A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THEISM. BY PHYSICUS. BOSTON:HOUGHTON, OSGOOD, & COMPANY. 1878. [_All rights reserved_] * * * * * _CANST THOU BY SEARCHING FIND OUT GOD?_ * * * * * PREFACE. * * * * * The following essay was written several years ago; but I have hithertorefrained from publishing it, lest, after having done so, I should findthat more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the essay setsforth. Judging, however, that it is now more than ever improbable that Ishall myself be able to detect any errors in my reasoning, I feel that itis time to present the latter to the contemplation of other minds; and indoing so, I make this explanation only because I feel it desirable to stateat the outset that the present treatise was written before the publicationof Mr. Mill's treatise on the same subject. It is desirable to make thisstatement, first, because in several instances the trains of reasoning inthe two essays are parallel, and next, because in other instances I havequoted passages from Mr. Mill's essay in connections which would bescarcely intelligible were it not understood that these passages areinsertions made after the present essay had been completed. I have alsoadded several supplementary essays which have been written since the mainessay was finished. It is desirable further to observe, that the only reason why I publish thisedition anonymously is because I feel very strongly that, in matters of thekind with which the present essay deals, opinions and arguments should beallowed to produce the exact degree of influence to which as opinions andarguments they are entitled: they should be permitted to stand upon theirown intrinsic merits alone, and quite beyond the shadow of that unfairprejudication which cannot but arise so soon as their author's authority, or absence of authority, becomes known. Notwithstanding this avowal, however, I fear that many who glance over the following pages will read inthe "Physicus" of the first one a very different motive. There is at thepresent time a wonderfully wide-spread sentiment pervading all classes ofsociety--a sentiment which it would not be easy to define, but thepractical outcome of which is, that to discuss the question of which thisessay treats is, in some way or other, morally wrong. Many, therefore, whoshare this sentiment will doubtless attribute my reticence to a puerilefear on my part to meet it. I can only say that such is not the case. Although I allude to this sentiment with all respect--believing as I dothat it is an offshoot from the stock which contains all that is best andgreatest in human nature--nevertheless it seems to me impossible to denythat the sentiment in question is as unreasonable as the frame of mindwhich harbours it must be unreasoning. If there is no God, where can be theharm in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence? If there is aGod, surely our first duty towards him must be to exert to our utmost, inour attempts to find him, the most noble faculty with which he has endowedus--as carefully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit tofurnish of his own existence as we investigate the evidence of inferiorthings in his dependent creation. To say that there is one rule or methodfor ascertaining truth in the latter case, which it is not legitimate toapply in the former case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity, if he exists, has not supplied us with rational evidence of his existence. For my own part, I feel that such an assertion cannot but embody far moreunworthy conceptions of a Personal God than are represented by any amountof earnest inquiry into whatever evidence of his existence there may bepresent; but, neglecting this reflection, if there is a God, it is certainthat reason is the faculty by which he has enabled man to discover truth, and it is no less certain that the scientific methods have provedthemselves by far the most trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to thisundoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whetheror not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both moremorally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as aproblem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any otherlight. Or, stating the case in other words, I believe that in whateverdegree we intentionally abstain from using in this case what we _know_ tobe the most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degreeare we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we areguilty of the worst among human sins--"Depart from us, for we desire notthe knowledge of thy ways. " If it is said that, supposing man to be in astate of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of histrial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark; but I must also askit to be remembered, that unless faith has _some_ basis of reason whereonto rest, it differs in nothing from superstition; and hence that it isstill our duty to investigate the _rational_ standing of the questionbefore us by the _scientific_ methods alone. And I may here observeparenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigationsconcerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such investigations, however, the present essay has nothing to do, although, I may remark thatif there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible in the structure of aprofessing revelation, such evidence, in whatever degree present, would beof the best possible kind for substantiating the hypothesis of Theism. Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the mosttruly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the followingpages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion were morenegative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice in me _for thisreason_ to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of the present kindcould ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism, there might be muchfor its author to regret, but nothing for him to be ashamed of; and, byparity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result of such an inquiry isseen to have a tendency to negative the theistic theory, the author shouldnot be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his conviction as to the degree ofsuch tendency, provided only that his conviction is an _honest_ one, andthat he is conscious of its having been reached by using his faculties withthe utmost care of which he is capable. If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate acharacter that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I replythat they are nevertheless the _best_ methods available, and hence that theretort is without pertinence: the question is still to be regarded as ascientific one, although we may perceive that neither an affirmative nor anegative answer can be given to it with any approach to a fulldemonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one fallingwithin the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the merefact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently impossible shouldnot deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a well-recognisedprinciple of scientific research, that however difficult or impossible itmay be to _prove_ a given theory true or false, the theory shouldnevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the fullrigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be hoped for, it still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the lastanalysis of which it is capable. Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the followinganalysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour of thetheory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of light whichthe progress of modern science--physical and speculative--has shed upon it. And forasmuch as it is impossible that demonstrated truth can ever be shownuntrue, and forasmuch as the demonstrated truths on which the presentexamination rests are the most fundamental which it is possible for thehuman mind to reach, I do not think it presumptuous to assert what appearsto me a necessary deduction from these facts--namely, that, possible errorsin reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined mustremain without material modification as long as our intelligence remainshuman. LONDON, 1878. * * * * * ANALYSIS. CHAPTER I. EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. SECT. 1. Introductory. 2. Object of the chapter. 3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence. 4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God. 5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations. 6. The Argument from Consciousness. 7. The Argument for a First Cause. CHAPTER II. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. 8. Introductory. 9. Examination of the Argument, and the independent coincidence of my viewsregarding it with those of Mr. Mill. 10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enunciation of it in theform of a Syllogism. 11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in the abstract. Mill quoted and answered. This defect in the Syllogism clearly defined. 12. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelligence to bethe only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to beggingthe whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability of Matterthinking no proof that it may not think. Locke himself strangely concedesthis. His fallacies and self-contradictions pointed out in an Appendix. 13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but assuming thathe is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter thinks as aTheist is to his hypothesis that it does not. 14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value, save thatwhile Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to restupon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford'sessay on "Body and Mind" is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating theworth of the Argument as to the _most_ conceivable being _most_ likelytrue. 15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceivability Argumentas applied to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a _virtual_ thoughnot a _formal_ fallacy. 16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argument fromInconceivability. 17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the conclusion thatonly Intelligence can have caused Intelligence. 18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must contain all thatis contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted toshow that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higherperfections never growing out of lower ones. 19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the propositionthat only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton quoted to show thatin his philosophy the entire question as to the being of a God hinges uponthat as to whether or not human volitions are caused. 20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton erroneouslyidentified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. Hisresulting dilemma. 21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine fact withspurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact of our having a moral senseremains to be considered. 22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the presence of themoral sense can be explained by natural causes. _A priori_ probability ofthe moral sense having been evolved. _A posteriori_ confirmation suppliedby Utilitarianism, &c. 23. Mill's presentation of the Argument a resuscitation of Paley's. Hiscriticism on Paley shown to be unfair. 24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out. 25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way. 26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illustrate theroot fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's observations upon thisArgument criticised. 27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument from Design. TheArgument shown to be a _petitio principii_. CHAPTER IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS. 28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argument fromDesign could have written upon it at all, had it not been for hisinstinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from GeneralLaws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency insisted upon. 29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws prior to theenunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev. BadenPowell quoted. 30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in terms of thedoctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word "Law" defined in terms ofthis doctrine. 31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws subsequent tothe enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. 32. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect of thequestion as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature becauseNature admits of being intelligently interrogated. 33. The subjective aspect of this question, according to the data affordedby evolutionary psychology. 34. Correspondence between products due to human intelligence and productssupposed due to Divine Intelligence, a correspondence which is onlygeneric. Illustrations drawn from prodigality in Nature. Furtherillustrations. Illogical manner in which natural theologians deal with suchdifficulties. The generic resemblance contemplated is just what we shouldexpect to find, if the doctrine of evolutionary psychology be true. 35. The last three sections parenthetical. Necessary nature of theconclusion which follows from the last five sections. CHAPTER V. THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD. 36. Emphatic re-statement of the conclusion reached in the previouschapter. This conclusion shown to be of merely scientific, and not oflogical conclusiveness. Preparation for considering the question in itspurely logical form. 37. The logic of probability in general explained, and canon ofinterpretation enunciated. 38. Application of this canon to the particular case of Theism. 39. Exposition of the logical state of the question. 40. Exposition continued. 41. Result of the exposition; "Suspended Judgment" the only logicalattitude of mind with regard to the question of Theism. CHAPTER VI. THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. 42. Statement of the position to which the question of Theism has beenreduced by the foregoing analysis. 43. Distinction between a scientific and a metaphysical teleology. Statement of the latter in legitimate terms. Criticism of this statementlegitimately made on the side of Atheism as being gratuitous. Impartialjudgment on this criticism. 44. Examination of the question as to whether the metaphysical system ofteleology is really destitute of all rational support. Pleading of asupposed Theist in support of the system. The principle of correlation ofgeneral laws. The complexity of Nature. 45. Summary of the Theist's pleading, and judgment that it fairly removesfrom the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology the charge of the latterbeing gratuitous. 46. Examination of the degree of probability that is presented by thehypothesis of metaphysical teleology, comprising an examination of theTheistic objection to the scientific train of reasoning on account of itssymbolism, and showing that a no less cogent objection lies against themetaphysical train of reasoning on account of its embodying the suppositionof unknowable causes. Distinction between "inconceivability" in a formal orsymbolical, and in a material or realisable sense. Reply of a supposedAtheist to the previous pleading of the supposed Theist. Herbert Spencerquoted on inconceivability of cosmic evolution as due to Mind. 47. Final judgment on the rational value of a metaphysical system ofteleology. Distinction between "inconceivability" in an absolute and in arelative sense. Final judgment on the attitude of mind which it is rationalto adopt towards the question of Theism. The desirability and therationality of tolerance in this particular case. CHAPTER VII. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 48. General summary of the whole essay. 49. Concluding remarks. APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. APPENDIX. A Critical Exposition of a Fallacy in Locke's use of the Argument againstthe possibility of Matter thinking on grounds of its being inconceivablethat it should. SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY I. Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theistical Argument, and criticism toshow that it is inadequate to sustain the doctrine of "Cosmic Theism" whichMr. Fiske endeavours to rear upon it. SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY II. A Critical Examination of the Rev. Professor Flint's work on "Theism". SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY III. On the Speculative Standing of Materialism. SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IV. On the Final Mystery of Things. * * * * * THEISM. * * * * * CHAPTER I. EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THEISM. § 1. Few subjects have occupied so much attention among speculativethinkers as that which relates to the being of God. Notwithstanding, however, the great amount that has been written on this subject, I am notaware that any one has successfully endeavoured to approach it, on all itsvarious sides, from the ground of pure reason alone, and thus to fix, asnearly as possible, the exact position which, in pure reason, this subjectought to occupy. Perhaps it will be thought that an exception to thisstatement ought to be made in favour of John Stuart Mill's posthumous essayon Theism; but from my great respect for this author, I should rather beinclined to regard that essay as a criticism on illogical arguments, thanas a _careful_ or _matured_ attempt to formulate the strictly rational_status_ of the question in all its bearings. Nevertheless, as this essayis in some respects the most scientific, just, and cogent, which has yetappeared on the subject of which it treats, and as anything which came fromthe pen of that great and accurate thinker is deserving of the most seriousattention, I shall carefully consider his views throughout the course ofthe following pages. Seeing then that, with this partial exception, no competent writer hashitherto endeavoured once for all to settle the long-standing question asto the rational probability of Theism, I cannot but feel that any attempt, however imperfect, to do this, will be welcome to thinkers of everyschool--the more so in view of the fact that the prodigious rapidity whichof late years has marked the advance both of physical and of speculativescience, has afforded highly valuable data for assisting us towards areasonable and, I think, a final decision as to the strictly logicalstanding of this important matter. However, be my attempt welcome or no, Ifeel that it is my obvious duty to publish the results which have beenyielded by an honest and careful analysis. § 2. I may most fitly begin this analysis by briefly disposing of sucharguments in favour of Theism as are manifestly erroneous. And I do thisthe more willingly because, as these arguments are at the present time mostin vogue, an exposure of their fallacies may perhaps deter our popularapologists of the future from drawing upon themselves the silent contemptof every reader whose intellect is not either prejudiced or imbecile. § 3. A favourite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolishingAtheism, Pantheism, Materialism, &c. , by successively calling upon them toexplain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that theneed of such an explanation is absent in the case of Theism--as though theattribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity thanwhen posited elsewhere. It is, I hope, unnecessary to observe that, so far as the ultimate mysteryof existence is concerned, any and every theory of things is equallyentitled to the inexplicable fact that something is; and that any endeavouron the part of the votaries of one theory to shift from themselves to thevotaries of another theory the _onus_ of explaining the necessarilyinexplicable, is an instance of irrationality which borders on theludicrous. § 4. Another argument, or semblance of an argument, is the very prevalentone, "Our heart requires a God; therefore it is probable that there is aGod:" as though such a subjective necessity, even if made out, could everprove an objective existence. [1] § 5. If it is said that the theistic aspirations of the human heart, by themere fact of their presence, point to the existence of a God as to theirexplanatory cause, I answer that the argument would only be valid after thepossibility of any more proximate causes having been in action has beenexcluded--else the theistic explanation violates the fundamental rule ofscience, the Law of Parcimony, or the law which forbids us to assume theaction of more remote causes where more proximate ones are found sufficientto explain the effects. Consequently, the validity of the argument nowunder consideration is inversely proportional to the number ofpossibilities there are of the aspirations in question being due to theagency of physical causes; and forasmuch as our ignorance of psychologicalcausation is well-nigh total, the Law of Parcimony forbids us to allow anydeterminate degree of logical value to the present argument. In otherwords, we must not use the absence of knowledge as equivalent to itspresence--must not argue from our ignorance of psychological possibilities, as though this ignorance were knowledge of corresponding impossibilities. The burden of proof thus lies on the side of Theism, and from the nature ofthe case this burden cannot be discharged until the science of psychologyshall have been fully perfected. I may add that, for my own part, I cannothelp feeling that, even in the present embryonic condition of this science, we are not without some indications of the manner in which the aspirationsin question arose; but even were this not so, the above considerationsprove that the argument before us is invalid. If it is retorted that thefact of these aspirations having had _proximate_ causes to account fortheir origin, even if made out, would not negative the inference of thesebeing due to a Deity as to their _ultimate_ cause; I answer that this isnot to use the argument from the presence of these aspirations; it ismerely to beg the question as to the being of a God. § 6. Next, we may consider the argument from consciousness. Many personsground their belief in the existence of a Deity upon a real or supposednecessity of their own subjective thought. I say "real or supposed, "because, in its bearing upon rational argument, it is of no consequence ofwhich character the alleged necessity actually is. Even if the necessity ofthought be real, all that the fact entitles the thinker to affirm is, thatit is impossible for _him_, by any effort of thinking, to rid himself ofthe persuasion that God exists; he is not entitled to affirm that thispersuasion is necessarily bound up with the constitution of the human mind. Or, as Mill puts it, "One man cannot by proclaiming with ever so muchconfidence that _he_ perceives an object, convince other people that theysee it too.... When no claim is set up to any peculiar gift, but we aretold that all of us are as capable of seeing what he sees, feeling what hefeels, nay, that we actually do so, and when the utmost effort of which weare capable fails to make us aware of what we are told, we perceive thissupposed universal faculty of intuition is but 'The Dark Lantern of the Spirit Which none see by but those who bear it. '" It is thus, I think, abundantly certain that the present argument must, from its very nature, be powerless as an argument to anyone save itsassertor; as a matter of fact, the alleged necessity of thought is notuniversal; it is peculiar to those who employ the argument. And now, it is but just to go one step further and to question whether thealleged necessity of thought is, in any case and properly speaking, a_real_ necessity. Unless those who advance the present argument are thevictims of some mental aberration, it is overwhelmingly improbable thattheir minds should differ in a fundamental and important attribute from theminds of the vast majority of their species. Or, to continue the abovequotation, "They may fairly be asked to consider, whether it is not morelikely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in theirminds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an impressionin theirs. " No doubt it is true that education and habits of thought may sostereotype the intellectual faculties, that at last what is conceivable toone man or generation may not be so to another;[2] but to adduce thisconsideration in this place would clearly be but to destroy the argumentfrom the _intuitive_ necessity of believing in a God. Lastly, although superfluous, it may be well to point out that even if theimpossibility of conceiving the negation of God were an universal law ofhuman mind--which it certainly is not--the fact of his existence could notbe thus proved. Doubtless it would be felt to be much more probable than itnow is--as probable, for instance, if not more probable, than is theexistence of an external world;--but still it would not be necessarilytrue. § 7. The argument from the general consent of mankind is so clearlyfallacious, both as to facts and principles, that I shall pass it over andproceed at once to the last of the untenable arguments--that, namely, fromthe existence of a First Cause. And here I should like to express myselfindebted to Mr. Mill for the following ideas:--"The cause of every changeis a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no newantecedent, there would be no new consequent. If the state of facts whichbrings the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for anindefinite duration, the effect also would have existed always or beenproduced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact ofcausation, within the sphere of experience, that the causes as well as theeffects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem, therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for afirst cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, asit exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a FirstCause. " The rest of Mr. Mill's remarks upon the First Cause argument are tolerablyobvious, and had occurred to me before the publication of his essay. Ishall, however, adhere to his order of presenting them. "But it is necessary to look more particularly into this matter, andanalyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind haveexperience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have abeginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had nobeginning, this permanent element may with some justice be termed a firstor universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself to causeanything, it enters as a con-cause into all causation. " He then shows that the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy supplies uswith such a datum, and thus the conclusion easily follows--"It would seem, then, that the only sense in which experience supports, in any shape, thedoctrine of a First Cause, viz. , as the primæval and universal element ofall causes, the First Cause can be no other than Force. " Still, however, it may be maintained that "all force is will-force. " But"if there be any truth in the doctrine of Conservation of Force, ... Thisdoctrine does not change from true to false when it reaches the field ofvoluntary agency. The will does not, any more than other agencies, createForce: granting that it originates motion, it has no means of doing so butby converting into that particular manifestation, a portion of Force whichalready existed in other forms. It is known that the source from which thisportion of Force is derived, is chiefly, or entirely, the force evolved inthe processes of chemical composition and decomposition which constitutethe body of nutrition: the force so liberated becomes a fund upon whichevery muscular and every nervous action, as of a train of thought, is adraft. It is in this sense only that, according to the best lights ofscience, volition is an originating cause. Volition, therefore, does notanswer to the idea of a First Cause; since Force must, in every instance, be assumed as prior to it; and there is not the slightest colour, derivedfrom experience, for supposing Force itself to have been created by avolition. As far as anything can be concluded from human experience, Forcehas all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated.... "All that can be affirmed (even) by the strongest assertion of the Freedomof the Will, is that volitions are themselves uncaused and are, therefore, alone fit to be the first or universal cause. But, even assuming volitionsto be uncaused, the properties of matter, so far as experience discloses, are uncaused also, and have the advantage over any particular volition, inbeing, so far as experience can show, eternal. Theism, therefore, in so faras it rests on the necessity of a First Cause, has no support fromexperience. " Such may be taken as a sufficient refutation of the argument that, as humanvolition is apparently a cause in nature, and moreover constitutes thebasis of our conception of all causation, therefore all causation isprobably volitional in character. But as this is a favourite argument withsome theists, I shall introduce another quotation from Mr. Mill, which istaken from a different work. "Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervousaction, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves. Though it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient andnot merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of theparticular phenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that cause;are we therefore to say with these writers that since we know of no otherefficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there _is_no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A moreoutrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because among theinfinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely, aparticular mode of action of certain nerves which has for its cause and, aswe are now supposing, for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; andbecause this is the only efficient cause of "which we are conscious, beingthe only one of which, in the nature of the case, we _can_ be conscious, since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justifyus in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind ofefficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarlyhuman or animal phenomenon?" It is then shown that a logical parallel tothis mode of inference is that of generalising from the one known instanceof the earth being inhabited, to the conclusion that "every heavenly bodywithout exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star, or nebula, isinhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things. " Afterwhich the passage continues, "It is true there are cases in which, withacknowledged propriety, we generalise from a single instance to a multitudeof instances. But they must be instances which resemble the one knowninstance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with it exceptthat of being instances.... But the supporters of the volition theory askus to infer that volition causes everything, for no other reason exceptthat it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon, far frombeing a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its lawsbearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, whetherof inorganic or of organic nature. "[3] * * * * * CHAPTER II. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. § 8. Leaving now the obviously untenable arguments, we next come to thosewhich, in my opinion, may properly be termed scientific. It will be convenient to classify those as three in number; and under oneor other of these heads nearly all the more intelligent advocates of Theismwill be found to range themselves. § 9. We have first the argument drawn from the existence of the human mind. This is an argument which, for at least the last three centuries, andespecially during the present one, has been more relied upon than any otherby philosophical thinkers. It consists in the reflection that the being ofour own subjective intelligence is the most certain fact which ourexperience supplies, that this fact demands an adequate cause for itsexplanation, and that the only adequate cause of our intelligence must besome other intelligence. Granting the existence of a conditionedintelligence (and no one could reasonably suppose his own intelligence tobe otherwise), and the existence of an unconditioned intelligence becomes alogical necessity, unless we deny either the validity of the principle thatevery effect must have an adequate cause, or else that the only adequatecause of Mind is Mind. It has been a great satisfaction to me to find that my examination of thisargument--an examination which was undertaken and completed several monthsbefore Mr. Mill's essay appeared--has been minutely corroborated by that ofour great logician. I mention this circumstance here, as on previousoccasions, not for the petty motive of vindicating my own originality, butbecause in matters of this kind the accuracy of the reasoning employed, andtherefore the logical validity of the conclusions attained, are guaranteedin the best possible manner, if the trains of thought have beenindependently pursued by different minds. § 10. Seeing that, among the advocates of this argument, Locke went so faras to maintain that by it alone he could render the existence of a Deity ascertain as any mathematical demonstration, it is only fair, preparatory toour examining this argument, to present it in the words of this greatthinker. He says:--"There was a time when there was no knowing (_i. E. _, conscious)being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also aknowing being from all eternity. If it be said, there was a time when nobeing had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of allunderstanding, I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever havebeen any knowledge: it being as impossible that things wholly void ofknowledge, and operating blindly, and without perception, should produce aknowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself threeangles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea ofsenseless matter, that it should put into itself, sense, perception, andknowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should putinto itself greater angles than two right ones. "[4] Now, although this argument has been more fully elaborated by otherwriters, the above presentation contains its whole essence. It will be seenthat it has the great advantage of resting _immediately_ upon thefoundation from which all argument concerning this or any other matter, must necessarily arise, viz. , --upon the very existence of our argumentativefaculty itself. For the sake of a critical examination, it is desirable tothrow the argument before us into the syllogistic form. It will then standthus:-- All known minds are caused by an unknown mind. Our mind is a known mind;therefore, our mind is caused by an unknown mind. § 11. Now the major premiss of this syllogism is inadmissible for tworeasons: in the first place, it is assumed that known mind can only becaused by unknown mind; and, in the second place, even if this assumptionwere granted, it would not explain the existence of Mind as Mind. To takethe last of these objections first, in the words of Mr. Mill, "If the mereexistence of Mind is supposed to require, as a necessary antecedent, another Mind greater and more powerful, the difficulty is not removed bygoing one step back: the creating mind stands as much in need of anothermind to be the source of its existence as the created mind. Be itremembered that we have no direct knowledge (at least apart fromRevelation) of a mind which is even apparently eternal, as Force and Matterare: an eternal mind is, as far as the present argument is concerned, asimple hypothesis to account for the minds which we know to exist. Now itis essential to an hypothesis that, if admitted, it should at least removethe difficulty and account for the facts. But it does not account for mindto refer our mind to a prior mind for its origin. The problem remainsunsolved, nay, rather increased. " Nevertheless, I think that it is open to a Theist to answer, "My object isnot to explain the existence of Mind in the abstract, any more than it ismy object to explain Existence itself in the abstract--to either of whichabsurd attempts Mr. Mill's reasoning would be equally applicable;--but Iseek for an explanation of _my own individual finite mind_, which I know tohave had a beginning in time, and which, therefore, in accordance with thewidest and most complete analogy that experience supplies, I believe tohave been _caused_. And if there is no other objection to my believing inIntelligence as the cause of my intelligence, than that I cannot prove myown intelligence caused, then I am satisfied to let the matter rest here;for as every argument must have _some_ basis of assumption to stand upon, Iam well pleased to find that the basis in this case is the most solid whichexperience can supply, viz. , --the law of causation. Fully admitting that itdoes not account for Mind (in the abstract) to refer one mind to a priormind for its origin; yet my hypothesis, if admitted, _does_ account for thefact that _my mind_ exists; and this is all that my hypothesis is intendedto cover. For to endeavour to _explain_ the existence of an _eternal_ mind, could only be done by those who do not understand the meaning of thesewords. " Now, I think that this reply to Mr. Mill, on the part of a theist, would sofar be legitimate; the theistic hypothesis _does_ supply a provisionalexplanation of the existence of known minds, and it is, therefore, anexplanation which, in lieu of a better, a theist may be allowed to retain. But a theist may not be allowed to confuse this provisional explanation ofhis own mind's existence with that of the existence of Mind in theabstract; he must not be allowed to suppose that, by thus hypotheticallyexplaining the existence of known minds, he is thereby establishing aprobability in favour of that hypothetical cause, an Unknown Mind. Only ifhe has some independent reason to infer that such an Unknown Mind exists, could such a probability be made out, and his hypothetical explanation ofknown mind become of more value than a guess. In other words, although thetheistic hypothesis supplies _a possible_ explanation of known mind, wehave no reason to conclude that it is _the true_ explanation, unless otherreasons can be shown to justify, on independent grounds, the validity ofthe theistic hypothesis. Hence it is manifestly absurd to adduce thisexplanation as evidence of the hypothesis on which it rests--to argue thatTheism must therefore be true; because we assume it to be so, in order toexplain _known_ mind, as distinguished from _Mind_. If it be answered, Weare justified in assuming Theism true, because we are justified in assumingthat known mind can _only_ have been caused by an unknown mind, and hencethat Mind must somewhere be self-existing, then this is to lead us to thesecond objection to the above syllogism. § 12. And this second objection is of a most serious nature. "Mind can onlybe caused by Mind, " and, therefore, Mind must either be uncaused, or causedby a Mind. What is our warrant for ranking this assertion? Where is theproof that nothing can have caused a mind except another mind? Answer tothis question there is none. For aught that we can ever know to thecontrary, anything within the whole range of the Possible may be competentto produce a self-conscious intelligence--and to assume that Mind is so faran entity _sui generis_, that it must either be self-existing, or derivedfrom another mind which is self-existing, is merely to beg the wholequestion as to the being of a God. In other words, if we can prove that theorder of existence to which Mind belongs, is so essentially different fromthat order, or those orders, to which all else belongs, as to render it_abstractedly impossible_ that the latter can produce the former--if we canprove this, we have likewise proved the existence of a Deity. But this isjust the point in dispute, and to set out with a bare affirmation of it ismerely to beg the question and to abandon the discussion. Doubtless, by themere act of consulting their own consciousness, the fact now in disputeappears to some persons self-evident. But in matters of such highabstraction as this, even the evidence of self-evidence must not be reliedupon too implicitly. To the country boor it appears self-evident that woodis annihilated by combustion; and even to the mind of the greatestphilosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt that the sun movedover a stationary earth. Much more, therefore, may our broad distinctionbetween "cogitative and incogitative being"[5] not be a distinction whichis "legitimated by the conditions of external reality. " Doubtless many will fall back upon the position already indicated, "It isas repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put intoitself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea ofa triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two rightones. " But, granting this, and also that conscious matter is the solealternative, and what follows? Not surely that matter cannot perceive, andfeel, and know, merely because it is repugnant to our idea of it that itshould. Granting that there is no other alternative in the wholepossibility of things, than that matter must be conscious, or thatself-conscious Mind must somewhere be self-existing; and granting that itis quite "impossible for us to conceive" of consciousness as an attributeof matter; still surely it would be a prodigious leap to conclude that forthis reason matter cannot possess this attribute. Indeed, Locke himselfelsewhere strangely enough insists that thought may be a property ofmatter, if only the Deity chose to unite that attribute with thatsubstance. Why it should be deemed abstractedly impossible for matter tothink if there is no God, and yet abstractedly possible that it shouldthink if there is a God, I confess myself quite unable to determine; but Iconceive that it is very important clearly to point out this peculiarity inLocke's views, for he is a favourite authority with theists, and thispeculiarity amounts to nothing less than a suicide of his entire argument. The mere circumstance that he assumed the Deity capable of endowing matterwith the faculty of thinking, could not have enabled him to _conceive_ ofmatter as thinking, any more than he could _conceive_ of this in theabsence of his assumption. Yet in the one case he recognises thepossibility of matter thinking, and in the other case denies suchpossibility, _and this on the sole ground of its being inconceivable_!However, I am not here concerned with Locke's eccentricities:[6] I ammerely engaged with the general principle, that a subjective inability toestablish certain relations in thought is no sufficient warrant forconcluding that corresponding objective relations may not obtain. § 13. Hence, an objector to the above syllogism need not be a materialist;it is not even necessary that he should hold any theory of things at all. Nevertheless, for the sake of definition, I shall assume that he is amaterialist. As a materialist, then, he would appear to be as much entitledto his hypothesis as a theist is to his--in respect, I mean, of thisparticular argument. For although I think, as before shown, that in strictreasoning a theist might have taken exception to the last-quoted passagefrom Mill in its connection with the law of causation, that passage, ifconsidered in the present connection, is certainly unanswerable. What isthe state of the present argument as between a materialist and a theist?The mystery of existence and the inconceivability of matter thinking aretheir common data. Upon these data the materialist, justly arguing that hehas no right to make his own conceptive faculty the unconditional test ofobjective possibility, is content to merge the mystery of his own mind'sexistence into that of Existence in general; while the theist, compelled toaccept without explanation the mystery of Existence in general, nevertheless has recourse to inventing a wholly gratuitous hypothesis toexplain one mode of existence in particular. If it is said that the latterhypothesis has the merit of causing the mystery of material existence andthe mystery of mental existence to be united in a thinkable manner--viz. , in a self-existing Mind, --I reply, It is not so; for in whatever degree itis unthinkable that Matter should be the cause of Mind, in that precisedegree must it be unthinkable that Mind was ever the cause of Matter, thecorrelatives being in each case the same, and experience affording noevidence of causality in either. § 14. The two hypotheses, therefore, are of exactly equivalent value, savethat while the one has a certain basis of fact to rest upon, [7] the otheris wholly arbitrary. But it may still be retorted, 'Is not that which is_most_ conceivable _most likely_ to be true? and if it is more conceivablethat my intelligence is caused by another Intelligence than that it iscaused by Non-intelligence, may I not regard the more conceivablehypothesis as also the more probable one? It is somewhat difficult to sayhow far this argument is, in this case, valid; only I think it is quiteevident that its validity is open to grave dispute. For nothing can be moreevident to a philosophical thinker than that the substance of Mind must--sofar at least as we can at present see--_necessarily_ be unknowable; so thatif Matter (and Force) be this substance, we should antecedently expect tofind that the actual causal connection should, in this particular case, bemore inconceivable than some imaginary one: it would be more natural forthe mind to infer that something conceivably more akin to itself should beits cause, than that this cause should be the entity which really givesrise to the unthinkable connection. But even waiving this reflection, andgranting that the above argument is _valid_, it is still to an indefinitedegree _valueless_, seeing that we are unable to tell _how much it is morelikely_ that the more conceivable should here be true than that the lessconceivable should be so. § 15. Returning then to Locke's comparison between the certainty of thisargument and that which proves the sum of the angles of a triangle to beequal to two right-angles, I should say that there is a _virtual_, thoughnot a _formal_, fallacy in his presentation. For mathematical science beingconfessedly but of relative significance, any comparison between the degreeof certainty attained by reasoning upon so transcendental a subject as thepresent, and that of mathematical demonstrations regarding relative truth, must be misleading. In the present instance, the whole strain of theargument comes upon the adequacy of the proposed test of truth, viz. , ourbeing able to conceive it if true. Now, will any one undertake to say thatthis test of truth is of equivalent value when it is applied to a triangleand when it is applied to the Deity. In the one case we are dealing with ageometrical figure of an exceedingly simple type, with which our experienceis well acquainted, and presenting a very limited number of relations forus to contemplate. In the other case we are endeavouring to deal with the_summum genus_ of all mystery, with reference to which experience is quiteimpossible, and which in its mention contains all the relations that are tous unknown and unknowable. Here, then, is the oversight. Because men findconceivability a valid test of truth in the affairs of everyday life--as itis easy to show _à priori_ that it must be, if our experience has beenformed under a given code of constant and general laws--therefore theyconclude that it must be equally valid _wherever_ it is applied; forgettingthat its validity must perforce decrease in proportion to the distance atwhich the test is applied from the sphere of experience. [8] § 16. Upon the whole, then, I think it is transparently obvious that themere fact of our being unable to conceive, say, how any disposition ofmatter and motion could possibly give rise to a self-consciousintelligence, in no wise warrants us in concluding that for this reason nosuch disposition is possible. The only question would appear to be, whetherthe test which is here proposed as an unconditional criterion of truthshould be allowed any the smallest degree of credit. Seeing, on the onehand, how very fallible the test in question is known to have proved itselfin many cases of much less speculative difficulty--seeing, too, that evennow "the philosophy of the condition proves that things there are whichmay, nay must, be true, of which nevertheless the mind is unable toconstrue to itself the possibility;"[9] and seeing, on the other hand, thatthe substance of Mind, whatever it is, must necessarily beunknowable;--seeing these things, if any question remains as to whether thetest of inconceivability should in this case be regarded as having anydegree of validity at all, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt thatsuch degree should be regarded as of the smallest. § 17. Let us then turn to the other considerations which have been supposedto justify the assertion that nothing can have caused our mind save anotherMind. Neglecting the crushing fact that "it does not account for Mind torefer it to another Mind for its origin, " let as see what positive reasonsthere are for concluding that no other influence than Intelligence canpossibly have produced our intelligence. § 18. First we may notice the argument which is well and tersely presentedby Locke, thus:--"Whatsoever is first of all things must necessarilycontain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that canever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that ithath not actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarilyfollows that the first eternal being cannot be Matter. " Now, as thispresentation is strictly formal, I shall first meet it with a formal reply, and this reply consists in a direct contradiction. It is simply untrue that"whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, andactually have, at least, all the perfections that can after exist;" or thatit can never "give to another any perfection that it hath not actually initself. " In a sense, no doubt, a cause contains all that is contained inits effects; the latter content being _potentially_ present in the former. But to say that a cause already contains _actually_ all that its effectsmay afterwards so contain, is a statement which logic and common sensealike condemn as absurd. Nevertheless, although the argument now before us thus admits of achildishly easy refutation on strictly formal grounds, I suspect that insubstance the argument in a general way is often relied upon as one of veryconsiderable weight. Even though it is clearly illogical to say that causescannot give to their effects any perfection which they themselves do notactually present, yet it seems in a general way incredible that grossmatter could contain, even potentially, the faculty of thinking. Nevertheless, this is but to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability;to do which, even were it here legitimate, would, as we have seen, beunavailing. But to appeal to the argument from Inconceivability in thiscase would _not_ be legitimate; for we are in possession of an abundantanalogy to render the supposition in question, not only conceivable, butcredible. In the words of Mr. Mill, "Apart from experience, and arguing onwhat is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seemsto be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious orelevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the knownanalogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, arethe vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which, and bythe properties of which, they are raised up! The tendency of all recentspeculation is towards the opinion that the development of inferior ordersof existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration, andhigher organisation for lower, is the general rule of nature. Whether thisis so or not, there are at least in nature a multitude of facts bearingthat character, and this is sufficient for the argument. " § 19. We now come to the last of the arguments which, so far as I know, have ever been adduced in support of the assertion that there can be noother cause of our intelligence than another and superior Intelligence. Theargument is chiefly remarkable for the very great prominence which wasgiven to it by Sir W. Hamilton. This learned and able author says:--"The Deity is not an object ofimmediate contemplation; as existing and in himself, he is beyond ourreach; we can know him only mediately through his works, and are onlywarranted in assuming his existence as a certain kind of cause necessary toaccount for a certain state of things, of whose reality our faculties aresupposed to inform us. The affirmation of a God being thus a regressiveinference from the existence of a special class of effects to the existenceof a special character of cause, it is evident that the whole argumenthinges on the fact, --Does a state of things really exist such as is onlypossible through the agency of a Divine Cause? For if it can be shown thatsuch a state of things does not really exist, then our inference to thekind of cause requisite to account for it is necessarily null. "This being understood, I now proceed to show you that the class ofphænomena which requires that kind of cause we denominate a Deity isexclusively given in the phænomena of mind, --that the phænomena of mattertaken by themselves, (you will observe the qualification taken bythemselves) so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation. "If, in man, intelligence be a free power, --in so far as its libertyextends, intelligence must be independent of necessity and matter; and apower independent of matter necessarily implies the existence of animmaterial subject, --that is, a spirit. If, then, the original independenceof intelligence on matter in the human constitution, in other words, if thespirituality of mind in man be supposed a datum of observation, in thisdatum is also given both the condition and the proof of a God. For we haveonly to infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence holds thesame relative supremacy in the universe which it holds in us, and the firstpositive condition of a Deity is established in the establishment of theabsolute priority of a free creative intelligence. "[10] § 20. Thus, according to Sir W. Hamilton, the whole question as to thebeing of a God depends upon that as to whether our "intelligence be a freepower, "--or, as he elsewhere states it himself, "Theology is whollydependent upon Psychology, for with the proof of the moral nature of manstands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity. " It will be observedthat I am not at present engaged with the legitimacy of this author'sdecision upon the comparative merits of the different arguments in favourof Theism: I am merely showing the high opinion he entertained of theparticular argument before us. He positively affirms that, unless thefreedom of the human will be a matter of experience, Atheism is the solealternative. Doubtless most well-informed readers will feel that thesolitary basis thus provided for Theism is a very insecure one, while manysuch readers will at once conclude that if this is the only basis whichreason can provide for Theism to stand upon, Theism is without any rationalbasis to stand upon at all. I have no hesitation in saying that thelast-mentioned opinion is the one to which I myself subscribe, for I amquite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with themost moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself toembrace the theory of Free-will. I may add that I cannot but believe thatthose who do embrace this theory with an honest conviction, must havefailed to understand the issue to which modern thought has reduced thequestion. Here, however, is not the place to discuss this question. It willbe sufficient for my purpose to show that even Sir W. Hamilton himselfconsidered it a very difficult one; and although he thought upon the wholethat the will must be free, he nevertheless allowed--nay, insisted--that hewas unable to conceive how it could be so. Such inability in itself doesnot of course show the Free-will theory to be untrue; and I merely pointout the circumstance that Hamilton allowed the supposed fact unthinkable, in order to show how very precarious, even in his eyes, the argument whichwe are considering must have appeared. Let us then, for this purpose, contemplate his attitude with regard to it a little more closely. He says, "It would have been better to show articulately that Liberty and Necessityare both incomprehensible, as beyond the limits of legitimate thought; butthat though the Free-agency of Man cannot be speculatively proved, soneither can it be speculatively disproved; while we may claim for it as afact of real actuality, though of inconceivable possibility, the testimonyof consciousness, that we are morally free, as we are morally accountablefor our actions. In this manner the whole question of free- and bond-willis in theory abolished, leaving, however, practically our Liberty, and allthe moral instincts of Man entire. "[11] From this passage it is clear that Sir W. Hamilton regarded these twocounter-theories as of precisely equivalent value in everything save "thetestimony of consciousness;" or, as he elsewhere states it, "as equallyunthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thustheoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the morallaw ... Gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over thedoctrine of fate. " But the whole question concerning the freedom of the will has now come tobe as to whether or not consciousness _does_ give its verdict on the sideof freedom. Supposing we grant that "we are warranted to rely on adeliverance of consciousness, when that deliverance is _that_ a thing is, although we may be unable to think _how_ it can be, "[12] in this case thequestion still remains, whether our opponents have rightly interpreted thedeliverance of their consciousness. I, for one, am quite persuaded that Inever perform any action without some appropriate motive, or set ofmotives, having induced me to perform it. However, I am not discussing thisquestion, and I have merely made the above quotations for the purpose ofshowing that Sir W. Hamilton appears to identify the _theory_ of Free-willwith the _fact_ that we possess a moral sense. He argues throughout asthough the theory he advocates were the only one that can explain a given"fact of real actuality. " But no one with whom we have to deal questionsthe fact of our having a moral sense; and to identify this "deliverance ofconsciousness" with belief in the theory that volitions are uncaused, is, or would now be, merely to abandon the only questions in dispute. It is very instructive, from this point of view, to observe the dilemmainto which Hamilton found himself driven by this identification of genuinefact with spurious theory. He believed that the fact of man possessing anethical faculty could only be explained by the theory that man's will wasnot determined by motives; for otherwise man could not be the author of hisown actions. But when he considered the matter in its other aspect, hefound that his theory of Free-will was as little compatible with moralresponsibility as was the opposing theory of "Bond-will;" for not only didhe candidly confess that he could not conceive of will as acting withoutmotives, but he further allowed the unquestionable truth "that, thoughinconceivable, a motiveless volition would, if conceived, be conceived asmorally worthless. "[13] I say this is very instructive, because it showsthat in Hamilton's view each theory was alike irreconcilable with "thedeliverance of consciousness, " and that he only chose the one in preferenceto the other, because, although not any more conceivable a solution, itseemed to him a more possible one. [14] § 21. Such, then, is the speculative basis on which, according to Sir W. Hamilton, our belief in a Deity can alone be grounded. Those who at the present day are still confused enough in their notionsregarding the Free-will question to suppose that any further rationalquestion remains, may here be left to ruminate over this _bolus_, and todraw from it such nourishment as they can in support of their belief in aGod; but to those who can see as plainly as daylight that the doctrine ofDeterminism not only harmonises with all the facts of observation, butalone affords a possible condition for, and a satisfactory explanation of, the existence of our ethical faculty, --to such persons the question willnaturally arise:--"Although Hamilton was wrong in identifying a known factwith a false theory, yet may he not have been right in the deductions whichhe drew from the fact?" In other words, granting that his theory ofFree-will was wrong, does not his argument from the existence of a moralsense in man to the existence of a moral Governor of the Universe remain asintact as ever? Now, it is quite true that whatever degree of cogency theargument from the presence of the moral sense may at any time have had, this degree remains unaffected by the explosion of erroneous theories toaccount for such presence. We have, therefore, still to face the fact thatthe moral sense of man undoubtedly exists. § 22. The question we have to determine is, What evidence have we to showthat the moral part of man was created in the image of God; and if there isany such evidence, what counter-existence is there to show that the moralexistence of man may be due to natural causes? In deciding this question, just as in deciding any other question of a purely scientific character, wemust be guided in our examination by the Law of Parcimony; we must notassume the agency of supernatural causes if we can discover the agency ofnatural causes; neither must we merge the supposed mystery directly intothe highest mystery, until we are quite sure that it does not admit ofbeing proximately explained by the action of proximate influences. Now, whether or not Mr. Darwin's theory as to the origin and development ofthe moral sense be considered satisfactory, there can, I think, be verylittle doubt in any impartial mind which duly considers the subject, thatin _some way or other_ the moral sense has been evolved. The body ofscientific evidence which has now been collected in favour of the generaltheory of evolution is simply overwhelming; and in the presence of so largean analogy, it would require a vast amount of contradictory evidence toremove the presumption that human conscience, like everything else, hasbeen evolved. Now, for my own part, I am quite unable to distinguish anysuch evidence, while, on the other hand, in support of the _à priori_presumption that conscience has been evolved, I cannot conceal from myselfthat there is a large amount of _à posteriori_ confirmation. I am quiteunable to distinguish anything in my sense of right and wrong which Icannot easily conceive to have been brought about during the evolution ofmy intelligence from lower forms of psychical life. On the contrary, everything that I can find in my sense of right and wrong is precisely whatI should expect to find on the supposition of this sense having beenmoulded by the progressive requirements of social development. Read in thelight of evolution, Conscience, in its every detail, is deductivelyexplained. And, as though there were not sufficient evidence of this kind to justifythe conclusion drawn from the theory of evolution, the doctrine ofutilitarianism--separately conceived and separately worked out onaltogether independent grounds--the doctrine of utilitarianism comes inwith irresistible force to confirm that _à priori_ conclusion by the widestand most unexceptionable of inductions. [15] In the supernatural interpretation of the facts, the whole stress of theargument comes upon the character of conscience as a _spontaneouslyadmonishing influence which acts independently of our own volition_. For itis from this character alone that the inference can arise that conscienceis the delegate of the will of another. Thus, to render the whole argumentin the singularly beautiful words of Dr. Newman:--"If, as is the case, wefeel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened at transgressing the voiceof conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doingwrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms uson hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming serenityof mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight, which follows on onereceiving praise from a father, --we certainly have within us the image ofsome person to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we findour happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, inwhose anger we waste away. These feelings in us are such as require fortheir exciting cause an intelligent being; we are not affectionate towardsa stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorseor compunction in breaking mere human law. Yet so it is; conscience emitsall these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and, on the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, aresignation, and a hope which there is no sensible, no earthly object toelicit. 'The wicked flees when no one pursueth;' then why does he flee?whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in thehidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does notbelong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception isdirected must be supernatural and divine; and thus the phenomena ofconscience as a dictate avail to impress the imagination with the pictureof a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive. "[16] Now I have quoted this passage because it seems to me to convey in aconcise form the whole of the argument from Conscience. But how tremendousare the inferences which are drawn from the facts! As the first step in ourcriticism, it is necessary to point out that two very different orders offeelings are here treated by Dr. Newman. There is first the pure oruncompounded ethical feelings, which spring directly from the moral sensealone, and which all men experience in varying degrees. And next there arewhat we may term the _ethico-theological_ feelings, which can only springfrom a blending of the moral sense with a belief in a personal God, orother supernatural agents. The former class of feelings, or theuncompounded ethical class, have exclusive reference to the moralobligations that subsist between ourselves and other human beings, orsentient organisms. The latter class of feelings, or the ethico-theologicalclass, have reference to the moral obligations that are believed to subsistbetween ourselves and the Deity, or other supernatural beings. Now, inorder not to lose sight of this all-important distinction, I shallcriticise Dr. Newman's rendering of the ordinary argument from Consciencein each of these two points of views separately. To begin, then, with theuncompounded ethical feelings. Such emotions as attend the operation of conscience in those who follow itslight alone without any theories as to its supernatural origin, are all ofthe character of _reasonable_ or _explicable_ emotions. Granting thatfellow-feeling has been for the benefit of the race, and therefore that ithas been developed by natural causes, certainly there is nothing_mysterious_ in the emotions that attend the violating or the following ofthe dictates of conscience. For conscience is, by this naturalisticsupposition, nothing more than an organised body of certain psychologicalelements, which, by long inheritance, have come to inform us, by way ofintuitive feeling, how we should act for the interests of society; so that, if this hypothesis is correct, there cannot be anything more mysterious orsupernatural in the working of conscience than there is in the working ofany of our other faculties. That the disagreeable feeling of_self-reproach_, as distinguished from _religious_ feeling, should followupon a violation of such an organized body of psychological elements, cannot be thought surprising, if it is remembered that one of theseelements is natural fellow-feeling, and the others the elements which leadus to know directly that we have violated the interests of other persons. And as regards the mere fact that the working of conscience is independentof the will, surely this is not more than we find, in varying degrees, tobe true of all our emotions; and conscience, according to the evolutiontheory, has its root in the emotions. Hence, it is no more an argument tosay that the irrepressible character of conscience refers us to a God ofmorality, than it would be to say that the sometimes resistless force ofthe ludicrous refers us to a god of laughter. Love, again, is an emotionwhich cannot be subdued by volition, and in its tendency to persist bearsjust such a striking resemblance to the feelings of morality as we shouldexpect to find on the supposition of the former having played an importantpart in the genesis of the latter. The _dictating_ character of conscience, therefore, is clearly in itself of no avail as pointing to a superhumanDictator. Thus, for example, to take Dr. Newman's own illustration, whyshould we feel such tearful, broken-hearted sorrow on intentionally orcarelessly hurting a mother? We see no shadow of a reason for resorting toany supernatural hypothesis to explain the fact--love between mother andoffspring being an essential condition to the existence of higher animals. Yet this is a simple case of truly conscientious feeling, where the thoughtof any _personal_ cause of conscience _need_ not be entertained, and iscertainly not necessary to explain the effects. And similarly with _all_cases of conscientious feeling, _except in cases where it refers directlyto its supposed author_. But these latter cases, or the ethico-theologicalclass of feelings, are in no way surprising. If the moral sense has had anatural genesis in the actual relations between man and man, as soon as anideal "image" of "a holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive" God isfirmly believed to have an objective existence, as a matter of course moralfeelings must become transferred to the relations which are believed toobtain between ourselves and this most holy God. Indeed, it is these veryfeelings which, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must beconcluded, in accordance with the law of parcimony, to have _generated_this idea of God as "holy, just, " and good. And the mere fact that, whenthe complex system of religious belief has once been built up, conscienceis strongly wrought upon by that belief and its accompanying emotions, issurely a fact the very reverse of mysterious. Suppose, for the sake ofargument, that the moral sense has been evolved from the social feelings, and should we not certainly expect that, when the belief in a moral andall-seeing God is superadded, conscience should be distracted at thethought of offending him, and experience a "soothing, satisfactory delight"in the belief that we are pleasing him? And as to the argument, "Why doesthe wicked flee when none pursueth? whence his terror?" the question admitsof only too easy an answer. Indeed, the form into which the question isthrown would almost seem--were it not written by Dr. Newman--to imply asarcastic reference to the power of superstition. "Who is it that, " notonly Dr. Newman, but the haunted savage, the mediæval sorcerer, or thefrightened child, "sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers ofhis heart?" Who but the "image" of his own thought? "If the cause of theseemotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which hisperception is directed must be supernatural and divine. " Assuredly; butwhat an inference from what an assumption! Whether or not the moral sensehas been developed by natural causes, "these emotions" of terror at thethought of offending beings "supernatural and divine" are not of suchunique occurrence "in the visible world" as to give Dr. Newman the monopolyof his particular "Object. " With a deeper meaning, therefore, than heintends may we repeat, "The phenomena of conscience as a dictate _avail_ toimpress the _imagination_ with the _picture_ of a Supreme Governor. " Butcriticism here is positively painful. Let it be enough to say that those ofus who do not already believe in any such particular "Object"--be it ghost, shape, demon, or deity--are strangers, utter and complete, to any suchsupernatural pursuers. The fact, therefore, of these various religiousemotions being associated with conscience in the minds of theists, can initself be no proof of Theism, seeing that it is the theory of Theism whichitself _engenders_ these emotions; those who do not believe in this theoryexperiencing none of these feelings of personal dread, responsibility to anunknown God, and the feelings of doing injury to, or of receiving praisefrom, a parent. To such of us the violation of conscience is its ownpunishment, as the pursuit of virtue is its own reward. For we know thatnot more certainly than fire will burn, any violation of the deeply-rootedfeelings of our humanity will leave a gaping wound which even time may notalways heal. And when it is shown us that our natural dread of fire is dueto a supernatural cause, we may be prepared to entertain the argument thatour natural dread of sin, as distinguished from our dread of God, islikewise due to such a cause. But until this can be done we must, asreasonable men, _whose minds have been trained in the school of nature_, forbear to allow that the one fact is of any greater cogency than theother, so far as the question of a supernatural cause of either isconcerned. For, as we have already seen, the law of parcimony forbids us toascribe "the phenomena of conscience as a dictate" to a supernatural cause, until the science of psychology shall have proved that they cannot havebeen due to natural causes. But, as we have also seen, the science ofpsychology is now beginning, as quick and thoroughly as can be expected, toprove the very converse; so that the probability is now overwhelming thatour moral sense, like all our other faculties, has been evolved. Therefore, while the burden of proof really lies on the side of Theism--or with thosewho account for the natural phenomena of conscience by the hypothesis of asupernatural origin--this burden is now being rapidly discharged by theopposite side. That is to say, while the proofs which are now beginning tosubstantiate the naturalistic hypothesis are all in full accord with theordinary lines of scientific explanations, the vague and feeble reflectionsof those who still maintain that Conscience is evidence of Deity, are allsuch as run counter to the very truisms of scientific method. In the face of all the facts, therefore, I find it impossible to recogniseas valid any inference which is drawn from the existence of our moral senseto the existence of a God; although, of course, all inferences drawn fromthe existence of our moral sense to the _character_ of a God alreadybelieved to exist remain unaffected by the foregoing considerations. [17] * * * * * CHAPTER III. THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. § 23. The argument from Design, as presented by Mill, is merely aresuscitation of it as presented by Paley. True it is that the logicalpenetration of the former enabled him to perceive that the latter had "putthe case much too strongly;" although, even here, he has failed to seewherein Paley's error consisted. He says:--"If I found a watch on anapparently desolate island, I should indeed infer that it had been leftthere by a human being; but the inference would not be from the marks ofdesign, but because I already know by direct experience that watches aremade by men. " Now I submit that this misses the whole point of Paley'smeaning; for it is evident that there would be no argument at all unlessthis author be understood to say what he clearly enough expresses, viz. , that the evidence of design supposed to be afforded by the watch issupposed to be afforded by examination of its mechanism only, and not byany previous knowledge as to how that particular mechanism called a watchis made. Paley, I take it, only chose a watch for his example because heknew that no reader would dispute the fact that watches are constructed bydesign: except for the purpose of pointing out that mechanism is in somecases admitted to be due to intelligence, for all the other purposes of hisargument he might as well have chosen for his illustration any case ofmechanism occurring in nature. What the real fallacy in Paley's argumentis, is another question, and this I shall now endeavour to answer; for, asMill's argument is clearly the same in kind as that of Paley and hisnumberless followers, in examining the one I am also examining the other. § 24. In nature, then, we see innumerable examples of apparent design: arethese of equal value in testifying to the presence of a designingintelligence as are similar examples of human contrivance, and if not, whynot? The answer to the first of these questions is patent. If such exampleswere of the same value in the one case as they are in the other, theexistence of a Deity would be, as Paley appears to have thought it was, demonstrated by the fact. A brief and yet satisfactory answer to the secondquestion is not so easy, and we may best approach it by assuming theexistence of a Deity. If, then, there is a God, it by no means follows thatevery apparent contrivance in nature is an actual contrivance, in the samesense as is any human contrivance. The eye of a vertebrated animal, forinstance, exhibits as much apparent design as does a watch; but no one--atthe present day, at least--will undertake to affirm that the evidence ofdivine thought furnished by one example is as conclusive as is the evidenceof human thought furnished by the other--and this even assuming a Deity toexist. Why is this? The reason, I think, is, that we know by our personalexperience what are our own relations to the material world, and to thelaws which preside over the action of physical forces; while we can have nocorresponding knowledge of the relations subsisting between the Deity andthese same objects of our own experience. Hence, to suppose that the Deityconstructed the eye by any such process of thought as we know that menconstruct watches, is to make an assumption not only incapable of proof, but destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. Take an example. Therelation in which a bee stands to the external world is to a large extent amatter of observation, and, therefore, no one imagines that the formationof its scientifically-constructed cells is due to any profound study on thebee's part. Whatever the origin of the cell-making instinct may have been, its nature is certainly not the same as it would have been in man, supposing him to have had occasion to construct honeycombs. It may be saidthat the requisite calculations have been made for the bees by the Deity;but, even if this assumption were true, it would be nothing to the point, which is merely that even within the limits of the animal kingdom therelations of intelligence to the external world are so diverse, that thesame results may be accomplished by totally different intellectualprocesses. And as this example is parallel to the case on which we areengaged in everything save the _observability_ of the relations involved, it supplies us with the exact measure of the probability we are trying toestimate. Hence it is evident that so long as we remain ignorant of theelement essential to the argument from design in its Paleyerian form--viz. , knowledge or presumption of the relations subsisting between anhypothetical Deity and his creation--so long must that argument remain, notonly unassignably weak, but incapable of being strengthened by any numberof examples similar in kind. § 25. To put the case in another way. The root fallacy in Paley's argumentconsisted in reasoning from a particular to an universal. Because he knewthat design was the cause of adaptation in some cases, and because thephenomena of life exhibited more instances of adaptation than any otherclass of phenomena in nature, he pointed to these phenomena as affording anexceptional kind of proof of the presence in nature of intelligent agency. Yet, if it is admitted--and of this, even in Paley's days, there was astrong analogical presumption--that the phenomena of life are throughouttheir history as much subject to law as are any other phenomenawhatsoever, --that the method of the divine government, supposing such toexist, is the same here as elsewhere; then nothing can be clearer than thatany amount of observable adaptation of means to ends within this class ofphenomena cannot afford any different kind of evidence of _design_ than isafforded by any other class of phenomena whatsoever. Either we know therelations of the Deity to his creation, or we do not. If we do, then wemust know whether or not _every_ physical change which occurs in accordancewith law--_i. E. _, every change occurring within experience, and so, untilcontrary evidence is produced, presumably every change occurring beyondexperience--was separately planned by the Deity. If we do not, then we haveno more reason to suppose that any one set of physical changes rather thananother has been separately planned by him, unless we could point (as Paleyvirtually pointed) to one particular set of changes and assert, These arenot subject to the same method of divine government which we observeelsewhere, or, in other words, to law. If it is retorted that _in some wayor other_ all these wonderful adaptations must ultimately have been due tointelligence, this is merely to shift the argument to a ground which weshall presently have to consider: all we are now engaged upon is to showthat we have no right to found arguments on the assumed _mode_, _manner_, or _process_ by which the supposed intelligence is thought to haveoperated. We can here see, then, more clearly where Paley stumbled. Hevirtually assumed that the relations subsisting between the Deity and theuniverse were such, that the exceptional adaptations met with in theorganised part of the latter cannot have been due to the same intellectual_processes_ as was the rest of the universe--or that, if they were, stillthey yielded better evidence of having been due to these processes thandoes the rest of the universe. And it is easy to perceive that his errorarose from his pre-formed belief in special creation. So long as a manregards every living organism which he sees as the lineal descendant of aprecisely similar organism originally struck out by the immediate fiat ofDeity, so long is he justified in holding his axiom, "Contrivance must havehad a contriver. " For "adaptation" then becomes to our minds the synonym of"contrivance"--it being utterly inconceivable that the numberlessadaptations found in any living organism could have resulted in any otherway than by intelligent contrivance, at the time when this organism was inthe first instance _suddenly_ introduced into its complex conditions oflife. Still, as an argument, this is of course merely reasoning in acircle: we adopt a hypothesis which presupposes the existence of a Deity asthe first step in the proof of his existence. I do not say that Paleycommitted this error expressly, but merely that if it had not been for hispre-formed conviction as to the truth of the special-creation theory, hewould probably not have written his "Natural Theology. " § 26. Thus let us take a case of his own choosing, and the one which isadduced by him as typical of "the application of the argument. " "I know ofno better method of introducing so large a subject than that of comparing asingle thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with a telescope. Asfar as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the sameproof that the eye was made for vision as there is that the telescope wasmade for assisting it. They are both made upon the same principles, bothbeing adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of raysof light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves;but these laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted tothem. For instance: these laws require, in order to produce the sameeffect, that the rays of light, in passing through water into the eye, should be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of airinto the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part ofit called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrialanimals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than thisdifference?" But what, let us ask, is the proximate cause of thisdifference? 'The immediate volition of the Deity, manifested in specialcreation, ' virtually answers Paley; while we of to-day are able to reply, 'The agency of natural laws, to wit, inheritance, variation, survival ofthe fittest, and probably of other laws as yet not discovered. ' Now, ofcourse, according to the former of these two premises, there can be no morelegitimate conclusion than that the difference in question is due tointelligent and special design; but, according to the other premise, it isequally clear that no conclusion can be more unwarranted; for, under thelatter view, the greater rotundity of the crystalline lens in a fish's eyeno more exhibits the presence of any special design than does theadaptation of a river to the bed which it has itself been the means ofexcavating. When, therefore, Paley goes on to ask:--"How is it possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation ofequal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the case of the eye, yet toacknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainestand clearest of all propositions, in the case of the telescope?" the answeris sufficiently obvious, namely, that the "evidence" in the two cases is_not_ "equal;"--any more than is the existence, say, of the Nile of equalvalue in point of evidence that it was designed for traffic, as is theexistence of the Suez Canal that it was so designed. And the mere fact thatthe problem of achromatism was solved by "the mind of a sagacious opticianinquiring how this matter was managed in the eye, " no more proves that"this could not be in the eye without purpose, which suggested to theoptician the only effectual means of attaining that purpose, " than wouldthe fact, say, of the winnowing of corn having suggested thefanning-machine prove that air currents were designed for the purpose ofeliminating chaff from grain. In short, the real substance of the argumentfrom Design must eventually merge into that which Paley, in theabove-quoted passage, expressly passes over--viz. , "the origin of the lawsthemselves;" for so long as there is any reason to suppose that anyapparent "adaptation" to a certain set of "fixed laws" is itself due to theinfluence of other "fixed laws, " so long have we as little right to saythat the latter set of fixed laws exhibit any better indications ofintelligent adaptation to the former set, than the former do to that of thelatter--the eye to light, than light to the eye. Hence I conceive that Millis entirely wrong when he says of Paley's argument, "It surpasses analogyexactly as induction surpasses it, " because "the instances chosen areparticular instances of a circumstance which experience shows to have areal connection with an intelligent origin--the fact of conspiring to anend. " Experience shows as this, but it shows us more besides; it shows usthat there is no _necessary_ or _uniform_ connection between an"intelligent origin" and the fact of apparent "means conspiring to an[apparent] end. " If the reader will take the trouble to compare thisquotation just made from Mill, and the long train of reasoning thatfollows, with an admirable illustration in Mr. Wallace's "NaturalSelection, " he will be well rewarded by finding all the steps in Mr. Mill'sreasoning so closely paralleled by the caricature, that but for therespective dates of publication, one might have thought the latter had anexpress reference to the former. [18] True, Mr. Mill closes his argumentwith a brief allusion to the "principle of the survival of the fittest, "observing that "creative forethought is not absolutely the only link bywhich the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connectedwith the fact of sight. " I am surprised, however, that a man of Mr. Mill'spenetration did not see that whatever view we may take as to "the adequacyof this principle (_i. E. _, Natural Selection) to account for such trulyadmirable combinations as some of those in nature, " the argument from_Design_ is not materially affected. So far as this argument is concerned, the issue is not Design _versus_ Natural Selection, but it is Design_versus_ Natural Law. By all means, "leaving this remarkable speculation(_i. E. _, Mr. Darwin's) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may havein store for it, " and it by no means follows that "in the present state ofknowledge the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probabilityin favour of creation by intelligence. " For whatever we may think of thisspecial theory as to the _mode_, there can be no longer any reasonabledoubt, "in the present state of our knowledge, " as to the truth of thegeneral theory of _Evolution_; and the latter, if accepted, is asdestructive to the argument from _Design_ as would the former be if proved. In a word, it is the _fact_ and not the _method_ of Evolution which issubversive of Teleology in its Paleyerian form. § 27. We have come then to this:--Apparent intellectual adaptations areperfectly valid indications of design, so long as their authorship is knownto be confined to human intelligence; for then we know from experience whatare our relations to these laws, and so in any given case can argue _àposteriori_ that such an adaptation to such a set of laws by such anintelligence can only have been due to such a process. But when we overstepthe limits of experience, we are not entitled to argue anything _à priori_of any other intelligence in this respect, even supposing any suchintelligence to exist. The analogy by which the unknown relations areinferred from the known is "infinitely precarious;" seeing that two of theanalogous terms--to wit, the divine intelligence and the human--may differto an immeasurable extent in their properties--nay, are supposed thus todiffer, the one being supposed omniscient, omnipotent, &c. , and the othernot. And, as a final step, we may now see that the argument from Design, inits last resort, resolves itself into a _petitio principii_. For, ultimately, the only point which the analogical argument in question isadduced to prove is, that the relations subsisting between an Unknown Causeand certain physical forces are so far identical with the relations knownto subsist between human intelligence and these same forces, that similarintellectual processes are required in the two cases to account for theproduction of similar effects--and hence that the Unknown Cause isintelligent. But it is evident that the analogy itself can have noexistence, except upon the presupposition that these two sets of relations_are_ thus identical. The point which the analogy is adduced to prove istherefore postulated by the fact of its being adduced at all, and the wholeargument resolves itself into a case of _petitio principii_. * * * * * CHAPTER IV. THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS. § 28. Turning now to an important error of Mr. Mill's in respect ofomission, I firmly believe that all competent writers who have everundertaken to support the argument from Design, have been moved to do so bytheir instinctive appreciation of the much more important argument, whichMill does not mention at all and which we now proceed to consider--theargument from General Laws. That is to say, I cannot think that any onecompetent writer ever seriously believed, had he taken time to analyse hisbeliefs, that the cogency of his argument lay in assuming any knowledgeconcerning the _process_ of divine thought; he must have really believedthat it lay entirely in his observation of the _product_ of divinethought--or rather, let us say, of divine intelligence. Now this is thewhole difference between the argument from Design and the argument fromGeneral Laws. The argument from Design says, There must be a God, becausesuch and such an organic structure must have been due to such and such anintellectual _process_. The argument from General Laws says, There must bea God, because such and such an organic structure must _in some way orother have been ultimately due to_ intelligence. Nor does this argument endhere. Not only must such and such an organic structure have been ultimatelydue to intelligence, but every such structure--nay, every phenomenon in theuniverse--must have been the same; for all phenomena are alike subject tothe same method of sequence. The argument is thus a cumulative one; for asthere is no single known exception to this universal mode of existence, theunited effect of so vast a body of evidence is all but irresistible, andits tendency is clearly to point us to some _one_ explanatory cause. Thescope of this argument is therefore co-extensive with the universe; itdraws alike upon all phenomena with which experience is acquainted. Forinstance, it contains all the phenomena covered by the Design argument, just as a genus contains any one of its species; it being manifest, fromwhat was said in the last section, that if the general doctrine ofEvolution is accepted, the argument from Design must of necessity mergeinto that from General Laws. And this wide basis, we may be sure, must bethe most legitimate one whereon to rest an argument in favour of Theism. Ifthere is any such thing as such an argument at all, the most unassailablefield for its display must be the universe as a whole, seeing that if weseparate any one section of the universe from the rest, and suppose that wehere discover a different kind of testimony to intelligence from that whichwe can discover elsewhere, we may from analogy be abundantly sure that onthe confines of our division there must be second causes and general lawsat work (whether discoverable or not), which are the immediate agents inthe production of the observed results. Of course I do not deny that someclasses of phenomena afford us more and better proofs of intellectualagency than do others, in the sense of the laws in operation being morenumerous, subtle, and complex; but it will be seen that this is a differentinterpretation of the evidence from that against which I am contending. Thus, if there are tokens of divine intention (as distinguished fromdesign) to be met with in the eye, --if it is inconceivable that so "niceand intricate a structure" should exist without intelligence as its_ultimate_ cause; then the discovery of natural selection, or of any otherlaw, as the _manner_ in which this intelligence wrought in no wiseattenuates the proof as to the fact of an intelligent cause. On thecontrary, it tends rather to confirm it; for, besides the evidence beforeexisting, there is added that which arises from the conformity of themethod to that which is observable in the rest of the universe. Thus, notwithstanding what Hamilton, Chalmers, and others have said, Icannot but feel that the ubiquitous action of general laws is, of all factssupplied by experience, the most cogent in its bearing upon teleology. Ifperpetual and uninterrupted uniformity of method does not indicate theexistence of a presiding intelligence, it becomes a question whether anyother kind of method--short of the intelligently miraculous--could possiblydo so; seeing that the further the divine _modus operandi_ (supposing suchto exist) were removed from absolute uniformity, the greater would be theroom for our interpreting it as mere fortuity. But forasmuch as theprogress of science has shown that within experience the method of theSupreme Causality is absolutely uniform, the hypothesis of fortuity isrendered irrational; and let us think of this Supreme Causality as we may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive influence ofuninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exactprecision, worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity. § 29. Had it been my lot to have lived in the last generation, I doubt notthat I should have regarded the foregoing considerations as final: I shouldhave concluded that there was an overwhelming balance of rationalprobability in favour of Theism; and I think I should also have insistedthat this balance of rational probability would require to continue as itwas till the end of time. I should have maintained, in some such words asthe following, in which the Rev. Baden Powell conveys this argument:--"Thevery essence of the whole argument is the invariable preservation of theprinciple of _order_: not necessarily such as we can directly recognise, but the universal conviction of the unfailing subordination of everythingto _some_ grand principles of _law_, however imperfectly apprehended in ourpartial conceptions, and the successive subordination of such laws toothers of still higher generality, to an extent transcending ourconceptions, and constituting the true chain of universal causation whichculminates in the sublime conception of the COSMOS. "It is in immediate connection with this enlarged view of universalimmutable natural order that I have regarded the narrow notions of thosewho obscure the sublime prospect by imagining so unworthy an idea as thatof occasional interruptions in the physical economy of the world. "The only instance considered was that of the alleged sudden supernaturalorigination of new species of organised beings in remote geological epochs. It is in relation to the broad principle of law, if once rightlyapprehended, that such inferences are seen to be wholly unwarranted byscience, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible inphilosophy; while, even in those instances properly understood, the realscientific conclusions of the invariable and indissoluble chain ofcausation stand vindicated in the sublime contemplations with which theyare thus associated. "To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essentialrequisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this_one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting thevery idea of nature_;--which forms the vital essence of the whole ofinductive science, and the sole assurance of those higher inferences fromthe inductive study of natural causes which are the vindications of asupreme intelligence and a moral cause. "_The whole of the ensuing discussion must stand or fall with the admissionof this grand principle_. Those who are not prepared to embrace it in itsfull extent may probably not accept the conclusions; but they must be sentback to the school of inductive science, where alone it must beindependently imbibed and thoroughly assimilated with the mind of thestudent in the first instance. "On the slightest consideration of the nature, the foundations, and generalresults of inductive science, ... We recognise the powers of intellect fitlyemployed in the study of nature, ... Pre-eminently leading us to perceive_in nature_, and in the invariable and universal constancy of its laws, theindications of universal, unchangeable, and recondite arrangement, dependence, and connection in reason.... "We thus see the importance of taking a more enlarged view of the greatargument of natural theology; and the necessity for so doing becomes themore apparent when we reflect on the injury to which these sublimeinferences are exposed from the narrow and unworthy form in which thereasoning has been too often conducted.... "The satisfactory view of the whole case can only be found in those moreenlarged conceptions which are furnished by the grand contemplation ofcosmical order and unity, and which do not refer to inferences from the_past_, but to proofs of the _ever-present_ mind and reason in nature. "If we read a book which it requires much thought and exercise of reason tounderstand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason aswe proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at presentcomprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason _existin that book_ irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any questionas to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is everopen to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightlydifferent form:--When the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or thenaturalist notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he isnot an _author_ expressing his own ideas, --he is a mere _amanuensis_ takingdown the dictations of nature: his observation book is the record of thethoughts of _another mind_: he has but set down literally what he himselfdoes not understand, or only very imperfectly. On further examination, andafter deep and anxious study, he perhaps begins to decipher the meaning, byperceiving some law which gives a signification to the facts; and thefurther he pursues the investigation up to any more comprehensive theory, the more fully he perceives that there is a higher reason, of which his ownis but the humbler interpreter, and into whose depths he may penetratecontinually further, to discover yet more profound and invariable order andsystem, always indicating still deeper and more hidden abysses yetunfathomed, but throughout which he is assured the same recondite andimmutable arrangement ever prevails. "That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itselfthought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express mustbe itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, thenthe mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of thestudent. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is thenecessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vastextent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and itsreality, as _existing in the immutably connected order of objectsexamined_, independently of the mind of the investigator. "But considerations of this kind, just and transcendently important as theyare in themselves, give us no aid in any inquiry into the _origin_ of theorder of things thus investigated, or the _nature_ or other attributes ofthe mind evinced in them. "The real argument for universal _intelligence_, manifested in theuniversality of order and law in the material world, is very different fromany attempt to give a form to our conceptions, even by the language ofanalogy, as to the _nature_ or _mode of existence_ or operation of thatintelligence [_i. E. _, as I have stated the case, the argument can only reston a study of the _products_, as distinguished from the _processes_ of suchintelligence]: and still more different from any extension of our inferencefrom what _is_ to what _may have been_, from _present_ order to a supposed_origination_, first adjustment, or planning of that order. "By keeping these distinctions steadily in view, we appreciate properlyboth the limits and the extent and compass of what we may appropriatelycall COSMOTHEOLOGY. "[19] I have quoted these passages at length, because they convey in a moreforcible, guarded, and accurate manner than any others with which I amacquainted, the strictly rational standing of this great subject prior tothe date at which the above-quoted passage was written. Therefore, as Ihave said, if it had been my lot to have lived in the last generation, Ishould certainly have rested in these "sublime conceptions" as in anargument supreme and irrefutable. I should have felt that the progress ofphysical knowledge could never exert any other influence on Theism thanthat of ever tending more and more to confirm that magnificent belief, bycontinuously expanding our human thoughts into progressively advancingconceptions, ever grander and yet more grand, of that tremendous Origin ofThings--the Mind of God. Such would have been my hope--such would have beenmy prayer. But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has soterrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may nowbehold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, andburying our highest life in mindless desolation. Science, whom erstwhile wethought a very Angel of God, pointing to that great barrier of Law, andproclaiming to the restless sea of changing doubt, "Hitherto shalt thoucome, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed, "--evenScience has now herself thrown down this trusted barrier; the flood-gatesof infidelity are open, and Atheism overwhelming is upon us. § 30. All and every law follows as a necessary consequence from thepersistence of force and the primary qualities of matter. [20] That thismust be so is evident if we consider that, were it not so, force could notbe permanent nor matter constant. For instance, if action and reaction werenot invariably equal and opposite, force would not be invariablypersistent, seeing that in no case can the formula fail, unless some one orother of the forces concerned, or parts of them, disappear. And as with asimple law of this kind, so with every other natural law andinter-operation of laws, howsoever complex such inter-operation may be; forit is manifest that if in any case similar antecedents did not determinesimilar consequents, on one or other of these occasions some quantum offorce, or of matter, or of both, must have disappeared--or, which is thesame thing, the law of causation cannot have been constant. Every naturallaw, therefore, may be defined as the formula of a sequence, which musteither ensue upon certain forces of a given intensity impinging uponcertain given quantities, kinds, and forms of matter, or else, by notensuing, prove that the force or the matter concerned were not of apermanent nature. § 31. The argument, then, which was elaborated in § 29, and which has solong and so generally received the popular sanction in the common-senseepitome, that in the last record there must be mind in external nature, since "that which it requires thought and reason to understand must itselfbe thought and reason, "--this argument, I say, must now for ever beabandoned by reasonable men. No doubt it would be easy to point to severalspeculative thinkers who have previously combated this argument, [21] andfrom this fact some readers will perhaps be inclined to judge, from a falseanalogy, that as the argument in question has withstood previous assaults, it need not necessarily succumb to the present one. Be it observed, however, that the present assault differs from all previous assaults, justas demonstration differs from speculation. What has hitherto been but mereguess and unwarrantable assertion has now become a matter of the greatestcertainty. That the argument from General Laws is a futile argument, is nolonger a matter of unverifiable opinion: it is as sure as is the mostfundamental axiom of science. That the argument will long remain inillogical minds, I doubt not; but that it is from henceforth quiteinadmissible in accurate thinking, there can be no question. For the sake, however, of impressing this fact still more strongly upon such readers ashave been accustomed to rely upon this argument, and so find it difficultthus abruptly to reverse the whole current of their thoughts, --for the sakeof such, I shall here add a few remarks with the view of facilitating theconception of an universal Order existing independently of Mind. § 32. Interpreting the mazy nexus of phenomena only by the facts whichscience has revealed, and what conclusion are we driven to accept? Clearly, looking to what has been said in the last two sections, that from the timewhen the process of evolution first began, --from the time before thecondensation of the nebula had showed any signs of commencing, --everysubsequent change or event of evolution was _necessarily bound_ to ensue;else force and matter have not been persistent. How then, it will be asked, did the vast nexus of natural laws which is now observable ever begin orcontinue to be? In this way. When the first womb of things was pregnantwith all the future, there would probably have been existent at any ratenot more than one of the formulæ which we now call natural laws. This onelaw, of course, would have been the law of gravitation. Here we may takeour stand. It does not signify whether there ever was a time whengravitation was not, --_i. E. _, if ever there was a time when matter, _as wenow know it_, was not in existence;--for if there ever was such a time, there is no reason to doubt, but every reason to conclude, that theevolution of matter, as we now know it, was accomplished in accordance withlaw. Similarly, we are not concerned with the question as to how the law ofgravitation came to be associated with matter; for it is overwhelminglyprobable, from the extent of the analogy, that if our knowledge concerningmolecular physics were sufficiently great, the existence of the law inquestion would be found to follow as a necessary deduction from the primaryqualities of matter and force, just as we can now see that, when present, its peculiar quantitative action necessarily follows from the primaryqualities of space. Starting, then, with these data, --matter, force, and the law ofgravitation, --what must happen? We have the strongest scientific reason tobelieve that the matter of the solar system primordially existed in ahighly diffused or nebulous form. By mutual gravitation, therefore, all thesubstance of the nebula must have begun to concentrate upon itself, or tocondense. Now, from this point onwards, I wish it to be clearly understoodthat the mere consideration of the supposed facts not admitting ofscientific proof, or of scientific explanation if true, in no wise affectsthe certainty of the doctrine which these facts are here adduced toestablish. Fully granting that the alleged facts are not beyond dispute, and that, even if true, innumerable other unknown and unknowable facts musthave been associated with them--fully admitting, in short, that our ideasconcerning the genesis of the solar system are of the crudest and leasttrustworthy character; still, if it be admitted, what at the present dayonly ignorance or prejudice can deny, viz. , that, as a whole, evolution hasbeen the method of the universe; then it follows that the doctrine herecontended for is as certainly true as it would be were we fully acquaintedwith every cause and every change which has acted and ensued throughout thewhole process of the genesis of things. Now, bearing this caveat in mind, we have next to observe that when oncethe nebula began to condense, new relations among its constituent partswould, _for this reason_, begin to be established. "Given a rare and widelydiffused mass of nebulous matter, ... What are the successive changes thatwill take place? Mutual gravitation will approximate its atoms, but theirapproximation will be opposed by atomic repulsion, the overcoming of whichimplies the evolution of heat. " That is to say, the condensation of thenebula as a whole of necessity implies at least the origination of thesenew material and dynamical relations among its constituent parts. "As fastas this heat partially escapes by radiation, further approximation willtake place, attended by further evolution of heat, and so on continuously:the processes not occurring separately, as here described, butsimultaneously, uninterruptedly, and with increasing activity. " Hence thenewly established relations continuously acquire new increments ofintensity. But now observe a more important point. The previous essentialconditions remaining unaltered--viz. , the persistence of matter and force, as well as, or rather let us say and consequently, the law ofgravitation--these conditions, I say, remaining constant, and the newlyestablished relations would necessarily _of themselves_ give origin to_new_ laws. For whenever two given quantities of force and matter met inone of the novel relations, they would of necessity give rise to noveleffects; and whenever, on any future occasion, similar quantities of forceand matter again so met, precisely similar effects would of necessityrequire to occur: but the occurrence of similar effects under similarconditions is all that we mean by a natural law. Continuing, then, our quotation from Mr. Herbert Spencer's terse and lucidexposition of the nebular theory, we find this doctrine virtually embodiedin the next sentences:--"Eventually this slow movement of the atoms towardstheir common centre of gravity will bring about phenomena of another order. "Arguing from the known laws of atomic combination, it will happen that, when the nebulous mass has reached a particular stage of condensation--whenits internally situated atoms have approached to within certain distances, have generated a certain amount of heat, and are subject to a certainmutual pressure (the heat and pressure increasing as the aggregationprogresses), some of them will suddenly enter into chemical union. Whetherthe binary atoms so produced be of kinds such as we know, which ispossible, or whether they be of kinds simpler than any we know, which ismore probable, matters not to the argument. It suffices that molecularcombinations of some species will finally take place. " We have, then, herea new and important change of relations. Matter, primordially uniform, hasitself become heterogeneous; and in as many places as it has thus changedits state, it must, in virtue of the fact, give rise to other hithertonovel relations, and so, in many cases, to new laws. [22] It would be tedious and unnecessary to trace this genesis of natural lawany further: indeed, it would be quite impossible so to trace it for anyconsiderable distance without feeling that the ever-multiplying mazes ofrelations renders all speculation as to the actual processes quite useless. This fact, however, as before insisted, in no wise affects the onlydoctrine which I here enunciate--viz. , that the self-generation of naturallaw is a necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and force. Andthat this must be so is now, I hope, sufficiently evident. Just as in thefirst dawn of things, when the proto-binary compounds of matter gave riseto new relations together with their appropriate laws, so throughout thewhole process of evolution, as often as matter acquired a hitherto novelstate, or in one of its old states entered into hitherto novel relations, so often would non-existent or even impossible laws become at once possibleand necessary. And in this way I cannot see that there is any reason tostop until we arrive at all the marvellous complexity of things as theyare. For aught that speculative reason can ever from henceforth show to thecontrary, the evolution of all the diverse phenomena of inorganic nature, of life, and of mind, appears to be as necessary and as self-determined asis the being of that mysterious Something which is Everything, --the Entitywe must all believe in, which without condition and beyond relation holdsits existence in itself. § 33. Does it still seem incredible that, notwithstanding it requiresmental processes to interpret external nature, external nature maynevertheless be destitute of mind? Then let us look at the subject on itsobverse aspect. According to the theory of evolution--which, be it always remembered, is nomere gratuitous supposition, but a genuine scientific theory--humanintelligence, like everything else, has been evolved. Now in what does theevolution of intelligence consist? Any one acquainted with the writings ofour great philosopher can have no hesitation in answering: Clearly and onlyin the establishment of more and more numerous and complex internal orpsychological relations. In other words, the law of intelligence being"that the strengths of the inner cohesions between psychical states must beproportionate to the persistences of the outer relations symbolised, " itfollows that the development of intelligence is "secured by the one simpleprinciple that experience of the outer relations _produces_ innercohesions, and makes the inner cohesions strong in proportion as the outerrelations are persistent. " Now the question before us at present is merelythis:--Must we not infer that these outer relations are regulated by mind, seeing that order is undoubtedly apparent among them, and that it requiresmental processes on our part to interpret this order? The only legitimateanswer to this question is, that these outer relations _may_ be regulatedby mind, but that, in view of the evolution theory, we are certainly notentitled to infer that they _are_ so regulated, _merely_ because itrequires mental processes on our part to interpret their orderly character. For if it is true that the human mind was itself evolved by these outerrelations--ever continuously moulded into conformity with them as the primecondition of its existence--then its process of interpreting them is butreflecting (as it were) in consciousness these outer relations by which theinner ones were originally produced. Granting that, as a matter of fact, anobjective macrocosm exists, and if we can prove or render probable thatthis objective macrocosm is _of itself_ sufficient to evolve a subjectivemicrocosm, I do not see any the faintest reason for the latter to concludethat a self-conscious intelligence is inherent in the former, merelybecause it is able to trace in the macrocosm some of those orderlyobjective relations by which its own corresponding subjective relationswere originally produced. If it is said that it is impossible to conceivehow, apart from mind, the orderly objective relations themselves can everhave originated, I reply that this is merely to shift the ground ofdiscussion to that which occupied us in the last section: all we are nowengaged upon is, --Granting that the existence of such orderly relations isactual, whether with or without mind to account for them; and granting alsothat these relations are _of themselves_ sufficient to producecorresponding subjective relations; then the mere fact of our consciousintelligence being able to discover numerous and complex outer relationsanswering to those which they themselves have caused in our intelligence, does not warrant the latter in concluding that the causal connectionbetween intelligence and non-intelligence has ever been reversed--thatthese outer relations in turn are caused by a similar consciousintelligence. How such a thing as a conscious intelligence is possible isanother and wholly unanswerable question (though not more so than that asto the existence of force and matter, and would not be rendered less so bymerging the fact in a hypothetical Deity); but granting, as we must, thatsuch an entity does exist, and supposing it to have been evolved by naturalcauses, then it would appear incontestably to follow, that whether or notobjective existence is presided over by objective mind, our subjective mindwould _alike_ and _equally_ require to read in the facts of the externalworld an indication, whether true or false, of some such presiding agency. The subjective mind being, by the supposition, but the obverse aspect ofthe sum total of such among objective relations as have had a share in itsproduction, when, as in observation and reflection, this obverse aspect isagain inverted upon its die, it naturally fits more or less exactly intoall the prints. § 34. This last illustration, however, serves to introduce us to anotherpoint. The supposed evidence from which the existence of mind in nature isinferred does not always depend upon such minute correspondences betweensubjective method and objective method as the illustration suggests. Everynatural theologian has experienced more or less difficulty in explainingthe fact, that while there is a tolerably general similarity between thecontrivances due to human thought and the apparent contrivances in naturewhich he regards as due to divine thought, the similarity is nevertheless_only_ general. For instance, if a man has occasion to devise anyartificial appliance, he does so with the least possible cost of labour tohimself, and with the least possible expenditure of material. Yet it isobvious that in nature as a whole no such economic considerations obtain. Doubtless by superficial minds this assertion will be met at first with anindignant denial: they have been accustomed to accumulate instances of thisvery principle of economy in nature; perhaps written about it in books, andillustrated it in lectures, --totally ignoring the fact that the instancesof economy in nature bear no proportion at all to the instances ofprodigality. Conceive of the force which is being quite uselessly expendedby all the wind-currents which are at this moment blowing over the face ofEurope. Imagine the energy that must have been dissipated during thesecular cooling of this single planet. Feebly try to think of what the sunis radiating into space. If it is retorted that we are incompetent to judgeof the purposes of the Almighty, I reply that this is but to abandon theargument from economy whenever it is found untenable: we presume to becompetent judges of almighty purposes so long as they appear to imitate ourown; but so soon as there is any divergence observable, we change front. Bythus selecting all the instances of economy in nature, and disregarding allthe vastly greater instances of reckless waste, we are merely layingourselves open to the charge of an unfair eclecticism. And this formalrefutation of the argument from economy admits of being further justifiedin a strikingly substantial manner; for if all the examples of economy innature that were ever observed, or admit being observed, were collectedinto one view, I undertake to affirm that, without exception, they would befound to marshal themselves in one great company--the subjects whose law is_survival of the fittest_. One question only will I here ask. Is itpossible at the present day for any degree of prejudice, after dueconsideration, to withstand the fact that the solitary exceptions to theuniversal prodigality so painfully conspicuous in nature are to be foundwhere there is also to be found a full and adequate physical explanation oftheir occurrence? But, again, prodigality is only one of several particulars wherein themodes and the means of the supposed divine intelligence differ from thoseof its human counterpart. Comparative anatomists can point to organicstructures which are far from being theoretically perfect: even the mind ofman in these cases, notwithstanding its confessed deficiencies in respectboth of cognitive and cogitative powers, is competent to suggestimprovements to an intelligence supposed to be omniscient and all-wise! Andwhat shall we say of the numerous cases in which the supposed purposes ofthis intelligence could have been attained by other and less roundaboutmeans? In short, not needlessly to prolong discussion, it is admitted, evenby natural theologians themselves, that the difficulties of reconciling, even approximately, the supposed processes of divine thought with the knownprocesses of human thought are quite insuperable. The fact is expressed bysuch writers in various ways, --_e. G. _, that it would be presumptuous in manto expect complete conformity in all cases; that the counsels of God arepast finding out; that his ways are not as our ways, and so on. Observingonly, as before, that in thus ignoring adverse cases natural theologiansare guilty of an unfair eclecticism, it is evident that all suchexpressions concede the fact, that even in those provinces of nature wherethe evidence of superhuman intelligence appears most plain, the resemblanceof its apparent products to those of human intelligence consists in ageneral approximation of method rather than in any precise similarity ofparticulars: the likeness is generic rather than specific. Now this is exactly what we should expect to be the case, if the similarityin question be due to the cause which the present section endeavours to setforth. If all natural laws are self-evolved, and if human intelligence isbut a subjective photograph of certain among their interrelations, it seemsbut natural that when this photograph compares itself with the wholeexternal world from parts of which it was taken, its subjective lights andshadows should be found to correspond with some of the objective lights andshadows much more perfectly than with others. Still there would doubtlessbe sufficient general conformity to lead the thinking photograph toconclude that the great world of objective reality, instead of being the_cause_ of such conformity as exists, was itself the _effect_ of somecommon cause, --that it too was of the nature of a picture. Dropping thefigure, if it is true that human intelligence has been evolved by naturallaw, then in view of all that has been said it must now, I think, betolerably apparent, _that as by the hypothesis human intelligence hasalways been required to think and to act in conformity with law, humanintelligence must at last be in danger of confusing or identifying the factof action in conformity with law with the existence and the action of aself-conscious intelligence. Reading then in external nature innumerableexamples of action in conformity with law, human intelligence falls backupon the unwarrantable identification, and out of the bare fact that lawexists in nature concludes that beyond nature there is an IntelligentLawgiver. _ § 35. From what has been said in the last five sections, it manifestlyfollows that all the varied phenomena of the universe not only may, butmust, depend upon the persistence of force and the primary qualities ofmatter. [23] Be it remembered that the object of the last three sections wasmerely to "_facilitate conception_" of the fact that it does not at allfollow, because the phenomena of external nature admit of beingintelligently inquired into, therefore they are due to an intelligentcause. The last three sections are hence in a manner parenthetical, and itis of comparatively little importance whether or not they have beensuccessful in their object; for, from what went before, it is abundantlymanifest that, whether or not the subjective side of the question admits ofsatisfactory elucidation, there can be no doubt that the objective side ofit is as certain as are the fundamental axioms of science. It does notadmit of one moment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all theexquisite beauty and melodious harmony of nature follow as necessarily andas inevitably from the persistence of force and the primary qualities ofmatter, as it is certainly true that force is persistent, or that matter isextended and impenetrable. No doubt this generalisation is too vast to beadequately conceived, but there can be equally little doubt that it isnecessarily true. If matter and force have been eternal, so far as humanmind can soar it can discover no need of a superior mind to explain thevaried phenomena of existence. Man has truly become in a new sense themeasure of the universe, and in this the latest and most appalling of hissoundings, indications are returned from the infinite voids of space andtime by which he is surrounded, that his intelligence, with all its noblecapacities for love and adoration, is yet alone--destitute of kith or kinin all this universe of being. * * * * * CHAPTER V. THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD. § 36. But the discussion must not end here. Inexorable logic has forced usto conclude that, viewing the question as to the existence of a God only bythe light which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer appears tobe any semblance of an argument in its favour. Let us then turn uponscience herself, and question her right to be our sole guide in thismatter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that thehypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainlysuperfluous is the very basis of all science is certainly true. There canno longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is whollyunnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there isdoubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. Nay, thedoubt is even less than this, because while the knowledge that my pen willfall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly upon empirical knowledge (Icould not predict with _à priori_ certainty that it would so fall, for thepen might be in an electrical state, or subject to some set of unknownnatural laws antagonistic to gravity), the knowledge that a Deity issuperfluous as an explanation of anything, being grounded on the doctrineof the persistence of force, is grounded on an _à priori_ necessity ofreason--_i. E. _, if this fact were not so, our science, our thought, ourvery existence itself, would be scientifically impossible. But now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it remainsto question how far the authority of science extends. Even our knowledge ofthe persistence of force and of the primary qualities of matter is but ofrelative significance. Deeper than the foundations of our experience, "deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition, --deep asthe very nature of mind, "[24] are these the most ultimate of known truths;but where from this is our warrant for concluding with certainty that theseknown truths are everywhere and eternally true? It will be said that thereis a strong analogical probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am notnow speaking of probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we denythe doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude thatthere is no absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this considerationone of great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. Itwill be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts tothis:--Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of thetheistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the phenomena ofnature is a fact which has been demonstrated _scientifically_, neverthelessit must likewise on all hands be admitted that this fact has not, andcannot be, demonstrated _logically_. Or thus, although it is unquestionablytrue that so far as science can penetrate she cannot discern anyspeculative necessity for a God, it may nevertheless be true that ifscience could penetrate further she might discern some such necessity. Nowthe present discussion would clearly be incomplete if it neglected todefine as carefully this the logical standing of our subject, as it hashitherto endeavoured to define its scientific standing. As a final step inour analysis, therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience, and, ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the mostcertain of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purelyformal considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consentto forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding thesubject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone, finally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of thequestion before them. Disregarding the actual probability which theyseverally feel to exist in relation to their own individual intelligences, they must apply themselves to ascertain the probability which exists inrelation to those fundamental laws of thought which preside over theintelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, be understood that, as we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, by deductions drawnfrom the very foundations of all possible science, the _relative_probability as to the existence of a God, so we shall next apply ourselvesto the task of ascertaining the _absolute_ probability of suchexistence--or, more correctly, what is the strictly _formal_ probability ofsuch existence when its possibility is contemplated in an absolute sense. § 37. To begin then. In the last resort, the value of every probability isfixed by "ratiocination. " In endeavouring, therefore, to fix the degree ofstrictly formal probability that is present in any given case, our methodof procedure should be, first to ascertain the ultimate ratios on which theprobability depends, and then to estimate the comparative value of theseratios. Now I think there can be no doubt that the value of any probabilityin this its last analysis is determined by the number, the importance, andthe definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of therelations unknown; and, consequently, that in all cases where the sum ofthe unknown relations is larger, or more important, or more indefinite thanis the sum of the known relations, it is an essential principle that thevalue of the probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease inthe similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decreaseconsists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of therelations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointedout, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his "Logic" when treatingof Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while recognising theelements of number and importance, he has overlooked that of definiteness. This element, however, is a very essential one--indeed the most essentialof the three; for there are many analogical inferences in which either thecharacter or the extent of the unknown relations is quite indefinite; andit is obvious that, whenever this is the case, the value of the analogy isproportionably diminished, and diminished in a much more materialparticular than it is when the diminution of value arises from a mereexcess of the unknown relations over the known ones in respect of theirnumber or of their importance. For it is evident that, in the latter case, however little value the analogy may possess, the exact degree of suchvalue admits of being _determined_; while it is no less evident that, inthe former case, we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogyat all, and this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknownrelations. § 38. Now the particular instance with which we are concerned is somewhatpeculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire sphere of human experiencefrom which to argue, we are still unable to gauge the strictly logicalprobability of any argument whatsoever; for the unknown relations in thiscase are so wholly indefinite, both as to their character and extent, thatany attempt to institute a definite comparison between them and the knownrelations is felt at once to be absurd. The question discussed, being themost ultimate of all possible questions, must eventually contain in itselfall that is to man unknown and unknowable; the whole orbit of humanknowledge is here insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institutethe required measurements. § 39. I think it is desirable to insist upon this truth at somewhat greaterlength, and, for the sake of impressing it still more deeply, I shallpresent it in another form. No one can for a single moment deny that, beyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, there exists the unfathomableabyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use this latter word as embodyingany theory: I merely wish it to state the undoubted fact, which all mustadmit, viz. , that beneath all our possible explanations there lies a greatInexplicable. Now let us see what is the effect of making this necessaryadmission. In the first place, it clearly follows that, while ourconceptions as to what the Unknowable contains may or may not represent thetruth, it is certain that we can never discover whether or not they do. Further, it is impossible for us to determine even a definite _probability_as to the existence (much less the nature) of anything which we may supposethe Unknowable to contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such asupposition is more _conceivable_ than such and such; but, as alreadyindicated, the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely_probable_ than the other, unless it has been previously shown, either thatthe capacity of our conceptions is a _fully adequate measure_ of thePossible, or that the proportion between such capacity and the extent ofthe Possible is a proportion that can be _determined_. In either of thesecases, the Conceivable would be a fair measure of the Possible: in theformer case, an exact equivalent (_e. G. _, in any instance of contradictorypropositions, the most conceivable would _certainly_ be true); in thelatter case, a measure any degree less than an exact equivalent--the degreedepending upon the _then_ ascertainable disparity between the extent of thePossible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable (includingof course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the Possible, and inits name carries the declaration that the disparity between its extent andthe extent of the Conceivable (_i. E. _, the other species of the Possible)is a disparity that cannot be determined. We are hence driven to theconclusion that the most apparently probable of all propositions, ifpredicated of anything within the Unknowable, may not in reality be a whitmore so than is the most apparently improbable proposition which it ispossible to make; for if it is admitted (as of course it must be) that weare necessarily precluded from comparing the extent of the Conceivable withthat of the Unknowable, then it necessarily follows that in no casewhatever are we competent to judge how far an _apparent_ probabilityrelating to the latter province is an _actual_ probability. In other words, did we know the proportion subsisting between the Conceivable and theUnknowable in respect of relative extent and character, and so of inherentprobabilities, we should then be able to estimate the actual value of anyapparent probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, ourability to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimateour ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particularis total--_i. E. _, since we cannot even approximately determine theproportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the Unknowable, --theresult is that our ability to make the required estimate in any given caseis absolutely _nil_. § 40. I have purposely rendered this presentation in terms of the highestabstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of any one, whatever histheory of things may be, finding anything at which to object, and partly inorder that my meaning may be understood to include all things which arebeyond the range of possible knowledge. Most of all, therefore, must thispresentation (if it contains anything of truth) apply to the questionregarding the existence of Deity; for the _Ens Realissimum_ must of allthings be furthest removed from the range of possible knowledge. Hence, ifthis presentation contains anything of truth--and of its rigidly accuratetruth I think there can be no question--the assertion that theSelf-existing Substance is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and theassertion that this Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being, are alike assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logicalprobability, I say _assignable_ degree of logical probability, because that_some_ degree of such probability may exist I do not undertake to deny. AllI assert is, that if we are here able to institute any such probability atall, we are unable logically to assign to it any determinate degree ofvalue. Or, in other words, although we may establish some probability in asense relative to ourselves, we are unable to know how far this probabilityis a probability in an absolute sense. Or again, the case is not as thoughwe were altogether unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedlyaffords us some information regarding this, although, comparativelyspeaking, we are unable to know how much. Consequently, we must supposethat, in any given case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should bePossible than that the Inconceivable should be so, and that the ConceivablyProbable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: inneither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood ispresent. § 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that theonly attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards thequestion concerning the being of a God is that of "suspended judgment. "Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to denyIntelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it tobe observed, that this is the attitude which the majority ofscientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard tothis matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured toformulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can beno doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the wholeof such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends willhave been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of avague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and sobeyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession ofa logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of ouropinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value. * * * * * CHAPTER VI. THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY. § 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerationswhich have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientificconsiderations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In theseprevious chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just ascertainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is ittrue that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered, superfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessaryas it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter isindestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, itremained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelledus to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. Foralthough we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of forceare the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing howfar the question of Theism depended on these data, we carried thediscussion of that question to the utmost possible limits of scientificthought, it still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even thesethe most ultimate data of science are only known to be of relativesignificance. And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism wasseen to be most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate thesubstance of a chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered thatits effect was to establish this position beyond all controversy--viz. , that when ideas which have been formed by our experience within the regionof phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontologicalpossibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never haveany means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendentalprobabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even themost ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the questionof Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning whencontemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of thesemetaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have seen it tobe left by the highest generalisations of physical science? Let uscontemplate this question with the care which it deserves. In the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely formalconsiderations is to render all reasonings on the subject of Theism equallyillegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that such reasoningscan only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter of pure logic, these considerations are destructive of all assignable validity of any suchreasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly relative probability is, insome undefinable degree, of more value than no probability at all, as wehave seen these same formal considerations to show (see § 40); and, moreover, even were this not so, the human mind will never rest until itattains to the furthest probability which to its powers is accessible. Therefore, if we do not forget the merely relative nature of theconsiderations which are about to be adduced, by adducing them we may atthe same time satisfy our own minds and abstain from violating theconditions of sound logic. The shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simplythis:--Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has shownthe theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does it notfollow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous in anysense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has hithertogone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism can restis a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the theory ofevolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the primary data ofscience, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not follow that thetheory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory which rested on thatbasis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of Chapter IV. , that thequestion here put must certainly be answered in the affirmative, so far asits scientific aspect is concerned. But when we consider the question inits purely logical aspect, as we have done in Chapter V. , the case isotherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific visionenables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does nottherefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not exist. Science indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in nature, and ifby the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative influence on thephenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond the sphere ofexperience. And this achievement of science, be it never forgotten, is anachievement of prodigious importance, effectually destroying, as it does, all vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it now carefully observed, although all vestiges of a _scientific_ teleology are thus completely andpermanently ruined, the formal considerations adduced in the last chaptersupply the conditions for constructing what may be termed a _metaphysical_teleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve tobring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of theteleological argument has now been reduced. § 43. In the first place, let it be understood that I employ the terms"scientific" and "metaphysical" in the convenient sense in which they areemployed by Mr. Lewes, viz. , as respectively designating a theory that isverifiable and a theory that is not. Consequently, by the term "scientificteleology" I mean to denote a form of teleology which admits either ofbeing proved or disproved, while by the term "metaphysical teleology" Imean to denote a form of teleology which does not admit either of beingproved or of being disproved. Now, with these significations clearlyunderstood, it will be seen that the forms of teleology which we havehitherto considered belong entirely to the scientific class. That thePaleyerian form of the argument did so is manifest, first because thisargument itself treats the problem of Theism as a problem that issusceptible of scientific demonstration, and next because we have seen thatthe advance of science has proved this argument susceptible of scientificrefutation. In other words, from the supposed axiom, "There cannot beapparent design without a designer, " adaptations in nature become logicallyavailable as purely scientific evidence of an intelligent cause; and thatPaley himself regarded them exclusively in this light is manifest, bothfrom his own "statement of the argument, " and from the character of theevidence by which he seeks to establish the argument when stated--witnessthe typical passage before quoted (§ 26). On the other hand, we haveclearly seen that this Paleyerian system of natural theology has beeneffectually demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection--thefundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to bescientifically untrue. Hence the term "scientific teleology" is withoutquestion applicable to the Paleyerian system. Nor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of theteleological argument which we have had to consider--the argument, namely, from General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly seen that theinference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to the existence ofan omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is the inference fromapparent Design to the existence of a Supreme Designer. In other words, science, by establishing the doctrine of the persistence of force and theindestructibility of matter, has effectually disproved the hypothesis thatthe presence of Law in nature is of itself sufficient to prove theexistence of an intelligent Law-giver. Thus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for everobsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For aswe have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge precludes usfrom asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the region of theKnowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible to institute ametaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the Knowable Mind doesexist. There being a necessary absence of any positive information wherebyto refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who chooses to adopt it isfully justified in doing so, provided only he remembers that the purelymetaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is ensured against disproof, likewise, and in the same degree, precludes it from the possibility ofproof. He must remember that it is no longer open to him to point to anyparticular set of general laws and to assert, these proclaim Intelligenceas their cause; for we have repeatedly seen that the known states of matterand force themselves afford sufficient explanation of the facts to which hepoints. And he must remember that the only reason why his hypothesis doesnot conflict with any of the truths known to science, is because he hasbeen careful to rest that hypothesis upon a basis of purely formalconsiderations, which lie beyond even the most fundamental truths of whichscience is cognisant. Thus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in somesuch terms as these:--'Fully conceding what reason shows must be conceded, and there still remains this possible supposition--viz. , that there is apresiding Mind in nature, which exerts its causative influence beyond thesphere of experience, thus rendering it impossible for us to obtainscientific evidence of its action. For such a Mind, exerting such aninfluence beyond experience, may direct affairs within experience bymethods conceivable or inconceivable to us--producing, possibly, innumerable and highly varied results, which in turn may produce theireffects within experience, their introduction being then, of course, in theordinary way of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that bythe intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena ofcosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science canshow to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at leastone nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, aSupreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observablenature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the nameablein this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance whether or notthis suggested method is the method which the supposed Mind actuallyadopts, seeing that there may still be other possible methods, which, nevertheless, we are unable to suggest. ' Doubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed bymany persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, concernedwith whatever character of probability it may be supposed to exhibit. I ammerely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis which can bepresented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of nature is anylonger to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. No doubt, scientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely gratuitous;for, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is no need of anysuch hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first sight, that nohypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so far as thepresentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate for an atheistto reply:--'All that this so-called metaphysical theory amounts to is awholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is always difficult, and usuallyimpossible, logically or unequivocally to prove a negative. If my adversarychose to imagine that nature is presided over by a demon with horns andhoofs, or by a dragon with claws and tail, I should be as unable todisprove this his supposed theory as I am now unable to disprove his actualtheory. But in all cases reasonable men ought to be guided in their beliefsby such positive evidence as is available; and if, as in the present case, the alternative belief is wholly gratuitous--adopted not only without anyevidence, but against all that great body of evidence which the sum-totalof science supplies--surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in thechoice of our creed?' Now all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that themetaphysical theory of Theism _is_ wholly gratuitous, in the sense of beingutterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of all_scientific_ support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but the questionremains as to whether it is similarly destitute of _metaphysical_ support. § 44. To this question, then, let us next address ourselves. From thetheistic pleading which we have just heard, it is abundantly manifest thatthe formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are present: the questionnow before us is as to whether or not any actual evidence exists in favourof such a theory. In order to discuss this question, let us begin byallowing the theist to continue his pleading. 'You have shown me, ' he maysay, 'that a scientific or demonstrable system of teleology is no longerpossible, and, therefore, as I have already conceded, I must take my standon a metaphysical or non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latterterm is a loose one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees ofevidence short of actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be, What amount of evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system ofteleology? And this question I answer by the following considerations:--Asgeneral laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome ofthe primary data of science, it certainly follows that general lawscollectively must be the same--_i. E. _, that the whole system of generallaws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, thenecessary outcome of the persistence of force and the indestructibility ofmatter. But you have also dearly shown me that these lights are of thefeeblest conceivable character when they are brought to illuminate thefinal mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to assert, that ifthere is any one principle to be observed in the collective operation ofgeneral laws which cannot conceivably be explained by any cause other thanthat of intelligent guidance, I am still free to fall back on such aprinciple and to maintain--Although the collective operation of generallaws follows as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science, this one principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot beconceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligentguidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as itcannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I maylegitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now Icannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywherecharacterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally Ibehold in nature, order, beauty, harmony, --that is, a perfect _correlation_among general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation among general laws, considered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself requires some explanatorycause such as the persistence of force and the indestructibility of mattercannot conceivably be made to supply. For unless we postulate some oneintegrating cause, the greater the number of general laws in nature, theless likelihood is there of such laws being so correlated as to produceharmony by their combined action. And forasmuch as the only cause that I amable to imagine as competent to produce such effects is that of intelligentguidance, I accept the metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere ofthe Knowable there exists an Unknown God. [25] 'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurdcontradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of thefact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessaryconsequence from the primary data of physical science, it neverthelessafterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by ametaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose ofeliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. For theposition which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting thelogical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is deducedfrom the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this train ofreasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the presenceof a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my contention begranted--viz. , that to human faculties it is not conceivable how, in theabsence of a directing intelligence, general laws could be so correlated asto produce universal harmony--then I have brought the matter to thisissue:--Notwithstanding the scientific train of argument being complete initself, it still leaves us in the presence of a fact which it cannotconceivably explain; and it is this unexplained residuum--this totalproduct of the operation of general laws--that I appeal to as the logicaljustification for a system of metaphysical teleology--a system which offersthe only conceivable explanation of this stupendous fact. 'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of reasoning isof the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "symbolicconceptions of the illegitimate order. "[26] That is to say, we can see howsuch simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite mayhave been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising andgeneralising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a paradox ishere legitimate--inconceivable conceptions. Now the farther we travel intothis region of unrealisable ideas, the less trustworthy is the report thatwe are able to bring back. The method is in a sense scientific; but wheneven scientific method is projected into a region of reallysuper-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that character of undoubtedcertainty which it enjoys when dealing with verifiable subjects of inquiry. The demonstrations are formal, but they are not real. 'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of thescientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted, it leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that whateverprobability the phenomena of nature may in former times have been thoughtto establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent Author of nature, that probability has been in no wise annihilated--nor apparently can itever be annihilated--by the advance of science. And not only so, but Iquestion whether this probability has been even seriously impaired by suchadvance, seeing that although this advance has revealed a speculative_raison d'être_ of the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the sametime shown the baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view ofwhat has just been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning theexistence of a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile tocontemplate this astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of howmuch we already know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then thinkthat this knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the hugeimmensity of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythmswhich must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let usask, Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been thework of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligentagency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate resultswould have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought theunimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue ofwhich that thought itself exists, --if we then extend our symbols torepresent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have takenplace to evolve human intelligence into what it is, --and if we stillfurther extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the languageof symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those natural lawswhich now preside over the human will;--in the face of so vast anassumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am content still torest in the faith of my forefathers. ' § 45. Now I think it must be admitted that we have here a valid argument. That is to say, the considerations which we have just adduced must, Ithink, in fairness be allowed to have established this position:--That thesystem of metaphysical teleology for which we have supposed a candid theistto plead, is something more than a purely gratuitous system--that it doesnot belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which theatheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone, might be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed theist, while fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train ofreasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his opinion, lies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is beyond hispowers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature otherwise thanas a product of some one integrating cause; and that the only cause ofwhich he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an effect is thatof a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this complex harmonyof nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be conceivably explained byany deductions from physical science, he feels that he is justified inexplaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical hypothesis. And in sodoing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at any rate to thisextent--that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose of this metaphysicalhypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How far it is a probablehypothesis is another question, and to this question we shall now addressourselves. § 46. If it is true that the deductions from physical science cannot beconceived to explain some among the observed facts of nature, and if it istrue that these particular facts admit of being conceivably explained bythe metaphysical hypothesis in question, then, beyond all controversy, thismetaphysical hypothesis must be provisionally accepted. Let us thencarefully examine the premises which are thus adduced to justify acceptanceof this hypothesis as their conclusion. In the first place, it is not--cannot--be denied, even by a theist, thatthe deductions from physical science _do_ embrace the fact of cosmicharmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain the operation ofgeneral laws collectively, they must be regarded as also explaining everyeffect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is a consideration towhich our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He metit by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoningevolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner, "symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when theconclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with thefact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to bebeyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due tosuch a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on thescientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be noquestion that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which thattrain of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weaknessto the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think, be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who wouldventure honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmicharmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train ofreasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist mayreply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolicmethod of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of thecase, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available. If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointingout a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness, be it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual, as distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusionattained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expectedto abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour ofa metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leapingwith a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to theinference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist maywell point out that, however objectionable his scientific method ofreasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must atany rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbolsthroughout refer to known causes. [27] With regard, then, to this strictureon the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveatwhich it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, it is not ofsufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a scientific in favourof a metaphysical mode of reasoning. How then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration that, "when the conclusion thus illegitimately[28] evolved is confronted with thefact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to bebeyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due tosuch a cause"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a greatdeal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word"conceive. " For we have just seen that, by employing "symbolicconceptions, " we _are_ able to frame what we may term a _formal_ conceptionof universal harmony as due to the persistence of force and the primaryqualities of matter. That is to say, we have seen that such universalharmony as nature presents must be regarded as an effect of the collectiveoperation of general laws; and we have previously arrived at a formalconception of general laws as singly and collectively the product ofself-evolution. Consequently, the word "conceive, " as used in the theisticargument, must be taken to mean our ability to frame what we may term a_material_ conception, or a representation in thought of the whole historyof cosmic evolution, which representation shall be in some satisfactorydegree intellectually realisable. Observing, then, this importantdifference between an inconceivability which arises from an impossibilityof establishing relations in thought between certain _abstract_ or_symbolic_ conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a merefailure to realise in imagination the results which must follow amongexternal relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among themever took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does notappear that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings. 'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme Mindin nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, therefore, thatthe only reason we require to entertain the supposition of any suchexistence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so great, we areunable adequately to conceive of its self-evolution--notwithstanding ourreason tells us plainly that, given a self-existing universe of force andmatter, and such self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I thenreflect that this is a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If thehypothesis of self-evolution is true, we should _à priori_ expect that bythe time evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the productionof a reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great thatthe nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their attemptsto comprehend the various processes going on around them. This seems to beabout the state of things which we now experience. Still, as reasonadvances more and more, we may expect, both from general _à priori_principles and from particular historical analogies, that more and more ofthe processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by reason, and thatin proportion as our ability to _understand_ the frame and the constitutionof things progresses, so our ability to _conceive_ of them as all naturallyand necessarily evolved will likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, forexample, how vast a number of the most intricate and delicate correlationsin nature have been rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due tonon-intelligent causes, by the discovery of a single principle innature--the principle of natural selection. 'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the unconditionaltest of truth, just as it was in the argument against the possibility ofmatter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of self-evolution, not because itis the more remote one, but simply because we experience a subjectiveincapacity adequately to frame the requisite generalisations in thought, orto frame them with as much clearness as we could wish. Yet our reason tellsus as plainly as it tells us any general truth which is too large to bepresented in detail, that there is nothing in the nature of thingsthemselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to the supposition of theirhaving been self-evolved. Only on the ground, therefore, of our ownintellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by the self-evolutionaryhypothesis, the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order;only because the number and complexity of subjective relations have not yetbeen able to rival those of the objective relations producing them; only onthis ground do we refuse to assent to the obvious deductions of ourreason. [29] 'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of atheismwhich these deductions establish is considerably fortified by certain _àposteriori_ considerations which we cannot afford to overlook. Inparticular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the theistic theory isborn of highly suspicious parentage, --that Fetichism, or the crudest formof the theory of personal agency in external nature, admits of being easilytraced to the laws of a primitive psychology; that the step from this toPolytheism is easy; and that the step from this to Monotheism is necessary. If it is objected to this view that it does not follow that because sometheories of personal agency have proved themselves false, therefore allsuch theories must be so--I answer, Unquestionably not; but the aboveconsiderations are not adduced in order to _negative_ the theistic theory:they are merely adduced to show that the human mind has hithertoundoubtedly exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret theobjective processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; andas we can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency innature, whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectualevolution, I think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy oughtto be allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to thistheory--although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would admitof immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence infavour of the theory. [30] 'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me?Nothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponentadequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physicalcausation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of hisposition; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the considerationthat inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion oftruth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, Iwill now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take theargument from teleology in its widest possible sense--the argument, I mean, from the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the grossconstituent part of it from design--even taking this argument in its widestsense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is nowsufficiently obvious _can_ only be that of the inconceivability of itsnegation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing thatit is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect ofIntelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; andtherefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being turnedwith quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to exert uponAtheism. '"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded andaccepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is aperpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas. No distinction is made between propositions that contain real thoughts andpropositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A thinkable propositionis one of which the _two terms can be brought together in consciousnessunder the relation said to exist between them_. But very often, when thesubject of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and whenthe predicate of a proposition has been thought of as something known, andwhen the relation alleged between them has been thought of as a knownrelation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been thought. Thethinking separately of the elements of a proposition is mistaken for thethinking of them in the combination which the proposition affirms. Andhence it continually happens that propositions which cannot be renderedinto thought at all are supposed to be not only thought but believed. Theproposition that Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The twoterms are separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relationof effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them togetherin this relation. '"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his ownstates of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own, he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked toframe a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under whichalone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing ofthought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effectswrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I amnot to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness are severallyknown as like other states in the series that has gone by, and in which therelations between them are severally known as like past relations in theseries. If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 'originatingMind, ' I must conceive this Mind as having attributes akin to those of theonly mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all. '"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking howthe 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states produced bythings objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classingthem as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result to another. I will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind' thecharacter absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consistsof a series of states of consciousness? Put a series of states ofconsciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and thenendeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible toimagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving asantecedent to any one of the movements I see going on; for my own states ofconsciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. Buthow if I attempt to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actionsthroughout the universe--to the motions of the multitudinous starsthroughout space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, tothe gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitelymultiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? Icannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing eventhe relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's surface. Icannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds and thedissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, and thegrinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of it asantecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in all theplants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowdedtropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them, and the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. Even a singlesmall set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I cannot conceive asantecedent a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, forinstance, think of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are atthis instant curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is itpossible for me to conceive an 'originating Mind, ' which I must representto myself as a _single_ series of states of consciousness, working theinfinitely multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in worldstoo numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that bafflesimagination? '"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere goingon, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple Dynamics, 'then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of allattributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when thus divested ofits distinguishing attributes, the conception disappears--the word Mindstands for a blank.... '"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is thecause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long only asno attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the allegedrelation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_ may be adefensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be soaccepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of _understanding_--asa statement making the order of the universe comprehensible--is a quiteindefensible position. "'[31] § 47. We have now heard the pleading on both sides of the ultimate issue towhich it is possible that the argument from teleology can ever be reduced. It therefore devolves on us very briefly to adjudicate upon the contendingopinions. And this it is not difficult to do; for throughout the pleadingon both sides I have been careful to exclude all arguments andconsiderations which are not logically valid. It is therefore impossiblefor me now to pass any criticisms on the pleading of either side which havenot already been passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, inmy capacity of an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude thischapter with a few general considerations. In the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to ascientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be regardedas fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a metaphysicalmode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an unknowable cause. Andit must be allowed that the force of this antecedent objection isconsiderably increased by the reflection that the _kind_ of unknowablecause which is thus postulated is that which the human mind has alwaysshown an overweening tendency to postulate as a cause of natural phenomena. I think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the _àpriori_ standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious than thatof his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the means wherebyto estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections. With regard, then, to the _à posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rivaltheories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i. E. _, theinconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the caseof both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition whichembodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i. E. _, aninconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as thecause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration ofphysical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employingunthinkable propositions. Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is aneternity of matter and of force, [32] and the other an Infinite Mind, sothat in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; andtherefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon thesubject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the otherfrom an appeal to the test of inconceivability. Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate. What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerningthe rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, tothis question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, inits every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in otherwords, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justifya wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure afoundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me, 'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refinedexpression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictlyrational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'Thequestion which you put I take to be a question which it is whollyimpossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree ofeven rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character ofthe mind which contemplates it. ' This statement, no doubt, soundsparadoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations. When we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we maymean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from thedistinction previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisableconceptions. For we may mean that one of the two propositions presentsterms which cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relationwhich the proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean thatone of the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is morecongruous with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the otherproposition. Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It ismore conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and twoshould make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It ismore conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should beable to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first ofthese usages the test of _absolute_ inconceivability, and the second thetest of _relative_ inconceivability. Doubtless, when the word"inconceivability" is used in the sense of relative inconceivability, it isincorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some way; because, if usedwithout qualification, there is danger of its being confused withinconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if used with somequalifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For the process ofconception being in all cases the process of establishing relations inthought, we may properly say, It is relatively more conceivable that a manshould walk than that a man should fly, since it is _more easy_ toestablish, the necessary relations in thought in the case of the formerthan in the case of the latter proposition. The only difference, then, between what I have called absolute inconceivability and what I have calledrelative inconceivability consists in this--that while the latter admits of_degrees_, the former does not. [33] With this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe thatin everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative inconceivabilityas a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases this test of relativeinconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as valid a test of truthas is the test of absolute conceivability. For as every man is more or lessin harmony with his environment, his habits of thought with regard to hisenvironment are for the most part stereotyped correctly; so that the mostready and the most trustworthy gauge of probability that he has is animmediate appeal to consciousness as to whether he _feels_ the probability. Thus every man learns for himself to endow his own sense of probabilitywith a certain undefined but massive weight of authority. Now it is thistest of relative conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees tothe question of Theism. For if, from education and organised habits ofthought, the probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in acertain direction, when this probability is called in question, the wholebody of this organised system of thought rises in opposition to thequestioning, and being individually conscious of this strong feeling ofsubjective opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to bemore inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in sosaying he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that theacceptance or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable willdepend entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absoluteinconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism, disputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relativeinconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivableproposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits ofthought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology willappear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable one. Thus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the SupremeMind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles the humanmind, while in other of its attributes--among which he will placeomnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency--it transcends the humanmind as greatly as the latter "transcends mechanical motion;" and thereforethat although it is true, as a matter of logical terminology, that we oughtto designate such an entity "Not mind" or "Blank, " still, as a matter ofpsychology, we may come nearer to the truth by assimilating in thought thisentity with the nearest analogies which experience supplies, than byassimilating it in thought with any other entity--such as force ormatter--which are felt to be in all likelihood still more remote from it innature. On the other hand, to an atheist it will no doubt appear moreconceivable, because more simple, to accept the dogma of an eternalself-existence of something which we call force and matter, and with thisdogma to accept the implication of a necessary self-evolution of cosmicharmony, than to resort to the additional and no less inconceivablesupposition of a self-existing Agent which must be regarded both as Mindand as Not-mind at the same time. But in both cases, in whatever degreethis test of relative inconceivability of a negative is held by thedisputants to be valid in solving the problem of Theism, in that degree iseach man entitled to his respective estimate of the probability inquestion. And thus we arrive at the judgment that the rational probabilityof Theism legitimately varies with the character of the mind whichcontemplates it. For, as the test of absolute inconceivability is equallyannihilative in whichever direction it is applied, the test of relativeinconceivability is the only one that remains; and as the formal conditionsof a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, andthe formal conditions of a physical explanation of cosmic harmony are noless undoubtedly present on the other hand, it follows that a theist and anatheist have an equal right to employ this test of relativeinconceivability. And as there is no more ultimate court of appeal wherebyto decide the question than the universe as a whole, each man has here anequal argumentative right to abide by the decision which that court awards_to him individually_--to accept whatever probability the sum-total ofphenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it isneedless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed andaccurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personalequations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a Godwith clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no whisper ofsuch a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is to remark, that the individuals in each class--provided they bear in mind the strictly_relative_ character of their belief--have a similar right to be regardedas holding a rational creed: the grounds of belief in this case logicallyvary with the natural disposition and the subsequent training of differentminds. [34] It only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to endowthis test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real logicalworth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily life, andthere finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget that itsvalue as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the distance fromexperience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case evenwith the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V. ), but much moremust it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For, without comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, asdistinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to anyparticular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparablewith its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which oursense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although, therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain abelief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitledto be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whateverdegree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than thegrounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must themembers of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must aman be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability withthat of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense ofprobability in this matter is determined by an innate psychologicalinability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determinedby the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habituallyassociated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test ofrelative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying abelief of the most diffident possible kind. And from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think thathe has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit ortone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; butrather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of hisintellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from theexternal world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging processof his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted onthe hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardenedarmoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must nottoo confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of hisown weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need weall stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments isaffected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind inwhich we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not toover-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actuallysuperior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surelyneedless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bearin mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjectiveopposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modesof thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of ourjudgment from the polluting tyranny of habit. * * * * * CHAPTER VII. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. § 48. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here sufficeto convey an epitomised recollection of the numerous facts and conclusionswhich we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first disposed of theconspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of things, or the mysteryof existence, admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in anyfurther degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that theargument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such asubjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient toprove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with regardto the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations point toGod as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to observe that theargument could only be admissible after the possibility of the operation ofnatural causes had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposedintuitive necessity of individual thought was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposed necessity were a real one, it would onlypossess an individual applicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremely improbable that the supposed necessity is a real necessityeven for the individual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain thatit is not such to the vast majority of the race. The argument from thegeneral consent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to factsand principles, was passed over without comment; while the argument from afirst cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argumentthat, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation isprobably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch ofinference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced worthless. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in favour ofTheism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds are causedby an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our mind is causedby an unknown mind, --is a syllogism that is inadmissible for two reasons. In the first place, "it does not account for mind (in the abstract) torefer it to a prior mind for its origin;" and therefore, although thehypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of _known_ mind, it isuseless as an argument for the existence of the unknown mind, theassumption of which forms the basis of that explanation. Again, in the nextplace, if it be said that mind is so far an entity _sui generis_ that itmust be either self-existing or caused by another mind, there is noassignable warrant for the assertion. And this is the second objection tothe above syllogism; for anything within the whole range of the possiblemay, for aught that we can tell, be competent to produce a self-consciousintelligence. Thus an objector to the above syllogism need not hold anytheory of things at all; but even as opposed to the definite theory ofmaterialism, the above syllogism has not so valid an argumentative basis tostand upon. We know that what we call matter and force are to allappearance eternal, while we have no corresponding evidence of a "mind thatis even apparently eternal. " Further, within experience mind is invariablyassociated with highly differentiated collocations of matter anddistributions of force, and many facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the grade of intelligence invariably depends upon, orat least is associated with, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both a qualitative and a quantitative relation betweenintelligence and cerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter andmotion cannot produce consciousness because it is inconceivable that theyshould, we have seen at some length that this is no conclusiveconsideration as applied to a subject of a confessedly transcendentalnature, and that in the present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is speculatively certain that the substance of mind must beunknowable, it seems _à priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of theunknowable reality, this cause should be more difficult to render intothought in that relation than would some other hypothetical substance whichis imagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is inthis case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, thestatement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects cancontain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by everydayexperience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the will andthe existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively by thetheory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of utilitarianism. Onthe whole, then, with regard to the argument from the existence of thehuman mind, we were compelled to decide that it is destitute of anyassignable weight, there being nothing more to lead to the conclusion thatour mind has been caused by another mind, than to the conclusion that ithas been caused by anything else whatsoever. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that Mill'spresentation of it is merely a resuscitation of the argument as presentedby Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named writertreated this whole subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprisingin him; for while he has failed to assign anything like due weight to theinductive evidence of organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into asupernatural explanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failedsignally in his _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in commonwith all previous writers, he failed to observe that it is utterlyimpossible for us to know the relations in which the supposed Designerstands to the Designed, --much less to argue from the fact that the SupremeMind, even supposing it to exist, caused the observable products by anyparticular intellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of theDesign argument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to bedue to a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude thatthis Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such andsuch cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise thesupposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of theexistence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after all, ofvery little importance whether or not we are able to divine the _methods_of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that, _in some wayor other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due to Intelligenceof some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the first to endorse thisremark. It has always appeared to me one of the most unaccountable thingsin the history of speculation that so many competent writers can haveinsisted upon _Design_ as an argument for Theism, when they must all haveknown perfectly well that they have no means of ascertaining the subjectivepsychology of that Supreme Mind whose existence the argument is adduced todemonstrate. The truth is, that the argument from teleology must, and canonly, rest upon the observable _facts_ of nature, without reference to theintellectual _processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have beenaccomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge, " this ismerely to change the teleological argument from its gross Paleyerian form, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. And we sawthat this transformation is now a rational necessity. How far the greatprinciple of natural selection may have been instrumental in the evolutionof organic forms, is not here, as Mill erroneously imagined, the question;the question is simply as to whether we are to accept the theory of specialcreation or the theory of organic evolution. And forasmuch as no competentjudge at the present time can hesitate for one moment in answering thisquestion, the argument from a proximate teleology must be regarded as nolonger having any rational existence. How then does it fare with the last of the arguments--the argument from anultimate teleology? Doubtless at first sight this argument seems a verypowerful one, inasmuch as it is a generic argument, which embraces not onlybiological phenomena, but all the phenomena of the universe. Butnevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent powerdwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if force andmatter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have resulted byway of necessary consequence. It will be remembered that I dwelt atconsiderable length and with much earnestness upon this truth, not onlybecause of its enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, butalso because no one has hitherto considered it in that relation. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the conclusion thatwas liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless collapse of all thepossible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully demonstrated thatthere is no shadow of a positive argument in support of the theistictheory, there arose the danger that some persons might erroneously concludethat for this reason the theistic theory must be untrue. It thereforebecame necessary to point out, that although, as far as we can see, naturedoes not require an Intelligent Cause to account for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could see farther, we should see that naturecould not be what she is unless she had owed her existence to anIntelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability there is that anIntelligent Cause is unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability there is that the doctrine of thepersistence of force is everywhere and eternally true. As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted theregion of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science, and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the discussioninto the transcendental region of purely formal considerations. And here welaid down the canon, "that the value of any probability, in its lastanalysis, is determined by the number, the importance, and the definitenessof the relations known, as compared with those of the relations unknown;"and, consequently, that in cases where the unknown relations are morenumerous, more important, or more indefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inference varies inversely as the difference in theserespects between the relations compared. From which canon it followed, thatas the problem of Theism is the most ultimate of all problems, and socontains in its unknown relations all that is to man unknown andunknowable, these relations must be pronounced the most indefinite of allrelations that it is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that although we have here the entire range of experience from which toargue, we are unable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. The unknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite, both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the knownrelations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite probabilityeither for or against the being of a God. Therefore, although it is truethat, so far as human science can penetrate or human thought infer, we canperceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right on this account toconclude that there is no God. The probability, therefore, that nature isdevoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest kind if regardedscientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific demonstration, --isnevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically. Notwithstanding it isas true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of all experiencethat, if there is a God, his existence, considered as a cause of theuniverse, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that, if there hadnever been a God, the universe could never have existed. Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter howgreat the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative sense, wehave no means of estimating such probability in an absolute sense. Fromwhich position there emerged the possibility of another argument in favourof Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of the teleologicalargument in another form. For it may be said, seeing that these formalconsiderations exclude legitimate reasoning either for or against Deity inan absolute sense, while they do not exclude such reasoning in a relativesense, if there yet remain any theistic deductions which may properly bedrawn from experience, these may now be adduced to balance the atheisticdeductions from the persistence of force. For although the latterdeductions have clearly shown the existence of Deity to be superfluous in ascientific sense, the formal considerations in question have no lessclearly opened up beyond the sphere of science a possible _locus_ for theexistence of Deity; so that if there are any facts supplied by experiencefor which the atheistic deductions appear insufficient to account, we arestill free to account for them in a relative sense by the hypothesis ofTheism. And, it may be urged, we do find such an unexplained residuum inthe correlation of general laws in the production of cosmic harmony. Itsignifies nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive themethods whereby the supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nordoes it signify that its operation must now be relegated to asuper-scientific province. What does signify is that, taking a general viewof nature, we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety ofher harmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation. Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will beremembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply todistinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, incontradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, itwill be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms ofteleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible reach ofscience, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific refutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis which isclearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be susceptible ofscientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system of teleology doesrest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it accepts the mostultimate truths of which science can ever be cognisant--viz. , thepersistence of force and the consequently necessary genesis of naturallaw, --it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of regarding Mind as theultimate cause of things is not on this account removed; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of a Supreme Mind to be positedin a super-scientific sphere, then in a super-scientific sphere it ought tobe posited. No doubt this hypothesis at first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science can penetrate, there is no need of any suchhypothesis at all--cosmic harmony resulting as a physically necessaryconsequence from the combined action of natural laws, which in turn resultas a physically necessary consequence of the persistence of force and theprimary qualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true thatmetaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered scientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if consideredpsychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable that Mind shouldbe the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the persistence of forceshould be so, then it is not irrational to accept the more conceivablehypothesis in preference to the less conceivable one, provided that thechoice is made with the diffidence which is required by the considerationsadduced in Chapter V. I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological senselegitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone thisargument can rest--viz. , the position that the fundamental postulate ofAtheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate ofTheism--we have seen two important objections to lie. For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" ishere used is that of the impossibility of framing _realisable_ relations inthe thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_ relationsin thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is true thatthe complexity of the human organisation and its functions isinconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much lessweight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without waitingagain to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative standing ofMaterialism) how far even the genuine test of inconceivability ought to beallowed to make against an inference which there is a body of scientificevidence to substantiate, we went on to the second objection against thisfundamental position of metaphysical teleology. This objection, it will beremembered, was, that it is as impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony asan effect of Mind, as it is to conceive of it as an effect of mindlessevolution. The argument from inconceivability, therefore, admits of beingturned with quite as terrible an effect on Theism, as it can possibly bemade to exert on Atheism. Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, andwhich we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of Theism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its metaphysicalcharacter it has escaped the opposition of physical science, only toencounter a new opposition in the region of pure psychology to which itfled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it devolved on us todetermine the relative magnitudes of these opposing forces. And in doingthis we first observed that, if the supporters of metaphysical teleologyobjected _à priori_ to the method whereby the genesis of natural law wasdeduced from the datum of the persistence of force, in that this methodinvolved an unrestricted use of illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then itis no less open to an atheist to object _à priori_ to the method whereby adirecting Mind was inferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that thismethod involved the population of an unknowable cause, --and this of acharacter which the whole history of human thought has proved the humanmind to exhibit an overweening tendency to postulate as the cause ofnatural phenomena. On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far astheir respective standing _à priori_ is concerned, both theories may beregarded as about equally suspicious. And similar with regard to theirstanding _à posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at leastone infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutelyinconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of thetwo theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is aquestion which no one man can answer for another. For as the test ofabsolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a manwishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by what Ihave designated relative inconceivability--_i. E. _, in accordance with theverdict given by his individual sense of probability as determined by hisprevious habits of thought. And forasmuch as the test of relativeinconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to vary with thecharacter of the mind which applies it, the strictly rational probabilityof the question to which it is applied varies in like manner. Or, otherwisepresented, the only alternative for any man in this matter is either todiscipline himself into an attitude of pure scepticism, and thus to refusein thought to entertain either a probability or an improbability concerningthe existence of a God; or else to incline in thought towards anaffirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits ofthought have rendered such an inclination more facile in the one directionthan in the other. And although, under such circumstances, I shouldconsider that man the more rational who carefully suspended his judgment, Iconclude that if this course is departed from, neither the metaphysicalteleologist nor the scientific atheist has any perceptible advantage overthe other in respect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of ametaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and theformal conditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present onthe other, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied whereinthe pendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may bemade to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the abstractnature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which at thepresent time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the confusingamount of good, bad, and indifferent literature on both sides of thecontroversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not think thatthe result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the score of itslacking precision. At a time like the present, when traditional beliefsrespecting Theism are so generally accepted and so commonly concluded, as amatter of course, to have a large and valid basis of induction whereon torest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this short essay, by showing howvery concise the scientific _status_ of the subject really is, will do moreto settle the minds of most readers as to the exact standing at the presenttime of all the probabilities of the question, than could a perusal of allthe rest of the literature upon this subject. And, looking to the presentcondition of speculative philosophy, I regard it as of the utmostimportance to have clearly shown that the advance of science has nowentitled us to assert, without the least hesitation, that the hypothesis ofMind in nature is as certainly superfluous to account for any of thephenomena of nature, as the scientific doctrine of the persistence of forceand the indestructibility of matter is certainly true. On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logicalaspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite ashas the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter whichdoes not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity beleft for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears thisconsideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly complain of mynot having done my utmost in this case to define as sharply as possible thecharacter and the limits of this margin. § 49. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that anyantecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess isunquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with theutmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions hereworked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save thestrength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society togive his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they may he worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the most profitablefor the race, so I am persuaded that every individual endeavour to attainit, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed and sincere, oughtwithout hesitation to be made the common property of all men, no matter inwhat direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And sofar as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can havea more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency ofmy work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysishas been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lowerplane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purelyformal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle allbelief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline myintellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purestscepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with thosewho affirm that the twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirablesubstitute for the waning splendour of "the old, " I am not ashamed toconfess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lostits soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "workwhile it is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from theterribly intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when noman can work, " yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of theappalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once wasmine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it, --at such timesI shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which mynature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not beingsufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it bedue to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least werethe sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and forothers who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words ofHamilton, --Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, butof annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has become transformed into theterrific oracle to Oedipus-- "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art. " * * * * * APPENDIX AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. * * * * * APPENDIX. * * * * * A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF A FALLACY IN LOCKE'S USE OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINSTTHE POSSIBILITY OF MATTER THINKING ON GROUNDS OF ITS BEING INCONCEIVABLETHAT IT SHOULD. Lest it should be thought that I am doing injustice to the views of thisillustrious theist, I here quote his own words:--"We have the ideas ofmatter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether anymere material being thinks or no, it being impossible for us, by thecontemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whetheromnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a powerto perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed athinking immaterial substance; it being, in respect of our notions, notmuch more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if Hepleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that He shouldsuperadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we knownot wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substance the Almightyhas been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see nocontradiction in it that the first eternal thinking being should, if hepleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put togetheras he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think, I have proved, lib. Iv. , ch. 10 and 14, &c. , it is no less thana contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own naturevoid of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, suchas, _e. G. _, pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should bein an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, asfar as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body; andmotion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to producenothing but motion: so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyondour ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. Forsince we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no wayconceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that Hecould not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceivecapable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion ofmatter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any waylessen the belief of the soul's immateriality, &c.... It is a point whichseems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; and he who willgive himself leave to consider freely, and look into the dark and intricatepart of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine himfixedly for or against the soul's materiality. Since on which side soeverhe views it, either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extendedmatter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is inhis thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. An unfair way whichsome men take with themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness ofsomething they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contraryhypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiassedunderstanding. " This passage, I do not hesitate to say, is one of the most remarkable inthe whole range of philosophical literature, in respect of showing how eventhe strongest and most candid intellect may have its reasoning facultyimpaired by the force of a preformed conviction. Here we have a mind ofunsurpassed penetration and candour, which has left us side by side twoparallel trains of reasoning. In the one, the object is to show that theauthor's preformed conviction as to the being of a God is justifiable ongrounds of reason; in the other, the object is to show that, granting theexistence of a God, and it is not impossible that he may have endowedmatter with the faculty of thinking. Now, in the former train of reasoning, the whole proof rests entirely upon the fact that "it is impossible toconceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinkingintelligent being. " Clearly, if this proposition is true, it must destroyone or other of the trains of reasoning; for it is common to them both, andin one of them it is made the sole ground for concluding that matter cannotthink, while in the other it is made compatible with the supposition thatmatter may think. This extraordinary inconsistency no doubt arose from thefact that the author was antecedently persuaded of the existence of an_Omnipotent_ Mind, and having been long accustomed in his intellectualsymbols to regard it presumptuous in him to impose any limitations on thisalmighty power, when he asked himself whether it would be possible for thisalmighty power, if it so willed, to endow matter with the faculty ofthinking, he argued that it might be possible, notwithstanding his beingunable to conceive the possibility. But when he banished from his mind theidea of this personal and almighty power, and with that idea banished allits associations, he then felt that he had a right to argue more freely, and forthwith made his conceptive faculty a test of abstract possibility. Yet _the sum total of abstract possibility, in relation to him, must havebeen the same in the two cases_; so that in whichever of the two trains ofreasoning his argument was sound, in the other it must certainly have beennull. We may well feel amazed that so able a thinker can have fallen into soobvious an error, and afterwards have persisted in it through pages andpages of his work. It will be instructive, however, to those who rely uponLocke's exposition of the argument from Inconceivability to see howeffectually he has himself destroyed it. For this purpose, therefore, Ishall make some further quotations from the same train of reasoning. Thestatement of Locke's opinion that the Almighty could endow matter with thefaculty of thinking if He so willed, called down some remonstrances andrebukes from the then Bishop of Worcester. Locke's reply was a very lengthyone, and from it the following extracts are taken. I merely request thereader throughout to substitute for the words God, Creator, Almighty, Omipotency, &c. , the words _Summum genus_ of Possibility. "But it is further urged that we cannot conceive how matter can think. Igrant it, but to argue from thence that God therefore cannot give to mattera faculty of thinking is to say God's omnipotency is limited to a narrowcompass because man's understanding is so, and brings down God's infinitepower to the size of our capacities.... "If God can give no power to any parts of matter but what men can accountfor from the essence of matter in general; if all such qualities andproperties must destroy the essence, or change the essential properties ofmatter, which are to our conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to bethe natural consequence of that essence; it is plain that the essence ofmatter is destroyed, and its essential properties changed, in most of thesensible parts of this our system. For it is visible that all the planetshave revolutions about certain remote centres, which I would have any oneexplain or make conceivable by the bare essence, or natural powersdepending on the essence of matter in general, without something added tothat essence which we cannot conceive; for the moving of matter in acrooked line, or the attraction of matter by matter, is all that can besaid in the case; either of which it is above our reach to derive from theessence of matter or body in general, though one of these two mustunavoidably be allowed to be superadded, in this instance, to the essenceof matter in general. The omnipotent Creator advised not with us in themaking of the world, and His ways are not the less excellent because theyare past finding out.... "In all such cases, the superinducement of greater perfections and noblerqualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that were therebefore, unless there can be showed a manifest repugnancy between them; butall the proof offered for that is only that we cannot conceive how matter, without such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, intruth, no more than to say matter in general, or every part of matter, asmatter, has them not, but is no reason to prove that God, if He pleases, cannot superadd them to some parts of matter, unless it can be proved to bea contradiction that God should give to some parts of matter qualities andperfections which matter in general has not, though we cannot conceive howmatter is invested with them, or how it operates by virtue of those newendowments; nor is it to be wondered that we cannot, whilst we limit allits operations to those qualities it had before, and would explain them bythe known properties of matter in general, without any such inducedperfections. For if this be a right rule of reasoning, to deny a thing tobe because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be, I shall desirethem who use it to stick to this rule, and see what work it will make bothin divinity as well as philosophy, and whether they can advance anythingmore in favour of scepticism. "For to keep within the present subject of the power of thinking andself-motion bestowed by omnipotent power in some parts of matter: theobjection to this is, I cannot conceive how matter should think. What isthe consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a power to think. Let this standfor a good reason, and then proceed in other cases by the same. "You cannot conceive how matter can attract matter at any distance, muchless at the distance of 1, 000, 000 miles; ergo, God cannot give it such apower: you cannot conceive how matter should feel or move itself, or affectany material being, or be moved by it; ergo, God cannot give it suchpowers: which is in effect to deny gravity, and the revolution of theplanets about the sun; to make brutes mere machines, without sense orspontaneous motion; and to allow man neither sense nor voluntary motion. "Let us apply this rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how anextended solid substance should think, therefore God cannot make it think:can you conceive how your own soul or any substance thinks? You find, indeed, that you do think, and so do I; but I want to be told how theaction of thinking is performed: this, I confess, is beyond my conception;and I would be glad any one who conceives it would explain it to me. "God, I find, has given me this faculty; and since I cannot but beconvinced of His power in this instance, which, though I every momentexperience in myself, yet I cannot conceive the manner of, what would it beless than an insolent absurdity to deny His power in other like cases, onlyfor this reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?... "That Omnipotency cannot make a substance to be solid and not solid at thesame time, I think with due reverence [diffidence?[35]] we may say; butthat a solid substance may not have qualities, perfections, and powers, which have no natural or visibly necessary connection with solidity andextension, is too much for us (who are but of yesterday, and know nothing)to be positive in. "If God cannot join things together by connections inconceivable to us, wemust deny even the consistency and being of matter itself; since everyparticle of it having some bulk, has its parts connected by waysinconceivable to us. So that all the difficulties that are raised againstthe thinking of matter, from our ignorance or narrow conceptions, stand notat all in the way of the power of God, if He pleases to ordain it so; norprove anything against His having actually endowed some parcels of matter, so disposed as He thinks fit, with a faculty of thinking, till it can heshown that it contains a contradiction to suppose it. "Though to me sensation be comprehended under thinking in general, in theforegoing discourse I have spoke of sense in brutes as distinct fromthinking; because your lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in brutes. But here I take liberty to observe, that if your lordship allows brutes tohave sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to someparcels of matter a power of perception and thinking, or that all animalshave immaterial, and consequently, according to your lordship, immortalsouls, as well as men; and to say that fleas and mites, &c. , have immortalsouls as well as men, will possibly be looked on as going a great way toserve an hypothesis.... "It is true, I say, 'That bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else, ' andso I thought when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of theiroperation. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton'sincomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's powerin this point by my narrow conceptions. The gravitation of matter towardsmatter, by way unconceivable to me, is not only a demonstration that Godcan, if He pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation above whatcan be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we knowof matter, but also an unquestionable and everywhere visible instance thatHe has done so. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I will takecare to have that passage rectified.... "As to self-consciousness, your lordship asks, 'What is there likeself-consciousness in matter?' Nothing at all in matter as matter. But thatGod cannot bestow on some parcels of matter a power of thinking, and withit self-consciousness, will never be proved by asking how is it possible toapprehend that mere body should perceive that it doth perceive? Theweakness of our apprehension I grant in the case: I confess as much as youplease, that we cannot conceive how an unsolid created substance thinks;but this weakness of our apprehension reaches not the power of God, whoseweakness is stronger than anything in man. " Lastly, Locke turns upon his opponent the power of the _odium theologicum_. "Let it be as hard a matter as it will to give an account what it is thatshould keep the parts of a material soul together after it is separatedfrom the body, yet it will be always as easy to give an account of it as togive an account what it is that shall keep together a material andimmaterial substance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give anaccount of that, I hope, does not, with your lordship, weaken thecredibility of the inseparable union of soul and body to eternity; and Ipersuade myself that the men of sense, to whom your lordship appeals inthis case, do not find their belief of this fundamental point much weakenedby that difficulty.... But you will say, you speak only of the soul; andyour words are, that it is no easy matter to give an account how the soulshould be capable of immortality unless it be a material substance. I grantit, but crave leave to say, that there is not any one of these difficultiesthat are or can be raised about the manner how a material soul can beimmortal, which do not as well reach the immortality of the body.... "But your lordship, as I guess from your following words, would argue thata material substance cannot be a free agent; whereby I suppose you onlymean that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance should begin, stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that whenyou can make it conceivable how any created, finite, dependent substancecan move itself, I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestowthis power on a solid than an unsolid created substance.... But though youcannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can be a freeagent (pardon me, my lord, if I put in both, till your lordship please toexplain it of either, and show the manner how either of them can of itselfmove itself or anything else), yet I do not think you will so far deny mento be free agents, from the difficulty there is to see how they are freeagents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for the day ofjudgment. " Let us now, for the sake of contrast, turn to some passages which occur inthe other train of reasoning. "If we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can neverbegin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with orwithout motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, andknowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and everyparticle of it. " There is a double fallacy here. In the first place, conceivability is made the unconditional test of possibility; and, in thenext place, it is asserted that unless every particle of matter can think, no collocation of such particles can possibly do so. This latter fallacy isfurther insisted upon thus:--"If they will not allow matter as matter, thatis, every particle of matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, theywill have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitativebeing out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextendedparts, if I may so speak.... Every particle of matter, as matter, iscapable of all the same figures and motions of any other, and I challengeany one in his thoughts to add anything else to one above another. " Now, aswe have seen, Locke himself has shown in his other trains of argument thatthis challenge is thoroughly futile as a refutation of possibilities; butthe point to which I now wish to draw attention is this--It does not followbecause certain and highly complex collocations of material particles maybe supposed capable of thinking, that therefore every particle of mattermust be regarded as having this attribute. We have innumerable analogies innature of a certain collocation of matter and force producing certainresults which another somewhat similar collocation could not produce: insuch cases we do not assume that all the resulting attributes of the onecollocation must be presented also by the other--still less that theseresulting attributes must belong to the primary qualities of matter andforce. Hence, it is not fair to assume that thought must either be inherentin every particle of matter, or else not producible by any possiblecollocation of such particles, unless it has previously been shown that soto produce it by any possible collocation is in the nature of thingsimpossible. But no one could refute this fallacy better than Locke himselfhas done in some of the passages already quoted from his other train ofreasoning. But to continue the quotation:--"If, therefore, it be evident thatsomething necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident thatthat something must necessarily be a cogitative being; for it is asimpossible [_inconceivable_] that incogitative matter should produce acogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, shouldproduce a positive being or matter. " Again, --"For unthinking particles ofmatter, however put together, can have [_can be taught to have_] nothingthereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it isimpossible [_inconceivable_] should give thought and knowledge to them. " It is unnecessary to multiply these quotations, for, in effect, they wouldall be merely repetitions of one another. It is enough to have seen thatthis able author undertakes to demonstrate the existence of a God, and thathis whole demonstration resolves itself into the unwarrantable inference, that as we are unable to conceive how thought can be a property of matter, therefore a property of matter thought cannot be. That such an erroneousinference should occur in any writings of so old a date as those of Lockeis not in itself surprising. What is surprising is the fact, that in thesame writings, and in the course of the same discussion, the fallacy ofthis very inference is repeatedly pointed out and insisted upon in a greatvariety of ways; and it has been chiefly for the sake of showing thepernicious influence which preformed opinion may exert--viz. , even toblinding the eyes of one of the most clear-sighted and thoughtful men thatever lived to a glaring contradiction repeated over and over again in thecourse of a few pages, --it has been chiefly for this reason that I haveextended this Appendix to so great a length. I shall now conclude it byquoting some sentences which occur on the very next page after that fromwhich the last quoted sentences were taken. Our author here again returnsto his defence of the omnipotency of God; and as he now again thuspersonifies the sum total of possibility, his mind abruptly reverts to allits other class of associations. In this case the transition isparticularly interesting, not only on account of its suddenness, but alsobecause the correlations contemplated happen to be exactly the same in thetwo cases--viz. , matter as the cause of mind, and mind as the cause ofmatter. Remember that on the last page this great philosopher supposed hehad demonstrated the abstract impossibility of matter being the cause ofmind on the ground of a causal connection being inconceivable, let us nowobserve what he says upon this page regarding the abstract possibility ofmind being the cause of matter. "Nay, possibly, if we would emancipateourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they wouldreach to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at somedim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin toexist by the power of that eternal first being.... But you will say, Is itnot impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since wecannot possibly conceive it? I answer--No; because it is not reasonable todeny the power of an infinite being [this phrase, in the absence ofhypothesis, _i. E. _, in Locke's other train of reasoning, is of courseequivalent to the sum-total of possibility] because we cannot comprehendits operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because wecannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceivehow anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not areason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constantexperience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, whichare produced in us only by the free action or thought of our minds, and arenot, nor can be, the effects of the impulse or determination of the blindmatter in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in our power orchoice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, whilst my left handis still: what causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but mywill, a thought in my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests, and the left hands moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied:explain this and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be tounderstand creation. "[36] * * * * * SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS. * * * * * I. COSMIC THEISM. [37] Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable is a doctrine of so muchspeculative importance, that it behoves all students of philosophy to haveclear views respecting its character and implications. Mr. Spencer hashimself so fully explained the character of this doctrine, that noattentive reader can fail to understand it; but concerning those of itsimplications which may be termed theological--as distinguished fromreligious--Mr. Spencer is silent. Within the last two or three years, however, there has appeared a valuable work by an able exponent of the newphilosophy; and in this work the writer, adopting his master's teaching ofthe Unknowable, proceeds to develop it into a definite system of what maybe termed scientific theology. And not only so, but he assures the worldthat this system of scientific theology is the highest, the purest, and themost ennobling form of religion that mankind has ever been privileged toknow in the past, or, from the nature of the case, can ever be destined toknow in the future. It is a system, we are told, wherein the mostfundamental truths of Theism are taught as necessary deductions from thehighest truths of Science; it is a system wherein no single doctrineappeals for its acceptance to any principle of blind or credulous faith, but wherein every doctrine can be fully justified by the searching light ofreason; it is a system wherein the noblest of our aspirations and the mostsublime of our emotions are able to find an object far more worthy and muchmore glorious than has ever been supplied to them by any of the older formsof Theism; and it is a system, therefore, in which, with a greatly enlargedand intensified meaning, we may worship God, and all that is within usbless His holy name. Assuredly a proclamation such as this, emanating fromthe most authoritative expounders of modern thought, as the highest and thegreatest result to which a rigorous philosophic synthesis has led, is aproclamation which cannot fail to arrest our most serious attention. Nay, may it not do more than this? May it not appeal to hearts which long haveceased to worship? May it not once more revive a hope--long banished, perhaps, but still the dearest which our poor natures haveexperienced--that somewhere, sometime, or in some way, it may yet bepossible to feel that God is not far from any one of us? For to those whohave known the anguish of a shattered faith, it will not seem so childishthat our hearts should beat the quicker when we once more hear a voiceannouncing to a world of superstitious idolaters--"Whom ye ignorantlyworship, Him declare I unto you. " But if, when we have listened to the gladtidings of the new gospel, we find that the preacher, though apparently inearnest, is not worthy to be heard again on this matter; and if, as we turnaway, our eyes grow dim with the memory of a vanished dream, surely we mayfeel that the preacher is deserving of our blame for obtruding thus uponthe most sacred of our sorrows. Mr. John Fiske is, as is well known, an author who unites in himself thequalities of a well-read student of philosophy, a clear and accuratethinker, a thorough master of the principles which in his recent work heundertakes to explain and to extend, and a writer gifted in a remarkabledegree with the power of lucid exposition. Such being the intellectualcalibre of the man who elaborates this new system of scientific theology, Iconfess that, on first seeing his work, I experienced a faint hope that, inthe higher departments of the Philosophy of Evolution as conceived by Mr. Spencer and elaborated by his disciple, there might be found some rationaljustification for an attenuated form of Theism. But on examination I findthat the bread which these fathers have offered us turns out to be a stone;and thinking that it is desirable to warn other of the children--whether ofthe family Philosophical or Theological--against swallowing on trust amorsel so injurious, I shall endeavour to point out what I conceive to bethe true nature of "Cosmic Theism. " Starting from the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, Mr. Fiske, following Mr. Spencer, proceeds to show how the doctrine implies that theremust be a mode of Being to which human knowledge is non-relative. Or, inother words, he shows that the postulation of phenomena necessitates thefurther postulation of noumena of which phenomena are the manifestations. Now what may we affirm of noumena without departing from a scientific orobjective mode of philosophising? We may affirm at least this much ofnoumena, that they constitute a mode of existence which need notnecessarily vanish were our consciousness to perish; and, therefore, thatthey now stand out of necessary relation to our consciousness. Or, in otherwords, so far as human consciousness is concerned, noumena must be regardedas absolute. "But now, what do we mean by this affirmation of absolutereality independent of the conditions of the process of knowing? Do we meanto ... Affirm, in language savouring strongly of scholasticism, thatbeneath the phenomena which we call subjective there is an occultsubstratum Mind, and beneath the phenomena which we call objective there isan occult substratum Matter? Our conclusion cannot be stated in any suchform.... Our conclusion is simply this, that no theory of phenomena, external or internal, can be framed without postulating an AbsoluteExistence of which phenomena are the manifestations. And now let uscarefully note what follows. We cannot identify this Absolute Existencewith Mind, since what we know as Mind is a series of phenomenalmanifestations.... Nor can we identify this Absolute Existence with Matter, since what we know as Matter is a series of phenomenal manifestations.... Absolute Existence, therefore, --the Reality which persists independently ofus, and of which Mind and Matter are the phenomenal manifestations, --cannotbe identified either with Mind or with Matter. Thus is Materialism includedin the same condemnation with Idealism.... See then how far we havetravelled from the scholastic theory of occult substrata underlying eachgroup of phenomena. These substrata were but the ghosts of the phenomenathemselves; behind the tree or the mountain a sort of phantom tree ormountain, which persists after the body of perception has gone away withthe departure of the percipient mind. Clearly this is no scientificinterpretation of the facts, but is rather a specimen of naïve barbaricthought surviving in metaphysics. The tree or mountain being groups ofphenomena, what we assert as persisting independently of the percipientmind is a something which we are unable to condition either as tree or asmountain. "And now we come down to the very bottom of the problem. Since we dopostulate Absolute Existence, and do not postulate a particular occultsubstance underlying each group of phenomena, are we to be understood asimplying that there is a single Being of which all phenomena, internal andexternal to consciousness, are manifestations? Such must seem to be theinevitable conclusion, since we are able to carry on thinking at all onlyunder the relations of Difference and No-difference.... It may seem that, since we cannot attribute to the Absolute Reality any relations ofDifference, we must positively ascribe to it No-difference. Or, what is thesame thing, in refusing to predicate multiplicity of it, do we notvirtually predicate of it unity? We do, simply because we cannot thinkwithout so doing. "[38] A single Absolute Reality being thus posited, our author proceeds, towardsthe close of his work, to argue that as this Reality cannot be conceived aslimited either in space or time, it constitutes a Being which correspondswith our essential conception of Deity. True it is devoid of certainaccessory attributes, such as personality, intelligence, and volition; butfor this very reason, it is insisted, the theistic ideal as thus presentedis a purer, and therefore a better, ideal than has ever been presentedbefore. Nay, it is the highest possible form of this ideal, as thefollowing considerations will show. In what has consisted that continuouspurification of Theism which the history of thought shows to have beeneffected, from the grossest form of belief in supernatural agency asexhibited in Fetichism, through its more refined form as exhibited inPolytheism, to its still more refined form as exhibited in Monotheism? Innothing but in a continuous process of what Mr. Fiske calls"deanthropomorphisation. " Consequently, must we not conclude that when wecarry this process yet one step further, and divest our conception of Deityof all the yet lingering remnants of anthropomorphism which occur in thecurrent conceptions of Deity, we are but still further purifying thatconception? Assuredly, the attributes of personality, intelligence, and soforth, are only known as attributes of Humanity, and therefore to ascribethem to Deity is but to foster, in a more refined form, the anthropomorphicteachings of previous religions. But if we carefully refuse to limit Deityby the ascription of any human attributes whatever, and if the onlyattributes which we do ascribe are such as on grounds of pure reason alonewe are compelled to ascribe, must we not conclude that the form of Theismwhich results is the purest and the most refined form in which it ispossible for Theism to exist? "From the anthropomorphic point of view itwill quite naturally be urged in objection, that this apparently desirableresult is reached through the degradation of Deity from an 'intelligentpersonality' to a 'blind force, ' and is therefore in reality an undesirableand perhaps quasi-atheistic result. "[39] But the question which reallypresents itself is, "theologically phrased, whether the creature is to betaken as a measure of the Creator. Scientifically phrased, the question iswhether the highest form of Being as yet suggested to one petty race ofcreatures by its ephemeral experience of what is going on in one tinycorner of the universe, is necessarily to be taken as the equivalent ofthat absolutely highest form of Being in which all the possibilities ofexistence are alike comprehended. "[40] Therefore, in conclusion, "whetheror not it is true that, within the bounds of the phenomenal universe thehighest type of existence is that which we know as humanity, the conclusionis in every way forced upon us that, quite independently of limitingconditions in space or time, there is a form of Being which can neither beassimilated to humanity nor to any lower type of existence. We have noalternative, therefore, but to regard it as higher than humanity, even 'asthe heavens are higher than the earth, ' and except for the intellectualarrogance which the arguments of theologians show lurking beneath theirexpressions of humility, there is no reason why this admission should notbe made unreservedly, without the anthropomorphic qualifications by whichits effect is commonly nullified. The time is surely coming when theslowness of men in accepting such a conclusion will be marvelled at, andwhen the very inadequacy of human language to express Divinity will beregarded as a reason for a deeper faith and more solemn adoration. "[41] I have now sufficiently detailed the leading principles of Cosmic Theism torender a clear and just conception of those fundamental parts of the systemwhich I am about to criticise; but it is needless to say that, for allminor details of this system, I must refer those who may not already haveperused them to Mr. Fiske's somewhat elaborate essays. In now beginning mycriticisms, it may be well to state at the outset, that they are to berestricted to the philosophical aspect of the subject. With matters ofsentiment I do not intend to deal, --partly because to do so would be undulyto extend this essay, and partly also because I believe that, so far as theacceptance or the rejection of Cosmic Theism is to be determined bysentiment, much, if not all, will depend on individual habits of thought. For whether or not Cosmic Theism is to be regarded as a religion adapted tothe needs of any individual man, will depend on what these needs are feltto be by that man himself: we cannot assert magisterially that thisreligion must be adapted to his needs because we have found it to beadapted to our own. And if it is retorted that, human nature beingeverywhere the same, a form of religion that is adapted to one man must onthis account be adapted to another, I reply that it is not so. For if a manwho is what Mr. Fiske calls an "Anthropomorphic Theist" finds fromexperience that his system of religion--say Christianity--creates andsustains a class of emotions and general habits of thought which he feelsto be the highest and the best of which he is capable, it is useless for a"Cosmic Theist" to offer such a man another system of religion, in whichthe conditions essential to the existence of these particular emotions andhabits of thought are manifestly absent. For such a man cannot but feelthat the proffered substitution would be tantamount, if accepted, to anutter destruction of all that he regards as essentially religious. He willtell us that he finds it perfectly easy to understand and to appreciatethose feelings of vague awe and "worship of the silent kind" which theCosmic Theist declares to be fostered by Cosmic Theism; but he will alsotell us that those feelings, which he has experienced with equal vividnessunder his own system of Anthropomorphic Theism, are to him but asnon-religious dross compared with the unspeakable felicity of holdingdefinite commune with the Almighty and Most Merciful, or of renderingworship that is a glad hosanna--a fearless shout of joy. On the other hand, I believe that it is possible for philosophic habits of thought so todiscipline the mind that the feelings of vague awe and silent worship inthe presence of an appalling Mystery become more deep and steady than atheist proper can well believe. It is therefore impossible that eitherparty can fully appreciate those sentiments of the other which they havenever fully experienced themselves; for even in those cases where ananthropomorphic theist has been compelled to abandon his creed, as thechange must take place in mature life, his tone of mind has been determinedbefore it does take place; and therefore in sentiment, though not in faith, he is more or less of a theist for the rest of his life: the only effect ofthe change is to create a troubled interference between his desires and hisbeliefs. However, I do not intend to develop this branch of the subject further thanthus to point out, in a general way, that religion-mongers as a class areapt to show too little regard for the sentiments, as distinguished from thebeliefs, of those to whom they offer their wares. But although I do notintend to constitute myself a champion of theology by pointing out thedefects of Cosmic Theism in the aspect which it presents to current modesof thought, there is one such defect which I must here dwell upon, becausewe shall afterwards have occasion to refer to it. A theologian may verynaturally make this objection to Cosmic Theism as presented by Mr. Fiske--viz. , that the argument on which this philosopher throughout reliesas a self-evident demonstration that the new system of Theism is a furtherand a final improvement on all the previous systems of Theism, is afallacious argument. As we have already seen, this argument is, that as theprogress in the purification of Theism has throughout consisted in aprocess of "deanthropomorphisation, " therefore the terminal phase in thisprocess, which Cosmic Theism introduces, must be still in the direction ofthat progress. But to this argument a theologian may not unreasonablyobject, that this terminal phase differs from all the previous phases inone all-important feature--viz. , in effecting a _total abolition_ of theanthropomorphic element. Before, therefore, it can be shown that thisterminal phase is a further development of _Theism_, it must he shown thatTheism still remains Theism after this hitherto characteristic element hasbeen removed. If it is true, as Mr. Fiske very properly insists, that allthe various forms of belief in God have thus far had this as a commonfactor, that they ascribed to God the attributes of Man; it becomes aquestion whether we may properly abstract this hitherto invariable factorof a belief, and still call that belief by the same name. Or, to put thematter in another light, as cosmists maintain that Theism, in all thephases of its development, has been the product of a probably erroneoustheory of personal agency in nature, when this theory is expresslydiscarded--as it is by the doctrine of the Unknowable--is itphilosophically legitimate for cosmists to render their theory of things interms which belong to the totally different theory which they discard? Nodoubt it is true that the progressive refinement of Theism has throughoutconsisted in a progressive discarding of anthropomorphic qualities; butthis fact does not touch the consideration that, when we proceed to stripoff the last remnants of these qualities, we are committing an act whichdiffers _toto coelo_ from all the previous acts which are cited asprecedents; for by this terminal act we are not, as heretofore, _refining_the theory of Theism--we are completely _transforming_ it by removing anelement which, both genetically and historically, would seem to constitutethe very essence of Theism. Or the case may be presented in yet another light. The only use of terms, whether in daily talk or in philosophical disquisition, is that ofdesignating certain things or attributes to which by general custom weagree to affix them; so that if anyone applies a term to some thing orattribute which general custom does not warrant him in so applying, he ismerely laying himself open to the charge of abusing that term. Now applythese elementary principles to the case before us. We have but to think ofthe disgust with which the vast majority of living persons would regard thesense in which Mr. Fiske uses the term "Theism, " to perceive how intimateis the association of that term with the idea of a Personal God. Suchpersons will feel strongly that, by this final act of purification, Mr. Fiske has simply purified the Deity altogether out of existence. And Iscarcely think it is here competent to reply that all previous acts ofpurification were at first similarly regarded as destructive, because it isevident that none of these previous acts affected, as this one does, thecentral core of Theism. And, lastly, if it should be still furtherobjected, that by declaring the theory of Personal Agency the central coreof Theism, I am begging the question as to the appropriateness of Mr. Fiske's use of the word "Theism, "--seeing he appears to regard theessential meaning of this word to be that of a postulation of merely CausalAgency, --I answer, More of this anon; but meanwhile let it be observed thatany charge of question-begging lies rather at the door of Mr. Fiske, inthat he assumes, without any expressed justification, that the essence ofTheism _does_ consist in such a postulation and in nothing more. And as heunquestionably has against him the present world of theists no less thanthe history of Theism in the past, I do not see how he is to meet thischarge except by confessing to an abuse of the term in question. I will now proceed to examine the structure of Cosmic Theism. We are all, Isuppose, at one in allowing that there are only three "verballyintelligible" theories of the universe, --viz. , that it is self-existent, orthat it is self-created, or that it has been created by some other andexternal Being. It is usual to call the first of these theories Atheism, the second Pantheism, and the third Theism. Now as there are here threedistinct nameable theories, it is necessary, if the term "Cosmic Theism" isto be justified as an appropriate term, that the particular theory which itdesignates should be shown to be in its essence theistic--_i. E. _, that thetheory should present those distinguishing features in virtue of whichTheism differs from Atheism on the one hand, and from Pantheism on theother. Now what are these features? The postulate of an EternalSelf-existing Something is common to Theism and to Atheism. Here Atheismends. Theism, however, is generally said to assume Personality, Intelligence, and Creative Power as attributes of the single self-existingsubstance. Lastly, Pantheism assumes the Something now existing to havebeen self-created. To which, then, of these distinct theories is CosmicTheism most nearly allied? For the purpose of answering this question, Ishall render that theory in terms of a formula which Mr. Fiske presents asa full and complete statement of the theory:--"_There exists a_ POWER, _towhich no limit in space or time is conceivable, of which all phenomena, aspresented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only knowthrough these manifestations. _" But although the word "Power" is here sostrongly emphasised, we are elsewhere told that it is not to be regarded ashaving more than a strictly relative or symbolic meaning; so that, in pointof fact, some more neutral word, such as "Something, " "Being, " or"Substance, " ought in strictness to be here substituted for the word"Power. " Well, if this is done, we have the postulation of a Being which isself-existing, infinite, and eternal--relatively, at all events, to ourpowers of conception. Thus far, therefore, it would seem that we are stillon the common standing-ground of Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism; for as itis not, so far as I can see, incumbent on Pantheism to affirm that "thoughtis a measure of things, " the _apparent_ or _relative_ eternity which thePrimal Something must be supposed to present may not be _actual_ or_absolute_ eternity. Nevertheless, as Mr. Fiske, by predicating Divinity ofthe Primal Something, implicitly attributes to it the quality of an_eternal_ self-existence, I infer that Cosmic Theism may be concluded atthis point to part company with Pantheism. There remain, then, Theism andAtheism. Now undoubtedly, at first sight, Cosmic Theism appears to differ fromAtheism in one all-important particular. For we have seen that, by means ofa subtle though perfectly logical argument, Cosmic Philosophy has evolvedthis conclusion--that all phenomena as presented in consciousness aremanifestations of a not improbable Single Self-existing Power, of whoseexistence these manifestations alone can make us cognisant. From which itapparently follows, that this hypothetical Power must be regarded asexisting out of necessary relation to the phenomenal universe; that it is, therefore, beyond question "Absolute Being;" and that, as such, we areentitled to call it Deity. But in the train of reasoning of which this is avery condensed epitome, it is evident that the legitimacy of denominatingthis Absolute Being Deity, must depend on the exact meaning which we attachto the word "Absolute"--and this, be it observed, quite apart from thequestion, before touched upon, as to whether Personality and Intelligenceare not to be considered as attributes essential to Deity. In what sense, then, is the word "Absolute" used? It is used in this sense. As from therelativity of knowledge we cannot know things in themselves, but onlysymbolical representations of such things, therefore things in themselvesare absolute to consciousness: but analysis shows that we cannotconceivably predicate Difference among things in themselves, so that we areat liberty, with due diffidence, to predicate of them No-difference: hencethe noumena of the schoolmen admit of being collected into a _summum genus_of noumenal existence; and since, before their colligation noumena wereseverally absolute, after their colligation they become collectivelyabsolute: therefore it is legitimate to designate this sum-total ofnoumenal existence, "Absolute Being. " Now there is clearly no exception tobe taken to the formal accuracy of this reasoning; the only question is asto whether the "Absolute Being" which it evolves is absolute in the senserequired by Theism. I confess that to me this Being appears to be absolutein a widely different sense from that in which Deity must be regarded asabsolute. For this Being is thus seen to be absolute in no other sense thanas holding--to quote from Mr. Fiske--"existence independent of theconditions of the process of knowing. " In other words, it is absolute onlyas standing out of necessary relation to _human consciousness_. But Theismrequires, as an essential feature, that Deity should be absolute asstanding out of necessary relation to _all else_. Before, therefore, theAbsolute Being of Cosmism can be shown, by the reasoning adopted, todeserve, even in part, the appellation of Deity, it must be shown thatthere is no other mode of Being in existence save our own subjectiveconsciousness and the Absolute Reality which becomes objective to itthrough the world of phenomena. But any attempt to establish this positionwould involve a disregard of the doctrine that knowledge is relative; andto do this, it is needless to say, would be to destroy the basis of theargument whereby the Absolute Being of Cosmism was posited. Or, to state this part of the criticism in other words, as the first stepin justifying the predication of Deity, it must be shown that the Being ofwhich the predication is made is absolute, and this not merely asindependent of human consciousness, but as independent of the wholenoumenal universe--Deity itself alone excepted. That is, the Being of whichDeity is predicated must be Unconditioned. Hence it is incumbent on CosmicTheism to prove, either that the Causal Agent which it denominates Deity isitself the whole noumenal universe, or that it created the rest of anoumenal universe; else there is nothing to show that this Causal Agent wasnot itself created--seeing that, even if we assume the existence of a God, there is nothing to indicate that the Causal Agent of Cosmism is that God. It would appear therefore from this, that whatever else the Cosmist'stheory of things may be, it certainly is not Theism; and I think thatcloser inspection will tend to confirm this judgment. To this then let usproceed. Mr. Fiske is very hard on the atheists, and so will probably repudiate withscorn any insinuations to the effect that his theory of things is"quasi-atheistic. " Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is very unjust tothe atheists, in that while he spares no pains to "purify" and "refine" thetheory of the theists, so as at last to leave nothing but what he regardsas the distilled essence of Theism behind; he habitually leaves the theoryof the atheists as he finds it, without making any attempt either to"purify" it by removing its weak and unnecessary ingredients, or to"refine" it by adding such sublimated ingredients as modern speculation hassupplied. Thus, while he despises the atheists of the eighteenth centuryfor their irrationality in believing in the self-existence of a_phenomenal_ universe, and reviles them for their irreligion in denyingthat "the religious sentiment needed satisfaction;" he does not wait toinquire whether, in its essential substance, the theory of these men is notthe one that has proved itself best able to withstand the grinding actionof more recent thought. But let us in fairness ask, What was the essentialsubstance of that theory? Apparently it was the bare statement of theunthinkable fact that Something Is. It therefore seems to me useless in Mr. Fiske to lay so much stress on the fact that this Something was originallyidentified by atheists with the phenomenal universe. It seems useless to dothis, because such identification is clearly no part of the _essence_ ofAtheism, which, as just stated, I take to consist in the single dogma ofself-existence as itself sufficient to constitute a theory of things. And, if so, it is a matter of scarcely any moment, as regards that theory, whether we are _immediately_ cognisant of that which is self-existent, oronly become so through the world of phenomena--the vital point of thetheory being, that Self-existence, _wherever posited_, is itself the onlyadmissible explanation of phenomena. Or, in other words, it does not seemthat there is anything in the atheistic theory, as such, which isincompatible with the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge; so thatwhatever cogency there may be in the train of reasoning whereby a singleCausal Agent is deduced from that doctrine, it would seem that an atheisthas as much right to the benefit of this reasoning as a theist; and thereis thus no more apparent reason why this single Causal Agent should beappropriated as the God of Theism, than that it should be appropriated asthe Self-existing X of Atheism. Indeed, there seems to be less reason. Foran atheist of to-day may very properly argue:--'So far from beholdinganything divine in this Single Being absolute to human consciousness, it isjust precisely the form of Being which my theory postulates as theSelf-existing All. In order to constitute such a Being God, it must beshown, as we have already seen, to be something more than a merely CausalAgent which is absolute in the grotesquely restricted sense of beingindependent of 'one petty race of creatures with an ephemeral experience ofwhat is going on in one tiny corner of the universe;' it must be shown tobe something more than absolute even in the wholly unrestricted sense ofbeing Unconditioned; it must be shown to possess such other attributes asare distinctive of Deity. For I maintain that even Unconditioned Being, _merely as such_, would only then have a right to the name of God when ithas been shown that the theory of Theism has a right to monopolise thedoctrine of Relativity. ' In thus endeavouring to "purify" the theory of Atheism, by divesting it ofall superfluous accessories, and laying bare what I conceive to be itsessential substance; it may be well to state that, even apart from theirirreligious character, I have no sympathy with the atheists of the pastcentury. I mean, that these men do not seem to me to deserve any credit foradvanced powers of speculation merely because they adopted a theory ofthings which in its essential features now promises to be the mostenduring. For it is evident that the strength of this theory now lies inits _simplicity_, --in its undertaking to explain, so far as explanation ispossible, the sum-total of phenomena by the single postulate ofself-existence. But it seems to me that in the last century there were nosufficient data for rendering such a theory of things a rational theory;for so long as the quality of self-existence was supposed to reside inphenomena themselves, the very simplicity of the theory, as expressed inwords, must have seemed to render it inapplicable as a reasonable theory ofthings. The astounding variety, complexity, and harmony which areeverywhere so conspicuous in the world of phenomena must have seemed tonecessitate as an explanation some one integrating cause; and it isimpossible that in the eighteenth century any such integrating cause canhave been conceivable other than Intelligence. Therefore I think, with Mr. Fiske, that the atheists of the eighteenth century were irrational inapplying their single postulate of self-existence as alone a sufficientexplanation of things. But of course the aspect of the case is nowcompletely changed, when we regard it in all the flood of light which hasbeen shed on it by recent science, physical and speculative. For thedemonstration of the fact that energy is indestructible, coupled with thecorollary that every so-called natural law is a physically necessaryconsequence of that fact, clearly supply us with a completely novel datumas the ultimate source of experience--and a datum, moreover, which is asdifferent as can well be imagined from the ever-changing, ever-fleeting, world of phenomena. We have, therefore, but to apply the postulate ofself-existence to this single ultimate datum, and we have a theory ofthings as rational as the Atheism of the last century was irrational. Nevertheless, that this theory is more akin to the Atheism of the lastcentury than to any other theory of that time, is, I think, unquestionable;for while we retain the central doctrine of self-existence as alone ascientifically admissible, or non-gratuitous, explanation of things, weonly change the original theory by transferring the application of thisdoctrine from the world of manifestations to that which causes themanifestations: we do not resort to any of the _additional_ doctrineswhereby the other theories of the universe were distinguished from thetheory of Atheism in its original form. However, as by our recognition ofthe relativity of knowledge we are precluded from dogmatically denying anytheory of the universe that may be proposed, it would clearly be erroneousto identify the doctrine of the Unknowable with the theory of Atheism: allwe can say is, that, so far as speculative thought can soar, the permanentself-existence of an inconceivable Something, which manifests itself toconsciousness as force and matter, constitutes the only datum that can beshown to be required for the purposes of a rational ontology. To sum up. In the theory which Mr. Fiske calls Cosmic Theism, while I amable to discern the elements which I think may properly be regarded ascommon to Theism and to Atheism, I am not able to discern any singleelement that is specifically distinctive of Theism. Still I am far fromconcluding that the theory in question is the theory of Atheism. All I wishto insist upon is this--that as the Absolute Being of Cosmism presents noother qualities than such as are required by the renovated theory ofAtheism, its postulation supplies a basis, not for Theism, but forNon-theism: a man with such a postulate ought in strictness to abstain fromeither affirming or denying the existence of God. And this, I may observe, appears to be the position which Mr. Spencer himself has adopted as theonly logical outcome of his doctrine of the Unknowable--a position which, in my opinion, it is most undesirable to obscure by endeavouring to give ita quasi-theistic interpretation. I may further observe, that we here seemto have a philosophical justification of the theological sentimentpreviously alluded to--the sentiment, namely, that by his attempt at afinal purification of Theism, Mr. Fiske has destroyed those essentialfeatures of the theory in virtue of which alone it exists as Theism. Forseeing it is impossible, from the relativity of knowledge, that theAbsolute Being of Cosmism can ever be shown absolute in the sense requiredby Theism, and, even if it could, that it would still be but theUnconditioned Being of Atheism; it follows that if this Absolute Being isto be shown even in part to deserve the appellation of Deity, it must beshown to possess the only remaining attributes which are distinctive ofDeity--to wit, personality and intelligence. But forasmuch as the final actof purifying the conception of Deity consists, according to Mr. Fiske, inexpressly removing these particular attributes from the object of thatconception, does it not follow that the conception which remains is, as Ihave said, not theistic, but non-theistic? Here my criticism might properly have ended, were it not that Mr. Fiske, after having divested the Deity of all his psychical attributes, forthwithproceeds to show how it may be dimly possible to reinvest him withattributes that are "quasi-psychical. " Mr. Fiske is, of course, far toosubtle a thinker not to see that his previous argument from relativityprecludes him from assigning much weight to the ontological speculations inwhich he here indulges, seeing that in whatever degree the relativity ofknowledge renders legitimate the non-ascription to Deity of known psychicalattributes, in some such degree at least must it render illegitimate theascription to Deity of unknown psychical attributes. But in the part of hiswork in which he treats of the quasi-psychical attributes, Mr. Fiske ismerely engaged in showing that the speculative standing of the"materialists" is inferior to that of the "spiritualists;" so that, as thisis a subject distinct from Theism, he is not open to the charge ofinconsistency. Well, feeble as these speculations undoubtedly are in thesupport which they render to Theism, it nevertheless seems desirable toconsider them before closing this review. The speculations in question arequoted from Mr. Spencer, and are as follows:-- "Mind, as known to the possessor of it, is a circumscribed aggregate ofactivities; and the cohesion of these activities, one with another, throughout the aggregate, compels the postulation of a something of whichthey are the activities. But the same experiences which make him aware ofthis coherent aggregate of mental activities, simultaneously make him awareof activities that are not included in it--outlying activities which becomeknown by their effects on this aggregate, but which are experimentallyproved to be not coherent with it, and to be coherent with one another(_First Principles_, §§ 43, 44). As, by the definition of them, theseexternal activities cannot be brought within the aggregate of activitiesdistinguished as those of Mind, they must for ever remain to him nothingmore than the unknown correlatives of their effects on this aggregate; andcan be thought of only in terms furnished by this aggregate. Hence, if heregards his conceptions of these activities lying beyond Mind asconstituting knowledge of them, he is deluding himself: he is butrepresenting these activities in terms of Mind, and can never do otherwise. Eventually he is obliged to admit that his ideas of Matter and Motion, merely symbolic of unknowable realities, are complex states ofconsciousness built out of units of feeling. But if, after admitting this, he persists in asking whether units of feeling are of the same nature asthe units of force distinguished as external, or whether the units of forcedistinguished as external are of the same nature as units of feeling; thenthe reply, still substantially the same, is that we may go further towardsconceiving units of external force to be identical with units of feeling, than we can towards conceiving units of feeling to be identical with unitsof external force. Clearly, if units of external force are regarded asabsolutely unknown and unknowable, then to translate units of feeling intothem is to translate the known into the unknown, which is absurd. And ifthey are what they are supposed to be by those who identify them with theirsymbols, then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them isinsurmountable: if Force as it objectively exists is absolutely alien innature from that which exists subjectively as Feeling, then thetransformation of Force into Feeling is unthinkable. Either way, therefore, it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of outer existence. But if, on the other hand, units of Force as they exist objectively areessentially the same in nature with those manifested subjectively as unitsof Feeling, then a conceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element ofthat aggregate of activities constituting a consciousness is known asbelonging to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. Beyond thelimits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist activities quiteindependent of it, and which cannot be brought into it. We may imagine, then, that by their exclusion from the circumscribed activitiesconstituting consciousness, these outer activities, though of the sameintrinsic nature, become antithetically opposed in aspect. Beingdisconnected from consciousness, or cut off by its limits, they are therebyrendered foreign to it. Not being incorporated with its activities, orlinked with these as they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as itwere, run through them; and so they come to be figured as unconscious--aresymbolised as having the nature called material, as opposed to that calledspiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable possibility thatunits of external Force may be identical in nature with units of the forceknown as Feeling, yet we cannot by so representing them get any nearer to acomprehension of external Force. For, as already shown, supposing all formsof Mind to be composed of homogeneous units of feeling variouslyaggregated, the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable asbefore to think of the substance of Mind as it exists in such units; andthus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of external Forceas being essentially like units of the force known as Feeling, and as soconstituting a universal sentiency, we should be as far as ever fromforming a conception of that which is universally sentient. "[42] Now while I agree with Mr. Fiske that we have here "the most subtleconclusion now within the ken of the scientific speculator, reached withoutany disregard of the canons prescribed by the doctrine of relativity, " Iwould like to point out to minds less clear-sighted than his, that thissame "doctrine of relativity" effectually debars us from using this"conclusion" as an argument of any assignable value in favour of Theism. For the value of conceivability as a test of truth, on which thisconclusion is founded, is here vitiated by the consideration that, _whatever_ the nature of Force-units may be, we can clearly perceive it tobe a subjective necessity of the case that they should admit of being moreeasily conceived by us to be of the nature of Feeling-units than to be ofany other nature. For as units of Feeling are the only entities of which weare, or can be, conscious, they are the entities into which units of Forcemust be, so to speak, subjectively translated before we can cognise theirexistence at all. Therefore, _whatever_ the real nature of Force-units maybe, ultimate analysis must show that it is more conceivable to identifythem in thought with the only units of which we are cognisant, than it isto think of them as units of which we are not cognisant, and concerningwhich, therefore, conception is necessarily impossible. Or thus, the onlyalternative with respect to the classifying of Force-units lies betweenrefusing to classify them at all, or classifying them with the onlyultimate units with which we are acquainted. But this restriction, foraught that can ever be shown to the contrary, arises only from thesubjective conditions of our own consciousness; there is nothing toindicate that, in objective reality, units of Force are in any wise akin tounits of Feeling. Conceivability, therefore, as a test of truth, is in thisparticular case of no assignable degree of value; for as the entities towhich it is applied are respectively the highest known abstractions ofsubjective and objective existence, the test of conceivability isneutralised by directly encountering the inconceivable relation thatsubsists between subject and object. I think, therefore, it is evident thatthese ontological speculations present no sufficient warrant for aninference, even of the slenderest kind, that the Absolute Being of Cosmismpossesses attributes of a nature quasi-psychical; and, if so, it followsthat these speculations are incompetent to form the basis of a theorywhich, even by the greatest stretch of courtesy, can in any legitimatesense be termed quasi-theistic. [43] On the whole, then, I conclude that the term "Cosmic Theism" is not anappropriate term whereby to denote the theory of things set forth in"Cosmic Philosophy;" and that it would therefore be more judicious to leavethe doctrine of the Unknowable as Mr. Spencer has left it--that is, withouttheological implications of any kind. But in now taking leave of thissubject, I should like it to be understood that the only reason why I haveventured thus to take exception to a part of Mr. Fiske's work is because Iregret that a treatise which displays so much of literary excellence andphilosophic power should lend itself to promoting what I regard as mistakenviews concerning the ontological tendencies of recent thought, and thiswith no other apparent motive than that of unworthily retaining in the newphilosophy a religious term the distinctive connotations of which areconsidered by that philosophy to have become obsolete. * * * * * II. SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY IN REPLY TO A RECENT WORK ON THEISM. [44] On perusing my main essay several years after its completion, it occurredto me that another very effectual way of demonstrating the immensedifference between the nature of all previous attacks upon the teleologicalargument and the nature of the present attack, would be briefly to reviewthe reasonable objections to which all the previous attacks were open. Veryopportunely a work on Theism has just been published which states theseobjections with great lucidity, and answers them with much ability. Thework to which I allude is by the Rev. Professor Flint, and as it ischaracterised by temperate candour in tone and logical care in exposition, I felt on reading it that the work was particularly well suited fordisplaying the enormous change in the speculative standing of Theism whichthe foregoing considerations must be rationally deemed to have effected. Itherefore determined on throwing my supplementary essay, which I hadpreviously intended to write, into the form of a criticism on ProfessorFlint's treatise, and I adopted this course the more willingly becausethere are several other points dwelt upon in that treatise which it seemsdesirable for me to consider in the present one, although, for the sake ofconciseness, I abstained from discussing them in my previous essay. Withthese two objects in view, therefore, I undertook the followingcriticism. [45] In the first place, it is needful to protest against an argument which ourauthor adopts on the authority of Professor Clark Maxwell. The argument isnow a well-known one, and is thus stated by Professor Maxwell in hispresidential address before the British Association for the Advancement ofScience, 1870:--"None of the processes of nature, since the time whennature began, have produced the slightest difference in the properties ofany molecule. We are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence ofthe molecules or the identity of their properties to the operation of anyof the causes which we call natural. On the other hand, the exact qualityof each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir JohnHerschel has well said, the essential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent. Thus we havebeen led along a strictly scientific path, very near to the point at whichscience must stop. Not that science is debarred from studying the externalmechanism of a molecule which she cannot take to pieces, any more than frominvestigating an organism which she cannot put together. But in tracingback the history of matter, science is arrested when she assures herself, on the one hand, that the molecule has been made, and, on the other, thatit has not been made by any of the processes we call natural. " Now it is obvious that we have here no real argument, since it is obviousthat science can never be in a position to assert that atoms, the veryexistence of which is hypothetical, were never "made by any of theprocesses we call natural. " The mere fact that in the universe, as we nowknow it, the evolution of material atoms is not observed to be taking place"by any of the processes we call natural, " cannot possibly be taken asproof, or even as presumption, that there ever was a time when the materialatoms now in existence were created by a supernatural cause. The factcannot be taken to justify any such inference for the following reasons. Inthe first place, assuming the atomic theory to be true, and there isnothing in the argument to show that the now-existing atoms are notself-existing atoms, endowed with their peculiar and severally distinctiveproperties from all eternity. Doubtless the argument is, that as thereappear to be some sixty or more elementary atoms constituting the rawmaterial of the observable universe, it is incredible that they can allhave owed their correlated properties to any cause other than that of adesigning and manufacturing intelligence. But, in the next place--and herecomes the demolishing force of the criticism--science is not in a positionto assert that these sixty or more elementary atoms are in any real senseof the term elementary. The mere fact that chemistry is as yet in tooundeveloped a condition to pronounce whether or not all the forms of matterknown to her are modifications of some smaller number of elements, or evenof a single element, cannot possibly be taken as a warrant for so huge aninference as that there are really more than sixty elements all endowedwith absolutely distinctive properties by a supernatural cause. Now thisconsideration, which arises immediately from the doctrine of the relativityof knowledge, is alone amply sufficient to destroy the present argument. But we must not on this account lose sight of the fact that, even to ourstrictly relative science in its present embryonic condition, we are notwithout decided indications, not only that the so-called elements areprobably for the most part compounds, but even that matter as a whole isone substance, which is itself probably but some modification of energy. Indeed, the whole tendency of recent scientific speculation is towards theview that the universe consists of some one substance, which, whetherself-existing or created, is diverse only in its relation to ignorance. Andif this view is correct, how obvious is the inference which I haveelaborated in § 32, that all the diverse forms of matter, as we know them, were probably evolved by natural causes. So obvious, indeed, is thisinference, that to resort to any supernatural hypothesis to explain thediverse properties of the various chemical elements appears to me a mostglaring violation of the law of parcimony--as much more glaring, forinstance, than the violation of this law by Paley, as the number andvariety of organic species are greater than the number and variety ofchemical species. And if it was illegitimate in Paley to use a mere absenceof knowledge as to how the transmutation of apparently fixed species ofanimals was effected as equivalent to the possession of knowledge that suchtransmutation had not been effected, how much more illegitimate must it beto commit a similar sin against logic in the case of the chemical elements, where our classification is confessedly beset with numberless difficulties, and when we begin to discern that in all probability it is a classificationessentially artificial. Lastly, the mere fact that the transmutation ofchemical species and the evolution of chemical "atoms" are processes whichwe do not now observe as occurring in nature, is surely a consideration ofa far more feeble kind than it is even in the case of biological speciesand biological evolution; seeing that nature's laboratory must be now soinconceivably different from what it was during the condensation of thenebula. What an atrocious piece of arrogance, therefore, it is to assertthat "none of the processes of nature, _since the time when nature began_, have produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule!"No one can entertain a higher respect for Professor Clark Maxwell than Ido; but a single sentence of such a kind as this cannot leave two opinionsin any impartial mind concerning his competency to deal with such subjects. I am therefore sorry to see this absurd argument approvingly incorporatedin Professor Flint's work. He says, "I believe that no reply to these wordsof Professor Clark Maxwell is possible from any one who holds the ordinaryview of scientific men as to the ultimate constitution of matter. They mustsuppose every atom, every molecule, to be of such a nature, to be sorelated to others and to the universe generally, that things may be such aswe see them to be; but this their fitness to be built up into the structureof the universe is a proof that they have been made fit, and since naturalforces could not have acted on them while not yet existent, a supernaturalpower must have created them, and created them with a view to theirmanifold uses. " Here the inference so confidently drawn would have been aweak one even were we not able to see that the doctrine of naturalevolution probably applies to inorganic nature no less than to organic. Forthe inference is drawn from considerations of a character so transcendentaland so remote from science, that unless we wish to be deceived by a merelyverbal argument, we must feel that the possibilities of error in theinference are so numerous and indefinite, that the inference itself iswell-nigh worthless as a basis of belief. But when we add that in ChapterIV. Of the foregoing essay it has been shown to be within the legitimatescope of scientific reasoning to conclude that material atoms have beenprogressively evolved _pari passu_ with the natural laws of chemicalcombination, it is evident that any force which the present argument couldever have had must now be pronounced as neutralised. Natural causes havebeen shown, so far as scientific inference can extend, as not improbablysufficient to produce the observed effects; and therefore we are no longerfree to invoke the hypothetical action of any supernatural cause. The same observations apply to Professor Flint's theistic argument drawnfrom recent scientific speculations as to the vortex-ring construction ofmatter. If these speculations are sound, their only influence on Theismwould be that of supplying a scientific demonstration of the substantialidentity of Force and Matter, and so of supplying a still more valid basisfor the theory as to the natural genesis of matter from a single primordialsubstance, in the manner sketched out in Chapter IV. For the argumentadduced by Professor Flint, that as the manner in which the vorticialmotion of a ring is originated has not as yet been suggested, therefore itsorigination must have been due to a "Divine impulse, " is an argument whichagain uses the absence of knowledge as equivalent to its possession. We arein the presence of a very novel and highly abstruse theory, or ratherhypothesis, in physics, which was originally suggested by, and has hithertobeen mainly indebted to, empirical experiments as distinguished frommathematical calculations; and from the mere fact that, in the case of sucha hypothesis, mathematicians have not as yet been able to determine thephysical conditions required to originate vorticial motion, we are expectedto infer that no such conditions can ever have existed, and therefore thatevery such vortex system, if it exists, is a miracle! And substantially the same criticism applies to the argument whichProfessor Flint adduces--the argument also on which Professors Balfour andTait lay so much stress in their work on the _Unseen Universe_--theargument, namely, as to the non-eternal character of heat. The calculationson which this argument depends would only be valid as sustaining thisargument if they were based upon a knowledge of the universe _as a whole_;and therefore, as before, the absence of requisite knowledge must not beused as equivalent to its possession. These, however, are the weakest parts of Professor Flint's work. Itherefore gladly turn to those parts which are exceedingly cogent aswritten from his standpoint, but which, in view of the strictures on theteleological argument that I have adduced in Chapters IV. And VI. , I submitto be now wholly valueless. "How could matter of itself produce order, even if it were self-existentand eternal? It is far more unreasonable to believe that the atoms orconstituents of matter produced of themselves, without the action of aSupreme Mind, this wonderful universe, than that the letters of the Englishalphabet produced the plays of Shakespeare, without the slightestassistance from the human mind known by that famous name. These atomsmight, perhaps, now and then, here and there, at great distances and longintervals, produce by a chance contact some curious collocation orcompound; but never could they produce order or organisation on anextensive scale, or of a durable character, unless ordered, arranged, andadjusted in ways of which intelligence alone can be the ultimateexplanation. To believe that these fortuitous and indirected movementscould originate the universe, and all the harmonies and utilities andbeauties which abound in it, evinces a credulity far more extravagant thanhas ever been displayed by the most superstitious of religionists. Yet noconsistent materialist can refuse to accept this colossal chancehypothesis. All the explanations of the order of the universe whichmaterialists, from Democritus and Epicurus to Diderot and Lange, havedevised, rest on the assumption that the elements of matter, being eternal, must pass through infinite combinations, and that one of these must be ourpresent world--a special collocation among the countless millions ofcollocations, past and future. Throw the letters of the Greek alphabet, ithas been said, an infinite number of times, and you must produce the'Iliad' and all the Greek books. The theory of probabilities, I need hardlysay, requires us to believe nothing so absurd.... But what is the 'Iliad'to the hymn of creation and the drama of providence?" &c. Now this I conceive to have been a fully valid argument at the time it waspublished, and indeed the most convincing of all the arguments in favour ofTheism. But, as already so frequently pointed out, the considerationsadduced in Chapter IV. Of the present work are utterly destructive of thisargument. For this argument assumes, rightly enough, that the onlyalternative we have in choosing our hypothesis concerning the finalexplanation of things is either to regard that explanation as Intelligenceor as Fortuity. This, I say, was a legitimate argument a few months ago, because up to that time no one had shown that strictly natural causes, asdistinguished from chances, could conceivably be able to produce a cosmos;and although the several previous writers to whom Professor Flintalludes--and he might have alluded to others in thisconnection--entertained a dim anticipation of the fact that natural causesmight alone be sufficient to produce the observed universe, still these dimanticipations were worthless as _arguments_ so long as it remainedimpossible to suggest any natural _principle_ whereby such a result couldhave been conceivably effected by such causes. But it is evident thatProfessor Flint's time-honoured argument is now completely overthrown, unless it can be proved that there is some radical error in the reasoningwhereby I have endeavoured to show that natural causes not only _may_, but_must_, have produced existing order. The overthrow is complete, becausethe very groundwork of the argument in question is knocked away; a thirdpossibility, of the nature of a necessity, is introduced, and therefore thealternative is no longer between Intelligence and Fortuity, but betweenIntelligence and Natural Causation. Whereas the overwhelming strength ofthe argument from Order has hitherto consisted in the supposition ofIntelligence as the one and only conceivable cause of the integration ofthings, my exposition in Chapter IV. Has shown that such integration musthave been due, at all events in a relative or proximate sense, to astrictly physical cause--the persistence of force and the consequentself-evolution of natural law. And the question as to whether or notIntelligence may not have been the absolute or ultimate cause is manifestlya question altogether alien to the argument from Order; for if existingorder admits of being accounted for, in a relative or proximate sense, bymerely physical causes, the argument from a relative or proximate order isnot at liberty to infer or to assume the existence of any higher or moreultimate cause. Although, therefore, in Chapter V. , I have been careful topoint out that the fact of existing order having been due to proximate ornatural causes does not actually _disprove_ the possible existence of anultimate and supernatural cause, still it must be carefully observed thatthis _negative_ fact cannot possibly justify any _positive_ inference tothe existence of such a cause. Thus, upon the whole, it may be said, without danger of reasonable dispute, that as the argument from Order has hitherto derived its immense weightentirely from the fact that Intelligence appeared to be the one and onlycause sufficient to produce the observed integration of the cosmos, thisimmense weight has now been completely counterpoised by the demonstrationthat other causes of a strictly physical kind must have been instrumental, if not themselves alone sufficient, to produce this integration, So that, just as in the case of Astronomy the demonstration of the one naturalprinciple of gravity was sufficient to classify under one physicalexplanation several observed facts which many persons had previouslyattributed to supernatural causes; and just as in the more complex scienceof Geology the demonstration of the one principle of uniformitarianism wassufficient to explain, without the aid of supernaturalism, a still greaternumber of facts; and, lastly, just as in the case of the still more complexscience of Biology the demonstration of the one principle of naturalselection was sufficient to marshal under one scientific, or natural, hypothesis an almost incalculable number of facts which were previouslyexplained by the metaphysical hypothesis of supernatural design; so in thescience which includes all other sciences, and which we may term thescience of Cosmology, I assert with confidence that in the one principle ofthe persistence of force we have a demonstrably harmonising principle, whereby all the facts within our experience admit of being collocated underone natural explanation, without there being the smallest reason toattribute these facts to any supernatural cause. But perhaps the immense change which these considerations must logically beregarded as having produced in the speculative standing of the argumentfrom teleology will be better appreciated if I continue to quote fromProfessor Flint's very forcible and thoroughly logical exposition of theprevious standing of this argument. He says:-- "To ascribe the origination of order to _law_ is a manifest evasion of thereal problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained. Thequestion is--Has law a reason, or is it without a reason? The unpervertedhuman mind cannot believe it to be without a reason. " I do not know where a more terse and accurate statement of the case couldbe found; and to my mind the question so lucidly put admits of the directanswer--Law clearly has a reason of a purely physical kind. And therefore Isubmit that the following quotation which Professor Flint makes fromProfessor Jevons, logical as it was when written, must now be regarded asembodying an argument which is obsolete. "As an unlimited number of atoms can be placed in unlimited space in anunlimited number of modes of distribution, there must, even granting matterto have had all its laws from eternity, have been at some moment in time, out of the unlimited choices and distributions possible, that one choiceand distribution which yielded the fair and orderly universe that nowexists. Only out of rational choice can order have come. " But clearly the alternative is now no longer one between chance and choice. If natural laws arise by way of necessary consequence from the persistenceof a single self-existing substance, it becomes a matter of scientific(though not of logical) demonstration that "the fair and orderly universethat now exists" is the one and only universe that, in the nature ofthings, _can_ exist. But to continue this interesting passage from Dr. Flint's work--interesting not only because it sets forth the previousstanding of this subject with so much clearness, but also because the workis of such very recent publication. "The most common mode, perhaps, of evading the problem which order presentsto reason is the indication of the process by which the order has beenrealised. From Democritus to the latest Darwinian there have been men whosupposed they had completely explained away the evidences of design innature when they had described the physical antecedents of the arrangementsappealed to as evidences. Aristotle showed the absurdity of thissupposition more than 2200 years ago. " Now this is a perfectly valid criticism on all such previous non-theisticalarguments as were drawn from an "indication of the process by which theorder has been realised;" for in all these previous arguments there was anabsence of any physical explanation of the _ultimate_ cause of the processcontemplated, and so long as this ultimate cause remained obscure, althoughthe evidence of design might by these arguments have been excluded fromparticular processes, the evidence of design could not be similarlyexcluded from the ultimate cause of these processes. Thus, for instance, itis doubtless illogical, as Professor Flint points out, in any Darwinian toargue that because his theory of natural selection supplies him with anatural explanation of the process whereby organisms have been adapted totheir surroundings, therefore this process need not itself have beendesigned. That is to say, in general terms, as insisted upon in theforegoing essay, the discovery of a natural law or orderly process cannotof itself justify the inference that this law or method of orderlyprocedure is not itself a product of supernatural Intelligence; but, on thecontrary, the very existence of such orderly processes, considered only inrelation to their products, must properly be regarded as evidence of thebest possible kind in favour of supernatural Intelligence, _provided thatno natural cause can be suggested as adequate to explain the origin ofthese processes_. But this is precisely what the persistence of force, considered as a natural cause, must be pronounced as necessarily competentto achieve; for we can clearly see that all these processes obviously mustand actually do derive their origin from this one causative principle. Andwhether or not behind this one causative principle of natural law thereexists a still more ultimate cause in the form of a supernaturalIntelligence, this is a question altogether foreign to any argument fromteleology, seeing that teleology, in so far as it is _teleology_, can onlyrest upon the observed facts of the cosmos; and if these facts admit ofbeing explained by the action of a single causative principle inherent inthe cosmos itself, teleology is not free to assume the action of anycausative principle of a more ultimate character. Still, as I haverepeatedly insisted, these considerations do not entitle us dogmatically todeny the existence of some such more ultimate principle; all that theseconsiderations do is to remove any rational argument from teleologicalsources that any such more ultimate principle exists. Therefore I am, ofcourse, quite at one with Professor Flint when he says Professor Huxley"admits that the most thoroughgoing evolutionist must at least assume 'aprimordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universeare the consequences, ' and 'is thereby at the mercy of the theologist, whocan defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was notintended to involve the phenomena of the universe. ' Granting this much, heis logically bound to grant more. If the entire evolution of the universemay have been intended, the several stages of its evolution may have beenintended, and they may have been intended for their own sakes as well asfor the sake of the collective evolution or its final result. " Now thatsuch _may have been_ the case, I have been careful to insist in Chapter V. ;all I am now concerned with is to show that, in view of the considerationsadduced in Chapter IV. , there is no longer any evidence to prove, or evento indicate, that such _has been_ the case. And with reference to thisopportune quotation from Professor Huxley I may remark, that the"thoroughgoing evolutionist" is now no longer "at the mercy of thetheologian" to any further extent than that of not being able to disprove apurely metaphysical hypothesis, which is as certainly superfluous, in anyscientific sense, as the fundamental data of science are certainly true. It may seem almost unnecessary to extend this postscript by pursuingfurther the criticism on Professor Flint's exposition in the light of "asingle new reason ... For the denial of design" which he challenges; butthere are nevertheless one or two other points which it seems desirable toconsider. Professor Flint writes:-- "M. Comte imagines that he has shown the inference from design, from theorder and stability of the solar system, to be unwarranted, when he haspointed out the physical conditions through which that order and stabilityare secured, and the process by which they have been obtained.... Now theassertion that the peculiarities which make the solar system stable and theearth habitable have flowed naturally and necessarily from the simplemutual gravity of the several parts of nebulous matter is one which greatlyrequires proof, but which has never received it. In saying this, we do notchallenge the proof of the nebular theory itself. That theory may or maynot be true. We are quite willing to suppose it true--to grant that it hasbeen scientifically established. What we maintain is, that even if we admitunreservedly that the earth and the whole system to which it belongs onceexisted in a nebulous state, from which they were gradually evolved intotheir present condition conformably to physical laws, we are in no degreeentitled to infer from the admission the conclusion which Comte and othershave drawn. The man who fancies that the nebular theory implies that thelaw of gravitation, or any other physical law, has of itself determined thecourse of cosmical evolution, so that there is no need for believing in theexistence and operation of a divine mind, proves merely that he is notexempt from reasoning very illogically. The solar system could only havebeen evolved out of its nebulous state into that which it now presents ifthe nebula possessed a certain size, mass, form, and constitution, if itwas neither too fluid nor too tenacious--if its atoms were all numbered, its elements all weighed, its constituents all disposed in due relation toone another; that is to say, only if the nebula was in reality as much asystem of order, which Intelligence alone could account for, as the worldswhich have been developed from it. The origin of the nebula thus presentsitself to reason as a problem which demands solution no less than theorigin of the planets. All the properties and laws of the nebula require tobe accounted for. What origin are we to give them? It must be either reasonor unreason. We may go back as far as we please, but, at every step andstage of the regress we must find ourselves confronted with the samequestion, the same alternative--intelligent purpose or colossal chance. " Now, so far as Comte is here guilty of the fallacy I have already dweltupon of building a destructive argument upon a demonstration of mereorderly processes in nature, as distinguished from a demonstration of thenatural cause of these processes, it is not for me to defend him. All wecan say with regard to him in this connection is, that, having a sort ofscientific presentiment that if the knowledge of his day were sufficientlyadvanced it would prove destructive of supernaturalism in the higher andmore abstruse provinces of physical speculation, as it had previouslyproved in the lower and less abstruse of these provinces, Comte allowed hisinferences to outrun their legitimate basis. Being necessarily ignorant ofthe one generating cause of orderly processes in nature, he improperlyallowed himself to found conclusions on the basis of these processes alone, which could only be properly founded on the basis of their cause. Butfreely granting this much to Professor Flint, and the rest of his remarksin this connection will be found, in view of the altered standing of thissubject, to be open to amendment. For, in the first place, no one need nowresort to the illogical supposition that "the law of gravitation or anyother physical law has of itself determined the course of cosmicalevolution. " What we may argue, and what must be conceded to us, is, thatthe common substratum of all physical laws was at one time sufficient toproduce the simplest physical laws, and that throughout the whole course ofevolution this common substratum has always been sufficient to produce themore complex laws in the ascending series of their ever-increasing numberand variety. And hence it becomes obvious that the "origin of the nebula"presents a difficulty neither greater nor less than "the origin of theplanets, " since, "if we may go back as far as we please, " we can entertainno _scientific_ doubt that we should come to a time, prior even to thenebula, when the substance of the solar system existed merely assuch--_i. E. _, in an almost or in a wholly undifferentiated form, theproduct, no doubt, of endless cycles of previous evolutions anddissolutions of formal differentiations. Therefore, although it isundoubtedly true that "the solar system could only have been evolved out ofits nebulous state into that which it now presents if the nebula possessed"those particular attributes which were necessity to the evolution of such aproduct, this consideration is clearly deprived of all its force from ourpresent point of view. For unless it can be shown that there is someindependent reason for believing these particular attributes--which musthave been of a more and more simple a character the further we recede intime--to have been miraculously imposed, the analogy is overwhelming thatthey all progressively arose _by way of natural law_. And if so, theuniverse which has been thus produced is the only universe in thisparticular point of space and time which could have been thus produced. That it is an _orderly_ universe we have seen _ad nauseam_ to be noargument in favour of its having been a _designed_ universe, so long as thecause of its order--general laws--can be seen to admit of a naturalexplanation. Thus there is clearly nothing to be gained on the side of teleology bygoing back to the dim and dismal birth of the nebula; for no "thoroughgoingevolutionist" would for one moment entertain the supposition that naturallaw in the simplest phases of its development partook any more of amiraculous character than it does in its more recent and vastly morecomplex phases. The absence of knowledge must not be used as equivalent toits presence; and if analogy can be held to justify any inferencewhatsoever, surely we may conclude with confidence that if existing generallaws admit of being conceivably attributed to a natural genesis, theprimordial laws of a condensing nebula must have been the same. There is another passage in Professor Flint's work to which it seemsdesirable to refer. It begins thus: "There is the law of heredity: likeproduces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce like?... Physical science cannot answer these questions; but that is no reason whythey should not both be asked and answered. I can conceive of no otherintelligent answer being given to them than that there is a God of wisdom, who designed that the world should be for all ages the abode of life, " &c. Now here we have in another form that same vicious tendency to take refugein the more obscure cases of physical causation as proofs of supernaturaldesign--the obscurity in this case arising from the _complexity_ of thecauses and work, as in the former case it arose from their _remoteness_ intime. But in both cases the same answer is patent, viz. , that although"physical science cannot answer these questions" by pointing out theprecise sequence of causes and effects, physical science is neverthelessquite as certain that this precise sequence arises in its last resort fromthe persistence of force, as she would be were she able to trace the wholeprocess. And therefore, in view of the considerations set forth in ChapterIV. Of this work, it is no longer open to Professor Flint or to any otherwriter logically to assert--"I can conceive of no other intelligent answerbeing given to" such questions "than that there is a God of wisdom. " The same answer awaits this author's further disquisition on otherbiological laws, so it is needless to make any further quotations in thisconnection. But there is one other principle embodied in some of thesepassages which it seems undesirable to overlook. It is said, for instance, "Natural selection might have had no materials, or altogether insufficientmaterials, to work with, or the circumstances might have been such that thelowest organisms were the best endowed for the struggle for life. If theearth were covered with water, fish would survive and higher creatureswould perish. " Now the principle here embodied--viz. , that had the conditions of evolutionbeen other than they were, the results would have been different--is, ofcourse, true; but clearly, on the view that _all_ natural laws spring fromthe persistence of force, no other conditions than those which actuallyoccurred, or are now occurring, could ever have occurred, --the whole courseof evolution must have been, in all its phases and in all its processes, anunconditional necessity. But if it is said, How fortunate that the outcome, being unconditionally necessary, has happened to be so good as it is; Ianswer that the remark is legitimate enough if it is not intended to conveyan implication that the general quality of the outcome points to beneficentdesign as to its cause. Such an implication would not be legitimate, because, in the first place, we have no means of knowing in how many cases, whether in planets, stars, or systems, the course of evolution has failedto produce life and mind--the one known case of this earth, whether or notit is the one success out of millions of abortions, being of necessity theonly known case. In how vastly greater a number of cases the course ofevolution may have been, so to speak, deflected by some even slight, thoughstrictly necessary, cause from producing self-conscious intelligence, it isimpossible to conjecture. But this consideration, be it observed, is nothere adduced in order to _disprove_ the assertion that telluric evolutionhas been effected by Intelligence; it is merely adduced to prove that suchan assertion cannot rest on the single known result of telluric evolution, so long as an infinite number of the results of evolution elsewhere remainunknown. And now, lastly, it must be observed that even in the one case with whichwe are acquainted, the net product of evolution is not such as can ofitself point us to _beneficent_ design. Professor Flint, indeed, in commonwith theologians generally, argues that it does. I will therefore brieflycriticise his remarks on this subject, believing, as I do, that they form avery admirable illustration of what I conceive to be a generalprinciple--viz. , that minds which already believe in the existence of aDeity are, as a rule, not in a position to view this question ofbeneficence in nature in a perfectly impartial manner. For if the existenceof a Deity is presupposed, a mind with any particle of that most noblequality--reverence--will naturally hesitate to draw conclusions thatpartake of the nature of blasphemy; and therefore, unconsciously perhaps tothemselves, they endeavour in various ways to evade the evidence which, ifhonestly and impartially considered, can scarcely fail to negative theargument from beneficence in the universe. Professor Flint argues that the "law of over-production, " and theconsequent struggle for existence, being "the reason why the world is sowonderfully rich in the most varied forms of life, " is "a means to an endworthy of Divine Wisdom. " "Although involving privation, pain, andconflict, its final result is order and beauty. All the perfections ofsentient creatures are represented as due to it. Through it the lion hasgained its strength, the deer its speed, and the dog its sagacity. Theinference seems natural that these perfections were designed to be attainedby it; that this state of struggle was ordained for the sake of theadvantages which it is actually seen to produce. The suffering which theconflict involves may indicate that God has made even animals for somehigher end than happiness--that he cares for animal perfection as well asfor animal enjoyment; but it affords no reason for denying that the endswhich the conflict actually serves it was intended to serve. " Now, whatever may be thought of such an argument as an attemptedjustification of beneficent design already on independent ground believedto exist, it is manifestly no argument at all as establishing anypresumption in favour of such design, unless it could be shown that theDeity is so far limited in his power of adapting means to ends that theparticular method adopted in this case was the best, all things considered, that he was able to adopt. For supposing the Deity to be, what ProfessorFlint maintains that he is--viz. , omnipotent--and there can be no inferencemore transparent than that such wholesale suffering, for whatever endsdesigned, exhibits an incalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in thedivine character than that which we know in any, the very worst, of humancharacters. For let us pause for one moment to think of what suffering innature means. Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions ofmillions of animals must be supposed to have been sentient. Since that timetill the present, there must have been millions and millions of generationsof millions of millions of individuals. And throughout all this period ofincalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms havebeen in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to theoutcome, we find that more than half of the species which have survived theceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and insentientforms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth andtalons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded fortorment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, and sickness, with oozingblood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence thatdimly close in deaths of brutal torture! Is it said that there arecompensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the enjoyments Iplainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the pains, and thiswhether or not evolution is due to design. Therefore all I am concernedwith is to show, that if such a state of things is due to "omnipotentdesign, " the omnipotent designer must be concluded, so far as reason caninfer, to be non-beneficent. And this it is not difficult to show. When Isee a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a spring-trap, I abhor thedevilish nature of the being who, with full powers of realising what painmeans, can deliberately employ his noble faculties of invention incontriving a thing so hideously cruel. But if I could believe that there isa being who, with yet higher faculties of thought and knowledge, and withan unlimited choice of means to secure his ends, has contrived untoldthousands of mechanisms no less diabolical than a spring-trap; I shouldcall that being a fiend, were all the world besides to call him God. Am Itold that this is arrogance? It is nothing of the kind; it is plainmorality, and to say otherwise would be to hide our eyes from murderbecause we dread the Murderer. Am I told that I am not competent to judgethe purposes of the Almighty? I answer that if these are _purposes_, I _am_able to judge of them so far as I can see; and if I am expected to judge ofhis purposes when they appear to be beneficent, I am in consistency obligedalso to judge of them when they appear to be malevolent. And it can be nopossible extenuation of the latter to point to the "final result" as "orderand beauty, " so long as the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent_ Designer"are known to have been so revolting. All that we could legitimately assertin this case would be, that so far as observation can extend, "he cares foranimal perfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment, " and even tothe _total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merelybe to deny beneficence as an attribute of God. The dilemma, therefore, which Epicurus has stated with great lucidity, andwhich Professor Flint quotes, appears to me so obvious as scarcely torequire statement. The dilemma is, that, looking to the facts of organicnature, theists must abandon their belief, either in the divineomnipotence, or in the divine beneficence. And yet, such is the warpingeffect of preformed beliefs on the mind, that even so candid a writer asProfessor Flint can thus write of this most obvious truth:-- "The late Mr. John Stuart Mill, for no better reason than that naturesometimes drowns men and burns them, and that childbirth is a painfulprocess, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall notsay what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed by such anargument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the littlenessof man. The mind of man never shows itself so small as when it tries tomeasure the attributes and limit the greatness of its Creator. " But the argument--or rather the truism--in question is an attempt to doneither the one nor the other; it simply asserts the patent fact that, ifGod is omnipotent, and so had an unlimited choice of means whereby toaccomplish the ends of "animal perfection, " "animal enjoyment, " and therest; then the fact of his having chosen to adopt the means which he hasadopted is a fact which is wholly incompatible with his beneficence. And onthe other hand, if he is beneficent, the fact of his having adopted thesemeans in order that the sum of ultimate enjoyment might exceed the sum ofconcomitant pain, is a fact which is wholly incompatible with hisomnipotence. To a man who already believes, on independent grounds, in anomnipotent and beneficent Deity, it is no doubt possible to avoid facingthis dilemma, and to rest content with the assumption that, in a sensebeyond the reach of human reason, or even of human conception, the twohorns of this dilemma must be united in some transcendental reconciliation;but if a man undertakes to reason on the subject at all, as he must andought when the question is as to the _existence_ of such a Deity, thenclearly he has no alternative but to allow that the dilemma is a hopelessone. With inverted meaning, therefore, may we quote Professor Flint's wordsagainst himself:--"The mind of man never shows itself so small as when ittries to measure the attributes ... Of its Creator;" for certainly, ifProfessor Flint's usually candid mind has had a Creator, it nowheredisplays the "littleness" of prejudice in so marked a degree as it doeswhen "measuring his attributes. " Thus in a subsequent chapter he deals at greater length with thisdifficulty of the apparent failure of beneficence in nature, arguing, ineffect, that as pain and suffering "serve many good ends" in the way ofwarning animals of danger to life, &c. , therefore we ought to concludethat, if we could see farther, we should see pain and suffering to beunmitigated good, or nearly so. Now this argument, as I have previouslysaid, may possibly be admissible as between Christians or others who_already_ believe in the existence and in the beneficence of God; but it isonly the blindest prejudice which can fail to perceive that the argument isquite without relevancy when the question is as to the _evidences_ of suchexistence and the _evidences_ of such character. For where the _fact_ ofsuch an existence and character is the question in dispute, it clearly canbe no argument to state its bare assumption by saying that if we knew moreof nature we should find the relative preponderance of good over evil to beimmeasurably greater than that which we now perceive. The platform ofargument on which the question of "Theism" must be discussed is that of theobservable Cosmos; and if, as Dr. Flint is constrained to admit, there is afearful spectacle of misery presented by this Cosmos, it becomes merequestion-begging to gloss over this aspect of the subject by any vagueassumption that the misery must have some unobservable ends of sotranscendentally beneficent a nature, that were they known they wouldjustify the means. Indeed, this kind of discussion seems to me worse thanuseless for the purposes which the Professor has in view; for it onlyserves by contrast to throw out into stronger relief the natural and theunstrained character of the adverse interpretation of the facts. Accordingto this adverse interpretation, sentiency has been evolved by naturalselection to secure the benefits which are pointed out by Professor Flint;and therefore the fact of this, its cause, having been a _mindless_ cause, clearly implies that the _restriction_ of pain and suffering cannot be anactive principle, or a _vera causa_, as between species and species, thoughit must be such within the limits of the same organism, and to a lesserextent within the limits of the same species. And this is just what we findto be the case. Therefore, without the need of resorting to whollyarbitrary assumptions concerning transcendental reconciliations betweenapparently needless suffering and a supposed almighty beneficence, thenon-theistic hypothesis is saved by merely opening our eyes to theobservable facts around us, and there seeing that pain and misery, alike inthe benefits which they bring and in the frightful excesses which theymanifest, play just that part in nature which this hypothesis would lead usto expect. Therefore, to sum up these considerations on physical suffering, the casebetween a theist and a sceptic as to the question of divine beneficence isseen to be a case of extreme simplicity. The theist believes in suchbeneficence by purposely concealing from his mind all adverseevidence--feeling, on the one side, that to entertain the doubt to whichthis evidence points would be to hold dalliance with blasphemy, and, on theother side, that the subject is of so transcendental a nature that, in viewof so great a risk, it is better to avoid impartial reasoning upon it. Asceptic, on the other hand, is under no such obligation to preconceivedideas, and is therefore free to draw unbiassed inferences as to thecharacter of God, if he exists, to the extent which such character isindicated by the sphere of observable nature. And, as I have said, when thesubject is so viewed, the inference is unavoidable that, so far as humanreason can penetrate, God, if he exists, must either be non-infinite in hisresources, or non-beneficent in his designs. Therefore it is evident thatwhen the _being_ of God, as distinguished from his _character_, is thesubject in dispute, Theism can gain nothing by an appeal to evidences of_beneficent_ designs. If such evidences were unequivocal, then indeed theargument which they would establish to an intelligent cause of nature wouldbe almost irresistible; for the fact of the external world being in harmonywith the moral nature of man would be unaccountable except on thesupposition of both having derived their origin from a common _moral_source; and morality implies intelligence. But as it is, all the so-calledevidence of divine beneficence in nature is, without any exception of akind that is worthless as proving _design_; for all the facts admit ofbeing explained equally well on the supposition of their having been due topurely physical processes, acting through the various biological laws whichwe are now only beginning to understand. And further than this, so far arethese facts from proving the existence of a moral cause, that, in view ofthe alternative just stated, they even ground a positive argument to itsnegation. For, as we have seen, all these facts are just of such a kind aswe should expect to be the facts, on the supposition of their having beendue to natural causes--_i. E. _, causes which could have had no moralsolicitude for animal happiness as such. Let us now, in conclusion, dwellon this antithesis at somewhat greater length. If natural selection has played any large share in the process of organicevolution, it is evident that animal enjoyment, being an important factorin this natural cause, must always have been furthered _to the extent inwhich it was necessary for the adaptation of organisms to theirenvironment_ that it should. And such we invariably find to be the limitswithin which animal enjoyments _are_ confined. On the other hand, so longas the adaptations in question are not complete, so long must more or lessof suffering be entailed--the capacity for suffering, as for enjoyment, being no doubt itself a product of natural selection. But as all specifictypes are perpetually struggling together, it is manifest that thecompetition must prevent any considerable number of types from becoming sofar adapted to their environment of other types as to become exempt fromsuffering as a result of this competition. There being no one integratingcause of an intelligent or moral nature to supply the conditions ofhappiness to each organic type without the misery of this competition, suchhappiness as animals have is derived from the heavy expenditure of painsuffered by themselves and by their ancestry. Thus, whether we look to animal pleasures or to animal pains, the result isalike just what we should expect to find on the supposition of thesepleasures and pains having been due to necessary and physical, asdistinguished from intelligent and moral, antecedents; for how different isthat which is from that which might have been! Not only might beneficentselection have eliminated the countless species of parasites which nowdestroy the health and happiness of all the higher organisms; not onlymight survival of the fittest, in a moral sense, have determined thatrapacious and carnivorous animals should yield their places in the world toharmless and gentle ones; not only might life have been without sicknessand death without pain;--but how might the exigences and the welfare ofspecies have been consulted by the structures and the habits of oneanother! But no! Amid all the millions of mechanisms and habits in organicnature, all of which are so beautifully adapted to the needs of the speciespresenting them, there is _no single instance_ of any mechanism or habitoccurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of anotherspecies--although, as we should expect on the non-theistic theory, thereare some comparatively few cases of a mechanism or a habit which is ofbenefit to its possessor being also utilised by other species. Yet, on thebeneficent-design theory, it is impossible to understand why, when allmechanisms and habits in the same species are invariably correlated for thebenefit of that species, there should never be any such correlation betweenmechanisms and habits of different species. For how magnificent, howsublime a display of supreme beneficence would nature have afforded if allher sentient animals had been so inter-related as to minister to eachother's happiness! Organic species might then have been likened to acountless multitude of voices, all singing to their Creator in oneharmonious psalm of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of suchcorrelation; every species is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcomeof the always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life. So much, then, for the case of _physical_ evil; but Dr. Flint also treatsof the case of _moral_ evil. Let us see what this well-equipped writer canmake of this old problem in the present year of grace. He says--"But itwill be objected, could not God have made moral creatures who would becertain always to choose what is right, always to acquiesce in His holywill?... Well, far be it from me to deny that God could have originated asinless moral system.... But if questioned as to why He has not donebetter, I feel no shame in confessing my ignorance. It seems to me thatwhen you have resolved the problem of the origin of moral evil into thequestion, Why has God not originated a moral universe in which the lowestmoral being would be as excellent as the archangels are? you have at onceshown it to be _speculatively incapable of solution_ [italics mine], andpractically without importance[!]. The question is one which wouldobviously give rise to another, Why has God not created only moral beingsas much superior to the archangels as they are superior to the lowestAustralian aborigines? But no complete answer can be given to a questionwhich may be followed by a series of similar questions to which there is noend. We have, besides, neither the facts nor the faculties to answer suchquestions. "[46] Now I confess that this argument presents to my mind more of subtlety thansense. I had previously imagined that the archangels were supposed to enjoya condition of moral existence which might fairly be thought to remove themfrom any association with that of the Australian aborigines. But as thisquestion is one that belongs to Divinity, I am here quite prepared to bowto Professor Flint's authority--hoping, however, that he is prepared totake the responsibility should the archangels ever care to accuse me ofcalumny. But, as a logician, I must be permitted to observe, that if I ask, Why am I not better than I am? it is no answer to tell me, Because thearchangels are not better than they are. For aught that I know to thecontrary, the archangels may be morally _perfect_--as an authority in suchmatters has told us that even "just men" may become, --and therefore, foraught that I know to the contrary, Professor Flint's regress of moraldegrees _ad infinitum_, may be an ontological absurdity. But granting, forthe sake of argument, that archangels fall infinitely short of moralperfection, and I should only be able to see in the fact a hopelessaggravation of my previous difficulty. If it is hard to reconcile thesupreme goodness of God with the moral turpitude of man, much more would itbe hard to do so if his very angels are depraved. Therefore, if thereasonable question which I originally put "may be followed by a series ofsimilar questions to which there is no end, " the goodness of God mustsimply be pronounced a delusion. For the question which I originally putwas no mere flimsy question of a stupidly unreal description. My own moraldepravity is a matter of painful certainty to me, and I want to know why, if there is a God of infinite power and goodness, he should have made methus. And in answer I am told that my question is "practically withoutimportance, " because there may be an endless series of beings who, in theirseveral degrees, are in a similar predicament to myself. Perhaps they are;but if so, the moral evil with which I am directly acquainted is made allthe blacker by the fact that it is thus but a drop in an infinite ocean ofmoral imperfection. When, therefore, Professor Flint goes on to say, "Weought to be content if we can show that what God has done is wise andright, and not perplex ourselves as to why He has not done an infinity ofother things, " I answer, Most certainly; but _can_ we show that what Godhas done is wise and right? Unquestionably not. That what he has done _may_be wise and right, could we see his whole scheme of things, no carefulthinker will deny; but to suppose it can be _shown_ that he has done this, is an instance of purblind fanaticism which is most startling in a work on_Theism_. "The best world, _we may be assured_, that our fancies can feign, would in reality be far inferior to the world God has made, whateverimperfections we may think we see in it. " Are we leading a sermon on thedatum "God is love"? No; but a work on the questions, Is there a God? and, if so, Is he a God of love? And yet the work is written by a man whoevidently tries to argue fairly. What shall we say of the despotism ofpreformed beliefs? May we not say at least this much--that those whoendeavour to reconcile their theories of divine goodness with the facts ofhuman evil might well appropriate to themselves the words above quoted, "Wehave neither the facts nor the faculties to answer such questions"? For the"facts" indeed are absent, and the "faculties" of impartial thought must beabsent also, if this obvious truth cannot be seen--that "these questions"only derive their "speculatively unanswerable" character from the rationalfalsity of the manner by which it is sought to answer them. The "facts" ofour moral nature, so far as honest reason can perceive, belie thehypothesis of Theism; and although the "faculties" of man may be forced byprejudice into an acceptance of contradictory propositions, the truth isobvious that only by the hypothesis of Evolution can that old-tied knot becut--the Origin of Evil. The form of Theism for which Dr. Flint is arguingis the current form, viz. , that there is a God who combines in himself theattributes of _infinite_ power and _perfect_ goodness--a God at once_omnipotent_ and _wholly_ moral. But, in view of the fact that moral evilexists in man, the proposition that God is omnipotent and the propositionthat he is wholly moral become contradictory; and therefore the fact ofmoral evil can only be met, either by abandoning one or other of thesepropositions, or by altogether rejecting the hypothesis of Theism. * * * * * III. THE SPECULATIVE STANDING OF MATERIALISM. As a continuation of my criticism on Mr. Fiske's views, I think it isdesirable to add a few words concerning the speculative annihilation withwhich he supposes Mr. Spencer's doctrines to have visited Materialism. Ofcourse it is a self-evident truism that the doctrine of Relativity isdestructive of Materialism, if by Materialism we mean a theory whichignores that doctrine. In other words, the doctrine of Relativity, ifaccepted, clearly excludes the doctrine that Matter, _as knownphenomenally_, is at all likely to be a true representative of whatever_thing-in-itself_ it may be that constitutes Mind. But this position isfully established by the doctrine of Relativity alone, and is therefore notin the least affected, either by way of confirmation or otherwise, by Mr. Spencer's extended doctrine of the Unknowable--it being only because thelatter doctrine presupposes the doctrine of Relativity that it is exclusiveof Materialism in the sense which has just been stated. So far, therefore, Mr. Spencer's writings cannot be held to have any special bearing on thedoctrine of Materialism. Such a special bearing is only exerted by thesewritings when they proceed to show that "it seems an imaginable possibilitythat units of external force may be identical in nature with the units ofthe force known as feeling. " Let us then ascertain how far it is true thatthe argument already quoted, and which leads to this conclusion, is utterlydestructive of Materialism. In the first place, I may observe that this argument differs in severalinstructive particulars from the anti-materialistic argument of Locke, which we have already had occasion to consider. For while Locke erroneouslyimagined that the test of inconceivability is of equivalent value_wherever_ it is applied, save only where it conflicts with preconceivedideas on the subject of Theism (see Appendix A. ), Spencer, of course, ismuch too careful a thinker to fall into so obvious a fallacy. But again, itis curious to observe that in the anti-materialistic argument of Spencerthe test of inconceivability is used in a manner the precise opposite ofthat in which it is used in the anti-materialistic argument of Locke. Forwhile the ground of Locke's argument is that Materialism must be untruebecause it is inconceivable that Matter (and Force) should be of apsychical nature; the ground of Spencer's argument is that what we know asForce (and Matter) may _not_ inconceivably be of a psychical nature. For myown part, I think that Spencer's argument is, psychologically speaking, themore valid of the two; but nevertheless I think that, logically speaking, it is likewise invalid to a perceptibly great, and to a further indefinite, degree. For the argument sets out with the reflection that we can only knowMatter and Force as symbols of consciousness, while we know consciousnessdirectly, and therefore that we can go further in conceivably translatingMatter and Force into terms of Mind than _vice versa_. And this is true, but it does not therefore follow that the truth is more likely to lie inthe direction that thought can most easily travel. For although I am at onewith Mr. Spencer, whom Mr. Fiske follows, in regarding his test oftruth--viz. , inconceivability of a negation--as the most _ultimate_ testwithin our reach, I cannot agree with him that in this particular case itis the most _trustworthy_ test within our reach. I cannot do so because thereflection is forced upon me that, "as the terms which are contemplated inthis particular case are respectively the highest abstractions of objectiveand of subjective existence, the test of truth in question is neutralisedby directly encountering the inconceivable relation that exists betweensubject and object. " Or, in other words, as before stated, "_whatever_ thecause of Mind may be, we can clearly perceive it to be a subjectivenecessity of the case that, in ultimate analysis, we should find it moreeasy to conceive of this cause as resembling Mind--the only entity of whichwe are directly conscious--than to conceive of it as any other entity ofwhich we are only indirectly conscious. " When, therefore, Mr. Spencerargues that "it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms ofouter existence, " while it is not so impossible to interpret outerexistence in terms of inner existence, the fact is merely what we should inany case expect _à priori_ to be the fact, and therefore as a fact it isnot a very surprising discovery _à posteriori_. So that when Mr. Fiskeproceeds to make this fact the basis of his argument, that because we canmore conceivably regard objective existence as like in kind to subjectiveexistence than conversely, therefore we should conclude that there is acorresponding probability in favour of the more conceivable proposition, Idemur to his argument. For, fully accepting the fact on which the argumentrests, and it seems to me, in view of what I have said, that the latterassigns an altogether disproportionate value to the test ofinconceivability in this case. Far from endowing this test with so great anauthority in this case, I should regard it not only as perceptibly of verysmall validity, but, as I have said, invalid to a degree which we have nomeans of ascertaining. If it be asked, What other gauge of probability canwe have in this matter other than such a direct appeal to consciousness? Ianswer, that this appeal being here _à priori_ invalid, we are left to fallback upon the formal probability which is established by an application ofscientific canons to objective phenomena. (See footnote in § 14. ) For, beit carefully observed, Mr. Spencer, and his disciple Mr. Fiske, are notidealists. Were this the case, of course the test of an immediate appeal toconsciousness would be to them the only test available. But, on thecontrary, as all the world knows, Mr. Spencer asserts the existence of anunknown Reality, of which all phenomena are the manifestations. Consequently, what we call Force and Matter are, according to thisdoctrine, phenomenal manifestations of this objective Reality. That is tosay, for aught that we can know, Force and Matter may be anything withinthe whole range of the possible; and the only limitation that can beassigned to them is, that they are modes of existence which are independentof, or objective to, our individual consciousness, but which are uniformlytranslated into consciousness as Force and Matter. Now it does not signifyone iota for the purposes of Materialism whether these our symbolicalrepresentations of Force and Matter are accurate or inaccuraterepresentations of their corresponding realities, --unless, of course, some_independent_ reason could be shown for supposing that in their realitythey resemble Mind. Call Force _x_ and Matter _y_, and so long as we areagreed that _x_ and _y_ are _objective realities which are uniformlytranslated into consciousness as Force and Matter_, the materialisticdeductions remain unaffected by this mere change in our terminology; theseessential facts are allowed to remain substantially as before, namely, thatthere is an external something or external somethings--Matter and Force, or_x_ and _y_--which themselves display no observable tokens ofconsciousness, but which are invariably associated with consciousness in ahighly distinctive manner. I dwell at length upon this subject, because although Mr. Spencer himselfdoes not appear to attach much weight to his argument, Mr. Fiske, as wehave seen, elevates it into a basis for "Cosmic Theism. " Yet so far is thisargument from "ruling out, " as Mr. Fiske asserts, the essential doctrine ofMaterialism--_i. E. _, the doctrine that what we know as Mind is an effect ofcertain collocations and distributions of _what we know_ as Matter andForce--that the argument might be employed with almost the same degree ofeffect, or absence of effect, to disprove any instance of recognisedcausation. Thus, for example, the doctrine of Materialism is no more "ruledout" by the reflection that what we cognise as cerebral matter is onlycognised relatively, than would the doctrine of chemical equivalents be"ruled out" by the parallel reflection that what we cognise as chemicalelements are only cognised relatively. I say advisedly, "with _almost_ thesame degree of effect, " because, to be strictly accurate, we ought notaltogether to ignore the indefinitely slender presumption which Mr. Spencer's subjective test of inconceivability establishes on the side ofSpiritualism, as against the objective evidence of causation on the side ofMaterialism. As this is an important subject, I will be a little moreexplicit. We are agreed that Force and Matter are entities external toconsciousness, of which we can possess only symbolical knowledge. Therefore, as we have said, Force and Matter may be anything within thewhole range of the possible. But we know that Mind is a possible entity, while we have no certain knowledge of any other possible entity. Hence weare justified in saying, It is possible that Force and Matter may beidentical with the only entity which we know as certainly possible; butforasmuch as we do not know the sum of possible entities, we have no meansof calculating the chances there are that what we know as Force and Matterare identical in nature with Mind. Still, that there is _a_ chance wecannot dispute; all we can assert is, that we are unable to determine itsvalue, and that it would be a mistake to suppose we can do so, even in thelowest degree, by Mr. Spencer's test of inconceivability. Nevertheless, thefact that there is such a chance renders it in some indeterminate degreemore probable that what we know as Force and Matter are identical with whatwe know as Mind, than that what we know as oxygen and hydrogen areidentical with what we know as water. So that to this extent the essentialdoctrine of Materialism is "ruled out" in a further degree by thephilosophy of the Unknowable than is the chemical doctrine of equivalents. But, of course, this indefinite possibility of what we know as Force andMatter being identical with what we know as Mind does not neutralise, inany determinable degree, the considerations whereby Materialism in itspresent shape infers that what we know as Force and Matter are probablydistinct from what we know as Mind. But I see no reason why Materialism should be restricted to this "itspresent shape. " Even if we admit to the fullest extent the validity of Mr. Spencer's argument, and conclude with Professor Clifford as a matter ofprobability that "the universe consists entirely of Mind-stuff, " I do notsee that the admission would affect Materialism in any essential respect. For here again the admission would amount to little else, so far asMaterialism is directly concerned, than a change of terminology: instead ofcalling objective existence "Matter, " we call it "Mind-stuff. " I say "to_little_ else, " because no doubt in one particular there is here somechange introduced in the speculative standing of the subject. So long asMatter and Mind, _x_ and _y_, are held to be antithetically opposed insubstance, so long must Materialism suppose that a connection of_causality_ subsists between the two, such that the former substance is_produced_ in some unaccountable way by the latter. But when Matter andMind, _x_ and _y_, are supposed to be identical in substance, the need forany additional supposition as to a causal connection is excluded. Butunless we hold, what seems to me an uncalled-for opinion, that theessential feature of Materialism consists in a postulation of a causalconnection between _x_ and _y_, it would appear that the only effect ofsupposing _x_ and _y_ to be really but one substance _z_, must be that of_strengthening_ the essential doctrine of Materialism--the doctrine, namely, that conscious intellectual existence is _necessarily_ associatedwith that form of existence which we know phenomenally as Matter andMotion. If it is true that a "a moving molecule of inorganic matter doesnot possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses a small piece ofMind-stuff, " then assuredly the central position of Materialism is shown tobe impregnable. For while it remains as true as ever that mind andconsciousness can only emerge when what we know phenomenally as "Mattertakes the complex form of a living brain, " we have abolished the necessityfor assuming even a causal connection between the substance of what we knowphenomenally as Matter and the substance of what we know phenomenally asMind: we have found that, in the last resort, the phenomenal connectionbetween what we know as Matter and what we know as Mind is actually evenmore intimate than a connection of causality; we have found that it is asubstantial identity. To sum up this discussion. We have considered the bearing of modernspeculation on the doctrine of Materialism in three successive stages ofargument. First, we had to consider the bearing on Materialism of thesimple doctrine of Relativity. Here we saw that Materialism was onlyaffected to the extent of being compelled to allow that what we know asMatter and Motion are not known as they are in themselves. But we also sawthat, as the inscrutable realities are uniformly translated intoconsciousness as Matter and Motion, it still remains as true as ever that_what we know_ as Matter and Motion may be the causes of what we know asMind. Even, therefore, if the supposition of causality is taken to be anessential feature of Materialism, Materialism would be in no wise affectedby substituting for the words Matter and Motion the symbols _x_ and _y_. The second of the three stages consisted in showing that Mr. Spencer'sargument as to the possible identity of Force and Feeling is not in itselfsufficient to overthrow the doctrine that what we know as Matter and Motionmay be the cause of what we know as Mind. For the mere fact of its beingmore _conceivable_ that units of Force should resemble units of Feelingthan conversely, is no warrant for concluding that in reality anycorresponding probability obtains. The test of conceivability, although themost ultimate test that is available, is here rendered vague and valuelessby the _à priori_ consideration that _whatever_ the cause of Mind may be(if it has a cause), we must find it more easy to conceive of this cause asresembling Mind than to conceive of it as resembling any other entity ofwhich we are only conscious indirectly. Lastly, in the third place, we saw that even if Mr. Spencer's argument werefully subscribed to, and Mind in its substantial essence were conceded tobe causeless, the central position of Materialism would still remainunaffected. For Mr. Spencer does not suppose that his "units of Force" arethemselves endowed with consciousness, any more than Professor Cliffordsupposes his "moving molecules of inorganic matter" to be thus endowed. Sothat the only change which these possibilities, even if conceded to beactualities, produce in the speculative standing of Materialism, is to showthat the raw material of consciousness, instead of requiring to be _caused_by other substances--Matter and Force, _x_ and _y_, --occurs ready made asthose substances. But the essential feature of Materialism remainsuntouched--namely, that what we know as Mind is dependent (whether by wayof causality or not is immaterial) on highly complex forms of _what weknow_ as Matter, in association with highly peculiar distributions of _whatwe know_ as Force. * * * * * IV. THE FINAL MYSTERY OF THINGS. Some physicists are inclined to dispute the fundamental proposition inwhich the whole of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy may be said torest--the proposition, namely, that the fact of the "persistence of force"constitutes the ultimate basis of science. For my own part, I cannot butbelieve that any disagreement on this matter only arises from some want ofmutual understanding; and, therefore, in order to anticipate any criticismsto which the present work may be open on this score, I append thisexplanatory note. I readily grant that the term "persistence of force" is not a happy one, seeing that the word "force, " as used by physicists, does not at thepresent time convey the full meaning which Mr. Spencer desires it toconvey. But I think that any impartial physicist will be prepared to admitthat, in the present state of his science, we are entitled to conclude thatenergy of position is merely the result of energy of motion; or, in otherwords, that potential energy is merely an expression of the fact that theuniverse, as a whole, is replete with actual energy, whose essentialcharacteristic is that it is indestructible. And this may be concludedwithout committing ourselves to any particular theory as to the physicalexplanation of gravity; all we need assert is, that in some way or othergravity is the result of ubiquitous energy. And this, it seems to me, wemust assert, or else conclude that gravity can never admit of a physicalexplanation. For all that we mean by a physical explanation is the provedestablishment of an equation between two quantities of energy; so that ifenergy of position does not admit of being interpreted in terms of energyof motion, we must conclude that it does not admit of being interpreted atall--at least not in any physical sense. Throughout the foregoing essays, therefore, I have assumed that all formsof energy are but relatively varying expressions of the same fact--thefact, namely, which Mr. Spencer means to express when he says that force ispersistent. And it seems to me almost needless to show that this fact isreally the basis of all science. For unless this fact is assumed as apostulate, not only would scientific inquiry become impossible, but allexperience would become chaotic. The physicist could not prosecute hisresearches unless he presupposed that the forces which he measures are of apermanent nature, any more than could the chemist prosecute his researchesunless he presupposed that the materials which he estimates by energy-unitsare likewise of a permanent nature. And similarly with all the othersciences, as well as with every judgment in our daily experience. If, therefore, any one should be hypercritical enough to dispute the positionthat the doctrine of the conservation of energy constitutes the "ultimatedatum" of science, I think it will be enough to observe that if this is_not_ the "ultimate datum" of science, science can have no "ultimate datum"at all. For any datum more ultimate than permanent existence is manifestlyimpossible, while any such datum as non-permanent existence would clearlyrender science impossible. Even, therefore, if such hypercriticism had avalid basis of apparently adverse fact whereon to stand, I should feelmyself justified in neglecting it on _à priori_ grounds; but the only basison which such hypercriticism can rest is, not the knowledge of any adversefacts, but the ignorance of certain facts which we must either conclude tobe facts or else conclude that science can have no ultimate datum whereonto rest. In the foregoing essays, therefore, I have not scrupled tomaintain that the ultimate datum of science is destructive of teleology asa scientific argument for Theism; because, unless we deny the possibilityof any such ultimate datum, and so land ourselves in hopeless scepticism, we must conclude that there can be no datum more ultimate thanthis--Permanent Existence; and this is just the datum which we have seen tobe destructive of teleology as a scientific argument for Theism. It may be well to point out that from this ultimate datum of science--orrather, let us say, of experience--there follows a deductive explanation ofthe law of causation. For this law, when stripped of all the metaphysicalcorruptions with which it has been so cumbersomely clothed, simply meansthat a given collocation of antecedents unconditionally produces a certainconsequent. But this fact, otherwise stated, amounts to nothing more than are-statement of the ultimate datum of experience--the fact that energy isindestructible. For if this latter fact be granted, it is obvious that theso-called law of causation follows as a deductive necessity--or rather, asI have said, that this law becomes but another way of expressing the samefact. This is obvious if we reflect that the only means we have ofascertaining that energy is _not_ destructible, is by observing thatsimilar antecedents _do_ invariably determine similar consequents. It is asa vast induction from all those particular cases of sequence-changes whichcollectively we call causation that we conclude energy to beindestructible. And, obversely, having concluded energy to beindestructible, we can plainly see that in any particular cases of itsmanifestation in sequence-phenomena, the unconditional resemblance betweeneffects due to similar causes which is formulated by the law of causationis merely the direct expression of the fact which we had previouslyconcluded. It seems to me, therefore, that the old-standing questionconcerning the nature of causation ought now properly to be considered asobsolete. Doubtless there will long remain a sort of hereditary tendency inmetaphysical minds to look upon cause-connection as "a mysterious tie"between antecedent and consequent; but henceforth there is no need forscientific minds to regard this "tie" as "mysterious" in any other sensethan the existence of energy is "mysterious. " To state the law of causationis merely to state the fact that energy is indestructible. And from this there also arises at once the explanation and thejustification of our belief in the uniformity of nature. If energy is, inits relation to us, ubiquitous and persistent, it clearly follows that inall its manifestations which collectively we call nature, similar precedingmanifestations must always determine similar succeeding manifestations; forotherwise the energy concerned would require on one or on both of theoccasions, either to have become augmented by creation, or dissipated byannihilation. Thus our belief in the uniformity of nature, as in thevalidity of the law of causation, is merely an expression of our belief inthe ubiquitous and indestructible character of energy. Such being the case, we may fairly conclude that all these old-standing"mysteries" are now merged in the one mystery of existence. And deeper thanthis it is manifestly impossible that they can be merged; for it ismanifestly impossible that Existence in the abstract can ever admit of whatwe call explanation. Hence we can clearly see that, in a scientific sense, there must always remain a final mystery of things. But although we canthus see that, from the very meaning of what we call explanation, itfollows that at the base of all our explanations there must lie a greatInexplicable, I think that the mystery of Existence in the abstract may berendered less appalling if we reflect that, as opposed to Existence, thereis only one logical alternative--Non-existence. Supposing, then, ourphysical explanations to have reached their highest limits by resolving allmodes of Existence into one mode--force, matter, life, and mind, beingshown but different manifestations of the same Infinite Existence--thefinal mystery of things would then become resolved into the simplequestion, Why is there Existence?--Why is there not Nothing? Let us then first ask, What is "Nothing"? Is it a mere word, which presentsno meaning as corresponding to any objective reality, or has the word ameaning notwithstanding its being an inconceivable one? Or, otherwisephrased, is Nothing possible or impossible? Now, although in ordinaryconversation it is generally taken for granted that Nothing is possible, there is certainly no more ground for this supposition than there is forits converse--viz. , that Nothing is merely a word which signifies thenegation of possibility. For analysis will show that the choice betweenthese two counter-suppositions can only be made in the presence ofknowledge which is necessarily absent--the knowledge whether the universeof Existence is finite or infinite. If the universe as a whole is finite, the word Nothing would stand as a symbol to denote an unthinkable blank ofwhich a finite universe is the content. And forasmuch as Something andNothing would then become actual, as distinguished from nominalcorrelatives, we could have no guarantee that, in an absolute ortranscendental sense, it may not be possible, although it is inconceivable, for Something to become Nothing or Nothing Something. Hence, if Existenceis finite, No-existence becomes possible; and the doctrine of theindestructibility of Existence becomes, for aught that we can tell, of amerely relative signification. But, on the other hand, if Existence isinfinite, No-existence becomes impossible; and the doctrine of theindestructibility of Existence becomes, in a logical sense, of an absolutesignification. For it is manifest that if the universe of Existence iswithout end in space and time, the possibility of No-existence is ofnecessity excluded, and the word "Nothing" thus becomes a mere negation ofpossibility. [47] Thus, if it be conceded that the universe as a whole is infinite both inspace and time, the concession amounts to an abolition of the final mysteryof things. For all that we mean by a mystery is something that requires anexplanation, and the whole of the final mystery of things is thereforeembodied in the question, "Why is there Existence?--Why is there notNothing?" But if the universe of Existence be conceded infinite, thisquestion is sufficiently met by the answer, "Because Existence is, andNothing is not. " If it is retorted, But this is no real answer; I reply, Itis as real as the question. For to ask, Why is there Existence? is, uponthe supposition which has been conceded, equivalent to asking, Why is thepossible possible? And if such questions cannot be answered, it is scarcelyright to say that on this account they embody a mystery; because thequestions are really not rational questions, and therefore the fact oftheir not admitting of any rational answer cannot be held to show that thequestions embody any rational mystery. That there _is_ a rational mystery, in the sense of there being something which can never be _explained_, I donot dispute; all I assert is, that this mystery is inexplicable, only_because there is nothing to explain_; the mystery being ultimate, to askfor an explanation of that which, being ultimate, requires no explanation, is irrational. Or, to state the case in another way, if it is asked, Why isthere not Nothing? it is a sufficient answer, on supposition of theuniverse being infinite, to say, Because Nothing is nothing; it is merely aword which presents no meaning, and which, so far as anything can beconceived to the contrary, never can present any meaning. The above discussion has proceeded on the supposition of Existence beinginfinite; but practically the same result would follow on thecounter-supposition of Existence being finite. For although in this case, as we have seen, Non-entity would still be included within the range ofpossibility, it would still be no more conceivable as such than is Entity;and hence the question, Why is there not Nothing? would still beirrational, seeing that, even if the possibility which the questionsupposes were realised, it would in no wise tend to explain the mystery ofSomething. And even if it could, the final mystery would not be thusexcluded; it would merely be transferred from the mystery of Existence tothe mystery of Non-existence. Thus under every conceivable supposition wearrive at the same termination--viz. , that in the last resort there must bea final mystery, which, as forming the basis of all possible explanations, cannot itself receive any explanation, and which therefore is really not, in any proper sense of the term, a mystery at all. It is merely a factwhich itself requires no explanation, because it is a fact than which nonecan be more ultimate. So that even if we suppose this ultimate fact to bean Intelligent Being, it is clearly impossible that he should be able to_explain_ his own existence, since the possibility of any such explanationwould imply that his existence could not be ultimate. In the sense, therefore, of not admitting of any explanation, his existence would requireto be a mystery to himself, rendering it impossible for him to stateanything further with regard to it than this--"I am that I am. " I do not doubt that this way of looking at the subject will be deemedunsatisfactory at first sight, because it seems to be, as it were, a merelylogical way of cheating our intelligence out of an intuitively feltjustification for its own curiosity in this matter. But the fault reallylies in this intuitive feeling of justification not being itselfjustifiable. For this particular question, it will be observed, differsfrom all other possible questions with which the mind has to deal. Allother questions being questions concerning manifestations of existencepresupposed as existing, it is perfectly legitimate to seek for anexplanation of one series of manifestations in another--_i. E. _, to refer aless known group to a group better known. But the case is manifestly quiteotherwise when, having merged one group of manifestations into anothergroup, and this into another for an indefinite number of stages, wesuddenly make a leap to the last possible stage and ask, "Into what groupare we to merge the basis of all our previous groups, and of all groupswhich can possibly be formed in the future? How are we to classify thatwhich contains all possible classes? Where are we to look for anexplanation of Existence?" When thus clearly stated, the question, is, as Ihave said, manifestly irrational; but the point with which I am nowconcerned is this--When in plain reason the question is _seen_ to beirrational, why in intuitive sentiment should it not be _felt_ to be so?The answer, I think, is, that the interrogative faculty being usuallyoccupied with questions which admit of rational answers, we acquire a sortof intellectual habit of presupposing every wherefore to have a therefore, and thus, when eventually we arrive at the last of all possible wherefores, which itself supplies the basis of all possible therefores, we fail atfirst to recognise the exceptional character of our position. We fail atfirst to perceive that, from the very nature of this particular case, ourwherefore is deprived of the rational meaning which it had in all theprevious cases, where the possibility of a corresponding therefore waspresupposed. And failing fully to perceive this truth, our organised habitof expecting an answer to our question asserts itself, and we experiencethe same sense of intellectual unrest in the presence of this whollymeaningless and absurd question, as we experience in the presence ofquestions significant and rational. THE END. * * * * * Notes [1] The above was written before Mr. Mill's essay on Theism was published. Lest, therefore, my refutation may be deemed too curt, I supplement it withMr. Mill's remarks upon the same subject. "It may still be maintained thatthe feelings of morality make the existence of God eminently desirable. Nodoubt they do, and that is the great reason why we find that good men andwomen cling to the belief, and are pained by its being questioned. But, surely, it is not legitimate to assume that, in the order of the universe, whatever is desirable is true. Optimism, even when a God is alreadybelieved in, is a thorny doctrine to maintain, and had to be taken byLeibnitz in the limited sense, that the universe being made by a goodbeing, is the best universe possible, not the best absolutely: that theDivine power, in short, was not equal to making it more free fromimperfections than it is. But optimism, prior to belief in a God, and asthe ground of that belief, seems one of the oddest of all speculativedelusions. Nothing, however, I believe, contributes more to keep up thebelief in the general mind of humanity than the feeling of itsdesirableness, which, when clothed, as it very often is, in the form of anargument, is a _naive_ expression of the tendency of the human mind tobelieve whatever is agreeable to it. Positive value the argument of coursehas none. " For Mill's remarks on the version of the argument dealt with in§ 5, see his "Three Essays, " p. 204. [2] The words "or not conceivable, " are here used in the sense of "notrelatively conceivable, " as explained in Chap. Vi. [3] For the full discussion from which the above is an extract, see _Systemof Logic_, vol. I. Pp. 409-426 (8th ed. ). But, substituting "psychical" for"volitional, " see also, for some mitigation of the severity of the abovestatement, the closing paragraphs of my supplementary essay on "CosmicTheism. " [4] Essay on Understanding--Existence of God. [5] Locke, _loc. Cit. _ [6] See Appendix A. [7] Viz. , the constant association within experience of mind with certainhighly peculiar material forms; the constant proportion which is found tosubsist between the quantity of cerebral matter and the degree ofintellectual capacity--a proportion which may be clearly traced throughoutthe ascending series of vertebrated animals, and which is very generallymanifested in individuals of the human species; the effects of cerebralanæmia, anæsthetics, stimulants, narcotic poisons, and lesions of cerebralsubstance. There can, in short, be no question that the whole series ofobservable facts bearing upon the subject are precisely such as they oughtto be upon supposition of the materialistic theory being true; while, contrariwise, there is a total absence of any known facts tending tonegative that theory. At the same time it must be carefully noted, that theobserved facts (and any additional number of the like kind) do notlogically warrant us in concluding that mental states are necessarily_dependent_ upon material changes. Nevertheless, it must also be noted, that, in the absence of positive proof of causation, it is certainly inaccordance with scientific procedure, to yield our provisional assent to anhypothesis which undoubtedly connects a large order of constant_accompaniments_, rather than to an hypothesis which is confessedly framedto meet but a single one of the facts. Professor Clifford, in a lecture on "Body and Mind" which he delivered atSt. George's Hall, and afterwards published in the _Fortnightly Review_, argues against the existence of God on the ground that, as Mind is alwaysassociated with Matter within experience, there arises a presumptionagainst Mind existing anywhere without being thus associated, so thatunless we can trace in the disposition of the heavenly bodies someresemblance to the conformation of cerebral structure, we are to concludethat there is a considerable balance of probability in favour of Atheism. Now, as this argument--if we rid it of the grotesque allusion to theheavenly bodies--is one that is frequently met with, it seems desirable inthis place briefly to analyse it. First of all, then, the validity of theargument depends upon the probability there is that the constant associatedof Mind with Matter within experience is due to a _causal_ connection; forif the association in question is merely an _association_ and nothing more, the origin of known mind is as far from being explained as it would be wereMind never known as associated with Matter. But, in the next place, supposing the constant association in question to be due to a causalconnection, it by no means follows that because Mind is due to Matterwithin experience, therefore Mind cannot exist in any other mode beyondexperience. Doubtless, from analogy, there is a presumption against the hypothesis thatthe same entity should exist in more than one mode at the same time; butclearly in this case we are quite unable to estimate the value of thispresumption. Consequently, even assuming a causal connection between Matterand Human Mind, if there is any, the slightest, indications supplied by anyother facts of experience pointing to the existence of a Divine Mind, suchindications should be allowed as much argumentative weight as they wouldhave had in the absence of the presumption we are considering. HenceProfessor Clifford's conclusion cannot be regarded as valid until all theother arguments in favour of Theism have been separately refuted. DoubtlessProfessor Clifford will be the first to recognise the cogency of thiscriticism--if indeed it has not already occurred to him; for as I know thathe is much too clear a thinker not to perceive the validity of theseconsiderations, I am willing to believe that the substance of them wasomitted from his essay merely for the sake of brevity; but, for the sake ofless thoughtful persons, I have deemed it desirable to state thus clearlythat the problem of Theism cannot be solved on grounds of Materialismalone. [This note was written before I had the advantage of ProfessorClifford's acquaintance, but now I leave it, as I leave all other parts ofthis essay--viz. , as it was originally written. --1878. ] [8] To avoid burdening the text, I have omitted another criticism which maybe made on Locke's argument. "Triangle" is a word by which we designate acertain figure, one of the properties of which is that the sum of itsangles is equal to two right angles. In other words, any figure which doesnot exhibit this property is not that figure which we designate a triangle. Hence, when Locke says he cannot conceive of a triangle which does notpresent this property, it may be answered that his inability arises merelyfrom the fact that any figure which fails to present this property is not afigure to which the term "triangle" can apply. Thus viewed, however, theillustration would obviously be absurd, for the same reason that thequestion of the clown is absurd, "Can you think of a horse that is justlike a cow?" What Locke evidently means is, that we cannot conceive of anygeometrical figure which presents all the other properties of a trianglewithout also presenting the property in question. Now, even admitting, withLocke, that it is as inconceivable that the entity known to us as Mattershould possess the property of causing thought as it is that the figurewhich we term a triangle should posses the property of containing more thantwo right angles, still it remains, for the purposes of Locke's supposedtheistic demonstration, to prove that it is an inconceivable for the entitywhich we call Mind _not_ to be due to another Mind, as it is for a triangle_not_ to contain, other than two right angles. But, further, even if itwere possible to prove this, the demonstration would make as much againstTheism as in favour of it; for if, as the illustration of the triangleimplies, we restrict the meaning of the word "Mind" to an entity one ofwhose essential qualities is that it should be caused by another Mind, thewords "Supreme and Uncaused Mind" involve a contradiction in terms, just asmuch as would the words "A square triangle having four right angles. " Itwould, therefore, seem that if we adhere to Locke's argument, and pursue itto its conclusion, the only logical outcome would be this:--Seeing that bythe word "Mind, " I expressly connote the quality of derivation from a priorMind, as a quality belonging no less essentially to Mind than the qualityof presenting two right angles belongs to a triangle; therefore, whateverother attributes I ascribe to the First Cause, I must clearly exclude theattribute Mind; and hence, whatever else such a Cause may be, it followsfrom my argument that it certainly is--Not Mind. [9] Hamilton. [10] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. I. Pp. 25-31. [11] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. Ii. P. 542. [12] _Loc. Cit. _, p. 543. [13] Appendix to Discussions, pp. 614, 165. [14] Mill, in the lengthy chapter which he devotes to the freedom of thewill in his Examination, does not notice this point. [15] If more evidence can be wanted, it is supplied in some suggestivefacts of Psychology. For example, "From our earliest childhood, the idea ofdoing wrong (that is, of doing what is forbidden, or what is injurious toothers) and the idea of punishment are presented to the mind together, andthe intense character of the impressions causes the association betweenthem to attain the highest degree of closeness and intimacy. Is it strange, or unlike the usual processes of the human mind, that in thesecircumstances we should retain the feeling and forget the reason on whichit is grounded? But why do I speak of forgetting? In most cases the reasonhas never, in our early education, been presented to the mind. The onlyideas presented have been those of wrong and punishment, and an inseparableassociation has been created between these directly, without the help ofany intervening idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous feelingsof mankind regard punishment and a wrong-doer as naturally fitted to eachother--as a conjunction appropriate in itself, independently of anyconsequences, " &c. --Mill, Examination of Hamilton, p. 599. [16] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107. [17] Throughout these considerations I have confined myself to the_positive_ side of the subject. My argument being of the nature of acriticism on the erroneous inferences which are drawn from the _good_qualities of our moral nature, I thought it desirable, for the sake ofclearness, not to burden that argument by the additional one as to thesource of the _evil_ qualities of that nature. This additional argument, however, will be found briefly stated at the close of my supplementaryessay on Professor Flint's "Theism. " On reading that additional argument, Ithink that any candid and unbiassed mind must conclude that, alike in whatit is _not_ as well as in what it _is_, our moral nature points to anatural genesis, as distinguished from a supernatural cause. [18] The illustration to which I refer is that of the watershed of acountry being precisely adapted to draining purposes. The rivers just fittheir own particular beds: the latter occupy the lowest grounds, and getbroader and deeper as they advance; pebbles, gravel, and sand all occupythe best teleological situations, &c. , &c. [19] "Order of Nature, " by the Rev. Baden Powell, M. A. , F. R. S. , &c. , 1859, pp. 228-241. [20] I think it desirable to state that I perceived this great truth beforeI was aware that it had been perceived also by Mr. Spencer. His statementof it now occurs in the short chapter of _First Principles_ entitled"Relations between Forces. " So far as I an able to ascertain, no one hashitherto considered this important doctrine in its immediate relation tothe question of Theism. In using the term "persistence of force, " I am aware that I am using a termwhich is not unopen to criticism. But as Mr. Spencer's writings havebrought this term into such general use among speculative thinkers, itseemed to me undesirable to modify it. Questions of mere terminology arewithout any importance in a discussion of this kind, provided that theterms are universally understood to mean what they are intended to mean;and I think that the signification which Mr. Spencer attaches to his term, "persistence of force, " is sufficiently precise. Therefore, adopting hisusage, whenever throughout the following pages I speak of force aspersisting, what I intend to be understood is, that there is asomething--call it force, or energy, or _x_--which, so far as experience orimagination can extend, is, in its relation to us, ubiquitous andillimitable; or, in other words, that it universally presents the propertyof permanence. (See, for a more detailed explanation, supplementary essay, "On the Final Mystery of Things. ") [21] Hamilton may here be especially noticed, because he went so far as tomaintain that the phenomena of the external world, taken by themselves, would ground a valid argument to the negation of God. Although I cannot butthink that this position was a conspicuously irrational one for anycompetent thinker to occupy before the scientific doctrine of thecorrelation of the forces had been enunciated, nevertheless I cannot losethe opportunity of alluding to this remarkable feature in Sir WilliamHamilton's philosophy, showing as it does that same prophetic forestallingof the results which have since followed from the discovery of theconservation of energy, as was shown by his no less remarkable theory ofcausation. (See supplementary essay "On the Final Mystery of Things. ") [22] Mr. N. Lockyer's work is now supplying important evidence on thesepoints. --1878. [23] It will of course be observed that if matter and force are identical, the unification is complete. [24] Herbert Spencer. [25] It may here be observed that the above discussion would not beaffected by the view of Professor Clifford and others, that natural law isto be regarded as having a subjective rather than an objectivesignification--that what we call a natural law is merely an arbitraryselection made by ourselves of certain among natural processes. Thediscussion would not be affected by this view, because the argument isreally based upon the existence of a cosmos as distinguished from a chaos;and therefore it would be rather an intensification of the argument thanotherwise to point out that, for the maintenance of a cosmos, natural laws, as conceived by us, would be inadequate. And this seems a fitting place tomake the almost superfluous remark, that throughout this present essay Ihave used the words "Natural Law, " "Supreme Law-giver, " &c. , in anapparently unguarded sense, merely in order to avoid needless obscurity. Fully sensible as I am of the misleading nature of the analogy which thesewords embody, I have yet adopted them for the sake of perspicuity--beingcareful, however, never to allow the false analogy which they express toenter into an argument on either side of the question. Thus, even where itis said that the existence of Natural Law points to the existence of aSupreme Law-maker, the argument might equally well be phrased: Theexistence of an orderly cosmos points to the existence of a disposing mind. [26] First Principles, pp. 27-29. [27] It may be here observed that this quality of indefiniteness on thepart of such reasoning is merely a practical outcome of the theoreticalconsiderations adduced in Chapter V. For as we there saw that the ratiobetween the known and the unknown is in this case wholly indefinite, itfollows that any symbols derived from the region of the known--even thoughsuch symbols be the highest generalities which the latter regionaffords--must be wholly indefinite when projected into the region of theunknown. Or rather let us say, that as the region of the unknown is but aprogressive continuation of the region of the known, the determinate valueof symbols of thought varies inversely as the distance--or, not improbably, as the square of the distance--from the sphere of the known at which theyare applied. [28] _i. E. _, illegitimate in a _relative_ sense. The conclusion islegitimate enough in a _formal_ sense, and as establishing a probability ofsome _unassignable_ degree of value. But it would be illegitimate if thisquality of indefiniteness were disregarded, and the conclusion supposed topossess the same character of actual probability as it has of formaldefinition. [29] In order not to burden the text with details, I have presented thesereflections in their most general terms. Thus, if it be granted that cosmicharmony results from the combined action of general laws, and that theselaws are the necessary result of the primary qualities of force and matter, this the most general statement of the atheistic position includes all morespecial considerations as a genus includes its species; and therefore itwould not signify, for the purposes of the atheistic argument, whether ornot any such more special considerations are possible. Nevertheless, forthe sake of completeness, I may here observe that we are not wholly withoutindications in nature of the physical causation whereby the effect ofcosmic harmony is produced. The universal tendency of motion to becomerhythmical--itself, as Mr. Spencer was the first to show, a necessaryconsequence of the persistence of force--is, so to speak, a conservativetendency: it sets a premium against natural cataclysms. But a moreimportant consideration is this, --that during the evolution of natural lawin the way suggested in Chapter IV. , as every newly evolved law came intoexistence it must have been, as it were, grafted on the stock of allpre-existing natural laws, and so would not enter the cosmic system as anelement of confusion, but rather as an element of further progress. Forinstance, when, with the origin of organic nature, the law of naturalselection entered upon the cosmos, it was grafted upon the pre-existingstock of other natural laws, and so combined within them in unity. And alittle thought will show that it was impossible that it should dootherwise; for it was impossible that natural selection could ever produceorganisms which would ever be able by their existence to conflict with thepre-existing system of astronomic or geologic laws; seeing that organisms, being a product of later evolution than these laws, would either have to beadapted to them or perish. And hence the new law of natural selection, which consists in so adapting organisms to the pre-existing laws that theymust either conform to them or die. Now, I have chosen the case of naturalselection because, as alluded to in the text, it is the law of all otherswhich is the most conspicuously effective in producing the harmoniouscomplexity of nature. But the same kind of considerations may be seen toapply to most of the other general laws with which we are acquainted, particularly if we bear in mind that the general outcome of their unitedaction as we observe it--the cosmic harmony on which so much stress islaid--is not _perfectly_ harmonious. Cataclysms--whether it be the captureof an insect, or the ruin of a star--although events of comparatively rareoccurrence if at any given time we take into account the total number ofinsects or the total number of stars, are events which nevertheless dooccasionally happen. And the fact that even cataclysms take place inaccordance with so-called natural law, serves but to emphasise theconsideration on which we are engaged--viz. , that the total result of thecombined action of general laws is not such as to produce perfect order. Lastly, if the answer is made that human ideas of perfect order may notcorrespond with the highest ideal of such order, I observe that to makesuch a answer is merely to abandon the subject of discussion; for if atheist rests his argument on the basis of our human conception of order, heis not free to maintain his argument and at the same time to abandon itsbasis at whatever point the latter may be shown untenable. [30] Since the above was written, the first volume of Mr. Spencer's"Sociology" has been published; and those who may not as yet have read thefirst half of that work are here strongly recommended to do so; for Mr. Spencer has there shown, in a more connected and conclusive manner than hasever been shown before, how strictly natural is the growth of allsuperstitions and religions--_i. E. _, of all the theories of personal agencyin nature. --1878. [31] Herbert Spencer's Essays, vol. Iii. Pp. 246-249 (1874). [32] This is the truly inconceivable element in the physical theory. As Ihave shown in the pleading on the side of Atheism, the supposedinconceivability of cosmic harmony being due to mindless forces, is not ofsuch a kind as wholly refuses to be surmounted by symbolic conceptions of asufficiently abstract character. But it is impossible, by the aid of anysymbols, to gain a conception of an eternal existence. And I may here pointout, that if Mind is said to be the cause of evolution, not only does thestatement involve the inconceivable proposition that such a Mind must beinfinite in respect to its powers of supervision, direction, &c. ; but thestatement also involves a necessary alternative between two additionalinconceivable propositions--viz. , either that such a Mind must have beeneternal, or that it must have come into existence without a cause. In thisrespect, therefore, it would seem that the theory of Atheism has theadvantage over that of Theism; for while the former theory is under thenecessity of embodying only a single inconceivable term, the latter theoryis under the necessity of embodying two such terms. [33] Mr. Herbert Spencer has treated of this subject in his memorablecontroversy with Mill on the "Universal Postulate" (see _Psychology_, §427), and refuses to entertain the term "Inconceivable" as applicable toany propositions other than those wherein "the terms cannot, by any effort, be brought before consciousness in that relation which the propositionasserts between them. " That is to say, he limits the term "Inconceivable"to that which is _absolutely_ inconceivable; and he then proceeds to affirmthat all propositions "which admit of being framed in thought, but whichare so much at variance with experience, in which its terms have habituallybeen otherwise united, that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relationwithout effort, " ought properly to be termed "_incredible_" propositions. Now I cannot see that the class "Incredible propositions" is, as thisdefinition asserts, identical with the class which I have termed"Relatively inconceivable" propositions. For example, it is a familiarobservation that, on looking at the setting sun, we experience an almost, if not quite, insuperable difficulty in _conceiving_ the sun's apparentmotion as due to our own actual motion, and yet we experience no difficultyin _believing_ it. Conversely, I entertain but little difficulty in_conceiving_--_i. E. _, imagining--a shark with a mammalian heart, and yet itwould require extremely strong evidence to make me _believe_ that such ananimal exists. The truth appears to be that our language is deficient interms whereby to distinguish between that which is wholly inconceivablefrom that which is with difficulty conceivable. This, it seems to me, wasthe principle reason of the dispute between Spencer and Mill above alludedto, --the former writer having always used the word "Inconceivable" in thesense of "Absolutely inconceivable, " and the latter having apparently usedit--in his _Logic_ and elsewhere--in both senses. I have endeavoured toremedy this defect in the language by introducing the qualifying words, "Absolutely" and "Relatively, " which, although not appropriate words, arethe best that I am able to supply. The conceptive faculty of the individualhaving been determined by the experience of the race, that which isinconceivable by the intelligence of the race may be said to beinconceivable to the intelligence of the individual in an _absolute_ sense;no effort on his part can enable him to surmount the organically imposedconditions of his conceptive faculty. But that which is inconceivablemerely to one individual or generation, while it is not inconceivable tothe intelligence of the race, may properly be said to be inconceivable tothe intelligence of that individual or generation only in a _relative_sense; apart from the special condition to which the individualintelligence has been subjected, there is nothing in the conditions ofhuman intelligence as such to prevent the thing from being conceived. [While this work has been passing through the press, I have found that Mr. G. H. Lewes has already employed the above terms in precisely the samesense as that which is above explained. --1878. ] [34] I should here like to have added some considerations on Sir W. Hamilton's remarks concerning the effect of training upon the mind in thisconnection; but, to avoid being tedious, I shall condense what I have tosay into a few sentences. What Hamilton maintains is very true, viz. , thatthe study of classics, moral and mental philosophy, &c. , renders the mindmore capable of believing in a God than does the study of physical science. The question, however, is, Which class of studies ought to be consideredthe more authoritative in this matter? I certainly cannot see what titleclassics, history, political economy, &c. , have to be regarded at all; andalthough the mental and moral sciences have doubtless a better claim, stillI think they must be largely subordinate to those sciences which deal withthe whole domain of nature besides. Further, I should say that there is novery strong _affirmative_ influence created on the mind in this respect byany class of studies; and that the only reason why we so generally findTheism and classics, &c. , united, is because we so seldom find classics, &c. , and physical science united; the _negative_ influence of the latter, in the case of classical minds, being therefore generally absent. [35] The qualities named are only known in a relative sense, and thereforethe apparent contradiction may be destitute of meaning in an absolutesense. [36] All the quotations in this Appendix have been taken from the chapteron "Our knowledge of the existence of a God, " and from the early part ofthat on "The extent of human knowledge, " together with the appended letterto the Bishop of Worcester. [37] A criticism of Mr. John Fiske's proposed system of theology asexpounded in his work on "Cosmic Philosophy" (Macmillan & Co. , 1874). [38] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. I. Pp. 87-89. [39] Cosmic Philosophy, vol. Ii. Pp. 429, 430. [40] Ibid. , p. 441. [41] Ibid. , pp. 450, 451. [42] Principles of Psychology, vol. I. Pp. 159-161. [43] We thus see that the question whether there may not be "somethingquasi-psychical in the constitution of things" is a question which does notaffect the position of Theism as it has been left by a negation of theself-conscious personality of God. But as the speculations on which thisquestion has been reared are in themselves of much philosophical interest, I may here observe that, in one form or another, they have been dimlyfloating in men's minds for a long time past. Thus, excepting the degree ofcertainty with which it is taught, we have in Mr. Spencer's words abovequoted a reversion to the doctrine of Buddha; for, as "force ispersistent, " all that would happen on death, supposing the doctrine true, would be an escape of the "circumscribed aggregate" of units forming theindividual consciousness into the unlimited abyss of similar unitsconstituting the "Absolute Being" of the Cosmists, or the "Divine Essence"of the Buddhists. Again, the doctrine in a vague form pervades thephilosophy of Spinoza, and is next clearly enunciated by Wundt. Lastly, ina recently published very remarkable essay "On the Nature of Things inThemselves, " Professor Clifford arrives at a similar doctrine by adifferent route. The following is the conclusion to which hearrives:--"That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplestfeeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A moving molecule ofinorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, but it possesses asmall piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as toform the film on the under side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuffwhich go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings ofSentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain andnervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuffare so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linkedtogether that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other. When matters take the complex form of a living human brain, thecorresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, havingintelligence and volition. " (Mind, January, 1878. ) [44] Theism, by Robert Flint, D. D. , LL. D. , Professor of Divinity in theUniversity of Edinburgh, &c. [45] Such being the objects in view, I have not thought it necessary toextend this criticism into anything resembling a review of ProfessorFlint's work as a whole; but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather atconfining my observations to those parts of his treatise which embody thecurrent arguments from teleology alone. I may here observe, however, ingeneral terms, that I consider all his arguments to have been answered byanticipation in the foregoing examination of Theism. I may also hereobserve, that throughout the following essay I have used the word "design"in the sense in which it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense isdistinctly a different one from that which the word bears in the writingsof the Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings, as pointed out in Chapter III. , the word bears its natural meaning of acertain _process of thought_, in Professor Flint's work it is used ratheras expressive of a _product of intelligence_. In other words, "design, " asused by Professor Flint, is synonymous with _intention_, irrespective ofthe particular psychological process by which the intention may have beenput into effect. [46] Op. Cit. , pp. 255-257. [47] Let it be observed that there is a distinction between what I may callsubstantial and formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers asflowers perish, or become non-existent; but the substances of which theywere composed persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out thatif the universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a wholewould present substantial existence as standing out of relation to spaceand time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formalexistences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, forinstance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in time asit has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it consists willnot become extinguished by the extinction of the system, it may not nowstand in any real relation to what we call space and time. I am inclined tothink that it is upon the idea of non-existence in this formal sense thatwe construct a pseud-idea of non-existence in a substantial sense; but itis evident that if the universe as a whole is absolute, this pseud-ideamust represent as impossibility. And from this it follows, that ifexistence is infinite in space and time, every _quantum_ of it with whichour experience comes into relation must represent, as its essentialquality, that quality which we find to be presented by the substance ofthings--the quality, that is, of persistence.