WHY WE ARE AT WAR GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE With an Appendix of Original Documents including the Authorized EnglishTranslation of the White Book issued by the German Government Second Edition Revised (fourth impression)containing the Russian Orange Book BY MEMBERS OF THE OXFORD FACULTY OF MODERN HISTORY 1914 PREFACE We are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of politicalthought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of thepresent war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake. We havesome experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we haveendeavoured to treat this subject historically. Our fifth chapter, whichto many readers will be the most interesting, is founded upon first-handevidence--the documents contained in the British White Book(Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as _Correspondencerespecting the European Crisis_), and the German White Book, which is anofficial apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book, asbeing difficult of access, we have printed _in extenso_. It exists intwo versions, a German and an English, both published for the GermanGovernment. We have reproduced the English version without correctingthe solecisms of spelling and expression. From the English White Book wehave reprinted, in the second appendix, a small selection of the moresignificant documents; many more are quoted in the body of our work. Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor ofInternational Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W. G. S. Adams, GladstoneProfessor of Political Theory and Institutions, for valuable suggestionsand assistance. The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those who signthis Preface. Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to theBelgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the Belgiannation, and especially for the University of Louvain. E. BARKERH. W. C. DAVISC. R. L. FLETCHERARTHUR HASSALLL. G. WICKHAM LEGGF. MORGAN Preface to Second Edition By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are now ableto print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained in theRussian Orange Book which have not been already published in the Germanand the British White Books. In the light of the evidence afforded bythe Russian Orange Book, we have modified one or two sentences in thisedition. 21 September, 1914. CONTENTS TABLE OF DATES CHAPTER I THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG Belgian neutrality--The origin of Belgium--England and the smallerPowers--The Treaty of 1839--Belgium's independence and neutrality. --Theneutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg--Its origin--The Treaty of1867--The collective guarantee. --The strategic importance ofBelgium--German plans long suspected. CHAPTER II THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871 Introduction--The Triple Alliance--Bismarck's dismissal--French colonialadvance---Germany's demands for compensations--The Anglo-Frenchagreement concerning Morocco--German objections--England and Russia--TheAgadir incident--Anglo-French exchange of notes--Disputes in theBalkans--The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886--Count Caprivi's law of1893--Franco-Russian _entente_--German military preparations--France'sresponse--Russia's reorganization--England's Army and Navy. Note. _Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_. CHAPTER III THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY Estrangement of Russia and Germany--Austria and the Balkans--Germanpenetration through the Balkans--Servia and Russia--Germany and theSlavs--Russia and England. CHAPTER IV CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914 Diary of the Events leading to the War. CHAPTER V NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS Dramatis personae. §1. _Germany's attitude to Russia andAustria_--Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia--Germany shieldsAustria--Conduct of Germany considered--Sir Edward Grey proposesmediation, and then a Conference of Four Powers--Germany's objections toa 'Conference'--Direct conversations between the Powers--Austria invitedto suspend military action--Mobilization; on whom does responsibilitylie?--War inevitable. §2. _Germany's attitude to France_--Germanyaccuses France of military preparations--Germany invades France. §3. _The question of British neutrality_--Possibility of England beinginvolved--Germany warned--German 'bid for British neutrality'--England'srefusal--France agrees, and Germany refuses, to respect Belgianneutrality--Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey--Neutrality ofLuxemburg violated--Germany demands a free passage through Belgium--SirEdward Grey protests--Belgium invaded--England's ultimatum--The ImperialChancellor urges necessity of Germany's action. §4. _England andServia_--Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in Servia--He isonly concerned for the peace of Europe--He urges mediation--He proposesa Conference. §5. _Great Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia andFrance_--Proposals by MM. Sazonof and Poincaré--England's refusal--Wasit wise?--The Austrian _dossier_. §6. _Italy's comments on thesituation_--Significance of Italy's position--Italy's endeavours toprevent war--Italy's declaration of neutrality. Note. Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servians reply. CHAPTER VI THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE The principles of _raison d'etat_ and the rule of law--Treitschke'steaching--The results of this philosophy--Contempt for public law--Theglorification of war--The philosophy pagan--Its adoption by Prussiansoldiers and Government--A plea for Prussia--England fights for law. EPILOGUE APPENDIXES I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THEEUROPEAN CRISIS III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLINRESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMANGOVERNMENT IV. THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNARESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIANGOVERNMENT VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK CHIEF DATES 1648 Jan. The Treaty of Munster. Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia. 1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht. 1772 First Partition of Poland. 1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg. 1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia. 1789 The French Revolution begins. 1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes. French Conquest of the Austrian Netherlands and Liège. Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'. Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared. 1793 Jan. Second Partition of Poland. Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and Holland. 1795 Third Partition of Poland. 1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the independence of Holland (then called 'Batavian Republic'). 1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens. 1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth. May 12. Declaration of War by England against France. 1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont. May 30. The First Peace of Paris. Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna. 1815 Mar-June. The Hundred Days. May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince of Orange as King of the United Netherlands. Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris. 1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug. ). 1830-1878 Servia autonomous. 1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. 1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium by the above-named Powers. 1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxemburg. Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon. 1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again guaranteed by Germany and France. 1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort. 1872 The _Dreikaiserbund_; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and Austria. 1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by Russia and England. 1878 The Treaty of Berlin. Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan. 1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria. 1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. 1885 Formation of United Bulgaria. War between Bulgaria and Servia. 1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia. 1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany. 1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France. 1893 Caprivi's Army Act. 1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field of Colonial Expansion. Treaty between England and France regarding their interests in Indo-China. Definite Alliance between Russia and France. 1898 Reconquest of the Sudan. Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference. 1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli. June. First Peace Conference at the Hague. New German Army Act. 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War. 1903 Revolution in Belgrade. 1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France with regard to North Africa. 1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier. June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcassé. Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan. Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. German Army Act. Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeeiras Conference. 1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague. 1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople. Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. German Navy Law. 1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the annexation of Bosnia by Austria. 1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy. 1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser. 1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by a closer Anglo-French _entente_. German Army Act. 1912 Sensational German Army Bill. War in the Balkans. Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates £11, 416, 700. Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey broken off. 1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincaré elected French President. Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Government at Constantinople. May 26. Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States. May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. June 20. Universal military service in Belgium. June 26. Conference between the French President, the French Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey. June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece. New German Army Bill. July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria. The Turks re-occupy Adrianople. New Russian Army Bill. French Army Bill. Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Roumania. Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey. Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania. Austrian War Fund increased. 1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia. CHAPTER 1 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG I The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the idea ofa Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically andgeographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial character; itsboundaries have been determined by the Great Powers and cut across theancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it must be added that itspopulation is heterogeneous both in race and language. These facts, however, in no sense diminish the legal rights of Belgium as a nation. She is a sovereign state by the same charter as Italy or Greece; and forthe convenience of Europe she has been solemnly declared a neutralstate, endowed with special privileges but burdened with correspondingobligations. While those privileges were maintained--and they have beenrigidly maintained for more than eighty years--the Belgian peoplepunctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have declinedto betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful neighbour, orby participating in the violation of European public law, their countryis a wilderness of smoking ruins. In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914, Belgiumhas proved that she possesses other titles to existence and respect thanthose afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies of neighbours, orby the doctrines of international law. She has more than satisfied thetests which distinguish the true from the fictitious nationality. Thosewho have hitherto known Belgium only as a hive of manufacturing andmining industry, or as a land of historic memories and monuments, arenow recognizing, with some shame for their past blindness, the moral andspiritual qualities which her people have developed under the aegis of aEuropean guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, if Belgium wereobliterated from the map of Europe, the world would be the poorer andEurope put to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of hernationality will never be forgotten while liberty has any value orpatriotism any meaning among men. We cannot do less than echo thegeneral sentiment of admiration for a constancy to national ideals whichhas left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than those ofAttila. But the case against her oppressor is not to be founded solelyor mainly on her peculiar merits. In a special sense it rests upon thelegal rights and duties with which she has been invested for theconvenience of her neighbours and for the welfare of the European statesystem. It was in their interest, rather than her own, that the GreatPowers made her a sovereign independent state. As such she is entitled, equally with England or with Germany, to immunity from unprovokedattack. But the Powers which made her a sovereign state, also, and forthe same reasons of convenience, made her a neutral state. She wastherefore debarred from consulting her own safety by making alliancesupon what terms she would. She could not lawfully join either of the twoarmed camps into which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, ifshe had been as contemptible as she is actually the reverse, she wouldstill be entitled to expect from England and from every other of herguarantors the utmost assistance it is in their power to give. Infighting for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is, ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the weakerto exist. * * * * * The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of Belgium--with theexception of the bishopric of Liège, which was until 1795 anecclesiastical principality--were known in the seventeenth century asthe Spanish, in the eighteenth as the Austrian, Netherlands. Theyreceived the first of these names when they returned to the allegianceof Philip II, after a short participation in the revolt to which Hollandowes her national existence. When the independence of Holland wasfinally recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands weresubjected to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe hasseen fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in theScheldt was admitted by the Treaty of Münster (1648), and Antwerp wasthus precluded from developing into a rival of Amsterdam. In the age ofLouis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were constantly attacked by France, who acquired at one time or another the chief towns of Artois andHainault, including some which have lately come into prominence in thegreat war, such as Lille, Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk, however, of the Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht toAustria, then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passedwith the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern borderwere to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as abarrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown atthe French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian Netherlands andLiège in November, 1792; and immediately afterwards threw down agauntlet to England by opening to all nations the navigation of theScheldt. This, and the threatened French attack on Holland, her ally, drew England into conflict with the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp inFrench hands and as an open port would be a dangerous menace; andsecondly, the French had announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostileto all standing treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its risein France and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannotrecognize a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'. [1] The answerof William Pitt, which in effect declared war upon the Revolution, contains a memorable statement of the attitude towards public law whichEngland held then, as she holds it to-day: 'With regard to the ScheldtFrance can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she alsohave the right to set aside equally the other treaties between allPowers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies.... England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power ofannulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended naturalright, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political systemof Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consentof all the Powers'. [2] This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was anattitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of WesternEurope when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the samegrounds England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, acommercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzerland, where shehad no immediate interests to protect. By the Treaty of Lunéville(February, 1801) France and Austria had mutually guaranteed theindependence of the Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch toadopt whatever form of government seemed good to them. In defiance ofthese stipulations Napoleon maintained a garrison in Holland, and forcedupon her a new Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November, 1801). Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republicand had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that theFrench should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which Napoleonreplied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. His interviewwith the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many points ofresemblance with the now famous interview of August 4, 1914, between SirEdward Goschen and Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, likethe Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed himself unable, to understand why Great Britain should insist upon the observance oftreaties. To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars thatBelgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect themselves orthe German people against an aggressive French Government. The alliestherefore, in the year 1813, handed over to Holland the AustrianNetherlands and the bishopric of Liège in order 'to put Holland in aposition to resist attack until the Powers could come to its aid'. Thisarrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there wasno government or visible unity in the Belgian provinces after theretirement of the French, the union with Holland, originally suggestedby Lord Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians thegreat privilege of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed atthe Congress of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlandswas declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers. But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that thisunion was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The Belgianscomplained that they were not allowed their just share of influence andrepresentation in the legislature or executive. They resented theattempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch Liberalism upon them. They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch officials and garrisons, anddrew up for themselves a monarchical and parliamentary constitution. Their aspirations aroused much sympathy both in England and in France. These two countries induced the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) to recognize the new kingdom as an independent neutral state. This recognition was embodied in the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articlessigned at London in October, 1831; and it was not too generous to theaspirations of Belgian nationality. Since the Belgians had been defeatedin the field by Holland and had only been rescued by a French army, theywere obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts ofLuxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed before thissettlement was recognized by Holland. But at length this last guaranteewas obtained; and the Treaty of London, 1839, finally established theinternational status of Belgium. Under this treaty both her independenceand her neutrality were definitely guaranteed by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the Treaty of1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore desirable topoint out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to prevent Englandfrom supporting the cause of France. It was with this object that hepublished the proposal alleged to have been made to him by the Frenchrepresentative, Benedetti, in 1866, that Prussia should help France toacquire Belgium as a solace for Prussian annexations in NorthernGermany. Then, as now, England insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. Theresult was that, on the instance of Lord Granville, Germany and Franceentered into an identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to theeffect that, if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, GreatBritain would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. Thetreaty was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept. 1870) the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transportthe German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that thiswould be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused. Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired herspecial status. As an independent state she is bound by the elementaryprinciple of the law of nations, that a neutral state is bound to refuseto grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This is a well-establishedrule, and was formally affirmed by the Great Powers at the Hague PeaceConference of 1907. The fifth Article of the Convention [3] then drawnup respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Waron Land runs as follows:-- 'A neutral power ought not to allow on its territory any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'. Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No. 2:-- 'Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or supplies'. By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent upon herperpetual neutrality:-- 'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states'. [4] It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That, it seems, has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the GermanReichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard to Belgium, Germany has assumed the position which the Government of the FrenchRevolution adopted towards the question of the Scheldt, and whichNapoleon adopted towards the guaranteed neutrality of Switzerland andHolland. Now, as then, England has special interests at stake. Theconsequences of the oppression or the extinction of the smallernationalities are bound to excite peculiar alarm in England. Inparticular she cannot forget how she would be menaced by theestablishment of a militarist state in Belgium. But since in England'scase the dangers and uncertainties of a state of things in which Mightis treated as Right are particularly apparent, it is only to be expectedthat she should insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity oftreaties, a sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to thestrongest nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, nonation is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers canmeet it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nationsmust perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege ofenslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition wouldbe a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among suchcompetitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity, impartialonlookers may debate if they please. England has answered both thesequestions with an unhesitating negative. II Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for allpractical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbour;and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion[5]of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with lesspower of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If thedefence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinaryEnglishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history ofBelgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that areinvolved in the German violation of her rights. As the followingnarrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in theinterests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protectionagainst French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and itmight perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded thaton Belgium, was not treated by this country as a _casus belli_. England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistentlyadopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside thereach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in thecase of Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. Englandholds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smallerstates of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerfulneighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment fallsfirst upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support aprotest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern ofRussia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance forprotection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from theFrench side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exerciseour influence, but not as principals. Any other course would beimpossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying ourpower to help the states within our reach. * * * * * The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state which hadlost its existence during the French Revolution. Although it was placedunder the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant of itsformer sovereign, it was not incorporated in his kingdom, but retainedits own identity and gave to its ruler the secondary title of Grand Dukeof Luxemburg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in some waysanomalous; for lying as it did between the Meuse and the Rhine, andpossessing in the town of Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strengthsome competent critics reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltaramong the fortresses of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensablelink in the chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Notbeing able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against theFrench, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all landbetween the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops onbehalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus Luxemburg washeld by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign confederation, andover this garrison the only right allowed to the Grand Duke, thesovereign of the country, was that of nominating the governor. This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian Revolutionof 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw in its lot withBelgium to form the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the GrandDuchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the great fortresswith its garrison of Prussian troops. It is not surprising that, underthese circumstances, the Grand Duchy joined the Prussian _Zollverein_, and so drew nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character ofits inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorptioninto Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon thesmall state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presenteditself for reopening the question until 1866. In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between Prussiaand Italy on one side and Austria and the small German states on theother would be long and exhausting, and would end in France imposingpeace on the weary combatants with considerable territorial advantage toherself. His anticipation was entirely falsified; the war lasted onlyseven weeks and Prussia emerged victorious and immensely strengthened bythe absorption of several German states and by the formation of theNorth German Confederation under her leadership. This, the firstshattering blow which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes hadreceived, led him to demand compensation for the growth of Prussianpower, and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France. This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from thequestion of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison heldLuxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had beendestroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the garrisonowed its existence being gone, it was only logical that the garrisonshould go too. After much demur Count Bismarck acknowledged the justiceof the argument (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow thatthe French should therefore take the place vacated by the Prussians. Atthe same time the fortress could not be left in the hands of a weakPower as a temptation for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. Thequestion of Luxemburg was therefore the subject discussed at a Congressheld in London in the following May. Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and reasonable. Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the great rock-fortressno longer had the military value of earlier days, they not only raisedno objections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, but in theCongress it was they who proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchyshould be neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the Powers'. [6]A treaty was therefore drawn up on May 11, 1867, of which the secondarticle ran as follows:-- 'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State. 'It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other States. 'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article. 'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State'. [7] The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications ofLuxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for itsevacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade therestoration of the fortifications. Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, whichwas proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until thetreaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality, only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely, the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, CountBismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgershad violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by givingfacilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions weretaken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abusesoccurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality ofLuxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors weresatisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At theend of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg ascompensation for the loss of Metz. In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed onthe death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, onwhose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father's throne. There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for specialcomment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under thecollective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originallyproposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee ofthe Powers, ' and it was altered at the instance of the English ForeignMinister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was suggested by theRussian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and byPrussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been based upon the fear thatEngland might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburgsingle-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. Inother words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means ofdragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany andFrance. From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's objection;as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right tomake war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation, ' shouldLuxemburg be attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in theBritish White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambonof 'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby andLord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of theco-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have alsonot thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a _casusbelli_. III It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that hereastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, thenorth-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the Sambre, and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and along theSwiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for militaryoperations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with many deepvalleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work torectify artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and ina chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains they erected a rampartwhich has the reputation of being impregnable. This is the line Belfort, Épinal, Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this line withoutviolating neutral territory would have to be frontal, for on the norththe line is covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg, while on the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swissfrontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French defences, the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in the war of1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle against which tolaunch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris was therefore deemedimpossible if respect were to be paid to the neutrality of Belgium andLuxemburg, and it was for this purely military reason that Germany hasto-day violated her promises to regard the neutrality of these states. This was frankly admitted by Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'ifthey had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, inview of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to havegot through without formidable opposition entailing great loss oftime'. [8] In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into Frenchterritory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liège and thence into Francepast Namur and through what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German armycould debouch into France through this gap the more easily inasmuch asthe French, relying on the neutrality of these two states, had notstrongly fortified the frontier from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, asthe country to the west of the Sambre was very easy country formanoeuvring and furnished with good roads and railways, it was reckonedthat the formidable French lines to the south could be turned in thismanner, and the German army could march upon Paris from the north-east. As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain neutral. It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and controllingas it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could notbe allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy communicationbetween one portion of the German army and another. That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some yearspast a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also amatter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan wouldinvolve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the dutywas supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of theFrench opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. Theplea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealtthe Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who areeither ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casualconversation all over England these last three years; and Sir EdwardGrey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what theconsequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that heinformed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government donot expect our neutrality'. [9] There has been no secret about itwhatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of theImperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th shouldhave been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation ormisinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of thethoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis themilitary situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quitewell what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on ourpart in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have beenexpressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to theshoulders of Great Britain. This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to theground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology. Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peacethat we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join theFrench on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offeredby Liège, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause. For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what wastantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state ofBelgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war. Notes: [Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. Viii 301. ] [Footnote 2: Ibid. 304. ] [Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, _The Hague PeaceConferences_, pp. 281-9. ] [Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, _Map of Europeby Treaty_, vol. Ii, pp. 979-98. ] [Footnote 5: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, (Cd. 7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2. ] [Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. Iii, p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of _Prussia_ of Collective Guarantee byPowers of Neutrality of _Luxemburg_, London, 7th May, 1867. '] [Footnote 7: Hertslet, _ut sup. _, vol. Iii, p. 1803. The HighContracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia. ] [Footnote 8: _Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlinrespecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the GermanGovernment_ (Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914. ] [Footnote 9: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, p. 62, no. 116. July 31, 1914. See also _infra_ pp. 82 _et seqq_. ] CHAPTER II THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871 Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should sketchin outline the events which have produced the present grouping ofbelligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations which haveequipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To understand whyAustria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the glove to France andRussia, why England has intervened not only as the protector of Belgium, but also as the friend of France, we must go back to the situationcreated by the Franco-German War. Starting from that point, we mustnotice in order the formation of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the Dual Alliance between France andRussia, of the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian understandings. TheTriple Alliance has been the grand cause of the present situation; notbecause such a grouping of the Central European Powers wasobjectionable, but because it has inspired over-confidence in the twoleading allies; because they have traded upon the prestige of theirleague to press their claims East and West with an intolerable disregardfor the law of nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude ofGermany towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward stepby step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert aEuropean conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to representas stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's well-being. Theseprecautions, so obviously necessary that they were continued andexpanded by the most pacific Government which England has seen since Mr. Gladstone's retirement, have taken two forms: that of diplomaticunderstandings, and that of naval preparations. Whichever form they havetaken, they have been adopted in response to definite provocations, andto threats which it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictlyand jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately inview. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in herarmaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, withreasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country andEnglish sea-borne trade against any probable combination of hostilePowers. Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation since1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886. The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France submitted to thedemands of the new-born German Empire, opened a fresh era of Europeandiplomacy and international competition. The German Empire became atonce, and has ever since remained, the predominant Power in WesternEurope. The public opinion of this new Germany has been captured to nosmall extent by the views of such aggressive patriots as Treitschke, whoopenly avowed that 'the greatness and good of the world is to be foundin the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in aword of the German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for theestablishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essentialpreliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and England. But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck remainedChancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the GermanGovernment. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position of theEmpire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected enemies. In1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with Austria and Russia, the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe, the so-called_Dreikaiserbündnis_, which was designed to perpetuate the _status quo_. But the friendship with Russia quickly cooled; it received a sharpset-back in 1875, when the Tsar Alexander II came forward ratherostentatiously to save France from the alleged hostile designs ofGermany; it was certainly not improved when Bismarck in his turnmediated between Russia and her opponents at the Congress of Berlin(1878). On the other hand, a common interest in the Eastern Questiondrew closer the bonds between Germany and Austria. The latter feltherself directly menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former wasnot prepared to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hencein 1879 was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austriawhich has been so largely responsible for the present situation. TheTreaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely defensivein its character; but the terms showed that Russia was the enemy whomboth the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to activemeasures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, or any Powerwhich had Russian support. In 1882 the alliance of the two great GermanPowers was joined by Italy--a surprising development which can only beexplained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not hope forsecurity at home, or for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, solong as she remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constitutedhad a frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italywould receive strong support from partners in comparison with whoseresources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance hasendured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the diplomaticsystem of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results have beencommensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and ambition which Italyhas made, it is for Italy to judge. On the whole she has been a sleepingpartner in the Alliance; its prestige has served almost exclusively forthe promotion of Austrian and German aims; and one of its results hasbeen to make Austria a formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic. Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as PrinceBismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though England was onfriendly terms with France and had, equally with Russia, laboured toavert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After 1882 the Englishoccupation of Egypt constituted for some years a standing grievance inthe eyes of France. The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in likemanner been a source of growing apprehension to England since 1868; and, for a long time after the Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were onthe watch to check the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. Butcommon interests of very different kinds were tending to unite thesethree Powers, not in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, butin a string of compacts concluded for particular objects. One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the policy ofthe principal partners in the Triple Alliance, particularly that ofGermany, had become incalculable and was only consistent in periodicoutbursts of self-assertiveness, behind which could be discerned asteady determination to accumulate armaments which should be strongenough to intimidate any possible competitor. The growth of this feelingdates from the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser. Bismarck had sedulously courted the friendship of Russia, even after1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with Russia againstAustria. While he increased the war strength of the army, he openlyannounced that Germany would always stand on the defensive; and headdressed a warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive'policy which was even then in the air, though it was still far from itstriumph:-- 'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened by France and Russia; it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive war is more advantageous to us, " and ask for a credit of a hundred millions, I do not know whether you would grant it--I hope not. '[10] But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German policy inless cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia was allowed tolapse; friction between the two Powers increased, and as the resultGermany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance of France andRussia, which gradually developed, during the years 1891-6, from afriendly understanding into a formal contract for mutual defence. Thereis no doubt that this alliance afforded France a protection against thatunprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she has never ceasedto dread since 1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abusedthe new strength which this alliance gave her. It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shownaggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of theTriple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that Francehas invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco waspermitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in French West Africahas been recognized by treaties with Germany and England; in East Africashe has Madagascar, of which her possession has never been disputed byany European Power; her growing interests in Indo-China have impingedonly upon an English sphere of interest and were peacefully defined byan Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, tosome extent the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, whereshe partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the GermanGovernment has never ventured to state the French colonial methods as a_casus belli_. That the German people have viewed with jealousy thegrowth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite recently, onthe eve of the present war, we were formally given to understand thatGermany, in any war with France, might annex French colonies[11]; and itis easy to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policiesof the German military and naval experts. Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently refusedto believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest enough to enteron a war of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial empires. Germandiplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely shattered this conviction. But up to the year 1914 the worst which was generally anticipated wasthat she would pursue in the future on a great scale the policy, whichshe has hitherto pursued on a small scale, of claiming so-called'compensations' when other Powers succeeded in developing their colonialspheres, and of invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why theefforts of explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield toFrance their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not ourbusiness to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the methodsby which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject thatwe should describe the methods by which Germany has endeavoured tointimidate France at various stages of the African question. The troublearose out of a Moroccan Agreement between England and France, which wasthe first definite proof that these two Powers were drifting intorelations closer than that of ordinary friendship. In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about Egypt. Francerecognized the English occupation of Egypt; England, on her side, promised not to impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. Itwas agreed that neither in Egypt nor in Morocco should there be apolitical revolution; and that in both countries the customs tariffshould make no distinction between one nation and another. This compactwas accompanied by a settlement of the old disputes about French fishingrights in Newfoundland, and of more recent difficulties concerning thefrontiers between French and English possessions in West Africa. [12] Thewhole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides, of healinglocal controversies which had little meaning except as instruments ofdiplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco isdistinguished from that concerning West Africa and Newfoundland in sofar as it recognizes the possibility of objections on the part of otherPowers. It promised mutual support in the case of such objections; butnot the support of armed force, only that of diplomatic influence. At the moment of these agreements Count Bülow told the Reichstag thatGermany had no objection, as her interests were in no way imperilled bythem. Later, however, Germany chose to regard the Moroccan settlement asan injury or an insult or both. In the following year the Kaiser made aspeech at Tangier (March, 1905) in which he asserted that he woulduphold the important commercial and industrial interests of Germany inMorocco, and that he would never allow any other Power to step betweenhim and the free sovereign of a free country. It was subsequentlyannounced in the German Press that Germany had no objection to theAnglo-French Agreement in itself, but objected to not having beenconsulted before it was arranged. This complaint was met, on the part ofFrance, by the retirement of M. Delcassé, her Minister of ForeignAffairs, and by her assent to an International Conference regardingMorocco. The Conference met at Algeciras, and German pretensions weresatisfied by an international Agreement. [13] It is to be observed thatin this Conference the original claims of Germany were opposed, not onlyby Russia, from whom she could hardly expect sympathy, but even byItaly, her own ally. When Germany had finally assented to the Agreement, her Chancellor, in flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'thatGerman interests were in no way imperilled by it', announced thatGermany had been compelled to intervene by her economic interests, bythe prestige of German policy, and by the dignity of the German Empire. The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the conclusion of theAnglo-French agreements, had found herself suddenly delivered from herpreoccupations on the side of Russia, and had seized the opportunity toassert herself in the West while Russia was involved in the mostcritical stage of her struggle with Japan. But this war came to an endbefore the Convention of Algeciras had begun; and Russia, even in thehour of defeat and internal revolutions, was still too formidable to beoverridden, when she ranged herself beside her Western ally. Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there aredifferent versions. What is certain is that she gave France herdiplomatic support. But the German Chancellor officially acknowledged, when all was over, that England's share in the Anglo-French Agreementhad been perfectly correct, and that Germany bore England no ill-willfor effecting a _rapprochement_ with France. Still there remained astrong impression, not only in England and France, that there had beenon Germany's part a deliberate intention to test the strength of theAnglo-French understanding and, if possible, to show France that Englandwas a broken reed. It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has taken, since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any embarrassments inwhich she had previously been involved with other Powers. In 1905 shehad shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her influence to moderatethe terms of the settlement with Japan. This was a wise step, consonantalike with English treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests ofEuropean civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement withRussia (1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the threecountries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. Itcannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a localcharacter, exactly as was that with France; that our friendlyunderstandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; andthat neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe;unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the precaution, which was from time to time adopted, of permitting consultations betweenthe French and English military experts. It was understood that theseconsultations committed neither country to a policy of commonaction. [14] England was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendidisolation'; but she had as yet no desire to involve herself, even fordefensive purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as thatwhich had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy. But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question ofMorocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our friendship withFrance. The German occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only onemeaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France on a question that wasthe subject of a special agreement between France and us'. [15] Theattack failed in its object. War was averted by the prompt action of theBritish Government. Mr. Asquith[16] announced that Great Britain, indiscussing the Moroccan question, would have regard to Britishinterests, which might be more directly involved than had hitherto beenthe case, and also to our treaty obligations with France. Somewhat laterMr. Asquith announced that if the negotiations between France andGermany did not reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain wouldbecome an active party to the discussion. [17] The nature of Britishinterests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a Guildhallspeech as consisting in the peace of the world, the maintenance ofnational honour, and the security of international trade. [18] The lastphrase was a significant reference to the fact that Agadir, thoughvalueless for commercial purposes, might be invaluable to any Powerwhich desired to molest the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubtedthen, or doubts to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a warwhich she had done nothing to provoke. The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and France. Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a multitude ofprejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last that both wereexposed to a common danger of the most serious character. Hence a newphase in the Anglo-French _entente_, which was cemented, not by atreaty, but by the interchange of letters between the English Secretaryfor Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador inLondon (M. Paul Cambon). On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[19]reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that ifeither Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by athird Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in thatevent depend on the armed assistance of the other. ' Sir Edward Greycontinued:--'I agree that if either Government had grave reason toexpect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something thatthreatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with theother whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggressionand to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be preparedto take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of theGeneral Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and theGovernments would then decide what effect should be given to them. ' M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to acceptthe arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered. [20] The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature. Neither partywas bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with the other. Theundertaking was to discuss any threatening situation, and to take commonmeasures if both agreed to the necessity; there was an admission thatthe agreement might result in the conduct of a joint defensive war upona common plan. Such an understanding between two sovereign states couldbe resented only by a Power which designed to attack one of them withoutclear provocation. The date at which these notes were interchanged is certainlysignificant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies were advancing onConstantinople, and already the spoils of the Balkan War were indispute. Servia incurred the hostility of Austria-Hungary by demandingAlbania and Adriatic ports; and the Dual Monarchy announced that itcould never accept this arrangement. Behind Servia Austrian statesmensuspected the influence of Russia; it was, they said, a scheme forbringing Russia down to a sea which Austria regarded as her ownpreserve. Austria mobilized her army, and a war could hardly have beenavoided but for the mediation of Germany and England. If England hadentertained the malignant designs with which she is credited in someGerman circles, nothing would have been easier for her than to fan theflames, and to bring Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The notesshow how different from this were the aims of Sir Edward Grey. Heevidently foresaw that a war between Austria and Russia would result ina German attack upon France. Not content with giving France assurance ofsupport, he laboured to remove the root of the evil. A congress tosettle the Balkan disputes was held at London in December, 1912; and itpersuaded Servia to accept a reasonable compromise, by which sheobtained commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This for themoment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. To whom the solutionwas due we know from the lips of German statesmen. The German Chancellorsubsequently (April 7, 1913) told the Reichstag:-- 'A state of tension had for months existed between Austria-Hungary and Russia which was only prevented from developing into war by the moderation of the Powers.... Europe will feel grateful to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation with which he conducted the discussion of the Ambassadors in London, and which constantly enabled him to bridge over differences. ' The Chancellor concluded by saying: 'We at any rate shall never stir upsuch a war'--a promise or a prophecy which has been singularlyfalsified. It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct which Germany hasadopted towards the great Slavonic Power on her flank. Since Bismarckleft the helm, she has sometimes steered in the direction ofsubservience, and sometimes has displayed the most audacious insolence. Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers have felt that in thelong run the momentum of a Russian attack would be irresistible; atother times, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War, they havetreated Russia, as the Elizabethans treated Spain, as 'a colossusstuffed with clouts. ' But rightly or wrongly they appear to have assumedthat sooner or later there must come a general Armageddon, in which thecentral feature would be a duel of the Teuton with the Slav; and inGerman military circles there was undoubtedly a conviction that the epicconflict had best come sooner and not later. How long this idea hasinfluenced German policy we do not pretend to say. But it has certainlycontributed to her unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments'which all thinking men have condemned as an insupportable, tax uponWestern civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it wasintended to avert. The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so, it wasto a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous strides inpopulation and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The 'Boulanger Law' of1886 raised the peace footing of the French army above 500, 000 men, at atime when that of Germany was 427, 000, and that of Russia 550, 000. Bismarck replied by the comparatively moderate measure of adding 41, 000to the German peace establishment for seven years; and it is significantof the difference between then and now that he only carried his Billafter a dissolution of one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to itssuccessor. France must soon have repented of the indiscretion to which she had beentempted by a military adventurer. With a population comparatively smalland rapidly approaching the stationary phase it was impossible that shecould long maintain such a race. In 1893 Count Caprivi's law, carriedlike that of Bismarck after a stiff struggle with the Reichstag, raisedthe peace establishment to 479, 000 men. Count Caprivi at the same timereduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two; butwhile this reform lightened the burden on the individual conscript, itmeant a great increase in the number of those who passed throughmilitary training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. TheFranco-Russian _entente_ of 1896 was a sign that France began to feelherself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the defensive. In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495, 000 for the next sixyears; in 1905 to 505, 000. On the second of these occasions the GermanGovernment justified its policy by pointing out that the French warstrength was still superior to that of Germany, and would become stillstronger if France should change the period of service from three yearsto two. The German law was announced in 1904; it had the natural effect. The French Senate not only passed the new law early in 1905, but alsoswept away the changes which the Lower House had introduced to lightenthe burden of annual training upon territorial reserves. France foundher justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year. This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been heavilypunished for a step which might be taken to indicate that _Revanche_ wasstill a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost effortshave only succeeded in raising her peace establishment to 545, 000(including a body of 28, 000 colonial troops stationed in France), andher total war strength to 4, 000, 000. In the same period the peaceestablishment of Germany was raised to over 800, 000, and her total warstrength of fully trained men to something like 5, 400, 000. It is obviousfrom these figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to bepossible to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her onlypossible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of theGerman army, which is certainly not less well equipped or organized thanthat of France. This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in hercontinental policy which could be challenged as tending to overthrow theEuropean balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime offence in Germaneyes; and her colonial policy has only been attacked as a pretext forpicking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive trial of strength before thegrowth of Russian resources should have made her ally impregnable. Let us now look at the German military preparations from a German pointof view. The increases of the last twenty years in military expenditureand in fighting strength have been openly discussed in the Reichstag;and the debates have usually run on the same lines, because theGovernment up to 1912 pursued a consistent policy, framed for some yearsahead and embodied in an Army Act. The underlying principle of theseArmy Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, 1911) was to maintain a fairly constantratio between the peace strength and the population. But the warstrength was disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of1893, which reduced the period of compulsory service from three years totwo. The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increaseits war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the long-sufferanceof those who served and those who paid the bill. It was taken asaxiomatic that an increasing population ought to be protected by anincreasing army. National defence was of course alleged as the primeconsideration; and if these preparations were really required by growingdanger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could dootherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itselflegitimately aggrieved. Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent years thatnational independence means the power of taking the aggressive in anycase where national interests or _amour-propre_ may prompt it. Theincrease of the German army, either in numbers or in technicalefficiency, seems to be regularly followed by masterful strokes ofdiplomacy in which the 'mailed fist' is plainly shown to othercontinental Powers. Thus in 1909, at the close of a quinquennium ofmilitary re-equipment, which had raised her annual army budget from£27, 000, 000 to £41, 000, 000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexationof Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St. Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring Russiainto a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step; _radixmalorum_ we may call it, so far as the later development of thecontinental situation is concerned. Russia withdrew from the impendingconflict in 1909, but it is improbable that she has ever forgiven thematter or the manner of the German ultimatum. In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an attempt to'force a quarrel on France. ' But in 1911 Germany realized that hermilitary calculations had been insufficient, if she wished to continuethese unamiable diplomatic manners. It was not a question ofself-preservation; it was a question, as the German Chancellor told theReichstag, of showing the world that 'Germany was firmly resolved not tobe pushed aside. ' Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated, as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russianperil could hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister ofWar said publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which eitherdesired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany. ' Russia hadrecently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs ofweakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for generalpeace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, had retiredfrom office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied the Czar to thePotsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russiaover their Persian interests had been settled by agreement in 1911. But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's interventionin the Balkans to secure for Servia at least commercial access to theAdriatic. This compromise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by Germanstatesmanship, only increased the determination of the German Governmentto 'hold the ring' in the Balkans, to claim for Austria the right ofsettling her own differences with Servia as she would, and to denyRussia any interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort ofthe German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength byinstalments until it reached 870, 000, and for the eventual provision ofa war strength of 5, 400, 000 men. This enormous increase was recommended'by the unanimous judgement of the military authorities' as being'necessary to secure the future of Germany. ' The Chancellor warned theReichstag that, although relations were friendly with Russia, they hadto face the possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while inRussia itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic developmentand an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also areference to the new law for a return to three years' service whichFrance was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peaceestablishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the mainpreoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the aggrandizement ofher military strength and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse. Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss. She had gone toofar; she had provoked into the competition of armaments a Power as farsuperior to Germany in her reserves of men as Germany thought herselfsuperior to France. It was not too late for Germany to pause. On herfuture behaviour towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of1913 should be taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge toall possible opponents. The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance with Germany'sexample. In France, on March 4, the Supreme Council of War, havinglearned the outline of the German programme, decided to increase theeffective fighting force by a return to the rule of three years'service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30), the French PrimeMinister announced (May 15) that he would of his own authority keep withthe colours those who were completing their second year's service in theautumn. The French Army Bill, when finally passed (July 16), lowered theage limit for commencing service from twenty-one to twenty, and broughtthe new rule into force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) Belgiumintroduced universal military service in place of her former lenientsystem. In Russia a secret session of the Duma was held (July 8) to passa new Army Budget, and the term of service was raised from three tothree and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for no great increasein the numerical strength of her army; but budgeted (October 30) forextraordinary naval and military expenditure, to the extent of£28, 000, 000, to be incurred in the first six months of 1914. Thus on allsides the alarm was raised, and special preparations were put in hand, long before the crisis of 1914 actually arrived. It was Germany that hadsounded the tocsin; and it is difficult to believe that some startling_coup_ was not even then being planned by the leaders of her militaryparty. We have been told that, whatever the appearance of things might be, itwas Russia who drove Germany to the extraordinary preparations of 1913;that Germany was arming simply in self-defence against a SlavonicCrusade. What are the facts? Economically Russia, as a state, is in astronger position than the German Empire. In 1912 we were told that forthe past five years the revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by anaverage sum of £20, 000, 000 per annum. The revenue of Russia in 1913 wasover £324, 000, 000; she has budgeted for £78, 000, 000 of militaryexpenditure in 1914, of which some £15, 000, 000 is emergency expenditure. The total revenue of the German Empire in 1913 was £184, 000, 000; she hasbudgeted for a military expenditure in 1914 of £60, 000, 000. To adopt theusual German tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173millions to be defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has apopulation of 65 millions to be defended on only two. The militaryefforts of Russia, therefore, have been made on a scale relativelysmaller than those of Germany. We must, however, add some further considerations which have been urgedby German military critics; the alleged facts we cannot test, but westate them for what they may be worth. The reorganization of the Russianarmy in recent years has resulted, so we are told, in the grouping ofenormously increased forces upon the western frontier. The westernfortresses also have been equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roadsand railways have been constructed to accelerate the mobilization of thewar strength; and, above all, strategic railways have been pushedtowards the western frontier. Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effectgone behind the Potsdam Agreement of 1910, by which she withdrew herarmies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German frontier. We confessthat, in all this, while there may have been cause for watchfulness onthe part of Germany, we can see no valid cause for war, nothing that ofnecessity implies more than an intention, on the part of Russia, not tobe brow-beaten in the future as she was in 1909 and 1912. These military developments did not escape English notice. They excitedendless speculation about the great war of the future, and the partwhich this country might be asked to bear in it. Few, however, seriouslysupposed that we should commit ourselves to a share in the fighting uponland. The problem most usually discussed in this connexion was that ofpreparation to resist a sudden invasion from abroad. Was it possible toavoid compulsory service? Was the Territorial Force large enough andefficient enough to defend the country if the Expeditionary Force hadgone abroad? Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for landwarfare in August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenthcentury. But her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had beenplanned for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice thecountry had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the nationalfortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long asthe Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable invasionof the British Isles was possible. But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted agrowing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid down asour official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were our chiefEuropean rivals at sea. That France or Russia would combine with Germanyto challenge our naval supremacy was improbable; but other states werebeginning to build on a larger scale, and this multiplied the possiblenumber of hostile combinations. That Germany should wish for a strongfleet was only natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, hercolonial interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down adefinite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme shouldbecome more extensive at each revision, was no necessary proof ofmalice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when the programme of1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so that the German Navywas practically doubled. England was at that moment involved in theSouth African War, and it was hard to see against whom the new fleetcould be used, if not against England. This was pointed out from time totime by the Socialist opposition in the Reichstag. The orthodox officialreply was that Germany must be so strong at sea that the strongest navalPower should not be able to challenge her with any confidence. But thefeeling of the semi-official Navy League was known to be violentlyhostile to England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed itspopularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league. It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion that, onthe sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right to unlimitedself-assertion. Common prudence dictated close attention to the GermanNavy Laws; especially as they proved capable of unexpected acceleration. The 'Two Power' standard, under the stress of German competition, becameincreasingly difficult to maintain, and English Liberals were inclinedto denounce it as wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Governmenttried the experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was nocorresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval Law of1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third; and Germanministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a proposal for a mutuallimitation of armaments. In 1909 this country discovered that in capital ships--which now beganto be considered the decisive factor in naval warfare--Germany wouldactually be the superior by 1914 unless special measures were taken. TheBritish Government was awakened to the new situation (it arose from theGerman Naval Law of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path ofincreasing expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted therace in naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling;but we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled, sinceour national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The 'Two Power'standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became the object ofspecial attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord said on March 13, 1911, that we should make our navy superior to any foreign navy and toany _probable_ combination which we might have to meet single-handed. Inpractice this meant a policy of developing, in the matter ofDreadnoughts, a superiority of sixty per cent, over the German navy;this, it was officially explained in 1912, had been for some years pastthe actual Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. WinstonChurchill, March 18, 1912). But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912 saw a newGerman Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure of £1, 000, 000annually for six years, and had the effect of putting nearly four-fifthsof the German navy in a position of immediate readiness for war. Earlierin the year the British Government had announced that, if the Germanpolicy of construction were accelerated, we should add to our programmedouble the number which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed herpreparations we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The GermanBill came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in thiscountry by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to nearlya million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first and smallestinstalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the new German law. ' Thenew British policy was maintained in 1913 and in 1914, though in 1913the First Lord of the Admiralty made a public offer of a 'navalholiday, ' a suspension of new construction by mutual consent. TheImperial Chancellor responded only by suggesting that the proposal wasentirely unofficial, by asking for concrete proposals, and by sayingthat the idea constituted a great progress; and his naval estimates in1913 were half a million higher than those of 1912. From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is clear thaton sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years ago the Germannavy did not enter into England's naval calculations. For the last sixyears, if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which ourAdmiralty felt the necessity of watching from year to year, and indeedfrom month to month. It is the first time for more than a hundred yearsthat we have had to face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navyunder one government and concentrated within easy distance of ourshores. ' On German principles we should long ago have adopted the'offensive-defensive. ' We have been at least as seriously menaced byGermany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But wecan confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has neverbeen used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an aggressivecolonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to make possibleintentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position thatonly a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our effortsfor the peace of Europe. NOTE _Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_. In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for thedelimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral of NorthAfrica. The agreement included five secret Articles which were notpublished until November, 1911. The purport of the Articles which werepublished at the time was as follows. By the first Article Englandstated that she had not the intention of changing the political state ofEgypt; and France declared that she would not impede the action ofEngland in Egypt by demanding that a term should be fixed for theBritish occupation or in any other way. By the second Article Francedeclared that she had not the intention of changing the political stateof Morocco; and England recognized that it appertained to France, as thePower conterminous with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of thiscountry and to assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, andmilitary reforms which it required, France promised to respect thecustomary and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the thirdArticle England made a corresponding promise to France in respect ofEgypt. By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by notlending themselves in either country to inequality in the establishmentof Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway rates. The sixth andseventh Articles were inserted to ensure the free passage of the SuezCanal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The eighth declared that bothGovernments took into friendly consideration the interests of Spain inMorocco, and that France would make some arrangements with the SpanishMonarchy. The ninth Article declared that each Government would lend itsdiplomatic support to the other in executing the clauses relative toEgypt and Morocco. [21] Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 and 4) relatedto Spain, defining the territory which she was to receive 'whenever theSultan ceases to exercise authority over it, ' and providing that theAnglo-French agreement would hold good even if Spain declined thisarrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Government founditself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify its policyin respect to Egypt or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, andseventh Articles of the public declaration would remain intact; that is, each would under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercialliberty, ' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and theStraits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming anyintention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicialorganization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptianlegislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and Franceagreed on condition that she should not be impeded from making similarreforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the Egyptian nationaldebt. Notes: [Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's _Bismarck_, p. 444. ] [Footnote 11: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_ (Cd. 7467), No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See_infra_, Appendix II. ] [Footnote 12: For these agreements see _The Times_, April 12, 1904, andNovember 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter. ] [Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 (1906). ] [Footnote 14: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M. Cambon, November 22, 1912. See Appendix II. ] [Footnote 15: _Correspondence_, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29, 1914. ] [Footnote 16: _Times_, July 7, 1911. ] [Footnote 17: _Times_, July 27, 1911. ] [Footnote 18: _Times_, July 22, 1911. ] [Footnote 19: _Correspondence_, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). SeeAppendix II. ] [Footnote 20: _Ibid_. P. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105). ] [Footnote 21: _Times_, April 12, 1904. ] CHAPTER III THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynasticconnexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy ofrepression of Polish nationality--the fatal legacy of the days ofFrederic the Great and Catharine II--united the two empires. Nationalsentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away fromGermany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy leftthe Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked onBalkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on herside turned to new allies. The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims of theRussian Government into close accord with the desires of national Slavsentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had cherishedno Balkan ambitions: he had been content to play the part of an 'honestbroker' at the Congress of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarianaffair of 1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. 'William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate Germany seems tohave conducted, for many years past, a policy of establishing herinfluence, along with that of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. Andit is this policy which is the _fons et origo_ of the present struggle;for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, solong as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions ofcenturies. After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she turned forcompensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it seemed somerecompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Hence she could expand southwards--ultimately perhaps to Salonica. Servia, which might have objected, was a vassal kingdom, the protégé ofAustria, under the dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope tofollow the line to Salonica, [22] so Germany, before the end of thenineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a parallel line ofpenetration, which would carry her influence through Constantinople, through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended her political and economicinfluence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. In 1898 the King ofRoumania (a Hohenzollern by descent) conceded direct communicationthrough his territories between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 aGerman company obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Koniehto the head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand inthe way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling inConstantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, toexploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally fromSouth-Eastern Europe. In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. Ablood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-AustrianObrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of theKarageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austriantutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close touchwith Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria tookadvantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annexformally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia, which had hoped to gain these territories, once a part of the oldServian kingdom, was mortally offended, and would have gone to war withAustria, if Russia, her champion under the new dynasty, could only havegiven her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese war, couldnot do so; Russia, on the contrary, had to suffer the humiliation ofgiving a pledge to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that shewould not support Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. Shehas saved money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everythingin her power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria hassought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, inthe sense that no legal proof was offered)[23] of complicity in themurder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has riskedwar rather than surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slavsentiment imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: nogovernment could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia isnot merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slavpeoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question whetherSouth-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and lost toRussian influence. Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: shehas irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality andthe increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep Germanalarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued apolicy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles, forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polishlandowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism isreally alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of theSlavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been anextensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made bythe Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create theold Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelledfrom the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was herpolicy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has madethe breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable. It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great SlavEmpire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why, it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is thereany bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition toGermany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought topursue a common cause--that of international arbitration and ofdisarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bondbetween the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are otherand more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and foughtRussia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fightRussia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, theinterest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East ofEurope now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the newconstitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil. 'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day Englishman. All three Dumas ... Were remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for quotation. '[24] In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not onlycoincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owedmuch to the inspiration of England. Notes: [Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912), started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways ofBosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also_Correspondence_, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There isreliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonicarailway. '] [Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV, _infra_. ] [Footnote 24: _Camb. Mod. Hist_. Xii. 379. ] CHAPTER IV CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merelyintended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailedaccount of the negotiations and declarations of those days which thereader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to aplain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neitherdiscussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nordistinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposalswhich were made by would-be mediators. The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the oldquarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarianmonarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit ofceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centreof the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering thetown, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by abomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shotby assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparentlyplanned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexationof Bosnia and the Herzegovina (_supra_, p. 54), and who desired thatthese provinces should be united to Servia. The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to theconclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from aServian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, theServian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who providedthe pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed fromServia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Serviancustoms-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published noproof of these conclusions, [25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to theServian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, itwas intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia withinforty-eight hours. [26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to bepublished on a specified date by the Servian Government, and tenengagements which the Servian Government were to give theAustro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of theseengagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7). On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the otherPowers of Europe, [27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper, the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_. It was therefore intended to be apublic warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told thePowers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in theServian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging toAustria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, ifnecessary, by military measures; and that the question was one whichconcerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia. [28] Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Serviaalone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told theBritish Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct wasprovocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible ofacceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unlessGermany had first been consulted; that if Austria began militarymeasures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The RussianMinister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with Franceand Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia couldaccept some of the Austrian demands. [29] To the Austro-HungarianGovernment the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quiteinsufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; andhe urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the chargesagainst Servia. [30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia wouldpunish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demandsof Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed toarbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leavethe arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy--thefour Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators. On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the ServianGovernment replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austriandemands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. TheAustrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, andcriticized its details in an official memorandum. [32] TheAustro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part ofthe Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungarydeclared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England'ssolidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and afterJuly 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, betweenAustria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; andItaly and France were ready to co-operate with England. [33] Germany, however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formalintervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russiaconsented to it. [34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukaseordering mobilization, [35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 theRussian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servianquestion the subject of direct conversations with Vienna. [36] This offerwas at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, butsubsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progressbetween the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1. [37] No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of thesouthern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July29. [38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances thatshe would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] theseassurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem tohave been the subject of the last conversations between Russia andAustria-Hungary. Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendlysettlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals forpeace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, andJuly 31. [40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russianmobilization was alarming, and that France was also making militarypreparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measureto the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thusindicated. [43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russiathat, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization againstboth France and Russia. [44] But on July 27, Russia had explained thather mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, andwould only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servianfrontier. [45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized thesouthern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose ofmediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by theGerman Ambassador at St. Petersburg. [46] Germany in fact believed, orprofessed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though notproclaimed, was already far advanced. [47] On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still inprogress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany eachtook the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demandingthat Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to Franceasking what course she would take in the event of war between Germanyand Russia. Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir EdwardGrey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overturesto England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in theevent of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, ifvictorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense ofFrance; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting Frenchcolonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality. [48] Theseproposals were refused by England on July 30. [49] On August 1 the GermanAmbassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on conditionthat Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Greyreplied that England's hands were still free, and that he could notpromise neutrality on that condition alone. [50] Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she wouldnot remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia. [51] On July 31the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on herside, replied that England could give no pledge at present. [52] On thesame day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgianneutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving a reply. [53] But, onAugust 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; andEngland promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked bythe German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea. [54] On August4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing thatGermany had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian territory, and appealing to England for help. [55] On the same day, August 4, England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, beforemidnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. [56] This demandwas taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by Englandagainst Germany. DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand andthe Duchess of Hohenberg. July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters. July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crimelaid before the Emperor. July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army. July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares, especially by Berlin operators. July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the HungarianChamber, describes war as a sad _ultima ratio_, 'but every state andnation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as astate and a nation. ' The _Times_ leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented onin Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia. ' July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem. July 21. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ warns Austria-Hungary of the folly ofits campaign against Servia. July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48hours in which to accept. July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungariandemands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia. --Strike at St. Petersburg. Failure of the conference on Home Rule. July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory byAustria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade. Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension oftime-limit allowed to Servia. Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Viennaand St. Petersburg. --Serious riot in Dublin. July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, andGerman Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately for thepurpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications. Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered. Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannotremain indifferent to the fate of Servia. Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night. July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference. German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference. ' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversationbetween Vienna and St. Petersburg. British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres. Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning theattitude of Great Britain. The _Times_ Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned thisafternoon from Kiel to Potsdam. July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia. Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin. Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servianreply. The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar. July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military districtsof Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise territorialintegrity of France, but will not extend the same assurance for Frenchcolonies. Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not necessarilystand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace failed. Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent. The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies. July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian forces. The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity of thesituation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule Amending Bill. The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser. July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered. Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect neutralityof Belgium. France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is doubtfulwhether any answer will be returned to this request. Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its ultimatumto Servia. Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar. Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilizationshould cease within 12 hours. Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define herattitude in case of a Russo-German war. English bankers confer with the Government about the financialsituation. Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of Englishships at Hamburg. Orders issued for general mobilization of French army. Orders issued for general mobilization of German army. Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg. Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet willprotect the North Coast of France against the German fleet. Germans enter French territory near Cirey. Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members ofthe Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war. Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium. Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons. Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory. Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer bymidnight. The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practicallyannouncing war against Germany and explaining the British position. Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia. Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport. Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. Notes: [Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the GermanWhite Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27. We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in thiscountry) in Appendix IV. ] [Footnote 26: Full text _infra_ in Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23); more correctly in _Correspondence respecting the EuropeanCrisis_, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but thedifferences between the two versions are immaterial for our presentpurpose. ] [Footnote 27: See the communication to England in _Correspondence_, No. 4. ] [Footnote 28: _Correspondence_, No. 9, Note communicated by the GermanAmbassador, July 24. ] [Footnote 29: _Correspondence_, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24. ] [Footnote 30: _Correspondence_, No. 13, Note communicated by RussianAmbassador, July 25. ] [Footnote 31: _Correspondence_, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 25. ] [Footnote 32: For text of Servian note see _infra_ Appendix I (GermanWhite Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there. ] [Footnote 33: _Correspondence_, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27; _ibid_. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27. ] [Footnote 34: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. ] [Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (_infra_ in Appendix I). The Tsarto His Majesty, July 30. ] [Footnote 36: _Correspondence_, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey. ] [Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28(_Correspondence_, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 see_Correspondence_, No. III; of August I, see Appendix V. ] [Footnote 38: _Correspondence_, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to RussianAmbassador at Berlin, July 28. ] [Footnote 39: _Correspondence_, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 28. ] [Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, _infra_). ] [Footnote 41: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. ] [Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (_infra_, AppendixI). ] [Footnote 43: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30. ] [Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems tobe July 27. ] [Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II. ] [Footnote 46: _Ibid_. P. 9. ] [Footnote 47: _Ibid_. P. 10. ] [Footnote 48: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. ] [Footnote 49: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30. ] [Footnote 50: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1. ] [Footnote 51: _Ibid_. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30. ] [Footnote 52: _Ibid_. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31. ] [Footnote 53: _Ibid_. No. 114, 120, 122. ] [Footnote 54: _Ibid_. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2. ] [Footnote 55: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4. ] [Footnote 56: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4] CHAPTER V NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS For purposes of reference the following list of _dramatis personae_ maybe useful:-- GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, _succ_. 1910. _Foreign Secretary_: Sir Edward Grey. _Ambassadors from France_: M. Paul Cambon. _Russia_: Count Benckendorff. _Germany_: Prince Lichnowsky. _Austria_: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein. _Belgium_: Count A. De Lalaing (_Minister_). RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, _succ_. 1894. _Foreign Secretary_: M. Sazonof. _Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir George Buchanan. _France_: M. Paléologue. _Germany_: Count Pourtalès. _Austria_: Friedrich Count Szápáry. FRANCE: Raymond Poincaré, _President, elected_ 1913. _Premier_: M. Viviani. _Acting Foreign Secretary_: M. Doumergue. _Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Francis Bertie. _Russia_: M. Isvolsky. M. Sevastopoulo (_Charge d'Affaires_). _Germany_: Baron von Schoen. _Austria_: Count Scézsen. GERMANY: Emperor William II, _succ_. 1888. _Imperial Chancellor_: Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg. _Foreign Secretary_: Herr von Jagow. _Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (_Councillor_). _Russia:_ M. Swerbeiev. M. Bronewsky (_Charge d'Affaires_). _France:_ M. Jules Cambon. _Austria_: Count Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, _succ_. 1848. _Foreign Secretary_: Count Berchtold. _Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Maurice de Bunsen. _Russia_: M. Schebesco. M. Kondachev (_Charge d'Affaires_). _France_: M. Crozier. _Germany_: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Bögendorff. ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, _succ_. 1900. _Foreign Secretary_: Marquis di San Giuliano. _Ambassador from Great Britain_: Sir Rennell Rodd. BELGIUM: King Albert, _succ_. 1909. _Minister of Great Britain_: Sir Francis Villiers. SERVIA: King Peter, _succ_. 1903. _Minister of Great Britain_: C. L. Des Graz. D. M. Crackanthorpe (_First Secretary_). _Russian Chargé d'Affaires_: M. Strandtmann. I _Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia_. From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on theassassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on theAustrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude thatit was a 'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone. '[57]Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that theServian agitation was part of Russian propagandism. [58] In thenegotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia isnot to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed outthat 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action assoon as Austria attacked Servia'. [59] After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continuedto maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and toreject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military actionin Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion inRussia'. [60] At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was veryfrankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austriain the Servian business:-- 'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade. '[61] M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined thispolicy of Germany pretty soon:-- 'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin. '[62] When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it isinteresting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informedofficials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinionthus:-- 'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. '[63] And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with hisRussian colleague that 'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. '[64] Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning theattitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that thisgeneral attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, andthat if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely haveacted more efficiently towards that end. No diplomatic pressure was putupon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to anylengths against Servia. Over and over again the German diplomats weretold that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would notlisten. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'todiscuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and inthis he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrianconcern with which Russia had nothing to do'. [65] Next day the GermanAmbassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign surprise that Servianaffairs could be of such interest to Russia'. [66] But in their WhiteBook, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remarkthat they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude ofAustria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field'. [67]Both stories cannot be true: the German Government have, not for thelast time in the history of these negotiations, to choose betweenineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way thatRussia was bound to come into the field. When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he couldto obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia, and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria sothat she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. On the day of thepresentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, theGerman Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he tookthe important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and GermanAmbassadors should meet him in conference immediately 'for the purposeof discovering an issue which would prevent complications'. [68] Theproposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and ItalianGovernments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal, and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its realcharacter upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receiptof the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that the conference suggested 'would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it. ' Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that 'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'. [69] Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and ItalianAmbassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Somedoubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of theGerman Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objectionmust be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir EdwardGoschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he wouldfind it possible to work with us. '[70] The next day the same idea waspressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:-- 'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. '[71] But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then goneso far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country. With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediationacceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the firstperiod of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility ofrejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might havepreserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany. The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory andsympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues tomisrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on theparticular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on thegeneral situation of Europe. In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation bydirect conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage, but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st bothSir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formulawhich might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities betweenthe Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that PrinceLichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so littleacquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately hetold Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some points must besent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action mightbe afforded to Austria'. [73] And in the matter of the conference, on thevery day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering theproposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, thatthe German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austriaand Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as anally to help Austria if attacked. [74] The mutual incompatibility of thetwo voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis diSan Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliationbetween them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficultywas rather the "conference" than the principle'. [75] But we may askwhether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not reallyshow that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeingthat he said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'itwould be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between theAustrian and Russian Governments'. [76] But, if it was not the principlethat was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothingelse but assume that the German Government objected to the termsemployed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibblethey wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable. Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate ornot; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laidat the door of the German Government. The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt wasthen made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend militaryaction. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, hadmade on July 25th a distinction between military preparations andmilitary operations, and had urged that his Government had only theformer then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that therewere great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria tosuspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had beenwilling to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austriandeclaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneousAustrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe couldhave been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed bynews of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. [77] Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilizedagainst Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked whathe meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that 'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. '[78] This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable. But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no groundsfor German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made aboutthis mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, [79] but it isperhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir GeorgeBuchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the languageused by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the foursouthern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangeringthe peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred toall that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discusssuch matters. '[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the GermanAmbassador, Count Pourtalès, used such language to his home Government, for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatchesappear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshinglyhonest. The military attaché says, 'I deem it certain that mobilizationhas been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. He adds: 'it is doubtful atWarsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere'. [81] There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germansthemselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only thing that looksat all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the ImperialGerman Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a 'state of war'(_Kriegszustand_) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is avery different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow inthe northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilizationelsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27thbefore any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the factthat Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of Julythat Government did not consider _Kriegszustand_ in Kovno to beequivalent to 'mobilization against Germany'. Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war. Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressiveattitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither wanted, nor wasin a position to make war'. [82] This attitude of mind was known anddeplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemedto be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was inearnest'. [83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by CountPourtalês, who on July 29 reported that the German Government werewilling to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected byAustria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus becomean Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if shewere to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the RussianMinister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors'that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Governmentthat Germany was making military and naval preparations againstRussia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland'. [84] After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded thesituation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, andstrong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, thoughunder no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate fromher ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of thesovereignty of Servia'. [85] 'Preparations for general mobilization willbe proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, ' wrote SirGeorge Buchanan. [86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey thatall attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as againstServia. [87] Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered ageneral mobilization. [88] This was answered on the same day by aproclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, 'as it can only be againstGermany that Russian general mobilization is directed'. [89] Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, thatRussia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations ofAustria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a generalmobilization. [90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope thatmediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as againstServia might yet be accepted. [91] But his efforts were useless, forGermany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demandingdemobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilizein the south as well'. [92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed wasthat this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all hermobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, whensuch interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment. War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though theEmperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams eachimploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each sayingthat matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other'sdemands, [93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the positionthat 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'. [94] This attitude isas inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready todiscuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russiaannounced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserveher waiting attitude'. [95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this inwhich, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issuesan ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but oneanswer? The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized againstServia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself, and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germanythreatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her militarypreparations--an inexcusable step, which increased Russia'sapprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilizationinevitable. [96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this stepin consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the threeempires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russiaand Austria, [97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situationwas not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing herultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly? II _Germany's attitude to France. _ We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe thediplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On the27th of July we are told that the German Government received 'the firstintimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France: the 14thCorps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison'. [98]Will it be believed that, except for the assertion 'of rapidlyprogressing preparations of France, both on water and on land', [99] thisis the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to provethe aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth while to pointout that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heardof the 'rapidly progressing preparations of France', the FrenchAmbassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that 'they had donenothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled theofficers on leave'. [100] The very next day the French Government had 'reliable information thatthe German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready forwar', [101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated intoFrench territory. [102] With great forbearance the French Governmentwithdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, althoughGerman reservists had been recalled from abroad 'by tens of thousands', the French Government had not called out a single reservist. Well mightthe French Minister for Foreign Affairs say 'Germany has done it'. [103] Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Governmentpresented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the Frenchintentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that itwould consult its own interests. [104] III _The Question of British Neutrality_. Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel. If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were onlyinvolved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidlyagainst Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France;and England would not have been dragged into war. [105] The question ofBritish neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th, when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if wardoes take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'. [106] Two days later he wroteagain:-- 'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... Not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... My reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. '[107] On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed atboth the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish theAmbassador to be misled ... Into thinking we should stand aside'. Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassadorthat 'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action. '[108] Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor hadmade his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on July 29:-- 'He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. 'I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland ... So long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. '[109] This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the BritishGovernment:-- 'His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 'What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. 'From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy. 'Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. 'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. [110] He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutelyfree and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression bythe Powers of the Triple _Entente_:-- 'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately ... The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this crisis ... Be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. ' Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that Franceshould not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not beviolated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warningwas received by Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so takenup with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... That hereceived your communication without a comment. '[111] But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcelycomplain that no warning had been given to him. With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deductionas to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may beremarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told SirRennell Rodd that he had 'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. '[112] As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it isnot impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to SirRennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlinsent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning. Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of shortduration, for when the British Government demanded both of France andGermany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality ofBelgium so long as no other Power violates it', [113] the French gave anunequivocal promise the same day, [114] while the German answer is astriking contrast:-- 'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. 'It appears from what he said that German Government considers that certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. '[115] It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was acontingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky waswarned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling inthis country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the GermanGovernment similar to that given by France:-- 'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. '[116] The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and withoutauthority from his Government, tried to exact a promise that GreatBritain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise not to violateBelgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse such anoffer, seeing that it left out of account all question of an attack onFrance and her colonies, about which it had been stated already thatthere could be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity ofFrance and her colonies was suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey wasbound to refuse, for the reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen inrejecting what is now known as Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamousproposal', namely, that France without actually losing territory mightbe so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and becomesubordinate to German policy. And if there should be still any doubtabout Sir Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to hisstatement in the House of Commons on August 27. [117] The importantpoints are that the offers of August 1 were made on the soleresponsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, and without authority from hisGovernment; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed theconditions on which we might remain neutral, and that, on August 3, sofar was the German Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality ofBelgium that he actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make theneutrality of Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowskymay have said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that twodays later the German Government were making no concessions on thatpoint; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a positionwe had taken up on July 30, four days before. One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to have beenmade by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowskywhether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attackher. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was anoffer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, andthe German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of therelief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relationsbetween the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for suchhopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there everany idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the originalproposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical. [118] Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were stilldiscussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be anoccasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg. Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[119] that Lord Stanley and LordClarendon in 1867 had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it wasnot intended that every Power was bound single-handed to fight anyGovernment which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard bythe Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequencesas the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equallyreprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the morecowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. Againstthis intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, she did notappeal to the Powers. [120] Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to theKing for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity ofBelgium'. [121] The German Government had issued an ultimatum to theBelgian, asking for 'a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours'. [122] Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest againstthis violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with ourselves wasa party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium wouldnot be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian Government was toldto resist German aggression by all the means in its power, as GreatBritain was prepared to join France and Russia to maintain theindependence and integrity of Belgium. [123] On receipt of the protest ofSir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one moredesperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will, under nopretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass through Belgium wasnecessary because the 'German army could not be exposed to French attackacross Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachableinformation'. It was for Germany 'a question of life and death toprevent French advance'. [124] But matters had gone too far: that day(August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at Gemmenich, andthereupon the British demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, issued earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum:-- 'We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. 'We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. 'In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. '[125] The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given ofdisappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishmentat the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of paper' of 1839would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's desperate bid forneutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government hadcounted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeplydisappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour tobargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peacebetween Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their originmust be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom webelieve, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the warbroke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour ofEuropean peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the Germanhierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that SirEdward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie onJuly 31, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been adecisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect ourneutrality. '[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sentout from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customsauthorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detainingBritish ships, [127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar fromBritish vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered tobe released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was madetwenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominousstatement that 'no information was to be had'. [128] This, however, is a digression from the main question. History willdoubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany tothe development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, willjudge that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutralcountry by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued onAugust 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by the German Government forthis wanton outrage on international agreements are instructive. Inconversation with Sir Edward Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor theChancellor urged that the French had violated the neutrality; theargument is purely and simply that the route by way of the Vosges isdifficult, time is everything, and it is a matter of life and death toGermany to crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may beable to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. Thisexcuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those whoput it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so vice paidhomage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky that hehad 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that the German army wasexposed to French attack across Belgium. On the other hand, theChancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have known nothing of anysuch action by France; at any rate he made no mention of it in hisspeech to the Reichstag:-- 'We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to hack his way through. '[129] In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have anexample either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable folly. Theviolation of Belgium must have been designed either in order to bring usinto the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in spite of treaties andwarnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet the foolishness of such acalculation is as nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germanyhad to violate Belgian neutrality because the French were going to doso, or had done so. In such a case undoubtedly the wisest course forGermany would have been to allow the French to earn the reward of theirown folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain, to whom not five days before they had solemnly promised to observe theneutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word mustindubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the side ofGermany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put forward theplea that the French had already violated its neutrality before war wasdeclared. This plea has been like a snowball. It began with theineffective accusation that the French were at Givet, a town in Frenchterritory, and that this constituted an attack on Germany, though howthe presence of the French in a town of their own could be called aviolation of their neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. Fromthat it has gradually grown into a more formidable story of the Frenchsupplying a garrison to Liège. There can be little doubt that all theseattempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French violated Belgianneutrality are another illustration of Swift's dictum to the effect that'as universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems', itis astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, 'evenby those who are most celebrated in that faculty'. [130] IV _England and Servia_. We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis whichfollowed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon thepresentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and toEnglish readers at least more interesting, to realize what attitude wastaken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained the position, which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had nodirect interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty toprevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would notsee, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both politicaland religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-HungarianGovernment to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrityor independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia tomilitary action. For Russia had greater interests in the security ofServia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each casethe Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfereto protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia byracial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself, not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but toprevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia whichwould inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. Hestated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons onJuly 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which hethen explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he wouldconcern himself 'with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government[132]. ' In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the GermanAmbassador:-- 'If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence[133]. ' Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peaceat the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further andtried to induce Servia to 'express concern and regret' and to 'giveAustria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is proved that Servianofficials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders atSerajevo[134]. ' Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go;Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof whenhe laid stress on the need of the sanction of British publicopinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:-- 'I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it. '[136] However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] waspresented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by theAustro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff, withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that aconference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet inLondon immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which wouldprevent complications', and 'that all active military operations shouldbe suspended pending results of conference'. [138] This proposal failed, as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28thAustria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm tohis original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'thedispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt calledto take a hand'. [139] And on the same day he declined to discuss withCount Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria andServia'. [140] No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomaticallycorrect and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire forpeace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal anddouble-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria inrefusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that 'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of international relations. '[141] V _Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_. There is however another question which involves the whole foreignpolicy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war byboldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from severalquarters, and it is possible that such action might have beensuccessful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmlyrefused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examinethese proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped thatHis Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidaritywith Russia and France. [142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburgjoined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that 'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France[143]. ' On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed hisconviction that 'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude[144]. ' Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for ForeignAffairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:-- 'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect. '[145] Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey andthe British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. SirGeorge Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he 'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'. [146] On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, sofar from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it wouldmerely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their presentattitude. [147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambonthat 'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'. [148] That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and onBritain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had anotheranswer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to haveknown she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the RussianAmbassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austriancircles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that 'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'. [149] The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peaceowing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequentmobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir EdwardGrey said:-- 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. '[150] It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified. England's attitude may have been an important factor in the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusingto commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with dueobservance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on ourneutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for ForeignAffairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir EdwardGrey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutralunder all circumstances. Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany'sprudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action wasthroughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionablyhe had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazingrick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up theconflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany'sknowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt. It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe andelsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between theseintrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at thedisposal of the British Government. [154] For even Count Mensdorff'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to besatisfactory'. [155] To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-HungarianGovernment based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd. But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the GermanWhite Book says they are, [156] it is only a stronger reason for allowingthe Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain thepersistent refusal, [157] until July 31st, [158] to permit anynegotiations on the basis of the Servian reply. Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more SirEdward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war betweenAustria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from thefirst, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even tosubmission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers toprevent further complications; he did everything in his power torestrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined tojoin Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to theviolation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert thehorrors of war from Europe. VI _Italy's comments on the situation_. We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the TripleAlliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhatdivergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-twoyears. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the criticalsituation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note toServia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It issupremely significant that Italy, though a member of the TripleAlliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note toServia; that she worked persistently side by side with England inendeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, toinduce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspendall military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention anopportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great warbroke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from herallies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said, is even now being offered to her. [159] This is but a bald description ofItaly's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from officialdocuments. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in aconversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italywas desirous to see war avoided', [160] and he cordially approved theidea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy againapproved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately inLondon. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most stronglyto the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Serviato suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, andwent even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thoughtmost likely to be successful at Vienna. [161] He thought it very doubtfulwhether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend militaryoperations, but made a further suggestion that 'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone'. [162] Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point inServia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point formediation. [163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection tothe idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of anexchange of views in London. [164] Next day he added to this thepractical suggestion that 'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. '[165] Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifyingRussia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should 'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire Servian territory'. [166] All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered herultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what wasItaly to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian ForeignMinister:-- 'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral. '[167] The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'Franceopened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy wouldhave been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, totake part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the TripleAlliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions. NOTE _Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_. On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum toServia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatumwhich the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arroganceand in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:-- 'I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. '[170] It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained, [171] that theAustro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded asan ultimatum, but as a _démarche_ with a time-limit. In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Governmentdemanded:-- A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'OfficialGazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and shouldcommunicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration (1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary; (2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated inthe propaganda; (3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who maybe guilty of such machinations. B. That Servia should undertake (1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt ofAustria-Hungary; (2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societiesand to confiscate their means of propaganda; (3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and allmethods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion againstAustria-Hungary; (4) to remove from the military service and from the administration allofficers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names anddeeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right ofcommunicating; (5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives ofAustria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrianmovement; (6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevoplot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates; (7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch andof Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromisedby the results of the inquiry at Serajevo; (8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic inarms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials whohelped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime; (9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime. On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to theAustro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathiesthis reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. TheServian Government agreed A. That Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration (1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed againstAustria-Hungary; (2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperialand Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in thepropaganda; (3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons whoare guilty of such acts. B. That Servia would undertake (1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the mostsevere punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt ofAustria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitutionproviding for the confiscation of such publications; (2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies; (3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments allthat serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever theAustro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of thispropaganda; (4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicialinquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against theterritorial integrity of Austria-Hungary; (5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of thedemand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so faras is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminalprocedure and with good neighbourly relations; (6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevoplot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarianofficials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the lawof criminal procedure; (7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon asthe note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrestCiganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed(on probation) by the directorate of railways; (8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit trafficof arms and explosives across the frontier; (9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, assoon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passagesand as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made bythe said officials. The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactoryand inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the sameevening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile theypublished a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which theServian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and foundunsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demandNo. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one samplemay be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointedout[175] that it 'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. ' Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demandswas necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treatedthis as deliberate misrepresentation:-- 'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties. ... 'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible. '[176] It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been agenuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austriamight prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for ForeignAffairs suggested. [177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary topermit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far tojustify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression 'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation'. [178] Notes: [Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914. ] [Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4. ] [Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. ] [Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25. ] [Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See also German White Book, p. 5. ] [Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28). ] [Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, August 1. ] [Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August1. ] [Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. ] [Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29. ] [Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I). ] [Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26. ] [Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. ] [Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. ] [Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29. ] [Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I). ] [Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, July 24. ] [Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27. ] [Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. ] [Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. ] [Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out thatRussia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactorythan the information of the German Imperial attaché in Russia, whoseaccount of the Russian military preparations supports only in part theallegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7;also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian OrangeBook No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI). ] [Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27. ] [Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29. ] [Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. ] [Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26. ] [Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, fromthe _Militär-Wochenblatt_: 'The fighting power of Russia is usuallyover-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, thehigher command, armaments.... All military preparations for war, ofwhatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and thatorder which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, withoutexaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events withcomplete calm, trusting to God and her own might. '] [Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July29. ] [Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI). ] [Footnote 85: _Ibid_. ] [Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. ] [Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31. ] [Footnote 88: _Ibid_. ] [Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. ] [Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July31, that 'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on thefrontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'. ] [Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31. ] [Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. ] [Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I). ] [Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. ] [Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135. ] [Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI). ] [Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that 'The Austro-HungarianAmbassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss thesubstance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied byexpressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that thediscussions should take place in London with the participation of theGreat Powers. '] [Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8. ] [Footnote 99: _Ibid_. P. 9, Exhibit No. 17. ] [Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29: 'His Excellency denied German Government had done this. Nevertheless it is true. '] [Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. ] [Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Ministerfor Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon. ] [Footnote 103: _Ibid_. ] [Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I). ] [Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 1. ] [Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25. ] [Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27. ] [Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29. ] [Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 (received July 29). ] [Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30. ] [Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. ] [Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30. ] [Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertieand Sir E. Goschen, July 31. ] [Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31. ] [Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium wasbound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia(Art. 2). ] [Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1. ] [Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6. ] [Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellortelegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up theEnglish proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absoluteneutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that theFrench frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p. M. OnMonday, August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime. '] [Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 2. ] [Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, August 2. ] [Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August4. ] [Footnote 122: _Ibid_. ] [Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August4. ] [Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary toPrince Lichnowsky, August 4. ] [Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August4. ] [Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31. ] [Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145. ] [Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3. ] [Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1. ] [Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_(October, 1706). ] [Footnote 131: p. 6. ] [Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. De Bunsen, July 24. ] [Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _démarche_ makes italmost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria willhave mobilized against each other. '] [Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July24. ] [Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24:'I said ... Direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war onbehalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British publicopinion. '] [Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25. ] [Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter. ] [Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 26. ] [Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29. ] [Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. De Bunsen, July29. ] [Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by theRussian Ambassador, July 25. ] [Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24. ] [Footnote 143: _Ibid_. ] [Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31. ] [Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. ] [Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24. ] [Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27:'Their (sc. The German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such amenace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influenceat Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friendwho was anxious to preserve peace. '] [Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29. ] [Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27. ] [Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31. ] [Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29. ] [Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30: 'Although I am not able to verify it, I have privateinformation that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrianultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to theGerman Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that heendorses every line of it. '] [Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV. ] [Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8. ] [Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. De Bunsen, July27. ] [Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ AppendixI). ] [Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30. ] [Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. De Bunsen, August 1. ] [Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance ofthe contents of the Austrian note, see App. V. ] [Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 25. ] [Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27. ] [Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. ] [Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99. ] [Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29. ] [Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30. ] [Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July29. ] [Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3. ] [Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_). ] [Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid. _). ] [Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. De Bunsen, July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), which will be found in Appendix I. ] [Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25. ] [Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24. ] [Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the ServianMinister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ inAppendix I. ] [Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_. ; see _infra_ AppendixI. ] [Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. De Bunsen, July 24. ] [Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_. ; see _infra_ AppendixI. ] [Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. ] [Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July27. ] CHAPTER VI THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally awar between two different principles--that of _raison d'état_, and thatof the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appearedin our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, whenthe Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice ofa prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet thedemands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of lawand sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism nowappears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of whichclaims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europein order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other standsfor the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants towhich it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they standin the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of suchcovenants as a grave and inevitable obligation. Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great nationalhistorian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, theGermans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard whatthey regard as the national German state. [179] 'The state', saysTreitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: aboveit there is nothing at all in the history of the world. ' There is hereno room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_;for international law in any true sense. What really exists is theexclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense thanthat of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes allforeign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreignarticles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economysuch as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke thisexclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentiallypower: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might fordefence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual isself-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; andself-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highestmoral duty of the state. ' 'Of all political weaknesses that offeebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin againstthe Holy Spirit of Politics. ' This may seem the mere worship of might, and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but weshould misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is notconceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state isprecious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: thearmed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the_colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds thatMachiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as hefailed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, thatis to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It isnaturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture. Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive. The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the finalcharacter of international obligation; the other is the praise of theglory of war. _Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so calledmust bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for itsabsolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by astate, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso_rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future overagainst other states. ' International treaties are no absolutelimitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only forsuch time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judgeset over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the lastresort subject to its own decision--in other words, to its ownrepudiation. [180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, thatthe maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies theviolation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It isridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other statesto start by taking the catechism into its hands. ' All these hints of hismaster were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple ofTreitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter ofthe nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students. There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law. 'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can saythat one nation has a better conception than another. ' 'Noself-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' toany international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highestideals. ' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words andforeign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'. Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; andthis, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things arealtered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may nolonger be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no onecontemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region ofAfrica. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territoryis not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality. '[181] But it is the glorification of war--war aggressive as well as wardefensive--which is the most striking result of the doctrine of theall-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index toTreitschke's _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the followingheadings--'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God';'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politics _par excellence_'. Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and theseare to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it ispolitics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot bethought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sicknation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, warcomes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Thereinlies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishesbefore the great thought of the state. ' War alone makes us realize thesocial organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism whichdemands war. ' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if onestruck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)--as if _Heldentum_ couldnot exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shallalways recur as a terrible medicine for humanity. ' Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealizationof war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order topreserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state topreserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualismwill triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of theworld. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can ormay be the goal of a policy'. War, war--the 'strong medicine', theteacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitablebiological law, the force that spreads the finest culture--war is thelaw of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive--primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserveall its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip awayby emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itselfcolonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must findthem by conquest from other powers. [182] Treitschke already cried thewatchwords--'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke alreadydesignated England as the object of German attack, and began to instilin Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth ofGermany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intactfor German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be aWorld-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state--a sham, an hypocrisy. [183] The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moralveneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good olddays when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right ofconquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that insuch cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as towhat is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise atthose who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to liveas the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right. The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterlyrevolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer--the talkof war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidatingsupposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk ofpower as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a sternProtestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but thedoctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute forcedisguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as politicalmorality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is adoctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain itsstate', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charityand humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culturegoes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which hasbeen at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, theintelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military stateshould remain. ' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. Bytheir fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvainsmoking in ashes to the sky. It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, becauseit is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but alsothat of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is thephilosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellorhimself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justifyGermany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. Let us only remember, injustice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine ofGermany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tellus that Germany is 'just merely an extended Prussia'). And let usremember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from twothings--geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation, and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by herHohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especiallysince Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has madePrussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man whofeels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathingspace, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of hisfather's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest thepartition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquestirrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has beeneasier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, tothink in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in theEast, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), ofinternational obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England andRussia united in the common cause of Europe to-day--that sees bothchampioning the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other inthe West. [185] But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and wefight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is thepublic law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, greatand small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightinessof the state--to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, orseem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of aEuropean society, or at least a European comity of nations, within whichall states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, bywhich all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. Wewill not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the state andposture of gladiators' in their relations one with another; we stand forthe reign of law. Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its owninternal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are apeople in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is nonew thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. WhenEngland and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on theside of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law ofEurope, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We didnot fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed thepublic law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we wereready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in _Punch_, of August, 1870, shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear andshield, with the words--'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't troubleyou, dear friend. But if they do----' To-day they have; and England hasdrawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with thosetraditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood--traditions as realand as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England;traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public lifeall the world over? America once fought and beat England, inlong-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law--thatlaw-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusettsto-day as it is in any Britisher--is a bond of sympathy between the twoin this great struggle of the nations. To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moralhypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, theyfeel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', withits dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and deathstruggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians;but we have put on what Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition', the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that weare fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We arefighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The newGerman political theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. Theold--the very old--English political theory is, 'The Right is ourinterest'. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending thecause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending thatcause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence? This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public lawof Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands forher own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, andthe 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled. (Treitschke's _Politik_, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi'sbook, _Deutschland und der nächste Krieg_, was published in 1911, andhas been translated into English under the title _Germany and the NextWar_. See also J. A. Cramb, _England and Germany_, 1914. ) Notes: [Footnote 179: The unity of the German state is in no small measure amatter of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschkewas the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonicorigin, and immediately of Saxon birth. ] [Footnote 180: We are reminded of the famous sentence in _ThePrince_:--_Dove non è giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine_. ] [Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The conception of permanent neutralityis entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which canonly attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states. ' Itwould seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germanyis helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The suggestionthat Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not adopted by the GermanGovernment before the war, nor by Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speechto the Reichstag on the Belgian question (see _supra_, p. 91). ] [Footnote 182: It was significant that Germany, while offering toEngland at the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil ofFrance, would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of Frenchcolonies (_supra_, p. 82). ] [Footnote 183: Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, ofthe distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, orPan-Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard England asTeutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German fold. In theselast few weeks we have been reproached as a people for being traitors toour 'Teutonic' blood. Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty;but as a matter of fact our mixed blood has many other strains than theTeutonic. On the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profitconsult a book by Paul Vergnet, _La France en danger_ (Oct. 1913). ] [Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in hislater years he revolted against the Prussian military system. ] [Footnote 185: German professors have recently reproached England forbeing allied with 'Muscovite barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whosesovereign convened the first Peace Conference? Have not England andRussia striven together in peace (as they now strive together in war)for a great common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fastenon Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that hashappened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantagerefer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff, _Russia:the Psychology of a Nation_ (Oxford, 1914). ] EPILOGUE In conclusion something must be said of the process by which ourunderstanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, became thesolid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, confronts the Germanforces. England gave France no positive engagements until the eleventhhour; it may be argued that England gave them far too late, and that thewar might never have occurred if England had been less obstinately andjudicially pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. Wehesitated to throw in our lot with France, because France would notstand neutral while Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from theincalculable entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we alliedourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, we were askingourselves, should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans? We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might contemplatethis policy. She could not define beforehand the limits which she wouldobserve in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now know, thata war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, only a pretext for a newattack on France, even more deadly in intention than that of 1870. France could not do without the help of Russia. How then could sheafford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declaring, at Germany'scommand, that she would do nothing to help Russia? This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last daysbefore the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well disposed, couldnot help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and for France these werethe critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must depend. Sheappealed urgently to England for support. But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it could makeno definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had been foreshadowedin earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clearthat there could be no prospect of common action unless France wereexposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no certainty of such action evenin that case. But France had staked everything upon the justice of hercause. She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all theworld; and that England could not, with any self-respect, refuseassistance. The French mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, toconvince the British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleethad been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England noless than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was thedisappointment with which France received the English answer of July31st. But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If ouranswers to France were guarded, our answers to the German overtures ofJuly 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of Francewith diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went still further, byundertaking to defend the French coasts and shipping, if the Germanfleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justifyour position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th we may quote whatMr. Asquith said the other day (September 4th):-- 'No one who has not been in that position can realize the strength, the energy, and the persistence with which we laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest, straining almost to breaking-point our most cherished friendships and obligations. ' Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never anyprospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it should notsucceed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It is easy to bewise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet government and wehave Parliamentary government. Before an English minister can act, in amatter of national importance, no matter how positive his ownconvictions may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must feelcertain of convincing a democracy which is essentially pacific, cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of the German attack on Belgiumwould have convinced the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanshiphad degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us on August 4th; andon that day we sent our ultimatum to Berlin. To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to back withthe French for their national existence and our own. Our own, becauseEngland's existence depends not only on her sea-power, but upon themaintenance of European state-law. The military spirit which we havedescribed above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the rights of nations becauseit sees a foe in every equal; because it regards the prosperity of aneighbour as a national misfortune; because it holds that nationalgreatness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbingother nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and whopossibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning: _Tuares agitur, paries cum proximus ardet_. Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue wouldfind her still convinced that she has taken the only course compatiblewith honour and with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyedif England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this object Englandand France have staked their last ship and their last soldier. But, itmay be asked, what state-system do we hope to establish, if and when weare successful in this great crusade? What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is, first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and whatever elsecan be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is theindispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essentialis an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience suchanother invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France whichis prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would beirreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as theother two, is the conservation of those other nations which can onlyexist on sufferance so long as _Realpolitik_ is practised with impunity. To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history shehas made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be toogreat. In these struggles she assisted the small Powers, less fromaltruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Hollandagainst Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon shesupported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of herpower, Switzerland and Piedmont. We do not argue--it would be absurd to argue--that England has alwaysbeen free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Hollandmay well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and theEnglish Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in theseventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland andEngland fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequentalliances have healed, over a policy which England has long sincerenounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a greatwrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmarkknows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspiredwith Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England. Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her noassistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, notdeliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still payingfor that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson. The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state asDenmark may react on such a state as England. England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become lessprosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm ofnaval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help shecan. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she couldnot tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires tofound. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the politicalsystem for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. Thatsystem England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it isadopted. English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with Englishinterests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended strugglingnationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece andItaly for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill ofEngland to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, islargely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature. They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity. They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization whichlinks together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred andmore durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. Inthis fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped onEngland's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we haveforgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunateposition, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in thesame direction. APPENDIX I GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby madethe European War. WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMSAND NOTES. Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin. Foreign Office, Berlin, August 1914. On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-DukeFranz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, wereassassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. Theinvestigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities hasyielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Dukeand successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade withthe cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from theServian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of theentire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servianpolicies directed against the conservation and integrity of theAustro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means whichthe pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for theachievement of these aims. The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and finalseparation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarianmonarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policyhas not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemndeclarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policiestoward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborlyrelations. In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 yearsServia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war. It could only do this because it believed itself supported in itsintentions by Russia. Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russianpatronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union whichsucceeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of herEuropean possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution ofspoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union underRussian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longeragainst Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existenceof the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia shouldcede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received duringthe last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina whichwere to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with thisplan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid ofFrench propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was notcompatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of themonarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. TheImperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception andasked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with ourallys estimate of the situation, and assure him that any actionconsidered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against theconservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude ofAustria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, andthat it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our dutyas allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests ofAustria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yieldingattitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance inthese trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interestswere menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbscontinued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence ofAustria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection ofall the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thusmaking untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. Amorally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism wouldbe no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could haveconfidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever moremenacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serviabut have not participated in her preparations. Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and thepan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported bythe Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessationof this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for theaccomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrianofficials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and thefinal dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating againstAustria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands. The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one dayafter the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note. As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a replywhich, though complying in some points with the conditions ofAustria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor throughprocrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands ofthe monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations withServia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting furtherServian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficientlyexperienced. From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war. [Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2. ] From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that therewere here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have tosettle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward thelocalizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers thatAustria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the positionthat no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austriain this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield theServians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed ourrepresentatives with the foreign powers. [Sidenote: see exhibit 3. ] Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to theRussian Government that the step undertaken against Servia impliedmerely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but thatAustria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continuedfriendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had nointention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan. In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, andaimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and theEnglish Governments promised an action in the same direction. But theseendeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia inthe Austro-Servian disagreement. [Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5. ] The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in theServio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, CountPourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declaredagain, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungaryhad no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. Afterthe official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did notclaim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace ofthe world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. [Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9. ] The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin inthe evening. [Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b. ] The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg wereinstructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russianmobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was alsodirected to make the following declaration to the Russian Government: "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army. "But mobilization means war. "As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding. " [Sidenote: see exhibit 11. ] On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave theGerman military attaché his word of honor that no order to mobilize hadbeen issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horsemustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servianfrontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i. E. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances thosesituated on the German frontier, i. E. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization againstAustria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging hisshoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché thenpointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary asextremely menacing also for Germany. In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at arapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on theGerman-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the stateof war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and thestrengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatorymeasures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres andreturned to its garrison. In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by mostemphatic steps. [Sidenote: see exhibit 12. ] On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit thedifferences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of theAmbassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. Wedeclared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much weapproved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could notcall Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it founderedupon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected. [Sidenote: see exhibit 13. ] Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to theAustro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purelyAustro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations betweenAustria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about anunderstanding between these two powers. [Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16. ] We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conferenceidea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna inwhich he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servianreply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for furthernegotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with fullappreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilitieshaving already been opened. In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advisedVienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of themonarchy. Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the militarypreparations of Russia and France. [Sidenote: see exhibit 17. ] On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification inBerlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same timefurther news was received concerning rapidly progressing militarypreparations of France, both on water and on land. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had aninterview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which hereported by telegraph, as follows: "The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i. E. An infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration, --a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia. "I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. "It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia". On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired thefollowing report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staffof the Russian army: "The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilization, viz. Calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i. E. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization. "As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given. "I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves. " In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threateningattitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out thatAustria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. TheAustro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructedon July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation withSasonow. Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to the Russian ministerthe note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, andto accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discusswith Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russianrelations. [Sidenote: see exhibit 19. ] Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supportedevery proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility ofa peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th ofJuly forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis fornegotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions inServia, i. E. After her march into Servia. We thought that Russia wouldaccept this basis. During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewedand cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declarationof the state of war over all important parts of the Russian westfrontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was infull swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures weredenied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor. Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-Germanmediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordereda general mobilization. [Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23. ] During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty calledthe attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russianmobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities. On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majestythe Kaiser: "I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. "Your cordially devoted "Nicolas. " This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H. M. TheKaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p. M. : "Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary. " Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of allthe Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already orderedduring the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock thatsame afternoon. [Sidenote: see exhibit 24. ] After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, theImperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon ofJuly 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared thestate of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of theRussian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russiadid not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungarywithin 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof. [Sidenote: see exhibit 25. ] At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed todemand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whetherit would remain neutral in a Russo-German war. The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing thesecurity of our country, the laborious action at mediation of theEuropean cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousnessof which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain adoubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly thatRussia wanted war. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight. The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us. Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed toH. M. The Kaiser, as follows: "I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz. , that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply. " To this H. M. The Kaiser replied: "I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers. " As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of areply to our inquiry, H. M. The Kaiser ordered the mobilization of theentire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p. M. [Sidenote: see exhibit 25. ] The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in theevent of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply withinthe stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in astate of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before aconfirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that isto say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i. E. , the same afternoonon which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troopscrossed our frontier and marched into German territory. Thus Russia began the war against us. Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to theFrench Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p. M. [Sidenote: see exhibit 27. ] The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply onAugust 1st at 1. P. M. Which gave no clear idea of the position ofFrance, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would dothat which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. M. , themobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered. On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities. THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES. THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA. Presented July 23rd in Belgrade. "On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Viennamade the following statement, by order of his Government: "Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situationestablished in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to thedecisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Serviabinds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistence which shehas assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and shebinds herself further to change the direction of her present policiestowards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter infriendly and neighborly relations. "The history of the last years, and especially the painful events ofJune 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement inServia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from theAustro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyesof the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond theterritory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series ofassassinations and murders. "Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declarationof March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing tosuppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the varioussocieties and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridledlanguage of the press, the glorification of the originators ofassassinations, the participation of officers and officials insubversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in publiceducation, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would misleadthe Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for itsinstitutions. "This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itselfguilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28thdemonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of suchsufferance. "_It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminalauthors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo wasconceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombswith which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials whobelonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation ofthe criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out byleading Servian frontier officials. _ "The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial andRoyal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which ithas assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centrein Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of themonarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial andRoyal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute apermanent menace for the peace of the monarchy. "In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government isforced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that itcondemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. E. Theentirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from themonarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress withall means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda. "In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the RoyalServian Government will publish on the first page of its official organof July 26th, 1914, the following declaration: "The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed againstAustria-Hungary, i. E. The entirety of those machinations whose aim it isto separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belongingthereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of thesecriminal actions. "The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers andofficials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and havethus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the RoyalGovernment was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March31st, 1909. "The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought orevery attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of anypart of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphaticallyto the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entirepopulation of the kingdom, that it will hence-forward proceed with theutmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, toprevent and suppress which it will make every effort. " "This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance ofthe Royal Army through an order of H. M. The King, and it is to bepublished in the official organ of the Army. "The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows: "1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contemptfor, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency isdirected against the latters territorial integrity; "2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society NarodnaOdbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceedin the same manner against the other societies and associations inServia which occupy themselves with the propaganda againstAustria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities underanother name or in another form; "3. Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, sofar as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction areconcerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propagandaagainst Austria-Hungary; "4. To remove from military service and the administration in general allofficers and officials who are guilty of propaganda againstAustria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the materialwhich the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, theImperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to theRoyal Government; "5. To consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and RoyalGovernment co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed againstthe territorial integrity of the monarchy; "6. To commence a judicial investigation against the participants of theconspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in theexaminations; "7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosicand a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have beencompromised through the result of the investigation; "8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of theServian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across thefrontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, whoassisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing thefrontier; "9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regardto the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia andabroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, toexpress themselves in interviews in a hostile manner againstAustria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th; "10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the RoyalGovernment at the latest until Saturday 25th inst. , at 6 p. M. A memoirconcerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as theyconcern points 7. And 8. Is enclosed with this note. " ENCLOSURE. The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices inthe Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following results: 1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay inSarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with theaid of Major Voja Tankosic. 2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by thecriminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, andpresented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade. 3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of theServian Army in Kragujevac. 4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowicinstructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gaveinstructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in aforest near the target practice field of Topshider--(outside Belgrade). 5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia andHerzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of theirarms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. Theentry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina waseffected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and ofLoznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic ofLoznica with the aid of several other persons. THE SERVIAN ANSWER. Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914. (With Austria's commentaries in italics. ) The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial andRoyal Government of the 23rd inst. And is convinced that its reply willdissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendlyand neighborly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdomof Servia. The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewedprotests against the great neighborly monarchy like those which at onetime were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in the declarationand actions of the responsible representatives of the state at thattime, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31st1909; furthermore that since that time neither the differentcorporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt toalter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and theHerzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. And R. Governmenthas made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a textbook, in regard to which the I. And R. Government has received anentirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time ofthe Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderatepolicy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she hasbrought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has beenpreserved. _The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that sincethe declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no attempt on thepart of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and theHerzegovina. _ _With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as wehave not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anythingofficial in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of theobligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress themovement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy. _ _Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entiredirection of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighborlyrelations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not tointerfere with the possession of Bosnia. _ The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of aprivate character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceablework of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance inother countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of thestate. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown greatcourtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which havearisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded tosolve the greater number thereof, in favor of the progress of bothcountries. _The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions ofthe press and the activity of Servian associations possess a privatecharacter and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrastwith the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal ofpress and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press andthe societies to a certain control of the state. This is also providedfor by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the ServianGovernment consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to superviseits press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to behostile to the monarchy. _ The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertionsthat citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of theoutrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to cooperatein the investigation of the crime, and it was ready in order to proveits complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard towhom it would receive information. _This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accuratelyinformed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalitiesand not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws toinstitute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has donenothing in this direction. _ According to the wishes of the I. And R. Government, the RoyalGovernment is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard toposition and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation in thecrime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itselfparticularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of Julyto publish the following enunciation: "The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which should bedirected against Austria-Hungary, i. E. The entirety of such activitiesas aim towards the separation of certain territories from theAustro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentableconsequences of these criminal machinations. " _The Austrian demand reads_: "_The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda againstAustria-Hungary_.... " _The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has beenmade by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that apropaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that itis not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the ServianGovernment reserves itself the supterfuge for later occasions that ithad not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, norrecognized the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deducefurther that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propagandasimilar to the present one_. The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I. And R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries haveparticipated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these havetherefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of whichthe Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declarationof March 31st, 1909. The Government ... Identical with the demanded text. _The formula as demanded by Austria reads_: "_The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries... Have participated_.... " _Also with this formula and the further addition "according to thedeclaration of the I. And R. Government", the Servian Government pursuesthe object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for thefuture_. The Royal Government binds itself further: 1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in thepress laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, andcontempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished, as well asevery publication whose general tendency is directed against theterritorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution toembody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permitsthe confiscation of such publications as is at present impossibleaccording to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution. _Austria had demanded_: _1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contemptfor the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorialintegrity of the monarchy. _ _We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care thatsuch attacks of the press would cease in the future. _ _Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as meanstowards this end, viz. :_ _a) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to themonarchy can be individually punished, a matter, which is immaterial tous, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues isvery rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, thefew cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not theleast guarantee for the desired success. _ _b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permitconfiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the existence ofsuch a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation ofthe Government to enforce it and that has not been promised us. _ _These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as weare not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in theevent of the notpassing of these laws by the Skuptschina everythingwould remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation ofthe Government. _ 2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. And R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana andother similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminalactions of this manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstandingthis, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. And R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as everysociety which should act against Austria-Hungary. _The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostileto the monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia; it is thereforean entirely inacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts thatit knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completelyfulfilled, as we have asked besides:_ "_To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to preventthe reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and inanother form. _" _In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, sothat through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee forputting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to theMonarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana. _ 3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminatefrom the public instruction in Servia anything which might further thepropaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. And R. Government furnishes actual proofs. _Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for apropaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Serviawhile it must know that the text books introduced in the Servian schoolscontain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portionof the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliatedsocieties. _ _Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of ourdemands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the additiondesired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as wellas the means of instruction"--a sentence which shows clearly where thepropaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servianschools_. 4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers andofficials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it hasbeen proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty ofactions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; it expectsthat the I. And R. Government communicate to it for the purpose ofstarting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged. _By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services ofthose officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which thesepersons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials asindulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally notpunishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in thispoint_. 5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the senseand the scope of that demand of the I. And R. Government which concernsthe obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit thecooperation of officials of the I. And R. Government on Servianterritory, but it declares that it is willing to accept everycooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminallaw, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations. _The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to dowith this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state policewhich is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reservedattitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of itsvague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties_. 6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course tobegin an investigation against all those persons who have participatedin the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as thecooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials ofthe I. And R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as thisis a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet insome cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to theAustro-Hungarian officials. _The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable_: _1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in theoutrage_. _2. Participation by I. And R. Government officials in the examinations("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire"). _ _3. It did not occur to us to let I. And R. Government officialsparticipate in the Servian court procedure; they were to cooperate onlyin the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material forthe investigation. _ _If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is donedeliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between"enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired toescape from every control of the investigation which would yield, ifcorrectly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as itpossesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation ofour officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in greatnumber) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands asimpossible_. 7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on whichthe note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. However, asfar as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of theAustro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th withthe Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him. The I. And R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing groundsfor suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation atSarajevo. _This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after theoutrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic hadparticipated in the outrage. In the first place, it is thereforeincorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In thesecond place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade who hadhimself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew hiswhereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of MilanCiganowic did not exist in Belgrade_. 8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe theexisting measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms andexplosives. It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, andpunish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the lineShabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted theperpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier. 9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about theexpressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made ininterviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion ofthe I. And R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as theI. And R. Government points out in detail where those expressions weremade and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually beenmade by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself willtake care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collectedtherefor. _The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews inquestion. If it demands of the I. And R. Government that it shouldfurnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reservesfor itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is notits intention seriously to fulfill the demand. _ 10. The Royal Government will notify the I. And R. Government, so far asthis has not been already done by the present note, of the execution ofthe measures in question as soon as one of those measures has beenordered and put into execution. The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interestnot to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case theI. And R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with thisanswer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it byreferring the decision of this question to the International Court atthe Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who haveparticipated in the working out of the declaration given by the ServianGovernment on March 31st 1909. _The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time. _ EXHIBIT I. The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914. The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning thecircumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian successor tothe throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims whichthe pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizesfor their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt mustdisappear that the center of action of the efforts for the separation ofthe south slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and theirunion with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where itdisplays its activity with the connivance of members of the Governmentand of the Army. The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In aspecially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during theBosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderationof the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of thepowers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that timeAustria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to aconflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the ServianGovernment gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, atleast with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serbpropaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its dooris to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. Ithas become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity norwith the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view anylonger idly the doings across the border through which the safety andthe integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With thisstate of affairs, the action as well as the demands of theAustro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by thegovernment in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Serviangovernment will decline to meet these demands and that it will allowitself to be carried away into a provocative attitude towardAustria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungariangovernment, unless it renounced definitely its position as a greatpower, but to press its demands with the Servian government and, if needbe, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to whichthe choice of means must be left with it. I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the senseindicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (SirEdward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to theview that in this question there is concerned an affair which should besettled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation towhich it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. Weanxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because everyintercession of another power on account of the various treaty-allianceswould precipitate inconceivable consequences. I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about thecourse of your interview. EXHIBIT 2. The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914. You will make the following report to the Government to which you areaccredited: In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in itsnote to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that theoutrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallena victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivanceof members of the Servian government and army. It is a product of thepan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source ofpermanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for thewhole of Europe. The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosniancrisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of theAustro-Hungarian government and the energetic intercession of the powersis it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary wasexposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance offuture well-behaviour, which the Servian government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferanceof official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued toincrease in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with itsdignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungariangovernment persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond thefrontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the monarchy arepermanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as wellas the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only asjustifiable. The reply of the Servian government to the demands which theAustro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. Through itsrepresentative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Serviaare not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. Therewill remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian government than topress its demands, if need be through military action, unless itrenounces for good its position as a great power. Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course anda task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia in the conflictbetween Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration whichwould result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believesitself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does notinduce Austria-Hungary to yield. The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is notAustria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but itis Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same inher existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expressionin the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that it mustchampion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the rightto do so. However, it must realize that it makes the Serb activities itsown, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarianmonarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of theAustro-Servian affair, which all other great powers desire to localize, there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evidentand it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officiallydeclared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquireServian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, butonly desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening itsexistence. The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearlyindicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungaryhas for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a completeisolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interesttherefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at allpossible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the supportby ourselves of those endeavors which aim at the localization of theconflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carriedout successfully for forty-four years in the interest of thepreservation of the peace of Europe. Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russiathe fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty asallies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our command. Weshall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clearconsciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war willbring upon the peoples of Europe. EXHIBIT 3. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July24th 1914. Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé d'affaires inorder to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's pointof view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historicaldevelopment of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchyentertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary wouldnot claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meantas a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force ofcircumstance, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continuedamicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bringabout a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charged'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, tookthe discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise tosubmit it immediately to Sasonow. EXHIBIT 4. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancelloron July 24th 1914. I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interviewwith Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in unmeasured accusationstoward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared mostpositively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that theServo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the partiesconcerned. EXHIBIT 5. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram ofJuly 26th 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonowthis afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they toldme afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary hadno idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. EXHIBIT 6. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancelloron July 25th 1914. Message to H. M. From General von Chelius (German honorary aide de campto the Czar). The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenlyinterrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. Themanoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-dayto the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters thereobtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have theimpression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austriaare being made. EXHIBIT 7. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancelloron July 26th 1914. The military attaché requests the following message to be sent to thegeneral staff: I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev andOdessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere. EXHIBIT 8. Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July27th 1914. Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. (Note that the official translator means _Kriegszustand_. ) EXHIBIT 9. Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July27th 1914. Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinuedmanoeuvres. EXHIBIT 10. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. July 26th 1914. Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnlythat it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will nottouch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establishpeaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call forseveral classes of the reserves is expected immediately which isequivalent to mobilization. [186] If this news proves correct, we shallbe forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desireto localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remainsunchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with allpossible emphasis. [Footnote 186: The German text inserts _auch gegen uns_, i. E. Alsoagainst us. ] EXHIBIT 10a. Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. July 26th 1914. After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has nointention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of theKingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solelywith Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend uponFrance with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation ofthe peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace. EXHIBIT 10b. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgon July 26th, 1914. After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorialdis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of thepeace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threatenseriously the peace of Europe. EXHIBIT 11. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancelloron July 27th, 1914. Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War: Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. TheSecretary of War has given me his word of honor that no order tomobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are beingmade, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossedthe Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed towardAustria, viz. , Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Underno circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiryinto the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged hisshoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that weappreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization evenagainst Austria as very menacing. EXHIBIT 12. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July27th, 1914. We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold aquadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place ourally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Ourmediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. EXHIBIT 13. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July25th, 1914. The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and anAustro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish tointerpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we takethe position that this question must be localized by virtue of allpowers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope thatRussia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility andthe seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of anAustro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers. EXHIBIT 14. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgon July 28th, 1914. We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in amanner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration ofwar which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. EXHIBIT 15. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July27th, 1914. We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense asdesired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to CountBerchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna. EXHIBIT 16. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July28th, 1914. Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks forthe communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequentdeclaration of war, the step appears belated. EXHIBIT 17. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July29th, 1914. News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies fromhour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the FrenchGovernment to this and accentuate that such measures would call forthcounter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threateningstate of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean acall for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would beaggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace. EXHIBIT 18. Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. The Kaiseron July 30th, 1914. Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty'stelegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that atelegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram hasmade a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization againstAustria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majestythat it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry hecould not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for themeasureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilizationagainst Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a localwar with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibilityrested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it hadno intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilizedagainst Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for animmediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germanyone could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could notdesert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. Itold him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to bemobilized. EXHIBIT 19. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July31st, 1914. We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungarythrough a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiserand His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir EdwardGrey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have beengreatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite ofpacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures againstus that the situation is becoming continually more menacing. EXHIBIT 20. I. His Majesty to the Czar. July 28th, 10. 45 p. M. I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is causedby the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulousagitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to therevolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and hisconsort, still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with methat both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have acommon interest to insist that all those who are responsible for thishorrible murder, shall suffer their deserved punishment. On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered byYou and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view ofthe cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time withfirm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary toobtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hopeconfidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome alldifficulties which may yet arise. Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin signed: Wilhelm. EXHIBIT 21. II. The Czar to His Majesty. Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p. M. I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask Youearnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against aweak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share istremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist thepressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measureswhich will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war wouldbe, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your powerto restrain Your ally from going too far. signed: Nicolas. EXHIBIT 22. III. His Majesty to the Czar. July 29th, 6. 30 p. M. I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for theconservation of peace. However: I cannot--as I told You in my firsttelegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominiouswar". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serviaas long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to beconsidered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises ofServia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I amstrengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet thatAustria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. Iam therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia toremain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe intothe most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a directunderstanding is possible and desirable between Your Government andVienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--myGovernment endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally militarymeasures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace byAustria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire toavoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Yourappeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted. signed: Wilhelm. EXHIBIT 23. IV. His Majesty to the Czar. July 30th, 1 a. M. My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of YourGovernment to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; Ihave told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary hasmobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of YourGovernment, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediatorwith which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which Ihave accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not madeimpossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. signed: Wilhelm. EXHIBIT 23a. V. The Czar to His Majesty. Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1. 20 p. M. I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-nightTatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. Themilitary measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, andfor the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hopewith all my heart that these measures will not influence in any mannerYour position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Yourstrong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived atwith us. Nicolas. EXHIBIT 24. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgon July 31st, 1914. Urgent. In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to thishour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized herentire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russianmeasures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaimthe threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop everymeasure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hoursand notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this atonce to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication. EXHIBIT 25. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July31st, 1914. Urgent. Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, thereforealso against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We havetherefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to befollowed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours allmeasures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implieswar. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutralin a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hourof inquiry. Utmost speed necessary. EXHIBIT 26. Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgon August 1st, 12. 52 p. M. Urgent. If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock(mid-European time) the following statement: "Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de lamener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en availété exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereurd'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir unrôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à lamobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. "A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatifmilitaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouvavis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eûtmanqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la securité etl'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemandse vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur detoutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actesmilitaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande etayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contrel'Allemande, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoirà Votre Excellence ce qui suit: "Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de l'Empire relèvele défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie. " Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction byRussian time. Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs tothe American Embassy. EXHIBIT 27. Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August1st 1. 05 p. M. Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral inthe event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that Francewould do that which her interests dictated. APPENDIX II EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS _For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6(1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command ofHis Majesty, August 1914_ No. 13. _Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25. _ (Translation. ) M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the11th (24th) July, 1914: "The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day afterthe presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to thePowers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any stepswhich might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. "In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal toall the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed bythe Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above allessential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should beextended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform thePowers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and RoyalGovernment base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficienttime to study them. "In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austriandemands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer adviceto the Servian Government. "A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatorythe proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, andwould be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. "Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinetat Vienna. "M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere tothe point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey willsee his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador atVienna. " No. 17. _Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July_ 25. ) (Telegraphic. ) _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914. I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.... The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to doas you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but thatno independent State could be expected to accept the political demandswhich had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the ServianGovernment would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into theinterior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to helpthem. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He wouldlike to see the question placed on an international footing, as theobligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in theAustrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready tostand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia mightpropose to submit the question to arbitration. On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate warby mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour ofpeace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressiveintentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed atoverthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishingher own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wantedwar, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmlywith France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Viennato better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation weredisregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she wereto declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said thatunfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon ourneutrality. I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for ForeignAffairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not becontent with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied thatRussia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become thepredominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of thesupport of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured meonce more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but thatunless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation asdesperate. No. 18. _Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 25. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Berlin, July 25, 1914. _ Your telegram of the 24th July acted on. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of atelegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, heimmediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on toAustrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extensionof time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately itappeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary ofState thought that in these circumstances there would be delay anddifficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said thathe did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but headmitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to givethe Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. Healso admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of theAustro-Hungarian demands. Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was thatCount Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and hadtold him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servianterritory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calminginfluence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be fearedthat, in taking military action against Servia, Austria woulddangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. Heremained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said thattelegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look veryreassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that lastthing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his powerto prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russiabecame threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestionas to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note leftmuch to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestlythat, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents ofthat note, he had in fact had no such knowledge. No. 41. _Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 27. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914. I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the GreatPowers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian notewas so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-HungarianGovernment are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that theyconsider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that untilpunishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they willlisten to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy atthe prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or preventionwould undoubtedly be a great disappointment. I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, toexpress to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of HisMajesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and toask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. No. 43. _Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 27. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Berlin, July_ 27, 1914. Your telegram of 26th July. Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practicallyamount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, becalled together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He couldnot therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was toco-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that youridea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representativesof the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggestmeans for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, thatsuch a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added thatnews he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was anintention on the part of M. De Sazonof to exchange views with CountBerchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to asatisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anythingelse, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian andRussian Governments. In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that asyet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilisedagainst Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what hemeant by "mobilising against Germany. " He said that if Russia onlymobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised innorth, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system ofmobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly tolocate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very carefulnot to be taken by surprise. Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh hadcaused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation. No. 56. _Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 28. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914. The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation withBaron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He toldhim that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was wellacquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state ofRussian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke outwith Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was notprepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, andespecially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped thatsomething would be done before Servia was actually invaded. BaronMacchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish hadalready taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been theaggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could tokeep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet takeplace, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce theServian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and tofall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice toenable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactoryconversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs hadyesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The formerhad agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had beenperfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached anunderstanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably beasked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. TheRussian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburghshould be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with theRussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to adviseServia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independentPower. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Ministerfor Foreign Affairs. No. 62. _Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 28. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Vienna, July 28_, 1914. I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of yourtelegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation, " butsaid that, as mentioned in your speech, [187] which he had just read tome, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powersless interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-HungarianGovernment would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actualhostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply ashaving gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that youthought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlikeoperations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador inBerlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs saidquietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis ofServian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-knownpacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, mightbe accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. Thiswas a matter that must be settled directly between the two partiesimmediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret thathostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they mightlead to complications threatening the peace of Europe. In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if inthe course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimesdiffer from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with themany just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but fromthe fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel withServia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. Itrusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal forceto his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought thatRussia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which didnot aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer bepostponed. [Footnote 187: "Hansard, " Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. ] No. 85. _Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 29. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Berlin, July_ 29, 1914. I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency hadjust returned from Potsdam. He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a Europeanconflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany'sobligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts tomaintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid forBritish neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able tojudge the main principle which governed British policy, that GreatBritain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in anyconflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at whichGermany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that theImperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expenseof France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said thathe was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regardsHolland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany'sadversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that shewould do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operationsGermany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war wasover, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided againstGermany. His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellorthe object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about anunderstanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might formthe basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in minda general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though itwas of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and anassurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisismight possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisationof his desire. In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request wouldappeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at thisstage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of actionand that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicatedthe contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressedhis best thanks to you. No. 87. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_. Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914. After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, Itold him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he mustnot be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any senseof false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts topreserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary totell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficultyfrom a quite different point of view from that taken during thedifficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco thedispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in whichit appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening aquarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a specialagreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute betweenAustria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should notfeel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question ofthe supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in theBalkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a warover a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France becameinvolved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a casethat we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn intoa quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, herhonour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free fromengagements, and we should have to decide what British interestsrequired us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as heknew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I wasabout to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, butit would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled intosupposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in acontingency that I still hoped might not arise. M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. Heunderstood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle forsupremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called tointervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France becomeinvolved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, weshould then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quiteprepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it. He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demandfrom Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to helpRussia if Russia was attacked. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 89. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914. After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about theEuropean situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quiteprivate and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situationwas very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at presentactually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germanybecame involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great thatit would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to bemisled by the friendly tone of our conversation--which I hoped wouldcontinue--into thinking that we should stand aside. He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant thatwe should, under certain circumstances, intervene? I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that waslike a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if thingsbecame worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of ourintervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was notinvolved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such thatwe thought British interests required us to intervene, we must interveneat once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as thedecisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone ofour conversations would continue as at present, and that I should beable to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in workingfor peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if theissue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, Idid not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly toneof all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposingthat we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they hadnot been so misled, the course of things might have been different. The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, hetold me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as hisview of the situation. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 98. _Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received July 30. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Berlin, July_ 30, 1914. Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of PrinceLichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he askedAustro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to acceptmediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or someother point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till nowreceived no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austriawill have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yetonly mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary alsoagainst Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in gettingRussia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading herin the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act ofaggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peacemay be preserved. He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in viewof Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are beingtaken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave--a measure which hadbeen officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassadoryesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way ofmilitary preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have tomobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did notdesire war, but it would be a military necessity. His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky lastnight contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactlywith surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness andloyalty with which you had spoken. He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very latelast night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done. No. 101. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. (Telegraphic. ) _Foreign Office, July_ 30, 1914. Your telegram of 29th July. [188] His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor'sproposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French coloniesare taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take Frenchterritory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, forFrance, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, couldbe so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and becomesubordinate to German policy. Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make thisbargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which thegood name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whateverobligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. Wecould not entertain that bargain either. Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospectof a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germanyoffered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying ourhands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances mayseem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettabledevelopment of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add mostearnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations betweenEngland and Germany is that they should continue to work together topreserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutualrelations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government willwork in that way with all sincerity and good-will. And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and thepresent crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote somearrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could beassured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued againsther or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly orseparately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a correspondingobject, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been tooUtopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this presentcrisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through forgenerations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reactionwhich will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochementbetween the Powers than has been possible hitherto. [Footnote 188: See No. 85. ] Enclosure 1 in No. 105. _Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon_. My dear Ambassador, _Foreign Office, November 22_, 1912. From time to time in recent years the French and British naval andmilitary experts have consulted together. It has always been understoodthat such consultation does not restrict the freedom of eitherGovernment to decide at any future time whether or not to assist theother by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between expertsis not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commitseither Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and maynever arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and Britishfleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon anengagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had gravereason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might becomeessential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armedassistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect anunprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened thegeneral peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether bothGovernments should act together to prevent aggression and to preservepeace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take incommon. If these measures involved action, the plans of the GeneralStaffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governmentswould then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, &c. E. GREY. No. 119. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_. Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 31, 1914. M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to SirArthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we wouldintervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, it wewould only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it woulddecide the German attitude in favour of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany underthe impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures topromise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitelydeclined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so farthis morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France andGermany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, ofcourse, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and Itold M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under theimpression that we would stand aside. M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday. I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, thatwe could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should haveto put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament inadvance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opiniondid not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country wereinvolved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause theGovernment and Parliament to take the view that intervention wasjustified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, Iwould not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining ourattitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not tointervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood withregard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should askboth France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake anengagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality ofBelgium. M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germanymade an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things hadgone at present, we could not take any engagement. M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposalsthat might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interestthat France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a verydiminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a greatmistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and weshould now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could notsubmit his question to the Cabinet again. I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there wassome new development, but at the present moment the only answer I couldgive was that we could not undertake any definite engagement. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 122. _Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received August 1. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914. Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to SirF. Bertie. I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult theEmperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gatheredfrom what he said that he thought any reply they might give could notbut disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event ofwar ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they wouldreturn any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note ofyour request. It appears from what he said that German Government consider thatcertain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As aninstance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany hadbeen placed under an embargo already. I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matterfurther, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to meremote. In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany wouldin any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the FrenchGovernment. No. 123. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. Sir, _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914. I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the GermanGovernment with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of verygreat regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in thiscountry. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as thatwhich had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieveanxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violationof the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respectedit, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in thiscountry. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinetmeeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him amemorandum of it. He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgianneutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and wewere considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was thatour attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, andthat the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Publicopinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutralityon that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditionson which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrityof France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remainneutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep ourhands free. I am, &c. E. GREY. [Footnote 189: See No. 122. ] No. 133. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. (Telegraphic. ) _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914. M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram fromM. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:-- "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of hisGovernment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it wasdesirable that the discussions should take place in London with theparticipation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the directionof these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. Itwould be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stopprovisionally to her military action on Servian territory. " (The above has been communicated to the six Powers. ) No. 134. _Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. --(Received August 1. )_ (Telegraphic. ) _Paris, August_ 1, 1914. President of the Republic has informed me that German Government weretrying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only aftera decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that theEmperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although themeasures which the German Government have already taken are in effect ageneral mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French generalmobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France isalready forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German militarypreparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to theGerman frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. So as to avoid any groundsfor accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, onthe other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have madeincursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor ofRussia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations withthe German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that FrenchGovernment, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire thepreservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its beingpossible to avoid war. No. 148. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_. (Telegraphic. ) _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914. After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the followingmemorandum:-- "I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comesinto the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostileoperations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet willgive all the protection in its power. "This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty'sGovernment receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken asbinding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the abovecontingency of action by the German fleet takes place. " I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issuesto consider, and that Government felt that they could not bindthemselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke outbetween France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the FrenchGovernment, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirelyundefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them thisassurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless theGerman fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security toFrance that would enable her to settle the disposition of her ownMediterranean fleet. M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him thedoctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of theneutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; wewere considering what statement we should make in Parliamentto-morrow--in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgianneutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to theGerman Ambassador on this point. No. 153. _Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. (Telegraphic. ) _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914. The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King fordiplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:-- "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and thatof your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 andthe proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supremeappeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government tosafeguard the integrity of Belgium. " His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Governmenthas delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendlyneutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, andpromising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom andits possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case ofrefusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested withintwelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as aflagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation ofa treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and mustrequest an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not beproceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. Youshould ask for an immediate reply. APPENDIX III Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlinrespecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the GermanGovernment. (Cd. 7445. ) _Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_. Sir, _London, August_ 8, 1914. In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon andenquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the ImperialGovernment would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr vonJagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be"No, " as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed thefrontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Governmenthad been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advanceinto France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to getwell ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisiveblow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not havehoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of thefortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailinggreat loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained bythe Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia wasan inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow thatthis _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and Iasked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoidpossible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He repliedthat, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them todraw back. During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I againproceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary ofState that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with theirviolation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had beeninstructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Governmentthat His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in theirpower to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treatyto which Germany was as much a party as themselves. Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no otheranswer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, thatthe safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that theImperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency awritten summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you hadmentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government wouldexpect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terribleconsequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even atthe last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He repliedthat if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answermust be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand mypassports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a shortconversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regretat the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, whichhad been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through GreatBritain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my workin Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, butthat he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of ourengagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have actedotherwise than they had done. I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it mightbe, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. HisExcellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible toa degree; just for a word--"neutrality, " a word which in war time had sooften been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain wasgoing to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than tobe friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendereduseless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled downlike a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was likestriking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life againsttwo assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terribleevents that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me tounderstand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life anddeath to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter'sneutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that sheshould keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium'sneutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, orwhat confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britainin the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compacthave been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted tohis Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences couldhardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but hisExcellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of ouraction, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained fromadding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he saidthat the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all thegreater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had beenworking with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace betweenAustria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which sawthe two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations betweenthem had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace betweenRussia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to facewith a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could notpossibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from ourlate fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regrettedthis more than I. After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drewup a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed inat the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P. M. It was acceptedby that office, but apparently never despatched. [190] [Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. ] APPENDIX IV THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME The following document is contained in the German Version of the GermanWhite Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge ofthe Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it isomitted altogether in the official version in English of the GermanWhite Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has theappearance of an extract from a German newspaper. Aus dem österreich-ungarischen Material. Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der österreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote andie auswärtigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konfliktserwähnte Dossier wird heute veröffentlicht. In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbienausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die südlichenTeile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mitSerbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurückgreist. Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mittelnund an Intensität wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit derUnnerionskrise ihren Höhepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzenhervor. Während einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegendie Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamittelnabgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kämpfe vorbereiteten, unter denendie Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionärenKomitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom BelgraderAuswärtigen Amte völlig abhängige Organisation unter Leitung vonStaatsmännern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und demehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und MilanPribicevic gehören zu diesen Gründern. Dieser Berein hatte sich dieBildung und Ausrüstung von Freischaren für den bevorstehenden Krieggegen die öfterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. Ineiner dem Memoire angefügten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vomZentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorganegleichen Namens veröffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Tätigfeltund Ziele dieses Vereins ausführlich dargelegt werden. Es heißt darin, daß zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihrennahen und ferneren Brüdern jenseits der Grenze und unseren übrigenFreunden in der Welt gehören. _Oesterreich ist als erster und größter Feind bezeichnet_. Wie dieNarodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. DasSchlußkapitel enthält einen Apell an die Regierung und das VolkSerbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln für den Kampf vorzubereiten, den dieAnnexion vorangezeigt hat. Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbranaangeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Tätigkeit der Narodna Odbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zurAusbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovicund von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmäßig inspiziert wurden. Weiterwurden die Komitatschis im _Schießen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbrücken_ usw. Unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichenErklärung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Endedieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich abernicht nur nicht erfüllt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch dieserbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire führt als Beispiel die Art undWeise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesaninpublizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentäter als serbischerNationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blätterwurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch aufwohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt. Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gründung wurde die NarodnaOdbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der_Schützenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, undverschiedene andere Vereine angehörten_. Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und diefüörperliche Entwickelung der Bevölkerung Serbiens sowie derenmaterielle Kräftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihrwahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihremVereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass eseine unerlässliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen erstengrössten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu führen, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zurBefreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionenunterjochter Brüder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe undReden ähnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswärtigeTätigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die inVortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, beidenen offen Mitglieder für die erwähnte serbische Vereinigung geworbenwurden, besteht. Gegenwärtig ist noch die Untersuchung darüber im Zuge, dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchiebestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zuvereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmänner und Missionäre wurde die Aufwiegelungin die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. Sowurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und einGendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchieunter bedenklichen Umständen verleitet. In den Schulen derLehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Dergewünschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militärisch auch insofernvorbereitet, als serbische Emissäre im Falle des Ausbruchs derFeindseligkeiten mit der Zerstörung von Transportmitteln usw. , derAnfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird ineiner besonderen Beilage belegt. Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Tätigkeitder Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit denAttentaten gegen den Königlichen Kommissär in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und demmissglückten Attentat Schäfers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Esverbreitet sich hierauf über den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf denThronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, über die Art, wie sich die Jungen schonin der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wiesich die Attentäter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zudem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des MajorsTankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassën lieferte, wie auch die Rolleeines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigenBeamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 alsZögling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte. Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nachBosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darüber lässt, dassdies ein wohl voerberiteter und für die geheimnisvollen Zwecke derNarodna oft begangener Schleichweg war. Eine Beilage enthält einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts inSerajewo über die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog FranzFerdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic geständig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem flüchtigenMehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihmzu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist geständig, dieBombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistoleausgeführt zu haben. Beide Täter gaben zu, bei der Verübung der Tat dieAbsicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlageenthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichterüber Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmässighergestellt wurden, für millitärische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrerOriginalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevacstammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft über den Transport der dreiAttentäter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiterenZeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehöriger der Monarchie einigeTage vor dem Attentat dem österreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in BelgradMeldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Verübungdes Attentats gegen den Erzherzog während dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnienbestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihnunmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gründenverhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein. Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffendenPolizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt hätten. Dadiese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprüft sind, kann über derenStichhaltigkeit vorläufig noch kein Urteil gefällt werden. In derBeilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischenKriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, während dasvierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiensversinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Südungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenröte derserbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffneteFrauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreiendenProvinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw. Stehen. APPENDIX V Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Viennarespecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-HungarianGovernment. (Cd. 7596) _Sir M. De Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_. _London, September_ 1, 1914. Sir, The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to theoutbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do morethan record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a fewcomments. The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serviawas preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. ExceptHerr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of theactual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to seethrough the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, FrenchAmbassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of theUnder-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was leftunder the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed tospeak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, andthat the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothingwith which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At thesecond of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was atthat very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would bepublished in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the otherUnder-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to meon the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of itspresentation about the time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what waspreparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absenceabout the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when eventscompelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be soclosely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have beentaken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this criticaltime. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of theimpending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphedto you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "NeueFreie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using languagewhich pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official"Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note waspublished, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austriawould shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave Europeancomplications. On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By commonconsent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance byServia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the followingafternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had beenunconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. Themistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in theevening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Gieslhad broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy ofdelight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songstill the small hours of the morning. The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most partof organised processions through the principal streets ending up at theMinistry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestationsagainst the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard ofpolice which held the approaches to the principal embassies during thosedays. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, inmany other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly thepopularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubtthat the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom thismomentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even besaid the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions ofthe provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been muchdisappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serviaduring the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with therecent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with littlesympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and theentire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condignpunishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believedthat it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or ofsubmitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peacefulsolution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect thatthe forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans mustinevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the causeof Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable thatany country should place itself in her path, or that questions of merepolicy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding thenecessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime ofSerajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the GermanAmbassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course ofevents, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made tosecure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russiaand Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servianquestion by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intriguemight have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this coursethe Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitableconsequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisationand declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisationagainst Austria. Austria met this move by completing her ownmobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passedinto history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty'sGovernment for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paperon the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold andurged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned inyour speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should beaccepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of thequestion at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphicreport of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austriawas that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept theconference which you had suggested should take place between the lessinterested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matterwhich must be settled directly between the two parties immediatelyconcerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret thathostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead toEuropean complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy withAustria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, andpointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the startingpoint of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at thequestion primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of thepeace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of thequestion in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no rightto intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought noterritorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the courseof his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towardsbringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorialconferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had muchbelief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of ahighly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it soughtto harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellencymaintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but leftno doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-HungarianGovernment to proceed with the invasion of Servia. The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in theendeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interestof peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation orthat of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out hisinstructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what responsehe was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his owndirect negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish CountSzápáry with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopefulconversations which had there been taking place between the latter andM. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later(30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilisedagainst Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendlymanner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations atSt. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germanywas much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latteran arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I wasinformed by M. Schebeko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the mainpoint at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent tosubmit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemedincompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austriawould refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, hadfinally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of apeaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1stAugust by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither"banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations. [192] M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the mostconciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that thelatter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would holdback her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled bynegotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared toaccept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cutshort by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of adirect conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh andParis. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer ispossible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and onFrance on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probabilityhave saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had beeninstructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declaredagainst her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened onthe 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions atVienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had beeninstructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of themenacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the factthat Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungaryconsidered herself also at war with Russia. " M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by theAustro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgentlyrequested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might beable to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swissfrontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On theprevious day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the groundthat Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point wasnot fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumainehad received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that noAustrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statementwas supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold'sassurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually tothe French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in awesterly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replaceGerman troops employed at the front. These two statements were made byCount Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador'sdeparture was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but hisExcellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made bythe Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the stepsof the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in thethroes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had beenassassinated. The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna byspecial editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. Anabstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of theGerman Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appearedthe same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The"Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The"Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in thecolumns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgianneutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to takepart in the war. The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, butscarcely mentioned in the newspapers. On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of theprevious day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war withGermany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at thatdate at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for mypassport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-HungarianGovernment. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government ofcourse expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us withoutthe notice required by diplomatic usage. On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive yourtelegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to informCount Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that acomplete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the groundthat Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on theside of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontierunder conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture havingbeen brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for mypassport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informedCount Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the twocountries from midnight of the 12th August. After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who acceptedimmediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellencywould take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungaryduring the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for whichhis Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that along telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet beenbrought to him. His Excellency received my communication with thecourtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complicationswhich were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. Inpoint of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at warwith France, though diplomatic relations with that country had beenbroken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced thisunwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument... [Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914). "] [Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914). "] APPENDIX VI EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK _Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_: _Négociations ayant précédé la guerre_ _10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Août 1914_ PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI This important collection of documents, which has only reached us sincethe publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which wehad deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp. 66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of anyproposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of thewillingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary andRussia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisistook Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadorsaccredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts whenfriction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8. ) The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened tomobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. Thisthreat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking allprecautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's desire, the onlycourse open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assumethat war is probably inevitable. ' (_Infra_, No. 58. ) The reader willalso notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing theGerman army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn;and that the German Government explained that the publication had beenpremature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62. ) We know from theBritish White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening inher attitude to Russia. It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was notofficially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declaredwar on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79. ) In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methodsemployed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of theServian reply to Austria-Hungary. MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES. RECUEIL DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES. Négociations ayant précédé la guerre. 10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Août 1914. Petrograde, Imprimerie de l'Etat. 1914. No. 1. Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914. Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, à 6 heures du soir, anMinistre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une noteultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un délai de 48 heures pourl'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajouté verbalement quepour le cas où la note ne serait pas acceptée intégralement dans undélai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec lepersonnel de la Légation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui setrouvent en tournée électorale ont été rappelés et sont attendus àBelgrade demain Vendredi à 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'acommuniqué le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie etdéclare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes del'Autriche. (Signé) Strandtman. No. 2. Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914. Texte de la note qui a été transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministred'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:... (_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in AppendixI. _)) Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo àl'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé àcette note'. [193] (Signé) Strandtman. [Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3(_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book. ] No. 3. Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeurd'Autriche-Hongrie à St. -Pétersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangèresle 11/24 Juillet 1914 à 10 heures du matin. Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est trouvé dans la nécessité deremettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l'entremise du MinistreImpérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal deSerbie: (Suit le texte de la note). Voir document No. 2. No. 4. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'affaires enAutriche-Hongrie. _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangèresd'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit.... (This communication is printed in the British White Book(_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English. ) Communiqué à Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 5. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de Sa Majestél'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France. _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. Me réfère à mon télégramme à Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous espérons quele Gouvernement auprès duquel. Vous êtes accrédité partagera notre pointde vue et prescrira d'urgence à son Représentant à Vienne de seprononcer dans le même sens. Communiqué à Belgrade. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 6. Télégramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent de Serbie à Sa Majestél'Empereur. Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbeune note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirsinternationaux, la Serbie dès les premiers jours de l'horrible crime adéclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir uneenquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujetsétait prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autoritésAustro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la noteAustro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie etincompatibles avec sa dignité comme Etat indépendant. Ainsi on nousdemande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du gouvernement dansl'officiel et un ordre du souverain à l'armée, où nous réprimerionsl'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous mêmes desreproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides. --Onnous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois enSerbie pour participer avec les nôtres à l'instruction et poursurveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note. Nous avons reçu un délai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute dequoi la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêtsà accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec lasituation d'un Etat indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception noussera conseillée par Votre Majesté; toutes les personnes dont laparticipation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punis parnous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans deschangements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donnéun délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration dudélai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière. Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions Votre Majestéde nous donner Son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieusede Votre Majesté qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nousfait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendupar Son généreux coeur slave. En ces moments difficiles l'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbequi supplie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'intéresser au sort duRoyaume de Serbie. (Signé) Alexandre. No. 7. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. Tous les journaux du matin, même ceux, rares, qui reconnaissentl'impossibilité pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posées, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton énergique adopté parl'Autriche. L'officieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulièrement agressif;il qualifie de superflus les recours éventuels de la Serbie à St. Pétersbourg, à Paris, à Athènes et à Bucarest, et termine en disant quele peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que lasituation dans la péninsule Balcanique va enfin s'éclaircir. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 8. Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. La copie de la note officiellement remise à Belgrade a été communiquéepar l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche an Gouvernement Français. Plus tardl'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visité le Ministre et lui a lu unecommunication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'encas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligée derecourir à une pression et, en cas de besoin, à des mesures militaires;la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'à l'avis de l'Allemagnecette question devrait être résolue directement entre l'Autriche et laSerbie et qu'il était de l'intérêt des Puissances de circonscrirel'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties intéressées. Le Gérant duDépartement Politique, qui assistait à l'entretien, demanda àl'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considérer l'action autrichienne comme unultimatum--en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas où la Serbie ne sesoumettrait pas entièrement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilitésétaient inévitables? L'ambassadeur évita une réponse directe enalléguant l'absence d'instructions. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 9. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. Pachitch est rentré à Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le délaifixé, c'est à dire demain Samedi à 6 heures du soir, une réponse àl'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. Onadressera aujourd'hui même aux Puissances la prière de défendrel'indépendance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre estinévitable--nous ferons la guerre. (Signé) Strandtman. No. 10. Communiqué du Gouvernement Impérial. St. -Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Les derniers événements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatumà la Serbie préoccupent le Gouvernement Impérial an plus haut degré. LeGouvernement suit attentivement l'évolution du conflit serbo-autrichienqui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifférente. No. 11. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des AffairesEtrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Le comte Berchtold se trouve à Ischl. Vu l'impossibilité d'y arriver àtemps, je lui ai télégraphié notre proposition de prolonger le délai del'ultimatum et l'ai répétée verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'apromis de la communiquer à temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, mais a ajouté qu'il pouvait prédire avec assurance un refus catégorique. (Signé) Koudachew. No. 12. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des AffairesEtrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Suite à mon télégramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio laréponse négative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois à notre proposition deprolonger le délai de la note. (Signé) Koudachew. No. 13. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Reçu avec retard le 14--27 Juillet 1914. Je transmets la réponse que le Président du Conseil des Ministres Serbea remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois à Belgrade aujourd'hui avantl'expiration du délai de l'ultimatum.... (The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book(_Correspondence_, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, pp. 23-32(supra, Appendix I. ). ) No. 14. Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 11/24 Juillet. Ai communiqué son contenu anMinistre des Affaires Etrangères. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglaisl'a également prié de conseiller à Vienne la prolongation du délai del'ultimatum; il a communiqué cette démarche télégraphiquement à Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre démarche, mais il craint qu'à la suitede l'absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses télégrammes ne restent sans résultats; il a, en outre, des doutessur l'opportunité pour l'Autriche de céder an dernier moment et il sedemande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'airépondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait céder sansporter atteinte à son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les argumentsconformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus précises. Même lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir à Vienne pouréviter la possibilité de conséquences redoutables, le Ministre desAffaires Etrangères répondait chaque fois négativement. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 15. Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Ai reçu le télégramme du 11/24 Juillet concernant la prolongation dudélai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le Représentant de France à Vienne a été muni d'instructions conformes. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 16. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Reçu télégramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit à l'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre à Vienne d'appuyer notre démarche concernant laprolongation du délai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en même temps quel'Ambassadeur d'Autriche était venu le voir et avait expliqué qu'on nedevrait pas attribuer à la note autrichienne le caractère d'unultimatum; il faudrait la considérer comme une démarche qui, en casd'absence de réponse ou en cas de réponse insuffisante au terme fixé, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le départimmédiat de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainercependant le commencement immédiat des hostilités. --Grey a ajouté qu'àla suite de cette explication il a indiqué à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterreà Vienne que dans le cas où il serait trop tard pour soulever laquestion de la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arrêtdes hostilités pourrait peut-être servir de base à la discussion. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 17. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres. _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvantprovoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nouscomptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du côtéde la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'équilibre européen, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passé et quiserait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 18. Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre desAffaires Etrangères le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue parquelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernementd'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation del'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas euconnaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait étéremise et n'a exercé aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tortqu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire. L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche lesrevendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre laSerbie. Avant tout elle désire comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencementdu différend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localisé. No. 19. Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme)_ Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Me réfère à mon télégramme du 11/24 Juillet. Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publié, sous une forme pas entièrementexacte, les déclarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en lesfaisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent à cette démarche lecaractère d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, très impressionné parces divulgations, a visité aujourd'hui le Gérant du DépartementPolitique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu lecaractère de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a déclaré que l'Autricheavait présenté sa note à la Serbie sans entente précise avec Berlin, mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autricheet que certainement 'la flèche une fois partie' (ce sont là ses propresparoles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirsd'alliée. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 20. L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a déclaré que leGouvernement Allemand n'avait pas été informé du texte de la noteautrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entièrement la démarche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demandé en même temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentirà agir à St. Pétersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a réponduque cela était complètement impossible. Le Ministre a ajouté que tantque les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, lesintérêts Anglais n'étaient engagés qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devaitprévoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite lamobilisation de la Russie et que dès ce moment on se trouverait enprésence d'une situation à laquelle seraient intéressées toutes lesPuissances. L'Angleterre se réservait pour ce cas une complète libertéd'action. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 21. Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Malgré le caractère extrêmement conciliant de la réponse serbe àl'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, à 6-1/2 du soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas reçu an délai fixé uneréponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de laLégation. La Scoupchtina est convoquée à Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. LeGouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la mêmeville. (Signé) Strandtman. No. 22. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. Grey a dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'à son avis la mobilisationautrichienne devait entraîner la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alorssurgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre générale et qu'il ne voyait qu'unseul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en présence des mobilisationsautrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterres'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immédiate et proposent tout d'abordleurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan nécessitait avant toutl'agrément de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pasmobiliser. En conséquence il a adressé tout d'abord à Berlin unequestion à ce sujet. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 23. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Italie. _(Télégramme). _ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. L'Italie pourrait jouer un rôle de tout premier ordre en faveur dumaintien de la paix, en exerçant l'influence nécessaire sur l'Autricheet en adoptant une attitude nettement défavorable au conflit, car cedernier ne saurait être localisé. Il est désirable que vous exprimiez laconviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide àla Serbie. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 24. Le Gérant du Consulat à Prague au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Prague, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. La mobilisation a été décrétée. (Signé) Kazansky. No. 25. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie. _(Télégramme). _ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avecl'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Après avoir examiné avec lui les 10demandes adressées à la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'à part la formepeu habile sous laquelle elles sont présentées, quelques-unes parmielles sont absolument inexécutables, même dans le cas où le gouvernementSerbe déclarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1et 2 ne pourraient être exécutés sans un remaniement des lois serbes surla presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de laScoupchtina pourrait être difficilement obtenu; quant à l'exécution despoints 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des conséquences fort dangereuseset même faire naître le danger d'actes de terrorisme dirigés contre lesmembres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrerdans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il mesemble, qu'avec certains changements dans les détails, il ne serait pasdifficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenuesétaient confirmées par des preuves suffisantes. Dans l'intérêt de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szápáry, est précieuse à l'Autriche au même degré qu'à toutes les Puissances, ilserait nécessaire de mettre au plus tôt possible une fin à la situationtendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait très désirable quel'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fût autorisé d'entrer avec moi dans unéchange de vues privé aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelquesarticles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 Juillet. Ce procédépermettrait peut-être de trouver une formule qui fût acceptable pour laSerbie, tout en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de sesdemandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans lesens de ce télégramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et enItalie. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 26. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne. _(Télégramme). _ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet. Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon télégramme à Vienne d'aujourd'huiau Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir, que de son côté il trouvera possible de conseiller à Vienne d'allerau-devant de notre proposition. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 27. Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. Le Directeur du Département Politique m'informe, que lors de lacommunication qu'il a faite à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de laréponse serbe à l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas caché son étonnementde ce qu'elle n'ait pas donné satisfaction à Giesl. L'attitudeconciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du DépartementPolitique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 28. Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite auGérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et lui a fait lesdéclarations suivantes: «L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas desacquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de laSerbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Parconséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne sesent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paixet espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourgdans un sens modérateur». Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagnepourrait de son côté entreprendre des démarches analogues à Vienne, surtout en présence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve laSerbie. L'Ambassadeur répondit que cela n'était pas possible, vu larésolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances--l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France--ne pouvaient pas entreprendre desdémarches à St. Pétersbourg et à Vienne, puisque l'affaire se réduisaiten somme à un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeurallégua l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusad'adhérer à la proposition allemande. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 29. Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet 1914. Le Directeur du Département Politique a déclaré qu'à son avis personnel, les démarches successives allemandes à Paris ont pour but d'intimider laFrance et d'amener son intervention à St. Pétersbourg. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 30. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. Après la réception à Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'arméeautrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composée, aux dires desjournaux, en partie d'éléments autrichiens, se livra à une série debruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancée dela soirée les manifestants se massèrent à plusieurs reprises devant lepalais de l'Ambassade Impériale en poussant des cris hostiles à laRussie; la police était presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 31. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme)_. Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. Ai reçu votre télégramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me télégraphier si, àVotre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Viennes'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la médiation des 4Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à St. Pétersbourg que Vous étiez disposé à accepter cette combinaison, Grey adécidé de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faitehier soir à Berlin, à Paris et à Rome. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 32. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France et enAngleterre. _(Télégramme)_. St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. (Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 53. ). ) No. 33. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France, enAngleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie. _(Télégramme)_. St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. Ai pris connaissance de la réponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbeau Baron Giesl. Elle dépasse toutes nos prévisions par sa modération etson désir de donner la plus complète satisfaction à l'Autriche. Nous nevoyons pas quelles pourraient être encore les demandes de l'Autriche, àmoins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un prétexte pour une guerreavec la Serbie. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 34. Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme)_. Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a conféré aujourd'hui de nouveau longuementsur la situation avec le Directeur du Département Politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insisté sur l'exclusion de toute possibilitéd'une médiation ou d'une conférence. (Signé) Sevastopoulo. No. 35. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. Ai conféré avec le Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, enprésence de Berthelot, immédiatement après mon retour à Paris. Tous lesdeux m'out confirmé les détails concernant les démarches del'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiqués dans sestélégrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirmé par écrit sadéclaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'ellene recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas à l'intégrité de laSerbie. Son unique but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. 2) Parconséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne etla France, complètement solidaires dans l'ardent désir de ne pas romprela paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens modérateur. Le Baron deSchoen a spécialement souligné l'expression de la solidarité entrel'Allemagne et la France. D'après la conviction du Ministre de laJustice, les démarches susdites de l'Allemagne out pour but évident dedésunir la Russie et la France, d'entraîner le Gouvernement Françaisdans la voie des représentations à St. Pétersbourg et de compromettreainsi notre allié à nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter laresponsabilité non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant tous sesefforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 36. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. Il ressort de vos télégrammes du 13/26 Juillet que vous ne connaissiezpas encore la réponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le télégramme par lequelcette nouvelle m'a été communiquée de Belgrade a été également en routependant 20 heures. Le télégramme du Ministre des Affaires EtrangèresFrançais expédié avant-hier, au triple tarif, à onze heures du matin, etcontenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre démarche, n'est parvenu à sadestination qu'à 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce télégramme n'aitété retenu intentionnellement par le télégraphe autrichien. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 37. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communiqué auGérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères que la réponse de la Serbiea été jugée insuffisante à Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autricheprocéderait à des 'actions énergiques' don't le but serait de forcer laSerbie de lui donner les garanties nécessaires. Le Ministre ayantdemandé en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur répondit qu'iln'avait pas de renseignements exacts à ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvaits'agir d'un passage da la frontière serbe, d'un ultimatum et même d'unedéclaration de guerre. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 38. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. J'ai prié le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'appuyer à Vienne votreproposition tendant à autoriser Szápáry d'élaborer, par la voie d'unéchange de vues privé avec Vous, une rédaction des demandesaustro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a réponduqu'il était an courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avisde Pourtalès que, puisque Szápáry avait commencé cette conversation, ilpourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il télégraphiera dans ce sens àl'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Vienne. Je l'ai prié de conseiller d'unefaçon plus pressante à Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie deconciliation; Jagow a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller àl'Autriche de céder. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 39. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, cedernier avait reçu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tenté delui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative à une action enfaveur de la paix, action qui serait exercée simultanément àSt. -Pétersbourg et à Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie etla France. Cambon a proposé que ces Puissances donnent à Vienne unconseil dans les termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourraitaggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle». En adoptant cette formulevoilée on éviterait de mentionner la nécessité de s'abstenir d'uneinvasion de la Serbie. Jagow a opposé à cette proposition un refuscatégorique, et cela malgré les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a faitvaloir, comme un bon côte de la proposition, le groupement mixte desPuissances grâce auquel on évitait l'opposition de l'Alliance àl'Entente, ce dont s'était si souvent plaint Jagow lui-même. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 40. Télégramme de Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur à Son Altesse Royale lePrince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914. Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant à Moi dans un momentparticulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments quiM'animent à Son égard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe. Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la situation actuelle et MonGouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentesdifficultés. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le GouvernementRoyal ne veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pourarriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'unenouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie. Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous nosefforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré Notre plus sincère désir, Nous ne réussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun casla Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie. (Signé) Nicolas. No. 41. L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet 1914. [194] Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est absent. Pendant un entretienprolongé, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout àfait amicaux, attiré son attention sur l'impression défavorable qu'aproduite en Russie la présentation par l'Autriche à la Serbie dedemandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque état indépendant, bien quepetit. J'ai ajouté que ce procédé, qui pourrait amener des complicationsles moins désirables, a provoqué en Russie une profonde surprise et uneréprobation générale. Il faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influencedes assurances du Représentant Allemand à Vienne, lequel pendant toutecette crise a joué un rôle d'instigateur, a compté sur la probabilité dela localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilité deporter à cette dernière impunément un coup grave. La déclaration duGouvernement Impérial concernant l'impossibilité pour la Russie derester indifférente en présence d'un tel procédé a provoqué ici unegrande impression. (Signé) Schébéko. [Footnote 194: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27. ] No. 42. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet 1914. [195] Grey vient de répondre à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui était venu lequestionner sur la possibilité d'une action à St. -Pétersbourg, que cetteaction devrait se produire à Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin seraitle mieux qualifié pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en même temps quela réponse serbe à la note autrichienne dépassait par sa modération etson esprit de conciliation tout ce à quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey aajouté qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseillé à Belgrade dedonner une réponse modérée et qu'il pensait que la réponse serbe pouvaitservir de base à une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question. Dans ces conditions, a continué Grey, si l'Autriche malgré cette réponsecommençait les hostilités, elle prouverait son intention d'anéantir laSerbie. La question placée sur ce terrain produirait une situation quipourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient impliquées toutes lesPuissances. Grey a enfin déclaré que le Gouvernement Anglais était bien sincèrementdisposé à collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agiraitde la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contrairel'Angleterre se réservait une pleine liberté d'action. (Signé) Benckendorff. [Footnote 195: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27. ] No. 43. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre. (_Télégramme_). St. -Pétersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. (Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 54. ). ) No. 44. Le Consul général à Fiume au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. L'état de siège a été proclamé en Slavonie, en Croatie et à Fiume et enmême temps les réservistes de toutes les catégories ont été mobilisés. (Signé) Salviati. No. 45. L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. (Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (I)). ) No. 46. Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publié le texte de la note responsive serbe quilui avait été communiqué. Jusqu'à ce moment cette note n'a paru inextenso dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui selon toute évidence neveulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte del'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteursallemands. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 47. L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914. Le décret sur la mobilisation générale a été signé. (Signé) Schébéko. No. 48. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres. [196] _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914. En présence des hostilités entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il estnécessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action médiatriceet que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soitimmédiatement suspendue. Autrement la médiation ne servira que deprétexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donneraentre temps à l'Autriche la possibilité d'écraser complètement la Serbieet d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans. Communiqué à Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome. (Signé) Sazonow. [Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated) version of this telegram isgiven in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 70 (2)). ] No. 49. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne. _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet, 1914. (Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (2)). ) No. 50. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre et enFrance. _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. (Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (3)). ) No. 51. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. Sur ma question s'il avait une réponse de Vienne relativement à Votreproposition de pourparlers privés à St. -Pétersbourg, le Secrétaired'Etat a répondu négativement. Il déclare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtoutouvertement. Parlant à Cambon, il a même ajouté qu'en cas d'une pressiontrop évidente l'Autriche se hâterait de mettre l'Allemagne en présenced'un fait accompli. Le Secrétaire d'Etat dit qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui un télégramme dePourtalès d'où il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous êtesdisposé à trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai répliqué queprobablement Vous avez été dès le commencement en faveur d'un compromis, bien entendu à la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pourl'Autriche, mais également pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'ilparaissait que nous avions commencé à mobiliser sur la frontièreautrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pourl'Autriche la possibilité de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus quel'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas depréparatifs sur notre frontière. J'ai répondu que, d'après lesrenseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait également surnotre frontière et que par conséquent nous devions prendre des mesuresanalogues. J'ai ajouté que les mesures que nous avons peut-être prisesde notre côté n'étaient nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne. (Signé) Bronewsky. No. 52. Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement, adéclaré à Pachiteh que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralité. (Signé) Strandtman. No. 53. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. A l'occasion de l'arrivée du Président de la République Français leMinistre des Affaires Etrangères avait préparé un court exposé de lasituation politique actuelle, à pen près dans les termes suivants:L'Autriche, craignant la décomposition intérieure, s'est emparée duprétexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir desgaranties qui pourront revêtir la forme de l'occupation descommunications militaires serbes ou même du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix dépend de laseule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit être «localisée»entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est à dire de la punition de lapolitique précédente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. Dececi l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action modératrice àPétersbourg. Ce sophisme a été réfuté à Paris comme à Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a en vain tâché d'entraîner la France à une actionsolidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de lapaix. Les mêmes tentatives out été faites à Londres. Dans les deuxcapitales il a été répondu que l'action devrait être exercée à Vienne, car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter lesrares réserves de la Serbie, et la déclaration de guerre menacent deprovoquer la guerre générale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuventexercer une action modératrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a faitpreuve de la plus grande modération, surtout en conseillant à la Serbied'accepter ce qui était possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'huil'Allemagne paraît renoncer à l'idée d'une action sur la Russie seule etincline vers une action médiatrice à Pétersbourg et à Vienne, mais enmême temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tâchent de faire traînerl'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose à la Conférence sans indiquer aucuneautre manière d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mène des pourparlersmanifestement dilatoires à Pétersbourg. En même temps elle prend desmesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolérées, ses prétentionsaugmenteront proportionnellement. Il est très désirable que la Russieprête tout son appui an projet de médiation que présentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, sous prétexte de «garantie», pourra, en fait, changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 54. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Londres, le 10/29 Juillet 1914. Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 15/28 Juillet à Grey. Ila déclaré aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlersdirects entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient échoué, et que lescorrespondants des journaux mandaient de St. -Pétersbourg que la Russiemobilisait contre l'Autriche à la suite de la mobilisation de cettedernière. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est déclaréen faveur de la médiation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultés quant àla forme. Grey a insisté pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquât laforme laquelle à l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4Puissances d'exercer leur médiation pour éviter la guerre; vu leconsentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la médiationpourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas où l'Allemagne consentirait àse ranger du côté de la paix. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 55. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entière résolution du GouvernementFrançais d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette résolution est soutenue parles cercles les plus étendus et par les partis, y compris lesradicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui présenter une déclarationexprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques dugroupe. Dès son arrivée à Paris, Viviani a télégraphié d'urgence àLondres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Pétersbourg etVienne il était nécessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelât le plustôt possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition concernant lamédiation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a reçu aujourd'huil'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouvelé l'assurance des tendancespacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que sil'Allemagne désirait la paix elle devrait se hâter d'adhérer à laproposition de médiation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a répondu que lesmots «conférence» ou «arbitrage» effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani arépliqué qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile detrouver une autre forme de médiation. D'après l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succès des négociations entre les Puissances il seraitnécessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander à la Serbie. Viviani a répondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'enenquérir auprès de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsiveserbe pourrait servir de base à la discussion; il a ajouté que la Francedésirait sincèrement la paix, mais qu'elle était en même temps résolued'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses alliés et amis, et que lui, le Baronde Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette résolution rencontrait laplus vive approbation du pays. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 56. Télégramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie à saMajesté l'Empereur. Profondément touché par le télégramme que Votre Majesté a bien vouluM'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. Jeprie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie, dontVotre Majesté est animée envers Mon pays, nous est particulièrementprécieuse et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie estassuré étant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de Votre Majesté. Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachementprofond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et lessentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection deVotre Majesté seront conservés pieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes. (Signé) Alexandre, No. 57. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. J'ai communiqué à Pachitch le texte du télégramme responsif de SaMajesté l'Empereur an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch après l'avoir lu, sesigna et dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clément»! Ensuite ilm'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'émotion qui l'avait gagné. L'héritierest attendu à Nich dans la nuit. (Signé) Strandtman. No. 58. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en France. _(Télégramme). _ St. Pétersbourg, le 10/29 Juillet 1914. Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqué la résolution prisepar son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas sespréparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commencé ces derniers qu'à lasuite de la mobilisation à laquelle avait déjà procédé l'Autriche et vul'absence évidente chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un modequelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie. Puisque nous ne pouvons pas accéder au désir de l'Allemagne, il ne nousreste que d'accélérer nos propres armements et de compter avecl'inévitabilité probable de la guerre. --Veuillez en avertir leGouvernement Français et lui exprimer en même temps notre sincèrereconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faiteen son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui denotre alliée de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cettedéclaration nous est particulièrement précieuse. Communiqué auxAmbassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 59. Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Nich, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. Le Prince-Régent a publié hier un manifeste signé par tous les Ministresà l'occasion de la déclaration de la guerre par l'Autriche à la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: «Défendez de toutesvos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de l'ouverture solennelle dela Scouptchina, le Régent lut en son nom le discours du trône, an débutduquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation démontrait l'importancedes évènements actuels. Suit l'exposé des faits des derniersjours--l'ultimatum autrichien, la réponse serbe, les efforts dugouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui était compatible avec la dignitéde l'Etat pour éviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armée du voisinplus puissant contre la Serbie, aux côtés de laquelle se tient leMonténégro. En passant à l'examen de l'attitude des Puissances enprésence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentimentsdont est animée la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de saMajesté l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera laSerbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et de la Russieun «jivio» formidable et fébrile secouait la salle des séances. Lesmarques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furentaussi relevées séparément et provoquèrent des «jivio» d'approbation dela part des députés. Le discours du trône se termine par la déclarationd'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du voeu que toutes lesmesures soient prises pour faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement. (Signé) Strandtman. No. 60. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, enAutriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en Italie. _(Télégramme). _ St. Pétersbourg, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a demandé si nous nepouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourraitdonner--de ne pas porter atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie--etindiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir àsuspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicté, pour être transmise d'urgenceà Berlin, la déclaration suivante: «Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que laquestion austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portentatteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesserses préparatifs militaires. » Veuillez télégraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du GouvernementAllemand en présence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre désir de faire lepossible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvonspas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'à faire gagnerdu temps à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche pour leurs préparatifsmilitaires. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 61. L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. J'apprends que le décret de mobilisation de l'armée et de la flotteallemandes vient d'être promulgué. (Signé) Swerbéew. No. 62. L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me téléphoner pour mecommuniquer que la nouvelle lancée tout à l'heure de la mobilisation del'armée et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets desjournaux étaient imprimés d'avance en prévision de toutes éventualités, et mis en vente à l'heure de l'après-midi, mais que maintenant ils sontconfisqués, (Signé) Swerbéew. No. 63. L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 16-29 Juillet et ai transmis le texte deVotre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que je viens devoir; il m'a dit qu'il avait reçu un télégramme identique del'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St. -Pétersbourg et m'a déclaré ensuite qu'iltrouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche. (Signé) Swerbéew. No. 64. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 16 et 17 Juillet à Greylequel considère la situation comme très sérieuse, mais désire continuerles pourparlers. J'ai fait observer à Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviezfait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur dumaintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne pût profiter de cesatermoiements pour écraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vousvous trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée. A cette époque nos rapportsavec l'Allemagne n'étaient pas compromis. Après la déclaration del'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St. -Pétersbourg concernant la mobilisationallemande, ces rapports avaient changé et sa demande avait reçu de Votrepart la seule réponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsquel'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne était revenu auprès de Vous et s'était enquisde Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulées dans des circonstancestout-à-fait spéciales. J'ai en même temps de nouveau insisté auprès deGrey sur la nécessité de prendre en considération la situation nouvellecréée par la faute de l'Allemagne à la suite de l'action del'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a répondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'iltiendrait compte de ces arguments. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 65. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à Grey pour quelle raisonl'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey arépondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractère agressif, mais que lasituation était telle que chaque Puissance devait se préparer. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 66. L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. Malgré la mobilisation générale je continue à échanger des vues avec leComte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chezl'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et devisées de conquête à l'égard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent égalementsur la nécessité pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout l'actioncommencée et de donner à la Serbie une leçon sérieuse qui pourraitconstituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir. (Signé) Schébéko. No. 67. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie. [197] _(Télégramme). _ St. Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. Me réfère à mon télégramme du 17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de songouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le désir duCabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formuleque j'ai proposée hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai répondu quej'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous je vous transmets laformule modifiée en conséquence. 'Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur leterritoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe àassumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet queles Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourraitaccorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinteà ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance, --la Russie s'engageà conserver son attitude expectante. ' (Signé) Sazonow. [Footnote 197: The second paragraph is printed in the British White Book(_Correspondence_ No. 132). ] No. 68. L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me dire que nospourparlers, qui étaient déjà difficiles à la suite de la mobilisationcontre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en présence des gravesmesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles yrelatives sont, d'après lui, reçues ici de tous les côtés et devrontprovoquer inévitablement des mesures analogues de la part del'Allemagne. A cela j'ai répondu que, d'après des renseignements sûrsdont je disposais et qui étaient confirmés par tous nos compatriotesarrivant à Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites sepoursuivait également en Allemagne avec grande activité. Malgré cela, leMinistre des Affaires Etrangères affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappelerles officiers de leurs congés et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres. (Signé) Swerbéew. No. 69. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre. _(Télégramme). _ St. -Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre à Grey l'expressionde ma plus sincère reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il ausé pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grâce à quoil'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'estpas encore perdu. Je l'ai aussi prié de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que cen'était qu'à Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelqueschances d'un succès quelconque, en facilitant à l'Autriche la nécessitéd'un compromis. Communiqué à l'Ambassadeur en France. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 70. Télégramme secret aux Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur àl'étranger. (_Télégramme_). Le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a déclaré, d'ordre de sonGouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est-à-dire à midi, Samedi, nous ne commencions pas la démobilisation, non seulement à l'égard del'Allemagne, mais aussi à l'égard de l'Autriche, le GouvernementAllemand serait forcé de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma questionsi c'était la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a répondu par la négative, mais enajoutant que nous étions fort près d'elle. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 71. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Londres, 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. Grey m'a dit qu'il a télégraphié à Berlin qu'à son avis la dernièreformule acceptée par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base denégociations qui présente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifiquedu conflict. Il a exprimé en même temps l'espoir qu'aucune grandePuissance ne commencerait les hostilités avant l'examen de cetteformule. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 72. L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. (_Télégramme_). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a posé aux Gouvernements Françaiset Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralité de laBelgique. La France a répondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le GouvernementAllemand a déclaré ne pouvoir répondre à cette question catégoriquement. (Signé) Benckendorff. No. 73. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visité hier Viviani et lui a déclare quel'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte àl'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais était prête à discuter avecles autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. LeGouvernement Français est très préoccupé par les préparatifs militairesextraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontière française, car il estconvaincu que sous le voile du «Kriegszustand» se produit une véritablemobilisation. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 74. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. A la réception ici du télégramme de l'Ambassadeur de France àSt. -Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faitel'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la résolution de l'Allemagne dedécréter aujourd'hui la mobilisation générale, le Président de laRépublique a signé le décret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procède àl'affichage des listes d'appel des réservistes. L'Ambassadeurd'Allemagne vient de rendre visite à Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucunenouvelle communication, en alléguant l'impossibilité de déchiffrer lestélégrammes qu'il a reçus. Viviani l'a informé de la signature du décretde mobilisation en réponse à la mobilisation allemande et lui a faitpart de son étonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eût pris une telle mesure àun moment où se poursuivait encore un échange de vues amical entre laRussie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajouté que la mobilisation nepréjugeait pas nécessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagnepourrait rester à Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est resté à Vienneet celui d'Autriche à St. -Pétersbourg. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 75. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. _(Télégramme). _ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. Je tiens du Président que pendant les dernières journées l'Ambassadeurd'Autriche a assuré avec force le Président du Conseil des Ministres etlui même, que l'Autriche nous aurait déclaré être prête à respecter nonseulement l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droitssouverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence surcette déclaration. J'ai opposé un démenti catégorique à cela. (Signé) Iswolsky. No. 76. Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St. -Pétersbourg le 19Juillet 1914 à 7 h. 10 du soir. Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de lamener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avaitété exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereurd'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir unrôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. -Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à lamobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suitede cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun présage militaire de la partde l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un dangergrave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à cepéril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même del'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé des'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes lesRussies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. LaRussie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondreà[198]) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude[198]) que son action était dirigée contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce quisuit: Sa Majesté l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevantle défi se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie. St. -Pétersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914. (Signé) F. Pourtalès. [Footnote 198: Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dansl'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparéesd'avance et que par erreur elles out été insérées toutes les deux dansla note. ] No. 77. Communiqué du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères concernant les événementsdes derniers jours. Le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914. Un exposé défigurant les événements des derniers jours ayant paru dansla presse étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères croit de sondevoir de publier l'aperçu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendantle temps susvisé. Le 10/23 Juillet a. C. Le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade présentaan Ministre Président Serbe une note où le Gouvernement Serbe étaitaccusé d'avoir favorisé le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti àl'assassinat de l'héritier du trône austro-hongrois. En conséquencel'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement decondamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi deprendre, sous le contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesurestendant à la découverte du complot, à la punition des sujets serbes yayant participé et à la prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur lesol du Royaume. Un délai de 48 heures fut fixé au Gouvernement Serbepour la réponse à la susdite note. Le Gouvernement Impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie àSt. -Pétersbourg avait communiqué le texte de la note 17 heures après saremise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, duts'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles étaient inexécutables quantan fond, tandis que d'autres étaient présentées sous une formeincompatible avec la dignité d'un Etat indépendant. Trouvantinadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie contenue dans cesdemandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer saprépondérance dans les Balcans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, leGouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale àl'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de soumettre à un nouvelexamen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. LeGouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir à unediscussion de la note. L'action modératrice des autres Puissances àVienne ne fut non plus couronnée de succès. Malgré que la Serbie eût reprouvé le crime et se fût montrée prête àdonner satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassa lesprévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade jugea la réponse serbeinsuffisante et quitta cette ville. Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des demandes présentées parl'Autriche, la Russie avait déclaré encore auparavant qu'il lui seraitimpossible de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à employertous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fût acceptablepour l'Autriche et ménageât son amour-propre de grande puissance. Enmême temps la Russie établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solutionpacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliqueraitpas la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme Etat indépendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement Impérialdans cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le GouvernementAustro-Hongrois, après s'être dérobé à toute intervention conciliatricedes Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à lamobilisation, déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le joursuivant Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a accompagné ladéclaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé etexécuté le crime de Seraïewo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime dedroit commun lancée contre tout un peuple et tout un État attira à laSerbie par son inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de lasociété européenne. A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, malgré la déclaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait resterindifférente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial jugeanécessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires deKiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision s'imposaitparce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise auGouvernement Serbe et les premières démarches de la Russie cinq jourss'étaient écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucunpas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, lamobilisation de la moitié de l'armée austro-hongroise avait étédécrétée. Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par laRussie; il lui fut en même temps expliqué qu'elles n'étaient que laconséquence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigées contrel'Allemagne. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial déclara que laRussie était prête à continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solutionpacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de négociations directes avec leCabinet de Vienne, soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conférence des quatre Grandes Puissances nonintéressées directement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne etl'Italie. Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua également. L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et leCabinet de Vienne se déroba à la participation à la Conférence desPuissances projetée. Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de lapaix. Répondant à la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à quellesconditions nous consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, leMinistre des Affaires Etrangères déclara que ces conditions seraient lareconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serbe avaitrevêtu le caractère d'une question européenne, et la déclaration decette même Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur desdemandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne inacceptable pourl'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on reçut à St. -Pétersbourg la nouvellede la proclamation de la mobilisation générale par l'Autriche-Hongrie. En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le territoire Serbe etBelgrade fut bombardée derechef. L'insuccès de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'élargir lesmesures de précaution militaires. Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question à ce sujet, il luifut répondu que la Russie était forcée de commencer ses armements pourse prémunir contre toutes éventualités. Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie n'en discontinuaitpas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cettesituation et déclara être prête à accepter tout moyen de solution duconflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par nous. Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Allemand, le18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande d'avoir àsuspendre ses mesures militaires à midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Août, enmenaçant, dans le cas contraire, de procéder à une mobilisationgénérale. Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Août, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit auMinistre des Affaires Etrangères, an nom de son Gouvernement, ladéclaration de guerre. No. 78. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de S. M. I'Empereur à l'étranger. (_Télégramme_). St. -Pétersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914. Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès à présent derejeter sur nous la responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation aété provoquée par l'énorme responsabilité que nous aurions assumée, sinous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à un moment oùl'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers d'un caractère dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procédait à une mobilisation générale. Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagé vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagnepar sa parole à n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraientles pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et aprèstoutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne nepouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre déclaration que nousaccepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignitéet l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en étantcomplètement incompatible avec notre propre dignité, aurait certainementébranlé l'équilibre Européen assurant l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Cecaractère Européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plusimportant que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa décision de nous déclarerla guerre à un moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre lesPuissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde responsabilité. (Signé) Sazonow. No. 79. Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St. -Pétersbourg auMinistre des Affaires Etrangères le 24 Juillet à 6 h. Du soir. D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongriea l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre desAffaires Etrangères de Russie ce qui suit: «Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre laMonarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'ensuite de ce conflit la Russie, d'après une communication du Cabinet deBerlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et quecelle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec laditePuissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerreavec la Russie à partir du présent moment. "(Signé) Szápáry. St. -Pétersbourg. 6 Août/24 Juillet 1914. "