the first four and the first two chapters of thesecond book are devoted to the textual interpretations of theUpani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutistVedānta creed does not consist in proving the Vedānta tobe a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, butin so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agreein holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be theonly truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answersome of the objections that may be made from the Sā@mkhyapoint of view against his absolutist creed and to show that someapparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not presentany real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refutethe Sā@mkhya, Yoga, Nyāya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhāgavataand S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters andhis commentaries on the first four sūtras contain the main pointsof his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showingthat the conclusion of the sūtras was always in strict agreementwith the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara neveroccupied the premier position; its value was considered onlysecondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understandingof the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannotbe known by reason alone. What one debater shows to bereasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what heshows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater. So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logicand argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be foundin the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all tobe used only with a view to the discovery of the real purportof the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thusbound to vindicate the position of the Vedānta as a thoroughlyrational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend onits rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But whatwas true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara'sinterpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradictexperience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show thathis interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience. If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretationthat was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparentcontradictions with experience could in some way be explained, 435

he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writinga philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us thewhole truth as taught and revealed in the Upani@sads and notsimply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneouslyappear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belongto reason but to the scriptures. 

He started with the premise that whatever may be the reasonit is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error whichidentifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of thesenses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification, for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenalknower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there wouldbe no cognitive act. S'a@nkara does not try to prove philosophicallythe existence of the pure self as distinct from all otherthings, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upani@sads describethe pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimatetruth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can betaken, for it is so revealed in the Upani@sads. This point beinggranted, the next point is that our experience is always basedupon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. Andthe imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc. Upon the self; and this with S'a@nkara is a beginningless illusion. All this had been said by Gau@dapāda. S'a@nkara accepted Gau@dapāda'sconclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positiveproof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for therefutation of other systems of thought. This being done hethought that he had nothing more to do than to show that hisidea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upani@sads. Heshowed that the Upani@sads held that the pure self as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. Thisbeing accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It mustbe a mere magic show of illusion or māyā. S'a@nkara never triesto prove that the world is māyā, but accepts it as indisputable. For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusionis that all else is mere illusion or māyā. He had thus toquarrel on one side with the Mīmā@msā realists and on the otherwith the Sā@mkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validityof the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. TheMīmā@msists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to beinterpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action, 436

or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean thatthe Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also be interpretedas containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds ofactions. The description of Brahman in the Upani@sads does nottherefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon aspossessing the particular nature described there, i. E. Brahmanshould be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses anature which is identical with our self; such a procedure wouldthen lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. S'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point wasthat the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required;but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation whenthe truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was theultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakā@n@da (those dealing with the injunctions relatingto the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferiortypes of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads, the jńānakā@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimatetruth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants whohad transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, andwho had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenlyjoy. Throughout his commentary on the _Bhagavadgītā_ S'a@nkaratried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctionsof the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices, etc. , belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained inthat order they had no right to follow the higher teachings ofthe Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scripturalduties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of alldesires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions, the field of karmamārga (the path of duties), and wantedto know the truth alone, they entered the jńānamārga (the wayof wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedāntawas thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longerinclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted completeemancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intendingto study the Vedānta are (1) discerning knowledge about what iseternal and what is transitory (_nityānityavastuviveka_), (2)disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of

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the after world (_ihāmutraphalabhogavirāga_), (3) attainment ofpeace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentrationand faith (_s'amadamādisādhanasampat_) and desire for salvation(_mumuk@sutva_). The person who had these qualifications shouldstudy the Upani@sads, and as soon as he became convinced of thetruth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attainedemancipation. When once a man realized that the self alonewas the reality and all else was māyā, all injunctions ceased tohave any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (_karma_) andthe path of wisdom (_jńāna_) were intended for different classes ofpersons or adhikārins. There could be no joint performance ofVedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught inthe Upani@sads (_jńāna-karma-samuccayābhāva@h_). As against thedualists he tried to show that the Upani@sads never favoured anykind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference betweenthe Vedānta as expounded by Gau@dapāda and as explained byS'a@nkara consists in this, that S'a@nkara tried as best he could todissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the expositionof the former and to formulate the philosophy as a directinterpretation of the older Upani@sad texts. In this he achievedremarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as ahidden Buddhist (_pracchanna Bauddha_), but his influence onHindu thought and religion became so great that he was regardedin later times as being almost a divine person or anincarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples, and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeedinggenerations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in amuch stronger way than S'a@nkara did. Our treatment of S'a@nkara'sphilosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedāntathought, as offered by these followers of S'a@nkara. These interpretationsare nowhere in conflict with S'a@nkara's doctrines, butthe questions and problems which S'a@nkara did not raise havebeen raised and discussed by his followers, and without these onecould not treat Vedānta as a complete and coherent system ofmetaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections, we may close this with a short description of some of the mainfeatures of the Vedānta thought as explained by S'a@nkara. 

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is "the cause from which(proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this worldwhich is extended in names and forms, which includes many

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agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works speciallydetermined according to space, time, and cause, a world which isformed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imaginationof the) mind [Footnote ref 1]. " The reasons that S'a@nkara adduces for theexistence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) Theworld must have been produced as the modification of something, but in the Upani@sads all other things have been spoken ofas having been originated from something other than Brahman, so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung intobeing, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated fromsomething else, for then we should have a _regressus ad infinitum_(_anavasthā_). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not havecome forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent sourcethen from which this world has come into being is Brahman. (3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (_sāk@si_) whichshines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognitionwhich the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self, and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it, for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us alland is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions. 

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self ofus all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we areidentifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all thatwe call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutelywithout any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of ourtrue state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individualself as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truthis the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pureblessedness, and pure being. 

All creation is illusory māyā. But accepting it as māyā, itmay be conceived that God (Īs'vara) created the world as a meresport; from the true point of view there is no Īs'vara who createsthe world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we allexist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence ofĪs'vara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. Inreality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory. Brahman, the self, is at once the material cause (upādāna-kāra@na)as well as the efficient cause (nimitta-kāra@na) of the world. 

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[Footnote 1: S'a@nkara's commentary, I. I. 2. See also Deussen's _System ofthe Vedānta_. ]

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There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and theeffect is but an illusory imposition on the cause--a mere illusionof name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs andcall them by so many different names, but it cannot be admittedthat they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformationsas plates and jugs are only appearances of name andform (_nāmarśpa_). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effectimposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent(_vyavahārika_) as mere objects of name and form (_nāmarūpa_), butthe cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(_pāramārthika_)[Footnote ref 1]. 

The main idea of the Vedānta philosophy. 

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedćnta philosophyas taught by the @S'a@kara school is this, that the ultimateand absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing asmany in different individuals. The world also as apart fromus the individuals has no reality and has no other truthto show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeabletruth underlying them all is the self. While othersystems investigated the pramanas only to examine how farthey could determine the objective truth of things or our attitudein practical life towards them, Vedćnta sought to reachbeneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the finaland ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm, the subject and the object. The famous instruction of@S'vetaketu, the most important Vedānta text (mahāvākya) says, "That art thou, O S'vetaketu. " This comprehension of my selfas the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when thisknowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearanceswill automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purgedof all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend thistruth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious forsalvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptorinstructs him, "That art thou. " At once he becomes the truthitself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence;all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the

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[Footnote 1: All that is important in S'a@nkara's commentary of the_Brahma-sūtras_ has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his_System of the Vedanta_; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give anylong account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken fromthe writings of his followers. ]

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many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; thevast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shinesforth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believedthat when man attained salvation, he became divested of allworld-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests, and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouchedby all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there theidea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desireand attachment with the world and had known the nature ofhis self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and hisown psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and allhis connections with the world ceased, though the world continuedas ever the same with others. The external world was a realitywith them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of trueknowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of whichthe self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldlyjoys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly. The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergothe experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruitsof past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, workedagain under the delusion of a false relationship between himselfand the world, and so the world process ran on. Mufti (salvation)meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosisand the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regardedas an unconscious one by Nyāya-Vais'e@sika and Mīma@msā, and as a state of pure intelligence by Sā@mkhya and Yoga. Butwith Vedānta the case is different, for it held that the world assuch has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imaginationwhich lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired. As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, theBrahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world asa field of experience cease. This happens not because the connectionsof the self with the world cease, but because the appearanceof the world process does not represent the ultimate andhighest truth about it. All our notions about the abidingdiversified world (lasting though they may be from beginninglesstime) are false in the sense that they do not represent the realtruth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselvesreally are, but do not also know what the world about us is. We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing

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it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is nodoubt true that these experiences show us an established orderhaving its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth. They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear tobe so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self iscomprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that onetruth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth asthe absolute--the only truth in world and man. The world-appearanceas experienced by us is thus often likened to theillusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the momentthe perception appears to be true and the man runs to pickit up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; butas soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece ofconch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deludedby the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusionof silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposesso long as it persisted, but when true knowledge wasacquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will alsovanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When falseknowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again. The Upani@sads tell us that he who sees the many here isdoomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is butdelusion of name and form. Other systems believed that evenafter emancipation, the world would continue as it is, thatthere was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have anyknowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments bythe processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sā@mkhyapuru@sa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuffis dissociated from it and merged in the prak@rti, the Mīmā@msāand the Nyāya soul is also incapable of knowing the worldafter emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. Butthe Vedānta position is quite distinct here. We cannot knowthe world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perceptionof this world-appearance proves itself to be false to theperson who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusioncannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known tous, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, andindefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we donot know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we knowthat when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this

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world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate linkis necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi ormanas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shellthe illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusoryperception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a trueknowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upani@sads heldthat reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere, and S'ańkara explained it by adding that the "many" was merelyan illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was boundto disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearanceis māyā (illusion). This is what S'ańkara emphasizes in expoundinghis constructive system of the Upani@sad doctrine. The question is sometimes asked, how the māyā becomes associatedwith Brahman. But Vedānta thinks this question illegitimate, for this association did not begin in time either withreference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons. In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusiondoes not affect the unchangeable truth. Māyā or illusion is noreal entity, it is only false knowledge (_avidyā_) that makes theappearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found. Māyā or avidyā has an apparent existence only so long as itlasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It isnot a real entity in association with which a real world-appearancehas been brought into permanent existence, for it only hasexistence so long as we are deluded by it (_prātītika-sattā_). Māyā therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logicaldivision of existence and non-existence and the principle of excludedmiddle. For the māyā can neither be said to be "is" nor"is not" (_tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīyā_). It cannot be said thatsuch a logical category does not exist, for all our dream andillusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they areperceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independentexistence than the fact of their perception. If it hasany creative function, that function is as illusive as itsown nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts. Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by associationwith māyā, for there can be no association of the real with the empty, the māyā, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance. 

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In what sense is the world-appearance false?

The world is said to be false--a mere product of māyā. Thefalsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involvedin the category of the indefinite which is neither _sat_ "is"nor _asat_ "is not. " Here the opposition of the "is" and "is not"is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is "isnot, " since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, andhas its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledgedawns. It is not therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle inthe air" or a hare's horn is "is not, " for these are called _tuccha_, the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be"is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state ofignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is _sat_ (is), but since it does not exist for all times it is _asat_ (is not). Thisis the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (_jagat-prapańca_)that it is neither _sat_ nor _asat_ in an absolute sense. Orrather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood ofthe world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears tobe the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, thebeing, _sat_, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, itwill be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist, and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusoryperception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell, we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time ofillusory perception to be what we saw before us as "this" (thisis silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, andwill never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception ofsilver, the "this" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared assilver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (_sat_), the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case whenthe "this" before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, thesilver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the "this"before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is oncedirectly realized, the conviction comes that the world neverexisted. The negation of the world-appearance however has noseparate existence other than the comprehension of the identityof the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as thatthe world-appearance is negated. The negation here involvedrefers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the

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negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when theconviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false(for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity differentfrom Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then thisreinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of theworld-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself, and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis, that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negationalso as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the onlything left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. Thepeculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that itappears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (_sat_) though itis not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledgedawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearanceis an appearance which is different from what weknow as real (_sadvilak@sa@na_); for the real is known to us asthat which is proved by the prama@nas, and which will neveragain be falsified by later experience or other means of proof. A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted;but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearancewill be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regardedas real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and theworld-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entitiessuch that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth. The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it thenegation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearanceand hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, butthe falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance iscontradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itselfis also contradicted. 

Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous(_svaprakās'a_) and has no form; it cannot therefore be theobject of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things, ideas, emotions, etc. , in contrast to it are called _d@rs'ya_ (objects ofconsciousness), while it is the _dra@s@tā_ (the pure consciousnesscomprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended asan expression of a mental state (_v@rtti_), it is said to have a form andit becomes d@rs'ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects ofconsciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from beingmanifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state. 

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[Footnote 1: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithyātvanirukti_. ]

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Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of theUpani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shinesforth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakās'aand dra@s@tā. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of anyform or mode. The notion of _d@rs'yatva_ (objectivity) carries withit also the notion of _ja@datva_ (materiality) or its nature asnon-consciousness (_ajńānatva_) and non-selfness (_anātmatva_) whichconsists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness. The relation of consciousness (_jńāna_) to its objects cannot beregarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shallsee later, it is not possible to determine the relation betweenknowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of theconch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms inwhich consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence. In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (_ānanda_) shinesforth, the ānanda is not an object or form of the illuminatingconsciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever thereis a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusoryimposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are differentfrom the essence of consciousness, not only in this that theydepend on consciousness for their expression and are themselvesbut objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are allfinite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, theabiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever. The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. Are limitedin themselves in what they are, but through them all the purebeing runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is, the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all theindividual appearances, there is no other class (_jāti_) such ascowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that differentindividual forms are illusorily imposed (_gha@tādīkam sadarthekalpitam, pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@tīyamānatvāt_). Sothis world-appearance which is essentially different from theBrahman, the being which forms the material cause on which itis imposed, is false(_upādānani@s@thāiyaniābhāvapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithyātvasiddhi@h--as Citsukha has it). 

The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena. 

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perceptionof silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldlyillusions is called _prātibhāsika, _ as they are contradicted by other

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later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is nevercontradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called _vyavahārika_(from _vyavahāra_, practice, i. E. That on which is based all ourpractical movements). So long as the right knowledge of theBrahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearanceruns on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulatedexperience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true. It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearanceceases to manifest itself that we have to say that fromthe ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance isfalse and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedānta it issometimes asked how, as we see the reality (_sattva_) before us, we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedānta answersthat the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, norcan it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge, for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge withouta conception of reality, and no conception of reality without aconception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehendswithin it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, andindependence, which cannot be had directly from experience, as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth. Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the truereality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash ofconsciousness which is all through identical with itself in all itsmanifestations of appearance. Our present experience of theworld-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will notbe contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in allexperience is the being (_sat_) and not its forms. This being thatis associated with all our experience is not a universal genus normerely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is thebeing, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective eventsand appearances (_ekenaiva sarvānugatena sarvatra satpratīti@h_). Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being(_sat_) as Nyāya supposes, but they are so because they are themselvesbut appearance imposed on one identical being as the basisand ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis(_adhi@s@thāna_) on which the illusions appear. This being is notdifferent with different things but one in all appearances. Ourperceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as aguarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

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could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures)did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidateinference, but it can do so only when its own validityhas been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner. But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that thesewill never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti arealso against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearancecannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradictedby inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perceptionin this case is contradicted by inference and we havehence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend(_upajīvya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but suchdependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutelyvalid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained byproper examination and enquiry (_parīk@sā_), which may convinceus that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universaltestimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition andrealization of our endeavours in the external world, it is provedbeyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality. But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us withany degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will neverbe contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedānta alsoadmits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that theworld-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that itcannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come whento the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease toexist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of theobjects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these willnever be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of theworld-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedānta inferencethat the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itselfto be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman asone dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradictsthe perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifoldaspect. 

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance isfalse, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relationbetween the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness(_d@rs'ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

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connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not beenso there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of itsconnections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagineany kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, forit can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samavāya_);and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of noother. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannotbe that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effectlike the jńātatā of Mīmā@msā is produced upon the object, for suchan effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor canobjectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us)associated with the object as Prabhakāra thinks, for there aremany things which are the objects of our consciousness but notconsidered as useful (e. G. The sky). Objectivity also cannot meanthat the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_jńāna-kāra@na_)involved in knowledge, for this can only be with referenceto objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objectsof past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing isnot present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their ownforms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for thoughthis may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true ofinference, where the object of consciousness is far away and doesnot mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whateverway we may try to conceive manifold things existing separatelyand becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have alsoseen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsistingbetween objects and consciousness, and hence it has to beadmitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after allnothing but illusory. 

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousnessyet for the illumination of specific objects it is admittedeven by Vedānta that this can only take place through specificsense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; butif that be so why not rather admit that this can take placeeven on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifoldexternal world without? The answer that the Vedānta gives tosuch a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination hasnot to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

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flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness;so it is not possible that the external reality should have topass through any process before consciousness could arise; whathappens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in allthings as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as itsveil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould orstate). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminateseverything with which it comes into relation. Such an illuminationof objects by its underlying reality would have been continuousif there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as thereality is hidden by the veil of ajńāna (nescience). This veil isremoved as soon as the light of consciousness shines through amental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thingshines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusoryimpositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajńāna which isremoved by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon asthe veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. Theaction of the senses, eye, etc. Serves but to modify the v@rtti of themind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the correspondingajńāna veil which was covering the corresponding specific part ofthe world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of theobject which was already present, being divested of the veil, showsitself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could notbe manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as theveil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality showsthe corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itselfis the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated butever exists; errors of perception (e. G. Silver in the conch-shell)take place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of theeye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributedto the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because itgenerated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of thewrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion"this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver, it is the _cit, _ consciousness or reality as underlying the objectrepresented to us by "this" or "_idam_" that is the basis (_adhi@s@thāna_)of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience ornon-cognition (_ajńāna_) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereasthe right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

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basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in mymental state (_v@rtti_), so that the illusion is not of the formthat the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver. " Objectivephenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expressionof illumination of them as states of knowledge is madethrough the _cit_ being manifested through the mental mould orstates. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge. Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about asshadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these formswhen the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removedby their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification(_v@rtti_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination ofknowledge must be through the mental states there is no otherentity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifestedthrough the states. This Vedānta does not admit, for it holdsthat it is necessary that before the operation of the mentalstates can begin to interpret reality, reality must already bethere and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Hadthere been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has tobe admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous realityuntouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which arematerial and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminousconsciousness that seems to assume diverse formsin connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations(_upādhi_). It manifests _ajńāna_ (nescience) and hence does not byitself remove the ajńāna, except when it is reflected through anyspecific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no innerand outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousnesswhich is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenalappearances of the objective world, and the consciousness thatmanifests itself through the mental states. There is only oneidentical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basisof the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflectionthrough the mental states or v@rttis. 

The phenomena or objects called the drs'ya can only be determinedin their various forms and manifestations but not asto their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity ofany relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samavāya (inherence)

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between them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for thetruth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs'ya (perceived)have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are butillusory creations on it. 

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychologicalillusion such as "this is silver, " the knowledge of "this" as a thingis only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceivedas a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are notnoticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pureconsciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristicsof any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of anyillusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere"this" can be. The answer of Vedānta is that when the Brahmanstands as the ground (_adhi@s@thāna_) of the world-appearance itscharacteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its specialcharacter as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather itmay be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possiblebecause the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealedto us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is, "the "isness, " or "being, " does not shine in its purity, but only asa characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion. In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shinesforth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore theBrahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is madepossible. It is again objected that since the world-appearancecan serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real andnot illusory. But the Vedānta points out that even by illusoryperceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusoryperception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snakecould do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreamsmay be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physicalfunctions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressionsimbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficientto account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions producedin actual waking life account for the dream creations. According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done inprevious lives and according to the impressions or potencies(_sa@mskāra_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind ofworld-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannotaffect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

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the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjectivecreation for each individual, for even before his cognition thephenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowablestate of existence (_svena adhyastasya sa@mskārasyaviyadādyadhyāsajanakatvopapatte@h tatpratītyabhāvepi tadadhyāsasyapūrvam sattvāt k@rtsnasyāpi vyavahārikapadārthasyaajńātasattvābhyupagamāt_). It is again sometimes objected that illusionis produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (_adhi@s@thāna_)and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver, " butno such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance. To this Vedānta says that similarity is not an indispensablefactor in the production of an illusion (e. G. When awhite conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eyethrough the influence of bile or _pitta_). Similarity helps the productionof illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressionsor memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well bedone by _ad@r@s@ta_--the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds. In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion ofthis world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits noother do@sa (defect) than the avidyā (nescience) which constitutesthe appearance. Here avidyā is the only do@sa and Brahman is theonly adhi@s@thāna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, theself-luminous as the adhi@s@thāna, the illusory creations could nothave been manifested at all The cause of the direct perceptionof illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@thāna. Hence where the adhi@s@thāna is hidden by the veil of avidyā, theassociation with mental states becomes necessary for removingthe veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@thāna. As soon as the adhi@s@thāna, the ground, the reality, the blissfulself-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear. The disappearance of the phenomena means nothingmore than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman. 

The Definition of Ajńāna (nescience). 

Ajńāna the cause of all illusions is defined as that which isbeginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_anādibhāvarupatvesati jńānanivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itselfin all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects ofperception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has nobeginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

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is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive(_bhāvarūpa_) it can very well constitute the essence of negation(_abhāva_) too, for the positivity (_bhāvatva_) does not mean here theopposite of abhāva (negation) but notes merely its difference fromabhāva (_abhāva-vilak@sa@natvamātram vivak@sitam_). Ajńāna is nota positive entity (_bhāva_) like any other positive entity, but it iscalled positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abhāva_). It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in theordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is differentboth from position as well as from negation. It is sometimesobjected that ajńāna is a mere illusory imagination of the momentcaused by defect (_do@sa_) and hence it cannot be beginningless(_anādi_); but Vedānta holds that the fact that it is an imaginationor rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merelya temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could havebeen said to be a temporary product of the moment if the groundas well as the illusory creation associated with it came into beingfor the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, theground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajńāna therefore beingever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajńāna is theindefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is differentfrom the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it isbeginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to havea beginning or not to have it does not in any way determinewhether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolutionof a thing depends upon the presence of the thing whichcan cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes theillusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause whichproduced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedāntistshowever define ajńāna as the substance constituting illusion, andsay that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regardedas forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary thatonly a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for whatis necessary for the notion of a material cause (_upādāna_) is this, that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes ofeffects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist inand through the effects which are produced in the time process. Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajńāna whichalso is unreal should be the cause of it. 

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Ajńāna established by Perception and Inference. 

Ajńāna defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nornegative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptionsas "I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else, "or "I do not know what you say, " or more particularly "I hadbeen sleeping so long happily and did not know anything. " Suchperceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative. It may be objected that the perception "I do not know" is notthe perception of the indefinite, the ajńāna, but merely the negationof knowledge. To this Vedānta says that had it been theperception of a negation merely, then the negation must havebeen associated with the specific object to which it applied. A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negationgenerally appears as a substantive with the object of negationas a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation. But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" doesnot involve the negation of any particular knowledge of anyspecific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectlessignorance. Such an indefinite ajńāna is positive in the sense thatit is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positivein the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itselfin our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perceptionof a general negation, then even where there is a jug onthe ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on theground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there. Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of thenegation of all specific things; similarly a general negation withoutany specific object to which it might apply cannot manifestitself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledgeis thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if thelatter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I donot know" can persist, even though many individual objects beknown to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I donot know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it israther better to say that it is the perception of a different categorynamely the indefinite, the ajńāna. It is our common experience

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that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajńāna_) of a specific typewe launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to beadmitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from theperception of mere negation. The character of our perceivingconsciousness (_sāk@si_) is such that both the root ajńāna as wellas its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as representedin mental states (_v@rtti-jńāna_), are comprehended by it. Of course when the v@rttijńāna about a thing as in ordinaryperceptions of objects comes in, the ajńāna with regard to it istemporarily removed, for the v@rttijńāna is opposed to the ajńāna. But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_sāk@si-caitanya_)is conceived it can comprehend both the ajńāna and the jńāna(knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things showthemselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known oras unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends allpositives either as indefinite ajńāna or as states of knowledgeor as specific kinds of ajńāna or ignorance, but it is unable tocomprehend a negation, for negation (_abhāva_) is not a perception, but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus whenI say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousnesswith reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of anegation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised fromthe Nyāya point of view that since without the knowledge of aqualification (_vis'e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis'i@s@ta_) cannot beknown, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousnesswithout the object being known first. To this Vedāntareplies that the maxim that the qualification must be knownbefore the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can aswell perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is notout of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity, but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive. Even the naiyāyikas would agree that in the expression "thereis no negation of a jug here, " no separate negation can be accepted, for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctionsand differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, sonegations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositionsand appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc. ; so alldistinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may beaccepted that negation like position is one which appears as manyon account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

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content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason toobject that such perceptions as "I do not know" refer to theperception of an indefinite ajńāna in consciousness. So also theperception "I do not know what you say" is not the perceptionof negation, for this would require that the hearer should knowfirst what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it isimpossible to say "I do not know what you say. "

So also the cognition "I was sleeping long and did notknow anything" has to be admitted as referring to the perceptionof the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say thatduring sleep there is no perception, but what appears to theawakened man as "I did not know anything so long" is only aninference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant andactive state of the senses in the awakened state that the activityhad ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object ofknowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is noinvariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state ofthe senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediatelypreceding state. During sleep there is a mental stateof the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it isby the impression (_sa@mskāra_) of the aforesaid mental state ofajńāna that one remembers that state and says that "I did notperceive anything so long. " The indefinite (_ajńāna_) perceived inconsciousness is more fundamental and general than the merenegation of knowledge (_jńānābhāva_) and the two are so connectedthat though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred fromthe perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definiteis thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived assuch in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakenedstate as well as in the sleeping state. 

The presence of this ajńāna may also be inferred from themanner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousnesswhich was not known or rather known as indefinite before wesay "I did not know it before, but I know it now. " My presentknowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinitewhich was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, justas the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself byremoving the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference itsexistence

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[Footnote 1: See _Pańcapādikāvivara@na, Tattvadīpana_, and_Advaitasiddhi_. ]

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is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahmandoes not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If therewas no ajńāna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itselfin its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajńāna there wouldhave been no illusion. It is the ajńāna that constitutes the substanceof the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regardedas constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as itis unchangeable. This ajńāna is manifested by the perceivingconsciousness (_sāk@si_) and not by the pure consciousness. Theperceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence whichreflects itself in the states of avidyā (ignorance). 

Locus and Object of Ajńāna, Aha@mkāra, and Anta@hkara@na. 

This ajńāna rests on the pure _cit_ or intelligence. This cit orBrahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is notopposed to the ajńāna or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposedto the ajńāna and destroys it only when it is reflected through themental states (_v@rtti_). The ajńāna thus rests on the pure cit and noton the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go toproduce the notion of ego "_aham_" or the individual soul. VācaspatiMis'ra however holds that the ajńāna does not rest on the pure citbut on the jīva (individual soul). Mādhava reconciles this view ofVācaspati with the above view, and says that the ajńāna may beregarded as resting on the jīva or individual soul from this point ofview that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jīva(_Cinmātrās'ritam ajńānam jīvapak@sapātitvāt jīvās'ritam ucyate_Vivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seemshowever to indicate that the ajńāna is with reference to the perceivingself in association with its feeling as ego or "I"; but thisis not so; such an appearance however is caused on account ofthe close association of ajńāna with anta@hkara@na (mind) both ofwhich are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha, p. 48). 

The ajńāna however does not only rest on the cit, but it hasthe cit as its visaya or object too, i. E. Its manifestations arewith reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit isthus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajńāna is noticed;the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminouscharacter, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career onthe part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya, 458

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous citseems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it doesnot shine (_nāsti na prakās'ate iti vyavahāra@h_) or rather there is noappearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman ishidden by the ajńāna means nothing more than this, that it issuch {_tadyogyatā_) that the ajńāna can so relate itself with it thatit appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and otherstates of ajńāna-consciousness in experience. Ajńāna is thusconsidered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. Itis opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispelit. The action of this ajń@ana is thus on the light of the realitywhich it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolvedby the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is notonly with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousnessbut also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss;so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in ourpleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure citis indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting theessence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that thereis only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenalexperiences of pleasure. The ajńāna is one, but it seems to obstructthe pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which itmay be said that the ajńāna has many states as constituting theindividual experiences of the indefinite with reference to thediverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajńānaare technically called tulājńāna or avasthājńāna. Any state ofconsciousness (v@rttijńāna) removes a manifestation of the ajńānaas tulājńāna and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object. 

The most important action of this ajńāna as obstructing thepure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstratedin the notion of the ego or aha@mkāra. This notion of aha@mkārais a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and otherassociations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc. ;it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructedin the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousandlimitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation ofthe notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each setof previous false impositions determining the succeeding set ofimpositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associationsheld up in the mind (_anta@hkara@na_) with the real, the false with

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the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na takenas the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notionof the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one, so, here also when I say "I perceive", there are two distinct elementsof the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fusedinto one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that whichappears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self. Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and otherunreal. 

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhākarasought to repudiate. Prabhākara did not consider the self to beself-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought(_tripu@ti_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, theobject of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that theanalogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron balland the fire are separately experienced, but the self and theanta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we cannever say that these two are really different, and only have anillusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_)is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, andlike it does not require the assistance of anything else for thefulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedānta objects to this sayingthat according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible todiscover any relation between the self and the knowledge. Ifknowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may aswell be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledgeare indeed one and the same. Kumārila thinks this thought(_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyāya and Prabhākara as aquality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like othermovements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were asubstance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion ofa thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyāya the _ātman_ is conscious only throughassociation with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitablecollocations. Thus, _Nyāyamańjarī_ in refuting the doctrine ofself-luminosity {_svaprakās'a_) says (p. 432)

 _sacetanas'citā yogāttadyogena vinā ja@da@h nārthāvabhāsadanyaddhi caitanya@m nāma manma@he. ]

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constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a qualityof the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarilyto be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from whatelse could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that theself, the ātman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts anyof his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijńāna, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1]. 

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet aha@mkāra is absent during deep sleep. It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slepthappily and did not know anything"; yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkāra arealtogether submerged in the ajńāna, and there are only theajńāna and the self; on waking, this aha@mkāra as a state ofanta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perceptionof the ajńāna in the sleep and originates the perception"I did not know anything. " This aha@mkāra which is a mode(_v@rtti_) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidyā, and ismanifested as jńānas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyās'akti(power of work). This kriyās'akti of the aha@mkāra is illusorilyimposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears tobe an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkāraitself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti ofthe anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkāra of a past period cannow be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na, aha@mkāra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect ofthe anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in itscapacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty ofknowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. Whenthe pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it iscalled a jīva. It is clear from the above account that the ajńānais not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. Butit cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to supportit (_ās'raya_); its own nature as the ajńāna or indefinite is perceiveddirectly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originatingthe phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyāyamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and_Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_, pp. 53-58. ]

[Footnote 2: See _Vedānta-paribhā@sā_, p. 88, Bombay edition. ]

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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itselfthrough these which hide it, when corresponding states arise inthe anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth throughthese states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkāra is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajńāna-phenomena containingwithin it the associations and impressions of past phenomena asmerit, demerit, instincts, etc. From a beginningless time when thejīva or individual soul began his career. 

Anirvācyavāda and the Vedānta Dialectic. 

We have already seen that the indefinite ajńāna could beexperienced in direct perception and according to Vedānta thereare only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminousBrahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latterhas for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle bywhich the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in allthe diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which isdifferent from the category of the positive and the negative, hasonly a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when thetrue knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however canbe known about the nature of this indefinite except its characteras indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixedorder of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidyā, ajńāna or māyā is indeedhardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can allthese well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It issaid to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existencebeside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principleand to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everythingelse except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardlyappeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were onlyseeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it exceptpure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason. It has been proved that whatever notions we have about theobjective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless andfalse. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they mustshow this character when exposed to discerning criticism. Allcategories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and tobe without any conceivable notion that though apparent beforeus yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them asthat they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of ourfundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken byS'rīhar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossiblewithin the limits of this chapter, to give a completeaccount of their criticisms of our various notions of reality. I shall give here, only one example. 

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference(_bheda_)from _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhādya_. Four explanations arepossible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may beperceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience(_svarūpa-bheda_) as Prabhākara thinks; (2) the differencebetween two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other(_anyonyābhāva_), as some Naiyāyikas and Bhā@t@tas think; (3) differencemeans divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as theVais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate qualityin itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyāya. Taking the firstalternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the clothrepresent in themselves, by their very form and existence, theirmutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving thecloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristicof the cloth, then the jug also must have penetratedinto the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceivein the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?i. E. If difference is a thing which can be directly perceived bythe senses, then as difference would naturally mean differencefrom something else, it is expected that something else suchas jug, etc. From which the difference is perceived, must alsobe perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But ifthe perception of "difference" between two things has penetratedtogether in the same identical perception, then the self-contradictionbecomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not whatwe perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference fromsomething else, and if that thing from which the difference isperceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as anentity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself representsits difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the differencefrom the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the clothitself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

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the jug only indicates a term from which differenceis intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independentof any association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? Ifit is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relationto other things from which it is differentiated. If its differencefrom the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficultycomes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve thecloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature ofthe jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug wouldalso be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference butidentity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a characterof the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult toascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they havenot, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everythingmight be the quality of everything. If there is a relationbetween these two, then that relation would require anotherrelation to relate itself with that relation, and that would againrequire another relation and that another, and so on. Again, itmay be said that when the jug, etc. Are seen without referenceto other things, they appear as jug, etc. , but when they areviewed with reference to cloth, etc. They appear as difference. But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirelydifferent from the perception of difference. It should also benoted that the notion of difference is also different from thenotions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to saythat there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to saythat the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appearas difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth. The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other thingsfor its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is differentfrom the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which isthe same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that thedifference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, andnot merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. Thisshows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of thething perceived. 

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

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things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, wefind that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is notin the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the samedifficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation ofjug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also theresidence of the absence of jug in the cloth would requirethat the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reducedifference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in thecloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical clothitself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot beexplained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabhāva_) is explainedas the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness inthe jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such qualityin jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded;and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated asidentical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in clothwe might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, forclothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absenceof jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothnessin the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the thirdalternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics(_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether thevaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergenceas can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; ifthe answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endlessvaidharmyas progressing _ad infinitum_. If the answer is in thenegative then there being no divergence between the two divergencesthey become identical, and hence divergence of characteristicsas such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms ofthings are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes theother, then apart from the differences--the natural forms--thethings are reduced to formlessness (_ni@hsvarūpatā_). If natural forms(_svarūpa_) mean special natural forms (_svarūpa-vis'e@sa_) then as thespecial natural forms or characteristics only represent difference, the natural forms of the things as apart from the special oneswould appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that thereis no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explaindifferences of things, for there also the questions would arise asto whether separateness exists in different things or similar onesor whether separateness is identical with the thing in which itexists or not, and so forth. 

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The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis anddialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chaptersof _Kathāvatthu_. In the great _Mahābha@sya_ on Pā@nini by Patańjalialso we find some traces of it. But Nāgārjuna was the man whotook it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in allits subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to provethat everything that appeared as a fixed order or system wasnon-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable andself-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there wasonly the void (_s'ūnya_). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method inhis refutations of Nyāya and the Buddhist systems; but S'rīhar@saagain revived and developed it in a striking manner, and afterhaving criticized the most important notions and concepts of oureveryday life, which are often backed by the Nyāya system, soughtto prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that wecannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations ofall possible definitions that the Nyāya could give necessarily ledto the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did notexist though they appeared to do so; the Vedāntic contentionwas that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajńānaproduces only appearances which when exposed to reason showthat no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in otherwords the world-appearance, the phenomena of māyā or ajńāna, are indefinable or anirvacanīya. This great work of S'rīhar@sawas followed by _Tattvadīpikā_ of Citsukha, in which he generallyfollowed S'rīhar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with theaddition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method ofVedānta thus followed on one side the method of S'ūnyavāda inannulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the otherVijńānavāda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating characterof knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminousultimate reality. 

The Theory of Causation. 

The Vedānta philosophy looked at the constantly changingphenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover theroot whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions causedby the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

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and by its transformations produced the effect, are consideredinsufficient to explain the problem which the Vedćnta had beforeit. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally precededcertain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set ofphenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set. In fact the concept of causation and production had in itsomething quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiryafter the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental andprimary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at thepresent moment when we wished to know what was the cause ofthe jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effectwas only a more complex form of manifestation, what is theground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? Ifapart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representationof the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariablypresent at an antecedent point of time, the effect springsforth into being, we find that we are just where we were before, and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. TheNyćya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in ageneral way in associating certain groups of things of a particularkind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeedingmoment as being relevant pairs of which one being present theother also has a probability of being present, but can do nothingmore than this. It does not answer our question as to the natureof cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensablecondition for the cause. But time, according to Nyćya, is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceivedas antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and theseagain involve succession; thus the notions of succession of timeand of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutuallydependent upon each other (_anyonyās'raya_) neither of these canbe conceived independently. Another important condition isinvariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariableantecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present asan antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman'shouse, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If itmeans such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect, it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing

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[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses arealways present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry. ]

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to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedenceand nothing more. If invariability means the existence ofthat at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then alsoit fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presenceof the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If itis said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associatedwith its accessory factors, then also the question remainsthe same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause. Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by aplurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that whichhappening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannotalso be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particularcause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect thatfrom a special kind of cause we can without fail get a specialkind of effect (cf. Vātsyāyana and _Nyāyamańjarī_), for out of thesame clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate, etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, thenthe question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; doesit mean the factors themselves or something else above them? Onthe former supposition the scattered factors being always presentin the universe there should always be the effect; if it meanssomething else above the specific factors, then that something alwaysexisting, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation(_sāmagrī_) be defined as the last movement of the causesimmediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for therelation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible. Moreover if movement is defined as that which producesthe effect, the very conception of causation which was requiredto be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involvedin the causal conception that a cause is that which must produceits effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logicallyinconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find outthe real nature of the causal principle from the interminableseries of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristicsof the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajńāna of māyā, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena inthemselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are allcarved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, andsome day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the purebeing, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

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which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. Thetrue cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists throughall experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions uponit of ajńāna or avidyā. It is thus the clay, the permanent, thatis regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mereappearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truthis the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth isbeing, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are beingimposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is whatis called the _satkāryavāda_ or more properly the _satkāra@navāda_of the Vedānta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only thismuch truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or beingwhich alone is true. This appearance of the one cause thebeing, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is calledthe _vivarttavāda_ as distinguished from the _sā@mkhyayogapari@nāmavāda_, in which the effect is regarded as the real developmentof the cause in its potential state. When the effect has adifferent kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ butwhen the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called_pari@nāma (kāra@nasvalak@sa@nānyathābhāva@h pari@nāma@h tadvilak@sa@novivartta@h_ or _vastunastatsamattāko'nyathābhāva@h pari@nāma@htadvi@samasattāka@h vivartta@h)_. Vedānta has as much to objectagainst the Nyāya as against the pari@nāma theory of causationof the Sā@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality--all these are indefinable and inconceivable in thelight of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restatethings and phenomena as they appear in the world. In realityhowever though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedamvinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam kāryyam vivartta@h)_. 

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and theworld, the different followers of S'a@nkara Vedānta in explainingthe cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on themāyā, ajńāna or avidyā, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimeson them both. Thus Sarvaj@nātmamuni, the writer of_Sa@nk@sepa-s'ārīraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahmanshould be regarded as the causal substance (_upādāna_) of theworld-appearance, whereas Prakās'ātman Akhan@dānanda, and

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Mādhava hold that Brahman in association with māyā, i. E. Themāyā-reflected form of Brahman as Īs'vara should be regardedas the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearanceis an evolution or pari@nāma of the māyā as located in Īs'vara, whereas Īs'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Othershowever make a distinction between māyā as the cosmical factorof illusion and avidyā as the manifestation of the same entityin the individual or jīva. They hold that though the world-appearancemay be said to be produced by the māyā yet themind etc. Associated with the individual are produced by theavidyā with the jīva or the individual as the causal matter(_upādāna_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whomboth Īs'vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is betterrather to think that these are all manifestations of the jīva inassociation with his avidyā or ajńāna. Others however hold thatsince in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure beingand in another materiality etc. , both Brahman and māyā are tobe regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causalmatter, upādāna and māyā as the entity evolving in pari@nāma. Vācaspati Mis'ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause ofthe world-appearance through māyā as associated with jīva. Māyā is thus only a sahakāri or instrument as it were, by whichthe one Brahman appears in the eye of the jīva as the manifoldworld of appearance. Prakās'ānanda holds however in his _SiddhāntaMuktāvalī_ that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffectedeven as illusory appearance, and is not even the causalmatter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in thephenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is theproduct of māyā, which is both the instrumental and the upādāna(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergencesof view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affectthe principal Vedānta text that the only unchangeable cause isthe Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have onlya temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word māyāwas used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power andwonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlyingit was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it beganto be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadāra@nyaka, Pras'na, and Svetās'vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. Itis not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads

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the word māyā occurs only once in the B@rhadāra@nyaka and onceonly in the Pras'na. In early Pāli Buddhist writings it occursonly in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sauses it in the sense of magical power. In Nāgārjuna and the _Lankāvatāra_it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S'a@nkara theword māyā is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principleof creation as a s'akti (power) or accessory cause, and as thephenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance. 

It may also be mentioned here that Gau@dapāda the teacherof S'a@nkara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the helpof the māyā doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with thespirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do notpay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance orenquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dapāda assertsclearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, thatthe world does not exist in reality, that it is māyā, and not reality. When the highest truth is realized māyā is not removed, for it isnot a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its ownairy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dapāda who comparedthe world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objectsseen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capableof being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false andunreal. The ātman says Gau@dapāda is at once the cognizer andthe cognized, the world subsists in the ātman through māyā. As ātman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarilyfollows that all experience is also illusory. S'a@nkara expoundedthis doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sadsand the Brahma-sūtra, but he seems to me to have done littlemore than making explicit the doctrine of māyā. Some of hisfollowers however examined and thought over the concept ofmāyā and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinablethereby substantially contributing to the development ofthe Vedānta philosophy. 

Vedānta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1]. 

Pramā@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. Ifmemory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

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[Footnote 1: Dharmarājādhvarīndra and his son Rāmak@r@s@na worked out acomplete scheme of the theory of Vedāntic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedānta metaphysics. The early Vedāntists were more interested in demonstrating the illusorynature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference asworked out by Dharmarājādhvarīndra he was largely indebted to the Mīmām@sāschool of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamāna s'abda andanupalabdhi also Dharmarājādhvarīndra accepted the Mīmām@sā view. TheVedantins, previous to Dharmarājādhvarīndra, had also tacitly followedthe Mīmām@sā in these matters. ]

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pramā@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such rightknowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge(_pramā_) in Vedānta is the knowledge of an object which has notbeen found contradicted (_abādhitārthavi@sayajńānatva_). Exceptwhen specially expressed otherwise, pramā is generally consideredas being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired(_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objectionsare sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for afew minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successivemoments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquiredin the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedāntaconsiders that so long as a different mental state does not arise, any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but asremaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceiveone thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been aseries of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledgeof the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledgeof the preceding moments, for so long as any mentalstate has any one thing for its object it is to be considered ashaving remained unchanged all through the series of moments. There is of course this difference between the same percept of aprevious and a later moment following in succession, that freshelements of time are being perceived as prior and later, thoughthe content of the mental state so far as the object is concernedremains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the sensesthough the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed. When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental staterepresenting the book is not changed every second, and hencethere can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mentalstates in succession each of which is a repetition of the previousone, for so long as the general content of the mental state remainsthe same there is no reason for supposing that there has been anychange in the mental state. The mental state thus remains thesame so long as the content is not changed, but though it remainsthe same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

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addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of theexternal world should be regarded as right knowledge until theabsolute is realized. 

When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with theexternal objects through the senses and becomes transformed asit were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na hasbeen transformed into a state (_v@rtti_) [Footnote 1]. As soon as theanta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of itsknowledge, the ignorance (_ajńāna_) with reference to that object isremoved, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness(_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden byignorance. The appearance or the perception of an objectis thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a formresembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposesthat by the action of ajńāna, pure consciousness or beingis in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite ofthe cit underlying all this diversified objective world which isbut the transformation of ignorance (ajńāna), the former cannotmanifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorancethey are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. Thediversified objects of the world are but transformations ofthe principle of ajńāna which is neither real nor unreal. Itis the nature of ajńāna that it veils its own creations. Thuson each of the objects created by the ajńāna by its creating(_vik@sepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (āvara@na) capacity. But when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@nathrough the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed intothe form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veilon that particular ajńāna form--the object, and as the self-shiningcit is shining through the particular ajńāna state, wehave what is called the perception of the thing. Though there isin reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet theajńāna has created such illusory distinctions as individual soulsand the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space, ___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vedānta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). Thesame anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called mānās, buddhi, aha@mkāra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is calledmānās, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. Aspresenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkāra, and asproducing memory citta. These four represent the different modificationsor states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a specialkind of modification of ajńāna as anta@hkara@na). ]

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etc. And veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporaryand the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajńāna formsso that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying thesubject and the object through the broken veil. Perception onthe subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation(_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objectiveconsciousness comprehending the sensible objects through thespecific mental states(_tattadindriyayogyavi@sayāvacchinnacaitanyābhinnatvamtattadākāravi@sayāvacchinnajńānasya tattadams'e pratyak@satvam_). This union in perception means that the objective has at thatmoment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness ofthe perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@nais called jīvasāk@si. 

Inference (_anumāna_), according to Vedānta, is made by ournotion of concomitance (_vyāptijńāna_) between two things, actingthrough specific past impressions (_sa@mskāra_). Thus when I seesmoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smokewith fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and Iinfer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill andthe smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitancerevived in the subconscious only establishes the connection betweenthe smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance isgenerated by the perception of two things together, when nocase of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhicārājńāna_)regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogethersubjective, the Vedāntist does not emphasize the necessityof perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bhūyodars'anamsak@rddars'anam veti vis'e@so nādara@nīya@h_). Vedānta isnot anxious to establish any material validity for the inference, but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception ofconcomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of theconcomitance of one thing with another when no contradictoryinstance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedānta whether thisconcomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases. The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance(_anvayavyāpti_) that the Vedānta allows. So theVedānta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyāyasupported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presencewith agreement in absence), _kevalānvayi_ (by universal agreementwhere no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

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_kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Vedāntaadvocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratijńa_ (the hill is fiery);(2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@tānta_ (as in thekitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyāya maintained [Footnoteref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedānta asbeing sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing theone case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnamsarvam mithyā Brahmabhinnatvāt yedevam tadevam yathā s'uktirūpyam_). First premiss (_pratijńā_) all else excepting Brahman is false; secondpremiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss(_dr@s@tānta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnoteref 2]. 

Ātman, Jīva, Īs'vara, Ekajīvavāda and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivāda. 

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous(_svayamprakās'a). But what does this mean? Vedāntadefines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act butis yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve satiaparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means thecapacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousnesswithout in any way being an object of consciousness. Wheneveranything is described as an object of consciousness, its characteras constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may notbe present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another. This makes it dependent on some other such entity which canproduce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all itsobjects in this that it is never dependent on anything else forits manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug, the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousnessto manifest it, then that might again require another, andthat another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavasthā_). If consciousnessdid not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation, then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if hehad seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness(_anubhūti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance

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[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijńā, hetu and udāharana, orudāhara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyāya, viz. Pratijńa, hetu, udāhara@na, upanaya and nigamana. ]

[Footnote 2: Vedāntic notions of the pramāna of upamana, arthapatti, s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mīmām@sā view, do notrequire to be treated here separately. ]

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of all our world experience. This goes directly againstthe jńātatā theory of Kumārila that consciousness was not immediatebut was only inferable from the manifesting quality(_jńātatā_) of objects when they are known in consciousness. 

Now Vedānta says that this self-luminous pure consciousnessis the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the objectof any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present inconsciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because itis of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. Theself itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but isnever itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as theperceiving of self as object of knowledge is but associationcomprehended under the term aha@mkāra (ego). The real self isidentical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness. This real self called the ātman is not the same as the jīva orindividual soul, which passes through the diverse experiencesof worldly life. Īs'vara also must be distinguished from thishighest ātman or Brahman. We have already seen that manyVedāntists draw a distinction between māyā and avidyā. Māyāis that aspect of ajńāna by which only the best attributesare projected, whereas avidyā is that aspect by which impurequalities are projected. In the former aspect the functions aremore of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latterveiling (_āvara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relationof the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with māyā andavidyā (also called ajńāna) was believed respectively to explain thephenomenal Īs'vara and the phenomenal jīva or individual. Thisrelation is conceived in two ways, namely as upādhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection islike the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoesthe effect of the impurity and movements of the water. Thesun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by theimpurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun maybe the same but it may be reflected in different kinds ofwater and yield different kinds of images possessing differentcharacteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenallyhave all the appearance of reality. The other conceptionof the relation is that when we speak of ākās'a (space) in the jugor of ākās'a in the room. The ākās'a in reality does not suffer

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any modification in being within the jug or within the room. Inreality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (_avachinna_)within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limitedby the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, theākās'a limited within it will remain as separate from the ākās'alimited within the room. 

Of the Vedāntists who accept the reflection analogy the followersof N@rsi@mhās'rama think that when the pure cit is reflectedin the māyā, Īs'vara is phenomenally produced, and when in theavidyā the individual or jīva. Sarvajńātmā however does notdistinguish between the māyā and the avidyā, and thinks thatwhen the cit is reflected in the avidyā in its total aspect as cause, we get Īs'vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na--a productof the avidyā--we have jīva or individual soul. 

Jīva or individual means the self in association with the egoand other personal experiences, i. E. Phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jīva also threestages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@nais submerged, the self perceives merely the ajńāna and thejīva in this state is called prājńa or ānandamaya. In the dream-statethe self is in association with a subtle body and is calledtaijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with asubtle and gross body is called vis'va. So also the self in its purestate is called Brahman, when associated with māyā it is calledĪs'vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter ascontrolling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the grosselements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virā@tpuru@sa. 

The jīva in itself as limited by its avidyā is often spoken ofas pāramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense andthe ego in the waking states as vyavahārika (phenomenal), andwhen in the dream states as dream-self, prātibhā@sika (illusory). 

Prakās'ātmā and his followers think that since ajńāna is onethere cannot be two separate reflections such as jīva and Īs'vara;but it is better to admit that jīva is the image of Īs'vara in theajńāna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with māyā isĪs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajńāna givesus the jīva. The manifestation of the jīva is in the anta@hkara@naas states of knowledge. The jīva thus in reality is Īs'vara andapart from jīva and Īs'vara there is no other separate existence of

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Brahma-caitanya. Jīva being the image of Īs'vara is thus dependenton him, but when the limitations of jīva are removedby right knowledge, the jīva is the same Brahman it always was. 

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of theavaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possibleof things which have colour, and therefore jīva is cit limited (avacchinna)by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Īs'vara is that which is beyondit; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversityof the jīvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions arenot of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determiningor comprehending the relation of Īs'vara and jīva. In theVedānta system Īs'vara has but little importance, for he is but aphenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much morepowerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any ofus. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, andboth jīva and Īs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. SomeVedāntists hold that there is but one jīva and one body, andthat all the world as well as all the jīvas in it are merely hisimaginings. These dream jīvas and the dream world willcontinue so long as that super-jīva continues to undergo hisexperiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginaryindividuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginarysalvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience ofthe imaginary jīvas. The cosmic jīva is alone the awakened jīvaand all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as thedoctrine of ekajīva (one-soul). 

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by someVedāntists that there are many individuals and the world-appearancehas no permanent illusion for all people, but each personcreates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objectivedatum which forms the common ground for the illusory perceptionof all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness arope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, andagree in their individual perceptions that they have all seenthe same snake, though each really had his own illusion andthere was no snake at all. According to this view the illusoryperception of each happens for him subjectively and has nocorresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This mustbe distinguished from the normal Vedānta view which holdsthat objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

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are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanentlyand have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparisonwith the truth or reality which is ever the same constantand unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance. According to the other view phenomena are notobjectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so thatthe jug I see had no existence before I happened to have theperception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusionoccurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not existbefore. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is thereforecalled the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivāda, i. E. The theory that thesubjective perception is the creating of the objects and that thereare no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions. In the normal Vedānta view however the objects ofthe world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact withwhich the subjective perceptions are created. The objectivephenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajńāna, but still these phenomena of the ajńāna are there as the commonground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objectiveepistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivāda has no properepistemology, for the experiences of each person are determinedby his own subjective avidyā and previous impressions as modificationsof the avidyā. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivāda theory approachesnearest to the Vijńānavāda Buddhism, only with this differencethat while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent beingVedānta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeablereality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentaryperceptions are but impositions on it. 

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, thatboth are modifications of ajńāna. It is indeed difficult tocomprehend the nature of ajńāna, though its presence in consciousnesscan be perceived, and though by dialectic criticismall our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away andbecome self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedānta explainsthe reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all theseindefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modesof the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continuefrom beginningless time consists in this, that the real inits full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

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that we get of it is always through manifestations of formsand names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable, incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but undercertain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real, and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have apositive being which is undeniable. This positive being is onlythe highest being, the real which appears as the being of those formsand names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or acup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or beingapart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay thatis imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to havebeing in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributingthe characteristics of the unreal forms--the modes ofajńāna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all ourexperience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us toconceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajńāna. Moreover such is the nature of ajńānas that they are knowableonly by a false identification of them with the self-luminousBrahman or ātman. Being as such is the highest truth, theBrahman. The ajńāna states are not non-being in the sense ofnothing of pure negation (_abhāva_), but in the sense that they arenot being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being, the ajńāna, and this illumination means nothing more than afalse identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajńānaif they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness, and this association means an illusion, superimposition, andmutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness thesecannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alonethat is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajńānastates in themselves as apart from the ātman we fail in a dilemma, for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, andwhen it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thusapart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no otherkind of its existence is known to us. If ajńāna had been a non-entityaltogether it could never come at all, if it were a positiveentity then it would never cease to be; the ajńāna thus is amysterious category midway between being and non-being andundefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it iscalled _tattvānyatvābhyām anirvācya_ or undefinable and undeterminableeither as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is

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a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unrealin its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousnessit is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while theyare manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensibleas to their real nature or mutual relation, andcomprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness, but apart from these no rational conception of them can beformed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajńāna(for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested inconsciousness and depending on this the D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivādins assertedthat our experience was inexplicably produced under the influenceof avidyā and that beyond that no objective common groundcould be admitted. But though this has the general assent ofVedānta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explainingour common sense view (_pratikarmavyavasathā_) we maythink that we have an objective world before us as the commonfield of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things andoperations by which the phenomenon of our experience may beinterpreted in the light of the Vedānta metaphysics. 

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as theātman, the one highest reality, secondly as jīva or the ātman aslimited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiatedfrom the ātman, but ātman is regarded as identical with the psychosisthus appearing as a living and knowing being, as _jīvasāk@si_ orperceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jīva comprehends, knows, or experiences; thirdly the anta@hkara@na psychosis ormind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidyā manifestations, just as the outer world objects are exterior centres ofavidyā phenomena or objective entities. The anta@hkara@na is notonly the avidyā capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences, but it also contains all the tendencies and modes ofpast impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. Theanta@hkara@na is always turning the various avidyā modes of it intothe jīvasāk@si (jīva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), andthese are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformedinto experience. These avidyā states of the anta@hkara@naare called its v@rttis or states. The specific peculiarity of thev@rttiajńānas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposedupon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousnessand have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The

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forms of ajńāna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled onlyso long as they do not come into relation to these v@rttis ofanta@hkara@na, for the ajńāna can be destroyed by the cit only in theform of a v@rtti, while in all other forms the ajńāna veils the citfrom manifestation. The removal of ajńāna-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@naor the manifestation of v@rtti-jńāna is nothing but this, thatthe anta@hkara@na states of avidyā are the only states of ajńānawhich can be superimposed upon the self-luminous ātman(_adhyāsa_, false attribution). The objective world consists of theavidyā phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivityconsists in this that avidyā in this form cannot be superimposedon the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. Theseavidyā phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but inall these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyondconsciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidyāphenomena as anta@hkara@na states that they coalesce with theavidyā states and render themselves objects of consciousness orhave their veil of āvara@na removed. It is thus assumed that inordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. The anta@hkara@nagoes out of the man's body (_s'arīramadhyāt_) and coming intouch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form, and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit whichis always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug. The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested(though these were taking place on the background ofthe same self-luminous Brahman or ātman as forms of the highesttruth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajńāna phenomenain these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous. It was only by coming into contact with these phenomenathat the anta@hkara@na could be transformed into correspondingstates and that the illumination dawned which at once revealedthe anta@hkara@na states and the objects with which these states orv@rttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through thev@rttis alone has the power of removing the ajńāna veiling thecit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer, or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only ofappearance and due to avidyā. And it is only from the point ofview of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objectscan only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite togetherthrough the anta@hkara@nav@rtti, which makes the external objects

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translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajńānawhich was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals theobject phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflectedthrough it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. Thepratyak@sa-pramā or right knowledge by perception is the cit, thepure consciousness, reflected through the v@rtti and identical withthe cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed byit. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish threeconsciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objectivephenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jīvaor pramātā, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the v@rttiof the anta@hkara@na; when these three unite perception is effected. 

Pramā or right knowledge means in Vedānta the acquirementof such new knowledge as has not been contradicted byexperience (_abādhita_). There is thus no absolute definition oftruth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so longas it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though itis very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradictedby right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus theknowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not trueabsolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousnesswhich is never contradicted in any experience at any time. Thetruth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding outwhether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experienceor not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is tobe regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will becontradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized. 

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generatedby a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations aspleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generatedthe perceptions, "I am happy, " or "I am sorry. " In continuousperception of anything for a certain time as an objector as pleasure, etc. The mental state or v@rtti is said to last in thesame way all the while so long as any other new form is nottaken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any newknowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on thehill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@nav@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matterof inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with thefire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

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mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and asinference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquiredperception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it isodoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandalwood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert itto be odoriferous. Vedānta does not admit the existence of therelation called _samavāya_ (inherence) or _jāti_ (class notion); andso does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from theother class called inference, and holds that both perception andinference are but different modes of the transformations of theanta@hkara@na reflecting the cit in the corresponding v@rttis. Theperception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the anta@hkara@nav@rtti transformed into the form of an object with which it isin contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity ofthe cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception inthe subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjectivecit with the objective cit. This identity of course means thatthrough the v@rtti the same reality subsisting in the object andthe subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred, being away from contact with anta@hkara@na, has apparentlya different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness. Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representingthe same identical reality in the object and the subject byanta@hkara@na contact, and it is held that the knowledge producedby words (e. G. This is the same Devadatta) referring identicallyto the same thing which is seen (e. G. When I see Devadattabefore me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledgeproduced by "this is Devadatta" though a verbal (_s'ābda_)knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the anta@hkara@nav@rtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyak@sa. The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the sameas the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge asrepresented in the proposition "this is Devadatta" involving theunity of two terms "this" and "Devadatta" with a copula, butonly the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perceptionalready experienced, the knowledge proceeding from"this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpaknowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousnesswhen the preceptor instructs "thou art Brahman" theknowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for

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though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yetfrom the point of view of intrinsic significance (_tātparya_) oneidentical reality only is indicated. Vedānta does not distinguishnirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in s'ābdaperception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases thecondition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by thesentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereasin savikalpa perception we have a combination of differentideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" (_rājapuru@saāgacchatī_). Here no identical reality is signified, but what issignified is the combination of two or three different concepts [Footnoteref 1]. 

It is not out of place to mention in this connection thatVedānta admits all the six pramā@nas of Kumārila and considerslike Mīmā@msā that all knowledge is self-valid (_svat@ah-pramā@na_). But pramā has not the same meaning in Vedāntaas in Mīmā@msā. There as we remember pramā meant theknowledge which goaded one to practical action and as suchall knowledge was pramā, until practical experience showed thecourse of action in accordance with which it was found to becontradicted. In Vedānta however there is no reference to action, but pramā means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definitionof self-validity as given by Mīmā@msā Vedānta adds anotherobjective qualification, that such knowledge can have svata@h-prāmā@nyaas is not vitiated by the presence of any do@sa (causeof error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedānta of coursedoes not think like Nyāya that positive conditions (e. G. Correspondence, etc. ) are necessary for the validity of knowledge, nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like theMīmā@msists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. Itadopts a middle course and holds that absence of do@sa is a necessarycondition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear thatthis is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has tobe admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid, but Vedānta says that as it requires only a negative conditionfor the absence of do@sa, the objection does not apply to it, and itholds that if it depended on the presence of any positive conditionfor proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyāya, then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged. But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be

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[Footnote 1: See _Vedāntaparibhā@sā_ and _S'ikhāma@ni. _]

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attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedānta was bound tofollow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that thepure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything elsefor establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenalforms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearancewould come to be valid; so it held that knowledgecould be regarded as valid only when there was no do@sapresent; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledgewas false and had no validity, because there was theavidyā-do@sa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge wasvalid in which there was no do@sa. Validity (prāmā@nya) withMīmā@msā meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us topractical action in accordance with it, but with Vedānta it meantcorrectness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence ofdo@sa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate thecorrectness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1]. 

Vedānta Theory of Illusion. 

We have already seen that the Mīmā@msists had asserted thatall knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yathārthā@hsarve vivādaspadībhūtā@h pratyayā@h pratyayatvāt_). Evenillusions were explained by them as being non-perception of thedistinction between the thing perceived (e. G. The conch-shell), andthe thing remembered (e. G. Silver). But Vedānta objects to this, and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing whichis clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it issaid that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i. E. Non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver), then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation, and negation with Mīmā@msā is nothing but the bare presence of thelocus of negation (e. G. Negation of jug on the ground is nothing butthe bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perceptionof the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barelyand merely the "silver" and "this. " Even admitting for argument'ssake that the distinction between two things or two ideasis not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no onecould be tempted to move forward to action (such as stoopingdown to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive

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[Footnote 1: See _Vedāntaparibhā@sā, S'ikhāma@ni, Ma@niprabhā_ and Citsukhaon svata@hprāma@nya. ]

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conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practicalmovement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfectperception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiatedand comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silverappears to be like true silver before me and this generates themovement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. Forthe appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead usto behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. ThusI may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despitethis similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya asif it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mīma@msā positionmay be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Vedānta thinks that the illusionis not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenonof illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects;the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusionis generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc. , whereas thephenomena of external objects are not due to such specific do@sas. The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be describedthus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas amental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before meis generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental stateof the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidyā(nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presenceof the do@sa, and this disturbance along with the impression ofsilver remembered through similarity is transformed into theappearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silverappearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental stategenerated by its contact with the illusory silver. These twotransformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenalillusory silver state, are manifested by the perceiving consciousness(_sāk@sicaitanya_). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations, one in the avidyā states forming the illusory objective silverphenomenon, and another in the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti or mind state. But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena, their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we haveone knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory ofillusion is that an indefinable (_anirvacanīya-khyāti_) illusory silveris created in every case where an illusory perception of silveroccurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedānta, namely the

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[Footnote 1: See _Vivara@na-prameya-sa@mgraha_ and _Nyāyamakaranda_ onakhyāti refutation. ]

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_pāramārthika_ or absolute, _vyavahārika_ or practical ordinaryexperience, and _prātibhāsika, _ illusory. The first one representsthe absolute truth; the other two are false impressions dueto do@sa. The difference between vyavahārika and prātibhāsikais that the do@sa of the vyavahārika perception is neither discoverednor removed until salvation, whereas the do@sa of theprātibhāsika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (suchas defect of the senses, sleep, etc. ) is perceived in the world ofour ordinary experience, and thus the prātibhāsika experiencelasts for a much shorter period than the vyavahārika. But justas the vyavahārika world is regarded as phenomenal modificationsof the ajńāna, as apart from our subjective experience andeven before it, so the illusion (e. G. Of silver in the conch-shell) isalso regarded as a modification of avidyā, an undefinable creationof the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa. Thus in thecase of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silveris created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which iscalled the creation of an indefinable (_anirvacanīya_) silver of illusion. Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the samebut the avidyā of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (_pari@nāma_)on account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation. The illusory silver is thus _vivartta_ (appearance) from the pointof view of the cit and pari@nāma from the point of view ofavidyā, for the difference between vivartta and pari@nāma is, thatin the former the transformations have a different reality fromthe cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it), while in the latter case the transformations have the same realityas the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the samestuff as the avidyā whose transformations it is). But now adifficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due toa coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modifiedby do@sa and the object--cit as underlying the "this" beforeme (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have theexperience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that"this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes placein connection with my previous notion as "this, " the form ofthe knowledge also is "this is silver, " whereas in the notion"I am happy, " the notion of happiness takes place in connectionwith a previous v@rtti of "I. " Thus though the coalescingof the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the

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knowledge takes the form of "I am, " and in another as "this is"according as the previous impression is "I" or "this. " In dreamsalso the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perceptionof silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations aregenerated through the defects of sleep, and these creations areimposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regardedmerely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in theform that "I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc. " and notthat "I remember the chariots. " In the dream state all the sensesare inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there, but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space, time, objects, etc. Is imposed upon the cit. The objection thatsince the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought tolast even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences oughtto continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the wakingstages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into differentstates on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc. , which werecausing the dream cognitions. This is called _niv@rtti_ (negation)as distinguished from _bādha_ (cessation). The illusory creation ofdream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but thesecannot be experienced any longer, for there being no do@sa ofsleep the anta@hkara@na is active and suffering modifications inaccordance with the objects presented before us. This is what iscalled niv@rtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experienceit, whereas bādha or cessation occurs when the illusory creationceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shellthe illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, thiswas not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceivedas silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of realitywas not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objectiveillusory creation; for the reality in the s'ukti (conch-shell) istransferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed uponit. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kindsof illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinablesilver (_anirvacanīya-rajatotpatti_) and the other is the attributionof the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusorysilver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusionthat it is a reality. This is no doubt the _anyathākhyāti_form of illusion as advocated by Nyāya. Vedānta admits thatwhen two things (e. G. Red flower and crystal) are both present

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before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the otherby illusion (e. G. The illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusionis of the form of anyathākhyāti; but if one of the things is notpresent before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is notof the anyathākhyāti type, but of the anirvacanīyakhyāti type. Vedānta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believedthat all appearance of reality in the world-appearancewas really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminousin all our experiences. The world appearance is anillusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with itis a misattribution (_anyathākhyāti_) of the characteristic of theBrahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, whichmanifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience, just as it is the reality of s'ukti that gives to the appearance ofsilver its reality. 

Vedānta Ethics and Vedānta Emancipation. 

Vedānta says that when a duly qualified man takes to thestudy of Vedānta and is instructed by the preceptor--"Thouart that (Brahman), " he attains the emancipating knowledge, and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory. The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedānta are (1)that the person having studied all the Vedas with the properaccessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. Is in full possession ofthe knowledge of the Vedas, (2) that either in this life or in another, he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (suchas daily prayer, etc. Called _nitya-karma_) and occasionally obligatoryduty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son, called _naimittika-karma_) and must have avoided all actions forthe fulfilment of selfish desires (_kāmya-karmas_, such as theperformance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibitedactions (e. G. Murder, etc. _ni@siddha-karma_) in such away that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (nokarma is generated by the _nitya_ and _naimittika-karma_, and ashe has not performed the _kāmya_ and prohibited karmas, he hasacquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purifiedhis mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means offitting the mind for Vedānta instruction (called _sādhana_) hecan regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedānta instruction. These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal

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and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of thislife and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste forall enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge, (4) control over the senses by which these are restrainedfrom everything but that which aids the attainment of rightknowledge (_dama_), (a) having restrained them, the attainmentof such power that these senses may not again be tempted towardsworldly enjoyments (_uparati_), (b) power of bearing extremesof heat, cold, etc. , (c) employment of mind towards the attainmentof right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor andUpani@sads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessingthe above qualities should try to understand correctlythe true purport of the Upani@sads (called _s'rava@na_), and byarguments in favour of the purport of the Upani@sads tostrengthen his conviction as stated in the Upani@sads (called_manana_) and then by _nididhyāsana_ (meditation) which includesall the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truthas one. Vedānta therefore in ethics covers the ground ofYoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understandingthe difference between puru@sa and prak@rti, with Vedāntasalvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahmanalone is the true reality, his own self [Footnote ref 1]. Mīmā@msā assertsthat the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be thesupreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordancewith the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of goodand the removal of evil. But Vedānta holds that though thepurport of the earlier Vedas is as Mīmā@msā has it, yet thisis meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect thegoal is clearly as the Upani@sads indicate it, namely the attainmentof the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedicduties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it wasbelieved by many (e. G. Vācaspati Mis'ra and his followers) thatdue performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire agreat keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; othersbelieved (e. G. Prakās'ātmā and his followers) that it served tobring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors, etc. And to remove many obstacles from the way so that it becameeasier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge. In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajńānas removed

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[Footnote 1: See _Vedāntasāra_ and _Advaitabrahmasiddhi. ]

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are only smaller states of ajńāna, whereas when theBrahma-knowledge dawns the ajńāna as a whole is removed. Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also astate of knowledge, but such is its special strength that whenthis knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge whichat first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajńānamodification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed, only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in itsown true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a pieceof wood would burn the whole city and after that would burnthe very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledgewould destroy all the illusory world-appearance andat last destroy even that final state [Footnote ref l]. 

The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahmanas the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete blissshines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes asillusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is butlimited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures alsoare but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a tasteof which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The beingof Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existentbeings as the _sattā_ (being as class notion) of the naiyāyika, butthe concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousnessand pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (_sat_) is purebliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidyā duringmukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as thequestion, how the avidyā came forth and stayed during the world-appearance. It is best to remember that the category of theindefinite avidyā is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestationand destruction. Vedānta however believes that even when thetrue knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for awhile, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it. Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave likean ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longeracquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripekarmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body andthere will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn ofperfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas ofbeginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any

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[Footnote 1:_Siddhāntales'a_. ]

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of the illusions subjective or objective which could make anyknowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man iscalled _jīvanmukta_, i. E. Emancipated while living. For him allworld-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alonein himself where everything else has vanished for ever from thestage [Footnote ref 1]. 

Vedānta and other Indian Systems. 

Vedānta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyāya, and most ofits powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. S'a@nkara himself had begun it by showing contradictions andinconsistencies in many of the Nyāya conceptions, such as thetheory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of samavāya, the conception of jāti, etc [Footnote ref 2]. His followers carried it tostill greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours ofS'rīhar@sa, Citsukha, Madhusūdana, etc. It was opposed to Mīmā@msā sofar as this admitted the Nyāya-Vais'e@sika categories, but agreedwith it generally as regards the pramā@nas of anumāna, upamiti, arthāpatti, s'abda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporterin Mīmā@msā with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifestingpower of knowledge. But it differed from Mīmā@msāin the field of practical duties and entered into many elaboratediscussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only toordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic dutiesto perform but were to rise above them and attain the highestknowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic dutiesonly so long as he was not fit for Vedānta instruction andstudies. 

With Sā@mkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedānta seems tobe very close. We have already seen that Vedānta had acceptedall the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc. , thatwere advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedāntaand Sā@mkhya was this that Sā@mkhya believed, that the stuff ofwhich the world consisted was a reality side by side with thepuru@sas. In later times Vedānta had compromised so far withSā@mkhya that it also sometimes described māyā as being madeup of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedānta also held that accordingto these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications

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[Footnote 1: See _Pańcadas'ī_. ]

[Footnote 2: See S'a@nkara's refutation of Nyāya, _S'a@nkara-bhā@sya_, II. Ii. ]

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of the māyā. Thus Īs'vara is believed to possess a mind of puresattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted inVedānta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sā@mkhyaheld it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that māyā wasbelieved to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, itwas indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different fromwhat we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantialnothing, a magic entity which had its being only so longas it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrableas regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation, but even then it was believed to be a combination ofpositive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the realscomposing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belongedto it with which it could be defined. Māyā however was undemonstrable, indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was aseparate category of the indefinite. Sā@mkhya believed in thepersonal individuality of souls, while for Vedānta there was onlyone soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the māyātransformations. There was an adhyāsa or illusion in Sā@mkhyaas well as in Vedānta; but in the former the illusion was dueto a mere non-distinction between prak@rti and puru@sa or meremisattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedānta therewas not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinablecreation. Causation with Sā@mkhya meant real transformation, but with Vedānta all transformation was mere appearance. Though there were so many differences, it is however easy tosee that probably at the time of the origin of the two systemsduring the Upani@sad period each was built up from very similarideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifestedthemselves into the present divergences of the two systems. Though S'a@nkara laboured hard to prove that the Sā@mkhyaview could not be found in the Upani@sads, we can hardly beconvinced by his interpretations and arguments. The morehe argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sā@mkhyathought had its origin in the Upani@sads. Sā'a@nkara and hisfollowers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism fromthe Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the s'ūnyaof Nāgārjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish betweenpure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts ofS`a@nkara to the self-luminosity of the Vijńānavāda Buddhism

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can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truthin the accusations against S'a@nkara by Vijńāna Bhik@su andothers that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led tothink that S'a@nkara's philosophy is largely a compound ofVijńānavāda and S'ūnyavāda Buddhism with the Upani@sadnotion of the permanence of self superadded.