[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. Hyphenation and accentuation have been standardised, allother inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spellinghas been maintained. Page 365, 299 mm. Is probably an error for . 299-in. Page 399, "could reach effectively the trenches of theRussians" should probably be "could reach effectively the trenches of theAustrians". ] THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR History of the European War from Official Sources Complete Historical Records of Events to Date, Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs Prefaced by What the War Means to America Major General Leonard Wood, U. S. A. Naval Lessons of the War Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. N. The World's War Frederick Palmer Theatres of the War's Campaigns Frank H. Simonds The War Correspondent Arthur Ruhl Edited by Francis J. Reynolds Former Reference Librarian of Congress Allen L. Churchill Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia Francis Trevelyan Miller Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War P. F. Collier & Son Company New York [Illustration: _A great French siege gun in action near themuch-contested battle field of Arras. During the terrific explosion thegunners cover their ears. _] THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR THE WAR BEGINS INVASION OF BELGIUM BATTLE OF THE MARNE CRACOW · WARSAW POLISH CAMPAIGN WAR IN EAST PRUSSIA VOLUME II P · F · Collier & Son · New York Copyright 1916 By P. F. Collier & Son CONTENTS PART I. --GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES CHAPTER Page I. Attack on Belgium 9 II. Siege and Capture of Liege 12 III. Belgium's Defiance 23 IV. Capture of Louvain--Surrender of Brussels 27 V. Coming of the British 33 VI. Campaigns in Alsace and Lorraine 38 VII. Siege and Fall of Namur 45 VIII. Battle of Charleroi 54 IX. Battle of Mons 60 X. The Great Retreat Begins 68 XI. Fighting at Bay 79 XII. The Marne--General Plan of Battle Field 87 XIII. Allied and German Battle Plans 95 XIV. First Moves in the Battle 101 XV. German Retreat 111 XVI. Continuation of the Battle of the Marne 116 XVII. Continuation of the Battle of the Marne 119 XVIII. Other Aspects of the Battle of the Marne 126 XIX. "Crossing the Aisne" 130 XX. First Day's Battles 135 XXI. The British at the Aisne 140 XXII. Bombardment of Rheims and Soissons 146 XXIII. Second Phase of Battle of the Aisne 149 XXIV. End of the Battle 153 XXV. "The Race to the Sea" 158 XXVI. Siege and Fall of Antwerp 160 XXVII. Yser Battles--Attack on Ypres 168 XXVIII. Attacks of La Bassée and Arras 177 XXIX. General Movements on the French and Flanders Fronts 181 XXX. Operations Around La Bassée and Givenchy 187 XXXI. End of Six Months' Fighting in the West 193 PART II. --NAVAL OPERATIONS XXXII. Strength of the Rival Navies 196 XXXIII. First Blood--Battle of the Bight 208 XXXIV. Battles on Three Seas 219 XXXV. The German Sea Raiders 225 XXXVI. Battle Off the Falklands 230 XXXVII. Sea Fights of the Ocean Patrol 237 XXXVIII. War on German Trade and Possessions 242 XXXIX. Raids on the English Coast 245 XL. Results of Six Months' Naval Operations 258 PART III. --THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT XLI. General Characteristics of the Theatre of Warfare 261 XLII. The Strategic Value of Russian Poland 268 XLIII. Austrian Poland, Galicia, and Bukowina 272 XLIV. The Balkans--Countries and Peoples 275 XLV. The Caucasus--The Barred Door 286 PART IV. --THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN XLVI. Serbia's Situation and Resources 291 XLVII. Austria's Strength and Strategy 298 XLVIII. Austrian Successes 301 XLIX. The Great Battles Begin 305 L. First Victory of the Serbians 310 PART V. --THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN LI. Results of First Battles 321 LII. Serbian Attempt to Invade Austrian Territory 323 LIII. Austria's Second Invasion 329 LIV. End of Second Invasion--Beginning of Third 331 LV. Preliminary Austrian Successes 335 LVI. Crisis of the Campaign--Austrian Defeat 339 LVII. The Fate of Belgrade 345 LVIII. Attempts to Retake Belgrade 348 LIX. Serbians Retake the City--End of Third Invasion 353 LX. Montenegro in the War 358 PART VI. --AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN LXI. Strength and Equipment of the Antagonists 362 LXII. General Strategy of the Campaign 371 LXIII. Austria Takes the Offensive 376 LXIV. A Cautious Russian Advance -- Russian Successes -- Capture of Lemberg 379 LXV. Dankl's Offensive and Retreat 390 LXVI. Battle of Rawa-Russka 395 LXVII. Russian Victories--Battles of the San 398 LXVIII. Summary of Operations of September, 1914 403 LXIX. Investiture of Przemysl 405 LXX. Austrian Retreat Begins 410 LXXI. Fighting at Cracow 416 LXXII. Austrians Again Assume the Offensive 423 PART VII. --RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN LXXIII. First Clash on Prussian Frontier 430 LXXIV. Advance of Russians Against the Germans 435 LXXV. Battle of Tannenberg and Russian Retreat 438 LXXVI. Second Russian Invasion of East Prussia 446 LXXVII. First German Drive Against Warsaw 450 LXXVIII. German Retreat from Russian Poland 458 LXXIX. Winter Battles of the Polish Campaign 462 LXXX. Winter Battles in East Prussia 478 LXXXI. Results of First Six Months of Russo-German Campaign 482 PART VIII. --TURKEY AND THE DARDANELLES LXXXII. First Moves of Turkey 493 LXXXIII. The First Blow Against the Allies 501 LXXXIV. British Campaign in Mesopotamia 506 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS French Siege Gun at Arras _Frontispiece_ Opposite Page Bridge Destroyed by the Belgians at Liege 14 General Joffre 78 Germans Refortifying Antwerp 158 Emden Aground After the Sydney's Victory 222 Wreck of the Blücher in the North Sea Battle 254 Serbian Infantrymen on Their Way to the Front 302 General von Hindenburg 382 Gerdauen, East Prussia, Destroyed in Russian Invasion 478 LIST OF MAPS Page Peace Distribution of Army Corps and Naval Stations of Belligerent Powers (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_ France, Pictorial Map of 11 Belgium, Beginning of German Invasion of 17 Alsace-Lorraine, French Invasion of 51 Battle of Mons and Retreat of Allied Armies 71 Battle of the Marne--Beginning on September 5, 1914 89 Battle of the Marne--Situation on September 9, 1914 98 Battle of the Marne--End of German Retreat and the Intrenched Line on the Aisne River 107 Liege Fort, German Attack of 162 Antwerp, Siege and Fall of 162 Flanders, Battle Front in 173 German and English Naval Positions 199 War in the East--Relation of the Eastern Countries to Germany 263 The Balkans, Pictorial Map of 293 Serbian and Austrian Invasions 296 Russia, Pictorial Map of 364 Galicia, Russian Invasion of 367 Battle of Tannenberg 440 [Illustration: Peace Distribution of Army Corps and NavalStations of Belligerent Powers. ] PART I--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES CHAPTER I ATTACK ON BELGIUM The first great campaign on the western battle grounds in the EuropeanWar began on August 4, 1914. On this epoch-making day the German armybegan its invasion of Belgium--with the conquest of France as itsultimate goal. Six mighty armies stood ready for the great invasion. Their estimated total was 1, 200, 000 men. Supreme over all was theEmperor as War Lord, but Lieutenant General Helmuth von Moltke, chief ofthe General Staff, was the practical director of military operations. General von Moltke was a nephew of the great strategist of 1870, and hisname possibly appealed as of happy augury for repeating the formercapture of Paris. The First Army was assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in the north of Belgium, within a few miles of the Dutch frontier. It was under the command ofGeneral von Kluck. He was a veteran of both the Austrian andFranco-Prussian Wars, and was regarded as an able infantry leader. Hispart was to enter Belgium at its northern triangle, which projectsbetween Holland and Germany, occupy Liege, deploy on the great centralplains of Belgium, then sweep toward the French northwestern frontier inthe German dash for Paris and the English Channel. His army thus formedthe right wing of the whole German offensive. It was composed of pickedcorps, including cavalry of the Prussian Guard. The Second Army had gathered in the neighborhood of Limbourg under thecommand of General von Bülow. Its advance was planned down the valleysof the Ourthe and Vesdre to a junction with Von Kluck at Liege, then amarch by the Meuse Valley upon Namur and Charleroi. In crossing theSambre it was to fall into place on the left of Von Kluck's army. The German center was composed of the Third Army under Duke Albrecht ofWürttemberg, the Fourth Army led by the crown prince, and the Fifth Armycommanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria. It was assembled on the lineNeufchateau-Treves-Metz. Its first offensive was the occupation ofLuxemburg. This was performed, after a somewhat dramatic protest by theyouthful Grand Duchess, who placed her motor car across the bridge bywhich the Germans entered her internationally guaranteed independentstate. The German pretext was that since Luxemburg railways were Germancontrolled, they were required for the transport of troops. Preparationswere then made for a rapid advance through the Ardennes upon the CentralMeuse, to form in order upon the left of Von Bülow's army. A part of theFifth Army was to be detached for operations against the French fortressof Verdun. The Sixth Army was concentrated at Strassburg in Alsace, under Generalvon Heeringen. As inspector of the Prussian Guards he bore a very highmilitary reputation. For the time being General von Heeringen's part wasto remain in Alsace, to deal with a possibly looked for strong Frenchoffensive by way of the Vosges or Belfort. The main plan of the German General Staff, therefore was a wideenveloping movement by the First and Second Armies to sweep the shore ofthe English Channel in their march on Paris, a vigorous advance of thecenter through the Ardennes for the same destination, and readiness forbattle by the Sixth Army for any French force which might be temptedinto Alsace. That this plan was not developed in its entirety, was dueto circumstances which fall into another place. [Illustration: Pictorial Map of France. ] The long anticipated _Day_ dawned. Their vast military machine movedwith precision and unity. But there was a surprise awaiting them. TheBelgians were to offer a serious resistance to passage through theirterritory--a firm refusal had been delivered at the eleventh hour. Thevanguard was thrown forward from Von Kluck's army at Aix, to breakthrough the defenses of Liege and seize the western railways. This forceof three divisions was commanded by General von Emmich, one of themjoining him at Verviers. On the evening of August 3, 1914, Von Emmich's force had crossed intoBelgium. Early on the morning of August 4, 1914, Von Kluck's secondadvance line reached Visé, situated on the Meuse north of Liege andclose to the Dutch frontier. Here an engagement took place with aBelgian guard, which terminated with the Germans bombarding Visé. TheBelgians had destroyed the river bridge, but the Germans succeeded inseizing the crossing. This was the first actual hostility of the war on the western battlegrounds. With the capture of Visé, the way was clear for Von Kluck'smain army to concentrate on Belgian territory. By nightfall, Liege wasinvested on three sides. Only the railway lines and roads runningwestward remained open. CHAPTER II SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LIEGE A view of Liege will assist in revealing its three days' siege, with theresulting effect upon the western theatre of war. Liege is the capitalof the Walloons, a sturdy race that in times past has at many a crisisproved unyielding determination and courage. At the outbreak of war itwas the center of great coal mining and industrial activity. In thecommercial world it is known everywhere for the manufacture of firearms. The smoke from hundreds of factories spreads over the city, oftenhanging in dense clouds. It might aptly be termed the Pittsburg ofBelgium. The city lies in a deep, broad cut of the River Meuse, at itsjunction with the combined channels of the Ourthe and Vesdre. Itstretches across both sides, being connected by numerous bridges, whileparallel lines of railway follow the course of the main stream. Thetrunk line from Germany into Belgium crosses the Meuse at Liege. For themost part the old city of lofty houses clings to a cliffside on the leftbank, crowned by an ancient citadel of no modern defensive value. Whatever picturesqueness Liege may have possessed is effaced by thesqualid and dilapidated condition of its poorer quarters. To the northbroad fertile plains extend into central Belgium, southward on theopposite bank of the Meuse, the Ardennes present a hilly forest, stream-watered region. In its downward course the Meuse flows out of theLiege trench to expand through what is termed the Dutch Flats. Liege, at the outbreak of the war, was a place of great wealth andextreme poverty--a Liege artisan considered himself in prosperity on $5a week. It was of the first strategic importance to Belgium. Itssituation was that of a natural fortress, barring the advance of aGerman army. The defenses of Liege were hardly worth an enemy's gunfire before 1890. They had consisted of a single fort on the Meuse right bank, and thecitadel crowning the heights of the old town. But subsequently theBelgian Chamber voted the necessary sums for fortifying Liege and Namuron the latest principles. From the plans submitted, the one finallydecided upon was that of the famous Belgian military engineer HenriAlexis Brialmont. His design was a circle of detached forts, alreadyapproved by German engineers as best securing a city within frombombardment. With regard to Liege and Namur particularly, Brialmont heldthat his plan would make passages of the Meuse at those placesimpregnable to an enemy. When the German army stood before Liege on this fourth day of August, in1914, the circumference of the detached forts was thirty-one miles withabout two or three miles between them, and at an average of five milesfrom the city. Each fort was constructed on a new model to withstand thehighest range and power of offensive artillery forecast in the lastdecade of the nineteenth century. When completed they presented the formof an armored mushroom, thrust upward from a mound by subterraneanmachinery. The elevation of the cupola in action disclosed no more ofits surface than was necessary for the firing of the guns. The moundswere turfed and so inconspicuous that in times of peace sheep grazedover them. In Brialmont's original plan each fort was to be connected byinfantry trenches with sunken emplacements for light artillery, but thisimportant part of his design was relegated to the dangerous hour of athreatening enemy. This work was undertaken too late before the onsweepof the Germans. Instead, Brialmont's single weak detail in surroundingeach fort with an infantry platform was tenaciously preserved long afterits uselessness must have been apparent. Thus Liege was made a ringfortress to distinguish it from the former latest pattern of earthramparts and outworks. Six major and six minor of these forts encircled Liege. From north tosouth, beginning with those facing the German frontier, their names ranas follows: Barchon, Evegnée, Fleron, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, Boncelles, Flemalle, Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, Liers, and Pontisse. The armamentsof the forts consisted of 6-inch and 4. 7-inch guns, with 8-inch mortarsand quick firers. They were in the relative number of two, four, two andfour for the major forts, and two, two, one and three for the minor_fortins_, as such were termed. The grand total was estimated at 400pieces. In their confined underground quarters the garrisons, even ofthe major forts, did not exceed eighty men from the engineer, artilleryand infantry branches of the service. Between Fort Pontisse and theDutch frontier was less than six miles. [Illustration: This bridge over the Meuse at Liege was blown up by theBelgians to delay the German advance. The German army crossed on pontoonbridges. ] It was through this otherwise undefended gap that Von Kluck purposed toadvance his German army after the presumed immediate fall of Liege, tothat end having seized the Meuse crossing at Visé. The railway line toAix-la-Chapelle was dominated by Fort Fleron, while the minor FortsChaudfontaine and Embourg, to the south, commanded the trunk line by wayof Liege into Belgium. On the plateau, above Liege, Fort Loncin heldthe railway junction of Ans and the lines running from Liege north andwest. Finally, the forts were not constructed on a geometric circle, butin such manner that the fire of any two was calculated to hold an enemyat bay should a third between them fall. This was probably an accuratetheory before German guns of an unimagined caliber and range werebrought into action. In command of the Belgian forts at Liege was General Leman. He hadserved under Brialmont, and was pronounced a serious and efficientofficer. He was a zealous military student, physically extremely active, and constantly on the watch for any relaxation of discipline. Thesequalities enabled him to grasp at the outset the weakness of hisposition. If the Germans believed the refusal to grant a free passage for theirarmies through Belgium to be little more than a diplomatic protest, itwould seem the Belgian Government was equally mistaken in doubting theGermans would force a way through an international treaty of Belgianneutrality. Consequently, the German crossing of the frontier discoveredBelgium with her mobilization but half complete, mainly on a line forthe defense of Brussels and Antwerp. It had been estimated by Brialmontthat 75, 000 men of all arms were necessary for the defense of Liege on awar footing, probably 35, 000 was the total force hastily gathered in theemergency to withstand the German assault on the fortifications. Itincluded the Civic Guard. General Leman realized, therefore, that, without a supporting fieldarmy, it would be impossible for him to hold the German hosts beforeLiege for more than a few days--a week at most. But he hoped within such time the French or British would march to hisrelief. Thus his chief concern was for the forts protecting the railwayleading from Namur down the Meuse Valley into Liege--the line of aFrench or British advance. On the afternoon of August 4, 1914, German patrols appeared on the leftbank of the Meuse, approaching from Visé. They were also observed by thesentries on Forts Barchon, Evegnée and Fleron. German infantry andartillery presently came into view with the unmistakable object ofbeginning the attack on those forts. The forts fired a few shots by wayof a challenge. As evening fell the woods began to echo with the roar ofartillery. Later, Forts Fleron, Chaudfontaine and Embourg were added tothe German bombardment. The Germans used long range field pieces withpowerful explosive shells. The fire proved to be remarkably accurate. Astheir shells exploded on the cupolas and platforms of the forts, thegarrisons in their confined citadels began to experience that inferno ofvibrations which subsequently deprived them of the incentive to eat orsleep. The Belgians replied vigorously, but owing to the broken natureof the country, and the forethought with which the Germans tookadvantage of every form of gun cover, apparently little execution wasdealt upon the enemy. However, the Belgians claimed to have silenced twoof the German pieces. In the darkness of this historic night of August 4, 1914, the flames ofthe fortress guns pierced the immediate night with vivid streaks. Theirsearchlights swept in broad streams the wooded slopes opposite. Thecannonade resounded over Liege, as if with constant peals of thunder. Inthe city civilians sought the shelter of their cellars, but few of theGerman shells escaped their range upon the forts to disturb them. This exchange of artillery went on until near daybreak of August 5, 1914, when infantry fire from the woods to the right of Fort Embourgapprised the defenders that the Germans were advancing to the attack. The Germans came on in their customary massed formation. The prevalentopinion that in German tactics such action was employed to hearten theindividual soldier, was denied by their General Staff. In their opinionan advantage was thus gained by the concentration of rifle fire. Belgianinfantry withstood the assault, and counterattacked. When dawn broke, ageneral engagement was in progress. About eight o'clock the Germans werecompelled to withdraw. [Illustration: Beginning of German Invasion of Belgium. ] The first engagement of the war was won by the Belgians. It was reportedthat the Belgian fire had swept the Germans down in thousands, but thiswas denied by German authorities. Up to this time the German forcesbefore Liege were chiefly Von Kluck's vanguard under Von Emmich, hissecond line of advance, and detachments of Von Bülow's army. On theBelgian side no attempt was made to follow up the advantage. The reasongiven is that the Germans were seen to be in strong cavalry force, anarm lost totally in the military complement of Liege. The German losseswere undoubtedly severe, especially in front of Fort Barchon. This wasone of the major forts, triangular in shape, and surrounded by a ditchand barbed wire entanglements. The armament of these major forts hadrecently been reenforced by night, secretly, with guns of heaviercaliber from Antwerp. As they outmatched the German field pieces of thefirst attack, presumably the German Intelligence Department had failedin news of them. An armistice requested by the Germans to gather in thewounded and bury the dead was refused. Thereupon the artillery duelrecommenced. A hot and oppressive day disclosed woods rent and scarred, standingwheat fields shell-plowed and trampled, and farm houses set ablaze. Thebringing of the Belgian wounded into Liege apprised the citizens thattheir side had also suffered considerably. Meanwhile, the Germans werereenforced by the Tenth Hanoverian Army Corps, from command of whichGeneral von Emmich had been detached to lead Von Kluck's vanguard, alsoartillery with 8. 4-inch howitzers. The bombardment on this 5th day of August, 1914, now stretched from Viséaround the Meuse right bank half circle of forts to embrace Pontisse andBoncelles at its extremities. In a few hours infantry attack beganagain. The Germans advanced in masses by short rushes, dropping to firerifle volleys, and then onward with unflinching determination. Theforts, wreathed in smoke, blazed shells among them; their machine gunsspraying streams of bullets. The Germans were repulsed and compelled toretire, but only to re-form for a fresh assault. Both Belgian and Germanaeroplanes flew overhead to signal their respective gunners. A Zeppelinwas observed, but did not come within range of Belgian fire. TheBelgians claim to have shot down one German aeroplane, and another issaid to have been brought to earth by flying within range of its ownartillery. During the morning of August 5, Fort Fleron was put out of action byshell destruction of its cupola-hoisting machinery. This proved a weakpoint in Brialmont's fortress plan. It was presently discovered that thefire of the supporting forts Evegnée and Chaudfontaine could not commandthe lines forming the apex of their triangle. Further, since the Belgianinfantry was not in sufficient force to hold the lines between theforts, a railway into Liege fell to the enemy. The fighting here was ofsuch a desperate nature, that General Leman hastened to reenforce withall his reserve. This battle went on during the afternoon and night of August 5, into themorning of August 6, 1914. But the fall of Fort Fleron began to tell infavor of the Germans. Belgian resistance perforce weakened. Theceaseless pounding of the German 8. 4-inch howitzers smashed the innerconcrete and stone protective armor of the forts, as if of little moreavail than cardboard. At intervals on August 6, Forts Chaudfontaine, Evegnée and Barchon fell under the terrific hail of German shells. A waywas now opened into the city, though, for the most part, still contestedby Belgian infantry. A party of German hussars availed themselves ofsome unguarded path to make a daring but ineffectual dash to captureGeneral Leman and his staff. General Leman was consulting with his officers at military headquarters, on August 6, 1914, when they were startled by shouts outside. He rushedforth into a crowd of citizens to encounter eight men in German uniform. General Leman cried for a revolver to defend himself, but anotherofficer, fearing the Germans had entered the city in force, lifted himup over a foundry wall. Both Leman and the officer made their escape byway of an adjacent house. Belgian Civic Guards hastening to the scenedispatched an officer and two men of the German raiders. The rest of theparty are said to have been made prisoners. The end being merely a question of hours General Leman ordered theevacuation of the city by the infantry. He wisely decided it could be ofmore service to the Belgian army at Dyle, than held in a beleaguered anddoomed city. Reports indicate that this retreat, though successfullyperformed, was precipitate. The passage of it was scattered with arms, equipment, and supplies of all kinds. An ambulance train was abandoned, twenty locomotives left in the railway station, and but one bridgedestroyed in rear beyond immediate repair. After its accomplishment, General Leman took command of the northern forts, determined to holdthem against Von Kluck until the last Belgian gun was silenced. Early on August 7, 1914, Burgomaster Kleyer and the Bishop of Liegenegotiated terms for the surrender of the city. It had suffered butslight damage from the bombardment. Few of the citizens were reportedamong the killed or injured. On behalf of the Germans it must be saidtheir occupation of Liege was performed in good order, with militarydiscipline excellently maintained. They behaved at first fairlyimpartial in establishing their rule in the city, and paid for allsupplies requisitioned. They were quartered in various public buildingsand institutions, probably to the number of 10, 000. The German troops atfirst seemed to present an interesting spectacle. They were mostly youngmen, reported as footsore from their long march in new, imperfectlyfitting boots, and hungry from the lack of accompanying commissariat. This is proof that the German's military machine did not work toperfection at the outset. Later, alleged hostile acts by Belgianindividuals moved the German military authorities to seize a group ofthe principal citizens, and warn the inhabitants that the breaking of apeaceful attitude would be at the risk of swiftly serious punishment. Precautions to enforce order were such as is provided in martial law, and carried out in the beginning with some show of fairness. The Germansappeared anxious to restore confidence and win a feeling of good will. For some days after the capitulation of the city the northern fortscontinued a heroic resistance. So long as these remained uncaptured, General Leman maintained that, strategically, Liege had not fallen. Hethus held in check the armies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow, when everyhour was of supreme urgency for their respective onsweep into centralBelgium and up the Meuse Valley. The Germans presently brought into anoverpowering bombardment their 11-inch siege guns. On August 13, 1914, Embourg was stricken into ruin. On the same day theelectric lighting apparatus of Fort Boncelles having been destroyed, thefew living men of its garrison fought through the following night indarkness, and in momentary danger of suffocation from gases emitted bythe exploding German shells. Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, though its cupolas werebattered in and shells rained upon the interior, the commander refusedan offer of surrender. A little later the concrete inner chamber wallsfell in. The commander of Boncelles, having exhausted his defensive, hoisted the white flag. He had held out for eleven days in a veritabledeath-swept inferno. Fort Loncin disputed with Boncelles the honor of being the last tosuccumb. The experience of its garrison differed only in terribledetails from Boncelles. Its final gun shot was fired by a man with hisleft hand, since the other had been severed. Apparently a shell explodedin its magazine, and blew up the whole fort. General Leman wasdiscovered amid its débris, pinned beneath a huge beam. He was releasedby his own men. When taken to a trench, a German officer found that hewas merely unconscious from shock. When sufficiently recovered, General Leman was conducted to General vonEmmich to tender his personal surrender. The two had previously beencomrades at maneuvers. The report of their meeting is given by a Germanofficer. The guard presented the customary salute due General Leman'srank. General von Emmich advanced a few steps to meet General Leman. Both generals saluted. "General, " said Von Emmich, "you have gallantly and nobly held yourforts. " "I thank you, " Leman replied. "Our troops have lived up to theirreputation. War is not like maneuvers, _mon Général_, " he added with apointed smile. "I ask you to bear witness that you found meunconscious. " General Leman unbuckled his sword to offer it to the victor. Von Emmich bowed. "No, keep it, " he gestured. "To have crossed swords with you has been anhonor. " Subsequently the President of the French Republic bestowed on Liege theCross of the Legion of Honor. To its motto in this instance might havebeen added appropriately: Liege, the Savior of Paris. The few days ofits resistance to an overwhelming force enabled the Belgium army toimprove its mobilization, the British to throw an expeditionary armyinto France, and the French to make a new offensive alignment. It willforever remain a brilliant page in war annals. In a military estimate itproved that forts constructed on the latest scientific principles, butunsupported by an intrenched field army, crumple under the concentratedfire of long-range, high-power enemy guns. The fall of the northern and eastern Liege forts released Von Kluck'sarmy for its march into central Belgium. Meanwhile the Belgian army hadbeen concentrated on a line of the River Dyle, with its left touchingMalines and its right resting on Louvain. Its commander, GeneralSelliers de Moranville, made his headquarters in the latter city. TheBelgian force totaled 110, 000 men of all complements. Whether thisincluded the reenforcement by the Liege infantry is uncertain. During August 10 and 11, 1914, General Moranville threw forwarddetachments to screen his main body in front of the German advance. Onthe 11th a rumor that the French had crossed the Sambre, moved GeneralMoranville to extend his right wing to Eghezee, with the hope of gettingin touch with the Allies. That the French and British were hastening tohis support could not be doubted. They were already overdue, butassuredly would come soon. That was the Belgian reliance, passing frommouth to mouth among the Court, Cabinet Ministers, General Staff, downto the factory toilers, miners, and peasants on their farms. The Sambrereport, like many others in various places, proved unfounded. CHAPTER III BELGIUM'S DEFIANCE A view of the general situation in Belgium will assist in clearing theway for swiftly following events. Germany had invaded Belgium againstthe diplomatic and active protests of its Government. But the GermanGovernment still hoped that the heroic resistance of Liege would satisfyBelgian national spirit, and a free passage of German troops now begranted. The German Emperor made a direct appeal to the King of theBelgians through the medium of the Queen of Holland. From the Germanpoint of outlook their victory could best be attained by the marchthrough Belgium upon Paris. The German Government asserted that theFrench and British contemplated a similar breach of Belgian neutrality. To their mind, it was a case of which should be on the ground first. Onthe other hand, the Allies pronounced the German invasion of Belgium anunprovoked assault, and produced countertestimony. The controversy hascontinued to this day. But the war as it progressed has seen manybreaches of neutrality, and a certain resignation to the inevitable hassucceeded the moral indignation so easily aroused in its early stages. Let us now glance at the condition of Belgium when war was declared. TheBelgians were an industrial and not a militant people. They had amplereason to yearn for a permanent peace. Their country had been thecockpit of Europe from the time of Cæsar until Waterloo. The names oftheir cities, for the most part, represented great historic battlefields. Again and again had the ruin of conflict swept over theirunfortunately situated land. At all periods the Belgians were bravefighters on one side or the other, for Belgium had been denied anational unity. Doubtless, therefore, they welcomed the establishment oftheir independent sovereignty and the era of peace which followed. Historically, they had suffered enough, with an abundance to spare, fromperpetual warfare. Their minds turned hopefully toward industrial andcommercial activity, stimulated by the natural mineral wealth of theirsoil. Thus the products of their factories reached all countries, SouthAmerica, China, Manchuria, and Central Africa, especially of lateryears, where a great territory had been acquired in the Congo. The ironand steel work of Liege was famous, Antwerp had become one of the chiefports of Europe and growing into a financial power. But owing to theconfined boundaries of Belgium, there grew to be a congestion ofpopulation. This produced a strong democratic and socialistic upliftwhich even threatened the existence of the monarchy. Also, all thatmonarchy seemed to imply. The Belgians, doubtless with memories of the past, despised and hatedthe display of military. Consequently it was only with difficulty, andin the face of popular opposition, that the Belgium Government hadsucceeded with military plans for defense, but imperfectly carried out. Herein, perhaps, we have the keynote to Belgium's desperate resistanceto the German invaders. In the light of the foregoing, it is easilyconceivable that the Germans represented to the Belgians the militaryyoke. They were determined to have none of it, upon any overtures orterms. But they relied on France and England for protection, when commonprudence should have made the mobilization of an up-to-date army of500, 000 men ready for the call to repel an invader on either of thefrontiers, instead of the practically helpless force of 110, 000. The German General Staff did not believe the Belgians intended to raisea serious barrier in their path. But with the crisis, democratic Belgiumunited in a rush to arms, which recalls similar action by the Americancolonists at the Revolution. Every form of weapon was grasped, from oldmuskets to pitchforks and shearing knives. It was remarked by a foreignwitness that in default of properly equipped armories, the Belgiansemptied the museums to confront the Germans with the strangestassortment of antiquated military tools. As testimony of Belgian feeling, the Labor party organ "Le Peuple"issued the following statement: "Why do we, as irreconcilableantimilitarists, cry 'Bravo!' from the bottom of our hearts to all thosewho offer themselves for the defense of the country? Because it is notonly necessary to protect the hearths and homes, the women and thechildren, but it is also necessary to protect at the price of our bloodthe heritage of our ancient freedom. Go, then, sons of the workers, andregister your names as recruits. We will rather die for the idea ofprogress and solidarity of humanity than live under a régime whosebrutal force and savage violence have wiped outright. " The Belgian General Staff, foreseeing dire consequences from theinvading hosts, warned all to maintain as peaceful an attitude aspossible. In spite of the efforts of Belgian officials, severe penaltieswere inflicted on the citizens. On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, a German cavalry screen, thrown inadvance of the main forces, came in touch with Belgian patrols. A seriesof engagements took place. The Germans tried to seize the bridges acrossthe Dyle at Haelen, and at Cortenachen on the Velpe, a tributary of theformer river, mainly with the object of outflanking the Belgian leftwing. The Belgians are said to have numbered some 10, 000 of all arms, and were successful in repulsing the Germans. On August 13, 1914, similar actions were continued. At Tirlemont 2, 000German cavalry swept upon the town, but were beaten off. At Eghezee onthe extreme Belgian right--close to Namur and the historic field ofRamillies--another brush with the Germans took place. Belgian cavalrycaught a German cavalry detachment bivouacked in the village. Sharpfighting through the streets ensued before the Germans withdrew. Inspite of the warning of the Belgian General Staff, and similar advanceGerman notices, the citizens of some of these and other places begansniping German patrols. Meantime, moving over the roads toward Namur, toiled the huge German42-centimeter guns. The German General Staff had taken to mind thelesson of Liege. Each gun was transported in several parts, hauled bytraction engines and forty horses. Of this, with the advance of VonKluck and Von Bülow, the Belgian General Staff was kept in totalignorance by the German screen of cavalry. So ably was this screen workperformed that the Belgians were led to believe the Germans hadsucceeded in placing no more than two divisions of cavalry, togetherwith a few detachments of infantry and artillery, on Belgian soil. They, in fact, regarded the German cavalry skirmishing as a rather clumsyoffensive. As we have seen, the resistance of Forts Boncelles and Loncin at Liegeheld back the main German advance from seven to ten days. Their fallreleased into German control the railway junction at Ans. With that wasincluded the line from Liege up the left bank of the Meuse to Namur. Also, another line direct to Brussels. On August 15, 1914, the cavalry screen was withdrawn, and four Germanarmy corps were revealed to the surprised Belgian line. In thisemergency, clearly their only hope lay with the French. In Louvain, Brussels, and Antwerp, anxious questions lay on all lips. "Why do notthe French hasten to our aid? When will they come? Will the British failus at the twelfth hour?" Eager watchers at Ostend beheld no sign of the promised transports todisembark a British army of support in the day of overwhelming need. About this time some French cavalry crossed the Sambre to join handswith the Belgian right wing near Waterloo. But it was little more than adetachment. The French General Staff was occupied with a realignment, and had decided not to advance into Belgium until they could do so inforce sufficient to cope with the Germans. The Belgian General Staff sawthere was no other course but to fall back, fighting rear-guard actionsuntil the longed-for French army was heralded by the thunder of friendlyguns. The Belgian army was thus withdrawn from the River Gethe to holdAerschot on its left stubbornly through August 14, 1914. Diest, St. Trond, and Waremme fell before the German tidal wave without resistance. Von Kluck's main army endeavored to sweep around the Belgian right atWavre, but was checked for a brief space. CHAPTER IV CAPTURE OF LOUVAIN--SURRENDER OF BRUSSELS During August 17, 1914, the German center was hurled forward inirresistible strength. The citizens of the villages in its path fledprecipitously along the roads to Brussels. At intersections all kinds ofvehicles bearing household effects, together with live stock, blockedthe way to safety. The uhlan had become a terror, but not without someprovocation. Tirlemont was bombarded, reduced, and evacuated by theBelgian troops. The latter made a vigorous defensive immediately beforeLouvain, but their weakness in artillery and numbers could not withstandthe overwhelming superiority of the Germans. They were thrust back fromthe valley of the Dyle to begin their retreat on Antwerp, chiefly by wayof Malines. This was to elude a successful German envelopment on theirLouvain right. They retired in good order, but their losses had beenconsiderable. This body was the Belgian right wing, which fell back to take up aposition before Louvain. Here it fought a well-sustained action onAugust 19, 1914, the purpose of which was to cover the retreat of themain army by way of Malines on Antwerp. The Belgian right wing thusbecame a rear guard. It withstood the German attack until the early morning of August 20, 1914, when, separated from the main body, the overpowering number ofGerman guns and men drove it back to a final stand between Louvain andBrussels. If its losses had been heavy, the carrying away of the woundedproved that it still maintained a fighting front. The retreat of themain army on Antwerp was part of Brialmont's plan for the defense ofBelgium, since the position of Brussels was not capable of a strongdefense. By this time the main army was safely passing down the valleyof the Dyle to the shelter of the Antwerp forts, leaving the right wingto its fate. Louvain thus fell to the Germans. Toward noon of August 20, 1914, the burgomaster and four sheriffsawaited at one of the city gates, the first German appearance. Thisproved to be a party of hussars bearing a white flag. They conducted theburgomaster to the waiting generals at the head of the advance column. In token of surrender the burgomaster was requested to remove his scarfof office, displaying the Belgian national colors. The German terms werethen pronounced. A free passage of troops through the city was to begranted, and 3, 000 men garrisoned in its barracks. In return, cash wasto be paid for all supplies requisitioned, and a guarantee given for thelives and property of the inhabitants. The Germans further agreed tomaintain the established civil power, but warned that hostile acts bycivilians would be severely punished. These terms were in general inconformity with the rules of war governing the military occupation of anenemy city. The Germans put forward the claim that the hostile act ofany civilian places him in the same position as a spy, to be punished bydeath. The Germans entered Louvain with bands playing, and singing in a greatswelling chorus: "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Hail to the War Lord. " Theymarched to quick time, but in passing through the great square of theGare du Nord broke into the parade goose step. In the van were suchfamous regiments as the Death's Head and Zeiten Hussars. The infantrywore heavy boots, which, falling in unison, struck the earth withresounding blows, to echo back from the house walls. Thus cavalry, infantry, and artillery poured through Louvain in a gray-green surge ofhitherto unimagined military might. This, for the latter part of the20th and the day following. At first the citizens looked on from the sidewalks in a spellboundsilence. Scarcely one seemed to possess the incentive to breathe awhisper. Only the babies and very small children regarded theawe-inspiring spectacle as something provided by way of entertainment. For the rest of the citizens it was dumbfounding beyond humancomprehension. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery rolled on unceasingly tothe clatter of horses' hoofs, the tramp of feet, the rumble of guns, andthat triumphant mighty chorus. There was nothing of aforetime plumed andgold-laced splendor of war about it, but the modern Teutonic arms ongrim business bent. Except for a curious glance bestowed here and there, the German troops marched with eyes front, and a precision as if beingreviewed by the emperor. A few shots were heard to stir instant terroramong the citizen onlookers, but these were between the German advanceguard and Belgian stragglers left behind in the city. Presently the sidestreets became dangerous to pedestrians from onrushing automobilescontaining staff officers, and motor wagons of the military train. General von Arnim, in command, ordered the hauling down of all alliedcolors, but permitted the Belgian flag to remain flying above the Hôtelde Ville. He promptly issued a proclamation warning all citizens topreserve the peace. It was both placarded and announced verbally. Thelatter was performed by a minor city official, ringing a bell as hepassed through the streets accompanied by policemen. Toward evening of August 20, 1914, the cafés and restaurants filled upwith hungry German officers and men; every hotel room was occupied, andprovision shops speedily sold out the stores on their shelves. TheGermans at first paid in cash for everything ordered, and preserved anattitude of nonaggression toward the citizens. But subconsciously thereran an undercurrent of dread insecurity. At the outset a German officerwas said to have been struck by a sniper's bullet. Somewhatconspicuously the wounded officer was borne on a litter through thestreets, followed by the dead body of his assailant. Very promptly anews curtain was drawn down around the city, cutting it off from allinformation of the world without. Artillery fire was heard. Presumablythis came from the last stand of the Belgian rear guard in a valley ofthe hilly country between Louvain and Brussels. With sustained optimismto the end, rumor had it that the artillery fire was that of French andBritish guns coming to the relief of Louvain. Toward nightfall one ortwo groups of alleged snipers were brought in from the suburbs andmarched to the place of execution. The feeling of a threatened calamity deepened. Another warningproclamation was issued ordering all citizens to give up their arms. Further, everyone was ordered to bed at eight o'clock, all windows wereto be closed and all doors unlocked. A burning lamp was to be placed ineach window. On the claim that German soldiers had been killed bycitizens, the burgomaster and several of the city officials were securedas hostages. A stern proclamation was issued threatening with immediateexecution every citizen found with a weapon in his possession or house. Every house from which a shot was fired would be burned. This was on August 22, 1914. By the evening of that day the German armyhad passed through Louvain, estimated to the number of 50, 000 men. Onlythe 3, 000 garrison remained in the city. Outwardly, the citizens resumedtheir usual daily affairs as if with a sense of relief, but whispersdropped now and then revealed an abiding terror beneath. Some timeduring the next day or two the anticipated calamity fell upon Louvain. The Germans without any proof insisted that sniping was going on, andthe military authorities seized this pretext to put into force theirthreatened reprisal. The torch was thrown into convicted houses. Largergroups of citizens were led to execution. Thereupon the "brute" passiondormant in soldiers broke the bonds of discipline. Flames burst fortheverywhere. Beneath the lurid glow cast upon the sky above Louvain wholestreets stood out in blackened ruin, and those architectural treasuresof the Halles and the University, with its famous library, weredestroyed beyond hope of repair. Only the walls of St. Peter's Church, containing many priceless paintings, remained. Meanwhile, on the morning of August 20, 1914, the German army had sweptaway the comparatively small Belgian rear-guard force before Brussels, and advanced upon the capital. On the previous 17th the King of theBelgians removed his Government to Antwerp. The diplomatic corpsfollowed. Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, however, remained. In his capacity as a neutral he had assisted stranded Germans inBrussels from hasty official and mob peril. He stayed to perform asimilar service for the Belgians and Allies. His success in theseefforts won for him German respect and the gratitude of the wholeBelgian nation. A lingering plan for defending Brussels by throwing up barricades andconstructing wire entanglements, to be manned by the Civic Guard, wasabandoned in the face of wiser counsel. It would merely have resulted ina bombardment, with needless destruction of life and property. Brusselswas defenseless. In flight before the German host, refugees of all classes were streaminginto Brussels--young and old, rich and poor, priest and layman. Nearlyall bore some burden of household treasure, many some patheticallyabsurd family heirloom. Every kind of vehicle appeared to have beencalled into use, from smart carriages drawn by heavy Flemish horses tolittle carts harnessed to dogs. Over all reigned a stupefied silence, broken only by shuffling footfalls. Among them the absence ofautomobiles and light horses would indicate all such had beencommandeered by the Belgian military authorities. Their cavalry wasbadly in need of good light-weight mounts. At crossroads passage toimagined safety was blocked by farm live stock driven by bewilderedpeasants. On Thursday morning, August 20, 1914, the burgomaster motored forth tomeet the Germans. His reception and the terms dictated by General vonArnim were almost identically the same as at Louvain. The burgomasterwas perforce compelled to accept. The scene of the entry of the Germantroops into Louvain was repeated at Brussels. There was the samestolidly silent-packed gathering of onlookers on the sidewalks, the samethundering triumphant march of the German host. Corps after corps, probably of those who had fought at Liege, and subsequently passedaround the city on the grand sweep toward the French frontier. Moreover, huge bodies of German troops were advancing up the valley of the Meuseand through the woods of the Ardennes. As in Louvain, that night thehotels, restaurants, cafés, and shops of Brussels were patronized by arush of trade which never before totaled such extent in a single day. Bills of purchase were settled by the Germans in cash. The city waspromptly assessed a war indemnity of $40, 000, 000. With the fall of Brussels, the first objective of the Germans may besaid to have been gained. But the right wing of Von Kluck's army wasstill operating northward upon Antwerp. The Belgian army had escaped himwithin the circle of Antwerp's forts, so that he detailed a force deemedto be sufficient to hold the enemy secure. Then he struck eastwardbetween Antwerp and Brussels at Alost, Ghent, and Bruges. In his advancehe swept several divisions of cavalry, also motor cars bearing machineguns. Beyond Bruges his patrol caught their first glimpse of the NorthSea, drawing in toward another much-hoped-for goal on the EnglishChannel. But the Belgian army within security of Antwerp had not been routed. Ithad retreated in good order, thanks to the resistance of its right-wingrear guard. General de Moranville promptly reenforced it with newvolunteers to the extent of some 125, 000 men. In addition, he drew upona fresh supply of ammunition, and new artillery well horsed. Hiscavalry, however, were certainly no better and probably worse than thatwith which his army had been complemented originally. On August 23, 1914, obtaining information that the Germans were inconsiderably inferior force at Malines, the Belgians began a vigorouscounteroffensive. General de Moranville drove the Germans out of Malineson the day following. That was in the nature of a master stroke, for itgave the Belgians control of the shortest railway from Germany into WestFlanders. Further, since Von Kluck had reached Bruges, andreenforcements under General von Boehn had passed across the Belgiandirect line on Brussels, the great German right wing was in danger ofbeing caught in a trap. Von Boehn, therefore, was hurriedly detachedrearward to deal with the Belgian counteroffensive. But this deprivedVon Kluck of his needed reenforcements to overcome 2, 000 British marineslanded at Ostend, that, together with the Civic Guard, had beaten backGerman patrols from the place. Had the British now landed an army atOstend, Von Kluck, between the Belgian and British forces, would havebeen in serious danger of annihilation. With the German right wing thuscrumpled, the whole of their offensive would have broken down. But theBritish did not come, and so the Belgians were left to fight it outsingle handed. This fighting went on for three weeks, with accuratedetails lacking. Mainly it was upon the line Aerschot-DyleValley-Termonde, with Antwerp for the Belgian base. On August 24, 1914, a German Zeppelin sailed over Antwerp and dropped anumber of bombs. The Belgians thrust their right wing forward andrecaptured Alost. They advanced their center to a siege of Cortenburg. Malines seemed secure. To the Belgians this was a historic triumph. Famous for its manufacture of lace under the name of Mechlin, almostevery street contained some relic of architectural interest. TheCathedral of St. Rombaut, the seat of a cardinal archbishop, held uponits walls some of Van Dyck's masterpieces. Margaret of Austria had heldcourt in its Palais de Justice. In this emergency, Von Boehn was heavily reenforced with the Third ArmyCorps, reserves from the south, and 15, 000 sailors and marines. His armywas now between 250, 000 and 300, 000 men. This placed overwhelming oddsagainst the Belgians. But for four days they fought a stubborn battle atWeerde. This was from September 13 to 16, 1914, and resulted in the capture ofthe Louvain-Malines railway by the Germans. The Belgians had now foughtto the extremity of what could be expected without aid from the Allies. The sole action left for them was to fall back for a defense of Antwerp. Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German offensive had completed itstask on Belgian soil. CHAPTER V COMING OF THE BRITISH We now come to the arrival of the British on the Continent. In using theterm British, it is expressly intended to comprise the united forces ofthe British Isles. On August 3, 1914, the British Government practically gave up hope thatwar with Germany could be avoided, though it would appear to havelingered until the ultimatum to Germany to vacate Belgian soil remainedunanswered. On that day the army was mobilized at Aldershot. On August 5, 1914, Lord Kitchener was recalled at the outset from ajourney to Egypt, and appointed Minister of War. No more fortunateselection than this could have been made. Above all else, LordKitchener's reputation had been won as an able transport officer. In theemergency, as Minister of War, the responsibility for the transport of aBritish army oversea rested in his hands. On August 5, 1914, the Houseof Commons voted a credit of $100, 000, 000, and an increase of 500, 000men to the regular forces. Upon the same day preparations went forwardfor the dispatch of an expeditionary army to France. The decision to send the army to France, instead of direct to a landingin Belgium, would seem to have been in response to an urgent Frenchentreaty that Great Britain mark visibly on French soil her unity withthat nation at the supreme crisis. For some days previously Britishreluctance to enter the war while a gleam of hope remained to confine, if not prevent, the European conflagration, had created a feeling ofdisappointment in France. The British expeditionary army consisted at first--that is previous tothe Battle of the Marne--of two and a half army corps, or fivedivisions, thus distributed: First Corps, Sir Douglas Haig; SecondCorps, General Smith-Dorrien; Fourth Division of the Third Corps, General Pulteney. The Sixth Division of the Third Corps and the FourthCorps under General Rawlinson were not sent to France till after the endof September, 1914. It contained besides about one division and a halfof cavalry under General Allenby. A British division varies from 12, 000to 15, 000 men (three infantry brigades of four regiments each; threegroups of artillery, each having three batteries of six pieces; twocompanies of sappers, and one regiment of cavalry). The force totaledsome 75, 000 men, with 259 guns. The whole was placed under the commandof Field Marshal Sir John French, with Lieutenant General Sir ArchibaldMurray, Chief of Staff. Field Marshal French was sixty-two and was two years younger than LordKitchener. His responsibilities were great, how great no one at thebeginning of the war realized his capabilities for the developing scopeof the task untried, but as a serious and courageous officer he fullymerited the honors he had already won. By August 7, 1914, Admiral Jellicoe was able to guarantee a safe passagefor the British army across the English Channel. A fortunatemobilization of the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea for maneuversshut off the German Grand Fleet from raiding the Channel. There wasnothing to criticize in the manner in which the Expeditionary Army wasthrown into France. Its equipment was ready and in all details fullyworthy of German military organization. From arms to boots--the latternot long since a scandal of shoddy workmanship--only the best materialand skill had been accepted. Its transport proved the genius of LordKitchener in that brand of military service. The railways leading to theports of embarkation, together with passenger steamships--some of themfamiliar in American ports--were commandeered as early as the 4th ofAugust. During the night of August 7, 1914, train after train filled with troopssteamed toward Southampton, and some other south-coast ports. Complements were also embarked at Dublin, Avonmouth, and the BristolChannel. In the middle of the night citizens of small towns along theroute were awakened by the unceasing rumble of trains. They had noconception of its import. They did not even realize that war hadactually burst upon the serenity of their peaceful lives. Each transportvessel was placed in command of a naval officer, and guarded in itspassage across the channel by light cruisers and torpedo destroyers. Thetransport of the whole Expeditionary Army was completed within ten days, without the loss of a man and with a precision worthy of all militarycommendation. But such secrecy was maintained that the British publicremained in ignorance of its passage until successfully accomplished. American correspondents, however, were not yet strictly censored, sothat their papers published news of it on August 9. On Sunday, August 9, 1914, two British transports were observed makingfor the harbor of Boulogne. The weather was all that could be wished, the crossing resembled a bank-holiday excursion. For some dayspreviously the French had taken a gloomy view of British support. ButFrench fishermen returning from Scotland and English ports maintainedconfidence, for had not British fishermen told them the French wouldnever be abandoned to fall a prey to the enemy. When the two advance British transports steamed into view, "LesAnglais, " at last everyone cried. At once a hugely joyful reversion offeeling. The landing of the British soldiers was made a popular ovation. Their appearance, soldierly bearing, their gentleness toward women andchildren, their care of the horses were showered with heartfelt Frenchcompliments. Especially the Scotch Highlanders, after their cautiousfashion, wondered at the exuberance of their welcome. For the braveIrish, was not Marshal MacMahon of near-Irish descent and the firstpresident of the Third Republic? The Irish alone would save thatrepublic. Women begged for the regimental badges to pin on theirbreasts. In turn they offered delicacies of all kinds to the soldiers. For the first time in a hundred years the British uniform was seen onFrench soil. Then it represented an enemy, now a comrade in arms. Thebond of union was sealed at a midnight military mass, celebrated byEnglish-speaking priests, for British and French Catholic soldiers atCamp Malbrouch round the Colonne de la Grande Armée. The two namesrecalled the greatest of British and French victories--Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde, Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena. Meanwhile, officers of the French General Staff had journeyed to Londonto confer with the British General Staff regarding the camping andalignment of the British troops. Meanwhile, also, the British reservesand territorials were called to the colors. The latter comprised themilitia, infantry and artillery, and the volunteer yeomanry cavalry, infantry and artillery. The militia was the oldest British militaryforce, officered to a great extent by retired regular army men, itspermanent staffs of noncommissioned officers were from the regular army, and it was under the direct control of the Secretary of State for War. The volunteer infantry, artillery, and yeomanry cavalry were on asomewhat different basis, more nearly resembling the American militia, but the British militia were linked with regular-line battalions. Thereserves, militia and volunteers, added approximately 350, 000well-trained men for immediate home defense. On Sunday, August 17, 1914, it was officially announced that the wholeof the British Expeditionary Army had landed in France. Conferencesbetween the British and French General Staffs resulted in the Britisharmy being concentrated first at Amiens. From that point it was toadvance into position as the left wing of the united French and Britisharmies, though controlled by their separate commanders. The French Fifth Army had already moved to hold the line of the RiverSambre, with its right in touch with Namur. Cavalry patrols had beenthrown forward to Ligny and Gembloux, where they skirmished with uhlans. Charleroi was made French headquarters. It was the center of extensivecoal-mining and steel industry. Pit shafts and blast furnaces dominatedthe landscape. Historically it was the ground over which Blücher'sFourth Army Corps marched to the support of the British at Waterloo. Nowthe British were supporting the French upon it against their formerally. On Thursday, August 20, 1914, the British took up their position on theFrench left. Their line ran from Binche to Mons, then within the Frenchfrontier stretched westward to Condé. From Mons to Condé it followed theline of the canal, thus occupying an already constructed barrier. Formerly Condé was regarded as a fortress of formidable strength, butits position was not held to be of value in modern strategy. Its forts, therefore, had been dismantled of guns, and its works permitted to fallinto disuse. But the fortress of Maubeuge lay immediately in rear of theBritish line. In rear again General Sordêt held a French cavalry corpsfor flank actions. In front, across the Belgian frontier, Generald'Amade lay with a French brigade at Tournai as an outpost. Before proceeding to British headquarters, General French held aconference with General Joffre, Commander in Chief of all the Frencharmies. Until the outbreak of the war, General Joffre was practicallyunknown to the French people. He was no popular military idol, noboulevard dashing figure. But he had seen active service with credit, and had climbed, step by step, with persevering study of militaryscience into the council of the French General Staff. As a strategisthis qualities came to be recognized as paramount in that body. A fewyears previously he had been intrusted with the reorganization of theFrench army, and his plans accepted. Therefore, when war with Germanybecame a certainty, it was natural the supreme command of the Frencharmy should fall to General Joffre. CHAPTER VI CAMPAIGNS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE The French staff apparently had designed a campaign in Upper Alsace andthe Vosges, but the throwing of a brigade from Belfort across thefrontier on the extreme right of their line on August 6 would seem tohave been undertaken chiefly with a view of rousing patrioticenthusiasm. French aeroplane scouts had brought in the intelligence thatonly small bodies of German troops occupied the left bank of the Rhine. Therefore the opportunity was presented to invade the upper part of thelost province of Alsace--a dramatic blow calculated to arouse the Frenchpatriotic spirit. Since the Germans had expended hardly any effort inits defense, leaving, as it were an open door, it may have been part ofthe strategic idea of their General Staff to draw a French army intothat region, with the design of inflicting a crushing defeat. ThusFrench resistance in the southern Vosges would have been weakened, thecapture of Belfort, unsupported by its field army, a probability, and adrive beyond into France by the German forces concentrated atNeubreisach made triumphant. Doubtless the French General Staff fullygrasped the German intention, but considered a nibble at the alluringGerman bait of some value for its sentimental effect upon the French andAlsatians. Otherwise the invasion of Upper Alsace with a brigade wasdoomed at the outset to win no military advantage. On August 7, 1914, the French dispersed a German outpost intrenchedbefore Altkirch. Some cavalry skirmishing followed, which resulted inthe French gaining possession of the city. As was to be expected, thecitizens of Altkirch welcomed the French with enthusiasm. The followingmorning the French were permitted an uncontested advance to Mülhausen. That such an important manufacturing center as Mülhausen should haveremained unfortified within striking distance of the French frontier, that the French entered it without being compelled to fire a shot, was asurprise to every one with the probable exception of the German andFrench General Staffs. The citizens of Mülhausen repeated the joyous ovation bestowed on theFrench troops in Altkirch. The French uniform was hailed as the visiblesign of deliverance from German dominion, and the restoration of thelost province to their kindred of the neighboring republic. The climaxof this ebullition was reached in a proclamation issued by direction ofGeneral Joffre. "People of Alsace, " it ran, "after forty years of wearywaiting, French soldiers again tread the soil of your native country. They are the pioneers in the great work of redemption. What emotion andwhat pride for them! To complete the work they are ready to sacrificetheir lives. The French nation with one heart spurs them forward, and onthe folds of their flag are inscribed the magical names Liberty andRight. Long live France! Long live Alsace!" During August 8, 1914, some intermittent fighting went on in thevicinity of Mülhausen, which seems to have given the French general incommand the impression that the Germans were not eager for acounterattack. In turn the Germans may well have been puzzled that aFrench brigade instead of an army was thrown into Upper Alsace for thebait of Mülhausen. Possibly they waited a little for the main body, which did not come. Sunday, August 9, 1914, revealed the Germans in such overpoweringstrength, that the French were left no other choice than to beat ahasty retreat. They accordingly fell back upon Altkirch, to intrench afew miles beyond their own border. Thus ended the French initialoffensive. In military reckoning it achieved little of value. Meanwhile in the Ardennes on August 13, 1914, the German Crown Prince, commanding the Fourth Army, advanced from Luxemburg into the southernArdennes and captured Neufchâteau. His further objective was to breakthrough the French line somewhere near the historic ground of Sedan. Butat this point some change in the German plan seems to have taken place. From the maze enveloping the opening events of the war, one can onlyconjecture a reason which would move such an irrevocable body as theGerman General Staff to alter a long-fixed plan. Probably, then, theunanticipated strength of Belgian resistance foreshadowed the summoningof reenforcements to Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German army. Wehave seen, in fact, how he came to be near a desperate need at Bruges, and only the heavy reenforcement of Von Boehn enabled that general todeliver a final defeat to the Belgian field army at Weerde. Whatever thecause of change of plan may have been, important forces attached to orintended for the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and the crown princewere withdrawn to support the armies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow. Theseforces went to form a unit under General von Hausen, a veteran ofSadowa. This change left the Saxon army of the crown prince with hardlysufficient strength for a main attack on the French line at Sedan, butstill formidable enough to feel its way cautiously through the Ardennesto test the French concentration on the central Meuse's west bank. Whenthe German right had finally settled Liege, the Saxon army could thenjoin in the united great movement on Paris. Early on the morning of August 15, 1914, a French detachment of half aninfantry regiment, thrown into Dinant, was surprised by a mobile Saxonadvance force of cavalry, infantry and artillery. Dinant lies across theMeuse eighteen miles south of Namur. It is a picturesque ancient town, the haunt of artists and tourists. In the vicinity are the estates ofseveral wealthy Belgian families, particularly the thirteenth-centurychâteau of Walzin, once the stronghold of the Comtes d'Ardennes. Abridge crosses the Meuse at Dinant, which sits mainly on the east bankwithin shadow of precipitous limestone cliffs. A stone fort moreimposing in appearance than modern effectiveness crowns the highestcliff summit overlooking Dinant. The Germans came by way of the eastbank to occupy the suburbs. They presently captured the fort and hoistedthe German flag. Meanwhile the French took possession of the bridge, being at a considerable disadvantage from German rifle fire from thecliffs. The solid stone abutments of the bridge, however, enabled theFrench to hold that position until strong reenforcements arrived earlyin the afternoon. While French infantry cleared the environs of Germans, their artillery bombarded the fort from the west bank. Their shellsplayed havoc with the old fort defenses, soon compelling its evacuationby the Germans. One of the first French artillery shells blew intoshreds the German flag flying triumphantly over the fort, thus deprivingthe French of the satisfaction of hauling it down. Toward evening theGermans retreated toward the Lesse, followed by the French. In previouswars the forces engaged were of sufficient strength to designate Dinanta battle, but with the vast armies of the present conflict it sinks tothe military grade of a mere affair. However, it is called by the Frenchthe Battle of Dinant. The troops which entered Alsace on August 7, 1914, to the number of18, 000 to 20, 000, belonged to the army of the frontier. This first army, which was under the orders of General Dubail, wasintrusted with the mission of making a vigorous attack and of holding infront of it the greatest possible number of German forces. The generalin command of this army had under his orders, if the detachment fromAlsace be included, five army corps and a division of cavalry. Hisorders were to seek battle along the line Saarburg--Donon, in the BrucheValley, at the same time possessing himself of the crests of the Vosgesas well as the mountain passes. These operations were to have as theirtheaters: (1) the Vosges Mountains, (2) the plateau of Lorraine to thenorthwest of Donon, and (3) the left bank of the Meurthe. This left bankof the Meurthe is separated from the valley of the Moselle by abristling slope of firs, which is traversed by a series of passages, thedefiles of Chipotte, of the Croix Idoux, of the Haut Jacques d'Anozel, of Vanemont, of Plafond. In these passes, when the French returned tothe offensive in September, 1914, furious combats took place. The Germanforces opposed to this first army consisted of five active army corpsand a reserve corps. The first French army, after a violent struggle, conquered the passes ofthe Vosges, but the conquest was vigorously opposed and took more timethan the French had reckoned on. As soon as it had become master of theDonon and the passes, the first French army pushed forward into thedefile of Saarburg. At St. Blaise it won the first German colors, tookBlamont and Cirey (August 15, 1914), seized the defiles north of thecanal of the Marne and the Rhine, and reached Saarburg. Here aconnection was established with the army of Lorraine, which hadcommenced its operations on the 14th. A violent battle ensued, knownunder the name of the Battle of Saarburg. The left wing of the Frencharmy attacked August 19, 1914; it hurled itself at the fortifiedpositions, which were copiously fringed with heavy artillery. In spiteof the opposition it made progress to the northwest of Saarburg. On the 20th the attack was renewed, but from the beginning it wasevident that it could not succeed and that the duty intrusted to theEighth Army Corps of opening up the way for the cavalry corps could notbe accomplished. This army corps had gone through a trying ordeal as aresult of the bombardment by the heavy German artillery established infortified positions, covering distances all measured in advance, withevery group and French battery presenting a sure target and the actionof the French cannon rendered useless. If the left wing of the First Army found itself checked, the center andthe right on the other hand were in an excellent position and were ableto advance. But at this point (August 21, 1914) the Second French Armythe army of Lorraine met a serious reverse in the region of Morhangeand was compelled to retreat. This retreat left the flank of the FirstArmy gravely unprotected, and as a consequence this army was alsoobliged to fall back. This rear-guard movement was accomplished over avery difficult piece of country down to the Baccarat-Ban deSapt-Provenchère line, south of the Col du Bonhomme. It was foundnecessary to abandon the Donon and the Col de Sapt. The task committed to the Second Army, that of Lorraine under DeCastlenau, was to protect Nancy, then to transfer itself to the east, advancing later to the north and attacking in a line parallel to thattaken by the First Army on the Dieuze-Château Salins front in thegeneral direction of Saarbrücken. Its mission was therefore at once bothoffensive and defensive: to cover Nancy and continue toward the west theattack of the First Army. After having repulsed, August 10 and 11, 1914, the strong German attacksin the region of Spincourt and of Château Salins the Second Army tookthe offensive and went forward almost without stopping during four daysof uninterrupted fighting. Penetrating into Lorraine, which had beenannexed, it reached the right bank of the Selle, cut off Marsal andChâteau Salins, and pushed forward in the direction of Morhange. Theenemy fell back; at Marsal he even left behind enormous quantities ofammunition. As a matter of fact, he fell back on positions that had been carefullyfortified in advance and whence his artillery could bombard at an almostperfectly accurate range. August 20, 1914, made a violent counterattackon the canal of Salines and Morhange in the Lake district. The immediatevicinity of Metz furnished the German army with a vast quantity of heavyartillery, which played a decisive rôle in the Battle of Morhange. TheFrench retreated, and during this rear-guard movement the frontier cityof Lunéville was for some days occupied by the Germans. Thus the First and Second Armies failed in their offensive and sawthemselves obliged to retreat, but their retreat was accomplished underexcellent circumstances, and the troops, after a couple of days of rest, found themselves in a condition again to take the offensive. The FirstArmy gave energetic support to the Second Army, which was violentlyattacked by the Germans in the second week of August. The German attack, which was first arrayed against Nancy, turned more and more to the east. The battle, at first waged in the Mortagne basin, was gradually extendedto the deep woods on the left bank of the Meurthe and on to Chipotte, Nompatelize, etc. The battles that have been named the Battle ofMortagne, the Battle of the Meurthe, the Battle of the Vosges, all wagedby the First Army, were extremely violent in the last week of August andthe first two weeks of September. These combats partly coincided withthe Battle of the Marne; they resulted, at the end of that battle, inthe German retreat. The Second Army renewed the offensive August 25, 1914; it decisively checked the march of the German army and commencedto force it back. The instructions issued to General de Castelnau directed him everywhereto march forward and make direct attacks. The day of August 25, 1914, was a successful day for the French; everywhere the Germans wererepulsed. From August 26 till September 2, 1914, the Second Armycontinued its attacks. At this point the commander in chief having need of important forces athis center and at his right relieved the Second Army of much of itsstrength. This did not prevent it from engaging in the great Battle ofNancy and winning it. It was September 4, 1914, that this battle beganand it continued till the 11th, the army sustaining the incessantassaults of the Germans on its entire front advanced from GrandCouronne. The German emperor was personally present at this battle. There was at Dieuze a regiment of white cuirassiers at whose head it washis intention to make a triumphal entry into Nancy. Heavy Germanartillery of every caliber made an enormous expenditure of ammunition;on the Grand Mont d'Amance alone, one of the most important positions ofthe Grand Couronne of Nancy, more than 30, 000 howitzer shells were firedin two days. The fights among the infantry were characterized on theentire front by an alternation of failure and success, every point beingtaken, lost and retaken at intervals. The struggle attained to especial violence in the Champenoux Forest. OnSeptember 5, 1914, the enemy won Maixe and Remereville, which they lostagain in the evening, but they were unable to dislodge the French fromthe ridge east of the forest of Champenoux. The Mont d'Amance wasviolently bombarded; a German brigade marched on Pont-à-Mousson. TheFrench retook Crevic and the Crevic Wood. On the 7th the Germans directed on Ste. Geneviève, north of the GrandCouronne, a very violent attack, which miscarried. Ste. Geneviève waslost for a time, but it was retaken on the 8th; more than 2, 000 Germanslay dead on the ground. The same day the enemy threw themselvesfuriously on the east front, the Mont d'Amance, and La Neuvelotte. Southof the Champenoux Forest the French were compelled to retire; they werethrown back on the ridge west of the forest. On the 9th a newbombardment of Mont d'Amance, a struggle of extreme violence, took placeon the ridge west of the forest of Champenoux, the French gainingground. General Castelnau decided to take the direct offensive, theGermans giving signs of great fatigue. On the 12th they retired veryrapidly. They evacuated Lunéville, a frontier town, where they left agreat quantity of arms and ammunition. The French began immediately topursue them, the Germans withdrawing everywhere over the frontier. CHAPTER VII SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR When the Germans occupied Brussels on August 20, 1914, we observed thatcorps after corps did not enter the city, but swept to the south. Thiswas Von Kluck's left wing moving to attack the Allies on the Sambre-Monsfront. The forces which passed through Brussels were Von Kluck'scenter, advancing south by east to fall in line beside the right wing, which had mainly passed between Brussels and Antwerp to the capture ofBruges and Ghent. The whole line when re-formed on the French frontierwould stretch from Mons to the English Channel--the great right wing ofthe German armies. Meanwhile, Von Bülow's second army had advanced up the valley of theMeuse, with its right sweeping the Hisbaye uplands. Some part of thisarmy may have been transported by rail from Montmédy. Its generaladvance in columns was directed chiefly upon the Sambre crossings. AsVon Kluck's wide swing through Belgium covered a greater distance, VonBülow's army was expected to strike the Allies some twenty-four hoursearlier. Its march, therefore, was in the nature of an onrush. But Von Bülow was now in the full tide of fighting strength--an amazingspectacle to chance or enforced witnesses. Well may the terrifiedpeasants have stood hat in hand in the midst of their ruined villages. Any door not left open was immediately broken down and the interiorsearched. Here and there a soldier could be seen carrying a souvenirfrom some wrecked château. But for the most part everyone fled frombefore its path, leaving it silent and abandoned. The field gray-greenuniforms were almost invisible in cover, in a half light, or whenadvancing through mist. No conceivable detail seemed to have beenoverlooked. Each man carried a complete equipment down to handy trifles, the whole weighed to the fraction of an ounce, in carefully estimatedproportions. But this was not enough. Waiting for each column to pass were men withbuckets of drinking water, into which the soldiers dipped their aluminumcups. Temporary field post offices were established in advance, so thatmessages could be gathered in as the columns passed. Here and there weremen to offer biscuits and handfuls of prunes. In methodical, machine-like progress came the ammunition wagons, commissariat carts, field kitchens, teams of heavy horses attached to pontoons, tractionengines hauling enormous siege guns, motor plows for excavatingtrenches, aeroplanes, carriages containing surgeons, automobiles forthe commanders, and motor busses in which staff officers could be seenstudying their maps. On some of these vehicles were chalkedBerlin-Paris. No branch of the service was absent, no serviceable partif it overlooked--not even a complement of grave diggers. It movedforward always at an even pace, as if on parade, with prearrangedsignals passed down the line when there was any obstacle, a descent orbend in the road. The tramp of many thousands cast into the atmosphere clouds of finedust, but even those in rear marched through it as if their lungs weremade of steel. No permission was granted to open out for the circulationof air, though it was the month of August. It is safe to assert therewas not a single straggler in Von Bülow's army. At the first sign of ithe was admonished with a vigor to deter his comrades. Discipline wasseverely maintained. At every halt the click of heels, and rattle ofarms in salute went on down the line with the sharp delivery of orders. On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, the town of Huy, situated midway betweenLiege and Namur, was seized. It possessed an old citadel, but it wasdisarmed, and used now only as a storehouse. Some Belgian detachmentsoffered a slight resistance at the bridge, but were speedily driven off. The capture of Huy gave the Germans control of the railway fromAix-la-Chapelle to France, though broken at Liege by the still standingnorthern forts. But they secured a branch line of more immediateservice, running from Huy into Central Belgium. On August 15, 1914, Von Bülow's vanguard came within sight of Namur. Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts. Beganthen the siege of Namur. Namur, being the second fortress hope of theAllies--the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to swing hisarmy into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing Germans--abrief survey of the city and fortifications will be necessary. Thesituation of the city is not as imposing as that of Liege. For the mostpart it sits on a hillside declivity, to rest in the angle formed by thejunction of the Sambre and Meuse. It is a place of some historic andindustrial importance, though in the latter respect not so well known asLiege. To the west, however, up the valley of the Sambre, the countrypresents the usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tallchimneys issuing clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightlydébris. While away to the north stretches the great plain of CentralBelgium, southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospectin wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east, theMeuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege. But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its beingthe second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan was that ofLiege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on the samearmor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in number, fourmajor forts and five _fortins_. The distance between each fort was onthe average two and a half miles, with between two and a half to fivemiles from the city as the center of the circumference. Facing Von Bülow's advance, fort Cognelée protected the Brusselsrailway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between it andthe left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed by the Meuse, forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring. Again in the angle ofthe Sambre and Meuse forts St. Héribert and Malonne protected the city. North of the Sambre, forts Suarlée and Emines completed the circle. In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. Theresistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion, andsome days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command of thegarrison of Namur, which comprised from 25, 000 to 30, 000 men. Doubtlessreports had come to him of the situation at Liege. He immediately set towork to overcome the cause of the failure of Brialmont's plan at Liege, by constructing trenches between the forts, protected by barbed wireentanglements, and mines in advance of the German approach. As hiscircumference of defense was less than that of Liege, his force promisedto be capable of a more prolonged resistance. Besides the Allies were close at hand. Only eighteen miles separatedhim from strong detachments of French infantry and artillery at Dinant. As we have seen French cavalry had been thrown forward as far asGembloux on the road to Brussels, but ten miles to the northeast ofNamur. Somewhere between that place and Charleroi French Chasseursd'Afrique had advanced to occupy outpost positions. His positionappeared by no means hopeless--considerably better than the unsupportedfield army at Liege. The armor of his forts was calculated to withstandthe 36-lb. Shells of the heaviest German fieldpieces, but comparativelyslight damage was anticipated from the known heavier howitzers. If theGermans purposed to assault Namur in mass formation, as they had done atLiege, General Michel had every reason to feel confident he couldrepulse them with tremendous losses. But the Germans had learned a severely taught lesson at Liege. They hadno intention of repeating those tactics. Behind a remarkable screen ofsecrecy, they managed to conceal from General Michel--as they did fromthe Allies--the existence of their enormous siege guns. Whether theybrought into action at Namur their famous 42-centimeters, capable ofthrowing a shell of high explosive power weighing 2, 500 lbs. , isuncertain. In fact, it is still doubtful where they were first fired atthe allied enemy. Two are said to have assisted in the final destructionof the northern forts of Liege, and two were seen rolling over the fieldof Waterloo. The Germans remained silent upon the subject, and nothingdefinite about their first discharge was disclosed. But unquestionablytheir fire was capable of demolishing into ruin any fort on earth withina short period. It is certain, however, the Germans brought againstNamur their 28-centimeter guns, and probably some of 21-centimetercaliber. These artillery weapons were quite formidable enough to reducethe Namur forts. The former threw a shell of 750 pounds from a range ofthree miles--beyond the reach of the Namur guns. The latter projectedshells of 250 pounds. The Germans are said to have employed thirty-twoof the heavier caliber guns, and a large number of 21-centimeter. Thus Namur was doomed before the bombardment commenced. Von Bülow'sleft wing advanced up the Meuse north bank from Huy, some part of itcrossing to the south bank at Ardenne, where it came in touch with theSaxon army. At sundown of August 20, 1914, Von Bülow was in position before Namur, three miles from its defenses. Darkness fell upon a hot and sultryAugust atmosphere. Presently the flashes and boom of the German gunsbegan a bombardment of the trenches between forts Cognelée andMarchovelette. It continued through the night. But the Belgian fortressguns were outranged. It would have been a mere waste of ammunition toreply. Neither could the Belgian infantry venture on a counterattack, for the Germans were clearly observed in overwhelming strength. At theoutset the Germans devoted their efforts to clearing the trenches of theBelgian infantry, leaving the forts for subsequent demolition. Theunfortunate Belgian infantry, therefore, could do nothing but fireintermittent rifle volleys, without any effect upon the Germans. Theybravely bore this storm of shells for ten hours. Not a man who liftedhis head above the German machine gun-swept parapets but was notinstantly killed or wounded. Thus the majority of the officers werekilled, and the ranks within the trenches decimated. Toward morning on August 21, 1914, the Belgians could stand the tornadoof death no longer. The demoralized troops fled from the trenches, leaving the gap between forts Cognelée and Marchovelette open. TheGermans then opened fire on the forts. In comparison with the new Germansiege howitzers, the old-fashioned Belgian guns proved to be weakweapons. The tremendous pounding of the German shells not only smashedthe fort cupolas, and crumpled into ruin the interior stone and steelprotective armor, but quickly put the Belgian guns out of action. Thuswhile fort Maizeret received some 1, 200 German shells at the speed oftwenty to the minute, it was able to reply with only ten shots. FortsMarchovelette and Maizeret were the first to fall. Seventy-five men ofthe Marchovelette garrison were found dead amid its ruins--nearly itstotal complement. [Illustration: French Invasion of Alsace-lorraine. ] Early on Friday morning of August 21, 1914, forts Andoy, Dave, St. Héribert and Malonne were subjected to a similar furious bombardment. After three hours of the cannonade Andoy, Dave and St. Héribertsurrendered. During the morning the Germans thrust a force into thesouthern angle of the Sambre and Meuse. Here the Belgian infantryoffered a vigorous resistance. It was hoped that the French at Dinantwould hasten to their relief. But Dinant was for the second time withina few days the scene of conflict. Some 6, 000 French Turcos and artillerydid arrive, but too late to be of use in helping to save Namur. Shellsnow began to drop in the city while aeroplanes flung down bombs. Athunderstorm rumbled in combination with the continuous roar of theGerman guns. A panic took hold of the citizens. Distracted men, womenand children huddled together in spellbound terror, or sought theshelter of their cellars. The more superstitious pronounced this to bethe end of all things, from the eclipse of the sun which darkened thesky. Fort Malonne succumbed sometime during the afternoon of August 21, 1914. As at Liege, with General Leman, so in Namur General Michel foresaw thecity and forts' fate was imminent. Only the northwest forts Suarlée, Emines and Cognelée held out. The Belgians and French had been defeatedby the Germans in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse. The horizonrevealed no sign of a French army advancing. General Michel, therefore, decided upon the evacuation of the city by the Belgian infantry. It wassuccessfully accomplished, though even more in the nature of a flightthan at Liege. But General Michel went with them, instead of remaining, like General Leman, to fight the defense of his fortress to the last. The retreating Belgians on August 22, 1914, had some adventurouswandering before them. They had first to cut their way through a body ofGerman troops, then to become involved with a French force nearCharleroi. It took them seven days to reach Rouen by way of Amiens. There they were embarked for sea transport to Ostend. At Ostend, theyjoined the main Belgian army after its retreat from Antwerp. On Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, the Germans began the bombardment ofFort Suarlée. This fort repeated the heroic resistance of FortBoncelles at Liege. It held out until the afternoon of August 25. It wasapparently then blown up by the explosion of its own magazine, thusagain repeating the end of Fort Loncin at Liege. Meantime the Germanshad succeeded in reducing Forts Cognelée and Emines. The Germans entered Namur on the afternoon of August 23, 1914. Thereseems to have been some oversight in the plan, for the advance guardfound themselves under fire of their own guns directed upon the citadeland the Grande Place. This, however, was speedily rectified. Theirbehavior was much the same as at Louvain and Brussels. They marched inwith bands playing and singing patriotic songs. Proclamations were atonce issued warning the citizens not to commit any hostile act. Theinhabitants were far too cowed to contemplate anything but submission. Good discipline was preserved. The city took fire that night probably bydeliberate design of the invaders. The citizens were induced to comeforth from their cellars and hiding places to reopen the cafés andshops. General von Bülow entered Namur on Monday morning August 24, 1914. Hewas accompanied by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, recently appointedGovernor General of Belgium. Previous to the former Balkan War he hadbeen employed in reorganizing the Turkish army. An onlooker in Namurthus describes the German Field Marshal:--"An elderly gentleman coveredwith orders, buttoned in an overcoat up to his nose, above which gleameda pair of enormous spectacles. " General Michel attributed his defeat to the German siege guns. The firewas so continuous upon the trenches that it was impossible to hold them, and the forts simply crumpled under the storm of shells. But back ofGeneral Michel's plea the allied Intelligence Departments lackedefficiency or energy, or both, in not gaining more than a hint, at anyrate, of the enormous German siege guns until they were actuallythundering at the gates. CHAPTER VIII BATTLE OF CHARLEROI Toward the end of the third week of August, 1914, the atmosphere ofevery European capital became tense with the realization that amomentous crisis was impending. It was known that the French-Britisharmies confronted German armies of equal, if not of superior strength. In Paris and London the military critics wrote optimistically that theGermans were marching into a trap. The British army had arrived at the front in splendid fighting trim. Itwas difficult to restrain the impetuous valor of the French soldiers. The skies were bright and there was confidence that the Germans wouldunquestionably meet with a crushing defeat. Let us glance at the line ofthe French and British armies stretched along the Belgian frontier. Itran from within touch of Namur up the right bank of the Sambre, throughCharleroi to Binche and Mons, thence by way of the coal barge canal justwithin the French frontier to Condé. For the choice of a great battleground there was nothing particularly attractive about it in a militarysense. There is evidence to show in an official communiqué from General Joffrepublished on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be merely the leftwing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on the adopted Germanplan--from Condé to Belfort. "An army, " runs the communiqué, "advancingfrom the northern part of the Woevre and moving on Neufchâteau isattacking the German forces which have been going through the Duchy ofLuxemburg and are on the right bank of the Samoy. Another army from theregion of Sedan is traversing the Belgian Ardennes and attacking theGerman forces marching between the Lesse and the Meuse. A third armyfrom the region of Chimay has attacked the German right between theSambre and the Meuse. It is supported by the English army from theregion of Mons. " These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalryskirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made plainin throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier into Lignyand Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels. This we havepreviously noted in another connection. The rout of the French army inLorraine, however, put an end to the grand Condé-Belfort offensive. Thus the Namur-Condé line became a main defensive position instead of anoffensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As such it waswell enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur held secure. Liegehad already proved its vulnerability, but it would seem that the FrenchGeneral Staff joined with General Michel, the Commander of Namur, inbelieving the Namur forts would give a better account. The FrenchGeneral Staff were informed of the approximate strength of the advancingarmies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow, and had nothing to fear frominferiority in numbers. The staff never gave out the strength of theirforces, but there is reason for believing the great armies were nearlyequally matched after mobilization--about 1, 200, 000 men. Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the Frenchright. It has been established that woods, particularly in summer, formthe best cover from the observation or attacks of airmen. The spreading, leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate visually from a height of even afew hundred feet, at least to obtain accurate information of what istranspiring beneath. French air scouts brought in correct information that they had seen thearmies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince massed along thesouthern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under the foliagethere was another army unseen--that of General von Hausen. The Frenchmoved their Fifth Army up to position on the line of the Sambre. Theyadvanced their Third Army, commanded by General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg, and their Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary across the RiverSemois to watch the Meuse left bank and gain touch with GeneralLanzerac. General de Cary came from Sedan, throwing out detachmentsupon the Meuse left bank. These operations were to confront the armiesof the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince. But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the army ofGeneral von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not distinguish itfrom the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and the crown prince, amidthe forest of the Ardennes, or they did not observe it at all. To thearmy of General von Hausen there clings a good deal of mystery. Whenlast noted by us, previous to the minor battle of Dinant, it had beenformed by forces drawn from the armies of the Duke of Württemberg andcrown prince. Ostensibly at that time, it was destined to support, as aseparate field force, the armies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow. Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold out. Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march on CentralBelgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength seemed urgent. But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one after the other underthe fire of the German siege guns. General von Hausen was released foraction elsewhere. Thus we may assume, he was ordered to follow thearmies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince down through theArdennes to strike the Meuse south of Namur. By this time he had beensubstantially reenforced. Now under his command were the completeTwelfth and Nineteenth Corps, and the Eleventh Reserve Corps. Also acavalry division of the Prussian Guard, with some other detachments ofcavalry. His Eleventh Reserve Corps were Hessians, the Twelfth andNineteenth Corps were Saxons. The latter two corps were regarded asamong the best in the German army. In the Franco-Prussian War theyfought with conspicuous bravery through every battle in which they wereengaged. They won the battle for Prussia at Gravelotte by turning theFrench right and capturing St. Privat. They marched to Sedan under thecrown prince--subsequently the Emperor Frederick--to occupy the firstline in the hard fighting of the Givonne Valley. During the siege ofParis they occupied a part of the German northern line, finally to marchin triumph into Paris. This infantry and cavalry of the Prussian Guardstiffened Von Hausen's force into an army of battle strength. We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the Frenchdefensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's army. However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French GeneralStaff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently Generalvon Bülow regarded them as little more than passing targets for hissiege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple mathematicalcalculation of almost the number of shells necessary to fire, and thehours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts to masses of débris. We can picture General von Bülow as he sat in the motor car with Marshalvon der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned up to hisnose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion ran mainlyupon the impending attack of their Second Army on the French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of the armies of the Dukeof Württemberg and crown prince advancing away to their left upon theforces of the French Generals Ruffey and de Cary. But there wasapparently a German gap here between Von Bülow's army and the armies ofthe Duke of Württemberg and crown prince, though we noticed previouslyVon Bülow's army came in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huyand Namur, when a detachment of Von Bülow's left wing was thrown acrossthe Meuse at Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme rightresting on the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the"trap" military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quitelikely the two German generals Von Bülow and Von der Goltz, chatting intheir motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch ofimagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the oldgentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name of VonHausen was mentioned. The German attack on the French right began early in the morning ofFriday, August 21, 1914. A party of German hussars crossed the Meuse, rode through Charleroi, and trotted on toward the Sambre. At first theywere mistaken for a British cavalry patrol. Probably the populace inCharleroi were not sufficiently familiar at that time with the Britishhussar uniform to distinguish it from the German. In all armies hussaruniforms bear a close resemblance. A French officer, however, presentlydetected the situation. After a skirmish the German hussars were drivenoff with the loss of a few killed and wounded. But the raid evidentlycame out of the gap as a surprise to the French. The citizens werepromptly ordered to their homes. Barricades were raised in the streets, and mitrailleuses were placed in sweeping positions. An artilleryengagement began at Jemappe, nine miles above Namur on the left bank ofthe Sambre, between Von Bülow's vanguard and the main French right. Later in the day Von Bülow's vanguard artillery had advanced to openfire on Charleroi and Thuin, seven miles beyond. On Saturday, August 22, 1914, Von Bülow attacked Charleroi in fullstrength. As we have seen, he had already practically settled withNamur. Their main assault on Saturday was delivered on the Sambrebridges at Chatelet and Thuin, below and above Charleroi, respectively. Sometime on Saturday they succeeded in crossing to turn Charleroi intoone of the most frightful street battle grounds in history. The conflictraged for the possession of iron foundries, glass works, and otherfactories. The thoroughfares were swept by storms of machine-gun fire. Tall chimneys toppled over and crashed to the ground, burying defendersgrouped near under piles of débris. Desperate hand-to-hand encounterstook place in workshops, electric-power stations, and manufacturingplants. The normal whir of machinery, now silent, was succeeded by thecrack and spitting of continuous rifle fire. The French-Turco and Zouave troops fought with savage ferocity, withgleaming eyes, using bayonets and knives to contest alleys andpassageways. House doors were battered in to reach those firing fromupper windows. Roofs and yard walls were scaled in chase of fleeingparties. The Germans were driven out of Charleroi several times, only toreturn in stronger force. Similarly with the French. With each changeof victors, the losing side turned to bombard with a torrent ofartillery shells the war-engulfed city. At nightfall on August 22, 1914, Charleroi burst into flames. A dreadand significant glow fell upon the sky. Absent were the usualintermittent flare of blast furnaces. The greater part of Charleroi hadbecome a heap of ruins. Those of its citizens still alive cowered inholes or corners for shelter. The battle of Charleroi went on throughout the night. Early on themorning of Sunday, August 23, 1914, Von Hausen swept down through thegap between the armies of Von Bülow and the Duke of Württemberg. Hecrossed the Meuse, drove from before him the French detachments watchingit, and advanced to attack the rear of the French right. Von Hausen took the French at Charleroi completely by surprise. At themoment they could comprehend neither where he came from nor the measureof his strength. But he was in army force. The French were compelled to withdraw their right from Charleroi. VonHausen seized the advantage to hurl his forces upon their rear, whileVon Bülow thundered in assault more vigorously than ever on the Frenchfront. A powerful force was hurled upon them from an unexpecteddirection. Presently the retreat of the French Fifth Army was threatenedby the two Saxon corps of Von Hausen's army, pressing on the Frenchright flank and rear. In this emergency the retirement of the FrenchFifth Army appears to have been undertaken with spontaneous realizationof utmost danger. It gave way before the attacks of Von Bülow and VonHausen to move southward, leaving their British left wing withoutinformation of defeat. CHAPTER IX BATTLE OF MONS On Friday, August 21, 1914, the British force began to take position onthe French left, forming the line Binche-Mons-Condé. When finallyconcentrated it comprised the First and Second Army Corps, and GeneralAllenby's cavalry division. The regiments forming the cavalry divisionwere the Second Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, Fourth Hussars, SixthDragoon Guards, with a contingent of the Household Guards. The FirstArmy Corps was given the right of the line from Binche to Mons. It wascommanded by Sir Douglas Haig. He was a cavalry officer like thecommander in chief, and a comparatively young man for such aresponsibility, but had seen active service with credit. His corps wascomprised of six guards' battalions. The First Black Watch, SecondMunster Fusiliers, The Royal Sussex, North Lancashire, Northamptons, Second King's Royal Rifles, Third West Surreys, The South WalesBorderers, Gloucesters, First Welsh Regiment, Highland Light Infantry, Connaught Rangers, Liverpools, South Staffords, Berkshires, and FirstKing's Royal Rifles. The First Irish Guards went into action for thefirst time in its history. The second corps extended from Mons to Condé, commanded by Sir HoraceSmith-Dorrien. General Dorrien was a west of England man, and turningfifty-six. He had seen active service in the Zulu War, Egypt, Sudan, theChitral Relief Force, and Tirah campaign. He had occupied the positionsof adjutant general in India, commander of the Quetta division, andcommander in chief at Aldershot. He was recognized as a serious militarystudent, and possessing the approval and confidence of Lord Kitchener. The Second Corps was composed of Royal Irish Rifles, Wiltshires, SouthLancashires, Worcesters, Gordons, Royal Scots, Royal Irish, Middlesex, Royal Fusiliers, Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Lincolns, Yorkshire Light Infantry, West Kent, West Riding, ScottishBorderers, Manchesters, Cornwalls, East Surreys, and Suffolks. To therear Count Gleichen commanded the Norfolks, Bedfords, Cheshires, andDorsets. On the left of the Second Corps was stationed General Allenby'scavalry. In passing we may note that the commander in chief of the British forceswas a cavalry officer, the commander of the First Army Corps a cavalryofficer, and that the cavalry was in comparatively ample force. VonMackensen of the German force came from that branch of the service. Cavalry officers are excellent soldiers, but their training as such isnot promising for the command of modern armies, mainly of infantry andartillery, with other complements. In war much has changed sinceWaterloo, with the value of cavalry retreating into the background asaeroplanes sweep to the front for scouting and other purposes. From Binche to Condé the line assigned to the British was approximatelytwenty-five miles. Their force totaled some 75, 000 men with 259 guns. General French, therefore, had 2, 500 men to the mile of front. This wasan insufficient force, as the usual fighting front for a battalion of athousand men in defense or in attack is estimated in all armies at about425 yards. The British brigade of four battalions (4, 000 rifles) coversa half-mile front. General French's Third Army Corps having beenutilized elsewhere, he was compelled to use his cavalry in four brigadesas reserve. Previous to the German attack on Charleroi, General Joffre still held tohis plan of a left-wing attack, or rather a counterattack after theGermans were beaten. But battles were commencing on other fronts, properly belonging to the general retreat, which made its executiondoubtful even in an hour of victory. The capture of Charleroi, ofcourse, dissipated it as a dream. That General French realized thesuperiority in numbers of Von Kluck's advancing army both in infantryand artillery is nowhere suggested. His airmen had merely brought in theinformation that the attack would be in "considerable force. " The FrenchIntelligence Service were led to believe and informed the Britishcommander that Von Kluck was advancing upon him with only one corps, ortwo at the most. Some of General French's cavalry scouting as fartoward Brussels as Soignes, during the 21st and 22d, confirmed it. Butthe British proceeded to prepare for attack immediately on takingposition. They set to work digging trenches. While continuing their defensive efforts through Saturday, August 22, 1914, there floated to them a distant rumble from the eastward. Opinionsdiffered as to whether it was the German guns bombarding Namur, or abattle in progress on the Sambre. For the most part British officers andmen had but a vague idea of their position, or the progress of thefighting in the vicinity. Even the headquarters staff remaineduninformed of the desperate situation developing on the French right atCharleroi. The headquarters of the British army was at Mons. It lies within what isknown as "le Borinage, " that is the boring district of Belgium, thecoal-mining region. In certain physical aspects it much resembles thesame territory of Pennsylvania. Containing one or two larger towns suchas Charleroi and Mons, it is sprinkled over with villages gathered nearthe coal pits. Everywhere trolley lines are to be seen running from themines to supply the main railways and barge canals. Formerly the people were of a rough, ignorant and poverty toiling type, but of late years have greatly improved with the introduction oforganized labor and education. Previous bad conditions, however, haveleft their mark in a stunted and physically degenerate type ofdescendants from the mining population of those times. In contrast tolater comers they resemble a race of dwarfs. The men seldom exceed fourfeet eight inches in height, the women and children appear bloodless andemaciated. The output of the Borinage coal field exceeds twenty million tons ayear. Its ungainly features of shafts, chimneys, and mounds of débrisare relieved in places by woodlands, an appearance of a hilly country ispresented where the pit mounds have been planted with fir trees. Apartfrom its mining aspect, Mons is a city of historic importance. Itcontains a Gothic cathedral and town hall of medieval architecturalnote. It also, cherishes a special yearly fête of its own on TrinitySunday, when in the parade of the Limaçon, or snail, the spectacle ofSt. George and the Dragon is presented. With great pride the citizensof Mons showed the British soldiers of occupation an ancient cannon, claimed to have been used by their forefathers as an ally of the Englishat Crécy. Especially east of Mons, toward Binche, the British line ran throughthis district. Several of the greatest European battles have been foughtin its vicinity--Ramilles, Malplaquet, Jemappe, and Ligny. The night of Saturday, August 22, 1914, passed peacefully for theBritish soldiers, still working on their trenches. But distant boom ofguns from the east continued to vibrate to them at intervals. Of itsportend they knew nothing. Doubtless as they plied the shovel they againspeculated over it, wondering and possibly regretting a chance of theirhaving been deprived of the anticipated battle. Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, dawned brightly with no sign of theenemy. In Mons and the surrounding villages the workmen donned theirusual holiday attire, women stood about their doors chatting, childrenplayed in the streets. Church bells rung as usual summoning to publicworship. General French gathered his generals for an early conference. General Joffre's message on Saturday morning, assured General French ofvictory, and positively informed him that Von Kluck was advancing uponhim with no more than one or two army corps. In testimony of it, GeneralFrench thus wrote a subsequent official dispatch. "From information I received from French headquarters, I understood thatlittle more than one or at most two of the enemy's army corps, withperhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position, and I wasaware of no outflanking movement attempted by the enemy" (Von Hausen'sadvance on the right). "I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact thatmy patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoiteringoperations. The observations of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear outthis estimate. " To General French, therefore, his position seemed well secured. In thelight of it he awaited Von Kluck's attack with confidence. Towardmid-day some German aeroplanes swept up above the woods in front, andcircled over the British line. British marksmen at once fired on thebodies and hawklike wings of the intruders. Some tense interest was roused among the men as British aeroplanes roseto encounter the German aircraft. It was the first real battle of thesky they had witnessed. General French's cavalry patrols now broughtinformation that the woods were thick with German troops, some of themdeploying eastward toward their right at Binche. At twenty minutes to one the first shots swept from the woods upon theBritish line. Presently, Von Kluck's main attack developed with greatrapidity. The German artillery was brought to the front edge of thewoods to hurl a storm of shells on the British trenches. It was returnedwith equal vigor. But very soon it became apparent to British commandersalong the line that the German artillery fire was in far greater volumethan what might be expected from two army corps, whose normal complementwould be some 340 guns. Instead it was estimated 600 German guns wereshortly brought into action. The battle field was described by the Germans as "an emptiness. " Theterm is intended to emphasize that the old martial display and pomp hascompletely gone. A grand advance upon each other, with trumpetssounding, banners fluttering, brilliant uniforms, and splendid cavalrycharges, was impossible with long range weapons hailing storms ofbullets and shells of devastating explosive power. Cover was the allimportant immediate aim of both attack and defense. In this respect aswe have seen, the German gray-green uniform assisted by rendering themalmost invisible within shelter of such woods as those before Mons. Onthe other hand, the brown khaki shade of the British fielduniforms--originally designed for the same purpose on the sandy wastesof Egypt and Northern India--became conspicuous upon a green background. As the battle of Mons developed, the British line of the Condé Canal wasswept with German shrapnel. German shells, also, began bursting in thesuburbs of Mons and in the near-by villages. Sir Douglas Haig's rightthus came under strong fire. German aeroplanes assisted by droppingsmoke bombs over the British positions to give the angle of range fortheir artillery. Thereupon fights above took place between British andGerman airmen, while the armies beneath thundered shot and shell uponeach other. The Germans came on in massed formation of attack. TheBritish were accustomed to attack in open extended line, and theirshooting from any available cover was generally excellent. They couldnot understand the German attack in such close order that they weremowed down in groups of hundreds. The German infantry rifle fire, breaking from the shelter of the woodsto encounter a stronger British fire than was anticipated, was at firstineffective. As to the mass formation they depended upon overwhelmingreserves to take the places of those dead piled in heaps before theBritish trenches. It was General Grant's "food for powder" plan ofattack repeated. Thus the battle raged upon the entire length of the British line, withrepeated advances and retreats on the part of the Germans. Now and thenthe bodies almost reached the British trenches, and a breach seemed incertain prospect. But the British sprang upon the invaders, bayonet inhand, and drove them back to the shelter of the woods. The Irishregiments, especially, were considered invincible in this "cold steel"method of attack, their national impulsive ardor carrying them in a furythrough the ranks of an enemy. But at Mons always the Germans returnedin ever greater numbers. The artillery increased the terrible rain ofshells. Pen pictures by British soldiers vividly describe the battlesomewhat conflictingly. "They were in solid square blocks, standing out sharply against theskyline, and you couldn't help hitting them. It was like butting yourhead against a stone wall. .. . They crept nearer and nearer, and then ourofficers gave the word. A sheet of flame flickered along the line oftrenches and a stream of bullets tore through the advancing mass ofGermans. They seemed to stagger like a drunken man hit between the eyes, after which they made a run for us. .. . Halfway across the open anothervolley tore through their ranks, and by this time our artillery begandropping shells around them. Then an officer gave an order and theybroke into open formation, rushing like mad toward the trenches on ourleft. Some of our men continued the volley firing, but a few of ourcrack shots were told off for independent firing. .. . They fell back inconfusion, and then lay down wherever cover was available. We gave themno rest, and soon they were on the move again in flight. .. . This sort ofthing went on through the whole day. " From another view we gather that "We were in the trenches waiting forthem, but we didn't expect anything like the smashing blow that struckus. All at once, so it seemed, the sky began to rain down bullets andshells. At first they went wide . .. But after a time . .. They got ourrange and then they fairly mopped us up. .. . I saw many a good comrade goout. " During the early part of the battle Von Kluck directed his main attackupon the British right, with a furious artillery bombardment of Bincheand Bray. This was coincident with the crumpling of the French right atCharleroi by the army of Von Bülow, and its threatened retreat by thatof Von Hausen. The retirement of the French Fifth Army, therefore, leftGeneral Haig exposed to a strong flank attack by Von Kluck. Confrontedwith this danger, General Haig was compelled to withdraw his right to arise of ground southward of Bray. This movement left Mons the salient ofan angle between the First and Second British Army Corps. Shortly afterthis movement was performed, General Hamilton, in command of Mons, foundhimself in peril of converging German front and flank attacks. If theGermans succeeded in breaking through the British line beyond Mons, hewould be cut off and surrounded. General Hamilton informed his superior, General French, of this danger, and was advised in return "to be carefulnot to keep the troops in the salient too long, but, if threatenedseriously to draw back the center behind Mons. " A little after General French had sent General Hamilton this warning, hereceived a telegram from General Joffre which he describes as "a mostunexpected message. " General Joffre's telegram conveyed the first newsto General French not only that the French Fifth Army had been defeatedand was in retreat--the first intimation even that the French right atCharleroi under General Lanrezac was in peril--but that at least threeGerman army corps were attacking the British. Doubtless the Germansmashing of General Joffre's planned grand counterattack, after theGermans were to be beaten, was disheartening as well as a soredisappointment. General French possessed 75, 000 men. It was now disclosed that in frontVon Kluck was hurling upon him 200, 000 men, Von Bülow was hammering onhis right, Von Hausen in pursuit of the French threatened his rear, while some 50, 000 Germans were enveloping his left. He had no option butto order a retreat. Dealing with the combined action of the French and British in thiscritical period a French military writer says: "The French armies of the center--that is to say, the Third and FourthArmies--had as their mission the duty of attacking the German army inBelgian Luxembourg, of attempting to put it to flight and of crumplingit up against the left flank of the German main body at the north. Thisoffensive on the part of the French center began on August 21, 1914. TheThird Army (General Ruffey) followed from the east to the west thecourse of the Semoy, a tributary on the right of the Meuse. The FourthArmy operated between the Meuse and the Lesse. The Germans occupied theplateau which extends from Neufchâteau to Paliseul. It is uncertainterritory, covered with heaths and thick woods, and lends itself poorlyto the reconnaissance work of aviators or cavalry patrols. There are notargets for the artillery. The Germans had strongly fortified theground. The infantry of the Fourth Army which hurled itself againstthese positions was thrown back; still fighting it fell back over theMeuse. The pursuit by the Germans was punctuated by strongcounterattacks, which inflicted great losses on them. The Third Army wassimilarly checked in its march on Neufchâteau by the superior forces ofthe crown prince and was thrown back on the Semoy. Thus the offensiveactions undertaken by the armies of the French center miscarried. Notonly were they unable to lend their aid to the armies of the left, butthey saw themselves obliged to retreat. "The situation could only be reestablished by a victory on the part ofthe Fifth French Army operating in conjunction with the army of GeneralFrench. This army, however, found itself in the presence of Germanforces of great strength, consisting of the crack corps of the Germanarmy. On the 22d the Germans at the cost of considerable lossessucceeded in passing the Sambre, and General Lanrezac fell back onBeaumont-Givet, being apprehensive of the danger which threatened hisright. On the 24th the British army retreated, in the face of a Germanattack, on to the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. It appeared at first thatthe British had in front of them at most an army corps, with perhaps acorps of cavalry. They were apprised, however, about five o'clock in theevening that three army corps were advancing against them, while afourth was marching against their left along the road from Tournai in aturning movement. General French effected his retreat during the nightbehind the salient of Mons. Threatened on August 24 by the strength ofthe whole German army, he fled backward in the direction of Maubeuge. " CHAPTER X THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS The German hosts now stood at the gates of France. It was a mightyspectacle. The soldiery of the Kaiser which had swept their way intoBelgium, there to meet the unexpected resistance of the defenders ofKing Albert, had reached their goal--the French frontier. About the middle of August, 1914, General Joffre, assigned to theBritish Expeditionary Force, commanded by Sir John French, the task ofholding Mons against the powerful German advance. The British forceformed the left wing of the line of front that stretched for some twohundred miles close to the Belgian frontier. Extending from Arrasthrough the colliery towns of Mons and Charleroi, the extreme westernfront of the armies was held by General D'Amade at Arras, with about40, 000 reserve territorial troops; by General French, with 80, 000British regulars, at Mons; by the Fifth French Army of 200, 000first-line troops, under General Lanrezac, near Charleroi; and by aforce of 25, 000 Belgian troops at Namur. The total Allied troops in thisfield of battle were thus about 345, 000 men. Opposed to them, on the north, were about 700, 000 German troops, Generalvon Kluck farthest to the west, Generals von Bülow and von Hausen aroundthe Belgian fortress of Namur, Grand Duke Albrecht of Württemberg in theneighborhood of Maubeuge, and finally, on the extreme left of the Germanline, the Army of the Moselle, under Crown Prince Wilhelm. The position of the Allied armies was based on the resisting power ofNamur. It was expected that Namur would delay the German advance as longas Liege had done. Then the French line of frontier fortresses--Lille, with its half-finished defenses; Maubeuge, with strong forts and a largegarrison; and other strongholds--would form a still more useful systemof fortified points for the Allies. The German staff, however, had other plans. At Liege they had rashlyendeavored to storm a strong fortress by a massed infantry attack, whichhad failed disastrously until their new Krupp siege guns had beenbrought up. These quickly demolished the defenses. These siege guns, therefore, which had thus fully demonstrated their value againstfortifications soon brought about the total defeat of the Frenchoffensive, and compelled the Allies to retreat from Belgium and northernFrance. The Germans lost no time in investing Namur, and on Saturday, asnoted above, August 22, 1914, the fortress fell into the invaders'hands. On the same day, August 22, 1914, the Fifth French Army, under the leadof General Lanrezac, was enduring the double stress of Von Bülow's armythundering against its front, and Von Hausen's two army corps pressinghard upon its right flank and rear, threatening its line of retreat. Against such terrific odds the French line at Dinant and Givet broke, exposing the flank and rear of the whole army; and by the evening ofthat day, August 22, the passages of the River Sambre, near Charleroi, had been forced, and the Fifth Army was falling back, contesting everymile of the ground with desperate rear-guard action. The British, meanwhile, defending the Mons position, were in grave danger of beingcut off, enveloped, and destroyed. Sir John French had put his two army corps into battle array. He hadabout thirty miles of front to defend, with Mons nearly in the center. On Sunday afternoon, August 23, 1914, the full weight of the Germanonset fell for the first time upon the British. All that night the British were under the fire of German artillery. Sir John French realized the danger of his Maubeuge-Jenlain position, and on Monday evening, August 24, 1914, realizing the importance ofputting a substantial barrier, such as the Somme or the Oise, betweenhis force and the enemy, gave orders for the retirement to be continuedat five o'clock the next morning, August 25, 1914. He had decided upon anew position about the town of Le Cateau, east of Cambrai. Before dawn, August 25, 1914, the southward march over rough, hilly country wasresumed, and toward evening of August 25, 1914, after a long, hard day'sfighting march over the highroads, in midsummer heat and thundershowers, the Guards Brigade and other regiments of the Second Corps, wet andweary, arrived at the little market town of Landrecies. From Landrecies, after an encounter with a German column, they marched south towardWassigny on Guise. [Illustration: Battle of Mons and Retreat of Allied Armies. ] While the night attack on Landrecies was raging, the Germans, taxingtheir men to the uttermost, marched four other corps through the tractof country between the west side of the forest and the road fromValenciennes to Cambrai. These corps were in a position alongSmith-Dorrien's front before dawn of Wednesday, August, 26, 1914, and inthe earliest hours of the morning it became apparent that the Germanswere determined to throw the bulk of their strength against the Britishbattalions which had moved up to a position south of the small town ofSolesmes, extending to the south of Cambrai. Thus placed, this forcecould shield the Second Corps, now beginning its retreat under pressureof the German army advancing from Tournai. These troops under GeneralSnow were destined to play an important part in the impending battle ofLe Cateau. By sunrise the guns of the four German corps were firing from positionsfacing the British left, and gray-green masses of infantry were pressingforward in dense firing lines. In view of this attack, GeneralSmith-Dorrien judged it impossible to continue his retreat at daybreak. The First Corps was at that moment scarcely out of difficulty, andGeneral Sordêt--whose troops had been fighting hard on the flank of theFifth French Army, with General Lanrezac, against General von Bülow'shosts--was unable to help the British, owing to the exhausted state ofhis cavalry. The situation was full of peril; indeed, Wednesday badefair to become the most critical day of the retreat. As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoningfrontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great envelopingmove on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions fromwhich they could enfilade the British line. Smith-Dorrien, having noavailable reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy guns on one sideand by hostile infantry on all sides. "It became apparent, " says SirJohn French's dispatch, "that if complete annihilation was to beavoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given tocommence it about 3. 30 p. M. The movement was covered with the mostdevoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which hadsuffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the fartherretreat from the position assisted materially in the completion of thisdifficult and dangerous operation. The saving of the left wing couldnever have been accomplished unless a commander" (Sir HoraceSmith-Dorrien) "of rare coolness had been present to personally conductthe operation. " This retirement foreshadowed the end of the battle. Worn out by repeatedrepulses, the Germans had suffered too heavily to continue their attacksor to engage in an energetic pursuit. According to General French'sestimate, the British losses during the trying period from August 23 toAugust 26, 1914, inclusive, were between 5, 000 and 6, 000 men and thelosses suffered by the Germans in their pursuit and attacks across theopen country, owing largely to their dense formation, were much greater. The Battle of Le Cateau gave the Germans pause. Further retreat of theBritish could now be resumed in orderly array; for by now General Sordêtwith his cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, andGeneral D'Amade with his two reserve divisions from the neighborhood ofArras was attacking General von Kluck's right, driving it back onCambrai. Disaster to the British forces was averted, though the peril ofGerman interposition between the Allied army and Paris would soon compelstill further withdrawals. Covered by their gunners, but still under heavy fire of the Germanartillery, the British began again to retire southward. Their retreatwas continued far into the night of August 26, 1914, and through the27th and 28th; on the last date--after vigorous cavalry fighting--theexhausted troops halted on a line extending from the French cathedraltown of Noyon through Chauny to La Fère. There they were joined byreenforcements amounting to double their loss. Guns to replace thosecaptured or shattered by the enemy were brought up to the new line. There was a breathing space for a day, while the British made ready totake part in the next great encounter. This fourth week in August marked a decisive period in the history ofthe Great War. All the French armies, from the east to the west, as wellas the British army, were in retreat over their frontiers. To whatresolution had the French commander in chief come? That was the questionon every lip. What at that moment was the real situation of the Frencharmy? Certainly the first engagements had not turned out as well as theFrench could have hoped. The Germans were reaping the reward of theirmagnificent preparation for the war. Their heavy artillery, with whichthe French army was almost entirely unprovided, was giving proof of itsefficacy and its worth. The moral effect of those great projectileslaunched from great distances by the immense German guns wasconsiderable. At such great distances the French cannons of 75, admirable as they were, could make no effective reply to the Germanbatteries. The French soldiers were perfectly well aware that they werethe targets of the great German shells while their own cannon could makeno parallel impression on the enemy. The German army revealed itself as an extraordinary instrument of war. Its mobility and accouterments were perfect. It had over a hundredthousand professional noncommissioned officers or subofficers, admirablysuited to their work, with their men marching under the control of theireye and finger. In the German army the active corps, as well as thereserve corps, showed themselves, thanks to these noncommissionedofficers, marvelously equipped. In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by professiontotaled hardly half the German figures. The German army, moreover, wasmuch more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French. TheGermans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to use them indefense and attack better than the French. They had moreover, to adegree far superior to that of the French, studied the use offortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements, and so on. The Germans were also at first better trained than the Frenchreservists; they had spent longer periods in the German army, and theirreserve corps were almost equal to the active corps. In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training ofseveral weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve theirfull worth. At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks to themarvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike qualities ofthe race, the training was completed. At the beginning of the month ofSeptember the reserve divisions fought with the same skill, the samekeenness, and the same swing as the active army corps. Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the Frenchhigh command. These General Joffre attended to without the loss of aninstant. Every general that appeared to him incapable of fulfilling thetask allotted to him was weeded out on the spot, without consideringfriendships or the bonds of comradeship, or intimacy that might bebetween them. As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula: Thatthe German army was better prepared for war than the French army, forthe simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the war, becauseshe had it in view, a thing which could not be said of France. But theFrench army revealed right from the beginning the most admirable andmarvelous qualities. The soldiers fought with a skill and heroism thathave never been equaled. Sometimes, indeed, their enthusiasm and couragecarried them too far. It mattered little. In spite of losses, in spiteeven of retreat, the morale of the whole French army on the entire frontfrom Alsace to the Somme remained extraordinarily high. The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German armiesthrough Belgium had been foreseen by the French General Staff, butopinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning movementlikely to be made by the German right wing in crossing Belgianterritory. Among French experts some were of opinion that the Germanswould confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse, while othersthought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much vaster turningmovement, thus descending on France in a direction due north and south. If the violation of Belgian neutrality was no surprise to the FrenchStaff, it was nevertheless hardly expected that the Germans would beable to put in line with such rapidity at the outset all their reserveformations. Each army corps was supported by its reserve corps, whichshowed itself as quick in mobilization and preparation as the activecorps. Germany, while maintaining sufficient forces on the Russian front, wasstill able to put in the field for its great offensive against France amore numerous body of troops than would have been believed in France. This permitted them to maintain in Alsace, in Lorraine, and in BelgianLuxembourg armies as numerous as those which faced them on the Frenchside, and at the same time to mass the major part of their troops on theright so as to pour into the valley of the Oise their chief invadingforces. This explains why the French left, which was exposed to the offensive ofthe German right, was obliged to make a rapid retreat, permitting theGerman armies of General von Kluck and General von Bülow to advance withall speed in the direction of Paris. The French military staff, as soon as they perceived the danger thatthreatened, proceeded to a new alignment of forces. As long as thisalignment of forces could not be effected the retreat had to continue. As soon as it was accomplished, as soon as General Joffre had his armieswell in hand and the situation of his troops well disposed, he checkedthe retreat, gave the signal for the offensive, and so followed thegreat Battle of the Marne. The German plan consisted, therefore, in delivering the main blowthrough the medium of the right wing of the German forces, consisting ofthe army of Von Kluck, the army of Von Bülow, and the army of VonHausen, which were to march with all speed in the direction of Paris. What plan had the French staff in mind to oppose to this plan of theGermans? Its plan aimed at checking and holding the greatest possiblenumber of Germans by a vigorous offensive in Alsace and Lorraine so asto prevent them from joining the three first German armies whichthreatened Paris. In support of this offensive of the armies of Alsaceand Lorraine, the central French armies attacked in the direction of theArdennes and Belgian Luxembourg with the object of checking the centerof the German armies and then turning toward the west so as to cooperatein the offensive of the French forces which, aided by the British armyand the Belgian army, were fighting in Belgium. The French armies, which are numbered from the right to the left--thatis, from the east to the west--comprised: A detachment of the Army ofAlsace that was dissolved toward the end of the month of August; theFirst Army (General Dubail); the Second Army (General de Castelnau); theThird Army (General Ruffey, replaced at the end of August, 1914, byGeneral Sarrail); the Fourth Army (General de Langle de Cary); theFifth Army (General Lanrezac, replaced in the last days of August, 1914, by General Franchet d'Espérey). At the right of this army was stationedthe British army under the command of General French. To what resolution did General Joffre come? On that memorable evening ofthe 24th, and on that morning of the 25th, two alternatives presentedthemselves before him. Should they, rather than permit the enemy toinvade the soil of France, make a supreme effort to check the Germans onthe frontier? This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning tothe enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some seriousinconveniences. The attack of the German armies operating on the right(Generals von Kluck, von Bülow, von Hausen) were extremely menacing. Inorder to parry this attack it was necessary considerably to reenforcethe French left, and for that purpose to transfer from the right to theleft a certain number of army corps. That is what the military call, inthe language of chess players, "to castle" the army corps. But thismovement could not be accomplished in a few hours. It required, evenwith all the perfection of organization shown by the French railwaysduring this war, a certain number of days. As long as this operationfrom the right to the left had not been accomplished, as long as theleft wing of the French army and even the center remained without thereenforcement of elements taken from the right, it would have beenextremely imprudent, not to say rash, for the French high command toattempt a decisive battle. If General Joffre had risked a battleimmediately he would have been playing the game without all his trumpsin hand and would have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decideddisaster, from which it might have been impossible to recover. The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting from aretreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring about a newgrouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to advance, and whenthe occasion showed itself favorable the French armies, along with theBritish army, would take the offensive and wage a decisive battle. It was to this second decision that General Joffre came. As soon as onAugust 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French retreatwas going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of forces and forpreparations with a view to the offensive. General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his orders indetail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle of the Marne. They constitute an eloquent and convincing document. The series oforders were contained in the "Bulletin des Armées de la RépubliqueFrançaise, " June 6, 1915, Sunday. The first of these orders, datedAugust 25, 1914, runs as follows: "The projected offensive movement not having been found possible ofexecution, the consequent operations will be so conducted as to put inline, on our left, by the junction of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, theBritish army, and new forces recruited from the eastern district, a bodycapable of taking the offensive while other armies for the neededinterval hold in check the efforts of the enemy. .. . " The retreating movement was regulated so as to bring about the followingdisposition of forces preparatory to an offensive: "In the Amiens district a new grouping of forces, formed of elementsconveyed by rail (Seventh Corps, four divisions of reserve, and perhapsanother active army corps), brought together from August 27 to September2, 1914. This body will remain ready to take the offensive in thegeneral direction of St, Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume. " The same general instructions of August 25, 1914, marks out the zones ofmarch, and says: "The movement will be covered by the rear guards spread out at favorablepoints of vantage so as to utilize every obstacle for the purpose ofchecking, by brief and violent counterattacks in which the artillerywill play the chief part, the march of the enemy or at least to retardit. " (Signed) J. JOFFRE. [Illustration: General Joffre. ] The object of this maneuver is thus already on August 25, 1914, clearlyindicated; it looked not to a defensive, but to an offensive movement, which was to be resumed as soon as circumstances appeared favorable. Much is made clear in these orders of General Joffre, which arecharacterized by perspicuity, foresight, and precision. The retreat was effected; but it was only a provisional retreat. Whenever an occasion presented itself to counterattack the enemy for thepurpose of delaying his advance, that occasion was to be taken advantageof. And that is, in fact, what took place. Two days later, on August 27, 1914, General Joffre brought together, using army corps and divisions recruited elsewhere, a supplementaryarmy, the Ninth Army, which was detailed to take its place between theFourth and Fifth Armies. He intrusted its command to a general, who, while commanding the Twentieth Corps, had distinguished himself by hisbrilliant conduct in Lorraine, General Foch. The establishment of the army of Manoury on the left of the Frencharmies so as to fall on the right flank of the Germans when they marchedon Paris; the establishment of a strong army under one of the bestFrench generals at the center for the purpose of encountering the mainweight of the German army; such were the two decisions of the Frenchcommander in chief, taken on August 25 and 27, 1914, which contained ingerm the victory of the Marne, waged and won two weeks later. CHAPTER XI FIGHTING AT BAY The forces of France also had been fighting to protect their retreatsouthward in these August days of 1914. After the passages of the Sambrewere forced, during the great Mons-Charleroi battle, the Fifth FrenchArmy was placed in very perilous straits by the failure of the FourthArmy, under General Langle, to hold the Belgian river town of Givet. Hard pressed in the rear by General von Bülow's army, and on theirright by General von Hausen commanding the Saxon Army and the PrussianGuard, the Fifth Army of France had to retire with all possible speed, for their path of retreat was threatened by a large body of Teutonsadvancing on Rocroi. On August 23, 1914, holding their indomitable pursuers in check bydesperate rear-guard action, with their two cavalry divisions underGeneral Sordêt galloping furiously along the lines of the western flankto protect the retiring infantry and guns, the Fifth Army unexpectedlyturned at Guise. At that point considerable reenforcements in troops andmaterial arrived, making the Fifth Army the strongest in France. It nowdefeated and drove over the Oise the German Guard and Tenth Corps, andthen continued its retirement. But the left wing of the French army wasunsuccessful, and Amiens and the passages of the Somme had to beabandoned to the invaders. On Sunday, August 23, 1914, the Fourth Army, operating from the Meuse, was heavily outnumbered by the Saxon army around the river town ofDinant. They fell back, after furious fighting for the possession of thebridges, which the French engineers blew up as the army withdrewsouthward to the frontier. Soon after, at Givet, the Germans succeededin wedging their way across the Meuse. Some advanced on Rocroi andRethel, and other corps marched along the left bank of the Meuse, through wooded country, against a steadily increasing resistance whichculminated at Charleville, a town on the western bank of the river. There a determined stand was made. On August 24, 1914, the town of Charleville was evacuated, the civilianswere sent away to join multitudes of other homeless refugees, and thenthe French also retired, leaving behind them several machine guns hiddenin houses, placed so that they commanded the town and the three bridgesthat connected it with Mézières. The German advance guards reached the two towns next day, August 25, 1914, which, as we know, witnessed the British retirement toward LeCateau. Unmolested, they rode across the three bridges into the quiet, empty streets. Suddenly, when all had crossed, the bridges were blownup behind them by contact mines, and the German cavalrymen were raked bythe deadly fire of the machine guns. Nevertheless, finding their foeswere not numerous, they made a courageous stand, waiting for their maincolumns to draw nearer. Every French machine gunner was silenced by theGuards with their Maxims; but when the main invading army swept intoview along the river valley, the French artillery from the hills aroundCharleville mowed down the heads of columns with shrapnel. Still theTeutons advanced with reckless courage. While their artillery wasengaged in a duel with the French, German sappers threw pontoon bridgesacross the river, and finally the French had to retire. BetweenCharleville and Rethel there was another battle, resulting in theabandonment of Mézières by the French. The retreating army crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse, whichit enters below Mézières, and advanced toward Neufchâteau; but they wererepulsed by the Germans under the Duke of Württemberg. At Nancy onAugust 25, 1914, there was another engagement between the garrison ofToul and the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria; after fierceonslaughts the garrison was compelled to yield and retire. Finally, onAugust 27, 1914, at Longwy, a fortified town near Verdun, the army ofthe German crown prince succeeded in bursting into France after a longsiege, and marched toward the Argonne. Thus from the western coastalmost to Verdun there was a general Franco-British retreat. On August 28, 1914, pressed by the German armies commanded by Von Kluckon the west, by Von Hausen from Dinant and Givet, by Von Bülow fromCharleroi and Namur, the Allies were pushed back upon a line stretchingroughly from Amiens through Noyon-Le Fère to Mézières; while theirforces east of the Meuse between Mézières and Verdun were retreatingbefore Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, and to the southeast of Verdunbefore the Bavarians. All northern France was thus open to the invaders. After the battle of Le Cateau, however, the Germans slackened theirpursuit for a very brief interval; partly because the terrific strainof marching and fighting was telling upon them no less than upon theAllies, partly because the engineers had blown up the bridges over everyriver, canal, and stream, behind the retreating armies, and partlybecause, under directions from the French commander in chief, GeneralManoury was organizing a new force on the British left, a new SixthArmy, mainly reserve troops, one corps of line troops, and GeneralSordêt's cavalry. On the right of the British were General Lanrezac'stroops; then, between Lanrezac's Fifth Army and the Fourth Army, came aNinth Army, under General Foch, formed of three corps from the south. Counterattacks were ordered by the French general in chief, continuedduring the entire retreat and had frequently brilliant results. On August 29, 1914, a corps of the Fifth Army and of the divisions ofreserve attacked with success in the direction of St. Quentin with theobject of withdrawing the pressure on the British army. Two other corpsand a division of reserves joined issue with the Prussian Guard and theTenth Corps of the German army which debouched from Guise. This was avery violent battle, known under the name of the Battle of Guise. At theend of the day, after various fluctuations in the fight, the Germanswere thrown completely over the Oise and the entire British front wasrelieved. The Prussian Guard on that occasion suffered great losses. August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Carysucceeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as heendeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continuedon the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division ofMorocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinarydefeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye. Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished ingood order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized; asa matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point. All theFrench armies were thus found intact and prepared for the offensive. The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris atgreat speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the FrenchGeneral Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able to establish anew alignment of forces. The new army established on the left of theFrench armies, and intrusted to General Manoury, was not able tocomplete its concentration in the localities first intended. In place ofconcentrating in the region of Amiens it was obliged to operate more tothe south. The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result of thevigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows: A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached ChâteauThierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of fouractive army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne. The SecondArmy (General von Bülow), with three active army corps and two reservecorps, had attained to the region of Laon. The Third German Army(General von Hausen), with two active army corps and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Château Porcin-Attigny. Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps, and numerousErsatz companies, were in contact with the French troops (Fourth andFifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the others from Verdun to theVosges. Such was the situation. It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army, commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Espérey, would have founditself in grave peril following on the backward bending of the Britishand French forces operating on its left, if the French had accepted thechallenge of a decisive battle. The French commander in chief resolutelychose the alternative that obviated such a risk, that is, he decided ona postponement of the offensive and the continuation of the retreat. Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of theretreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region north of Bar-le-Duc. That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the otherhand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if the forcescould be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation of the Britisharmy and the army of Manoury on the left, and on the right that of thedivisions of reserve that had been held on the heights of the Meuse. Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of August 29, 1914, the Britishretirement began afresh, and 10, 000 French troops also withdrew from theSomme, blowing up the bridges as they went. Everywhere along the roadswere crowds of country folk and villagers with wagons and carts piledhigh with household goods or carrying aged persons and children, all inpanic flight before the dreaded invaders, fleeing for refuge in Paris. At various places these stricken multitudes joined the army ambulances, taking the shortest routes. Rumors of the coming of the uhlans ran alongthe straggling lines with tales of the grievous havoc and ruin whichthese horsemen, vanguards of the German columns, had wrought in theland. Hardly had the retirement begun, when a body of uhlans enteredAmiens and demanded from the mayor the surrender of the town. This wasformally given, and the civilians were ordered, on pain of death, not tocreate the slightest disturbance and not to take part in any action, overt or covert, against the soldiery. Afterward, cavalry, infantry, andartillery took possession of the town on August 30, 1914. On the sameday a German aeroplane dropped bombs on Paris. While retiring from the thickly wooded country south of Compiègne, theBritish First Cavalry Brigade were surprised while dismounted and atbreakfast in the early morning of September 1, 1914. Moving figures onthe distant skyline first attracted the attention of those who had fieldglasses, but in the dim light their identity was not at first revealed. Suddenly all doubt was resolved by a rain of shells on the camp. Manymen and a large number of horses were killed. At once the order "Actionfront!" rang out, and the remaining horses, five to a man, were hurriedto cover in the rear, while on the left a battery of horse artillerywent into instant action. The German attack was pressed hard, and thebattery was momentarily lost until some detachments from the BritishThird Corps, with the guns of the artillery brigade, galloped up to itssupport. Then they not only recovered their own guns, but also succeededin capturing twelve of the enemy's. On the eventful day of September 3, 1914, the British forces reached aposition south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. They haddefended the passage of the river against the German armies as long aspossible, and had destroyed bridges in the path of the pursuers. Next, at General Joffre's request, they retired some twelve miles farthersouthward with a view to taking a position behind the Seine. In themeantime the Germans had built pontoon bridges across the Marne, andwere threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces andthe Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several outpost actionstook place. By the 1st of September, 1914, the day of the Russian victories atLemberg, Von Kluck's army had reached Senlis, only twenty-five milesfrom Paris. Despite this imminent danger, the capital was remarkablyquiet and calm; every day, as fateful event crowded upon event, seemedto renew the resolution and coolness of the population. It seemedadvisable, however, to transfer the seat of government for the timebeing from Paris to Bordeaux, after assuring the defense of the city byevery means that could be devised. The defenses of Paris consisted of three great intrenched camps, on thenorth, east, and southwest, respectively. Of these the most important isthe last, which includes all the fortified area to the south and west ofthe Seine. A railway over sixty miles in length connects all the works, and, under the shelter of the forts, it could not only keep themsupplied with the necessary ammunition and stores, but also it could beutilized to convey troops from point to point as they might be needed. However, it was an open secret that even the outer and newer defenseswere not of any great strength. If the Germans broke through theoutlying circle of forts, the inner line would be of small value, andthe city itself would be exposed to long-range bombardment. Paris wasnot ready for a siege, and if attacked it would speedily fall. Early in the morning of September 3, 1914, President Poincaré, accompanied by all the ministers, left Paris, and was followed at noonby the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and the reservesof the Banque de France. The higher courts were also transferred toBordeaux. The municipal authority was constituted by the president ofthe City Council, and the Council of the Seine Department, who wereempowered to direct civil affairs under the authority of GeneralGalliéni as military governor, the prefect of Paris, and the prefect ofpolice. On his appointment to the command, Galliéni did what he could tostrengthen the defenses. Trenches were dug, wire entanglements wereconstructed, and hundreds of buildings that had been allowed to springup over the military zone of defense were demolished in order to leave aclear field of fire. The gates of the city were barred with heavypalisades backed by sandbags, and neighboring streets also werebarricaded for fighting. Certain strategic streets were obstructed bynetworks of barbed wire, and in others pits were dug to the depth of aman's shoulders. The public buildings were barricaded with sandbags andguarded with machine guns. But while Paris was preparing for siege and assault the French staffwere concentrating their efforts on making a siege impossible by adecisive stroke against the German advance. Hardly had the Government left the city when tidings arrived thatinstead of marching on Paris, General von Kluck had swung southeastwardtoward the crossing of the Marne. This news was obtained by the alliedflying corps, which had made daring flights over the enemy's line. CHAPTER XII THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD On September 4, 1914, the bugler of Destiny sounded the "Halt!" to theretreat of the armies of the Allies from the Belgian frontier. Themarvelous fighting machine of the German armies, perhaps the most superborganization of military potency that has been conceived by the mind ofman, seemed to reach its limit of range. Success had perched upon theGerman eagles, and for two weeks there had been a steady succession ofvictories. Nevertheless the British and French armies were not crushed. They were overwhelmed, they were overpowered, and, under stern militarynecessity, they were forced to fall back. Day after day, under the swinging hammer-head blows of the German drive, the flower of the forces of the Allies had been compelled to break. Alittle less generalship on the part of the defenders, or a little morerecklessness behind that smashing offensive might have turned thisretirement into a rout. Even as it was, the official dispatches revealthat, while occasional and local retirements had been considered, such asweeping retreat was far from contemplated by Generals Joffre andFrench. German official dispatches bear testimony to the intrepidcharacter of the defenders sullenly falling back and contesting everyinch of the way, as much as they do to the daring and the vivid braveryof the German attackers who hurled themselves steadily, day after day, upon positions hastily taken up in the retreat where the retirementcould be partly repaid by the heaviest toll of death. The great strategical plan of the Germans, which had displayed itselfthroughout the entire operations on the western theatre of war from thevery first gun of the campaign, came to its apex on this September 3, 1914. If the allied armies could develop a strong enough defense to haltthe German offensive at this point, and especially if they could developa sufficiently powerful counteroffensive to strike doubt into theconfident expectations of the armies of the Central Powers, then thestrategical plan had reached a check, which might or might not be acheckmate, as the fortunes of war might determine. If, on the otherhand, the stand made by the Allies at this point should proveineffective, and if the counteroffensive should reveal that the Germanhosts had been able to establish impregnable defenses as they marched, then the original strategic plan of the attackers must be considered asintact and the peril of France would become greatly intensified. It is idle, in a war of such astounding magnitude, to speak about anyone single incident as being a "decisive" one. Such a term can onlyrightly be applied to conditions where the opposing powers each have butone organized army in the field, and these armies meet in a pitchedbattle. None the less, the several actions which are known as theBattles of the Marne may be considered as decisive, to the extent thatthey decided the limit of the German offensive at that point. The GermanGeneral Staff, taking the ordinary and obvious precautions in the caseof a possible repulse, chose and fortified in the German rear positionsto which its forces might fall back in the event of retreat. Theseprepared positions had a secondary contingent value for the Germans inview of the grave Russian menace that might call at any moment for atransfer of German troops from the western to the eastern front. The Battle of the Marne stopped the advance of the main German army onthat line, forcing it back. [Illustration: Battle of the Marne--Beginning on September 5, 1914. ] The scene of the battle ground is one of the most famous in Europe, noteven the plains of Belgium possessing a richer historical significancethan that melancholy plain, the Champagne-Pouilleuse, upon whoseinhospitable flats rested for centuries the curse of a prophecy, thatthere would the fate of France be decided, a prophecy of rareconnotation of accuracy, for it refrained from stating what that fateshould be. Yet the historic sense is amplified even more by remembrancethan by prophecy, for in the territory confronting that huge arc onwhich 1, 400, 000 German and Austrian soldiers lay encamped, awaiting whateven the German generals declared to be "the great decision, " therelies, on the old Roman road running from Châlons a vast oval mound, known to tradition as "the Camp of Attila. " In that country, a Romangeneral, Aetius, leading a host of soldiers of whom many were Gauls, broke a vast flood wave of the Huns as those savage Mongol hordes hurledthemselves against Rome's westernmost possession. On that occasion, however, the Visigoths, under their King Theodoric, fought side by sidewith the Gauls. Then, the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine and on thebanks of the Seine were brothers in arms, now, that same countrysideshall see them locked in deadly conflict. The morale of tradition is a curious thing, and often will nerve a swordarm when the most impassioned utterance of a beloved leader may fail. There were few among the soldiers of France who forgot that in the southof this same plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse was the home of Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, patriot and saint, and more than one French soldierprayed that the same voices which had whispered in the ear of the virginof Domremy should guide the generalissimo who was to lead the armies ofFrance upon the morrow. Here, tradition again found old alliancessevered and new ones formed, for the Maid of Orleans led the Frenchagainst the English, while in the serried ranks awaiting the awful testof the shock of battle, English and French soldiers lived and slept asbrothers. The topography of the region of the battle field is of more than commoninterest, for modern tactics deal with vaster stretches of country thanwould have been considered in any previous war. This is due, partly, tothe large armies handled, partly to the terrific range of modernartillery, and also to what may be called the territorial perceptivenesswhich aeronautical surveys make possible to a general of to-day. Whilewar has not changed, it is true that a commander of an army in moderncampaign is compelled to review and to take into account a far largergroup of factors. A modern general must be capable of grasping increasedcomplexities, and must possess a synthetic mind to be able to reduce allthese complicating factors into a single whole. The first factor of thebattles of the Marne was the topographical factor, the consideration ofthe land over which the action was to take place. Let the River Marne be used as a base from which this topography can bedetermined. The Marne rises near Langres, which is the northwest angleof that pentagon of fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Langres, Dijon, andBesançon), which incloses an almost impregnable recuperative ground forexhausted armies. From Langres the Marne flows almost north by west forabout fifty miles through a hilly and wooded country, then, taking amore westerly course, it flows for approximately seventy-five milesalmost northwest, across the Plain of Champagne, past Vitry-le-Françoisand Châlons, thence almost due westward through the Plateau of Sézanne, by Epernay, Château Thierry, La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Meaux to jointhe Seine just south of Paris. In the neighborhood of Meaux, three smalltributaries flow into the Marne--the Ourcq from the north, and the GrandMorin and Petit Morin from the east. The Marshes of St. Gond, ten mileslong from east to west and a couple of miles across, lie toward theeastern borders of the Plateau of Sézanne, and form the source of thePetit Morin, which has been deepened in the reclamation of the marshcountry. Once more considering the source of the Marne, near Langres, it will benoted that the River Meuse rises near by, flowing north by east to Toul, and then north-northwest past Verdun to Sedan, where it turns due north, flowing through the Ardennes country to Namur, in Belgium. To the eastof the Meuse lies the difficult forest clad hill barrier, known as theHills of the Meuse; to the east extends (as far as Triaucourt) thecraggy and broken wooded country of the Argonne, a natural barrier whichstretches southward in a chain of lakes and forests. West of this impassible country of the Meuse and the Argonne lies theplain of Champagne-Pouilleuse, which is almost a steppe, bare and open, only slightly undulating, overgrown with heath, and studded here andthere by small copses of planted firs, naught but a small portion of thewhole being under cultivation. Between the Forest of the Argonne andthis great plain, which is over a hundred miles long from north to southand forty miles in width, lies a short stretch of miniature foothills, with upland meadows here and there, but crossed in every direction bysmall ravines filled with shrubs and low second-growth timber. Here liesthe source of the Aisne, a river destined to live in history; and on thefarther side begins the great plain. On the west of the plain of Champagne rises, 300 feet, with a curiousclifflike suddenness, the Plateau of Sézanne. The effect is as though ageological fault had driven the original plateau from north to souththroughout its entire length, and then as though there had been ageneral subsidence of the plain, giving rise to the clifflike formationsknown as Les Falaises de Champagne, at the foot of which runs the roadfrom La Fère-Champenoise to Rheims. The disposition and arrangement of the German forces is next to beconsidered. It can be assumed that their objective was Paris. It is alsoworthy of remembrance that the German tactical method has always favoredthe envelopment of the enemy's flanks rather than a frontal attackaiming to pierce the enemy's center, which latter was a favorite methodof Napoleon I to reach decision. The tactical method of envelopment demands great numerical superiority, and on account of the extreme extension of front necessitated is apt tobecome dangerous as perforce the center is left weak. Attempts toenvelop, with which the observer is confronted again and again whenconsidering the military movements of the Central Powers on the westernbattle front, were revealed on the morning of September 3, 1914, in theposition occupied by the German forces, and, correspondingly, in thearrangement of the allied armies. The German right, on September 3, 1914, and September 4, 1914, at whichtime it was nearest to its desired goal of Paris, held the banks of theMarne from Epernay to the banks of the little tributary the Ourcq, whichruns into the Marne from the north. This extreme right comprised theSecond Corps and the Fourth Reserve Corps, encamped on the western bankof the little stream the Ourcq; while the Fourth Corps was given thehonor of the tip of the right, being camped on the Marne at LaFerté-sous-Jouarre, supported by the Third Corps, the Seventh Corps andthe Seventh Corps Reserve. The Ninth Cavalry Division occupied anadvanced position west of Crécy and the Second Cavalry Division occupiedan advanced position near the British army, north of Coulommiers. Thesetroops constituted the First German Army, under the command of Generalvon Kluck. The Allies' left, confronting this position, held strong reserves, andby the nature of the ground itself, was well placed to prevent anyenveloping movement, dear to the German school of military tactics. Itrested securely on the fortress of Paris, believed by its constructorsto be the most fully fortified city in the world, and should the Germanright endeavor to encircle the left wing of the Allies, should itdevelop a farther westerly movement, it would but come in contact withthe outer line of those defenses and thence be deflected in such anenormous arc as to thin the line beyond the power of keeping it strongenough to resist a piercing attack at all points. Clearly, then, as longas the extreme left of the Allies remained in contact with the defensesof Paris, an enveloping movement was not possible on the easterly flank. Facing the German extreme right, was the Sixth French Army, one of thegreat reserves of General Joffre, which had been steadily building upsince August 29, 1914, with its right on the Marne and its left at Betz, in the Ourcq Valley, encamped on the western side of that stream, facingthe Second and Fourth Corps of the Germans. The strengthening of thatarmy from the forces at Paris was hourly, and while three or four daysbefore it had been felt that the Sixth French Army was too weak to beplaced in so vital a point--that it should have been supplemented withthe Ninth Army--the results justified the French generalissimo's plansand more than justified his confidence in the British Army, orExpeditionary Force, which faced the tip of the German right wing driveand was encamped on a line from Villeneuve le Comte to Jouy le Chatel, the center of the British army being at a point five miles southeast ofCoulommiers. This army was under the command of General Sir John French. The right center of the German line was held by General von Bülow'sarmy, consisting of the Ninth Corps, the Tenth Corps, the Tenth ReserveCorps, and the Guard Corps. This army also was encamped upon the Marne, stretching from the eastern end of General Von Kluck's army as far asEpernay. This army thus held the Forests of Vassy but was confronted bythe marshes of St. Gond. Confronting this right center was, first of all, General Conneau'sCavalry Corps, which was in touch with the right wing of the Britisharmy under Sir John French. Then, holding the line from Esternay toCourtaçon lay the Fifth French Army under General d'Espérey. Full inface of the strongest part of the German right center stood one of thestrongest of General Joffre's new reserves, the Ninth Army under GeneralFoch, with the marshes of St. Gond in front of him, and holding atwenty-mile line from Esternay, past Sézanne to Camp de Mailly, aremarkably well-equipped army, very eager for the fray. The hastily replenished corps, largely of Saxons, which had been Generalvon Hausen's army, lay next to General von Bülow, a little north ofVitry, and as it proved, a weak spot in the German line. The left centerof the attacking force was under the command of the Duke of Württembergand extended across the whole southern end of the plain of Champagne tothe upper streams of the Aisne south of St. Menhould. The extreme leftof this advanced line was the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, holdingthe old line on the Argonne to the south of Verdun. In close relation tothis advanced line, but not directly concerned with the battles of theMarne, were the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince, encamped in theplateau of the Woevre, engaged largely in the task of holding open thevarious lines of communication, while far to the south, in the vicinityof the much battered little town of Mulhouse, lay the remains of thedecimated army of the Alsace campaigns under General von Heeringen. Facing this left center came General Langle's Fourth French Army, covering the southern side of the plain of Châlons, it lay south ofVitry-le-François, and faced due north. On this army, it was expected, the brunt of the drive would fall. At this point the French battle linemade a sharp angle, the Third French Army, commanded by GeneralSarrail, occupying a base from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. It thus facedalmost west, skirting the lower edge of the Forest of Argonne. At thesame time it was back to back with the Second French Army, which coveredthe great barrier of forts from Verdun to Toul and Epinal, while theFirst French Army held the line from Epinal to Belfort. CHAPTER XIII ALLIED AND GERMAN BATTLE PLANS So much for the actual disposition of the armies. The question ofpreponderance of numbers, of advantages of position, and of comparativefighting efficiency is the next factor with which to be reckoned. Thenumbers were fairly evenly matched. About twelve days before thisfateful day of September 3, 1914, there were approximately 100 Germandivisions as against seventy-five French, British, and Belgiandivisions. But, during those twelve days, French and Britishmobilization advanced with hectic speed, while, at the same time, Germany was compelled to transfer ten or perhaps fifteen of herdivisions to the eastern theater of war. It follows, therefore, thatthere were about 4, 000, 000 soldiers in all the armies that confrontedeach other in the week of September 3-10, 1914, of whom, probably, 3, 000, 000 were combatants. An early estimate placed the German strength at 1, 300, 000 combatants, and the Allies at about 1, 700, 000. A later French estimate put theGermans at 1, 600, 000, with the Allies between 1, 400, 000 and 1, 500, 000. The preponderance of efficiency of equipment lay with the Germans. The plans of the German campaign at this time, so far as they can bedetermined from the official orders and from the manner in which therespective movements were carried out, were three-fold. The first ofthese movements was the order given to General von Kluck to swirl hisforces to the southeast of Paris, swerving away from the capital in anattempt to cut the communications between it and the Fifth French Armyunder General d'Espérey. This plan evidently involved a feint attackupon the Sixth French Army under General Manoury (though General Paretook charge of the larger issues of this western campaign), coupled witha swift southerly stroke and an attack upon what was supposed to be theexposed western flank of General d'Espérey's army. The cause of thefailure of this attempt was the presence of the British army, as hasbeen shown in the alignment of the armies given above, and as will beshown in detail later, in the recital of the actual progress of thefighting. Important as was this movement, however, it was the least ofthe three elements in General von Moltke's plan for the shattering ofthe great defense line of the Allies. The second element in this plan was, contrary to Germany's usualtactics, the determination to attack the center of the French line andbreak through. Almost three-quarters of a million men were concentratedon this point. The armies of General von Bülow, General Hausen and theDuke of Württemberg were massed in the center of the line. There, however, General Foch's new Ninth Army was prepared to meet the attack. It will be remembered that, in the disposition of the troops, theserespective armies were facing each other across the great desolateplain, the ancient battle ground. If the German center could breakthrough the French center, and if at the same time General von Kluck, commanding the German right, could execute a swift movement to thesoutheast, the Fifth French Army would be between two fires, togetherwith such part of the Ninth Army as lay to the westward of the point tobe pierced. This strategic plan held high promise, and it would havemenaced the whole interior of France southward from the plain ofChampagne, but even this second part of the plan, important as it was, does not appear to have been the crucial point in the campaign. The glory of the victory, if indeed victory it should prove, as thesuccesses of the previous two weeks had led the Germans to believe, wasto be given to the crown prince. With a great deal of trouble and withfar more delay than had been anticipated, the crown prince's army had atlast managed to get within striking distance of the forefront of thegreat battle line. His forces occupied the territory north of Verdun toa southern point not far from Bar-le-Duc. Here the German secret serviceseems to have been as efficient, as it failed to be with regard toconditions only fifty miles away. General Sarrail's army, whichconfronted the army of the crown prince, was somewhat weak. It consistedof about two army corps with reserve divisions. Nor could General Joffresend any reenforcements. Every available source of reenforcements hadbeen drawn upon to aid the Sixth Army, encamped upon the banks of theOurcq, in order that Paris might be well guarded. No troops could bespared from the Fifth and Ninth Armies, which had to bear the brunt ofthe attack from the German center. General Sarrail, therefore, had todepend on the natural difficulties of the country and to avoid givingbattle too readily against the superior forces by which he wasconfronted. It was a part of the plan of the French generalissimo, however, to feel the strength of the German center, and if it provedthat they could be held, to release several divisions and send them tothe aid of General Sarrail. Subordinate to this contemplated attack by the crown prince, yet forminga part of it, and, in a measure, a fourth element in the campaign, wasthe double effort from the garrisons of Metz and Saarbrücken, combiningwith the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince and the forces of Generalvon Heeringen. The Second French Army, therefore, could not come to theaid of the Third, except in desperate need, for it was in the veryforefront of the attack on Nancy. If the German left could pierce theFrench lines at Nancy and pour through the Gap of Lorraine, it would beable to take General Sarrail's army in the rear at Bar-le-Duc, and wouldthus completely hem it in, at the same time isolating Verdun, which, thus invested in the course of time must fall, forming an invaluableadvanced fortress to the German advance. [Illustration: Battle of the Marne--Situation on September 9, 1914. ] Before proceeding to the actual working out of this plan of campaign itmay be well to recapitulate it, in order that each development may beclear. The German plan was to pierce the French line at three places, atMeaux, at Bar-le-Duc and at Nancy. General von Kluck, at Meaux, wouldcut off the Fifth and the Ninth Armies from communication with theirbase at Paris, the Bavarian Crown Prince would weaken General Sarrail'sdefense in the rear, and if possible come up behind him, and thus thestage would be set for the great onrush of the Imperial Crown Prince, who, with an almost fresh army, and with a most complete and elaboratesystem of communications and supplies, should be able to crush the weakpoint in France's defense, the army under General Sarrail. Such avictory was designed to shed an especial luster upon the crown princeand thus upon the Hohenzollern dynasty, a prestige much needed, for thedelays in the advance of the crown prince's army had already given riseto mutterings of discontent. From a strategical point of view the planwas sound and brilliant, the disposition of the forces was excellentlycontrived, and the very utmost of military skill had been used inbringing matters to a focus. The French plan, is the next to be considered. From official orders anddispatches and also from the developments of that week, it is clear thatGeneral Joffre had perceived the possibility of such a plan as theGermans had actually conceived. He had brought back his armies--andthere is nothing harder to handle than a retreating army--step by stepover northern France without losing them their morale. The loss of lifewas fearful, but it never became appalling. The French soldiers hadfaith in Joffre, even as their faith in France, and, while the Germanshad victories to cheer them on, the soldiers of the Allies had to keepup their courage under the perpetual strain of retreat. Theadministration had evacuated Paris. Everywhere it seemed that theweakness of France was becoming apparent. To the three armies in thefield, those commanded severally by General Manoury, Sir John French, and General Lanrezac, the generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements. But he informed the French Government that he was not able to save thecapital from a siege. Yet, as after events showed, while these variousconditions could not rightly be considered as ruses upon GeneralJoffre's part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that heunderstood and took full advantage of the readiness of the attackinghosts to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory. Thefirst feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to theGerman belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened andthereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly. The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre's decision notto do the expected thing. With General Sarrail placed at the extremestpoint of danger, it would have been a likely move to transfer the entireBritish Expeditionary Force from the left wing to the weak point atBar-le-Duc. There is reason to believe that General von Kluck believedthat this had been done. The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that of adetermination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive. Time aftertime had the other generals implored their leader to give them leave totake the offensive, and on every occasion a shake of the head had beenthe reply. Sir John French had wondered. But when the French officersfound themselves in the region of the Marne, close to the marshes of St. Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon had faced the Russians, they were morecontent. It was familiar as well as historic ground. Even the youngestofficer knew every foot of that ground thoroughly. It was, at the sametime, the best point for the forward leap and one of the last points atwhich a halt could be made. The fourth part of the plan was the holding fast to the point of Verdun, for thereby the communication of the armies of the Central Powers wasseriously weakened. It is to be remembered that this actual fightingarmy of more than a million men depended for food and for ammunitionsupplies upon the routes from Belgium and Luxemburg by way of Mézièresand Montmédy, and the circuitous line to Brussels via St. Quentin. HadMaubeuge fallen a little earlier the situation of the Central Powerswould have been less difficult, and both commissariat and ammunitionproblems would have been easier of solution. But Maubeuge held out untilSeptember 7, 1914, and by that time the prime results of the battles ofthe Marne had been achieved. To this problem Verdun was the key, forfrom Metz through Verdun ran the main line, less than one-half thelength of line to the Belgian bases of supplies, and, owing to thenature of the country, a line that could be held with a quarter thenumber of men. But Verdun stood, and General Joffre held the two armiesback to back, converging on the point at Verdun. Such was the country over which the battles of the Marne were fought, such were the numbers and dispositions of the several armies on eachside, and such, as far as can be judged, were the plans and counterplansof the strategic leaders in the great conflict. CHAPTER XIV FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the Germanextreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in asoutheasterly direction. It was a hazardous move, for it requiredGeneral von Kluck to execute a flank march diagonally across the frontof the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force. At thistime, according to the dispatches from Sir John French, the British armylay south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets, defending thepassage of the river and blowing up the bridges before General vonKluck. On September 4, 1914, air reconnaissances showed that General von Kluckhad stopped his southward advance upon Paris, and that his columns weremoving in a southeasterly direction east of a line drawn throughNanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. Meanwhile the French and Britishgenerals more effectually concealed their armies in the forests, doingso with such skill that their movements were unmarked by the German airscouts. All that day General von Kluck moved his forces, leaving hisheavy artillery with about 100, 000 men on the steep eastern bank of theOurcq and taking 150, 000 troops south across the Marne toward La FertéGaucher. He crossed the Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, all unconsciousthat scores of field glasses were trained upon his troops. Probably believing that the British army had been hurried to the aid ofGeneral Sarrail, General von Kluck advanced confidently. Havingconcealment in view, the commanders of the French army and the Britisharmy between them had left a wide gap between the two armies. Throughone of these apparently unguarded openings a strong body of uhlanpatrols advanced, riding southward until they reached Nogent, south ofParis, and seemingly with the whole rich country of central France laidwide open to a sharp and sudden attack. Among the many strange featuresof this series of the battles of the Marne this must certainly bereckoned as one. Though possessing an unequaled military organization, though priding itself on its cavalry scouts, though aided by aerialscouts, and though well supplied with spies, yet the Allied armies, withthe age-old device of a forest, were able to cloak their movements fromthis perfectly organized and powerful invading army. Much of the creditof this may be assigned to the French and English aircraft, which keptGerman scouting aircraft at a distance. But the Allied generals wereastounded at the result of their maneuver, which, as they admittedafterward, was merely a military precautionary measure against thediscovery of artillery sites, and a device to keep the enemy in generalignorance. On Saturday, September 5, 1914, at the extreme north of the line of thetwo armies facing each other across the Ourcq, an artillery duel began. The offensive was taken by the French, and though in itself it was notmore striking than any of the artillery clashes that had marked theprevious month's fighting, it was significant, for it marked thebeginning of the battles of the Marne. The plans of General Joffre werecomplete, but the actual point at which the furious contest should beginwas not yet determined. In the northern Ourcq section, however, therealization by the French that they were actually on the offensive atlast, that the long period of retreat was over, could not berestrained. The troops were eager to get to work with the bayonet, andgreatly aided by their field artillery, in which mobility had beensacrificed to power, they quickly cleared the hills to the westward ofthe Ourcq. By nightfall of September 5, 1914, the country west of theOurcq was in French hands. But to cross that river seemed impossible. General von Kluck's heavy artillery had been left behind to hold thatposition, and every possible crossing was covered with its own blast ofdeath. Here General von Kluck's generalship was successful. It might have beenregarded as risky to leave 100, 000 men to guard a river confronted by250, 000 picked and reenforced French troops. But General von Kluck'sfaith in German guns and German gunnery was not ill-founded. This wasthe first of the open-air siege conflicts, and the French army had noguns which could be used against the German heavy artillery. Hence itfollowed that the brilliant work of the Sixth French Army on this firstday of the battles of the Marne achieved no important result, for thelong-range hidden howitzers, manned by expert German gunners and wellsupplied with ammunition, defied all attempts at crossing the littlestream of the Ourcq. This first day's fighting on the Marne revealed one of France's chiefestneeds--heavy artillery. The French light quick-firing gun was a deadlyweapon, but France had neglected the one department of artillery inwhich the Germans had been most successful--the use of powerful motortraction to move big guns without slackening the march of an army. General von Kluck's artillery was impregnable to the French. Indeed, theGermans could not be dislodged from the Ourcq until the BritishExpeditionary Force sent up some heavy field batteries. It was then toolate for the withdrawal from the Ourcq to be of any serious consequencein determining the result along the battle front. The afternoon of that day, when the Zouaves were driving the Germansacross the Ourcq with the bayonet and were themselves effectuallystopped by the German wall of artillery fire, General Joffre and SirJohn French met. At last the British commander received the welcome newsfrom the generalissimo that retreat was over and advance was about to bebegun. "I met the French commander in chief at his request, " runs the officialdispatch, "and he informed me of his intention to take the offensiveforthwith by wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting onthe Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq; cross and attack theflank of the First German Army, which was then moving in a southeasterlydirection east of that river. "He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my leftresting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the gapbetween that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemyon my front and join in the general offensive movement. German troops, which were observed moving southeast up the left bank of the Ourcq onthe Fourth, were now reported to be halted and facing that river. Headsof the enemy's columns were seen crossing at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mezy. "Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging onMontmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were locatedin the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferté-Gaucher, and Dagny. "These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened ona front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the leftflank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Maupertuis, which was about the British center, Courtaçon, which was the left of theFifth French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the NinthArmy under General Foch, and so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth, and Third French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun. " Sunrise on Sunday morning, on a summer day in sunny France, was thesetting for the grim and red carnage which should show in the next fiveconsecutive days that the German advance was checked, that thesouthernmost point had been reached, and that for a long time to come itwould tax the resources of the invaders to hold the land that alreadyhad been won. General Joffre had so arranged his forces that the mostspectacular--and the easiest--part fell to the British, and it wasaccomplished with perfection of detail. But the honors of the battles ofthe Marne lay with General Sarrail's army and with the "Iron Division ofToul. " On the same morning, this special army order, issued by Sir John French, was read to the British troops: "After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement, whichhave been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan of the alliedarmies, the British forces stand to-day formed in line with their Frenchcomrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled in their attempt to investParis, the Germans have been driven to move in an easterly andsoutheasterly direction with the apparent intention of falling instrength upon the Fifth French Army. In this operation they are exposingtheir right flank and their line of communications to an attack from thecombined Sixth French Army and the British forces. "I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its powerand to push on vigorously to the attack beside the Sixth French Army. "I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on thecontrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which theyhave shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's flankwith all their strength and, in unison with the Allies, drive themback. " As before, the day's fighting began with the efforts of the Sixth FrenchArmy against the Ourcq. Before the Germans could be driven from the eastbank the few villages they occupied on the west bank had to be taken, and as these were covered by heavy artillery from the farther bank, theFrench loss of life was very severe. Yet these several combats--of whichthere were as many as there were villages--were stationary. In everycase the Germans were compelled to cross the river; in every case theartillery made it impossible for the French to follow them. At dawn also every one of the French armies advanced, and within two orthree hours of sunrise found themselves engaged with the German front. The spirited order to the troops issued that morning by General Joffrehad left no doubt in the minds of Frenchmen on the importance of theissue. It read: "At a moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country dependsis going to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind you all thatthis is no longer the time to look behind. All our efforts must bedirected toward attacking and driving back the enemy. An army which canno longer advance must at all costs keep the ground it has won, andallow itself to be killed on the spot rather than give way. In thepresent circumstance no faltering can be tolerated. " Yet in spite of the powerful efforts of the French armies they were allheld in check, and General Sarrail was beginning to give way. Though the fighting in the center had been stationary on this sixth ofSeptember, 1914, it had been desperate. D'Espérey was facing the 150, 000men of Von Kluck's army, and the effect of the British attack on VonKluck's flank had not yet been felt. He more than held his own, but atgreat cost. General Foch, with the Ninth Army, had a double problem, forhe was wrestling with General von Bülow to hold the southern edge of theSézanne Plateau, while General von Hausen's Saxon Army was trying toturn his right flank. A violent attack, which, for the space of over twohours seemed likely to succeed, was launched by the Duke of Württembergagainst General Langle and the Fourth Army. The attack was repelled, butthe French losses were proportionately great. There could be no denialthat many such attacks could break through the line. General Sarrail'sarmy, fighting a losing game, showed marvelous stubbornness andgameness, but even so, it could not resist being pushed south of FortTroyon, itself unable to support the battering it might expect toreceive when the German siege guns should be brought into place. [Illustration: Battle of the Marne--End of German Retreat and theIntrenched Line on the Aisne River. ] At every point but one the Germans had a right to deem the daysuccessful. The only reversal had been a minor one before the forest ofCrécy. Yet, of all the generals on that front Von Kluck alone was in aposition to see the gravity of the situation. The British had caught himon the flank as he tried to pierce the left wing of Generald'Espérey's army, and if he should now retreat, that army could envelophim and thus catch him between two fires. Next morning, Monday, September 7, 1914, another glorious summermorning, saw a resumption of the battle along exactly the same lines, with the same persistent attack and defense along the eastern part ofthe front, and with the British making full use of the blunder made bythe German right. General von Kluck had realized his plight, but, evenso, he had not secured an understanding of the size of the force thatwas threatening his flank, and he sent as a reenforcement a single armycorps which had been intrenched near Coulommiers on the Grand Morin. TheBritish had three full army corps and were well supplied with cavalryand artillery. Yet Coulommiers was Von Kluck's headquarters andactually, when the Germans were driven back and the British troopsentered the town, Prince Eitel, the second son of the kaiser; Generalvon Kluck and his staff were compelled to run down to their motor carsand escape at top speed along the road to Rebais, leaving theirhalf-eaten breakfast on the table, and their glasses of wine halfemptied. One of the most dramatic cavalry actions of this period of thewar took place shortly before noon, when one hundred and seventeensquadrons of cavalry were engaged. In this action the British weresuccessful, but the German cavalry were tired and harassed, having beenseverely handled the day before. In this engagement between the British and the German right, all theodds had been in favor of the British, and success meant merely thegrasping at opportunities that presented themselves. Still, byconstantly striking at General von Kluck's exposed flank, his frontalattack of General d'Espérey was so weakened, that, toward evening at theclose of two days of continuous and very severe fighting, the FifthFrench Army was able to advance and hold the position from LaFerté-Gaucher to Esternay. The ground gained was valuable but notessential, yet it made a profound impression. General d'Espérey's step forward was the Germans' step back. It meantthat the road to Paris was barred. How fully this was realized may beseen from an order signed by Lieutenant General Tuelff von Tschepe undWeidenbach and found in the house that had been occupied by the staff ofthe Eighth German Army Corps when the victorious French enteredVitry-le-François. The order was dated "September 7, 10:30 p. M. " and itread as follows: "The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. Theprincipal French troops have been forced to accept battle, after havingbeen continually forced back. The great decision is undoubtedly at hand. To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well asall that of our Army Corps, are bound to be engaged all along the linefrom Paris to Verdun. To save the welfare and the honor of Germany Iexpect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fightsof the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the lastbreath. Everything depends on the result of to-morrow. " Much did, indeed, depend on the result of the morrow, and for the thirdday, again, it was General von Kluck's initial move that broughtdisaster to the German side. Why was it that Von Kluck, instead of marching directly on Paris, aswould have been expected, made a detour, having as his object not thecapital but the French army? It may be said in favor of it that thedecision taken by the German General Staff was in conformity with themilitary doctrine of Napoleon. According to this doctrine, a capital, whatever its importance, is never more than an accessory object, geographical or political. What is of importance is the strategicalobject. The strategical object is the essential, the geographical objectis only accessory. Once the essential object is attained, the accessoryobject is acquired of itself. Once the French armies had been beaten, thrown back, and dispersed, Von Kluck could return to the capital andtake it easily. Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the armyof Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace to his left, and in front of him the British army and the Fifth French Army; he mighthave been caught as in a vise between these forces while all hisactivity was being absorbed by his attack on the intrenchments aroundParis. It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as itseemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of theMarne, and the result of the war might have been very different. It was, however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false maneuver on hispart, that determined the victory of the Marne. Von Kluck did exactlywhat he ought to have done; the decision taken by the German GeneralStaff was exactly what it ought to have taken, and what was foreseenduring the whole course of the war. It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations madeby the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and those of thearmy of Manoury and the military government of Paris, made it clear thatthe German right (Von Kluck's army) was bending its march toward thesoutheast in the direction of Meaux and Coulommiers, leaving behind itthe road to Paris. At this moment the Fifth French Army of the left was ready to meet theGerman forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked toward thenorthwest by the British army and by General Manoury's army to thenortheast of the capital. The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre's order of August25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning movement, andthey were in a position to counter with an enveloping movementthemselves. The wings of the French forces found support in theirmaneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris and Verdun. Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack, and issued on theevening of September 4 the series of general orders, which announced thebig offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle. CHAPTER XV GERMAN RETREAT That morning of the 8th, then, saw General von Kluck in full retreat. His frontal attack on General d'Espérey had failed and the Fifth FrenchArmy had advanced. The British were at his flank, and besides, they hadbeen able to spare some of their heavy artillery to send to the SixthArmy under General Maunoury, to enable him to cross the Ourcq. It is byno means certain that even with this assistance could the Sixth Armyhave silenced the terrible fire of those howitzers, but General vonKluck dared no longer leave his artillery there, it must be taken withhim on his retreat, or become valuable booty. Leaving a few batteries toguard the crossings of the river, the Ourcq division of the German rightretreated in good order, to rejoin their comrades who had been sounexpectedly mauled by the British. The honor of this day was, curiously, not to the victorious, but to the defeated army. Had Generalvon Kluck done nothing other than conduct his army in retreat as he did, he would have shown himself an able commander. Sir John French andGeneral d'Espérey followed up their advantage. The artillery fire of theBritish was good and in a running fight, such as this retreat, the lightfield artillery of the French did terrible execution. The brunt of theBritish fighting was at La Trétoire. General d'Espérey fought steadilyforward all day, driving the retreating army as closely as he could, butproceeding warily because of General von Kluck's powerfulcounterattacks. The fighting was continuous from the first break ofdaylight until after dusk had fallen, and it was in the twilight thatthe French Army at last carried Montmirail on the Petit Morin, a feat ofstrategic value, since it exposed the right flank of Von Bülow's army, exposed by the retreat of General von Kluck. From this review of the forced retirement of General von Kluck, it willbe seen that the German right was compelled to sustain an attack atthree points, from the Sixth French Army on the banks of the Ourcq, from the British army in the region of Coulommiers and from the FifthFrench Army near Courtaçon. Each of these attacks was of a widelydifferent character. The result of this attack has been shown in thesummary of the three days (four days on the Ourcq) which resulted in theBritish capture of Coulommiers and in the French capture of Montmirail. This was General Joffre's counteroffensive, and it developed in detailalmost exactly along the lines that he had laid down. The scene of the fighting across the west bank of the Ourcq was that ofa wide-open country, gently undulating, dotted with comfortablefarmhouses, and made up of a mosaic of green meadow lands and thestubble of grain fields. The German heavy guns came into action as soonas the French offensive developed. Tremendous detonations that shook theearth, and which were followed by sluggish clouds of an oily smokeshowed where the high-explosive shells had struck. Already, by theevening of the first day's fighting, there were blazing haystacks andfarmhouses to be seen, and the happy and smiling plain showed scarredand rent with the mangling hand of war. On the 6th, a sugar refinery, which had been held as an outpost by a force of 1, 800 Germans, was seton fire by a French battery. The infantry had been successful in gettingto within close range and as the invaders sought to escape from theburning building, they were picked off one by one by the Frenchmarksmen. The French infantry, well intrenched, suffered scarcely anyloss. It was in brilliant sunshine that the fire broke out, and theconflagration was so fierce that the empty building sent up littlesmoke. The flames scarcely showed in the bright light, and to theonlooker, it seemed as if some rapid leprous disease was eating up thebuilding. The situation was horrible for the Germans, either to betrapped and to perish in the flames, or to face the withering Frenchinfantry fire without any opportunity to fight back. Less than 300 ofthe occupants of the refinery won clear. Wherever the forces met, the slaughter was great and terrible. In theexcitement and the eagerness of the first offensive, the French seemedto have forgotten the lessons of prudence that the long retreat shouldhave ingrained into their memory, and they sought to take every villagethat was occupied by the Germans with a rush. The loss of life wasgreatest at a point four miles east of Meaux. There, on a sharp, tree-covered ridge, the Germans had intrenched, and gun platforms hadbeen placed under the screen of the trees. An almost incessant hail ofshrapnel fell on these lines, and the French infantry charges wererepulsed again and again, with but little loss on the German line. But, meantime, village after village had been attacked by the French andcarried with the bayonet, and on Sunday, September 6th, 1914, that partof the battles of the Marne which dealt with the driving back of theGermans to the line of the Ourcq, was in some of its feature like ahand-to-hand conflict of ages long gone by. Yet, overhead aeroplanescircled, on every side shells were bursting, the heavy smell of blood ona hot day mingled with the explosive fumes, but the Zouaves and theTurcos fought without ceasing and with a force and spirit that went farto win for the French the cheering news that village after village hadbeen freed of the invaders. When the night of that Sunday fell, however, on the line of the Ourcq, the balm of darkness seemed to be almost as much a forgotten thing asthe blessedness of silence. There was no darkness that night. As theGermans evacuated each village they set fire to it. The invadersactually held their machine guns at work in the burning village untilthe position was no longer tenable. The wind blew gustily that night, and all the hours long, the Germans collected their dead, built greatpyres of wood and straw and cremated their comrades who had fallen onthe field of battle. The next day, at this point, developed fighting of the same generalcharacter. One of the most heroic defenses of General von Kluck's armywas that of the Magdeburg Regiment, which held its advanced post tenminutes too long and consequently was practically annihilated. Althoughthe French had everywhere shown themselves superior with the bayonet andat close infighting, even as the Germans had displayed an incrediblecourage in advance under gunfire, and rightly held their heavyartillery to be the finest in the world, in the mêlée around the colorsof the Magdeburg Regiment, there was nothing to choose for either side. The lieutenant color bearer was killed, in the midst of a ring of dead, and not until almost the whole regiment had been killed under the impactof far superior numbers, were the tattered colors taken into the Frenchlines. It was on this day, Tuesday, September 8, 1914, that the Britisharmy realizing that it had turned the flank of General von Kluck'ssouthern divisions sent its heavy batteries to the pressure on the banksof the Ourcq. A graphic picture of the artillery side of the fighting on the Ourcq wasgiven by one of the artillery officers detached from the British force. "Meaux was still a town of blank shutters and empty streets when we gotthere this morning, " he wrote, "but the French sappers had thrown aplank gangway across the gap in the ruined old bridge, built in A. D. 800, that had survived all the wars of France, only to perish at last inthis one. "Smack, smack, smack, smack go the French guns; and then, a few secondslater, four white mushrooms of smoke spring up over the far woods andslowly the pop, pop, pop, pop, of the distant explosions comes back toyou. But now it is the German gunners' turn. Bang! go his guns, twomiles away; there is a moment of eerie and uncomfortablesilence--uncomfortable because there is just a chance they might havealtered their range--and then, quite close by, over the wood where thebattery is, come the crashes of the bursting shells. They sound like aTitan's blows on a gigantic kettle filled with tons of old iron. "At Trilport there is a yawning gap, where one arch of the railwaybridge used to be, with a solitary bent rail still lying across it. And, among the wreckage of the bridge below, lying on its side and more thanhalf beneath the water, is the smashed and splintered ruin of a closedmotor car. "Beyond the town was a ridge on which the French batteries were posted. We could see the ammunition wagons parked on the reverse slope of thehill. More were moving up to join them. "The village beyond, Penchard, was thronged with troops and blocked withambulance wagons and ammunition carts. "Through the rank grass at the side came tramping a long file of dusty, sweating, wearied men. They carried long spades and picks as well astheir rifles. They had come out of the firing line and were going backto Penchard for food. "Topping the next ridge . .. The hill slopes steeply down to the hamletof Chamvery, just below us. The battery which I mentioned just now is inthe wood on this side of it to our right. The Zouaves' firing line islying flat on the hillside a little way beyond the village, and behindthem, farther down the hill, are thick lines of supports in the cover ofintrenchments. It is a spectacle entirely typical of a modern battle, for there is scarcely anything to see at all. If it were not for thoseshells being tossed to and fro on the right there, and an occasionalsplutter of rifle fire, one might easily suppose that the lines ofblue-coated men lying about on the stubble were all dozing in the hotafternoon sun. "Even when some of them move they seem to do it lazily, to saunterrather than to walk. .. . It is only in the cinematograph or on thecomparatively rare occasions of close fighting at short range that menrush about dramatically. For one thing, they are too tired to hurry; andanyhow, what is the use of running when a shell may burst any minuteanywhere in the square mile you happen to be on? "I walked with the company officers who were planning a fresh advance, map in hand. They had gained the village in which we were that morning, but at tremendous loss. "'Out of my company of 220, ' said one captain, 'there are only 100 left. It's the same story everywhere--the German machine guns. Their firesimply clears the ground like a razor. You just can't understand howanyone gets away alive. I've had men fall at my right hand and my left. You can't look anywhere, as you advance, without seeing men dropping. Ofour four officers, two are wounded and one dead. I am left alone incommand. '" This hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of villages on the westbank of the Marne, this heavy loss to the French troops by the Germanartillery, and this sudden check at the Ourcq itself, until Britishheavy batteries were sent, marks the character of what may be called thebattle of the Ourcq, the westernmost of the battles of the Marne. AsGeneral von Kluck had divided his forces, in order to carry out theattempt to pierce the left of General d'Espérey's army, the Germanforces in the battle of the Ourcq were outnumbered almost three to one. In spite of these odds against them, the extreme German right held forfour days the position it had been given to hold. CHAPTER XVI CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE Remembering again the general outline of General von Kluck's plan, thatof executing a diagonal movement with 150, 000 of his men to attack theeasternmost point of the Fifth Army, and possibly to envelop it by aflank movement, the continuation of the Battle of the Marne may betreated with more detail. This part is called by some the Battle ofCoulommiers. In this battle there was as great a change in morale as in the battle ofthe Ourcq. There, the French had been stirred to high endeavor by therealization that the word to advance had at last been given. This alsooperated in part on the British in the battle of Coulommiers, but, inaddition, there was another very important factor. The dawn of that Sunday summer morning, September 6, 1914, was one ofgreat exhilaration for the British forces. The offensive was begun, thetime for striking back had come, and every column resounded withmarching choruses. The countryside was lovely, as had been all thecountryside through which the retreating armies had passed, gay with thelittle French homesteads, flower decked and smiling, heavily ladenorchards, and rich grain fields, some as yet uncut, some newly stacked. Women and children, with here and there an old man, ran along the lineof march ministering to the wants of their defenders. There was no needfor language, as courtesy and gratitude are universal, and the Englishwere fighting for "La Belle France. " So the morning wore on. Through the forested region of Crécy the British passed, and it has beentold hereinbefore how they surprised the two cavalry commands thrust outas scouts by General von Kluck. But, as they reached the land that hadbeen occupied by the German hosts, the bearing of the men changed, evenas the country changed. The simple homes of the peasants were in ashes, every house that had showed traces of comfort had been sacked or guttedwith fire. Between noon and three o'clock in the afternoon of that daythree burned churches were passed. The songs stopped. A black silencefell upon the ranks. Bloody business was afoot. It was in the middle of the afternoon, a slumbrous harvest afternoon, that a big gun boomed in the distance, and the shell shrieked dolefullythrough the air, its vicious whine ceasing with a tremendous sudden roaras it burst behind the advancing British lines. On the instant, Sir JohnFrench's batteries almost wiped out the German cavalry, and ten minuteshad not elapsed before the full artillery on both sides had begun aterrific fire that was stunning to the senses. Under cover of their ownfire, the British infantry advanced and hurled themselves against theouter line of General von Kluck's Second Army. The attack failed. TheBritish were driven back, but though the loss of life was sharp, it wasnot great, as the British commander had but advanced his men to test outthe invader's strength. The British artillery was well placed, and underits cover the British made a second advance, this time successful. TheGermans replied with a counterattack which was repulsed, but in thatforty minutes 10, 000 men had fallen. A dispatch has been quoted from a French soldier, showing the terriblehavoc caused by the German machine guns, and a letter from a Germanofficer, published in the "Intelligenzblatt" of Berne pays a liketribute to the artillery of the Allies. Speaking of this very section ofthe battle front, he wrote: "We were obliged to retreat as the English were attempting a turningmovement, which was discovered by our airmen. [This refers to theadvance of the British First Army Corps under Sir Douglas Haig in thedirection of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, which, if it could have beensuccessfully carried out, would have meant the entire loss of Generalvon Kluck's southern army. ] During the last two hours we werecontinually exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, for ourartillery had all either been put out of action or had retreated and hadceased to fire. [This dispatch was evidently, therefore, written towardthe end of the second day, on Monday, September 7, 1914, when Generalvon Kluck realized that his forward drive had failed and that he mustfall back. ] "The enemy's airmen flew above us, describing two circles, which means, 'there is infantry here. ' The enemy's artillery mowed the ground withits fire. In one minute's time I counted forty shells. The shrapnelexploded nearer and nearer; at last it reached our ranks. I quicklyhugged a knapsack to my stomach in order to protect myself as best Icould. The shrieks of the wounded rang out on all sides. Tears came tomy eyes when I heard the poor devils moaning with pain. The dust, thesmoke, and the stench of the powder were suffocating. "An order rang out, and bending as low as possible, we started up. Wehad to pass right in the line of fire. The men began to fall likeninepins. God be thanked that I was able to run as I did. I thought myheart would burst, and was about to throw myself on the ground, unableto continue, when your image and that of Bolli rose before my eyes, andI ran on. "At last we reached our batteries. Three guns were smashed to pieces, and the gun carriages were burned. We halted for a few seconds to takebreath. And all the time that whistling and banging of the shellscontinued. It is a wonder one is not driven mad. " Admiration cannot be withheld from General von Kluck for his splendidfight at the battle of Coulommiers. He was out-generaled, for one thing, because of his plan--or his orders--to strike a southeasterly blow; hewas outmaneuvered by the presence of a vastly larger British force thanhe had any reason to expect, and he was outnumbered almost two to one. Through the apple and pear orchards of La Trétoire the battle wassanguinary; the British (reenforced on September 7, 1914, by some Frenchdivisions) swept through the terrain in widely extended lines, for closeformation was not to be thought of with artillery and machine guns infront. It was bitter fighting, and the German right contested every inchof ground stubbornly. Once, indeed, it seemed that General von Kluckwould turn the tables. He rapidly collected his retreating troops, andwith unparalleled suddenness hurled them back upon the advancing FirstCorps under Sir Douglas Haig. Aeroplane scouts decided the issue. Hadthe British been compelled to await the onset, or had they been forcedto depend on cavalry patrols, there would have been no opportunity toresist that revengeful onslaught. But no sooner had the Germans begun tore-form than Sir Douglas Haig moved his machine guns to the front andfell back a few hundred yards to a better position. This happened onSeptember 8, 1914, and may be regarded as the last offensive move madeby General von Kluck's army in the west. On that same day Coulommierswas invested and Prince Eitel compelled to flee, and the battle ofCoulommiers was won. CHAPTER XVII CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE The third part of the battle of the Marne, called by some the Battle ofMontmirail, was not marked by special incident. General d'Espérey's partwas to hold firm, and this he did. Not only by reason of the Britishassistance on the left, but also because the strong army of General Fochto the right was a new army, of greater strength than was known toGeneral von Moltke and the German General Staff. The battle ofMontmirail was won by the steady resistance of the Fifth Army to thehammer blows of the German right, and to the quick advantage seized byGeneral d'Espérey when the British weakened the flank of the forceopposing him. On September 8, 1914, General d'Espérey had not only heldhis ground, but had driven General von Kluck back across the Grand MorinRiver at La Ferté-Gaucher, and also across the Petit Morin atMontmirail. Since the British had butted the Germans back from the PetitMorin at La Trétoire, these three days of fighting in the battles ofCoulommiers and Montmirail had won the Allies advanced positions acrosstwo rivers, and had so weakened the German right that it was compelledto fall back on the main army and forego its important strategicadvantage on the east bank of the Ourcq River. These three battles, Ourcq, Coulommiers, and Montmirail, constitute therecoil from Paris, and at the same time they constitute the defeat ofwhat was hereinbefore shown to be one of the four fundamentals of thegreat German campaign plan. With the situation thus cleared, so tospeak, one may now pass to the details of the second part of the Germanplan, which was to engage the powerful Ninth and Fourth Armies, underthe command of Generals Foch and Langle, respectively, to break throughthem, if possible, but at all hazards to keep them sufficiently menacedto disable General Joffre from sending reenforcements therefrom to thearmy of General Sarrail, on which the whole force of the army of thecrown prince was to be hurled. The next section of the Allied armies, then, was General Foch's NinthArmy, which encountered the German drive at Fère Champenoise, and whichresulted in the severe handling of General von Bülow's forces. Withcharacteristic perception of the difference between a greater and alesser encounter, General Foch called his share of the battles of theMarne, the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond. " This did not culminateuntil Wednesday, September 9, 1914, so that the German retreat there wasone day later than the final retreat of General von Kluck. The clash between the armies of General von Bülow and of General Fochbegan, as did the battle wrath along the whole front, at dawn of thatfateful Sunday, September 5, 1914. General Foch, a well-known writer onstrategy, had devised his army for defense. He was well supplied withthe famous 75-millimeter guns, holding them massed in the center of hisline. His extreme right and left were mobile and thrown partly forwardto feel the attack of the invading army. But, in spite of allpreparations, General Foch found himself hard-set to hold his own onSeptember 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1914. The battle continued incessantly, bynight as well as by day, for the artillerists had found each other'srange. There was comparatively little hand-to-hand fighting at thispoint, General Foch only once being successful in luring the Germans towithin close firing range. The results were withering, and General vonBülow did not attempt it a second time. There seems reason to believethat General von Bülow had counted upon acting as a reserve force toGeneral von Kluck during the latter's advance, and that, consequently, he did not think it prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew thesituation to westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at FèreChampenoise on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th. It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail onthe evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Bülow's armyhad been exposed by the advance of General d'Espérey and the retreat ofGeneral von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch, and despite thedanger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile left like a greattongue. That night the weather turned stormy, facilitating this move. Atone o'clock in the morning, the statement has been made, word reachedGeneral Foch indirectly that air patrols had observed a gap in thealignment of the German armies between General von Bülow's left andGeneral von Hausen's right. During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked twocomplete surprises on General von Bülow. He had enveloped the Germancommander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there with Generald'Espérey's army behind him, since the latter had by now advanced toMontmirail. At the same time he had thrust a wedge between Von Bülow andGeneral von Hausen, threatening General von Bülow's left flank as well. The first was a seizure of an opportunity, executed with militarypromptness, the second was a bold _coup_, and its risk might well haveappalled a less experienced general. Considering the westernmost of these movements first, it will be seen atonce how the enveloping action brought about the "Affair of the Marshesof St. Gond. " General von Bülow's army was stretched in an arc aroundthe marshes, which, it will be remembered, have been described as apocket of clay, low-lying lands mainly reclaimed, but which become miryduring heavy rains. It was General von Bülow's misfortune, that, on thevery night that his flank was exposed, there should come a torrentialdownpour. These same marshes had figured more than once before inFrance's military history, and General Foch, as a master strategist, wasdetermined that they should serve again. When the rain came, he thankedhis lucky stars and acted on the instant. When the morning of September 9, 1914, dawned, the left wing of GeneralFoch's army was not only covering the exposed flank of General vonBülow's forces, but parts of it were two miles to the rear. Under thedriving rain, morning broke slowly, and almost before a sodden andrain-soaked world could awake to the fact that day had come, GeneralFoch had nipped the rear of the flank of the opposing army, and wasbending the arc in upon itself. Under normal circumstances, such anaction would tend but to strengthen the army thus attacked, since itbrings all parts of the army into closer communication. But General Fochknew that the disadvantages of the ground would more than compensate forthis, since the two horns of General von Bülow's army could not combinewithout crossing those marshes, now boggy enough, and growing boggierevery second. The task was harder than General Foch anticipated, for thesame rainy conditions that provided a pitfall for the Germans were alsoa manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers. But, in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the flank brokeand gave way, and two entire corps from General von Bülow's right wereprecipitated into the marshes. Forty guns were taken--to that time thelargest capture of artillery made by the Allies--and a number ofprisoners. Hundreds perished miserably, but General Foch held back hisartillery from an indiscriminate slaughter of men made helpless in theslimy mud. Thus ended the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond, " whichbroke still further the German right wing. Thanks to General Foch's further activities, General von Bülow hadtroubles upon his left wing. When dawn of this same day of torrentialrain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that runs from Mareuilto Fère-Champenoise, at which point lay the left of General von Bülow'sarmy, it witnessed a number of 75-millimeter guns on selected gun sitescommanding the right flank of the German right center. General Foch'sdaring, the success of the maneuver, and the fact that the conduct ofall the French armies on that day and the day following seems to be withthe full cognizance of this venture, led inevitably to the conclusionthat those brilliant feats, conceived by General Foch, had beencommunicated to General Joffre in time for the French General Staff todirect the French armies to the right and left of General Foch tocooperate with his action. Had General Foch been less ably supported, his wedge might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides. But General Foch's main army to the west kept General von Bülow busy, and General Langle's army to the east fought too stubbornly for the Dukeof Württemberg to dare detach any forces for the relief of General vonBülow. General von Hausen's Saxon Army was weak, at best. What were the forces that operated to make this particular point so weakare not generally known. As, however, the divisions from Alsace weremuch in evidence three or four days later, it is more than probable thatthese divisions were intended for service at this point, and also toreenforce General von Kluck's army, but that, by the quick offensiveassumed by General Joffre on the Ourcq, and, owing to the roundaboutnature of the German means of communication, these expectedreenforcements had not arrived. The German official dispatches point outthat General von Bülow's retreat was necessitated by the retreat ofGeneral von Kluck. Of this there is no doubt, but even militarynecessity does not quite explain why General von Bülow bolted soprecipitately. His losses were fearful, and the offensive of GeneralFoch rendered it necessary for the Germans to fall back on the Aisne. The armies of the Duke of Württemberg and of the crown prince may beconsidered together, for they were combined in an effort to pierce theFrench line near the angle at Bar-le-Duc. General Langle held ondesperately against the repeated attacks of the Duke of Württemberg. Ground was lost and recovered, lost again and recovered, and everytrifling vantage point of ground was fought for with a bitter intensity. Though active, with all the other armies, on September 5 and 6, 1914, itwas not until September 7 that General Langle found himself strained tohis utmost nerve. If he could hold, he could do no more, and when nightfell on September 7, no person was more relieved than General Langle. Yet the next day was even worse. Instead of slackening in the evilweather, the German drive became more furious. The exhausted Fourth Armyfought as though in a hideous nightmare, defended their lines in asullen obstinacy that seemed almost stuporous, and countercharged in ablind frenzy that approached to delirium. It was doubtful if GeneralLangle's army could hold out much longer. But, when General von Bülowwas compelled to retreat, when General Foch turned his attention toGeneral von Hausen's Saxon Army, and when General Joffre found himselfin a position to rush reenforcements and reserves to the aid of GeneralLangle, a new color was given to the affair. The defense stiffened, andas rapidly as it stiffened, so much the more did it become patent thatthe Duke of Württemberg could not afford to be in an exposed positionfar in advance of all the other attacking armies. Wednesday, September9, 1914, revealed to the German center the need of falling back on thecrown prince's army, which was the pivot on which the whole campaignswung. Meantime, the crown prince's army had been steadily victorious. The weakFrench army under General Sarrail had been pushed back, yielding onlyfoot by foot, back, back, along the rugged hill country of the Meuse. Adetermined stand was made to protect the little fort of Troyon, tenmiles south of Verdun, for had the Germans succeeded in taking this, Verdun would have been surrounded. No army and no generalship could havedone more than the Third Army and General Sarrail did, but they couldnot hold their ground before Troyon. On September 7, 1914, the way toTroyon was open, and the army of the crown prince prepared to demolishit. Then came September 9, 1914, when the allied successes in thewestern part of the Marne valley allowed them to send reenforcements. Thus the Third Army was perceptibly strengthened and hope for Troyongrew. One day more, certainly two days more, and nothing could havesaved Troyon, but with the whole German line in retreat, the army of thecrown prince could not be left on the advance. Incredible though it may seem, when the army of the crown princebesieging Troyon withdrew, that little fort was a mere heap of ruins. There were exactly forty-four men left in the fort and four serviceableguns. Even a small storming party could have carried it without theleast trouble, and its natural strength could have been fortified insuch wise as to make it a pivotal point from which to harry Verdun. At the extreme east, on that ring of wooded heights known as the GrandeCouronne de Nancy, and drawn up across the Gap of Nancy, the SecondFrench Army, under General de Castelnau, successfully resisted the driveof the Crown Prince of Bavaria. Great hopes had been placed on thisattack, and on September 7, 1914, the German Emperor had viewed thefight at Nancy from one of the neighboring heights. Surely a victory forthe German arms might come either at the point where stood the GermanEmperor or where led the crown prince. But the fortunes of war decidedotherwise. Far from losing at Nancy, the French took the offensive. After an artillery duel of terrific magnitude, they drove the Bavarianarmy from the forests of Champenous and took Amance. The line of theMeurthe was then found untenable by the Germans, and on September 12, 1914, General de Castelnau reoccupied the town of Lunéville, which hadbeen in the hands of the Germans since August 22, 1914. With General von Kluck in retreat on September 7, 1914, General vonBülow hastening to the rear on September 8, 1914, with the Duke ofWürttemberg falling back on September 9, 1914, and the Imperial CrownPrince and the Bavarian Crown Prince retreating to an inner ring ofdefense on September 10, 1914, the battles of the Marne may, in ameasure, be said to have concluded. As, however, the new alignments weremade mainly by reason of the topographical relationships of the Marneand the Aisne Rivers and the territory contiguous thereto, it is perhapsmore in keeping with the movement to carry forward the German retreatacross the Marne as a part of the same group of conflicts. CHAPTER XVIII OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE In dealing with a battle as important as that of the Marne points ofview are valuable. We therefore follow with an account of its generalcourse and description of its main features by a French military writer, whose knowledge is based on information that is official. "Before the German armies, " he says, "became engulfed in the vastdepression that stretches from Paris to Verdun, General Joffre withadmirable foresight had brought together a powerful army commanded byGeneral Manoury and having as its support the fortified camp of Paris. As soon as General von Kluck, turning momentarily from the road to theFrench capital and bending his march to the southeast, laid bare hisright wing, General Joffre vigorously launched against his flank theentire army of General Manoury. The brilliant offensive of this armyachieved success from the beginning; it threw back the German forces. Von Kluck perceived the danger that threatened him, and the danger wasserious, for it only required that Manoury should advance a littlefurther and he would have been almost totally defeated. Resolutely, energetically, and with a sang-froid to which homage must be rendered, Von Kluck proceeded to circumvent this danger. He ordered back to thenorth two of his army corps, recrossed the Marne, and threw himself withintrepidity on Manoury. "But the retreat of these two army corps allowed General French andGeneral Franchet d'Espérey both to drive forward vigorously. Somethingresembling the phenomenon of a whirlwind then took place in the Germanranks. The British army made progress toward the north, the Fifth FrenchArmy, commanded by General Franchet d'Espérey, did the same. GeneralManoury, assisted by all the troops that General Galliéni was ablerapidly to put at his disposal, made headway against the furiousonslaught of Von Kluck. Thus the entire German right found itself in amost critical situation. It could not overcome Manoury, who wasthreatening its communications, and on the other hand it found itselfpowerless to resist the victorious advance of Generals French and deFranchet d'Espérey. "It was the critical moment of the battle. The German General Staffdecided that there was only one method of putting an end to it, and thatwas to direct against the army of General Foch in the center anoffensive so violent that the center would be pierced and the Frencharmies cut in two. If this attack succeeded it would free at once theGerman right and separate into two impotent parts the entire Frenchmilitary force. During the 7th, 8th, and 9th of September the ImperialPrussian Guard directed to the compassing of that end all its energy andcourage. All in vain. General Foch not only checked the Germanonslaught, but drove it back. Thus the French center was not pierced, Von Kluck was not relieved, and he found himself in a position that grewmore and more critical. The general retreat of the German armies was theinevitable result. To this decision the German General Staff came, andon the evening of September 9 orders were given to all the armies of theright and center to retire sixty kilometers to the rear. Thus the battleof the Marne was won by the French. " The writer then goes on to say: "It was on September 5, toward the endof the morning, that the general order of General Joffre, leading to thegreat battle, reached the French armies. Each separate army immediatelyturned and vigorously engaged in battle. The army of Manoury, the firstto get ready, sprang forward to the attack. It thrust back the Germanforces which were at first inferior in number, and it attained on theevening of the 5th the Pinchard--St. Soulplet--Ver front; but Von Kluckthrew two army corps over the Marne and hurled himself on Manoury. Hesummoned from Compiègne all the reenforcements at his disposal, and heplaced all his heavy artillery between Vareddes and May-en-Multien. During the day of September 6th Manoury made headway toward the Ourcq. On the following day he advanced at a lesser pace on its left bank, taking and then losing the villages of Marcilly and Chambry--murderousstruggles maintained amid terrible heat. General Galliéni, who followedthe battle with the utmost attention, hurriedly came to the assistanceof Manoury; he sent to him on the 7th and 8th the Seventh Division, which had just arrived at Paris, half of the division being transferredby rail, the other half by means of thousands of automobilesrequisitioned for the purpose. General Joffre likewise sent to Manourythe Fourth Army Corps, recruited from the Third Army, though an almostentire division of it was called for by the British to safeguard thejunction of forces. "The day of September 8 turned out the most arduous for Manoury; theGermans, making attacks of extreme violence, won some success. Theyoccupied Betz, Thury-en-Vallois and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. Von Kluckattacked all his force on the right, and it was at that time he whothreatened Manoury with an encircling movement. The Fourth French ArmyCorps, sent forward at full speed by General Joffre and arriving at thespot, had the order to allow itself to be killed to the last man, but tomaintain its ground. It maintained it. It succeeded toward evening inchecking the advance of the Germans. In a brilliant action the army ofManoury took three standards. It rallied the main body of its forces onthe left and prepared for a new attack. "During this time the British army, following on the retreat of part ofthe forces of Von Kluck, was able to make headway toward the north. Itwas the same with the Fifth French Army. The British, leaving behind iton September 6 the Rosoy--Lagny line, reached in the evening the southbank of the Great Morin. On the 7th and 8th they continued their march;on the 9th they debouched to the north of the Marne below ChâteauThierry, flanking the German forces which on that day were opposing thearmy of Manoury. It was then that the German forces began to retreat, while the British army, pursuing the enemy, took seven cannon and manyprisoners and reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. TheBritish army continued till before Coulommiers, and after a brilliantstruggle forced the passage of the Little Morin. The Fifth French Armyunder General Franchet d'Espérey made the same advance. It drove backthe three active army corps of the Germans and the reserve corps that itfound facing it. On September 7 it pressed forward to theCourtaçon--Cerneux--Monceaux--les--Provins--Courgivaux--Esternay line. During the days that followed it reached and crossed the Marne, capturing in fierce combats some howitzers and machine guns. "General Foch showed admirable sang-froid and energy. At the mostcritical moment, the decisive hour of the battle, he accomplished amagnificent maneuver, which is known under the name of the _maneuver ofFère Champenoise_. Foch noted a rift between the German army of VonBülow and that of Von Hausen. The German Guard was engaged with theTenth Division of the reserve in the region of the marshes of St. Gond. "On September 9 Foch resolutely threw into this rift the Forty-SecondDivision under General Grossetti, which was at his left, and his armycorps of the left. He thus made a flank attack on the German forces, notably the Guard which had bent back his army corps on the right. Theeffect produced by the flank attack of Manoury on the right of Generalvon Kluck's army was renewed here. The enemy, taken aback by thisaudacious maneuver, did not resist and made a precipitate retreat. Onthe evening of the 9th the game was thus lost to the Germans. Theirarmies of the right and of the center were beaten and the retreatfollowed. The Imperial Guard left in the marshes of St. Gond more than8, 000 men and almost all its artillery. Victory henceforth began toperch on the Allied banners over all the vast battle field. " Such was this battle of seven days in which almost 3, 000, 000 men wereengaged. If it is examined in its ensemble, it will be seen that eachFrench army advanced step by step, opening up the road to theneighboring army, which immediately gave it support, and then strikingat the flank of the enemy which the other attacked in front. The effortsof the one were closely coordinated with the efforts of the other. Adeep unity of ideas, of methods, and of courage animated the wholeAllied line. CHAPTER XIX "CROSSING THE AISNE" In order to gain a clear idea of what was involved in the feat of"crossing the Aisne, " which more than one expert has declared to be thegreatest military feat in river crossing in the history of arms, it iswell to look at the topography of that point, first in its relation tothe whole German line, and, second, in its relation to possible attackin September, 1914. The prepared positions on the Aisne to which the Germans fell back afterthe battle of the Marne, were along a line of exceptionally strongnatural barriers. The line extends from a point north of Verdun, on theheights of the Meuse, across the wooded country of the Argonne and theplain of Champagne to Rheims, thence northwest to Brimont, crossing theAisne near its confluence with the Suippe, and from thence proceeding toCraonne, whence it takes a westerly course along the heights of theAisne to the Forest of the Eagle, north of Compiègne. The eastern end ofthis line has already been described in connection with the battles ofthe Marne, and it is the western section of this line which now demandsconsideration. Just as the River Marne was taken as a basis for theconsideration of the topography of the battles that centered round thecrossing of the Ourcq, Grand Morin, Petit Morin, and the Marne, so theAisne is naturally the most important determinant in the problems of itscrossing. The River Aisne rises in the Argonne, southwest of Verdun. Through theChampagne region its banks are of gradual slope, but shortly after itpasses Rethel, on its westerly course, the configuration changessharply, and at Craonne the bluffs overlooking the river are 450 feethigh. It is easy to see what an inaccessible barrier is made by such aline of cliffs. For forty miles this line of bluffs continues, almostreaching to Compiègne, where the Aisne enters the Oise. Not only are thebanks of the Aisne thus guarded by steep bluffs, but the character ofthose bluffs is peculiarly fitted for military purposes. For longstretches along the north side the cliffs stand sheer and have spursthat dip down sharply to the valley. The ridge, or the top of the bluff, which looks from below like the scarp of a great plateau, lies at anaverage of a mile or more from the stream. Many of these spurs jut outin such a way that if fortified they could enfilade up and downstream. To add to the military value of such a barrier the edge of the scarp isheavily wooded, while the lower slopes are steep and grassy, with smallwoods at irregular intervals. Even from the high ground on the southbank of the stream, the top of the plateau on the north cannot be seen, and from below it is effectually cloaked. Two tributaries are to be considered in this river valley which thusforms so natural a post of defense. Both flow in from the south, theSuippe, which joins the main stream at Neufchâtel-sur-Aisne and theVesle, on which stands the ancient city of Rheims. This river joins theAisne a little over seven miles east of Soissons, which is itself twentymiles east of Compiègne. The line taken by the German armies for their stand was not the riveritself, but the northern ridge. At no place more than a mile and a halffrom the river, it was always within gunfire of any crossing. Everyplace of crossing was commanded by a spur. Every road on the north bankwas in their hands, every road on the south bank curved upward so as tobe a fair mark for their artillery. As the German drive advanced, a hugebody of sappers and miners had been left behind to fortify this Aisneline, and the system developed was much the same along its entiredistance. There were two lines of barbed-wire entanglements, one in the bed of thestream which would prevent fording or swimming, and which, being underwater, could not easily be destroyed by gunfire from the southern bank. Above this was a heavy chevaux-de-frise and barbed-wire entanglement, partly sunk and concealed from view; in many places pitted and coveredwith brushwood. Above this, following approximately a thirty-footcontour, came a line of trenches for infantry, and fifty yards behind asecond line of trenches, commanding a further elevation of fifty feet. Two-thirds of the way up the hill came the trench-living quarters, thekitchens, the bakeries, the dormitories, and so forth, and the crest ofthe hill bristled along its entire length with field guns, effectuallyscreened by trees. On the further side of the ridge, in chalk pits, werethe great howitzers, tossing their huge shells over the ridge and itsdefenses into the river itself, and even on the south bank beyond. Truly, a position of power, and one that the boldest of troops mighthesitate to attack. It is quite possible that had the entire strength of the German positionbeen known, no attempt to cross would have been made, but there wasalways a possibility that the counterchecks of the German army were nomore than the rear-guard actions of the three or four days immediatelypreceding. Yet Sir John French seems to have expected the true state ofaffairs, for he remarks in his dispatches: "The battles of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the 6th tothe evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate flight ofthe enemy when we were brought face to face with a position ofextraordinary strength, carefully intrenched and prepared for defense byan army and staff which are thorough adepts in such work. " Yet it was evident that if the armies of the Allies were to secure anylasting benefit from the battles of the Marne, they must dislodge theinvading hosts from their new vantage ground. It was obvious that thetask was one of great peril and one necessarily likely to be attendedwith heavy loss of life. Sir John French, knowing the tactical value ofdriving a fleeing army hard, determined on forcing the issue withoutdelay. Before proceeding to recount in detail the events of that six days'battle of the Aisne, which little by little solidified into an impasse, it might be well to trace the new positions that had been taken by therespective armies engaged in the struggle for the supremacy of westernEurope. General von Kluck, still in charge of the First German Army, wasin control of the western section from the Forest of the Eagle to theplateau of Craonne. He had forced his men to almost superhuman efforts, and by midnight of September 11 he had succeeded in getting most of hisartillery across the Aisne, at Soissons, and had whipped his infantryinto place on the heights north of the stream. That, with his exhaustedtroops, he succeeded remains still a tribute to his power as acommander. But the men were done. Further attack meant rout. Hissalvation lay in his heavy field guns and howitzers, an arm of theservice in which the French army, under General Maunoury (and GeneralPau, who had taken a superior command during the turning of the Germandrive at the Marne), was notoriously weak. Still there was littlecomfort there, for the British army was well supplied with heavyartillery, and the Fifth French Army of General d'Espérey, also comingup to confront him, was not entirely lacking in this branch of theservice. General von Bülow's army was combined with that of General von Hausen, who fell ill and was retired from his command. Against this combinedarmy was ranged the victorious and still fresh army of General Foch, lacking two corps, which had been detached for reserves elsewhere. Oneof these corps apparently went to the aid of General Sarrail, whosestand was still a weak point in the Allies' line. General Sarrail, however, was now better supported by the movement of General Langle withthe Fourth French Army, who advanced toward Troyon and confronted thecombined armies of the Imperial Crown Prince and the Duke ofWürttemberg. This released General Sarrail to his task of intrenchingand enlarging the defenses about Verdun, the importance of which hadbecome more poignant than ever before in the events of the past week. The far eastern end of the line remained unchanged. The credit for the crossing of the Aisne lies with the British troops. The battles of the Marne had thrust Sir John French into a prominentposition, wherein he was able to achieve a much-desired result withoutany great loss of life. But the battle of the Aisne was different. Itwas a magnificent effort boldly carried out, and, as was afterwardlearned, it could not have been successful had the onset been delayedeven one day. General Maunoury's army, encamped in the forest of the Compiègne, wasagain the first to give battle, as it had been in the battles of theMarne. Using some heavy guns that had been sent on from Paris, inaddition to the batteries that had been lent him by the British, hesecured some well-planned artillery positions on the south bank, andspent the morning in a long-range duel with the German gunners nearSoissons. The Germans had not all taken up their positions on the northside of the Aisne on the morning of September 12, 1914, and the heavybattery of the Fourth British Division did good service early in themorning, dislodging some of these before it wheeled in line beside thebig French guns, in an endeavor to shell the trenches and level thebarbed-wire entanglements, that an opportunity might be made to cross. But the results were not encouraging of success, for the reply from thefurther shore was terrific. General von Kluck's army might be worn out, but the iron throats of his guns were untiring, and he knew that hugereenforcements were on the way. CHAPTER XX FIRST DAY'S BATTLES That first day of the battle of the Aisne, September 12, 1914, which wasindeed rather preparatory than actual, was also marked by some unusuallybrilliant cavalry work in General Allenby's division. The German linewas on the farther side of the Aisne, but all the hill country betweenthe Marne and the Aisne had to be cleared of the powerful rear guards ofthe retreating German army, or perhaps it would be more correct to saythe advance guards of the new German line. Early in the morning thecavalry under General Allenby swept out from the town of Braisne on theVesle and harried in every direction the strong detachments that hadbeen sent forward, driving them back to the Aisne. Over the high woodedridge between the Vesle and the Aisne the Germans were driven back, andthe Third Division, under General Hamilton, supported the cavalry inforce, so that, by the evening, General Hamilton's division was able tocamp below the hill of Brenelle, and even, before night fell, to gettheir guns upon that height, from which they could reply to the Germanbatteries snugly ensconced upon the frowning ridge on the northern bankof the Aisne. The Fifth British Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, found itself ina tight place at the confluence of the Vesle and Aisne Rivers, for atthat point lay a stretch of flat bottomland exposed to the German fire. By a ruse, which returned upon their own heads, the Germans hadpreserved one bridge across the Aisne, the bridge at Condé. This wasdone as a lure to Sir Charles Fergusson's forces, but even more so itwas intended as a sallying point as soon as the German army deemeditself in a position to attack again. The bridge was destined to figurein the events of the great conflict when the grapple should come. One of the most graphic of all the accounts of the fighting of that daywas from the pen of a major in the British field artillery, and itpresented in sharp and vivid colors how the field artillery joined withthe cavalry in clearing the German troops from the hills between theMarne and the Aisne. He wrote: "We got the order to go off and join a battery under Colonel ----'sorders. We came en route under heavy shrapnel fire on the road. I gavethe order to walk, as the horses had hardly had any food for a couple ofdays, and also I wanted to steady the show. I can't say I enjoyedwalking along at the head with old ---- behind me, especially when sixshrapnel burst right in front of us. We got there just in time, rushedinto action, and opened fire on a German counterattack at short range, destroying the lot so far as I could see. "We then moved slightly to another position to take on a valley, downwhich they were attacking, and were at it the whole day, firing about900 rounds into quantities of German attacks and counterattacks. Theycannot stand the shrapnel, and the moment I got one on them they turnedand bolted back to the wood. "I got on to their trenches; one shell dropped in. [It would appear fromthis that some of the advance guards of the new defense line were eitherintrenching or occupying trenches made during the battles of the Marne, probably the latter, or else the writer is speaking of the actions ofhis battery on the 10th as well as the 12th before the invaders hadretreated across the Marne. ] I was enfilading them, and they tore out ofthe trenches, and so on, each trench in turn, and fell in hundreds. Also, through the range finder, ---- saw I'd hit a machine gun, and theyhad abandoned it and another. So it went all day, shells and bulletshumming around, but only one of my staff horses was hit. Our infantryadvancing and retiring--others advancing and coming back--Germans doinglikewise, a hellish din of shell fire, and me pouring in fire whenever Icould see them. "At last I got six shrapnel into a wood and cleared a heap of them outand got into them with shrapnel. It was awful! The sergeant major puthis hand up to his head and said: "Oh, sir, it's terrible!" That seemedto settle them, and at last we saw the infantry advancing to theirpositions without resistance. "Now was my chance. I determined to get those machine guns if I could, as otherwise the infantry would. So I left ---- in command and got thetrumpeter, sergeant major, and six men with six rifles, and went forward'to reconnoiter, ' as I reported to ---- after I had gone. It was a weirdride, through thick black woods, holding my revolver ready, going infront with the little trumpeter behind and the others following some wayin the rear. We passed some very bad sights, and knew the woods werefull of Germans who were afraid to get away on account of the dreadedshell fire. We got in front of our infantry, who were going to fire atus, but I shouted just in time. "At last we came to the edge of a wood, and in front of us, about 200yards away, was a little cup-shaped copse, and the enemy's trenches withmachine guns a little farther on. I felt sure this wood was full ofGermans, as I had seen them go in earlier. I started to gallop for it, and the others followed. Suddenly about fifty Germans bolted out, firingat us. I loosed off my revolver as fast as I could, and ---- loosed offhis rifle from the saddle. They must have thought we were a regiment ofcavalry, for, except for a few, they suddenly yelled and bolted. Istopped and dismounted my lot to fire at them, to make sure that theydidn't change their minds. "I waited for a lull, and mounted all my lot behind the bushes and madethem spring as I gave the word to gallop for cover to the woods wherethe Welsh company was. There I got ----, who understands them (theguns), and an infantryman who volunteered to help, and ---- and I ran upto the Maxims and took out the breech mechanism of both and one of thebelts, and carried away one whole Maxim. We couldn't manage the other. "We got back very slowly on account of the gun, and the men went wildwith excitement that we had got one gun complete and the mechanism andbelt of the other. " With such incidents the pursuit of the Germans across the Marne and tothe Aisne was replete, and so thoroughly did the advance French andEnglish troops scour that country that when the morning of September 13, 1914, dawned there was scarcely a German soldier left on the southernside of the Aisne, west of Rheims. The administration of the German armies meanwhile had been markedlychanged. In the turning movement on the Marne the plan was clearlyoutlined, each commander had his instructions, and that was all. Butwith the need for changes of plan there was need for a directing head, and Field Marshal von Heeringen was sent in a hurry to take charge ofthe Aisne. This placed both General von Kluck and General von Bülow intosubordinate positions. Field Marshal von Heeringen held a deservedreputation as one of the most brilliant as well as one of the mostiron-willed of the German military leaders. He had been the backbone ofthe crown prince's movement against Troyon, a movement which, given aday or two longer, might have meant the capture of Verdun. This was not the only factor that was framing up to give the Germanarmies a decided advantage. The essential factor of the Aisne was thearrival of General von Zwehl and his guns. On September 13, 1914, at 6a. M. , Zwehl arrived in Laon, and in less than an hour he was in actionon the Aisne front. The story of General von Zwehl and his guns isessential to an understanding of the causes that rendered the Britishvictory of the Aisne a barren and a fruitless victory at best. The week of September 5-12, 1914, witnessed the entire series of thebattles of the Marne, which drove the Germans across the Marne andacross the Aisne, as well as a German victory which exerted almost aspowerful an influence in favor of the invaders as the check at the Marnedid for the defenders. This victory was the fall of Maubeuge. It isgoing too far to say--as several military writers have done--thatGeneral von Zwehl saved Germany, and that unless he had arrived asopportunely as he did the "German retreat to the Aisne valley would havebeen changed into a disastrous and overwhelming rout. " But it is notgoing too far to say that the successful holding of the Aisne line wasdue to the victor of Maubeuge. General von Zwehl was one of the iron-jawed battle-scarred warriors of1870, a man with a will as metallic as his own siege guns, and a manwho could no more be deflected from his purpose than a shell could bediverted in its flight. He had been set to reduce Maubeuge and he haddone so with speed and with thoroughness. Maubeuge was not protected byopen-air earthworks, but by a circle of armor-plate concrete forts. Tothe mighty siege guns handled by General von Zwehl, these were notrouble, for Von Zwehl had not only the heavy batteries attached to theSeventh Army Reserve, but he also had a number of Von Kluck's guns andthe majority of General von Bülow's, neither of whom was expected toneed siege guns in the forward drive where mobility was an essential. Inaddition to this, General von Zwehl also had the great siege train thathad been prepared for the reduction of Paris. What chance had Maubeugeagainst such a potency? On September 8, 1914, word reached General von Zwehl that the forwarddrive had failed, that the main armies had been beaten back and that hewas to bring up his guns as rapidly as possible to cover the retreat. Asrapidly as he could, to General von Zwehl, meant but one thing--to getthere! He collected 9, 000 reserve troops, which was almost immediatelyswelled by another 9, 000, and with a total of 18, 000 troops he startedhis siege trains for the town of Laon, where Field Marshal von Heeringenhad taken up his headquarters. The weather turned bad, rendering theheavy guns extremely difficult to handle, but there could be no delay, no explanations, to General von Zwehl. If a gun was to be brought it wasto be brought and that was all about it! Four days and three nights ofalmost continuous marching is killing. The German commander carednothing for that. The guns must be kept moving. Could he get them thereon time? In the last twenty-four hours of the march, his 18, 000 troopscovered 41 miles and they arrived in Laon at six o'clock in the morningof September 13, 1914, and were in action an hour later. The problem, therefore, before the English and French at the Aisne, was not thecarrying of the river against a disheartened and retreating army, butthe carrying of the river against a well-thought-out and forcefulplan--a plan, moreover, backed up by the most powerful artillery thatthe world has ever seen. CHAPTER XXI THE BRITISH AT THE AISNE In the battles of the Marne, the brunt of the fighting had been bornemainly by the French armies, but the major part of work of the battle ofthe Aisne was borne by the British Expeditionary Force. Sir John Frenchwasted no time. Saturday night, September 12, 1914, was a night of laborfor engineers and gunners. The bridge trains belonging to the First andSecond Army Corps were ordered to the edge of the river at daybreak, andas soon as the first gleam of dawn appeared in the sky, the heroiceffort began. At the risk of seeming a little detailed, in order to understand thesomewhat involved maneuvers by which the British won the crossing of theAisne, instead of dealing with the advance of the British army as aunit, in the manner that was done in discussing the battles of theMarne, their activities will be shown as army corps: the Third ArmyCorps to the westward, under General Pulteney; the Second Army Corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, and the First Army Corps to theeastward, under Sir Douglas Haig, all, of course, under the generaldirection of Sir John French. The British had no means of knowing what was in front of them. There wasonly one way to find out--a way, alas, often costly, a way that in everycampaign costs thousands of lives apparently fruitlessly, and that is afrontal attack. Down over the slopes of the southern bank, into thebright, smiling river valley, where the little white villages in thedistance were hiding their dilapidated state, marched the British army. Not a sign of activity showed itself upon the farther shore. A summerhaze obscured objects at a distance, but, shortly before nine o'clock, the German batteries opened fire with a roar that was appalling. The Third Army Corps, after a brief artillery duel, advanced on Soissonsto cover the work of the engineers who were building a pontoon bridgefor the French troops. The German fire was deadly, yet though more thanhalf their men fell, the engineers put the pontoon bridge across. Germanhowitzer fire, from behind the ridge, however, soon destroyed thebridge. The Turcos crossed the river in rowboats and had a fierce butindecisive struggle in the streets of the medieval city. Meanwhile, withthe failure of the pontoon bridge at Soissons, General Pulteney struckto the northeast along the road to Venizel. The bridge at that point hadbeen blown up, but the British sappers repaired it sufficiently to setthe Eleventh Brigade across, and even, despite the lurid hail of shotand shell, four regiments gathered at Bucy-de-Long by one o'clock onthat Sunday, September 13, 1914. Over the heads of these courageousregiments towered the great hill of Vregny, a veritable Gibraltar ofheavy guns with numerous machine guns along the wooded edge. There wasno protection, and no shelter against the terrible German Maxim fire, sothat the moment came when to attempt further advance meant instantannihilation. Still, under cover of the success of the Eleventh Brigadethe engineers built a pontoon bridge at Venizel and the Twelfth Brigadecrossed to Bucy-de-Long, with a number of the lighter artillery. Asthere was absolutely no shelter, to storm the height at that point wasimpossible, and to remain where they were was merely to court suddendeath, so the Twelfth Brigade worked over the slopes to the ravine atChipres, where they intrenched. The task in front of the Second Army Corps was no less difficult. Thebridge at Condé was too strongly defended to be taken by assault, as SirHorace Smith-Dorrien speedily found out, so he divided his forces intotwo parts, one of which was directed at the village of Missy, two andone half miles west of Condé, while the other concentrated its attack ona crossing at the town of Vailly, three miles east of Condé. Bothdetachments made good their crossing, but the regiments that foundthemselves near Missy also realized that hasty, very hasty intrenchmentwas imperative, lest every one of them should be blown into kingdom comebefore half an hour had passed by. During the night some troops wererafted over, three men at a time, and these encamped near Missy. It wasa false move. For sixteen days thereafter the British troops had toremain in their dugouts, a large part of the time without food or water. To show a head above the trench was sudden death. The regiments that crossed the river at Vailly found themselves in evena worse plight. No sooner had they crossed than the bombardment began, and the Germans knew every range in the place accurately. More thanthat, the line of trenches was open to enfilade fire from a hiddenbattery, which did not unmask until the trench was filled with soldiers. This Eighth Brigade had to retire in disorder. The Fifth Brigade, attached to the First Army Corps under Sir DouglasHaig, an Irish and Scotch group of regiments, were the most successfulof all. The bridge at Pont Arcy had been destroyed, but still one of itsgirders spanned the stream. It would have been tricky walking, evenunder ordinary circumstances, but nerve racking to attempt, when fromevery hill and wood and point of land, Maxims, machine guns and a steadyrifle fire are concentrated on the man crossing that one girder. By theafternoon, the engineers attached to the First Army Corps had alsoestablished a pontoon bridge, and the whole brigade crossed the river inthe evening and dug itself in. Late on Sunday afternoon, however, a weak spot showed itself in theGerman line and Sir John French threw the First Division of the FirstArmy Corps across the river near Bourg. Some of the infantry crossed bya small pontoon bridge and a brigade of cavalry started to follow them. When they were in mid-stream, however, a terrific storm of fire smotethem. The cavalry pushed on, but could not ride up the hill in the teethof the bombardment. The infantry were eager to go, but nothing was to begained by the move, so the cavalry returned over the pontoon, by a mostextraordinary occurrence not having lost a single member in the threehours it had been scouting on the hostile side of the Aisne. Theinfantry intrenched themselves solidly to await the morning. The main forces of the First Division were especially lucky. Using thecanal aqueduct they made their way toward Bourg, and drove the Germansback toward the main ridge. More than three-quarters of the summit of the ridge had been won, theentire Second Infantry Brigade was across, the Twenty-fifth ArtilleryBrigade was across, ready to support, and General Bulfin, instead oftiring his men by making them intrench there, ordered them to rest, throwing their outposts in front of the hamlet of Moulins. This ended the first day's fighting on the battle of the Aisne. Of theThird Army Corps, a small body of men had reached Chipres. There theyhad been joined by a small force from the Second Army Corps. In theFirst Army a strong detachment dug itself in not far from Pont d'Arcy. The incomparably superior position of the Germans, their huge numbers, their possession of innumerable guns, made even this shaky tenuredangerous, though all held on. Sir John French had tested and found outthe German strength and the result was not encouraging. Although this repulse of the British army at every point was a decidedvictory for the German gunners, Field Marshal von Heeringen had beenimpressed by two things: the courage of the British attacking army, andthe destructiveness of the French artillery on the south bank of theriver. The German commander withdrew all his men from the advancedtrenches on between the ridge and the river, keeping, however, stronglyintrenched detachments of riflemen at all commanding points withpowerful artillery as their support. Sunday night was a veritable pandemonium of destruction and tumult. Allnight long, without cessation, the batteries of both sides, knowingexactly their opponents' range, fired perpetually. All night longsearchlight bombs were thrown. All night long, golden and red and yellowstreams of flame or the sudden jagged flash of an explosion lit up theblack smoke of burning buildings and fields in the valley, or showed thewhite puff-like low clouds of the bursting shrapnel. Not for an instantdid the roar diminish, not for a second was the kindly veil of nightleft unrent by a fissure of vengeful flame. Yet, all night long, asceaselessly as the great guns poured out their angry fury, so did menpour out their indomitable will, and in that hell light of battle flameengineers labored to construct bridges, small bodies of troops movedforward to join their comrades in the trenches who had been able tomake a footing the day before, and all night long, those ghastly yetmerciful accompaniments of a battle field--the ambulance corps--carriedon their work of relief. The searchlights swept up and down the valley, like great eyes that watched to give direction to the venom of war. At three o'clock in the morning of Monday, September 14, 1914, tworegiments were sent to capture a sugar factory strongly held by theenemy. That sugar factory became a maelstrom. Three more regiments hadto be brought up and finally the guards, and even thus heavilyoverpowered, the Germans successfully defended it until noon. They soldtheir lives dearly--those defenders. That sugar factory stood on thatMonday as did Hogoumont at Waterloo. It delayed the advance of theentire First Corps, but at four o'clock in the afternoon, Sir DouglasHaig ordered a general advance. The last afternoon and evening scored adistinct success for the English arms, and when at last it grewabsolutely too dark to see, that corps held a position stretching fromTroton to La Cour de Soupir. Its chief importance, however, was that itgave the Allies a strongly intrenched position on the plateau itself. It was of this day's fighting that, almost a month later, Sir JohnFrench was able to say in his official dispatches: "The action of the First Corps on this day under the direction andcommand of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skillful, bold, and decisive acharacter that he gained positions which alone have enabled me tomaintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe fightingon the north bank of the river. " The offensive of this entire movement was intrusted to the First Corps. The artillery strength of the armies of General von Kluck and Von Bülowwas such that it was almost impossible for the Second and Third BritishArmy Corps to assail them by a charge up the bluff. But, meantime, theFrench had not been idle. On September 13, 1914, General d'Espérey'sFifth Army crossed the Aisne east of Bourg, and on the following daycommenced the assault on the Craonne plateau. The next day, Tuesday, September 15, 1914, was a day of several smallvictories for the Germans. General von Zwehl was hard hitter and aquick hitter. Having disposed of his artillery where he thought it couldbe of the most use, he aided Field Marshal von Heeringen with counselsof counterattack, counsels that the Field Marshal fully indorsed. TheSixth French Army under General Manoury, at the extreme west of theline, was the chief point of attack. Though well placed on a strongposition at Nampcel, the Germans drove the French before them likeclouds before the wind, recaptured the spurs, forced the French backwardthrough the Morsain ravine and back to their original crossing place ofthe Aisne between Viv and Fontenoy. The Third Corps of the British suffered heavy loss of life without anyopportunity to retaliate, for it was too thoroughly and completelydominated by the guns of Vregny. The lull of Wednesday, September 16, 1914, was a foretaste of thedeadlock which was gradually forming. The French Fifth Army had beencompelled to abandon all idea of a direct attack upon the Craonneplateau, the natural position being far too strong. The Second and ThirdCorps of the British army could do nothing. Sir John French, thougheager to push the advantage, secured by his position on the heights, waswell aware that such a move was not possible unless the entire Frenchline was ready to cooperate with him, for, if he tried to drive downupon the ridge of the Aisne, or, for that matter, tried to flank it, theline of the Duke of Württemberg would bend back upon him and nip him ina way which would render escape difficult. A sudden recrudescence of activity on the western front gave rise to thehope that the deadlock might yet be avoided, that the two great armiesmight come to handgrips again. Bolstered up by reenforcements, GeneralManoury checked the German attack and regained all the ground that hadbeen lost. Concentrating on the need of driving the invaders out of thequarries of Autreches, the French succeeded. This eased the western endof the line, and the Second and Third British Army Corps were left inpeace. Friday, September 18, 1914, is again a date of moment, not becauseanything of importance was transacted, but because nothing wastransacted. It was a day of realizations. It was a day that convincedthe Allies that the German positions could not be broken down by frontalattack, just as the battles of the Marne had convinced the Germans thatthe road to Paris was not yet open. The six days from September 12 to 18had revealed beyond preadventure that the German line along the ridge ofthe Aisne was not merely a convenient halting place for a rear-guardaction, but that it was formed of lines of strong fortifications, almostimpregnable and absolutely beyond the hope of storming. The forces weretoo evenly balanced for any concerted action to produce a desiredeffect, the possession of air scouts eliminated any question of asurprise. In other words, the conclusion was borne in upon the Allieswith full force that, much as the German plan had failed at Marne, sohad the Allies' plan failed at Aisne. The crossing of the Aisne, thewinning of the heights by Sir Douglas Haig were victories--not onlythat, but they were full of that glory which goes with successfuldaring--yet they led nowhere. The plan of the Allies must be abandonedand a new one formed. This decision of a change of strategical plan, then, closed the Allies' frontal attack upon the position of the CentralPowers on the ridge of the Maise, and marks the end of the first phaseof the battle of the Aisne. CHAPTER XXII BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS AND SOISSONS To be considered almost as a part of the advance upon the Aisne were thebombardments of Soissons and of Rheims, the former being a part of thefirst phase of the Aisne battles, the second belonging to the secondphase. Soissons, it will be remembered, lies at the western end of thehigh bluffs that form a bank to the River Aisne for over fifty miles. Itis on the high road between Rheims and Compiègne, and on the south sideof the Aisne, and consequently returned into French hands on September13, 1914. No sooner did the French armies enter the little town, however, than Soissons, dominated by the twin towers of its ancientcathedral, became a target for the concentrated fire of the Germans, whose artillery, it will be remembered, had been supplemented thatmorning by the huge guns brought on from Maubeuge by the magnificentforced marches of General von Zwehl. By noon the lower half of that oncelovely city was in flames. On every hand walls collapsed as though theyhad been made of pasteboard. Women and children were buried beneath theruins or blown to pieces as they fled into the streets. One of thetowers of the cathedral was damaged, and there was not a corner of thetown that was safe from fire. The French batteries tried to cover thecity and silence the batteries opposing them on the north front of theriver, but the odds were too great. All day long, and throughout the greater part of every night, for thefirst three days of the battle of the Aisne, September 13, 14, and 15, 1914, the bombardment of Soissons was continual, and, in addition tobeing a wreck, the town became a shambles. Closely allied to the Soissons bombardment, and occurring simultaneouslywith the battle of the Aisne, was the series of engagements occurring inthe quarries around Autreches and Coucy-le-Château, fought by advancedbodies in front of the right wing of the German army encamped on theridge of the Aisne. These engagements developed the illuminating factthat during times of peace German capital had been invested in thesequarries and with their usual intrigue the Germans had fortified thesequarries, so that they were veritable fortresses, and indeed, formed acontinuation of that line of defense the crowning point of which was theAisne cliff near the plateau of the Craonne. During the days when theBritish First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was performing theastounding feat of crossing the Aisne and holding the land thus gainedagainst a veritable tempest of counterattack, these stone quarries weretaken and lost again every few hours. The French infantry of GeneralManoury's army, far less exhausted than the harassed regiments ofGeneral von Kluck's forces, found little difficulty in forcing theGermans back from Autreches, but, no sooner were they well established, than the roar of the combined guns of General von Kluck and General vonZwehl would make the position untenable, and under cover of thatappalling rain of death, the German infantry would creep back toreoccupy the positions from which they had been ousted by the bayonetsonly a few hours before. It was the German tactics of machine vs. Men, adireful and cruel battle plan to the opposing forces. Upon the day that the advance of the British definitely stopped, or, inother words, when General Joffre and Sir John French realized thatfurther effort against the defenses of the Germans on the ridge beyondthe Aisne would only mean loss of life to no gainful purpose, thebombardment of Rheims began. The old city had suffered severely duringthe German advance upon the Marne. Still, it had not been pillaged, andwhen the Germans retreated across the Aisne the old city held much ofits glory unimpaired. Still the flawless beauty of Rheims Cathedralstood guard over the ancient city. Then on September 18, 1914, the shelling of the city began and abombardment of the most terrific character continued for ten days. Rheims Cathedral, which the French declared was outside the zone ofdirect fire and was used as a hospital with the Red Cross flag flying, and which the Germans asserted to have been used for a signal stationand to have been surrounded by gun stations, was said to have beendemolished by the German guns. This act created a sensation throughoutthe world, for Rheims Cathedral was like a gem from Paradise, regardedby most art lovers as one of the most beautiful buildings in the world. Every civilized country was shaken with grief when the news of thedisaster to Rheims Cathedral was published. The Germans were apparently unmoved by the world's indignation. Theyclaimed to have acted only from "military necessity, " which, accordingto the old brutal theory, still regarded by the Huns, knows no law. Inan inspired article written by Major General von Ditfurth, in the"Hamburger Nachrichten, " this latter point is emphasized. He wrote: "It is of no consequence if all the monuments ever created, all thepictures ever painted, and all the buildings ever erected by the greatarchitects of the world were destroyed, if by their destruction wepromote Germany's victory over her enemies. .. . The commonest, uglieststone placed to mark the burial place of a German grenadier is a moreglorious and perfect monument than all the cathedrals in Europe puttogether. "Let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter, which isno better than the twittering of birds. Let them cease their talk aboutthe cathedral at Rheims and about all the churches and castles of Francewhich have shared its fate. These things do not interest us. " Opinions have differed concerning Von Ditfurth's appraisal of thecomparative values of Rheims Cathedral and the tombstone of a Germangrenadier, but even the champions of military necessity were glad tolearn later that the cathedral still stood, though much damaged. Therewas military excuse for the bombardment of the city of Rheims. But thecathedral was by far the most conspicuous object in the Rheimslandscape. It was optional with the Germans to spare it except for somecasual shell that missed its aim. On the contrary they chose the greatchurch as a special target, as evidenced by repeated damage to thecathedral and by the destruction of buildings all about it by shellfire. This was certainly not military necessity, though the city ofRheims had a place in the new strategical plan developed by FieldMarshal von Heeringen upon the collapse of the drive on Paris, which wasfoiled by the battles of the Marne. CHAPTER XXIII SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors. One, the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense against anyforce that could be brought up against it by the Allies. It meant theability to hold strongly fortified positions against all odds. Thehistory of the trenches that winter, of which more will be said later, reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded, aided by the ironcraft of the old Prussian fighter General von Zwehl. The other factor depended on the vexed question of means ofcommunication. There was no cross-country railway linking the easternGerman wing to the western German wing. As has been previously remarked, all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout way. Verdun was adesired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen was wise enough to knowthat if the crown prince's effort against General Sarrail had failed, ifthe Third French Army had secured heavy reenforcement, and if it hadbeen left unmolested for a week, the outer ring of defenses aroundVerdun would, by that time, have become so amazingly strengthened thatdirect or frontal attack would be impossible, while the flanking attackhad failed. It was vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope thatthe establishment of the direct communication between Metz and Verdunmight pass into the hands of the invaders. On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running throughRheims, Rethel, Mezières to the great war depot, Coblenz on the Rhine. Abranch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave communication to theeastern wing. All the links of this were in German hands, except Rheims, and if that railroad center could be secured, the importance to theGerman advance would be enormous. Under such circumstances, it canscarcely be held that Rheims was not necessarily a point, the attack ofwhich was due to military necessity. The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the Aisneby the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the directleadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon the opencountry between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims. It was at thispoint that the German commander in chief of this section of the battleline intended to deliver a crushing blow by which might be regained theprestige secured at Charleroi and lost again at the Marne. Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims shouldnot have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so once, thoughthe fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of bringing thesepoints of natural defense up to the highest degree of modern efficiency, the French had dismantled them entirely, so as to make Rheims with itsglorious cathedral an open town, safe from bombardment. It was, according to the rules of war, safe from bombardment, but only in theevent of its not being defended. General Foch did not dare to take thisstand. He knew, as well as did General von Heeringen, the strategicvalue of Rheims as railroad center, and accepted the issue of battle. In the falling back of the several German armies from the Marne to theAisne, the Germans had kept possession of the chief forts of thedistrict around Rheims. No strong effort had been made to dislodge them, for the forward movement of the Allies had been directed against thefortified heights of the Aisne, facing the Soissons-Craonne defense. Itwill be remembered that the armies of General Foch and Langle, especially the latter, had taken no part in the first phase of theBattle of the Aisne, but had stubbornly thrown back the armies of theDuke of Württemberg, which had combined with those of the crown prince. The right wing of this large conjoined army had held the fort sitesaround Rheims and especially they had made full use of the chief fort onthe wooded heights of Nogent l'Abbesse, a trifle less than half a milefrom the cathedral city and therefore within easy destructive shellingrange. The heavy artillery was planted here, the infantry intrenchedaround it, and strong defense trenches were established along the RiverSuippe that runs into the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac. On Friday, September 18, 1914, the first movement of the second phasewas begun, when the Germans launched a sharp counterattack on the Frenchcenter. This was the first German offensive movement since their retreatfrom the Marne, and it was powerful and well handled. General Foch fellback into defensive positions, but had much ado to hold his own. Heevaded giving battle around Rheims and took up a position at Souain, which he held with the jaunty obstinacy he had displayed so often in theretreat through northern France. It was obvious that he could not holdout long, but by clever generalship, and especially by anextraordinarily brilliant use of the cavalry arm, he held off the armyfor that day. That night strong reenforcements came to his aid, and onSeptember 19, 1914, the balance of the forces was more nearly equal. On September 19, 1914, therefore, the situation of the armies was muchas follows: The Germans, acting under the general command of FieldMarshal von Heeringen, controlled Rheims under the gunfire of theirheavy artillery from two points, the heights of Nogent l'Abbesse to thesoutheast of Rheims, and the hill of Brimont a little over half a mileto the northeast. Their right flank was covered by the powerful defensesof the Aisne and the guns of the Craonne plateau, their left flank was aseries of intrenchments along the river Suippe, which merged into thesecond line of defense of the main army under the Duke of Württemberg. On the other side of Rheims, or to the west of the cathedral city, theAllies also held two heights, one at Pouillon, between the Aisle and theVesle, and therefore to the northwest of the city, and the other on asharp steep, known as the Mountain of Rheims, near Verzenay, on thesouth side of the river. This was therefore west and a little south ofRheims. But, and herein lies the question that has so often arisen inthe discussion of the comparative strength of the two armies--especiallywithout the British batteries--the French lacked heavy long-rangeartillery. They had no such howitzers as those of the German forces. Thus the Germans could shell Rheims to their hearts' content, and theAllies could not silence that gunfire from their own fortifiedpositions. Once more, then, it became a battle between infantry andartillery, between men and machines. This time, however, the advance was not favorable to the Germans. Theirheavy artillery commanded Rheims, but it did not command the French lineto the west of Rheims. The invaders performed prodigies of valor. Againand again they hurled themselves against the French line. But GeneralFoch's troops were well supplied with that terrible engine ofdestruction--the French 3-inch fieldpiece, known, as the 75-mm. , anextremely powerful gun for its caliber. In four successive night attacks on September 19-20, 1914, the heaviestonset was made. Supported by a terrific gunfire, directed with the longpointing fingers of searchlights, the German infantry, invigorated by aweek's rest, rolled up in gray-clad tidal waves against the French line. General Foch had known how to post his defense, and within twenty-fourhours he had made the line between Pouillon and the Mountain of Rheimsalmost as strong as the German line between Brimont and Nogentl'Abbesse. Poor Rheims lay between, wide open to the eruption ofdestruction that belched from the throats of the German howitzers. CHAPTER XXIV END OF THE BATTLE After September 22, 1914, there was a lull in the fighting at Rheims, and as afterward appeared, this was due mainly to another change of planon the part of the German Staff. But it was no part of General Foch'sintentions to leave the bombardment of the cathedral unrevenged. He had, indeed, caused an unparalleled slaughter on the night of September 19, 1914, as has been stated, but his troops were avid for reprisal and theFrench strategist knew well how dangerous it is to allow an army, eagerfor action and revenge, to eat its heart out vainly. He was too wise torun the risk of a countercharge, but four days later his opportunitycame, and he took advantage of it to the full. At dawn on September 26, 1914, a detachment of 15, 000 Germans, includingall that remained of the famous Prussian Guards Corps, that same bodythat had fought so marvelously on many occasions, and which had sufferedthe most cruelly in the affair of the marshes of St. Gond, made a sortiefrom the base line at Nogent l'Abbesse to destroy the railway linebetween Rheims and Verdun, this line was, indeed, the principal link ofcommunication to that all-important fortress that protruded itsbristling salient into the heart of the German position. A Frenchaviator, who had climbed into his machine when it was yet dark, in orderto do a little daybreak scouting before the light should be sufficientlybright to make him an easy target, saw this movement and reported itimmediately to General Foch. That commander, who knew how to usecavalry, ordered a regiment at the gallop to occupy the village ofAuberive, on the Suippe, and there harry the advancing columnsufficiently to give him time to bring up the light artillery and tobring into action a large body of infantry encamped at Jouchery, fivemiles away. Before six o'clock, the cavalry were in Auberive. The men worked likefiends. The streets were rapidly barricaded, machine guns hoisted toroofs and other points where they might command a wide sweep of fire. Then the cavalry rode forward to meet the advancing column. Not knowingwhat might be in front of him, the German commander halted, awaitingreports from his air scouts. The halt was but three-quarters of an hour, but that was of vast importance. The scouts reported only a regiment ofcavalry ahead, but a powerful detachment of French artillery on the roadfrom Jouchery. The German leader detached 2, 000 of the Death's HeadHussars, his crack cavalry, to cut off, or at all events to delay, theFrench guns. He was aware that the artillery would have no anticipationof this and, in the surprise, the guns might be captured. Meantime, hehurried his advance to Auberive, captured the village, though afteranother hour's delay, caused by the resistance of the cavalry, whoretreated to St. Hilaire. Meantime, at St. Hilaire, the surprise charge of the Death's HeadHussars was launched. It was scarcely a question of minutes, it wasrather a matter of seconds. But the French artillery knew their lightfieldpieces as thoroughly as the Germans were masters of the heavy guns. In less than two minutes the artillery teams were unharnessed, the gunswere in position and the gunners took their places when the Hussars wereso near the voices of their leaders could be heard. Thirty secondsearlier, and the Hussars would have been in among the guns and made anotable capture. There was just time enough for a man to breathe twice, when the order came to fire. The Hussars were at less than a hundredyards' range. As the shrapnel burst, the front squadrons seemed tostumble and fall. The ranks were so near that the change from livinghuman beings into mangled pieces of flesh and rags could clearly beseen. More than one veteran gunner felt squeamish at the sight. But therear squadrons, though their horses' hoofs were squelching in the bloodof their comrades of a moment before, never blenched or faltered butswept on at a thundering gallop. Again the guns spoke, and again. Thatwas all. Amid the vines, here and there a writhing figure could be seen, or a wounded horse endeavoring to rise, and here and there a stragglerstriving to escape. It was level open country; twice again the gunsroared, five rounds in all, and all movement ceased. The engagement hadlasted less than five minutes and of those two thousand splendidhorsemen not one escaped. The French artillerists picked up the woundedand sent them back to Rheims to receive nursing and care, and thenhurried on to the action whither they were bound when surprised by theHussars. The infantry of the Germans and of the French were now coming to handgrips. A battalion of Zouaves was creeping round to attack the advancingcolumn in the rear. The German commander at Nogent l'Abbesse learnedfrom his air scouts what was happening. He saw the peril of theadvancing column, that it was almost surrounded, and he threw furthercolumns into the fray, to cover the retreat. The sortie on the railwayhad now become impossible. General Foch had moved too quickly. But, evenso, the peril was great, for the German force was almost cut off. Itmeant the loss of 15, 000 men and artillery, or it meant the sacrifice ofsome one corps to cover the retreat. The latter course was chosen. Three thousand of the Guards Corps, the flower of the Prussian Army, were sent like a catapult at the gap in the French line, immediately infront of Rheims. Five times they charged, and with such heroic daringand such penetrative energy that General Foch did not dare break fromhis position. As they came up for the fifth assault, a wild cheer ofadmiration broke out along the French line. But the rifles spokesteadily, none the less for that. After the fifth assault, barely ahundred men were left, nearly all wounded. They reversed rifles, a signof surrender, and in all honor they were received by General Foch, whoconducted them to the hospital in the rear. They lived up to the fullthe most heroic traditions of the old Prussian corps and they saved thatwhole German force from destruction. Still, with the annihilation of theDeath's Head Hussars and the remainder of the Prussian Guards Corps onthe same day, the forces under General Foch felt that in part Rheims hadbeen avenged. The other section of this second phase of the Aisne consisted of thetrench warfare, which solidified from September 19 to October 6, 1914, under conditions of extreme difficulty and more than extreme discomfort. It was practically the establishment of a trench campaign that lastedall winter, and revived the centuries-old fortress warfare, applying itunder modern conditions to field fortifications. The French during thatwinter on the Aisne never quite succeeded in rivaling the mechanicalprecision of the German movements; the Germans, on the other hand, nevershowed themselves to possess the emotional fervor of the French with thebayonet. In many places German and Allies' trenches almost touched each other. The first two weeks at the Aisne were one continual downpour, and thefoundation of that ground is chalk. On the sides of the plateau ofCraonne, after two weeks' rain, the chalky mud seemed bottomless. "Itfilled the ears and eyes and throats of our men, " wrote John Buchan, "itplastered their clothing and mingled generously with their diet. Theirgrandfathers, who had been at Sebastopol, could have told them somethingabout mud; but even after India and South Africa, the mire of the Aisneseemed a grievous affliction. " The fighting was constant, the nervousstrain exhausting, and the cold and wet were even harder to bear. Therehad as yet been no time to build trenches with all conveniences, such asthe Germans possessed on the crest of the ridge, and the trenches ofthe Allies were a chilled inferno of woe. A stretch of waste ground lay between the trenches, and often for daysat a time the fire was too heavy to rescue the wounded or bring in thedead. The men in the trenches, on either side, were compelled to hearthe groans of the wounded, lying in the open day after day, untilexhaustion, cold and pain brought them a merciful release. In lettersmore than one soldier declared that the hardest thing to bear was tohear a fellow comrade shrieking or groaning in agony a few steps awayfor hours--even days at a time--and to be able to do nothing to help. The stench from the unburied bodies was so great that officially all thetobacco for the whole battle front was commandeered and sent to thetrenches under the plateau of Craonne and on the hill to the westward, where the British First Army Corps was placed. Such, for the two weeksbetween September 22, 1914, and October 6, 1914, was the trench warfareduring the second phase of the battle of the Aisne, a condition neverafter repeated in the war, for such a feat as the crossing of the Aisnecould scarcely be duplicated. It was gallant, it was magnificent, and itwas costly--the British casualty list for September 12 to October 6, 1914, being, killed, wounded and missing, 561 officers and 12, 980men--but it was useless, and only served to give the Allies a temporarybase whereby General Foch was successful in checking the German attemptto capture the Rheims-Verdun railway. It was a victory of bravery, butnot a victory of result. During all these operations the Belgian army, now at Antwerp, hadharassed the German troops by frequent sorties. The capture of the citywas at once undertaken by the German Staff, following the stalematecreated by the operations at the Aisne. CHAPTER XXV "THE RACE TO THE SEA" The Germans, having failed in their first enveloping movement, attempteda second after the battle of the Marne. They tried to repeat theirmaneuver of August, endeavoring to overwhelm the French left; while theFrench, on their side, tried to overwhelm the German right. Each ofthese armies, by a converging movement, gradually drew its forces towardthe west. No sooner did the Germans bring up a new corps on their rightthan the French brought up another on their left. Thus the front of thebattle ascended more and more to the west and north until arriving atthe sea it could go no farther. This is what has been called by Frenchmilitary critics "The Race to the Sea. " In this race to the sea theGermans had a great advantage over the French. A glance at the map isenough to make it understood. The concave form of the German front madethe lines of transportation shorter; they were within the interior ofthe angle, while the French were at the exterior. On the German sidethis movement drew into the line more than eighteen army corps, ortwelve active corps, six reserve corps, and four cavalry corps. [Illustration: These German soldiers are dragging a great siege gun intoposition for use in refortifying the city of Antwerp. ] On the French side it resulted in the posting of the army of Castelnauon the left of Manoury's army, in the deployment of the army of Generalde Maud'huy to the left of the army of Castelnau, in the transference ofthe British army to the left of the army of Maud'huy, in the relegationof the army of Urbal to the left of the British army, the army of Urbalbeing later flanked by the Belgian army which came out of Antwerp. Inorder to accomplish this new and extended disposition of forces theFrench General Staff was compelled to reduce to their extreme limits theeffective strengths of the armies of the east and of the Oise, and as aresult to make the maximum use of the means of transport. In this itsucceeded. When the great battle of Flanders was waged toward the end ofOctober, the Germans, trying to turn the French left and to pierce it, found themselves facing considerable French forces, which, allied withthe British and Belgian armies, completely barred the passage againstthem. From the 15th of September, 1914, it was clear that the Germans weremaking a great effort to try and overwhelm the French left. GeneralJoffre parried the attack, reenforcing at first the army of Manoury byan army corps, then transferring to the left of the army of Manoury theentire army of Castelnau that was in Lorraine. A corps of cavalry andfour territorial divisions commanded by General Brugère received theorder to establish itself on both banks of the Somme and protect thedetraining of the army of Castelnau. From September 21 to September 26, 1914, all the French forces that hadnewly arrived were engaged in the Lassigny-Reye-Péronne region. Theysucceeded in withstanding, not without difficulty, the German attack, but they could not advance. The Germans determinedly and unweariedlycontinued to mass new forces on their right. On the left of the army ofCastelnau it was therefore necessary to establish a new army. It wasestablished on September 30, 1914, under the command of GeneralMaud'huy. From the first days of October this army waged violentconflicts in the region of Arras and of Lens. It found facing it twoGerman cavalry corps, the Guard, four active army corps, and two reservecorps. General Joffre continued without intermission to send new forces to theleft. On October 4, 1914, he called on General Foch in the north andcharged him with the duty of coordinating the action of all the armiesin that region: those of De Castelnau, Maud'huy, and the territorialdivisions. At the beginning of October the British army, which wasposted on the Aisne, was transferred to the left of the French armiesand replaced by the armies of Manoury and d'Espérey. The Belgian army, issuing from Antwerp on October 9, 1914, effected its retreat, coveredby the British naval forces and 6, 000 French marines. It took its placeon the Yser Canal between Nieuport and Dixmude. The Germans continuing their efforts to turn the French left, it wasfound necessary again to strengthen that left considerably; and newFrench army corps were transferred to Flanders and Belgium. It was a newFrench army that was established and the command of it was intrusted toGeneral d'Urbal. It consisted at first of two divisions of territorialsand four divisions of cavalry of the corps of General de Mitry, alongwith a brigade of naval fusiliers. But from October 27 to November 11, 1914, it received considerable reenforcements. During the second week in November the German attack revealing itspurpose more clearly, General Joffre sent four more battalions ofchasseurs and four more brigades of infantry. The reenforcements sent tothe French army of the north totaled as a result five army corps, adivision of cavalry, a territorial division, sixteen cavalry regiments, and more than sixty pieces of heavy artillery. CHAPTER XXVI SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP The siege of Antwerp began on September 29, 1914, and in less than twoweeks, October 10, 1914, this historic city, one of the most importanttrade centers of the world and one of the strongest fortresses inEurope, was forced to capitulate, though it had always been believed tobe impregnable. During the latter part of September, 1914, the forces of thebelligerents were driving northward in that memorable race for theChannel in which both sides had the same object; each was trying to bethe first to turn the other's front and crumble his line. At the same time the German forces, then in the vicinity of Brussels, under the command of General von Beseler, pushed toward Antwerp, onwhich the Belgian army had fallen back to make its last stand. This movewas necessary in order to cut off all danger of rear attacks which wouldmenace General von Kluck's drive to the coast, a movement which hadreached Douai on October 1, 1914. The German General Staff had decided to take Antwerp at all cost. General von Beseler on the last day of September, 1914, reached a pointwithin range of Antwerp's farthest outer forts. In order to understand the record of the following successive steps inthe siege of Antwerp, a description of this city's position and thelocation of its double circle of forts is necessary. Antwerp wasconsidered one of the most formidable strongholds in the world. Theelaborate defenses of Antwerp evolved from the original fortificationsof thirty years ago through continual additions. The location of thecity offers very many natural advantages for its defense, and theengineering genius controlling the work made full use of theseopportunities. From the north Antwerp has access to the sea by the riverScheldt, of which the arm nearest to the city is narrow, with six strongforts on each bank, including the citadel. [Illustration: Liege Forts, Showing German Attack. ] [Illustration: Siege and Fall of Antwerp. ] Any armies approaching from the south must cross the rivers Rupel andNethe, which practically, in the shape of a semicircle, swing around thecity to the south at a distance varying from about six to twelve miles. Within this circle of flowing water, and about two miles from the city, is another circle, formed by twelve powerful forts. At a point almostdue east from the center of the city and commanding the railroad toHolland, by way of Turnhout, is located the first of eight forts, designated by numbers. From there they swing to the south and west, withfort eight very close to the Scheldt and directly south to the villageof Hoboken. On the other side of the river are Forts de Cruibeke andZwyndrecht, the latter commanding the railroad to Ghent. Further northand right on the banks of the Scheldt are Forts St. Marie, la Perle, andSt. Philip, the first two on the left bank and the last on the right, all three opposite the new harbor and docks. In the northeast Fort deMerkem guards the railroad to Rotterdam. Outside of this circle and inthe south, outside of the Nethe-Rupel line, there is another completecircle of nineteen even stronger forts, at a distance from the cityvarying between five and ten miles. Starting again in the east--due eastfrom fort one--and swinging south, these forts are named: Oeleghem, Broeckem, Kessel, Lierre, Koningshoyckt, Wavre St. Catherine, Waelhem--the last two only a few miles north of Malines--Breendonck, Liezel, Bornem, Rupelmonde, Haesdonck, Doel, Blauwgaren--the last twoguarding the Scheldt at the point of its entrance into Holland, one oneach bank--Stabroek, Ertbrand, Brasschaet, Schooten, and Gravenwezel. Between these outer forts there were redoubts of considerable strength, which were armed with 4-inch guns. The forts of the inner ring areplaced at regular intervals of 2, 200 yards and at a distance of about3, 500 yards from the enceinte of the city, which itself had powerfuldefenses as well. Add to these defenses the important fact that the entire districtsurrounding Antwerp was subject to inundation to such a depth that allapproach to the city could be made impracticable to an enemy force withheavy cannon and ammunition. Military authorities held Antwerp to be ofincomparable strength and as nearly impregnable as engineering geniuscould make it. During the latter part of September, 1914, several of the outer fortswere subjected to bombardment, and many of these had become useless asdefenses. General von Beseler's advance was still barred by the river Nethe, uponthe opposite bank of which the defense was concentrated. During theengagements which now ensued the German aircraft kept the commandersadvised as to conditions behind the enemy's lines, now and then droppingbombs, apparently doing considerable damage. On October 2, 1914, General von Beseler scattered from "Taube"aeroplanes a number of printed papers over the entire district. Thesecirculars contained a proclamation to the Belgian soldiers, advisingthem to stop fighting for England and Russia and to return home to theirwives and children, as Germany was ready to help and befriend them. The Belgian Government, which had established itself in Antwerp afterthe occupation of Brussels, decided to leave the city as soon aspossible. Two small steamers were ordered to be held in readiness. Theforeign legations also decided to go with the Government. Throughout this day a steady fire was kept up on the nearest outerforts, but the Belgian soldiers contested every inch of ground againstthe German advance. This fighting continued throughout the entire dayfollowing, during which two of the minor outer forts were silenced. Rapid progress by the Germans was very difficult owing to the peculiarconformation of the course of the river Scheldt at the point of attack. This made especially difficult the laying of concrete foundations forthe heavy guns. The first detachment of British troops, numbering about 8, 000 marines, reached Antwerp on October 3, 1914. This buoyed up the spirits of theBelgian soldiers and redoubled their efforts. Under cover of thecontinuous fire of their guns, the Germans made determined efforts tocross the river Nethe at Waelhem. Desperate fighting, which lasted allnight and until early in the morning of October 4, took place. Thisattempt, however, failed. Later in the day the Germans succeeded inputting a pontoon bridge in place. Troops in solid masses hurriedacross; but as they reached the other side some well-directed shots fromthe Belgian guns blew the pontoon bridge to pieces, killing many. Throughout the night of October 4, 1914, and the day and night ofOctober 5, the battle raged about Lierre with savage ferocity. TheBritish marines had by this time relieved the Belgians. The German fire, however, compelled the defenders to draw back a considerable distance. At four o'clock in the morning of October 6, 1914, the Germans succeededin crossing the river in force, and now the defenders were obliged togive way, as the outer forts had ceased to afford them any protection. Late in the afternoon the members of the Belgian Cabinet and theirofficial families went aboard one steamer, while the French and BritishLegations boarded another, both sailing early on October 7. The Belgian troops had begun to withdraw the evening before. All thedefending forces now hastened their retreat. The actual evacuation hadindeed begun. Time was taken, however, to put out of commission somethirty steamships lying at their docks and to set afire all the largeoil tanks on the west side of the river Scheldt. The streets in Antwerppresented scenes of almost indescribable confusion. Even before thebombardment had been long in operation almost the entire civilpopulation became panic-stricken. Hither and thither, wherever the crowddrifted, explosions obstructed their paths; fronts of buildings bentover and fell into the streets, in many cases crushing their occupants. Although the burgomaster had issued a proclamation advising the peopleto remain calm--indoors, if possible--nothing could stop the stampede. The defending troops withdrawing through the city from the firing linedestroyed everything that might possibly be of use to the enemy. Thesuburbs of Antwerp seemed to be ablaze in every direction; the villageof Waerloos had been burning for some days; Contich, Duffel, and Lierrealso, and Have, Linth, and Vieux Dieu had been destroyed by shell fire. Mortsel was practically obliterated by the Belgians clearing the rangefor the guns of the inner forts. In the preparation for defense theBelgians destroyed upward of ten thousand buildings within a radius oftwenty miles. The exodus of the civil population began in earnest on October 8, 1914. Some of the streets in the heart of the city were choked with people, while other streets in the same vicinity were dead and deserted. Thewithdrawal of the troops was well screened from the German guns, buttheir retreat to the west had been cut off to a great extent, andHolland was now the only refuge for many. The Germans did not use theirheaviest guns and high-explosive shells in bombarding the city. During this terrible time, in utter darkness and confusion, crowdsamounting to many thousands--men, and women with babies, and children ofall ages--streamed through the streets that led to the quays or to theturnpike to Holland. All sorts of vehicles, from dogcarts to motortrucks, the former drawn by dogs, men, and horses, carried thebelongings of the fugitives that could not be carried away in person. The bombardment continued with varying severity throughout October 8, 1914. As the Germans drew nearer to the city all the inner forts on thesouth and east sides of the circle took part in replying to thecannonade. Some of these forts--notably two, three, four, and five--werebadly battered. By afternoon the city seemed deserted--nothing butdébris of fallen buildings and wreckage met the eyes, and a smallremnant of the population was still struggling for escape. Along all the wayside immense crowds of men, women, and childrengathered. The railway stations were choked with struggling humanity. Their condition was pitiable. These scenes continued all day andthroughout the entire night. On the morning of October 9, 1914, the struggle to get away continued. Long lines formed on the quay where it had been reported that two boatswould leave for Ostend by eleven o'clock, and all those that could paystruggled to get their passage booked. There were between 35, 000 and40, 000 people on the quays, every one buoyed up by the hope that safetywas in sight at last. But the boats failed to sail and a murmur ofdisappointment rose from this vast multitude of unfortunates. However, there were other means of escape available, such as tugboats, plying between Flushing, Rotterdam, and other adjacent points inHolland. These tugs had no great accommodations for passengers andcomparatively few people escaped by this means. No trains were scheduledto run and in despair the crowds started to cross the bridge and makefor the road to the Dutch frontier. Altogether from 150, 000 to 200, 000of the population of the city escaped by one means or another. During a continuous bombardment of twelve hours the cathedral stoodunharmed. The southern part of Antwerp was a desolate waste of ruins. Insome streets all the homes were ablaze, the flames leaping hither andthither with the wind. The great oil tanks burning fiercely on theopposite bank of the River Scheldt were fired upon by some well-directedshots to check the blaze, a huge black volume of thick smoke now risingfrom the flames. To add to the difficulties and confusion the watersupply had been cut off during the early stages of the bombardmentthrough the destruction of the city's waterworks which were located inone of the suburbs to the south, and the consequences threatened tobecome alarming. Everywhere fires were burning. This was the tragic scene when the German army entered the conqueredcity of Antwerp on October 10, 1914. It is probable that a large part ofthe city would have been burned, if the Germans had not entered in timeto check the conflagration. Without loss of time, forces were put towork fighting the fires and clearing the streets, propping up unsafebuildings and making order out of chaos, generally with good results. Assoon as the bombardment had ceased proclamations were pasted on wallsand houses throughout the city urging everyone to surrender any arms intheir possession and begging for a calm demeanor when the German troopspass through the streets. About noon on October 10, 1914, a patrol of cyclist-mounted policeescorted the burgomaster to the gate of the city to receive the Germanforces. When they entered order was restored without delay. Soldierswere immediately detached from their special command and formed intogangs under competent foremen and all put to work at once each accordingto his trade, fitness or adaptability. The forts that had beendismantled were hastily patched up and new guns mounted for emergencyuse. On October 11, 1914, Field Marshal von der Goltz, the Governor Generalof Belgium, came from Brussels and made a tour of inspection of thedouble girdle of forts. Upon examination it was found that the actualdamage done to the city by the bombardment was comparatively slight. During the last days of Antwerp's reign of terror fully 300, 000fugitives sought shelter in Bergen-op-Zoom about twenty-five milesnorthward across the Dutch frontier. Most of these were in a conditionalmost indescribable, ragged, travel-worn, shoeless, and bespattered andhungry. Few had money; valuables or other resources. All they owned theycarried on their backs or in bundles. The little Dutch town ofBergen-op-Zoom with but 15, 000 inhabitants was swamped; but theHollanders did their best to meet this terrible pressure and itscitizens went without bread themselves to feed the refugees. Slowly somesort of order was organized out of the chaos and when the DutchGovernment was able to establish refugee camps under militarysupervision the worst was over. A majority of this vast army was bydegrees distributed in the surrounding territory where tentaccommodations had been completed. The good Hollanders provided for thechildren with especial care and sympathy. They supplied milk for thebabies and children generally. Devoted priests comforted many; butmilitary organization prevailed over all. Among the thousands of thesepoor refugees that crossed the frontier at Maastricht and besieged thedoors of the Belgian consul there was no railing or declaiming againstthe horror of their situation. The pathos of lonely, staring, apatheticendurance was tragic beyond expression. CHAPTER XXVII YSER BATTLES--ATTACK ON YPRES A large part of the Belgian forces with some of the English marines wereforced across the Dutch border, where they were promptly disarmed andinterned, while the remnants of these forces retreated toward the westby way of St. Nicolas and reached Ostend on October 11 and 12, 1914, with greatly reduced numbers. Many were cut off and captured by theGerman forces, which entered Ghent on October 12, and pressed on toYpres in one direction and to Lille in another. Next day, thethirteenth, they approached Ostend, forcing these Belgians who hadmanaged to get through, to evacuate. Bruges was occupied by the German forces on October 14, 1914, and otherdetachments appeared in Thielt, Daume, and Esschen on the same day, thusgetting under their control the entire Kingdom of Belgium, with theexception of the northwestern corner, north of Ypres, to the coast ofthe channel. For Ostend, too, had fallen into their hands by October 15, after the English and Belgian troops had been taken away by an Englishfleet; the Belgians were transported to France where they werere-formed while the English marines were sent back to England. In the meantime the Germans were drawing on reenforcements from theVosges and the Champagne districts and every day their numbersincreased. West Flanders was swarming with German cavalry, and aboutthis time they were as far west as Hazebrouck and Cassel, and onlytwenty-five miles distant from Dunkirk. By October 20, 1914, the allied line was in position from Albert to thesea, a little short of 100 miles, eighty as the crow flies. From southto north the allied front was commanded by General Maud'huy from Albertto Vermelles; General Smith-Dorrien from Vermelles to Laventie, oppositeLille; General Poultney, from Laventie to Messines; General Haig fromMessines to Bixschoote; General de Mitry had French and Belgian mixedtroops defending the line from Bixschoote to Nieuport and the sea, supported by an English and French fleet. For days this fleet under the British Admiral Hood had shelled the coastdefenses under General von Beseler's command. As the naval guns had afar better range than General von Beseler's artillery, it was an easymatter to hold the coast at Nieuport Bains, and even six miles inlandwithout subjecting any of the ships to the fire of the German guns. On the German side General von Bülow held the front against GeneralMaud'huy, the Bavarian Crown Prince against General Smith-Dorrien, whilethe Duke of Württemberg commanded the forces on the balance of the lineto the sea. It is estimated that upward of thirty army corps covered theGerman front. Throughout the balance of October, 1914, and well into November, 1914, agreat many different actions and some of the heaviest fighting of thisperiod took place all along this line. On the 21st the new Germanformations pressed forward in great force all along the line. On thesouth of the Lys the Germans assaulted Violaines. On the north of theLys in the English center a fiercely contested action took place near LaGheir, which village the Germans captured in the morning. The GermanTwenty-sixth Reserve Corps pressed on to Passchendale, where they metwith stout resistance from the English-Belgian forces. On October 22, 1914, the Germans attacked from the La Bassée region andgained several small villages. Both Allies and Germans suffered immenselosses. Much of the slaughter was due to the point-blank magazine fireand the intermittent shrapnel explosions from both sides. The most savage fighting was kept up all along the line, but noadvantage accrued to either side until Friday, October 28, 1914, whenthe Germans succeeded in crossing the Yser at St. George and forcingtheir way two miles to Ramscapelle, retaken on the 30th by GeneralGrossetti. This was accomplished by General von Beseler's troops, opposing the mixed troops of the Belgian and French. On that nightfourteen separate attacks were made by the Germans on Dixmude and theywere repulsed each time. On October 24, 1914, about 5, 000 German troops crossed the canal atSchoorbakke and next day there were more to come, so for the moment itlooked as though the allied line on the Yser had been broken. Thestruggle at this point continued until October 28, during which time theAllies contested every inch of ground. The kaiser was with the Duke ofWürttemberg on this day, expecting every moment that his great design tobreak through the lines and drive his forces to Dunkirk and Calais wouldbe accomplished. At the crisis the Belgians broke down the dykes and flooded the countryfor miles around. Heavy rains during the last weeks had swelled theYser. The Belgians had dammed the lower reaches of the canal; the Yserlipped over its brim and spread lagoons over the flat meadows. Soon theGerman forces on the west bank were floundering in a foot of water, while their guns were waterlogged and deep in mud. The Germans did notabandon their efforts. The kaiser called for volunteers to carryRamscapelle--two Württemberg brigades responded--and gained the place, but at terrible loss. On the 30th of October, 1914, again the Württembergers advanced to theattack. They waded through sloppy fields from the bridgeheads at St. George and Schoorbakke, and by means of table tops, boards, planks andother devices crossed the deeper dykes. So furious was the attackpressed home that they won the railway line and held their ground. Theywere to do some severe fighting, however, for next day French-Belgianand African mixed troops fought fiercely to drive the Germans back butfailed. Seeing their success in partially flooding the battle field, theBelgians made more breaches in the dams, and, opening the sluices in thecanal, threw a flood of water greater still over the area occupied bythe Germans. In seething brown waves the water rose up to the highground at the railway near Ramscapelle. The Germans were caught in thistide and scores of them were drowned. Many escaped, some struggled toland on the Allies front and were made prisoners. Sir John French summarized part of the fighting in Flanders, after thecapture of Antwerp, in the following official report: "The Second Corpsunder General Smith-Dorrien was opposed by overpowering forces ofGermans, but nevertheless advanced until October 18, 1914, when theGerman opposition compelled a reenforcement. Six days later the LahoreDivision of the Indian Army was sent to support the Second Corps. OnOctober 16, Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had covered the retreat of theBelgian army from Antwerp, with two divisions of English cavalry and twodivisions of French infantry, was stationed on the line east of Ypresunder orders to operate over a wide front and to keep possession of allthe ground held by the Allies until the First Army Corps could reachYpres. "General Rawlinson was opposed by superior forces and was unable toprevent the Germans from getting large reenforcements. With fourdivisions holding a much wider front than their size justified he faceda rather awkward situation, as the enemy was massed from the Lys. "The shattered Belgian army and the weary French troops advanced tocheck the Germans--but in vain. Sir Douglas Haig with the First ArmyCorps was sent to recapture Bruges on October 19, 1914, while theBelgian army intrenched along the Yser Canal. General Haig failed--owingto bad roads. October 21 brought the most severe attack made on theFirst Corps at Ypres, in the checking of which the WorcestershireRegiment did good work. This day marked the most critical period in thebattle which resulted in the recapture of the village of Gheluvelt. " South of Dixmude is one of the most historic and quaintly attractivecities of Belgium, Ypres. It is situated on a tributary of the Ysercalled the Yperlee, and a railway runs through it from Roulers to themain Lille--St. Ower line at Hazebrouck and a very important canal runsfrom the Yser in the north to the Lys at Comines. The allied lines were held by the British First and Third Corps andseveral cavalry divisions, at this point all under the chief command ofGeneral Haig, while the Bavarian Crown Prince directed the movements ofthe German forces. On October 20, 1914, the allied line stretched--a fewmiles to the northeast of Ypres--from Bixschoote to the crossroads amile and a half northwest of Zonnebeke. The cavalry only were kept busyduring this day, while the other forces were making elaboratepreparations for the main drive. The great attack was delivered October21 against the point of the salient between Zonnebeke and Besselaere. The allied line on the left was so much exposed that the Twenty-secondBrigade was enfiladed by the Germans at the very beginning, and in thecenter the Germans pierced the line held by the Royal Scots Fusiliers, with the Yorkshires on the extreme right. The fierce assaults from bothsides ended in a draw for this day. On October 22, 1914, the fighting was most severe all day; but later inthe day the most violent assault of all was made by the Germans upon theFirst Brigade on the left. There the trenches were held by the Camerons, north of Pilkem on the Langemarck--Bixschoote road. Here the Germansbroke the line and succeeded in capturing part of the Camerons--thefamous Red Tartans. Further south, the Royal Scots Fusiliers wereobliged to give way. The Germans pressed hard in the vicinity ofHollebeke which point opened a clear road to Ypres; but here the alliedforces stood their ground. Still farther south the Essex Regiment andthe Lancashire Fusiliers fought savagely, but were driven back uponArmentierre when night fell. [Illustration: Battle Front in Flanders. ] Early Friday morning, October 23, 1914, the Allies made a desperateassault upon the trenches lost by the Camerons on the previous day. Thefighting culminated in a savage bayonet attack which resulted in therecapture of these trenches by the British composed of the King's RoyalRifles, the Royal West Surrey Regiment and the Northamptons. On October 24, 1914, the Germans advanced upon the allied extreme left;but were successfully repulsed between Zonnebeke and Poelcapelle. Laterin the day the Germans renewed their attack and compelled the alliedtroops to retire some distance. The advance on the allied left was continued on Sunday, October 25, 1914. Repeatedly the Germans succeeded in piercing the allied lines; butat one time, even though they had broken through, a momentary lack ofreserves compelled them to retreat to avoid capture. A savage envelopingattack was made during the night, north of Zandvoorde, where again theGermans broke through the allied lines, but were unable to maintaintheir advantage through failure of reenforcements to come up in time. The Leicester Brigade were shelled out of their trenches and wereobliged to fall back to the south of the River Lys. During the following three days--October 26, 27, 28, 1914--artilleryfire was resorted to and desultory fighting and skirmishes along theentire line resulted in no noteworthy advantage to either belligerent. Thursday, October 29, 1914, opened with clear and bracing weather whichpromised to continue throughout the day. The German attack which hadbeen preparing for the past three days now broke like an irresistiblewave upon the salient of the Gheluvelt crossroads, where the BritishFirst Corps was stationed. The first division was driven back from itstrenches and after that the line swayed forward and backward for hours, but by two o'clock in the afternoon the position remained unchanged. With the coming of the dawn on October 30, 1914, the fighting wasresumed with even more savage determination on both sides. The hottestengagement centered about the ridge of Zandvoorde. German artillery firecleared the allied trenches, burying many of the British soldiers aliveunder mountains of earth and débris. This forced the line to retreat afull mile to Klein Zillebeke to the north. The kaiser witnessed thisengagement and by his presence cheered the German soldiers on to themost desperate fighting. On the following day October 31, 1914, the crisis came. The fightingbegan along the Menin-Ypres road early in the morning and advanced withgreat violence upon the village of Gheluvelt. The First and ThirdBrigades of the First Division were swept back and the First ColdstreamGuards were wiped out as a unit. The whole division was driven back fromGheluvelt to the woods between Veldhoek and Hooge. The alliedheadquarters at Hooge were shelled. General Lomas was wounded and six ofthe staff officers were killed. The Royal Fusiliers who desperately stuck to their trenches fightingsavagely were cut off and destroyed. Out of a thousand but seventysoldiers remained. Between two and three o'clock there occurred the mostdesperate fighting seen in the battle of Ypres. At 2:30 o'clock in theafternoon the Allies recaptured Gheluvelt at the point of the bayonetand by evening the Allies had regained their position. Ypres had notbeen captured by the Germans by this time, but they had secured theirposition in all the suburbs of Ypres and had that city at their mercy, provided allied reenforcements ordered up did not obstruct their path. The fighting still continued for part of November, 1914, but for themonth of October no definite result was to be recorded. At Ypres, on November 2, 1914, the Germans captured 2, 300 English troopsand many machine guns. Dixmude was stormed by the Germans on the 10th ofNovember, and they crossed the Yser Canal, capturing the Allies positionwest of Langemark, also driving them out of St. Eloi. Snow and floodsinterfered with the fighting along the battle front. Ypres was bombardedon several occasions and was repeatedly set on fire. November 11, 1914, was another day of severe fighting. At daybreak theGermans opened fire on the allied trenches to the north and south ofthe road from Menin to Ypres. After a furious artillery fire the Germansdrove their men forward in full force. This attack was carried out bythe First and Fourth brigades of the Prussian Guard Corps which had beenespecially selected to capture Ypres if possible, since that task hadproved too heavy for the infantry of the line. As the Germans surgedforward they were met by a frontal fire from the allied lines, and asthey were moving diagonally across part of the allied front, they werealso attacked on the flank by the English artillery. Though thecasualties of the Germans were enormous before they reached the Englishlines, such was their strength and the momentum of the mass that, inspite of the splendid resistance of the English troops, the Germanssucceeded in breaking through the allied lines in several places nearthe road. They penetrated some distance into the woods behind theEnglish trenches, where some of the bloodiest fighting of the entire wartook place. On November 12, 1914, comparative quiet reigned and with the exceptionof artillery duels and some desultory fighting no results were obtainedon either side. The British report makes this comment on this attemptupon Ypres: "Their (the Prussian Guard Corps') dogged perseverance inpursuance of their objective claims admiration. "The failure of one great attack, heralded as it was by an impassionedappeal to the troops made in the presence of the emperor himself, butcarried out by partially trained men, has been only the signal foranother desperate effort in which the place of honor was assigned to thecorps d'élite of the German army. "It must be admitted that the Guard Corps has retained that reputationfor courage and contempt of death which it earned in 1870, when EmperorWilliam I, after the battle of Gravelotte, wrote: 'My Guard has formedits grave in front of St. Privat, ' and the swarms of men who came upbravely to the British rifles in the woods around Ypres repeated thetactics of forty-four years ago, when their dense columns, toiling upthe slopes of St. Privat, melted away under the fire of the French. " Ypres was now but a name. Nothing but a mass of ruins reminded the worldof its previous quaint splendor. For Ypres had been rich in historicbuildings and monuments of past days. With the fall of Antwerp the Germans had made every effort to pushforward strong forces toward the west and had hastened to bring up newarmy corps which had been hurriedly organized, their object being todrive the Allies out of Belgium and break through to Dunkirk and Calais. Altogether they collected 250, 000 fresh men. Eventually the Germans hadnorth of La Bassée about fourteen corps and eight cavalry divisions, aforce of 750, 000 men, with which to attempt to drive the Allies into thesea. In addition there was immensely powerful armament and heavy siegeartillery, which also had been brought up from around Antwerp. But inspite of these strong forces it became clearly evident by the middle ofNovember that the attempt to break through to Calais had failed for thetime being. The flooding of the Yser marks the end of the main strugglefor Calais. The battle fronts had shifted. Between them there was a mileor two of mud and water. The Belgians had lost a quarter of theireffectives. The Germans had evacuated the west bank of the Yser and wereobliged to return to the point from which they had started. CHAPTER XXVIII ATTACKS ON LA BASSÉE AND ARRAS While the engagement on the Yser was in progress in October, 1914, fierce fighting was kept up in the second section of the battle front, pivoting on Givenchy to the south and running east to the north of theLa Bassée-Lille road. In this section the forces of the Crown Prince ofBavaria opposed the troops under the command of General Smith-Dorrien. From October 1 to 3, 1914, considerable fighting went on in the flatseast of Arras between Lens and the River Scarpe. This resulted in theretirement of the Allies on the 4th. The Germans began to bombard Arras, keeping it up until the 6th, when their attempt to take the city nextday was successfully repulsed. On October 8, the Germans, then holdingDouai and Lens, were shelling Lille, then held by the Britishterritorials. For the next two weeks artillery duels alternated withtrench fighting and skirmishing. The main attack at La Bassée covered fully ten days, lasting fromOctober 22, 1914, to November 2, 1914. The first severe fighting came ashas already been mentioned, on October 22, 1914. The British were drivenout of the village of Violaines, which is situated on the road betweenLorgies and Givenchy, and General Smith-Dorrien was compelled to retreatto the village of Faugissant, to the south of Lavantie. On October 24, 1914, the Germans attacked heavily along the entire line, and the First Gordon Highlanders were driven out of their trenches. Forthree days the most savage fighting continued, resulting in the captureof Neuve Chapelle by the Germans on October 27, which was defended byEast Indian troops. The fighting was desperate on both sides and becamemuch confused, as units here and there had succeeded in breaking throughtheir respective opponents' lines. All of this day and the next, October28, this struggle continued, but the Germans maintained the ground theyhad won, forcing the allied forces to retire in order to re-form theirlines. On October 29, 1914, the Germans attacked at Festubert, and gainedseveral of the allied trenches after a severe struggle lastingthroughout the day. Again the Germans maintained their new position, compelling the Indian troops to retire to the defense of the La Basséegate, where they were joined by several British brigades and the SecondCorps Artillery. October 30, 1914, was consumed in continuous artillery duels, which heldthe lines while the troops enjoyed much needed rest. On October 31, 1914, the Indian forces were again savagely attacked bythe Germans whose machine guns enfiladed them in their trenches. Thisattack has become noted for the great loss of British officerscommanding the Hindus. Concurrent with this fighting the Germans also made the most savageonslaughts further south, with the object of capturing Arras. The mainattack against this important French city began on October 20, 1914, andlasted six days until the evening of October 26. The Germans in havingpossession of Lens had a great advantage, as they were thereby enabledto threaten the allied left center, which was stationed to the west ofLens; for, just south from the town, ran a railway which connected withthe main line three miles east of Arras, called the Arras--Douai--Lilleline. This gave the Germans a perfect system of lateral communications. The German general, Von Bülow, commanding the Prussian Guard Corps ledthe attack on October 24, 1914, when he pushed his forces, fighting forevery inch of the ground, to within gun range of the city of Arras. Allday the most desperate fighting continued and had not General Maud'huyreceived the reenforcements which hurriedly came up just when needed thenorthern gates of Arras would have been gained by the Germans, who wereheld back in a position near enough, however, to subject Arras toanother bombardment and the shell fire from this position rained uponArras to the end of the month and some six days into November. From the date of the entry of the French into Alsace on August 7, 1914, the battle front in France extended from the Swiss frontier, norththrough western Alsace, thence in a northwesterly direction to a pointwhere the line met the front of the German forces advancing on Paris. On October 1, 1914, this battle front extended in an unbroken line fromSwitzerland to the city of Douai in northeastern France. The CrownPrince of Bavaria commanded in the first section from Alsace to midwaybetween Nancy and Verdun; the Crown Prince of Prussia directed theVerdun section reaching from west of Thiaucourt to Montfaucon; the Dukeof Württemberg to Massiges; General von Hausen thence to Bery-au-Bac;General von Bülow to a point directly north of Soissons; General vonKluck in a northwesterly direction to a point west of Noyon and onwardto the north and northeast to Douai, which is about fifteen milesnortheast of Arras, from which point north the campaign has beendescribed. The French army opposing this German front was under thesupreme command of General Joffre. The commanding officers in thevarious sectors of this front were being continually changed, making itdifficult to name the commanders in each sector, except when some moreor less noteworthy engagement had taken place along the line. The battlefront here described did not materially change throughout the months ofOctober, 1914, to February 1, 1915. Continual engagements took placealong this entire front--a gain of a few yards here balanced by a lossof a like distance elsewhere. Both belligerents had securely intrenched themselves. The pickax andspade were far more in use than the rifle, so that now cold weathercoming on, the soldiers on both sides of the front were able to make thetrenches quite comfortable. In many instances they laid down plankfloors and lined the walls with boards, put up stoves, constructedsleeping bunks and tables, stools and benches, and even decorated therooms thus evolved with anything suitable for the purpose. Pictures andphotographs from home were the favorite decorations. All this wasimpossible for their brethren in the north and in Flanders, where theactivities of the conflict subjected the soldiers to continual changesand removals. The main objective of the Germans was the French fortresses Belfort, Epinal, Toul, and Verdun, for these obstructed the march to Paris. Thecontinual onslaughts and counterassaults made upon this line left itpractically unchanged during the month of October, 1914, in which timeno engagements worthy of the name "battle" occurred. The fighting in thenorth had been so desperate that it completely obscured the activitieson the entire line to the south. The net gains during the months of October and November, 1914, foreither belligerent were practically nil. From Belfort in the south toArras in the north the advance or retreat in any given section was but amatter of yards; a ridge, a farm, a hill, or other choice gun position, the farther bank of a rivulet or stream or canal occupied orcaptured--here by the French, there by the Germans--generally proved tobe but temporary possessions and wasted efforts. It was incidents such as these that made up the record of events alongthis line. During all this time the military aeroplanes were busydropping explosives upon the enemy's lines, and extending theiroperations far to the rear, circling above the larger towns and cities, doing considerable damage in many places. But this was not the onlypurpose of these daring sky pilots; for the principal object in flyingover the adversary's country was to make observations and reportmovements of troops. In this respect the aeroplane had done immenseservice throughout the campaign. CHAPTER XXIX GENERAL MOVEMENTS ON THE FRENCH AND FLANDERS FRONTS We have seen that at the end of November, 1914, Ypres was still in theAllies' hands, though the Germans were exerting a fierce pressure inthat region, and were gradually, even if very slowly, getting closer andcloser to it. At the beginning of December, 1914, the Germans drew their forces closeup to Ypres, so closely in fact that they could bring into play theirsmall-caliber howitzers, and before many hours Ypres was in flames inmany places. The allied forces fought fiercely to compel the Germans towithdraw. Hand-to-hand fighting, bayonet charges, and general confusionwas the order of the day. Thousands of men would creep out of theirholes in the ground and crawl, availing themselves of whatever coveringpresented itself, to some vantage point and there stand up as one manand charge directly into the adversary's ranks. All this was part of the general scheme worked out miles from the spotwhere the conflict was going on. There in some quaint little townoccupying some out-of-the-way house was the General Staff. The roomswere filled with officers; the walls were hung with large and smallfield and detail maps, upon which were plainly marked the name of everycommanding officer and the forces under his command. Every detail of thearmies' strength--names of the commanders, and any other detail wasplainly in view. It was here decided to turn the entire command of the allied forcesalong the Yser over to the British to avoid confusion. It was well thatthis was done just at this time, for on December 3, 1914, the Germansmade a fierce onslaught along the entire front of thirteen miles betweenYpres and Dixmude, bringing into use a great number of stanch raftspropelled by expert watermen, thus carrying thousands of the Germanforces over and along the Ypres River. Again the belligerents came to a hand-to-hand conflict, and so welldirected was the allied counterattack that no advantage to the Germanswas obtained. For three days this severe fighting continued. Thestruggle was most sharp between Dixmude and the coast at Westende, wherethe Germans hoped to break through the allied lines, and thus crumple uptheir entire front, making a free passage. On December 7, 1914, the French captured Vermelles, a minor village afew miles southwest of La Bassée. This little village had been thecenter of a continuous struggle for mastership for nearly two months. Atlast the French occupied this rather commanding point, important to theAllies, as it afforded an excellent view over a wide stretch of countryoccupied by the Germans. The German Staff headquarters were removed from Roulers, which is abouttwelve miles distant from Ypres, on December 8, 1914, from the vicinityof Ypres, while their own forces had been concentrated upon Dixmude, twelve miles to the north. This town had suffered severely before, butthe allied forces using what shelter they could improvise, were doingconsiderable damage from this point. Therefore the Germans began tobombard the place. On December 9, 1914, the Germans succeeded in gaining slightly towardYpres. Farther north they were by this time also in a position to takeFurnes under fire. This town lies on the frontier between Belgium andFrance, in the path of some of the most savage onslaughts on the part ofthe Germans to break through the allied lines in order to reach thechannel towns of Dunkirk and Calais. On December 10, 1914, the allied forces made an ineffectual attack onRoulers, which the German General Staff had just left. South of Ypresthe allied forces made a severe attack upon the town of Armentières, about eight miles from Ypres, but gained no permanent advantage. During this time the Germans had also so far succeeded in consolidatingtheir positions in the neighborhood of Ostend, that they could put theirheavy guns in position near the shores of that famous watering place. This was a very necessary precaution to meet the attacks of Englishgunboats, and even larger cruisers that were patrolling that coast. On December 12, 1914, the severest fighting was along the Yser Canal, which was crossed and recrossed several times. On December 13, 1914, the Allies succeeded in repulsing the Germans onthe River Lys, where for three days the Germans had inaugurated a hotoffensive. These engagements were exact counterparts of the fighting atother points in Flanders, where both opponents were apparently wellmatched, and where advantages were won and lost in rapid succession. There was severe fighting also on December 14, 1914, extending along theentire front in Flanders from Nieuport to below Ypres. In the north theGermans made severe onslaughts, all more or less held up or repulsed bythe Belgians, French, and English. The fighting was hottest nearNieuport, where the Allies made some small temporary gains. Besides thethree armies participating in the conflict, the British fleet also tookpart in bombarding the German coast positions. Three British bargesequipped with naval machine guns entered the River Yser in order tocooperate in the fighting. These boats took the two villagesLombaertzyde and St. Georges. In this action some of the heaviest fighting was done by the Frenchmarines. Some slight advantages were also gained by the Allies in theneighborhood of St. Eloi and Klein Zillebeke. Following these minor successes, attack was made upon the German lineson the west side of Wytschaete, a village which the Germans hadsucceeded in holding during the great battle of Ypres. To the west ofthis village is a wood called the Petit Bois, and to the southwest isthe Maedelsteed spur, an eminence on hilly ground. From both of theseplaces the Germans covered the village, prepared to hold it against allcomers. Major Duncan, commanding the Scots, and Major Baird leading the RoyalHighlanders, attacked the Petit Bois, and in the flare of terriblemachine gun and rifle fire, carried a trench west of the woods, whilethe Gordon Highlanders advanced upon the spur, taking the first trench. They were, however, obliged to fall back to the position from which theyhad started, with no advantage gained. This engagement at Wytschaetegave a good illustration of the difficulty of fighting in heavy, winterground, devoid of cover, and so waterlogged that any speed in advancewas next to impossible. Just prior to the battle the ground had thawed, and the soldiers sank deep into the mud at every step they took. On December 15, 1914, the Germans attacked a little to the south ofYpres, but no definite result was obtained. On the following day theAllies replied by an onslaught at Dixmude with a similar result. TheGermans attempted to turn and strike at Westende the next day. Roulers was temporarily occupied by the Allies on December 18, 1914, andin another location, about twenty-five miles farther southwest, in theneighborhood of Givenchy, the Allies' Indian troops were put to thetest. The attack was launched on the morning of the 19th. The Lahore and the Meerut divisions both took part. The Meerut divisionsucceeded in capturing a trench; but a little later on a counterattack, launched by the Germans, forced the Indians back. The Lahore division, including the First Highland Light Infantry and the Fourth Gurkhas, tooktwo lines of the enemy's trenches with hardly any casualties. Thesecaptured trenches were at once occupied, and when they were full tocapacity, the Germans exploded the previously prepared mines, and blewup the entire Hindu force. At daylight on the morning of December 20, 1914, the Germans commenced aheavy artillery fire along the entire front. This was followed by aninfantry charge along the entire line between Givenchy and La QuinqueRue to the north. The defense of Givenchy was in the hands of the IndiaSirhind Brigade, under General Brunker. At ten o'clock the Sirhindsbecame confused and fled, enabling the Germans to capture Givenchy. TheFifty-seventh Rifles and the Ninth Bhopals were stationed north of LaBassée Canal and east of Givenchy, and the Connaught Rangers werewaiting at the south of the canal. The Forty-seventh Sikhs were sent tosupport the Sirhind Brigade, with the First Manchesters, the FourthSuffolks, and two battalions of French Provincials, the entire forcebeing under command of General Carnegy. All these mixed forces nowessayed a combined counterattack in order to recover the ground lost bythe Sirhind Brigade, but this failed. The Allies called up reserves and re-formed the ranks broken by thatday's reverses. With the Seventh Dragoon Guards under the command ofLieutenant Colonel Lemprière, they began another attack. This, too, failed. When the Sirhind Brigade fell back, the Seaforth Highlanderswere left entirely exposed. The Fifty-eighth Rifles went to the supportof their left. Throughout the entire afternoon the Seaforths had madestrenuous efforts to capture the German trenches to the right and leftof their position. Upon the arrival of the Fifty-eighth the fightingredoubled in ferocity, but no advance was made. Finally word was givento retreat. The Allies lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The First Brigade was detached, and by midnight it had reached Bethune, about five miles west of Givenchy. Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to movealso, the entire First Division in support of the exhausted Indiantroops. Action was begun on December 20, 1914, early in the afternoon by asimultaneous attack, and was continued until nightfall withoutimportant results. The next morning General Haig in person took thecommand, but little ground was gained. While this contest was in progress around Givenchy, the Germans tookpossession of the city of Arras, ten miles to the south. Between December 23 and 30, 1914, the Belgian army, strongly reenforcedby French troops, began a series of violent attacks upon the Germanlines; but the Germans replied by a ceaseless bombardment of Nieuport, which is about a mile inland. No results of importance were obtained oneither side. The last week of December, 1914, bore a relieving holiday aspect, for itseemed as though by general consent the carnival of blood was to beconsidered not consonant with the solemnity of the season. But for allthat the French succeeded in blowing up some German trenches with a newhowitzer they were anxious to try out, and the Belgian-French forcesretook St. Georges in northern Flanders. St. Georges had been held by the Germans for some time; the villagestands on the right hand of the Yser, and it was the only position theyretained on that side of the river. It seems from the very ease withwhich the village was taken that the Germans felt their position thereuntenable, and withdrew to their own side of the river in order to enjoya quiet Christmas with their comrades, whose singing of Christmas songswas forever being wafted over that river of blood. Although the generalaction continued on both sides, no serious battles are to be recorded inFlanders for the balance of the year 1914. CHAPTER XXX OPERATIONS AROUND LA BASSÉE AND GIVENCHY On the whole, the results obtained during the first days of 1915 on theBelgian battle front favored the Germans. Of this front the Belgiansheld but three miles more or less, and the British were defending a lineof about twenty miles, while the French covered the balance of abouttwelve miles, all of which included about the entire front in Flandersfrom the dunes at Nieuport on the Channel to Armentières in the south, aline--by no means straight--about thirty-five miles in length. Activities along the extended front in the Champagne district havingproved successful for the German forces to a considerable extent, theGeneral Staff turned its attention now to the La Bassée region. There was good tactical reason for this move, because the British wereseriously threatening the position, straddling La Bassée Canal where itflows between Cuinchy and Givenchy, and there was danger that they mightcapture La Bassée, where the Germans held a salient of considerablestrategical importance, as it covered their line of communication to thesouth. Previous successful operations by the British at Richebourg andFestubert north of Givenchy, and at Vermelles, south of Cuinchy, evidently prompted the Germans to attempt a counterattack. Besides itwas desirable for the Germans to test the strength of the Allies at thispoint, and to do this with some measure of success the Germans massed aconsiderable force for this purpose. Beginning about January 14, 1915, the British met with varying and minorsuccesses and defeats in this region, but no noteworthy action had takenplace for upward of ten days, until January 25, under the eye of theGerman Kaiser, the principal attack, which had been carefully planned, took place. On the morning of January 25, 1915, a demonstration along the frontfrom Festubert to Vermelles and as far north as Ypres and Pervyse wasinaugurated. The Germans began to shell Bethune, which was within the allied linesabout eight or nine miles west of La Bassée. An hour later, in theneighborhood of nine o'clock, following up heavy artillery fire, theFifty-sixth Prussian Infantry and the Seventh Pioneers advanced south ofthe canal, which runs eastward from Bethune, where the British lineformed a salient from the canal forward to the railway near Cuinchy, andthence back to the Bethune and La Bassée road where the British joinedthe French forces. This salient was occupied by the Scots and the Coldstream Guards. TheGermans were obliged to advance by the road, as the fields were too softfor the passage of the troops; even the roads were in a terriblecondition, deep ruts and thick, sticky mud greatly retarding the onwardmarch of the German forces. But the Allies fared little better in thisrespect. In fact the entire engagement was fought out in a veritable seaof mud and slush. Well-directed artillery fire by the Germans blew up the British trenchesin this salient, and the Germans at once penetrated the unsupportedBritish line. The Germans also had the advantage of an armored train, which they ran along the tracks from La Bassée almost into Bethune, sufficiently close to throw considerable shell fire into this town. The Germans advanced in close formation, throwing hand grenades. Theycame on so rapidly and with such momentum that the Guards, trying invain to stem the tide with the bayonet, were overwhelmed, and theBritish, in spite of desperate resistance, were forced back step bystep. At some points the distance between the trenches was so small that itwas utterly impossible to stop the onrush from one trench to the other. The Germans swept and broke through the British lines, treading theirfallen opponents under foot as they advanced. At this point the Britishturned and fled, as there was no hope of successful resistance. As the great momentum forced the German advance through the alliedlines into the open field beyond and was joined by a heavy column, whichhad debouched from the vicinity of Auchy, British guns opened amurderous fire and inflicted terrible slaughter upon these ranks. The Coldstream and the Scots Guards retreated to their second line ofdefense, where they joined others of their command held in reservethere. Once again they turned to meet the oncoming Germans, and againwere forced to give way, leaving the Germans in possession of all theground previously gained. The remnants of the Guards retreated untilthey were met by the London-Scottish regiment sent to reenforce them. Here they halted while a counterattack was being organized by the FirstRoyal Highlanders, part of the Camerons, and the Second King's RifleCorps which also came up. At one o'clock on January 25, 1915, and with the cooperation of theFrench on their right, this rapidly improvised force moved forward, making unobstructed progress on their wings by the canal and the road. For some reason their center was delayed and held back. When they didfinally arrive and pressed forward with a rush to meet the Germanforces, who were ready to receive them, the impact was fearful, and thecasualties on both sides enormous; but no gains were made by the Allies, and the Germans held the ground they had won. At the height of thebattle the Second Royal Sussex rushed into the fray in support of theirhard-pressed comrades, but all to no purpose, for these as the otherswere forced back to the rear of their starting point with but a fractionof their forces remaining to report the events of the day. While this terrible slaughter was in progress, the French left on theother side of La Bassée road, which separated the Allies at this point, had been attacked by the right of the German line, and driven back to aconsiderable distance, but not as far back as the British, so that theFrench left was in advance of the British right and badly exposed toflank attack from the northward. This obliged the entire allied forces to retreat some distance fartherto the rear, and as night came on and the severity of the action hadceased, the Allies had an opportunity to realign their positions andsomewhat strengthen the same by the First Guard Brigade which now cameup, showing the terrible suffering to which they had been subjected. Finally, however, it was found advisable to withdraw the Guardaltogether and replace them by the First Infantry Brigade. Now the German tactical idea became clear. It was to force the Britishto concentrate on the exposed line between Festubert and Givenchy, northof the canal, and then to turn the British right by the German forces intheir new position just south of the canal, thus calling forsimultaneous action on both sides of the canal. The Germans delivered an equally severe attack upon the allied positionin the village of Givenchy, about a mile north of the canal, whichbounded the scene of the attack just described. As in the other attack, the Germans opened action by severe artillery fire, using high-explosiveshells, and after due preparation, at about 8. 15 in the morning, theinfantry advanced, as is customary with the Germans, in close formation. The British met this advance by somewhat weak artillery fire, which, itwas afterward explained was due to continued interruption of thetelephonic communications between the observers and the batteries in thefight. However, as it was, this fire, added to the machine gun and riflefire from the trenches, served to turn the German advance from theiroriginal direction, with the result that they crowded together in thenortheast corner of Givenchy after passing over the first-line trenchesof the Allies' front. Their momentum carried the Germans far into thecenter of the village, with remarkably few casualties considering themurderous fire to which they had been subjected throughout theirimpetuous advances. In the village of Givenchy, however, the Second Welsh Regiment and theFirst South Wales Borderers, which had been stationed there and held inreserve, gave the Germans a warm reception, and when the First RoyalHighlanders came up they delivered a fierce counterattack. In this theywere supported by the fire of the French artillery, which assistance, however, proved costly to the Allies, as the French fire and burstingshells killed friend and foe alike. Street fighting became savage, amidthe explosions of shells sent to enliven the occasion by the French. This concluded the action for the day and when the smoke cleared awayboth sides found their position comparatively little changed and nothingbut the thinned ranks of the combatants reminded the observer that themost severe kind of fighting had taken place for the best part of a day. The following day, January 26, 1915, the action was resumed, and theattack opened along the Bethune and La Bassée road. This soon died out, as though by general consent, each side reoccupying their position ofthe previous evening. But on Friday, January 29, 1915, early in the morning, the Germans againopened with severe artillery fire which directed its attentionparticularly to the British line, where the First Army Corps lay betweenLa Bassée Canal and the Bethune road near Cutchy. After an hour'sshelling the Germans sent one battalion of the Fourteenth Corps towardthe redoubt, and two battalions of the same corps were sent to the northand south of this redoubt. Now upon this point and to the north of itstood the Sussex Regiment and to the south of it the NorthamptonshireRegiment. The attack was severe, but the defense was equal to it and thenet results were summed up in the casualty lists on both sides. Anattack upon the French, south of Bethune, on the same day met with likeresults. The great German objective was to open another road to Dunkirkand Calais, and had they been successful in the engagements of the pastfew days it is probable that they would have succeeded. To the north in the coast district the Belgians had succeeded inflooding a vast area, which served for the time to separate thecombatants for a considerable distance, obliging the Germans to resortto rafts, boats and other floating apparatus to carry on a somewhathaphazard offensive and resulting in nothing more than a change fromgunfire slaughter to drowning. The immense inconvenience attendant tothis mode of warfare decided the Germans to drain this area and theysucceeded in doing this by the end of January, 1915. On the other hand the Belgians captured two German trenches in the northon January 17, 1915, and the British sent a force to attack Lille onJanuary 18. The Belgian trenches were reoccupied by the Germans and theLille attack was successfully repulsed. Then, for a week, there was nothing of importance until January 23, 1915, when the Germans made a strong attack upon Ypres which wasrepulsed. On January 24 the Germans recaptured St. Georges and bombardeda few of the towns and villages harboring allied troops. The Belgians continued in their endeavor to flood the German positionalong the Yser, on January 25, 1915, and succeeded in obliging theiropponents to vacate for a time at least, and on the last day of Januaryallied forces consisting of Zouaves, Gurkhas and other Indian companiesmade an attack upon the German trenches upon the dunes at Lombaertzyde, gaining a temporary advantage at an expense of considerable loss incasualties. In reviewing the activities during the month of January, 1915, thedisagreeable state of the weather must be taken into consideration; thisresulted in terrible suffering, to which the battling forces weresubjected during the actual fighting and even more so while at rest, either on the open field or in the questionable comfort of aninhospitable and leaky trench. While every effort was made by the respective General Staffs to supplytheir fighting troops with such comforts as were absolutely necessary tokeep body and soul together and in trim for the next day's work, littlecould be accomplished and it is a marvel how these poor soldiers didwithstand the rigorous weather which blighted the prospect of victory, so dear to all who wear a uniform. CHAPTER XXXI END OF SIX MONTHS' FIGHTING IN THE WEST There were few military movements on the French battle front duringDecember, 1914, along the Aisne, the Oise and in the northern Champagne. The fighting was mostly artillery duels and skirmishes by separateunits. In the Argonne, however, the Crown Prince of Germany was activeand there, as well as along the Moselle and on the heights of theVosges, many engagements were fought out resulting in varying advantagesto either opponent. Both sides had been strongly intrenched and theground was covered by snow to great depths, making progress impossibleexcept upon skis and snowshoes. On December 3, 1914, the French captured Burnhaupt, a hill east ofMülhausen in Upper Alsace, only to give up their advantage after aGerman counterattack. On December 16 the Germans attacked in the Woevreregion and in Alsace; but were repulsed the following day. On December31, 1914, the French attacked Steinbach in Alsace, but were driven outagain. The New Year of 1915 opened gently along the battle front in Francebelow Arras. The first large movement in 1915 began on January 8, atSoissons. This city lies on both banks of the river Aisne and was in thepossession of the French. The French forces attacked during a drenchingrain, pushing up the rising ground to the north with their heavy guns, regardless of the soft ground which rapidly turned to deep mud andslush. They succeeded in carrying the first line of German trenches on afront a mile wide, thus gaining the top of the hill, which gave them anexcellent position for their artillery. The next day the Germanscounterattacked, but failed to dislodge the French. Nothing occurred on Sunday, January 10, 1915, but on Monday, about noon, January 11, the Germans came on with great force. The delay on the partof the Germans was due to their awaiting reenforcements then on the roadto Soissons. For four days there had been a steady downpour of rainwhich had not even stopped at this time. The River Aisne was muchswollen and some of the bridges had been carried away, cutting off allsupplies for the French, who were slowly giving way but fightingdesperately. On January 12, 1915, and on the 13th the French were driven down theslopes in a great rush. This predicament was a terrible one--theonrushing Germans 500 feet in front of them and the swollen river makingsuccessful retreat impossible, with the ground between almost impassablewith mud and slush. French reserves had improvised a pontoon bridgeacross the Aisne at Missy, in the rear of their now precarious position. This bridge was just strong enough to carry the men and ammunition; butnot the heavy guns. The retreat turned into a rout--a general stampedefor the bridge and river. The slaughter was terrible, the river swollen as it was seemed chokedwith floating soldiers. The few who safely got across the bridge andthose who were successful in reaching the farther bank of the Aisnealive, reached Soissons eventually. The German gain in prisoners andbooty was enormous and their gain in ground advanced their line a fullmile, on a front extending five miles to Missy and a little beyond. TheGermans strongly intrenched their new position without loss of time. Farther along this front, in the neighborhood of Perthes, a lessimportant engagement took place. The Germans, under General von Einem, opposed General Langle de Cary and his French forces. The results ofthis engagement were negligible. On January 18, 1915, a savage attack by the Germans was successfullyrepulsed at Tracy-le-Val and on the 19th the French made an assault uponthe German position at St. Mihiél, in the Verdun section without gainingany ground. Farther north on this section the French pressed on andgained a little ground near the German fortress Metz; but the veryvicinity of this fortress counterbalanced this gain. On January 21, 1915, the Germans recaptured the Le Prêtre woods near St. Mihiél, and next day the belligerents fought a fierce engagement in theVosges without advantage to either side. Prince Eitel, the second sonof the Kaiser, commanded an attack upon Thann in Alsace on January 25, 1915, but was repulsed by the French defenders. On January 28, 1915, the Germans made some gains in the Vosges and inUpper Alsace, but in their attempt to cross the River Aisne on the 29ththey were unsuccessful. January 30, 1915, brought some successes to the Germans in the Argonneforest, where throughout the month the most savage fighting was going onin thick underbrush and from tree tops. PART II--NAVAL OPERATIONS CHAPTER XXXII STRENGTH OF THE RIVAL NAVIES Sea fights, sea raids, and the hourly expectation of a great navalbattle--a struggle for the control of the seas between modernarmadas--held the attention of the world during the first six months ofthe Great War. These, with the adventures of the _Emden_ in the watersof the Far East, the first naval fight off Helgoland, the fight off thewestern coast of South America, the sinking of the _Lusitania_, and theexploits of the submarines--held the world in constant expectancy andthreatened to involve neutral nations, thus causing a collapse of worldtrade and dragging all the peoples of the earth into the maelstrom ofwar. This chapter will review the navies as they gather for action. It willfollow them through the tense moments on shipboard--the days of watchingand waiting like huge sea dogs tugging at the leash. Interspersed areheroic adventures which have added new tales of valor to the epics ofthe sea. The naval history of the great European conflict begins, not with thefirst of the series of declarations of war, but with the preliminarypreparations. The appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz as Secretary ofState in Germany in 1898 is the first decisive movement. It was in thatyear that the first rival to England as mistress of the world's seas, since the days of the Spanish Armada, peeped over the horizon. Two yearsbefore the beginning of the present century, Von Tirpitz organized acampaign, the object of which was to make Germany's navy as strong asher military arm. A law passed at that time created the present Germanfleet; supplementary laws passed in 1900 and 1906 through the Reichstagby this former plowboy caused the German navy to be taken seriously, notonly by Germans but by the rest of the world. England, jealous of hersea power, then began her maintenance of two ships for each one of herrival's. Germany answered by laying more keels, till the ratio stoodthree to two, instead of two to one. Two years before the firing of the pistol shot at Sarajevo, whichprecipitated the Great War, the British admiralty announced thathenceforth the British naval base in the Mediterranean would beGibraltar instead of Malta. Conjectures were made as to the significanceof this move; it might have meant that England had found the pace toogreat and had deliberately decided to abandon her dominance of theeastern Mediterranean; or that Gibraltar had been secretly reequipped asa naval base. What it did mean was learned when the French Minister ofMarine announced in the following September that the entire navalstrength of France would thereafter be concentrated in theMediterranean. This was the first concrete action of the _ententecordiale_--the British navy, in the event of war, was to guard theBritish home waters and the northern ports of France; the French navywas to guard the Mediterranean, protecting French ports as well asFrench and British shipping from "the Gib" to the Suez. What was the comparative strength of these naval combinations when thewar started? From her latest superdreadnoughts down to her auxiliary ships, such asthose used for hospital purposes, oil carrying and repairing, Englandhad a total of 674 vessels. Without consideration of ages and types thistotal means nothing, and it is therefore necessary to examine her navalstrength in detail. She had nine battleships of 14, 000 tons displacementeach, built between 1895 and 1898--the _Magnificent_, _Majestic_, _Prince George_, _Jupiter_, _Cæsar_, _Mars_, _Illustrious_, _Hannibal_, and _Victorious_--with engines developing 12, 000 horsepower that sentthem through the water at 17. 5 knots, protected with from nine tofourteen inches of armor, and prepared to inflict damage on an enemywith torpedoes shot from under and above the water, and with four12-inch guns, twelve 6-inch guns, sixteen 3-inch guns, and twenty gunsof smaller caliber but of quicker firing possibilities. Her next class was that of the _Canopus_--the _Goliath_, _Vengeance_, _Ocean_, _Albion_, and _Glory_--2, 000 tons lighter than the first classnamed above, but more modern in equipment and construction, having beenbuilt between the years 1900 and 1902. Their motive power was heavier, being 13, 500 horsepower, and their speed was almost a knot faster. Increase in the power of naval guns had made unnecessary any increase inthe thickness of their armor, and consequently ranged from 6 to 12inches in thickness. Their armament was about the same as that of theolder class, but each carried two more torpedo tubes. [Illustration: Map of German and English Naval positions. ] Discussion in naval circles throughout the world turned then to thequestion of whether it were better to build heavier ships with heavierarmament, or to build lighter and faster ships designed to "hit and getaway. " The British authorities inclined toward the former view, andbetween 1901 and 1904 the British navy was augmented with the_Implacable_, _London_, _Bulwark_, _Formidable_, _Venerable_, _Queen_, _Irresistible_, and _Prince of Wales_--each of the heretofore unheard-ofdisplacement of 15, 000 tons. In spite of their size they werecomparatively fast, having an average speed of 18 knots; they did notneed, and were not equipped with heavier armor, having plates as thin as3 inches and as thick as 12. They were built to "take punishment, " andtherefore they had no greater armament than the vessels previouslynamed. The naval program of 1908 and 1904 also included the _Duncan_, _Albemarle_, _Russell_, _Cornwallis_, and _Exmouth_, each 1, 000 tonslighter than the ships of the _Implacable_ type, but with the sameequipment, defensive and offensive, and of the same speed. And in thesame program, as if to offset the argument for heavier and strongerships, there were included the lighter and faster ships, _Swiftsure_ and_Triumph_, displacing only 11, 500 tons, but making 19 knots. Their speedpermitted and necessitated lighter armor--10 inches through at thethickest points--and their armament was also of a lighter type, fortheir four largest guns were capable of firing 10-inch shells. Germany was becoming a naval rival worthy of notice, and the insularposition of England came to be a matter of serious concern by 1906. Britain has never considered the building of land forts for herprotection--her strength has always been concentrated in floating warmachines. She now began to build veritable floating forts, ships of16, 350 tons displacement. By the end of 1906 she had ready to givebattle eight ships of this class, the _King Edward VII_, _Commonwealth_, _Dominion_, _Hindustan_, _Africa_, _Hibernia_, _Zealandia_, and_Britannia_. Speed was not sacrificed to weight, for they were given aspeed of 18. 5 knots, developed by engines of 18, 000 horsepower. Theirthinnest armor measured 6 inches, and their heavy guns were protectedwith plates 12 inches thick. The 12-inch gun was still the heaviestpiece of armament in the British navy, and these eight ships eachcarried four of that measurement, as well as four 9. 2-inch guns, ten6-inch guns, fourteen rapid-fire guns of 3 inches, two machine guns, andfour torpedo tubes. Now that it was seen that ships of enormous displacement could also beswift, England committed herself to the building of ships of evengreater size. In 1907 came the first of the modern dreadnoughts, so-called from the name which was given to the original ship of 17, 900tons displacement. The _Dreadnought_ made the marvelous speed (for aship of that size) of 21 knots, which she was enabled to do with turbineengines of 23, 000 horsepower. Her armor measured from 8 to 11 inches inthickness, and her great size enabled her to carry as high as ten12-inch guns. Her minor batteries were strong in proportion. Then, as if taking her breath after a stupendous effort, England in thefollowing year built two ships of 16, 000 tons displacement, the _LordNelson_ and the _Agamemnon_, with speed, armor, and armament much lowerthan those of the _Dreadnought_. But having taken a rest, Britain wasagain to make a great effort, launching in 1909 the _Temeraire_, _Superb_, and _Bellerophon_, monsters displacing 18, 600 tons. Withengines of 23, 000 horsepower that could drive them through the seas at21 knots, ready to ward off blows with armor from 8 to 11 inches thick, firing at the same time volleys from ten 12-inch guns down to sixteen4-inch rapid firers. Naval architecture had now taken a definite turn, the principal featureof which was the tremendous size of the destructive floating machines. England, a leader in this sort of building, in 1910 built the_Vanguard_, _Collingwood_, and _St. Vincent_, each displacing 19, 250tons. Nor were they lacking in speed, for they made, on an average, 21knots. The 20, 000-ton battleship was then a matter of months only, andit came in the following year, when the _Colossus_, _Hercules_, and_Neptune_ were launched. It was only in the matter of displacement thatthese three ships showed any difference from those of the _Vanguard_class; there were no great innovations either in armament or armor. Butin the same year, 1911, there were launched the _Thunderer_, _Monarch_, _Orion_, and _Conqueror_, each of 22, 500 tons, and equipped with armorfrom 8 to 12 inches thick, for the days of 3-inch armor on first-classwarships had gone forever. These had a speed of 21 knots, and were thefirst British ships to have anything greater than a 12-inch gun. Theycarried as a primary battery ten 13. 5-inch guns, and sixteen 4-inchguns, along with six more of small caliber as their secondary battery. In 1912 and 1913 there was only one type of warship launched having23, 000 tons displacement with 31, 000 horsepower, a half a knot fasterthan previous dreadnoughts, and carrying, like the previous class, ten13. 5-inch guns, along with some of smaller caliber. The ships of thisclass were the _King George V_, _Ajax_, _Audacious_, and _Centurion_. The year 1914 saw even more terrible machines of death launched. Twotypes were put into the water, the first that of the _Iron Duke_ class, of which the other members were the _Benbow_, _Emperor of India_, and_Marlborough_. They showed great improvement in every point; their speedwas 22. 5 knots, their displacement 25, 000 tons, and their torpedo tubesfive. Like their immediate predecessors, they carried a primary batteryof ten 13. 5-inch guns, along with the smaller ones, and their armormeasured from 8 to 12 inches in thickness. The second type of the yearwas that of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and _Warspite_ class. They surpassedall the warships when they were built. Their speed for their size wasthe greatest--25 knots. They had the largest displacement amongwarships--27, 500 tons; they had the thickest armor, ranging from 8 to13. 5 inches; they had the most improved form of engines--oil burners, developing 58, 000 horsepower; and most marvelous of all was theirprimary battery, which consisted of eight 15-inch guns. The largest gunyet made had been the 16-inch gun, for use in permanent position in landforts, and, with the German army, for a mobile force. It now was shownthat the modern warship could carry a gun as heavy as any on land. Therewere in the course of construction when the war broke out eight moresuch monsters, the _Malaya, Valiant_, and _Barham_, sister ships of the_Queen Elizabeth_, and the _Royal Oak_, _Resolution_, _Royal Monarch_, _Ramillies_, and _Renown_, each of 29, 000 tons displacement, but havingthe same armament as the _Queen Elizabeth_. All of these were hastenedto completion as soon as war was declared. At the time of the declaration of war England had, in addition to thesegreatest ships, a number of supporting ships such as the ten battlecruisers, _Indomitable_, _Invincible_, _Indefatigable_, _Inflexible_, _Australia_, _New Zealand_, _Queen Mary_, _Princess Royal_, _Lion_, andthe _Tiger_. Their displacements ranged from 17, 250 to 28, 000 tons, andtheir speeds from 25 to 30 knots, the last being that of the _Tiger_. Their speed is their greatest feature, for their armament and batteriesare much lighter than those of the first-line ships. Next, there were ready thirty-four high-speed cruisers of quite lightarmament and armor. There were six of the _Cressy_ type, four of the_Drake_ type, nine of the same type as the _Kent_, six of the same classas the _Antrim_, six like the _Black Prince_, three of the same class asthe _Shannon_, together with seventeen heavily protected cruisers, ofwhich the _Edgar_ was the prototype. The rest of the British navy needsno detailed consideration. It consisted at the outbreak of the war of 70protected light cruisers, 134 destroyers, and a number of merchant shipsconvertible into war vessels, together with submarines and other smallships. The navy of France stood fourth in the list of those of the world powersat the time the war started. There were eighteen old vessels, builtbetween 1894 and 1909, including the _Carnot_ class (corresponding tothe British ship _Magnificent_), the _Charlemagne_, _Bouvet_, _Suffren_, _République_, and _Démocratie_ classes. The most modern of these typesdisplaced no more than 14, 000 tons, made no more than 18 knots, andcarried primary batteries of 12-inch guns. Some improvement was made in the six ships of the _Danton_ class whichwere built in 1911 and 1912. They displaced 18, 000 tons, had armor from9 to 12 inches thick and carried guns of 12-inch caliber. Theycorrespond to the British ship _Temeraire_. In 1913 and 1914 werelaunched the _Jean Bart_, _Courbet_, _Paris_, and _France_ of thedreadnought type, but much slower and not so heavily armed as theBritish ships of the same class. In eight ships which were incompletewhen war was declared the matter of speed received greater attention, and they are consequently faster than the older vessels of the sametype. It is in the nineteen French armored cruisers--France has nobattle cruisers--that the French showed better efforts as builders ofspeedy ships, for they made 23 knots or more. In the list of Frenchfighting ships there are in addition two protected cruisers, the_D'Entrecasteaux_ and the _Guichen_, together with ten light cruisers. But the French "mosquito fleet, " consisting of destroyers, torpedo boatsand submarines, is comparatively large. Of these she had 84, 135, and78, respectively. After the Russo-Japanese War the battle fleets of Russia were entirelydissipated, so that when the present conflict came she had no shipswhich might have been accounted worthy aids to the navies of England andFrance. In so far as is known, her heaviest ships were the _AndreiPervozvannyi_ and the _Imperator Pavel I_, each displacing only 17, 200tons, and of the design of 1911. Against these fighting naval forces of the allied powers were ranged thenavies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The former had, at the outbreakof hostilities, 36 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 9 armored cruisers, and 48 cruisers. Instead of giving attention to torpedo boats she gaveit to destroyers, of which she had 130. And of submarines she had 27. In detail her naval forces consisted, first, of the _Kaiser FriedrichIII_, _Kaiser Karl der Grosse_, _Kaiser Barbarossa_, _Kaiser WilhelmII_, and _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, all built as a result of the firstagitation of Von Tirpitz, between the years 1898 and 1901. They eachdisplaced 10, 614 tons, had a speed of 18 knots, required 13, 000horsepower, were protected with from 10 to 12 inches of armor, andcarried four 9. 4-inch guns, fourteen of 5. 9 inches, twelve of3. 4-inches, and twenty of smaller measurement. Roughly they correspondedto the British ships of the _Canopus_ class, both in design and time oflaunching. Following this class came that of the _Wittelsbach_, including also the_Wettin_, _Zähringen_, _Mecklenburg_, and _Schwaben_, built between 1901and 1903, displacing 11, 643 tons, making 18 knots, protected with from 9to 10 inches of armor and carrying a primary battery of four 9. 4-inchguns, eighteen 5. 9-inch guns, and a large secondary battery. The similartype in the British navy was the _Canopus_--for England was far ahead ofGermany, both in the matter of displacement and primary battery. Duringthe same years England had launched ships of the type of the_Implacable_. In 1904 came the German ships _Hessen_, _Elsass_, and _Braunschweig_, and in 1905 and 1906 the _Preussen_ and _Lothringen_. They were wellbehind the English ships of the same years, for they displaced only12, 097 tons, made 18 knots, carried armor of from 9 to 10 inches inthickness, and a primary battery of four 11-inch guns, fourteen 6. 7-inchguns, and twelve 3. 4-inch guns, together with rapid firers and otherguns in a secondary battery. England at this time was putting 12-inchguns in the primary battery of such ships as the _King Edward VII_. Still Germany kept up the race, and in 1906, 1907, and 1908 launched the_Hannover_, _Deutschland_, _Schlesien_, _Schleswig-Holstein_, and_Pommern_, with 12, 997 tons displacement, 16, 000 horsepower, a speed of18 knots, and only 11-inch guns in the primary batteries. WhereasEngland, at the same time, was building ships of the dreadnought type. Next came four ships of the _Vanguard_ class--the _Westfälen_, _Nassau_, _Rheinland_, and _Posen_, built in 1909 and 1910. Their heaviest gunsmeasured 11 inches, while those of the English ships of the same classmeasured 12 inches. The displacement of these German fighting ships was18, 600 tons. In point of speed they showed some improvement over theolder German ships, making 19. 5 knots. Germany, like England, was nowcommitted to the building of larger and larger ships of the line. The_Helgoland_, _Thüringen_, _Oldenburg_, and _Ostfriesland_, which wereput into the water in 1911 and 1912, were consequently of 22, 400 tonsdisplacement, with a speed of 20. 5 knots and carrying twelve 12-inchguns, fourteen 5. 9-inch rapid-fire guns, fourteen 3. 9-inch rapid-fireguns, a few smaller guns, and as many as six torpedo tubes. While England was maintaining her "two to three" policy, and while theUnited States stood committed to the building of two first-classbattleships a year, Germany, in 1913, put five of them into the water. These were the _König Albert_, _Prinz Regent Luitpold_, _Kaiserin_, _Kaiser_, and _Friedrich der Grosse_, each capable of speeding throughthe water at a rate of 21 knots, displacing 23, 310 tons and carrying anarmament of ten 12-inch guns, fourteen 5. 9-inch guns, and a large numberof rapid-fire guns of smaller measurement. Their armor was quite heavy, being 13 inches thick on the side and 11 inches thick where protectionfor the big guns was needed. The largest ships in the German navy which were launched, fitted, andmanned at the time that the war began, were those which were built in1914 and which had a displacement of 26, 575 tons. These ships were the_König_, _Grosser Kurfürst_, and the _Markgraf_. The corresponding typein the British navy was that of the _Iron Duke_, built in the same year. The British ships of this class were 1, 000 tons lighter in displacement, a bit faster--making 22. 5 knots to the 22 knots made by the Germanships--and their armament was not so strong as that of the German type, for the German ships carried ten 14-inch guns, whereas the Englishcarried ten 13. 5-inch guns. In addition to these first-class battleships, Germany had certainothers, individual in type, such as the _Von der Tann_, _Moltke_, _Goeben_, _Seydlitz_, _Derfflinger_, _Fürst Bismarck_, _Prinz Heinrich_, _Prinz Adalbert_, _Roon_ and _Yorck_, _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, _Blücher_, _Magdeburg_, _Strassburg_, _Breslau_, _Stralsund_, _Rostock_, and _Karlsruhe_. These may be reckoned as scout cruisers, for theyshowed much speed, the fastest making 30 knots and the slowest 19 knots. The oldest dates from 1900, and the newest from 1914. Germany had, also, thirty-nine more fast protected cruisers which were designed for scoutduty. In destroyers she was well equipped, having 143 ready for service whenwar was declared. Her twenty-seven submarines were of the most improvedtype, and much about their construction and armament she was able tokeep secret from the rest of the world. It is probable that even theirnumber was greater than the intelligence departments of foreign naviessuspected. The best type had a speed on the surface of 18 knots andcould travel at 12 knots when submerged. The type known as _E-21_, ofthe design of 1914, measured 213 feet 8 inches in length and had a beamof 20 feet. Austria, though not renowned for her naval strength, had certain unitswhich brought up the power of the Teutonic powers considerably. She hadnine first-class battleships, the _Erzherzog Karl_, _Erzherzog FerdinandMax_, _Erzherzog Friedrich_, _Zrinyi_, _Radetzky_, _Erzherzog FranzFerdinand_, _Teggethoff_, _Prinz Eugen_, and _Viribus Unitis_. These, atthe time Austria went to war, ranged in age from nine years to one year, and varied in displacement from 10, 000 tons to 20, 000 tons. The largestguns carried by any of them measured 12 inches, and the fastest, the_Prinz Eugen_, made 20 knots. Of secondary importance were thebattleships _Kaiserin Maria Theresia_, _Kaiser Karl VI_, and _St. Georg_. The register of battleships was supplemented with ten lightcruisers of exceptionally light displacement, the highest being only3, 966 tons. Scouting was their chief function. Austria had, also, 18destroyers, 63 torpedo boats, and 6 submarines. Such were the respective strengths of the opponents on that day in July, 1914, when the Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary lost his life. For tenyears the officers of the navy created by the German Admiral von Tirpitzhad at all dinners come to their feet, waved their wine glasses and hadgiven the famous toast "Der Tag"--to the day on which the English andGerman naval hosts would sally forth to do battle with each other. "DerTag" found both forces quite ready, though the British naval authoritiesstole a march on their German rivals in the matter of mobilization. It had been the custom for years in the British navy to assemble thegreater part of the British ships during the summer at the port ofSpithead, where, decorated with bunting, with flags flying, withvisitors in holiday spirit, and with officers and men in smart dress, the vessels were reviewed by the king on the royal yacht. But in the eventful year of 1914, perhaps by accident, perhaps bydesign, for the truth may never be known, the review had a differentaspect. There was no gaiety. The number of ships assembled this time wasgreater than ever before--216 actual fighting ships passed slowly beforethe royal yacht--there were no flags, no bunting, no holiday crowds, nosmart dress for officers and men. Instead, the fleet was drawn up readyfor battle, with decks cleared, guns uncovered, steam up, and magazinesreplenished. During the tense weeks in which the war clouds gatheredover southern Europe this great fighting force remained in the Britishhome waters, and when, at fifteen minutes after midnight on August 4, "Der Tag" had come, this fleet sailed under sealed orders. Andthroughout the seven seas there were sundry ships flying the Union Jackwhich immediately received orders by cable and by wireless. Of the disposition of the naval forces of Germany less was known. Hergreatest strength was concentrated in the North Sea, where the island ofHelgoland, the Gibraltar of the north, and the Kiel Canal with its exitsto the Baltic and North Seas, furnished excellently both as naval basesand impenetrable protection. Throughout the rest of the watery surfaceof the globe were eleven German warships, to which automatically fellthe task of protecting the thousands of ships which, flying the Germanred, white, and black, were carrying freight and passengers from portto port. The first naval movements in the Great War occurred on the morning ofAugust 5, 1914. The British ship _Drake_ cut two cables off the Azoreswhich connected Germany with North and South America, thus leaving theseeleven German fighting ships without communication with the Germanadmiralty direct. And the war was not a day old between England andGermany before the German ship _Königin Luise_ was caught sowing minesoff the eastern English ports by the British destroyer _Lance_. CHAPTER XXXIII FIRST BLOOD--BATTLE OF THE BIGHT The Germans had taken heed of the value of mines from lessons learned atthe cost of Russia in the war with Japan, and set about distributingthese engines of destruction throughout the North Sea. The Britishadmiralty knowing this, sent out a fleet of destroyers to scour homewaters in search of German mine layers. About ten o'clock on the morning of August 5, 1914, Captain Fox, onboard the _Amphion_, came up with a fishing boat which reported that ithad seen a boat "throwing things overboard" along the east coast. Aflotilla, consisting of the _Lance_, _Laurel_, _Lark_ and _Linnet_, setout in search of the stranger and soon found her. She was the _KöniginLuise_, and the things she was casting overboard were mines. The _Lance_fired a shot across her bow to stop her, but she put on extra speed andmade an attempt to escape. A chase followed; the gunners on the Britishship now fired to hit. The first of these shots carried away the bridgeof the German ship, a second shot missed, and a third and fourth hit herhull. Six minutes after the firing of the first shot her stern was shotaway, and she went to the bottom, bow up. Fifty of her 130 men werepicked up and brought to the English shore. The first naval blood of the Great War had been drawn by Britain onAugust 5, 1914. The _Königin Luise's_ efforts had not been in vain. Shehad posthumous revenge on the morning of August 6, when the _Amphion_, flagship of the third flotilla of destroyers, hit one of the mines whichthe German ship had sowed. It was seen immediately by her officers thatshe must sink; three minutes after her crew had left her there came asecond explosion, which, throwing débris aloft, brought about the deathof many of the British sailors in the small boats, as well as that of aGerman prisoner from the _Königin Luise_. All the world, with possibly the exception of the men in the Germanadmiralty, now looked for a great decisive battle "between the giants"in the North Sea. The British spoke of it as a coming second Trafalgar, but it was not to take place. For reasons of their own the Germans kepttheir larger and heavier ships within the protection of Helgoland andthe Kiel Canal, but their ships of smaller type immediately becameactive and left German shores to do what damage they might to theBritish navy. It was hoped, perhaps, that the naval forces of the twopowers could be equalized and a battle fought on even terms after theGermans had cut down British advantage by a policy of attrition. A flotilla of German submarines on August 9 attacked a cruiser belongingto the main British fleet, but was unable to inflict any damage. Thelord mayor of the city of Birmingham received the following telegram thenext morning: "Birmingham will be proud to learn that the first Germansubmarine destroyed in the war was sunk by H. M. S. _Birmingham_. " Twoshots from the British ship had struck the German _U-15_, and she sankimmediately. The German admiralty, even before England had declared war, suspectedthat the greatest use for the German navy in the months to come would beto fight the British navy, but they ventured to show their navalstrength against Russia beforehand. Early in August they sent the_Augsburg_ into the Baltic Sea to bombard the Russian port of Libau, butafter doing a good bit of damage the German ship retired. It is probablethat this raid was nothing more than a feint to remind Russia that shecontinually faced the danger of invasion from German troops landed onthe Baltic shores under the cover of German ships, and that she mustconsequently keep a large force on her northern shores instead ofsending it west to meet the German army on the border. Among the German ships which were separated from the main fleet in theNorth Sea, and which were left without direct communication with theGerman admiralty after the cutting of the cables off the Azores by the_Drake_, were the cruisers _Goeben_ and _Breslau_. When England declaredwar these two German ships were off the coast of Algeria. Both were veryfast vessels, having a speed of 28 knots, and they were designed to go6, 000 knots without needing replenishment of their coal bunkers. On the morning of August 5, after having bombarded some of the coastcities of Algeria they found themselves cut off on the east by a Frenchfleet and on the west by an English fleet, but by a very clever bit ofstratagem they escaped. The band of the _Goeben_ was placed on a raftand ordered on a given moment to play the German national airs after anappreciable period. Meanwhile, under the cover of the night's darknessthe two German ships steamed away. After they had a good start the bandon the raft began to play. The British patrols heard the airs andimmediately all British ships were searching for the source of themusic. To find a small raft in mid-sea was an impossible task, and whilethe enemy was engaged in it the two Germans headed for Messina, then aneutral port, which they reached successfully. The Italian authoritiespermitted them to remain there only twenty-four hours. Before leaving they took a dramatic farewell, which received publicityin the press of the whole world, and which was designed to lead theBritish fleet commanders to believe that the Germans were coming out todo battle. Instead, they headed for Constantinople. They escaped all theships of the British Mediterranean fleet with the exception of thecruiser _Gloucester_. With this ship they exchanged shots and were inturn slightly damaged, but they reached the Porte in seaworthycondition, and were immediately sold to the Turkish Government, whichwas then still neutral. The crews were sent to Germany and were warmlywelcomed at Berlin. The officers responsible for their escape weredisciplined by the British authorities. Both Germany and England, the former by means of the eleven ships atlarge, and the latter by means of her preponderance in the number ofships, now made great efforts to capture trading ships of the enemy. When England declared war there was issued a royal proclamation whichstated that up to midnight of August 14 England would permit Germanmerchantmen in British harbors to sail for home ports, provided Germanygave British merchantmen the same privilege, but it was specified thatships of over 5, 000 tons would not receive the privilege because theycould be converted into fighting ships afterward. But on the high seasenemy ships come upon were captured. The German admiralty on August 1 had issued orders to German merchantmento keep within neutral ports, and by this means such important ships asthe _Friedrich der Grosse_ and the _Grosser Kurfürst_ eluded capture. Inthe harbor of New York was the _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, a fast steamerof 23. 5 knots. She left New York on July 28 carrying a cargo of$10, 000, 000 in gold, and was on the high seas when England declared war. Naturally she was regarded by the British as a great prize, and thewhole world awaited from day to day the news of her capture, but hercaptain, showing great resourcefulness, after nearly reaching theBritish Isles, turned her prow westward, darkened all exterior lights, put canvas over the port holes and succeeded in reaching Bar Harbor, Me. , on the morning of August 5. Similarly the _Lusitania_ and the French liner _Lorraine_, leaving NewYork on August 5, were able to elude the German cruiser _Dresden_, whichwas performing the difficult task of trying to intercept merchantmenbelonging to the Allies as they sailed from America, while she waskeeping watch against warships flying the enemies' flags. Still moreimportant was the sailing from New York of the German liner _KaiserWilhelm der Grosse_. This ship had a speed of 22. 5 knots and adisplacement of 14, 349 tons. During the first week of the war shecleared the port of New York with what was believed to be a tradecargo, but she so soon afterward began harassing British trading shipsthat it was believed that she left port equipped as a vessel of war orfitted out as one in some other neutral port. The continued story of theGerman raids on allied trading ships must form a separate part of thisnarrative. It was only a month after the outbreak of hostilities thatthe fleets of the allied powers had swept clean the seven seas of allships flying German and Austrian flags which were engaged in trade andnot in warlike pursuits. The first naval battle of the Great War was fought on August 28, 1914. "A certain liveliness in the North Sea" was reported through the pressby the British admiralty on the 19th of August. Many of the smallervessels of the fleet of Admiral von Ingenohl, the German commander, suchas destroyers, light cruisers, and scouting cruisers, were sighted. Shots between these and English vessels of the same types were exchangedat long range, but a pitched battle did not come for still a week. Meanwhile the British navy had been doing its best to destroy the minefields established by the Germans. Trawlers were sent out in pairs, dragging between them large cables which cut the mines from thesea-bottom moorings: On being loosened they came to the surface and weredestroyed by shots from the trawlers' decks. On the 28th of August came the battle off the Bight of Helgoland. Theisland of Helgoland had been a British possession from 1807 till 1890, when it was transferred to Germany by treaty. It was seen immediately bythe Germans that it formed an excellent natural naval base, lying as itdoes, thirty-five miles northwest of Cuxhaven and forty-three milesnorth of Wilhelmshaven. They at once began to augment the naturalprotection it afforded with their own devices. Two Zeppelin sheds wereerected, concrete forts were built and 12-inch guns were installed. Thescene of the battle which took place here was the Bight of Helgoland, which formed a channel eighteen miles wide some seven miles north of theisland and near which lay the line of travel for ships leaving the portsof the Elbe. British submarines which had been doing reconnaissance work on theGerman coast since August 24 reported to the British commander, AdmiralJellicoe, that a large force of German light cruisers and smaller craftwere lying under the protection of the Helgoland guns, and heimmediately arranged plans for leading this force away from thatprotection in order to give it battle. Briefly the plans made providedthat three submarines were to proceed on the surface of the water towithin sight of the German ships and when chased by the latter were tohead westward. The light cruisers _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ weredetailed to run in behind any light German craft which were to followthe British submarines, endeavoring to cut them off from the Germancoast, and these two vessels were backed by a squadron of light cruisersheld in readiness should the first two need assistance. Squadrons ofcruisers and battle cruisers were detailed to stay in the rear, stillfurther to the northwest, to engage any German ships of their own classwhich might get that far. It was at midnight on August 26 that Commodore Keyes moved towardHelgoland with eight submarines accompanied by two destroyers. Duringthe next day--August 27--this force did nothing more than keep watch forGerman submarines and scouting craft, and then took up its allottedposition for the main action. The morning of the 28th broke misty andcalm. Under half steam three of the British submarines, the _E-6_, _E-7_, and _E-8_ steamed toward the island fortress, showing their hullsabove water and followed by the two detailed destroyers. The mist thickened. Still more slowly and cautiously went the Britishsubmersibles, and while they went above water, five of their sistercraft traveled under the surface. Here was the bait for the German shipsunder Helgoland's guns. Would they bite? The Germans soon gave the answer. First there crept out a Germandestroyer which took a good look at the situation and then gave wirelesssignals to some twenty more of her type, which soon came out to joinher. The twenty-one little and speedy German boats bravely came out andchased the two British destroyers and three submarines, while a Germanseaplane slowly circled upward to see if the surrounding regionsharbored enemies. Presumably the airman found what he sought for hesoon flew back to report to Helgoland. The peaceful aspect of the watersto the east of the island immediately changed, as a squadron of lightcruisers weighed anchor and put out after the retiring Britishers. Before a description of the fighting can be given it is necessary tounderstand the plan of the fight as a whole. Assuming that the page onwhich these words are printed represents a map of the North Sea and thatthe points of the compass are as they would be on an ordinary chart, wehave the island of Helgoland, half an inch long and a quarter of an inchwide, situated in the lower right-hand corner of this page, with abouthalf an inch separating its eastern side from the right edge of the pageand the same distance separating it from the bottom. The lower edge ofthe page may represent the adjoining coasts of Germany and Holland, andthe right-hand edge may represent the coast of the German province ofSchleswig and the coast of Denmark. At seven o'clock on the morning of August 28 the positions of thefighting forces were as follows: The decoy British submarines weremaking a track from Helgoland to the northwest, pursued by a flotilla ofGerman submarines, destroyers, and torpedo boats, and a fleet of lightcruisers. On the west--the left edge of the page, halfway up--there werethe British cruisers _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ accompanied by flotillas, and steaming eastward at a rate that brought them to the rear of theGerman squadron of light cruisers, thus cutting off the latter from thefortress. In the southwest--the lower left-hand corner of thepage--there was stationed a squadron of British cruisers, ready to closein when needed; in the northwest--the upper left-hand corner of thepage--there were stationed a squadron of British light cruisers andanother of battle cruisers, and it was toward these last two units thatthe decoys were leading the German fleets. The _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ felt the first shock of battle, on theside of the British. The German cruiser _Ariadne_ closed with theformer, while the latter soon found itself very busy with the Germancruiser _Strassburg_. For thirty-five minutes--before the _Fearless_drew the fire of the _Strassburg_--the two German vessels poured atelling fire into the _Arethusa_, and the latter was soon in badcondition, but she managed to hold out till succored by the _Fearless_, and then planted a shell against the _Ariadne_ which carried away herforebridge and killed her captain. The scouting which had been done bythe smaller craft of the German fleets showed their commanders thatthere were other British ships in the neighborhood besides the two theyhad first engaged, and it was thought wiser to withdraw in face ofpossible reenforcement of the British, consequently the _Strassburg_ and_Ariadne_ turned eastward to seek the protection of the fortress. The_Arethusa_, a boat that had been in commission but a week when thebattle was fought, was in a bad way; all but one of her guns were out ofaction, her water tank had been punctured and fire was raging on hermain deck amidships. The _Fearless_ passed her a cable at nine o'clockand towed her westward, away from the scene of action, while her crewmade what repairs they could. The flotillas of both sides had meanwhile been busy. At the head of thesquadron of German destroyers that came out of the waters behindHelgoland was the _V-187_. Without slacking speed she steamed straightfor the British destroyers, her small guns spitting rapidly, but she wasoutnumbered by British destroyers, which poured such an amount of steelinto her thin sides that she went under, her guns firing till theirmuzzles touched the water and her crew cheering as they went to theirdeaths. A few managed to keep afloat on wreckage, and during a lull inthe fighting, which lasted from nine o'clock till ten, boats werelowered from the British destroyers _Goshawk_ and _Defender_ to pick upthese stranded German sailors. The commanders of the German fleet, perceiving these small boats fromafar, thought that the British were resorting to the old principle ofboarding, and the German light cruiser _Mainz_ came out to fire uponthem. Two of the British small boats had to be abandoned as their motherships made off before the oncoming German. They were in a perilousposition, right beneath the guns of the fortress. But now a daring andunique rescue took place. The commander of the British submarine _E-4_had been watching the fighting through the periscope of his craft, andseeing the helpless position of the two small boats, he submerged, madetoward them, and then, to the great surprise of the men in them, came upright between them and took their occupants aboard his boat. Repairs had been made on the _Arethusa_ which enabled her to go intoaction again by ten o'clock. Accompanied again by two light cruisers often four-inch guns and the _Fearless_, she turned westward in answer tocalls for assistance from the destroyers _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_, which accompanied the submarines and which reported that they were beingchased by fast German cruisers. Suddenly the light cruiser _Strassburg_again came out of the mist and bore down on the British cruisers. Herlarger guns were too heavy and had too long a range for those of theBritish craft, and the latter immediately sent out calls which broughtinto action for the first time certain ships belonging to the squadronof British light cruisers, which had been stationed to thenorthwest--the upper left-hand corner of the page. The vessels which answered the calls were the light cruisers _Falmouth_and _Nottingham_ with eight eight-inch and nine six-inch gunsrespectively, but before arriving the _Strassburg_ still had time toinflict more damage on the _Arethusa_. The cruisers _Köln_ and _Mainz_joined the _Strassburg_, and the British vessels were having a bad timeof it when their commander ordered the _Fearless_ to concentrate allfire on the _Strassburg_. This, and a concentrated fire from thedestroyers, proved too strong for her and she turned eastward, disappearing in the mist off Helgoland. The _Mainz_ then received theattention of all available British guns, including the battle cruiser_Lion_, and soon fire broke out within her hold. Next her foremast, slowly tottering and then inclining more and more, crashed down upon herdeck, a distorted mass. Following that came down one of her funnels. Thefire which was raging aboard her was hampering her machinery, and herspeed slackened; the moment to strike with a torpedo had come, and oneof these "steel fishes" was sent against her hull below water. In theexplosion which followed one of her boilers came out through her deck, ascended some fifty feet and dropped down near her bow; her enginesstopped, and she began to settle slowly, her bow going down first. It was now noon. From behind the veil of the surrounding mist came the_Falmouth_ and _Nottingham_, which with the guns in their turretscompletely finished the hapless _Mainz_, and their sailors openlyadmired the bravery of her crew, which, while she sank, maintainedperfect order and sang the German national air. There was yet the _Köln_ with which the _Arethusa_ had to do battle. Butby now the heavy British battle cruisers _Lion_ and _Queen Mary_ hadalso come down from the northwest to take part in the fighting, andletting the _Arethusa_ escape from the range of the light cruiser_Köln_, they went for the German, which, overpowered, fled towardHelgoland. While the chase was on the _Ariadne_ again made herappearance and came to the aid of the _Köln_, but the light cruiser_Ariadne_ carried no gun as effective in destructive power as the13. 5-inch guns of the _Lion_, and she, too, had to seek safety inflight. The British ships then finished the _Köln_; so badly was she hitthat when the British small boats sought the spot where she quickly sankthey found not a man of her crew afloat. Every man of the 370 of hercrew perished. The afternoon came, and with its advent the mist, which had kept theguns of Helgoland's forts out of action, had cleared off the calm watersof the North Sea. By the time the sun had set only floating wreckagegave evidence that here brave men had fought and died. By evening therespective forces were in their home ports, being treated for theirhurts. The Germans had lost the _Mainz_, _Köln_, and _Ariadne_, and the_Strassburg_ had limped home. The loss in destroyers and other smallcraft in addition to that of the _V-187_ was not known. The loss on theBritish side had not entailed that of a large ship, but the _Arethusa_when she returned to her home port was far from being in good condition, and some of the smaller boats were in the same circumstances. Admiral von Ingenohl was committed more strongly than ever, as a resultof this engagement, to the belief that the best policy for his commandwould be to keep his squadrons within the protection afforded byHelgoland and that the most damage could be done to the enemy by pickingoff her larger ships one by one. In other words, he again turned to thepolicy of attrition. He immediately put it into force. On the 3d of September the British gunboat _Speedy_ struck a mine in theNorth Sea and went down. It was only two days later that the lightcruiser _Pathfinder_ was made the true target of a torpedo fired by aGerman submarine off the British eastern coast, and she, too, went tothe bottom. But the British immediately retaliated, for the submarine_E-9_ sighted the German light cruiser _Hela_ weathering a bad storm onSeptember 13 between Helgoland and the Frisian coast. A torpedo waslaunched and found its mark, and the _Hela_ joined the _Köln_ and_Mainz_. Up to this point the results of attrition were even, but theGermans scored heavily during the following week. On September 22 the three slow British cruisers _Cressy_, _Hogue_, and_Aboukir_ were patrolling the waters off the Dutch coast, unaccompaniedby small craft of any kind, when suddenly, at half past six in themorning, the _Aboukir_ crumpled and sank, the victim of anothersubmarine attack. But the commander of the _Hogue_ thought she had beensunk by hitting a mine, and innocently approached the spot of thedisaster to rescue such of the crew of the _Aboukir_ as were afloat. Thework of mercy was never completed, for the _Hogue_ itself was hit by twotorpedoes in the next few moments, and she joined her sister ship. Thecommander of the _Cressy_, failing to take a lesson from what he hadwitnessed, now approached, and his ship was also hit by two torpedoes, making the third victim of the German policy of attrition within anhour, and Captain Lieutenant von Weddigen, commander of the _U-9_, whichhad done this work, immediately became a German hero. CHAPTER XXXIV BATTLES ON THREE SEAS So stood the score in the naval warfare in the North Sea at the end ofthe second month of the Great War. But while these events were takingplace in the waters of Europe, others of equal import had been takingplace in the waters of Asia. On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war onGermany and immediately set about scouring the East for German craft ofall kinds. Japan brought to the naval strength of the Allied powers no mean unit. Hers was the only navy in the world which had seen the ultramodernbattleships in action; the Russian navy which had had the sameexperience was no more. Eight of her first-class battleships were, atthe time of her entrance into the Great War, veterans of the war withRussia. The _Fugi_, _Asahi_, _Kikasa_, and _Shikishima_ had gone intothe former war as Japanese ships, and the remaining four had gone intoit as Russian ships, but had been captured by the Japanese. These werethe _Hizen_, _Sagami_, _Suwo_, and _Iwami_. Their value was not great, for the _Fugi_ had been launched as far back as 1896. Nevertheless shecarried 12-inch guns and displaced 12, 300 tons. But her speed was only17 knots at the most. She had been built in England as had the _Asahi_and _Shikishima_, which were launched in 1900 and 1901. They alsocarried 12-inch guns and had a speed of 18. 5 knots. Their tonnage was15, 000. Admiral Togo's former flagship, the _Mikasa_, was also of thepredreadnought type, having been built in 1900, and carrying a mainbattery of 12-inch guns. Her speed was 18. 5 knots. Of the former Russian ships the rechristened _Iwami_ was of Frenchbuild, protected with Krupp steel armor to the thickness of 7. 5 inches. Her displacement was 13, 600 tons, and her speed 18 knots. Like the otherships of this class in the Japanese navy, she carried a main battery of12-inch guns. The _Hizen_ was an American product, having been built byCramps in 1902. Her displacement was 12, 700 tons, made a speed of 18. 5knots, was also protected with Krupp steel and carried four 10-inchguns. She was a real veteran, for she had undergone repairs necessitatedby having been torpedoed off Port Arthur and had been refloated afterbeing sunk in later action there. The _Sagami_ and the _Suwo_ had beenbuilt in 1901 and 1902. They displaced 13, 500 tons, had a speed of 18. 5knots, and carried as their heaviest armament 10-inch guns. In addition to these eight ships Japan had also nine protected cruisers, all of the same type and all veterans of the war with Russia. They wereof such strength and endurance that the Japanese admiralty rated themcapable of taking places in the first line of battle. These were the_Nisshin_ and _Kasuga_, purchased from Italy and built in 1904, displacing 7, 700 tons, and making a speed of 22 knots; the _Aso_, Frenchbuilt and captured from the Russians, and of the same design andmeasurements as the other two; and the protected cruisers _Yakumo_, _Asama_, _Idzumo_, _Tokiwa_, _Aguma_, and _Iwate_, built before the warwith Russia, slightly heavier than their sister ships but not as fast. None of this type has been added to the Japanese navy since 1907. Japanhas, instead, given attention to scouting cruisers, with the result thatshe possessed three excellent vessels of this class, the _Yahagi_, _Chikuma_, and _Hirato_, with the good speed of 26 knots and displacing5, 000 tons. They were built in 1912. And not so efficient were the otherships of similar design, the _Soya_, built in America, _Tone_ and_Tsugaru_. The veteran Japanese navy was supplemented with 52 destroyers and 15submarines, all built since the war with Russia, and a number of heaviervessels. Among the latter were the first-class battleships _Kashima_ and_Katori_, completed in 1906, and displacing 16, 400 tons. Their heavyguns measured 12 inches, and they made a speed of 19. 5 knots. There werealso the vessels _Ikoma_ and _Tsukuba_, individual in type, withcorresponding kinds in no other navy, and which might be called a crossbetween an armored cruiser and battle cruiser. Though displacing no morethan 13, 766 tons, they carried four 12-inch guns, and made thecomparatively low speed of 20. 5 knots. In 1909 and 1910 the Japaneseadded two more ships of this kind to their navy, the _Ibuki_ and_Kurama_, slightly heavier and faster and with the same armament. The dreadnought _Satsuma_ also came in 1910--a vessel displacing 19, 400tons, but making a speed of only 18. 2 knots, and with an extraordinarilyheavy main battery consisting of four 12-inch guns and twelve 10-inchguns. The _Aki_, launched in 1911, was 400 tons heavier than the_Satsuma_, and was more than 2 knots faster, and her main battery wasequally strong. The dreadnoughts _Settsu_ and _Kawachi_, completed in1913 and 1912 respectively, displaced 21, 420 tons, but were able to makenot more than 20 knots. At this time the Japanese admiralty, perhaps onaccount of lessons learned in the war with Russia, was buildingdreadnoughts with less speed than those in the other navies, but withmuch heavier main batteries. These two vessels carried a unique mainbattery of twelve 12-inch guns, along with others of smallermeasurement. What the dreadnoughts lacked in speed was made up in thatof four battle cruisers launched after 1912. These were the _Kirishima_, _Kongo_, _Hi-Yei_, and _Haruna_, with the good speed of 28 knots. Theirdisplacement was 27, 500 tons, and they carried in their primarybatteries eight 14-inch guns and sixteen 6-inch guns. At the time Japan entered the war she had in building foursuperdreadnoughts with the tremendous displacement of 30, 600 tons. Thesevessels, the _Mitsubishi_, _Yukosaka_, _Kure_, and _Kawasaki_, had beendesigned to carry a main battery of the strength of the U. S. S. _Pennsylvania_, and to have a speed of 22. 5 knots. The first move of the Japanese navy in the Great War was to cooperatewith the army in besieging the German town of Kiaochaw on the ShantungPeninsula in China, but the operation was soon more military than naval. Japanese warships captured Bonham Island in the group known as theMarshall Islands, and, having cleared eastern waters of German warships, scoured the Pacific in such a manner as to chase those which escapedinto the regions patrolled by the British navy. The German vessels which made their escape were among the eleven whichwere separated from the rest of Germany's navy in the North Sea at theoutbreak of hostilities. They were, with the exception of the_Dresden_, the _Leipzig_, _Nürnberg_, _Scharnhorst_, and _Gneisenau_. Itwas weeks before they were first reported--on September 22 at the harborof Papeete, where they destroyed the French gunboat _Zelie_, and afterputting again to sea their location was once more a mystery. On the evening of November 1 a British squadron consisting of thevessels _Good Hope_, _Otranto_, _Glasgow_, and _Monmouth_, all exceptthe _Good Hope_ coming through the straits, sighted the enemy. TheBritish ships lined up abreast and proceeded in a northeasterlydirection. The Germans took up the same alignment eight miles to thewestward of the British ships and proceeded southward at full speed. Both forces opened fire at a distance of 12, 000 yards shortly after sixo'clock off Coronel near the coast of Chile. The _Gneisenau_ was struckby a 9. 2-inch shot from the _Good Hope_. The _Scharnhorst_ and_Gneisenau_ picked the _Good Hope_ as their first target, but findingthat they could do no damage at that range and that they were safe fromthe fire of the British ship, they came to within 6, 000 yards of her. Her fire in reply was augmented by that of the _Monmouth_. Excellent aimon the part of the Germans soon had the _Good Hope_ out of action, andfire broke out aboard her. Soon after general action her magazineexploded. The _Monmouth_ then received the brunt of the fire from the Germanships, and came in for more than her share of the destructive fire, being put virtually out of action, and at the same time there occurredan explosion on board the _Good Hope_ and she sank immediately, carryingAdmiral Cradock to his death. There remained of the British force only the _Otranto_--a convertedliner and not really a battleship of the line--the _Glasgow_ and thehopelessly disabled _Monmouth_ to continue the fight with an efficientGerman force. The British commander ordered the former two to get awayby making speed, but the officer in charge of the _Glasgow_, paying noheed to the order, kept in the fight. [Illustration: The famous German raider "Emden" beached on one of theCocos Islands after being wrecked by the "Sydney's" shells. ] Dusk was then coming on and the _Glasgow_ sought to take advantage of itby getting between the German ships and the limping _Monmouth_, concealing the latter from them with her smoke. But the Germans had nowcome to within 4, 500 yards. To escape possible attack from torpedoesthe German ships spread out their line, but perceiving that such adanger was not present, they again closed in to finish the crippledBritish ships. All of the German ships now went for the _Glasgow_, andshe had to desert the _Monmouth_, which first sailed northward, in badcondition, and later made an attempt to run ashore at Santa Maria, butwas unable to do so. The inevitable "if" played its part in the battle. When the Britishfleet first went after the Germans it had as one of its units thebattleship _Canopus_. But her speed was not up to that of the otherships, and she fell far to their stern. By the time the action was onshe was too distant to take part in it. No attempt was made to gotogether owing to the slowness of the battleship. The _Canopus_ wasnever in the action at all, being 150 miles astern. Had Cradock notdesired to he need not have taken on the action but retired in the_Canopus_. The setting of the sun also played its part; if daylight hadcontinued some hours more the British squadron might have held out tillthe _Canopus_ brought up, for the almost horizontal rays of the sun werein the eyes of the German gunners. But as it dropped below the wateryhorizon it left the British ships silhouetted against a clear outline. The _Canopus_ did not get into the fight, and the greatest concern ofthe _Glasgow_ as she steamed off was to warn the British battleship tokeep off, for of less speed than the German ships, and outnumbered bythem, her appearance meant her destruction. The _Glasgow_, later joinedby the _Canopus_, arrived in battered condition at the Falkland Islands. The _Monmouth_, after the main action was over, was found and finishedby the German squadron and went down. Seventy shots were fired at herwhen she lay sinking, on fire and helpless, and unable to fire her guns. Germany had evened the score in the second battle between fleets. The _Dresden_ after the Falkland action took refuge in Fiordes of Terradel Fuego and after being there for a couple of months proceeded to thehead of the Island of Juan Fernandez where she was found by the_Glasgow_, _Kent_ and auxiliary cruiser _Orama_ and was destroyed. Most remarkable had been the career of the German third-class cruiser_Nürnberg_, which had joined the other German ships that went to make upthe German squadron which fought in this battle off Coronel. Thisvessel, on the day after Germany and England went to war, was lying nearYap, an island in the Pacific, that had been, until captured by theJapanese, the wireless station of most importance to the Germans in thePacific Ocean. She immediately, after being apprised that she was partof a navy engaged in a war, set sail and was not reported again untilthe 7th of September, when she appeared at Fanning Island, a cablestation maintained by Britain, and from which cables run to Vancouver tothe east and Australia to the west. Here she hid her identity byentering the harbor flying the tricolor of France and appearing asthough she was making a friendly visit. Officials on the island, happyto think they would have such a visitor, saw two cutters leave thewarship. Great was the surprise of those watching events from the shore when theysaw the French flag lowered from the masthead of the visitor and in itsplace the German naval ensign run up. The cutters were just aboutreaching knee-deep water at the shore when this surprise came, and itwas augmented when, with the protection of the guns of the vessel, themen in these cutters showed themselves to be a hostile landing party. Her presence was not reported to the rest of the world for the goodreason that she cut all cables leading from the island. All the Britishmen there were put under guard, and after damaging all cable instrumentsshe could find, the _Nürnberg_, accompanied by a collier that had comewith her, again took to the high seas. She next turned up at the island of St. Felix, 300 miles west of theChilean coast, but did not come to the harbor. During the night ofOctober 14 the inhabitants of that island saw the flash and heard theroar of an explosion miles out to sea, and for a number of days laterthey picked up on their beach the wreckage of what must have been acollier. As has been related in preceding paragraphs, the _Nürnberg_took part in that fight. The end of her career came in the battle offthe Falkland Islands, which will be dealt with later. CHAPTER XXXV THE GERMAN SEA RAIDERS While British men-o'-war were capturing German merchantmen and takingthem to British ports, the German raiders which were abroad were earningterrifying reputations for themselves because the enemy merchantmen withwhich they came upon had to be destroyed on the high seas, for therewere no ports to which they could be taken. Prominent among these wasthe _Königsberg_, a third-class cruiser. When the war came she was inAsiatic waters and immediately made the east coast of Africa her "beat. "While patrolling it she came upon two British merchant ships, and aftertaking from their stores such supplies as were needed she sent them tothe bottom. On September 20, 1914, she made a dash into the harbor ofZanzibar and found there the British cruiser _Pegasus_, which on accountof her age was undergoing a complete overhauling. She was easy prey forthe German ship, for besides the fact that she was stationary her gunswere of shorter range than those of her adversary. Shell after shelltore into her till she was battered beyond all resemblance to a fightingcraft. But her flag flew till the end, for though it was shot down fromthe masthead, two marines held it aloft, one of them losing his life. And when the _Königsberg_, her task of destruction complete, sailed off, the lone marine still held up the Union Jack. The British ships in thosewaters made a systematic hunt for her and located her at last, on the30th of October. She was hiding in her favorite rendezvous, some milesup the Rufigi River in German East Africa. The ship which found her wasthe _Chatham_, a second-class cruiser, with a draft much heavier thanthat of the _Königsberg_, and the difference gave the latter a goodadvantage, for she ran up the river and her enemy could not follow. Norcould the English ship use her guns with much effect, for the gunnerscould not make out the hull of the German ship through the tropicalvegetation along the river banks. All that the British ship could dowas to fire shells in her general direction and then guess what effectthey had. But to prevent her escape, colliers were sunk at the mouth ofthe river. She had come to as inglorious an end as her victim, the_Pegasus_. The account of another raider, the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, which left NewYork on the evening that England declared war, with her bunkers loadedwith coal and other supplies for warships, has already been related. Themystery concerning this sailing was cleared up when she was caughtcoaling the _Karlsruhe_ in the Atlantic. Both ships made off in safetythat time, and soon after a British cruiser reported that she had beenheard in wireless communication with the _Dresden_. Thereafter the fateof this ship remained a mystery till she put in at Hampton Roads onApril 11, 1915. Most spectacular was the career of the _Emden_, a third-class cruiser, which sailed from Japanese waters at the same time as the _Königsberg_. Through the ability of her commander, Captain Karl von Müller, sheearned the soubriquet "Terror of the East, " for by using a clever systemof supply ships she was able to raid eastern waters for ten weekswithout making a port or otherwise running the risk of leaving a clue bywhich British ships might find her. Her favorite occupation was that ofstopping enemy merchantmen which she sank. But her captain alwaysallowed one--the last one--of her prizes to remain afloat, and in thishe sent to the nearest port the officers, passengers, and crews of thosethat were destroyed. At times he used prizes as colliers, putting themunder command of his petty officers. By way of diversion, Captain von Müller steamed into the harbor ofMadras in the Bay of Bengal and opened with his guns on the suburbs ofthe town, setting on fire two huge oil tanks there. The fort therereturned the fire, but the _Emden_ after half an hour sailed awayunharmed. She had been enabled to come near the British guns on shore byflying the French flag, which she continued to display until her gunsbegan to boom. She then left the waters of Bengal Bay, but not beforeshe had ended the journey of $30, 000, 000 worth of exports to India, andhad sent to the bottom of the sea some $15, 000, 000 worth of imports. Twenty-one steamers had been her victims, their total value having beenabout $3, 250, 000, and their cargoes were worth at least $15, 000, 000. Very expensive the British found her, and they were willing to go to anylength to end her career. They curtailed her activities somewhat whenthe _Yarmouth_ captured the converted liner _Markomannia_, which was oneof her colliers, and recaptured the Greek freighter _Pontoporos_, whichhad been doing the same duty. This took place off the coast of Sumatra. But Von Müller was undaunted, even though his coal problem was becomingserious. He knew that the _Yarmouth_ had sailed from Penang near Malaccaand that she was not at that base, since she was searching for his ownvessel. He therefore conceived the daring exploit of making a visit toPenang while the _Yarmouth_ was still away. He came within ten miles ofthe harbor on the 28th of October, and disguised his ship by erecting afalse funnel made of canvas upheld by a wooden frame, much liketheatrical scenery. This gave the _Emden_ four funnels, such as the_Yarmouth_ carried. Coming into the harbor in the twilight of the dawn, she was taken by those on shore to be the British ship, not a hostilegun ready for her. Lying in the harbor was the Russian cruiser _Jemchug_ and three Frenchdestroyers and a gunboat. The watch on the Russian ship questioned her, and was told by the wireless operator on the _Emden_ that she was the_Yarmouth_ returning to anchor. By this ruse the German ship was enabledto come within 600 yards of the Russian ship before the false funnel wasdiscovered. Fire immediately spurted from the Russian guns, but atorpedo from the _Emden_ struck the _Jemchug's_ engine room and made itimpossible for her crew to get ammunition to her guns. Von Müller pouredsteel into her from a distance of 250 yards with terrible effect. TheRussian ship's list put many of her guns out of action, and she wasunable to deliver an effective reply. Another torpedo from the _Emden_exploded her magazine. Fifteen minutes after the firing of the firstshot the Russian had gone to the bottom. Von Müller now put the prow of the _Emden_ to sea again, for he fearedthat both the _Yarmouth_ and the French cruiser _Dupleix_ had by thenbeen summoned by wireless. Luck was with him. Half an hour after leavingthe harbor he sighted a ship flying a red flag, which showed him at oncethat she was carrying a cargo of powder. He badly needed the ammunition, and he prepared to capture her. But this operation was interrupted by amirage, which caused the small French destroyer _Mosquet_ to appear likea huge battleship. When he discovered the truth, Von Müller closed withthe Frenchman, who came to the rescue of the _Glenturret_, the powdership. Destroyer and cruiser closed for a fight, the former trying to getclose enough to make work with torpedoes possible, but the long range ofthe _Emden's_ guns prevented this, and the _Mosquet_ was badly damagedby having her engine room hit. Soon she was in a bad way, and Von Müllerordered his guns silenced, thinking the destroyer would now give up thefight. But the Frenchman was valiant and refused to do so; he let gowith two torpedoes which did not find their mark, and was immediatelysubjected to a withering fire, which caused his ship to sink, bow first. One of the destroyers which had been in the harbor now came out to takeissue with the _Emden_, but it was the business of the latter tocontinue destroying merchant ships and not to run the risk of having hercareer ended by a warship, so she immediately put off for the IndianOcean. A storm which then came up permitted her to make a better escape. It was not until the 9th of November that the world at large heard moreof her, and it proved to be the last day of her reign of terror. Therewas a British wireless and cable station on the Cocos (Keeling) Isles, southwest of Java, and Von Müller had determined to interrupt thecommunication maintained there connecting India, Australia, and SouthAfrica. Forty men and three officers, with three machine guns, weredetailed by him as a landing party to destroy instruments and cut thecables. But such a thing had been partially forestalled by the Britishauthorities, who had set up false cable ends. These were destroyed bythe deceived Germans. When the _Emden_ had first made her appearance thenews had been sent out by the wireless operator on shore, not knowingwhat ships would pick up his calls. This time luck was against Von Müller, for it so happened that a convoyof troop ships from Australia was passing within one hundred miles. Theywere accompanied by the Australian cruisers _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_. The latter was dispatched to go to the Cocos Islands, and by getting upa speed of 26 knots she reached them in less than three hours. VonMüller knew that escape by flight was impossible, for his ship had beenweeks at sea; her boilers were crusted, her machinery badly in need ofrepair, and she had not too much coal. He therefore decided to givebattle, and went straight for the _Sydney_ at full speed. His object wasto meet her on even terms, for her advantage was that her guns had muchgreater range than those of the _Emden_. If he could get close enough hemight be able to use his torpedo tubes. But Captain Glossop of the_Sydney_ saw through this maneuver and maintained good distance betweenthe two ships. About the first shot from the _Emden_ killed the man atthe range finder on the fore bridge of the _Sydney_. Captain Glossop wasstanding within a few feet of him at the time. The replies from the Australian ship were fatal. The foremost funnel ofthe _Emden_ crumpled and fell; her fire almost ceased, and then shebegan to burn; the second funnel and the third fell also; there wasnothing left but to beach her, which Von Müller did, just before noon. While she lay there helpless the _Sydney_ shot more steel into her, leaving her quite helpless, and then went off to chase a merchant shipwhich had been sighted during the fighting and which, when caught, proved to be the British ship _Buresk_, now manned by Germans and doingduty as collier to the _Emden_. Returning to the latter, Captain Glossopsaw that she still flew the German flag at her masthead. He signaledher, asking whether she would surrender, but receiving no reply afterwaiting five minutes he let her have a few more salvos. The German flagcame down and the white flag went up in its place. The _Jemchug_ hadbeen avenged, and the terribly costly career of the _Emden_ brought toan end. Von Müller was taken prisoner, and on account of his valor waspermitted to keep his sword. But the landing party, which had cut thefalse cables, was still at large. The adventures of these three officersand forty men form a separate story, which will be narrated later. CHAPTER XXXVI BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS The defeat of the British squadron back in the first week of Novemberhad sorely tried the patience of the British public, and the admiraltyfelt the necessity of retrieving faith in the navy. Von Spee was stillmaster of the waters near the Horn, and till his ships had again beenmet the British could not boast of being rulers of the waves. Consequently Admiral Fisher detailed the two battle cruisers_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ to go to the Falkland Islands. They leftEngland November 11, 1914, and on the outward journey met with and tookalong the light cruisers _Carnarvon_, _Kent_, and _Cornwall_, thesecond-class cruiser _Bristol_, and the converted liner _Macedonia_. The_Canopus_ and the _Glasgow_, now repaired, all joined the squadron, which was commanded by Admiral Sturdee. The vessels coaled at Stanley, Falkland Islands, and while so engaged on December 8 were warned by acivilian volunteer watcher on a near-by hill that two strange vesselshad made their appearance in the distance. British naval officersidentified them and other vessels which were coming into view as theships of Von Spee's squadron, the one which had been victorious offCoronel. During the interval that had elapsed since that engagement these Germanships had not been idle. Von Spee knew that the _Glasgow_ had gone tothe Falklands and that there were important wireless stations there, buthe put off going after those prizes and picked up others. The _Nürnberg_had cut communication between Banfield and Fanning Islands. Two Britishtrading ships had fallen victims to the _Dresden_, and four more hadmet the same end at the hands of the _Leipzig_. For coal and othersupplies Von Spee had been relying on the Chilean ports, but now cametrouble between him and the port authorities, for England was accusingthe South American nation of acting without regard to neutrality. It wasfor this reason that Von Spee turned southward to take the FalklandIslands. The world at large, and of course Von Spee, had no knowledge ofthe ships which had set out from Plymouth for the Falklands on theeleventh of the month, so he approached in full expectation of makingnot only a raid but for occupation. He knew that he would have toexchange shots with the _Glasgow_ and perhaps some small ships, and hebelieved the islands weakly defended by forts, but there was nothing inthat to defer his attack. The result--the lookout near Stanley hadreported the oncoming warships _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, followedby the rest of the German squadron. German guns were trained on thewireless station, and great was the surprise of the unfortunate Von Speeand his officers when there was heard the booming of guns which theyknew immediately must be mounted on warships larger than their own. Their scouting had been defective, and the presence of the _Inflexible_and _Invincible_ had till then not been discovered. They then reasonedthat these were the guns of the _Canopus_--a critical and fatal error. The _Canopus_ from behind the hills fired on the German ships in anendeavor to protect the wireless station. Beyond the range of her gunshovered the lighter German cruisers _Dresden_, _Leipzig_, and _Nürnberg_to await the outcoming of the _Glasgow_. Both the _Gneisenau_ and_Scharnhorst_ concentrated their fire on the _Canopus_, and when the_Glasgow_, accompanied by the _Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, and _Kent_, madeher appearance it did not change the battle formation of the Germans, for the _Canopus_ was still the only large vessel they were aware of. Now the _Leipzig_ came nearer in order to take up the fight with thelighter British ships. By nine in the morning the German ships weredrawn out in single file, running parallel with the shore in anortheasterly direction. At the head of the line was the _Gneisenau_, followed by the _Dresden_, _Scharnhorst_, _Nürnberg_, and _Leipzig_, inthat order. They thought that this would entice what they believed to bethe whole of the British force present into coming out for a runningfight, and in which the old _Canopus_ would be left behind to befinished after the lighter vessels were done for. But all this time the_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ were silent with their guns, though therewas bustle enough aboard them while their coaling was being hurried. By ten o'clock these two larger ships were ready with steam up and deckscleared, and they came out from behind the hill. Von Spee saw thatdiscretion was the better part of valor and gave orders for his ships tomake off at full speed. For a time the two squadrons kept parallel toeach other at a distance of twelve miles, with the British squadron--the_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ leading--north of the German ships. The_Baden_ and _Santa Isabel_, two transports that had been part of theGerman squadron, were unable to keep up with the others and headedsouth, pursued by the _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_. The two British battlecruisers were faster than any other ships in either squadron, and whilepulling up on the German ships were in danger of pulling away from theirown ships. To avoid the latter, Admiral Sturdee kept down their speedand was content with taking a little longer to get within gun range ofVon Spee's ships. By two o'clock the distance between them was about16, 000 yards; the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had now left the rest ofthe British squadron far behind and took issue with the _Scharnhorst_and _Gneisenau_ respectively. The remaining British ships, with theexception of the _Carnarvon_, gave attention to the three lighter Germancruisers and the _Eitel Friedrich_, which had broken from the firstformation and were now pointing southeast. Von Spee ordered the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ to turn broadside tothe enemy. Shells were falling upon the German ships with fair accuracy, but their return fire could do little damage to the British ships, because the range was a little too great for the German 8. 2-inch guns. Those of the _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were of the 12-inch type. All four ships were belching forth heavy black smoke that hung low overthe water after it left the funnels. A moderate breeze carried itnorthward, and Von Spee moved his ships this way and that till his smokeblew straight against the guns of the British ships, making it almostimpossible for the British gunners to take aim and note effect. But thesuperior speed of the two British battle cruisers stood them in goodstead, and their commanders brought them up south of the enemy--on theirother side. It was now the German gunners who found the smoke in theirfaces, and the advantage was with the British. By three o'clock in the afternoon fire had broken out on the_Scharnhorst_ and Von Spee replied to Sturdee's inquiry that he wouldnot quit fighting, though some of his guns were out of action and thosewhich still replied to the Britisher did now only at intervals. Therewas evidently something wrong with the machinery that brought shells andammunition to her guns from out of her hold, the fire probablyinterfering with it. A 12-inch shell cut right through her third funneland carried it completely off the ship. She turned so that she couldbring her starboard guns into action, and they did so feebly. The fireon board her grew worse and worse, and it could be seen blood-redthrough holes made by the shells from the _Invincible_ whenever her hullshowed through the dense clouds of escaping steam that enveloped her. Just at four o'clock she began to list to port, thus having herstarboard guns put out of action, for they pointed toward the sky, andthe shells which came from them described parabolas, dropping into thewater at safe distance from the English ship. More and more she listed, till her port beam ends were in the cold waters of the South Atlantic, and while in that position she sank some fifteen minutes later. Meanwhile the duel between the _Gneisenau_ and _Inflexible_ had beengoing on. A 12-inch shell from one of the British cruisers struck one ofthe after gun turrets of the _Gneisenau_ and swept it overboard. TheGerman ship used the sinking _Scharnhorst_ as a screen and tried to takeon both British ships. Still she was able to plant some effective shellsagainst the _Invincible_ as a final reply. By half-past five she waslisting heavily to starboard and her engines had stopped. The Britishship, thinking she was surely done for, ceased firing at her and watchedher for ten minutes, while a single gun on board of her fired atintervals. The three ships _Carnarvon_, _Inflexible_, and _Invincible_now closed in on her and punished her till the flag at her stern washauled down. But the ensign at her peak continued to fly. Just at sixo'clock, with this color still in position, she suddenly heeled tostarboard, while the men of her crew made hastily up her slanting decksand then climbed over on to the exposed part of her upturned port side. Many of these unfortunate men had time to jump into the sea, but otherswere caught when she suddenly disappeared beneath the surface. There remained the task of picking up her survivors, but they were notnumerous, for the shock of the cold water killed a large number. Havingpicked up those whom they could, the three British ships signaled thenews of their victories to the distant cruisers which were fighting itout with the _Dresden_, _Leipzig_, _Nürnberg_, and _Eitel Friedrich_. These lighter German cruisers had left the line of battle and had turnedsouthward at just about the time that the action between the_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ and _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ began. They started off with the _Dresden_ at the foremost point of a triangleand with the other two at the two remaining points. The _Glasgow_, _Cornwall_, and _Kent_ went after them, while the _Carnarvon_, becauseher speed was not high enough to accompany them, remained with thebattle cruisers. The _Glasgow_ drew up with the German ships first, andat three o'clock began to fire on the _Leipzig_ at a distance of 12, 000yards. As in the other action of that afternoon, the British ship tookadvantage of the fact that her guns had longer range, and she drew backfrom the German ships so that their guns could not reach her, though herown shells began to fall upon their decks. It was her object to keepthem busy until she could be joined by her accompanying ships. [Illustration: Plan--Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Surdee's Action off theFalkland Islands. Dec 8, 1914. ] The _Cornwall_ by four o'clock was also near enough to the _Leipzig_ toopen fire on her, and three hours later the German cruiser was having atime of it with a large fire in her hold. British faith in heavyarmament with long range had again been vindicated. There was somethingof human interest in this duel between the _Glasgow_ and the_Leipzig_. In their previous meeting, off Coronel, the German ship hadhad all the better of it and now the men of the British ship were outfor revenge. Consequently the _Glasgow_ signaled to the other Britishships: "Stand off--I can manage this myself!" By eight o'clock in theevening the _Glasgow_ had her in bad condition, and the _Carnarvon_ cameup to assist in raking her till there was nothing left but a mass ofwreckage on her decks. But her flag was still flying and the Britishships kept circling around her, thinking she still wished to fight, butnot coming near enough to permit the use of her torpedo tubes. Miserablewas the plight of the _Leipzig's_ crew, for the two hundred men who werestill alive were unable to get to her flag on account of the fire aboardher, and they had to remain inactive while the _Carnarvon_ and _Glasgow_poured round after round into their ship. Only twelve remained alive atnine o'clock, when she began to list to port. Slowly more and more ofthe under-water part of her hull showed above the sea, and she continuedto heel until her keel was right side up. In this position she sank, alarge bubble marking the spot. When the _Nürnberg_ left the line of German ships at one o'clock, it wasthe British cruiser _Kent_ that went after her, a vessel more heavilyarmed than the German ship, yet about a knot slower. But by hard work onthe part of the engineers and stokers of the _Kent_ she was able, byfive o'clock, to get within firing distance of the _Nürnberg_. By astrange trick of fate the _Kent_ was sister ship to the _Monmouth_ whichhad fallen victim to one of the _Nürnberg's_ torpedoes in the battle offCoronel. Here, too, was a duel with human interest in it. In theirdesire for revenge, the men of the _Kent_ made fuel of even herfurniture in order to speed up her engines. Her 6-inch guns now began tostrike the German ship, and soon a fire broke out aboard her. She couldhave ended the German vessel by keeping a fire upon her while remainingtoo distant to be within range of the _Nürnberg's_ 4-inch guns, but duskwas gathering and an evening mist was settling down upon the water. Consequently the _Kent_ drew nearer to her adversary. The firing of the_Nürnberg_ was then effective and more than twenty of her shells tookgood effect on the British ship. It was only through prompt action onthe part of her crew that her magazine was kept from exploding, for ashell set fire to the passage leading to it. By seven o'clock in the evening the _Nürnberg_ was practically "blind, "for the flames from the fire that was raging on her had reached herconning tower. A member of her crew hauled down her flag, and the_Kent_, thinking that the fight was over, came close to her. Whilewithin a few hundred yards of her, however, she was greeted with newfiring from the German cruiser. But this ceased under a raking from the_Kent's_ starboard guns, and once again the flag of the _Nürnberg_, which had been run up on resumption of shooting, was hauled down. Members of her crew then had to jump into the sea to escape death fromburning--the fire was quenched only when she went down at half pastseven. The overworked engineers and stokers of the _Kent_ were rewardedfor their hard work by being permitted to come on deck to watch the_Nürnberg_ go down, and all were soon engaged in helping to save thelives of the German sailors in the water. Just as the red glow of thesinking _Nürnberg_ was dying down a large four-masted sailing ship, withall sails set, came out of the mist, her canvas tinged red by theflames' rays. Silently she went by, disappearing again into the mist, aweird addition to an uncanny scene. Chasing the various units of the broken line of German ships had takenthe British ships miles from each other, but after ten o'clock theybegan to reach each other by wireless signals and all made again forStanley. It was not until the afternoon of the next day, however, thatword came from the _Kent_, for her pursuit had taken her farther thanany of the other British ships. The _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_ had made good in their pursuit of the_Santa Isabel_ and _Baden_, but in going after the _Dresden_ the_Bristol_ was not successful; the German ship got away in the rainstormwhich came up during the evening, and the _Bristol_, which had hurriedout of the harbor at Stanley not quite ready for battle, was unable tokeep on her trail. The fast _Eitel Friedrich_, which as a merchant shipconverted into a man-o'-warsman had greater speed than any of the shipson either side, was able to get away also. These two German ships nowtook up their parts as raiders of allied commerce, and were notaccounted for till months later. There was now on the high seas noGerman squadron. CHAPTER XXXVII SEA FIGHTS OF THE OCEAN PATROL There were some minor naval operations in the waters of Europe whichhave been neglected while larger actions elsewhere were recorded. Duringthe month of September, 1914, the British admiralty established ablockade of the mouth of the River Elbe with submarines, and the Germanboats of the same type were showing their worth also. On August 28, 1914, the day after the raid on Libau by the German cruiser _Augsburg_, thedate of the battle of the Bight of Helgoland, the two Russian protectedcruisers _Pallada_ and _Bayan_, while patrolling the Russian coast inthe Baltic Sea, were attacked by German submarines. Surrounded by thesesmall craft, which made poor targets, the two Russian ships sought toescape by putting on full speed, but the former was hit by a torpedo andsank. The other got away. All of the Allies, with the exception of France, had by the beginning ofSeptember, 1914, suffered losses in their navies. The navy of therepublic was engaged in assisting a British fleet in maintainingsupremacy in the Mediterranean, and kept the Austrian fleet bottled upin the Adriatic Sea. French warships bombarded Cattaro on September 10, 1914, to assist the military operations of the Montenegrin Government. These ships then proceeded to the island of Lissa and there destroyedthe wireless station maintained by Austria. The Austrian navy made noappearance while the allied fleets scoured the lower coast of Dalmatia, bringing down lighthouses, destroying wireless stations, and bombardingthe islands of Pelagosa and Lesina. On the 19th of September, 1914, they returned to Lissa and landed a force which took possession of it, thus establishing a new naval base against the Central Powers' navies. Duels between pairs of ships took place in various seas. The career ofthe raider _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, a fast converted liner, wasended by the British ship _Highflyer_, a cruiser, near the Cape VerdeIslands, on August 27, 1914, after the former had sunk the merchantman_Hyades_ and had stopped the mail steamer _Galician_. The greater speedof the German vessel was of no advantage to her, for she had been caughtin the act of coaling. What then transpired was not a fight, for inarmament the two were quite unequal. She soon sank under the_Highflyer_'s fire, her crew having been rescued by her colliers. The next duel took place between the _Carmania_ and _Cap Trafalgar_, British and German converted liners, respectively. They met on September14, 1914, in the Atlantic off South America. In view of the fact that atthe beginning of the war these two ships had been merchantmen and hadbeen armed and commissioned after the outbreak of hostilities, thisengagement was something of the nature of those between privateersmen inthe old days. In speed, size, and armament they were about equal. Fornearly two hours they exchanged shots between 3, 000 and 9, 000 yards, andmarkmanship was to determine the victory. The shots from the _Carmania_struck the hull of the other ship near the water line repeatedly, andthe British commander was wise enough to present his stern and bow endsmore often than the length of the _Carmania_'s sides. At the end of thefight the German ship was afire and sank. Her crew got off safely in hercolliers, and the British ship made off because her wireless operatorheard a German cruiser, with which the _Cap Trafalgar_ had been incommunication, signaling that she was hastening to the liner's aid. Only two days before this the British cruiser _Berwick_ captured theconverted liner _Spreewald_ in the North Atlantic, where she had beentrying to interrupt allied commercial vessels. Germany kept up her policy of attrition by clever use of submarines andmines. The British battleship _Audacious_, while on patrol duty off thecoast of Ireland in the early days of the war, met with a disaster ofsome sort and was brought to her home port in a sinking condition. Therigors of the British censorship almost kept the news of this out of theBritish papers and from the correspondents of foreign papers. It wasreported that she had struck a mine, that she had been torpedoed, andthat she had been made the victim of either a spy or a traitor whocaused an internal explosion. The truth was never made clear. Rumorsthat she had gone down were denied by the British admiralty some monthslater, when they reported her repaired and again doing duty, but thiswas counteracted by a report that one of the ships that was completedafter the start of hostilities had been given the same name. About the sinking of the _Hawke_ there was less conjecture. This vesselhad gained notoriety in times of peace by having collided with the_Olympic_ as the latter left port on her maiden voyage to New York. Onthe 15th of October, 1914, while patrolling the northern British homewaters she was made the target of the torpedo of a German submarine andwent down, but the _Theseus_, which had been attacked at the same time, escaped. Four German destroyers were to be the next victims of the war inEuropean waters. On October 17, 1914, the _S-115_, _S-117_, _S-118_, and_S-119_ while doing patrol duty off the coast of the Netherlands, cameup with a British squadron consisting of the cruiser _Undaunted_ and thedestroyers _Legion_, _Lance_, and _Loyal_. An engagement followed, inwhich damage was done to the British small boats and the four Germandestroyers were sunk. Captain Fox, senior British officer, had been onthe _Amphion_ when she sank the _Königin Luise_ and had been rescuedafter being knocked insensible by the explosion of the mine that sentthe _Amphion_ to the bottom. The exploit of Lieutenant Commander Horton in the British submarine_E-9_ when he sank the _Hela_ has already been narrated. The samecommander, with the same craft, during the first week of October, 1914, proceeded to the harbor of the German port of Emden, whence had sailedmany dangerous German submarines and destroyers that preyed on Britishships. He lay submerged there for a long period, keeping his men amusedwith a phonograph, and then carefully came to the surface. Through theperiscope he saw very near him a German destroyer, but he feared thatthe explosion of a torpedo sent against her would damage his own craft, so he allowed her to steam off, and when she was 600 yards away he letgo with two torpedoes. The second found its mark, and the _S-126_ was nomore. He immediately went beneath the surface and escaped the cordon ofdestroyers which immediately searched for him. By October 7 the _E-9_was back in Harwich, its home port. On the 31st of October, 1914, the cross-channel steamer _Invicta_received the S. O. S. Signal and went to rescue the crew of the oldBritish cruiser _Hermes_, which had been struck by two torpedoes from aGerman submarine near Dunkirk. All but forty-four of her men were saved. The next victim of a German submarine was the gunboat _Niger_, which, inthe presence of thousands of persons on the shore at Deal, founderedwithout loss of life on November 11, 1914. But one of the Germansubmarines was to go to the bottom in retaliation. On the 23d ofNovember the _U-18_ was seen and rammed off the Scotch coast, and somehours later was again seen near by. This time she was floating on thesurface and carrying a white flag. The British destroyer _Garry_ broughtup alongside of her and took off her crew, just as she foundered. Three days later the _Bulwark_, a British battleship of 15, 000 tons andcarrying a crew of 750 officers and men, was blown up in the Thameswhile at anchor at Sheerness. It was never discovered whether she was avictim of a torpedo, a mine, or an internal explosion. It is possiblethat a spy had placed a heavy charge of explosives within her hull. Onlyfourteen men of her entire complement survived the disaster. It was in November, 1914, also, that the sometime German cruisers_Goeben_ and _Breslau_, now flying the Turkish flag, became activeagain. As units in a Turkish fleet they bombarded unfortified ports onthe Black Sea on the first day of the month. Retaliation for this wasmade by the Allies two days later when a combined fleet of French andEnglish battleships bombarded the Dardanelles forts, inflicting acertain amount of damage. On the 18th of November, 1914, the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ engaged aRussian fleet off Sebastopol. The composition of this Russian fleet wasnever made public by the Russian admiralty, but it is known that theRussian battleship _Evstafi_ was the flagship. She came up on thestarboard side of the two German ships and opened fire on the nearer, the _Goeben_, at a distance of 8, 000 yards. The latter, hit by theRussian 12-inch guns was at first unable to reply because the firstshots set her afire in several places, but she finally let go with herown guns and after a fourteen-minute engagement she sailed off into afog. Her sister ship the _Breslau_ took no part in the exchange ofshots, and also made off. The damage done to the _Goeben_ was not enoughto put her out of commission; the _Evstafi_ suffered slight damage andhad twenty-four of her crew killed. The British submarine commander, Holbrook, with the _B-11_ upheld theprestige of this sort of craft in the British navy. He entered thewaters of the Dardanelles on the 13th of December, 1914, and submerging, traveled safely through five lines of Turkish mines and sent a torpedoagainst the hull of the Turkish battleship _Messudiyeh_. The _B-11_slowly came to the surface to see what had been the result of herexploit, and her commander, through the periscope saw her going down bythe stern. It was claimed later by the British that she had sunk, aclaim which was officially denied by the Turks. Her loss to Turkey, ifit did occur, was not serious, for she was too old to move about, andher only service was to guard the mine fields. The _B-11_ after beingpursued by destroyers again submerged for nine hours and camesuccessfully from the scene of the exploit. CHAPTER XXXVIII WAR ON GERMAN TRADE AND POSSESSIONS With the exceptions of the deeds done by the German sea raiders theremaining naval history of the first six months of the war had to do forthe most part with British victories. When Von Spee's squadron, with theexception of the light cruiser _Dresden_, which was afterward sunk atthe Island of Juan Fernandez, was dispersed off the Falkland Islandsthere was no more possibility of there being a pitched fight betweenGerman and British fleets other than in the North Sea. England began then to hit at the outlying parts of the German Empirewith her navy. The cruiser _Pegasus_, before being destroyed by the_Königsberg_ at Zanzibar on September 20, 1914, had destroyed a floatingdock and the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam, and the _Yarmouth_, before she went on her unsuccessful hunt for the _Emden_, captured threeGerman merchantmen. As far back as the middle of August, 1914, the capture of German Samoahad been planned and directed from New Zealand. On the 15th of thatmonth an expedition sailed from Wellington, and in order to escape the_Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, went first to French New Caledonia, wherethe British cruisers _Psyche_, _Philomel_, and _Pyramus_ were met with. On the 23d of the month, this force, which was augmented by the Frenchcruiser _Montcalm_ and the Australian battleships _Australia_ and_Melbourne_, sailed first for the Fiji Islands and then to Apia on UpoluIsland off Samoa. They reached there on the 30th. There was, of course, no force on the island to withstand that of the enemy, and arrangementsfor surrender of the place were made by signal. Marines were sentashore; the public buildings were occupied, the telegraph and telephonewires cut, the wireless station destroyed and the German flag hauleddown, to be replaced by the Union Jack. The Germans taken prisoners wererewarded for the kind treatment they had accorded British residentsbefore the appearance of this British force, and were sent to NewZealand. The next German possession to be taken was that in the BismarckArchipelago. It was known that there was a powerful wireless station atHerbertshöhen, the island known as New Pomerania. A small landing partywas put ashore on the island in the early morning of September 11, 1914, and made its way, without being discovered, to the town. The surprisedinhabitants were too frightened to do anything until this party left togo further on to the wireless station. By that time it met with someresistance, but overcame it. A few days later another landing party hadcaptured the members of the staff of the governor of New Pomerania, together with the governor himself, at Bougainville, Solomon Islands, whence they had fled. The wireless stations on the island of Yap, in theCarolines, and on Pleasant Island were destroyed during the followingmonth. Perhaps the strangest operations of naval character ever performed werethe inland "sea" fights in Africa. The great Nyassa Lake in Africa wasthe scene of this fighting. With its entire western shore in Britishpossession and with a goodly part of its waters within the territory ofGerman East Africa, it was not unnatural that fighting should take placethere. Both countries maintained small armed vessels on the lake. TheBritish ship _Gwendolen_, a 350-ton craft, had been built on the Clydeand had been sent to Nyassa Lake in sections and there assembled andlaunched in 1898. During August she fought with a German ship andcaptured it. The fighting on the lake could not, however, determine thesuccess of the military operations taking place in those regions. The preponderance of British naval strength was beginning to tellseverely upon German trade by the end of 1914, and her boast thatthrough her navy she would starve out Germany aroused the GermanGovernment greatly. In answer to these British threats, Grand Admiralvon Tirpitz, German Secretary of Marine, in an interview given to anAmerican newspaper correspondent, hinted that Germany's retaliationwould be a war on British merchant ships by German submarines. The interview at the time aroused but mild comment; the idea was a newone, and the question immediately arose as to whether such action wouldbe within the limits of international law. For the time being, however, Von Tirpitz's words remained nothing more than a threat. It was notuntil months later that the threat was made good, and the consequencesmust form a separate part of this narrative. The seaplane, the newest naval machine at the time, and as yet anuntried factor, was to see maiden service first at the hands of theBritish, when on the 25th of December a raid on Cuxhaven was made. Sevennaval seaplanes attacked a fleet of German cruisers and destroyers lyingoff Schilling Roads near the German port. The men who thus made historyin aviation were Francis E. T. Hewlett, son of the famous novelist, accompanied by seven pilots. A naval force consisting of a lightcruiser, a flotilla of destroyers and another of submarines brought upnear Helgoland during the morning. When this naval force was firstdiscovered by the lookouts on Helgoland, there immediately appearedapproaching from the German base two Zeppelins and a number of Germanseaplanes, together with some submarines. Meanwhile, from the decks ofthe British craft there went up the seven British seaplanes. In order to give them a place for landing after they returned from theirraid, it was necessary for the British ships to remain in the vicinityfor three hours. The _Undaunted_ and _Arethusa_, with the rest of theBritish force, had to "dance" about, dodging the submarines which wereattacking them from beneath the surface of the water and the aircrafthovering over them. Bombs dropped from the latter failed to find theirtargets, and by swift maneuvering the torpedoes shot at them were alsocaused to go far wide of the mark. The British airmen dropped their bombs on points of military importanceat Cuxhaven, but their effect was kept secret by the German authorities. Six of the seven returned to the squadron and were picked up bysubmarines. Three of the seaplanes were wrecked and had to be abandoned. Fog not only prevented the British airmen from doing their best work, but it kept the marksmen on the German aircraft also from hitting theships on the waters beneath them. This raid had been made in answer toa great outcry that had gone up from the British public after Germanwarships had raided the eastern coast of England. CHAPTER XXXIX RAIDS ON THE ENGLISH COAST During the first days of November, 1914, the Germans planned and carriedout a general surprise for the British navy. After the battle in theBight of Helgoland, back in August, the British thought that Germanywould continue to keep her navy within the protection of her coastdefenses, perhaps forever. But such was not her intention. On the afternoon of November 2, 1914, there gathered off some part ofGermany's northern shore a squadron consisting of the battle cruisers_Von der Tann_, _Seydlitz_, and _Moltke_, the protected cruisers_Kolberg_, _Strassburg_, and _Graudenz_, the armored cruisers _Yorck_and _Blücher_, together with some destroyers. The slowest of thesevessels could make a speed of 25 knots, and the fastest, the _Graudenz_and _Moltke_, could make 28 knots. The guns of the _Blücher_ were theheaviest in the squadron, those of her primary battery being 12-inchcannon. Ten-inch guns were on the decks of the other ships. The first that the rest of the world knew of the gathered force was atevening, November 2, 1914, when a fleet of British fishermen hailed themwith friendly signs, thinking them British ships, not far from Lowestoftsome time after six o'clock. The fishermen started at once for theirhome ports in order to apprise the British authorities, but they had notgone far when the news was flashed to the British admiralty office fromthe wireless room of the British gunboat _Halcyon_. But only the firstfew words of the warning were able to get through, for the wirelessoperators on the German ships "jammed" their keys, and a few shots fromthe German guns were sufficient to bring down the wireless apparatus ofthe gunboat as well as one of her funnels. She turned off and made forher home port to report the news some hours later. It was only ten miles from the British shores that the _Halcyon_ hadsighted the German ships, but they were able, nevertheless, to elude allBritish warships in those regions and proceeded to Yarmouth, firing atthe wireless station, the naval yards, and the town itself. Fearingmines near the coast, the German commander did not attempt to come intoo close, with the result that many of the German shots fell short, and, in spite of the fact that the bombardment lasted for nearly half anhour, the damage done by them was not great. The inhabitants of the towns of Lowestoft and Yarmouth were asleep inthe early hours of the morning when they first heard the booming of theGerman guns. In the darkness of the British winter they hurriedly wentdown to the water front, where, far out at sea, they could make outfaintly the hull of but one vessel, but the red flashes from the boomingguns showed that other ships were present. The crowds on the shorewatched two British destroyers and two submarines, which had been lyingin the harbor, put out after the German force. The latter by that timehad started off, dropping in its wake a number of floating mines. Thisstrategy resulted in the loss of the submarine _D-5_, which hit one ofthe mines and sank immediately. The German cruiser _Yorck_ was claimedby the British to have hit a mine also, with the result that she sankand carried down with her some 300 of her crew. This was denied later bythe German admiralty, and like all such controversies must remain asecret with the officials of both Governments. Judged by material effects, this raid was a failure. But in view of thefact that the Germans had shown that a squadron could actually elude thelarge number of British warships patrolling the North Sea, and wasactually able to strike at the British coast, it was a moral victory forGermany. "We must see clearly that in order to fight with success we must fightruthlessly, in the proper meaning of the word. " These were the words ofCount Reventlow, when he heard the news of the defeat of the Germansquadron commanded by Von Spee off the Falkland Islands. As a result, and in revenge for this defeat, the German admiralty planned a secondraid on the coast towns of England. The towns chosen for attack thistime were Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby. The first of these was acity of 100, 000 persons, and its principal business was shipbuilding. Scarborough was nothing more than a seaside resort, to which each summerand at Christmas were attracted thousands of Englishmen who sought tospend their vacations near the water. Whitby, though it had someattractions for holiday crowds, such as a quaint cathedral, was at mostnothing more than a home port for a number of fishing boats. It was brazenly claimed later by the Germans that these three towns, according to definitions in international law, were fortified ports, andconsequently open to attack by hostile forces. In reply the Britishclaimed that there was nothing in any of the three which could bringthem into that category. This controversy is still another which the wardeveloped. There is, however, the fact that the information which theGerman Government had obtained about them, and which it made public, must necessarily have been less comprehensive than that supplied to theworld at large by the British authorities. Guidebooks, as well astourists who have visited the place, reported that an old castle stoodin Scarborough which in past centuries had been a fort, but which at theoutbreak of the war was nothing more than a show place. The only gun inplace at the castle was an obsolete piece that had seen service in theCrimean War. Whitby, in times of peace, at least, had not even such"armament. " It was on the 16th of December, 1914, that this second raid took place. Over the North Sea there hung a light mist. The German admiralty did notafterward make public the names of the cruisers which participated inthis expedition, but they are believed to have been the _Derfflinger_, _Blücher_, _Von der Tann_, _Seydlitz_, and _Graudenz_. It was at eighto'clock in the morning that the residents of the three English townsfirst heard the booming of the German guns, and coast guards near bywere able, with the aid of very strong glasses, to make out the hulls ofthe attacking cruisers some miles out to sea. It was not thoughtpossible that the Germans could again elude the British ships on patrolin these waters, and the guards therefore thought that the firing camefrom ships flying the Union Jack and tried to signal to them. But theycame to realize the truth when they received no answering signals. As it was not known but that the Germans would make an attempt to land, the guards in the obsolete fort at Hartlepool took their positions andtwo small patrol boats in the harbor made ready to give what resistancethey could. These, the _Doon_ and the _Hardy_, drew the fire of theGerman guns, and, seeing it was impossible to withstand the German fire, they made off and escaped. This time the Germans were better informedabout the conditions they dealt with, and evidently had no fear ofmines, for they came to within two miles of the shore. The forts onshore were bombarded and private houses near by were hit by Germanshells, killing two women who lived in one of them. The forts tried toreply to the German guns, but those of the English battery were by nomeans modern, and firing them only served to further convince theGermans that the place was fortified; they inflicted no damage on theGerman ships. The lighthouse was the next target chosen by the Germans, one of theirshells going right through it, but leaving it standing. Within fiftyminutes 1, 500 German shells were fired into the town and harbor. Whiletwo of the three cruisers which were engaged in bombarding drew offfurther to sea and fired at Hartlepool, the third remained to finish thebattery on shore, but in spite of the fact that it was subjected to longand heavy firing, it was not so terribly damaged. Many of the shellsfrom the other two ships went over the towns entirely and buriedthemselves in the countryside that heretofore had been turned up only bythe peaceful plow. Other shells did havoc in the business andresidential sections of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool, bringing downbuildings and killing civilians in them as well as on the streets. At about the same hour the coast guards near Scarborough reported theapproach of foreign ships off the coast, and then telephoned that thestrangers were German cruisers and that they had begun to bombard thetown. A German shell destroyed the shed from which the telephone messagehad come and the warnings from it ceased. It was seen by those on shorethat the attack here was being made by four ships, two of them cruisersand two of them mine layers, only 800 yards out in the water. This timethey were not handicapped by the fact that they had to stand out so farfrom shore, and it was a surprise to the natives to see ships of suchdraft come so close to land--a fact which convinced the Britishauthorities that spies had been at work since the first raid, sending tothe German admiralty either charts or detailed descriptions of theregion. The castle was badly damaged by their fire; the town itself came next, the Grand Hotel coming in for its share of destruction. They did littleinjury to a wireless station in the suburbs, but hit quite a number ofresidences, the gas and water works. Half an hour afterward the two cruisers which had fired upon Scarboroughappeared off Whitby and began to fire at the signal station there. Inthe ten minutes that the bombardment of Whitby lasted some 200 shellsfell into the place. This time the fact that the German ships came closeto the shore worked against them, for there are high cliffs close to thewater at the spot and it was necessary for the German gunners to use ahigh angle, which did not give them much chance to be accurate. TheGerman ships next turned seaward and made for their home ports. The scenes enacted in the three towns during the bombardment andafterwards were tragic. Considering the fact, however, that the personsunder fire were civilians, many of them women and children, theircoolness was remarkable. They did not know what should be done, for thethought of bombardment was the last thing that had come into the mindsof the authorities when England went to war, and as a result noinstructions for such an emergency had been issued by the authorities. Some thought it best to stay within doors, some thought it best to gointo the streets. In Hartlepool a large crowd gathered in the railwaystation, some fully dressed, some only in night clothes. Many of the women carried babies in their arms and were followed byolder children who clung to their skirts. Policemen led this crowd outof the station and started them along a street which would bring themout into the country, but while they were passing the library they wereshowered by the stone work as it fell when hit by the German shells. Oneshell, striking the street itself, killed three of the six children whowere fleeing along it in company with their mother. Many other personsmet deaths as tragic either within their own homes or on the streets. St. Mary's Catholic Church as well as the Church of St. Hilda weredamaged, as were the shipyards and the office of the local newspaper. The destruction of the gas works left the town in almost completedarkness for many nights afterward. The authorities issued aproclamation ordering all citizens to remain indoors for a time, andthen began to count the number of dead and injured. The first estimategave the former as 22 and the latter as 50, but subsequent reckoningshowed that both figures were too low. In Scarborough most of the inhabitants were still in bed when thebombardment started and for a few minutes did not become excited, thinking the booming of the guns was the sound of thunder. But when theshells began to drop on their houses they knew better. Many were killedor wounded while they hastily got into their clothes. One shell hit St. Martin's Church while communion was being held. Here, too, the railwaystation was made the objective of many refugees, and the police did whatthey could to send the women and children out of range of fire byputting them on trains of extra length. As in all such scenes there werehumorous sides to it. One old workman, while hurrying along a street washeard to say: "This is what comes of having a Liberal Government. " Inall, about 6, 000 people left the town immediately and did not return forsome days. Similar were the scenes enacted in Whitby when the turn of that towncame. Only two persons were killed in that town, while thirteencasualties were reported from Scarborough. The raid immediately became the subject for discussion in the newspapersof every country on the globe. In England it was bitterly denounced, andthe term "baby killers" was applied to the men of the German navy. InGermany it was justified on the ground that the German admiralty hadinformation and proof that the bombarded cities were fortified, andtherefore, under international law, subject to bombardment. Nor did theGerman journalists lose the opportunity to declare that Great Britain nolonger ruled the waves nor to show pride over the fact that their fleethad successfully left the German coast and had successfully returned toits home port. The war, they said, had been brought to England's door. The year 1914 ended gloomily for the British public; nothing could havedisappointed them more than the failure to catch the Germans. Nor didthe new year open brightly for Britain, for on the first day of January, 1915, there came the news of disaster to the _Formidable_, sister shipto the _Bulwark_. The lesson of the _Hogue_, _Cressy_, and _Aboukir_ hadnot been learned, for this ship went down under the same circumstances. While patrolling near Torbay during a night on which there was a brightmoon and a calm sea, this ship, in company with seven other large shipsunaccompanied by a "screen" of destroyers, was hit by a torpedo firedfrom a German submarine. Most of her crew were asleep when the torpedostruck and damaged the engine room so much that no lights could beturned on. In the darkness they hurried to the deck, which was slantingfrom her list. In obedience to orders issued by the admiralty after thesinking of the _Cressy_ and the ships with her, the rest of the fleetimmediately sailed away from the scene, so that no more of them would behit. Only a light cruiser stood by the sinking _Formidable_. A secondtorpedo struck her and this had the effect of letting water into herhold on the side which was slowly coming out of the water. She took aposition with even keel after that, and this fact enabled most of hercrew to get off safely before she sank. Once more the Germans were to attempt a raid on the coast cities ofEngland. The date of this third attempt was January 24, 1915. This timethe British were a bit better prepared, for a squadron of battlecruisers, consisting of the _Lion_, _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, _NewZealand_, and _Indomitable_, put out from a port in the north of Englandat about the same time that the Germans left their base. All of theseships, with the exception of the last named, were quite fast, havingspeeds of from 25 to 28. 5 knots; they were at the same time carryingheavy armament--13. 5-inch guns in the main batteries. In company withthem went four cruisers of what is known in England as the "town class";these were the _Nottingham_, _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_, and_Southampton_, together with the three light cruisers _Arethusa_, _Aurora_, and _Undaunted_, and a squadron of destroyers. The Germanfleet which was engaged in this raid consisted of the _Seydlitz_, _Moltke_, _Derfflinger_, and _Blücher_, in company with a fleet ofdestroyers. The German ships were not quite as fast as the Englishships, nor did they carry guns of such range or destructive power astheir British opponents. Early in the first hours of January 24, these two forces, unknown toeach other were steaming head on, the Germans taking a course leadingnorthwest and the English a course leading southeast. At twenty minutespast seven in the morning the _Aurora_ first sighted the enemy andengaged him immediately with her two 6-inch guns, sending at the sametime word of her discovery to Admiral Beatty. Admiral Hipper, the Germancommander, as soon as he knew the enemy had sighted him, turned aboutand started to steam in a southeasterly direction. In view of the results of this battle, it is best to go into the matterof the tactics involved. Tactics may be of two kinds--spontaneous orpremeditated. When two hostile fleets meet on the high sea far from thebase of either, the object of each is the complete destruction of theother, and the tactics employed are spontaneous. Such an action was thatoff Coronel. But on a closed sea such as the North Sea spontaneoustactics can rarely be used, for the reason that naval bases are toonear, and from these there may slyly come reenforcements to one or theother or to both of the fighting fleets, making the arrangement of trapsan easy matter. This is particularly true of the North Sea, on which itis possible for a fleet to leave Cuxhaven early in the evening and to beat Scarborough early the following morning. In addition, sailing isrestricted because an unusually large portion of its waters is tooshallow to permit of the passage of large ships. The Germans on this occasion had arranged a trap. They knew that aftermaking two successful raids on the English coast the British would keepeven a closer watch for them. When they sailed from their base, it waswith the expectation of meeting a hostile force, as was undoubtedlytheir expectation on the first two raids. But they did not intend tofight matters out on high waters. What they wanted to do was to get theBritish involved in a good running engagement, steering a southeasterlycourse the while and luring the British ships within striking force of awaiting fleet of superdreadnoughts and perhaps land guns and mines. Thisexplains why Admiral Hipper turned stern as soon as he got into touchwith the enemy. There was a distance of fourteen miles between the two fleets when the_Lion_ got her heavy guns into action. The German line was off her port(left) bow. At the head of that line was the _Moltke_, and following hercame the _Seydlitz_, _Derfflinger_, _Blücher_, and the destroyers in theorder given. At the head of the British line was the _Lion_, followed bythe _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, _New Zealand_, and _Indomitable_ in theorder named. The other cruisers and the destroyers of the British fleetbrought up the rear. In the chase which followed the Germans werehandicapped by the fact that the _Blücher_ was far too slow to bebrought into action, which meant that either the other ships must leaveher behind to certain destruction or that they must slow down to keepwith her. They chose the latter course, while her stokers did their bestto increase her speed. In the English fleet there was the same troublewith the _Indomitable_, but inasmuch as the British were the pursuersand had a preponderance in ships and in the range of their guns, thisdid not matter so much to them. But the stokers of the _Indomitable_worked as hard, if not harder, than those of the _Blücher_. By half past nine the two forces were seven miles apart and the battlewas on. It is necessary here to give certain facts about gunnery on alarge modern battleship. Firing at a range of seven miles means a testof mathematics rather than of the mere matter of pointing guns. At thatdistance the target--the ship to be hit--is barely visible on the skyline on the clearest and calmest sea. If a hole the size of the head ofa pin be made in a piece of cardboard and the latter be held about afoot and a half from the eye, the distant ship will just about fill thehole. The guns on the modern battleships are not "laid"; that is, they are notaimed as were the cannon of past days or the rifle of to-day. It is settoward its target by two factors. The first is known as "traverse, "which means how far to the left or right it must be pointed in ahorizontal plane. The second factor is "elevation"--how far up or downit must be pointed in a vertical plane. The latter factor determines howfar it will throw its projectile, and up to a certain point the higherthe gun is pointed the further will go the shell. A certain paradoxseems to enter here. It is a fact that a distant ship presents a targetmore easily hit if its bow or stern is toward the gunner. If it presentsa broadside there is the danger that the shells will go either beyondthe ship or will fall short of it, for the greatest beam on a warship isnot much more than 90 feet. If the bow or stern is toward the gunner hehas a chance of landing a shell on any part of the 600 or more feet ofthe ship's length. The first firing in a battle at a distance is knownas "straddling, " by which is meant that a number of shots are sentsimultaneously, some falling short, some falling beyond the target, andsome hitting it. [Illustration: The german cruiser "Blücher" turning on her side as shesank in the North Sea battle of January 24. 1915. The other vessels ofthe German squadron escaped. ] The man who really "aims" the gun never sees what he is shooting at. Atsome point of vantage on his ship one of the officers observes the enemyand reports to the chief gunner the distance, the direction, and theeffect of the first shots. The gunnery officer then makes certaincalculations, taking into consideration the speed of his own ship andthe speed of the enemy ship. He knows that at a given moment his targetwill be at a given point. He knows also just how fast his shells willtravel and makes calculations that enable him to place a shell at thatpoint at just the right second. In this battle the shells of the Britishship took about twenty seconds to go from the mouths of the guns to theGerman hulls. And they made a curve at the highest point of which theyreached a distance of more than two miles; and most wonderful of all wasthe fact that at the beginning of the firing a man standing on the deckof one of the German ships could not even see the ship which wasfiring the shells at her, though the weather was very clear. By a quarter to ten o'clock the _Lion_ had come up with and had passedthe slow _Blücher_, firing broadsides into her as she went by. The_Tiger_ then passed the unfortunate German ship, also letting her have aheavy fire, and then the _Princess Royal_ did likewise. Finally the _NewZealand_ was able to engage her and later even the slow _Indomitable_got near enough to do so. By that time the _Blücher_ was afire and oneof her gun turrets, with its crew and gun, had been swept off bodily bya British shell. Meanwhile the _Lion_, _Tiger_, and _Princess Royal_ kept straight aheadtill they were able to "straddle" even the leading ship of the enemy'sline. The _Tiger_ and _Lion_ poured shells into the _Seydlitz_, but wereunable to do much damage to the _Moltke_. While they were thus engagedthe _Princess Royal_ singled out the _Derfflinger_ for her target. Thelight British cruiser _Aurora_, _Arethusa_, and _Undaunted_ were farahead of the rest of the British fleet and were firing at the _Moltke_, but thick black smoke which poured from their funnels as their engineswere speeded up got between the gunners of the _Lion_ and their target, the _Moltke_, completely obscuring the latter. As a result the threelight British cruisers were ordered to slow down and to take positionsto the rear. By eleven o'clock there were fires raging on both the _Seydlitz_ and the_Derfflinger_, and Admiral Hipper decided to try to save his largerships by sacrificing the destroyers that accompanied them. Consequentlythe German destroyers put their bows right toward the large Britishships and charged, but the fire which they drew was too much for themand they gave up this maneuver. The British destroyer _Meteor_, which had been maintaining a perilousposition between the battleships, then attempted to torpedo the_Blücher_, which had fallen far to the rearward to be abandoned by therest of the German fleet. Badly damaged as the _Blücher_ was, the crewof one of her guns managed to get in some final shots, one of themnearly ending the career of the British destroyer. The _Arethusa_ hadalso come up and prepared to launch a torpedo. Cruiser and destroyertorpedoed her at about the same moment, and later, while within 200yards of the sinking German ship the _Arethusa_ sent another torpedo ather. She now began to list, although not greatly damaged, on her portside till her keel showed. Her crew showed remarkable bravery. The men lined up as though at a review and began to sing the Germannational airs, intending to go to their deaths in that formation. But anofficer on the _Arethusa_ shouted to them through a megaphone to jumpwhile they could to save their lives. This had a psychological effect, and as the starboard side of her hull slowly came up her men were seenscrambling on it from behind her taffrail and creeping down toward herkeel. Some of them almost walked into the water while she was in thatposition. Her guns were pointing toward the sky, one of them slowlyrevolving. Finally, when she was completely upside down she went under. Many of her crew were picked up by British small boats, and her captain, who was one of them, was taken to England, where he died later from theresults of this experience and was buried with full naval honors. The German destroyers had meanwhile come between their own cruisers andthose of the enemy and emitted volumes of heavy smoke, which they hopedwould form an effective screen between the former and the gunners on thelatter. Admiral Hipper then ordered all of his ships to turn northward, in the hope of getting away behind this screen, but the British admiralanticipated this maneuver and changed the course of his ships so that heagain had the German ships in view after both fleets had driven throughthe smoke. The _Lion_ of the British fleet was chosen as the target for the Germanships, and by keeping a concentrated fire upon her were able to doconsiderable damage. One shell penetrated the bow of the _Lion_ as itwas partly lifted out of the water on account of the great speed she wasmaking; this shot hit her water tank and made it impossible for her touse her port engine from that time on. She slowed down. When she fellout of the line it was necessary for Admiral Beatty to leave her, and hetransferred his flag to the destroyer _Attack_. But all of this tooktime and it was quite long before he was able to rejoin his leadingships. By twenty minutes past twelve he had got aboard the _PrincessRoyal_. Rear Admiral Moore automatically took up command of the British fleetwhile his senior officer was making these changes. It is not known whatAdmiral Moore's orders had been, but it is known that he suddenlyordered all ships to cease firing and allowed the German warships toproceed without further engaging them. By the time that Admiral Beattywas again on a battle cruiser the action was virtually over. The_Indomitable_ passed a cable to the crippled _Lion_ and towed the latterhome, the rest of the British fleet keeping to the rearward to be readyfor possible resumption of fighting. Much criticism was made by the British press and by laymen on accountof the sudden termination of the fight, and there was great complaint inEngland because the career of all the raiding German ships had not beenbrought to an end. But when the engagement ended the opposing fleetswere within seventy miles of Helgoland, and the German admiralty hadready a fleet of dreadnoughts and another of battle cruisers to engagethe British ships when they got within striking distance. By ending thefight when he did the British commander chose not to be led into thistrap. Nor was there dissatisfaction in England alone. In Germany thecomplaint was that the ruse had not worked, and not long afterwardAdmiral von Ingenohl was replaced as commander of the High Sea Fleet byAdmiral von Pohl. None of the blame for the failure was laid at the doorof the officer who had actually been engaged in the fighting--AdmiralHipper--which showed that his senior officers had considered theengagement as part of a larger action. CHAPTER XL RESULTS OF SIX MONTHS' NAVAL OPERATIONS The first six months of naval operations in the Great War came to aclose without battle between the main fleets of the navies of thewarring nations. The British navy had kept open communication with theContinent, allowing the Expeditionary Force, as well as later militarycontingents, to get to the trenches in Flanders and France. It had, inaddition, made possible the transportation of troops from Canada andAustralia. The ports of France were open for commerce with America, which permitted the importation of arms and munitions, and the sameprivilege had been won for the ports in the British Isles. The northern ports of the Central Powers were closed to commerce withall but the Scandinavian countries, and the oversea German possessions, where they were accessible to naval attack, had been taken from her. TheGerman and Austrian flags had been swept from the seven seas, with theexception of those on three or four German cruisers that now and thenshowed themselves capable of sinking a merchantman. In the four engagements of importance which had been fought by the endof January, 1915, the British had been the victors in three--the battlesof the Bight of Helgoland, the Falkland Islands, and the third Germanraid of January 24, 1915--the Germans had been victors in one--the fightoff Coronel. British and other allied ships were unable to inflict damage on thecoast defenses of Germany, but the latter in two successful raids hadbeen able to bombard British coast towns, offsetting in a way the lossof oversea dominions. Great Britain, after six months of naval warfare had lost threebattleships, the _Bulwark_, _Formidable_, and _Audacious_;[1] the fivearmored cruisers _Aboukir_, _Cressy_, _Hogue_, _Monmouth_, and _GoodHope_; the second-class cruisers _Hawke_ and _Hermes_; the twothird-class cruisers _Amphion_ and _Pegasus_; the protected scout_Pathfinder_ and the converted liner _Oceanic_; losses in destroyers andother small vessels were negligible. [Footnote 1: The British admiralty did not clear up the mystery of her disaster. ] Germany had lost no first-class battleships, but in third-class cruisersher loss was great, those that went down being the eleven ships_Ariadne_, _Augsburg_, _Emden_, _Graudenz_, _Hela_, _Köln_, _Königsberg_, _Leipzig_, _Nürnberg_, _Magdeburg_, _Mainz_, and the_Dresden_; she lost, also, the four armored cruisers _Blücher_, _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, and _Yorck_; the old cruiser _Geier_(interned); the three converted liners _Spreewald_, _Cap Trafalgar_, and_Kaiser Wilhelm_; and the mine layer _Königin Luise_. The German policy of attrition had not taken off as many ships as hadbeen lost by Germany herself, and, as England's ships so far outnumberedher own, it may well be said that the "whittling" policy was notsuccessful. She made up for this by having still at large the cruiser_Karlsruhe_ which damaged a great amount of commerce, and by theexploits of her submarines, far outshining those of the Allies. Russia had lost the armored cruiser _Pallada_, and the _Jemchug_, athird-class cruiser, and the losses of the French and Austrian navieswere not worth accounting. With regard to interned vessels both sideshad losses. While the Germans were unable to use the great modernmerchantmen which lay in American and other ports, and had to do withoutthem either as converted cruisers or transports, the Allies were forcedto detail warships to keep guard at the entrance of the various portswhere these interned German liners might at any moment take to the highseas. In naval warfare the number of ships lost is no determining factor infiguring the actual victory--the important thing being the existence ornonexistence of the grand fleets of the combatants after the fighting isfinished. Viewed from such an angle, the fact that the Allies had leftno German ships at large other than those in the North Sea, cannotentitle them to victory at the end of the first six months of war. Solong as a German fleet remained intact and interned in neutral ports, naval victory for the Allies had not come, though naval supremacy wasindicated. The fact was apparent, moreover, that while the Central Powers werebeing deprived of all their trade on the seas, the world's commerceendangered only by submarines was remaining wide open to the Allies. PART III--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT CHAPTER XLI GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE OF WARFARE World war--the prophecy of the ages--now threatened the foundations ofcivilization. Whether or not the modern era was to fall under the sword, as did the democracy of Greece and the mighty Roman Empire, was again tobe decided on battle grounds that for seventy centuries have devouredthe generations. The mountain passes were once more to reverberate withthe battle cry--the roar of guns, the clank of artillery, the tramp ofsoldiery. The rivers were to run crimson with the blood of men; citieswere to fall before the invaders; ruin and death were to consumenations. It was as though Xerxes, and Darius, and Alexander the Great, and Hannibal, and all the warriors of old were to return to earth tolead again gigantic armies over the ancient battle fields. While the war was gaining momentum on the western battle grounds ofEurope, gigantic armies were gathering in the East--there to wage mightycampaigns that were to hold in the balance the destiny of the greatRussian Empire, the empire of Austria, the Balkan kingdoms--Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Bulgaria. The Turks were again to enter upon a warof invasion. Greece once more was to tremble under the sword. Even Egyptand Persia and Jerusalem itself, the battle grounds of the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Trojans, the bloody fields of paganism andearly Christianity, were all to be awakened by the modern trumpets ofwar. Before we enter upon these campaigns in the East it is well to surveythe countries to be invaded, to review the battle lines and travel inthese pages over the fighting ground. The eastern theatre in the first six months of the war, from August 4, 1914, to February 1, 1915, includes the scenes of the fighting in thehistoric Balkans and in the Caucasus. But the eastern front proper isreally that region where the Teutonic allies and the Russians opposedeach other, forming a fighting line almost a thousand miles long. Itstretches from rugged old Riga on the shores of the Baltic Sea in thefar north, down through Poland to the Carpathian Mountains, touching thewarm, sunlit hills on the Rumanian frontier. When the total losses ofthe Great War are finally counted it will probably be found that herethe heaviest fighting has occurred. This is the longest battle line in the world's history. Partly onaccount of its great length, and partly because of the nature of thecountry, we see the two gigantic forces in this region locked togetherin their deadly struggle, swaying back and forth, first one giving way, then the other. This was especially the case in the northern section, along the German-Russian frontier. [Illustration: The War in the East--The Relation of the EasternCountries to Germany. ] As we view the armies marshaling along this upper section, along theBaltic shore, southward, including part of East Prussia as well asBaltic Russia, we look upon the ancient abode of the Lithuanians, supposed to be the first of the Slavic tribes to appear in Europe. Hardly any part of Europe has a more forbidding aspect than this region. There the armies must pass over a flat, undulating country, almost aslow in level as the Baltic, and therefore occupied in large part bymarshes and lagoons through which they must struggle. In all parts thesoil is unproductive. At one time it was a universal forest: thick, dark, and dank. A century ago, however, Catherine the Great distributedlarge areas of this comparatively worthless land among her favorites andcourtiers. In this way a certain percentage was reclaimed, and with theincoming of the sunlight more favorable conditions for human life wereestablished. Yet even now it is very thinly settled. Through this region the armies must cross big rivers: the Oder, Dvina, Warthe, Vistula, Pregel, and Niemen, northward and northeastward. Justabove or eastward of that point, where the German-Russian frontiertouches the shore, the Baltic curls into a dent, 100 miles deep, formingthe Gulf of Riga. Near the southern extremity of this gulf, eight milesfrom the mouth of the Dvina, is the city of Riga, ranking second only toPetrograd in commercial importance as a seaport, and with a populationof about 300, 000. As the armies move across the frontier they come to a vast domainprojecting into this marsh country, like a great, broad tongue lickingthe shore of the Baltic; this wide strip of German territory is EastPrussia--a country to be beleaguered. Not far below the tip of thistongue, about five miles from the mouth of the Pregel River in theFrische Haff, and about twenty-five miles from the seacoast, is situatedanother embattled stronghold--the city of Königsberg which, since 1843, has been a fortress of the first rank. These two cities in the followingpages will be the immediate objectives of the enemy forces operating onthis section of the eastern front. It will be obvious why the lines of battle were less permanently fixedhere than in the more solid and mountainous sections of northern France. Railroads and fairly well-laid highways do indeed traverse these swampsin various parts, especially in German territory, but trenches could notbe dug in yielding mire. In yet another feature were the militaryoperations hampered by the nature of the terrain here; the use of heavyartillery. We have seen that one of the chief causes of success attending Germanattacks in the other theatres of the war has been their use of heavyguns. But in the fighting before Riga, we shall see when the Germansseemed on the point of taking that city their heavy artillery was sohandicapped that it was rendered practically useless. Being restrictedby the marshes to an attack over a comparatively narrow front, they werecompelled to leave their heavy guns behind on firmer soil. The gunswhich they could take with them were matched by the Russians; thefighting was, therefore, almost entirely limited to infantryengagements, in which the Russians were not inferior to the Germans. Thus, we shall find the German advance on Riga was stopped before itcould attain its object. In studying the fighting in this part of the eastern front, it will beseen why the Germans were more successful below Riga, and why theRussians were compelled to evacuate Vilna. Here is a broad rise, something like the back of a half-submerged submarine, which seems tocross the country, where the land becomes more solid. The armies mustmove, instead of through marshes, along innumerable small lakes, most ofthe lakes being long and narrow and running north and south, with afairly thick growth of timber among them, mostly pine and spruce andfir. In character this section is rather similar to parts of Minnesota. There are two cities to be conquered in this drier region, Dvinsk, and, further south, Vilna, once the chief city or capital of the Lithuanians. We shall see the Russians thrust back from Königsberg, and the heavyfighting shifted over to this section; yet even here, where the hugeguns of the Germans could find footing, the terrain was not suited totrench warfare, and every arrival of reenforcements on either side wouldswing the lines back or forth. In studying the military movements in a country of this character, special attention must be paid to the railway lines. Railways, and moreespecially those running parallel to the fronts, are absolutelynecessary to success. In looking, therefore, for a key to the object ofany particular movement, the first step must be a close study of thisrailroad situation. We find from Riga to the fortress of Rovno there is a continuous line ofrailroad, running generally north and south and passing through Dvinsk, Vilna, Lida, Rovno, and thence down through Poland to Lemberg. Everyeffort of the Russian armies in the succeeding chapters will be made tokeep to the westward of and parallel to this line, and for a very goodreason. Feeding into this great north and south artery are the branch lines fromPetrograd to Dvinsk; from Moscow to the junction at Baranovitschi; fromKiev to Sarny. Aside from these three important branch lines, there area few other single-track off-shoots, but from a military point of viewthey are of no importance. This line was the main objective (short of capturing Riga itself) of theGerman operations. This line proves especially vital to the Russians, for nowhere east of it is there another such line which could be usedfor the same purpose. If, in the campaigns to be described, this railroad falls into Russianhands, it gives every facility for strengthening or reenforcing any partof the Russian front where German pressure becomes excessive. It is, inaddition, a solution to the difficult problem of transportation ofsupplies. To use a military term, it gives the Russian army a mobilitynot possessed by the enemy because of a lack of similar facilities. But should this railroad be taken by the Germans, the advantage wouldimmediately be reversed. And if once the Russian lines were driven backbeyond the railroad, a division of their forces would be forced uponthem; their armies would be obliged to group themselves beside the threeeast and west branches already mentioned, for only by these threesystems could their forces be supplied, lateral communications beingabsolutely lacking. And this is the key to the fighting, not only in thenorthern section of the front, but all along the line, down to Galicia. Naturally, only the Russian railroads need be considered, for in thefirst months of the war the Germans are the invaders in the northernhalf of the eastern front, except for a few short periods in thebeginning. Compared to the German railway lines near the frontier, theRussian lines are very few. There are two distinct railway lines running from Germany into EastPrussia, with innumerable branches leading to all points of the Russianfrontier, laid especially for military purposes. It was along these thatwe shall witness the German forces rushed from Belgium to drive back thefirst Russian advance. But, of course, the moment the Germans enterRussian territory they have no advantage over the Russians, since eventheir wonderful efficiency does not enable them to build railroads asfast as an army can advance. Hence, we observe their efforts to gainpossession of the Russian railroads. We come now to the central part of the eastern front. Here, just belowEast Prussia, Russian Poland projects into German territory in a greatsalient, about 200 miles wide and 250 long, resembling a huge bite inshape. This land is a monotonous, wind-swept plain, slightly undulating, itshigher parts not even 500 feet above sea level. To the northward andeastward it descends gradually into the still lower lands of EastPrussia and White Russia, but in the south it lifts into the foothillsof the Carpathian Mountains. Gigantic armies are to move over this plateau, timbered in parts withoak, beech, and lime, and in some sections deeply cut by small riversand streams forming fissures, some narrow and craggy, others broad andsloping with marshy bottoms. Toward the south the soldiers must crossnarrow ravines in all directions, often covered with wild, thickundergrowth. The chief river is the Vistula, which enters by thesouthern boundary and flows first north, then northwest, skirting theplateau region at a height of 700 feet, finally making its exit nearThorn, thence on to the Baltic through East Prussia. Its valley dividesthe hilly tracts into two parts: Lublin heights in the east and theSedomierz heights to the westward. Picture in your mind the great armiesapproaching these ridges, the most notable of which is the Holy CrossMountains, rising peaks almost 2, 000 feet above sea level. The fighting forces in the northeast, where the plain slopes graduallyinto the Suwalki Province, must pass over a country dotted with lakesand lagoons, which farther on take on the character of marshes, stagnantponds, peat bogs, with small streams flowing lazily from one to theother. Here and there are patches of stunted pine forests, withoccasional stretches of fertile, cultivated soil. Throughout thissection many rivers flow along broad, level valleys, separating intovarious branches which form many islands and, during the rainy seasons, flood the surrounding country. Farther west the armies pass through broad valleys or basins, once thebeds of great lakes, whose rich, alluvial soil give forth abundant cropsof cereals. Here, too, flows the Niemen, 500 miles in length, watering abasin 40, 000 square miles in area and separating Poland from Lithuania. It advances northward in a great, winding pathway, between limestonehills covered with loam or amid forests, its banks rising to higheminences in places, past ruined castles built in the Middle Ages. Inthe yellowish soil along its banks grow rich crops of oats, buckwheat, corn, and some rye. Naturally such a section would be thickly populated, not only on account of the fertile soil, but because the Niemen, likethe Vistula, is one of the country's means of communication andtransportation. As many as 90, 000 men earn their livelihoods innavigating the steamers and freight barges passing up and down thisgreat waterway. At Yurburg the Niemen enters East Prussia on its way tothe Baltic. CHAPTER XLII THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUSSIAN POLAND It is in the southern part of Russian Poland, among the foothills of theCarpathians, that the armies come into possession of its mineralresources, a fact which will have some influence on the German militarymovements in this region. Up in the Kielce hills copper has been minedfor 400 years, though the value of these mines has decreased on accountof the much greater quantity found in America. A hundred years ago theKielce mines produced nearly 4, 000 tons of copper a year. Brown iron oreis also found here in deposits 40 per cent pure, while there are alsoveins of zinc sometimes 50 feet thick, yielding ore of 25 per centpurity. Sulphur, one of the ingredients for the manufacture ofexplosives, is found at Czarkowa in the district of Pinczow. In thesouthwest, in Bedzin and Olkuz, there are coal deposits about 200square miles in area. In the southern districts wheat is also grown insome abundance. The military value of this country is further enhanced by politicalconditions. Like the greater part of Galicia to the southward, it ispeopled by the Poles, who form one of the important branches of thegreat Slavic family. At one time Poland was a kingdom whose territoryand possessions spread from the Carpathians up to the Baltic and farinto the center of Russia, ruling its subject peoples with quite as muchrigor as the Poles have themselves been ruled by Russia and Germany. Poland is a seat of conquest in the Great War. For not much over ahundred years ago what remained of this old kingdom was divided amongthe three great powers: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Austria, on thewhole, has been much the best master. Germany tried in various ways toGermanize her subjects in German Poland, thereby rousing their bitterhatred. Russia was no less autocratic in attempting to extinguish thespirit of nationality among the Poles under her rule. But, naturally, the fact remains that between the Poles and the Russians there are stillties of blood. In moving westward, by this route Russia would be movingamong a race who, in spite of all they had suffered at the hands of theCzar, still would naturally prefer Slav to Teuton. We shall soon stand with the invading armies in the center of RussianPoland, and enter the great city of Warsaw. This conquered citadel withmore than 400, 000 inhabitants, is situated on the Vistula. It was, nextto Paris, the most brilliant city of Europe in the early part of lastcentury. But under Russian influence it became a provincial town inspirit, if not in size. It once had the character of prodigal splendor;within late years it became a forlorn, neglected city, not the leasteffort being made by the Russian authorities to modernize its appearanceand improvement. From a sanitary point of view it became one of theleast progressive cities of Europe. And yet, as the armies march intothe capital, there are still signs of the city's past glory: over thirtypalaces rear their lofty turrets above the tile roofs of the houses, among them the palace of the long-dead Polish kings. However, from a military point of view, Warsaw maintained greatimportance in the Great War. It is at this time one of the strongestcitadels of Europe, and around it lies the group of fortresses calledthe Polish Triangle. The southern apex is Ivangorod on the Vistula; theeastern, Brest-Litovsk; the northern being Warsaw itself. To thenorthwest lies the advanced fort of Novo Georgievsk. This triangle is afortified region with three fronts: two toward Germany and one towardAustria, and the various forts are fully connected by means ofrailroads. It would appear, therefore, that Russian Poland would offer excellentconditions for an army on the defensive. And this is quite true, theVistula, especially, serving as a screen against the attacking armiesfrom the west. As a matter of fact, it would have been extremelydifficult to take Warsaw by a frontal attack. Warsaw's weakness lay inthe north in the swamp regions. One of the greatest dangers in all wars, against which a militarycommander has to guard his army, is that of being flanked. The road orroads leading from the rear to the base of supplies, along which notonly food supplies for the soldiers, but, quite as important, ammunition, is brought up, either in wagons, automobiles, or in railroadtrains, are the most sensitive part of an army's situation. Unless theyare very short--that is, unless an army is very close to its base ofsupplies--it is impossible to guard these lines of communicationadequately. Therefore, if the enemy is able to break through on eitherside of the front, there is great danger that he may swing his forcesaround and cut these lines of communication. The army that is thusdeprived of its sources of supply has nothing left then but tosurrender, sometimes even to inferior forces. Sometimes, of course, ifthe army is within the walls of a fortified city and is well suppliedwith food and ammunition, it may hold out and allow itself to bebesieged. This may even be worth while, for the sake of diminishing theenemy's strength to the extent of the forces required for besieging, usually many times larger than the besieged force. But in the case ofWarsaw we shall see that that would not have been a wise plan; hardlyany food supply that could have been laid by would have maintained thelarge civil population, and the big guns of the Germans would soon havebattered down the city's defenses. This the Russians realized from the very beginning. As is well knownnow, Russia had never intended to hold Poland against the Teutons. Herreal line of defense was laid much farther back. It was only on accountof the protest of France, when the two Governments entered into theiralliance, that any fortifications at all were thrown up in Poland. Areal line of defense must be more or less a straight line, with nobreak. And the marshes in the north, as well as the tongue of EastPrussia projecting in along the shores of the Baltic toward Riga madethat impossible. Russia's real line of defense was farther east, alongthe borders of Russia proper and along the line of railroad alreadyreferred to. By studying this territory east of Poland it will becomeobvious why Russia should prefer this as her main line of defenseagainst a German invasion. As we witness the armies moving along what was once the frontier betweenPoland and Russia proper we shall find the plain of Poland dips into aregion which apparently was once a vast lake which drained into theDnieper, but the outlet becoming choked, this stagnant water formed intothose immense morasses known as the Pripet Marshes, forming overtwo-fifths of the whole province of Minsk and covering an area of over600 square miles. Even when more than 6, 000, 000 acres have beenreclaimed by drainage, the armies found some of these marshes extendingcontinuously for over 200 miles. In the upper Pripet basin the woodswere everywhere full of countless little channels which creep through awilderness of sedge. Along the right bank of the Pripet River the landrises above the level of the water and is fairly thickly populated. Elsewhere extends a great intricate network of streams with endlessfields of bulrushes and stunted woods. Over these bogs hang unhealthyvapors, and among the rank reeds there is no fly, nor mosquito, norliving soul or sound in the autumn. Not even infantry could pass over this region--not to consider cavalryor artillery, save in the depth of a cold winter when the water and mireis frozen. Even then it would be impossible to venture over the icewith heavy guns. An invading army must, therefore, split in two partsand pass around the sides, and nothing is more dangerous than splittingan army in the face of the enemy. It is behind these vast marshes thatwe shall find the Russians planned to make their first determined stand. Here, too, the Russians expected to have the advantage of beingsurrounded by their own people, for this is the country of the WhiteRussians, so called on account of their costumes. Here the purest Slavictype is preserved; they have not blended with other stocks, as the GreatRussians with the Finns and the Little Russians, farther south, with theMongols. For a while this territory was subject to the kings of Poland, who oppressed its inhabitants most barbarously, from the effects ofwhich they have not even fully recovered. To-day White Russia is one ofthe poorest and most backward parts of the empire. And even yet thegreat bulk of the landlords are Poles. CHAPTER XLIII AUSTRIAN POLAND, GALICIA AND BUKOWINA Let us now pass ahead of the armies into the southern section of theeastern front. Here we have to consider only Austrian Poland, Galiciaand Bukowina, for here there is much less swaying back and forth, theRussians maintaining their lines much more steadily than farther north. This section is an undulating terrace which slopes down to the Vistulaand the Dniester; behind rise the Carpathian ranges, forming the naturalfrontier between the broad, fertile plains of Hungary and Russia. Herethe population is quite dense, there being 240 inhabitants to the squaremile. Nearly half of the total area is in farm lands, about one-fourthwoodland, and the rest mostly meadow and pasture, less than a quarter ofone per cent being lake or swamp. Rich crops of barley, oats, rye, wheat, and corn are grown here, while the mineral resources includecoal, salt, and petroleum, the latter especially being important inmodern warfare on account of the great quantities of fuel necessary formotor carriages. Here, in Galicia, we shall witness the conquests of the important cityof Lemberg--with its 160, 000 population--fourth in size of all Austriancities, only Vienna, Prague, and Triest being larger. Further in towardthe mountains we shall see the storming of the strongly fortified cityof Przemysl (pronounced Prshemisel), also important as the junction ofthe network of railroads that the Austrians had built throughout thecountry, including several lines passing over the Carpathians intoHungary. And farther west still we shall look upon the invasion of theold Polish city of Cracow, also strongly fortified. This section isespecially rich in industries, mines, and agriculture. Here, too, are staged many of the battles of the rivers--parallel withthe mountain ranges flows the Dniester in a southeasterly direction, into which, flowing down from the north and running parallel with eachother, empty the Gnila Lipa, the Zlota Lipa, and the Stripa, all ofwhich figure prominently in the war movements, for each of these iscrossed several times by both armies engaged at bloody costs. As will be noted by reading the chapters on the fighting on the easternfront, here, as in East Prussia, the Russians make a determined advanceand actually succeed in conquering this territory from the Austrians. Atone time we find them even in possession of all except one of the chiefpasses in the Carpathians and threatening to overrun the plains ofHungary. To hold Russian Poland it was necessary that they should have afirm grip of East Prussia and Austrian Poland, thus protecting theflanks of their center. Had they been able to hold their grip, then theycould have straightened out their entire line from north to south, andWarsaw would have been safe. But we shall see both their extremitiesdriven back; therefore Warsaw was in danger, in spite of itsfortifications. That the Austrians should have allowed themselves to be thrust back overthe Carpathians is one of the surprises of the early stages of the war. For these mountains are only second in size in all Europe to the Alpsthemselves, forming the eastern wing of the great European mountainsystem. They are about 800 miles long and nearly 250 miles wide inparts. Some of the higher peaks reach 8, 000 feet above sea level. Imagine the vision of an army marching along the roads from thefoothills to the mountains leading through mysterious, shadowy spruceforests, where the soil is covered with rich carpets of moss. Foamingstreams ripple in among the moss-covered bowlders. Then the paths emergeon the cheerful, emerald-green pastures of the slopes, alive with theflocks of goats, sheep and cattle, attended by their shepherds. A littlefarther and the whole scenery changes, and the armies approachtremendous mountains of solid granite, ominously dark, shining likehammered iron, rising abruptly from the stone débris and black patchesof mountain fir, and towering bluffs and crags seem to pierce the skywith their sharp peaks, bastions and jagged ridges, like giganticfortresses. Clouds of white mist, driven and torn by gusts of wind, cling to the precipitous walls, and masses of eternal snow lie in themany fissures and depressions, forming large, sharply outlined streaksand patches. The Magyars inhabit the great central plains of Hungary whichconstitutes ethnologically a vast island of Magyars in a sea of Slavs. The Carpathian slopes on the Hungarian side of the ranges, including themounts of the Tatra--with the exception of the Zips district, which ispeopled with German-Saxon colonists--are inhabited, in their westernparts, by two million Slovaks, in the eastern parts by half a millionRuthenians or Little Russians, and on the Transylvanian side by nearlythree million Rumanians. The border lines between these Rumanians andthe Magyars and between the Hungaro-Slav groups (Slovaks and Ruthenians)and the Magyars lie far down within the borders of the great centralHungarian plains. This line at one point extends to within a few milesof the Hungarian capital of Budapest. CHAPTER XLIV THE BALKANS--COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES This survey of the fighting ground in eastern Europe brings us now tothe "cockpit of the war. " From a military point of view, as well as fromthe political, the Balkan theatre is of equal importance with other bigfronts in Europe. It is the gateway to the Orient for central Europe. Here the armies engaged are numbered only by the hundred thousands, nonereach a million. But from the point of view of human interest andpolitical intrigue it is by far the most picturesque. Here the hatredbetween the combatants is most bitter; indeed so bitter that when itburst into flame a mad whirlwind of passion swept over half the world. For here the great conflagration began. A map of the Balkan Peninsula is almost, on the face of it, a fullexplanation of the causes of the war. The military campaigns, studied inconnection with their physical environment, explain all the diplomaticintrigues of the past fifty years, for they are the intrigues themselvestranslated into action. Geographically speaking, the Balkan nations are those situated in thebig peninsula of southern Europe which lies below the Danube River andthe northern border of Montenegro. Some authorities, however, includeRumania, and others even bring in Austria's Slavic provinces, Bosnia andHerzegovina. The most noticeable feature of this vast war-ridden region is itsmountains. Those same Carpathian Mountains, which form the naturalboundary between the land of the Magyars and the Russian plains, take asudden turn westward at the Rumanian frontier, then sweep around in agreat semicircle, forming a shape resembling a scythe, the handle ofwhich reaches up into Poland, the blade curling around within the BalkanPeninsula. Behind the handle, and above the upper part of the blade, stretch the broad plains of Hungary, through which flows the greatDanube, the largest river in Europe next to the Russian Volga--a riverwhich flowed with blood during the Great War. Just in the middle of theback of the blade this great river bursts through the mountain chain, swirling through the famous Iron Gate into the great basin within thecurved blade. On the south of its farther course to the Black Sea liethe plains of northern Bulgaria. The curving chain of mountains below the Iron Gate is the Balkan Range. But excepting for the plains of Thrace, lying south of the Balkans, overtoward the Black Sea and above Constantinople, the rest of the peninsulais almost entirely one confused tangle of craggy mountains, interspersedthroughout with small, fertile valleys and plateaus. This roughness ofsurface becomes especially aggravated as one passes westward, and overtoward the Adriatic coast, from Greece up into the Austrian province ofDalmatia, the country is almost inaccessible to ordinary travelers. What is the political value of this beleaguered domain? The broad, significant fact is that any road from western Europe to the Orient mustpass through the Balkan Peninsula, and that these mountains almost blockthat road. From north to south there is just one highway, so narrow thatit is really a defile. This road stretches from the seat of the war at Belgrade on the Danubedown a narrow valley, the Morava, thence through the highlands ofMacedonia into the Vardar Valley to Saloniki, on the Ægean Sea. At Nish, above Macedonia, another road branches off into Bulgaria across theplains of Thrace and into Constantinople. This was the road by which theCrusaders swarmed down to conquer the Holy Land. This was the road bywhich, hundreds of years later, the Moslems swarmed up into the plainsof Hungary and overran the south of Europe, until they were finallychecked outside the gates of Vienna. Nothing is more significant of theterror that these marching hosts inspired than the fact that, with theexception of a few larger towns, the villages hid themselves away fromthis highway in the hills. Bear clearly in mind that in the existence of this narrow way to theOrient lies the key not only to the causes of the war, but to themilitary campaigns that we shall follow in this region. For it is theTeutons who would in the Great War, like the Crusaders of old, pass downthis highway and again conquer the East, though in this case theirobject is trade, and not the Holy Sepulcher. To secure the pathway through this strategic country it also isnecessary to have control of the territory on all sides, and this isquite as true in a political as in a military sense. To secure theirpathway up into Europe the Turks once conquered all the peoples in theBalkans, except those inhabiting the mountains over on the Adriatic: theMontenegrins and a small city called Ragusa, just above Montenegro inDalmatia. It is not at all peculiar that just here, in almost the samelocality, the Teutons should meet with the first and strongestresistance. A study of the territory in which the first fighting of the war occurredwill explain the foregoing calculations. It will be observed thatAustrian territory runs down past the eastward turn in the Danube, alongthe frontier of Montenegro, until it narrows gradually into a tip atCattaro, just below Cettinje, the Montenegrin capital. This land iscomposed of the three provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. Allthis territory is inhabited by the same race that peoples Serbia andMontenegro--the Serbs. In fact, the Slavic population reaches up allalong the coast to Trieste, and even a little beyond. For this reason itis in this direction that we shall see the Serbians and the Montenegrinsinvade Austrian territory, after their initial success in repulsing theAustrian invasion. The objectives of the brief campaign soon to be considered wereSarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and Ragusa, the famous little seaporton the Adriatic. Ragusa is of especial interest on account of itsremarkable history. In the Middle Ages it was the most important seaportin that part of the world. Its ships sailed over all the Mediterraneanand from them is derived the word "argosy, " signifying a ship laden withwealth. Again and again the Turks attempted to conquer this littlestate, which was at that time a republic, but always the Ragusans beatoff the enemy. For the country about is so rocky, so rough, that thecity was easily defended, especially in that time when nearly allfighting was hand to hand. The first and foremost word in the Great War--the key word--is Sarajevo. Here is the scene of the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria, which was at least the final cause of the war. As we enter it we find apopulation of about forty thousand, half of which are Mohammedans. It isa large, straggling town, situated in a narrowing valley overtopped bysteep hills on either side, which close in a narrow gorge in the eastand broaden into a plain on the west. It was to the eastward, however, that we shall find the heavy fighting along the Austro-Serbian frontier. The armies along the Danube will soon command our attention. As theyfollow the river toward Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, it is no longerthe "Blue Danube" of the famous German song. Here, in fact, it is abroad, mud-colored river, dotted with a number of low islands along itscenter. Belgrade, where the first shots of the war were fired, islocated on rather high ground, backed by a semicircle of low hills inits rear. But opposite all is flat and, in places, marshy. Modern gunscould, of course, keep up an effective fire across the river at thispoint, as in fact they did before the actual invasion of Serbia began, but the conditions for a crossing are not favorable. It was from thewest, from the Bosnian side, that the actual attack was made. Just below Belgrade the river Save, shallower and narrower, empties intothe Danube, forming the frontier westward, past Shabatz, to Ratcha, where the Drina, flowing down from the Macedonian highlands northward, joins it, forming the western frontier between Bosnia and Serbia. The Drina, where much fighting occurs, is no ordinary waterway, no meremountain stream, though it lies in a mountainous country. Beforereaching its junction with the Save it is fed by many importanttributaries. Ever swift, often torrential, it has washed out a bed ofimposing width, and by a constant cutting out of new courses has createda series of deltas. It was one of the largest of these islands, that ofKuriachista, between Losnitza and Leschnitza, that the Austrians choseas a base for their first invasion. From this point up and around toShabatz lies the bloody field of the Austro-Serbian battles. A description of this section, in brief at least, is necessary to anunderstanding of the three Austrian invasions made here, and all threeof which failed disastrously. North and west of Shabatz lies the greatplain of Matchva, bounded on its east and north by the Save and by theDrina on the west. It is a rich, fertile land, but much broken up bywoodland. To the southeast a rolling valley is divided by the RiverDobrava, while due south the Tzer Mountains rise like a camel's back outof the plain and stretch right across from the Drina to the Dobrava. Thesouthern slopes of Tzer are less abrupt than those on the north anddescend gradually into the Leschnitza Valley, out of which rise thelesser heights of the Iverak Mountains. Both these ranges are largelycovered by prune orchards, intersected with some sparse timber. This is a region of natural fortifications. Descending southward again, the foothills of Iverak are lost in a chain of summits, which flank theright bank of the Jadar River, that tributary of the Drina River fromwhich the first big battle takes its name. From the left bank of the Jadar, from its junction with the Drina toJarebitze, a great rolling level stretches south until the high GuchevoMountains, stretching in southeasterly direction, rise abruptly and hidethe Bosnian hills from view. From there, southward, the country isextremely mountainous, even the highways being blasted out of the sidesof the precipitous mountains along the innumerable ravines through whichrun watercourses which, though almost dry in summer, burst intotorrential streams after the snows begin to melt in the higheraltitudes. Naturally in such a country roads are of prime importance in militaryoperations. A few built and maintained by the state are in excellentcondition and practicable in all sorts of weather. But for the restcommunications consist of bridle paths and trails over the mountains. As has been stated, the great highway from Belgrade to Saloniki is thekey to all military operations in the Balkans; nor is this case anyexception. A study of the map will show how this big, underlying factentered into the plans of the first three attempts at invading Serbia. Naturally, had facilities been convenient at Belgrade, that would havebeen the point from which to advance. The next possible point was overthe Drina, because it was not so wide or so deep. Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the war were sparsely servedby railroads. But for the purpose of an invasion of Serbia the linesrunning to Tuzla in the north and to Vishegrade and Uvatz in the southwere of much strategic importance. Moreover, unlike the Hungarian plainopposite Belgrade, the country is so mountainous and well wooded thatgreat bodies of troops could be moved about without being observed. Wenow come to the main reason why this point was chosen, next to Belgrade. Though we shall see that they did not reach it at their first attempt, there is no doubt that the main objective of the Austrians was thelittle town of Valievo, lying some distance back from the Jadar and thefield of battle. For at Valievo is the terminus of a light railway whichjoins with the main line running from Belgrade down to Saloniki. TheTeutons were in a hurry to open this highway, for it meant opening ameans of communication with the Turks, who were to become, and later didbecome, their active allies. These are political matters of significancehere insomuch as they explain the special importance of the railway fromBelgrade south along the ancient highway of the Crusaders. Before following this route farther south, a few words should be devotedto Montenegro. Between Serbia and Montenegro lies the Sanjak ofNovibazar. This small territory nominally belonged to Turkey before theBalkan War, but it was in fact garrisoned by Austrian troops, the civiladministration being left to the Turks. Austria had gone to specialtrouble to establish this arrangement, so that it might have a wedgebetween the territories of the two little Serb nations. Anticipatingthis war long ago, Austria had counted on having a large enough force inNovibazar to prevent a union of the two armies. But, when it actuallycame, she was in no position to prevent it, so much of her strengthbeing required to meet the Russians. Montenegro is the natural refuge of the Serbs. Whenever in the past theywere especially hard pressed by the Turks, they would flee to themountain fastnesses of Tzherna Gora, the Black Mountain, for heremilitary operations, even in this day of modern artillery, areabsolutely impossible, and when it came to mountain guerrilla fighting, the Turks were no match for the Serbs. Thus it was that the Serbs wereable to preserve their old traditions, their language and the best bloodof their race. And it may be said that to a slightly lesser extentRagusa served the same purpose. The Montenegrins are born fighters and die fighters. From one end to theother Montenegro is one wilderness of mountain crags and toweringprecipices, traversed only by foot trails. Here and there a shelf oflevel soil may be found, just enough to enable people to grow their ownnecessities. The capital of this rocky domain, high up among the cragsand overlooking the Adriatic, is Cettinje, which was to be stormed andconquered by the Teutons. The main street, about 150 yards long, comprising two-thirds of the town, is so broad that three or fourcarriages may be driven abreast down the length of it. It is composedentirely of one and two story cottages. A few short streets branch offat right angles, and in these is all of Cettinje that is not comprisedin the main street. The king inhabited a modest-looking, brown edificewith a small garden attached. Overlooking the capital is Mt. Lovcen, ontop of which the Montenegrins planted guns to defend any attack thatmight be made against them. South of Montenegro and north of Greece lies another country ofinstinctive fighters. It is similar in physical aspect, but verydifferent in its population. This is the land of the Albanians, whom theTurks conquered by force of arms, like all the rest of the Balkanpeninsula. They are a distinct race by themselves; it is supposed thatthey are the descendants of the ancient Illyrians, those wild tribes ofwhom the ancient Greeks wrote. Nor is this unlikely, for in such acountry as theirs the inhabitants are most likely to remain pure fromgeneration to generation. Returning for a few moments to Belgrade, we now may resume our coursedown the ancient highway toward Saloniki. Down the Morava Valley passesthe railroad, after which it passes within a few miles of the Bulgarianfrontier, near Kustendil; dangerously near the frontier of a possibleenemy, but especially perilous in this war in which the Serbians wouldnaturally endeavor to retreat toward her ally, Greece. Just below Vranya the railroad enters what was, before the two BalkanWars, the Turkish territory of Macedonia. This region down to withinsixty miles of Saloniki was reconquered from the Turks by the Serbs, having been Serb inhabited since early in the Christian era as shown byhistorical record. As early as 950 Constantin Porphyrogenitus writes ofits inhabitants as Serbs, from whom, he says, the town of Serbia on theBistritza River near Saloniki took its name. Throughout this regionthere are so many mountain ranges that it would be impossible to namethem all. Nowhere has blood been more continuously shed than here, andnowhere in Europe is the scenery more beautiful. Especially impressive is that section around Monastir, toward thefrontier of Albania and away from the main line of the railroad. Here, not more than a day's walk from the city of Monastir, or Bitolia, as itsSlavic inhabitants call it, is Lake Prespa, a small sheet ofcrystal-clear water in which are reflected the peaks and the ruggedcrags of the surrounding mountains. Through a subterranean passage thewaters of this mountain lake pass under the range that separates it fromthe much larger lake, Ochrida, the source of the bloody Drina. The people of these mountains are Serbs, almost to Saloniki. Uskub, whose ancient Serb name is Skoplya, was the old Serb capital, and therethe Serb ruler Doushan was crowned emperor in 1346. For the past five hundred years these Macedonians have been used to allthe ways of guerrilla fighting. Roaming through their mountains in smallbands they have harassed the Turkish soldiers continuously. The Bulgarian ruler Ferdinand had through many years by means ofcommittees and church jugglery striven to Bulgarize this population, preparatory to the contemplated seizure of the territory which he hasnow been able with the help of the Germanic powers to accomplish. But inreality the Bulgar population in what was European Turkey was found onlyeastward of the Struma in Thracia including Adrianople. Those regionsformed the ample and legitimate field of ambition for the unification ofthe Bulgars. When hostilities broke out in 1914, when Serbia was defending herselfagainst the Austrians, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, the secret ally bytreaty of Austria, did everything possible to forward his designsagainst the Serbs and sent armed Bulgar bands into Serb Macedonia. Shortly below the city of Monastir in the west begins the Greekfrontier, running over eastward to Doiran, where it touches theBulgarian frontier. Here the railroad, coming down along the VardarRiver, emerges into the swamp lands and over them passes into the cityof Saloniki. Here is the old territory of Philip of Macedon, the father of theconqueror. For some forty or fifty miles these swamps stretch out fromSaloniki, overshadowed by Mt. Olympus on their southern edge. While notquite so extensive as the Pinsk Swamps, they are quite as impassable, from a military point of view. In the center of this region of bulrushesand stunted forests is an open sheet of shallow water, Lake Enedjee. Nearly all this swamp land is submerged, but here and there are smallislands. For some years the Turkish soldiers garrisoned these islandsduring the mild winter months, living on them in rush huts. In thesummer they would withdraw into the near-by foothills. But one summerseveral hundred Comitajis descended into the swamps and took possession. The stunted forests and the bulrushes here are traversed by a maze ofnarrow waterways, just wide enough for a punt to pass along. When thesoldiers returned in the fall, they started out for their islands instrings of punts. Presently they were met by volleys of bullets thatseemed to come from all directions out of the bulrushes. Some, in theirpanic, leaped out into the shallow water and sunk in the mire. The restretired. For years the Turkish soldiers attempted to drive the Comitajis out ofthe swamp. First they surrounded it, watching all possible landingplaces, but the outlaws had supplies smuggled in to them by thepeasants. Then the Turks began bombarding with heavy cannon, which, ofcourse, was futile, since they could not distinguish the points at whichthey were firing. And finally they gave up molesting the Comitajis, whocontinued making the swamps their headquarters until the Young Turkscame into power. Then, believing that a constitutional Macedonia wasfinally to be granted them, all the Comitajis laid down their arms. It is a peculiar fact that Saloniki, one of the largest cities on thepeninsula, with a population considerably over a hundred thousand, should represent none of the national elements of the country. Forthough Bulgars, Turks, Greeks, and Serbs may be found there, anoverwhelming majority, nearly 90, 000 of the people, are Spanish Jews. Walking along the streets, it would be easy to imagine oneself in Spainor in Mexico; on all sides the shouts of peddlers, the cries of cabmen, the conversation of pedestrians, are in Spanish. With a knowledge ofthat language the stranger may make his way about as easily as in hisown native country. These are the descendants of the Jews who weredriven out of Spain by Torquemada and his Spanish Inquisition and wereso hospitably received by the Sultan of Turkey. Saloniki, where we shall witness severe battles, is situated at the headof the gulf by the same name, an inlet of the Ægean Sea. It is awell-fortified city, built on the water's edge, but surrounding it ishigh land commanding the surrounding country. Added to that, the swampregion is another protection from an enemy coming from inland. Itsseaward forts, however, are, or were, obsolete and would probablycrumble before the fire of modern naval guns. Stretching down the eastern shore of the Gulf is a peninsula on which isthe famous Mt. Athos, that very peculiar community of celibate monks. Here, in the Holy Mountain, as the Slavs call it, there are monasteriesrepresenting all the various denominations of the Greek Orthodox Church:Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian, each swarming with hundreds ofmonks, who pass their time in idleness. Not only are women forbidden toenter this domain, but even female dogs or cats are kept out. Across this upper end of the Ægean, from Mt. Athos, is the Bulgarianport, Dedeagatch, to which runs a branch of the main railway from Sofiato Constantinople. The country here is low and swampy, the port itselfbeing little more than a boat landing. Just below this point, across the Gulf of Saros, is the peninsula ofGallipoli, where a critical phase of the war was fought. It is somewhatlike the blade of a scimitar, covering the entrance to the Sea ofMarmora. Between this strip of land and the coast of Asia Minor is anarrow strait, the outer mouth of which is called the Dardanelles, theinner gateway being the famous Hellespont. Here it was that Xerxescrossed over on a bridge of boats at the head of his Persian army toinvade Greece, only to meet disaster at Thermopylæ, and here Alexanderof Macedonia crossed over to begin his march of conquest which was toextend his power as far as India. And about this narrow strait iscentered the ancient Greek myth about Hero and Leander, which inspiredByron to swim across from Asia to Europe. How well the Turks have fortified this approach to their capital is wellenough indicated in the story of the operations of the allied fleets intheir attempt to force the passage. From the Hellespont to Constantinople is a sail of forty miles, along acoast steep and rugged, destitute of any harbor or even a beach where aboat might land. Nor is there a more beautiful sight than that which ispresented on approaching the Turkish capital from this direction, especially of an early morning. Against the dawn in the East aresilhouetted the minarets and domes and the palace roofs of the city;then, as the light increases, the white buildings are distinguished moreclearly through a purple mist that rises from the waters, until the shipenters the Bosphorus, gliding past the shipping and the boat trafficalong the shore of the harbor. The beauties of the Bosphorus have beendescribed in every book of travel that has ever included this section ofthe world in its descriptions: it is undoubtedly the most beautifulwaterway that may be found in any country. Emerging into the Black Sea from the Bosphorus, one strikes theBulgarian coast not far above that neck of land on which Constantinopleis built. Along this stretch of coast up to the mouth of the Danubethere are two harbors, Varna and Burgas. Each is terminus of a branchrailroad leading off from the Nish-Sofia-Constantinople line. BehindBurgas lie the level tracts of Eastern Rumelia, or Thrace, as that partof the country is still called. But Varna is above the point where theBalkan Range strikes the coast, all of which is steep and rocky. Above Varna begins the Delta of the Danube, up which steamers andheavily laden barges sail continuously, but here also begins the neutralterritory of Rumania, the Dobruja, the richest section of the Danubebasin, which was ceded to Rumania by Bulgaria after the Second BalkanWar. CHAPTER XLV THE CAUCASUS--THE BARRED DOOR We now come to that section of the eastern theatre of the war whichreceived the least extended notice in printed reports--the barreddoorway between Europe and Asia, --the Caucasus. Not because the fightingthere was less furious, but because the region was less accessible towar correspondents. The struggle was in fact quite as bloody and evenmore savage and barbarous here than elsewhere, for on this front Russmeets Turk, Christian meets Moslem, and where they grapple the veneer ofchivalry blisters off. Here again, as in Galicia, we come to a natural frontier, not onlybetween two races, but between two continents. For here, crossing theisthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, stretches a mountainrange over seven hundred miles in length, rising abruptly out of theplains on either side. These are the Caucasus Mountains, forming theboundary between Europe and Asia. The higher and central part of the range (which averages only from sixtyto seventy miles in width) is formed of parallel ridges, not separatedby deep and wide valleys, but remarkably connected by elevated plateaus, which are traversed by narrow fissures of extreme depth. The highestpeaks are in the most central chain; Mt. Elburz, attaining an elevationof 18, 000 feet above the sea, while Mt. Kasbeck reaches a height of morethan 16, 000 feet, and several other peaks rise above the line ofperpetual snow. The outlying spurs and foothills of this chain of loftymountains are of less extent and importance than those of almost anyother mountain range of similar magnitude, subsiding, as they do, untilthey are only 200 feet high along the shores of the Black Sea. Someparts are almost entirely bare, but other parts are densely wooded andthe secondary ranges near the Black Sea are covered by magnificentforests of oak, beech, ash, maple, and walnut. This range is an almost impassable wall across the narrow isthmus whichjoins Europe and Asia, and the Gorge of Dariel is the gateway in thiswall through which have come almost all the migrating races that havepeopled the continent of Europe. As is well known, the white peoples ofEurope have been classified as the Caucasian race, because they were allsupposed to have passed through this gateway originally. Apparently eachof these oncoming waves of barbaric humanity, bursting through the greatgateway, must have left behind some few remnants of their volume, fornowhere in the world, in so limited an area, is there such a diversityand mixture of peoples. In the words of one writer, who speaks withauthority on this region, the Caucasus is "an ethnological museum wherethe invaders of Europe, as they traveled westward to be manufacturedinto nations, left behind samples of themselves in their raw condition. " Here may be found the Georgians, who so long championed the Crossagainst the Crescent, the wild Lesghians from the highlands ofDaghestan; the Circassians, famed for the beauty of their women;Suanetians, Ossets, Abkhasians, Mingrelians, not to enumerate dozens ofother tribes and races, each speaking its own tongue. It is said thatover a hundred languages are spoken throughout this region; seventy inthe city of Tiflis alone. The scenery of the mountains themselves is unparalleled in grandeurexcept by the Himalayas and offers many a virgin peak to the ambitiousmountain climber. Here may be found the ibex, the stag, the wild boar, the wild bull and an infinite variety of feathered game. The animal lifeof the mountains has, in fact, become more abundant of late years onaccount of the high charges for hunting licenses fixed by the RussianGovernment. Wolves are so plentiful that in severe winters they descendto the lowlands in great packs and rob the flocks before the very eyesof the shepherds. The most important mineral resources of the region are the oil wells;here, in fact, around Batum, are situated some of the most important oilfields in the world. Of manganese ore, an essential of the steelindustry, the Caucasus furnishes half of the world's supply, which isexported from the two ports of Poti and Batum. Its mineral wealth seemsto be practically unlimited, copper, zinc, iron, tin, and many othermetals being found throughout the region, in most cases in exceedinglyrich deposits. The agricultural resources are not so important, especially from a military point of view, though vast quantities ofsheep are raised in the highlands in the spring and summer, the flocksbeing driven down into the plains to the south in winter. One of the outstanding features of Russian occupation is the greatGeorgian military road which has been built across the mountains ofrecent years and maintained by the Government. Its engineering ismasterly; here and there it passes close to or under vast overhanginglumps of mountainside. Everywhere the greatest care has been taken ofthis most important military highway, Russia's avenue into that countryshe coveted and fought for so long. Beginning at Vladikavkaz, it runsthrough Balta, Lars, thence through the famous Gorge of Dariel, the"Circassian Gates, " the dark and awful defile between Europe and Asia. The gorge is what the geologists call a "fault, " for it is not really apass over the mountain chain, but a rent clear across it. Seventy yearsago it was almost impassable for avalanches or the sudden outbursts ofpent-up glacial streams swept it from end to end, but the Russians havespent over $20, 000, 000 on it and made it safe. In 1877, during theRusso-Turkish War, nearly all the troops and stores for carrying the warinto Turkey and Asia came by this road. Its importance has since been lessened to a certain degree, for there isnow direct railway communication from Moscow to Baku, at one end of theTrans-Caucasian Railway, and therefore to Kars itself, via Tiflis; andequally from Batum to Kars at the other end to which military steamerscan bring troops and supplies from Odessa and Novorossik in the BlackSea. The most important city in this region is Tiflis, the "city of seventylanguages. " It may, indeed, be called the modern Babel. As seen from themountains, it lies at the bottom of a brown, treeless valley, betweensteep hills, on either side of the River Kura. It is a point of great importance to modern Russia. It forms, to beginwith, the end of the great military road across the mountains which, inspite of the railways, is still the quickest way to Europe for an armyas well as for travelers, and all the mails come over it by expresscoaches. From Tiflis a railway runs to Kars, a strong frontier on thePersian frontier. Tiflis has been much developed under the Russian Government. In themodern section of the city the streets are wide and paved and lighted byelectricity and the stores are large and handsome while electricrailways run in all directions. In the older parts of the city, however, the houses remain as they were built centuries ago, divided out into themany quarters devoted to the residences of the many races andnationalities that compose the population of Tiflis. Between most ofthem is bitter enmity and prejudice, even among those of the two greatreligious faiths, Christians and Mohammedans. It is this diversity ofinterests, which extends throughout all the section down into Persia, which has so complicated the situation on this front. For not only arethe two military forces fighting here, but wherever governmentalauthority is momentarily relaxed, there these mutual animosities flareup into active expression and the most barbarous features of warfaretake place, such as the massacres of the Armenians by the Mohammedans. Neither Turkey nor Russia has been especially eager to suppress thesebitter feuds, even in time of peace. In time of war there is nothing torestrain them, and the whole region is swept by carnage infinitely morehideous than legitimate warfare. We have now passed over the entire theatre of the battles on the Easternfrontiers of the war in Europe. The battle grounds are familiar to us. In the succeeding chapters we will follow the armies over thiswar-ridden dominion and watch the battle lines as they move through thewar to its decisive conclusion. PART IV--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN CHAPTER XLVI SERBIA'S SITUATION AND RESOURCES The first great campaign on the southeastern battle grounds of the GreatWar began on July 27, 1914, when the Austrian troops undertook theirfirst invasion of Serbia. They crossed the Serbian border at Mitrovitza, about fifty miles northwest of Belgrade, driving the Serbians beforethem. The first real hostilities of the war opened with the bombardmentof Belgrade by the Austrians on July 29, 1914--six days before thebeginning of the campaigns on the western battle fields. We are now familiar with the theatre of war as described in thepreceding chapters, and will now follow the first Austrian armies intoSerbia. A stubborn fight excites the admiration of all observers, regardless ofthe moral qualities of the combatants. So, wherever our sympathies maylie, considering the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that thedefense which the Serbians made against the first efforts of theAustrians to invade their country will stand out in the early history ofthe war as one of the most brilliant episodes of that period of thegeneral struggle. Like a mighty tidal wave from the ocean the Austrianhosts swept over the Serbian frontier in three furious successiveonslaughts, only to be beaten back each time. Naturally, there werematerial and moral causes, aside from the mere valor of the Serbians, which combined to create this disaster for the Austrian forces, butenough of the human element enters into the military activities ofthese campaigns to make them easily the most picturesque of the earlyperiod of the war. Before entering into a description of the actual events in 1914, it iswell to consider the forces engaged. From a material point of view theSerbians entered into these campaigns greatly handicapped. They hadlately been through two wars. In the First Balkan War they had not, itis true, been severely tested; the weight of the fighting had been borneby the Bulgarians in Thrace. The real test, and the great losses, cameonly with the second war, when the Serbian army threw every fiber of itsstrength against the Bulgarians in the Battle of the Bregalnitza, one ofthe most stubborn struggles in military history. The result was aSerbian victory, but it was very far from being a decisive andconclusive victory. The Bulgarians were forced back some fifteen milesinto their own territory, but had it not been for the intervention ofRumania there can be no doubt that the Serbs would have entered Sofia. Here it was that the Serbians lost 7, 000 killed and 30, 000 wounded oftheir best men, as against 5, 000 killed and 18, 000 wounded in the wholewar with Turkey; a total loss that was bound to be felt a few monthslater when the struggle was to be against so powerful an adversary asAustria-Hungary. The two previous wars had, without exaggeration, deprived the Serbian fighting forces of one-tenth their number--a tenththat was of the very best of first-line troops. [Illustration: Pictorial Map of the Balkans. ] Added to this was another serious handicap, possibly even more serious. Serbia had, indeed, emerged victorious from the two wars, with a largestretch of conquered territory at her backdoor. But this acquiredterritory, practically all of Macedonia that had not gone to Greece, waspeopled by Serbs. For twenty-five years these Macedonians had beenorganized into revolutionary fighting bands, the "Macedonian Committee"for the liberation of Macedonia and Albania from the Turks, and hadstruggled, not only against the Turks, but against foreign armed bandsof propagandists. Some eight years subsequently to the foundation of theMacedonian Committee of native origin, the Bulgars founded in 1893 theircommittee which was called the Macedo-Adrianople Committee. During theFirst Balkan War these experienced guerrilla fighters were valuableallies to the Serbian forces operating against the Turks. But even before the First Balkan War the Serbians had very distinctlygiven the Macedonians to understand that they were to remain Serbiansubjects. This action on their part had had not a little to do withrousing the Bulgarians to precipitate the Second Balkan War. And whenfinally Serbia conquered all this territory, confirmed to her down toDoiran by the treaty of Bucharest, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria began atonce a fiery anti-Serb propaganda throughout the world, and tookmeasures through provocatory agents and Bulgar bands crossing fromBulgaria into Macedonia to create disturbances. When the Great War broke out in July, 1914, this Bulgarian activity inSerb Macedonia grew more intense. Thus it was that when the Austriansattacked the Serbians on their front the Serbians had still to detachenough of their forces to guard the Serbo-Bulgar border to prevent thecrossing into Serb Macedonia of Bulgar bands. And added to this was thedanger from Bulgaria herself. The Serbians knew that the opportunemoment had only to come and Bulgaria, too, would hurl herself on theSerbian eastern flank. Thus another large percentage of the Serbianfighting forces had also to be stationed along the Bulgarian frontier toguard against possible attack from that quarter. Offsetting these handicaps, however, and more than equalizing them, wasthe moral strength of the Serbian fighting units. They had just emergedthrough two victorious wars; they had triumphed so completely that therewas small wonder if the Serbian farmers had come to believe themselvesinvincible and their leaders infallible. Practically every man in theSerbian army was a seasoned veteran; he had had not only his baptism offire, but he had been through some of the bloodiest battles of moderntimes. He had got over his first fright; he was in that state of mindwhere danger and bloodshed no longer inspired either fear or horror. Andeven the warlike savage trembles on entering his first battle. Finally, he was now defending his country, his home, his very fireside and hisfamily against foreign invasion. And it is generally admitted that a manfighting in that situation is equal to two invaders, all other thingsbeing equal. The Serb army opposing the Austrian invasions was composed of tendivisions of the First Ban and five divisions of the Second Ban. Five ofthe divisions of the First Ban and the five of the Second came from thekingdom as it was prior to the two Balkan wars, but the second fivedivisions of the First Ban were new creations recruited from SerbMacedonia. The principles on which the organization of the Serbian army was basedwere very simple. The former kingdom was divided into five territorialdivisional districts--Nish, Valievo, Belgrade, Kragujevatz, andZaitchar. Each of these territorial divisional districts was subdividedinto four regimental recruiting districts, each of which provided oneinfantry regiment of four battalions and one depot battalion. Thebattalion numbered about a thousand men, so that the war strength of thedivisional infantry amounted to, about 16, 000 men. Attached to eachdivision was a regiment of artillery, consisting of three groups ofthree 6-gun batteries; in all, 54 guns. The divisional cavalry, existingonly in war time, consisted of a regiment of four squadrons, from menand horses previously registered. To each division was also attached itsown technical and administrative units, engineers, and supply column, and its total strength amounted to 23, 000 officers and men of first-linetroops. In addition to these five divisions of the First Ban, there was also aregiment of mountain artillery, made up of six batteries, six howitzerbatteries and two battalions of fortress artillery. Then there was aseparate cavalry division composed of two brigades, each of tworegiments. Its war strength was 80 officers and 3, 200 men. Attached tothe cavalry division were two horse artillery batteries, of eight gunseach. All told, this first-line army numbered about 200, 000, with about5, 200 sabers and 330 guns. [Illustration: Serbian and Austrian Invasions. ] The Second Ban, or reserve, much inferior in armament to the first line, brought the strength up to about 280, 000 men. But this figure isprobably an underestimate. Volunteers were enrolled in immense numbers. Some of them were men who had been exempted in the first conscription;others were Serbs from Austrian territory. The United States sent backthousands of Austrian and Macedonian Serbs who had emigrated there. Itis probable, therefore, that the total strength of the Serbian forcesshortly after the war broke out was at least 280, 000, if not a triflemore. To this must be added the Montenegrin army which, though operatingin a separate field, contributed its share in driving the Austriansback; another 40, 000 men of first-class fighting ability and experience. Finally, there was the third reserve, another 50, 000 men, but they couldbe used for fighting only in the gravest emergency. The infantry of the First Ban was armed with excellent Mauser rifles, caliber 7 mm. , model 1899. The Second Ban carried a Mauser, the oldsingle loader, to which a magazine was fitted in the Serbian arsenals;while the Third Ban had the old single-loader Berdan rifle. The machinegun carried was the Maxim, of the same caliber as the new Mauser. In artillery the Serbians were perhaps not so well off. Their cannonshad seen a great deal of service in the Balkan wars, and the larger apiece of artillery the more limited is the number of rounds it can fire. It is extremely doubtful that there had been time to replace many ofthese worn-out pieces. The field gun was of French make; it was a 3-inch quick firer with amaximum range for shrapnel of 6, 000 yards, a little over 3-1/2 miles. The Second Ban was armed with old De Bange guns of 8 cm. Caliber. Theheavy guns, which had done much service outside Adrianople, were ofCreuzot make, and included 24 howitzers of 15 cm. And some mortars of 24cm. As for the aviation wing, there was none. The Serbian army was under the superior command of the Chief of theGeneral Staff, Voivode (Field Marshal) Putnik. Unlike his youngercolleagues, his military education was entirely a home product; he hadnever studied abroad. His father was one of those Serbs born on Austriansoil; he had emigrated from Hungary to Serbia in the early forties wherehe had followed the vocation of school-teacher. In 1847 the futuregeneral was born. After passing through the elementary schools, youngPutnik entered the military academy at Belgrade. He had already attaineda commission when the war of 1876 with Turkey broke out, through whichhe served as a captain of infantry. His next experience was in theunfortunate war with Bulgaria, in 1885, in which the Serbians werebeaten after a three days' battle. At the outbreak of the war withTurkey, in 1912, General Putnik was made head of the army and receivedthe grade of voivode (field marshal), being the first Serbian to enjoythat distinction. The grade of field marshal was created in the Serbianarmy during the First Balkan War. With him worked Colonel Pavlovitch, the son of a farmer, who had won aseries of scholarships, enabling him to study in Berlin. He had directedthe military operations in the field against Turkey and Bulgaria, and hewas to do the same thing under his old chief against the Austrians. CHAPTER XLVII AUSTRIA'S STRENGTH AND STRATEGY Let us now review the Austrian forces that participated in the invasionsof Serbia. In number they were practically unlimited, at least they faroutnumbered the Serbian forces that met them in the field. Theirarmament was of the best and their equipment as complete as boundlessresources could make it. They were, however, partly made up of thepeoples of the Slavic provinces of Austria--Bohemians, Croatians, Dalmatians, and Bosnians. Naturally there could be but little enthusiasmin their attacks on their brother Slavs, and while there are many mutualanimosities between these various branches of the Slavic race, suchfeelings are, at any rate, secondary to the general dislike of the"Schwabs, " as the German-Austrians are called, and the Magyars. Possiblythis had much to do with the Austrian defeats. The Hungarian, orMagyar, regiments were probably in the majority. But the Magyars fromthe interior of Hungary have no special reason to hate the Serbians, and, aside from that, they were attacking on foreign soil. At the head of the Austrian campaigns against Serbia was GeneralPotiorek, generally described as a textbook strategist. But just howmuch his failures were due to his own inefficiency and how much to theinefficiency of those under him will probably never be determined; hehad in the end to suffer for both. These were the two great contending forces that were set in motion bythe departure of Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, fromBelgrade, on July 25, 1914. On the same day the Prince Regent Alexandersigned a decree ordering the general mobilization of the Serbian army. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria declared war. By that timeSerbia was in the midst of her mobilization. That the Austrians, who had the advantage of having taken theinitiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the openingof hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of theirfavorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial militarycritics. On the same day that they declared war they had the opportunityto hurl their troops across the Danube and take Belgrade withpractically no opposition. Apparently they were not ready; from thatmoment the difficulties that would have attended such a movementincreased hourly. A force of 20, 000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense ofBelgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the evening ofthe day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division concentratedbetween Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade--a force that was hardlysufficient to take the Serbian capital. Two days later an army corpswould have been needed for the enterprise, for by this time the Serbianarmy had begun concentrating considerable numbers within strikingdistance of the capital. Thus the first opportunity was lost by thetardiness of the Austrians to act. It is presumed that the reader has already studied the description ofthis theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside fromthat, the movements that follow should only be traced with the aid of amap. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete picture of thefield of operations. The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing theDanube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before, contemplated amain attack that should begin from another quarter. The Austro-Serbian frontier, almost 340 miles in extent, is formed onthe north by the Save as well as by the Danube, and on the east andsoutheast by the Drina River. These two smaller streams abound inconvenient fords, especially in summer. To many of these points on thenortheastern frontier Austria had already constructed strategicrailways. Moreover, the Austrian territory throughout this section is somountainous and well timbered that large forces of troops could be wellscreened from observation, whereas the country opposite Belgrade is flatand bare. It was from this direction that the Serbian General Staff expected thefirst advance of the enemy. And yet there were dozens of other pointswhere an attack in force was possible. Each must be covered with a forceat least strong enough to hold the enemy back long enough to enable theforces stationed at the other points to come up to support. Here was thegreat advantage that the Austrians had to begin with; an advantage whichthe attacking army always enjoys. The attacking general alone knowswhere the first battle shall be fought. The Serbians, therefore, could not count on meeting the Austrians infull force before they could enter Serbian territory. They realized thatthey must give way at the first contact; that the Austrians wouldundoubtedly advance quite some distance within Serbian territory beforeenough Serbian forces could be brought up against them to make theopposition effective. Realizing this, it was decided to place fairly strong advance guards atall probable points of invasion with orders to resist as long aspossible; until, in fact, defensive tactics could be adapted to thesituation and the main Serbian army could be brought up to offer battle. However, two points stood out as the most probable. These were the twoalready mentioned; the north, along the line from Obrenovatz to Belgradeand to Semendria; or, the front Obrenovatz-Ratza-Losnitza-Liubovia. Thefirst possibility had the advantage to the Austrians of offering theshortest route to the center of the country--the Morava Valley, theirnatural objective. But it also necessitated a difficult crossing of theDanube, which would have had to be preceded by the building of pontoonbridges. This would have given the Serbians time to move up their mainforces. The second alternative, an invasion from the east, would haveentailed a longer journey, but the advantage of natural covering andeasy crossing made it a sounder plan. On July 28, 1914, the Serbians concentrated their forces in anticipationof either event. The outpost forces were stationed at or near Losnitza, Shabatz, Obrenovatz, Belgrade, Semendria, Pozarevatz and Gradishte. Buttheir principal armies were centrally grouped along the linePalanka-Arangelovatz-Lazarevatz, while weaker, though important, detachments were stationed in the vicinity of Valievo, a branch railroadterminus, and Uzitze. This narrowed the field down to such limits thatit was possible to march the troops from point to point, while the fewrailway facilities available were utilized for food and ammunitionsupplies. CHAPTER XLVIII AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES On the morning of July 29, 1914, the day after war had been declared, the residents of Belgrade were startled by a deep roar, followed by thewhistling shriek of a huge body, hurtling through the air, and a shellburst over the battlements of the old Turkish citadel, doing no damage. Immediately there came another deep shock; the Serbian guns wereresponding. Thence on the cannonading along the Danube front continuedfor week after week, with only now and then a lull. The Austrian batteries bombarded not only Belgrade, but Semendria, Gradishte and a number of other points along the river bank. Next theywere seen building a pontoon bridge out to one of the little islands inthe river, opposite the city and barges were towed alongside thelandings on the opposite shore, presently to be crowded with blackmasses of Austrian troops. Naturally, the Serbian gunners made theseobjects the targets of their fire. But these were mere bluffs, suchfeints as the skilled boxer makes when he wants to get behind the guardof his opponent. If anything, these demonstrations only served to deepenthe conviction of General Putnik that the real danger was not from thisquarter. But where was the first great blow to strike? Naturally, not only theGeneral Staff, but the whole army and population waited in deep anxiety. This tension lasted over the last days of July, into the first week ofAugust, 1914. Then, on August 6, 1914, some Bosnian peasants, Serbs, appeared andreported that they had seen great bodies of soldiers moving along themountain roads toward Syrmia, in northeastern Bosnia. Two days later, early in the morning, two Austrian aeroplanes whirred over the RiverSave and circled over Krupanie, Shabatz and Valievo. The last doubtswere then dispelled; the attack was coming from the east. And finally, on August 12, 1914, the message flashed over the wires thatthe outposts had seen boats in movement, full of soldiers, behind anisland on the Drina, opposite Loznitza. Near that town, and in factalong the whole lower course of the Drina, the river has frequentlychanged its channel, thus cutting out numerous small islands, whichwould serve as a screen to the movements of troops contemplating acrossing. Pontoon bridges could be built on the farther side of almostany of these islands without being observed from the other shore. Thiswas exactly what the Austrians were doing. [Illustration: Serbian Infantrymen on Their Way to the Front. ] Suddenly, on August 12, 1914, there came a burst of rifle fire and theboom of heavy field guns, and a fleet of barges, under cover of thisfire, emerged from around both ends of one of these islands and made forthe Serbian shore. The two battalions of Third Reserve Serbians, stationed there as an outpost, trained their old De Bange field guns, ofwhich they had two batteries, on the oncoming swarms and began firing. But the Austrian fire became heavier and heavier; a blast of steelpellets and shells swept through the cornfields and the plum orchards, tearing through the streets of the village and crumpling up the houses. The breastworks of the small Serbian detachment were literally thecenter of a continuous explosion of shells. When a full tenth of their number lay dead or disabled, the Serbiansbegan retiring across the cornfields and up the slopes leading to theheights behind Losnitza. There, on higher ground, which offered moreeffective shelter, they made a determined stand and continued their fireon the Austrian masses. Having crossed the river, the Austrians threw up defensive breastworksand dug elaborate trenches, thus fortifying their crossing. Next theybuilt a pontoon bridge, and then the main Austrian army poured across; awhole army corps and two divisions of a second. Meanwhile, on the same day, August 12, 1914, a similar event washappening at Shabatz, on the Save, where that river takes a sharpsouthward turn and then swings up again before joining the Danube atBelgrade. Here the country is a level plain, really the southern limitof the great plain which stretches up to the Danube, past Belgrade andso into Hungary. Here, too, the Austrians screened themselves behind anisland in the river, then hurled their forces across, driving the feebledetachment of Third Reserve Serbian troops back across the plain up intothe hills lying to the southeast of Shabatz. Then the advance guard ofthe Austrian Fourth Army occupied the town, strongly fortified it andbuilt a pontoon bridge across the river from their railroad terminus atKlenak. Further passages of a similar nature were forced that day, August 12, 1914, at other points by smaller forces; one at Zvornik and another atLiubovia. In addition the Austrians also threw bridges across the riverat Amajlia and Branjevo. Thus it will be seen that the invasion covereda front of considerably over a hundred miles and that six strong columnsof the enemy had crossed, all of which naturally converged on Valievo. For Valievo was the terminus of a small, single track railroad whichjoined the main line at Mladenovatz. Thus the Austrians would have aconvenient side door open into the heart of Serbia which was, of course, their main objective. To this Belgrade was merely incidental. With thisline of transport and communication in Austrian hands, Belgrade wouldfall of itself. From Losnitza, where the main column of Austrians crossed the Drina toValievo, runs the River Jadar, along a level valley, which narrows as itnears Valievo. On the left-hand side of the Jadar Valley rise thesouthern slopes of the Tzer Mountains, covered with cornfields, pruneorchards, with here and there a stretch of thick timber. Continuingsouthward, slightly to the eastward, up the Jadar Valley another rangerises, slightly smaller than the Tzer Mountains, forming a smallervalley which branches off eastward. Along this runs the River Leshnitza, parallel with the Jadar until it makes an independent junction with theDrina. Still farther up the valley the foothills of the Iverak ridgesare lost in a series of fairly important summits which closely flank theJadar River. To the south of the Jadar River the valley stretches into a rollingplain, which rises abruptly into the giant Guchevo Mountains. It is thisrange, converging with the Tzer and Iverak Mountains toward Valievo, andforming the plain of the Jadar Valley, which was presently to become thecenter of the first great battle between the Serbians and Austrians. A military movement against Valievo, therefore, demanded completepossession of these two ridges, which overlooked the line of march. Thisthe Austrians knew well enough, even before the first of their troopshad crossed the Drina. As is well known, the best maps, not only ofSerbia but of all the Balkan countries, have been made by Austrianengineers. There was probably not a spur, not a fissure, certainly not atrail, of these mountains that had not been carefully surveyed andmeasured by engineers of the Austrian staff. The Austrians knew the country they were invading quite as well as didthe native Serbians. All through it may be said that it was not throughwant of accurate knowledge that the Austrians finally met disaster. Rather was it because they misjudged the relative values of their facts. And one of their first mistakes was in overestimating the effects of thetwo Balkan Wars on the efficiency of the Serbian army. First of all, aswas obvious from the leisureliness with which they proceeded to occupythe two mountain chains in question, that they vastly misjudged thecapacity of the Serbian troops to make rapid movements. Even as thefirst shots were being fired across the Drina at Losnitza, the Serbianforces were on the move, westward. Two army corps were at once rushedtoward the Valley of the Jadar; part of a third was sent to block theadvance of the Austrians from Shabatz. Meanwhile the Austrians tooktheir time. For two days they busied themselves fortifying the bridge atLosnitza. CHAPTER XLIX THE GREAT BATTLES BEGIN On August 14, 1914, began the first battle of the Serbian campaign. TheAustrians proceeded to storm the heights from which the small outpostdetachments had all the time been bombarding them with its old-fashionedguns. The Serbians, though few in number, made a desperate resistance. It was their business to hold back the enemy as long as possible, evenuntil the reenforcements should arrive. Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, the Austrians advanced in agreat mass, then charged up the hillsides toward the Serbian position. The Serbians waited until they were well up the steep slopes and therush of the enemy had subsided to a more toilsome climb. Then they sentdown volley after volley from every available weapon. The Austrian soldiers, who had until then never experienced anythingmore warlike than field maneuvers, lost their nerves; the first linebroke and ran at the first fire. However, that was likely to happen toany troops under fire for the first time. Down in the plain they formedagain, and again they swept up the slopes. This time they did not turnat the first volley. On they came, with fixed bayonets. And presentlythe first line reached the top of the heights, and the fighting washand-to-hand. For a moment the Serbians, overwhelmed by numbers, were onthe point of fleeing. But these same men had been through many ahand-to-hand encounter with both Turks and Bulgars; that experiencestood them in good stead. And again they swept back the attacking massesof Austria-Hungary. By evening, August 14, 1914, the Austrians had not yet taken theheights. But the Serbians, most of them middle-aged and old men, hadspent their vitality. As the dark night lowered over the scene, theyfell back, until, at Jarebitze, they met the first advance guards of theoncoming Serbian main army. And here they halted, and the united forcesproceeded to dig a trench on a ten-mile front, extending from north tosouth, through the town and clear across the Jadar Valley. Nor did theAustrians then attempt to follow up this first success. Thus theSerbians were allowed to intrench themselves unmolested until, next day, August 15, 1914, they were joined by the balance of their forces. Now, by studying the map, it will be seen at a glance that it was onlythe Tzer Mountains which separated the Austrian column crossing theDrina at Losnitza and the column which had crossed the Save and hadoccupied Shabatz. Should the Austrians from over the Drina getpossession of the Tzer ridges, they would thus effect a junction withthe forces in Shabatz, and so form a line that would cut off a largeportion of northwestern Serbia. Aside from that, they would have a solidfront. But should the Serbians possess themselves of the Tzer ridgesfirst, then they would have driven a wedge in between their two mainforces. This would make it difficult for either to advance, for thenthey would be exposing a flank to the enemy, who would also have a greatadvantage in position. Moreover, the Serbians would be in a position toturn immediately toward either of the Austrians' columns, whichevermight need most attention. Meanwhile, the Serbian cavalry had made a reconnaissance toward Shabatz. They immediately sent back reports of overwhelming forces occupying thetown. It was out of the question to make any attack there for thepresent. It was now learned, for the first time, that another of the enemy'scolumns had crossed the Drina far down in the south, and was marching onKrupanie, just below the Guchevo Mountains and on the way to the upperpart of the Jadar Valley. However, as the first report seemed toindicate that this was only a minor force, a small force of thirdreserve men was detached to hold this force back and prevent itsentrance into the main field of operations. During the day and night of August 15, 1914, the two opposing forces weremoving into position for battle: setting the pawns for the game ofstrategy that was to be played. The Austrians at Losnitza were advancingup the mountain slopes and took possession of the Tzer and Iverakridges, straddling the Leshnitza Valley. Up in Shabatz, Austrian troops were pouring across the pontoon bridges. A flanking column, coming from the Drina, had arrived at Slepehevitch. Another force was stationed with its left and center on Krupanie, itsright spread out into the mountains north of Liubovia. On the Serbian side the right wing of the Second Army, screened by thecavalry division, were preparing to cut off the Austrian forces in thenorth from their juncture with those advancing along the Tzer ridges;the center and left was marching on the enemy on the Iverak ridges, inconjunction with the right of the Third Army, then north of Jarebitze. The center of the Third held the positions south of Jarebitze, while itsleft, split into small detachments, had been directed to oppose theinvasion toward Krupanie and the advance from Liubovia. Such were the positions of the various forces as dawn broke brightly onthe morning of August 16, 1914. As the growing light made objectsvisible, the extreme right division of the Serbian front, which wascreeping northward to cut off Shabatz, discovered a strong Austriancolumn moving along the lower spurs of the Tzer Mountains. Obviouslythis body was clearing the ground for a general descent of the forces upalong the ridges; a whole army corps. This movement threatened to becomea serious obstacle to the Serbian plan of separating the Austrians inShabatz from those farther south. But the situation was saved by one ofthose incidents which sometimes stand out above the savagery of warfareand give to it a touch of grandeur. A young artillery officer, Major Djukitch, of the Fourth ArtilleryRegiment, asked permission to go out and meet this body of advancingAustrians with but a single cannon. He would create a diversion whichwould give the Serbians time to adapt themselves to the changedconditions, though the chances were very largely in favor of his losinghis life on this mission. Permission was granted. Calling on volunteersfrom his command, he advanced with his single cannon and took up aposition in the path of the approaching enemy. The moment he opened firethe Austrians, naturally not realizing that only one cannon was opposingthem, and believing that a large Serbian force had surprised them, brokeinto a panic. Half an hour after he had opened fire, the Serbian fieldcommander sent a messenger to Major Djukitch, ordering him to retire. Inreply he sent a message to the commander, describing the confusion hehad created in the Austrian ranks, and instead of retiring, he asked forreenforcements. The balance of his own battery, a detachment ofinfantry, and a cavalry division was sent him. The result was that theAustrian column was temporarily driven back into the mountains. Hastilyre-forming, the Austrians now massed along a line extending fromBelikamen to Radlovatz, while the Serbians deployed along a frontrunning from Slatina through Metkovitch to Gusingrob. At 11 a. M. , August 16, 1914, the two opposing forces opened fire inearnest, up and down the line. All day the cannon roared and the riflesand machine guns crackled; now and again the Austrians would shoot forthfrom their line a sharp infantry attack, but these were repulsed, withmore and more difficulty as the day advanced, for the Serbians were muchinferior in numbers. Toward evening their situation became verycritical. Yet every part of the line held out desperately, knowing thatreenforcements were being hurried forward from the rear as fast as mencould move. And just before dark, along the roads from the eastward, came thedistant cheers from the advancing columns. An officer dashed up onhorseback shouting encouragement to the battered men in the trenches. Acheer arose, which rolled up and down the line. Again it rose, then, even before it had died out, with wild yells the Serbians sprang overtheir breastworks and swept madly across the intervening space to theAustrian lines; smashing through cornfields, over rocks, through thetall grass of orchards. At their heels followed the reenforcingsoldiers, though they had that day marched nearly sixty miles. Over theAustrian breastworks they surged, like an angry wave from the sea, theirbayonets gleaming in the sunset glow. It was the kind of fighting theyknew best; the kind that both Serbians and Bulgars know best, the kindthey had practiced most. Small wonder if the inexperienced peasants from the plains of Hungary, unused till then to any sight more bloody than a brawl in the villageinn, trembled before this onslaught. Their officers shoutedencouragement and oaths, barely audible above the mad yells of theSerbians. Nevertheless, they gave way before the gleaming line ofbayonet blades before them. Some few rose to fight, stirred by somelong-submerged instinct generated in the days of Genghis Khan. But themajority turned and fled, helter-skelter, down the sides of themountains toward the valleys, leaving behind guns, ammunition, andcannon. One regiment, the Hundred and Second, stood its ground andfought. As a result it was almost completely annihilated. The same fatebefell the Ninety-fourth Regiment. But the majority sought and foundsafety in flight. By dark the whole Austrian center was beaten back, leaving behind great quantities of war material. CHAPTER L FIRST VICTORY OF THE SERBIANS The Serbians had made their first move successfully on that day ofAugust 16, 1914. More important than this mere preliminary defeat of theenemy was the fact that the Austrians in Shabatz were now definitely cutoff from any possible juncture with the Austrians in the south. For thepresent they were debarred from entering the main field of operations. This freed the Serbian cavalry for action elsewhere. Meanwhile a portionof the right wing of the Serbian line was detached to keep the Austriansinside Shabatz. Farther to the south the Serbians were not so decidedly successful. Thecenter of the Serbian Second Army, that directed against the southernslopes of the Tzer Mountains and the Iverak ridges, had arrived atTekerish at midnight. As dawn broke on August 16, 1914, they perceived a strong Austriancolumn descending from above, coming in the same direction. Unfortunately the Serbians were in the midst of bald, rolling foothills, while the Austrians were up among the tall timber which clothes themountain slopes at this point. The Serbians deployed, extending theirline from Bornololye through Parlok to Lisena, centering their artilleryat Kik. The Austrians made the best of their superior position. For some hours there was furious firing, then, at about eight o'clockthe Austrian gunners got the range of the Serbian left flank with theirfield pieces, which was compelled to fall back. But just then timelyreenforcements arrived from the rear, and the Serbians dug themselvesin. By evening the Serbians had lost over a thousand men, though theyhad succeeded in taking 300 prisoners and several machine guns from theAustrians. The left wing of the Second Army had, in the meantime, arrived againstIverak. That this division was able to arrive at such a timely juncturewas due to its having made a forced march of fifty-two miles over themountain roads during the previous day. Yet before dawn on the morningof August 16, 1914, it was ready to continue its march to Poporparlok. But then came the news that the Austrians had driven back the left wingof the Third Army from that position and had occupied it. The situation in which this division found itself was by no means clear. Nothing had been heard from Shabatz. The division operating along theTzer ridges had been badly hammered. The Third Army had lostPoporparlok. The commander decided to stay where he was and simply holdthe ground against any advance of the enemy from Iverak. This divisionwas, therefore, intrenched along a line from Begluk to Kik, and a strongadvance was thrown out toward Kugovitchi. During the morning thisadvance guard made a strong attack against Kugovitchi, drove theAustrians out, and established themselves there. At dawn, August 16, 1914, the left flank of this division, at Begluk, was shelled by the Austrian artillery, which was followed by infantryattacks. These were easily repulsed during the day. But then the enemywas reenforced, and late that night they came on again in great masses. The Serbians allowed them to almost reach their trenches: then, emptyingthe magazines of their rifles at them, they piled themselves over theirbreastworks and into them with bayonets and hand bombs. This was toomuch for the Austrians; they fled in wild disorder. Least encouraging was the experience of the Serbian Third Army, whichwas defending the territory south of the Iverak Mountains. Here theAustrians developed a vigorous and persistent offensive, hoping to turnthe Serbian left and thus capture the road to Valievo. The attack on the positions at Jarebitze commenced at daybreak on August16, 1914. Here the Serbians held good ground: rocky summits, but solimited in extent that there was room only for a few companies at atime. On the other hand the ground before them was broken up intohollows screened by growing corn. This enabled the Austrians to deploytheir lines beyond the Serbian flanks unseen. They did execute just sucha movement, and attempted to circle around toward the Serbian rear. At the same time the Serbians here were attacked from in front byanother hostile column which had come from across the plain on the southside of the Jadar valley, where hollows, sunken roads, and fields ofcorn again formed ample screening. However, in spite of all thesemovements, the Serbians were able to hold their own. The Austrianattacks were all beaten back. Their position might have been heldindefinitely, but developments to the south were taking on a threateningform. It will be remembered that an Austrian force had been reportedapproaching from the south, moving on Krupanie, and that it had seemedso insignificant that a small detachment of third reserve troops hadbeen sent to hold it back. But this enemy force now developed into threemountain brigades. Reenforcements of infantry and mountain artillery were hurried down tosupport the retaining force, but the Austrians were able to force theirway on toward Zavlaka. Seeing Valievo thus threatened, the Serbiansretired from their position at Jarebitze and took up a new positionalong a line from Marianovitche to Schumer, thus enabling them to faceboth the enemy columns. This retreat was fortunately not interfered withby the Austrians, though in executing it the Serbian artillery, whichhad been in position on the right bank of the Jadar, was obliged to passalong the Austrian front in single file, in order to gain the main road. Early the next morning, August 17, 1914, the Serbians were in positionand had extended their line to Soldatovitcha, whence the detachment fromKrupanie had retired. Summing up the day's fighting, and considering itas a whole, it will be seen that the Austrians had pretty well heldtheir own, except on their extreme left, where they had failed to get intouch with their forces in Shabatz. After the defeat of the Austrians at Belikamen on August 16, 1914, thecavalry division was reenforced by some infantry and artillery, thensent on the delicate mission of driving a wedge in between the Austriansin Shabatz and those along the Drina. Spreading out across the Matchvaplain, its left wing up against the slopes of the Tzer Mountains, andits right wing within reach of Shabatz, it advanced as far as Dublje inthe north. At the same time it was able to assist the column advancingalong the Tzer ridges by playing its artillery on the Austrian positionin the mountains at Troyan. Throughout all the fighting this cavalrydivision rendered notable service by its dismounted action. On the morning of August 17, 1914, the extreme right of the Serbianfront now turned toward Shabatz. Though only half the number of theforces they were proceeding to engage, they continued onward. But oncloser approach it became apparent that they could do nothing more thanhold the Austrians inside the town. So well and so thoroughly had theAustrians fortified themselves that it was hopeless for so small a forceto attempt an attack. Thus this section of the Serbian front settleddown to wait for reenforcements. The center and left of the Second Army now prepared to advance along theTzer and Iverak ridges. The Austrians in this section, who had sufferedso severely the day before at Belikamen, were now concentrated aroundTroyan, the most easterly and the second highest peak of the chain. At dawn on August 17, 1914, the Serbians located the Austrians. Immediately they began a heavy artillery fire on this position, thenproceeded to infantry attack. Two regiments hurled themselves up theslopes, and with bayonets and hand bombs drove the Austrians back. Afterthat no further progress was possible that day, the Serbians having towait for their artillery to come up. The Austrians now began intrenchingthemselves on the heights of Kosaningrad, the loftiest portion of theTzer range. Along the Iverak ridges the Austrians made a determined advance. Thesituation of the Serbian troops in this section, the left wing of theSecond Army, was extremely dangerous, for their left flank was becomingexposed by the continued retreat of the Third Army. The only hopefulaspect of their situation was that the Austrians were also having theirleft flank exposed by the retreat of the Austrians along the Tzerridges. Evidently the opposing forces realized this fact, for they madea fierce attempt to drive back the Serbians opposing them, so that theirdanger from the north might be lessened. Half an hour later they wereseverely repulsed. But heavy reenforcements came up to the Austriansjust then, and again they attacked, this time more successfully. By noon, August 17, 1914, the Austrians had extended their line over tothe Serbian right wing. Unfortunately, at about that time the Third Army again called forassistance, and this hard-pressed division was compelled to send it. Theresult was that it was compelled to withdraw gradually to the heights ofKalem. The retirement was executed in good order, and the Austrianssatisfied themselves with occupying Kugovitchi. Intrenching themselvesin their new position, the Serbians awaited further attacks. Only anineffectual artillery fire was maintained by the enemy. Meanwhile camethe good news of the success of the Serbians along the Tzer ridges, sopreparations were made for another advance on the following day, August18, 1914. As has already been stated, the extreme south wing of the Serbian front, the Third Army, had retreated the day before so that it could present asolid front against not only the forces opposing it, but also anothercolumn coming up from the south, whose advance had been inadequatelycovered by third reserve men. Here the Austrians attempted to pierce theSerbian line in the extreme south and come out at Oseshina. But thoughvastly outnumbered, the Serbians held their ground stoutly until lateafternoon, when, as already shown, they were compelled to ask thedivision operating along Iverak for assistance. When this help came theywere able to resume their defense. Thus ended the second day of the general battle. On the whole theAustrians had suffered most, but the general situation was stillsomewhat in their favor. The Austrian center, along the Tzer ridges, hadbeen pushed back. To retrieve this setback the logical course for theAustrian commander in chief was to curl his wings in around the Serbianflanks. That he appreciated this necessity was obvious, to judge fromthe furious onslaughts against the Serbian Third Army in the extremesouth. But to weaken the Serbian center by these tactics it was alsonecessary to free the Austrians in Shabatz, or, at least, it wasnecessary that they should assume a strong offensive against theextreme right of the Serbians, and, if possible, flank them. But the Serbians anticipated the plans of the Austrians. Additionalreenforcements were sent to the extreme right with orders to spare nosacrifice that would keep the Austrians inclosed within theirfortifications around Shabatz. And true enough, next morning, August 18, 1914, shortly after the hotsummer sun had risen over the eastern ridges, the Austrians emerged fromShabatz and attacked the Serbians. The Austrian onslaught was furious, so furious that, step by step, the Serbians, in spite of theirreenforcements, were driven back. Fortunately toward evening theAustrian offensive began losing its strength, and that night theSerbians were able to intrench along a line from Leskovitz to Mihana. This obliged the cavalry division, which had been cooperating with theSerbian center and was driving the Austrians toward Leshnitza, to retirealong a line from Metkovitch to Brestovatz. Naturally the advance of theAustrians from Shabatz was endangering its right flank. Moreover, areenforced column of Austrians also appeared before it. But thisopposing force did not press its advance. Meanwhile, on the same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians werereenforcing their position on the Tzer ridges. They had also stronglyfortified the height of Rashulatcha, which lay between the heights ofTzer and Iverak, whence they could direct an artillery fire to eitherfield of activities. But the difficulties which the Serbians operating along the Iverakridges were meeting also hampered the Serbians who were attempting tosweep the Austrians back along the Tzer ridges. If they advanced too farthey would expose their flank to the Austrians over on Iverak. As ageneral rule, it is always dangerous for any body of troops to advanceany distance beyond the general line of the whole front, and this casewas no exception. However, though delayed, this division did advance. Oxen were employed in dragging the heavy field pieces along the trailsover the rocky ridges. With savage yells the Serbian soldiers leaped over the rocks, up thejagged slopes of Kosaningrad. Again they had fallen back on theirfavorite weapons, bayonets and hand bombs. The Austrians put up a stoutresistance, but finally their gray lines broke, then scattered down theslopes, followed by the pursuing Serbians. Having gained possession ofKosaningrad Peak, the Serbian commander next turned his attention toRashulatcha, which, in conjunction with the Serbians over on Iverak, could now be raked by a cross artillery fire. He had previously left areserve force behind at Troyan. This he now ordered to reenforce hisleft, which had been advancing along the southern slopes of the Tzerrange. This force he now directed against the heights, but the movementwas not vigorously followed up. Over on Iverak the Serbians had succeeded in making some headway. Forming into two columns, this wing marched out and attacked theAustrians at Yugovitchi and succeeded in driving them from theirtrenches. But immediately the Austrian artillery on Reingrob opened fireon them, and they were compelled to dig themselves in. And late thatnight, August 18, 1914, the Austrians delivered a fierce counterattack. But night fighting is especially a matter of experience, and here theSerbians with their two Balkan campaigns behind them, proved immenselysuperior. They drove the Austrians back with their bayonets. During that same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians had renewed theirpressure on the Third Army and the Third Ban men. Soldatovitcha wastheir first objective. During the day reenforcements arrived and thecommanding general was able to hold his own, retaking Soldatovitchaafter it had once been lost. Thus ended the day of August 18, 1914, thethird day of the battle. Early next morning, on August 19, 1914, the Austrians in Shabatz renewedtheir efforts to penetrate the Serbian lines to the southward. Sodetermined was their effort that finally the Serbians in this sectorwere driven back over on to the right bank of the River Dobrava. All daythe fighting continued, the Serbians barely holding their position, strong as it was. This success of the Austrians hampered the cavalry division, which hadnot only to secure its flank, but had also to keep between the ShabatzAustrians and the Serbians operating on Tzer, whom they might haveattacked from the rear. Along the Tzer ridges, however, things were going well for the Serbians. At noon they had taken Rashulatcha, which left the column free tocontinue its pursuit of the fleeing Austrians along the ridges. From theheights above the Serbian guns fired into the retreating Austrians downalong the Leshnitza River, turning the retreat into a mad panic. Byevening the advance guard of this division had arrived at JadranskaLeshnitza. In the early morning, August 19, 1914, the Serbians over on the Iverakridges had attacked in deadly earnest. Naturally the huge success andrapid advance of the Serbians over on the Tzer ridges were of greatimportance to them. Here the Austrians were put to rout too. At 11 a. M. The Serbians stormed Velika Glava and took it, but here their progresswas checked by a strong artillery fire from the west of Rashulatcha. Then rifle firing broke out along the whole line from Velika Glava toKik. Near Kik the Austrians were massing in strong force, and the ThirdArmy was reported to be again in danger, this time from a hostileturning movement. Fortunately general headquarters was able to come tothe rescue with reenforcements. This lessened the danger from Kik. Whereupon the advance along Iverak was continued. By the middle of theafternoon, when the Austrians were driven out of Reingrob, the Serbianscontrolled the situation. The defeat of the Austrians was complete. The Third Army was again in trouble during this day, August 19, 1914. Itsleft flank continued its advance from Soldatovitcha, but the Austriansattempted to pierce their center. But finally this sorely tried sectionof the Serbian front emerged triumphant. Before evening the Austrianswere driven back in scattered disorder, leaving behind them threehospitals filled with wounded, much material, and 500 prisoners. Here ended the fourth day of the bloody struggle--August 19, 1914. Inthe north around Shabatz the Austrians had made some advance, but allalong the rest of the line they had suffered complete disaster. The twoimportant mountain ridges, Tzer and Iverak, which dominated the wholetheatre of operations, were definitely in the hands of the Serbians. Andfinally, the Third Army had at last broken down the opposition againstit. Next morning, August 20, 1914, dawned on a situation that was thoroughlyhopeless for the Austrians. Even up around Shabatz, where they had beensuccessful the day before, the Austrians, realizing that all was lost tothe southward, made only a feeble attack on the Serbians, who wereconsequently able to recross the Dobrava River and establish themselveson the right bank. The cavalry division, whose left flank was not freed by the clearing ofthe Tzer ridges, hurled itself against the Austrians in the plainsbefore it and threw them into wild disorder. First they shelled them, then charged. The panic-stricken Magyars fled through the villages, across the corn fields, through the orchards. "Where is the Drina? Where is the Drina?" they shouted, whenever theysaw a peasant. A burning, tropical sun sweltered over the plain. Many ofthe fleeing soldiers dropped from exhaustion and were afterward takenprisoners. Others lost themselves in the marshy hollows and only emergeddays later, while still others, wounded, laid down and died where theyfell. In the Leshnitza similar scenes were taking place. From the ridges abovethe Serbian guns roared and poured hurtling steel messages of death downinto the throngs of retreating Austrians. Some few regiments, not sodemoralized as the others, did indeed make several attempts to fightrear-guard actions, to protect their fleeing comrades, but they againwere overwhelmed by the disorganized masses in the rear pouring overthem. In the Jadar valley another disorganized mob of Austrians was fleeingbefore the Serbians up on the Iverak ridges, who also were pouring a hotartillery fire into their midst. Presently the Third Army joined in themad chase. And now the whole Austrian army was wildly fleeing for theDrina River. There remained only one exception during the early part of the day, August 20, 1914. This was the Austrian forces on Kik, to the northwestof Zavlaka. The Serbian reenforcements which, it will be remembered, hadoriginally been directed toward Marianovitche, had been afterward sentwestward, and at dawn on August 20 they approached Kik in two columns. The left column occupied Osoye without resistance, but in descendingfrom that position, the Austrian artillery opened fire on it. An hour later the right column came up and opened an artillery fire, andunder cover of this bombardment a Serbian regiment reached the foot ofthe mountain. As was afterward learned, the Austrians at this point hadhad their machine guns destroyed by the Serbian artillery fire, and bythis time their own artillery had been sent back, in preparation for theretreat. Consequently they were only able to receive the Serbian attackwith rifle fire. At the height of this skirmish the extreme left of the Serbians onIverak, which had remained to guard against attack from this quarter, moved over against the Austrians. The cross-fire was too much for them;they turned and fled, leaving behind over six hundred dead, the Serbiansin this affair losing only seven killed. Jarebitze was now occupied; therest of the Serbians joined in the general pursuit. That night, August 20, 1914, the Austrians swarmed across the Drina, fleeing for their lives. By the next day the whole river bank wascleared of them. Serbian soldiers lined the whole length of the frontierin this section. There remained now only the Austrians in Shabatz todeal with. The whole Serbian army was now able to concentrate on thisremaining force of the enemy left in Serbian territory. Early on August 21, 1914, the attack began, and the Austrians herefought stoutly. Indeed, all that day they held the Serbians off frombehind their intrenchments. On August 22, 1914, the Serbians made ageneral assault. Fortunately they found a weakness in the fortificationson the western side of the town. To create a diversion, the Austriansdelivered a counterattack along the road toward Varna. By the morning of August 24, 1914, the Serbians had brought up a numberof heavy siege guns. But when the general bombardment had alreadycommenced, it was found that the Austrians had evacuated the town duringthe night, and retreated across the river. And so the first Austrianinvasion of Serbia came to its disastrous end. PART V--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN CHAPTER LI RESULTS OF FIRST BATTLES Though described as a punitive expedition in the Vienna press, thiscampaign cost the Austrians very dear, not only in material and inlives, but in prestige. Just what the Austrian casualties were cannot bedefinitely stated at this time, but at least 6, 000 were killed outrighton the field of battle, while at least 35, 000 were wounded. And another4, 000 fell into the hands of the Serbians as prisoners. In material theSerbians report that they captured 46 cannon, 30 machine guns, 140ammunition wagons, and a great mass of rifles, hospital paraphernalia, ammunition, stores, and other incidentals. The Serbian losses were heavy: 3, 000 dead and 15, 000 wounded. That theywere so much less is not extraordinary, for not only were they on thedefensive, but an army in flight, as were the Austrian, always losesheavily. The first onslaught of the Austrians in August, 1914, had been drivenback. A disorganized mob, the soldiers of Franz Josef had fled backacross the Drina and the Save, leaving thousands of dead and prisonersbehind. And for over a week the little Serbian army lay panting. Military science says that a victory should always be followed upclosely, for a beaten army is almost as helpless as a herd of cattle. But military science must also take into account the limitations ofhuman muscles and nerves. The Serbian reserve forces had been movingback and forth along the fighting front, strengthening a defense here, supporting an attack there, and some of them had covered from fifty tosixty miles a day. There were no fresh troops to pursue the Austrians. The Serbians needed rest. And so the Austro-Hungarian soldiers wereallowed to continue their northward flight unmolested. Thus for twelve days after the Battle of Shabatz, or from August 23, 1914, there was quiet along the Austrian and Serbian frontier. Theremnants of the Austrians had definitely retired northward. And at aboutthat time the Russians were driving hard at the Galician front. TheAustrians were being beaten there, too. Altogether the situation lookedextremely serious for Austria at that time. But, finally, encouraged bythe Allies, the Serbian General Staff decided to send an expedition overinto Austrian territory. Not much over twenty miles north of Shabatz is a range of mountains, called the Frushkagora. A fairly strong force holding these rocky ridgeswould be in a position to prevent the Austrian general from reenforcinghis armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the east. It would also afforda better protection to the northern frontier of Serbia than would aforce of the same size stationed within Serbian territory along the SaveRiver. The chief thought of the Serbian general was, however, to gaincontrol of this natural position and hold it while another Serbian forcewas invading Bosnia, in conjunction with the Montenegrin troops. Whatmade this first objective the more tempting was the known fact thatbetween the frontier and the Frushkagora range the Austrian forcesamounted only to about a dozen regiments. To the First Army, General Putnik assigned the execution of thisexpedition. That was now composed of two divisions, and the cavalrydivision, which had rendered such excellent service on the Matchva Plainduring the first invasion. The left wing of this expeditionary force wasto be supported by a division in Matchva, while the "Detachment ofBelgrade" was to operate on the right. A second reserve division was tohold Obrenovatz. Another glance at the map will show that, almost halfway between Shabatzand Belgrade, the Save takes a peculiar little loop into Serbianterritory, forming a narrow strip of Austrian territory projecting intoSerbia. Naturally, this little tongue could be commanded by the Serbianguns without first crossing the river, since the Austrians could onlyoperate here by marching down in a narrow column between the two sidesof the loop formed by the river. Such a force, however, could beimmediately flanked by the Serbians from their side of the river. Thispeculiar peninsula, known as the Kupinski Kut, was chosen as the pointat which the first crossing should be made. CHAPTER LII SERBIAN ATTEMPT TO INVADE AUSTRIAN TERRITORY It was the night of September 5, 1914. So secretly was this movementplanned and begun that the Serbian field officers did not themselvesknow what was to be undertaken when their forces arrived on the banks ofthe river at the Kut on the nights of September 5 and 6. The marcheswere made at night, to hide the movement as long as possible from theAustrian aeroplanes, which occasionally whirred their flight overSerbian territory. At one o'clock in the morning of September 6, 1914, the first troops ofthe invading expedition embarked on the barges lined up along the riverbank. A screening force having been ferried across, to protect the fordagainst possible attack, the construction of a pontoon bridge was begunat Novoselo, while farther up some flour mill floats were utilized for asecond bridge. It was an ideal place for a crossing. Farther up, at the neck of theisthmus, was an old river bed, where the Save had once cut a straightchannel. This was now full of stagnant water, while between it and theford the ground was covered with thick timber. The stagnant water, whilenot very deep, afforded somewhat the same protection that a wireentanglement would, and the woods served as a screen to the advanceguard of the Serbians stationed there to guard the crossing. Not fardistant, farther up in Austrian territory, was a small town, Obrez. After the Serbian army had crossed safely, it set to work clearing thetimber away, it being no longer necessary to screen themselves fromview, and a strong line of trenches was thrown across the neck of theisthmus, thus effectually protecting the ford for retreat, should thatbe necessary. At this moment two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery ofthe enemy appeared and attempted to oppose the further advance of theSerbians, but when the Serbian guns began shelling the forest opposite, this force fled in the direction of Obrez. Then the left of the Serbianforce worked its way around toward the town itself and, after firingsome dozens of shells, entered it and drove the Austrians still fartheron. The cavalry division now came up to secure possession of the town. Thetwo divisions then set to work to intrench themselves. Meanwhile theSerbian right, advancing toward the northeast, encountered another forceof the enemy, consisting of one regiment and two batteries, and, after ashort skirmish, drove it back and occupied the two villages, Kupinovoand Progar. Thus the Serbian operations in this section fared well. But at another point, on the extreme left, at Mitrovitza, they did notencounter such good fortune. The division operating here was to occupyand fortify Mitrovitza and with it a bridge, after which it was toadvance and worry the enemy's flank. The actual point chosen for theconstruction of the bridge was a customs station at Jasenova Grada, between Mitrovitza and Jarak. The column here had arrived at the river bank at midnight of September5, 1914, and at early dawn had begun building the pontoon bridge. Meanwhile a steady artillery and rifle fire was kept up, sweeping theopposite bank, to keep back the enemy. The Serbian commander of thisforce had received instructions to the effect that as soon as he hadmoved his troops across safely, he was to send two regiments forward:one to the right, the other to the left, and the whole line was toadvance and cover the territory between Mangjeloskabara and Shashinshi, the object being to push back any movement of the Austrians from Jarak. As at Novoselo, an advance guard crossed in barges before the bridge hadbeen thrown across. Immediately a heavy fire began from the enemy, hidden in the opposite forest. Many of the Serbians threw themselvesinto the river, and either swam or waded the rest of their way across. Finally three barge loads had effected a crossing. While waiting for therest to follow, sixty of the Serbians threw themselves over against theAustrians and, by their very boldness, drove them out of their trenchesand took twenty prisoners. Some delay in the building of the bridge followed, but more barge loadsof soldiers were sent across, and the fighting with the Austrians waspushed vigorously. But meanwhile the enemy was also being reenforced, more rapidly for not having a river behind him. By evening the Serbians, who had crossed, found themselves tremendously outnumbered and fightingon the defensive. At that time, one of the Serbian Regiments, which hadadvanced as far as Shashinshi, found itself isolated, with both flanksexposed. After two hours of stubborn fighting the regiment managed to draw backto the river bank, carrying with them a mass of wounded comrades, hopingthere to find the support of the main body of their army. But thepontoon bridge had not yet been completed. Of the 400 yards across theriver, only twenty remained unbridged. Seeing their advantage, thepursuing Austrians redoubled their attack furiously. The Serbianregiment, with half its men down, and only 60 feet of water betweenitself and the main corps, turned, with its back to the river, andfought back with equal fury. With frantic haste, the Serbian engineers attempted to finish thebuilding of their bridge, so that the main body of the troops might rushacross and relieve the situation of the regiment defending itselfagainst overwhelming numbers on the opposite bank. But before this couldbe accomplished, the wounded began throwing themselves into the pontoonnearest their side of the river. The mooring lines parted and the bargedrifted away from the end of the bridge, down the river, loaded withwounded soldiers. The same happened to the next barge. To add to thedisaster, the barges were old and leaky, and soon one of them filledwith water and began sinking. Presently it sank, throwing the woundedinto the river, where most of them were speedily drowned. The Serbians on the Austrian shore, now seeing their last hope ofsupport or escape cut off, continued fighting desperately until alltheir ammunition was gone. Then the handful of survivors surrendered. Bythis time it was already dark. The only one to escape across the riverwas the regimental surgeon who, carrying the regimental flag between histeeth, swam across the river and reached the main body of his countrymensafely. Fortunately, the recklessness which led this attempted crossing todisaster did not characterize the movements of the main body which hadcrossed at Novoselo. The advance continued under carefully thrown outscreens of cavalry, and was kept up until the trenches at the landingcould be abandoned and a wider circle of defensive works could be thrownup, including within their line the villages already mentioned. Thus thethree Serbian bases were strongly protected by a semicircle of fieldworks, radiating from Kupinovo. Having secured this position, GeneralBoyovitch, the Serbian field commander, advanced his cavalry in fanlikeformation to the north and west. One division followed the cavalry onthe right; another took a northeasterly direction. By the evening of September 7, 1914, the enemy had been driven back to aline reaching from Detch to Nikintzi. No serious encounters occurred forsome days, the Austrians evidently not desiring to make any seriousopposition until they should have sufficient backing. But on the morningof September 9, 1914, the Serbian right came in contact with stronglyintrenched Austrians at Detch and Surchin. During the first invasion thefighting had been under a tropical sun. Now the weather was cooler, almost cold at nights, which rendered the enthusiasm and the fighting ofthe men on both sides correspondingly more spirited. It was, therefore, with some vim that the Serbians threw themselves into an attack againstDetch. After a determined resistance, the Austrians were forced out. Next Surchin became the center of battle, but here the Austrians heldout stoutly, driving back the Serbian charges again and again. All that day of September 9, 1914, the Serbian advance was checked, butthe following morning, being reenforced, they charged into Surchin againand finally drove the Austrians out at the point of the bayonet. TheSerbians then turned north and captured Dobranovtsi. And at thisjunction the Serbians stationed at Belgrade crossed the river there andadvanced on Semlin. On September 11, 1914, General Boyovitch moved his whole front forward, with the object of driving all of the enemy westward into theFrushkagora Mountains and gaining full possession of the plain. Thiswould have left the two divisions and the cavalry free to advanceagainst the mountain range itself. Having once gained that stronghold, the Serbians would then have under their control the whole district ofSyrmia with its friendly population of Serbs. The Serbians were now extended along a front from Hrtkovtsi to PazovaNova while the Austrians were intrenched along a line from Jarak toPazova Stara. The following morning the Serbian left occupied Pechintsiand advanced north to the Romer Canal, where they met a heavy fire andwere compelled to intrench themselves. Farther west, however, theSerbians rushed the town of Jarak and took it by means of bayonets andhand bombs. Such was the situation on September 12, 1914, when a bright, clearmorning had dawned and a cool breeze swept over the plain. Off in thedistance rose the blue ridges of the Frushkagora Mountains, streakedwith the green of vegetation along their lower spurs. With tinglingblood and renewed vitality the Serbians looked forward to the word ofcommand which should send them onward, driving the Austrians beforethem. But that word of command seemed long delayed. Finally, indeed, it came, but only to the cavalry. The horsemen were sent ahead, up and down theline, screening the men in the trenches. And then suddenly came theword to the men in the trenches. "March!" They did fall in and begin to march. But not forward. The heads of thecolumns turned toward the rear, back toward Serbia. Presently the wholeSerbian army, just as further victories seemed all but won, was on theretreat. Behind them they heard the fire of their own cavalry, protecting their rear. The retreat was orderly and the river wasrecrossed without loss or confusion. Even more concerned anddisappointed were the Serb peasants of the villages through which theypassed, for these simple folk had thought the Magyars permanently beatenand that King Peter's men were now moving onward to take Vienna. Theyhad, therefore, shown unmeasured enthusiasm and had showered gifts ofchicken, milk, eggs and other rural dainties on their brother Serbs fromSerbia, to the full extent of their slender resources. A few days laterthey had to pay dearly for this manifestation of their sympathies. Whenagain the Magyars came down into their territory they became sooppressive toward these poor villagers that a Croatian regiment, whosemembers were racially akin to the Serbs, broke into open revolt andattacked the Magyars, the result being a pitched battle in which notonly rifles, but machine guns and cannon were employed. Presently wordwas passed back and forth among the rank and file of the Serbian armyexplaining the disappointing retreat. "The Austrians are swarming across the Drina again, " their officerswhispered. "There will be plenty of fighting yet, but it will be thesame old battle ground. " Thus ended Serbia's brief invasion of Austrian soil. CHAPTER LIII AUSTRIA'S SECOND INVASION The second Austrian invasion of Serbia began September 7, 1914. Had theSerbian General Staff known what mighty efforts the Austrians were toput forth at this second attempt to invade the country, it would neverhave undertaken the expedition into Syrmia. After the failure of thefirst invasion the Austrian staff placed at General Potiorek'sdisposition a force of 300, 000 men, with a reserve of another 150, 000 todraw upon, should the necessity become strong enough. Fortunately forthe Serbians the Russian pressure in Galicia became so strong, later on, that this reserve force was sent through the Carpathians, and when thecritical moment did arrive, General Potiorek was unable to avail himselfof its assistance. It may be well to know how the Austrian forces were disposed just beforethe second invasion. There were five whole army corps; one was stretchedout from Klenak to Bosut; another from Bosut to Bijeljina; another fromJanja to Kosluk and another from Kosluk to Zvornik. Aside from thisforce there was part of another corps lined up from Zvornik to Liuboviaand one and a half divisions held the front from Semlin to Weisskirchen. Four battalions were kept busy by the Montenegrins. It will be remembered that when the expedition into Syrmia began thebulk of the Serbian army was sent to the western frontier along theDrina, to be ready to invade Bosnia when the success of the Syrmiaexpedition should be assured. But so well is Bosnia wooded in thissection that the Serbians had not been able to observe the concentrationof troops that was going on before them across the Drina. Suddenly, on the morning of September 7, 1914, the whole frontier alongthe Drina, from Jarak south, became alive with Austrian soldiers. Northof Loznitza the fighting took on a very bloody and deadly character. Allday the battle line swayed back and forth with a succession of attacksand counterattacks. Several times the Austrians almost broke through, but in the end their whole line was driven back across the river. In theMatchva district, however, they succeeded in holding a triangular patchof swamp land, bounded by Ravjne, Tolich and Jarak. But even here theywere checked along a line from Ravjne to Tolich, where both sidesintrenched and came to a deadlock for the time being. Here the twoopposing lines continued their trench warfare without much spectaculardemonstration, but with a tremendous loss of life to both sides and anexpenditure of ammunition which the Serbians could little afford. Along the line south of Loznitza the fighting was not so favorable tothe Serbians. The forces stationed here had been weakened in the Syrmiaexpedition. And then, too, the country being extremely mountainous, theyhad overestimated the strength of their positions. Here, on the morning of September 8, 1914, the Austrians began a generaladvance, beginning at Liubovia. At first they were successfully heldback, but when they came on again with greatly augmented numbers, theSerbians were finally compelled to retire to a line of hills runningfrom Guchevo, through Jagodina and Proslop to Rozani, where theyintrenched themselves and prepared to resist any further advance. The Austrians, however, continued to attack. Around Krupanie belowLoznitza, the Serbians made a stubborn defense and succeeded in holdingthe heights of Kostainik. But their southern, or left, wing continued tobe driven back. By September 11, 1914, the Austrians had advanced as far as a line drawnfrom Shanatz to Petska. At this critical moment, however, one of thedivisions of the force that had been recalled from Syrmia arrived andthe combined forces were ordered to advance against the SokolskaMountains, whose ridges were occupied by the Austrians. The Serbians rushed the heights with their customary élan. The Austriansresisted stubbornly. They, in their turn, had been tasting the firstdraughts of victory, and were not so prepared to give in as on previousoccasions. For a long time the fighting was hand to hand. The men evenhurled big rocks at each other, grappled together in each other's armsand fought with knives and teeth. But finally some of the Austriansbroke and scattered and presently all of them fled. Their trenches andground on both sides of them, however, were covered with dead, Serbiansand Austrians promiscuously mingling together. So complete was the Serbian victory that their troops were now able toadvance and form a new line from Shanatz to Brodjanska Glavitza, withthe cavalry patrolling clear down to the Drina at Liubovia. Further north, however, the Austrians were still in possession ofMatchko Kamen (Cat Rock). Here the fighting had been most terrific, theheights having been taken and retaken no less than eight times. Thisposition dominated all the country around within artillery range. Bytaking this strategic point the Serbians would have had completepossession of a chain of heights which begin with Guchevo on the north, and would have constituted a natural frontier which could have been heldwith a minimum force of troops and expenditure of ammunition. But thismove was not carried out. Both sides were literally tired out. TheSerbians were unable to advance any farther, while the Austrians werecontent with not being driven back any farther. They were, also, nodoubt worried by the fact that down in the southern section the Serbianshad succeeded in not only driving the Austrians across the river, buthad even advanced some distance into the Bosnian hills. CHAPTER LIV END OF SECOND INVASION--BEGINNING OF THIRD Thus the second Austrian invasion was checked. The strategy was, perhaps, not so spectacular as in the first invasion, but the losses toboth sides had been much heavier. In killed, wounded and prisoners theAustrians lost fully 30, 000 of their men. There now followed asituation somewhat similar to that up in northern France; both sideswere deeply intrenched and in some parts faced each other over only afew yards of neutral ground. Again and again the Austrians deliveredattacks, attempting to break through the Serbian positions. All the artsof trench warfare were employed by the Austrians to overcome the Serbianresistance, but the Serbian engineers showed themselves at least theirequals in such maneuvers. At one time they successfully mined over ahundred yards of Austrian trenches and blew 250 of its defenders intothe air. As for the Serbians, their attempts to break through the Austrianpositions were fatally hampered by a shortage of ammunition. At onepoint they did, in fact, succeed in breaking through and then suddenlythe ammunition supply came to an end and the Serbians had to retireagain, leaving the Austrians to return to the trenches from which theyhad just been ejected. Up in the northwest the Austrians also held a narrow strip of Serbianterritory, along the Drina from Kuriachista up, but with this smallexception they were confined to their side of the river until thetriangular tract in the northeast of the Matchva Plain was reached, previously mentioned. Along the Save from Parashnitza to Shabatz they had also attempted asouthward movement, where they were supported by five river monitors. During the period of comparatively little activity which now followedthe Serbians were much worried by these monitors, which patrolled up anddown the river at night, throwing their searchlights on and exposing theSerbian trenches. Then, too, they could hurl bombs into the Serbianpositions with almost absolute impunity, for whenever the Serbian shellsstruck the heavy armor of these river fortresses they rolled offharmlessly. On the night of October 22, 1914, the Serbians sent some mines floatingdown the river, one of which struck a monitor and sank it in deep water. For nearly six weeks through November, 1914, this deadlock continued. But during all this time, the Austrian General Staff was quietlypreparing for another grand drive through Serbia. It was then that the150, 000 reserve, previously mentioned, was assigned to GeneralPotiorek's disposal, while his first line was also materiallystrengthened. Nor did the third invasion begin with any dramatic effort. The pressurewas applied gradually, little by little, until the Serbs were finallyface to face with the necessity of shortening their lines, if they werenot to be broken through. Other causes besides the increasing pressurefrom the Austrians contributed to the general causes. Winter was coming on in earnest now. The low bottom lands in the MatchvaPlain were becoming waterlogged; it was impossible to keep the trenchesfrom filling. The Serbians had, in the first place, made a mistake inattempting to hold these Matchva levels. On such battle grounds, theMagyars, from their own level plains, were too nearly their equals. Onlevel ground, too, the defenders have less the advantage, unless theyare in equal number, and the Serbians were everywhere in smaller number. This inferiority, too, made it less possible for the Serbian soldiers toobtain periods of rest away from the constant vigilance necessary in thefirst line trenches. The result was that they were under a more severestrain. They were subjected to all the drawbacks of trench warfare atits worst, without the respite that is usually accorded to men underthese conditions on other fronts. The nerve-racking strain thus imposedbecame finally more than ordinary human beings could endure. Smallwonder that the correspondents with the Serbian army reported many casesof insanity among the men in the trenches. Finally the order came to withdraw from the Matchva Plain, to thefoothills of the Tzer Mountains and the heights along the right bank ofthe Dobrava River. This retreat, made in the face of no specially strongattack, did not a little to depress the Serbian rank and file. It wasbeginning to feel that its strength was sapping away. It was soon obvious that a more general retirement would now becomenecessary. Complete command of the Tzer Mountains could not be attainedwithout the expenditure of more energy and ammunition than the Serbianscould afford at this time. So a general withdrawal was ordered, alongthe whole line. The Austrians, many of them fresh troops, unused todefeat, followed up in the footsteps of the retreating Serbians withenthusiastic vigor, from Shabatz to Liubovia. And presently Valievo, therailroad terminus and the first objective of the Austrians, becameuntenable. On November 11, 1914, the Serbians were compelled to evacuate this city. Its capture was the first step in the progress of the Austrians towardKragujevatz, Nish and a junction with the Turks near Constantinople. Still, as later events will show, the Serbians were by no means thebeaten rabble described by the Vienna press. The score or more of cannonwhich the Serbians were compelled to abandon on account of the badcondition of the mountain roads were hailed as evidence of a hardly woncampaign, and the stragglers captured were accepted as signs of ademoralization which had as yet not set in. On the other hand, whether this first success was real or not, it didserve to inspire the Austrian troops with an enthusiasm which they hadhitherto not possessed. The Serbians had not yet been driven back on the line along which theyhad originally intended to make their first stand against the invaders. During the period between the first mobilization and the beginning ofthe first invasion on August 12, 1914, what are referred to as theKolubara and Lyg positions had been strongly intrenched. But it had notproven necessary to fall back on these positions; the Austrians had beendriven back at once. But now, after the fall of Valievo, the Serbiansdecided to make no further resistance to the Austrian advance until thisline was reached. The Kolubara River itself is not of sufficient width to hold back anadvancing army long, but in places its banks rise so high and steep thatit serves very much the same purpose as a moat before a castle. In suchplaces comparatively few men could hold back a large number of theenemy. A little south of Lazarevatz the line of intrenchments left theKolubara and followed the Lyg River, where the country was even morerugged. From the source of the Lyg the Serbians had fortified the Jeljakand Maljen ridges, which control practically all the roads leading toKragujevatz and, proceeding in a southwesterly direction, they threw upearthworks on the Bukovi, Varda, Jelova, Bukovic, Miloshevatz and LeskaGora ranges, which defended an advance toward the Western Morava Valley. CHAPTER LV PRELIMINARY AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES It was along this line that in November, 1914, the Serbians determinedthe decisive battle of the campaign should be fought. At Obrenovatz wasstationed a strong brigade, known as the "Detachment of Obrenovatz. "Further south, at Konatiche, on the Kolubara River, the cavalry divisioncooperated with the Second Army, which held the line from Volujak toCooka and the ridges farther to the left. The Third Army occupied theright bank of the Lyg River from Barzilovitza to Ivanovchi. The FirstArmy stretched itself out from Gukoshi to Ruda and along the Jeljakridges to Maljen. And finally the "Army of Uzitsha, " which had fought sobrilliantly before in the southern section and penetrated into Bosnia, was assigned the protection of the base at Uzitsha and the WesternMorava; it intrenched itself from a point southwest of Yasenovatz, through Prishedo, along the Jelova crests, after which it crossed overto the heights of the Leska Gora to Shanatz. This new line, much shorter than that previously held, enabled theSerbians to contract. Moreover, all the country was favorable todefense. Nowhere was it so screened that an approaching enemy couldsurprise them. Here, certainly, one defender was equal to two invaders. Apparently the Austrian commanders realized that they had genuineobstacles to overcome, for they did not proceed with any impetuoushaste. It was six weeks before they had advanced so far as to come intoreal contact with the new Serbian line. During that interval they hadbeen preparing for this kind of mountain warfare, by bringing up specialmountain artillery and men who had had experience in just such a countryon the Italian front. It was mid-November, 1914, before the Austrians were ready to delivertheir first assaults. Almost every garrison in the town of Bosnia hadbeen drawn on to swell their numbers and the troops brought up from theItalian front amounted to a whole army corps. All in all, there wereabout 250 battalions of infantry, in addition to cavalry, artillery andengineer corps. One feature of this third invasion, which had not attended the first andsecond, was the vast number of refugees who now came fleeing through theSerbian lines. Their ox carts and their flocks blocked the roads, oldmen and women and children thronged the trails in their mad haste to getaway from the advancing Austrians. Their reports of the vast numbers ofthe enemy that they had seen may not have helped to encourage theSerbian soldiers, but, on the other hand, they gave reports, somewhatexaggerated, perhaps, of such hideous atrocities committed by theMagyars that henceforth the Serbians were to fight with an addedbitterness and hatred. Allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration, there still seems to besolid foundation for the reports of atrocities committed by theAustrians in Serbia. But this seems to be a circumstance inseparablefrom any war. And, naturally, the invaders are necessarily always theguilty ones. The Serbians did not commit atrocities for the very simplereason that they never had the opportunity to come in among the enemy'svillages. Had they invaded the Hungarian plains there would undoubtedlyhave been atrocities committed on both sides. An army like the Austrian, composed of so many different nationalities and races, would naturallybe more susceptible to such excesses. Whatever their reasons for waiting so long before their next generalattack, the Austrians had, at any rate, played into the hands of theirenemy to the extent that they had allowed him to accumulate a plentifulsupply of ammunition. Moreover, more was coming, sent by the Allies andthis had a cheering effect on the men. On the morning of November 15, 1914, the Austrians began their firstattack. It developed principally against the Second Army, south ofLazarevatz, and against the Uzitsha detachment in the direction ofKosjerichi. For five days the Austrians sent successive waves dashingagainst the Serbian walls, but each was repelled, hurled back, withcomparatively little effort. How determined the Austrians were may bejudged from the fact that the Serbians now took more prisoners than theyhad during all the previous operations. Meanwhile the Austrians were also making a determined effort to takeBelgrade; an effort, as will be described later, which was also to havean initial success. But, considering the unfamiliarity of even the bestinformed with the Serbian country, it will, perhaps, be wiser to takeeach theatre by itself. The operations before Belgrade, anyhow, were notclosely connected with those in the interior of the country. It seemed as though during those first five days of fighting theAustrians were merely testing the relative strength of the varioussections of the Serbian line. On November 20, 1914, a powerful force ofAustrians advanced and took possession of Milovatz, in close contactwith the right flank of the First Army. Another column drove at itscenter at Ruda and successfully stormed the heights of Strazhara. Thenext day these movements developed into a mighty assault on the Serbianpositions in this section. All day the Serbians held their ground, buttoward evening the center weakened, then caved in, collapsed. The resultwas that the whole First Army was beaten back with heavy loss, until itwas finally able to make another stand along the line from Babina Glavato Rajac. The fire of the renewed attack flared up and down the front. The ThirdArmy of the Serbians succeeded in holding its ground. Between theUzitsha detachment and the Austrians the fighting was especially bloody, but neither side gained any distinct advantage. But the retirement of the First Army from its strong position from Rudato Gukoshi was disastrous, not only from a purely military aspect, butalso in that it sent a wave of depression up and down the whole line ofSerbians. This loss might be retrieved by an effective artillerysupport, but again the Serbians were feeling a shortage of ammunition. Armed Bulgarian bands entering Serbia from Bulgaria had finallysucceeded in interrupting railroad traffic, and the supply of ammunitionhad been abruptly broken off. Fortunately for the Serbians, the Austrians showed their usualdisinclination of following up their success immediately. Their centerrested while their mountain brigades delivered a rather feeble attack onthe Serbian extreme left, on the line from Varda to Gruda. It was November 24, 1914, before the Austrians came on in force again. This time the Second Serbian Army was forced back; to a line runningfrom Galvitza to Smyrdlykovatz and the heights of Cooka were taken. TheUzitsha army was also forced to retire, on to the Goinjagora Mountains, at the head of the Western Morava Valley. The Austrians now alsoattempted to outflank the extreme left of the Serbian line. With thisobject in view they shot their mountain brigades down along their right, until the threatened Serbian flank was compelled to swing back toprotect itself from an enveloping movement. Finally, on November 28, 1914, the Uzitsha Army was able to make adetermined stand along the heights from Kita to Markovitza. In the south the Serbians had suffered a serious setback. Counterattackswere of little avail. How desperately the Serbians resisted may bejudged from the fact during one of their counterattacks, made atSalinatz, they took prisoner seven officers and 1, 580 men. In general, however, they were forced back, step by step. One by one, eachsucceeding ridge fell into the hands of the invaders. And finally thedominating ridges of the Suvobor Mountains were in complete possessionof the Austrians. In the north the Serbians had made a better showing. Along the KolubaraRiver the fighting had been especially heavy. One Austrian division hadeven succeeded in penetrating as far as Progon, on November 24, 1914, but it was finally driven back by the cavalry division with heavy loss. The result of this stage of the fighting was that the Serbians had againbeen compelled to lengthen their lines; their front now extended fromTchatchak to Belgrade, almost seventy miles. CHAPTER LVI CRISIS OF THE CAMPAIGN--AUSTRIAN DEFEAT We have now arrived at the critical point, not only of the thirdAustrian invasion, but of all the military operations in the Serbiantheatre. If the Austrians should now again be driven back, it would bepractically impossible for them to make another invasion unaided, atleast so long as they were engaged with Russia. And, on the other hand, if the Serbians lost now, the whole country was lost. The climax was athand. For this reason it may be well to define again the position andthe strength of the two opposing lines. On November 28, 1914, the Serbian units were disposed as follows: TheSecond Army, from Vechani to Vagan; the Third Army, from Kalanjevchi toKelja; the First Army, from Silopaj to Galich; the Uzitsha Army, fromKita to Markovitza. The Austrians had four mountain brigades in the direction of the WesternMorava Valley; about one and a half army corps on the road along Valievoto Milanovatz; an entire corps against Lazarevatz and two corps movingeastward against the Serbian line from Belgrade to Mladenovatz. On the night of November 29, 1914, to shorten this long line theSerbians decided to withdraw from Belgrade. A redistribution of theSerbian forces was then made as follows: the troops from the Kolubararetired to the heights about Sibnitza and the Belgrade detachment wasthrown astride the Belgrade-Nish Railroad along the summits ofVaroonitza in the east and Kosmai in the west. Elsewhere the positionsremained practically the same as before. Apparently General Putnik feltthat the retreat of the First Army, which had caused the generalretirement of the Serbian front, had not been absolutely necessary, forthe commander of that force was now relieved and in his place wasappointed General Mishitch, a member of the General Staff. How wise thischange was may be judged from the later behavior of the First Army, which was destined yet to retrieve itself. To the trained military observer, the strategic plan of the Austrianswould by this time have become apparent. With the Suvobor Mountains as acentral pivot, they had strengthened their wings and attempted to swingaround in the north by Mladenovatz and south down the Western MoravaValley. Had this movement been safely accomplished the mass of theSerbian army, together with their arsenal at Kragujevatz, would havebeen rounded up, after which the new Serbian capital, Nish, would havefollowed easily and Serbia would have been completely in Austrian hands. On December 2, 1914, this was the plan which the Austrians were puttinginto execution, in rather a leisurely way, when the Serbians, havingdrawn in their breath for a final effort, began their greatcounterattack. Nor can there be any doubt that the Austrians werecompletely surprised by this sudden renewal of the Serbian strength. Itis only necessary to read the press dispatches from Vienna, issuedduring the few days previous, to be convinced that General Potiorek hadreported the Serbians as completely defeated. Not only the Austrians, but the whole world was surprised by the startling change that now tookplace in the Serbian theatre. Under the command of General Mishitch, the First Army hurled itselfagainst Suvobor and, after a bloody three days' struggle, took theheights and pushed in the Austrian center, driving its forces in thissection in a disorganized flight toward Valievo. The days that ended thefirst invasion were renewed. Nor was this flight a mere sudden panic; ithad, in fact, risen in a crescendo, from a small beginning, until itdeveloped into a veritable débâcle. At first the Austrians had attempted an orderly withdrawal, as testifiedby their effort to take with them all their heavy artillery. The scenethat occurred near Gorni Toplitza will serve to illustrate the wholeretreat. Here, where the road winds around a commanding bluff, whichoverlooks a valley, the Austrians had planted a battery of field guns, right on the edge of the cliff. In the road leading up to this heightwere placed a score of ammunition wagons from which little two-wheeledcarts were employed to carry the ammunition up to the guns. Deployed onthe flank of this position, the Serbian gunners had suddenly covered itwith a terrible enfilading fire and men, horses, carts, and wagons layin a mangled heap. There were dead horses in the shafts of the carts, whose bridles were still clutched by the hands of dead men. Some few hadtried to escape the avalanche of flying steel and as they ran theyhurled from them caps, ammunition, haversacks and rifles only to beraked down before they could reach the shelter of a neighboring ravine. And this was merely one little corner of the general scene. All alongthe road to Valievo the ground was strewn with material, even to therations of the soldiers, jolted out of the knapsacks as they were castdown by their fleeing owners. During that first day of fighting the First Army captured twelveofficers, 1, 500 men, five mountain howitzers and four machine guns, thenadvanced, until by nightfall it was able to take up a position along aline from Kostuniche to Vranovicha. During this time the Uzitsha Armywas fiercely attacked in its position on both sides of the WesternMorava Valley, but it succeeded in driving back the assaults. The ThirdArmy had also advanced slowly toward Lipet, taking over 500 prisonersand two machine guns. The Second Army met desperate opposition, butfinally began surging ahead and soon sent in its share of captured warmaterial and prisoners. In the north an important force of the Austrians was making towardBelgrade, to lead a triumphal entry. Reconnoitering parties, sent outfrom the flank of this body, were seen in the direction of Slatina andPopovitch. The decided successes of this first day's fighting acted as a powerfulstimulant on the previously depressed Serbian rank and file, though theystill realized that there was many a hard fought attack to be driveninto the vitals of the ponderous body of the enemy before he could befinally hurled back across the frontier. The Austrians still remained inpossession of mountain positions of great natural strength, which couldonly be taken at the point of the bayonet. But the Serbians hadrecovered their _morale_; again they were fighting with that energy andvigor which had characterized their assaults during the first and secondinvasions. And they were amply rewarded. By December 5, 1914, the First Army had retaken the dominating heightsof the Suvobor Mountains and the summit of Rajatz. The Third Army, afterbuckling back a stubborn resistance, advanced as far as Vrlaja duringthe day. During that same night the Austrians were driven from Lipet, leaving 2, 000 of their own number behind as prisoners. The Second Army, on its part, had pushed steadily on and by night it reached Kremenitzaand Barosnevatz. The Uzitsha Army, opposed by greater numbers, wasunable to participate in the general forward movement, but, on the otherhand, it held its own during the day's fighting. During that night ithurled itself at the enemy, and by morning he was retreating towardZelenibreg. There was now no longer any doubt that the chances of success for thisthird invasion of Serbia were beginning to assume very slenderproportions. The three army corps in the Austrian center and right hadbeen completely broken and were now retreating in mad, disorganizedflight toward Valievo and Rogatitza. Even should the Serbians fail tofollow up this section of the enemy's forces with full vigor; evenshould it have a few days for re-forming, the loss of so much warmaterial made such a possibility very difficult. There would hardly betime, under any circumstance, to draw fresh supplies from over thefrontier before the Serbians could come up with them. On December 7, 1914, the Uzitsha Army reached Pozega. The First Army, after storming and taking the heights of Maljen, advanced and formed aline between Maljen and Toplitza. The Third Army made a strong pushforward and reached the line from Milovatz to Dubovitza, making a greathaul of guns and prisoners. Only the Second Army failed to make anyheadway. Obviously, the Austrian field commander realized that thesituation in the center was lost; this would account for his attempteddiversion in the north. Here two Austrian corps held their groundsuccessfully and they not only were able to check the advance of theSecond Army, but they advanced to an attack against the detachment ofBelgrade at Kosmai and Varoonitza. On the whole, however, the fortunes of war had, during that day, resteddecidedly with the Serbians. They had captured 29 officers, 6, 472 men, 27 field guns, 1 mountain gun, 15 gun carriages, 56 wagons loaded withartillery ammunition and between 500 and 600 ordinary transport wagons. Above all, the situation in the south, where it had at first seemed mosthopeless, was now retrieved beyond question and the Austrians in thatsection were fleeing helter-skelter before a lively Serbian advance, ledby the Serbian Generals Yourishich and Mishitch. The next day, December 8, 1914, began with hard fighting around Uzitsha, but the division here (the Uzitsha detachment), was not to be pressedback on its very own home soil; the Austrian lines wavered, broke, thenscattered, the soldiers fleeing for the frontier. The First Armycontinued triumphantly, as it had done the day before, advancing andsweeping all in its way before it. It ended the day by storming andentering Valievo. The Austrians holding Valievo had carefully prepared for its defense, for this town they were reluctant to give up. The approach by the mainroad had been heavily intrenched and the guns were in position. But themain force of the Serbians circled around in the hills and flanked theposition of the Austrians, taking them completely by surprise. Theybroke and ran, and while the fugitives hurried off toward Loznitza andShabatz, a rear guard of Hungarians on the hills to the northwest put upa rather indifferent fight before they, too, fled in mad disorder. Thelast of them were caught by the Serbian artillery and, while runningover a stretch of rising ground, over a hundred were shot to pieces byshrapnel. When the Serbians arrived the ground was literally coveredwith mangled forms; here and there sat a few wounded. The Third Army likewise shared in the general triumph. It reached theKolubara, at its junction with the Lyg. Throwing out one of itsdivisions eastward, it threatened the right flank of the enemy on Cooka, then permitted the Second Army to carry that position. By this movementthe Serbians succeeded in driving in a wedge and completely cut off thethree beaten and fleeing corps in the south from the two in the north, which were still showing some disposition to hold their ground. The operations in the west and northwest now resolved themselves into awild, scrambling foot race for the frontier. The worst of the fightingwas now over; indeed, the Austrians now fought only when cornered. Mostof them were by this time unarmed, thinking of nothing but how to reachthe frontier before the first of the pursuing Serbians. Only a powerful literary pen could paint such a picture as was nowspread over the land of Serbia. Wounded warriors, now resolvingthemselves into helpless, suffering farmers, simple tillers of the soil, save for the tatters of their blue and gray uniforms which aloneindicated what they had been, lay by the roadsides and along mountaintrails, abandoned by their comrades. Others lay mangled, their formsbeaten out of all recognition. Scattered over all, wherever road ortrail passed, lay guns and cartridges, sometimes in heaps, where theyhad been dumped out of the fleeing wagons. And further on lay the wagonsthemselves, some thrown over on their sides, where the drivers had cutthe traces and continued their flight on the backs of their horses. Later in the day, December 8, 1914, the scenes along the highways tookon a different character. The main columns of the pursuing Serbians hadpassed on, but straggling files of those too tired or too weak to be inthe fore of the chase still continued onward. More slowly followed asteady stream of returning refugees, their oxen, in various stages oflife and death, yoked up to every conceivable manner of springlessvehicle, piled high with odds and ends of furniture and bedding whichhad been snatched up in the mad hurry of flight. On top of the bundleslay sick and starving children, wan with want and exposure. Beside thewagon walked weary women or old men, urging their animals on with weirdcries and curses, returning to the devastated remains of what had oncebeen their homes. Later still, from opposite directions, came processions of Austrianprisoners, sometimes thousands of them, guarded by a handful of ThirdBan Serbian soldiers, still wearing their peasant costumes. Among theprisoners were smooth-faced youths and old men, some in the uniforms ofsoldiers, or of Landwehr, or Landsturm. All types of that hodge-podge ofnationalities and races which the flag of Austria-Hungary representswere there; Germans, Magyars, Croats, Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Lithuanians, and Bosnian Musselmans. In between the convoys straggled men of the Serbian army who had fallenout of the chase by the way, most of them Third Ban men, too advanced inyears to keep up the pace set by the younger men. Nowhere moved anythingbut suffering, bleeding humanity. On this scene the sun, a glowing disc of copper, finally set, and thestruggling figures merged into the deepening dusk, and presently onlyblack, halting shadows were creeping along the dark trails and roads. CHAPTER LVII THE FATE OF BELGRADE During all this time a separate drama was being enacted in and aroundBelgrade, the Serbian capital. Unfortified and not especially adaptedfor defense, except for the breadth of the Danube flowing along its lowfront, it was the cause of a general, world-wide wonder that it shouldnot have fallen almost immediately into Austrian hands. Quite aside frommilitary values, the capture of an enemy's capital always makes astrong, moral impression, on both sides. Beginning with the early morning of July 29, 1914, when a detachment ofSerbian irregulars beat off a river steamer and two troop laden bargeswhich were attempting to approach the shore just below Belgrade, therefollowed a period during which the citizens of the city had their fullshare in experiencing the horrors of warfare. The booming of heavy siegeartillery and the screaming of shells at first startled them, thenbecame so commonplace as barely to attract their attention. The attacksand counterattacks on mid-river islands became incidents of dailyoccurrence. Ruined buildings, wrecked houses and dead bodies in thestreets became an unmarked portion of their everyday life. For the greater part of this period Austrian cannon, planted across theriver, poured shell, shrapnel, and incendiary bombs into the city, withintent to batter down its modern buildings and to terrorize theinhabitants. Over 700 buildings were struck by bombs, shells, orshrapnel, and of these sixty were the property of the state, includingthe university, the museum, foreign legations, hospitals, and factories. The foundries, bakeries and all the factories along the Serbian shore ofthe river were razed to the ground. Austrian howitzer shells droppedthrough the roof of the king's palace and wrecked all of the gorgeousinterior. The university was riddled until the building, with itsclassrooms, laboratories, library, and workshops, was entirelydemolished. Even the cellars were destroyed by great shells, which brokedown the walls, pierced their way into the very bowels of the earth andthere exploded. As the result of a steady fire to destroy the statebank, one street, running up from the water's edge, was ripped up fromcurb to curb. Missiles pierced the wood paving and its concretefoundations by small holes, passed along underground for some distance, then exploded, throwing particles of the roadway to all sides. Many of these shells were fired from the Austrian batteries stationedover near Semlin, but presently there also appeared a fleet of rivermonitors, so heavily armored that no Serbian shell could pierce theirsides. These would parade up and down the river channel with impunity, adding their share to the general destruction. Finally, in the beginning of November, 1914, there arrived in Belgradetwo big 14-centimeter cannon, sent by the French Government by way ofthe Adriatic, together with French gunners and 20, 000 rounds ofammunition. These were put into position above the city and on November8, 1914, the French gunners sent their first message over into Hungary. The damage inflicted so impressed the monitors that they did not againventure into range. Moreover, spies, of whom there were probably anumber in Belgrade, had doubtless notified the Austrians that measures, were now being taken to mine the river effectively. In fact, manymeasures for a more effective offensive were being undertaken when thetrend of operations in the interior forced the Serbian General Staff toorder the evacuation of the capital. It will be remembered that the Serbians had been beaten back from theirmain line of defense and that a rearrangement of the Serbian forces hadthereby become necessary, in order that the line might be shortened. This included the abandonment of Belgrade on November 29, 1914. Theorder was carried out during the night. But before retiring, the Frenchgunners, who saw that they were going to lose their two big guns, determined to bid the enemy across the river a hearty good-by. In theearly morning they fired off their stock of 240 rounds of ammunition andin a little more than half an hour deposited some twelve tons ofmelinite on the enemy's forts at Bezania, with such terrifying effectthat the garrison abandoned it. Thus it came to pass that the twostrongholds, having snarled and barked at each other across the dividingwaters for nearly five months, were both evacuated at the same time. As will be remembered, the right wing of the Serbian lines, now joinedby the garrison of Belgrade, swung back and stretched across theBelgrade-Nish railroad, along the ridges of Varoonitza in the east andKosmai in the west. The Austrian left, composed of two army corps, immediately covered the ceded territory and, of course, enteredBelgrade. Then followed the strong Serbian counterattack against theAustrian center along the Suvobor ridges and the complete demoralizationof the Austrian forces from the center south. The northern wing of the Austrians, however, which held the countryaround Belgrade succeeded in holding its own, though it was presentlycut off from the rest of the Austrian forces. But this was all accordingto the plans of General Putnik. Being much outnumbered he could notspare the forces necessary to rout the enemy's strong northern force. Having broken the center of Potiorek's front, the Serbian commander gavehis chief attention to capturing the Austrian southern wing, operatingin the Western Morava Valley. On December 8 and 9, 1914, the Serbian right wing had been hard pressedalong the line from Kosmai to Varoonitza, but the completeness of theAustrian defeat in the other theatres enabled General Putnik torearrange his troops. He therefore dispatched the left wing of the ThirdArmy against Obrenovatz, attached the rest of the Third Army and thecavalry division to the Second Army and placed this new combination offorces, together with the garrison of Belgrade, under the command ofVoivode Stepanovitch, he who had made so brilliant a record at the firstbattle on the Tzer ridges. CHAPTER LVIII ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE BELGRADE On December 10, 1914, General Stepanovitch immediately began a movementagainst Belgrade which had now been in the hands of the Austrians sincethe first of the month. At this time the Third Army was pressing ontoward Obrenovatz, the cavalry division held the left bank of theBeljanitza River, the Second Army was holding a line from Volujak toNeminikuchir, the Belgrade detachment still maintained the ridges alongKosmai and Varoonitza and a detachment, which had come up fromSemendria, occupied Pudarchi. The troops thus formed a crescent, withone horn touching the Save and the other the Danube, Belgrade being thestar in the middle. The Austrian main positions stretched from Obrenovatz up the right bankof the Kolubara to Konatitche and then across to Grooka through Boran, Vlashko and Krajkova Bara. There now followed what was probably the most stubborn fighting of thethird invasion: either the Austrian soldiers composing this northernarmy were better material, or the Austrian commanders were especiallyanimated with the necessity of holding Belgrade. On the morning of December 11, 1914, the Serbian advance began. Aspossession of the railroad was of first importance, the center pushedrapidly ahead until it reached Vlashko heights. Again and again theSerbians charged up the slopes of this eminence, only to be beaten back. But finally, toward evening, the Austrians fell back and the summit wastaken, thereby giving the Serbians control of the railroad at Ralia; theterminus of the line, in fact, for a tunnel several miles farther northhad been blown up by the Serbians on the day they had evacuatedBelgrade. Early the next day, December 12, 1914, the advance was continued and theleft wing of the Third Army reached Obrenovatz and its right occupied aline from Konatitche to Boshdarevatz. The Second Army occupied thesummits designated as Hills 418 and 287 and the Belgrade detachmentadvanced to a front from Koviona to Krajkova Bara. Thus, with astonishing swiftness, and in spite of the stubbornresistance, the crescent was contracting and the Austrians were beingsqueezed back into Belgrade. But they continued their desperateresistance, fighting over every foot of ground before surrendering it. By December 13, 1914, the enemy had been routed from all the territorylying between the Save and the Drina, but with such desperation did theAustrians cling to Belgrade that they delivered repeated counterattacksupon the Serbian positions at Koviona and Krajkovo Bara before theyfinally retired north. The triumphant Serbians, though they had suffered severely, followed upthe retreat vigorously, pressing along the banks of the TopchiderskaRiver on the left and up the main road on the right. The left wing hadadvanced up the Kolubara River toward its junction with the Save, whichwas eight miles behind the Austrian front. The enemy had to draw backfor fear of being suddenly taken in the rear. Two monitors were sent upthe river to check the Serbian cavalry division, which was trying towork its way around the marshes and thus cut off the Austrian forceentirely. But this movement of the left wing was merely a feint; it wasintended simply to make the Austrian line waver. While the Austrianswere maneuvering in answer to this feint, the Serbian center was pushingits advance. The Austrians had attempted to check the Serbian advance by intrenchingheavy rear-guard forces in several strong positions, the nature of thecountry being especially suited to such tactics. The hills along theroad north of Ralia are, indeed, strategic points of immense militaryvalue. But the Serbians, their capital now almost in view, pressed onwith frantic vigor. The Austrians fought manfully, giving them one of the best fights theyhad yet been through. Instead of merely clinging to their hillintrenchments, they made fierce and determined efforts to pierce theSerbian line. It was in one of these counterattacks, near the centralheight, where the railroad entered a tunnel, that the resistance of theAustrians was broken. After the Serbian riflemen, with their machineguns, had thrown back the enemy, the Serbian artillery caught theretiring masses of blue and gray clad soldiers of the Dual Empire. This produced a panic in the densely packed retreating column, whereuponthe Serbian infantrymen leaped out of their trenches and dashed forwardin pursuit, forming two pursuing columns, one on either flank of thefleeing Austrians, like wolves worrying a wounded buffalo. And as thesestreams of Serbians ran uphill more rapidly than the blue-gray floodmoved, the Austrian rear guards, composed of heavy forces, turned tocheck the pursuit. On the morning of December 14, 1914, the Serbians approached thesouthern defenses of Belgrade, where the Austrians must make their laststand; along a line from Ekmekluk to Banovobrodo. Here General Potiorekhad constructed a system of earthworks, consisting of deep trenches withshrapnel cover and well-concealed gun positions, with numerous heavyhowitzers and fieldpieces. Evidently he hoped to withstand an indefinitesiege on this fragment of Serbian territory, holding Belgrade as abridgehead for another advance toward the main Morava Valley, when thenext effort to invade Serbia should be made. He would, at the same time, preserve at least a semblance of his prestige from all the calamitiesthat had befallen his armies, enabling him to represent the campaign asa reconnaissance in force, similar to Hindenburg's first advance againstWarsaw. But his troops had been so terribly punished that they could notgarrison the siege defenses. The Serbians, now drunk with their manyvictories, and absolutely reckless of death, as they drove on towardtheir capital, with their old king, grandson of Black George, movingthrough their foremost ranks, charged up into the ring of hills. The last fight, on December 14, 1914, which definitely broke the back ofthe last effort of the Austrians to maintain a footing on Serbian soil, took place on the central height, Torlak. Two battalions of Magyars weredefending this point. And just as the sun was setting over in theMatchva swamps in a glow of fiery clouds, the foremost Serbians leapedup to the attack. Long before the fight was over darkness set in. The Serbians, drivenback again and again, came back like bounding rubber balls. Finally theygained the trenches, and one general, horrible mêlée of struggling, shouting, furious combatants set in. The shooting had died down; theywere fighting with bayonets and knives now. Finally the tumult dieddown. But nearly every Austrian on that height died. Few escaped and notvery many were taken prisoners. Then, under cover of the night, theSerbians spread over the other heights and captured the whole line ofdefense works. No Serbian slept that night. They tugged and dragged at their heavy gunsthrough all the dark hours, up toward the city, and placed them onheights commanding the pontoon bridges that had been thrown over theSave from Semlin. When dawn broke on December 15, 1914, a heavy mist hung over the river, but the Serbians knew with accuracy the location of the pontoon bridge. All during the previous day and during the night the retreatingAustrians had been crowding over this bridge to escape into Austrianterritory. At first the retirement had been orderly, but later in theday, as the news from the front became more serious, as the low, distantroar of rifle and machine gun rolled nearer, the movement increased inintensity, and, during the night, developed into a hurried scamper. Cannon were unlimbered and thrown into the river, and troops foughtamong themselves over the right of way along the narrow plank walk. Inthe midst of this confusion, while yet thousands of the invaders werestill on the Serbian side of the river, just as dawn was breaking, therecame a deep report, the hissing of a flying steel missile, and a shelldropped in the middle of one of the pontoon supports, hurling timber andhuman beings up into the air. The confusion now became a wild panic. Some tried to return to the Serbian shore, others fought on. Dozens ofthe struggling figures rolled over the side of the bridge into theeddying currents of the waters. Again came the dull, heavy report, then another and another, followed bythe screeching overhead. Shells dropped into the water on all sides. Andthen another bomb burst on the pontoon where the first shell had landed. Even the roar of the shouting soldiers could not be heard above thecrashing of timbers, the snapping of mooring chains. The bridge swayed, then caved in, where the pontoon had been struck and was sinking. Between the two broken-off ends, still crowded with struggling humanity, rushed the turbid current of the river. The last road to safety had beencut. Presently the fog lifted and revealed a long line of retreatingAustrians, reaching down the road toward Obrenovatz, still headingdesperately for the bridge, as unconscious of its destruction as a lineof ants whose hill has been trampled in by a cow's hoof. But they werenot long to remain unconscious of the fact that they were now prisonersof war. CHAPTER LIX SERBIANS RETAKE THE CITY--END OF THIRD INVASION As the sun rose on December 15, 1914, the Serbian cavalry, accompaniedby King Peter, swept down from the heights of Torlak and entered thestreets of the capital. A volley from the remnant of a Hungarianregiment met them. The cavalrymen dismounted and began driving theMagyars down the streets, from one square to another. And while thisfight, an armed riot rather than a military action, was going on, finally to end in the practical slaughter of all the Hungarians whowould not surrender, the king entered the cathedral of his capital tocelebrate a Mass of thanksgiving for the deliverance of his kingdom fromthe hands of the enemy. And even as the Mass ended, stray shots echoedthrough the streets of the city still. Two hours later the Crown Prince Alexander, accompanied by his brother, Prince George, a strong cavalry escort, and the British militaryattaché, approached Belgrade. They were met on the outskirts by a crowdof women and children who, with a few exceptions, were all of theinhabitants that remained, the Austrians having carried the others offwith them the day before. They had collected masses of flowers, and withthese they bombarded and decorated the incoming soldiers. The girlsbrought the embroidered scarfs and sashes, which they had worked inpreparation for marriage, and these they hung about the cavalrymen'snecks until they looked as though they were celebrating at a villagewedding. Huge tricolor streamers now hung from the houses and buildings, while bits of dirty bunting fluttered from the cottages. In the streets of Belgrade the Austrians left 5 cannon, 8 ammunitionwagons, 440 transport wagons, and 1, 000 horses. Some 150 junior officersand 10, 000 men also found their retreat suddenly cut off; among themwere few officers of high rank. In one of the officers' headquarters theevening meal was still spread on the table, the soup half consumed, thewine half drunk. So ended the third Austrian invasion of Serbia. Of the army of 300, 000men who had crossed the Drina and Save rivers, not over 200, 000returned. During the last thirteen days of the operations the Serbianshad captured 41, 538 prisoners, including 323 officers, and enormousquantities of war material; 133 cannon, 71 machine guns, 29 guncarriages, 386 ammunition wagons, 45 portable ovens, 3, 350 transportwagons, 2, 243 horses, and 1, 078 oxen. The Austrian killed and woundednumbered not far from 60, 000. The Austrian occupation of Belgrade had lasted just fourteen days. Theinvaders had evidently not counted on the disaster that was so soon tocome to them. Under the guidance of their late military attaché inSerbia they had established themselves in the best available buildings, began to repair the streets, which they themselves had ripped open byshell fire, and set up the semblance of a city administration. But itwas still evident that no central authority from above had as yet beenable to assert itself. The personality of each commander, wasrepresented by the marks left behind in his district. The buildingsoccupied by one military authority remained cleanly and intact, even theking's photograph being left undamaged. In others, furniture wasdestroyed and the royal image shot and slashed to pieces. Entiresections of the town escaped pillage. Other quarters were plundered fromend to end. While the cathedral and other churches were not seriouslydamaged, the General Post Office was completely wrecked. The furniturein the Sobranje, the house of the national assembly, was destroyed andbroken, and the Royal Palace was stripped from floor to ceiling, thecontents being carted off to Hungary in furniture vans, broughtespecially from Semlin for that purpose. With the army of occupation came 800 wounded soldiers from the othertheatres of operations. Most of them were immediately turned over to theAmerican Red Cross unit established in Belgrade, already caring for1, 200 wounded Serbians. As the fighting continued in the interior thesenumbers were constantly augmented, until the American hospitalsheltered nearly 3, 000 wounded men. When the evacuation began the Austrians left their own wounded, but tookwith them the Serbian patients, to swell the number of their prisonersof war. Several hundred of the non-combatant citizens were also takeninto captivity. In the importance of its influence on the war as a whole, theachievement of the Serbians in repelling the three Austrian invasionswill probably be found, when the later history of the war is finallywritten, to take very high rank. For had Serbia fallen, the TeutonicEmpires would have been united with little delay to their Turkishallies. Austria might then have been able to hold off the Russians byherself, while the Germans would thereby have been so much stronger forpressing their campaigns in Belgium and East Prussia; with what resultscan only be guessed. The Austrians themselves were astounded by theextraordinary power of little Serbia. Their last disaster, indeed, soroused their anger that they began preparing again for another attemptto conquer this stubborn little nation. Calling the Germans to their aid, they began in January, 1915, tocollect a new army, 400, 000 strong, which was ranged along the Serbianfrontier. But the pressure from the Russians on the Carpathian frontpresently became so heavy that this body of troops was needed there, andso Serbia was left in peace for the time being. Thenceforward only insignificant fighting took place between thebelligerents on each side of the river, such fighting being mostly inthe nature of artillery actions. Belgrade was not again, during thatperiod at least, subjected to bombardment. An arrangement was madebetween the Serbian and Austrian commanders whereby the Serbiansrefrained from firing on Semlin, and the Austrians spared Belgrade. There was, however, some activity on the river itself. Belgrade was nowgarrisoned by a mixed force of Serbians, British, and French, theBritish being mostly gunners, who had been detached, together with somebig naval guns, from the British navy. For some time before they arrivedthe Austrian monitors and picket boats had again been patrolling theDanube and annoying the Serbians, but the Belgrade garrison put an endto the activities of these vessels with their big guns. The Britishsailors especially rendered good service by means of a small picket boatcommanded by Lieutenant Commander Kerr. Though armed with only a singlemachine gun, this small boat was so persistently troublesome to theenemy that it earned for itself the name "Terror of the Danube. " Of darknights it would poke its way into creeks and passages, alarming theAustrians constantly and causing them no little loss. Once it evensucceeded in persuading one of the monitors to pursue it into acarefully prepared mine field, over against the Serbian shore, with theresult that the monitor was permanently put out of action. But theseoperations were of minor importance just then. For now Serbia was calledon to face a new enemy, in some of its aspects much more terrible thanthe Austrians, for it demanded a sort of fighting in which the Serbianswere not so well trained. The Austrians had, indeed, left behind them anally that was to accomplish as much mischief almost as they themselveshad caused the Serbians. Not long after the final defeat of the third invasion an epidemic oftyphus appeared among the Serbian soldiers. Run down physically, as theymust have been, their vitality sapped by the hardships of the campaignsthey had just passed through, they fell victims to this scourge by thethousands. Not knowing how to attack or to defend itself against such anenemy, the little kingdom sent forth a cry for help, which was heard andresponded to by the United States, Great Britain, France, and evenRussia. Organizations were formed with the purpose of assisting Serbiain this extremity, and private persons also came forward with offers ofmoney and service. The Red Cross also did what it could under theemergency, but its resources were already being taxed to their fullextent by demands in all the battle fields of Europe. Sir Thomas Liptonsailed his yacht, the _Erin_, to Saloniki, loaded with supplies ofmedical stores, and carrying a full passenger list of doctors andnurses. Lady Paget, Lady Wimborne, and other women of rank in GreatBritain also devoted their whole energies to the cause. A society ofwomen physicians, an offspring of the Scottish Federation of theNational Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, did noble work in Serbia. After sending two hospital units to France, this women's organizationdispatched a third to the Balkans, where it was received with thedeepest gratitude, Serbia agreeing with enthusiasm to pay the salariesof its members and the cost of its maintenance. It was stationed atKragujevatz, where it was given a hospital of 250 beds. But meanwhile the epidemic had spread over the country. There werethousands of serious cases; men, women, and children were dyingeverywhere, unattended and under the most distressing circumstances. Hardly had the first of the foreign aid arrived when the immensity ofthe task required was recognized, and telegrams and cables were sent allover the world calling for further assistance. To this second appeal nocountry responded more nobly than the United States. Owing to the virulent character of the disease that raged in everydistrict the mortality was frightful. In many localities the death ratewas over 50 per cent. All during the spring and summer of 1915 the needof Serbia was extreme. In July there were in the country 420 Britishdoctors alone, aside from the French, Russian and American medical men, all working at the highest pressure and doing with very little sleep, yet unable to cover the ground. Many were the stricken patients who mustbe satisfied with floors instead of beds; many more who could not evenbe admitted into the hospitals. Nor were the Serbians the onlysufferers; from among the foreigners who had so nobly come to help theSerbians in their distress there were not a few who succumbed to thefatal disease. CHAPTER LX MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR The military operations on the Montenegrin front should really beconsidered as a part, though a detached part, of the Serbian campaigns. Up to the first Balkan War Serbia and Montenegro, or Tzernagora, as itis called by its own people, were separated by the sanjak of Novibazar, a territory which Turkey was allowed to retain after the Treaty ofBerlin at the instigation of Austria, so that the two countries shouldhave no opportunity to unite. By blood the two peoples are closely akin, though the isolation of the Montenegrins has been the cause of their notadopting so many of the outward tokens of civilization as the Serbians. Already on July 25, 1913, before Austria had officially declared waragainst Serbia, the Montenegrin Government, at the capital, Cettinje, announced that it would support Serbia should there be an outbreak ofhostilities with their common hereditary enemy, Austria. Montenegro had, indeed, even more reason than Serbia for hating the great empire to thenorthward, for its territory stretched down the coast from Dalmatia, andliterally fenced her in from the Adriatic, whose blue waters are visiblefrom the Montenegrin towns and villages perched up on the mountainsabove the shore. In the Balkan war the army of Montenegro had captured, at a terrible sacrifice of blood, the town of Scutari from the Turks, which dominates the only fertile section among the crags of the littlemountain kingdom. It was Austria, at the London Conference, who hadforced her to relinquish this dearly paid for prize, though soreluctantly was it given up that the Powers were on the point ofintervening. The value of the Montenegrin army in such a great war as was now begunwas slight, however, for in numbers it did not amount even to a fullarmy corps. Nor would it be very efficient outside of its own territory, for the Montenegrins, whose manner of life is quite as primitive as thatof the Albanians, are essentially guerrilla fighters, who cannot welladapt themselves to army discipline. On a war footing the army is composed of four divisions, the first threeof three brigades each, while one is composed only of two brigades. Altogether there are fifty-five battalions, or about 40, 000 men. Eachbrigade also includes one detachment of mounted scouts, one mountainbattery, one group of rapid-fire guns, one section of telegraphists andone section of engineers. Each division has, in addition, attached to ita detachment of mounted scouts, a section of engineers, a field batteryand a heavy battery. Then there is a reserve of eleven battalions, usually assigned to garrison or guard duty. Altogether the totalarmament amounts to 40, 000 rifles, 104 guns and forty-fourmitrailleuses. Of the actual operations along the Montenegrin front not so muchdetailed information is available as there is of the other sections ofthe theatre of war. War correspondents were not allowed to accompanyeither army in this field and the only reports so far given out, covering this period, are from the few official bulletins issued by thetwo respective governments and from other more indirect sources. On August 3, when the Austrians had already begun bombarding Belgrade, King Nicholas signed an order for the mobilization of his forces, andfour days later, on August 7, he declared war against Austria. Butalready the Austrians had detached an army corps under General Ermoly toprevent any possible juncture between the Serbian and Montenegrinforces. For the time being, therefore, until the Serbians had drivenback the first Austrian invasion, the Montenegrins facing this divisionof the Austrian army acted on the defensive. This, however, with the advantageous nature of the country, did notrequire the full strength of the Montenegrin army; part of it, therefore, was employed in an attack on the Austrian towns situated onthe narrow strip of Austrian territory running along the sea coast. Thechief of these, Cattaro, was subjected to a hot bombardment from theheavy guns on Mt. Lovcen, commanding that section of the coast. A fewdays later, on August 10, the Montenegrin infantry descended from thesurrounding heights and delivered a strong assault on Spizza and Budua. The activity of Austrian warships, which bombarded Antivari, whereMontenegro touched the coast, made it impossible for the Montenegrins tohold what they had taken. Another force, however, turned toward Scutariand occupied that town. Mt. Lovcen continued, not only then, but atintervals for the next year, to pour a heavy artillery fire on Cattaro, and its environs. In Bosnia, over toward the Serbian operations, fighting had alreadybegun and continued until the Serbians drove the main Austrian armyback. On August 20, just as the Serbians were delivering their lastattack on Shabatz and the Austrians were stampeding across the Drina, the Montenegrins delivered a heavy attack along their whole front, causing the Austrians to retire in that section as well. The followingday the Austrians, in trying to recover their lost ground, brought upmore mountain artillery, then advanced their infantry up against theMontenegrin entrenchments. Here occurred the first hand-to-handfighting, the Austrians charging with their bayonets again and again, but they were finally repulsed again with heavy loss. From now on the Montenegrins, under the command of General Vukotitch, who had so distinguished himself in the Balkan War, gradually assumed anoffensive and advanced into Bosnia. On September 2 he again encounteredthe Austrians at Bilek, and succeeded in defeating them after a heavyfight, in which a comparatively large number of prisoners were taken. The Montenegrins, comprising practically all of their army, continuedadvancing in three columns. On September 9 there was another hot fightat Foca, south of Sarajevo. At this juncture the Serbians sent a column into Bosnia, from Visegrad, whose purpose was to effect a connection with General Vukotitch, thatthe two combined forces might advance on and take Sarajevo, a movementwhich was to be carried on simultaneously with the Serbian advance intoAustrian territory from the Save. But, although the two allied armies almost reached the vicinity of theBosnian capital, the Austrians were now, toward the latter part ofSeptember, returning to this region in great force, to begin the secondinvasion of Serbia. The Montenegrin army was, in consequence, obliged toretire before vastly superior forces and, during the rest of the year, as did the Serbians, the Montenegrins were satisfied merely with keepingthe enemy out of their home territory. What fighting occurred after thatmoment was of more or less a desultory nature and entirely defensive. PART VI--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN CHAPTER LXI STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ANTAGONISTS The first campaign between the Austrian army and the Russian legionsbegan on August 6, 1914, when Austria declared war on Russia. We havewitnessed in the preceding chapters the German invasion of Belgium andFrance, and the Austrian invasion of Serbia; we will now view thefighting of the Russians and the Austrians on to the frontier, as itprogressed simultaneously with the Russian and German campaigns to bedescribed in subsequent chapters. For some days before war was declared, as noted in Volume I of thiswork, Austria-Hungary and Russia understood each other thoroughly. Russia was satisfied that Austria intended to force war on Serbia, andRussia was pledged to protect and uphold the little nation, which wasreally her ward and over which she had announced a protectorate. A review of the situation at this time shows that while mobilization wasbeing hastened, Russia had joined the Slav kingdom in asking for a delayon the ultimatum that Serbia had received from Austria on July 24, 1914. On July 27 Russia notified Austria that she could not permit Serbia tobe invaded. On July 29 an imperial ukase issued by the czar called allreservists to the colors. On July 31, 1914, M. Goremykin, President of the Council of the RussianEmpire, issued a manifesto which read: "Russia is determined not toallow Serbia to be crushed, and will fulfill its duty in regard to thatsmall kingdom, which has already suffered so much at Austria's hands. " Germany on July 30, 1914, had asked Russia to stop its mobilization, andhad demanded a reply within twenty-four hours. Russia had ignored theultimatum, and on August 1 the German Ambassador had handed adeclaration of war to the Russian Foreign Minister. On August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and the Austrian Ambassador leftSt. Petersburg. In such wise was the eastern arena cleared for action. Before describing in detail the Austro-Russian campaign, it is necessaryto bear in mind the conditions in the opposing armies. The strength ofthe Austrian army is discussed in the chapter on the Austro-Serbiancampaigns, while the fighting forces of Russia are discussed in thechapter on the Russian and German campaigns. Much has been said, and justly, in criticism of Russia's army at theoutbreak of the war and afterward, but there is no disputing the factthat it had been improved wonderfully as the direct result of the warwith Japan. In the strenuous years that followed that war, withrevolution an ever-present menace, the establishment of a constitutionalmonarchy, and the granting of religious toleration to the many creedsand sects which helped to make up the population, awakened its diversepeople to a new unity, inspired the people with hopefulness andactivity, and the _morale_ of the Russian army improved accordingly. The army, at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, on a peace basisincluded about 50, 000 officers and more than 1, 200, 000 men, whichincluded about 1, 000, 000 actual combatants. In recent years preceding, the annual contingent had been about 430, 000. At the end of July, 1914, the ukase, which proclaimed a general mobilization, summoned to thecolors five classes, or about two million men. The total number wasincreased by other reservists and volunteers to 4, 100, 000. [Illustration: Pictorial Map of Russia. ] There had been a wave of reform in every branch of the military service. The men who were conscripted to form the main strength of the army wereyoung and possessed more initiative than had the recruits of yearsbefore. Every effort was made to encourage this initiative under the newfield service regulations. In creating a new army with real fighting spirit, cohesion, and ability, Grand Duke Nicholas, who was made Generalissimo, was conspicuous. Eachyear the progress made under his direction has been displayed at theautumn maneuvers. Another member of the imperial family, Grand DukeSergius, was largely responsible for the excellent showing made by theRussian guns and gunners after war began. For purposes of administration all of European Russia was divided intoeight military districts--the Caucasus, Kazan, Kiev, Moscow, Odessa, Petrograd, Warsaw, and Vilna. There were also four Siberian districts, making twelve in all. To each district were assigned two or more armycorps. In war, these were grouped in varying numbers from three to fiveto constitute an army or army group. The equipment of the Russian infantry soldier comprised at the outbreakof the Great War a rifle, a 299-mm. Weapon with a quadrangularbayonet--which also was carried by noncommissioned officers--a waistbeltsupporting a pouch for thirty rounds on each side of the clasp, anintrenching tool, a bandolier holding another thirty rounds carried overthe left shoulder under the rolled greatcoat, and a reserve pouch alsoholding thirty rounds, which completed the full load of 120 rounds foreach man, suspended by a strap over the right shoulder. As the Russian soldiers moved to the Austrian frontier, there was slungover the right shoulder kits containing food and clothing and cookingutensils, and over the left shoulder one-sixth part of a shelter tent. The total weight borne by the regular Russian infantryman was nearly58-1/4 pounds. When the war started, the Russian army, in its invasion of Austria, hadits full complement of officers, and because of the great capacity ofits military schools, it was as well able as other nations engaged tomake up for losses in battle. One sweeping and beneficial change thathad been made was that promotion no longer went by seniority butentirely by merit: the higher the position the more rigid the tests. Incidentally, it was Russia's good fortune that the war came at a timewhen the noncommissioned ranks were full and it was possible to promotemany of these men to fill vacancies in the commissioned service. The use of Russian infantry on the battle fields, as we shall soon see, differed in no essential way from that common to other nations ofEurope. An advance under fire was almost identical with that of othernations. A single company in attack would dispatch two platoons as afiring line, retaining two in reserve, each of the platoons in frontproviding its own protection for skirmishing, according to the nature ofthe ground. If the cover was adequate, a few rifles were enough to locate the enemy, and either they could be reenforced or the front could be extended. Ifthe ground were quite open, the two leading platoons were extended atonce, so as to oppose the enemy with an equal extent of fire, and thenadvanced by rushes, each section covering the rush of the other byalternate firing. The two reserve platoons could be used either tooutflank the enemy, if the nature of the ground permitted, or for directreenforcement in any formation required. As has been said, all the nations engaged in the great conflict pursuedsimilar tactics in this respect, and the only advantage possessed byRussia in their use was that both her infantry and artillery possessed amuch larger number of officers, who had been trained to understand how, against a powerful opponent, to carry out efficiently in practice and intimes of great stress the theory which all nations held in common. The observer of the battles in the Russo-Austrian campaigns will seethat the Russian cavalry was inadequate, because its horses were toosmall, of inferior strain, and lacking the stamina needed in modernwarfare. They were valuable, however, because of their large numbers, and the fact that during the winter months, being acclimated and to thecountry born, they were able to pick up a living in the snow when otherhorses would starve. As regards field batteries, near the western Russian frontier and inAsia, nearly all of them had, when war was declared, eight guns. In mostof the batteries in Asia the number of men maintained in peace was thesame as in war. [Illustration: Russian Invasion of Galicia. ] The Russian army moved forward with adequate aerial corps. The keenestinterest in military aviation had been taken in Russia during two yearsbefore the war. Grand Duke Alexander was one of the founders of theaviation school at Sebastopol, where two-thirds of the Russian aviationofficers obtained their training. In the spring of 1914 the air fleetconsisted of 16 dirigibles and 360 aeroplanes, while orders for 1, 000aircraft of different descriptions had been placed with various firms inRussia. The army of Austria-Hungary which faced the Russians was composed of menfrom a country where universal military service prevailed. In theoryonly the physically unfit were exempt from service, and the liabilityextended from the beginning of the nineteenth year to the close of theforty-second. Actual service in the ranks and with the reserve wastwelve years. After the men had served ten years with the army and inits reserve they were included in the Landwehr for another two years. Itis likely that Austria had at the outbreak of war from 1, 200, 000 to1, 300, 000 men at her disposal. During the three years preceding she hadgreatly strengthened her equipment. The infantry of the joint Austrian army, which had to fight thecampaigns against the Russians on the east, and against the Serbians onthe south, comprised 102 regiments of infantry, 27 battalions ofJaegers, 4 regiments of Tyrolese Jaegers, and 4 regiments ofBosnia-Herzegovina infantry. Every infantry regiment had four fieldbattalions and a depot battalion. The duty of the latter was to fill upthe ranks of the others. Each infantry regiment had at least twomachine-gun detachments of two guns each, and in many there were twoguns per battalion. In Bosnia and Herzegovina every battalion had four, and this also was true of every Jaeger battalion. The Austrian infantrymen, as they met their Russian antagonists, carrieda small-bore magazine rifle, in use in the army since 1895, and knownafter its inventor as the Männlicher. It had a caliber of . 315 inch andfired a pointed bullet. It was loaded by means of a charger whichcontained five cartridges, and it was equipped with a bayonet. Thecavalry carbine was shorter but took the same bullet. One hundred andtwenty rounds were carried by the infantry soldier, and there wereforty rounds in the company ammunition wagon, and 160 in the infantryammunition columns, in addition. The machine gun in use was of the samecaliber and took the same ammunition as the infantry rifle. It wascomposed of few parts, and was a simple and highly effective instrument. On these first days of August, 1914, the cavalry of Austria--thehussars, uhlans, and dragoons, but really all of one type--lightcavalry--was equipped uniformly with saber and carbine. Thenoncommissioned officers and others who did not carry a carbine rodeforth equipped with an automatic pistol. There were forty-two cavalryregiments in the entire Austrian army, consisting of six squadrons, eachof which had a fighting strength of 150 sabers, not counting the pioneertroops. Every cavalry regiment had four machine guns with 40, 000 roundsof ammunition. The pioneer troops of the cavalry, which first wereintroduced in Austria, were composed of an officer and twenty-five men, equipped with tools and explosives needed by an advance force to clearobstacles, destroy railways, etc. Besides the pioneer troops, eight menin each squadron were equipped with similar tools. The telegraphsection, consisting of eight men, carried about seven miles of lightwire. The artillery of Austria-Hungary had been greatly modified in recentyears. The gun used for horse and field batteries was known as M5--thatis, the pattern of 1905. It was of 3-inch caliber, a quick firer, throwing a shrapnel shell which weighed 14. 7 pounds. High-explosiveshells also were carried in the proportion of two to five of shrapnel. The gun had a long recoil on its carriage, which absorbed the shock andthe gun returned to its place. This made rapid fire possible. Like the other powers, Austria-Hungary had adopted a howitzer for itsheavy batteries. It fired a shell of 38. 132 pounds. There was also aheavy gun in use, a 10. 5 centimeter, corresponding to a 4. 1-inch gun. The ammunition was like that of a howitzer--a shell weighing 38. 132pounds, which contained a high-explosive bursting charge and shrapnelwith 700 bullets, fifty to the pound. On the march the carriage wasseparated from the gun, and each was drawn by six horses. The mountain regions on all the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy resoundedon these August days of 1914 with the mountain artillery. The10. 5-centimeter guns and 4. 1-inch howitzer quick firers threw a shell ofthirty-two pounds. This howitzer had a range of more than 6, 000 yards, and was a powerful weapon. The 30. 5-centimeter mortars fired a shell of858 pounds with a bursting charge of 56 pounds of ecrasite. The extremerange of this mortar was about six miles. Ten rounds could be fired eachhour. Two guns and their ammunition lorries were drawn by three largetractors. An hour was required to get one of these guns ready foraction. Let us enter the headquarters of the Austrian army at the beginning ofthe Russian campaign. There we meet the engineer staff, which built andbesieged fortresses, and a military works department, which built andmaintained buildings that were not immediately connected withfortifications. Austria-Hungary had only a few fortresses of modernconstruction. The intrenched camps in Galicia, Cracow, and Przemysl weresoon to be besieged, and between them was a fortress known as Jaroslav, of insignificant value, like that of Huy between Liege and Namur inBelgium. The Austrian army had not made as much progress in aeronautics as thoseof other nations. There was a depot for dirigibles at Fischamend, abouteleven miles southeast of Vienna, but only a few dirigibles were readyfor service. These were of the Parsefal type. There were a number ofcaptive balloons. The number of aeroplanes available was very small. Aschool for teaching aviation had been established at Vienna-Neustadt. The faces of the soldiers of the Austria-Hungarian army on the Russianfrontier denoted many races, but it possessed considerable solidarity. Officers and soldiers recognized alike that they were all under a singlehead--the emperor. The officers were drawn from all classes of society, and this was also a unifying influence. They were on more intimaterelations with their men than the Prussian leaders, and "led" insteadof "drove" them. Commands for the whole army were given in German, butotherwise the language varied according to the composition of thevarious regiments as regarded races. The use of the German language forcommands undoubtedly aided in unifying the army. CHAPTER LXII GENERAL STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN The Austrian army faced the Russians on August 11, 1914, with awell-organized strategical plan. Austria, realizing the importance ofunity, cohesion, and harmony in her own forces, proposed at the outsetof the war to dissipate the strength of her enemy, Russia, by causing anuprising in Poland. The vanguard of Austria's advance along the Vistulaconsisted of the Galician army corps, made up of Polish soldiers. Alongthe border, arms and ammunition had been collected for the anticipatedinsurrection. A proclamation was sent by the Polish associations ofGalicia and Posen to their "brethren of Russian Poland. " In this, thePoles of Russia were urged to prepare for a rising, but not to attemptit until the Austrian vanguard had arrived and won a first battle. Thenarms would be provided for them. Russian strategy checkmated this plan. The czar issued a proclamationpromising home rule to Poland as soon as Germany and Austria had beenrepulsed. With this home rule he also offered self-government andfreedom of law and religion, and the reconstitution of the old Polishterritory by means of the annexation of Posen and Galicia. This movedivided the Polish leaders and stifled the incipient revolution. The spy system won and lost the first strategical battles before a shotwas fired. There is no doubt that the Austrians before the war knewalmost as much about Russia's preparations as did the Russiansthemselves. The Austrian system of espionage was elaborate and accurate, and the Austrians profited by that of Germany also. Nevertheless, Russia surprised her foes and allies alike by the rapidity with whichshe got her troops into action on the offensive once war was on. The Russian army was handicapped by lack of railroad facilities, but shemade the most of them. Her total mileage was about 25, 000, her systembeing inferior to that of Germany or Austria. Germany's was by far thebest of the three. Many of the Russian roads had but one line of track, their construction was inferior, stations were farther apart, and thespeed of trains was comparatively slow. They could not carry as muchtraffic as those of either of her two adversaries. The gauge of theRussian roads was 5 feet, so that the rolling stock could not be used onGerman and Austrian roads, which had a uniform gauge of 4 feet 8-1/2inches. The management of Russian railroads was too complicated for armypurposes. But Sukhomlinoff simplified it and instituted schools in whicharmy officers were instructed in putting soldiers on cars rapidly androuting trains to the best possible advantage. This and other activitiesof Sukhomlinoff, along the line of reform and improvement, were in nosmall measure responsible for the rapidity with which Galicia wasinvaded. Austria's military problem was a difficult one from the start. Her ally, Germany, could not extend much military assistance until a decisive blowhad been struck in the western theatre of war, but Austria, having amillion men in readiness and being strong in artillery, was expected toassume the offensive from the start and attack the imperfectly mobilizedRussian forces in western Poland. An immediate offensive was required, because she must hold Galicia at all cost. There were three places where Russia might cross the frontier ofGalicia--west of the point where the waters of the San empty into theVistula, between the Upper Bug and the San, or along the line of theRiver Sereth on the east. There was great danger in a combined movementby Russia against the first and third sections of the frontier whichwould cut off and surround the forces of Austria which were based onPrzemysl and Lemberg. In order to avoid this peril, apparently thesafest as well as boldest plan was to proceed northward against thefortresses of Warsaw. Such an advance would in all probability preventthe armies of Russia from crossing the Vistula and postpone any attackagainst the Sereth from the east. Austria was staking the success of such tactics on the incompleteness ofmobilization by the Russians, and therein she proved to be in error. Indeed, the quickness of Russia's military movements amazed the entireworld, with the exception of her Generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicholas, andhis aides and advisors. At the outbreak of the Great War, Nicholas was in command of the St. Petersburg military district. Under him was a Corps of Guards, and theFirst and Eighteenth Army Corps from 120, 000 to 150, 000 men. He was asoldier of the first rank and an able strategist. He had familiarizedhimself with the armies of other European nations. He long had plannedfor the emergency that now confronted him. In the rapid movement of the Russian forces, he was aided chiefly byGeneral Vladimir Sukhomlinoff. The latter saw that one of the chiefdefects in the Russian army, as disclosed by the Japanese War, was theslowness of her railroad operations, and some time before war wasdeclared he had set himself to improving conditions. He established aschool of railroading for officers where the rapid loading of troops oncars and the general speeding up of transportation were studiedscientifically. The good results of such work were apparent at the veryoutset of hostilities. As we have seen, France was saved in the first campaign in the west bythe sturdy resistance of little Belgium to the advance of the Germansthrough her territory, so Russia now helped to save France a second timeby the rapidity of her campaign. While German troops still wereinvesting Liege in Belgium, the Russian troops were registering theirfirst triumph at Eydtkuhnen, and upon the very day that Ghent fell intothe hands of the Germans, Russia began her strong offensive in EastPrussia. By such means were a large part of the German forces, intent ontaking Paris, diverted from attack on the western war arena to protectthe eastern frontier from Russian menace. The relief which Russia thusgave her Allies was invaluable. The battle of Mons was over in Belgiumand the retreat to the Marne in France had begun, and the Germans werealmost in sight of the French capital, when, save for Russia's timelyblow on the Polish frontier, the Germans, many war critics believe, would have reached Paris. When the Germans in the west were striving toward Calais on the EnglishChannel as their goal, it was the Russian offensive in Galicia thatforced Germany to transfer more army corps to the eastern front in orderto stop the tide that threatened to overflow Austria. Thus the Frenchand British were able to stop the advance that threatened to engulf themon the western front and given time to organize themselves for astrenuous contest. The strategic problem which confronted Russia was much more complicatedthan that which had to be solved either by Germany or Austria. It wasquite evident to her General Staff that at least during the first fewmonths of hostilities Germany would devote her whole time and attentionto attack in the western arena, the French being at the time her mostdangerous enemy. Except for a small part of the Austrian forces left tooppose the Serbians and Montenegrins, the whole army of Austria wasdepended upon to oppose the Russian advance. The important strategic condition that confronted Russia was this: Hermost dangerous enemy was Germany, but in order to attack Germany it wasnecessary that Austria's army should first be destroyed. The eastern theatre of the war has been described in a preceding chapterand it will be recalled that for about two hundred miles from east towest Russian Poland is inclosed on the north by East Prussia and on thesouth by Austria. Moreover, the Sudetic Mountains on the Austrianfrontier and the huge forests of Poland protect the position of GermanSilesia southeast of Breslau. Passing through it are the chief lines ofrailway connecting eastern and western Europe, including the routesbetween Poland, Galicia, Moravia, and Bohemia. At varying distances fromher Russian frontier Austria has a line of mountains of great defensivestrength. This is the Carpathian, which, extending inside theAustrian-Russian border line, is joined by the Transylvanian Alps andcontinues to form the south frontier of Austria. It would not be possible for the Russian invaders to menace Austriaseriously until these mountains had been crossed. Russia, however, wasmenaced by the configuration of the German-Austrian frontier, withPoland open to invasion from three sides. Also, Austria and Germany hadmany strongly intrenched positions at strategical points covering allthe chief lines of approach on their frontiers where the latter facedRussian territory. Besides being defended by artificial works, thefrontier had natural defenses, such as lakes, swamps, and forests. Allalong the Russian-Austrian frontier, in fact, there exist such naturaldefenses against invasion. On the southern boundary of Poland theRussian army was held off by great bogs which cover from east to west adistance of about 250 miles. The only crossing was a single line ofrailroad, the one extending from Kiev to Brest-Litovsk. From a militaryviewpoint, these marshes divided the line in two parts, imperiling thesituation of any fighting in front of them in case of defeat. They wouldoffer no kind of sustenance to troops driven within them. Russia was not prepared to put into the field an army large enough tohold the entire line from the Baltic to the Rumanian frontier, approximately 1, 000 miles, and there was no time, if part of the Germanforces were to be diverted from the western front, to raise such forcesand equip them. At the beginning of hostilities on August 11, 1914, the chief offensiveagainst Russia was intrusted to the First Austrian Army under GeneralDankl. This was composed of about seven army corps, having variousadditional units, or amounting in all to about 350, 000 men. This armyhad its base on Przemysl and Jaroslav, and the work which had beenassigned to it was to advance upward between the Vistula on the leftside and the Bug on the right, on to Lublin and Kholm. There it was tosever and hold the Warsaw-Kiev railroad so the line would be exposed inthe direction of Brest-Litovsk and the chief communications in the rearof Warsaw. The First Austrian Army, while it advanced to this position, would have as protection from attack on its right and rear from theeast and south the Second Army under General von Auffenberg. This army, advancing northeast from Lemberg, would control eastern Galicia from theBug to the Sereth and the Dniester. The numerical strength of Von Auffenberg's army at the start probablywas about 300, 000, and consisted of five army corps with five divisionsof cavalry. This, however, was only its initial strength. As hostilitiesdeveloped Von Auffenberg added to his strength until he is reported tohave had no less than six corps and additional cavalry. At first thisincrease came from the Third or Reserve Army, over which Archduke JosephFerdinand had command. While General Dankl was advancing toward Lublinon August 28, 1914, being protected on his right flank by VonAuffenberg, the army of the Archduke appears to have been pushed out ina similar manner on the left. CHAPTER LXIII AUSTRIA TAKES THE OFFENSIVE The Austrians crossed the Polish border on August 29, 1914, and moved onas far as Kielce and toward Radom without encountering seriousopposition. That may have been as far as it was intended to proceed. Inall three of the armies of Austria there were about 1, 000, 000 men, andagainst these forces were arrayed three Russian armies--a small force onthe Bug, which may be called the First Russian Army; a Second RussianArmy under General Russky, which was moving on Sokal from the Lutsk andDubno fortresses; and a Third Army under General Brussilov, which wasproceeding against the Sereth. There were about 300, 000 men in each ofthe two latter armies. Now the Russian strategy on September 1, 1914, was this: It was intendedthat their First Army should retire before Dankl, the Second Army tomenace Lemberg from the northeast and put its right wing between Dankland Von Auffenberg, and the Third Army to advance from the Sereth tothe town of Halicz on the Dniester, and so finish the investment ofLemberg on the south and east. It may have been, though this is not certain, that the General Staff ofthe Austrians did not see the close connection between the movements ofRussky and Brussilov. It may be that they believed they had onlyBrussilov to face at Lemberg, since Russky would be obliged to proceedto the aid of the First Russian Army on the Bug. Russky was famed as a highly scientific soldier, being a professor inthe Russian War Academy. In the war with Japan, he had been chief ofstaff to General Kaulbars, the commander of the Second Manchurian Army. Afterward, he had been closely associated with General Sukhomlinoff inthe reorganization of the Russian forces. Brussilov, whose armyconsisted of men of southern Russia, was a cavalry general and had seenservice under Skobelev in the Turkish War of 1877. General Ewarts, incharge of the Third Army, the smallest of the three, whose duty was tofight a holding battle, was a corps commander. No serious resistance was made by the Russians against the main Austrianadvance under General Dankl, and it proceeded almost to Lublin. At onetime it was within eleven miles of that place. On August 10, 1914, the Austrians who had crossed the frontier had afront of about eleven miles wide to the west of Tarnogrod. The Russianfrontier posts had a brush with the advance cavalry of the Austrians andthen fell back. There was a second skirmish at Goraj and a more seriousmeeting at Krasnik, and the Russians still retreated. The Austrians werejubilant over their victory at Krasnik and at the few delays theyencountered at the hands of the enemy. The Russians in their retreatproceeded toward the fortified position of Zamosc or toward Lublin andKholm. In the meantime Russia had been gathering an army on the line fromLublin to Kholm. There the Russians had the railroad behind them, in onedirection to Warsaw, and in the other to Kiev and Odessa. Each day asthe Austrians advanced the strength of the Russian army was improving. In the early days of September, 1914, it probably amounted to 400, 000men. When the Austrians were within fifteen miles of Lublin they firstencountered heavy resistance. They were checked and then delayed, butthe Russians were not ready to do more than hold their antagonists. Theywere waiting for developments farther to the southeast. On August 17, 1914, the Russian offensive had its definite start. GeneralDankl was finding himself with the First Austrian Army; when he stoppedin his advance toward Lublin, General Russky began a powerful attackagainst Von Auffenberg. Cooperating with Russky, as we have noted, andon his left was Brussilov, the total forces of these two commandersbeing at first double those with which Von Auffenberg was equipped tooppose them. As soon, however, as Von Auffenberg became aware of thenumerical superiority of his opponents, he drew for reenforcements onthe Third, or Reserve Army, which had advanced into Poland as far asKielce. The latter troops hurried to join Von Auffenberg, crossing the Vistulaby means of bridge boats at Josefow. When the issue really was joined, the troops of the Third Austrian Army, under the Archduke JosephFerdinand, were ready to act in close cooperation with those of VonAuffenberg. Thus, in the armies on both sides there were, in all, about1, 200, 000 men, with the advantage in favor of the Russians. Having thissuperiority in numbers, Russky felt that he was safe in attempting toenvelop the Austrian forces on both flanks. With the larger army--theSecond--he hurled his troops at the Austrian left and center, advancingalong the railway. On August 22, 1914, the Russians crossed the frontier and on thefollowing day, Russky occupied Brody, with small opposition. On the sameday, Brussilov, on his left, also crossed the frontier at Woloczysk, which is the frontier station on the Lemberg-Odessa railway. At thispoint the rolling stock used by the Russians on their own railway intheir advance was no longer available, as the gauge of the Russian andAustrian lines differs. The Austrians had retired with their own rollingstock in the direction of Lemberg, destroying what they did not takeaway, and so the Russian advance from that point was continued wholly, perforce, on foot. There was a good wagon road which ran parallel to therailroad toward Lemberg, and along this Brussilov's cavalry hurried. CHAPTER LXIV CAUTIOUS RUSSIAN ADVANCE--RUSSIAN SUCCESSES--CAPTURE OF LEMBERG On August 23, 1914, the Russians were almost on the heels of theretreating Austrians. After three hours' fighting, they drove them outof Tarnopol. Thereupon they retreated along the line of the Zlota Lipa, which is an affluent of the Dniester and runs almost directly southward. On August 25 and 26, 1914, there was some heavy fighting along thisriver, especially at Brzezany. Heretofore, the army under Brussilov hadnot met with any important resistance, having encountered chieflyfrontier posts, skirmishers, and small detachments of Austrians. Itseems that no great body of Austrians had penetrated much beyond theZlota Lipa. On the eastern side of this river was a line of low hills, offering a fine defensive position; the Austrians hastily began to makeuse of them. They were still constructing trenches when the Cossackcavalry appeared, driving the skirmishers of the Austrians before them. A fight began on August 24, 1914, which lasted ten days. The Russiancavalry was not strong enough to attempt to take the Austrians'intrenched position, and therefore waited for the main body of theRussian forces to come up. The fight extended over twenty miles offront, stubbornly contested by the Austrians. Finally, by directassault, the Russians took the position and the Austrians fell back, ingood order, toward Halicz, where the Gnita Lipa joins the Dniester. In the meantime, while Russky was thus pounding at Von Auffenberg'sright, Brussilov was attacking his right and center. Having crossed thefrontier between Brody and Sokal, Russky extended his forces on a widefront. While the center advanced straight for Busk and Krasne in adirect line toward Lemberg, the right, proceeding almost due west, wasattempting to penetrate between the army of Von Auffenberg and that ofDankl on the north, and was pushing powerfully on Von Auffenberg's left. Gallantly resisting, the Austrians were forced back in all directions, slowly but firmly. The fighting on Russky's right and center wasespecially fierce and severe and resulted in great losses on both sides. By the time Brussilov had taken the position on the Zlota Lipa, hisright was in touch with Russky's left, and the first stage of thecampaign was over. That Russia had been able to proceed so far with herplans would seem to indicate that the Austrians had underestimated therapidity with which she could complete her preparations. It was the fallof Tarnopol that made possible a junction of the Russian armies andenabled them to advance in a united line upon Lemberg. General Brussilov had to move to the attack without attractingattention. This was accomplished by both Russky and himself throwing outa screen of Cossacks all along the frontier of Eastern Galicia. For anextent of one hundred and fifty miles, the Cossacks skirmished at everyborder road or bridge between the Bug and the Dniester rivers. Theystarted this immediately after war was declared and soon, soinconsequential did such activity appear, that the Austrians, it seems, came to regard it as lacking any real purpose. After the third week inAugust, however, the commander at Lemberg sent a force of 2, 000 men tomake a reconnaissance in Podolia. These troops arrived at Gorodok, a small town across the border. Theirpresence there was most inconvenient for the Russians, for GeneralBrussilov was at that time advancing with a big army through Gorodok ontoward Galicia. It was imperative that the Austrian reconnoiteringtroops should be stopped and the only force available for this purposewas nine hundred Cossacks stationed at Gorodok to screen the main army. It was necessary for these Cossacks to repulse the Austrianreconnoitering force, without calling for large reenforcements. If thelatter were done, it would excite the suspicions of fugitives from thefight. Therefore, the Cossacks lined out in the woods far beyond the villageand then thirty of them went forward from cover to cover until they cameupon the Austrians. Simulating surprise, they fled in apparent panic. The Austrians entered upon a swift pursuit and were led into ambush. Thousands of them were cut down by a cross-fire of rifles and machineguns. The rest were pursued by Cossacks over the border and the invasionof Galicia was begun by the Russian main force. Then began the perilous part of the enterprise. The army of Russky wasadvancing on Lemberg from the north and the army of Brussilov wasconverging on the Galician capital from the east. After they had beenunited, they would assuredly outnumber the Austrian force which wasguarding Lemberg, but in the meantime either Russky or Brussilov was tooweak to escape defeat. Each might be met singly and overwhelmed. Theskill with which their combined operations were carried out was such, however, that General Brussilov was able to steal into Galicia andoccupy a large part of the country before battle actually was joined. The secrecy with which his great movement was executed wasextraordinary. It was executed in daylight, covering a period ofthirteen days, from August 19 to August 31, 1915. It was performed inspite of the fact that the Austrians had many spies, a large force oftrained cavalry, and scouts in aeroplanes darting over the frontier. Yetnot until it was too late did the Austrians discover the real nature ofthe Russian turning movement in Eastern Galicia. In part, this was attributable to the fact that the territory in whichBrussilov was operating was an ancient Russian duchy which had beenwrested from the ancestors of the czar. Eastern Galicia might becompared to Alsace-Lorraine, which had been torn from France. Peopled bya Slav race, Eastern Galicia had the same language, religion, andcustoms as the soldiers in Brussilov's army. When at the beginning of operations, Russia first assumed a generaloffensive on August 17, the Grand Duke Nicholas issued the followingproclamation addressed to Russian inhabitants of Galicia: "Brothers--A judgment of God is being wrought. With Christian patienceand self-annihilation, the Russian people of Galicia languished forcenturies under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecutioncould break in it the hope of liberty. As the tempestuous torrent breaksthe rocks to join the sea, so there exists no force which can arrest theRussian people in its onrush toward unification. "Let there no longer be a subjugated Russia. Let the country which formsthe heritage of Saint Vladimir throw off the foreign yoke and raise thebanner of united Russia, an indivisible land. May the providence of God, who has blessed the work of the great uniters of the Russian lands, bemade manifest. May God aid his anointed, the Emperor Nicholas of All theRussians, to complete the work begun by the Grand Duke Ivan Kalita. "Rise, fraternal Galician Russia, who have suffered so much, to meet theRussian army for you and your brethren, who will be delivered. Room willbe found for you in the bosom of our mother Russia without offendingpeaceable people of whatever nationality. Raise your sword against theenemy and your hearts toward God with a prayer for Russia and theRussian Czar!" This proclamation was received in Galicia with acclaim. When the Russiansoldiers came, priests and people came out from the villages withflowers and banners to meet their "little brothers. " Flowers were thrownon their heads from the upper balconies of houses, as they marchedthrough the streets. Whatever could be done by pretended ignorance orsilence to mislead the Austrians regarding the Russian advance was doneby peasants. Meanwhile, General Brussilov was making the most of his opportunities. He passed over the tributaries of the Dniester and without revealing hisstrength pushed back the Austrian cavalry screen. For this work he usedlarge bodies of Cossacks, with all necessary infantry and artillerysupport. [Illustration: Field Marshal von Hindenburg] While appearing to be merely a border raider, the Cossack had to veilhis main army and clear its path through bridgeheads, forts, andblockhouses, and he was well suited to this kind of work. Moving at therate of eight miles a day in advance of the infantry and the big guns, he maintained a continual skirmish with cavalry scouts, infantrymen, andgunners in places that had been fortified, and even armored trains. In all, the Cossack in the Galician campaign, proved himself not only amost efficient soldier but well behaved. Previously, his reputation hadbeen an evil one. Naturally, there were reports of brutality andsavagery, but none were proved. In fact, neither on the part of theRussians nor the Austrians was there manifest any of the "frightfulness"attributed, rightly or wrongly, to combatants in the western theatre ofwar. It was, of course, not to the interest of the Russians to mistreat thepeople of Galicia. They came, in their own estimation at least, asdeliverers, not as despoilers. As for the Austrians, they were in theirown country when in Galicia. When they penetrated north into Russia, itappears that they did little wanton damage. On their return, it is true, they laid waste a large part of the province of Volhynia, burningvillages and farmsteads as they proceeded. But this was dictated bymilitary exigencies, in order to delay and inconvenience their pursuers. There was an occasion when it might have been supposed there would havebeen excesses. This was when after an Austrian defeat, the Russian van, composed of three divisions of Cossack cavalry, pushed through Halicz inpursuit of the enemy. The victorious troops swept through a country, full of Jews, and utterly undefended. It was a garden of plenty, a richand fertile country. Instead of presenting a picture of desolation andruin after the Russian army had passed, its cattle still grazed in thefields, the fields were full of shocks of grain, and chickens, ducks, and swine wandered about the streets of the town. There was not a single wrecked house in the town itself, only a fewbuildings, such as warehouses near the railway station, having beendemolished by the Russians in order to hasten the departure of theenemy. There was another significant incident at the neighboring town ofBotszonce. Here the retiring Austrians attempted to make a stand, butwere shelled out by the Russians with their heavy guns. There were onlythree buildings in the city which were not reduced to ruins. These weretwo churches and the Town Hall, which, having a church-like spire, theRussians evidently took for a church of worship, also. In thisconnection, we may quote here a second proclamation which the Grand DukeNicholas, as Commander in Chief of the Russian forces, distributed inthe districts of Austria captured by the Russians. It was designed toprevent ill feeling between the people and the invaders. It was datedSeptember 17, and read: "To the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary: "The Government of Austria declared war against Russia because the greatempire, ever faithful to its historical traditions, could not forsakeinoffensive Serbia, nor acknowledge its enslavement. "On entering the Austro-Hungarian territory, I declare to you in thename of the great Emperor, that Russia, which has spent its blood manytimes for the emancipation of nations from the yoke of foreigners, onlyseeks the rehabilitation of right and justice. "Russia also brings liberty and the realization of your national views. For many centuries the Austro-Hungarian Government planted among youdiscord and enmity, for it knew that as a result of this strife itsdominion over you would continue. "On the contrary, my sole aim is that each and every one of you may growand prosper and keep at the same time the precious inheritance oflanguage and faith of your fathers. "Let every one of you, united to his brothers, live in peace and harmonywith his neighbors, respecting their national rights. Being convincedthat you will cooperate with all your strength to realize this, I callupon you to welcome the Russian troops as faithful friends who arefighting for the realization of your greatest ambitions. " Now, to return to the campaign which had been waged by Von Auffenberg: While he may be said to have lost this preliminary campaign, his armywas unbeaten. Immediately it fell back into the powerful and carefullybuilt line of defenses in front of Lemberg, extending over a front ofseventy or eighty miles, from the vicinity of Busk on the north toHalicz on the Dniester, on the south. An irregular extent of volcanichills, some containing extinct craters, extended along the greater partof its length, and ended on the south in a ridge parallel to the GnitaLipa as far as the Dniester. The northern end of this territory wasskirted by the railway running due east of Lemberg. The Austrian leftrested north of the railroad on the River Bug and the lake districtaround Krasne. Artificial fortifications improved these naturaldefenses. There were many miles of trenches with barbed-wireentanglements, and at different points massive fortifications ofconcrete and steel. The position was difficult to take at any point. On August 26 and 27, 1914, after the forces of Russky and Brussilov hadbeen joined, the Russians immediately began their attack along theentire front. The days that followed were replete with furious charges. Positions were taken only to be surrendered. Bayonet fighting figuredlargely in the clashes. After two days, though the Austrian lines werestill intact, the Russians claimed a victory. Events came about in thisway: After he had forced the crossing of the Zlota Lipa on August 26, and his right wing had connected with Russky on the north, Brussilov hadextended his left, by forced march through a country almost devoid ofroads, as far to the south as the valley of the Dniester. On August 31, 1914, the main body of this flanking body arrived in front of Halicz. Onthe day following, September 1, 1914, a furious attack began. More gunswere brought up and a fierce attack was concentrated near the littlevillage of Botszonce, where the enemy had taken a position. Afterward, the condition of the field, which had been literally plowed up withshell fire and strewn with the débris of cannonading and accouterments, showed how terrific the conflict had been. The final assault was made bythe Russian Ninth and Fifty-ninth Infantry under cover of a heavy shellfire. Enormous losses were sustained, but the Russians were enabled tomake a breach some kilometers wide in the Austrian line. Then the entire Austrian line began to give way. A desperate stand wasmade as a last resort in the village of Botszonce itself, but this wasturned into a useless sacrifice when the Russians, pushing forward heavyguns, unlimbered them on the same hills where the Austrians had foughtso determinedly and quickly reduced the town to ruins. On September 3, 1914, the Austrian retreat began in earnest. Where thefighting had been hottest around Botszonce and Halicz, the Russiansclaim they buried 4, 800 Austrian dead and captured thirty-two guns, someof which had been mounted by the Austrians but taken before they couldbe brought into use. The Austrian reports deny such figures, whileclaiming heavy losses by the Russians. There was a fine steel bridge across the river Dniester at Halicz, andthe extreme right of the retiring Austrian army crossed this, with, theRussian cavalry pursuing. The bridge was destroyed and also the onlyother bridge in that region of the Dniester at Chodorow. In such wisewas the pursuit southward delayed until pontoons could be thrown acrossthe stream by Russian engineers. This was done on the following day, whereupon Cossack cavalry to thestrength, it was reported, of three divisions, crossed the river andcame up with the retiring enemy. Behind the cavalry at a short distancecame several divisions of Brussilov's infantry, which rapidly pushedacross the south of Lemberg toward Stryj. After the extreme right of the Austrian line had been shattered andRussky had been victorious in his attack on the other extreme, the wholeline fell apart quickly and while the entire front was exposed toattack, the Austrian left was being enveloped from the direction ofKamionka by a flanking movement. One end of the Austrian line was beingbroken and the other bent back. The Russians increased the fury of theirattack and it was not long before the entire Austrian army was inretreat. On September 2, 1914, Lemberg was in the hands of the Russians. Thiscity, otherwise known as Lwow or Löwenberg, was first known as Leopolis, being founded in 1259 by the Ruthenian Prince Daniel for his son Leo. His history had been a checkered and stormy one. In 1340 it had beencaptured by Casimir the Great; it had been besieged by the Cossacks in1648 and 1655, and by the Turks in 1672; it had been captured by CharlesXII of Sweden in 1704, and bombarded in 1848. As capital of thecrownland of Galicia, it had come to be a handsome city, of many parks, wide boulevards, three cathedrals, many churches, and a great number ofimportant public monuments. It was the seat of a university whichcontained a highly valuable library of books and manuscripts and a greatmany treasures of historic and antiquarian interest. Its population wasabout 200, 000. The Austrians declared that Lemberg had been evacuated in order to saveall these treasures from destruction. It is certain that the civilpopulation of the town was strongly opposed to its being defended. Itwas cosmopolitan and contained elements, doubtless in the minority, whosympathized with Russia and who welcomed the Russian troops with greatenthusiasm. Whatever other reasons may be given for its abandonment, however, the fact remains that any attempt to hold it would have beenfutile. After the Russians had taken possession of Lemberg, tranquillity againprevailed. Although it was crowded for a considerable time thereafterwith Russian soldiery, there was no violence, disorder, or confusion. Onevery hand were seen Russian soldiers of all branches of the servicefraternizing with the people of the place. If a soldier even jostled acivilian accidentally he saluted and apologized. No drunkenness waspermitted. A considerable number of Austrian policemen continued topatrol the streets, with a Russian badge on their arms, however. Austrian surgeons and nurses, left in the town when the Austrian troopsretreated, continued to help care for Austrian wounded, also left there, and received the same pay for their services as their Russian associatesof the same rank. Austrian Red Cross attendants were allowed to walkabout the streets at will, unmolested. After its occupation by the Russians, Lemberg at once became a hugehospital base. For the care of wounded that daily came in from thefront, there were forty-two immense institutions. The inhabitants of Lemberg welcomed the Russians as deliverers. Adeputation came to General Russky and requested him to make known to theczar the readiness of the whole Slav population of the city to be loyal"sons of Russia. " In surrendering the government to Count Bobrinsky, whom the czar appointed Governor General of Galicia, M. Rutovsky, Mayorof Lemberg, said: "Not without our cooperation have the Austro-Hungarian troops leftLemberg, without firing a shot. There was no struggle here, thanks toour efforts. We believe your excellency has been informed that yourtroops found here cooperation and a cordial reception. "In proffering the government of this capital, allow me to express mygratitude to the former military governor, who lessened our hardships. " In his reply, Bobrinsky outlined the principles of his policy: "I consider Lemberg and East Galicia the real origin of Great Russia, "he said, "since the original population was Russian. The reorganizationwill be based on Russian ideals. We will immediately introduce theRussian language and Russian customs. These steps will be taken with thenecessary care. "We shall at first limit this to the appointment of Russian governorsand other officials. Many of the present officials will not be replaced. We shall forbid the convocation of your Legislature during the war. Allsocial and political organizations must be discontinued, and may resumetheir activities only by permission. These precepts obtain only in EastGalicia; West Galicia will be treated differently. " The Russians considered Lemberg to be of great strategical importance. Railroad lines radiated from it in all directions giving its captorsdirect communication with Kiev and Odessa, with their fortifiedpositions at Dubno and Rovno and thence to Petrograd, withBrest-Litovsk and Warsaw--save only for the inconvenience of changingthe gauge at the frontier. Soon after crossing the frontier, theRussians had changed the gauge of many of their engines and cars to fitthe Austrian gauge. They found at Lemberg thirty locomotives and a largenumber of railway cars left there by the Austrians. When on September 3, 1914, the Russians entered Lemberg, the officialRussian announcement of its taking was as follows: "Seven days of the most stubborn fighting in Eastern Galicia haveresulted in a complete victory for the Russians. Five Austrian Corpswere completely routed, and in retreating in disorder westward, abandoned their arms and baggage. "Besides an enormous number of killed, the Austrians lost not less than40, 000 prisoners, including many generals. The roads of retreat of theAustrians are so encumbered with carts, guns, and impedimenta that thepursuing troops are unable to use the roads. Panic is spreading amongthe Austrian troops. During the seven days the Russians have taken over200 guns, several colors, and about 70, 000 prisoners. Lwow (Lemberg) isin our hands. " Russia received this report with great joy. The news of the occupationof the town was conveyed by Grand Duke Nicholas to the czar. The FourthClass of the Order of St. George was bestowed on General Russky for "hisservices in the preceding battles. " The Third Class was given him forthe capture of Lemberg. The Fourth Class of the same Order was bestowedon General Brussilov. Throughout the empire, Thanksgiving Services wereheld to celebrate "the reunion with Galicia. " General Count Bobrinskywas appointed Governor General of the province. CHAPTER LXV DANKL'S OFFENSIVE AND RETREAT Let us now turn our attention to the scene of operations further north. There, it will be recalled, was taking place the principal Austrianoffensive by the First Army commanded by General Dankl. In the middle ofAugust, he was being held up by the armies of Generals Ewerts andPlehve, who barred his way toward Lublin and Kholm. A strong offensivewas not attempted then by the Russians against him, as they weregathering strength and waiting until Dankl's army should be cut off fromreenforcements. It was desired that their advance take place at the sametime as the completion of the advance on Lemberg of Russky andBrussilov. Finally, on September 4, 1914, the brief officialannouncement was made by Russia: "Our armies on September 4 assumed the offensive along a front betweenthe Vistula and the Bug. " Coming as it did, when the Russian people were rejoicing over the takingof Lemberg, this news was greeted with great enthusiasm. It will be recalled that when Russky's army advanced, a portion of theAustrian Reserve Army, commanded by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, washurriedly withdrawn from the position it held in Poland on the left ofthe Vistula, across the rear of Dankl's army, to assist General vonAuffenberg. This was referred to as an "advance, " in a "communiqué" published by theAustrian General Staff on September 3, 1914. It is probable that at thatvery early date some German troops also were being brought up for thesame purpose. Some of the Austrian reenforcements had been joined withVon Auffenberg's army and had shared in its reverses. Some had remainedto screen Dankl on the right. After Von Auffenberg's army began to encounter difficulties and itsprogress was stopped, the gap between its left and Dankl's right andrear grew too large for safety, so that there was a hurrying of forcesfrom the left bank of the Vistula to fill the gap. Later, as the Russianstrength grew, an entirely new Austrian army was assembled, consisting, it seems, of portions of the Third or Reserve Army under Archduke JosephFerdinand, which was augmented by two corps withdrawn from the Serbianfrontier, and also some German troops. The "Fourth" Army, under the command of the Archduke, was referred tothereafter in official announcements by Russia as the "Tomaszow Army. "To strengthen Dankl's left, which lay upon the Vistula at Opolie, Germantroops from Breslau also were brought up. In the last part of August and the first part of September, 1914, therewas considerable confused fighting between detached forces on both sidesin the frontier country between Zamosc and Sokal. Both sides claimedsuccesses. The Russians claimed that their wedge was driven throughsuccessfully to Tomaszow and that there a severe defeat was administeredto the Austrians. From there the latter retired to the swampy land about Bilgoraj and uponTarnograd. The tactics of the Russians had put a last barrier betweenthe two principal sections of the Austrians. Interest thereaftercentered in Dankl's First Army. Fighting on the Lublin-Kholm front, having been purely defensive on thepart of the Russians, at first, had grown fiercer as days passed, untilthere was continuous battle along the entire line. When Von Auffenberghad been defeated and his right and rear threatened, the condition ofthe northern army seemed so critical that General Dankl decided to forcethe issue. He might fall back or break through the Russian defense. Hedecided to attempt to pierce the line between Lublin and Kholm. OnSeptember 2, 1914, the Tenth Austrian Army Corps led the assault againstthe weaker part of the Russian line and reached within eleven miles ofLublin. There it was halted, and so the Austrian offensive seems to havespent itself. As we have seen, the Russian offensive began definitely on September 4, 1914. According to the Russian official announcement, two days later, "the enemy's center, lying in the region West of Krasnostaw (this beingalmost due north of Zamosc, about halfway to the center of a line drawnfrom Lublin to Kholm) was particularly disorganized. The Forty-fifthAustrian Regiment including the colonel, forty-four officers, and 1, 600men were surrounded, and surrendered. " The same announcement stated that"a German division, coming to the aid of the Austrians, was attacked onthe left bank of the Vistula. " Presumably, the Russian troops there hadcome from Ivangorod. After the Austrian First Army began to retire, it was followed by theRussian forces along its line. And this line, at first, wasapproximately eighty miles. As it retired, the left wing being hemmed inby the River Vistula, and the right feeling steady pressure from Russianforces on the right, where direct retreat was prevented by the swampynature of the country, the front was contracted until it was less thanforty miles. This had been accomplished by the time the army reached the San, whereit was necessary to effect a crossing by four or five bridges atdifferent points. Dankl was highly praised for the manner in which hehandled his army during this retreat, and saved it from destruction. InRussia, it had been assumed that the retreat would degenerate into apanic and the fate of the First Army was regarded there as practicallysealed. Russian strategists themselves speak in high terms of the wayDankl handled his army in this crisis. The Austrian advance on this front had its high mark on a line drawnfrom Opolie on the Vistula, through Krasnostaw to Grabiowiec, whence theline curved southward toward Tyszowce. And it was in the region of thelatter place that the Austrians claimed a big success, though this wasdenied by Petrograd. After the Russian advance on this front from Lublin and Kholm, as wehave seen, had begun with the "disorganization" of the Austrian centerat Krasnostaw, the next attempt was to strike at the Austrian left, starting at Opolie and developing thence along the entire line as far asTurobin. It was on this wing of the Russian army that the chief strength had beenassembled, the other parts of the line being left comparatively weak. Reasoning that even if the Austrians were able to break through thefront, where it was weaker, it would only make more certain their beingsurrounded finally, all new troops that arrived were shifted over to theright wing. On September 5 and 6, 1914, the Russians attacked the Austrian army atTomaszow, situated northeast of Krubessiow and southeast of Rawa-Russka. The Austrian army retired. Near Frempol, the Russian cavalry rushed big convoys of the enemy in thedirection of Lublin. Troops and convoys which were moving in thedirection of the road leading from Josefow to Annopol were dispersed byRussian artillery on the left bank of the Vistula. Detachments of the Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps attempted an attacknear Rawa-Russka, during the night of September 7, but were repulsed. Near Tomaszow the Russians took an enemy aeroplane. Aerial battles were not infrequent. Captain Nesteroff, one of the mostdaring of Russian aviators, sacrificed his life in a successful attemptto destroy an Austrian aeroplane. He was returning from the front afteran aerial reconnaissance when he saw an Austrian aeroplane hovering overthe Russian forces with the intention of dropping bombs. The Russian aviator immediately headed straight for the Austrian machineat full speed and dashed into it. The force of the impact caused thecollapse of both machines, which plunged to earth, both aviators meetinginstant death. The fortress of Nikolaieff, twenty miles south of Lemberg, was taken bythe Russians after severe fighting. The fortress was one of the mostmodern military strongholds in Austria, being supplied with all thenewest forms of defense and offensive weapons. It had steel cupolas, masked ranges of earthworks, and guns of modern type and heavy caliber. The Nikolaieff fortress commanded the passage of the River Dniester. Atthe fortress forty guns of the heaviest type and stores of all kindswere captured. Like Lemberg, the fortresses had been well stocked withprovisions, which fell into the Russians' hands. After occupying Nikolaieff the Russians undertook, after allowing theirsoldiers only two hours of rest, a night march for the purpose ofattacking new positions occupied by the enemy. A Russian battery, placedon the Vistula River, engaged with success an Austrian steamboat armedwith rapid-fire guns. About the same time troops were sent by train from the east of Lembergto near Chelm, and put in action against Austrian infantry intrenched ona long line, which included the village of Michailowka. The Russiansentered the village the same night, the Austrians having fallen back toa half circle of small, steep hills which overlooked the town. Somehouses had been set afire, but the flames had been extinguished by thevillagers themselves. At three o'clock the following morning the attack on the hills began. The Austrians occupying them numbered 15, 000, of which a large numberwere in a deeply wooded gorge. The Russian artillery swept the crest ofthe hill and shelled the gorge with shrapnel. The Austrians repliedstrongly. At noon the position was stormed. The Russians, at the word of command, rose with cheers and rushed the hill. Austrian guns to the left cut themdown badly. Later, after a desperate, brave fight, the position wastaken. The gorge was full of dead men lying in heaps. Officers said theyhad never seen so many dead lying in a single place. The troops gave theplace the name of "The Valley of Death. " It was reported that the Austrian general commanding the defense watchedsome of his men being disarmed after the battle. Presently the Austrianstandards were brought up from the gorge. At this sight, it was said, the Austrian general drew his revolver and shot himself dead. On September 5, 1914, Austrian troops which had been stationed behindthe Grodek Lake district passed the railway lines of Rawa-Russka andHorynier, and on the next day advanced to Kurniki. On the following daya heavy battle began between these forces and a strong Russian forceadvancing northward. Two days later the Austrians opened their offensiveon a forty-mile front, having the better of the conflict until September11, especially on the southern wing near Lemberg. The Austrians then retired because of the necessity which had arisen fora new grouping of their forces, the north wing of their army nearRawa-Russka being threatened by superior Russian forces near Krasnik andbetween Krasnik and the battle fields of Lemberg. The attack by the Russians on the Opolie-Turobin section of the lineseems to have been a powerful one and the Austrians retired southward, paralleling the course of the Vistula. For nineteen miles the Russiancavalry was engaged with the rear guard of the retreating forces. Therewas particularly fierce fighting at Suchodola and also at Krasnik. AtFrampol, there was a strong Russian cavalry charge. From this point, theAustrians were forced back on the left into the morasses about Bilgorajand the right and the center were crowded together as they drew near theSan. By that time, Russia claimed to have sent 10, 000 prisoners back toLublin. These movements were all the first days of September, 1914. CHAPTER LXVI BATTLE OF RAWA-RUSSKA During the time that Auffenberg's army had been retaining the positionbefore Lemberg, a new line of defense had been instituted in his rear. This line ran from Grodek to Rawa-Russka, and thence along the railroadline toward Narol. As the Russian forces between the armies at Tomaszowhad not as yet gotten as far as Tarnograd, the far left of VonAuffenberg's troops, or those of the Archduke, which were a continuationof Von Auffenberg's army at this point, were for a brief time almost intouch with the fringe of Dankl's army on its way to the San. But therewas no combined and determined stand at any time. The entire army fellback, set upon getting across the river. It is probable that on the line from Grodek to Rawa-Russka there weremore than 1, 250, 000 men in the armies on both sides. The line was morethan sixty miles long, but the struggle was concentrated on certainpoints and fighting elsewhere was not important. The most criticalpoints were at Grodek on the far south, where a position of considerablestrength was occupied by the Austrians, and at Rawa-Russka. One advantage which accrued to the Austrians was that they occupiedpositions which had been well fortified before the battle of Lemberg, probably in anticipation of a retreat. Nature, itself, protected theirright at Grodek against a turning movement. They had excellent railwayfacilities in their rear. The advantages possessed by the Russians werethose of numbers and the fact that they were encouraged by victory. The battle had its beginning about September 8, 1914, round the positionat Grodek, where the Austrians had retreated after the capture ofLemberg. It was on the extreme north of the line, however, that theyfirst began to give ground. There they were not able to make anyextended stand because the enemy, besides attacking them fiercely fromin front, began to envelop their left. The fighting went on over a large extent of ground. At several placeslarge numbers of Austrian prisoners were taken. The upper part of theAustrian line was forced steadily back, not without desperate fighting, and finally the entire line became doubled back on itself at a sharpangle from Rawa-Russka. Here the fighting was terrific. Rawa-Russka was a small Galician city, inhabited chiefly by Jews. Thegreater part of the town was old, but there was a modern settlement nearthe railway station, the town being one of the chief railway centers inthat part of Galicia. There, two lines cross, one a branch of the mainline to Cracow, from a point near Jaroslav to the frontier at Sokal, andthe other extending northwesterly from Lemberg to the Polish frontier atNarol. There were at Rawa-Russka large railroad works, roundhouses, sidings, and storage yards. As the big battle began to develop on September 8, 1914, it was seenthat Rawa-Russka was the place where it probably would be decided andthe best efforts of both sides were exerted there. The defenses on thepoint of the angle of the Austrian line, just behind which was thetown, were in extent no longer than six, or at most eight, miles. Nevertheless, during eight days, there were as many as 250, 000 or300, 000 men engaged here in night and day fighting. After the first two days, the Russians concentrated their attack on thevery apex of the Austrian angle, atop the bluffs at the edge of theten-acre battle field. During eight days, the Russians stormed thispoint repeatedly. In a single mile the Austrians made no less than eightdistinct stands. Some points before being evacuated were taken and surrendered severaltimes, and then retreat was only for a short distance, followed by justas determined resistance. The courage and determination of both armieswas equally admirable. One position held by Austrians for hours was in a stubble field. It wasnecessary to hold this point while a better position was being dug a fewhundred yards behind in a slight dip in the ground. The rain of shrapnelwas so heavy about this place that later it was not possible to pick upa handful of dirt from it without finding therein pieces of lead. For amile across the field where the Austrians had lain, bloody bandages andpieces of equipment were strewn thickly. Behind this line, two or three hundred yards, was another line justbeyond a small ground swell, where the Austrians placed themselves infairly deep trenches. The Russians took this trench, but being unable toadvance farther, dug themselves in on their side. The next day they weredriven out by the Austrians. Afterward the trench presented the strangeappearance of a ridge of earth with a trench on each side--with Austrianrelics on one side and Russian relics on the other. Day by day the Russians drove the Austrians back farther, until at last, the Austrians were holding a deep trench on the slope of the crest ofthe last ridge of hills defending the town itself. Immediately over theridge the Austrian batteries were concentrated. The last trench was notmore than four hundred yards in front of the Russian guns. Nevertheless, the Russians were unable to make any advance against thisposition until they brought up and put into position a considerablenumber of heavy howitzers. Then slowly they began to crumble theAustrian defenses. Notwithstanding this bombardment, the Austrians heldon for more than a day. Then the Russians stormed the entire top of thehill and seized the few guns which they had not already put out ofcommission. The hill was taken at the point of the bayonet. This was thedecisive moment in the whole conflict. From the center of the field where this action was taking place theRussian wedge extended to the north and south. The Austrian center wasbroken when night fell and the Russians were dropping shells into theoutskirts of Rawa-Russka. Attacks by the Russians followed, making itimpossible for the Austrians to hold the town and it was abandoned bythe Austrian forces. In any event it soon would have been enveloped inthe rear, considering the way events were shaping themselves on thesoutherly end of the line, and the defense would have been costly. CHAPTER LXVII RUSSIAN VICTORIES--BATTLES OF THE SAN Early in September, 1914, the Russians attacked strongly fortifiedpositions at Grodek. This was during the time when the Russian northernarmy was busy driving back the enemy from Frampol to Biloraj. Thedefenses of Grodek, which included the position at Sadowa-Wisznia, wereprotected by a chain of six lakes and considerable ground cut up bydikes. The Russians were commanded by General Brussilov, who duplicated herethe tactics of continuous and heavy attack with which he had overcomethe resistance of the Austrians at Halicz. The Austrians had taken stand on a group of heavily wooded hills. Inorder to reach this, the Russians were obliged to cross a plain aboutthree miles wide, in a series of parallels, while subjected to fire frommachine guns and rifles. It was not until three days later that they were able to gain a positionwhere their guns could reach effectively the trenches of the Russians. When the assault was made with bayonets, the trenches were found heapedwith bodies. According to the Russians, the prisoners they took saidthey had been without regular food for many days and had subsisted onraw potatoes and wild pears. Continually harassed by the Russians, theyhad not time to bury their dead and so the living had fought on whilethe remains of their fallen comrades decayed beside them. A brief account of the affair from the Russian viewpoint is contained inthe announcement from the Russian Headquarters Staff, made September 14, 1914: "The army of General Brussilov, against whom the Austrians made theirlast desperate onslaught has, on taking the offensive, captured manyguns, prisoners, and artillery parks, the numbers of which are now beingreckoned. General Brussilov testifies that his troops displayed thehighest energy, stanchness, and gallantry. The corps commanders calmlyand resolutely directed their troops and frequently wrested the victoryat critical moments. General Brussilov specially mentions thedistinguished services of General Radko Dmitrieff. " There is no doubt that the engagement here referred to was one of themost bitterly and desperately contested of the war. But the conflict onmany fields was being conducted on a scale so huge that it loses much ofits importance in a general survey. On the day following theannouncement just quoted, the Grand Duke Nicholas briefly announced that"the Russians, after occupying Grodek, reached Mocziska, and are nowwithin one day's march of Przemysl. " While Brussilov's center was moving on to Mocziska, which is about fortymiles west of Lemberg, his left was advancing southwesterly along therailroad line to Sambor, and on to Chyrow. The latter place, however, was not taken until September 24, 1914. The fortress of Przemysl wasthus cut off from the south. When Grodek fell, Brussilov's soldiers had been marching and fightingwithout pause for longer than three weeks. The feats of endurance theyhad performed were extraordinary but without delay they pursued theAustrians from Grodek with the same alertness that they had shown infollowing them from Halicz. In the meantime, as we have noted, Rawa-Russka had been taken. LikeBrussilov, Russky was not inclined to give an enemy he had bested anychance to recuperate, and while Brussilov was pursuing the Austrianright from Grodek to Chyrow on the south of Przemysl, Russky wasfollowing up his success with equal vigor, driving toward Sieniawa theshattered forces which had opposed him. Sieniawa was occupied on September 18, 1914, the same day that Brussilovtook Sambor. Jaroslav was captured by assault on September 21. There washard fighting on the way there, around Javorow, fifteen miles east ofPrzemysl, where the Russians claimed to have taken 5, 000 prisoners andthirty guns. In such wise was Przemysl cut off on the north, east, andsouth. Behind its defenses, what was left of Von Auffenberg's army tookrefuge. The Austrians also had met with reverses where Dankl's army had beenfalling back before the troops of Generals Ewarts and Plehve. It hasbeen shown that the continuity of the Austrian defenses had not beeneffective in the region northwest of Rawa-Russka, though it extendedbeyond the frontier between Tomaszow and Tarnograd. After the conflictat Tomaszow, the line of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand above Rawa-Russkato that place had been bent back on the Rawa-Russka-Jaroslav railroad, while the main body of Dankl's troops fell back on the line of the San. Never was the Russian pressure on its rear relaxed. The pressure wasespecially strong from the Russian right which had fought the battle ofKrasnik, after clearing the Opolie-Truobin district. The larger portionof the Austrian troops crossed the San near its junction with theVistula. Probably they hoped that while they might place themselves, onthe other side, in touch with the Austrian railroads, the river would bea barrier behind them against the Russians. It appears that General Dankl, anticipating the necessity of fallingback across the San, had been sending his transports back in advance ofhis retreat, almost from the time the retreat began. In fact, some ofthe transport trains had been sighted and subjected to shell fire asearly as September 9, 1914, from the left bank of the Vistula. Not untilSeptember 12 did the army itself reach the banks of the San. Two heavy rear guards, to north and east, were left to hold back theoncoming Russians, while the main body and the baggage were crossing theriver on September 12. The Vistula protected the left of one of theserear guards, the San protected the right of the other. Thus the twoformed an arch between the two streams. Marshy ground made difficult the attack on their front, but, nevertheless, they seem to have been unable to prevent the Russians frompiercing the screen before the crossing of the river had been completed. There was great slaughter. The Russians claimed that they took 30, 000prisoners. The artillery of the Russians was highly effective inshelling the bridges while the Austrians were passing over them in solidmasses. Beside the large number of those killed by shell fire many werereported to have been forced into the water and to have drowned. Neither was there respite for the Austrians on the other side of theriver, although, in theory, the forcing of the passage of the San by aninvading army was considered an impossible task. Enormous sums had beenspent by the Austrians in an attempt to make it impregnable. Along the upper or southern part of its extent it was protected by thepowerful position of Przemysl and by Jaroslav. From there a lightrailroad, which had been built solely for strategic purposes, ranparallel and close to its left bank almost to the point where it joinedwith the Vistula. As they retired, the Austrians destroyed bridges behind them. But theywere not able to destroy all, otherwise a few days' rest might have beenvouchsafed the First Army. By quick work the Russians seized andmaintained a hold on the bridge at Kreszov, on the frontier a few mileswest of Tarnograd. As an official communiqué from Petrograd put it:"The Russians leaped across the river on the very shoulders of theretreating enemy. " The victory on the San, September 12-19, 1914, may well be consideredone of the most important of the campaign. There is no way of estimatingthe Austrian losses, over and above the 30, 000 prisoners the Russianssay they took, but they probably were heavy. Still more important wasthe fact that the Russians had broken down the barrier which theAustrians had sought to put between themselves and the invaders. Savefor the fact that the Austrians were now in touch with their railroads, and for the moment within reach of security, being under the shelter ofCracow, their position within the triangle formed by the Vistula was nomore safe than it had been when they were above it. The Russians reported that within that triangle they seized an enormousamount of supplies of every kind. Moreover, with the advance onKrzeszov, the last of the invading Austrians had been forced fromRussian soil. No longer was an enemy left in the provinces of Podolia orVolhynia. It must be recalled also that Russian troops which were based onIvangorod also had intercepted German reenforcements on the left of theVistula as they hastened across Poland to the aid of Austria. The gunsof the Russians also had shelled the transports of the Austrians as theyretired along the right bank. The Russian right, pressed on the retiringAustrians, had been able to spare a large number of troops, and these ithad thrown across the Vistula at Josefow. These, acting asreenforcements of the Russian troops already on that side of the river, had hurried southward, paralleling the advance of the main army on theright bank and brushing aside whatever forces of the enemy they met. In this way they were able to prevent any help from that quarter comingto the Austrians. Also, when their comrades were delivering a final blowto the Austrians at the crossing of the San, they were busy on theopposite side of the Vistula driving back a large Austrian force andoccupying the important place of Sandomierz. They encountered andovercame near Sandomierz the Second German Landwehr Corps under GeneralWoyrsch. In the neighborhood of and at the town they reported that theyhad taken 3, 000 prisoners and 10 guns. CHAPTER LXVIII SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER, 1914 Let us now briefly summarize the Russian strategy during this month ofportentous development, September, 1914, which concluded with theadvance down the left bank of the Vistula and the occupation ofSandomierz. It will be recalled that, being more or less prepared, Russia had foundherself invaded by armies operating in three different directions overan extended front. These armies contained in all about a million men. The weakness of this advance, the Russians saw, consisted in this: thatthe farther two armies of invaders, advancing in divergent lines, proceed, the farther they become separated. Thus it is more difficultfor them to act in harmony or for either to protect the flanks of theother. For this reason the Russians were satisfied to allow the First ornorthern Army of the Austrians to advance almost without resistanceuntil it came within artillery range of its first main objective--thatis Lublin and the railway line to Ivangorod and Warsaw. Then the Russians delivered a blow with force at the weak Point betweenthe two invading armies in the vicinity of Tomaszow. The Austrians, tomeet this attack, were obliged to withdraw their reserve forces from thefar left across the rear of the First Army. When these forces provedinadequate, the organization of a new army began, and this was throwninto the gap. If it had been advanced immediately and simultaneously with the othertwo armies, the new army might have served its purpose, but thecampaign, it seems, was already too far advanced. The strength of theRussians had been augmented, and after they had driven the wedge in atTomaszow they retained it in place, and were able to widen the break bymeans of the operations which followed in the vicinity of Bilgoraj, andby driving back the Austrian forces above Rawa-Russka. In this way theFirst Austrian Army was left dangling at the extreme of its advance. In the meantime Brussilov had made his well-planned turning movementalong the Dniester on the far south, and had delivered his blow onHalicz. Russky at the same time was hammering at the Austrian front andleft, penning in Von Auffenberg's army on an ever-contracting front, andthrowing it back on its successive lines of defense on the Zlota Lipabefore Lemberg, and from Grodek to Rawa-Russka. The Austrians, pushed back from each of these, and with Cossack cavalryon their right, ranging over a considerable extent in southern Galicia, were forced to fall back, guarding as best they might their rear, westward toward Cracow. When Von Auffenberg's army had been put in a tight place, busy takingcare of its own safety, the Russians were able to devote their attentionto the army Dankl had in the north. There was no chance of aid reachingit now, and it was weakened from efforts to force the barriers that hadbeen put across its path. The chief strength of the Russians was massed against the left of thisarmy, for if that wing was broken the entire army would find itselfhemmed in and must retreat in order to avoid being surrounded. And so, forced from Opolie along the Vistula, attacked constantly on its entirefront and right flank from Tomaszow and Tarnograd, Dankl's army wasforced down to and across the San and beyond it. The movements of the Russians had been executed with great harmony. BySeptember 23, 1914, Dankl's army had been driven by Ewarts and Plehve tothe line of the Wisloka. Jaroslav was taken by Russky on September 21. Chyrow was possessed by Brussilov on September 24. Brussilov had enteredGalicia at Woloczysk on the same day--August 22--that Russky had crossedthe frontier and occupied Brody. The Austrian losses, since the taking of Lemberg, according to anofficial statement made by the Russians on September 17, 1914, were250, 000 killed and wounded, and 100, 000 prisoners with 400 guns, manycolors, and a vast quantity of stores. We are not obliged to acceptthese figures. They are given here for what significance and merit theymay have, but as coming from Russia. It was also reported by Russia thatthe rifles taken numbered almost half a million. The enemy's totallosses were put by Russia at from 35 to 50 per cent. Even the smallestimate is said by Austria to be an exaggeration. The Russians now held all eastern Galicia, and were masters of Lemberg, Jaroslav, Brody, Busk, Tarnopol, Grodek, Brzezany, Sambor, and othertowns of no little importance, and also of the railroads between thesetowns. They also were in control of the oil fields of Galicia, ofconsiderable importance to them at this time, and of the valuableagricultural resources of Galicia, or of such part of it as theyoccupied. Przemysl alone held out. Russian cavalry was already tryingthe approach to the Carpathians from the Dukla Pass to the Bukowina. CHAPTER LXIX INVESTITURE OF PRZEMYSL Many fortresses lost a reputation of long standing for strength duringthe Austro-Russian campaign. Grodek and Rawa-Russka, with fine naturaldefenses and excellent works, were carried by assault after gallantresistance. Lemberg's defenses were reputed to be powerful, but noattempt was made to utilize them. The fall of Jaroslav has never beenexplained. It was considered generally to be stronger than Namur orLiege, and a prolonged resistance was anticipated there. It withstoodattack for only two days. When heavy guns were brought to bear on it bythe Russians the garrison withdrew. Przemysl seems, alone of all theAustrian defenses, to have justified its reputation. Przemysl was not only a strongly fortified place but a beautiful city aswell, surrounded with flower gardens and orchards. Its history, likethat of Lemberg, had been a stormy one. Its population in 1914, including residents of its suburbs, was about 50, 000, principally Polesand Ruthenes, who lived together in amity and great religioustoleration. In September of that year, when the Russians made theirwhirlwind advance, there was, according to official reports from Vienna, an army of 80, 000 based on the city, under the leadership of GeneralBoroyevich. With a large part of this army, Boroyevich was reported to have moved tothe line of the Wisloka to give aid to Dankl's hard-pushed troops asthey made their stand on that river. It was understood that many of VonAuffenberg's soldiers, as they fell back, were employed as a garrisonfor the fortress. At the time of its investment it was said to containabout 100, 000 men, with its defense in charge of General Kusmanek. Afterward the strength of the garrison was increased. It has been indicated previously how the railway communications had beenbroken on the east and south by the advance of the Russians after thefall of Grodek and the taking of Mocsiska. The isolation of the fortressof Przemysl was completed by the fall of Jaroslav and the occupation ofRadymno, a town on the main Cracow railway on the left bank of the San, about eight miles east of Jaroslav and fifteen miles north of thefortress. And so it remained isolated, save for a short period when thetide of invasion was driven back. During this time it was again incommunication with Cracow. The Russians took it as a matter of course that the fortress would soonfall to them. Its fate was predicted in the newspapers of the Allies;but, in preparation for defense, stores of all kinds had been hurriedinto it, and plans had been laid for stout resistance. It had adetermined commander in General Kusmanek. The first shots were fired on September 18, 1914. The city wassurrounded on September 20, and an unbroken bombardment with manydesperate sorties ensued until October 2, when the Russians sent out awhite flag to the city and demanded its surrender. General Kusmanek'sreply was that he would not discuss surrender until he had exhausted allpowers of resistance. The attack reached its height on October 5, 1914. The Russians stormed again and again, hills of corpses outside the workstestifying to furious attacks they made. They succeeded in carryingtemporarily one of the outer works, eleven battalions having succeededin approaching these defenses undetected, because of damage to anAustrian searchlight. Suddenly they stormed the walls. The garrison retreated to thecasemates, from which they defended themselves with rifles and machineguns. The Russians forced their way to the casements and a hand-to-handstruggle with bayonets, gun butts, and hand grenades followed. WhenAustrian reenforcements, hastily telephoned for, arrived, the attackingparty was already retiring, leaving their dead and wounded in thecasemates and on the wall. Rockets and light shells illuminated theirretreat. There was desultory fighting during several days thereafter, and then the Russian army settled down to a routine investment, bidingthe time when their heavy siege guns could be brought up and the waymade ready for an effective assault. On October 18, 1914, there was abattle to the east of Chyrow and Przemysl, which was successful for theAustrians. The fighting near Mizynico was especially severe. The MagieraHeights, which had been in the possession of the Russians, were occupiedby the Austrians after a formidable bombardment by their artillery. Atthe same time Russian attacks on the east of Przemysl to Medyka Heights, on the southern wing of the battle field, which were especially directedagainst the heights to the southeast of Stryj and Sambor, were repulsed. A fresh attack of the Russians on the east bank of the river nearJaroslav also was repulsed. The addition of reserves and the opportunity to reorganize their army, gave new fighting force to the Austrians about this time. Wherever theRussians retired they followed them closely and by reconnaissances wereable to develop weak points in the Russian positions. On October 20, 1914, the Austrians had gained ground in several spots in a heavy, stubborn attack on the fortified positions of the Russians from Plotzynto the highroad east of Medyka, while a Russian counterattack wasunable to make headway. On the heights north of Nizankowice, Austrian troops scored anothervictory and took also the villages situated against the heights. In thesouthern wing the battle was carried on mainly by artillery. The modernfield fortification system being liberally used by the Austrians, thebattles had largely the nature of fortress warfare. On the same day theAustrians captured in the Carpathians the last point, Jablonki Pass, held by the Russians. Thus we now see the Austrian army, which had been described as routedand destroyed in battles in Galicia, seemingly taking on a new lease oflife, although appearing to have found an impenetrable barrier at theRiver San north of Jaroslav. On October 22, 1914, the Austrians retookCzernowitz, capital of the crownland of Bukowina, which had been in thepossession of the Russians since early in the war. They also capturedtwo field fortifications, situated one behind the other, to thesoutheast of Sambor. For eight days a terrific fight was waged between the Russians and theAustrians on the line from Sambor, along the River San to Przemysl andJaroslav, and then to the southward. The battle extended over a front ofabout sixty-five miles. The cannonading was uninterrupted. The Austrianshad started the attack at Sambor, but were thrown back by vigorousRussian counterattacks. A concentration of Austrian corps then attemptedan advance against Lemberg, with the intention of bisecting the Russianline. This attack was defeated with losses. On October 31, 1914, the Austrians defeated a mixed Russian column nearthe Galician-Bukowinian frontier, north of Kuty. In middle Galicia bythat date they had occupied Russian positions northeast of Turka, nearStryj, Sambor, east of Przemysl, and on the lower San. Several Russianattacks around Lisko were repulsed. At Lisko, Stryj, Sambor, and otherpoints the Austrians took many prisoners. Near Stryj and Sambor theAustrians blew up a Russian ammunition depot. On November 1, 1914, the Austrians claimed that they then had internedin Austria-Hungary, 649 Russian officers and 73, 179 Russian soldiers, not including the prisoners they had taken in the fighting in thedistrict northeast of Turka and south of the Stryj-Sambor line. Thefighting in this locality was renewed with greater intensity by bothsides early in the month, fortune favoring first one and then the other. On November 2, 1914, two infantry divisions and a rifle brigade ofRussians were dislodged from a strongly intrenched position. About this time the czar's forces began concentrating their main attacknortheast of Kielce in an effort to repeat the tactics by which they wonimportant victories over the Austrians in the first days of the war. Itwas their plan, provided they were able to break through at this point, to turn southward against the rear of the Austrian army in Galicia, justas they did two months before, after the battle of Rawa-Russka. The line of battle in the southeast now became more definitely outlined, extending from Turka through Nadworna and Kolomea to the Russian borderjust east of Czernowitz in Bukowina. The renewal of Russian attacksfollowed the bringing up of a new levy of reserves. The Russians now advanced with fair success along the whole Vistulafront. They secured Piotrkow and other places in such positions as tosuggest that the Austrians were running the risk of being cut off fromCracow, their ultimate goal of retreat. A rear-guard defense wasattempted by the Austrians at Opatow but without success, and theRussians took several hundred prisoners and six Maxims with a supplytrain. On the San River, where the fighting had been severe for a fortnight, the Russians adopted the method of deliberately sapping their opponents'trenches, precisely as a besieging force saps its way toward a fortress. This proved a success. When the Russian sap burst in the trenches theAustrians retreated, and the Russians, taking advantage of theconfusion, stormed the fortifications in the neighborhood and took them, capturing 5 officers, 500 men, and all the Maxims. An Austrian column which had descended the north slope of theCarpathians in the direction of Narvoda, where it had intrenched itself, was attacked and driven back. This operation, being removed by morethan one hundred miles from the nearest point to the great struggle, indicated that the Austrians, confident of victory, sent forces acrossthe Carpathians to catch the Russians in the rear when the proper momentcame. This moment, it seems, failed to arrive, and the Russians, having thesupport of the native inhabitants, had little difficulty in dealingsuccessfully with successive isolated attempts of the considerableHungarian reserve bodies sent across the Carpathians at various points. There was some activity about this time before Przemysl, which severaltimes had been reported, incorrectly, as having been taken by theRussians. An attempt was made by the garrison at a sortie. The Russiansallowed it to proceed until they could cut in behind, when the force wassurrounded. When it found it was impossible to cut a way through eitherforward or backward, it surrendered. The Russians took about 2, 000prisoners. On the Austrian retiring line from Kielce to Sandomierz the Russianssucceeded on November 5, 1914, in breaking down the defenses of theenemy, and in stimulating a more or less orderly retreat into a hastyflight. Sandomierz, itself, an exceedingly important strategic point, which had played a vital part since the early days of the war, fell intothe hands of the Russians. In fighting with the Austrian rear guardsouthward of Kielce the Russians took within a week 200 officers and15, 000 men prisoners, with scores of guns and Maxims. CHAPTER LXX AUSTRIAN RETREAT BEGINS At this time the Russians were strongly established on the six-milefront of the left bank of the San River, between Nizko and Rudnik. TheAustrian opposition there had been long and determined, but was finallybroken early in November, 1914. The Austrians began a retreat along thisfront. This retreat was such as to indicate less a general defeat than ageneral obedience to orders to withdraw. It is true that the Russianshad been pressing with great energy upon the upper Vistula and Sanfronts, especially since the settlement of the main fight farther northagainst the Germans and mixed forces, but the Austrians were inpossession of strong fortified positions which still were giving troubleto the Russians, in spite of their constantly increasing numbers. It was now plain that the Russians had left the Galician front until theVistula front had been cleared, when a proportion of the troops releasedthere could proceed to add to the fighting force in Galicia, therebycausing the retreat of the Austrians along the whole front. On November 5, 1914, the Russians achieved what the General Staffcharacterized as "the greatest victory since the beginning of the war. "This was the recapture of Jaroslav. It was announced to the Allies byGrand Duke Nicholas in a formal message, which also stated: "Following our successes upon the Vistula, a complete victory has justbeen gained by our troops along the whole of the front in Galicia. Ourstrategical maneuver has thus been crowned by what is incontestably thegreatest success gained on our side since the beginning of the war. I ammost confident of the speedy and entire accomplishment of our commontask, persuaded as I am that decisive success will be gained by theallied armies. " In the capture of Jaroslav the Russians took 5, 000Austrian prisoners. During several days before the general Austrian retreat along theVistula front began, they were engaged in furious attack, theirartillery fire being especially severe. It was evidently a supremeeffort. The last engagement was over an extended front, enormous forcesstriving to prevent the Russians crossing the San at a point nearMonastryzek. It was reported that reenforcements pushing over theCarpathians in an attempt to aid them were delayed in the snow-filledmountain passes. We will have a better understanding of Russian tactics as worked out inthe activities just referred to, if we consider here an officialstatement issued by the General Staff about this time concerning them. It read: "Fierce combats on the River San and south of Przemysl, which have beengoing on for more than three weeks, resulted on September 5 in thegeneral retreat of the Austrians. "On the preceding night the Austrians made a last effort to repulse ourtroops who were crossing the San. Until a late hour the enemy attackedon an extended front, taking the offensive in dense, successive lines, but everywhere they suffered enormous losses and were repulsed. "On November 5, 1914, the enemy's columns commenced to move from the Sanin the direction of Dukla Pass across the Carpathians and south ofPrzemysl, seeking everywhere to leave the battle front. We pursued themenergetically all along the line. "The abandonment by the main Austrian forces of the line of the San isthe result of the victorious battle fought at the end of September, theoriginal purpose of which was to block the offensive of theAustro-German armies against Warsaw and Ivangorod. "At the beginning of October our troops were engaged along a frontextending for 330 miles and passing through Warsaw, Kozienica, Przemysl, and Czernowitz. Toward October 20 we succeeded in gaining a decisivevictory on the left bank of the Vistula in the region of Warsaw. "Following up our successes during the last eighteen days, on a front of380 miles, we broke the resistance of the enemy who is now in fullretreat. This victory enables our troops to proceed to a realization offurther tasks to inaugurate a new period of the war. " This announcement is embodied here, not only for such information as itcontains which coincide with established facts, but that the Russianviewpoint toward such events and the purpose behind Russian activitiesmay be manifest. To the south of Przemysl on November 7, 1914, the Russians, havingincreased their activities in the region considerably, took 1, 000prisoners. Warfare about the fortress now seemed to be entering a newphase, which the Russians initiated with great artillery activity andan advance against Medyka. The Austrians responded with a closerconcentration, with the fortress as their center. After the first attackon Przemysl, all damage to the fortress had been repaired and the outerforts strengthened by field fortifications, of a very strong character, and covered by battery positions. A new railroad bridge was built at Nizankowice and communications withChyrow, about twenty-five miles to the south, restored. Numerous trainshad been used to transport wounded soldiers and useless Przemyslcivilians southward and to bring back flour, Zwieback, and othersupplies to the fortress. The arrival of many carloads of beer causedparticular rejoicing. On November 11, 1914, the Russians, advancing on Cracow from thedirection of Jaroslav, occupied Miechow and Dynow. The forces operatingfarther south seized Lisko. It now seemed to the Russians that the enemywould not be able to make an effective stand east of Tarnow and theDunajec River and so the Russians would find themselves once more on thelines they had been forced to abandon hastily six weeks previously, whenthe Germans first made their rapid advance to the Vistula. It was as aresult of this campaign and the course of the Russians in concedingsmaller successes in order to concentrate their forces at the mostimportant point that the Austrians found themselves driven back now atevery point, while the Russians advanced for the possession of thewestern part of Galicia. It was the hope of the Russians that theiradvance in Galicia would soon set free their Cossack divisions for a newinvasion of Hungary. On November 12, 1914, the Russians sustained a defeat near Czernowitz, capital of the Austrian province of Bukowina. The Austrians made anunexpected movement, crossing the Pruth, a few kilometers north ofCzernowitz and suddenly attacking the Russian right wing. The Russianswere completely surprised and after a short resistance decided to fallback upon their base, which seemed free. However, they were then takenunder fire by Austrian artillery, which caused great losses among theRussian detachments. The battle field was strewn with corpses. Russianforces in the Stryj valley also were forced to retire with heavy lossesby a surprise attack from an Austrian armored train and Austriancavalry. The Russian offensive in Galicia toward Dounaietz nowhere encounteredresistance. The Russians occupied Krosno and inflicted heavy losses onthe Austrian rear guard. It should be noted that during the middle of November, 1914, thecampaign on which the Russians were concentrating their attention wasagainst the Austrians. The Russian campaigns had consistently adhered tothe principle that in military operations important results are obtainedby bringing every force to bear upon a single point until the desiredend is accomplished. The Russians still followed this policy. The operations in East Prussia and in western Poland were for the timebeing made secondary while all energy was devoted to pushing forward thecampaign against Cracow. When they were now within fifteen miles of it, an appeal was sent by the city to the Germans for reenforcements. Thecivilians of the place removed themselves from the fortified area andthe inhabitants generally fled the locality. The German colony left forBerlin and Bavaria. Cracow was surrounded by a triple line of fortifications of which theouter line contained fifteen forts, eleven on the north, and four on thesouth bank of the Vistula. The defenses on the north were much strongerthan those on the East, where the San River and the fortresses ofJaroslav and Przemysl were once regarded as a secure barrier againstRussian advance. The Russians already had broken down that barrier andonly two small streams lay between their eastern army and the laststronghold of Galicia. On November 15, 1914, the Austrians defending Przemysl again attempted asortie, this time with greater success than before. It forced back theRussians on the north side of the fortress to the heights of Rokietnica, with small Austrian losses. A second sortie was repulsed by Russianartillery and cavalry and heavy losses inflicted on the Austrians. In Galicia we now find the Austrians west of the Donajec River, alongthe front from Tarnow to the Vistula. The Austrian line then followedthe Biala River for a few miles until it cut across to take advantage ofthe Wisloka, north and south of Jaslo. From there east the Austrianswere retreating into the passes of the Carpathians. These latter troops were relatively small bodies, whose main object wasto prevent the Russian cavalry from making raids into Hungary. OppositeTarnow the Austrians were prepared to put up a most stubborn resistance, for they regarded the holding of this part of their line as essential. Unless they could hold back the Russians there, they reasoned, thelatter would have a chance to break through and cut off the Austrianarmy that was retreating from Sanok and Jaslo. A Russian advance northof Cracow, they figured, would tend to cut off the entire Austrian armyfrom its German ally. This was an object for which the Russians werestriving. Abandonment by the Austrians of Central Galicia and the gathering oftheir armies toward Cracow soon began to show results in the stiffeningof their resistance to Russian advance. As the Austrians retreatedwestward their front decreased in length with consequent strengtheningof their line. It was their desire that this strengthening should enablethem to extend northward along the Warthe River, thus freeing some ofthe German troops for service in the army that was advancing from Thorn. By the Russians a German advance in considerable force along the narrowbattle front on the west bank of the river Vistula was regarded as afeint at the city of Warsaw, the intention of which was to draw Russiantroops from their advance upon Cracow and distract attention fromefforts to establish a strongly fortified defensive line from Kalisz toCracow. CHAPTER LXXI FIGHTING AT CRACOW On November 20, 1914, the Russians were before the outer line ofdefenses of Cracow, with strong opposition to their further advancement. Meanwhile they were pushing forward minor columns of Cossacks into thepasses of the Carpathian Mountains, intending that these should emerge, if possible, upon the Hungarian plains in raids similar to those whichwere made in the first Russian advance in September. During the next few days following November 20, 1914, there was constantand hard fighting in the vicinity of Cracow, the Austrians reportingthat they had taken three battalions of Russians prisoners. All reportsshowed a stiffening of the Austrian line, while the energy of Russianattacks was reduced by the diversion of troops to stem the Austrianinvasion by way of the Vistula. The Austrians were obliged, however, a few days later, to evacuate NeuSandec, fifty miles southeast of Cracow, and an important railroadjunction of the River Dunajec and the main line to Cracow. The Russiansreported they took 3, 000 prisoners and some machine guns. The capture ofNeu Sandec revealed a new Russian advance, threatening the right flankof the Austrian army along the Carpathian Mountains. By this capture theAustrians were deprived of an important railway into Hungary. In orderto stop this turning move it was necessary for them to weaken theircampaign north of Cracow. In the Cracow region the Austrians advanced on the north to Pilica, Wolbrom, and Miechow, about twenty miles from the Galician border. Tothe east the Russians advanced to within twelve miles of the fortress. In the fighting at Pilica and Wolbrom the Austrians claimed the captureof 29, 000 Russians. In the latter part of November, 1914, the Russians were successful inattack in Galicia along a line from thirty to sixty miles southeast ofCracow, taking more than 7, 000 prisoners, thirty cannon, and twentymachine guns in one engagement. On November 29, 1914, the Austrians alsoscored a victory on the front extending from Proszowicz to Onszreniawa, fourteen miles northeast of Cracow, southward through Brzesko on theVistula to Bochnia and Adsniez. General Radko Dmitrieff's cavalry kept in close touch with theretreating Austrians, who were attempting to shake off contact with, theRussians and gain time to re-form their ranks back of Cracow. Part ofthe Austrian troops defeated on the San had retired beyond theCarpathians to recuperate while the Russians attacked the Austrian forcesoutheast of Cracow. At this stage of hostilities, the Russians estimated that theAustro-Hungarian casualties had amounted to 19, 000 officers and 900, 000men. At the same time, it was estimated by the Austrians that the totalRussian losses had been 760, 000 in dead, wounded, deserters, andprisoners. Of these, 420, 000 were attributed to the various battlesagainst the Austro-Hungarian forces, and 340, 000 to battles against theGermans. The losses of the Russians in the campaigns against Austria-Hungary, asestimated for the various engagements, were as follows: Early raids, skirmishes, and frontier fighting, 15, 000; Krasnik, Niedzfica Duza, Lublin, 45, 000; Zamosz, Komarow, Tyszowce, 40, 000; first battle ofLemberg, 45, 000; second battle of Lemberg, 30, 000; Rawa-Russka, Magierow, 30, 000; offensive against middle Galicia, 15, 000; offensivearound Przemysl, 40, 000; raising siege of Przemysl, 15, 000; Carpathianinvasions, 30, 000; battles on the San beyond Przemysl, to date, 25, 000;Medyka-Stari, Sambor, 40, 000; outposts in the Carpathians, 15, 000; lastbattles of the Vistula from Sandomierz to Ivangorod, 35, 000. On December 1, 1914, the Austrians had been driven from all theirpositions over a front about thirty-three miles long, which defended theCarpathian passes from Konecha Village, twelve miles north of Bartfieldeastward--that is, on all roads leading through the Dukla Pass over theCarpathians. This was the lowest pass anywhere available across themountain range and being also the widest, is in all respects bestsuited for military purposes. All armies that previously had invaded thepresent area of Hungary from time immemorial, via the CarpathianMountains, had used the Dukla Pass. A number of points along the line mentioned, where the Austrians hadestablished defensive positions, were taken by the Russians, the mosteasterly being south of Mezolaborez. All were taken by assault. Manyguns, Maxims, and prisoners were captured. An energetic Russian advancecontinued to push the Austrians back toward Cracow. The Austriansevacuated one position after another with large losses. The Russian advance toward Bartfeld and Hammona, on the south slope ofthe Carpathians in Hungary, indicated an attempt to push forward aturning force around the south flank of the Austrian position, as itstood at that time. The damage caused by this raiding expedition wascalculated to force the Austrians to meet it and so divert them from themain fighting line at Cracow. Evidence of this shift was shown in areverse which the Austrians administered to the Russians at Hammona. Early in December, 1914, Russia replied to reports that she wassuffering from a shortage of recruits by declaring she could put twocorps against every one that Germany brought into Poland and still haveenough to carry on the campaign against Cracow as originally planned. Her two armies operating against that important objective point hadlinked flanks. Investment of the city was daily feared. The southern army, which moved directly west on the Tarnow-Cracow line, had fought its way over every inch of the ground, making a record offorty-five battles in forty-five days. At least, according to oldmeasures, these fights would be classed as battles. Under the stupendousconditions which surrounded this modern cataclysm, they probably rangeas little more than reconnaissances in force. Back to the banks of the River Raba, the advancing Russians pushed theAustrian foe. Here in a position of considerable defensive value, theenemy made a determined resistance. But the Russians swept on. TheAustrians made a stand soon afterward, outside the protecting radius ofthe fortress guns, in the angle made by the Raba and Schreniawa. Przemysl about this time was reported to be in dire straits. MonsignorJoseph Sebastian Felczar, Archbishop of Przemysl, said, December 3, 1914, after he had left the city for the Vatican: "Would to God my cathedral city might be spared the horrors of invasionbut I feel I can hope no longer. Our garrison has resisted with stubbornheroism but the Russians outnumber them two to one. I got away onlyafter long hours of wearisome wanderings across the Russian lines; theMuscovites had then already captured several of the outer ring of forts, besides other important vantage ground, and had hemmed round the wholefortress in a circle of steel. "When I left Przemysl, indescribable desolation reigned there. Thehouses, palaces, and public buildings were reduced to dust heaps. Despite severe measures taken by the authorities brigand bands prowledamong the ruins and pillaged such of the civil population as stillremained. A never-ending procession of caravans traversed the streets, which were chock full of wounded and dying. The hospitals wereovercrowded and the injured laid out in rows in the churches. " On December 4, 1914, the Russians, by the capture of Wieliczka, gainedanother step in their campaign for the possession of the broad passes tothe south and west of Cracow. Wieliczka is a small town, about ninemiles southwest of Cracow and three miles from the line of forts. It isbuilt over salt mines, a short railway bearing the product thereof tothe larger city. On the northwestern side, the Russians were only a few miles from thecity. It was only the Austro-German army, sitting in trenches and makingoccasional attacks on the Czenstochowa-Oilusz-Cracow line that preventedthe complete encirclement of the place. The contest between these forceswas mostly a slow artillery duel from day to day. It was now the turn of the Germans to relieve the Austrians, if theycould, from a critical position. For months before, the Austrians hadbeen sacrificed in the interest of the German plan of winning acrushing victory in France, and during the retreat from Warsaw it wasthe Austrians who bore the brunt of the fighting as a rear guard. Again, when the Germans found themselves hard pressed between the Warthe andthe Vistula, they flung the Austrian reenforcements to fresh defeat atWienun. It was the contention of Austrian military writer that in order tomaintain an effective resistance to the Russians at this time andafterward, the Germans should continue to withdraw troops from thewestern front. The Russians seemed to feel secure at this time in holding back theGerman forces in Poland and so were passing forward their campaign inGalicia, in an effort to interpose a wedge between the forces of theopposing nations. Russia also had a special motive for exerting every effort to inflictsome signal disaster upon the Austrians. It was only by such means thatshe could relieve the pressure on Serbia and thus save the smaller Slavstate from being overrun by the victorious Austrians. The Russian campaign against Cracow had been little effected by thefighting going on at Lodz. The Russian forces in the region of Cracowhad a clear line of retreat, if retreat should be necessary, and werenot needed for strengthening the resistance being made by the Russiansat Warsaw, as troops from Central Russia could be moved to thatthreatened district by the available railroads, much more rapidly thanarmies could be sent overland from Cracow. The Russian forces in thevicinity of Cracow could best help in the defense of Warsaw, the RussianGeneral Staff believed, by pressing their attack energetically and sokeeping busy in that field a large force of Austrians and Germans. On December 6, 1914, the defense of Cracow was stiffened by the arrivalof a large body of German troops. All the magnificent trees whichsurrounded the place were cut down to afford space for the artillery andvarious new lines of fortifications and barbed-wire entanglements wereconstructed. The Russians perceived a turning movement on the part of the enemy, south of Cracow, directed against the Russian left wing. Russianreenforcements which arrived found that the bridge over the Dunajec, near Kourove, had been destroyed, and that the heights on the left bankof the river were occupied by the enemy. Under a sustained fire byGermans, one of the Russian regiments crossed the Dunajec at a ford. They made their way through ice water up to their necks, and coming outon the other side, captured the heights by a vigorous assault. Thisassured and made safe the passage of the river by the other Russiantroops. On the following day, December 7, 1914, the Austro-Germans made aneffort to counteract the advance of the Russians to Wieliczka, southeastof Cracow. By a dash toward Neu Sandek, on the headwaters of the DunajecRiver, the Austrians attempted to outflank the Russians and thus forcethem to retreat from their advance position. The Austro-German forces occupied the valley of the stream Lososzyna, and the fighting front extended from near Wieliczka southeastward to theDunajec, about fifty miles in length. The Russian attack was successful, the losses inflicted upon the enemy, especially the German Twenty-fourthCorps, being very heavy. Several German heavy guns were knocked out, five field batteries were reduced to silence, guns and prisoners taken, and the Russians continued their attack. In the next few days in December, 1914, events favored the Austrians. InWest Galicia the south wing of the Russian army was defeated at Limanovoand compelled to retreat. The Austrians engaged in hot pursuit and tookmany prisoners. Austrian forces took Neu Sandec and again enteredGrybow, Gorlice, and Zmigrod. The Austrians reported that the Russianshad completely evacuated the Zemplin country. A third incursion of Germans into Galicia was arrested by Russians onthe very border of the province. Some maneuvering on the part of GeneralDmitrieff's corps sufficed to check the invading columns, although theycrossed the Carpathians on a wide front extending between Wieliczka andthe headwaters of the San River. During the same week, the garrison of Przemysl made a series ofattempts at sorties, but each time were driven back with heavy loss. TheRussians captured several hundred prisoners and ten Maxims. It waslearned later that increasing scarcity of provisions complicated bysickness was responsible for these tentative efforts to lift the siege. An unsuccessful attempt also was made by a force from the garrison toopen the railway in the direction of Biercza, on the southwest. It was asserted at Austrian headquarters that the total number ofRussians captured by the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia within three daysin the middle of December, 1914, was 33, 000. After a battle at Limanowa, it was said, 26, 000 were captured. The number of Russians killed wasvery large, according to report, 1, 200 dead being found at Limanowaalone. The problem of caring for prisoners had by this time become acute bothfor Austria and for Russia. According to the Russian Department of theInterior, which had charge of the maintenance of prisoners, there werethen in Russia, exclusive of the Germans reported captured in operationsunder way in North Poland, 350, 000 Austrian and German prisoners of war. Of this number only 100, 000 were Germans, the rest being Austrianscaptured during the campaign in Galicia. At Semipalatinek, on the Irtish River, near the borders of WesternMongolia, one small escort of Russian soldiers was serving as guard for100, 000 Austrian and German prisoners, whose prison walls consisted offour thousand miles of frozen steppes, separating them from the bordersof their own countries. The prisoners were brought by rail to Omsk, where they were embarked onsteamboats for the thousand mile trip down the Irtish River toSemipalatinek. Here quarters were found for them in the big barrackserected for the mobilization of the Russian army and unoccupied sinceits departure for the front. Every morning at eight o'clock the prisoners were released from thebarracks and permitted to wander about at will. When they departed inthe morning, they were told that unless they reported at the barracks bynightfall they would be locked out. At that time of the year, in such ableak country, this would mean death, as there was practically no placewhere they could obtain shelter. The freedom of the prisoners duringthe day was absolute, even to the extent of accepting employment fromlocal mining companies. In the thick of its fighting in Galicia, Russia had another problem todeal with, which was the Russianization of the country. In the middle ofDecember, 1914, arrangements were made under the auspices of a member ofthe Duma charged with national education in Galicia, for a large numberof elementary school teachers in the native schools of Galicia, toattend at certain centers a series of lectures on Russian language andliterature. Lember, Sambor, Tarnopol, Stanislavoff, and Chernovtsi werethe first towns chosen for the opening of these courses. Besides thismeasure, Russia, in the following month, opened ten model elementaryschools where all teaching was given in the Russian language. These werein small towns and villages. CHAPTER LXXII AUSTRIANS AGAIN ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE On December 14, 1914, the Russian General Staff announced that it had"discovered the enemy trying again to assume the offensive in Galicia. "Two days later, Austro-German columns were pouring over the Dukla. Itwas understood that three new German army corps had been sent to theeastern front, making nine new corps since the beginning of hostilities, and that three Austrian corps were withdrawn from Serbia. The number oftroops entering Galicia through the mountain passes was estimated at175, 000 men. This movement compelled the Russians to withdraw the raiding partieswhich had invaded Hungary. It is unlikely, however, that Russia hadplanned to invade Hungary in force, so long as Przemysl and Cracow stoodfirm. As the situation then was, it would have been a perilous feat tosend an army any distance across the mountains. Before such an invasioncould be attempted, it was first necessary that the positions of theRussians in western Galicia and Poland should be greatly strengthened. When the new Austro-German reenforcements arrived in Galicia over theDukla, the extreme southern end of the Russian line below Cracow waspushed back from advanced positions west of the Raba to and over theDunajec. But the Russians did not regard the menace from this quarter asa grave one. Announcement was made by General Sukhomlinoff, the RussianMinister of War, on December 23, 1914, that it had been stopped"absolutely. " We have said before that it was at the Austrians, ratherthan the Germans, that the Russians wished at this time to strike atelling blow. On December 28, 1914, General Dankl's army sought to help the mainGerman forces by passing over the Nida near its junction with the upperVistula above Tarnow. The Russians suddenly were reenforced at thispoint by troops who swam the ice-filled stream, attacked the Austrianson their flank, drove them back, and took 10, 000 prisoners. It was about this time, when Radko Dmitrieff was operating sosuccessfully in the neighborhood of Tarnow, that General Brussilovresumed the offensive in Galicia. He was able to feed and munition hisarmy from Kiev. Practically all the railroad system of Galicia could beutilized by him for maneuvering troops and distributing supplies. Histroops numbered only about 250, 000, but their strength was increased byrailway facilities. General Brussilov could afford to send a large forceunder General Selivanoff to help invest Przemysl. To the Russians, however, Przemysl was not of immediate importance. Thefortress commanded the railroad leading past Tarnow to Cracow, and wouldhave been badly needed, it is true, if the army of Dmitrieff at Tarnowhad been attacking Cracow. But the army of General Ivanoff had beenforced by this time to retire about fifty miles north of Cracow. Therefore, the smaller force commanded by Dmitrieff was unable to doanything against Cracow from the east; and so it withdrew from the uppercourse of the Dunajec River and became intrenched along the morewesterly tributary of the Dunajec, the Biala. The Russian line extended from the Biala to the Dukla Pass in theCarpathians. Still farther eastward, all along the lower valleys of theCarpathians, the army of General Brussilov was holding out against alarge Austro-Hungarian force. This was under the command of GeneralErmolli. The chief offensive movement of Ermolli in December, 1914, was directedtoward the relief of Przemysl. As has been indicated, his lines ranthrough Grybov, Krosno, Sanok, and Lisko, thereby putting a wedgebetween the army of Brussilov and that of Dmitrieff. He attackedDmitrieff from the east along the line of the Biala and the Dunajec. InChristmas week Dmitrieff administered a heavy defeat to him, and tooknearly thirty thousand prisoners and many guns. In this way he helpedprepare for new plans which Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff hadprepared for the Russian army in Galicia for the new year. Cracow had successfully resisted assault, and seemed likely to hold outagainst the best efforts of the Russians. The gateway to Silesia hadbeen closed. Hindenburg had achieved one of his chief objects in forcingthe central Russian forces back. He had paid a huge price in men inorder to establish a deadlock of warfare in trenches, about midway inthe big bend of the Vistula. Nevertheless, from the German viewpoint, the result achieved was worth it. If the battle for Silesia had been won in November, 1914, by GeneralRussky and General Ivanoff on the field in front of Cracow, Italy andRumania might have been brought into the fight by their continuedadvancing movement. Austria and Hungary thus might have been attackedand overcome by huge forces from three sides. If Austria-Hungary fell, the overthrow of Germany might have been threatened. Hindenburg'sstrategy had put this out of the range of possibility. It was such developments as have been mentioned that caused the Russiancommander in chief to decide on Hungary as the next object of attack. Heplanned to bring direct pressure upon Vienna and Budapest and so forcefirst the Hungarians and then the Austrians to ask for terms of peace. If they did not, he counted on Italy and Rumania entering the war andassuring victory for the Allies. On Christmas Day, 1914, under such conditions, began the great battlesof the Carpathians, which continued for many months to be a crisis ofthe war. The Russians were outnumbered, but their position wasfavorable. On December 25 they advanced on the Dukla Pass. Meanwhilefierce fighting continued at various points in Galicia. In theneighborhood of Tuchow, south of Tarnow, the Russians, on observing theadvance of the Twenty-sixth Austrian Brigade, slipped past on parallelroads and surprised the Austrian rear. The Russians opened fire withmachine guns and virtually annihilated the whole brigade. In two days'fighting in southern Galicia, near the Carpathians, the Russianscaptured more than 4, 000 prisoners, including a major of the GeneralStaff and five other officers, besides three heavy guns and two machineguns. In this region the Russians were moving small detachments throughthe mountain passes. Many spectacular engagements took place during the development of theRussian offensive among the mountain spurs of the Carpathians. OnChristmas Day, 1914, two Russian infantry regiments, under a murderousfire and wading waist deep in the icy water of the River Jasiolka, dislodged by bayonet charges the Austrians from their line and took asprisoners four officers and 150 men. On the same day an inferior forceof Austrians surprised a Russian detachment and took 4, 000 prisoners. In another engagement south of the Vistula, in the region of Tarnow, theRussians drove back the Austrians from the Tuchnow-Olpiny line. Theenemy abandoned ten rapid firers and the Russians took prisoner 43officers and more than 2, 500 men. The next day, December 2, 1914, continuing the pursuit of the Austrians, the Russians captured 8 machineguns and about 1, 000 prisoners. The Russians occupied the heights nearSiedfizka, on the left bank of the Biala River. This gave thempossession of a twenty-mile strip of territory separating the twoAustrian forces. Late in December, 1914, all attacks by the Austrians in the territorybetween the Pilica and the upper reaches of the Vistula ceased and theRussians assumed the active offensive in this region. They cleared theleft or easterly bank of the Nida River by the capture of an obstinatelydefended Austrian position which was taken by storm. South of the Vistula, or astride it on the front from Opatow across theBiala River to Biecz, the Russians took prisoners 200 officers and15, 000 men in their sweeping process. A retreat of Austrians in Galiciaalong the Lisko-Sanok-Dulka-Zmigrod front was precipitate, the nature ofthe country favoring them, the corridor-like valleys and passespreventing the Russians from pursuing them over parallel roads orharassing their flanks. Only six roads cross the Carpathians, two ofwhich are little more than mountain trails. Owing to the unbrokencharacter of this region, the Russian cavalry was able to do littlescouting, while the extreme cold interfered with the work of aeroplanes. In western Galicia the Russians made progress in spite of the almostimpassable condition of the country due to mud, driving the enemy fromthe front of Stromnik-Gorlice-Jasliska, taking guns and a large numberof machine guns. The year of 1914 closed with the Russian troops advancing in westernGalicia, having stormed several fortified works of the enemy, east ofZakliczyn, making prisoners of 44 officers and 1, 500 soldiers, andcapturing 8 machine guns. Southwest of Dukla Pass the Russians had dislodged the Austrians frompositions they had strongly fortified. They had also realized animportant success south of Lisko and had repulsed counterattacks by theenemy in the Carpathians at Uzsok Pass and renewed sorties by thegarrison at Przemysl. Early in January, 1915, the Russians developed great activity inBukowina and the Carpathians, without making much impression on Austrianpositions which they attacked on the Sucwaza River, in the UpperCsermosz territory, and also further west, on the ridges of theCarpathians. In the district of Gorlice and to the northwest ofZakliczyn determined Russian attacks were repulsed. During the fightingat Gorlice the Austrians stormed and captured a height south of there. During the second week in January, 1915, heavy rains put a stoptemporarily to the Russian offensive southward in the direction of NeuSandek, and at the same time to the Austrian offensive in RussianPoland. A thaw following rain converted the whole country into a vastmorass. It was physically impossible for the Austrians to bring up heavyartillery, without which the Russian position along the Nida River couldnot be forced. The Russian lines on the east bank of the Nida followed the heights, which were admirably suited for intrenchments and well covered withpositions for the Russian artillery fire. There was little firing, however, except an occasional artillery duel when the fog permitted andsporadic local infantry firing. Conditions were similar east of Cracow, the adversaries being well intrenched on opposite sides of the DunajecRiver. During this time another determined sortie was made by the garrison atPrzemysl, preceded by extensive cavalry reconnaissance. The Austrianinfantry then advanced in force in the direction of a wood near thecity. The Russians opened fire, but the Austrians rushed forward andgained the cover of the woods. They continued to push forward and theRussians permitted them to advance close to their position before makinga serious attempt to halt them. With the fighting thus at close range, the Russians opened a terrificfire from rifles and machine guns. The battle raged for several hours, with heavy losses on both sides. The Austrians then retired to thefortress. From the middle to the end of January, 1915, fierce snowstorms andbitter cold interfered with the activity of both Russians and Austrians. There were few engagements. Toward the end of the month, concentrationof Austrian troops in Bukowina became stronger. On January 21, 1914, anAustrian force, including an infantry division with artillery, attackedthe Russian front in the region of Kirlibaba, but was repulsed. On the night of January 27, 1914, the Russians were driven back in theUpper Ung Valley from their positions on both sides of Uzsok Pass. Thiswas one of the most important of the Carpathian passes, for thepossession of which many important engagements had been fought sincethe beginning of the war. It was strongly intrenched and stubbornlydefended in several good positions, one behind the other. It fell intothe hands of the Austrians after three days of hard fighting. West ofthe Uzsok Pass, Russian attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. NearVezeralles and Volovco battles ended with the Russians being driven fromthe heights of the pass. The Austrians took 400 prisoners. During the latter part of January, 1915, there were no developments ofimportance in Galicia. PART VII--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN CHAPTER LXXIII FIRST CLASH ON PRUSSIAN FRONTIER The first clash of arms between the Russian and German armies occurredon August 6, 1914, near Soldau, East Prussia. In this chapter we willfollow the events which were taking place on this frontier, simultaneously with the movements of the German invasions of Belgium andFrance, the Austro-Serbian campaigns, the Russian invasion of Austria, and the campaigns in the other parts of the world. The general causespreceding the outbreak of the war have been fully narrated in Volume I, while the theatre of the following campaign is clearly described in thechapter on that subject. It is necessary at this time, however, toreview the fighting lines before we bring the mighty German army and theRussian hosts into combat on their first battle ground. We have seen that for many years previous to the outbreak of the greatEuropean War all the countries involved had been forced by political, economic, and social conditions to work, each country in its own way, toward the same main object--military preparedness. Many factors, ofcourse, determined not only the means for achieving this result, butalso the degree to which it was finally accomplished. At this time weare interested only in the results so far as they affected Russia andGermany at the beginning of the war. When the armies gathered on the Russo-German frontier, both of thesecountries had reached a high degree of military efficiency. Germany, which for decades had been the acknowledged leader among the greatpowers as far as army development was concerned, had practicallyconcluded the increases and improvements for the accomplishment of whichits people had only recently submitted to a special scheme of veryextensive taxation, the "Wehrbeitrag. " By the results of this move, wefind that the western defenses against France and indirectly againstEngland profited much more than those in the east against Russia. Russia, as its army stood ready to strike its first blow at Germany, haddrawn to the fullest extent the obvious conclusions impressed upon it byits defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Graft, which had played such greathavoc during its last war, had been stamped out. The artillery equipmenthad been brought up to date and the troops in charge of it had increasedvastly their skill in its use. Everywhere formations had beenrearranged, increased and improved, and this rearrangement had affectedespecially the distribution of the empire's forces. Never before in itshistory had Russia concentrated so many troops in its eastern andcentral provinces. In setting its armies into action, Germany faced by far the easierproblem. Its territory was much more compact, its means of communicationwere vastly greater and superior, and racial differences between itsvarious parts were practically nonexistent. With a total area of 208, 825square miles, the German Empire possessed 39, 532 miles of railroad, whereas the Russian Empire in Europe, with 2, 100, 000 square miles hadonly 35, 447 miles of railroad. The Germans had the further advantage ofhaving brought all their means of transportation to the very acme ofperfection, while the Russians were lacking in equipment as well as inorganization. The remarkable quickness and effectiveness with which the Russian armyoperated at the moment of war indicates not only an unexpectedly highstate of preparedness, but also a remarkably high degree of leadershipon the part of its generals. The general staffs of both Russia and Germany were as well prepared tomeet on the battle ground as far as it had been within human power andforesight. Each side had collected all available information concerningthe other. The German genius for organization had proved itselfespecially valuable and fertile in this direction. On the basis of thisknowledge, well-defined plans of campaign had been worked out, and theleaders of both sides had many opportunities to exercise their strategicabilities, not only by solving problems created by these planstheoretically across the tables in their respective war colleges, butalso practically during the annual periods of maneuvers. As the armies faced each other in the first week of August, 1914, thestrategy of both sides was determined chiefly by three factors: (1) bythe obstacles and defenses which nature itself had placed in thelocalities in which the fighting was likely to take place; (2) by themeans of defense and offense which were available; (3) by politicalconditions. At the beginning of the war all but the last were absolutely knownquantities, and as far as Russia and Germany were concerned this lastfactor could be figured out comparatively easily. For it was clear thatif Germany would become involved in a war with Russia, Austria would befound fighting by its ally's side and _vice versa_. It was also fairlyreasonable to assume, and had immediately become a fact, that under suchconditions Germany would find itself involved with France too, whichwould mean that Germany's available fighting strength would have to bedivided into two parts at least. It was, of course, a matter of fairlycommon knowledge that Germany's concentration was much more powerful onits western border than on its eastern, so that Russia could count withreasonable certainty on a comparative weak, even if well organized, resistance on the part of Germany at the beginning of war. Germany's strategy in the east was influenced chiefly by its plan forthe western campaign, which we have already considered in the precedingchapters. The fight against France seemed to be of greater importanceand urgency to Germany than that against Russia. Why German strategyreached this conclusion does not concern us here. In passing, however, it may be well to remember that the German provinces adjoining Francedirectly, or indirectly behind Belgium and Luxemburg, were of muchgreater importance and value to the Germans than their provincesadjoining Russia, and that even the temporary loss of these wouldprobably have spelled disaster to Germany. Then, too, it was on thewestern side that England's influence was being felt; and, furthermore, the French army, though much less numerous than the Russian, was a moreformidable adversary on account of its greater effectiveness, as well asof the certainty of its much quicker movements. Russia had a preponderantly large advantage in numbers over Germany. Theresult of this fact, from a strategic point of view, was that Russiacould dare much more than her adversaries. She could strike stronger, quicker, and with greater frequency in more directions, and could riskto extend her operations much farther. The fact that means oftransportation, as has been pointed out, were much better developed inthe German frontier provinces than in those of Russia, was adisadvantage only as long as Russia fought on its own territory, thougheven then, necessarily, the invading enemy would be hampered at leastequally by the lack of transportation facilities. Russia's natural advantage of greater numbers pointed clearly to animmediate offensive which would bring with it the promise of moreadvantages, while both German and Austrian conditions indicated withequal clearness as the safest and sanest strategy a policy of "watchfulwaiting, " at least until such time when large enough forces could bespared from the western front or concentrated from available reservesources to promise to a more aggressive policy a fair chance of success. Thus Russia decided to strike immediately against Germany as well asagainst Austria. With the latter campaign we are not concerned here. Howshe devoted herself to this twofold task with all the power and means ather command we shall see in the following narrative. The hosts of Russia were standing on the German frontier. In the fourprovinces adjoining Austria-Hungary a total of sixteen army corps, orone-half of all the Russian army in European Russia, were available. ByJuly 31, 1914, the czar had ordered the general mobilization of army andnavy. The German Ambassador in Petrograd was instructed to notify theRussian Government that unless this order was countermanded withintwelve hours, Germany would immediately respond by mobilization of herarmy and navy. As the Russian mobilization had continued, Germanyofficially took the same step in the late afternoon of August 1, 1914, after a state of war had already been proclaimed for the entire empireon July 31, 1914. The fighting forces on the German side at the beginning of the war on ornear the east front included the First Army Corps at Königsberg, theTwentieth at Allenstein, the Seventeenth at Danzig, the Fifth at Posen, and the Sixth at Breslau. These mustered a total of forty-four infantry, twenty-one cavalry, and twenty-five artillery regiments, augmented byfour battalions of rifles (Jaeger), and twelve formations of technicaltroops. The entire peace effectiveness of these formations was about150, 000 men, which at full war strength undoubtedly meant at least notless than 500, 000 men, of whom about one-half were of the first line, the balance being made up of reserves and Landwehr troops. The Russians drew up, in the face of the Germans, two armies: the Armyof Poland and the Army of the Niemen. The latter in peace time centeredin Vilna and consisted of five army corps; the former used Warsaw as itsbase and consisted of at least as many army corps. It now held a widefront from the Narev in the north to the valley of the Bug River. Thesetwo armies together had an effectiveness of almost twice as many men asthe German forces, supported as they were by a series of well-garrisonedfortresses: Grodno, Osowiec, and Bialistock in the north; Lomza, NovoGeorgievsk, and Warsaw in the center; and Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk inthe south. In its entirety the mobilization of these forces wascompleted about the third week of August, 1914, but by the end of thefirst week the Army of the Niemen had completed its mobilization, and itwas from there that the first blow was struck. This army was commanded by General Rennenkampf, one of the few Russiangenerals who had succeeded in coming through the Russo-Japanese War, notonly with an untarnished, but even with an enhanced reputation. Its taskwas to invade the northern part of East Prussia, striking directly atKönigsberg. Small engagements, of course, took place all along the Russo-Germanborder between the advance guards of the two armies from the day war hadbeen declared. On August 6, 1914, a Russian cavalry division crossed over into theenemy's country south of Eydtkuhnen. The next ten days saw many isolatedadvances of this nature, all of them initiated by the Russians, and mostof them accomplishing their respective objects. One small force venturedas far north as the immediate proximity of Tilsit of Napoleonic memory. CHAPTER LXXIV ADVANCE OF RUSSIANS AGAINST THE GERMANS On August 16, 1914, within seventeen days after the official beginningof the Russian mobilization, everything was in readiness for the generaladvance. The next day immediately developed the first strong Germanresistance. At Stallupoehnen the German First Corps from Königsberg, under General von François, supported by two reserve corps, attempted tostem the Russian flood. Though they succeeded in taking 3, 000 prisonersand some machine guns, they had to fall back upon Gumbinnen. Thepressure of the superior Russian numbers--four active and two reservecorps--proved too strong. The battle front now was about thirty-fivemiles long, extending from Pillkallen on the north to Goldap on thesouth, with Gumbinnen in the center. On August 20, 1914, the first real battle on the eastern front wasfought before this pretty country town, which was founded in thebeginning of the eighteenth century, and had gradually acquired about15, 000 people. General Rennenkampf used his numerical superiority for apowerful onslaught against the enemy's center. Fourteen hours of themost stubborn fighting--beginning at dawn and ending only with thecoming of night--resulted in the final withdrawal of the German center. Though artillery did some preparatory work, it was the slashing thrustof glittering bayonets in massed formations and the tearing devastationof hand grenades that carried the day. The German wings kept up theirresistance for the next day, but finally joined the main army which hadwithdrawn through Gumbinnen to Insterburg. The losses on both sidesprobably were about even, amounting to at least 5, 000. The certainty of the Russian numerical superiority undoubtedly wasresponsible for Von François's continuation of his retreat to his mainbase, Königsberg. The Russians lost no time in following and reachedInsterburg on August 23, 1914. Practically without further oppositionall of northern East Prussia as far as the river Memel was in GeneralRennenkampf's hands, Tilsit, Labiau, Tapiau, Gerdauen, Korschen, Rastenburg, Angerburg, and Goldap indicate the limits of his conquest. With it went four of the six railroads centering in Königsberg, leavingopen only the two lines running to Allenstein and Danzig, which, ofcourse, meant serious danger to this important German fortress. The Russian Army of the Narew had, in the meantime, pushed its advancewith equal rapidity and success from the south. Its commander, GeneralSamsonoff, had won laurels in Manchuria, and had acquired considerablemilitary reputation as a commander in Turkestan and as a member of thegeneral staff. He had approximately as many men at his disposal as hiscolleague--about 250, 000. His task, however, was more difficult. For hisentire front would face, almost immediately after crossing the border, the treacherous lake district in the south of East Prussia. For hisadvance he used the two railroads from Warsaw into East Prussia, on thewest through Mlawa and Soldau, and on the east through Osowiec and Lyck. From the latter town he pushed his right wing forward in a northwesterlydirection, and sent his center toward the southwest to Johannisburg. On August 23 and 24, 1914, to meet this advance, the Germans hadavailable only one active army corps, centered in Allenstein, theTwentieth. Local Landwehr formations found the task of delaying theRussians far beyond their power. In quick succession Samsonoff tookSoldau, Neidenburg, Ortelsburg, and finally Allenstein. At Frankenau, just west of the Mazurian Lakes, his right wing connected with theTwentieth German Corps, which, supported by strongly preparedintrenchments, managed to hold up the Russian advance, but finally hadto give way and fall back on Allenstein and Osterode. This gave to theRussians command of one more railroad to Königsberg, that fromAllenstein. Though the two Russian armies had not yet formed a solidconnection, they were in touch with each other through their cavalry, and the Russian front was in the form of a doubly broken line runningfrom Friedland through Gerdauen to Angerburg (Niemen Army) and fromthere through Frankenau and Allenstein to Soldau (Narew Army). Theformer, facing southwest, in connection with the latter, now threatenednot only Königsberg, but the defensive line of the Vistula from Thorn toDanzig. The greater part of East Prussia seemed securely in thepossession of more than 500, 000 Russian soldiers, chiefly of the firstline, and under apparently very able leadership. The occupied territory suffered severely. Bombardment and fire had laidwaste, at least partially, some of the towns and a great many of thevillages. Requisitions for the support of the invading army necessarilybrought great hardships and losses to the unfortunate inhabitants. Theavalanche-like success of the Russian arms, the clearly displayedweakness of German numbers and the rapid retreat of their forcesnaturally added to the terror of the peasants who make up the largestpart of East Prussia's population. By thousands they fled from theirvillages and hamlets, carrying on their slow oxcarts or on theirshoulders whatever they had gathered as their most precious possessionsin their first hours of fear and terror. To them the word "Cossack"still called up pictures of the wild hordes that had overrun theircountry during the Seven Years' War, and later again in the Napoleonicwars. The large, strongly fortified cities of Königsberg and Danzigseemed to hold out the only hope for life and security, and toward thesethey flocked in ever-increasing masses. Even Berlin itself had broughthome to it some of the more refined cruelties of war by the arrival ofEast Prussian refugees. We have already seen that at the outbreak of the war only five activeGerman corps were left on the eastern front. Two, the First and theTwentieth, had, so far, had to bear the brunt of the Russian advance;one other, the Sixth, had been sent from Breslau to detract, as much aspossible, the Russian onslaught against the Austrian forces in Galicia;and the other two, the Fifth and Seventeenth, stationed in Danzig andPosen, were too far back to be immediately available. CHAPTER LXXV BATTLE OF TANNENBERG AND RUSSIAN RETREAT When on August 22, 1914, the full strength of the Russian attack becameevident, the German General Staff decided on heroic measures. Animmediate increase of the German forces to the point where they wouldmatch the Russian seemed out of the question, and the solution of theproblem, therefore, clearly lay in the ability of the general staff tofind a general who could, with the forces on hand, meet the requirementsof the situation--free East Prussia of the invader. Fortunately for Germany, its hour of need on the eastern front broughtforth this man. There had been living for a number of years in the westGerman city of Hanover a general who had been retired in 1911 ascommander of an army corps. His name was Paul von Hindenburg. He was atthat time in his sixty-seventh year, but having been an army officersince his youth, he was "hard as nails, " and from a military point ofview still in the prime of his years as a leader. It was well known in military circles that Von Hindenburg had acquiredthe most thorough knowledge of the difficult lake district south ofKönigsberg. He had devoted his time and energies for years to a mostexhaustive study and investigation of the Mazurian lakes and swamps. Again and again he had tramped through them on foot, picked his wayalong their treacherous paths on horseback, and finally put their fewroads to the supreme test of the motor car. He knew their everyshortcoming and advantage. His topographical information includedfording places for men and guns, and quicksands. Much of this knowledge he passed on to younger officers to whom helectured at the General Staff College in Berlin, and when, only someyears ago, practically all arrangements had been concluded by powerfulfinancial interests to drain and cultivate his beloved lakes and swampsfor agricultural purposes, he succeeded in overthrowing these plans atthe last moment. It is said that so powerful were these interests thatVon Hindenburg succeeded only by going, at last, to the emperor himself, and convincing him that the natural defensive possibilities outweighedin value any amount of increased acreage of reclaimed land. We have already shown the problem which faced Von Hindenburg. To drivethe Russians out of East Prussia he had to defeat two armies composed ofat least 500, 000 men, whose offensive momentum had been raised to a veryhigh power by a highly successful advance of more than a week'sduration. He, himself, could count only on far inferior numbers, notmore than the equivalent of four army corps. These he had to assemblewithout loss of time and with as much artillery equipment as could bespared from all directions. From Königsberg came the biggest part of thebeaten First Corps and its reserves. What was left of the TwentiethCorps, of course, was right on the ground. Undoubtedly the fortresses ofDanzig, Graudenz, Thorn, and Posen had to yield parts of theirgarrisons. However, most of these were troops of the second line. On August 23, 1914, Von Hindenburg arrived at Marienburg, about seventymiles southwest from Königsberg and almost as far to the northwest fromAllenstein, and assumed command of the East Prussian forces. Only threedays later, on August 26, 1914, he was ready to put in execution theplans on which he had worked for almost a lifetime. [Illustration: Battle of Tannenberg. ] Hindenburg's general strategical plan was as simple as the carrying outof it, considering the means at his command was difficult. Facing himwere two armies still out of contact with each other, or at least onlyvery loosely connected. Each alone outnumbered him at least by 50, 000;combined they were more than three times as powerful as all his forces. His only hope, therefore, was in attacking them separately. Thus hechose to strike first at Samsonoff's army which was much farther spreadout than Rennenkampf's, and would find it much more difficult than thelatter to keep open its main line of retreat and supply. Its left restedon Soldau, its right on Frankenau, while its center had been pushedforward to Allenstein through Soldau, and southeast from it ran the onlydirect railroad to his Polish base by way of Mlawa. Three other linescentered there, one in the west from Thorn, one in the northwest fromEylau (connecting with Danzig and Königsberg), and one in the east fromNeidenburg, which from there run north to Allenstein and northeast toJohannisburg and Lyck. Apparently centering his efforts on pushing hisadvance, Samsonoff had neglected to secure the former two roads. On August 26, 1914, Von Hindenburg occupied both and took SoldauJunction. The shortest line of retreat had now been cut off to theRussians, whose forces were scattered over a considerable territory, andon account of lack of railroads could not be concentrated quickly orefficiently at any one point. Though a determined effort was made onAugust 27, 1914, to retake Soldau, it was foredoomed to failure. Samsonoff's left was thrown back on Neidenburg, making his front evenmore unwieldly than before. At this time the German front was very short, its left being atHohenstein, about halfway between Soldau and Allenstein and slightlynortheast of Tannenberg. But it made up in activity what it lacked inlength. In vain the Russians tried to break the German ranks and open upa road to the northwest. Much blood was spilled on both, sides duringthree days' fighting, but the German line held. In the meantime theRussians had evacuated Allenstein, feeling the imperative need ofshortening their front. This gave Von Hindenburg the railroad that ranalmost parallel to the Russian front as well as the splendid main roadthat runs alongside of it. Commandeering every available motor vehiclefrom the entire surrounding countryside, he immediately extended hisline and swung around the Russian right as previously he had swungaround their left. Almost every road, rail or otherwise, that was of anyimportance was now in the hands of the Germans and along them could besent men and guns with overwhelming rapidity. With relentless energy VonHindenburg now used his intimate knowledge of the territory in which hewas fighting. Wherever he knew the most hopeless territory to be, therehe drove the Russians. Mazurian swamps and lakes did all that he hadever claimed they would do and more. They swallowed up his enemy by thethousand, they engulfed his guns and sucked in his horses. Within a week after Von Hindenburg had reached East Prussia the problemof the Narew Army had changed from how to extend its advance mostquickly to how to escape from this bottomless pit along the fewinadequate lines of escape that were left. The morale of this Russianarmy was broken. For even the most stolid Russian peasant soldier, whomneither the roar of guns nor the flash of bayonets could move, quaked atseeing whole companies and batteries disappear, in less time that ittakes to tell about it, in the morasses of a country without firm roadsand a minimum of solid ground. On the last day of August, 1914, thousands of Russians had laid downtheir arms and were sent back into central Germany. Of Russian armies ofmore than a quarter of a million nearly a hundred thousand fell intoGerman hands. Almost half as many more were killed or wounded. TheRussian commander in chief was killed on August 31, 1914. Only one corpsescaped by way of Ortelsburg and Johannisburg, while scattered fragmentsof varying size fought their way out, some into north Poland and someinto the protecting arms of the Niemen Army. Most of the guns ofSamsonoff's army were either captured by the Germans or lost in theswamps. This one week's battle among the Mazurian lakes is known now asthe Battle of Tannenberg, so named after a small town west of andhalfway between Soldau and Allenstein. Without giving his troops any rest Von Hindenburg now turned againstRennenkampf's forces. But, in spite of the rapidity of movement, theGerman commander could not accomplish all that he had set out to do. Apparently his plan was now to strike north past Angerburg and Goldap toGumbinnen, or possibly even to Eydtkuhnen in order to cut off theretreat of the army of the Niemen and drive them in a southerlydirection to their destruction in the Mazurian lakes, just as he haddone in his easterly drive against the Narew Army. But Rennenkampf wastoo quick. He recognized the danger that threatened him through thedefeat of Samsonoff's forces and he began his retreat as soon as itbecame evident that the other army's cause was lost. He was in a muchmore advantageous position than his colleague had been. For not only didthe territory through which he had to fall back offer no particulardifficulties when once he had escaped Hindenburg's attempt to push himup against the Mazurian lakes, but he had also a fairly efficientnetwork of railroads at his command centering in Insterburg. Long before he evacuated this city on September 11, 1914, he had drawnin most of his outlying formations in the north and west and had sentthem back safely across the border and behind the protection of theNiemen and its shield of fortresses--Kovno, Olita, and Grodno. In thishe was also materially assisted by the stubborn resistance which VonHindenburg encountered at Lyck at the hands of a small army that hadbeen sent out from Grodno to aid him, and the nucleus of which consistedof an entirely new Finnish, and an equally complete, Siberian Corps. Inspite of this, however, the pressure of the victorious Germans wasstrong and rapid enough to force him to a generally hurried retreat. Thelosses in killed and wounded were comparatively small, for almost allthe fighting was rear-guard action. But the Germans succeeded ingathering in about 30, 000 more prisoners, chiefly detachments that hadbeen unsuccessful in connecting in time with the main army. Much moreserious was the loss of some 150 guns and vast quantities of warmaterial for the removal of which both time and means had been lacking. On September 15, 1914, Von Hindenberg could announce that the last ofthe invaders had either been captured or driven back and that not anacre of German soil was in the possession of the Russian forces. On thatdate, moreover, he had already advanced far enough into Russianterritory to occupy the seat of government of the Russian province ofSuwalki, almost 150 miles in direct line east of Tannenberg, though lessthan 20 from the German border. From that point on he intrusted thefurther conduct of these operations to Lieutenant General von Morgen, who had been one of his division commanders at Tannenberg. By September 23, 1914, Rennenkampf had completed his retreat behind theNiemen. The fighting which took place during the ensuing week iscommonly designated as the "Battle of Augustovo, " though it covered amuch larger area. Augustovo itself is a small town about ten miles fromthe German frontier, about twenty miles south of Suwalki, and fortymiles northwest from Grodno. The German advance clearly suggested an attempt on their part to force acrossing of the Niemen. This in itself was a very difficult undertaking. The river is more than 600 feet wide, too deep to ford, and naturallynone of the few bridges over it were available for the Germans. Furthermore its right bank, which was held by the Russians, is veryhigh, commanding absolutely and practically everywhere the low left bankwhich in many places is almost as swampy as the worst parts of theMazurian lakes. West of the Niemen and between it and the frontier thecountry is full of lakes, much as in the Mazurian region. The Germans, of course, were under the same disadvantages there as the Russians hadsuffered from in East Prussia. Of railroads there were none except one, running in the shape of a semicircle from Grodno through Augustovo andSuwalki to Olita. On September 25, 1914, in spite of these conditions and disregarding theweakened state of their forces, the Germans attempted to cross theNiemen simultaneously at two places. About thirty miles north of Grodnothey had constructed a pontoon bridge and began to send across theirinfantry. It was only then that the Russians opened up their murderousfire from well-protected positions. Against it the Germans werepractically helpless. In spite of large numbers of guns that theybrought up, and in spite of repeated efforts of crossing in massedformations, the result was the same: immense losses on the part of theGermans and comparatively slight ones on the part of the Russians. Indeed, the last attempt was not only frustrated, but the Russians evenforced back the Germans some miles. Somewhat farther south the other attempt met with a similar fate. Therenot only had the Russians posted their heavy guns on the right bank, butinfantry had been strongly intrenched on the left. Their combinedopposition forced back the Germans under heavy losses after they hadfought all day and all night. During the last week of September, 1914, the Germans were gradually forced back along their entire front. Much ofthe fighting was done in the dense forests east of Augustovo and washand-to-hand fighting. In the afternoon of October 1, 1914, the Russiansrecaptured Augustovo after the Germans had made a determined stand, yielding only when heavy guns bombarded their positions from the westand northwest. On the next day the Germans had to retreat from Suwalkiand withdraw the lines that they had extended northward, and fall backbehind their frontier. This meant the end of the German attempt to crossthe Niemen and the beginning of the second invasion of East Prussia. CHAPTER LXXVI SECOND RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA Wonderful as had been Von Hindenburg's accomplishment in defeating theRussians and practically destroying one of their first-line armies, thelatter's recuperative power was almost as surprising. Deprived of theprize of three weeks' fighting, defeated, and driven by the enemy ontheir entire front for a depth of fifty miles into their own country, they were nevertheless ready in a few days for a new offensive. Undoubtedly this was partly due to the talent of their new commander, General Russky, who had been sent up from Galicia, where he had gatheredexperience as well as honors. But more so was it due to the protectingdefenses of the Niemen and the opportunities they offered forreorganization, rest, and the collection of new forces. The situation which was faced on the first week of October, 1914, wasperilous to all the armies engaged. Russia's fortresses on its easternfront were concerned for a twofold purpose. In the first place, theywere to lend increased power of resistance to whatever means of defensenature had provided, and this function, of course, determined theirlocation. Wherever rivers or other natural obstacles would offerthemselves to an invading enemy, there Russia had added especiallystrong artificial defenses. Any army invading Russia from East Prussia in a southerly directionwould have to cross the Narew River and its principal tributary on theright, the Bober. These two run, roughly speaking, parallel to theRusso-German border at a distance of about thirty to thirty-five miles, and no army attempting an invasion east of the Vistula and south of theNiemen could advance farther than this short distance without firstcrossing the Narew and Bober. The group of fortresses along this natural line of defense beginsopposite the southwestern corner of East Prussia with Osowiec, situatedon the railroad that runs from Lyck Bialistock. Thence it stretches in asouthwesterly direction through Lomsha, Ostrolenka, Rozan, Pultusk toNovo Georgievsk, which latter is the most important of these, commandingas it does the conflux of the Narew, Wkra, and Vistula rivers. This series of fortified places forms the center of the system offortifications against Germany. In a southeasterly direction from it theVistula offers another strong natural line of defense strengthened stillmore by the two big fortresses of Warsaw and Ivangorod, behind which, ona bend of the Bug River and almost equally distant from both, Brest-Litovsk, at the very western end of the vast Pripet swamps, defends the entrance to central Russia, to Smolensk and Moscow. Adjoining Osowiec on the north and making even more formidable andnaturally very strong defensive line of the River Niemen are Grodno, Olita, and Kovno. The second purpose of all these fortified places is to protect the rearof an offensive army advancing toward Germany and to offer a haven ofrefuge if it should become necessary for such an army to fall back. Atthe same time they serve as powerful bases and screens behind which anarmy of defense could quickly be changed into one of offense. Not onlyhad they served well this last purpose at the time of mobilization, butagain and again later on weakened Russian armies succeeded in retreatingbehind these protecting shields, from which they emerged again a littlelater, bent on new attacks, after they had been strengthened byreenforcements from Russia's inexhaustible resources of men. It was thus that the Russian armies saved themselves after VonHindenburg's smashing victory at Tannenburg. Out of about 650, 000 men, forming the Army of the Narew, and the Vilna Army, more than 300, 000 hadsucceeded in reaching the shelter of their fortresses. At that time the German forces, sadly in need of rest, were much toosmall and too weak to attempt an energetic general attack against eitherthe Niemen or the Narew-Bug lines of defenses. However, in order toprevent another invasion of East Prussia something had to be done. Theytherefore advanced a goodly distance into the province of Suwalki, occupying even the seat of its government, a town of the same name. Farther south Osowiec represented a continuous danger to East Prussia, being very close to the border and on the direct railroad to Lyck. Though the Germans were in no condition to undertake a siege, theydetermined to attempt at least to close the crossing of the Bober atthis most advantageous point. September 18, 1914, saw the beginning of this movement and ten dayslater heavy artillery in limited force was thundering against the gatesof the small but strong fortress. The suffering on both sides during this period was very great. Keepingcontinuously moving, fighting day and night under conditions the naturaldifficulties of which had been increased still more by unendingrainstorms, resulting in long delays for food and other supplies, Russians as well as Germans displayed wonderful energy and perseverance. And in spite of these difficulties, in spite of roads ankle deep in mud, the Germans advanced and the Russians re-formed their forces. On October 2, 1914, the Russian advance started from Grodno as a base. The Third Siberian and parts of the Twenty-second Finnish Army Corps, forming the left wing, met the enemy at Augustovo. For two days thebattle lasted, and though it involved only comparatively small numbersit was one of the most sanguinary engagements of this period. Both sideslost thousands of men and large quantities of war equipment. The Germanshaving received reenforcements, attempted a flanking movement againstthe right wing, undoubtedly with the intention of attacking the Russiansfrom the rear. They succeeded in getting a small force around theRussian right, which, however, had to be withdrawn very soon. For thebalance of October the fighting raged along the entire front from theNiemen in the north to Lomsha in the south, a distance of about 150miles. Neither side was able to gain any decisive advantage, for boththe offensive and the defensive was fought with equal stubbornness. Oneday fortune would smile on Russia's masses, only to turn its backagainst them during the next twenty-four hours. The lack of success ofthe German flanking movement around the Russian right brought to thelatter greater freedom of movement. It advanced toward Wirballen withthe object of gaining the road to Eydtkuhnen and Stallupoehnen, whichwould enable them to strike once more for the important junction atInsterburg. This attempt resulted in another minor but very sanguinaryengagement north of Vysztyt Lake. Again no decision had been reached, though the Russians were getting closer and closer to East Prussia. ARussian attempt to outflank the German left at Schirwindt, a few milesnorth of Eydtkuhnen and right across the line in East Prussia, was notany more successful than the previous German attempt, and weakened theRussian right, just as a similar failure on the other side had weakenedthe German left. Again honors, hardships, and losses were fairly even. In the center the Russian advance covered an extensive plain, known asthe Romintener Heide. There, too, continuous fighting, a great deal ofwhich was carried on at night, involved usually only comparatively smallformations and the result was equally indecisive. The Russian left wing had been more successful. It had fought its wayacross the border and taken Wargrabova. The Germans, however, succeededin retaking this place as early as October 9, 1914, pursuing theRussians and finally stormed their strong intrenchments a week later. The country here is slightly elevated and the Russians had dugthemselves in rather elaborately. Manyfold rows of trenches, in someplaces six and eight deep, had been thrown up around the small villageof Vielitzken which suffered severely during the German onrush. In the meantime another attempt to take Lyck had succeeded. The directroad through Osowiec was not available on account of the German forcelocated there. So the Russians sent a division forward from Lomshawhich, taking Bialla, reached Lyck on October 8, 1914. The Germans, lacking sufficient forces for a successful defense, withdrew not onlyfrom Lyck, but also from before Osowiec. But by October 13, 1914, the Niemen Army's advance into East Prussia hadbeen either forced back or delayed to such an extent that thiscomparatively weak Russian advance in the extreme south was out of touchwith the main forces of the Niemen Army, and therefore in turn waswithdrawn. This practically finished the second Russian invasion of East Prussia. The German forces gradually cleared all of their country of the enemyand followed him even into his own territory. But although continuousfighting went on during the last week of October, again chiefly aroundAugustovo and Bakalartshev, the Russians for the time being contentedthemselves with a defensive policy, just as the Germans were satisfiedwith their success in preventing the Russian advance without going overto a clean offensive. CHAPTER LXXVII FIRST GERMAN DRIVE AGAINST WARSAW We have already spoken of the strategic position of Russian Poland, ofits vulnerability, exposed as it is to attack from the Central Powers onthree sides, and finally what Russia had done to strengthen Poland'snatural line of defense, the Vistula River, by building fortresses onits most important points. It may be well to recall here that the lowerpart of this river flows through West Prussia, from Thorn to the Gulf ofDanzig. For almost a hundred miles, from Thorn to Novo Georgievsk, itcannot actually be considered of defensive value to Russia; flowingslightly northwest from the latter fortress to the border it is open toGerman use on either side. But at that point, about twenty milesnorthwest of Warsaw, any army coming along its valley would have to takefirst this important fortress before it could continue farther intocentral Poland. Should it fail in this it would have to withdraw itsforces from the right bank and then force a crossing at some pointbetween Novo Georgievsk and the point where the Vistula enters RussianPoland from Austrian Poland, a few miles east of Cracow. It is at thispoint also that the Vistula is swelled by its most importantcontributary, the Bug River, which, roughly speaking, flows parallel tothe Vistula at a distance of about seventy miles from the Galicianborder to a point on the Vilna-Warsaw railroad, about fifty miles eastof Warsaw, where it bends toward the west to join the Vistula. The BugRiver thus forms a strong secondary natural line of defense. In thenorth the Narew--a tributary of the Bug--forms an equally strong barrieragainst an army advancing from East Prussia. There cannot be much doubt that the plan of the Central Powersoriginally was to take Poland without having to overcome these veryformidable obstacles. If Von Hindenburg had succeeded after the battleof Tannenberg in crossing the Niemen, and if, at about the same time theAustro-Hungarians had also succeeded in defeating their Russianadversaries in Galicia, described in another chapter, this object couldhave been accomplished very easily by a concerted advance of both alongthe east bank of the Bug, with Brest-Litovsk as the most likely point ofjunction. The result would have been twofold: in the first place all ofPoland would have been in the hands of the Central Powers; for Russiaeither would have had to withdraw its forces from there before theirthree main lines of retreat--the railroads from Warsaw to Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev--had been cut by the invaders, or else the latter wouldhave been in a position to destroy them leisurely, having surroundedthem completely. In the second place it would have meant the shorteningof the eastern front by hundreds of miles, making it practically astraight line from the Baltic Sea to some point on the Russo-Galicianfrontier. In the preceding chapters, however, we have seen that up to thebeginning of October, 1914, neither the Germans nor the Austrians hadaccomplished this object. The former had to satisfy themselves withhaving cleared their own soil in East Prussia of the Russian invadersand with keeping it free from further invasions, while the latter werebeing pressed harder and harder every day and had to figure with apossible invasion of Hungary. It was then that the Central Powersdecided to invade Poland from the west, and thus gradually drove out theRussians. Why they persisted in their efforts to gain possession ofRussian Poland is clear enough. For in addition to the above-mentionedadvantage of shortening and straightening their front, they would alsodeprive Russia of one of its most important and populous centers ofindustry, in which the czar's domain was not overrich, and it wouldremove forever this dangerous indentation in the back of the GermanEmpire. Before we consider in detail the first German drive for Warsaw, it isalso necessary to consider briefly political conditions in RussianPoland. Ever since the partition of the old Kingdom of Poland among Germany, Austria, and Russia, the Polish provinces created thereby for thesethree empires had been a continuous source of trouble and worry to each. The Poles are well known for their intense patriotism, which perhaps isonly a particular manifestation of one of their general racialcharacteristics--temperament. At any rate the true Pole has neverforgotten the splendid past of his race, nor has he ever given up hopefor a reestablishment of its unity and independence. It is a ratherdifficult question to answer whether Russia, Germany, or Austria havesinned most against their Polish subjects. The fact remains, however, that all three most ruthlessly suppressed all Polish attempts to realizetheir national ideals. It is equally true that Russia went further alongthat line than either Germany or Austria, and on the other hand did lessfor its Polish subjects than the other two countries. Both in Germanyand Austria there existed therefore a more or less well-defined ideathat the Russian Poles would welcome German and Austrian troops withopen arms as their saviors from the Russian yoke. In Russia a certainamount of anxiety existed about what the Poles would do. The latter, ina way, at the beginning of the war found themselves facing a mostdifficult alternative. That their country would at some time or otherbecome a battling ground of the contending armies was quite evident. Whether Russia or the Central Powers would emerge as the final victorwas at least open to dispute. Whatever side the Poles chose, might bethe wrong side and bring to them the most horrible consequences. It wasundoubtedly with this danger in view that the "Gazeta Warzawska" printedon August 15, 1914, an editorial which in part read as follows: "Remain passive, watchful, insensible to temptation. "During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the marching ground of various armies; we shall see temporary victors assuming lordship for a while; but change of authority will follow, and inevitable retaliation; this several times, perhaps, in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step will meet with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause. In the name of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the nation's future, we entreat you, fellow countrymen, to remain deaf to evil inspirations, unshakable in your determination not to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole future to incalculable perils. " This, of course, was far from being a rousing appeal to support Russia'scause, but it was even further from being a suggestion to support thatof the Central Powers and revolt against Russia. Polish newspapers ofthe next day printed a proclamation signed by the Commander in ChiefGrand Duke Nicholas prophesying the fulfillment of the Polish dream ofunity, at least, even if under the Russian scepter, and promising arebirth of Poland "free in faith, in language, in self-government. " On August 17, 1914, four of the Polish political parties published amanifesto in which they welcomed this proclamation and expressed theirbelief in the ultimate fulfillment of the promises made. The net resultof the sudden three-cornered bid for Polish friendship and support, then, seems to have been that the leaders of Polish nationalism haddecided to abstain from embarrassing Russia, even though theirresistance against Germany and Austria with both of which other Poleswere fighting was not always very deep-seated. During the first month of the war practically nothing of importancehappened in the Polish territory. German detachments occupied some ofthe towns right across the border, in many instances for a short timeonly. Mlawa, Kalish, and Czestochowa were the most important placesinvolved. On August 31, 1914, however, the occupation of Radom, about 130 milesfrom the German frontier, was reported, and a few days later that ofLodz, next to Warsaw the biggest city of Russian Poland and an importantmanufacturing center. At about the same time all of the places along twoof the railroads running from Germany to Warsaw, Thorn to Warsaw, andKalish to Warsaw, as far as Lowitz, where they meet, were occupied. Inthis territory the Germans immediately proceeded to repair the railroadbridges destroyed by the retreating Russians, who, apparently, haddecided to fall back to their defenses on the Vistula. The Germans musthave felt themselves fairly secure in their possession of thisterritory, for on September 15, 1914, Count Meerveldt, then governor ofthe Prussian Province of Münster, was appointed its civil governor. Aday later the commanding general (Von Morgen) published a proclamation, addressed to the inhabitants of the two provinces of Lomza and Warsaw. In it he announced the defeat of the Russian Narew Army andRennenkampf's retreat and stated that larger forces were following hisown army corps, which latter considered them as its friends and had beenordered to treat them accordingly. He called upon them to rise againsttheir Russian oppressors and to assist him in driving them out ofbeautiful Poland which afterward was to receive at the hands of theGerman Emperor political and religious liberty. About ten days later the "additional stronger forces, " which Generalvon Morgen had prophesied, put in an appearance. They consisted offour separate armies, one advancing along the Thorn-Warsaw railroad, another along the Kalish-Warsaw line, a third along theBreslau-Czestochowa-Kielce-Radom-Ivangorod railroad, and the fourthfrom Cracow in the same direction. Just how large these four armieswere is not absolutely known. Estimates range all the way from 500, 000to 1, 500, 000 which makes it most likely that the real strength wasabout 1, 000, 000. Of these all but the Fourth Army were made up ofGerman soldiers, whereas the Cracow Army consisted of Austrians, forming the left wing of their main forces which about that time hadbeen rearranged in western Galicia. By the time all of these armies were ready to advance, the victor ofTannenberg, Von Hindenburg--who meanwhile had been raised to the rank offield marshal--had been put in supreme command of the combined Germanand Austro-Hungarian armies in Poland. Though he was fighting now onterritory concerning which he had at least no superior knowledge thanhis adversaries, his energy made itself felt immediately. He pushed theadvance of his four armies at an overpowering rate of speed and forcedthe Russians, who apparently were not any too sure, either about thestrength of the opposing forces or their ultimate plans, to fall backeverywhere. By October 5 the Russians, attempting to make a desperatestand near Radom, had been forced back almost as far as Ivangorod, andwithin the week following the Austro-German army, still further south, had reached the Vistula between the Galician border and Ivangorod. Theadvance of the Germans as well as the retreat of the Russians took placeunder terrific difficulties, caused by torrential rains which poureddown incessantly. Some interesting details may be learned from a letterwritten about that time by a German officer in charge of a heavymunition train: "From Czestochowa we advanced in forced marches. Duringthe first two days roads were passable, but after that they becameterrible, as it rained every day. In some places there were no roadsleft, nothing but mud and swamps. Once it took us a full hour to moveone wagon, loaded with munitions and drawn by fifteen horses, a distanceof only fifteen yards. .. . Horses sank into the mud up to their bodiesand wagons up to their axles. .. . One night we reached a spot which wasabsolutely impassable. The only way to get around it was through a denseforest, but before we could get through there it was necessary to cut anopening through the trees. For the next few hours we felled trees for adistance of over five hundred yards. .. . For the past eight days we havebeen on the go almost every night, and once I stayed in my saddle forthirty consecutive hours. During all that time we had no real rest. Either we did not reach our quarters until early in the morning or lateat night. What a bed feels like we've forgotten long ago. We considerourselves lucky if we have one room and straw on the floor for the sevenof us. For ten days I have not been out of my clothes. And when we doget a little sleep it is almost invariably necessary to start off againat once. .. . Even our food supplies have become more scarce day by day. Long ago we saw the last of butter, sausage, or similar delicacies. Weare glad if we have bread and some lard. Only once in a great while arewe fortunate enough to buy some cattle. But then a great feast isprepared. .. . Tea is practically all that we have to drink. .. . Thehardships, as you can see, are somewhat plentiful; but in spite of thisfact I am in tiptop condition and feeling wonderfully well. Sometimes Iam astonished myself what one can stand. " Early in October, 1914, the Germans came closer and closer to Warsaw. Atthe end of it they were in the south, within twenty miles of the oldPolish capital--at Grojec. At that time only a comparatively smallforce, not more than three army corps, was available, under GeneralScheidemann's command, for its defense. These, however--all of them madeup of tried Siberian troops--fought heroically for forty-four hours, especially around the strongly fortified little town of Blonie, aboutten miles west of Warsaw. The commander in chief of all the Russianarmies, Grand Duke Nicholas, had retired with his staff to Grodno, andWarsaw expected as confidently a German occupation as the Germansthemselves. But suddenly the Russians, who up to that time seem to haveunderestimated the strength of the Germans, awoke to the desperate needsof the situation. By a supreme effort they contrived to concentrate vastreenforcements to the east of Warsaw within a few days and to change theproportion of numbers before Warsaw from five to three in favor of theGermans to about three to one in their own favor. On October 10, 1914, panic reigned supreme in Warsaw. Although theGovernment tried to dispel the fears of the populace by encouragingproclamations, the thunder of the cannons, which could be heardincessantly, and the very evident lack of strong Russian forces, spokemore loudly. Whoever could afford to flee and was fortunate enough toget official sanction to leave, did so. The panic was still moreintensified when German aeroplanes and dirigibles began to appear in thesky. For fully ten days the fighting lasted around the immediateneighborhood of the city. Day and night, bombs thrown by the German airfleet exploded in all parts of the city, doing great damage to propertyand killing and wounding hundreds of innocent noncombatants. Day andnight could be heard the roar of the artillery fire, and nightfallbrought the additional terror of the fiery reflection from burstingshrapnel. The peasants from the villages to the west and south streamedinto the city in vast numbers. Thousands of wounded coming from alldirections added still more to the horror and excitement. The hardest fighting around Blonie occurred from October 13 to 17, 1914. On the 13th the Germans were forced to evacuate Blonie, and on October14 Pruszkow, a little farther south and still nearer to Warsaw. OnOctober 15 the Russians made a wonderful and successful bayonet attackon another near-by village, Nadarzyn. The next day, the 16th, saw almostall of this territory again in the hands of the Germans, and on the 17ththey succeeded even in crossing the Vistula over a pontoon bridgeslightly south of Warsaw. However, even then the arrival of Russianreenforcements made itself felt, for after a short stay on the rightbank of the Vistula the Germans were thrown back by superior Russianforces. All that day the fighting went on most furiously and lasted deepinto the night. The next day at last the Russian armies had all beenassembled. CHAPTER LXXVIII GERMAN RETREAT FROM RUSSIAN POLAND On October 19, 1914, the Germans, who apparently had accurateinformation concerning the immense numbers which they now faced, gave upthe attack and began their retreat. The retreat was carried out with asmuch speed and success as the advance. By October 20 the Germans hadgone back so far that the Russian advance formations could not keep upwith them and lost track of them. Without losing a gun, the First GermanArmy managed to escape the pursuing Russians as well as to evade twoattempts--one from the south and one from the north--to outflank themand cut off their retreat. During the fighting before Warsaw the total front on which the Russianarmies were battling against the German and Austrian invaders of Polandwas about 160 miles long, stretching from Novo Georgievsk in the north, along the Vistula, through Warsaw and Ivangorod to Sandomir at theGalician border in the south. All along this line continuous fightingwent on, and the heaviest of it, besides that directly before Warsaw, took place around the fortress of Ivangorod. Two attempts of theRussians to get back to the left side of the Vistula on October 12 and14, 1914, were frustrated under heavy losses on both sides. A Germansoldier states in a letter written home during the actual fightingbefore Ivangorod that at the end of one day, out of his company of 250, only 85 were left--the other 66 per cent having been killed or wounded. Just as the Russians had succeeded in assembling sufficientreenforcements at Warsaw, to make it inevitable for the German forces toretreat, they had brought equally large numbers to the rescue ofIvangorod. However, these did not make themselves really felt thereuntil October 27, 1914. Previous to that date the Germans and Austrianscaptured over 50, 000 Russians and thirty-five guns. When, on October 23and 24, 1904, aeroplane scouts discovered the approaching vastreenforcements, and similar reports were received from the First Armyfighting around Warsaw, the German and Austrian forces were allwithdrawn. The retreat of these groups of armies was accomplished muchin the same way as of that in the north, except that it began later andbrought with it more frequent and more desperate rear-guard actions. TheRussians, who were trying desperately to inflict as much damage aspossible to the retreating enemy, showed wonderful courage and heroicdisregard of death. In some places, however, the Germans had preparedstrong, even if temporary, intrenchments, sometimes three or more linesdeep, and the storming of these cost their opponents dearly. By October 24, 1914, the invaders had been forced back in the south asfar as Radom and in the north to Skierniewice; by October 28 Radom aswell as Lodz had been evacuated and were again in Russian hands. Thelines of retreat were the same as those of advance had been, namely, therailroads from Warsaw to Thorn, Kalish, and Cracow. Much damage was doneto these roads by the Germans in order to delay as much as possible thepursuit of the Russians. Considerable fighting occurred, however, whenever one of the rivers along the line of retreat was reached; soalong the Pilitza, the Rawka, the Bzura, and finally the Warta. By theend of the first week of November the German-Austrian armies had beenthrown back across their frontiers, and all of Russian Poland was oncemore in the undisputed possession of Russia. In a measure Von Hindenburg followed the example of his Russianadversaries when he withdrew his forces from Poland into Upper Silesiain November, 1914, after the unsuccessful first drive against Warsaw, ofwhich we have just read the details. His reasons for taking this stepwere evident enough. When it had been established definitely that thereenforcements which Russia had been able to gather made futile anyfurther hope of taking Warsaw with the forces at his command, only twopossibilities remained to the German general: To make a stand to thewest of the Vistula until reenforcements could be brought up, or to fallback to his bases and there concentrate enough additional forces tomake a new drive for Poland. He chose the latter, undoubtedly because itwas the safer and less costly in lives. How quickly the German retreat was accomplished we have already seen. Inspite of their rapidity, however, the Germans found time to hold up theRussians, not only by severe rear-guard actions, but also by destroyingin the most thorough manner the few railroad lines that led out ofPoland. In this connection they proved themselves to be as much pastmasters in the art of disorganization as they had hitherto shownthemselves to be capable of the highest forms of organization. About November 10, 1914, Von Hindenburg had completed his regrouping. The line along which the Russians were massed against him stretchedfrom the point where the Niemen enters East Prussia, slightly east ofTilsit, along the eastern and southern border of East Prussia to theVistula at Wloclawek, from there to the Warta at Kola, where it turnsto the west, along and slightly to the east of this river throughUniejow-Zdouska-Wola to Novo Radowsk. From there it passed to thenorth of Cracow in a curve toward Galicia, where strong Russian armieswere forcing back the Austrians on and beyond the Carpathians. Alongthis vast front--considerably over 500 miles long--the Russians haddrawn up forces which must have amounted very nearly to forty-fivearmy corps, or over 2, 000, 000 men. These were distributed as follows:The Tenth Army faced the eastern border of East Prussia west of theNiemen; the First Army the southern border of this province, north ofthe Narew and both north and south of the Vistula; the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Armies, forming the main forces of the Russians, fronted along the Warta against lower Posen and Upper Silesia, whilethe balance of the Russian armies had been thrown against theAustro-Hungarian forces in Galicia. Against these Von Hindenburg had three distinct armies which wereavailable for offensive purposes. The central army under General vonMackensen was concentrated between Thorn and the Warta River; a southernarmy had been formed north of Cracow and along the Upper Silesianborder, and was made up chiefly of Austro-Hungarian forces with acomparatively slight mingling of German troops. North of the Vistula, between Thorn and Soldau, a third and weaker army had been collected forthe protection of West Prussia. In Galicia, of course, stood the mainbody of the Austro-Hungarian forces, and in East Prussia defenses hadbeen prepared which made it possible to leave there weaker formationsfor defensive purposes only. The Germans fully appreciated the danger of the Russian numericalsuperiority. If these mighty forces were once allowed to get fully underway and develop a general offensive along the entire front, the Germancause would be as good as lost. The main object of Von Hindenburg, therefore, was to break this vast offensive power, and he decided to doso by an offensive of his own which, if possible, was to set in ahead ofthat of the Russians. Though the latter most likely had at leastone-third more men at their disposal than he, he had one advantage overthem, a wonderfully developed network of railroads, running practicallyparallel to this entire line. The Russians, on the other hand, hadnothing but roads running from east to west or from north to south, which could be used as feeders only from a central point to a number ofpoints along their semicircular line. Troops having once beenconcentrated could be thrown to another point if it was at any distanceat all only by sending them back to the central point and then sendingthem out again on another feeder, or else by long and difficult marcheswhich practically almost took too much time to be of any value. VonHindenburg could, if need be, concentrate any number of his forces at agiven point, deliver there an attack in force and then concentrate againat another point for a similar purpose, almost before his adversarycould suspect his purpose. His plan was to attack with his strongestforces under Von Mackensen the weakest point of the Russian line betweenthe Vistula and the Warta, beat them there and then march from the northagainst the right wing of the main forces of the Russians, which latterwas to be kept from advancing too far by the mixed Austrian and Germanarmy. On his two outmost flanks, in East Prussia and East Galicia, nothing but defensive actions were contemplated. The Russian plan was somewhat similar, except that their main attackapparently was to be directed in the south against Cracow, and fromthere against the immensely important industrial center of Silesia. Atthe same time, they intended to press as hard as possible their attacksin East Prussia and Galicia in order to force a weakening of the Germancenter. CHAPTER LXXIX WINTER BATTLES OF THE POLISH CAMPAIGN During November and December, 1914, and January, 1915, much of thefighting which took place on this immense front consisted of engagementsbetween comparatively small formations, and is very difficult to followin detail. For convenience we shall consider first the fighting inPoland, and then separately that in East Prussia, although, of course, they were carried on concurrently. On November 10, 1914, the Germans had reached Komn on the Warta, whereit met a small Russian force, of which it captured 500 men and machineguns. Two days later, November 12, the Russians crossed the Warta, andtheir advance troops, chiefly cavalry, had almost reached Kalish on theEast Prussian border. On that day, however, they were forced back againa short distance. Similar engagements took place at various points alongthe entire line, chiefly for the purpose of testing their respectivestrength. November 14, 1914, however, saw the first more extensive fighting. VonMackensen's group had reached by that time Wloclawek on the western bankof the Vistula and slightly east of the Thorn-Lowitz railroad, aboutthirty miles from Thorn. One of the Russian army corps of GeneralRussky's group made a determined stand. However, it was forced to fallback and lost 1, 500 prisoners and some ten machine guns. The Germansfollowed up this gain by pressing with all their power against theright wing of the Russian center army. For two or three days the battleraged along a front running from Wloclawek south to Kutno, a distance ofabout thirty miles. Both of these country towns are situated on thestrategically very important railroad from Thorn to Warsaw by way ofLowitz. The Russians had two or three army corps in this sector, including the one that had been forced back from Wloclawek. The Germansundoubtedly were in superior force at this particular point, and weretherefore able to press their attack to great advantage. The finalresult was a falling back of the entire Russian right to the Bzura Riverafter both sides had lost thousands in killed and wounded, and theRussians were obliged to leave over 20, 000 men, 70 machine guns, andsome larger guns in the hands of the Germans. Von Mackensen was rewardedfor this victory by being raised to the rank of "general oberst, " whichin the German army is only one remove from field marshal. In a measure separate battles in this Polish campaign sink, at thistime, into insignificance. For the total number of men involved, theextent of the battle ground, the frequency of engagements which underany other circumstances would, without any doubt, have been consideredbattles of the first magnitude, stamped them at this time as "minoractions. " The fighting, however, was as furious as at any time, thehardships as severe as anywhere, and the valor on both sides as great asever. Again the wonderful mobility of the German army organization wasone of the strongest features. A French critic says of the fighting inPoland at this time that "it was the most stirring since Napoleonictimes. It forced generals to make movements and to change and improviseplans to an extent which war history never before had registered. " Dr. Boehm, the war correspondent of the "Berliner Tageblatt, " says that theadvance was so fast that the infantry frequently had no time to lay downbefore firing, but had to do so standing or kneeling. Artillery most ofthe time moved on to a new position after having fired only a few shots. He also mentions the many cadavers of horses that could be seeneverywhere. Some of these, of course, were the victims of rifle or gunfire. But more had a small round hole in their forehead where the shotof mercy out of their own master's revolver had put them out of theirmisery. For the condition of the roads was such that, chiefly on accountof the rapidity of the advance, large numbers of horses would fall down, weakened and often with broken legs. Among one of the minor results of the battle of Kutno, necessitating thehurried withdrawal of the Russians, was the capture of the governor ofWarsaw, General von Korff. He was surprised in his automobile by a troopof German cavalry toward which he was driving apparently in the beliefthat they were Russians. During this period the Russians made an attack against the Germansbetween Soldau and Thorn. The left wing of this group was advancingalong the right bank of the Vistula against Thorn, but was successfullystopped by the Germans at Lipno and thrown back in the direction ofPlock. By November 16, 1914, the Russians had lost in that sector atotal of about 5, 000 prisoners with a proportionate number of machineguns. In general throughout the entire fighting in this territory theRussian losses by capture were astonishingly high. Of course, theGermans, too, lost men in this manner; but being in the offensive theysuffered less, while the Russians, continually forced to fall back, often found it impossible to withdraw advanced formations in time. Further to the north the Russians had reached the border along theWarsaw-Danzig railroad. An attempt to cross and take Soldau, however, miscarried, and on November 18 they fell back for the time being onMlawa. By this time the Russian defense had stiffened. Von Mackensen was nowwell fifty miles within Russian territory. But for the next few weeksthe Bzura was used with great success as a natural line of defense bythe Russians. From the 18th to the 30th of November, 1914, the fighting continuedwithout pause along the entire line. In the north of the central groupit centered around Plock, in the center of the same group around theimportant railroad junction Lowitz, and in the south once more aroundLodz. One day would bring some advantages to the Russians, the next dayto the Germans. Much of this fighting assumed the character of trenchwarfare, though, naturally, not to the extent that this had taken placeon the western front. By December 1, 1914, the troops under VonMackensen fighting around Lodz and Lowitz claimed to have captured atotal of 80, 000 men, 70 guns, 160 munition wagons, and 150 machine guns. Still further down south the Austro-German group had much the same kindof work to do. The fighting there centered first around Czestechowa, andlater around Novo Radowsk. About the end of November, 1914, it looked for a time as if the Russianswere gaining the upper hand. After they had fallen back to the Bzura, Von Hindenburg directed, with part of his left wing, an attack againstLodz from the north. Success of this move would mean grave danger to theentire central group of the Russians, the Warta Army. It threatened notonly its right wing, but would also bring German forces in the back ofits center and cut off its retreat to Warsaw. The Russian commanderrecognized the danger, and immediately began to throw strongreenforcements toward Lodz from Warsaw. To meet these Von Hindenburgformed a line from Lowitz through Strykow to Brzeziny. A Russian successwould mean immediate withdrawal of these forces from their attackagainst Lodz, and possibly have even more important results. At the lastmoment the Russians brought up reenforcements from the south, and withthem almost surrounded one of the German army corps which had advancedabout ten miles to the southeast of Brzeziny to Karpin. For three daysit looked as if this corps would either be annihilated or captured, butat last it succeeded in breaking through by way of Galkow to Brzezinynot only with comparatively small losses of its own, but with a fewthousand of captured Russians. For eighteen days the fighting lasted before Lodz. The Russians resistedthis time most stubbornly. They had thrown up strong fortificationsaround the entire town, which they used as a base for continuouscounterattacks. As late as December 5, 1914, fighting was still going on, but finallythat night the Russians made good their withdrawal, and on the 6th theGermans were once more in Lodz. This was partly the result of anunsuccessful attempt on the part of the Russians to relieve Lodz fromthe south. Between the battle ground around Lodz and that on which themost southern Austro-German group under the Austrian General, Boehm-Ermolli, was fighting there was a slight gap. Through this--justwest of Piotrkow--an attack could be made against the right wing of VonMackensen's army. To meet this stroke a small separate army was formedunder the command of the Austrian cavalry general, Von Tersztyansky, consisting of one German brigade, one Austro-Hungarian brigade, and acavalry division. This shows the close cooperation which existed at thattime between the forces of the Central Powers. This new army group tookin the first days of December 19, 1914, some of the smaller places westand south of Piotrkow. From then on until December 15, 1914, fighting went on day and night. One small village--Augustijnow--changed hands three times within oneday--December 8, 1914--remaining finally in the possession of theAustro-Germans. In the evening of the 15th Piotrkow was finally taken bystorm. This not only prevented any further attack against VonMackensen's right, but also gave the Austro-Germans possession of therailroad from Cracow to Warsaw as far as Piotrkow, and secured to themthe most important crossings over the Pilitza. This long-continued fighting, lasting almost the entire twenty-fourhours of every day and being accompanied by very severe artillery duels, spelled ruin to very many of the towns and villages involved; especiallya large number of the latter in the immediate vicinity of Lodz sufferedterribly. In many of them not a single house or hut was left standing, and thousands of Polish peasants, who even at the best had nosuperfluity of riches, were deprived of everything they possessed. Fireadded to the terror; for most of the houses were covered with straw, andthe destruction of one was usually quickly followed by the burning ofall others within reach. The losses of the Russians were not only very heavy in prisoners, butalso in wounded and killed, although in the latter respect the invadingarmies suffered almost as severely. Generals Scheidemann and Welitschko, both corps commanders, lost their lives, while it was reported thatGeneral Rennenkampf, who failed to come to the rescue of Lodz in time, was placed before a court-martial. After Lodz had been occupied on December 6, 1914, Von Mackensen's armyfollowed the retreating Russians. The latter offered the most stubbornresistance and a great deal of very close fighting took place. In manyinstances the Russian rear guard dug itself in wherever the groundoffered possibilities to do so quickly and then frequently protected itspositions with barbed wire. The storming of these of course caused theGermans heavy losses and delayed them sufficiently to allow the Russiansto withdraw in good order. For the possession of Lowitz, one of the most important railroadjunctions west of Warsaw, the battle raged more than two weeks. It beganas early as November 25, 1914, but it was not until about December 15, 1914, that the Russians gave up this point. They had thrown up verystrong fortifications on all sides of the town and the Germans underGeneral von Morgen had to bring up a strong force of artillery beforethey could reduce the place. The result was that this little town whichhad been in the thick of the fighting so many times was finally almostentirely destroyed and the outlying countryside became a scene of themost complete and terrible devastation. Some of the most violent fighting before Warsaw occurred at this timealong the upper Bzura and its southern tributary, the Rawka. The Russianline ran now almost straight from the influx of the Bzura into theVistula, along the east bank of the former through Sochaczev, then alongthe east bank of Rawka through Skierniewice and Rawa, from there alongsome hills to the river Pilitza, crossing it at Inovolodz, throughOpoczno and along the River Nida to the Vistula and beyond it throughTarnow into Galicia. In spite of their strong intrenchments and theirheroic fighting the Russians were gradually, though very slowly, forcedback. A great deal of this fighting was trench warfare of the moststubborn type. This necessarily meant that for weeks the line wavered. One day the Germans would force a passage across one, or perhaps all, ofthe rivers at one or more points, only to be thrown back the next dayand to have the Russians follow their example with an offensiveexcursion on the west bank. These continually changing "victories" and"defeats" make it next to impossible to follow in full all thedevelopments along this line. By December 25, 1914, the Germans heldSkierniewice; by December 27, 1914, Inovolodz; by January 3, 1915, Rawa;by January 5, 1915, Bolimow. Throughout the entire month of January, 1915, the most ferociousfighting continued around all these places, and many of them changedhands two or three times. Both sides very freely used the protectingdarkness of night to make attacks, and this naturally added a great dealto the hardships which the troops had to suffer. It must also not beforgotten that by this time winter had set in in earnest. Snow coveredthe ground and a very low temperature called for the most heroicendurance on the part of everybody. One of the American war correspondents, who at this time was with theRussian forces before Warsaw, gives a very vivid description of a nightcannonade in the neighborhood of Blouie: "The fire of the German cannonsis unbearable. Night grows darker and darker. Everywhere, in a greatcircle, the country is lighted up by camp fires which send their flamestoward heaven in a cloud of smoke. These little red spots throweverywhere a fiery glow over the snow, and down upon this wonderfulcolor symphony the moon pours its weak, ghostlike light through acurtain of clouds so that people seem to float away as in a dream. Inthe foggy twilight three battalions march to the front. .. . The noise ofthe gunfire penetrates to us in separate, spasmodic outbreaks. Flashesof fire flare up on the horizon. .. . Gradually we come closer and closerto the firing line. Now we are only two or three miles away from thefiring batteries. We turn toward the west and there a magnificent battlepanorama lies before our eyes. The moon sheds just enough light throughthe clouds to make it possible to recognize the shadows on the snow. Theflat, white field is lined with a seam of black trees. Behind these thinwoods stand the cannons. They stretch out in a long line, as far as theeye reaches, and their irregular positions are shown by the red tonguesof fire which flare up again and again. The noise of the battle, whichhad sounded all around us, has now swollen into the roaring thunder ofcannons. At a short distance, where the sky seems to touch the field, other flashes flare up, these are the German cannons. Sometimes as manyas four of these flashes break forth at one time and tear the dulltwilight with their glaring brightness. For a moment all the surroundingcountry with its phantastic shadows and its darting lights is submergedin blinding brilliancy; then another glittering light captures the eye. It is a bursting rocket which breaks up into thousands of little starsand illuminates the vast field of snow everywhere so that it glittersand glares. "But again another light appears in the dusky sky. A spray of gold! Thatis an exploding shrapnel, and almost at the same point three more ofthese missiles burst into their reddish golden glow. Then the giant armof a searchlight is thrust out into the midst of the foggy, swellingatmosphere and shows houses, fences and paths with an unsparingclearness. Irresolutely the mighty finger of light wanders across theplain as if it were searching for something and could not find it. Atlast it throws its coldling, shining ray on a defile and rests there. And suddenly out of the darkness there flares up a multitude of littleflashes which look from the distance as if innumerable matches werestruck and gave off sparks. The sparks run in a straight line, and thesebounding lights show the position of the trenches. Another line ofsparks puts in appearance, seemingly only a short distance away. That isformed by the battalions of the advancing, attacking enemy. Thensuddenly a ribbon of flame cuts through the shadows, and the sharp echoof machine guns bites into the night air. But so immensely far spreadsthe battle panorama that the eye is able to fix only small sections at atime. .. . " Among the many small villages and towns in this small sector betweenWarsaw and Lowitz, Bolimow saw the most furious fighting. Almost step bystep the Russians fought here the German advance, and when finally theygave way for a mile or less after days and nights of grueling fighting, they did so only to throw up immediately new defenses and force theinvaders to repeat their onslaught again and again. At any other time ofthe year this part of the country would have yielded little ground forfighting; for it is covered extensively with swamps. But now the bittercold of midwinter had covered these with ice solid enough to bear menand even guns. On January 28, 1915, the Germans at last threw theRussians out of their strong intrenchments at Bolimow. But others hadalready been prepared a short distance to the east, at a small village, Humin. The attack on this particular position began in the morning of the lastday of January, 1915. For three days the battle raged until, late in theafternoon of February 2, 1915, the Germans took Humin by storm. At timesit is difficult to decide whether battles involving vast fronts andequally vast numbers, or those fought in a small space and bycomparatively small numbers are the more heroic and ferocious. In thelatter case, of course, individual valor becomes not only much morenoticeable, but also much more important and details that are swallowedup by the great objects for which great battles are usually fought standout much more clearly. It will, therefore, be interesting to hear froman eyewitness, the war correspondent of one of the greatest Germandailies, the "Kölnische Zeitung, " what happened during the three days'battle of Humin: "It was seven o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1915. Punctually, inaccordance the orders given out the previous evening, the first shotrang out into the snowy air of the gray morning at this hour from abattery drawn up some distance back. Like a call of awakening it roaredalong, and fifteen minutes later when it had called everyone to theguns--exactly to the minute the time decided on by general orders--thebattle day of January 31, 1915, began with a monstrous tumult. Withtruly a hellish din the concert of battle started. A huge number ofbatteries had been drawn up and sent their iron "blessing" into theranks of the Russians. Field batteries, 15-centimeter howitzers, 10-centimeter guns, 21-centimeter mortars, and, to complete the wealthof variety, 30-centimeter mortars of the allied Austrians joyfullyshouted the morning song of artillery. A dull noise roared aroundBolimow, for in back of the town, before it, to the right and to theleft, stood the various guns in groups of batteries, and through the airpassed a shrill whistle. But it was not only their hellish din whichmade one tremble and start up, but even more so the dismal, powerfullyexciting howl of the gigantic missile of the great mortars, chasing upand 'way into the air almost perpendicular. It sounded each time as if agiant risen from out of the very bowels of the earth sent up great sobs. Like a wild chase of unbridled, unchained elements the powerful missileshot up high from the gun barrel. "A shriek of the most horrible kind, a trembling and shaking started inthe wildly torn air, a continual pounding, hissing whirlwind shot uplike a hurricane, lasted for seconds and disappeared in the distancelike some monstrous mystery. Surrounded by a glare of fire, encircled byblinding light, licked by sheaves of flames, the short barrel of themortar drew back at the moment of firing. Clouds of dust rose; theymixed gray with brown, with the smoke of gunpowder which hid from sightfor a few moments the entire gun, and then it rained down from the air, for whole minutes, the tiny pieces into which the cover of the chargehad been torn. After every shot of the big mortars, the heavy howitzersand the 21-centimeter mortars--which usually are the loud talkers in anartillery battle--could hardly make themselves heard. An entire batteryof them could not drown the noise of _one_ shot from an Austrian mortar. It sounded like a hoarse but weak bark as compared with this giganticinstrument of death and destruction. "During the morning the sky cleared; this enabled the observers to sightmore accurately. Orders were sent over the telephone; the telescopecontrolled the effect of the gunfire, and one could see plainly how, ina distance of a few miles, the hail of shot descended on the enemy'strenches. 'Way up towered the geysers of earth when the shot struckhome. Above the Russian trenches lay a long white cloud of powderforming a great wall of waves. The dull thunder of the guns wastremendous. It whistled and howled, it cried and moaned, it roared likethe surf of the ocean, like the terrifying growl of a thunderstorm, andthen it threw back a hundredfold clear echo. In between came the dullcrack of the Russian shrapnel. They broke in the broad, swampy lowlandsof the Rawka; they pierced the cover of ice which broke with atremendous noise while dark fountains of bog water gushed up from theground. In front and in back of the German batteries one could see thecraters made by the Russian hits; they were dark holes where the hardfrozen ground had been broken up into thick, slaglike pieces weighingtons and all over the white cover of snow had been strewn, dark brownand as fine as dust, the torn-up soil. "Then the storm of the trenches set in. At a given hour the roar of theguns stopped suddenly. A few minutes later the masses of infantry, heldin readiness, arose. They came up from their trenches, climbed overtheir walls, sought cover wherever it could be found, and were promptlyreceived by rifle and machine-gun fire from the Russians. That, however, lasted only a moment; then they advanced in a jump; the attacking linethinned out, stretched itself out and, continually seeking cover, triedto advance. A few minutes only and the first Russian trench line wasreached. In storm, with bayonet and rifle butt, they came on and brokeinto the trenches. They were fighting now man for man. Then theartillery fire set in again. Again in the afternoon the infantryadvanced in storm formation against the head of the village and thetrenches flanking it. From them roared rifle and machine-gun fireagainst the storming lines. Nothing could avail against theseintrenchments. Again artillery was called upon to support the attack. "It was now five o'clock in the afternoon on January 31, 1915, and theartillery fire still roared over the white plain. Here and there were afew scattered farms, deeply snowed in. In the distance stood forests, darkly silhouetted against the sky, covered with heavy, low-hanging snowclouds. In between were yawning depths, and farther up other curtains ofclouds glowing in the full purple light of the setting sun. A wonderfulmajesty lay on the heavens at that hour. But down on the earth, acrossthe white plain, the fighting German troops still crowded against theenemy. Again infantry fire started and became the livelier the nearertwilight approached and the deeper evening shadows prepared the comingnight. "The 1st of February, 1915, the second day of battle, broke damp andcloudy. Once more artillery fire set in. Later in the morning, just ason the first day, the infantry again attacked. While the roar of thebattle went on, some of the men prepared the last resting place fortheir comrades who had fallen on the previous day. Silently this workwas done. Here there were single graves, and then again places wherelarger numbers were to be put to rest together. One such grave was dugclose to the wall of the cemetery and in it were bedded the dead heroesso that their closed eyes were turned westward--toward home. A chaplainfound wonderful words at the open grave, blessing the rest of those whohad fallen on the field of honor and speaking to their comrades of thejoys of battle and of its sorrows while they said farewell to the deadwith bared heads. "The guns still roared; then they were silent and then roared on again. A remarkable tension was in the air. In a discord of feelings the daydrew to its end, and after that the third day of battle, the 2d ofFebruary, dawned with renewed fighting. It was noon. We were sitting atdivision headquarters, lunching, when the telephone rang loudly. With ajump a staff officer was before it. 'General, the Russian lines aregiving way. ' Quickly the general issued his orders. Once more thefighting set in with all the available strength and vigor. The thunderof the guns was renewed, and so the third day of battle ended with thestorming of the strong Russian positions in Humin and with theoccupation of the entire village by the German troops. " After the storming of Humin the Germans took the heights near Borzimow, which commanded the road Bolimow-Warsaw. Here, too, the fighting wasvery hard. South of Humin, near Wola-Szydlowieca, the Russian linesagain were broken on February 3, 1915, after a combined artillery andinfantry attack, which began early on February 2, 1915, and lasted formore than twenty-four hours. The next ten days brought continuousfighting at many points, some of it almost as ferocious as that of whichwe have just spoken, but none of it yielding any important results toeither side. With the middle of February a lull set in in this sector ofthe front. Of course the fighting did not stop entirely. But the Germansdid not advance farther, and the Russians were unable to break theirlines or to force them back anywhere to any appreciable extent. Of course all this fighting took place near enough to Warsaw to be heardthere and to fill its inhabitants with terror and fear of a possiblesiege or attack on the city proper. Although a great many people hadfled to the interior, thousands of others had flocked to the city, especially from those outlying districts that had been overrun by theinvaders. Most of these were practically destitute and without means oropportunity to earn any money. The Russian Government did its best tohelp them, and provided nineteen asylums and thirteen people's kitchenswhich, it is reported, distributed each day 40, 000 portions. Wood, coal, and oil gradually became more and more scarce and advanced to very highprices, causing a great deal of suffering, especially among the poorerclasses. Again reports of various neutral war correspondents, located at thattime in Warsaw, are of great interest. Says one: "The thunder of thecannons has started up once more. Only the forts of the belt line offortresses are still silent. The railroad to Wilanow has been closed. Noone is allowed to go beyond Mokotow. In front of the two railroadstations silent crowds of people are standing, their features showingtheir terror. They stand there like they would at a fire to which thefiremen are rushing with their engines and ladders. One's feet are likelumps of ice, one's head feels foolish and empty. Doors and windows inthe big new houses in Marshalkowska Street have been boarded up inexpectation of the rifle fire. It reminds one of a boat when, before thebreaking of the storm, hatches are closed up and sails are trimmed. Omnibuses come in loaded with wounded, likewise butcher wagons withsimilar loads. Many of the lighter wounded soldiers limp on foot. Withnightfall the entire city falls into darkness--strange, ghostlike. People creep along the walls with bowed heads. The silence of the nightonly intensifies the roar of the untiring guns, and they seem then tocome closer. " During all this time the German dirigibles and aeroplanes were veryactive, too, throwing bombs. Granville Fortescue pictures the terrorspread by them most realistically. "Warsaw's inhabitants know now wellthe meaning of an aeroplane, and whenever they see one approach they runin wild terror into their houses and cellars. Before every open doorpushing, shouting crowds mass themselves, and serious panics are causedwhen the sharp crack of the exploding bomb shakes and rattles all thewindows. As soon as the danger is passed the curious collect, first withhesitation, then bolder and bolder, around the spot where the bomb felland gape with terror at the powerful results produced by the explosion. Here a stretch of the railroad has been destroyed; the walls of thenear-by houses are covered with innumerable holes looking like smallpoxscars; others, of the splinters from the bomb, have dug themselves deepinto the ground and not a single window in the vicinity is unbroken. " A winter of the most bitter misery has closed in on the unfortunatecity; miserable-looking shapes by the thousands, without home or food, crowd the narrow, crooked streets. As sand flows through an hourglass, so regiment after regiment, from every part of the vast empire of theczar, streams through the streets which now are black with people. Fromfar-distant Siberia and from the borderlands of Turkestan thesegray-clad soldiers pour through Warsaw to the plains of Poland. In theirdull features no trace can be discovered of what they feel or think. Onecan study the faces of these Tartars, Mongols, and Caucasians as much asone pleases, there remains always the same mystery. Tramp, tramp, tramp--they march from the Kalish station along the railroad until theydisappear together with the horizon in a single gray mass--who knowswhither, who knows whence? It is at such times that one realizes themagnitude of Russia if one considers that many of them have traveledall the way from the Ural Mountains. Quietness and gloominess now reign in Warsaw's hospitals, in whichformerly there was so much life and activity. The patients have beensent, as far as their condition permitted, into central Russia torecuperate, and at this time only slightly wounded men are brought in. This is a bad sign, for the doctors figure correctly that it indicatesthat those seriously wounded are left on the battle fields and perishthere. The hotels, on the other hand, are full of life. There officershave settled down; every rank and every branch of the service isrepresented here, from the grizzly general down to the beardlesslieutenant; every province of the immense empire seems to have sent arepresentative. You may see there the most fantastic figures: Caucasiancolonels with enormous caps, huge mustaches, and black boots, figureswhich look still exactly like the Muscovian warriors from the days ofNapoleon. It strikes one as very strange to hear so many German namesborne by these Russian officers. And while the poor inhabitants ofWarsaw await their fate with fear and trembling, the officers are theonly ones full of joy, for war is their element and a promisingopportunity for thousands of enticing possibilities which peace neverbrought them. During November and December, 1914, both in north and south Poland, continuous fighting went on along the lines. In south Poland the fieldof action was at first north of Cracow, between the Rivers Warta andPilitza, and later between the latter and the River Nida. But althoughthe result of this fighting--which mainly was in favor of theGerman-Austrian forces--to a certain extent influenced the result in thecentral sector to the west of Warsaw, the details of it do not properlycall for consideration at this time and place. For it was directed muchmore by the Austrian General Staff than by that of the German armies, the forces involved were preponderantly Austro-Hungarian, and it wasmore closely connected with the Russian attack on Galicia and theCarpathians than with Von Hindenburg's attack on the Russian center. Itwill find its proper consideration in another place in connection withthe Galician campaign. Suffice it to say here that the Austro-Hungarianforces under Boehm-Ermolli, supported by the German division underGeneral van Woyrsch, carried successfully that part of Von Hindenburg'sgeneral plan which had been assigned to it--the protection of the rightwing of his central group of troops and the shielding of Cracow from adirect Russian attack. To the north of the central group--north of the Vistula and between itand the Narew--the Germans had assembled, as we have already stated, another group which had as its bases Soldau and Thorn. Their chief taskwas to protect the German provinces of West and East Prussia from aRussian attack from Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw. During November, 1914, these forces restricted themselves entirely todefensive fighting along the border. With the beginning of December, however, when the Russians had temporarily weakened their forcesfighting north of the Vistula in order to send additional support to thedefenders of Warsaw, the Germans attempted an advance which for a shorttime was successful. On December 10, 1914, Przasnysz, about twenty-five miles southeast ofMlawa, was stormed after the latter place had been occupied some timebefore. By December 15, 1914, however, the Russians had again strongerforces at their command for this part of the front, and with them theynot only threw the Germans again out of Przasnysz, but forced them toevacuate Mlawa and retire behind their border. A week later, aboutDecember 22, 1914, the Germans again advanced from Soldau andNeidenburg, and by December 24, 1914, Mlawa once more was in theirhands. Although the fighting in this sector practically went on withoutintermission from the beginning of November, 1914, to the end ofFebruary, 1915, comparatively small forces were involved on both sides. This, of course, excluded any possibility of a decisive result on eitherside, and we can therefore dismiss this end of the campaign with thestatement that, although the Germans north of the Vistula were moresuccessful in keeping the Russians off German soil than the Russianswere in keeping the Germans out of Poland, the latter did not make hereany appreciable headway in the direction of Warsaw, and accomplished nomore than to keep a goodly number of Russian regiments tied up in theprotection of Novo Georgievsk and the northern approach to Warsawinstead of permitting them to participate in the repulse of the mainattack against the Polish capital, where they would have been veryuseful indeed. CHAPTER LXXX WINTER BATTLES IN EAST PRUSSIA The most northern part of the eastern front is now the only one left forour consideration. We have already learned that when the German GeneralStaff planned its second drive against Warsaw, it had been decided torestrict the German forces collected in East Prussia south of the Niemenand east and south of the Mazurian Lakes to defensive measures. At thattime--the beginning of November, 1914--and until about the beginning ofFebruary, 1915, they consisted of two army corps under the command ofGeneral von Bülow, who at the outbreak of the war and for a few yearsprevious to it had been in command of a division with headquarters atInsterburg, and who was therefore well qualified for his task throughhis intimate knowledge of the territory. About 50 per cent of his forcesbelonged to the Landwehr, about 25 per cent to the Landsturm and onlyabout 25 per cent were of the first line. These faced a numerically verysuperior force variously estimated at five to seven army corps. TheGermans therefore found it necessary to equalize this overpoweringdifference by withdrawing behind a strong natural line of defense. Thisthey found once more behind the greater Mazurian Lakes to the south andbehind the River Angerapp which flows out of the lakes at Angerburg tothe north until it joins the river Pissa slightly to the east ofInsterburg. [Illustration: The town of Gerdauen, East Prussia was burned during theRussian invasion, when for a time East Prussia suffered like Belgium andPoland. ] These positions apparently were prepared during the early part ofNovember, 1914. For as late as November 15, 1914, fighting took placeat Stallupoehnen on the Kovno-Königsberg railroad and some ten mileseast of the Angerapp. A few days earlier, on November 9, 1914, a Russianattack, still farther east, north of the Wysztiter Lake, had resulted inconsiderable losses to the Russians. North of the Pissa River theGermans managed to stick closer to their border, along which there flowsa small tributary of the Niemen offering natural protection. Considerable fighting took place in this territory around the town ofPillkallen, but the German line held. On November 30, 1914, the Russians had again occupied that part of EastPrussia located between the border and the Mazurian Lake-Angerapp line. On that day the first of a long series of attacks against this verystrong line was made east of Darkehmen, but was as unsuccessful as allits successors. The German Emperor saw some of this fighting during ashort visit to the East Prussian defenders. All through December, 1914, the Russians made repeated attacks against the German lines, alwayswithout accomplishing their object of breaking through it and advancingagain against Königsberg. Of course, they inflicted severe losses ontheir adversaries, though their own, both in disabled and captured, weremuch more severe, due to the disadvantages which the difficult territoryheaped upon the attacking side. By the beginning of January winter hadset in in full earnest and the weather became so severe that no fightingof any importance took place throughout the entire month. The onlyexceptions were Russian attacks about January 15, 1915, against Loetzen, the German fortress on the eastern shore of the northernmost group ofthe lakes, which, however, brought no results. At the same timeGumbinnen was once more the center of considerable fighting. Later in the month, January 26, 28, and 29, 1915, this town again andagain had to pay dearly in additional destruction of what little of itthat was still left of its former prosperity for the advantage of beinglocated on the Königsberg road. On January 30, 1915, the Russiansattempted to break through a little further south at Darkehmen--butstill the German lines held. In the meanwhile new troops had been prepared and collected and werebeing rushed to that part of the east front for the purpose of clearingall of East Prussia of its invaders. These reenforcements were sent tothe right and left wings of the Mazurian Lakes-Angerapp line, and theformer began its attack in February. A few days before an exceptionallyheavy snowfall, accompanied by very high winds and very lowtemperatures, had set in. This not only added to the hardships of thetroops, but increased immensely the difficulties with which the leaderson both sides had to contend. On account of the weather the roads becameimpassable for motor cars and the railroads were hardly in bettercondition. At no time could a general count with any amount of certaintyon the prompt execution of movements. Trains were delayed for hours andregiments appeared in their allotted positions hours late. The right wing of the German front was sent around the southern end ofthe lake chain by way of Johannisburg. There the Russians had thrown upvery strong fortifications in connection with the dense forestssurrounding this town. To the southeast the river Pisseck forms theoutlet for one of the lakes and flows toward the Narew. This line, too, was held by the Russians, who had considerable forces, both inJohannisburg and to the east in Bialla. In the late afternoon and duringthe night of February 8, 1915 a crossing over the Pisseck was forced andJohannisburg was stormed. Russian reenforcements from thesouth--Kolno--arrived too late and were thrown back with considerablelosses in men and guns. In spite of the bitter cold the Germans pressedon immediately. They took Bialla on February 9, 1915, and thenimmediately pushed on to Lyck with part of their forces. This town, likeso many other East Prussian towns, had suffered cruelly, having been inthe thick of the fighting almost from the beginning of the war. Now theRussians again made a most determined stand in its vicinity, induced, nodoubt, chiefly by the defensive advantages which the territory offeredhere. To the west of Lyck, beyond the Lyck Lake, they had built up verystrong intrenchments which resisted all German attacks for days, and itwas not until the middle of February, 1915, that they gave up thesepositions. But even then they continued to hold Lyck itself, and it wasnot taken until after the middle of the month. The other part of theright wing in the meantime had forced the Russians out of the southeastcorner of East Prussia and was advancing against Grajeko and Augustovo. In the north the German left wing had pushed its advancesimultaneously, starting from around Tilsit and the Niemen line. TheRussians fell back on strongly prepared intrenchments along the linePillkallen-Stallupoehnen, but by February 10, 1915, they had to giveup this line and withdraw still farther south and east towardEydtkuhnen, Kibarty, and Wirballen, all places of which we heardconsiderable during the previous battling in East Prussia. It wassnowing furiously and the Russians apparently counted with too muchcertainty on this as a means of keeping the Germans from followingclosely. They procured quarters in these three towns and were going toenjoy a much needed rest for one night. But during that night theGermans, overcoming all difficulties of snowdrifts and impassibleroads, attacked and stormed Eydtkuhnen as well as Wirballen andkilled, wounded, or made prisoners almost all the Russian forceslocated there, amounting to about 10, 000 men with considerableartillery and even greater quantities of supplies. Gumbinnen also wasretaken by the Germans and by February 12, 1915, they were on Russianterritory and advancing once more against Suwalki. By the middle of February the last Russian had been driven out ofGermany. This series of battles, known commonly as the "Winter Battle ofthe Mazurian Lakes" not only freed East Prussia, but yieldedcomparatively large results in the numbers of prisoners taken. In ninedays' fighting about 50, 000 men, 40 guns, and 60 machine guns werecaptured. Both sides, of course, suffered also heavy losses in killedand wounded. These great battles here briefly summarized to round outthe account of the operations of the first six months are described ingreater detail in Volume III. CHAPTER LXXXI RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN This brings us approximately to the end of the first six months'fighting at the eastern front. It will be well now to pause for a shortspace of time and to sum up the results of the tremendous conflict whichhas been narrated. However, before we consider these results from amilitary point of view and strike the balance of successes achieved andfailures suffered, let us see how they affected those who were theactors in this terrible tragedy of mankind--the men who fought thesebattles and their leaders, and the poor, unfortunate men, women, andchildren whose habitations had been thrown by an unkind fate into thepath of this vortex of death and destruction. In determining the total losses which the Russian and German forcessuffered during the first six months of the war, it is next toimpossible to arrive at this time at absolutely correct figures. This isespecially true in regard to the German troops. In a way this soundsstrange, for the German war organization made itself felt in thisrespect, just as much as along other lines, and in none of the countriesinvolved were the official lists of losses published as rapidly, frequently, and accurately as in Germany, especially in the early stagesof the conflict. However, these lists included the German losses on allfronts as well as on the seas, and therefore are available for ourpurposes only as a basis for a computation of average losses. But bytaking these totals and comparing them with other figures from varioussources--newspapers, official Russian reports, English and Frenchcomputations (non-official), statistics of the International Red Cross, etc. --it is possible to determine a total per month of German losses ofall kinds--killed, wounded, missing, and captured--for all fronts onwhich German forces were fighting during the first six and a half monthsof the war. This total is 145, 000 men per month. Assuming that all inall the losses were about evenly divided on the western and easternfronts, and disregarding the comparatively small losses of the navy, weget a monthly average of German losses at the eastern front of 72, 500men, or a total for the entire period of 471, 250 men. This does notinclude those wounded who after a varying period of time were again ableto return to the fighting, and whose number of course was very large, but represents the number of those whose services had been lost to theGerman forces for all time. In the case of the Russian losses it is somewhat easier to arrive atfairly accurate figures, at least as far as their losses through captureare concerned. For the official German figures in this respect go intogreat detail and undoubtedly may be accepted as generally correct. During the early part of the war when the Russians were fighting alongthe border and on East Prussian territory they lost 15, 000 officers andmen by capture, at Tannenberg 90, 000, and immediately afterward in theLake district 30, 000 more. In October, 1914, fighting in the province ofSuwalki, during Hindenburg's advance to the Niemen and his retreat, hecaptured 10, 000, and by November 1, 1914, there were according to theofficial German count 3, 121 officers and 186, 797 men in German prisoncamps. By January 1, 1915, this number had increased to 3, 575 and306, 294 respectively, and by the middle of February the total in roundnumbers must have been at least 400, 000. That this is approximatelycorrect is proven by the statement of the Geneva Red Cross published inthe "Journal de Genève, " which gives the total of Russian prisoners inthe hands of the Central Powers by the end of February as 769, 500. According to the same source the Russians had lost by that time inkilled 743, 000 and in totally disabled 421, 500, while their slightlywounded--those who finally returned again to the active forces--reachedthe huge total of 1, 490, 000. These figures again are for the entireRussian forces, those fighting against German as well asAustro-Hungarian forces. Just what proportion should be assigned to theRussian forces fighting against the Germans is rather problematical. Forwhile these were fighting on a much larger front than those who had beenthrown against Galicia and the Bukowina, the latter were comparativelymuch more numerous and, therefore, probably suffered proportionatelylarger losses. Some of the losses also occurred in the fighting againstTurkey. However, we will be fairly safe--most likely shooting belowrather than above the mark--in estimating one-half of all these lossesas having been incurred on the Russo-German front. This, then, wouldgive us for the period of August 1, 1914, to February 15, 1915, thefollowing total Russian losses in their fighting against the Germanforces: Killed, 371, 500; totally disabled, 210, 750; captured, 384, 750, agrand total of 967, 000, or about twice as much as the German losses. Even these figures, without any further comment, are sufficient toindicate the terrible carnage and suffering that was inflicted on themanhood of the countries involved. But if we consider that every mankilled, wounded or captured, after all, was only a small part of a verylarge circle made up of his family--in most cases dependent on him forsupport--and of his friends, even the most vivid imagination fails togive proper expression in words of the sum total of unfathomable misery, broken hearts, spoiled lives, and destroyed hopes that are representedin these cold figures. At various points in this history we have had occasion to speak of thevarious generals, both Russian and German, who were directing these vastarmies, the greatest numerically and the most advanced technically whichmankind has ever seen assembled in its entire history. To go intodetails concerning the hundreds of military geniuses which foundoccasion to display the fruits of their training and talent would beimpossible. But on each side there was among all these leaders onesupreme leader on whose ability and decision depended not only theresults of certain battles, but the lives of their millions ofsoldiers--yes, even the fate of millions upon millions of men, women andchildren. The Russians had intrusted their destiny to a member of theirreigning family, an uncle of the czar, Grand Duke Nicholas, while theGermans had found their savior in the person of a retired general, practically unknown previous to the outbreak of the war, Paul vonHindenburg. Each had been put in supreme command, although the former'sburden was even greater than that of the latter, including not only theRussian forces fighting against the Germans, but also those fightingagainst the Austro-Hungarians. On both, however, depended so much thatit will be well worth while to devote a short space of time to gain amore intimate knowledge of their appearance, character and surroundings. We will spend, therefore, a day each at the headquarters of these twomen by following the observations which some well-known warcorrespondents made during their visits at these places. The war correspondent of the London "Times" had occasion during histravels with the Russian armies to make the following observations:"Modern war has lost all romance. The picturesque sights, formerly sodear to the heart of the journalist, have disappeared. War now hasbecome an immense business enterprise, and the guiding genius is not tobe found on the firing line, any more than the president of a greatrailroad would put on overalls and take his place in an engine cab. Herein Russia the greatest army which ever met on a battle field has beenassembled under the command of one individual, and the entirecomplicated mechanism of this huge organization has its center in ahidden spot on the plains of West Russia. It is a lovely region whichshows few signs of war. In a small forest of poplars and pines a numberof tracks has been laid which connect with the main line, and here livequietly and peacefully some hundreds of men who form the Russian GeneralStaff. A few throbbing autos rushing hither and thither and a troop ofabout 100 Cossacks are apparently the only features which do not belongto the everyday life of the small village which is the nearest regularrailroad station. Many hundreds of miles away from this picture oftranquillity is stretched out the tremendous chain of the Russian front, each point of which is connected with this string of railroad cars bytelegraph. Here, separated from the chaos of battle, uninfluenced by theconfusion of armed masses, the brain of the army is able to gain a clearand free view of the entire theatre of war which would only be obscuredby closer proximity. " Another, a French correspondent, says: "Whatever happens anywhere, fromthe Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains, is known immediately in thebig blue railroad cars whose walls are covered with maps. Telegraph andtelephone report the most minute occurrence. Should the commander inchief desire to inspect a position or to consult personally with one ofthe commanding generals there is always an engine ready with steam up. Headquarters suddenly rolls off; and, after two or three days, itreturns noiselessly, with its archives, its general staff, itsrestaurant, and its electric plant. The Grand Duke rules with an ironfist. Champagne and liquor is taboo throughout the war zone, and eventhe officers of the general staff get nothing except a little red wine. Woe to anyone who sins against this order, here or anywhere else at thefront. The iron fist of the Grand Duke hits, if necessary, even thegreatest, the most famous. At a near-by table I recognize an officer inplain khaki, Grand Duke Cyril. The proud face and the powerful figure ofthe commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, is sometimes to be seen inthis severe room. Shyly one approaches the chief commander upon whoseshoulders rests all the responsibility; and the attitude of the man whohas been chosen to lead the Russian armies to victory does not encouragefamiliarity. Next to him I notice Janushkewitch, the Chief of the GreatGeneral Staff, with the gentle, almost youthful face of a thinker. Buteverything is ruled by the personality of the Grand Duke, which, withits mixture of will power and of gracious majesty, is most captivating. " Let us now rush across space and follow still another war correspondent, this time a representative of the German press, to the headquarters ofthe German armies: "Field Marshal von Hindenburg has an impressiveappearance. With his erect, truly military carriage he makes a pictureof strength and health. With him appears a very young-looking generalwho cannot be older than fifty years. A high forehead, clear blue eyes, a powerful aquiline nose, an energetic mouth, a face--in one word--whichwould be striking even if the man, to whom it belongs, would not bewearing a general's uniform and the insignia of the order 'Pour lemérite'--one knows that one is face to face with the chief of theGeneral Staff, Ludendorff. The Field Marshal greets his guest withcharming friendliness, leads the way to the table and offers him theseat to his right. During the simple evening meal he rises and offersthe toast: 'The German Fatherland!' Around the table are about tenofficers, among them Captain Fleischmann von Theissruck of the Austrianarmy, who represents the Austrian General Staff. The Field Marshalmentions a letter which he received from some one entirely unknown tohim in which the writer reproaches him most severely because someCossacks had entered some small town on the border. 'That will happenagain and again, ' he says, 'and cannot be avoided. I cannot draw up mytroops along the entire border, man by man, like a quarantine guard. Togather forces quickly again and again and to beat the Russians again andagain, that is the best way to make them disgusted with their stay atthe German border. ' Then he relates some details about the battle ofTannenberg. He does not tire of entertaining his guest with interestingdetails about the fighting. He mentions the vast number of presentswhich have been sent to him by his numerous admirers. 'It is touchinghow good people are to me. A great many of their gifts are verywelcome--but what shall I do with framed pictures while I am in thefield? What shall I do after the war is over? Nothing. I'll go back toHanover. There are lots of younger men [pointing to Ludendorff and theothers] who want their chance, too. With my years, there is nothing morebeautiful than to retire after one's work has been done and to make roomfor the younger generation. '" Apparently the men at the "helm of the ship" lead a life of comparativeease and security. But if we consider the fearful responsibilities thatthey have to carry and the tremendous mental strain under which they arecontinuously, we can readily see that their lot is not to be envied. Ofcourse, their rewards are equally great if they are successful. But whatif they fail? At any rate they, as well as the troops who fight underthem, have the glamour of fighting, the promise of glory, the sense ofduty well done, to sustain them. But what of those others, equally oreven more numerous, on whose fields and forests, in whose streets andmarket places, around whose houses and churches the battles rage and theguns roar? What of the women and children, the sick and the old, whosefathers, husbands and sons are doing the fighting or, perhaps, havealready laid down their lives upon the altar of patriotism? What isthere left for them to do when they see their houses go up in flames, their few belongings reduced to ashes, their crops destroyed and eventheir very lives threatened with death and sometimes--worse yet--withdishonor? All this and more, millions upon millions of Russians and Germans, richand poor alike, had to suffer most cruelly. And on the eastern frontthis suffering in a way, perhaps, was even more severe than in the west. For there the actual fighting, while extending over an equally longfront, was much more concentrated, and after the first few months didnot move forward and backward; and existence, except in the immediatevicinity of the firing line, was at least possible, even if dangerousand precarious. But in the east thousands upon thousands of square milesin East Prussia, in West Russia, and especially in Poland, the fightingpassed in ever advancing and retreating waves as the surf rolls alongthe beach, and soon gunfire and marching millions of armed men hadleveled the country almost as smoothly as the waves of the ocean grindthe sand. In East Prussia the devastation wrought by the Russians, some throughwanton lust for destruction and in unreasoning hate for the enemy, butmostly through the pressure of military necessity, was terrible, especially east of the Mazurian Lakes and south of the Niemen. Butthere, at least, the poor inhabitants had the consolation of being ableto return to their destroyed homes after the Russians had been finallydriven out and to begin to build up again what war had destroyed, and inthis they had the help and support of their highly organized governmentand their more fortunate compatriots from the interior. In Poland, however, especially in the rural districts, even thatconsolation was lacking. For after German and Russian armies alike hadpassed over the country again and again, not only destroying values thatit had taken centuries to build up, but on account of the huge massesconcerned frequently denuding the entire countryside of absolutely everymeans of sustenance, the final result was occupation by the enemy. Andeven if that enemy, true to his inherent love of order and to his talentfor organization, immediately proceeded to establish a well-regulatedtemporary government, at the best his efforts would have to berestricted; for he had not much to spare, neither in men to do the workneeded, nor in means to finance it, nor even in food to give sustenanceto those who had lost everything. And the worst of it was that for years previous to the outbreak of thewar the two principal races inhabiting Poland--the Poles and theJews--had been fighting each other, with the Russian sympathies stronglyon the side of the Poles. Now when war overtook this unfortunatecountry, both the Poles and the Russians threw themselves like hungrywolves upon the unfortunate Jews. They were driven out from theirvillages, often the entire population irrespective of age, sex, orcondition. They were made to wander from one place to another, like somany herds of cattle, except that no herd of cattle had ever beentreated as cruelly as these poor helpless droves of women, children, andold and sick people whose men folk were fighting for their country whilethis very country did its best to kill their families. This is not theplace or time to go into this horrible catastrophe, beyond stating thisfact: In July, 1914, Poland had been inhabited by millions ofhard-toiling people who, though neither overly blessed with wealth oropportunities, nor enjoying conditions of life that were particularlyconducive to happiness, were at least able to found and raise familiesand to sustain an existence which was bearable chiefly because of thehope for something better to come. Six months later--January, 1915--these millions had stopped toil, for their fields were devastated, their cattle had been killed or driven away, their houses had beenburned down. Hundreds of thousands of them had been forced to flee tothe interior, other hundreds of thousands had died, some through wantand illness, some during the fighting around their homes, some throughmurder and worse. Families had been broken up and others wiped outentirely, and thousands of mothers had been separated from theirchildren, perhaps never to see them again. Even if, in isolated cases, destruction, and even death, was merited or made inevitably necessary, in the greatest number of cases the suffering was as undeserved as itwas severe. From a military point of view the net result of the fighting during thefirst six months of the war most decidedly was in favor of the Germans. February, 1915, found them conquerors along the entire extent of theRusso-German front, and the Russians those who had been conquered. Inspite of the successful campaigns which German arms had won, however, they had fallen far short of what they had apparently set out to do, andin that wider sense their successes came dangerously near to beingfailures. But even at that they were still ahead of their adversaries;for though they had not gained the two objects for which they hadstriven most furiously--the possession of Warsaw and the finaldestruction of the offensive power of the Russian armies--they heldlarge and important sections of the Russian Empire, they had driven theRussians completely out of Germany and forced them to do their furtherfighting on their own ground, and they had reduced the effectiveness oftheir armies by vast numbers, killing, disabling, or capturing, at amost conservative estimate, at least twice as many men as theythemselves had lost. During the first three weeks of August, 1914, the Russian armies hadinvaded East Prussia and laid waste a large section of it. Then came thedébâcle at Tannenberg, and by the middle of September, Germany was freedof the invader, who had lost tens of thousands in his attempt to forcehis way into the heart of the German Empire. Not satisfied with theseresults, the Germans on their part now attempted an invasion of largesections of West Russia, pursuing their defeated foes until they reachedthe Niemen and its chain of fortresses which they found insurmountableobstacles. It was once more the turn of the Russians, who now not onlydrove back the invading Germans to the border, but who by the beginningof October, 1914, faced again an invasion of their East Prussianprovince. However, less than two weeks sufficed this time to clearGerman soil once more, and by October 15, 1914, the Russians had againbeen forced back across the border. By this time the German Commander inChief, Von Hindenburg, had learned the lesson of the Niemen. Instead ofbattering in vain against this iron line of natural defenses, he threwthe majority of his forces against Poland, and especially against itschoicest prize--historic Warsaw. October 11, 1914, may be considered theapproximate beginning of the first drive against the Polish capital. During about two weeks of fighting the German armies advanced to thevery gates of Warsaw, which then seemed to be theirs for the meretaking. But suddenly the Russian bear recovered his self-control, andwith renewed vigor and replenished strength he turned once again againstthe threatening foe. By October 28, 1914, the Germans in North andCentral Poland and the Austro-Hungarians in South Poland had to retreat. November 7, 1914, became the starting date for the third Russianinvasion of East Prussia. The Germans now changed their tactics. Insteadof meeting the enemy's challenge and attempting to repeat their previousperformances of throwing him back and then invading his territory, theyrestricted themselves, for the time being, to defensive measures in EastPrussia, and launched a powerful drive of their own against Russianterritory. For the second time Warsaw was made their goal. By this time, to a certain extent at least, the offensive momentum of both sides hadbeen reduced in speed. Where it had taken days in the earlier campaignsto accomplish a given object, it now took weeks. Of course the rigors ofthe eastern winter which had set in by then played an important part inthis slowing-up process, which, however, affected the speed only of thearmies, but not the furor of their battling. December 6, 1914, broughtthe possession of Lodz to the Germans, and on the next day the Russianswere taught the same lesson before the Mazurian Lakes that they hadtaught to the Germans a few months before when they faced the Niemen. East Prussia up to the Lakes was in the hands of Russia, but beyond thatimpregnable line of lakes and swamps and rivers they could not go. In the meanwhile the drive against Warsaw was making small progress inspite of the most furious onslaughts. There, too, a series of rivers andswamps--less formidable, it is true, than in East Prussia, but hardlyless effective--stemmed the tide of the invaders. For more than twoweeks, beginning about December 20 and lasting well into January, theRussians made a most stubborn stand along the Bzura and Rawka line, andsuccessfully, though with terrible losses, kept the Germans from takingWarsaw. However, in order to accomplish this they had to weaken theirline at other points and thus bring about the collapse of their driveagainst Cracow, by means of which they expected to gain from the souththe road into Germany which had been denied to them again and again inthe north. The end of January, 1915, found the Germans practically as far in Polandas the beginning of the month. It is true that they had made littleprogress in four weeks, but it is also true that they had given up noneof the ground they had gained. And with the coming of February, 1915, they reduced their offensive activities at that part of the front andturned their attention once more to East Prussia. The second week ofFebruary, 1915, brought to the Russians their second great defeat on theshores of the Mazurian Lakes. By February 15 East Prussia again had beencleared of the enemy, and parts of the Russian provinces between theborder and the Niemen were in the hands of the Germans who apparentlyhad made up their minds that they were not going to permit any furtherRussian invasions of East Prussia if they could help it. They now held aquarter of Poland and a small part of West Russia, while the Russiansheld nothing except a long battle front, stretching almost from theBaltic to the Carpathian Mountains and threatened everywhere by an enemywho daily seemed to grow stronger rather than weaker. PART VIII--TURKEY AND THE DARDANELLES CHAPTER LXXXII FIRST MOVES OF TURKEY The entrance of Turkey, the seat of the ancient Ottoman Empire, into theGreat War in 1914, with its vast dominions in Europe, Asia, and Africa, created a situation which it was appalling to contemplate. The flames ofworld war were now creeping not only into the Holy Land, the birthplaceof Christian civilization, but to the very gates of Mecca, the "holiestcity of Islam. " Would the terrible economic struggle in Europe, the warfor world trade, now develop into a holy war that would bring thereligious faiths of the earth on to a great decisive battle ground? The seething flames of economic supremacy that were consuming Europe hadthreatened from the beginning of the war to creep into the Occident, aswe shall see in the chapter on "Japan and the Far East. " Moreover, asdescribed in "Naval Operations, " it was in the waters of the Near Eastthat the first big incident of the war on the sea took place. Despite the fact that the public had been looking forward to animmediate clash of the dreadnought squadrons of the two countriessomewhere between the east coast of Scotland and the Dutch shore, nothing of the kind happened. Instead, both grand fleets ran to safetyin the landlocked harbors of their respective countries. In was to the Mediterranean in the first week of August, 1914, that theattention of the world was first drawn by events. Two German warships, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, were off the coast of Algeria. The firstwas one of the finest ships of the German navy, a superdreadnoughtbattleship cruiser of 23, 000 tons, capable of making more than 28 knotsan hour. Her main battery consisted of ten 11-inch guns, and in additionshe mounted twelve 5. 9-inch guns and twelve 21 pounders. She was capabletherefore of meeting on equal terms any enemy vessel in theMediterranean, and more than capable of outrunning any of the heaviervessels of the French or British navy stationed in those waters. The_Breslau_ was capable of a similar speed, but was a much weaker vessel, being a light cruiser of only 4, 478 tons. Both of these vessels hadenormous coal capacities, the _Breslau_, in particular, being able totravel more than 6, 000 miles without refilling her bunkers. The speed and the coal capacity of these vessels were to prove of vitalimportance in the events of the next few days. For their rôle was to beone of flight, not to battle. England alone and, in an overwhelmingdegree, England and France combined hopelessly outnumbered and outgunnedthe two German warships in the Mediterranean. Realizing this, the Germancommander, after firing a few shots into the Algerian coast towns ofBone and Philippville, steamed northwest with the intention either ofoutwitting the English and French squadron commanders, or of runningthrough Gibraltar and so on to the broad Atlantic to wage war upon theBritish mercantile marine. The British, however, were alive to thisdanger and headed off the two German warships. Whereupon they turnednortheast. Early on the morning of Wednesday, August 5, 1914, these ships werediscovered steaming into the harbor of Messina, Italy. The English andFrench fleets, close upon the heels of the enemy, immediately took uppositions at either end of the Straits of Messina, confident that theyhad successfully bottled up the Germans. Then quickly there developed one of the most dramatic incidents in thehistory of naval warfare. It is described in this chapter as well as inthe narrative on "Naval Operations" because of its direct bearing onTurkish politics and policies. The captain and officers of the _Goeben_and the _Breslau_ went ashore at Messina, made their wills and depositedtheir valuables with the German consul. The decks of the apparentlydoomed vessels were cleared for action, flags run up to the resoundingcheers of the sailors and with the brass bands of the boats playing"Heil dir im Siegerkranz" they steamed swiftly out of Messina harbor towhat seemed like certain destruction. A blood-red sun was quickly setting in the perfect Italian sky. Thebands were hushed aboard the German warships, every light was dimmed, and the sailors were ordered to their posts. In tense whispers theydiscussed the coming fight. The ships were already at top speed plowingthrough the waters of the Mediterranean as fast as the throbbing enginescould urge them. A sharp lookout was kept for the enemy, but as onehour, two hours, three hours passed and none was seen it became apparentthat for the time at least they had evaded detection. Rounding thesouthern coast of Italy, they turned due east and the course laid forConstantinople. Morning came and still, at 28 knots an hour, the German warships werespeeding toward the Turkish capital--and safety. To the rear, too far toreveal their funnels, the pursuing French and English squadron followed, thin lazy strips of smoke attested their presence to the men aboard the_Breslau_ and the _Goeben_. Suddenly far to the southeast the masts of a single vessel were seen onthe horizon. Then the smokestacks of the British light cruiser_Gloucester_ poked their tops above the skyline and daringly she openedfire on the mighty _Goeben_. Tempting, however, as the opportunity wasfor the German commander with an overwhelming force at his heels hedared waste no time nor run the risk of a chance shot disabling hisvessel. He sheered off sharply to the northeast and in a few hours lostthe plucky _Gloucester_ to view. At the end of this week in August the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, theirengines hot from constant steaming at forced speed, but with flagsflying and bands playing, steamed through the narrow channel of theDardanelles, through the sea of Marmora, and cast anchor off thegloriously beautiful city of Constantinople. As quickly as theformalities would permit the two German warships were transferred toTurkish sovereignty, and to all intents and purposes, as future eventsproved, the Ottoman Empire entered the war as an ally of Germany andAustria. Turkey's attitude in these early days of the crisis of August, 1914, wasconditioned by several major causes easily discernible. For almost ageneration, Germany has been sedulously cultivating Turkish friendship. With that single-minded purposefulness so conspicuous in her diplomacy, Germany found it easy, especially under the régime of the former SultanAbdul Hamid II to outmaneuver the easy-going diplomacy of France, Russia, and England. Indeed, she found a real rival only in England, who, starting with the initial advantage of long political friendshipwith the Turkish people and the good will that grew out of the CrimeanWar, successfully opposed many of the chess moves of her German rival. However, with the coming to Constantinople as German Ambassador of thelate Marshal von Bieberstein, German prestige became supreme. Easily thebest German diplomatist of the present generation, Von Biebersteindominated the diplomatic corps at Constantinople and practicallydictated the foreign policy of Turkey. Through him, the Deutsche Banksecured the great Bagdad railway concession and completed the commercialsubjugation of the country by Berlin. These disquieting developments had been watched with anxiety in London. But it was not until Von Bieberstein sprang the Bagdad railway surprisethat England fully awoke to the situation. Then she stepped in andprevented any extension of the line to the Persian Gulf, an area whichBritish political and commercial circles regarded as peculiarly theirown. At the same time an effort was made to reclaim the position GreatBritain had lost in Turkey. With the fall of Abdul Hamid and the comingof the Young Turks there seemed a chance to do this, especially asGermany was looked upon by the members of the Committee of Union andProgress as the chief support of the deposed sultan. Kaiser William, however, played his cards with consummate skill. The German policy wasquickly adapted to the new situation. Von Bieberstein was eventuallyshifted to London and the leaders of the Young Turks, such as theyouthful and popular Enver Bey, were invited to Berlin to come underthe influence of the German army chiefs. The British Government, then inthe midst of negotiations with Russia and unwilling or unable to enterinto any outside arrangement that seemed to oppose the satisfaction ofthe Russian dream of Constantinople refused to accept the Young Turks'invitation to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire for alimited period in return for commercial and political concessions. Onthe other hand, Emperor William reaffirmed to the new sultan hisguardianship of Islam and his interest in the welfare of the Mohammedanswherever found. But perhaps the deciding factor in the inclination of the Turks towardGermany and her ally was to be found in the situation of the Mohammedanworld. Turkey had never reconciled herself to the English control ofEgypt and India and saw in the present war a possibility such as hadnever occurred before and possibly would never occur again of wrestingfrom the British the far-flung lands peopled by the followers ofMohammed. With powerful allies, and on more even terms than they hadever dreamed of, they could now do battle with the enemy that held theirrace in subjugation and with Russia, whose avowed object throughgenerations had been the capture of Constantinople, the possession andperhaps desecration of the holy places of their religion and thedismembering of the last self-governing state of Mohammedanism. These, then, were the major considerations that weighed with the Turkishpeople, no less than with the Turkish Government, in coming to adecision. So tremendous were the stakes at issue, so widespread, almostworld-wide, were the interests involved, that Turkey, situated as it wasguarding practically the sole gateway leading from Europe to Russia, could not hope to remain neutral. For better or for worse a decisionbetween the two warring factions must be made. England, France, and Russia protested vigorously against the action ofthe Turkish Government in taking over the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_. Turkey replied by drawing attention to an incident that had seriouslyinflamed public opinion in the Ottoman Empire. When the war started twofirst-class battleships, the _Sultan Osman_ and the _Reshadie_, werenearing completion for Turkey in English yards. Without any diplomaticpreliminaries the British admiralty confiscated the two ships on thegrounds of naval necessity. Whatever may have been the English motive, the Turkish people regarded this as an attempt on the part of England toweaken the Ottoman Empire and to make it impossible for it to safeguardits national interests in the troublesome days that were surely to cometo neutrals as well as to belligerents. But the Entente Powers hesitated to force a break on the _Goeben_ and_Breslau_ question and the diplomatic correspondence of the period showsthat they had strong hope, not only at that moment, but up to the momentof the final severance of relations of keeping the Turkish nation in astate of neutrality at least. Signs were multiplying, however, that suchwas not the intention of those in control at Constantinople. In August and September, 1914, great activity prevailed throughout thecountry. Arms and ammunition, especially heavy artillery in which theTurkish army was notoriously weak, constantly arrived from Germany andAustria. Every train from the central countries brought German armyofficers and a sprinkling of German noncommissioned officers with whichto stiffen the Ottoman troops. The army was mobilized and General Limanvon Sanders, a distinguished German officer, was appointed inspectorgeneral of the Turkish army. Immense stores of food and munitions wereconcentrated at Damascus, Constantinople, Bagdad, and on theTrans-Caucasus frontier, while a holy war against the infidel was openlypreached. German vessels lying off Constantinople seem to have been given more orless of a free hand and frequently searched Russian and British vesselsfor contraband. The Turkish authorities appear to have gone as far asthey dared in preventing Russian supplies getting through to the BlackSea. Russia protested and at times, along the shores of the Black Sea, used methods closely bordering upon open warfare. Both sides, however, seemed reluctant to take definite steps toward an open break. In so far as Turkey was concerned this was probably due to adisagreement among the members of the Government and others of powerfulinfluence outside official life. It was said that the sultan, the grandvizier, and Djavid Bey, Minister of Finance, as well as a majority ofthe cabinet, were opposed to war. However that may be, the issue wassoon decided by a small but immensely powerful clique headed by EnverBey and Talaat Bey, two of the more prominent and forceful of the YoungTurk leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. Of all the figures in Turkish life during the first months of the GreatWar, the most picturesque and probably the most influential in theevents that led up to the outbreak of hostilities in Turkey was that ofthe youthful Enver Pasha. He was one of the heroes of the remarkablerebellion that resulted in the downfall of Abdul Hamid, and since thenhe had ever played a leading part in the constantly shifting drama inConstantinople. Dapper, alert intelligent, and approachable, modestalmost to the point of shyness, Enver was almost a venerated figureamong the Turkish people. As he passed on horseback, his slim figureerect and stiff in its military pose, he attracted more attention andinterest than did the sultan himself. He formed the chief and perhaps the strongest link betweenConstantinople and Berlin. Honored in an unprecedented manner by thesultan, Enver's influence in Constantinople was almost supreme. It isthrough him that the various negotiations with Berlin were conducted. Soon after the triumph of the Young Turk movement Enver went to Berlinas military attaché to the Turkish Embassy, and thoroughly imbibed thePrussian military spirit. He returned to the Turkish capital anenthusiastic admirer of the German army system and became a willing allyof General Liman von Sanders in the latter's attempt to repair theweaknesses of the Turkish army revealed by the Balkan War. Second only to Enver Pasha in those critical days was Talaat Bey, an oldand more experienced member of the inner council of the Committee ofUnion and Progress and also a prominent figure in the revolution againstAbdul Hamid. He was described by Sir Louis Mallet, British Ambassador toConstantinople, as the most powerful civilian in the cabinet and alsoas the most conspicuous of the leaders of the Committee of Union andProgress. He was troubled by no such personal modesty and shyness as wasEnver. He was, however, a much harder man to judge. Enver was openlypro-German in the weeks that preceded the actual break with the EntentePowers, but for a long time the real intentions of Talaat Bey were indoubt--at least they were to the British, French, and RussianAmbassadors. Djemel Pasha, Minister of Marine, while pro-German in his sentiments, isbelieved to have hesitated in advising an open break, largely because ofthe condition of the Turkish navy and the state of Turkish finance. Thearrival of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, the importation of hundredsof German sailors to stiffen the Turkish marine, and, during October, the receipt of about $20, 000, 000 in gold from Berlin, won him over. Inthe end Djemel Pasha stood with Enver and Talaat. Other members of the Turkish Cabinet made a demonstration of attemptingto hold their country to an uneasy neutrality. Whether their effortswere sincere or designed to prevent an open rupture until thepsychological moment had arrived it is impossible to say. Sir LouisMallet, in his private dispatches to his Government, expresses his firmconviction that the sultan, the heir apparent, the grand vizier, PrinceSaid Halim, Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance and a clear majority ofthe cabinet were determined not to allow Turkey to be drawn into thewar. Up to the very last minute the British Ambassador did not despairof the success of this peace party. Events were too strong for theseadvocates of neutrality--events and the control of the all-importantarmy and navy by Enver and his associates. By the sword the OttomanEmpire was reared and by the sword it has been ruled ever since. During the months of September, 1914, and October, 1914, there were manyplain signs that Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey were heading straight for abreak. On September 9, 1914, the Porte gave notice of the proposedabolition of the capitulations by which the various powers enjoyedextraterritorial rights. At the same time what amounted to a finaldemand was made upon the British Government to return the two Turkishbattleships seized at the outbreak of the war. Extraordinary efforts were made by all the Entente Powers to keep Turkeyneutral. They proposed to agree to the abolition of the capitulations assoon as a modern judicial system could be set up in Turkey; they agreedto guarantee the independence and integrity of the country for a limitedbut extended term of years; they declared that Turkey would not sufferby any changes of national frontiers growing out of the war; and Englandeven promised to return the two superdreadnoughts upon the conclusion ofthe war, claiming that their retention meanwhile was absolutelynecessary for her protection. The main stipulations made by the Entente Powers in return for theseconcessions were that the German crews of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_be sent out of Turkey and that General Liman von Sanders and the othermembers of the German military mission be dismissed. With these demandsTurkey refused to comply, after hesitating over the first. Indeed, thestrength of the German stiffening in Turkey was constantly becominggreater: by the middle of September there were no less than 4, 000 Germanofficers and noncommissioned officers in Constantinople alone and everytrain from the north brought others. This situation of tension betweenTurkey and the Entente Powers continued all through September andOctober. The outside world momentarily expected an open rupture. CHAPTER LXXXIII THE FIRST BLOW AGAINST THE ALLIES On October 29, 1914, came news of a Bedouin invasion of the Sinaipeninsula and an occupation of the important Wells of Magdala on theroad to the Suez Canal. England became alarmed, and her composure wasnot restored by the news that came a few hours later. Claiming thatRussia had taken aggressive action in the Black Sea, three Turkishtorpedo boats sailed into Odessa Harbor, shelled the town, sank aRussian guardship, and did other considerable damage. On the following day, October 30, 1914, the Russian Ambassador atConstantinople asked for his passports and the British and Frenchrepresentatives with evident reluctance soon followed suit. On November1 Turkey was definitely and irretrievably at war with the Entente Powersand an ally of Germany and Austria. The war from the point of view of the Turkish people was a matter offour frontiers. There was the Dardanelles to guard; there was Egypt andthe Suez Canal to be threatened and perhaps captured; there was theCaucasus, where across towering mountains and deep gorges the Ottomanfaced the Russian, his hereditary and most feared enemy; and finallythere was Mesopotamia. All of these theatres of possible warfarepresented military problems, and one of them naval problems among themost intricate and interesting of those facing the nations involved inthis unprecedented war. In the Caucasus the mountains and the scarcityof broad passes and good roads, the almost entire lack of railwayfacilities and the whole nature of the country rendered offensiveoperations as difficult as on the northeast frontier of Italy or in theCarpathians. In Syria and on the road to the Suez Canal, the waterlessdesert, the entire absence of railways, the paucity and inadequacy ofroads and the nature of the obstacles to be crossed before an invasionof Egypt was possible made the task one of terrible difficulty. In theDardanelles the peninsula of Gallipoli, strong as it was in naturaladvantages, was open to naval attack from two and perhaps three sidesand its defense must prove not only a costly affair but one the issue ofwhich must be constantly open to doubt. Lastly in Mesopotamia the taskfor the Turks was a comparatively easy one, for an invading army mustmeet with constant difficulties through lack of water, excessive heat, absence of roads and railways and distance from real base of supplies. At the time of Turkey's entry into the war, military opinion all overthe world was divided on the question of the relative efficiency of herarmy. All agreed, however, that as an individual fighting animal theTurk had few if any equals. Centuries of warfare had established hisreputation, and the wonderful defense of Plevna had set the seal uponit. On the defensive, it was believed by many, he was unbeatable, conditions of supply and equipment being equal. The Balkan War, however, had been a severe blow to his prestige. It waswidely felt that his defeat by the Bulgars, the Serbians, and the Greekshad revealed serious, even vital, weaknesses in the Ottoman army. Consequently the test of Turkey in the Great War was anxiously awaitedby both allies and foes. Tremendous issues were at stake, and thefailure or success of the soldiers of the Crescent in standing beforethe troops of Russia, France, and Great Britain was bound to have animportant, perhaps decisive, influence on the outcome of the struggle asa whole. It is doubtful if the general staff of any of the warring countries hadany accurate or dependable figures of the Turkish army. Especially wasthis so of the army on a war footing. At one time only Mohammedans werepermitted to serve with the colors, the citizens of other religiousbeliefs being called upon to pay a yearly tax in lieu of service. Ofrecent years, however, that law was altered, and in the Balkan WarMohammedan and Christian served side by side and fought with equal ardorfor their country. Just how large a proportion of the Christianpopulation had been incorporated into the army at the time of theoutbreak of hostilities few experts were in any position to estimate. Germany, because of her painstaking investigations in Turkey as well asin every other country, probably was in possession of more accurate datathan any other nation, not even excepting the Turks themselves. The bestneutral authorities speak of 1, 125, 000 as the total war-time strength ofthe Ottoman forces, but that estimate was made prior to the war andbefore the world had learned that nations under modern conditions areable to place a much larger proportion of their available manhood in thefield than was ever thought possible. Probably the Turkish war strengthwas underestimated. The chief difficulty was not in finding the men, but in providing quickly equipment, and at the outset that was evidentlya very real obstacle in Turkey. The Turkish army was essentially a German creation, and largely thepersonal accomplishment of that very able military organizer and studentof war, Field Marshal von der Goltz. Von der Goltz spent a decade withthe Turkish army, and returned to Germany only to reorganize the easterndefenses of his country in preparation for the Great War. When Turkeyentered the struggle he returned to Constantinople at Enver Bey'spersonal request. The Turk does not become subject to military duty until he reaches theage of twenty. Then, however, for the next two decades he belongs to thearmy, either actually or potentially. The first nine years are spent inthe Nizam or first line, first with the colors and then in immediatereserve. Then come nine years in the Redif or Landwehr, and, finally, two years in the Mustaph'-phiz or Landsturm. All branches of the Turkish army were not equally good. Cavalry andinfantry were probably the equal of corresponding troops in the armiesof any other country, but the inefficiency of the artillery was blamedfor the débâcle of the Balkan War. Many of the thousands of Germantroops poured into Turkey before and after she entered the war weretrained gunners sent with the object of stiffening the weakest arm ofthe Turkish army. The Turkish army has always suffered, as have the armies of many othercountries, from a shortage of properly trained officers. Since theadvent of the Young Turks, and especially since Enver Pasha, with hisGerman training, succeeded to the position of Minister of War andCommander in Chief, the personnel of the officers' corps has been vastlyimproved. But it takes years--yes, generations--to create an adequatesupply of officers and noncommissioned officers for an army of theproportions of Turkey's, and the assistance of the German stiffeningmust have been of inestimable advantage to the Ottoman command. At the outbreak of the war the Turkish army was disposed in fourregional groups. The number of men actually with the colors, accordingto the best estimates, was 500, 000, with another 250, 000 trained men inimmediate reserve awaiting equipment. In or near Constantinople wereabout 200, 000 troops, including the First, Third, and Fifth Corps, apart of the Sixth, and four cavalry brigades. In Thrace, watching theuncertain Bulgars and Greeks, were the Second and most of the SixthCorps with cavalry regiments and frontier guards. In Palestine, menacingthe Suez Canal, were the 40, 000 troops of the Eighth Corps, besidesunnumbered irregular Arab forces, who could not, however, be dependedupon. In the Caucasus the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps and threebrigades of cavalry were facing the Russian forces across the windingfrontier. At Bagdad the Thirteenth Corps, and at Mosul the Twelfth, stood guard over Mesopotamia. For centuries England had had a very genuine and active interest in thePersian Gulf, recognizing its strategic and potential commercialimportance with that foresight which has distinguished her statesmen andtraders for generations. Russia had been regarded as the most likelynation to contest England's predominance in that quarter of the world, and her every move was watched and checkmated in Downing Street. At the outbreak of the war, however, and for a decade before, Germanyhad given many signs that she had to be reckoned with in anyarrangements in the waters washing the shores of Mesopotamia. And itsoon became apparent that the domination of that part of Turkey was tobe one of the chief spoils of victory. Much has been written aboutGermany's territorial ambitions. Much of it is based upon purespeculation, but publicists in Germany make no disguise of theFatherland's desire to win and make a political and economic unit of thecountries now embraced in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Servia, perhapsRumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Europe and Asia. One has but to take upthe map and outline this aggregation of states and turn to a table ofstatistics to realize the enormous advantages and powers of such a unit. Politically and economically, it would dominate Europe as has no otherpower for many generations. Economically and financially, it would beabsolutely independent of the rest of the world, but even if it werenot, no nation or combination of nations could afford to attempt toisolate it. CHAPTER LXXXIV BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA It was some such considerations as these working in the minds of themembers of the British Government that impelled them to undertake anoffensive in Mesopotamia almost immediately after the break of relationswith Turkey. But in addition there were two other reasons. Russia feareda Turkish attack in force in the Caucasus and called to England andFrance for a diversion. The Mesopotamia campaign working on the rightflank of the Turkish forces, as a whole, was an ideal operation intendedto draw troops from the Russian frontier. Secondly, the moral effect ofany considerable British success in Mesopotamia, and especially thecapture of Bagdad, was bound to be very great. Bulgaria, Greece, andRumania were believed to be waiting for a cue to enter the struggle, andperhaps turn the scales in the Balkans, while the attitude of theMohammedans in the French and British possessions was largely dependentupon the prestige of those two countries. Finally, in considering the relative importance of particular campaigns, observers are likely to lose sight of the tremendous importance ofpossession. In law possession is said to constitute nine points. Inwarfare, and in diplomacy, which must eventually follow, possession iseven more important. When the plenipotentiaries of the warring nationsgather around the peace table to arrive at a basis of settlement and thecards are laid on the table, that nation in possession of disputedterritory, whatever may be her military and financial condition, is in aposition to largely influence the terms. Only by the concession ofequivalent advantages or considerations will it be possible to oust her. How widely this is recognized will be evidenced by the scramble that ismade by each of the warring nations to secure possession of the landregarded as its particular sphere of influence. This is true ofMesopotamia, as of many other parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is evident that the Turkish military authorities were taken somewhatby surprise by the rapidity with which the British Government in Indiaperfected their arrangements for an attack upon Mesopotamia. Knowingthat the total British army was extremely limited, it was thought thatFrance, and possibly Egypt, would absorb British military activity forsome months to come. There was every reason, however, why the Britishshould not delay the attack upon the shores of Mesopotamia washed by thePersian Gulf. Running down to the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab to apoint (Abadam) almost directly opposite the Turkish village of Sanijehwas the enormously important pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Now this pipe line was one of the main supplies of the British navywhich, with the launching of the newer superdreadnoughts, was becomingincreasingly dependent upon oil instead of coal. So much was this sothat the British admiralty some time before the war bought a controllinginterest in this same Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was, then, primarilyto protect this fuel supply from a Turkish raid that an early descentupon the Mesopotamian coast was planned. On November 7, 1914, the Poona Brigade, composed of white and Indiantroops, under command of Brigadier General W. S. Delamain, appeared offthe Turkish village of Fao, where an antiquated Turkish fort lies amid agrove of palm trees. Against Persian Gulf pirates it could have put up avaliant fight, but it was a poor match for the guns of the Britishgunboat _Odin_. The defenders fled and the British force sailed up theShat-el-Arab. At Sanijeh they effected a landing, intrenched, andawaited the coming of two additional brigades. It soon became apparent that the Turks, either because they were notprepared or because they preferred to make their real stand nearer theirbase of supplies, did not intend to offer any serious opposition to theBritish advance. They adopted tactics designed to harass and delay theinvaders, however, and on the 11th of November a small force moved outof Basra and engaged the Indian troops attached to General Delamain'scommand. After a sharp action the Turks retired. No further opportunitywas given them to attack in small force, for two days later LieutenantGeneral Sir Arthur Barrett arrived at Sanijeh with the Armednagar andthe Belgaum Brigades, both made up of Indian troops with a stiffening ofBritish regiments. By November 16, 1914, the whole of the British forces were ashore, andon the following day at daybreak General Barrett ordered an advance. Themain Turkish forces were located at Sahil, about halfway between Sanijehand Basra. The battle was opened by an artillery duel. The British had agreat advantage in the possession of gunboats, upon which had beenmounted guns of considerable caliber. The Turks had selected theirpositions with great skill and knowledge, and despite the heavyartillery preparation, the British troops, when they did advance, werebadly punished. Recent rains had made the ground heavy, almost marshy, and the entire absence of vegetation gave the Turkish riflemen andmachine-gun crews an excellent chance to work. Slowly the Turks wereforced out of their advance positions, but just as the invaders wereabout to take advantage of the retreat of the enemy a curious phenomenonoccurred. Between the advancing British and the retiring Turks a mirageinterposed and effectually screened the movements of the latter. Becauseof this and the heavy ground no pursuit was possible. This action, resulting in the loss of 353 of the British force and aneven larger number of the Turkish troops (estimated by the British at1, 500, but which is almost certainly an exaggeration), decided the fateof Basra. Some opposition was made to the passage of the British riverexpedition, and at one point an unsuccessful attempt was made to blockthe passage of the Shat-el-Arab by the sinking of three steamers. About ten o'clock in the morning of November 22, 1914, the British riverforce, after silencing a battery that had been hurriedly erected by theTurks just below the town, reached Basra, and General Barrett hoistedthe British flag on the German Consulate, the customhouse having beenfired by the retreating Turks. Some time was spent by the invaders atBasra in preparing a base. It was not until December 3, 1914, that Lieutenant Colonel Frazer ofGeneral Barrett's force with Indian troops and some of the SecondNorfolks advanced on Kurna, fifty miles above Basra, at a point wherethe Tigris empties into the old channel of the Euphrates. LieutenantColonel Frazer's force was accompanied by three gunboats, an armedyacht, and a couple of armed launches. The troops landed four milesbelow the town and intrenched, while the river force moved up andshelled Kurna. When the troops advanced, it immediately became apparentthat the strength of the Turks had been underestimated and thatLieutenant Colonel Frazer's force was much too small to dislodge them. After losing heavily, Frazer ordered a retreat to the intrenchments fourmiles down the river, and sent word to Basra for reenforcements. On December 6, 1914, General Fry appeared with additional troops, andplans were laid for attacking Kurna on the flank. Just as the scheme wasnearing completion, however, Turkish officers appeared at the Englishcamp and asked for terms. Conditions were refused, and finally the Turkslaid down their arms. With the capture of Kurna the British secured control of the delta ofthe Euphrates, made impossible any raid upon the Persian Gulf and itsoil supply except in great force, and laid the foundations of anambitious campaign against the strategic points of the whole ofMesopotamia. Elaborate intrenched camps were built at Kurna, and near-byat Mezera, to await the coming of larger forces and supplies.