Transcriber's Note

Spelling and punctuation have been preserved as faithfully as possible. Only obvious typographical errors have been corrected. 

For ease of reading, the footnotes have been moved to the end of thebook. 

 A DISCOURSE

 ON

 THE STUDY

 OF THE

 LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS. 

 BY

 SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, M. P. 

 _SECOND EDITION. _

 LONDON: HENRY GOODE AND CO. 

 QUEEN'S HEAD PASSAGE, PATERNOSTER-ROW. 

 SOLD BY T. CLARK, EDINBURGH; AND WARDLAW AND CO. GLASGOW. 

 M. DCCC. XXVIII. 

 A DISCOURSE, ETC. 

 * * * * *

Before I begin a course of lectures on a science of great extent andimportance, I think it my duty to lay before the public the reasonswhich have induced me to undertake such a labour, as well as a shortaccount of the nature and objects of the course which I propose todeliver. I have always been unwilling to waste in unprofitableinactivity that leisure which the first years of my profession usuallyallow, and which diligent men, even with moderate talents, might oftenemploy in a manner neither discreditable to themselves, nor whollyuseless to others. Desirous that my own leisure should not be consumedin sloth, I anxiously looked about for some way of filling it up, whichmight enable me, according to the measure of my humble abilities, tocontribute somewhat to the stock of general usefulness. I had long beenconvinced that public lectures, which have been used in most ages andcountries to teach the elements of almost every part of learning, werethe most convenient mode in which these elements could be taught; thatthey were the best adapted for the important purposes of awakening theattention of the student, of abridging his labours, of guiding hisinquiries, of relieving the tediousness of private study, and ofimpressing on his recollection the principles of science. I saw noreason why the Law of England should be less adapted to this mode ofinstruction, or less likely to benefit by it, than any other part ofknowledge. A learned gentleman, however, had already occupied thatground, [1] and will, I doubt not, persevere in the useful labour whichhe has undertaken. On his province it was far from my wish to intrude. It appeared to me that a course of lectures on another science closelyconnected with all liberal professional studies, and which had long beenthe subject of my own reading and reflection, might not only prove amost useful introduction to the law of England, but might also become aninteresting part of general study, and an important branch of theeducation of those who were not destined for the profession of the law. I was confirmed in my opinion by the assent and approbation of men, whose names, if it were becoming to mention them on so slight anoccasion, would add authority to truth, and furnish some excuse even forerror. Encouraged by their approbation, I resolved without delay tocommence the undertaking, of which I shall now proceed to give someaccount; without interrupting the progress of my discourse byanticipating or answering the remarks of those who may, perhaps, sneerat me for a departure from the usual course of my profession; because Iam desirous of employing in a rational and useful pursuit that leisure, of which the same men would have required no account, if it had beenwasted on trifles, or even abused in dissipation. 

The science which teaches the rights and duties of men and of states, has, in modern times, been called the Law of Nature and Nations. Underthis comprehensive title are included the rules of morality, as theyprescribe the conduct of private men towards each other in all thevarious relations of human life; as they regulate both the obedience ofcitizens to the laws, and the authority of the magistrate in framinglaws and administering government; as they modify the intercourse ofindependent commonwealths in peace, and prescribe limits to theirhostility in war. This important science comprehends only that part of_private ethics_ which is capable of being reduced to fixed and generalrules. It considers only those general principles of _jurisprudence_ and_politics_ which the wisdom of the lawgiver adapts to the peculiarsituation of his own country, and which the skill of the statesmanapplies to the more fluctuating and infinitely varying circumstanceswhich affect its immediate welfare and safety. "For there are in naturecertain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived, but asstreams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soilsthrough which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regionsand governments where they are planted, though they proceed from thesame fountains. "[2]--_Bacon's Dig. And Adv. Of Learn. _ Works, vol. I. P. 101. 

On the great questions of morality, of politics, and of municipal law, it is the object of this science to deliver only those fundamentaltruths of which the particular application is as extensive as the wholeprivate and public conduct of men; to discover those "fountains ofjustice, " without pursuing the "streams" through the endless variety oftheir course. But another part of the subject is treated with greaterfulness and minuteness of application; namely, that important branch ofit which professes to regulate the relations and intercourse of states, and more especially, both on account of their greater perfection andtheir more immediate reference to use, the regulations of thatintercourse as they are modified by the usages of the civilised nationsof Christendom. Here this science no longer rests in general principles. That province of it which we now call the law of nations, has, in manyof its parts, acquired among our European nations much of the precisionand certainty of positive law, and the particulars of that law arechiefly to be found in the works of those writers who have treated thescience of which I now speak. It is because they have classed (in amanner which seems peculiar to modern times) the duties of individualswith those of nations, and established their obligation on similargrounds, that the whole science has been called, "The Law of Nature andNations. "

Whether this appellation be the happiest that could have been chosenfor the science, and by what steps it came to be adopted among ourmodern moralists and lawyers, [3] are inquiries, perhaps, of morecuriosity than use, and which, if they deserve any where to be deeplypursued, will be pursued with more propriety in a full examination ofthe subject than within the short limits of an introductory discourse. Names are, however, in a great measure arbitrary; but the distributionof knowledge into its parts, though it may often perhaps be varied withlittle disadvantage, yet certainly depends upon some fixed principles. The modern method of considering individual and national morality as thesubjects of the same science, seems to me as convenient and reasonablean arrangement as can be adopted. The same rules of morality which holdtogether men in families, and which form families into commonwealths, also link together these commonwealths as members of the great societyof mankind. Commonwealths, as well as private men, are liable to injury, and capable of benefit, from each other; it is, therefore, theirinterest as well as their duty to reverence, to practise, and toenforce those rules of justice which control and restrain injury, whichregulate and augment benefit, which, even in their present imperfectobservance, preserve civilised states in a tolerable condition ofsecurity from wrong, and which, if they could be generally obeyed, wouldestablish, and permanently maintain, the well-being of the universalcommonwealth of the human race. It is therefore with justice that onepart of this science has been called "_the natural law of individuals_, "and the other "_the natural law of states_;" and it is too obvious torequire observation, [4] that the application of both these laws, of theformer as much as of the latter, is modified and varied by customs, conventions, character, and situation. With a view to these principles, the writers on general jurisprudence have considered states as moralpersons; a mode of expression which has been called a fiction of law, but which may be regarded with more propriety as a bold metaphor, usedto convey the important truth, that nations, though they acknowledge nocommon superior, and neither can nor ought to be subjected to humanpunishment, are yet under the same obligations mutually to practisehonesty and humanity, which would have bound individuals, even if theycould be conceived ever to have subsisted without the protectingrestraints of government; if they were not compelled to the discharge oftheir duty by the just authority of magistrates, and by the wholesometerrors of the laws. With the same views this law has been styled, and(notwithstanding the objections of some writers to the vagueness of thelanguage) appears to have been styled with great propriety, "the law ofnature. " It may with sufficient correctness, or at least by an easymetaphor, be called a "_law_, " inasmuch as it is a supreme, invariable, and uncontrollable rule of conduct to all men, of which the violation isavenged by natural punishments, which necessarily flow from theconstitution of things, and are as fixed and inevitable as the order ofnature. It is the "_law of nature_, " because its general precepts areessentially adapted to promote the happiness of man, as long as heremains a being of the same nature with which he is at present endowed, or, in other words, as long as he continues to be man, in all thevariety of times, places, and circumstances, in which he has been known, or can be imagined to exist; because it is discoverable by naturalreason, and suitable to our natural constitution; because its fitnessand wisdom are founded on the general nature of human beings, and not onany of those temporary and accidental situations in which they may beplaced. It is with still more propriety, and indeed with the higheststrictness, and the most perfect accuracy, considered as a law, when, according to those just and magnificent views which philosophy andreligion open to us of the government of the world, it is received andreverenced as the sacred code, promulgated by the great Legislator ofthe Universe for the guidance of his creatures to happiness, guarded andenforced, as our own experience may inform us, by the penal sanctionsof shame, of remorse, of infamy, and of misery; and still fartherenforced by the reasonable expectation of yet more awful penalties in afuture and more permanent state of existence. It is the contemplation ofthe law of nature under this full, mature, and perfect idea of its highorigin and transcendent dignity, that called forth the enthusiasm of thegreatest men, and the greatest writers of ancient and modern times, inthose sublime descriptions, where they have exhausted all the powers oflanguage, and surpassed all the other exertions, even of their owneloquence, in the display of the beauty and majesty of this sovereignand immutable law. It is of this law that Cicero has spoken in so manyparts of his writings, not only with all the splendour and copiousnessof eloquence, but with the sensibility of a man of virtue; and with thegravity and comprehension of a philosopher. [5] It is of this law thatHooker speaks in so sublime a strain:--"Of law, no less can be said, than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of theworld; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least asfeeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; bothangels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each indifferent sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her asthe mother of their peace and joy. "--_Eccles. Pol. _ book i. In theconclusion. 

Let not those, who, to use the language of the same Hooker, "talk oftruth, " without "ever sounding the depth from whence it springeth, "hastily take it for granted, that these great masters of eloquence andreason were led astray by the specious delusions of mysticism, from thesober consideration of the true grounds of morality in the nature, necessities, and interests of man. They studied and taught theprinciples of morals; but they thought it still more necessary, and morewise, a much nobler task, and more becoming a true philosopher, toinspire men with a love and reverence for virtue. [6] They were notcontented with elementary speculations. They examined the foundations ofour duty, but they felt and cherished a most natural, a most seemly, amost rational enthusiasm, when they contemplated the majestic edificewhich is reared on these solid foundations. They devoted the highestexertions of their mind to spread that beneficent enthusiasm among men. They consecrated as a homage to virtue the most perfect fruits of theirgenius. If these grand sentiments of "the good and fair" have sometimesprevented them from delivering the principles of ethics with thenakedness and dryness of science, at least, we must own that they havechosen the better part; that they have preferred virtuous feeling tomoral theory; and practical benefit to speculative exactness. Perhapsthese wise men may have supposed that the minute dissection and anatomyof Virtue might, to the ill-judging eye, weaken the charm of herbeauty. It is not for me to attempt a theme which has perhaps beenexhausted by these great writers. I am indeed much less called upon todisplay the worth and usefulness of the law of nations, than tovindicate myself from presumption in attempting a subject which has beenalready handled by so many masters. For the purpose of that vindicationit will be necessary to sketch a very short and slight account (for suchin this place it must unavoidably be) of the progress and present stateof the science, and of that succession of able writers who havegradually brought it to its present perfection. 

We have no Greek or Roman treatise remaining on the law of nations. Fromthe title of one of the lost works of Aristotle, it appears that hecomposed a treatise on the laws of war, [7] which, if we had the goodfortune to possess it, would doubtless have amply satisfied ourcuriosity, and would have taught us both the practice of the ancientnations and the opinions of their moralists, with that depth andprecision which distinguish the other works of that great philosopher. We can now only imperfectly collect that practice and those opinionsfrom various passages which are scattered over the writings ofphilosophers, historians, poets, and orators. When the time shall arrivefor a more full consideration of the state of the government and mannersof the ancient world, I shall be able, perhaps, to offer satisfactoryreasons why these enlightened nations did not separate from the generalprovince of ethics that part of morality which regulates the intercourseof states, and erect it into an independent science. It would require along discussion to unfold the various causes which united the modernnations of Europe into a closer society; which linked them together bythe firmest bands of mutual dependence, and which thus, in process oftime, gave to the law that regulated their intercourse greaterimportance, higher improvement, and more binding force. Among thesecauses we may enumerate a common extraction, a common religion, similarmanners, institutions, and languages; in earlier ages the authority ofthe See of Rome, and the extravagant claims of the imperial crown; inlater times the connexions of trade, the jealousy of power, therefinement of civilization, the cultivation of science, and, above all, that general mildness of character and manners which arose from thecombined and progressive influence of chivalry, of commerce, oflearning, and of religion. Nor must we omit the similarity of thosepolitical institutions which, in every country that had been over-run bythe Gothic conquerors, bore discernible marks (which the revolutions ofsucceeding ages had obscured, but not obliterated) of the rude but boldand noble outline of liberty that was originally sketched by the hand ofthese generous barbarians. These and many other causes conspired tounite the nations of Europe in a more intimate connexion and a moreconstant intercourse, and of consequence made the regulation of theirintercourse more necessary, and the law that was to govern it moreimportant. In proportion as they approached to the condition ofprovinces of the same empire, it became almost as essential that Europeshould have a precise and comprehensive code of the law of nations, asthat each country should have a system of municipal law. The labours ofthe learned accordingly began to be directed to this subject in thesixteenth century, soon after the revival of learning, and after thatregular distribution of power and territory which has subsisted, withlittle variation, until our times. The critical examination of theseearly writers would perhaps not be very interesting in an extensivework, and it would be unpardonable in a short discourse. It issufficient to observe that they were all more or less shackled by thebarbarous philosophy of the schools, and that they were impeded in theirprogress by a timorous deference for the inferior and technical parts ofthe Roman law, without raising their views to the comprehensiveprinciples which will for ever inspire mankind with veneration for thatgrand monument of human wisdom. It was only indeed in the sixteenthcentury that the Roman law was first studied and understood as a scienceconnected with Roman history and literature, and illustrated by menwhom Ulpian and Papinian would not have disdained to acknowledge astheir successors. [8] Among the writers of that age we may perceive theineffectual attempts, the partial advances, the occasional streaks oflight which always precede great discoveries, and works that are toinstruct posterity. 

The reduction of the law of nations to a system was reserved forGrotius. It was by the advice of Lord Bacon and Peiresc that heundertook this arduous task. He produced a work which we now indeedjustly deem imperfect, but which is perhaps the most complete that theworld has yet owed, at so early a stage in the progress of any science, to the genius and learning of one man. So great is the uncertainty ofposthumous reputation, and so liable is the fame even of the greatestmen to be obscured by those new fashions of thinking and writing whichsucceed each other so rapidly among polished nations, that Grotius, whofilled so large a space in the eye of his contemporaries, is now perhapsknown to some of my readers only by name. Yet if we fairly estimate bothhis endowments and his virtues, we may justly consider him as one of themost memorable men who have done honour to modern times. He combined thedischarge of the most important duties of active and public life withthe attainment of that exact and various learning which is generally theportion only of the recluse student. He was distinguished as an advocateand a magistrate, and he composed the most valuable works on the law ofhis own country; he was almost equally celebrated as an historian, ascholar, a poet, and a divine; a disinterested statesman, aphilosophical lawyer, a patriot who united moderation with firmness, anda theologian who was taught candour by his learning. Unmerited exile didnot damp his patriotism; the bitterness of controversy did notextinguish his charity. The sagacity of his numerous and fierceadversaries could not discover a blot on his character; and in the midstof all the hard trials and galling provocations of a turbulent politicallife, he never once deserted his friends when they were unfortunate, norinsulted his enemies when they were weak. In times of the most furiouscivil and religious faction he preserved his name unspotted, and he knewhow to reconcile fidelity to his own party, with moderation towards hisopponents. Such was the man who was destined to give a new form to thelaw of nations, or rather to create a science, of which only rudesketches and indigested materials were scattered over the writings ofthose who had gone before him. By tracing the laws of his country totheir principles, he was led to the contemplation of the law of nature, which be justly considered as the parent of all municipal law. [9] Fewworks were more celebrated than that of Grotius in his own days, and inthe age which succeeded. It has, however, been the fashion of the lasthalf-century to depreciate his work as a shapeless compilation, in whichreason lies buried under a mass of authorities and quotations. Thisfashion originated among French wits and declaimers, and it has been, Iknow not for what reason, adopted, though with far greater moderationand decency, by some respectable writers among ourselves. As to thosewho first used this language, the most candid supposition that we canmake with respect to them is, that they never read the work; for, ifthey had not been deterred from the perusal of it by such a formidabledisplay of Greek characters, they must soon have discovered that Grotiusnever quotes on any subject till he has first appealed to someprinciples, and often, in my humble opinion, though, not always, to thesoundest and most rational principles. 

But another sort of answer is due to some of those[10] who havecriticised Grotius, and that answer might be given in the words ofGrotius himself. [11] He was not of such a stupid and servile cast ofmind, as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians andphilosophers, as those of judges, from whose decision there was noappeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses whoseconspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by theirdiscordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of theunanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and thefundamental principles of morals. On such matters, poets and orators arethe most unexceptionable of all witnesses; for they address themselvesto the general feelings and sympathies of mankind; they are neitherwarped by system, nor perverted by sophistry; they can attain none oftheir objects; they can neither please nor persuade if they dwell onmoral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. No system ofmoral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of humannature and the according judgment of all ages and nations. But where arethese feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved? In those verywritings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usagesand laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions ofphilosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as theobservation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of whichthe science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are justlychargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to factand experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy. 

If this were merely an objection of taste, I should be willing to allowthat Grotius has indeed poured forth his learning with a profusion thatsometimes rather encumbers than adorns his work, and which is not alwaysnecessary to the illustration of his subject. Yet, even in making thatconcession, I should rather yield to the taste of others than speak frommy own feelings. I own that such richness and splendour of literaturehave a powerful charm for me. They fill my mind with an endless varietyof delightful recollections and associations. They relieve theunderstanding in its progress through a vast science, by calling up thememory of great men and of interesting events. By this means we see thetruths of morality clothed with all the eloquence (not that could beproduced by the powers of one man, but) that could be bestowed on themby the collective genius of the world. Even Virtue and Wisdom themselvesacquire new majesty in my eyes, when I thus see all the great masters ofthinking and writing called together, as it were, from all times andcountries, to do them homage, and to appear in their train. 

But this is no place for discussions of taste, and I am very ready toown that mine may be corrupted. The work of Grotius is liable to a moreserious objection, though I do not recollect that it has ever been made. His method is inconvenient and unscientific. He has inverted the naturalorder. That natural order undoubtedly dictates, that we should firstsearch for the original principles of the science in human nature; thenapply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals, and lastly, employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicatedquestions that arise with respect to the intercourse of nations. ButGrotius has chosen the reverse of this method. He begins with theconsideration of the states of peace and war, and he examines originalprinciples only occasionally and incidentally as they grow out of thequestions which he is called upon to decide. It is a necessaryconsequence of this disorderly method, which exhibits the elements ofthe science in the form of scattered digressions, that he seldom employssufficient discussion on these fundamental truths, and never in theplace where such a discussion would be most instructive to the reader. 

This defect in the plan of Grotius was perceived, and supplied, byPuffendorff, who restored natural law to that superiority which belongedto it, and with great propriety treated the law of nations as only onemain branch of the parent stock. Without the genius of his master, andwith very inferior learning, he has yet treated this subject with soundsense, with clear method, with extensive and accurate knowledge, andwith a copiousness of detail sometimes indeed tedious, but alwaysinstructive and satisfactory. His work will be always studied by thosewho spare no labour to acquire a deep knowledge of the subject; but itwill, in our times, I fear, be oftener found on the shelf than on thedesk of the general student. In the time of Mr. Locke it was consideredas the manual of those who were intended for active life; but in thepresent age I believe it will be found that men of business are too muchoccupied, men of letters are too fastidious, and men of the world tooindolent, for the study or even the perusal of such works. Far be itfrom me to derogate from the real and great merit of so useful a writeras Puffendorff. His treatise is a mine in which all his successors mustdig. I only presume to suggest, that a book so prolix, and so utterlyvoid of all the attractions of composition, is likely to repel manyreaders who are interested, and who might perhaps be disposed toacquire some knowledge of the principles of public law. 

Many other circumstances might be mentioned, which conspire to provethat neither of the great works of which I have spoken, has supersededthe necessity of a new attempt to lay before the public a System of theLaw of Nations. The language of science is so completely changed sinceboth these works were written, that whoever was now to employ theirterms in his moral reasonings would be almost unintelligible to some ofhis hearers or readers; and to some among them too who are neither illqualified nor ill disposed to study such subjects with considerableadvantage to themselves. The learned indeed well know how little noveltyor variety is to be found in scientific disputes. The same truths andthe same errors have been repeated from age to age, with littlevariation but in the language; and novelty of expression is oftenmistaken by the ignorant for substantial discovery. Perhaps too verynearly the same portion of genius and judgment has been exerted in mostof the various forms under which science has been cultivated atdifferent periods of history. The superiority of those writers whocontinue to be read, perhaps often consists chiefly in taste, inprudence, in a happy choice of subject, in a favourable moment, in anagreeable style, in the good fortune of a prevalent language, or inother advantages which are either accidental, or are the result ratherof the secondary than of the highest faculties of the mind. --But thesereflections, while they moderate the pride of invention, and dispel theextravagant conceit of superior illumination, yet serve to prove theuse, and indeed the necessity, of composing, from time to time, newsystems of science adapted to the opinions and language of eachsucceeding period. Every age must be taught in its own language. If aman were now to begin a discourse on ethics with an account of the"_moral entities_" of Puffendorff, [12] he would speak an unknowntongue. 

It is not, however, alone as a mere translation of former writers intomodern language that a new system of public law seems likely to beuseful. The age in which we live possesses many advantages which arepeculiarly favourable to such an undertaking. Since the composition ofthe great works of Grotius and Puffendorff, a more modest, simple, andintelligible philosophy has been introduced into the schools; which hasindeed been grossly abused by sophists, but which, from the time ofLocke, has been cultivated and improved by a succession of disciplesworthy of their illustrious master. We are thus enabled to discuss withprecision, and to explain with clearness, the principles of the scienceof human nature, which are in themselves on a level with the capacity ofevery man of good sense, and which only appeared to be abstruse fromthe unprofitable subtleties with which they were loaded, and thebarbarous jargon in which they were expressed. The deepest doctrines ofmorality have since that time been treated in the perspicuous andpopular style, and with some degree of the beauty and eloquence of theancient moralists. That philosophy on which are founded the principlesof our duty, if it has not become more certain (for morality admits nodiscoveries), is at least less "harsh and crabbed, " less obscure andhaughty in its language, less forbidding and disgusting in itsappearance, than in the days of our ancestors. If this progress oflearning towards popularity has engendered (as it must be owned that ithas) a multitude of superficial and most mischievous sciolists, theantidote must come from the same quarter with the disease. Popularreason can alone correct popular sophistry. 

Nor is this the only advantage which a writer of the present age wouldpossess over the celebrated jurists of the last century. Since that timevast additions have been made to the stock of our knowledge of humannature. Many dark periods of history have since been explored. Manyhitherto unknown regions of the globe have been visited and described bytravellers and navigators not less intelligent than intrepid. We may besaid to stand at the confluence of the greatest number of streams ofknowledge flowing from the most distant sources that ever met at onepoint. We are not confined, as the learned of the last age generallywere, to the history of those renowned nations who are our masters inliterature. We can bring before us man in a lower and more abjectcondition than any in which he was ever before seen. The records havebeen partly opened to us of those mighty empires of Asia[13] where thebeginnings of civilization are lost in the darkness of an unfathomableantiquity. We can make human society pass in review before our mind, from the brutal and helpless barbarism of _Terra del Fuego_, and themild and voluptuous savages of Otaheite, to the tame, but ancient andimmovable civilization of China, which bestows its own arts on everysuccessive race of conquerors; to the meek and servile natives ofHindostan, who preserve their ingenuity, their skill, and their science, through a long series of ages, under the yoke of foreign tyrants; to thegross and incorrigible rudeness of the Ottomans, incapable ofimprovement, and extinguishing the remains of civilization among theirunhappy subjects, once the most ingenious nations of the earth. We canexamine almost every imaginable variety in the character, manners, opinions, feelings, prejudices, and institutions of mankind, into whichthey can be thrown, either by the rudeness of barbarism, or by thecapricious corruptions of refinement, or by those innumerablecombinations of circumstances, which, both in these opposite conditionsand in all the intermediate stages between them, influence or direct thecourse of human affairs. History, if I may be allowed the expression, isnow a vast museum, in which specimens of every variety of human naturemay be studied. From these great accessions to knowledge, law-givers andstatesmen, but, above all, moralists and political philosophers, mayreap the most important instruction. They may plainly discover in allthe useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, andunder all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which haveprevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive truths, thesacred master-principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered (with few and slight exceptions) by every nationupon earth, and uniformly taught (with still fewer exceptions) by asuccession of wise men from the first dawn of speculation to the presentmoment. The exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, befound rather apparent than real. If we could raise ourselves to thatheight from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptionswould altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of savages woulddisappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of afew licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony. This consent of mankind in first principles, and this endless variety intheir application, which is one among many valuable truths which we maycollect from our present extensive acquaintance with the history of man, is itself of vast importance. Much of the majesty and authority ofvirtue is derived from their consent, and almost the whole of practicalwisdom is founded on their variety. 

What former age could have supplied facts for such a work as that ofMontesquieu? He indeed has been, perhaps justly, charged with abusingthis advantage, by the undistinguishing adoption of the narratives oftravellers of very different degrees of accuracy and veracity. But if wereluctantly confess the justness of this objection; if we are compelledto own that he exaggerates the influence of climate, that he ascribestoo much to the foresight and forming skill of legislators, and far toolittle to time and circumstances, in the growth of politicalconstitutions; that the substantial character and essential differencesof governments are often lost and confounded in his technical languageand arrangement; that he often bends the free and irregular outline ofnature to the imposing but fallacious geometrical regularity of system;that he has chosen a style of affected abruptness, sententiousness, andvivacity, ill suited to the gravity of his subject: after all theseconcessions (for his fame is large enough to spare many concessions), the Spirit of Laws will still remain not only one of the most solid anddurable monuments of the powers of the human mind, but a strikingevidence of the inestimable advantages which political philosophy mayreceive from a wide survey of all the various conditions of humansociety. 

In the present century a slow and silent, but very substantialmitigation has taken place in the practice of war; and in proportion asthat mitigated practice has received the sanction of time, it is raisedfrom the rank of mere usage, and becomes part of the law of nations. Whoever will compare our present modes of warfare with the system ofGrotius[14] will clearly discern the immense improvements which havetaken place in that respect since the publication of his work, during aperiod, perhaps in every point of view, the happiest to be found in thehistory of the world. In the same period many important points of publiclaw have been the subject of contest both by argument and by arms, ofwhich we find either no mention, or very obscure traces, in the historyof preceding times. 

There are other circumstances to which I allude with hesitation andreluctance, though it must be owned that they afford to a writer of thisage some degree of unfortunate and deplorable advantage over hispredecessors. Recent events have accumulated more terrible practicalinstruction on every subject of politics than could have been in othertimes acquired by the experience of ages. Men's wit, sharpened by theirpassions, has penetrated to the bottom of almost all politicalquestions. Even the fundamental rules of morality themselves have, forthe first time, unfortunately for mankind, become the subject of doubtand discussion. I shall consider it as my duty to abstain from allmention of these awful events, and of these fatal controversies. But themind of that man must indeed be incurious and indocile, who has eitheroverlooked all these things; or reaped no instruction from thecontemplation of them. 

From these reflections it appears, that, since the composition of thosetwo great works on the Law of Nature and Nations which continue to bethe classical and standard works on that subject, we have gained bothmore convenient instruments of reasoning and more extensive materialsfor science; that the code of war has been enlarged and improved; thatnew questions have been practically decided; and that new controversieshave arisen regarding the intercourse of independent states, and thefirst principles of morality and civil government. 

Some readers may, however, think that in these observations which Ioffer, to excuse the presumption of my own attempt, I have omitted themention of later writers, to whom some part of the remarks is not justlyapplicable. But, perhaps, further consideration will acquit me in thejudgment of such readers. Writers on particular questions of public laware not within the scope of my observations. They have furnished themost valuable materials; but I speak only of a system. To the large workof Wolffius, the observations which I have made on Puffendorff as a bookfor general use, will surely apply with tenfold force. His abridger, Vattel, deserves, indeed, considerable praise. He is a very ingenious, clear, elegant, and useful writer. But he only considers one part ofthis extensive subject, namely, the law of nations strictly so called;and I cannot help thinking, that, even in this department of thescience, he has adopted some doubtful and dangerous principles, not tomention his constant deficiency in that fulness of example andillustration, which so much embellishes and strengthens reason. It ishardly necessary to take any notice of the text-book of Heineccius, thebest writer of elementary books with whom I am acquainted on anysubject. Burlamaqui is an author of superior merit; but he confineshimself too much to the general principles of morality and politics, torequire much observation from me in this place. The same reason willexcuse me for passing over in silence the works of many philosophers andmoralists, to whom, in the course of my proposed lectures, I shall oweand confess the greatest obligations; and it might perhaps deliver mefrom the necessity of speaking of the work of Dr. Paley, if I were notdesirous of this public opportunity of professing my gratitude for theinstruction and pleasure which I have received from that excellentwriter, who possesses, in so eminent a degree, those invaluablequalities of a moralist, good sense, caution, sobriety, and perpetualreference to convenience and practice; and who certainly is thought lessoriginal than he really is, merely because his taste and modesty haveled him to disdain the ostentation of novelty, and because he generallyemploys more art to blend his own arguments with the body of receivedopinions, so as that they are scarce to be distinguished, than othermen, in the pursuit of a transient popularity, have exerted to disguisethe most miserable common-places in the shape of paradox. 

No writer since the time of Grotius, of Puffendorff, and of Wolf, hascombined an investigation of the principles of natural and public law, with a full application of these principles to particular cases; and inthese circumstances, I trust, it will not be deemed extravagantpresumption in me to hope that I shall be able to exhibit a view of thisscience, which shall, at least, be more intelligible and attractive tostudents, than the learned treatises of these celebrated men. I shallnow proceed to state the general plan and subjects of the lectures inwhich I am to make this attempt. 

I. The being whose actions the law of nature professes to regulate, isman. It is on the knowledge of his nature that the science of his dutymust be founded. [15] It is impossible to approach the threshold of moralphilosophy, without a previous examination of the faculties and habitsof the human mind. Let no reader be repelled from this examination, bythe odious and terrible name of _metaphysics_; for it is, in truth, nothing more than the employment of good sense, in observing our ownthoughts, feelings, and actions; and when the facts which are thusobserved, are expressed as they ought to be, in plain language, it is, perhaps, above all other sciences, most on a level with the capacity andinformation of the generality of thinking men. When it is thusexpressed, it requires no previous qualification, but a sound judgment, perfectly to comprehend it; and those who wrap it up in a technical andmysterious jargon, always give us strong reason to suspect that they arenot philosophers but impostors. Whoever thoroughly understands such ascience, must be able to teach it plainly to all men of common sense. The proposed course will therefore open with a very short, and, I hope, a very simple and intelligible account of the powers and operations ofthe human mind. By this plain statement of facts, it will not bedifficult to decide many celebrated, though frivolous, and merely verbalcontroversies, which have long amused the leisure of the schools, andwhich owe both their fame and their existence to the ambiguous obscurityof scholastic language. It will, for example, only require an appeal toevery man's experience, to prove that we often act purely from a regardto the happiness of others, and are therefore social beings; and it isnot necessary to be a consummate judge of the deceptions of language, to despise the sophistical trifler, who tells us, that, because weexperience a gratification in our benevolent actions, we are thereforeexclusively and uniformly selfish. A correct examination of facts willlead us to discover that quality which is common to all virtuousactions, and which distinguishes them from those which are vicious andcriminal. But we shall see that it is necessary for man to be governednot by his own transient and hasty opinion upon the tendency of everyparticular action, but by those fixed and unalterable rules, which arethe joint result of the impartial judgment, the natural feelings, andthe embodied experience of mankind. The authority of these rules is, indeed, founded only on their tendency to promote private and publicwelfare; but the morality of actions will appear solely to consist intheir correspondence with the rule. By the help of this obviousdistinction we shall vindicate a just theory, which, far from beingmodern, is, in fact, as ancient as philosophy, both from plausibleobjections, and from the odious imputation of supporting those absurdand monstrous systems which have been built upon it. Beneficial tendencyis the foundation of rules, and the criterion by which habits andsentiments are to be tried. But it is neither the immediate standard, nor can it ever be the principal motive of action. An action, to becompletely virtuous, must accord with moral rules, and must flow fromour natural feelings and affections, moderated, matured, and improvedinto steady habits of right conduct. [16] Without, however, dwellinglonger on subjects which cannot be clearly stated, unless they are fullyunfolded, I content myself with observing, that it shall be my object, in this preliminary, but most important part of the course, to lay thefoundations of morality so deeply in human nature, as may satisfy thecoldest inquirer; and, at the same time, to vindicate the paramountauthority of the rules of our duty, at all times, and in all places, over all opinions of interest and speculations of benefit, soextensively, so universally, and so inviolably, as may well justify thegrandest and the most apparently extravagant effusions of moralenthusiasm. If, notwithstanding all my endeavours to deliver thesedoctrines with the utmost simplicity, any of my auditors should stillreproach me for introducing such abstruse matters, I must shelter myselfbehind the authority of the wisest of men. "If they (the ancientmoralists), before they had come to the popular and received notions ofvirtue and vice, had staid a little longer upon the inquiry concerning_the roots of good and evil_, they had given, in my opinion, a greatlight to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted withnature, they had made their doctrines less prolix, and moreprofound. "--_Bacon. Dign. And Adv. Of Learn. _ book ii. What Lord Bacondesired for the mere gratification of scientific curiosity, the welfareof mankind now imperiously demands. Shallow systems of metaphysics havegiven birth to a brood of abominable and pestilential paradoxes, whichnothing but a more profound philosophy can destroy. However we may, perhaps, lament the necessity of discussions which may shake thehabitual reverence of some men for those rules which it is the chiefinterest of all men to practise, we have now no choice left. We musteither dispute, or abandon the ground. Undistinguishing and unmeritedinvectives against philosophy, will only harden sophists and theirdisciples in the insolent conceit, that they are in possession of anundisputed superiority of reason; and that their antagonists have noarms to employ against them, but those of popular declamation. Let usnot for a moment even appear to suppose, that philosophical truth andhuman happiness are so irreconcilably at variance. I cannot express myopinion on this subject so well as in the words of a most valuable, though generally neglected writer: "The science of abstruse learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles's spear, that healed thewounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the damageitself had occasioned, and this perhaps is all it is good for; it castsno additional light upon the paths of life, but disperses the cloudswith which it had overspread them before; it advances not the travellerone step in his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot fromwhence he wandered. Thus the land of Philosophy consists partly of anopen champaign country, passable by every common understanding, andpartly of a range of woods, traversable only by the speculative, andwhere they too frequently delight to amuse themselves. Since then weshall be obliged to make incursions into this latter tract, and shallprobably find it a region of obscurity, danger, and difficulty, itbehoves us to use our utmost endeavours for enlightening and smoothingthe way before us. "[17] We shall, however, remain in the forest onlylong enough to visit the fountains of those streams which flow from it, and which water and fertilise the cultivated region of Morals, to becomeacquainted with the modes of warfare practised by its savageinhabitants, and to learn the means of guarding our fair and fruitfulland against their desolating incursions. I shall hasten fromspeculations, to which I am naturally, perhaps, but too prone, andproceed to the more profitable consideration of our practical duty. 

II. The first and most simple part of ethics is that which regards theduties of private men towards each other, when they are considered apartfrom the sanction of positive laws. I say, _apart_ from that sanction, not _antecedent_ to it; for though we _separate_ private from politicalduties for the sake of greater clearness and order in reasoning, yet weare not to be so deluded by this mere arrangement of convenience as tosuppose that human society ever has subsisted, or ever could subsist, without being protected by government and bound together by laws. Allthese relative duties of private life have been so copiously andbeautifully treated by the moralists of antiquity, that few men will nowchoose to follow them who are not actuated by the wild ambition ofequalling Aristotle in precision, or rivalling Cicero in eloquence. They have been also admirably treated by modern moralists, among whom itwould be gross injustice not to number many of the preachers of theChristian religion, whose peculiar character is that spirit of universalcharity, which is the living principle of all our social duties. For itwas long ago said, with great truth, by Lord Bacon, "that there neverwas any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainlyand highly exalt that good which is communicative, and depress the goodwhich is private and particular, as the Christian faith. "[18] Theappropriate praise of this religion is not so much, that it has taughtnew duties, as that it breathes a milder and more benevolent spirit overthe whole extent of morals. 

On a subject which has been so exhausted, I should naturally havecontented myself with the most slight and general survey, if somefundamental principles had not of late been brought into question, which, in all former times, have been deemed too evident to require thesupport of argument, and almost too sacred to admit the liberty ofdiscussion. I shall here endeavour to strengthen some parts of thefortifications of morality which have hitherto been neglected, becauseno man had ever been hardy enough to attack them. Almost all therelative duties of human life will be found more immediately, or moreremotely, to arise out of the two great institutions of property andmarriage. They constitute, preserve, and improve society. Upon theirgradual improvement depends the progressive civilization of mankind; onthem rests the whole order of civil life. We are told by Horace, thatthe first efforts of lawgivers to civilise men consisted instrengthening and regulating these institutions, and fencing them roundwith rigorous penal laws. 

 Oppida coeperunt munire et ponere leges Neu quis fur esset, neu quis latro, neu quis adulter. 

 1 _Serm. _ iii. 105. 

A celebrated ancient orator, of whose poems we have but a few fragmentsremaining, has well described the progressive order in which humansociety is gradually led to its highest improvements under theguardianship of those laws which secure property and regulate marriage. 

 Et leges sanctas docuit, et chara jugavit Corpora conjugiis; et magnas condidit urbes. 

 _Frag. C. Licin. Calvi. _

These two great institutions convert the selfish as well as the socialpassions of our nature into the firmest bands of a peaceable and orderlyintercourse; they change the sources of discord into principles ofquiet; they discipline the most ungovernable, they refine the grossest, and they exalt the most sordid propensities; so that they become theperpetual fountain of all that strengthens, and preserves, and adornssociety; they sustain the individual, and they perpetuate the race. Around these institutions all our social duties will be found at variousdistances to range themselves; some more near, obviously essential tothe good order of human life, others more remote, and of which thenecessity is not at first view so apparent; and some so distant, thattheir importance has been sometimes doubted, though upon more matureconsideration they will be found to be outposts and advanced guards ofthese fundamental principles: that man should securely enjoy the fruitsof his labour, and that the society of the sexes should be so wiselyordered as to make it a school of the kind affections, and a fit nurseryfor the commonwealth. 

The subject of _property_ is of great extent. It will be necessary toestablish the foundation of the rights of acquisition, alienation, andtransmission, not in imaginary contracts or a pretended state of nature, but in their subserviency to the subsistence and well-being of mankind. It will not only be curious, but useful, to trace the history ofproperty from the first loose and transient occupancy of the savage, through all the modifications which it has at different times received, to that comprehensive, subtle, and anxiously minute code of propertywhich is the last result of the most refined civilization. 

I shall observe the same order in considering the society of the sexesas it is regulated by the institution of marriage. [19] I shallendeavour to lay open those unalterable principles of general intereston which that institution rests: and if I entertain a hope that on thissubject I may be able to add something to what our masters in moralityhave taught us, I trust, that the reader will bear in mind, as an excusefor my presumption, that _they_ were not likely to employ much argumentwhere they did not foresee the possibility of doubt. I shall alsoconsider the history[20] of marriage, and trace it through all theforms which it has assumed, to that decent and happy permanency ofunion, which has, perhaps above all other causes, contributed to thequiet of society, and the refinement of manners in modern times. Amongmany other inquiries which this subject will suggest, I shall be ledmore particularly to examine the natural station and duties of thefemale sex, their condition among different nations, its improvement inEurope, and the bounds which Nature herself has prescribed to theprogress of that improvement; beyond which, every pretended advance willbe a real degradation. 

III. Having established the principles of private duty, I shall proceedto consider man under the important relation of subject and sovereign, or, in other words, of citizen and magistrate. The duties which arisefrom this relation I shall endeavour to establish, not upon supposedcompacts, which are altogether chimerical, which must be admitted to befalse in fact, which if they are to be considered as fictions, will befound to serve no purpose of just reasoning, and to be equally thefoundation of a system of universal despotism in Hobbes, and ofuniversal anarchy in Rousseau; but on the solid basis of generalconvenience. Men cannot subsist without society and mutual aid; they canneither maintain social intercourse nor receive aid from each otherwithout the protection of government; and they cannot enjoy thatprotection without submitting to the restraints which a just governmentimposes. This plain argument establishes the duty of obedience on thepart of citizens, and the duty of protection on that of magistrates, onthe same foundation with that of every other moral duty; and it shews, with sufficient evidence, that these duties are reciprocal; the onlyrational end for which the fiction of a contract could have beeninvented. I shall not encumber my reasoning by any speculations on theorigin of government; a question on which so much reason has been wastedin modern times; but which the ancients[21] in a higher spirit ofphilosophy have never once mooted. If our principles be just, the originof government must have been coeval with that of mankind; and as notribe has ever yet been discovered so brutish as to be without somegovernment, and yet so enlightened as to establish a government bycommon consent, it is surely unnecessary to employ any serious argumentin the confutation of a doctrine that is inconsistent with reason, andunsupported by experience. But though all inquiries into the origin ofgovernment be chimerical, yet the history of its progress is curious anduseful. The various stages through which it passed from savageindependence, which implies every man's power of injuring his neighbour, to legal liberty, which consists in every man's security against wrong;the manner in which a family expands into a tribe, and tribes coalesceinto a nation; in which public justice is gradually engrafted on privaterevenge, find temporary submission ripened into habitual obedience; forma most important and extensive subject of inquiry, which comprehends allthe improvements of mankind in police, in judicature, and inlegislation. 

I have already given the reader to understand that the description ofliberty which seems to me the most comprehensive, is that of _securityagainst wrong_. Liberty is therefore the object of all government. Menare more free under every government, even the most imperfect, than theywould be if it were possible for them to exist without any governmentat all: they are more secure from wrong, _more undisturbed in theexercise of their natural powers, and therefore more free, even in themost obvious and grossest sense of the word_, than if they werealtogether unprotected against injury from each other. But as generalsecurity is enjoyed in very different degrees under differentgovernments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by way of eminencecalled _free_. Such governments attain most completely the end which iscommon to all government. A free constitution of government and a goodconstitution of government are therefore different expressions for thesame idea. 

Another material distinction, however, soon presents itself. In mostcivilised states the subject is tolerably protected against grossinjustice from his fellows by impartial laws, which it is the manifestinterest of the sovereign to enforce. But some commonwealths are sohappy as to be founded on a principle of much more refined and providentwisdom. The subjects of such commonwealths are guarded not only againstthe injustice of each other, but (as far as human prudence cancontrive) against oppression from the magistrate. Such states, like allother extraordinary examples of public or private excellence andhappiness, are thinly scattered over the different ages and countries ofthe world. In them the will of the sovereign is limited with so exact ameasure, that his protecting authority is not weakened. Such acombination of skill and fortune is not often to be expected, and indeednever can arise, but from the constant though gradual exertions ofwisdom and virtue, to improve a long succession of most favourablecircumstances. 

There is indeed scarce any society so wretched as to be destitute ofsome sort of weak provision against the injustice of their governors. Religious institutions, favourite prejudices, national manners, have indifferent countries, with unequal degrees of force, checked or mitigatedthe exercise of supreme power. The privileges of a powerful nobility, ofopulent mercantile communities, of great judicial corporations, have insome monarchies approached more near to a control on the sovereign. Means have been devised with more or less wisdom to temper the despotismof an aristocracy over their subjects, and in democracies to protect theminority against the majority, and the whole people against the tyrannyof demagogues. But in these unmixed forms of government, as the right oflegislation is vested in one individual or in one order, it is obviousthat the legislative power may shake off all the restraints which thelaws have imposed on it. All such governments, therefore, tend towardsdespotism, and the securities which they admit against mis-governmentare extremely feeble and precarious. The best security which humanwisdom can devise, seems to be the distribution of political authorityamong different individuals and bodies, with separate interests andseparate characters, corresponding to the variety of classes of whichcivil society is composed, each interested to guard their own order fromoppression by the rest; each also interested to prevent any of theothers from seizing on exclusive, and therefore despotic power; and allhaving a common interest to co-operate in carrying on the ordinary andnecessary administration of government. If there were not an interest toresist each other in extraordinary cases, there would not be liberty. Ifthere were not an interest to co-operate in the ordinary course ofaffairs, there could be no government. The object of such wiseinstitutions which make the selfishness of governors a security againsttheir injustice, is to protect men against wrong both from their rulersand their fellows. Such governments are, with justice, peculiarly andemphatically called _free_; and in ascribing that liberty to the skilfulcombination of mutual dependence and mutual check, I feel my ownconviction greatly strengthened by calling to mind, that in this opinionI agree with all the wise men who have ever deeply considered theprinciples of politics; with Aristotle and Polybius, with Cicero andTacitus, with Bacon and Machiavel, with Montesquieu and Hume. [22] It isimpossible in such a cursory sketch as the present, even to allude to avery small part of those philosophical principles, political reasonings, and historical facts, which are necessary for the illustration of thismomentous subject. In a full discussion of it I shall be obliged toexamine the general frame of the most celebrated governments of ancientand modern times, and especially of those which have been most renownedfor their freedom. The result of such an examination will be, that noinstitution so detestable as an absolutely unbalanced government, perhaps ever existed; that the simple governments are mere creatures ofthe imagination of theorists, who have transformed names used for theconvenience of arrangement into real polities; that, as constitutions ofgovernment approach more nearly to that unmixed and uncontrolledsimplicity they become despotic, and as they recede farther from thatsimplicity they become free. 

By the constitution of a state, I mean "_the body of those written andunwritten fundamental laws which regulate the most important rights ofthe higher magistrates, and the most essential privileges[23] of thesubjects. _ "Such a body of political laws must in all countries ariseout of the character and situation of a people; they must grow with itsprogress, be adapted to its peculiarities, change with its changes; andbe incorporated into its habits. Human wisdom cannot form such aconstitution by one act, for human wisdom cannot create the materials ofwhich it is composed. The attempt, always ineffectual, to change byviolence the ancient habits of men, and the established order ofsociety, so as to fit them for an absolutely new scheme of government, flows from the most presumptuous ignorance, requires the support of themost ferocious tyranny, and leads to consequences which its authors cannever foresee; generally, indeed, to institutions the most opposite tothose of which they profess to seek the establishment. [24] But humanwisdom indefatigably employed for remedying abuses, and in seizingfavourable opportunities of improving that order of society which arisesfrom causes over which we have little control, after the reforms andamendments of a series of ages, has sometimes, though very rarely, [25]shewn itself capable of building up a free constitution, which is "thegrowth of time and nature, rather than the work of human invention. "Such a constitution can only be formed by the wise imitation of "_thegreat innovator_ TIME, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived. "[26] Without descending to thepuerile ostentation of panegyric, on that of which all mankind confessthe excellence, I may observe, with truth and soberness, that a freegovernment not only establishes an universal security against wrong, butthat it also cherishes all the noblest powers of the human mind; that ittends to banish both the mean and the ferocious vices; that it improvesthe national character to which it is adapted, and out of which itgrows; that its whole administration is a practical school of honestyand humanity; and that there the social affections, expanded into publicspirit, gain a wider sphere, and a more active spring. 

I shall conclude what I have to offer on government, by an account ofthe constitution of England. I shall endeavour to trace the progress ofthat constitution by the light of history, of laws, and of records, fromthe earliest times to the present age; and to shew how the generalprinciples of liberty, originally common to it, with the other Gothicmonarchies of Europe, but in other countries lost or obscured, were inthis more fortunate island preserved, matured, and adapted to theprogress of civilization. I shall attempt to exhibit this mostcomplicated machine, as our history and our laws shew it in action; andnot as some celebrated writers have most imperfectly represented it, whohave torn out a few of its more simple springs, and, putting themtogether, miscall them the British constitution. So prevalent, indeed, have these imperfect representations hitherto been, that I will ventureto affirm, there is scarcely any subject which has been less treated asit deserved than the government of England. Philosophers of great andmerited reputation[27] have told us that it consisted of certainportions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; names which are, intruth, very little applicable, and which, if they were, would as littlegive an idea of this government, as an account of the weight of bone, offlesh, and of blood in a human body, would be a picture of a living man. Nothing but a patient and minute investigation of the practice of thegovernment in all its parts, and through its whole history, can give usjust notions on this important subject. If a lawyer, without aphilosophical spirit, be unequal to the examination of this great workof liberty and wisdom, still more unequal is a philosopher withoutpractical, legal, and historical knowledge; for the first may wantskill, but the second wants materials. The observations of Lord Bacon onpolitical writers, in general, are most applicable to those who havegiven us systematic descriptions of the English constitution. "Allthose who have written of governments have written as philosophers, oras lawyers, _and none as statesmen_. As for the philosophers, they makeimaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are asthe stars, which give little light because they are so high. "--"_Hæccognitio ad viros civiles propriè pertinet_, " as he tells us in anotherpart of his writings; but unfortunately no experienced philosophicalBritish statesman has yet devoted his leisure to a delineation of theconstitution, which such a statesman alone can practically and perfectlyknow. 

In the discussion of this great subject, and in all reasonings on theprinciples of politics, I shall labour, above all things, to avoid thatwhich appears to me to have been the constant source of political error:I mean the attempt to give an air of system, of simplicity, and ofrigorous demonstration, to subjects which do not admit it. The onlymeans by which this could be done, was by referring to a few simplecauses, what, in truth, arose from immense and intricate combinations, and successions of causes. The consequence was very obvious. The systemof the theorist, disencumbered from all regard to the real nature ofthings, easily assumed an air of speciousness. It required littledexterity to make his argument appear conclusive. But all men agreedthat it was utterly inapplicable to human affairs. The theorist railedat the folly of the world, instead of confessing his own; and the men ofpractice unjustly blamed philosophy, instead of condemning the sophist. The causes which the politician has to consider are, above all others, multiplied, mutable, minute, subtile, and, if I may so speak, evanescent; perpetually changing their form, and varying theircombinations; losing their nature, while they keep their name;exhibiting the most different consequences in the endless variety of menand nations on whom they operate; in one degree of strength producingthe most signal benefit; and, under a slight variation of circumstances, the most tremendous mischiefs. They admit indeed of being reduced totheory; but to a theory formed on the most extensive views, of the mostcomprehensive and flexible principles, to embrace all their varieties, and to fit all their rapid transmigrations; a theory, of which the mostfundamental maxim is, distrust in itself, and deference for practicalprudence. Only two writers of former times have, as far as I know, observed this general defect of political reasoners; but these two arethe greatest philosophers who have ever appeared in the world. The firstof them is Aristotle, who, in a passage of his Politics, to which Icannot at this moment turn, plainly condemns the pursuit of a delusivegeometrical accuracy in moral reasonings as the constant source of thegrossest error. The second is Lord Bacon, who tells us, with thatauthority of conscious wisdom which belongs to him, and with that powerof richly adorning truth from the wardrobe of genius which he possessedabove almost all men, "Civil knowledge is conversant about a subjectwhich, above all others, is most immersed in matter, and hardliestreduced to axiom. "[28]

IV. I shall next endeavour to lay open the general principles of civiland criminal laws. On this subject I may with some confidence hope thatI shall be enabled to philosophise with better materials by myacquaintance with the law of my own country, which it is the business ofmy life to practise, and of which the study has by habit become myfavourite pursuit. 

The first principles of jurisprudence are simple maxims of reason, ofwhich the observance is immediately discovered by experience to beessential to the security of men's rights, and which pervade the laws ofall countries. An account of the gradual application of these originalprinciples, first, to more simple, and afterwards to more complicatedcases, forms both the history and the theory of law. Such an historicalaccount of the progress of men, in reducing justice to an applicable andpractical system, will enable us to trace that chain, in which so manybreaks and interruptions are perceived by superficial observers, butwhich in truth inseparably, though with many dark and hidden windings, links together the security of life and property with the most minuteand apparently frivolous formalities of legal proceeding. We shallperceive that no human foresight is sufficient to establish such asystem at once, and that, if it were so established, the occurrence ofunforeseen cases would shortly altogether change it; that there is butone way of forming a civil code, either consistent with common sense, orthat has ever been practised in any country, namely, that of graduallybuilding up the law in proportion as the facts arise which it is toregulate. We shall learn to appreciate the merit of vulgar objectionsagainst the subtlety and complexity of laws. We shall estimate the goodsense and the gratitude of those who reproach lawyers for employing allthe powers of their mind to discover subtle distinctions for theprevention of injustice;[29] and we shall at once perceive that lawsought to be neither more _simple_ nor more _complex_ than the state ofsociety which they are to govern, but that they ought exactly tocorrespond to it. Of the two faults, however, the excess of simplicitywould certainly be the greatest; for laws, more complex than arenecessary, would only produce embarrassment; whereas laws more simplethan the affairs which they regulate would occasion a defect of justice. More understanding[30] has perhaps been in this manner exerted to fixthe rules of life than in any other science; and it is certainly themost honourable occupation of the understanding, because it is the mostimmediately subservient to general safety and comfort. There is not, inmy opinion, in the whole compass of human affairs, so noble a spectacleas that which is displayed in the progress of jurisprudence; where wemay contemplate the cautious and unwearied exertions of a succession ofwise men through a long course of ages; withdrawing every case as itarises from the dangerous power of discretion, and subjecting it toinflexible rules; extending the dominion of justice and reason, andgradually contracting, within the narrowest possible limits, the domainof brutal force and of arbitrary will. This subject has been treatedwith such dignity by a writer who is admired by all mankind for hiseloquence, but who is, if possible, still more admired by all competentjudges for his philosophy; a writer, of whom I may justly say, that hewas "_gravissimus et dicendi et intelligendi auctor et magister_;" thatI cannot refuse myself the gratification of quoting his words:--"Thescience of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which, withall its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason ofages combining the principles of original justice with the infinitevariety of human concerns. "[31]

I shall exemplify the progress of law, and illustrate those principlesof universal justice on which it is founded, by a comparative review ofthe two greatest civil codes that have been hitherto formed--those ofRome and of England;[32] of their agreements and disagreements, both ingeneral provisions, and in some of the most important parts of theirminute practice. In this part of the course, which I mean to pursue withsuch detail as to give a view of both codes, that may perhaps besufficient for the purposes of the general student, I hope to convincehim that the laws of civilised nations, particularly those of his own, are a subject most worthy of scientific curiosity; that principle andsystem run through them even to the minutest particular, as really, though not so apparently, as in other sciences, and applied to purposesmore important than in any other science. Will it be presumptuous toexpress a hope, that such an inquiry may not be altogether an uselessintroduction to that larger and more detailed study of the law ofEngland, which is the duty of those who are to profess and practise thatlaw. 

In considering the important subject of criminal law it will be my dutyto found, on a regard to the general safety, the right of the magistrateto inflict punishments, even the most severe, if that safety cannot beeffectually protected by the example of inferior punishments. It will bea more agreeable part of my office to explain the temperaments whichWisdom, as well as Humanity, prescribes in the exercise of that harshright, unfortunately so essential to the preservation of human society. I shall collate the penal codes of different nations, and gathertogether the most accurate statement of the result of experience withrespect to the efficacy of lenient and severe punishments; and I shallendeavour to ascertain the principles on which must be founded both theproportion and the appropriation of penalties to crimes. 

As to the _law of criminal proceeding_, my labour will be very easy; foron that subject an English lawyer, if he were to delineate the model ofperfection, would find that, with few exceptions, he had transcribed theinstitutions of his own country. The whole subject of my lectures, ofwhich I have now given the outline, may be summed up in, the words ofCicero:--"Natura enim juris explicanda est nobis, eaque ab hominisrepetenda naturâ; considerandæ leges quibus civitates regi debeant; tumhæc tractanda, quæ composita sunt et descripta, jura et jussa populorum;in quibus. "--_Cic. De Leg. _ lib. I. C. 5. 

V. The next great division of the subject is the law of nations, strictly and properly so called. I have already hinted at the generalprinciples on which this law is founded. They, like all the principlesof natural jurisprudence, have been more happily cultivated, and moregenerally obeyed, in some ages and countries than in others; and, likethem, are susceptible of great variety in their application, from thecharacter and usages of nations. I shall consider these principles inthe gradation of those which are necessary to any tolerable intercoursebetween nations; those which are essential to all well-regulated andmutually advantageous intercourse; and those which are highly conduciveto the preservation of a mild and friendly intercourse betweencivilised states. Of the first class, every understanding acknowledgesthe necessity, and some traces of a faint reverence for them arediscovered even among the most barbarous tribes; of the second, everywell-informed man perceives the important use, and they have generallybeen respected by all polished nations; of the third, the great benefitmay be read in the history of modern Europe, where alone they have beencarried to their full perfection. In unfolding the first and secondclass of principles, I shall naturally be led to give an account of thatlaw of nations, which, in greater or less perfection, regulated theintercourse of savages, of the Asiatic empires, and of the ancientrepublics. The third brings me to the consideration of the law ofnations, as it is now acknowledged in Christendom. From the great extentof the subject, and the particularity to which, for reasons alreadygiven, I must here descend, it is impossible for me, within any moderatecompass, to give even an outline of this part of the course. Itcomprehends, as every reader will perceive, the principles of nationalindependence, the intercourse of nations in peace, the privileges ofembassadors and inferior ministers, the commerce of private subjects, the grounds of just war, the mutual duties of belligerent and neutralpowers, the limits of lawful hostility, the rights of conquest, thefaith to be observed in warfare, the force of an armistice, of safeconducts and passports, the nature and obligation of alliances, themeans of negotiation, and the authority and interpretation of treatiesof peace. All these, and many other most important and complicatedsubjects, with all the variety of moral reasoning, and historicalexamples, which is necessary to illustrate them, must be fully examinedin this part of the lectures, in which I shall endeavour to put togethera tolerably complete practical system of the law of nations, as it hasfor the last two centuries been recognised in Europe. 

"_Le droit des gens_ est naturellement fondé sur ce principe, que lesdiverses nations doivent se faire, dans la paix, le plus de bien, etdans la guerre le moins de mal, qu'il est possible, sans nuire à leursvéritables intérêts. "

"L'objet de la guerre c'est la victoire; celui de la victoire laconquête; celui de la conquête la conservation. De ce principe et duprécédent, doivent dériver toutes les loix qui forment _le droit desgens_. "

"Toutes les nations ont un droit des gens; les _Iroquois_ même quimangent leurs prisonniers en ont un. Ils envoient et reçoivent desembassades; ils connoissent les droits de la guerre et de la paix: lemal est que ce droit des gens n'est pas fondé sur les vrais principes. "_De l'Esprit des Loix_, liv. I. C. 3. 

VI. As an important supplement to the practical system of our modern lawof nations, or rather as a necessary part of it, I shall conclude with asurvey of the _diplomatic and conventional law of Europe_; of thetreaties which have materially affected the distribution of power andterritory among the European states; the circumstances which gave riseto them, the changes which they effected, and the principles which theyintroduced into the public code of the Christian commonwealth. Inancient times the knowledge of this conventional law was thought one ofthe greatest praises that could be bestowed on a name loaded with allthe honours that eminence in the arts of peace and of war can confer:

"Equidem existimo, judices, cùm in omni genere ac varietate artium, etiam illarum, quæ sine summo otio non facilè discuntur, Cn. Pompeiusexcellat, singularem quandam laudem ejus et præstabilem esse scientiam, _in fæderibus, pactionibus, conditionibus, populorum, regum, exterarumnationum_: in universo denique bellijure ac pacis. "--_Cic. Orat. Pro L. Corn. Balbo_, c. 6. 

Information on this subject is scattered over an immense variety ofvoluminous compilations; not accessible to every one, and of which theperusal can be agreeable only to very few. Yet so much of these treatieshas been embodied into the general law of Europe, that no man can bemaster of it who is not acquainted with them. The knowledge of them isnecessary to negotiators and statesmen; it may sometimes be importantto private men in various situations in which they may be placed; it isuseful to all men who wish either to be acquainted with modern history, or to form a sound judgment on political measures. I shall endeavour togive such an abstract of it as may be sufficient for some, and aconvenient guide for others in the farther progress of their studies. The treaties, which I shall more particularly consider, will be those ofWestphalia, of Oliva, of the Pyrenees, of Breda, of Nimeguen, ofRyswick, of Utrecht, of Aix-la-Chapelle, of Paris (1763), and ofVersailles (1783). I shall shortly explain the other treaties, of whichthe stipulations are either alluded to, confirmed, or abrogated in thosewhich I consider at length. I shall subjoin an account of the diplomaticintercourse of the European powers with the Ottoman Porte, and withother princes and states who are without the pale of our ordinaryfederal law; together with a view of the most important treaties ofcommerce, their principles, and their consequences. 

As an useful appendix to a practical treatise on the law of nations, some account will be given of those tribunals which in differentcountries of Europe decide controversies arising out of that law; oftheir constitution, of the extent of their authority, and of their modesof proceeding; more especially of those courts which are peculiarlyappointed for that purpose by the laws of Great Britain. 

Though the course, of which I have sketched the outline, may seem tocomprehend so great a variety of miscellaneous subjects, yet they areall in truth closely and inseparably interwoven. The duties of men, ofsubjects, of princes, of law-givers, of magistrates, and of states, areall parts of one consistent system of universal morality. Between themost abstract and elementary maxim of moral philosophy, and the mostcomplicated controversies of civil or public law, there subsists aconnexion which it will be the main object of these lectures to trace. The principle of justice, deeply rooted in the nature and interest ofman, pervades the whole system, and is discoverable in every part of it, even to its minutest ramification in a legal formality, or in theconstruction of an article in a treaty. 

I know not whether a philosopher ought to confess, that in his inquiriesafter truth he is biased by any consideration; even by the love ofvirtue. But I, who conceive that a real philosopher ought to regardtruth itself chiefly on account of its subserviency to the happiness ofmankind, am not ashamed to confess, that I shall feel a greatconsolation at the conclusion of these lectures, if, by a wide surveyand an exact examination of the conditions and relations of humannature, I shall have confirmed but one individual in the conviction, that justice is the permanent interest of all men, and of allcommonwealths. To discover one new link of that eternal chain by whichthe Author of the universe has bound together the happiness and the dutyof his creatures, and indissolubly fastened their interests to eachother, would fill my heart with more pleasure than all the fame withwhich the most ingenious paradox ever crowned the most eloquent sophist. 

I shall conclude this Discourse in the noble language of two greatorators and philosophers, who have, in a few words, stated thesubstance, the object, and the result of all morality, and politics, andlaw. 

"Nihil est quod adhuc de republicâ putem dictum, et quo possim longiusprogredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modo falsum esse illud, sine injuriânon posse, sed hoc verissimum, sine summâ justitiâ rempublicam regi nonposse. "--_Cic. Frag. _ lib. Ii. _de Repub. _

"Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society, and anyeminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under thesuspicion of being no policy at all. "--_Burke's Works_, vol. Iii. P. 207. 

FOOTNOTES

[1] See "A Syllabus of Lectures on the Law of England, to be deliveredin Lincoln's-Inn Hall by M. Nolan, Esq. " London, 1796. 

[2] I have not been deterred by some petty incongruity of metaphor fromquoting this noble sentence. Mr. Hume had, perhaps, this sentence in hisrecollection, when he wrote a remarkable passage of his works. SeeHume's Essays, vol. Ii. P. 352. Ed. Lond. 1788. 

[3] The learned reader is aware that the "jus naturæ" and "jus gentium"of the Roman lawyers are phrases of very different import from themodern phrases, "law of nature" and "law of nations. " "Jus naturale, "says Ulpian, "est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. " D. I. I. I. 3. "Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id que apud omnesperæque custoditur vocaturque jus gentium. " D. I. I. 9. But theysometimes neglect this subtle distinction--"Jure naturali quodappellatur jus gentium. " I. 2. I. II. _Jus feciale_ was the Roman termfor our law of nations. "Belli quidem æquitas sanctissimè populi Rom. Feciali jure perscripta est. " Off. I. II. Our learned civilian Zouch hasaccordingly entitled his work, "De Jure Feciali, sive de _Jure interGentes_. " The Chancellor D'Aguesseau, probably without knowing the workof Zouch, suggested that this law should be called, "_Droit entre lesGens_, " (Oeuvres, tom. Ii. P. 337. ) in which he has been followed by alate ingenious writer, Mr. Bentham, Princ. Of Morals and Pol. P. 324. Perhaps these learned writers do employ a phrase which expresses thesubject of this law with more accuracy than our common language; but Idoubt whether innovations in the terms of science always repay us bytheir superior precision for the uncertainty and confusion which thechange occasions. 

[4] This remark is suggested by an objection of _Vattel_, which is morespecious than solid. See his Prelim. § 6. 

[5] "Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, _naturæ congruens_, diffusa inomnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando àfraude deterreat, quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, nequeimprobos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi neque obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Necverò aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque estquærendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius. Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omnitempore una lex et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit, unusque eritcommunis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus. Ille legis hujusinventor, disceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit _ipse se fugiet etnaturam hominis aspernabitur_, atque hoc ipso luet maximas poenasetiamsi cætera supplicia quæ putantur effugerit. "--_Fragm. _ lib. Iii. _Cicer. De Republ. Apud Lactant_. 

It is impossible to read such precious fragments without deploring theloss of a work which, for the benefit of all generations, _should_ havebeen immortal. 

[6] "Age verò urbibus constitutis ut fidem colere et justitiam retinerediscerent et aliis parere suâ voluntate consuescerent, ac non modòlabores excipiendos communis commodi causâ sed etiam vitam amittendamexistimarent; qui tandem fieri potuit nisi homines ea quæ rationeinvenissent eloquentiâ persuadere potuissent. "--_Cic. De Inv. Rhet. _lib. I. In proëm. 

[7] [Greek: Dichaiômata tôt polimôt. ]

[8] Cujacius, Brissonius, Hottomannus, &c. &c. --Vide _Gravina Orig. Jur. Civil. _ pp. 132-38. Edit. Lips. 1737. 

Leibnitz; a great mathematician as well as philosopher, declares that heknows nothing which approaches so near to the method and precision ofgeometry as the Roman law. --_Op. _ tom. Iv. P. 254. 

[9] Proavia juris civilis. --_De Jur. Bell. Ac Pac. Proleg. _ § 16. 

[10] Dr. Paley, Princ. Of Mor. And Polit. Philos. Pref. Pp. Xiv. And xv. 

[11] Grot. Jur. Bell. Et Pac. Proleg. § 40. 

[12] I do not mean to impeach the soundness of any part of Puffendorff'sreasoning founded on moral entities. It may be explained in a mannerconsistent with the most just philosophy. He used, as every writer mustdo, the scientific language of his own time. I only assert that, tothose who are unacquainted with ancient systems, his philosophicalvocabulary is obsolete and unintelligible. 

[13] I cannot prevail on myself to pass over this subject without payingmy humble tribute to the memory of Sir W. Jones, who has laboured sosuccessfully in Oriental literature, whose fine genius, pure taste, unwearied industry, unrivalled and almost prodigious variety ofacquirements, not to speak of his amiable manners and spotlessintegrity, must fill every one who cultivates or admires letters withreverence, tinged with a melancholy which the recollection of his recentdeath is so well adapted to inspire. I hope I shall be pardoned if I addmy applause to the genius and learning of Mr. Maurice, who treads in thesteps of his illustrious friend, and who has bewailed his death in astrain of genuine and beautiful poetry, not unworthy of happier periodsof our English literature. 

[14] Especially those chapters of the third book, entitled, _Temperamentum circa Captivos_, &c. &c. 

[15] Natura enim juris explicanda est nobis, _eaque ab hominis repetendanaturâ_. --_Cic. De Leg. _ lib i. C. 5. 

[16] Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta atque ad summumperducta natura. --_Cic. De Leg. _ lib. I. C. 8. 

[17] Search's Light of Nature, by Abraham Tucker, esq. , vol. I. Pref. P. Xxxiii. 

[18] Bacon, Dign. And Adv. Of Learn. Book ii. 

[19] See on this subject an incomparable fragment of the first book ofCicero's Economics, which is too long for insertion here, but which, ifit be closely examined, may perhaps dispel the illusion of thosegentlemen, who have so strangely taken it for granted, that Cicero wasincapable of exact reasoning. 

[20] This progress is traced with great accuracy in some beautiful linesof Lucretius:

 ---- Mulier conjuncta viro concessit in unum, castaque privatæ veneris connubia læta cognita sunt, prolemque ex se vidère coortam: TUM GENUS HUMANUM PRIMUM MOLLESCERE COEPIT. ---- puerisque parentum Blanditiis facile ingenium fregere superbum. _Tunc et amicitiam coeperunt jungere_ habentes Finitima inter se, nec lædere nec violare. Et pueros commendârunt muliebreque sêclum Vocibus et gestu cum balbè significarent IMBECILLORUM ESSE ÆQUUM MISERIER OMNIUM. 

 _Lucret. _ lib. V. 1. 1010-22. 

[21] The introduction to the first book of Aristotle's Politics is thebest demonstration of the necessity of political society to thewell-being, and indeed to the very being, of man, with which I amacquainted. Having shewn the circumstances which render man necessarilya social being, he justly concludes, "[Greek: Kai oti anthropos physeipolitikon zôon. ]"--_Arist. De Rep. _ lib. I. 

The same scheme of philosophy is admirably pursued in the short, butinvaluable fragment of the sixth book of Polybius, which describes thehistory and revolutions of government. 

[22] To the weight of these great names let me add the opinion of twoillustrious men of the present age, as both their opinions are combinedby one of them in the following passage: "He (Mr. Fox) always thoughtany of the simple unbalanced governments bad; simple monarchy, simplearistocracy, simple democracy; he held them all imperfect or vicious, all were bad by themselves; the composition alone was good. These hadbeen always his principles, in which he agreed with his friend, Mr. Burke. "--_Mr. Fox on the Army Estimates_, 9th Feb. 1790. 

In speaking of both these illustrious men, whose names I here join, asthey will be joined in fame by posterity, which will forget theirtemporary differences in the recollection of their genius and theirfriendship, I do not entertain the vain imagination that I can add totheir glory by any thing that I can say. But it is a gratification to meto give utterance to my feelings; to express the profound venerationwith which I am filled for the memory of the one, and the warm affectionwhich I cherish for the other, whom no one ever heard in public withoutadmiration, or knew in private life without loving. 

[23] _Privilege_, in Roman jurisprudence, means the _exemption_ of oneindividual from the operation of a law. Political privileges, in thesense in which I employ the terms, mean those rights of the subjects ofa free state, which are deemed so essential to the well-being of thecommonwealth, that they are _excepted_ from the ordinary discretion ofthe magistrate, and guarded by the same fundamental laws which securehis authority. 

[24] See an admirable passage on this subject in Dr. Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments, vol. Ii. Pp. 101-112, in which the true doctrine ofreformation is laid down with singular ability by that eloquent andphilosophical writer. --See also Mr. Burke's Speech on Economical Reform;and Sir M. Hale on the Amendment of Laws, in the collection of mylearned and most excellent friend, Mr. Hargrave, p. 248. 

[25] Pour former un gouvernement modéré, il faut combiner lespuissances, les régler, les tempérer, les faire agir, donner pour ainsidire un lest à l'une pour la mettre en état de résister à une autre, c'est un chef-d'oeuvre de législation que le hasard fait rarement, etque rarement on laisse faire à la prudence. Un gouvernement despotiqueau contraire saute pour ainsi dire aux yeux; il est uniforme partout:comme il ne faut que des passions pour l'établir tout le monde est bonpour cela. --_Montesquieu, de l'Esprit des Loix_, liv. V. C. 14. 

[26] Lord Bacon, Essay xxiv. Of Innovations. 

[27] The reader will perceive that I allude to MONTESQUIEU, whom I nevername without reverence, though I shall presume, with humility, tocriticise his account of a government which he only saw at a distance. 

[28] This principle is expressed by a writer of a very differentcharacter from these two great philosophers; a writer, "_qu'onn'appellera plus philosophe, mais qu'on appellera le plus éloquent dessophistes_, " with great force, and, as his manner is, with someexaggeration. 

Il n'y a point de principes abstraits dans la politique. C'est unescience des calculs, des combinaisons, et des exceptions, selon leslieux, les tems, et les circonstances. --_Lettre de Rousseau au Marquisde Mirabeau_. 

The second proposition is true; but the first is not a just inferencefrom it. 

[29] The casuistical subtleties are not perhaps greater than thesubtleties of lawyers;_ but the latter are innocent, and evennecessary_. --HUME's _Essays_, vol. Ii. P. 558. 

[30] "Law, " said Dr. Johnson, "is the science in which the greatestpowers of understanding are applied to the greatest number of facts. "Nobody, who is acquainted with the variety and multiplicity of thesubjects of jurisprudence, and with the prodigious powers ofdiscrimination employed upon them, can doubt the truth of thisobservation. 

[31] Burke's Works, vol. Iii. P. 134. 

[32] On the intimate connexion of these two codes, let us hear the wordsof Lord Holt, whose name never can be pronounced without veneration, aslong as wisdom and integrity are revered among men:--"Inasmuch _as thelaws of all nations are doubtless raised out of the ruins of the civillaw_, as all governments are sprung out of the ruins of the Romanempire, it must be owned _that the principles of our law are borrowedfrom the civil law_, therefore grounded upon the same reason in manythings. "--12 _Mod. _ 482. 

 FINIS. 

 J. MOYES, TOOK'S COURT, CHANCERY LANE.