THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

_First Complete and Authorised English translation in Eighteen Volumes_

EDITED BY

DR OSCAR LEVY

[Illustration: Nietzsche. ]

VOLUME EIGHT

 * * * * *

THIRD EDITION

WE PHILOLOGISTS

TRANSLATED BY

J. M. KENNEDY

 * * * * *

T. N. FOULIS

13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET

EDINBURGH · AND LONDON

1911

CONTENTS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TO "WE PHILOLOGISTS" 105

WE PHILOLOGISTS 109

WE PHILOLOGISTS

AUTUMN 1874

(PUBLISHED POSTHUMOUSLY)

TRANSLATED BY J. M. KENNEDY

AUTHOR OF "THE QUINTESSENCE OF NIETZSCHE, " "RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHIESOF THE EAST, " &C. 

 The mussel is crooked inside and rough outside · it is only when we hear its deep note after blowing into it that we can begin to esteem it at its true value. --(Ind. Spruche, ed Bothlingk, 1 335)

 An ugly-looking-wind instrument · but we must first blow into it. 

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The subject of education was one to which Nietzsche, especially duringhis residence in Basel, paid considerable attention, and his insightinto it was very much deeper than that of, say, Herbert Spencer or evenJohann Friedrich Herbart, the latter of whom has in late years exercisedconsiderable influence in scholastic circles. Nietzsche clearly saw thatthe "philologists" (using the word chiefly in reference to the teachersof the classics in German colleges and universities) were absolutelyunfitted for their high task, since they were one and all incapable ofentering into the spirit of antiquity. Although at the first reading, therefore, this book may seem to be rather fragmentary, there are twomain lines of thought running through it: an incisive criticism ofGerman professors, and a number of constructive ideas as to whatclassical culture really should be. 

These scattered aphorisms, indeed, are significant as showing how farNietzsche had travelled along the road over which humanity had beentravelling from remote ages, and how greatly he was imbued with thepagan spirit which he recognised in Goethe and valued in Burckhardt. Even at this early period of his life Nietzsche was convinced thatChristianity was the real danger to culture; and not merely modernChristianity, but also the Alexandrian culture, the last gasp of Greekantiquity, which had helped to bring Christianity about. When, in thelater aphorisms of "We Philologists, " Nietzsche appears to be throwingover the Greeks, it should be remembered that he does not refer to theGreeks of the era of Homer or Æschylus, or even of Aristotle, but to themuch later Greeks of the era of Longinus. 

Classical antiquity, however, was conveyed to the public throughuniversity professors and their intellectual offspring, and theseprofessors, influenced (quite unconsciously, of course) by religious and"liberal" principles, presented to their scholars a kind of emasculatedantiquity. It was only on these conditions that the State allowed thepagan teaching to be propagated in the schools; and if, where classicalscholars were concerned, it was more tolerant than the Church had been, it must be borne in mind that the Church had already done all the roughwork of emasculating its enemies, and had handed down to the State abody of very innocuous and harmless investigators. A totally erroneousconception of what constituted classical culture was thus brought about. Where any distinction was actually made, for example, later Greekthought was enormously over-rated, and early Greek thought equallyundervalued. Aphorism 44, together with the first half-dozen or so inthe book, may be taken as typical specimens of Nietzsche's protestagainst this state of things. 

It must be added, unfortunately, that Nietzsche's observations in thisbook apply as much to England as to Germany. Classical teachers here maynot be rated so high as they are in Germany, but their influence wouldappear to be equally powerful, and their theories of education and ofclassical antiquity equally chaotic. In England as in Germany they are"theologians in disguise. " The danger of modern "values" to true culturemay be readily gathered from a perusal of aphorisms that follow: and, ifthese aphorisms enable even one scholar in a hundred to enter morethoroughly into the spirit of a great past they will not have beenpenned in vain. 

 J. M. KENNEDY. 

LONDON, _July 1911_. 

I

To what a great extent men are ruled by pure hazard, and how littlereason itself enters into the question, is sufficiently shown byobserving how few people have any real capacity for their professionsand callings, and how many square pegs there are in round holes: happyand well chosen instances are quite exceptional, like happy marriages, and even these latter are not brought about by reason. A man chooses hiscalling before he is fitted to exercise his faculty of choice. He doesnot know the number of different callings and professions that exist; hedoes not know himself; and then he wastes his years of activity in thiscalling, applies all his mind to it, and becomes experienced andpractical. When, afterwards, his understanding has become fullydeveloped, it is generally too late to start something new; for wisdomon earth has almost always had something of the weakness of old age andlack of vigour about it. 

For the most part the task is to make good, and to set to rights as wellas possible, that which was bungled in the beginning. Many will come torecognise that the latter part of their life shows a purpose or designwhich has sprung from a primary discord: it is hard to live through it. Towards the end of his life, however, the average man has becomeaccustomed to it--then he may make a mistake in regard to the life hehas lived, and praise his own stupidity: _bene navigavi cum naufragiumfeci_ . He may even compose a song of thanksgiving to "Providence. "

2

On inquiring into the origin of the philologist I find:

1. A young man cannot have the slightest conception of what the Greeksand Romans were. 

2. He does not know whether he is fitted to investigate into them;

3. And, in particular, he does not know to what extent, in view of theknowledge he may actually possess, he is fitted to be a teacher. Whatthen enables him to decide is not the knowledge of himself or hisscience; but

 (_a_) Imitation. 

 (_b_) The convenience of carrying on the kind of work which he had begun at school. 

 (_c_) His intention of earning a living. 

In short, ninety-nine philologists out of a hundred _should_ not bephilologists at all. 

3

The more strict religions require that men shall look upon theiractivity simply as one means of carrying out a metaphysical scheme: anunfortunate choice of calling may then be explained as a test of theindividual. Religions keep their eyes fixed only upon the salvation ofthe individual . Whether he is a slave or a free man, a merchant or ascholar, his aim in life has nothing to do with his calling, so that awrong choice is not such a very great piece of unhappiness. Let thisserve as a crumb of comfort for philologists in general; but truephilologists stand in need of a better understanding: what will resultfrom a science which is "gone in for" by ninety-nine such people? Thethoroughly unfitted majority draw up the rules of the science inaccordance with their own capacities and inclinations; and in this waythey tyrannise over the hundredth, the only capable one among them. Ifthey have the training of others in their hands they will train themconsciously or unconsciously after their own image . What then becomesof the classicism of the Greeks and Romans?

The points to be proved are--

(_a_) The disparity between philologists and the ancients. 

(_b_) The inability of the philologist to train his pupils, even withthe help of the ancients. 

(_c_) The falsifying of the science by the (incapacity of the) majority, the wrong requirements held in view; the renunciation of the real aim ofthis science. 

4

All this affects the sources of our present philology: a sceptical andmelancholy attitude. But how otherwise are philologists to be produced?

The imitation of antiquity: is not this a principle which has beenrefuted by this time?

The flight from actuality to the ancients: does not this tend to falsifyour conception of antiquity?

5

We are still behindhand in one type of contemplation: to understand howthe greatest productions of the intellect have a dreadful and evilbackground . The sceptical type of contemplation. Greek antiquity is nowinvestigated as the most beautiful example of life. 

As man assumes a sceptical and melancholy attitude towards his life'scalling, so we must sceptically examine the highest life's calling of anation: in order that we may understand what life is. 

6

My words of consolation apply particularly to the single tyrannisedindividual out of a hundred: such exceptional ones should simply treatall the unenlightened majorities as their subordinates; and they shouldin the same way take advantage of the prejudice, which is stillwidespread, in favour of classical instruction--they need many helpers. But they must have a clear perception of what their actual goal is. 

7

Philology as the science of antiquity does not, of course, endure forever; its elements are not inexhaustible. What cannot be exhausted, however, is the ever-new adaptation of one's age to antiquity; thecomparison of the two. If we make it our task to understand our own agebetter by means of antiquity, then our task will be an everlastingone. --This is the antinomy of philology: people have always endeavouredto understand antiquity by means of the present--and shall the presentnow be understood by means of antiquity? Better: people have explainedantiquity to themselves out of their own experiences; and from theamount of antiquity thus acquired they have assessed the value of theirexperiences. Experience, therefore, is certainly an essentialprerequisite for a philologist--that is, the philologist must first ofall be a man; for then only can he be productive as a philologist. Itfollows from this that old men are well suited to be philologists ifthey were not such during that portion of their life which was richestin experiences. 

It must be insisted, however, that it is only through a knowledge of thepresent that one can acquire an inclination for the study of classicalantiquity. Where indeed should the impulse come from if not from thisinclination? When we observe how few philologists there actually are, except those that have taken up philology as a means of livelihood, wecan easily decide for ourselves what is the matter with this impulse forantiquity: it hardly exists at all, for there are no disinterestedphilologists. 

Our task then is to secure for philology the universally educativeresults which it should bring about. The means: the limitation of thenumber of those engaged in the philological profession (doubtful whetheryoung men should be made acquainted with philology at all). Criticism ofthe philologist. The value of antiquity: it sinks with you: how deeplyyou must have sunk, since its value is now so little!

8

It is a great advantage for the true philologist that a great deal ofpreliminary work has been done in his science, so that he may takepossession of this inheritance if he is strong enough for it--I refer tothe valuation of the entire Hellenic mode of thinking. So long asphilologists worked simply at details, a misunderstanding of the Greekswas the consequence. The stages of this undervaluation are · thesophists of the second century, the philologist-poets of theRenaissance, and the philologist as the teacher of the higher classes ofsociety (Goethe, Schiller). 

Valuing is the most difficult of all. 

In what respect is one most fitted for this valuing?

--Not, at all events, when one is trained for philology as one is now. It should be ascertained to what extent our present means make this lastobject impossible. 

--Thus the philologist himself is not the aim of philology. 

9

Most men show clearly enough that they do not regard themselves asindividuals: their lives indicate this. The Christian command thateveryone shall steadfastly keep his eyes fixed upon his salvation, andhis alone, has as its counterpart the general life of mankind, whereevery man lives merely as a point among other points--living not only asthe result of earlier generations, but living also only with an eye tothe future. There are only three forms of existence in which a manremains an individual as a philosopher, as a Saviour, and as an artist. But just let us consider how a scientific man bungles his life: whathas the teaching of Greek particles to do with the sense of life?--Thuswe can also observe how innumerable men merely live, as it were, apreparation for a man, the philologist, for example, as a preparationfor the philosopher, who in his turn knows how to utilise his ant-likework to pronounce some opinion upon the value of life. When suchant-like work is not carried out under any special direction the greaterpart of it is simply nonsense, and quite superfluous. 

10

Besides the large number of unqualified philologists there is, on theother hand, a number of what may be called born philologists, who fromsome reason or other are prevented from becoming such. The greatestobstacle, however, which stands in the way of these born philologists isthe bad representation of philology by the unqualified philologists. 

Leopardi is the modern ideal of a philologist: The German philologistscan do nothing. (As a proof of this Voss should be studied!)

11

Let it be considered how differently a science is propagated from theway in which any special talent in a family is transmitted. The bodilytransmission of an individual science is something very rare. Do thesons of philologists easily become philologists? _Dubito_. Thus there isno such accumulation of philological capacity as there was, let us say, in Beethoven's family of musical capacity. Most philologists begin fromthe beginning, and even then they learn from books, and not throughtravels, &c. They get some training, of course. 

12

Most men are obviously in the world accidentally; no necessity of ahigher kind is seen in them. They work at this and that, their talentsare average. How strange! The manner in which they live shows that theythink very little of themselves: they merely esteem themselves in so faras they waste their energy on trifles (whether these be mean orfrivolous desires, or the trashy concerns of their everyday calling). Inthe so-called life's calling, which everyone must choose, we mayperceive a touching modesty on the part of mankind. They practicallyadmit in choosing thus. "We are called upon to serve and to be ofadvantage to our equals--the same remark applies to our neighbour and tohis neighbour, so everyone serves somebody else; no one is carrying outthe duties of his calling for his own sake, but always for the sake ofothers and thus we are like geese which support one another by the oneleaning against the other. _When the aim of each one of us is centred inanother, then we have all no object in existing;_ and this 'existing forothers' is the most comical of comedies. "

13

Vanity is the involuntary inclination to set one's self up for anindividual while not really being one; that is to say, trying to appearindependent when one is dependent. The case of wisdom is the exactcontrary: it appears to be dependent while in reality it is independent. 

14

The Hades of Homer--From what type of existence is it really copied? Ithink it is the description of the philologist: it is better to be aday-labourer than to have such an anæmic recollection of the past. --[1]

15

The attitude of the philologist towards antiquity is apologetic, or elsedictated by the view that what our own age values can likewise be foundin antiquity. The right attitude to take up, however, is the reverseone, viz. , to start with an insight into our modern topsyturviness, andto look back from antiquity to it--and many things about antiquity whichhave hitherto displeased us will then be seen to have been most profoundnecessities. 

We must make it clear to ourselves that we are acting in an absurdmanner when we try to defend or to beautify antiquity: _who_ are we!

16

We are under a false impression when we say that there is always somecaste which governs a nation's culture, and that therefore savants arenecessary; for savants only possess knowledge concerning culture (andeven this only in exceptional cases). Among learned men themselves theremight be a few, certainly not a caste, but even these would indeed berare. 

17

One very great value of antiquity consists in the fact that its writingsare the only ones which modern men still read carefully. 

Overstraining of the memory--very common among philologists, togetherwith a poor development of the judgment. 

18

Busying ourselves with the culture-epochs of the past: is thisgratitude? We should look backwards in order to explain to ourselves thepresent conditions of culture: we do not become too laudatory in regardto our own circumstances, but perhaps we should do so in order that wemay not be too severe on ourselves. 

19

He who has no sense for the symbolical has none for antiquity: letpedantic philologists bear this in mind. 

20

My aim is to bring about a state of complete enmity between our present"culture" and antiquity. Whoever wishes to serve the former must hatethe latter. 

21

Careful meditation upon the past leads to the impression that we are amultiplication of many pasts · so how can we be a final aim? But whynot? In most instances, however, we do not wish to be this. We take upour positions again in the ranks, work in our own little corner, andhope that what we do may be of some small profit to our successors. Butthat is exactly the case of the cask of the Danæ · and this is useless, we must again set about doing everything for ourselves, and only forourselves--measuring science by ourselves, for example with the question· What is science to us? not . What are we to science? People reallymake life too easy for themselves when they look upon themselves fromsuch a simple historical point of view, and make humble servants ofthemselves. "Your own salvation above everything"--that is what youshould say; and there are no institutions which you should prize morehighly than your own soul. --Now, however, man learns to know himself: hefinds himself miserable, despises himself, and is pleased to findsomething worthy of respect outside himself. Therefore he gets rid ofhimself, so to speak, makes himself subservient to a cause, does hisduty strictly, and atones for his existence. He knows that he does notwork for himself alone; he wishes to help those who are daring enough toexist on account of themselves, like Socrates. The majority of men areas it were suspended in the air like toy balloons; every breath of windmoves them. --As a consequence the savant must be such out ofself-knowledge, that is to say, out of contempt for himself--in otherwords he must recognise himself to be merely the servant of some higherbeing who comes after him. Otherwise he is simply a sheep. 

22

It is the duty of the free man to live for his own sake, and not forothers. It was on this account that the Greeks looked upon handicraftsas unseemly. 

As a complete entity Greek antiquity has not yet been fully valued · Iam convinced that if it had not been surrounded by its traditionalglorification, the men of the present day would shrink from it horrorstricken. This glorification, then, is spurious; gold-paper. 

23

The false enthusiasm for antiquity in which many philologists live. Whenantiquity suddenly comes upon us in our youth, it appears to us to becomposed of innumerable trivialities; in particular we believe ourselvesto be above its ethics. And Homer and Walter Scott--who carries off thepalm? Let us be honest! If this enthusiasm were really felt, peoplecould scarcely seek their life's calling in it. I mean that what we canobtain from the Greeks only begins to dawn upon us in later years: onlyafter we have undergone many experiences, and thought a great deal. 

24

People in general think that philology is at an end--while I believethat it has not yet begun. 

The greatest events in philology are the appearance of Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Wagner; standing on their shoulders we look far intothe distance. The fifth and sixth centuries have still to be discovered. 

25

Where do we see the effect of antiquity? Not in language, not in theimitation of something or other, and not in perversity and waywardness, to which uses the French have turned it. Our museums are graduallybecoming filled up: I always experience a sensation of disgust when Isee naked statues in the Greek style in the presence of this thoughtlessphilistinism which would fain devour everything. 

PLANS AND THOUGHTS RELATING TO A WORK ON PHILOLOGY

(1875)

26

Of all sciences philology at present is the most favoured · its progresshaving been furthered for centuries by the greatest number of scholarsin every nation who have had charge of the noblest pupils. Philology hasthus had one of the best of all opportunities to be propagated fromgeneration to generation, and to make itself respected. How has itacquired this power?

Calculations of the different prejudices in its favour. 

How then if these were to be frankly recognised as prejudices? Would notphilology be superfluous if we reckoned up the interests of a positionin life or the earning of a livelihood? What if the truth were toldabout antiquity, and its qualifications for training people to live inthe present?

In order that the questions set forth above may be answered let usconsider the training of the philologist, his genesis: he no longercomes into being where these interests are lacking. 

If the world in general came to know what an unseasonable thing for usantiquity really is, philologists would no longer be called in as theeducators of our youth. 

Effect of antiquity on the non-philologist likewise nothing. If theyshowed themselves to be imperative and contradictory, oh, with whathatred would they be pursued! But they always humble themselves. 

Philology now derives its power only from the union between thephilologists who will not, or cannot, understand antiquity and publicopinion, which is misled by prejudices in regard to it. 

The real Greeks, and their "watering down" through the philologists. 

The future commanding philologist sceptical in regard to our entireculture, and therefore also the destroyer of philology as a profession. 

THE PREFERENCE FOR ANTIQUITY

27

If a man approves of the investigation of the past he will also approveand even praise the fact--and will above all easily understand it--thatthere are scholars who are exclusively occupied with the investigationof Greek and Roman antiquity: but that these scholars are at the sametime the teachers of the children of the nobility and gentry is notequally easy of comprehension--here lies a problem. 

Why philologists precisely? This is not altogether such a matter ofcourse as the case of a professor of medicine, who is also a practicalphysician and surgeon. For, if the cases were identical, preoccupationwith Greek and Roman antiquity would be identical with the "science ofeducation. " In short, the relationship between theory and practice inthe philologist cannot be so quickly conceived. Whence comes hispretension to be a teacher in the higher sense, not only of allscientific men, but more especially of all cultured men? Thiseducational power must be taken by the philologist from antiquity; andin such a case people will ask with astonishment: how does it come thatwe attach such value to a far-off past that we can only become culturedmen with the aid of its knowledge?

These questions, however, are not asked as a rule: The sway of philologyover our means of instruction remains practically unquestioned; andantiquity _has_ the importance assigned to it. To this extent theposition of the philologist is more favourable than that of any otherfollower of science. True, he has not at his disposal that great mass ofmen who stand in need of him--the doctor, for example, has far more thanthe philologist. But he can influence picked men, or youths, to be moreaccurate, at a time when all their mental faculties are beginning toblossom forth--people who can afford to devote both time and money totheir higher development. In all those places where European culture hasfound its way, people have accepted secondary schools based upon afoundation of Latin and Greek as the first and highest means ofinstruction. In this way philology has found its best opportunity oftransmitting itself, and commanding respect: no other science has beenso well favoured. As a general rule all those who have passed throughsuch institutions have afterwards borne testimony to the excellence oftheir organisation and curriculum, and such people are, of course, unconscious witnesses in favour of philology. If any who have not passedthrough these institutions should happen to utter a word indisparagement of this education, an unanimous and yet calm repudiationof the statement at once follows, as if classical education were a kindof witchcraft, blessing its followers, and demonstrating itself to themby this blessing. There is no attempt at polemics · "We have beenthrough it all. " "We know it has done us good. "

Now there are so many things to which men have become so accustomed thatthey look upon them as quite appropriate and suitable, for habitintermixes all things with sweetness; and men as a rule judge the valueof a thing in accordance with their own desires. The desire forclassical antiquity as it is now felt should be tested, and, as it were, taken to pieces and analysed with a view to seeing how much of thisdesire is due to habit, and how much to mere love of adventure--I referto that inward and active desire, new and strange, which gives rise to aproductive conviction from day to day, the desire for a higher goal, andalso the means thereto · as the result of which people advance step bystep from one unfamiliar thing to another, like an Alpine climber. 

What is the foundation on which the high value attached to antiquity atthe present time is based, to such an extent indeed that our wholemodern culture is founded on it? Where must we look for the origin ofthis delight in antiquity, and the preference shown for it?

I think I have recognised in my examination of the question that all ourphilology--that is, all its present existence and power--is based on thesame foundation as that on which our view of antiquity as the mostimportant of all means of training is based. Philology as a means ofinstruction is the clear expression of a predominating conceptionregarding the value of antiquity, and the best methods of education. Twopropositions are contained in this statement. In the first place allhigher education must be a historical one, and secondly, Greek and Romanhistory differs from all others in that it is classical. Thus thescholar who knows this history becomes a teacher. We are not here goinginto the question as to whether higher education ought to be historicalor not; but we may examine the second and ask: in how far is it classic?

On this point there are many widespread prejudices. In the first placethere is the prejudice expressed in the synonymous concept, "The studyof the humanities": antiquity is classic because it is the school of thehumane. 

Secondly: "Antiquity is classic because it is enlightened----"

28

It is the task of all education to change certain conscious actions andhabits into more or less unconscious ones; and the history of mankind isin this sense its education. The philologist now practises unconsciouslya number of such occupations and habits. It is my object to ascertainhow his power, that is, his instinctive methods of work, is the resultof activities which were formerly conscious, but which he has graduallycome to feel as such no longer: _but that consciousness consisted ofprejudices_. The present power of philologists is based upon theseprejudices, for example the value attached to the _ratio_ as in thecases of Bentley and Hermann. Prejudices are, as Lichtenberg says, theart impulses of men. 

29

It is difficult to justify the preference for antiquity since it hasarisen from prejudices:

1. From ignorance of all non-classical antiquity. 

2. From a false idealisation of humanitarianism, whilst Hindoos andChinese are at all events more humane. 

3. From the pretensions of school-teachers. 

4. From the traditional admiration which emanated from antiquity itself. 

5. From opposition to the Christian church; or as a support for thischurch. 

6. From the impression created by the century-long work of thephilologists, and the nature of this work. It must be a gold mine, thinks the spectator. 

7. The acquirement of knowledge attained as the result of the study. Thepreparatory school of science. 

In short, partly from ignorance, wrong impressions, and misleadingconclusions; and also from the interest which philologists have inraising their science to a high level in the estimation of laymen. 

Also the preference for antiquity on the part of the artists, whoinvoluntarily assume proportion and moderation to be the property of allantiquity. Purity of form. Authors likewise. 

The preference for antiquity as an abbreviation of the history of thehuman race, as if there were an autochthonous creation here by which allbecoming might be studied. 

The fact actually is that the foundations of this preference are beingremoved one by one, and if this is not remarked by philologiststhemselves, it is certainly being remarked as much as it can possibly beby people outside their circle. First of all history had its effect, andthen linguistics brought about the greatest diversion among philologiststhemselves, and even the desertion of many of them. They have still theschools in their hands: but for how long! In the form in which it hasexisted up to the present philology is dying out; the ground has beenswept from under its feet. Whether philologists may still hope tomaintain their status is doubtful; in any case they are a dying race. 

30

The peculiarly significant situation of philologists: a class of peopleto whom we entrust our youth, and who have to investigate quite aspecial antiquity. The highest value is obviously attached to thisantiquity. But if this antiquity has been wrongly valued, then the wholefoundation upon which the high position of the philologist is basedsuddenly collapses. In any case this antiquity has been verydifferently valued, and our appreciation of the philologists hasconstantly been guided by it. These people have borrowed their powerfrom the strong prejudices in favour of antiquity, --this must be madeclear. 

Philologists now feel that when these prejudices are at last refuted, and antiquity depicted in its true colours, the favourable prejudicestowards them will diminish considerably. _It is thus to the interest oftheir profession not to let a clear impression of antiquity come tolight; in particular the impression that antiquity in its highest senserenders one "out of season?"_ i. E. , _an enemy to one's own time. _

It is also to the interest of philologists as a class not to let theircalling as teachers be regarded from a higher standpoint than that towhich they themselves can correspond. 

31

It is to be hoped that there are a few people who look upon it as aproblem why philologists should be the teachers of our noblest youths. Perhaps the case will not be always so--It would be much more natural_per se_ if our children were instructed in the elements of geography, natural science, political economy, and sociology, if they weregradually led to a consideration of life itself, and if finally, butmuch later, the most noteworthy events of the past were brought to theirknowledge. A knowledge of antiquity should be among the last subjectswhich a student would take up; and would not this position of antiquityin the curriculum of a school be more honourable for it than the presentone?--Antiquity is now used merely as a propædeutic for thinking, speaking, and writing; but there was a time when it was the essence ofearthly knowledge, and people at that time wished to acquire by means ofpractical learning what they now seek to acquire merely by means of adetailed plan of study--a plan which, corresponding to the more advancedknowledge of the age, has entirely changed. 

Thus the inner purpose of philological teaching has been entirelyaltered; it was at one time material teaching, a teaching that taughthow to live, but now it is merely formal. [2]

32

If it were the task of the philologist to impart formal education, itwould be necessary for him to teach walking, dancing, speaking, singing, acting, or arguing · and the so-called formal teachers did impart theirinstruction this way in the second and third centuries. But only thetraining of a scientific man is taken into account, which results in"formal" thinking and writing, and hardly any speaking at all. 

33

If the gymnasium is to train young men for science, people now say therecan be no more preliminary preparation for any particular science, socomprehensive have all the sciences become. As a consequence teachershave to train their students generally, that is to say for all thesciences--for scientificality in other words; and for that classicalstudies are necessary! What a wonderful jump! a most despairingjustification! Whatever is, is right, [3] even when it is clearly seenthat the "right" on which it has been based has turned to wrong. 

34

It is accomplishments which are expected from us after a study of theancients: formerly, for example, the ability to write and speak. Butwhat is expected now! Thinking and deduction . But these things are notlearnt _from_ the ancients, but at best _through_ the ancients, by meansof science. Moreover, all historical deduction is very limited andunsafe, natural science should be preferred. 

35

It is the same with the simplicity of antiquity as it is with thesimplicity of style: it is the highest thing which we recognise and mustimitate; but it is also the last. Let it be remembered that the classicprose of the Greeks is also a late result. 

36

What a mockery of the study of the "humanities" lies in the fact thatthey were also called "belles lettres" (bellas litteras)!

37

Wolf's[4] reasons why the Egyptians, Hebrews, Persians, and otherOriental nations were not to be set on the same plane with the Greeksand Romans: "The former have either not raised themselves, or haveraised themselves only to a slight extent, above that type of culturewhich should be called a mere civilisation and bourgeois acquirement, asopposed to the higher and true culture of the mind. " He then explainsthat this culture is spiritual and literary: "In a well-organised nationthis may be begun earlier than order and peacefulness in the outwardlife of the people (enlightenment). "

He then contrasts the inhabitants of easternmost Asia ("like suchindividuals, who are not wanting in clean, decent, and comfortabledwellings, clothing, and surroundings; but who never feel the necessityfor a higher enlightenment") with the Greeks ("in the case of theGreeks, even among the most educated inhabitants of Attica, the contraryoften happens to an astonishing degree; and the people neglect asinsignificant factors that which we, thanks to our love of order, are inthe habit of looking upon as the foundations of mental culture itself"). 

38

Our terminology already shows how prone we are to judge the ancientswrongly: the exaggerated sense of literature, for example, or, as Wolf, when speaking of the "inner history of ancient erudition, " calls it, "the history of learned enlightenment. "

39

According to Goethe, the ancients are "the despair of the emulator. "Voltaire said. "If the admirers of Homer were honest, they wouldacknowledge the boredom which their favourite often causes them. "

40

The position we have taken up towards classical antiquity is at bottomthe profound cause of the sterility of modern culture; for we have takenall this modern conception of culture from the Hellenised Romans. Wemust distinguish within the domain of antiquity itself: when we come toappreciate its purely productive period, we condemn at the same time theentire Romano-Alexandrian culture. But at the same time also we condemnour own attitude towards antiquity, and likewise our philology. 

41

There has been an age-long battle between the Germans and antiquity, _i. E. _, a battle against the old culture. It is certain that preciselywhat is best and deepest in the German resists it. The main point, however, is that such resistance is only justifiable in the case of theRomanised culture; for this culture, even at that time, was afalling-off from something more profound and noble. It is this latterthat the Germans are wrong in resisting. 

42

Everything classic was thoroughly cultivated by Charles the Great, whilst he combated everything heathen with the severest possiblemeasures of coercion. Ancient mythology was developed, but Germanmythology was treated as a crime. The feeling underlying all this, in myopinion, was that Christianity had already overcome the old religion ·people no longer feared it, but availed themselves of the culture thatrested upon it. But the old German gods were feared. 

A great superficiality in the conception of antiquity--little else thanan appreciation of its formal accomplishments and its knowledge--mustthereby have been brought about. We must find out the forces that stoodin the way of increasing our insight into antiquity. First of all, theculture of antiquity is utilised as an incitement towards the acceptanceof Christianity · it became, as it were, the premium for conversion, thegilt with which the poisonous pill was coated before being swallowed. Secondly, the help of ancient culture was found to be necessary as aweapon for the intellectual protection of Christianity. Even theReformation could not dispense with classical studies for this purpose. 

The Renaissance, on the other hand, now begins, with a clearer sense ofclassical studies, which, however, are likewise looked upon from ananti-Christian standpoint: the Renaissance shows an awakening of honestyin the south, like the Reformation in the north. They could not butclash; for a sincere leaning towards antiquity renders one unchristian. 

On the whole, however, the Church succeeded in turning classical studiesinto a harmless direction . The philologist was invented, representing atype of learned man who was at the same time a priest or somethingsimilar. Even in the period of the Reformation people succeeded inemasculating scholarship. It is on this account that Friedrich AugustWolf is noteworthy he freed his profession from the bonds of theology. This action of his, however, was not fully understood; for anaggressive, active element, such as was manifested by thepoet-philologists of the Renaissance, was not developed. The freedomobtained benefited science, but not man. 

43

It is true that both humanism and rationalism have brought antiquityinto the field as an ally; and it is therefore quite comprehensible thatthe opponents of humanism should direct their attacks against antiquityalso. Antiquity, however, has been misunderstood and falsified byhumanism · it must rather be considered as a testimony against humanism, against the benign nature of man, &c. The opponents of humanism arewrong to combat antiquity as well; for in antiquity they have a strongally. 

44

It is so difficult to understand the ancients. We must wait patientlyuntil the spirit moves us. The human element which antiquity shows usmust not be confused with humanitarianism. This contrast must bestrongly emphasised: philology suffers by endeavouring to substitute thehumanitarian, young men are brought forward as students of philology inorder that they may thereby become humanitarians. A good deal ofhistory, in my opinion, is quite sufficient for that purpose. The brutaland self-conscious man will be humbled when he sees things and valueschanging to such an extent. 

The human element among the Greeks lies within a certain _naiveté_, through which man himself is to be seen--state, art, society, militaryand civil law, sexual relations, education, party. It is precisely thehuman element which may be seen everywhere and among all peoples, butamong the Greeks it is seen in a state of nakedness and inhumanity whichcannot be dispensed with for purposes of instruction. In addition tothis, the Greeks have created the greatest number of individuals, andthus they give us so much insight into men, --a Greek cook is more of acook than any other. 

45

I deplore a system of education which does not enable people tounderstand Wagner, and as the result of which Schopenhauer sounds harshand discordant in our ears . Such a system of education has missed itsaim. 

46

(THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE FIRST CHAPTER. )

 Il faut dire la vérité et s'immoler--VOLTAIRE. 

Let us suppose that there were freer and more superior spirits who weredissatisfied with the education now in vogue, and that they summoned itto their tribunal, what would the defendant say to them? In allprobability something like this: "Whether you have a right to summonanyone here or not, I am at all events not the proper person to becalled. It is my educators to whom you should apply. It is their duty todefend me, and I have a right to keep silent. I am merely what they havemade me. "

These educators would now be hauled before the tribunal, and among theman entire profession would be observed · the philologists. Thisprofession consists in the first place of those men who make use oftheir knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquity to bring up youths ofthirteen to twenty years of age, and secondly of those men whose task itis to train specially-gifted pupils to act as future teachers--_i. E. _, as the educators of educators. Philologists of the first type areteachers at the public schools, those of the second are professors atthe universities. 

The first-named philologists are entrusted with the care of certainspecially-chosen youths, those who, early in life, show signs of talentand a sense of what is noble, and whose parents are prepared to allowplenty of time and money for their education. If other boys, who do notfulfil these three conditions, are presented to the teachers, theteachers have the right to refuse them. Those forming the second class, the university professors, receive the young men who feel themselvesfitted for the highest and most responsible of callings, that ofteachers and moulders of mankind; and these professors, too, may refuseto have anything to do with young men who are not adequately equipped orgifted for the task. 

If, then, the educational system of a period is condemned, a heavycensure on philologists is thereby implied: either, as the consequenceof their wrong-headed view, they insist on giving bad education in thebelief that it is good; or they do not wish to give this bad education, but are unable to carry the day in favour of education which theyrecognise to be better. In other words, their fault is either due totheir lack of insight or to their lack of will. In answer to the firstcharge they would say that they knew no better, and in answer to thesecond that they could do no better. As, however, these philologistsbring up their pupils chiefly with the aid of Greek and Roman antiquity, their want of insight in the first case may be attributed to the factthat they do not understand antiquity, and again to the fact that theybring forward antiquity into the present age as if it were the mostimportant of all aids to instruction, while antiquity, generallyspeaking, does not assist in training, or at all events no longer doesso. 

On the other hand, if we reproach our professors with their lack ofwill, they would be quite right in attributing educational significanceand power to antiquity; but they themselves could not be said to be theproper instruments by means of which antiquity could exhibit such power. In other words, the professors would not be real teachers and would beliving under false colours, but how, then, could they have reached suchan irregular position? Through a misunderstanding of themselves andtheir qualifications. In order, then, that we may ascribe tophilologists their share in this bad educational system of the presenttime, we may sum up the different factors of their innocence and guiltin the following sentence: the philologist, if he wishes for a verdictof acquittal, must understand three things antiquity, the present time, and himself · his fault lies in the fact that he either does notunderstand antiquity, or the present time, or himself. 

47

It is not true to say that we can attain culture through antiquityalone. We may learn something from it, certainly; but not culture as theword is now understood. Our present culture is based on an emasculatedand mendacious study of antiquity. In order to understand howineffectual this study is, just look at our philologists · they, trainedupon antiquity, should be the most cultured men. Are they?

48

Origin of the philologist. When a great work of art is exhibited thereis always some one who not only feels its influence but wishes toperpetuate it. The same remark applies to a great state--to everything, in short, that man produces. Philologists wish to perpetuate theinfluence of antiquity and they can set about it only as imitativeartists. Why not as men who form their lives after antiquity?

49

The decline of the poet-scholars is due in great part to their owncorruption: their type is continually arising again; Goethe andLeopardi, for example, belong to it. Behind them plod thephilologist-savants. This type has its origin in the sophisticism of thesecond century. 

50

Ah, it is a sad story, the story of philology! The disgusting erudition, the lazy, inactive passivity, the timid submission. --Who was ever free?

51

When we examine the history of philology it is borne in upon us how fewreally talented men have taken part in it. Among the most celebratedphilologists are a few who ruined their intellect by acquiring asmattering of many subjects, and among the most enlightened of them wereseveral who could use their intellect only for childish tasks. It is asad story · no science, I think, has ever been so poor in talentedfollowers. Those whom we might call the intellectually crippled found asuitable hobby in all this hair-splitting. 

52

The teacher of reading and writing, and the reviser, were the firsttypes of the philologist. 

53

Friedrich August Wolf reminds us how apprehensive and feeble were thefirst steps taken by our ancestors in moulding scholarship--how even theLatin classics, for example, had to be smuggled into the universitymarket under all sorts of pretexts, as if they had been contrabandgoods. In the "Gottingen Lexicon" of 1737, J. M. Gesner tells us of theOdes of Horace: "ut imprimis, quid prodesse _in severioribus studiis_possint, ostendat. "

54

I was pleased to read of Bentley "non tam grande pretium emendatiunculismeis statuere soleo, ut singularem aliquam gratiam inde sperem autexigam. "

Newton was surprised that men like Bentley and Hare should quarrel abouta book of ancient comedies, since they were both theologicaldignitaries. 

55

Horace was summoned by Bentley as before a judgment seat, the authorityof which he would have been the first to repudiate. The admiration whicha discriminating man acquires as a philologist is in proportion to therarity of the discrimination to be found in philologists. Bentley'streatment of Horace has something of the schoolmaster about it It wouldappear at first sight as if Horace himself were not the object ofdiscussion, but rather the various scribes and commentators who havehanded down the text: in reality, however, it is actually Horace who isbeing dealt with. It is my firm conviction that to have written a singleline which is deemed worthy of being commented upon by scholars of alater time, far outweighs the merits of the greatest critic. There is aprofound modesty about philologists. The improving of texts is anentertaining piece of work for scholars, it is a kind of riddle-solving;but it should not be looked upon as a very important task. It would bean argument against antiquity if it should speak less clearly to usbecause a million words stood in the way!

56

A school-teacher said to Bentley, "Sir, I will make your grandchild asgreat a scholar as you are yourself. " "How can you do that, " repliedBentley, "when I have forgotten more than you ever knew?"

57

Bentley's clever daughter Joanna once lamented to her father that he haddevoted his time and talents to the criticism of the works of othersinstead of writing something original. Bentley remained silent for sometime as if he were turning the matter over in his mind. At last he saidthat her remark was quite right; he himself felt that he might havedirected his gifts in some other channel. Earlier in life, nevertheless, he had done something for the glory of God and the improvement of hisfellow-men (referring to his "Confutation of Atheism"), but afterwardsthe genius of the pagans had attracted him, and, _despairing ofattaining their level in any other way_, he had mounted upon theirshoulders so that he might thus be able to look over their heads. 

58

Bentley, says Wolf, both as man of letters and individual, wasmisunderstood and persecuted during the greater part of his life, orelse praised maliciously. 

Markland, towards the end of his life--as was the case with so manyothers like him--became imbued with a repugnance for all scholarlyreputation, to such an extent, indeed, that he partly tore up andpartly burnt several works which he had long had in hand. 

Wolf says: "The amount of intellectual food that can be got fromwell-digested scholarship is a very insignificant item. "

In Winckelmann's youth there were no philological studies apart from theordinary bread-winning branches of the science--people read andexplained the ancients in order to prepare themselves for the betterinterpretation of the Bible and the Corpus Juris. 

59

In Wolf's estimation, a man has reached the highest point of historicalresearch when he is able to take a wide and general view of the wholeand of the profoundly conceived distinctions in the developments in artand the different styles of art. Wolf acknowledges, however, thatWinckelmann was lacking in the more common talent of philologicalcriticism, or else he could not use it properly: "A rare mixture of acool head and a minute and restless solicitude for hundreds of thingswhich, insignificant in themselves, were combined in his case with afire that swallowed up those little things, and with a gift ofdivination which is a vexation and an annoyance to the uninitiated. "

60

Wolf draws our attention to the fact that antiquity was acquainted onlywith theories of oratory and poetry which facilitated production, [Greek: technai] and _artes_ that formed real orators and poets, "whileat the present day we shall soon have theories upon which it would beas impossible to build up a speech or a poem as it would be to form athunderstorm upon a brontological treatise. "

61

Wolf's judgment on the amateurs of philological knowledge is noteworthy:"If they found themselves provided by nature with a mind correspondingto that of the ancients, or if they were capable of adapting themselvesto other points of view and other circumstances of life, then, with evena nodding acquaintance with the best writers, they certainly acquiredmore from those vigorous natures, those splendid examples of thinkingand acting, than most of those did who during their whole life merelyoffered themselves to them as interpreters. "

62

Says Wolf again · "In the end, only those few ought to attain reallycomplete knowledge who are born with artistic talent and furnished withscholarship, and who make use of the best opportunities of securing, both theoretically and practically, the necessary technical knowledge"True!

63

Instead of forming our students on the Latin models I recommend theGreek, especially Demosthenes · simplicity! This may be seen by areference to Leopardi, who is perhaps the greatest stylist of thecentury. 

64

"Classical education" · what do people see in it? Something that isuseless beyond rendering a period of military service unnecessary andsecuring a degree![5]

65

When I observe how all countries are now promoting the advancement ofclassical literature I say to myself, "How harmless it must be!" andthen, "How useful it must be!" It brings these countries the reputationof promoting "free culture. " In order that this "freedom" may be rightlyestimated, just look at the philologists!

66

Classical education! Yea, if there were only as much paganism as Goethefound and glorified in Winckelmann, even that would not be much. Now, however, that the lying Christendom of our time has taken hold of it, the thing becomes overpowering, and I cannot help expressing my disguston the point--People firmly believe in witchcraft where this "classicaleducation" is concerned. They, however, who possess the greatestknowledge of antiquity should likewise possess the greatest amount ofculture, viz. , our philologists; but what is classical about them?

67

Classical philology is the basis of the most shallow rationalism alwayshaving been dishonestly applied, it has gradually become quiteineffective. Its effect is one more illusion of the modern man. Philologists are nothing but a guild of sky-pilots who are not known assuch · this is why the State takes an interest in them. The utility ofclassical education is completely used up, whilst, for example, thehistory of Christianity still shows its power. 

68

Philologists, when discussing their science, never get down to the rootof the subject . They never set forth philology itself as a problem. Badconscience? or merely thoughtlessness?

69

We learn nothing from what philologists say about philology: it is allmere tittle-tattle--for example, Jahn's[6] "The Meaning and Place of theStudy of Antiquity in Germany. " There is no feeling for what should beprotected and defended: thus speak people who have not even thought ofthe possibility that any one could attack them. 

70

Philologists are people who exploit the vaguely-felt dissatisfaction ofmodern man, and his desire for "something better, " in order that theymay earn their bread and butter. 

I know them--I myself am one of them. 

71

Our philologists stand in the same relation to true educators as themedicine-men of the wild Indians do to true physicians What astonishmentwill be felt by a later age!

72

What they lack is a real taste for the strong and powerfulcharacteristics of the ancients. They turn into mere panegyrists, andthus become ridiculous. 

73

They have forgotten how to address other men; and, as they cannot speakto the older people, they cannot do so to the young. 

74

When we bring the Greeks to the knowledge of our young students, we aretreating the latter as if they were well-informed and matured men. What, indeed, is there about the Greeks and their ways which is suitable forthe young? In the end we shall find that we can do nothing for thembeyond giving them isolated details. Are these observations for youngpeople? What we actually do, however, is to introduce our young scholarsto the collective wisdom of antiquity. Or do we not? The reading of theancients is emphasised in this way. 

My belief is that we are forced to concern ourselves with antiquity at awrong period of our lives. At the end of the twenties its meaning beginsto dawn on one. 

75

There is something disrespectful about the way in which we make ouryoung students known to the ancients: what is worse, it isunpedagogical; or what can result from a mere acquaintance with thingswhich a youth cannot consciously esteem! Perhaps he must learn to"_believe_" and this is why I object to it. 

76

There are matters regarding which antiquity instructs us, and aboutwhich I should hardly care to express myself publicly. 

77

All the difficulties of historical study to be elucidated by greatexamples. 

Why our young students are not suited to the Greeks. 

The consequences of philology. Arrogant expectation. Culture-philistinism. Superficiality. Too high an esteem for reading and writing. Estrangement from the nation and its needs. 

The philologists themselves, the historians, philosophers, and juristsall end in smoke. 

Our young students should be brought into contact with real sciences. 

Likewise with real art. 

In consequence, when they grew older, a desire for _real_ history wouldbe shown. 

78

Inhumanity: even in the "Antigone, " even in Goethe's "Iphigenia. "

The want of "rationalism" in the Greeks. 

Young people cannot understand the political affairs of antiquity. 

The poetic element: a bad expectation. 

79

Do the philologists know the present time? Their judgments on it asPericlean, their mistaken judgments when they speak of Freytag's[7]genius as resembling that of Homer, and so on; their following in thelead of the littérateurs, their abandonment of the pagan sense, whichwas exactly the classical element that Goethe discovered in Winckelmann. 

80

The condition of the philologists may be seen by their indifference atthe appearance of Wagner. They should have learnt even more through himthan through Goethe, and they did not even glance in his direction. Thatshows that they are not actuated by any strong need, or else they wouldhave an instinct to tell them where their food was to be found. 

81

Wagner prizes his art too highly to go and sit in a corner with it, likeSchumann. He either surrenders himself to the public ("Rienzi") or hemakes the public surrender itself to him. He educates it up to hismusic. Minor artists, too, want their public, but they try to get it byinartistic means, such as through the Press, Hanslick, [8] &c. 

82

Wagner perfected the inner fancy of man . Later generations will see arenaissance in sculpture. Poetry must precede the plastic art. 

83

I observe in philologists ·

1. Want of respect for antiquity. 

2. Tenderness and flowery oratory; even an apologetic tone. 

3. Simplicity in their historical comments. 

4. Self-conceit. 

5. Under-estimation of the talented philologists. 

84

Philologists appear to me to be a secret society who wish to train ouryouth by means of the culture of antiquity · I could well understandthis society and their views being criticised from all sides. A greatdeal would depend upon knowing what these philologists understood by theterm "culture of antiquity"--If I saw, for example, that they weretraining their pupils against German philosophy and German music, Ishould either set about combating them or combating the culture ofantiquity, perhaps the former, by showing that these philologists hadnot understood the culture of antiquity. Now I observe:

1. A great indecision in the valuation of the culture of antiquity onthe part of philologists. 

2. Something very non-ancient in themselves; something non-free. 

3. Want of clearness in regard to the particular type of ancient culturethey mean. 

4. Want of judgment in their methods of instruction, _e. G. _, scholarship. 

5. Classical education is served out mixed up with Christianity. 

85

It is now no longer a matter of surprise to me that, with such teachers, the education of our time should be worthless. I can never avoiddepicting this want of education in its true colours, especially inregard to those things which ought to be learnt from antiquity ifpossible, for example, writing, speaking, and so on. 

86

The transmission of the emotions is hereditary: let that be recollectedwhen we observe the effect of the Greeks upon philologists. 

87

Even in the best of cases, philologists seek for no more than mere"rationalism" and Alexandrian culture--not Hellenism. 

88

Very little can be gained by mere diligence, if the head is dull. Philologist after philologist has swooped down on Homer in the mistakenbelief that something of him can be obtained by force. Antiquity speaksto us when it feels a desire to do so, not when we do. 

89

The inherited characteristic of our present-day philologists · a certainsterility of insight has resulted, for they promote the science, but notthe philologist. 

90

The following is one way of carrying on classical studies, and afrequent one: a man throws himself thoughtlessly, or is thrown, intosome special branch or other, whence he looks to the right and left andsees a great deal that is good and new. Then, in some unguarded moment, he asks himself: "But what the devil has all this to do with me?" In themeantime he has grown old and has become accustomed to it all; andtherefore he continues in his rut--just as in the case of marriage. 

91

In connection with the training of the modern philologist the influenceof the science of linguistics should be mentioned and judged; aphilologist should rather turn aside from it . The question of the earlybeginnings of the Greeks and Romans should be nothing to him . How canthey spoil their own subject in such a way?

92

A morbid passion often makes its appearance from time to time inconnection with the oppressive uncertainty of divination, a passion forbelieving and feeling sure at all costs: for example, when dealing withAristotle, or in the discovery of magic numbers, which, in Lachmann'scase, is almost an illness. 

93

The consistency which is prized in a savant is pedantry if applied tothe Greeks. 

94

 (THE GREEKS AND THE PHILOLOGISTS. )

 THE GREEKS. THE PHILOLOGISTS are ·

 render homage to beauty, babblers and triflers, develop the body, ugly-looking creatures, speak clearly, stammerers, are religious transfigurers filthy pedants, of everyday occurrences, are listeners and observers, quibblers and scarecrows, have an aptitude for the unfitted for the symbolical, symbolical, are in full possession of ardent slaves of the State, their freedom as men, can look innocently out Christians in disguise, into the world, are the pessimists of philistines. Thought. 

95

Bergk's "History of Literature": Not a spark of Greek fire or Greeksense. 

96

People really do compare our own age with that of Pericles, andcongratulate themselves on the reawakening of the feeling of patriotism:I remember a parody on the funeral oration of Pericles by G. Freytag, [9]in which this prim and strait-laced "poet" depicted the happiness nowexperienced by sixty-year-old men. --All pure and simple caricature! Sothis is the result! And sorrow and irony and seclusion are all thatremain for him who has seen more of antiquity than this. 

97

If we change a single word of Lord Bacon's we may say . InfimarumGræcorum virtutum apud philologos laus est, mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus. 

98

How can anyone glorify and venerate a whole people! It is theindividuals that count, even in the case of the Greeks. 

99

There is a great deal of caricature even about the Greeks · for example, the careful attention devoted by the Cynics to their own happiness. 

100

The only thing that interests me is the relationship of the peopleconsidered as a whole to the training of the single individuals · and inthe case of the Greeks there are some factors which are very favourableto the development of the individual. They do not, however, arise fromthe goodwill of the people, but from the struggle between the evilinstincts. 

By means of happy inventions and discoveries, we can train theindividual differently and more highly than has yet been done by merechance and accident. There are still hopes . The breeding of superiormen. 

101

The Greeks are interesting and quite disproportionately importantbecause they had such a host of great individuals. How was thatpossible? This point must be studied. 

102

The history of Greece has hitherto always been written optimistically. 

103

Selected points from antiquity: the power, fire, and swing of thefeeling the ancients had for music (through the first Pythian Ode), purity in their historical sense, gratitude for the blessings ofculture, the fire and corn feasts. 

The ennoblement of jealousy: the Greeks the most jealous nation. 

Suicide, hatred of old age, of penury. Empedocles on sexual love. 

104

Nimble and healthy bodies, a clear and deep sense for the observation ofeveryday matters, manly freedom, belief in good racial descent and goodupbringing, warlike virtues, jealousy in the [Greek: aristeyein], delight in the arts, respect for leisure, a sense for freeindividuality, for the symbolical. 

105

The spiritual culture of Greece an aberration of the amazing politicalimpulse towards [Greek: aristeyein]. The [Greek: polis] utterly opposedto new education; culture nevertheless existed. 

106

When I say that, all things considered, the Greeks were more moral thanmodern men what do I mean by that? From what we can perceive of theactivities of their soul, it is clear that they had no shame, they hadno bad conscience. They were more sincere, open-hearted, and passionate, as artists are; they exhibited a kind of child-like _naiveté_. It thuscame about that even in all their evil actions they had a dash of purityabout them, something approaching the holy. A remarkable number ofindividualities: might there not have been a higher morality in that?When we recollect that character develops slowly, what can it be that, in the long run, breeds individuality? Perhaps vanity, emulation?Possibly. Little inclination for conventional things. 

107

The Greeks as the geniuses among the nations. 

Their childlike nature, credulousness. 

Passionate. Quite unconsciously they lived in such a way as to procreategenius. Enemies of shyness and dulness. Pain. Injudicious actions. Thenature of their intuitive insight into misery, despite their bright andgenial temperament. Profoundness in their apprehension and glorifying ofeveryday things (fire, agriculture). Mendacious, unhistorical. Thesignificance of the [Greek: polis] in culture instinctively recognised, favourable as a centre and periphery for great men (the facility ofsurveying a community, and also the possibility of addressing it as awhole). Individuality raised to the highest power through the [Greek:polis]. Envy, jealousy, as among gifted people. 

108

The Greeks were lacking in sobriety and caution. Over-sensibility, abnormally active condition of the brain and the nerves; impetuosity andfervour of the will. 

109

"Invariably to see the general in the particular is the distinguishingcharacteristic of genius, " says Schopenhauer. Think of Pindar, &c. --"[Greek: Sophrosynae], " according to Schopenhauer, has its roots inthe clearness with which the Greeks saw into themselves and into theworld at large, and thence became conscious of themselves. 

The "wide separation of will and intellect" indicates the genius, and isseen in the Greeks. 

"The melancholy associated with genius is due to the fact that the willto live, the more clearly it is illuminated by the contemplatingintellect, appreciates all the more clearly the misery of itscondition, " says Schopenhauer. _Cf. _ the Greeks. 

110

The moderation of the Greeks in their sensual luxury, eating, anddrinking, and their pleasure therein; the Olympic plays and theirworship . That shows what they were. 

In the case of the genius, "the intellect will point out the faultswhich are seldom absent in an instrument that is put to a use for whichit was not intended. "

"The will is often left in the lurch at an awkward moment: hence genius, where real life is concerned, is more or less unpractical--itsbehaviour often reminds us of madness. "

111

We contrast the Romans, with their matter-of-fact earnestness, with thegenial Greeks! Schopenhauer: "The stern, practical, earnest mode of lifewhich the Romans called _gravitas_ presupposes that the intellect doesnot forsake the service of the will in order to roam far off amongthings that have no connection with the will. "

112

It would have been much better if the Greeks had been conquered by thePersians instead of by the Romans. 

113

The characteristics of the gifted man who is lacking in genius are to befound in the average Hellene--all the dangerous characteristics of sucha disposition and character. 

114

Genius makes tributaries of all partly-talented people: hence thePersians themselves sent their ambassadors to the Greek oracles. 

115

The happiest lot that can fall to the genius is to exchange doing andacting for leisure; and this was something the Greeks knew how to value. The blessings of labour! _Nugari_ was the Roman name for all theexertions and aspirations of the Greeks. 

No happy course of life is open to the genius, he stands incontradiction to his age and must perforce struggle with it. Thus theGreeks . They instinctively made the utmost exertions to secure a saferefuge for themselves (in the _polis_). Finally, everything went topieces in politics. They were compelled to take up a stand against theirenemies . This became ever more and more difficult, and at lastimpossible. 

116

Greek culture is based on the lordship of a small class over four tonine times their number of slaves. Judged by mere numbers, Greece was acountry inhabited by barbarians. How can the ancients be thought to behumane? There was a great contrast between the genius and thebreadwinner, the half-beast of burden. The Greeks believed in a racialdistinction. Schopenhauer wonders why Nature did not take it into herhead to invent two entirely separate species of men. 

The Greeks bear the same relation to the barbarians "as free-moving orwinged animals do to the barnacles which cling tightly to the rocks andmust await what fate chooses to send them"--Schopenhauer's simile. 

117

The Greeks as the only people of genius in the history of the world. Such they are even when considered as learners; for they understand thisbest of all, and can do more than merely trim and adorn themselves withwhat they have borrowed, as did the Romans. 

The constitution of the _polis_ is a Phoenician invention, even thishas been imitated by the Hellenes. For a long time they dabbled ineverything, like joyful dilettanti. Aphrodite is likewise Phoenician. Neither do they disavow what has come to them through immigration anddoes not originally belong to their own country. 

118

The happy and comfortable constitution of the politico-social positionmust not be sought among the Greeks . That is a goal which dazzles theeyes of our dreamers of the future! It was, on the contrary, dreadful;for this is a matter that must be judged according to the followingstandard: the more spirit, the more suffering (as the Greeks themselvesprove). Whence it follows, the more stupidity, the more comfort. Thephilistine of culture is the most comfortable creature the sun has evershone upon: and he is doubtless also in possession of the correspondingstupidity. 

119

The Greek _polis_ and the [Greek: aien aristeyein] grew up out of mutualenmity. Hellenic and philanthropic are contrary adjectives, although theancients flattered themselves sufficiently. 

Homer is, in the world of the Hellenic discord, the pan-Hellenic Greek. The [Greek: "agon"] of the Greeks is also manifested in the Symposium inthe shape of witty conversation. 

120

Wanton, mutual annihilation inevitable: so long as a single _polis_wished to exist--its envy for everything superior to itself, itscupidity, the disorder of its customs, the enslavement of the women, lack of conscience in the keeping of oaths, in murder, and in cases ofviolent death. 

Tremendous power of self-control: for example in a man like Socrates, who was capable of everything evil. 

121

Its noble sense of order and systematic arrangement had rendered theAthenian state immortal--The ten strategists in Athens! Foolish! Too biga sacrifice on the altar of jealousy. 

122

The recreations of the Spartans consisted of feasting, hunting, andmaking war · their every-day life was too hard. On the whole, however, their state is merely a caricature of the polls, a corruption of Hellas. The breeding of the complete Spartan--but what was there great about himthat his breeding should have required such a brutal state!

123

The political defeat of Greece is the greatest failure of culture; forit has given rise to the atrocious theory that culture cannot be pursuedunless one is at the same time armed to the teeth. The rise ofChristianity was the second greatest failure: brute force on the onehand, and a dull intellect on the other, won a complete victory over thearistocratic genius among the nations. To be a Philhellenist now meansto be a foe of brute force and stupid intellects. Sparta was the ruin ofAthens in so far as she compelled Athens to turn her entire attentionto politics and to act as a federal combination. 

124

There are domains of thought where the _ratio_ will only give rise todisorder, and the philologist, who possesses nothing more, is lostthrough it and is unable to see the truth · _e. G. _ in the considerationof Greek mythology. A merely fantastic person, of course, has no claimeither · one must possess Greek imagination and also a certain amount ofGreek piety. Even the poet does not require to be too consistent, andconsistency is the last thing Greeks would understand. 

125

Almost all the Greek divinities are accumulations of divinities . Wefind one layer over another, soon to be hidden and smoothed down by yeta third, and so on. It scarcely seems to me to be possible to pick thesevarious divinities to pieces in a scientific manner, for no good methodof doing so can be recommended: even the poor conclusion by analogy isin this instance a very good conclusion. 

126

At what a distance must one be from the Greeks to ascribe to them such astupidly narrow autochthony as does Ottfried Muller![10] How Christianit is to assume, with Welcker, [11] that the Greeks were originallymonotheistic! How philologists torment themselves by investigating thequestion whether Homer actually wrote, without being able to grasp thefar higher tenet that Greek art long exhibited an inward enmity againstwriting, and did not wish to be read at all. 

127

In the religious cultus an earlier degree of culture comes to light aremnant of former times. The ages that celebrate it are not those whichinvent it, the contrary is often the case. There are many contrasts tobe found here. The Greek cultus takes us back to a pre-Homericdisposition and culture. It is almost the oldest that we know of theGreeks--older than their mythology, which their poets have considerablyremoulded, so far as we know it--Can this cult really be called Greek? Idoubt it: they are finishers, not inventors. They _preserve_ by means ofthis beautiful completion and adornment. 

128

It is exceedingly doubtful whether we should draw any conclusion inregard to nationality and relationship with other nations fromlanguages. A victorious language is nothing but a frequent (and notalways regular) indication of a successful campaign. Where could therehave been autochthonous peoples! It shows a very hazy conception ofthings to talk about Greeks who never lived in Greece. That which isreally Greek is much less the result of natural aptitude than of adaptedinstitutions, and also of an acquired language. 

129

To live on mountains, to travel a great deal, and to move quickly fromone place to another . In these ways we can now begin to compareourselves with the Greek gods. We know the past, too, and we almost knowthe future. What would a Greek say, if only he could see us!

130

The gods make men still more evil; this is the nature of man. If we donot like a man, we wish that he may become worse than he is, and then weare glad. This forms part of the obscure philosophy of hate--aphilosophy which has never yet been written, because it is everywherethe _pudendum_ that every one feels. 

131

The pan-Hellenic Homer finds his delight in the frivolity of the gods;but it is astounding how he can also give them dignity again. Thisamazing ability to raise one's self again, however, is Greek. 

132

What, then, is the origin of the envy of the gods? people did notbelieve in a calm, quiet happiness, but only in an exuberant one. Thismust have caused some displeasure to the Greeks; for their soul was onlytoo easily wounded: it embittered them to see a happy man. That isGreek. If a man of distinguished talent appeared, the flock of enviouspeople must have become astonishingly large. If any one met with amisfortune, they would say of him: "Ah! no wonder! he was too frivolousand too well off. " And every one of them would have behaved exuberantlyif he had possessed the requisite talent, and would willingly haveplayed the role of the god who sent the unhappiness to men. 

133

The Greek gods did not demand any complete changes of character, andwere, generally speaking, by no means burdensome or importunate . It wasthus possible to take them seriously and to believe in them. At the timeof Homer, indeed, the nature of the Greek was formed · flippancy ofimages and imagination was necessary to lighten the weight of itspassionate disposition and to set it free. 

134

Every religion has for its highest images an analogon in the spiritualcondition of those who profess it. The God of Mohammed . Thesolitariness of the desert, the distant roar of the lion, the vision ofa formidable warrior. The God of the Christians . Everything that menand women think of when they hear the word "love". The God of theGreeks: a beautiful apparition in a dream. 

135

A great deal of intelligence must have gone to the making up of a Greekpolytheism . The expenditure of intelligence is much less lavish whenpeople have only _one_ God. 

136

Greek morality is not based on religion, but on the _polis_. 

There were only priests of the individual gods; not representatives ofthe whole religion . _i. E. _, no guild of priests. Likewise no Holy Writ. 

137

The "lighthearted" gods · this is the highest adornment which has everbeen bestowed upon the world--with the feeling, How difficult it is tolive!

138

If the Greeks let their "reason" speak, their life seems to them bitterand terrible. They are not deceived. But they play round life with lies:Simonides advises them to treat life as they would a play; earnestnesswas only too well known to them in the form of pain. The misery of menis a pleasure to the gods when they hear the poets singing of it. Welldid the Greeks know that only through art could even misery itselfbecome a source of pleasure, _vide tragoediam_. 

139

It is quite untrue to say that the Greeks only took _this_ life intotheir consideration--they suffered also from thoughts of death and Hell. But no "repentance" or contrition. 

140

The incarnate appearance of gods, as in Sappho's invocation toAphrodite, must not be taken as poetic licence · they are frequentlyhallucinations. We conceive of a great many things, including the willto die, too superficially as rhetorical. 

141

The "martyr" is Hellenic: Prometheus, Hercules. The hero-myth becamepan-Hellenic: a poet must have had a hand in that!

142

How _realistic_ the Greeks were even in the domain of pure inventions!They poetised reality, not yearning to lift themselves out of it. Theraising of the present into the colossal and eternal, _e. G. _, by Pindar. 

143

What condition do the Greeks premise as the model of their life inHades? Anæmic, dreamlike, weak . It is the continuous accentuation ofold age, when the memory gradually becomes weaker and weaker, and thebody still more so. The senility of senility . This would be our stateof life in the eyes of the Hellenes. 

144

The naive character of the Greeks observed by the Egyptians. 

145

The truly scientific people, the literary people, were the Egyptians andnot the Greeks. That which has the appearance of science among theGreeks, originated among the Egyptians and later on returned to them tomingle again with the old current. Alexandrian culture is anamalgamation of Hellenic and Egyptian . And when our world again foundsits culture upon the Alexandrian culture, then. .. . [12]

146

The Egyptians are far more of a literary people than the Greeks. Imaintain this against Wolf. The first grain in Eleusis, the first vinein Thebes, the first olive-tree and fig-tree. The Egyptians had lost agreat part of their mythology. 

147

The unmathematical undulation of the column in Paestum is analogous tothe modification of the _tempo_: animation in place of a mechanicalmovement. 

148

The desire to find something certain and fixed in æsthetic led to theworship of Aristotle: I think, however, that we may gradually come tosee from his works that he understood nothing about art, and that it ismerely the intellectual conversations of the Athenians, echoing in hispages, which we admire. 

149

In Socrates we have as it were lying open before us a specimen of theconsciousness out of which, later on, the instincts of the theoretic manoriginated: that one would rather die than grow old and weak in mind. 

150

At the twilight of antiquity there were still wholly unchristianfigures, which were more beautiful, harmonious, and pure than those ofany Christians: _e. G. _, Proclus. His mysticism and syncretism werethings that precisely Christianity cannot reproach him with. In anycase, it would be my desire to live together with such people. Incomparison with them Christianity looks like some crude brutalisation, organised for the benefit of the mob and the criminal classes. 

Proclus, who solemnly invokes the rising moon. 

151

With the advent of Christianity a religion attained the mastery whichcorresponded to a pre-Greek condition of mankind: belief in witchcraftin connection with all and everything, bloody sacrifices, superstitiousfear of demoniacal punishments, despair in one's self, ecstatic broodingand hallucination, man's self become the arena of good and evil spiritsand their struggles. 

152

All branches of history have experimented with antiquity · criticalconsideration alone remains. By this term I do not mean conjectural andliterary-historical criticism. 

153

Antiquity has been treated by all kinds of historians and their methods. We have now had enough experience, however, to turn the history ofantiquity to account without being shipwrecked on antiquity itself. 

154

We can now look back over a fairly long period of human existence · whatwill the humanity be like which is able to look back at us from anequally long distance? which finds us lying intoxicated among the débrisof old culture! which finds its only consolation in "being good" and inholding out the "helping hand, " and turns away from all otherconsolations!--Does beauty, too, grow out of the ancient culture? Ithink that our ugliness arises from our metaphysical remnants . Ourconfused morals, the worthlessness of our marriages, and so on, are thecause. The beautiful man, the healthy, moderate, and enterprising man, moulds the objects around him into beautiful shapes after his own image. 

155

Up to the present time all history has been written from the standpointof success, and, indeed, with the assumption of a certain reason in thissuccess. This remark applies also to Greek history: so far we do notpossess any. It is the same all round, however: where are the historianswho can survey things and events without being humbugged by stupidtheories? I know of only one, Burckhardt. Everywhere the widest possibleoptimism prevails in science. The question: "What would have been theconsequence if so and so had not happened?" is almost unanimously thrustaside, and yet it is the cardinal question. Thus everything becomesironical. Let us only consider our own lives. If we examine history inaccordance with a preconceived plan, let this plan be sought in thepurposes of a great man, or perhaps in those of a sex, or of a party. Everything else is a chaos. --Even in natural science we find thisdeification of the necessary. 

Germany has become the breeding-place of this historical optimism; Hegelis perhaps to blame for this. Nothing, however, is more responsible forthe fatal influence of German culture. Everything that has been keptdown by success gradually rears itself up: history as the scorn of theconqueror; a servile sentiment and a kneeling down before the actualfact--"a sense for the State, " they now call it, as if _that_ had stillto be propagated! He who does not understand how brutal andunintelligent history is will never understand the stimulus to make itintelligent. Just think how rare it is to find a man with as great anintelligent knowledge of his own life as Goethe had . What amount ofrationality can we expect to find arising out of these other veiled andblind existences as they work chaotically with and in opposition to eachother?

And it is especially naive when Hellwald, the author of a history ofculture, warns us away from all "ideals, " simply because history haskilled them off one after the other. 

156

To bring to light without reserve the stupidity and the want of reasonin human things · that is the aim of _our_ brethren and colleagues. People will then have to distinguish what is essential in them, what isincorrigible, and what is still susceptible of further improvement. But"Providence" must be kept out of the question, for it is a conceptionthat enables people to take things too easily. I wish to breathe thebreath of _this_ purpose into science. Let us advance our knowledge ofmankind! The good and rational in man is accidental or apparent, or thecontrary of something very irrational. There will come a time when_training_ will be the only thought. 

157

Surrender to necessity is exactly what I do not teach--for one mustfirst know this necessity to be necessary. There may perhaps be manynecessities; but in general this inclination is simply a bed ofidleness. 

158

To know history now means · to recognise how all those who believed in aProvidence took things too easily. There is no such thing. If humanaffairs are seen to go forward in a loose and disordered way, do notthink that a god has any purpose in view by letting them do so or thathe is neglecting them. We can now see in a general way that the historyof Christianity on earth has been one of the most dreadful chapters inhistory, and that a stop _must_ be put to it. True, the influence ofantiquity has been observed in Christianity even in our own time, and, as it diminishes, so will our knowledge of antiquity diminish also to aneven greater extent. Now is the best time to recognise it: we are nolonger prejudiced in favour of Christianity, but we still understand it, and also the antiquity that forms part of it, so far as this antiquitystands in line with Christianity. 

159

Philosophic heads must occupy themselves one day with the collectiveaccount of antiquity and make up its balance-sheet. If we have this, antiquity will be overcome. All the shortcomings which now vex us havetheir roots in antiquity, so that we cannot continue to treat thisaccount with the mildness which has been customary up to the present. The atrocious crime of mankind which rendered Christianity possible, asit actually became possible, is the _guilt_ of antiquity. WithChristianity antiquity will also be cleared away. --At the present timeit is not so very far behind us, and it is certainly not possible to dojustice to it. It has been availed of in the most dreadful fashion forpurposes of repression, and has acted as a support for religiousoppression by disguising itself as "culture. " It was common to hear thesaying, "Antiquity has been conquered by Christianity. "

This was a historical fact, and it was thus thought that no harm couldcome of any dealings with antiquity. Yes, it is so plausible to say thatwe find Christian ethics "deeper" than Socrates! Plato was easier tocompete with! We are at the present time, so to speak, merely chewingthe cud of the very battle which was fought in the first centuries ofthe Christian era--with the exception of the fact that now, instead ofthe clearly perceptible antiquity which then existed, we have merely itspale ghost; and, indeed, even Christianity itself has become ratherghostlike. It is a battle fought _after_ the decisive battle, apost-vibration. In the end, all the forces of which antiquity consistedhave reappeared in Christianity in the crudest possible form: it isnothing new, only quantitatively extraordinary. 

160

What severs us for ever from the culture of antiquity is the fact thatits foundations have become too shaky for us. A criticism of the Greeksis at the same time a criticism of Christianity; for the bases of thespirit of belief, the religious cult, and witchcraft, are the same inboth--There are many rudimentary stages still remaining, but they are bythis time almost ready to collapse. 

This would be a task . To characterise Greek antiquity as irretrievablylost, and with it Christianity also and the foundations upon which, upto the present time, our society and politics have been based. 

161

Christianity has conquered antiquity--yes; that is easily said. In thefirst place, it is itself a piece of antiquity, in the second place, ithas preserved antiquity, in the third place, it has never been in combatwith the pure ages of antiquity. Or rather: in order that Christianityitself might remain, it had to let itself be overcome by the spirit ofantiquity--for example, the idea of empire, the community, and so forth. We are suffering from the uncommon want of clearness and uncleanlinessof human things; from the ingenious mendacity which Christianity hasbrought among men. 

162

It is almost laughable to see how nearly all the sciences and arts ofmodern times grow from the scattered seeds which have been waftedtowards us from antiquity, and how Christianity seems to us here to bemerely the evil chill of a long night, a night during which one isalmost inclined to believe that all is over with reason and honestyamong men. The battle waged against the natural man has given rise tothe unnatural man. 

163

With the dissolution of Christianity a great part of antiquity hasbecome incomprehensible to us, for instance, the entire religious basisof life. On this account an imitation of antiquity is a false tendency . The betrayers or the betrayed are the philologists who still think ofsuch a thing. We live in a period when many different conceptions oflife are to be found: hence the present age is instructive to an unusualdegree; and hence also the reason why it is so ill, since it suffersfrom the evils of all its tendencies at once. The man of the future . The European man. 

164

The German Reformation widened the gap between us and antiquity: was itnecessary for it to do so? It once again introduced the old contrast of"Paganism" and "Christianity"; and it was at the same time a protestagainst the decorative culture of the Renaissance--it was a victorygained over the same culture as had formerly been conquered by earlyChristianity. 

In regard to "worldly things, " Christianity preserved the grosser viewsof the ancients. All the nobler elements in marriage, slavery, and theState are unchristian. It _required_ the distorting characteristics ofworldliness to prove itself. 

165

The connection between humanism and religious rationalism was emphasisedas a Saxonian trait by Kochly: the type of this philologist is GottfriedHermann. [13]

166

I understand religions as narcotics: but when they are given to suchnations as the Germans, I think they are simply rank poison. 

167

All religions are, in the end, based upon certain physical assumptions, which are already in existence and adapt the religions to their needs . For example, in Christianity, the contrast between body and soul, theunlimited importance of the earth as the "world, " the marvellousoccurrences in nature. If once the opposite views gain the mastery--forinstance, a strict law of nature, the helplessness and superfluousnessof all gods, the strict conception of the soul as a bodily process--allis over. But all Greek culture is based upon such views. 

168

When we look from the character and culture of the Catholic Middle Agesback to the Greeks, we see them resplendent indeed in the rays of higherhumanity; for, if we have anything to reproach these Greeks with, wemust reproach the Middle Ages with it also to a much greater extent. Theworship of the ancients at the time of the Renaissance was thereforequite honest and proper. We have carried matters further in oneparticular point, precisely in connection with that dawning ray oflight. We have outstripped the Greeks in the clarifying of the world byour studies of nature and men. Our knowledge is much greater, and ourjudgments are more moderate and just. 

In addition to this, a more gentle spirit has become widespread, thanksto the period of illumination which has weakened mankind--but thisweakness, when turned into morality, leads to good results and honoursus. Man has now a great deal of freedom: it is his own fault if he doesnot make more use of it than he does; the fanaticism of opinions hasbecome much milder. Finally, that we would much rather live in thepresent age than in any other is due to science, and certainly no otherrace in the history of mankind has had such a wide choice of nobleenjoyments as ours--even if our race has not the palate and stomach toexperience a great deal of joy. But one can live comfortably amid allthis "freedom" only when one merely understands it and does not wish toparticipate in it--that is the modern crux. The participants appear tobe less attractive than ever · how stupid they must be!

Thus the danger arises that knowledge may avenge itself on us, just asignorance avenged itself on us during the Middle Ages. It is all overwith those religions which place their trust in gods, Providences, rational orders of the universe, miracles, and sacraments, as is alsothe case with certain types of holy lives, such as ascetics; for we onlytoo easily conclude that such people are the effects of sickness and anaberrant brain. There is no doubt that the contrast between a pure, incorporeal soul and a body has been almost set aside. Who now believesin the immortality of the soul! Everything connected with blessedness ordamnation, which was based upon certain erroneous physiologicalassumptions, falls to the ground as soon as these assumptions arerecognised to be errors. Our scientific assumptions admit just as muchof an interpretation and utilisation in favour of a besottingphilistinism--yea, in favour of bestiality--as also in favour of"blessedness" and soul-inspiration. As compared with all previous ages, we are now standing on a new foundation, so that something may still beexpected from the human race. 

As regards culture, we have hitherto been acquainted with only onecomplete form of it, _i. E. _, the city-culture of the Greeks, based as itwas on their mythical and social foundations; and one incomplete form, the Roman, which acted as an adornment of life, derived from the Greek. Now all these bases, the mythical and the politico-social, have changed;our alleged culture has no stability, because it has been erected uponinsecure conditions and opinions which are even now almost ready tocollapse. --When we thoroughly grasp Greek culture, then, we see that itis all over with it. The philologist is thus a great sceptic in thepresent conditions of our culture and training · that is his mission. Happy is he if, like Wagner and Schopenhauer, he has a dim presentimentof those auspicious powers amid which a new culture is stirring. 

169

Those who say: "But antiquity nevertheless remains as a subject ofconsideration for pure science, even though all its educational purposesmay be disowned, " must be answered by the words, What is pure sciencehere! Actions and characteristics must be judged; and those who judgethem must stand above them: so you must first devote your attention toovercoming antiquity. If you do not do that, your science is not pure, but impure and limited . As may now be perceived. 

170

To overcome Greek antiquity through our own deeds: this would be theright task. But before we can do this we must first _know_ it!--There isa thoroughness which is merely an excuse for inaction. Let it berecollected how much Goethe knew of antiquity: certainly not so much asa philologist, and yet sufficient to contend with it in such a way as tobring about fruitful results. One _should_ not even know more about athing than one could create. Moreover, the only time when we canactually _recognise_ something is when we endeavour to _make_ it. Letpeople but attempt to live after the manner of antiquity, and they willat once come hundreds of miles nearer to antiquity than they can do withall their erudition. --Our philologists never show that they strive toemulate antiquity in any way, and thus _their_ antiquity remains withoutany effect on the schools. 

The study of the spirit of emulation (Renaissance, Goethe), and thestudy of despair. 

The non-popular element in the new culture of the Renaissance: afrightful fact!

171

The worship of classical antiquity, as it was to be seen in Italy, maybe interpreted as the only earnest, disinterested, and fecund worshipwhich has yet fallen to the lot of antiquity. It is a splendid exampleof Don Quixotism; and philology at best is such Don Quixotism. Alreadyat the time of the Alexandrian savants, as with all the sophists of thefirst and second centuries, the Atticists, &c. , the scholars areimitating something purely and simply chimerical and pursuing a worldthat never existed. The same trait is seen throughout antiquity · themanner in which the Homeric heroes were copied, and all the intercourseheld with the myths, show traces of it. Gradually all Greek antiquityhas become an object of Don Quixotism. It is impossible to understandour modern world if we do not take into account the enormous influenceof the purely fantastic. This is now confronted by the principle · therecan be no imitation. Imitation, however, is merely an artisticphenomenon, _i. E. _, it is based on appearance . We can accept manners, thoughts, and so on through imitation; but imitation can create nothing. True, the creator can borrow from all sides and nourish himself in thatway. And it is only as creators that we shall be able to take anythingfrom the Greeks. But in what respect can philologists be said to becreators! There must be a few dirty jobs, such as knackers' men, andalso text-revisers: are the philologists to carry out tasks of thisnature?

172

What, then, is antiquity _now_, in the face of modern art, science, andphilosophy? It is no longer the treasure-chamber of all knowledge; forin natural and historical science we have advanced greatly beyond it. Oppression by the church has been stopped. A _pure_ knowledge ofantiquity is now possible, but perhaps also a more ineffective andweaker knowledge. --This is right enough, if effect is known only aseffect on the masses; but for the breeding of higher minds antiquity ismore powerful than ever. 

Goethe as a German poet-philologist; Wagner as a still higher stage: hisclear glance for the only worthy position of art. No ancient work hasever had so powerful an effect as the "Orestes" had on Wagner. Theobjective, emasculated philologist, who is but a philistine of cultureand a worker in "pure science, " is, however, a sad spectacle. 

173

Between our highest art and philosophy and that which is recognised tobe truly the oldest antiquity, there is no contradiction: they supportand harmonise with one another. It is in this that I place my hopes. 

174

The main standpoints from which to consider the importance of antiquity:

1. There is nothing about it for young people, for it exhibits man withan entire freedom from shame. 

2. It is not for direct imitation, but it teaches by which means art hashitherto been perfected in the highest degree. 

3. It is accessible only to a few, and there should be a _police desmoeurs, _ in charge of it--as there should be also in charge of badpianists who play Beethoven. 

4. These few apply this antiquity to the judgment of our own time, ascritics of it; and they judge antiquity by their own ideals and are thuscritics of antiquity. 

5. The contract between the Hellenic and the Roman should be studied, and also the contrast between the early Hellenic and the lateHellenic. --Explanation of the different types of culture. 

175

The advancement of science at the expense of man is one of the mostpernicious things in the world. The stunted man is a retrogression inthe human race: he throws a shadow over all succeeding generations Thetendencies and natural purpose of the individual science becomedegenerate, and science itself is finally shipwrecked: it has madeprogress, but has either no effect at all on life or else an immoralone. 

176

Men not to be used like things!

From the former very incomplete philology and knowledge of antiquitythere flowed out a stream of freedom, while our own highly developedknowledge produces slaves and serves the idol of the State. 

177

There will perhaps come a time when scientific work will be carried onby women, while the men will have to _create, _ using the word in aspiritual sense: states, laws, works of art, &c. 

People should study typical antiquity just as they do typical men:_i. E. _, imitating what they understand of it, and, when the patternseems to lie far in the distance, considering ways and means andpreliminary preparations, and devising stepping-stones. 

178

The whole feature of study lies in this: that we should study only whatwe feel we should like to imitate; what we gladly take up and have thedesire to multiply. What is really wanted is a progressive canon of the_ideal_ model, suited to boys, youths, and men. 

179

Goethe grasped antiquity in the right way · invariably with an emulativesoul. But who else did so? One sees nothing of a well-thought-outpedagogics of this nature: who knows that there is a certain knowledgeof antiquity which cannot be imparted to youths!

The puerile character of philology: devised by teachers for pupils. 

180

The ever more and more common form of the ideal: first men, theninstitutions, finally tendencies, purposes, or the want of them. Thehighest form: the conquest of the ideal by a backward movement fromtendencies to institutions, and from institutions to men. 

181

I will set down in writing what I no longer believe--and also what I dobelieve. Man stands in the midst of the great whirlpool of forces, andimagines that this whirlpool is rational and has a rational aim inview: error! The only rationality that we know is the small reason ofman: he must exert it to the utmost, and it invariably leaves him in thelurch if he tries to place himself in the hands of "Providence. "

Our only happiness lies in reason; all the remainder of the world isdreary. The highest reason, however, is seen by me in the work of theartist, and he can feel it to be such: there may be something which, when it can be consciously brought forward, may afford an even greaterfeeling of reason and happiness: for example, the course of the solarsystem, the breeding and education of a man. 

Happiness lies in rapidity of feeling and thinking: everything else isslow, gradual, and stupid. The man who could feel the progress of a rayof light would be greatly enraptured, for it is very rapid. 

Thinking of one's self affords little happiness. But when we doexperience happiness therein the reason is that we are not thinking ofourselves, but of our ideal. This lies far off; and only the rapid manattains it and rejoices. 

An amalgamation of a great centre of men for the breeding of better menis the task of the future. The individual must become familiarised withclaims that, when he says Yea to his own will, he also says Yea to thewill of that centre--for example, in reference to a choice, as amongwomen for marriage, and likewise as to the manner in which his childshall be brought up. Until now no single individuality, or only the veryrarest, have been free: they were influenced by these conceptions, butlikewise by the bad and contradictory organisation of the individualpurposes. 

182

Education is in the first place instruction in what is necessary, andthen in what is changing and inconstant. The youth is introduced tonature, and the sway of laws is everywhere pointed out to him; followedby an explanation of the laws of ordinary society. Even at this earlystage the question will arise: was it absolutely necessary that thisshould have been so? He gradually comes to need history to ascertain howthese things have been brought about. He learns at the same time, however, that they may be changed into something else. What is theextent of man's power over things? This is the question in connectionwith all education. To show how things may become other than what theyare we may, for example, point to the Greeks. We need the Romans to showhow things became what they were. 

183

If, then, the Romans had spurned the Greek culture, they would perhapshave gone to pieces completely. When could this culture have once againarisen? Christianity and Romans and barbarians: this would have been anonslaught: it would have entirely wiped out culture. We see the dangeramid which genius lives. Cicero was one of the greatest benefactors ofhumanity, even in his own time. 

There is no "Providence" for genius; it is only for the ordinary run ofpeople and their wants that such a thing exists: they find theirsatisfaction, and later on their justification. 

184

Thesis: the death of ancient culture inevitable. Greek culture must bedistinguished as the archetype; and it must be shown how all culturerests upon shaky conceptions. 

The dangerous meaning of art: as the protectress and galvanisation ofdead and dying conceptions; history, in so far as it wishes to restoreto us feelings which we have overcome. To feel "historically" or "just"towards what is already past, is only possible when we have risen aboveit. But the danger in the adoption of the feelings necessary for this isvery great . Let the dead bury their dead, so that we ourselves may notcome under the influence of the smell of the corpses. 

THE DEATH OF THE OLD CULTURE. 

1. The signification of the studies of antiquity hitherto pursued:obscure; mendacious. 

2. As soon as they recognise the goal they condemn themselves to death ·for their goal is to describe ancient culture itself as one to bedemolished. 

3. The collection of all the conceptions out of which Hellenic culturehas grown up. Criticism of religion, art, society, state, morals. 

4. Christianity is likewise denied. 

5. Art and history--dangerous. 

6. The replacing of the study of antiquity which has become superfluousfor the training of our youth. 

Thus the task of the science of history is completed and it itself hasbecome superfluous, if the entire inward continuous circle of pastefforts has been condemned. Its place must be taken by the science ofthe _future_. 

185

"Signs" and "miracles" are not believed; only a "Providence" stands inneed of such things. There is no help to be found either in prayer orasceticism or in "vision. " If all these things constitute religion, thenthere is no more religion for me. 

My religion, if I can still apply this name to something, lies in thework of breeding genius . From such training everything is to be hoped. All consolation comes from art. Education is love for the offspring; anexcess of love over and beyond our self-love. Religion is "love beyondourselves. " The work of art is the model of such a love beyondourselves, and a perfect model at that. 

186

The stupidity of the will is Schopenhauer's greatest thought, ifthoughts be judged from the standpoint of power. We can see in Hartmannhow he juggled away this thought. Nobody will ever call somethingstupid--God. 

187

This, then, is the new feature of all the future progress of the world ·men must never again be ruled over by religious conceptions. Will theybe any _worse_? It is not my experience that they behave well andmorally under the yoke of religion; I am not on the side ofDemopheles[14] The fear of a beyond, and then again the fear of divinepunishments will hardly have made men better. 

188

Where something great makes its appearance and lasts for a relativelylong time, we may premise a careful breeding, as in the case of theGreeks. How did so many men become free among them? Educate educators!But the first educators must educate themselves! And it is for thesethat I write. 

189

The denial of life is no longer an easy matter: a man may become ahermit or a monk--and what is thereby denied! This conception has nowbecome deeper . It is above all a discerning denial, a denial based uponthe will to be just; not an indiscriminate and wholesale denial. 

190

The seer must be affectionate, otherwise men will have no confidence inhim · Cassandra. 

191

The man who to-day wishes to be good and saintly has a more difficulttask than formerly . In order to be "good, " he must not be so unjust toknowledge as earlier saints were. He would have to be a knowledge-saint:a man who would link love with knowledge, and who would have nothing todo with gods or demigods or "Providence, " as the Indian saints likewisehad nothing to do with them. He should also be healthy, and should keephimself so, otherwise he would necessarily become distrustful ofhimself. And perhaps he would not bear the slightest resemblance to theascetic saint, but would be much more like a man of the world. 

192

The better the state is organised, the duller will humanity be. 

To make the individual uncomfortable is my task!

The great pleasure experienced by the man who liberates himself byfighting. 

Spiritual heights have had their age in history; inherited energybelongs to them. In the ideal state all would be over with them. 

193

The highest judgment on life only arising from the highest energy oflife. The mind must be removed as far as possible from exhaustion. 

In the centre of the world-history judgment will be the most accurate;for it was there that the greatest geniuses existed. 

The breeding of the genius as the only man who can truly value and denylife. 

Save your genius! shall be shouted unto the people: set him free! Do allyou can to unshackle him. 

The feeble and poor in spirit must not be allowed to judge life. 

194

_I dream of a combination of men who shall make no concessions, whoshall show no consideration, and who shall be willing to be called"destroyers": they apply the standard of their criticism to everythingand sacrifice themselves to truth. The bad and the false shall bebrought to light! We will not build prematurely: we do not know, indeed, whether we shall ever be able to build, or if it would not be better notto build at all. There are lazy pessimists and resigned ones in thisworld--and it is to their number that we refuse to belong!_

FOOTNOTES:

[1] No doubt a reminiscence of the "Odyssey, " Bk. Ix--TR. 

[2] Formal education is that which tends to develop the critical andlogical faculties, as opposed to material education, which is intendedto deal with the acquisition of knowledge and its valuation, _e. G. _, history, mathematics, &c. "Material" education, of course, has nothingto do with materialism--TR. 

[3] The reference is not to Pope, but to Hegel. --TR. 

[4] Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), the well-known classical scholar, now chiefly remembered by his "Prolegomena ad Homerum. "--TR. 

[5] Students who pass certain examinations need only serve one year inthe German Army instead of the usual two or three--TR. 

[6] Otto Jahn (1813-69), who is probably best remembered in philologicalcircles by his edition of Juvenal. --TR. 

[7] Gustav Freytag at one time a famous German novelist--TR. 

[8] A well-known anti-Wagnerian musical critic of Vienna. --TR. 

[9] See note on p 149. --TR. 

[10] Karl Ottfried Muller (1797-1840), classical archæologist, whodevoted special attention to Greece--TR. 

[11] Friedrich Gottlieb Welcker (1784-1868), noted for hisultra-profound comments on Greek poetry--TR. 

[12] "We shall once again be shipwrecked. " The omission is in theoriginal--TR. 

[13] Johann Gottfried Jakob Hermann (1772-1848), noted for his works onmetre and Greek grammar. --TR. 

[14] A type in Schopenhauer's Essay "On Religion. " See "Parerga andParalipomena"--TR. 

FINIS. 

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_Printed at_ THE DARIEN PRESS, _Edinburgh_