THE SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES

OF THE

ANCIENT EASTERN WORLD;

OR, THE HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, AND ANTIQUITIES OF CHALDAEA, ASSYRIA

BABYLON, MEDIA, PERSIA, PARTHIA, AND SASSANIAN, OR NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE. 

BY

GEORGE RAWLINSON, M. A. , CAMDEN PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

IN THREE VOLUMES. 

VOLUME III. 

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

[Illustration: MAP of PARTHIA PROPER]

[Illustration: MAP OF PARTHIA]

A HISTORY OF PARTHIA. 

CHAPTER I. 

_Geography of Parthia Proper, Character of the Region, Climate, Character of the Surrounding Countries. _

The broad tract of desert which, eastward of the Caspian Sea, extendsfrom the Mougbojar hills to the Indian Ocean, a distance of above 1500miles, is interrupted about midway by a strip of territory possessingfeatures of much beauty and attraction. This strip, narrow compared tothe desert on either side of it, is yet, looked at by itself, a regionof no inconsiderable dimensions, extending, as it does from east towest, a distance of 320, and from north to south of nearly 200 miles. The mountain chain, which running southward of the Caspian, skirts thegreat plateau of Iran, or Persia, on the north, broadens out, afterit passes the south-eastern corner of the sea, into a valuable andproductive mountain-region. Four or five distinct ranges here runparallel to one another, having between them latitudinal valleys, withglens transverse to their courses. The sides of the valleys are oftenwell wooded; the flat ground at the foot of the hills is fertile; waterabounds; and the streams gradually collect into rivers of a considerablesize. 

The fertile territory in this quarter is further increased by theextension of cultivation to a considerable distance from the base ofthe most southern of the ranges, in the direction of the Great Iranicdesert. The mountains send down a number of small streams towardsthe south; and the water of these, judiciously husbanded by means ofreservoirs and _kanats_, is capable of spreading fertility over a broadbelt at the foot of the hills; which, left to nature, would be almost asbarren as the desert itself, into which it would, in fact, be absorbed. 

It was undoubtedly in the region which has been thus briefly describedthat the ancient home of the Parthians lay. In this neighborhood aloneare found the geographic names which the most ancient writers whomention the Parthians connect with them. Here evidently the Parthianswere settled at the time when Alexander the Great overran the East, andfirst made the Greeks thoroughly familiar with the Parthian name andterritory. Here, lastly, in the time of the highest Parthian splendorand prosperity, did a province of the Empire retain the name ofParthyene, or Parthia Proper; and here, also, in their palmiest days, did the Parthian kings continue to have a capital and a residence. 

Parthia Proper, however, was at no time coextensive with the regiondescribed. A portion of that region formed the district called Hyrcania;and it is not altogether easy to determine what were the limits betweenthe two. The evidence goes, on the whole, to show that, while Hyrcanialay towards the west and north, the Parthian country was that towardsthe south and east, the valleys of the Ettrek and Gurghan constitutingthe main portions of the former, while the tracts east and south ofthose valleys, as far as the sixty-first degree of E. Longitude, constituted the latter. 

If the limits of Parthia Proper be thus defined, it will have nearlycorresponded to the modern Persian province of Khorasan. It will haveextended from about Damaghan (long. 54° 10') upon the west, to theHeri-rud upon the east, and have comprised the modern districts ofDamaghan, Shah-rud, Sebzawar, Nishapur, Meshed, Shebri-No, and Tersheez. Its length from east to west will have been about 300 miles, and itsaverage width about 100 or 120. It will have contained an area of about33, 000 square miles, being thus about equal in size to Ireland, Bavaria, or St. Domingo. 

The character of the district has been already stated in general terms;but some further particulars may now be added. It consists, in thefirst place, of a mountain and a plain region--the mountain region lyingtowards the north and the plain region towards the south. The mountainregion is composed of three main ranges, the Daman-i-Koh, or Hills ofthe Kurds, upon the north, skirting the great desert of Rharaem, theAlatagh and Meerabee mountains in the centre; and the Jaghetai orDjuvein range, upon the south, which may be regarded as continued in thehills above Tersheez and Khaff. The three ranges are parallel, runningeast and west, but with an inclination, more or less strong, to thenorth of west and the south of east. The northern and central ranges areconnected by a water-shed, which runs nearly east and west, a little tothe south of Kooshan, and separates the head streams of the Ettrek fromthose of the Meshed river. The central and southern ranges are connectedby a more decided, mountain line, a transverse ridge which runs nearlynorth and south, dividing between the waters that flow westward into theGurghan, and those which form the river of Nishapur. This conformationof the mountains leaves between the ranges three principal valleys, thevalley of Meshed towards the south-east, between the Kurdish range andthe Alatagh and Meerabee; that of Miyanabad towards the west, betweenthe Alatagh and the Jaghetai; and that of Nishapur towards the south, between the eastern end of the Jaghetai and the western flank of theMeerabee. As the valleys are three in number, so likewise are therivers, which are known respectively as the Tejend, or river of Meshed, the river of Nishapur, and the river of Miyanabad. 

The Tejend, which is the principal stream of the three, rises fromseveral sources in the hills south of Kooshan, and flows with asouth-easterly course down the valley of Meshed, receiving numeroustributaries from both sides, until it reaches that city, when it bendseastward, and, finding a way through the Kurdish range, joins the courseof the Heri-rud, about long. 01° 10'. Here its direction is completelychanged. Turning at an angle, which is slightly acute, it proceeds toflow to the west of north, along the northern base of the Kurdish range, from which it receives numerous small streams, till it ends finally in alarge swamp or marsh, in lat. 39°, long. 57°, nearly. The entire lengthof the stream, including only main windings, is about 475 miles. In itslater course, however, it is often almost dry, the greater portion ofthe water being consumed in irrigation in the neighborhood of Meshed. 

The river of Nishapur is formed by numerous small streams, which descendfrom the mountains that on three sides inclose that city. Its wateris at times wholly consumed in the cultivation of the plain; but thenatural course may be traced, running in a southerly and south-westerlydirection, until it debouches from the hills in the vicinity ofTersheez. The Miyanabad stream is believed to be a tributary of theGurghan. It rises from several sources in the transverse range joiningthe Alatagh to the Jaghetai, the streams from which all flow westwardin narrow valleys, uniting about long. 57° 35'. The course of the riverfrom this point to Piperne has not been traced, but it is believedto run in a general westerly direction along the southern base of theAlatagh, and to form a junction with the Gurghan a little below theruins of the same name. Its length to this point is probably about 200miles. 

The elevation of the mountain chains is not great. No very remarkablepeaks occur in them; and it may be doubted whether they anywhere attaina height of above 6000 feet. They are for the most part barren andrugged, very scantily supplied with timber, and only in places capableof furnishing a tolerable pasturage to flocks and herds. The valleys, on the other hand, are rich and fertile in the extreme; that of Meshed, which extends a distance of above a hundred miles from north-westto south-east, and is from twenty to thirty miles broad, has almosteverywhere a good and deep soil, is abundantly supplied with water, and yields a plentiful return even to the simplest and most primitivecultivation. The plain about Nishapur, which is in length from eighty toninety miles, and in width from forty to sixty, boasts a still greaterfertility. 

The flat country along the southern base of the mountains, which ancientwriters regard as Parthia, par excellence, is A strip of territory about300 miles long, varying in width ac cording to the labor and the skillapplied by its inhabitants to the perfecting of a system of irrigation. At present the _kanats_, or underground water-courses, are seldomcarried to a distance of more than a mile or two from the foot of thehills; but it is thought that anciently the cultivation was extendedconsiderably further. Ruined cities dispersed throughout the tractsufficiently indicate its capabilities, and in a few places where muchattention is paid to agriculture the results are such as to imply thatthe soil is more than ordinarily productive. The salt desert lies, however, in most places within ten or fifteen miles of the hills; andbeyond this distance it is obviously impossible that the "Atak" or"Skirt" should at any time have been inhabited. 

It is evident that the entire tract above described must have been atall times a valuable and much coveted region. Compared with the arid andinhospitable deserts which adjoin it upon the north and south, Khorasan, the ancient Parthia and Hyrcania, is a terrestrial Paradise. Parthia, though scantily wooded, still produces in places the pine, the walnut, the sycamore, the ash, the poplar, the willow, the vine, the mulberry, the apricot, and numerous other fruit trees. Saffron, asafoetida, andthe gum ammoniac plant, are indigenous in parts of it. Much of the soilis suited for the cultivation of wheat, barley, and cotton. The ordinaryreturn upon wheat and barley is reckoned at ten for one. Game aboundsin the mountains, and fish in the underground water-courses. Among themineral treasures of the region may be enumerated copper, lead, iron, salt, and one of the most exquisite of gems, the turquoise. This gemdoes not appear to be mentioned by ancient writers; but it is so easilyobtainable that we can scarcely suppose it was not known from veryancient times. 

The severity of the climate of Parthia is strongly stated by Justin. According to modern travellers, the winters, though protracted, arenot very inclement, the thermometer rarely sinking below ten or elevendegrees of Fahrenheit during the nights, and during the daytime rising, even in December and January, to 40° or 50°. The cold weather, however, which commences about October, continues till nearly the end of March, when storms of sleet and hail are common. Much snow falls in the earlierportion of the winter, and the valleys are scarcely clear of it tillMarch. On the mountains it remains much longer, and forms the chiefsource of supply to the rivers during the spring and the early summertime. In summer the heat is considerable, more especially in the regionknown as the "Atak;" and here, too, the unwholesome wind, which blowsfrom the southern desert, is felt from, time to time as a terriblescourge. But in the upland country the heat is at no time very intense, and the natives boast that they are not compelled by it to sleep ontheir house-tops during more than one month in the year. 

The countries by which Parthia Proper was bounded were the following:Chorasmia, Margiana, Aria, Sarangia, Sagartia, and Hyrcania. 

Chorasmia lay upon the north, consisting of the low tract between themost northerly of the Parthian mountain chains and the old course of theOxus. This region, which is for the most part an arid and inhospitabledesert, can at no time have maintained more than a sparse and scantypopulation. The Turkoman tribes which at the present day roam over thewaste, feeding their flocks and herds alternately on the banks of theOxus and the Tejend, or finding a bare subsistence for them about theponds and pools left by the winter rains, represent, it is probable, with sufficient faithfulness, the ancient inhabitants, who, whatevertheir race, must always have been nomads, and can never have exceededa few hundred thousands. On this side Parthia must always have beentolerably safe from attacks, unless the Cis-Oxianian tribes werereinforced, as they sometimes were, by hordes from beyond the river. 

On the north-east was Margiana, sometimes regarded as a country byitself, sometimes reckoned a mere district of Bactria. This was thetract of fertile land upon the Murg-ab, or ancient Margus river, whichis known among moderns as the district of Merv. The Murg-ab is a streamflowing from the range of the Paropamisus, in a direction which is alittle east of north; it debouches from the mountains in about lat. 36° 25', and thence makes its way through the desert. Before it reachesMerv, it is eighty yards wide and five feet deep, thus carrying a vastbody of water. By a judicious use of dykes and canals, this fertilizingfluid was in ancient times carried to a distance of more thantwenty-five miles from the natural course of the river; and by thesemeans an oasis was created with a circumference of above 170, andconsequently a diameter of above fifty miles. This tract, inclosed onevery side by deserts, was among the most fertile of all known regions;it was especially famous for its vines, which grew to such a size thata single man could not encircle their stems with his two arms, andbore clusters that were a yard long. Margiana possessed, however, as aseparate country, little military strength, and it was only as aportion of some larger and more populous territory that it could becomeformidable to the Parthians. 

South of Margiana, and adjoining upon Parthia toward the east, was Aria, the tract which lies about the modern Herat. This was for the mostpart a mountain region, very similar in its general character to themountainous portion of Parthia, but of much smaller dimensions. Itspeople were fairly warlike; but the Parthian population was probablydouble or triple their number, and Parthia consequently had but littleto fear in this quarter. 

Upon the south-east Parthia was bordered by Sarangia, the country of theSarangae, or Drangae. This appears to have been the district southof the Herat valley, reaching thence as far as the Hamoon, or Sea ofSeistan. It is a country of hills and downs, watered by a number ofsomewhat scanty streams, which flow south-westward from the Paropamisusto the Hamoon. Its population can never have been great, and they wereat no time aggressive or enterprising, so that on this side also theParthians were secure, and had to deal with no formidable neighbor. 

Sagartia succeeded to Sarangia towards the west, and bordered Parthiaalong almost the whole of its southern frontier. Excepting in thevicinity of Tebbes and Toun (lat. 34°, long. 56° to 58°), thisdistrict is an absolute desert, the haunt of the gazelle and the wildass, dry, saline, and totally devoid of vegetation. The wild nomads, whowandered over its wastes, obtaining a scanty subsistence by means ofthe lasso, were few in number, scattered, and probably divided by feuds. Southern Parthia might occasionally suffer from their raids; butthey were far too weak to constitute a serious danger to the mountaincountry. 

Lastly, towards the west and the north-west, Parthia was bordered byHyrcania, a region geographically in the closest connection with it, very similar in general character, but richer, warmer, and altogethermore desirable. Hyrcania was, as already observed, the western andnorth-western portion of that broad mountain region which has beendescribed as intervening between the eastern shores of the Caspianand the river Arius, or Heri-rud. It consisted mainly of the two richvalleys of the Gurghan and Ettrek, with the mountain chains inclosing ordividing them. Here on the slopes of the hills grow the oak, the beech, the elm, the alder, the wild cherry; here luxuriant vines spring fromthe soil on every side, raising themselves aloft by the aid of theirstronger sisters, and hanging in wild festoons from tree to tree;beneath their shade the ground is covered with flowers-of various kinds, primroses, violets, lilies, hyacinths, and others of unknown species;while in the flat land at the bottom of the valleys are meadows of thesoftest and the tenderest grass, capable of affording to numerousflocks and herds an excellent and unfailing pasture. Abundant game findsshelter in the forests, while towards the mouths of the rivers, wherethe ground is for the most part marshy, large herds of wild boarsare frequent; a single herd sometimes containing hundreds. AltogetherHyrcania was a most productive and desirable country, capable ofsustaining a dense population, and well deserving Strabo's descriptionof it as "highly favored of Heaven. " The area of the country was, however, small, probably not much exceeding one half that of ParthiaProper; and thus the people were not sufficiently numerous to cause theParthians much apprehension. 

The situation and character of Parthia thus, on the whole, favored herbecoming an imperial power. She had abundant resources within herself;she had a territory apt for the production of a hardy race of men; andshe had no neighbors of sufficient strength to keep her down, whenshe once developed the desire to become dominant. Surprise has beenexpressed at her rise. But it is perhaps more astonishing that shepassed so many centuries in obscurity before she became an importantstate, than that she raised herself at last to the first position amongthe Oriental nations. Her ambition and her material strength were plantsof slow growth; it took several hundreds of years for them to attainmaturity: when, however, this point was reached, the circumstancesof her geographical position stood her in good stead, and enabled herrapidly to extend her way over the greater portion of Western Asia. 

CHAPTER II. 

_Early notices of the Parthians. Their Ethnic character and connections. Their position under the Persian Monarchs, from Cyrus the Great toDarius III. (Codomannus. )_

The Parthians do not appear in history until a comparatively recentperiod. Their name occurs nowhere in the Old Testament Scriptures. They obtain no mention in the Zendavesta. The Assyrian Inscriptionsare wholly silent concerning them. It is not until the time of DariusHystaspis that we have trustworthy evidence of their existence as adistinct people. In the inscriptions of this king we find their countryincluded under the name of Parthva or Parthwa among the provinces ofthe Persian Empire, joined in two places with Sarangia, Aria, Chorasmia, Bactria, and Sogdiana, and in a third with these same countries andSagartia. We find, moreover, an account of a rebellion in which theParthians took part. In the troubles which broke out upon the death ofthe Pseudo-Smerdis, B. C. 521, Parthia revolted, in conjunction (as itwould seem) with Hyrcania, espousing the cause of that Median pretender, who, declaring himself a descendant of the old Median monarchs, sethimself up as a rival to Darius. Hytaspes, the father of Darius, held atthis time the Parthian satrapy. In two battles within the limits of hisprovince he defeated the rebels, who must have brought into the fielda considerable force, since in one of the two engagements they lost inkilled and prisoners between 10, 000 and 11, 000 men. After their seconddefeat the Parthians made their submission, and once more acknowledgedDarius for their sovereign. 

With these earliest Oriental notices of the Parthians agree entirelysuch passages as contain any mention of them in the more ancientliterature of the Greeks. Hecatseus of Miletus, who was contemporarywith Darius Hystaspis, made the Parthians adjoin upon the Chorasmians inthe account which he gave of the geography of Asia. Herodotus spoke ofthem as a people subject to the Persians in the reign of Darius, andassigned them to the sixteenth satrapy, which comprised also the Arians, the Sogdians, and the Chorasmians. He said that they took part in theexpedition of Xerxes against Greece (B. C. 480), serving in the army onfoot under the same commander as the Chorasmians, and equipped like themwith bows and arrows, and with spears of no great length. In anotherpassage he mentioned their being compelled to pay the Persian water tax, and spoke of the great need which they had of water for the irrigationof their millet and sesame crops. 

It is evident that these notices agree with the Persian accounts, both as to the locality of the Parthians and as to the fact of theirsubjection to the Persian government. They further agree in assigningto the Parthians a respectable military character, yet one of no veryspecial eminency. On the ethnology of the nation, and the circumstancesunder which the country became an integral part of the Persiandominions, they throw no light. We have still to seek an answer to thequestions, "Who were the Parthians?" and "How did they become Persiansubjects?"

Who were the Parthians? It is not until the Parthians have emergedfrom obscurity and become a great people that ancient authors troublethemselves with inquiries as to their ethnic character and remoteantecedents. Of the first writers who take the subject into theirconsideration, some are content to say that the Parthians were a race ofScyths, who at a remote date had separated from the rest of the nation, and had occupied the southern portion of the Chorasmian desert, whencethey had gradually made themselves masters of the mountain regionadjoining it. Others added to this that the Scythic tribe to which theybelonged was called the Dahse; that their own proper name was Parni, orAparni; and that they had migrated originally from the country to thenorth of the Palus Maeotis, where they had left the great mass of theirfellow tribesmen. Subsequently, in the time of the Antonines, the theorywas started that the Parthians were Scyths, whom Sesostris, on hisreturn from his Scythian expedition, brought into Asia and settled inthe mountain-tract lying east of the Caspian. 

It can scarcely be thought that these notices have very much historicalvalue. Moderns are generally agreed that the Scythian conquests ofSesostris are an invention of the Egyptian priests, which they palmedon Herodotus and Diodorus. Could they be regarded as having really takenplace, still the march back from Scythia to Egypt round the north andeast of the Caspian Sea would be in the highest degree improbable. Thesettlement of the Parthians in Parthia by the returning conqueror is, infact, a mere duplicate of the tale commonly told of his having settledthe Colchians in Colchis, and is equally worthless. The earlier authors, moreover, know nothing of the story, which first appears in the secondcentury after our era, and as time goes on becomes more circumstantial. 

Even the special connection of the Parthians with the Dahse, and theirmigration from the shores of the Palus Mteotis, may be doubted. Straboadmits it to be uncertain whether there were any Dahse at all about theMseotis; and, if there were, it would be open to question whether theywere of the same race with the Dahse of the Caspian. As the settlementof the Parthians in the country called after their name dated from atime anterior to Darius Hystaspis, and the Greeks certainly did notset on foot any inquiries into their origin till at least two centurieslater, it would be unlikely that the Parthians could give them a trueaccount. The real groundwork of the stories told seems to have beentwofold. First, there was a strong conviction on the part of those whocame in contact with the Parthians that they were Scyths; and secondly, it was believed that their name meant "exile. " Hence it was necessary tosuppose that they had migrated into their country from some portion ofthe tract known as Scythia to the Greeks, and it was natural to inventstories as to the particular circumstances of the migration. 

The residuum of the truth, or at any rate the important conviction ofthe ancient writers, which remains after their stories are sifted, isthe Scythic character of the Parthian people. On this point, Strabo, Justin, and Arrian are agreed. The manners of the Parthians had, theytell us, much that was Scythic in them. Their language was half Scythic, half Median. They armed themselves in the Scythic fashion. They were, infact, Scyths in descent, in habits, in character. 

But what are we to understand by this? May we assume at once thatthey were a Turanian people, in race, habits, and language akin to thevarious tribes of Turkomans who are at present dominant over the entireregion between the Oxus and the Parthian mountain-tract, and withinthat tract have many settlements? May we assume that they stood in anattitude of natural hostility to the Arian nations by which they weresurrounded, and that their revolt was the assertion of independence bya down-trodden people after centuries of subjection to the yoke of astranger? Did Turan, in their persons, rise against Iean after perhaps athousand years of oppression, and renew the struggle for predominancein regions where the war had been waged before, and where it stillcontinues to be waged at the present day?

Such conclusions cannot safely be drawn from the mere fact that theScythic character of the Parthians is asserted in the strongest termsby the ancient writers. The term "Scythic" is not, strictly speaking, ethnical. It designates a life rather a descent, habits rather thanblood. It is applied by the Greeks and Romans to Indo-European andTuranian races indifferently, provided that they are nomads, dwellingin tents or carts, living on the produce of their flocks and herds, uncivilized, and, perhaps it may be added, accustomed to pass theirlives on horseback. We cannot, therefore, assume that a nation isTuranian simply because it is pronounced "Scythic. " Still, as in factthe bulk of those races which have remained content with the nomadiccondition, and which from the earliest times to the present day have ledthe life above described in the broad steppes of Europe and Asia, appearto have been of the Turian type, a presumption is raised in favor of apeople being Turanian by decided and concordant statements that it isScythic. The presumption may of course be removed by evidence to thecontrary; but, until such evidence is produced it has weight, andconstitutes an argument, the force of which is considerable. 

In the present instance the presumption raised is met by no argumentof any great weight; while on the other hand it receives importantconfirmation from several different quarters. It is said, indeed, thatas all, or almost all, the other nations of these parts were confessedlyArians (e. G. The Bactrians, the Sogdians, the Chorasmians, theMargians, the Arians of Herat, the Sagartians, the Sarangians, and theHyrcanians), it would be strange if the Parthians belonged to a whollydifferent ethnic family. But, in the first place, the existence ofisolated nationalities, detached fragments of some greater ethnic mass, embodied amid alien material, is a fact familiar to ethnologists; and, further, it is not at all certain that there were not other Turanianraces in these parts, as, for instance, the Thamanasans. Again, it issaid that the Parthians show their Arian extraction by their names; butthis argument may be turned against those who adduce it. It is true thatamong the Parthian names a considerable number are not only Arian, butdistinctly Persian--e. G. , Mith-ridates, Tiridates, Artabanus, Orobazus, Rhodaspes--but the bulk of the names have an entirely differentcharacter. There is nothing Arian in such appellations as Amminapes, Bacasis, Pacorus, Vonones, Sinnaces, Abdus, Abdageses, Gotarzes, Vologeses, Mnasciras, Sanatroeces; nor anything markedly Arian inPriapatius, Himerus, Orodes, Apreetseus, Ornos-pades, Parrhaces, Vasaces, Monesis, Exedares. If the Parthians were Arians, what accountis to be given of these words? That they employed a certain number ofPersian names is sufficiently explained by their subjection during morethan two centuries to the Persian rule. We are also distinctly told thatthey affected Persian habits, and desired to be looked upon as Persians. The Arian names borne by Parthians no more show them to be Arians inrace than the Norman names adopted so widely by the Welsh show them tobe Northmen. On the other hand, the non-Arian names in the former caseare like the non-Norman names in the latter, and equally indicate asecond source of nomenclature, in which should be contained the key tothe true ethnology of the people. 

The non-Arian character of the Parthians is signified, if not proved, bythe absence of their name from the Zendavesta. The Zendavesta enumeratesamong Arian nations the Bactrians, the Sogdians, the Margians, theHyrcanians, the Arians of Herat, and the Chorasmians, or all theimportant nations of these parts except the Parthians. The Parthiancountry it mentions under the name of Nisaya or Nisaea, implyingapparently that the Parthians were not yet settled in it. The only readyway of reconciling the geography of the Zendavesta with that of laterages is to suppose the Parthians a non-Arian nation who intrudedthemselves among the early Arian settlements, coming probably from thenorth, the great home of the Turanians. 

Some positive arguments in favor of the Turanian origin of the Parthiansmay be based upon their names. The Parthians affect, in their names, the termination -ac or -ah, as, for instance, in Arsac-es, Sinnac-es, Parrhaces, Vesaces, Sana-trseces, Phraataces, etc. --a termination whichcharacterizes the primitive Babylonian, the Basque, and most of theTuranian tongues. The termination -geses, found in such names asVolo-geses, Abda-geses, and the like, may be compared with the -ghizof Tenghiz. The Turanian root annap, "God, " is perhaps traceable inAmm-inap-es. If the Parthian "Chos-roes" represents the Persian "Kurush"or Cyrus, the corruption which the word has undergone is such as tosuggest a Tatar articulation. 

The remains of the Parthian language, which we possess, beyond theirnames, are too scanty and too little to be depended on to afford usany real assistance in settling the question of their ethnic character. Besides the words surena, "Commander-in-chief, " and Jcarta or Jcerta, "city, " "fort, " there is scarcely one of which we can be assured that itwas really understood by the Parthians in the sense assigned to it. Ofthese two, the latter, which is undoubtedly Arian, may have been adoptedfrom the Persians: the former is non-Arian, but has no known Turaniancongeners. 

If, however, the consideration of the Parthian language does not helpus to determine their race, a consideration of their manners and customsstrengthens much the presumption that they were Turanians. Like theTurkoman and Tatar tribes generally, they passed almost their wholelives on horseback, conversing, transacting business, buying andselling, even eating on their horses. They practised polygamy, secludedtheir women from the sight of men, punished unfaithfulness with extremeseverity, delighted in hunting, and rarely ate any flesh but that whichthey obtained in this way, were moderate eaters but great drinkers, didnot speak much, but yet were very unquiet, being constantly engaged instirring up trouble either at home or abroad. A small portion of thenation alone was free; the remainder were the slaves of the privilegedfew. Nomadic habits continued to prevail among a portion of those whoremained in their primitive seats, even in the time of their greatestnational prosperity; and a coarse, rude, and semi-barbarous characterattached always even to the most advanced part of the nation, to theking, the court, and the nobles generally, a character which, despite acertain varnish of civilization, was constantly showing itself intheir dealings with each other and with foreign nations. "The Parthianmonarchs, " as Gibbon justly observes, "like the Mogul (Mongol)sovereigns of Hindostan, delighted in the pastoral life of theirScythian ancestors, and the imperial camp was frequently pitched in theplain of Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the Tigris. " Niebuhrseems even to doubt whether the Parthians dwelt in cities at all. Herepresents them as maintaining from first to last their nomadic habits, and regards the insurrection by which their empire was brought to anend as a rising of the inhabitants of towns--the Tadjiks of thosetimes--against the Ilyats or wanderers, who had oppressed them forcenturies. This is, no doubt, an over statement; but it has a foundationin fact, since wandering habits and even tent-life were affected by theParthians during the most flourishing period of their empire. 

On the whole, the Turanian character of the Parthians, though notabsolutely proved, appears to be in the highest degree probable. If itbe accepted, we must regard them as in race closely allied to the vasthordes which from a remote antiquity have roamed over the steppe regionof upper Asia, from time to time bursting upon the south, and harassingor subjugating the comparatively unwarlike inhabitants of the warmercountries. We must view them as the congeners of the Huns, Bulgarians, and Comans of the ancient world; of the Kalmucks, Ouigurs, Usbegs, Eleuts, etc. , of the present day. Perhaps their nearest representativeswill be, if we look to their primitive condition at the foundingof their empire, the modern Turkomans, who occupy nearly the samedistricts; if we regard them in the period of their great prosperity, the Osmanli Turks. Like the Turks, they combined great military prowessand vigor with a capacity for organization and government not very usualamong Asiatics. Like them, they remained at heart barbarians, thoughthey put on an external appearance of civilization and refinement. Likethem, they never to any extent amalgamated with the conquered races, but continued for centuries an exclusive dominant race, encamped in thecountries which they had overrun. 

The circumstances under which the Parthians became subjects of thePersian empire may readily be conjectured, but cannot be laid downpositively. According to Diodorus, who probably followed Ctesias, theypassed from the dominion of the Assyrians to that of the Medes, and fromdependence upon the Medes to a similar position under the Persians. Butthe balance of evidence is against these views. It is, on the whole, most probable that neither the Assyrian nor the Median empire extendedso far eastward as the country of the Parthians. The Parthians probablymaintained their independence from the time of their settlement inthe district called after their name until the sudden arrival in theircountry of the great Persian conqueror, Cyrus. This prince, as Herodotustells us, subdued the whole of Western Asia, proceeding from nationto nation, and subjugating one people after another. The order of hisconquests is not traceable; but it is clear that after his conquestof the Lydian empire (about B. C. 554) he proceeded eastward, with thespecial object of subduing Bactria. 43 To reach Bactria, he would haveto pass through, or close by, Parthia. Since, as Herodotus says, "heconquered the whole way, as he went, " we may fairly conclude that onhis road to Bactria he subjugated the Parthians. It was thus, almostcertainly, that they lost their independence and became Persiansubjects. Competent enough to maintain themselves against thecomparatively small tribes in their near neighborhood, the Chorasmians, Hyrcanians, Arians of Herat, Bactrians, and Sagartians, it was notpossible for them to make an effectual resistance to a monarch whobrought against them the entire force of a mighty empire. Cyrus had, it is probable, little difficulty in obtaining their submission. It ispossible that they resisted; but perhaps it is more probable that theircourse on this occasion was similar to that which they pursued when theMacedonian conqueror swept across these same regions. The Parthians atthat period submitted without striking a blow. There is no reason tobelieve that they caused any greater trouble to Cyrus. 

When the Persian empire was organized by Darius Hystaspis intosatrapies, Parthia was at first united in the same government withChorasmia, Sogdiana, and Aria. Subsequently, however, when satrapieswere made more numerous, it was detached from these extensive countriesand made to form a distinct government, with the mere addition of thecomparatively small district of Hyrcania. 40 It formed, apparently, oneof the most tractable and submissive of the Persian provinces. Except onthe single occasion already noticed, when it took part in a revolt thatextended to nearly one-half the empire, it gave its rulers no trouble;no second attempt was made to shake off the alien yoke, which may indeedhave galled, but which was felt to be inevitable. In the final struggleof Persia against Alexander, the Parthians were faithful to theirmasters. They fought on the Persian side at Arbela; and though theysubmitted to Alexander somewhat tamely when he invaded their country, yet, as Darius was then dead, and no successor had declared himself, they cannot be taxed with desertion. Probably they felt little interestin the event of the struggle. Habit and circumstance caused them to sendtheir contingent to Arbela at the call of the Great King; but when thePersian cause was evidently lost, they felt it needless to make furthersacrifices. Having no hope of establishing their independence, theythought it unnecessary to prolong the contest. They might not gain, butthey could scarcely lose, by a change of masters. 

CHAPTER III. 

_Condition of Western Asia under the earlier Seleucidce. Revolts ofBactria and Parthia. Conflicting accounts of the establishment of theParthian Kingdom. First War with Syria. _

The attempt of Alexander the Great to unite the whole civilized world ina single vast empire might perhaps have been a success if the mind whichconceived the end, and which had to a considerable extent elaborated themeans, had been spared to watch over its own work, and conduct itpast the perilous period of infancy and adolescence. But the prematuredecease of the great Macedonian in the thirty-third year of his age, when his plans of fusion and amalgamation were only just beginning todevelop themselves, and the unfortunate fact that among his "Successors"there was not one who inherited either his grandeur of conception orhis powers of execution, caused his scheme at once to collapse; and theeffort to unite and consolidate led only to division and disintegration. In lieu of Europe being fused with Asia, Asia itself was split up. Fornearly a thousand years, from the formation of the great Assyrian empireto the death of Darius Codomannus, Western Asia, from the Mediterraneanto Affghanistan, or even to India, had been united tinder one head, hadacknowledged one sovereign. Assyria, Media, Persia, had successivelyheld the position of dominant power; and the last of the three hadgiven union, and consequently peace, to a wider stretch of country anda vaster diversity of peoples than either of her predecessors. Underthe mild yoke of the Achaemenian princes had been held together for twocenturies, not only all the nations of Western Asia, from the Indian andThibetan deserts to the AEgean and the Mediterranean, but a great partof Africa also, that is to say, Egypt, north-eastern Libya, and theGreek settlements of Cyrene and Barca. The practical effect of theconquests of Alexander was to break up this unity, to introduce inthe place of a single consolidated empire a multitude of separate andcontending kingdoms. The result was thus the direct opposite of thegreat conqueror's design, and forms a remarkable instance of thecontradiction which so often subsists between the propositions of manand the dispositions of an overruling Providence. 

The struggle for power which broke out almost immediately after hisdeath among the successors of Alexander may be regarded as having beenbrought to a close by the battle of Ipsus. The period of fermentationwas then concluded, and something like a settled condition of thingsbrought about. A quadripartite division of Alexander's dominions wasrecognized, Macedonia, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Syria (or south-westernAsia) becoming thenceforth distinct political entities. Asia Minor, thekingdom of Lysimachus, had indeed less of unity than the other threestates. It was already disintegrated, the kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, subsisting side by side with that of Lysimachus, whichwas thus limited to western and south-western Asia Minor. Afterthe death of Lysimachus, further changes occurred; but the state ofPergamus, which sprang up this time, may be regarded as the continuationof Lysimachus's kingdom, and as constituting from the time of EumenesI. (B. C. 263) a fourth power in the various political movements andcombinations of the Graeco-Oriental world. 

Of the four powers thus established, the most important, and that withwhich we are here especially concerned, was the kingdom of Syria (asit was called), or that ruled for 247 years by the Seleucidae. SeleucusNicator, the founder of this kingdom, was one of Alexander's officers, but served without much distinction through the various compaigns bywhich the conquest of the East was effected. At the first distributionof provinces (B. C. 323) among Alexander's generals after his death, hereceived no share; and it was not until B. C. 320, when upon the death ofPerdiccas a fresh distribution was made at Triparadisus, that hismerits were recognized, and he was given the satrapy of Babylon. In thisposition he acquired a character for mildness and liberality, and madehimself generally beloved, both by his soldiers and by those who wereunder his government. In the struggle between Antigonus and Eumenes(B. C. 317-316), he embraced the side of the former, and did him somegood service; but this, instead of evoking gratitude, appears to haveonly roused in Antigonus a spirit of jealousy. The ambitious aspirantafter universal dominion, seeing in the popular satrap a possible, andfar from a contemptible, rival, thought it politic to sweep him out ofhis way; and the career of Seleucus would have been cut short had henot perceived his peril in time, and by a precipitate flight secured hissafety. Accompanied by a body of no more than fifty horsemen, he tookthe road for Egypt, escaped the pursuit of a detachment sent to overtakehim, and threw himself on the protection of Ptolemy. 

This event, untoward in appearance, proved the turning-point inSeleucus's fortunes. It threw him into irreconcilable hostility withAntigonus, while it brought him forward before the eyes of men asone whom Antigonus feared. It gave him an opportunity of showing hismilitary talents in the West, and of obtaining favor with Ptolemy, andwith all those by whom Antigonus was dreaded. When the great strugglecame between the confederate monarchs and the aspirant after universaldominion, it placed him on the side of the allies. Having recoveredBabylon (B. C. 312), Seleucus led the flower of the eastern provinces tothe field of Ipsus (B. C. 301), and contributed largely to the victory, thus winning himself a position among the foremost potentates of theday. By the terms of the agreement made after Ipsus, Seleucus wasrecognized as monarch of all the Greek conquests in Asia, with the soleexceptions of Lower Syria and Asia Minor. 

The monarchy thus established extended from the Holy Land andthe Mediterranean on the west, to the Indus valley and the Bolormountain-chain upon the east, and from the Caspian and Jaxartes towardsthe north, to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean towards the south. Itcomprised Upper Syria, Mesopotamia, parts of Cappadocia and Phrygia, Armenia, Assyria, Media, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Carmania, Sagartia, Hyrcania, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Aria, Zarangia, Arachosia, Sacastana, Gedrosia, and probably some part of India. Its entire areacould not have been much less than 1, 200, 000 square miles. Of these, some 300, 000 or 400, 000 may have been desert; but the remainder wasgenerally fertile, and comprised within its limits some of the very mostproductive regions in the whole world. The Mesopotamian lowland, theOrontes valley, the tract between the Caspian and the mountains, theregions about Merv and Balkh, were among the richest in Asia, andproduced grain and fruits in incredible abundance. The rich pasturesof Media and Armenia furnished excellent horses. Bactria gave aninexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants in large numbers were readilyprocurable from India. Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin, werefurnished by several of the provinces, and precious stones of variouskinds abounded. Moreover, for above ten centuries, the precious metalsand the most valuable kinds of merchandise had flowed from every quarterinto the region; and though the Macedonians may have carried off, orwasted, a considerable quantity of both, yet the accumulations of ageswithstood the drain, and the hoarded wealth which had come down fromAssyrian, Babylonian, and Median times was to be found in the days ofSeleucus chiefly within the limits of his Empire. 

The situation which nature pointed out as most suitable for the capitalof a kingdom having the extension that has been here indicated wassome portion of the Mesopotamian valley, which was at once central andfertile. The empire of Seleucus might have been conveniently ruledfrom the site of the ancient Nineveh, or from either of the two stillexisting and still flourishing cities of Susa and Babylon. The impetusgiven to commerce by the circumstances of the time rendered a site nearthe sea preferable to one so remote as that of Nineveh, and thesame consideration made a position on the Tigris or Euphrates moreadvantageous than one upon a smaller river. So far, all pointed toBabylon as the natural and best metropolis; and it was further in favorof that place that its merits had struck the Great Conqueror, whohad designed to make it the capital of his own still vaster Empire. Accordingly Babylon was Seleucus's first choice; and there his Courtwas held for some years previously to his march against Antigonus. But either certain disadvantages were found to attach to Babylon asa residence, or the mere love of variety and change caused him veryshortly to repent of his selection, and to transfer his capital toanother site. He founded, and built with great rapidity, the city ofSeleucia upon the Tigris, at the distance of about forty miles fromBabylon, and had transferred thither the seat of government even beforeB. C. 301. Thus far, however, no fault had been committed. The secondcapital was at least as conveniently placed as the first, and would haveserved equally well as a centre from which to govern the Empire. Butafter Ipsus a further change was made--a change that was injudicious inthe extreme. Either setting undue store by his newly-acquired westernprovinces, or over-anxious to keep close watch on his powerful neighborsin those parts, Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Seleucus once more transferredthe seat of empire, exchanging this time the valley of the Tigris forthat of the Orontes, and the central position of Lower Mesopotamia foralmost the extreme western point of his vast territories. Antioch arosein extraordinary beauty and magnificence during the first few yearsthat succeeded Ipsus, and Seleucus in a short time made it his ordinaryresidence. The change weakened the ties which bound the Empire together, offended the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their monarch withdraw fromthem into a remote region, and particularly loosened the grasp of thegovernment on those more eastern districts which were at once furthestfrom the new metropolis and least assimilated to the Hellenic character. Among the causes which led to the disintegration of the Seleucidkingdom, there is none that deserves so well to be considered themain cause as this. It was calculated at once to produce the desire torevolt, and to render the reduction of revolted provinces difficult, if not impossible. The evil day, however, might have been indefinitelydelayed had the Seleucid princes either established and maintainedthrough their Empire a vigorous and effective administration, orabstained from entangling themselves in wars with their neighbors in theWest, the Ptolemies and the princes of Asia Minor. 

But the organization of the Empire was unsatisfactory. Instead ofpursuing the system inaugurated by Alexander and seeking to weldthe heterogeneous elements of which his kingdom was composed into ahomogeneous whole, instead of at once conciliating and elevatingthe Asiatics by uniting them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, bypromoting intermarriage and social intercourse between the two classesof his subjects, educating the Asiatics in Greek ideas and Greekschools, opening his court to them, promoting them to high employments, making them feel that they were as much valued and as well cared for asthe people of the conquering race, the first Seleucus, and after himhis successors, fell back upon the old simpler, ruder system, the systempursued before Alexander's time by the Persians, and before them perhapsby the Medes--the system most congenial to human laziness and humanpride--that of governing a nation of slaves by means of a classof victorious aliens. Seleucus divided his empire into satrapies, seventy-two in number. He bestowed the office of satrap on none butMacedonians and Greeks. The standing army, by which he maintained hisauthority, was indeed composed in the main of Asiatics, disciplinedafter the Greek model; but it was officered entirely by men of Greek orMacedonian parentage. Nothing was done to keep up the self-respect ofAsiatics, or to soften the unpleasantness that must always attach tobeing governed by foreigners. Even the superintendence over the satrapsseems to have been insufficient. According to some writers, it was agross outrage offered by a satrap to an Asiatic subject that stirredup the Parthians to their revolt. The story may not be true; but itscurrency shows of what conduct towards those under their government thesatraps of the Seleucidae were thought, by such as lived near the time, to have been capable. 

It would, perhaps, have been difficult for the Seleucid princes, evenhad they desired it, to pursue a policy of absolute abstention inthe wars of their western neighbors. So long as they were resolute tomaintain their footing on the right bank of the Euphrates, in Phrygia, Cappadocia, and upper Syria, they were of necessity mixed up with thequarrels of the west. Could they have been content to withdraw withinthe Euphrates, they might have remained for the most part clear of suchentanglements; but even then there would have been occasions when theymust have taken the field in self-defence. As it was, however, the ideaof abstention seems never to have occurred to them. It was the fonddream of each "Successor" of Alexander that in his person might, perhaps, be one day united all the territories of the great Conqueror. Seleucus would have felt that he sacrificed his most cherished hopesif he had allowed the west to go its own way, and had contented himselfwith consolidating a great power in the regions east of the Euphrates. 

And the policy of the founder of the house was followed by hissuccessors. The three Seleucid sovereigns who reigned prior tothe Parthian revolt were, one and all, engaged in frequent, if notcontinual, wars with the monarchs of Egypt and Asia Minor. The firstSeleucus, by his claim to the sovereignty of Lower Syria, established aground of constant contention with the Ptolemies; and though he did notprosecute the claim to the extent of actual hostility, yet in the reignof his son, Antiochus I. , called Soter, the smothered quarrel broke out. Soter fomented the discontent of Cyrene with its subjection to Egypt, and made at least one expedition against Ptolemy Philadelphus in person(B. C. 264). His efforts did not meet with much success; but they wererenewed by his son, Antiochus II. , surnamed "the God", who warred withPhiladelphus from B. C. 260 to B. C. 250, contending with him chiefly inAsia Minor. These wars were complicated with others. The first Antiochusaimed at adding the kingdom of Bithynia to his dominions, and attackedsuccessively the Bythynian monarchs, Zipcetas and Nicomedes I. (B. C. 280-278). This aggression brought him into collision with the Gauls, whom Nicomedes called to his aid, and with whom Antiochus had severalstruggles, some successful and some disastrous. He also attacked Eumenesof Pergamus (B. C. 263), but was defeated in a pitched battle nearSardis. The second Antiochus was not engaged in so great a multiplicityof contests; but we hear of his taking a part in the internal affairs ofMiletus, and expelling a certain Timachus, who had made himself tyrantof that city. There is also some ground for thinking that he had astanding quarrel with the king of Media Atropatene. Altogether itis evident that from B. C. 280 to B. C. 250 the Seleucid princes wereincessantly occupied with wars in the west, in Asia Minor and in SyriaProper, wars which so constantly engaged them that they had neither timenor attention to spare for the affairs of the far east. So long as theBactrian and Parthian satraps paid their tributes, and supplied therequisite quotas of troops for service in the western wars, the Antiochiwere content. The satraps were left to manage affairs at their owndiscretion; and it is not surprising that the absence of a controllinghand led to various complications and disorders. 

Moreover, the personal character of the second Antiochus must be takeninto account. The vanity and impiety, which could accept the name of"Theus" for a service that fifty other Greeks had rendered to oppressedtowns without regarding themselves as having done anything veryremarkable, would alone indicate a weak and contemptible morale, andmight justify us, did we know no more, in regarding the calamities ofhis reign as the fruit of his own unfitness to rule an empire. Butthere is sufficient evidence that he had other, and worse, vices. Hewas noted, even among Asiatic sovereigns, for luxury and debauchery; heneglected all state affairs in the pursuit of pleasure; his wives andmale favorites were allowed to rule his kingdom at their will; andtheir most flagrant crimes were neither restrained nor punished. Such acharacter could have inspired neither respect nor fear. The satraps, towhom the conduct of their sovereign could not but become known, wouldbe partly encouraged to follow the bad example, partly provoked by it toshake themselves free of so hateful and yet contemptible a master. 

It was, probably, about the year B. C. 256, the fifth of the secondAntiochus, when that prince, hard pressed by Philadelphus in the west, was also, perhaps, engaged in a war with the king of Atropatene in thenorth, that the standard of revolt was first actually raised in theeastern provinces, and a Syrian satrap ventured to declare himself anindependent sovereign. This was Diodotus, satrap of Bactria a Greek, ashis name shows. Suddenly assuming the state and style of king heissued coins stamped with his own name, and established himself withoutdifficulty as sovereign over the large and flourishing province ofBactria, or the tract of fertile land about the upper and middleOxus. This district had from a remote antiquity been one with specialpretensions. The country was fertile, and much of it strong; the peoplewere hardy and valiant; they were generally treated with exceptionalfavor by the Persian monarchs; and they seem to have had traditionswhich assigned them a pre-eminence among the Arian tribes at someindefinitely distant period. We may presume that they would gladlysupport the bold enterprise of their new monarch; they would feel theirvanity flattered by the establishment of an independent Bactria, eventhough it were under Greek kings; and they would energetically secondhim in an enterprise which gratified their pride, while it held out tothem hopes of a career of conquest, with its concomitants of plunder andglory. The settled quiet which they had enjoyed under the Achaemenideand the Seleucidae was probably not much to their taste; and theywould gladly exchange so tame and dull a life for the pleasures ofindependence and the chances of empire. 

It would seem that Antiochus, sunk in luxury at his capital, could notbring himself to make even an effort to check the spirit of rebellion, and recover his revolted subjects. Bactria was allowed to establishitself as an independent monarchy, without having to undergo the ordealof a bloody struggle. Antiochus neither marched against Diodotusin person, nor sent a general to contend with him. The authority ofDiodotus was confirmed and riveted on his subjects by an undisturbedreign of eighteen years before a Syrian army even showed itself in hisneighborhood. 

The precedent of successful revolt thus set could not well be barrenof consequences. If one province might throw off the yoke of its feudallord with impunity, why might not others? Accordingly, within a fewyears the example set by Bactria was followed in the neighboring countryof Parthia, but with certain very important differences. In Bactria theGreek satrap took the lead, and the Bactrian kingdom was, at any rate atits commencement, as thoroughly Greek as that of the Seleucidae. But inParthia Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The natives rebelledagainst their masters. An Asiatic race of a rude and uncivilized type, coarse and savage, but brave and freedom-loving, rose up against thepolished but effeminate Greeks who held them in subjection, and claimedand established their independence. The Parthian kingdom was thoroughlyanti-Hellenic. It appealed to patriotic feelings, and to the hateuniversally felt towards the stranger. It set itself to undo the workof Alexander, to cast out the Europeans, to recover to the Asiatics thepossession of Asia. It was naturally almost as hostile to Bactria as toSyria, although danger from a common enemy might cause it sometimesto make a temporary alliance with that kingdom. It had, no doubt, thegeneral sympathy of the populations in the adjacent countries, andrepresented to them the cause of freedom and autonomy. 

The exact circumstances under which the Parthian revolt took place areinvolved in much obscurity. According to one account the leader of therevolt, Arsaces, was a Bactrian, to whom the success of Diodotus wasdisagreeable, and who therefore quitted the newly-founded kingdom, andbetook himself to Parthia, where he induced the natives to revolt and toaccept him for their monarch. Another account, which is attractive fromthe minute details into which it enters, is the following:--"Arsaces andTiridates were brothers, descendants of Phriapites, the son of Arsaces. Pherecles, who had been made satrap of their country by Antiochus Theus, offered a gross insult to one of them, whereupon, as they could notbrook the indignity, they took five men into counsel, and with their aidslew the insolent one. They then induced their nation to revolt fromthe Macedonians, and set up a government of their own, which attained togreat power. " A third version says that the Arsaces, whom all representas the first king, was in reality a Scythian, who at the head of a bodyof Parnian Dahce, nomads inhabiting the valley of the Attrek (Ochus), invaded Parthia, soon after the establishment of Bactrian independence, and succeeded in making himself master of it. With this account, whichStrabo seems to prefer, agrees tolerably well that of Justin, whosays that "Arsaces, having been long accustomed to live by robberyand rapine, attacked the Parthians with a predatory band, killed theirsatrap, Andragoras, and seized the supreme authority. " As there wasin all probability a close ethnic connection between the Dahae and theParthians, it would be likely enough that the latter might accept fora king a chieftain of the former who had boldly entered their country, challenged the Greek satrap to an encounter, and by defeating andkilling him freed them--at any rate for the time--from the Greek yoke. An oppressed people gladly adopts as chief the head of an allied tribeif he has shown skill and daring, and offers to protect them from theiroppressors. 

The revolt of Arsaces has been placed by some as early as the year B. C. 256. The Bactrian revolt is assigned by most historians to thatyear; and the Parthian, according to some, was contemporary. Thebest authorities, however, give a short interval between the twoinsurrections; and, on the whole, there is perhaps reason to regard theParthian independence as dating from about B. C. 250. This year was theeleventh of Antiochus Theus, and fell into the time when he was stillengaged in his war with Ptolemy Philadelphus. It might have beenexpected that when he concluded a peace with the Egyptian monarch inB. C. 249, he would have turned his arms at once towards the east, andhave attempted at any rate the recovery of his lost dominions. But, asalready stated, his personal character was weak, and he preferred thepleasures of repose at Antioch to the hardships of a campaign in theCaspian region. So far as we hear, he took no steps to re-establishhis authority; and Arsaces, like Diodotus, was left undisturbed toconsolidate his power at his leisure. 

Arsaces lived, however, but a short time after obtaining the crown. Hisauthority was disputed within the limits of Parthia itself; and he hadto engage in hostilities with a portion of his own subjects. We maysuspect that the malcontents were chiefly, if not solely, those of Greekrace, who may have been tolerably numerous, and whose strength wouldlie in the towns. Hecatompylos, the chief city of Parthia, was among thecolonies founded by Alexander; and its inhabitants would naturally bedisinclined to acquiesce in the rule of a "barbarian. " Within littlemore than two years of his coronation, Arsaces, who had never been ableto give his kingdom peace, was killed in battle by a spear-thrust in theside; and was succeeded (B. C. 247) by his brother, having left, it isprobable, no sons, or none of mature age. 

Tiridates, the successor of Arsaces, took upon his accession hisbrother's name, and is known in history as Arsaces II. The practicethus begun passed into a custom, each Parthian monarch from henceforthbearing as king the name of Arsaces in addition to his own realappellation, whatever that might be. In the native remains the assumedname almost supersedes the other; but, fortunately, the Greek and Romanwriters who treat of Parthian affairs, have preserved the distinctiveappellations, and thus saved the Parthian history from inextricableconfusion. It is not easy to see from what quarter this practice wasadopted; perhaps we should regard it as one previously existing amongthe Dahan Scyths. 

If the Parthian monarchy owed its origin to Arsaces I. , it owed itsconsolidation, and settled establishment to Arsaces II. , or Tiridates. This prince, who had the good fortune to reign for above thirty years, and who is confused by many writers with the actual founder of themonarchy, having received Parthia from his brother, in the weak andunsettled condition above described, left it a united and powerfulkingdom, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in its defences, inalliance with its nearest and most formidable neighbor, and triumphantover the great power of Syria, which had hoped to bring it once moreinto subjection. He ascended the throne, it is probable, early in B. C. 247, and had scarcely been monarch a couple of years when he witnessedone of those vast but transient revolutions to which Asia is subject, but which are of rare occurrence in Europe. Ptolemy Euergetes, the sonof Philadelphus, having succeeded to his father's kingdom in the sameyear with Tiridates, marched (in B. C. 245) a huge expedition into Asia, defeated Seleucus II. (Callinicus) in Syria, took Antioch, and then, having crossed the Euphrates, proceeded to bring the greater part ofWestern Asia under his sway. Mesopotamia, Assyria, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Media, submitted to him. He went in person as far as Babylon, and, according to his own account, was acknowledged as master by allthe Eastern provinces to the very borders of Bactria. The Parthianand Bactrian kingdoms cannot but have trembled for their newly wonindependence. Here was a young warrior who, in a single campaign, hadmarched the distance of a thousand miles, from the banks of the Nile tothose of the Lower Euphrates, without so much as receiving a check, andwho was threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What resistancecould the little Parthian state hope to offer to such an enemy? Itmust have rejoiced Tiridates to hear that while the new conqueror wasgathering somewhat too hastily the fruits of victory, collecting anddespatching to Egypt the most valuable works of art that he could findin the cities which he had taken, and levying heavy contributions on thesubmitted countries, a revolt had broken out in his own land, to quellwhich he was compelled to retire suddenly and to relinquish the greaterpart of his acquisitions. Thus the threatened conquest proved a mereinroad, and instead of a power of greater strength replacing Syria inthese regions, Syria practically retained her hold of them, but withenfeebled grasp, her strength crippled, her prestige lost, and her honortarnished. Ptolemy had, it is probable, not retired very long, when, encouraged by what he had seen of Syria's weakness, Tiridates took theaggressive, and invading the neighboring district of Hyrcania, succeededin detaching it from the Syrian state, and adding it to his ownterritory. This was throwing out a challenge which the Syrian monarch, Callinicus, could scarcely decline to meet, unless he was prepared tolose, one by one, all the outlying provinces of his empire. 

Accordingly in B. C. 237, having patched up a peace with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, the Syrian monarch made an expedition against Parthia. Not feeling, however, altogether confident of success if he trustedwholly to his own unaided efforts, he prudently entered into an alliancewith Diodotus the Bactrian king, and the two agreed to combine theirforces against Tiridates. Hereupon that monarch, impressed with adeep sense of the impending danger, quitted Parthia, and, proceedingnorthwards, took refuge with the Aspasiacae, a Scythian tribe whichdwelt between the Oxus and the Jaxartes. The Aspasiacae probably lenthim troops; at any rate, he did not remain long in retirement, but, hearing that the Bactrian king, whom he especially feared, was dead, hecontrived to detach his son and successor from the Syrian alliance, andto draw him over to his own side. Having made this important stroke, hemet Callinicus in battle, and completely defeated his army. 

This victory was with reason regarded by the Parthians as a sort ofsecond beginning of their independence. Hitherto their kingdom hadexisted precariously, and as it were by sufferance. It could not butbe that the power from which they had revolted would one day seek toreclaim its lost territory; and, until the new monarchy had measuredits strength against that of its former mistress, none could feel securethat it would be able to maintain its existence. The victory gained byTiridates over Callinicus put an end to these doubts. It proved to theworld at large, and also to the Parthians themselves, that they hadnothing to fear--that they were strong enough to preserve their freedom. Considering the enormous disproportion between the military strengthand resources of the narrow Parthian State and the vast SyrianEmpire--considering that the one comprised about fifty thousand and theother above a million of square miles; that the one had inherited thewealth of ages and the other was probably as poor as any province inAsia; that the one possessed the Macedonian arms, training, and tactics, while the other knew only the rude warfare of the Steppes--the resultof the struggle cannot but be regarded as surprising. Still it wasnot without precedent, and it has not been without repetition. It addsanother to the many instances where a small but brave people, bent onresisting foreign domination, have, when standing on their defence, intheir own territory, proved more than a match for the utmost force thata foe of overwhelming strength could bring against them. It reminds usof Marathon, of Bannock-burn, of Morgarten. We may not sympathize whollywith the victors, for Greek civilization, even of the type introduced byAlexander into Asia, was ill replaced by Tatar coarseness and barbarism;but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spectacle of a handful ofgallant men determinedly resisting in the fastness of their native landa host of aliens, and triumphing over their would-be oppressors. 

The Parthians themselves, deeply impressed with the importance ofthe contest, preserved the memory of it by a solemn festival on theanniversary of their victory, which they still celebrated in the time ofTrogus. 

CHAPTER IV. 

_Consolidation of the Parthian Kingdom. Death of Tiridates and accessionof Arsaces III. Attack on Media. War of Artabanus (Arsaces III. ) withAntiochus the Great. Period of inaction. Great development of Bactrianpower. Reigns of Priapatius (Arsaces IV. ) and Phraates I. (Arsaces V. )_

Selbucus might perhaps not have accepted his defeat as final had he beenaltogether free to choose whether he would continue the Parthian waror no. The resources of his Empire were so vast, his command of menand money so unbounded, that he could easily have replaced one army byanother, and so have prolonged the struggle. But renewed troubles hadbroken out in the western portion of his dominions, where his brother, Antiochus Hierax, was still in arms against his authority. Seleucusfelt it necessary to turn his attention to this quarter, and havingonce retired from the Parthian contest, he never afterwards renewed it. Tiridates was left unmolested, to act as he thought fit, and either toattempt further conquests, or to devote himself to securing those whichhe had effected. He chose the latter course, and during the remainder ofhis reign--a space of above twenty years--he employed himself wholly instrengthening and adorning his small kingdom. Having built a numberof forts in various strong positions, and placed garrisons in them, hecarefully selected a site for a new city, which he probably intended tomake his capital. The spot chosen combined the advantages of beingat once delightful and easily defensible. It was surrounded withprecipitous rocks, which enclosed a plain of extraordinary fertility. Abundant wood and copious streams of water were in the neighborhood. Thesoil was so rich that it scarcely required cultivation, and the woodswere so full of game as to afford endless amusement to hunters. To thetown which he built in this locality Tiridates gave the name of Dara, aword which the Greeks and Romans elongated into Dareium. Unfortunately, modern travellers have not yet succeeded in identifying the site, which should, however, lie towards the East, perhaps in the vicinity ofMeshed. 

We may presume that Tiridates, when he built this remarkable city, intended to make it the seat of government. Hecatompylos, as a Greektown, had the same disadvantages, which were considered in later timesto render Seleucia unfit for the residence of the Parthian Court andmonarch. Dara, like Ctesiphon, was to be wholly Parthian. Its strongsituation would render it easy of defence; its vicinity to forestsabounding in game would give it special charms in the eyes of personsso much devoted, as the Parthian princes were, to the chase. But theintention of Tiridates, if we have truly defined it, failed of takingpermanent effect. He may himself have fixed his abode at Dara, but hissuccessors did not inherit his predilections; and Hecatompylos remained, after his reign, as before it, the head-quarters of the government, andthe recognized metropolis of Parthia Proper. 

After passing in peace and prosperity the last twenty years of hisreign, Tiridates died in a good old age, leaving his crown to a son, whose special name is a little uncertain, but who is called by mostmoderns Artabanus I. 

Artabanus, having ascended the Parthian throne about B. C. 214, and beinganxious to distinguish himself, took advantage of the war raging betweenAntiochus III. , the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, and Achseus, oneof his rebel satraps, to advance into Media, and to add to his dominionsthe entire tract between Hyrcania and the Zagros mountains. Of themanner in which he effected his conquests we have no account; but theyseem to have been the fruit of a single campaign, which must havebeen conducted with great vigor and military skill. The Parthian princeappears to have occupied Ecbatana, the ancient capital of the MedianEmpire, and to have thence threatened the Mesopotamian countries. Uponreceiving intelligence of his invasion, Antiochus levied a vast army, and set out towards the East, with a determination to subjugate allthe revolted provinces, and to recover the limits of the old Empireof Nicator. Passing the Zagros chain, probably by way of Behistun andKermanshaw, he easily retook Ecbatana, which was an open town, andundefended by the Parthians, and proceeded to prepare for a furtheradvance eastward. The route from Ecbatana to the Caspian Gates crosses, of necessity, unless a considerable circuit be taken, some large tractsof barren ground, inlets or bays of the Great Salt Desert of Iran. Artabanus cherished the hope that here the difficulties of the way wouldeffectually bar his enemy's progress, more especially as his troops wereso numerous, and as water was scanty throughout the whole region. Thestreams which flow from Zagros towards the East are few and scanty; theymostly fail in summer, which, even in Asia, is the campaigning season;and those who cross the desert at this time must depend on the wellswherewith the more western part of the region is supplied by means of_kanats_ or underground conduits, which are sometimes carried many milesfrom the foot of the mountains. The position of the wells, which werefew in number, was known only to the natives; and Artabanus hoped thatthe Syrian monarch would be afraid to place the lives of his soldiers insuch doubtful keeping. When, however, he found that Antiochus was notto be deterred by any fears of this kind, but was bent on crossing thedesert, he had recourse to the barbaric expedients of filling in, orpoisoning, the wells along the line of route-which the Syrian princewas likely to follow. But these steps seem to have been taken too late. Antiochus, advancing suddenly, caught some of the Parthian troops attheir barbarous work, and dispersed them without difficulty. He thenrapidly effected the transit, and, pressing forward, was soon in theenemy's country, where he occupied the chief city, Hecatompylos. Upto this point the Parthian monarch had declined an engagement. Noinformation has come down to us as to his motives; but they maybe readily enough conjectured. To draw an enemy far away from hisresources, while retiring upon one's own; to entangle a numerous hostamong narrow passes and denies; to decline battle when he offers it, and then to set upon him unawares, has always been the practice of weakmountain races when attacked by a more numerous foe. It is often goodpolicy in such a case even to yield the capital without a blow, andto retreat into a more difficult situation. The assailant must followwhithersoever his foe retires, or quit the country, leaving himunsubdued. Antiochus, aware of this necessity, and rendered confident ofsuccess by the evacuation of a situation so strong, and so suitable forthe Parthian tactics as Hecatompylos, after giving his army a shortrest at the captured capital, set out in pursuit of Artabanus, whohad withdrawn his forces towards Hyrcania. To reach the rich Hyrcanianvalleys, he was forced to cross the main chain of the Elburz, which hereattains an elevation of 7000 or 8000 feet. The route which his army hadto follow was the channel of a winter-torrent, obstructed with stonesand trunks of trees, partly by nature, partly by the efforts of theinhabitants. The long and difficult ascent was disputed by the enemy thewhole way, and something like a pitched battle was fought at the top;but Antiochus persevered, and, though his army must have sufferedseverely, descended into Hyrcanian and captured several of the towns. Here our main authority, Polybius, suddenly deserts us, and we can giveno further account of the war beyond its general result--Artabanus andthe Parthians remained unsubdued after a struggle which seems to havelasted some years; Artabanus himself displayed great valor; and atlength the Syrian monarch thought it best to conclude a peace with him, in which he acknowledged the Parthian independence. It is probable thathe exacted in return a pledge that the Parthian monarch should lend himhis assistance in the expedition which he was bent on conducting againstBactria; but there is no actual proof that the conditions of peacecontained this clause. We are left in doubt whether Artabanus stoodaloof in the war which Antiochus waged with Euthydemus of Bactriaimmediately after the close of his Parthian campaigns, or whether helent his aid to the attempt made to crush his neighbor. Perhaps, on thewhole, it is most probable that, nominally, he was Antiochus's ally inthe war, but that, practically, he gave him little help, having no wishto see Syria aggrandized. 

At any rate, whether Euthydemus had to meet the attack of Syria only, orof Syria and Parthia in combination, the result was, that Bactria, like Parthia, proved strong enough to maintain her ground, and that theSyrian King, after a while, grew tired of the struggle, and consented toterms of accommodation. The Bactrian monarchy, like the Parthian, cameout of the contest unscathed--indeed we may go further, and say that theposition of the two kingdoms was improved by the attacks made upon them. If a prince possessing the personal qualities that distinguished thethird Antiochus, and justified the title of "Great" which he derivedfrom his oriental expedition--if such a prince, enjoying profound peaceat home, and directing the whole force of his empire against them, couldnot succeed in reducing to subjection the revolted provinces of thenortheast, but, whatever military advantages he might gain, foundconquest impossible, and returned home, having acknowledged asindependent kings those whom he went out to chastise as rebellioussatraps, it was evident that the kingdoms might look upon themselvesas firmly established, or, at least, as secure from the danger ofre-absorption into the Syrian State. The repulse of Callinicus was aprobable indication of the fate of all future efforts on the part ofSyria to reduce Parthia; the conditions of peace granted by Antiochus toboth countries, after a series of military successes, constituted almosta proof that the yoke of Syria would never be re-imposed on either theParthian or the Bactrian nation. 

With the departure of Antiochus from the East, about B. C. 206, we enterupon a period when Parthian history is, for a quarter of a century, almost a blank. Nothing more is known of Arsaces III. After Antiochusretired; and nothing at all is known of his successor, Priapatius, beyond his name and the length of his reign, which lasted for fifteenyears (from about B. C. 196 to 181). The reigns of these princes coincidewith those of Euthydemus and his son, Demetrius, in Bactria; and perhapsthe most probable solution of the problem of Parthian inactivity at thistime is to be found in the great development of Bactrian power whichnow took place, and the influence which the two neighboring kingdomsnaturally exercised upon each other. When Parthia was strong andaggressive, Bactria was, for the most part, quiet; and when Bactriashows signs of vigorous and active life, Parthia languishes and retiresinto the shade. 

The Bactrian Kingdom, founded (as we have seen) a little before theParthian, sought from the first its aggrandizement in the East ratherthan in the West. The Empire of Alexander had included all the countriesbetween the Caspian Sea and the Sutlej; and these tracts, whichconstitute the modern Khorasan, Afghanistan, and Punjaub, had all beento a certain extent Hellenized by means of Greek settlements and Greekgovernment. But Alexander was no sooner dead than a tendency displayeditself in these regions, and particularly in the more eastern ones, towards a relapse into barbarism, or, if this expression be too strong, at any rate towards a rejection of Hellenism. During the early warsof the "Successors" the natives of the Punjaub generally seized theopportunity to revolt; the governors placed over the various districtsby Alexander were murdered; and the tribes everywhere declaredthemselves free. Among the leaders of the revolt was a certainChandragupta (or Sandracottus), who contrived to turn the circumstancesof the time to his own special advantage, and built up a considerablekingdom in the far East out of the fragments which had detachedthemselves from what was still called the Macedonian Empire. WhenSeleucus Nicator, about B. C. 305, conducted an expedition across theIndus, he found this monarch established in the tract between the Indusand the Ganges, ruling over extensive dominions and at the head ofa vast force. It is uncertain whether the two rivals engaged inhostilities or no. At any rate, a peace was soon made; and Seleucus, inreturn for five hundred elephants, ceded to Sandracottus certain landson the west bank of the Indus, which had hitherto been regarded asMacedonian. These probably consisted of the low grounds between theIndus and the foot of the mountains--the districts of Peshawur, Bunnoo, Murwut, Shikarpoor, and Kurrachee--which are now in British occupation. Thus Hellenism in these parts receded more and more, the SanskriticIndians recovering by degrees the power and independence of which theyhad been deprived by Alexander. 

This state of things could not have been pleasing to the Greek princesof Bactria, who must have felt that the reaction towards barbarism inthese parts tended to isolate them, and that there was a danger of theirbeing crushed between the Parthians on the one hand and the perpetuallyadvancing Indians on the other. When Antiochus the Great, afterconcluding his treaty with Euthydemus, marched eastward, the Bactrianmonarch probably indulged in hopes that the Indians would receive acheck, and that the Greek frontier would be again carried to the Indus, if not to the Sutlej. But, if so, he was disappointed. Antiochus, instead of making war upon the Indians, contented himself with renewingthe old alliance of the Seleucidae with the Maurja princes, andobtaining a number of elephants from Sophagesenus, the grandson ofSandracottus. It is even possible that he went further, and madecessions of territory in return for this last gift, which brought theIndian frontier still nearer than before to that of Bactria, At anyrate, the result of the Indian expedition of Antiochus seems to havebeen unsatisfactory to Euthydemus, who shortly afterwards commenced whatare called "Indian Wars" on his south-eastern frontier, employing inthem chiefly the arms of his son, Demetrius. During the latter yearsof Euthydemus and the earlier ones of Demetrius, the Bactrian rule wasrapidly extended over the greater portion of the modern Afghanistan; nordid it even stop there. The arms of Demetrius were carried across theIndus into the Punjaub region; and the city of Euthymedeia upon theHydaspes remained to later times an evidence of the extent of hisconquests. From B. C. 206 to about B. C. 185 was the most flourishingperiod of the Bactrian monarchy, which expanded during that space from asmall kingdom into a considerable empire. 

The power and successes of the Bactrian princes at this time accountsufficiently for the fact that the contemporary Parthian monarchs stoodupon their guard, and undertook no great expeditions. Arsaces III. , whocontinued on the throne for about ten or twelve years after his peacewith Antiochus, and Priapatius, or Arsaces IV. , his son, who succeededhim, and had a reign of fifteen years, were content, as alreadyobserved, to watch over their own State, husbanding its resources, andliving at peace with all their neighbors. It was not till Phraates I. (Arsaces V. ), the son of Priapatius, had mounted the throne, B. C. 181, that this policy was departed from, and Parthia, which had remainedtranquil for a quarter of a century, once more aroused herself, andassumed an attitude of aggression. 

The quarter to which Phraates I. Directed his arms was the country ofthe Mardians, a poor but warlike people, who appear to have occupieda portion of the Elburz range, probably that immediately south ofMazanderan and Asterabad. The reduction of these fierce mountaineersis likely to have occupied him for some years, since their country wasexceedingly strong and difficult. Though the Mardi were (nominally, atany rate) subjects of the Seleucidae, we do not hear of any assistancebeing rendered them, or, indeed, of any remonstrance being made againstthe unprovoked aggression of the Parthian monarch. The reign of PhraatesI. In Parthia coincides with that of Seleucus IV. (Philopator) in Syria;and we may account for the inactivity of this prince, in part byhis personal character, which was weak and pacific, in part by theexhaustion of Syria at the time, in consequence of his father's greatwar with Rome (B. C. 197-190), and of the heavy contribution whichwas imposed upon him at the close of it. Syria may scarcely have yetrecovered sufficient strength to enter upon a new struggle, especiallyone with a distant and powerful enemy. The material interests of theEmpire may also have seemed to be but little touched by the war, sincethe Mardi were too poor to furnish much tribute; and it is possible, ifnot even probable, that their subjection to Syria had long been ratherformal than real. Seleucus therefore allowed the Mardians to be reduced, conceiving, probably, that their transfer to the dominion of theArsacidse neither increased the Parthian power nor diminished his own. 

But the nation which submits to be robbed of a province, howeverunproductive and valueless, must look to having the process repeatedat intervals, until it bestirs itself and offers resistance. There isreason to believe that Phraates had no sooner conquered the Mardiansthan he cast his eyes on an adjacent district, and resolved to add it tohis territories. This was the tract lying immediately to the West of theCaspian Gates, which was always reckoned to Media, forming, however, a distinct district, know as Media Rhagiana. It was a region of muchnatural fertility, being watered by numerous streams from the Elburzrange, and possessing a soil of remarkable productiveness. Its breadthwas not great, since it consisted of a mere strip between the mountainsand the Salt Desert which occupies the whole centre of the Iranictableland; but it extended in length at least a hundred and fifty miles, from the Caspian Gates to the vicinity of Kasvin. Its capital city, froma remote antiquity, was Rbages, situated near the eastern extremityof the strip, probably at the spot now called Kaleh Erij, abouttwenty-three miles from the "Gates. " On this region it is clear thatPhraates cast a covetous eye. How much of it he actually occupied isdoubtful; but it is at least certain that he effected a lodgment in itseastern extremity, which must have put the whole region in jeopardy. Nature has set a remarkable barrier between the more eastern and themore western portions of Occidental Asia, about midway in the tractwhich lies due south of the Caspian Sea. The Elburz range in this partis one of so tremendous a character, and northward abuts so closelyon the Caspian, that all communication between the east and the westnecessarily passes to the south of it. In this quarter the Great Desertoffering an insuperable obstacle to transit, the line of communicationhas to cling to the flanks of the mountain chain, the narrow stripbetween the mountains and the desert--rarely ten miles in width--beingalone traversable. But about long. 52° 20' this strip itself fails. Arocky spur runs due south from the Elburz into the desert for a distanceof some twenty or thirty miles, breaking the line of communication, andseeming at first sight to obstruct it completely. This, however, is notthe case absolutely. The spur itself is penetrable by two passes, onewhere it joins the Elburz, which is the more difficult of the two, andanother, further to the south, which is easier. The latter now knownas the Girduni Sudurrah pass, constitutes the famous "Pylae Caspiae. "Through this pass alone can armies proceed from Armenia, Media, andPersia eastward, or from Turkestan, Khorasan, and Afghanistan into themore western parts of Asia. The position is therefore one of primaryimportance. It was to guard it that Rhages was built so near the easternend of its territory. So long as it remained in the possession of Syria, Parthian aggression was checked. Rhagiana, the rest of Media, and theother provinces were safe, or nearly so. On the other hand, the loss ofit to Parthia laid the eastern provinces open to her, and was at oncealmost equivalent to the loss of all Rhagiana, which had no othernatural protection. Now we find that Phraates surmounted the "Gates, "and effected a lodgment in the plain country beyond them. He removed aportion of the conquered Mardians from their mountain homes to the cityof Charax, which was on the western side of the Gates, probably on thesite now occupied by the ruins known as Uewanikif. Their location inthis strong post was a menace to the neighboring town of Rhages, whichcan scarcely have maintained itself long against an enemy encamped atits doors. We are not informed, however, of any results which followedon the occupation of Charax during the lifetime of Phraates. His reignlasted only seven years--from B. C. 181 to B. C. 174--and it is thusprobable that he died before there was time for his second importantconquest to have any further consequences. 

Phraates had sufficient warning of his coming decease to makepreparations with respect to a successor. Though he had several sons, some of whom were (we must suppose) of sufficient age to have ascendedthe throne, he left his crown to his brother, Mithridates. He felt, probably, that the State required the direction of a firm hand, that warmight at any time break out with either Syria or Bactria; while, ifthe career of conquest on which he had made Parthia enter were to bepursued, he could trust his brother better than any of his sons toconduct aggressive expeditions with combined vigor and prudence. Weshall see, as the history proceeds, how Mithridates justified hischoice. Phraates would also appear to have borne his brother especialaffection, since he takes the name of "Philadelphus" (brother-loving)upon his coins. It must have been a satisfaction to him that he was ableby his last act at once to consult for the good of his country, and togratify a sentiment on which it is evident that he prided himself. 

CHAPTER V. 

_Reign of Mithridates I. Position of Bactria and Syria at his accession. His first war with Bactria. His great Expedition against the EasternSyrian provinces, and its results. His second war with Bactria, terminating in its conquest. Extent of his Empire. Attempt of DemetriusNicator to recover the lost Provinces fails. Captivity of Demetrius. Death of Mithridates. _

The reign of Mithridates I. Is the most important in the Parthianhistory. [PLATE 1. Fig. 3. ] Receiving from his brother Phraates akingdom of but narrow dimensions, confined (as it would seem) betweenthe city of Charax on the one side, and the river Arius, or Hori-rud, on the other, he transformed it, within the space of thirty-seven years(which was the time that his reign lasted), into a great and nourishingEmpire. It is not too much to say that, but for him, Parthia might haveremained a more petty State on the outskirts of the Syrian kingdom, and, instead of becoming a rival to Rome, might have sunk shortly intoobscurity and insignificance. 

[Illustration: PLATE 1. ]

As commonly happens in the grand changes which constitute theturning-points of history, the way for Mithridates's vast successes wasprepared by a long train of antecedent circumstances. To show how therise of the Parthians to greatness in the middle of the second centurybefore our era was rendered possible, we must turn aside once morefrom our proper subject and cast a glance at the condition of the twokingdoms between which Parthia stood, at the time when Mithridatesascended the throne. 

The Bactrian monarchs in their ambitious struggles to possess themselvesof the tracts south of the Paropamisus, and extending from the Heri-rudto the Sutlej and the mouths of the Indus, overstrained the strengthof their State, and by shifting the centre of its power injuredirretrievably its principle of cohesion. As early as the reign ofDemetrius a tendency to disruption showed itself, Eucratidas havingheld the supreme power for many years in Bactria itself, while Demetriusexercised authority on the southern side of the mountains. It is truethat at the death of Demetrius this tendency was to a certain extentchecked, since Eucratidas was then able to extend his sway over almostthe whole of the Bactrian territory. But the old evil recurred shortly, though in a less pronounced form. Eucratidas, without being actuallysupplanted in the north by a rival, found that he could devote to thatportion of the Empire but a small part of his attention. The southerncountries and the prospect of southern and eastern conquests engrossedhim. While he carried on successful wars with the Arachotians, theDrangians, and the Indians of the Punjaub region, his hold on the morenorthern countries was relaxed, and they began to slip from his grasp. Incursions of the nomad Scyths from the Steppes carried fire andsword over portions of these provinces, some of which were Even, it isprobable, seized and occupied by the invaders. 

Such was, it would seem, the condition of Bactria under Eucratidas, thecontemporary of Mithridates. In Syria, Antiochus Epiphanes had succeededhis brother Seleucus IV. (Philopator) about a year before Mithridatesascended the Parthian throne. He was a prince of courage and energy;but his hands were fully occupied with wars in Egypt, Palestine, andArmenia, and the distant East could attract but a small share of histhought or attention. The claim put forward by Egypt to the possessionof Coele-Syria and Palestine, promised to Ptolemy V. (it was affirmed)as a dowry with Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus the Great, led tohostilities in the south-west which lasted continuously for four years(B. C. 171 to B. C. 168), and were complicated during two of them withtroubles in Judaea, rashly provoked by the Syrian monarch, who, unawareof the stubborn temper of the Jews, goaded them into insurrection. The war with Egypt came to an end in B. C. 168; it brought Syria noadvantage, since Rome interposed, and required the restitution ofall conquests. The war with the Jews had no such rapid termination. Antiochus, having not only plundered and desecrated the Temple, buthaving set himself to eradicate utterly the Jewish religion, andcompletely Hellenize the people, was met with the most determinedresistance on the part of a moiety of the nation. A patriotic partyrose up under devoted leaders, who asserted, and in the end secured, theindependence of their country. Not alone during the remaining yearsof Epiphanes, but for half a century after his death, throughout sevenreigns, the struggle continued; Judaea taking advantage of every troubleand difficulty in Syria to detach herself more and more completely fromher oppressor; being a continual thorn in her side, a constant source ofweakness, preventing more than anything else the recovery of her power. The triumph which Epiphanes obtained in the distant Armenia (B. C. 166-5), where he defeated and captured the king, Artaxias, was a poorset-off against the foe which he had created to himself at his doorsthrough his cruelty and intolerance. 

In another quarter, too, the Syrian power received a severe shakethrough the injudicious violence of Epiphanes. The Oriental templeshad, in some instances, escaped the rapacity of Alexander's generals and"Successors;" their treasuries remained unviolated, and contained largehoards of the precious metals. Epiphanes, having exhausted his ownexchequer by his wars and his lavish gifts, saw in these un-plunderedstores a means of replenishing it, and made a journey into hissouth-eastern provinces for the purpose. The natives of Elymais, however, resisted his attempt, and proved strong enough to defeat it;the baffled monarch retired to Tabae, where he shortly afterward fellsick and died. In the popular belief his death was a judgment upon himfor his attempted sacrilege; and in the exultation caused by the eventthe bands which joined these provinces to the Empire must undoubtedlyhave been loosened. 

Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (B. C. 164) improve the condition ofaffairs in Syria. The throne fell to his son, Antiochus Eupator, a boyof nine, according to Appian, or, according to another authority, oftwelve years of age. The regent, Lysias, exercised the chief power, andwas soon engaged in a war with the Jews, whom the death of Epiphaneshad encouraged to fresh efforts. The authority of Lysias was furtherdisputed by a certain Philip, whom Epiphanes, shortly before his death, had made tutor to the young king. The claims of this tutor to theregent's office being supported by a considerable portion of the army, acivil war arose between him and Lysias, which raged for the greaterpart of two years (B. C. 163-2), terminating in the defeat and deathof Philip. But Syrian affairs did not even then settle down intotranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid house, Demetrius by name, the sonof Seleucus IV. , and consequently the first cousin of Eupator, was atthis time detained in Rome as a hostage, having been sent there duringhis father's lifetime as a security for his fidelity. Demetrius, withsome reason, regarded his claim to the Syrian throne as better than thatof his cousin, the son of the younger brother, and being in the fullvigor of early youth, he determined to assert his pretensions in Syria, and to make a bold stroke for the crown. Having failed to obtain theSenate's consent to his quitting Italy, he took his departure secretly, crossed the Mediterranean in a Carthaginian vessel, and, landing inAsia, succeeded within a few months in establishing himself as Syrianmonarch. 

From this review it sufficiently appears that the condition of things, both in Syria and Bactria, was favorable to any aspirations whichthe power that lay between them might entertain after dominion andself-aggrandizement. The Syrian and Bactrian kings, at the time ofMithridates's accession, were, both of them, men of talent and energy;but the Syrian monarch was soon involved in difficulties at home, whilethe Bactrian had his attention attracted to prospects of advantage in aremote quarter, Mithridates might, perhaps, have attacked the territoryof either with an equal chance of victory; and as his predecessor hadset him the example of successful warfare on his western frontier, wemight have expected his first efforts to have been in this direction, against the dependencies of Syria. But circumstances which we cannotexactly trace determined his choice differently. While Eucratidas wasentangled in his Indian wars, Mithridates invaded the Bactrian territorywhere it adjoined Parthia, and added to his Empire, after a shortstruggle, two provinces, called respectively Turiua and that ofAspionus. It is conjectured that these provinces lay towards the northand the north-west, the one being that of the Turanians proper, and theother that of the Aspasiacae, who dwelt between the Jaxartes andthe Oxus. But there is scarcely sufficient ground for forming even aconjecture on the subject, since speculation has nothing but the namesthemselves to rest upon. 

Successful in this quarter, Mithridates, a few years later, havingwaited until the Syrian throne was occupied by the boy Eupator, and thetwo claimants of the regency, Lysias and Philip, were contending in armsfor the supreme power, made suddenly an expedition towards the west, falling upon Media, which, though claimed by the Syrian kings as aprovince of their Empire, was perhaps at this time almost, if not quite, independent. The Medes offered a vigorous resistance to his attack;and, in the war which followed, each side had in turn the advantage;but eventually the Parthian prince proved victorious, and the greatand valuable province of Media Magna was added to the dominons of theArsacidae. A certain Bacasis was appointed to govern it, whether assatrap or as tributary monarch is not apparent; while the Parthian king, recalled towards home by a revolt, proceeded to crush rebellion beforeresuming his career of conquest. 

The revolt which now occupied for a time the attention of Mithridateswas that of Hyrcania. The Hyrcanians were Arians in race; they werebrave and high-spirited, and under the Persian monarchs had enjoyed someexceptional privileges which placed them above the great mass of theconquered nations. It was natural that they should dislike the yoke of aTuranian people; and it was wise of them to make their effort to obtaintheir freedom before Parthia grew into a power against which revoltwould be utterly hopeless. Hyrcania might now expect to be joined by theMedes, and even the Mardi, who were Arians like themselves, and couldnot yet have forgotten the pleasures of independence. But though theeffort does not seem to have been ill-timed, it was unsuccessful. No aidwas given to the rebels, so far as we hear, by any of their neighbors. Mithridates's prompt return nipped the insurrection in the bud; Hyrcaniaat once submitted, and became for centuries the obedient vassal of herpowerful neighbor. 

The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians into contact withthe rich country of Susiana or Elymais; and it was not long beforeMithridates, having crushed the Hyrcanian revolt, again advancedwestward, and invaded this important province. Elymais appears to havea had a king of its own, who must either have been a vassal of theSeleucidse, or have acquired an independent position by revolt after thedeath of Epiphanes. In the war which followed between this monarch andMithridates, the Elymseans proved wholly unsuccessful, and Mithridatesrapidly overran the country and added it to his dominions. After this heappears to have received the submission of the Persians on the one handand the Babylonians on the other, and to have rested on his laurels forsome years, having extended the Parthian sway from the Hindoo Koosh tothe Euphrates. 

The chronological data which have come down to us for this periodare too scanty to allow of any exact statement of the number of yearsoccupied by Mithridates in effecting these conquests. All that can besaid is that he appears to have commenced them about B. C. 163 and tohave concluded them some time before B. C. 140, when he was in his turnattacked by the Syrians. Probably they had been all effected by theyear B. C. 150; since there is reason to believe that about that timeMithridates found his power sufficiently established in the west toallow of his once more turning his attention eastward, and renewing hisaggressions upon the Bactrian kingdom, which had passed from the rule ofEucratidas under that of his son and successor, Heliocles. 

Heliocles, who was allowed by his father a quasi-royal position, obtained the full possession of the Bactrian throne by the crime ofparricide. It is conjectured that he regarded with disapproval hisfather's tame submission to Parthian ascendency, and desired therecovery of the provinces which Eucratidas had been content to cede forthe sake of peace. We are told that he justified his crime on the groundthat his father was a public enemy; which is best explained by supposingthat he considered him the friend of Bactria's great enemy, Parthia. If this be the true account of the circumstances under which he becameking, his accession would have been a species of challenge tothe Parthian monarch, whose ally he had assassinated. Mithridatesaccordingly marched against him with all speed, and, easily defeatinghis troops, took possession of the greater part of his dominion. Elatedby this success, he is said to have pressed eastward, to have invadedIndia, and overrun the country as far as the river Hydaspes, but, ifit be true that his arms penetrated so far, it is, at any rate, certainthat he did not here effect any conquest. Greek monarchs of the Bactrianseries continued masters of Oabul and Western India till about B. C. 126;no Parthian coins are found in this region; nor do the best authoritiesclaim for Mithridates any dominion beyond the mountains which enclose onthe west the valley of the Indus. 

By his war with Heliocles the empire of Mithridates reached its greatestextension. It comprised now, besides Parthia Proper, Bactria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, Margiana, Hyrcania, the country of the Mardi, Media Magna, Susiana, Persia and Babylonia. Very probably its limitswere still wider. The power which possessed Parthia, Hyrcania, andBactria, would rule almost of necessity over the whole tract between theElburz range and the Oxus, if not even over the region between the Oxusand the Jaxartes; that which held the Caspian mountains and easternMedia could not fail to have influence over the tribes of the Iranicdesert; while Assyria Proper would naturally follow the fortunes ofBabylonia and Susiana. Still the extent of territory thus indicatedrests only on conjecture. If we confine ourselves to what is known bypositive evidence, we can only say that the Parthian Kingdom of thisperiod contained, at least, twelve provinces above enumerated. It thusstretched from east to west a distance of fifteen hundred miles betweenthe Suleiman mountains and the Euphrates, varying in width from three orfour hundred miles--or even more--towards the west and east, to anarrow strip of less than a hundred miles toward the centre. It probablycomprised an area of about 450, 000 square miles; which is somewhat lessthan that of the modern Persia. 

Unlike the modern Persia, however, the territory consisted almostentirely of productive regions. The excellent quality of the soilin Parthia Proper, Hyrcania, and Margiana, has been already noticed. Bactria, the next province to Margiana towards the east, was lessuniformly fertile; but still it contained a considerable proportion ofgood land along the course of the Oxus and its tributaries, which wascultivated in vineyards and cornfields, or else pastured large herds ofcattle. The Mardian mountain territory was well wooded; and the plainbetween the mountains and the Caspian was rich in the extreme. Media, where it adjoined on the desert, was comparatively sterile; but stilleven here an elaborate system of artificial irrigation brought a belt ofland under culture. Further west, in the Zagros chain, Media comprisedsome excellent pasture lands, together with numerous valleys asproductive as any in Asia. Elymais was, in part, of the same characterwith the mountainous portion of Media, while beyond the mountain itsank down into a rich alluvium, not much inferior to the Babylonian. Babylonia itself was confessedly the most fertile country in Asia. Itproduced wheat, barley, millet, sesame, vetches, dates, and fruitsof all kinds. The return of the wheat crop was from fifty to ahundred-and-fifty-fold; while that of the barley crop was threehundred-fold. The dates were of unusual size and superior flavor;and the palm, which abounded throughout the region, furnished aninexhaustible supply both of fruit and timber. 

The great increase of power which Mithridates had obtained by hisconquests could not be a matter of indifference to the Syrian monarchs. Their domestic troubles--the contentions between Philip and Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius Soter, Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas andDemetrius II. , Demetrius II. And Tryphon, had so engrossed them for thespace of twenty years (from B. C. 162 to B. C. 142) that they had felt itimpossible, or hopeless, to attempt any expedition towards the East, for the protection or recovery of their provinces. Mithridates hadbeen allowed to pursue his career of conquest unopposed, so far as theSyrians were concerned, and to establish his sway from the Hindoo Kooshto the Euphrates. But a time at last came when home dangers were lesspressing, and a prospect of engaging the terrible Parthians with successseemed to present itself. The second Demetrius had not, indeed, whollyovercome his domestic enemy, Tryphon; but he had so far brought him intodifficulties as to believe that he might safely be left to be dealtwith by his wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains. At the same time thecondition of affairs in the East seemed to invite his interference, Mithridates ruled his new conquests with some strictness, suspecting, probably, their fidelity, and determined that he would not by anyremissness allow them to escape from his grasp. The native inhabitantscould scarcely be much attached to the Syro-Macedonians, who hadcertainly not treated them very tenderly; but a possession of 170 years'duration confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may havegalled more than one to whose pressure they had become accustomed. Moreover, all the provinces which Parthia took from Syria containedGreek towns, and their inhabitants might at all times be depended onto side with their countrymen against the Asiatics. At the presentconjuncture, too, the number of the malcontents was swelled by theaddition of the recently subdued Bactrians, who hated the Parthian yoke, and longed earnestly for a chance of recovering their freedom. Thus whenDemetrius II. , anxious to escape the reproach of inertness, determinedto make an expedition against the great Parthian monarch, he foundhimself welcomed as a deliverer by a considerable number of his enemy'ssubjects, whom the harshness, or the novelty, of the Parthian rulehad offended. The malcontents joined his standard as he advanced;and supported, as he thus was, by Persian, Elymsen, and Bactriancontingents, he engaged and defeated the Parthians in several battles. Upon this, Mithridates, finding himself inferior in strength, hadrecourse to stratagem, and having put Demetrius off his guard byproposals of peace, attacked him, defeated him, and took him prisoner. The invading army appears to have been destroyed. The captive monarchwas, in the first instance, conveyed about to the several nations whichhad revolted, and paraded before each in turn, as a proof to them oftheir folly in lending him aid, but afterwards he was treated in amanner befitting his rank and the high character of his captor. Assigneda residence in Hyrcania, he was maintained in princely state, and waseven promised by Mithridates the hand of his daughter, Ehodo-guns. TheParthian monarch, it is probable, had the design of conquering Syria, and thought it possible that he might find it of advantage to havea Syrian prince in his camp, well disposed towards him, connected bymarriage, and thus fitted for the position of tributary monarch. But theschemes of Mithridates proved abortive. His career had now reached itsclose. Attacked by illness not very long after his capture of Demetrius, his strength proved insufficient to bear up against the malady, and hedied after a glorious reign of about thirty-eight years, B. C. 136. 

CHAPTER VI. 

_System of government established by Mithridates I. Constitution of theParthians. Government of the Provinces. Laws and Institutions. Characterof Mithridates I. _

The Parthian institutions possessed great simplicity; and it is probablethat they took a shape in the reign of Arsaces I. , or, at any rate, ofTiridates, which was not greatly altered afterwards. Permanency is thelaw of Oriental governments; and in a monarchy which lasted less thanfive hundred years, it is not likely that many changes occurred. TheParthian institutions are referred to Mithridates I. , rather than toTiridates, because in the reign of Mithridates Parthia entered upon anew phase of her existence--became an empire instead of a meremonarchy; and the sovereign of the time could not but have reviewedthe circumstances of his State, and have determined either to adopt theprevious institutions of his country, or to reject them. MithridatesI. Had attained a position which entitled and enabled him to settlethe Parthian constitution as he thought best; and, if he maintained anearlier arrangement, which is uncertain, he must have done so of hisown free will, simply because he preferred the existing Parthianinstitutions to any other. Thus the institutions may be regarded asstarting from him, since he approved them, and made them those of theParthian EMPIRE. 

Like most sovereignties which have arisen out of an association ofchiefs banding themselves together for warlike purposes under a singlehead, the Parthian monarchy was limited. The king was permanentlyadvised by two councils, consisting of persons not of his ownnomination, whom rights, conferred by birth or office, entitled to theirseats. One of these was a family conclave (concilium domesticum), orassembly of the full-grown males of the Royal House; the other was aSenate comprising both the spiritual and the temporal chiefs of thenation, the Sophi, or "Wise Men, " and the Magi, or "Priests. " Togetherthese two bodies constituted the Megistanes, the "Nobles" or "GreatMen"--the privileged class which to a considerable extent checked andcontrolled the monarch. The monarchy was elective, but only in the houseof the Arsacidae; and the concurrent vote of both councils was necessaryin the appointment of a new king. Practically, the ordinary law ofhereditary descent appears to have been followed, unless in the casewhere a king left no son of sufficient age to exercise the royal office. Under such circumstances, the Megistanes usually nominated the lateking's next brother to succeed him, or, if he had left behind him nobrother, went back to an uncle. When the line of succession had oncebeen changed, the right of the elder branch was lost, and did not reviveunless the branch preferred died out or possessed no member qualified torule. When a king had been duly nominated by the two councils, theright of placing the diadem upon his head belonged to the Surena, the"Field-Marshal, " or "Commander in Chief of the Parthian armies. " TheMegistanes further claimed and sometimes exercised the right of deposinga monarch whose conduct displeased them; but an attempt to exercise thisprivilege was sure to be followed by a civil war, no monarch acceptinghis deposition without a struggle; and force, not right, practicallydetermining whether he should remain king or no. 

After a king was once elected and firmly fixed upon the throne, hispower appears to have been nearly despotic. At any rate he could put todeath without trial whomsoever he chose; and adult members of the RoyalHouse, who provoked the reigning monarch's jealousy, were constantly sotreated. Probably it would have been more dangerous to arouse the fearsof the "Sophi" and "Magi. " The latter especially were a powerful body, consisting of an organized hierarchy, which had come down from ancienttimes, and was feared and venerated by all classes of the people. Theirnumbers at the close of the Empire, counting adult males only, arereckoned at eighty thousand;' they possessed considerable tracts offertile land, and were the sole inhabitants of many large towns orvillages, which they were permitted to govern as they pleased. Thearbitrary power of the monarchs must, in practice, have been largelychecked by the privileges of this numerous priestly caste, of which itwould seem that in later times they became jealous, thereby preparingthe way for their own downfall. 

The dominion of the Parthians over the conquered provinces wasmaintained by reverting to the system which had prevailed generallythrough the East before the accession of the Persians to power, andestablishing in the various countries either viceroys, holding officefor life, or sometimes dependent dynasties of kings. In either case, therulers, so long as they paid tribute regularly to the Parthian monarchsand aided them in their wars, were allowed to govern the people beneaththeir sway at their pleasure. Among monarchs, in the higher sense ofthe term, may be enumerated the kings of Persia, Elymaiis, Adiabene, Osrhoene, and of Armenia and Media Atropatene, when they formed, asthey sometimes did, portions of the Parthian Empire. The viceroys, who governed the other provinces, bore the title of Vitaxae, and werefourteen or fifteen in number. The remark has been made by the historianGibbon that the system thus established "exhibited under other names alively image of the feudal system which has since prevailed in Europe. "The comparison is of some value, but, like most historical parallels, itis inexact, the points of difference between the Parthian and the feudalsystem being probably more numerous than those of resemblance, but thepoints of resemblance being very main points, not fewer in number, andstriking. 

It was with special reference to the system thus established that theParthian monarchs took the title of "King of Kings", so frequent upontheir coins, which seems sometimes to have been exchanged for what wasregarded as an equivalent phrase, "Satrap of Satraps". This title seemsto appear first on the coins of Mithridates I. 

In the Parthian system there was one anomaly of a very curiouscharacter. The Greek towns, which were scattered in large numbersthroughout the Empire, enjoyed a municipal government of their own, andin some cases were almost independent communities, the Parthian kingsexercising over them little or no control. The great city of Seleuciaon the Tigris was the most important of all these: its population wasestimated in the first century after Christ at six hundred thousandsouls; it had strong walls, and was surrounded by a most fertileterritory. It had its own senate, or municipal council, of three hundredmembers, elected by the people to rule them from among the wealthiestand best educated of the citizens. Under ordinary circumstances itenjoyed the blessing of complete self-government, and was entirely freefrom Parthian interference, paying no doubt its tribute, but otherwiseholding the position of a "free city. " It was only in the case ofinternal dissensions that these advantages were lost, and the Parthiansoldiery, invited within the walls, arranged the quarrels of parties, and settled the constitution of the State at its pleasure. Privilegesof a similar character, though, probably, less extensive, belonged(it would seem) to most of the other Greek cities of the Empire. TheParthian monarchs thought it polite to favor them; and their practicejustified the title of "Phil-Hellene, " which they were fond of assumingupon their coins. On the whole, the policy may have been wise, but itdiminished the unity of the Empire; and there were times when seriousdanger arose from it. The Syro-Macedonian monarchs could always countwith certainty on having powerful friends in Parthia, whatever portionof it they invaded; and even the Romans, though their ethnic connectionwith the cities was not so close, were sometimes indebted to them forvery important assistance. 

We are told that Mithridates I. , after effecting his conquests, made acollection of the best laws which he found to prevail among the varioussubject peoples, and imposed them upon the Parthian nation. Thisstatement is, no doubt, an exaggeration; but we may attribute, withsome reason, to Mithridates the introduction at this time of variouspractices and usages, whereby the Parthian Court was assimilated tothose of the earlier Great Monarchies of Asia, and became in the eyesof foreigners the successor and representative of the old Assyrian andPersian Kingdoms. The assumption of new titles and of a new state--theorganization of the Court on a new plan--the bestowal of a new characteron the subordinate officers of the Empire, were suitable to the newphase of its life on which the monarchy had now entered, and may withthe highest probability, if not with absolute certainty, be assigned tothis period. 

It has been already noticed that Mithridates appears to have been thefirst Parthian sovereign who took the title of "King of Kings. "The title had been a favorite one with the old Assyrian and Persianmonarchs, but was not adopted either by the Seleucidae or by the Greekkings of Bactria. Its revival implied a distinct pretension to thatmastery of Western Asia which had belonged of old to the Assyrians andPersians, and which was, in later times, formally claimed by Artaxerxes, the son of Sassan, the founder of the New Persian Kingdom. PreviousParthian monarchs had been content to call themselves "the King, " or"the Great King"--Mithridates is "the King of Kings, the great andillustrious Arsaces. "

At the same time Mithridates appears to have assumed the tiara, or tallstiff crown, which, with certain modifications in its shape, hadbeen the mark of sovereignty, both under the Assyrians and under thePersians. Previously the royal headdress had been either a mere cap ofa Scythic type, but lower than the Scyths commonly wore it; or theordinary diadem, which was a band round the head terminating in two longribbons or ends, that hung down behind the head on the back. Accordingto Herodian, the diadem, in the later times, was double; but the coinsof Parthia do not exhibit this peculiarity. [PLATE 1, Fig. 4. ]

Ammianus says that among the titles assumed by the Parthian monarchs wasthat of "Brother of the Sun and Moon. " It appears that something of adivine character was regarded as attaching to the race. In the civilcontentions, which occur so frequently throughout the later history, combatants abstained from lifting their hands knowingly against anArsacid, to kill or wound one being looked upon as sacrilege. Thename of _Deos_ was occasionally assumed, as it was in Syria; and morefrequently kings took the epithet of [Greek], which implied the divinityof their father. After his death a monarch seems generally to have beenthe object of a qualified worship; statues were erected to him in thetemples, where (apparently) they were associated with the images of thegreat luminaries. 

Of the Parthian Court and its customs we have no account that is eithercomplete or trustworthy. Some particulars, however, may be gathered ofit on which we may place reliance. The best authorities are agreed thatit was not stationary, but migrated at different times of the year todifferent cities of the Empire, in this resembling the Court of theAchaemenians. It is not quite clear, however, which were the cities thushonored. Ctesiphon was undoubtedly one of them. All writers agreethat it was the chief city of the Empire, and the ordinary seat ofthe government. Here, according to Strabo, the kings passed the wintermonths, delighting in the excellence of the air. The town was situatedon the left bank of the Tigris, opposite to Seleucia, twelve or thirteenmiles below the modern Baghdad. Pliny says that it was built by theParthians in order to reduce Seleucia to insignificance, and that whenit failed of its purpose they built another city. 

Vologesocerta, in the same neighborhood with the same object; but theaccount of Strabo is more probable--viz. , that it grew up gradually outof the wish of the Parthian kings to spare Seleucia the unpleasantnessof having the rude soldiery, which followed the Court from place toplace, quartered upon them The remainder of the year, Strabo tells us, was spent by the Parthian kings either at the Median city of Ecbatana, which is the modern Hamadan, or in the province of Hyrca--In Hyrcania, the palace, according to him, was at Tape and between this place andEcbatana he no doubt regarded the monarchs as spending the time whichwas not passed at Ctesiphon. Athenaeus, however, declares that Rhageswas the spring residence of the Parthian kings; and it seems notunlikely that this famous city, which Isidore, writing in Parthiantimes, calls "the greatest in Media, " was among the occasionalresidences of the Court. Parthia itself was, it would seem, deserted;but still a city of that region preserved in one respect a royalcharacter, being the place where all the earlier kings were interred. 

The pomp and grandeur of the Parthian monarchs are described only in thevaguest terms by the classical writers. No author of repute appearsto have visited the Parthian Court. We may perhaps best obtain a truenotion of the splendor of the sovereign from the accounts which havereached us of his relations and officers, who can have reflected onlyfaintly the magnificence of the sovereign. Plutarch tells us that thegeneral whom Orodes deputed to conduct the war against Crassus came intothe field accompanied by two hundred litters wherein were containedhis concubines, and by a thousand camels which carried his baggage. Hisdress was fashioned after that of the Medes; he wore his hair partedin the middle and had his face painted with cosmetics. A body of tenthousand horse, composed entirely, of his clients and slaves, followedhim in battle. We may conclude from this picture, and from thegeneral tenor of the classical notices, that the Arsacidae revivedand maintained very much such a Court as that of the old Achaemenianprinces, falling probably somewhat below their model in politeness andrefinement, but equalling it in luxury, in extravagant expenditure, andin display. 

Such seems to have been the general character of those practices andinstitutions which distinguish the Parthians from the foundation oftheir Empire by Mithridates, Some of them, it is probable, he ratheradopted than invented; but there is no good reason for doubting that ofmany he was the originator. He appears to have been one of those rareindividuals to whom it has been given to unite the powers which formthe conqueror with those which constitute the successful organizer of aState. Brave and enterprising in war, prompt to seize an occasion and toturn it to the best advantage, not even averse to severities where theyseemed to be required, he yet felt no acrimony towards those who hadresisted his arms, but was ready to befriend them so soon as theirresistance ceased. Mild, clement, philanthropic, he conciliated thosewhom he subdued almost more easily than he subdued them, and by theefforts of a few years succeeded in welding together a dominion whichlasted without suffering serious mutilation for nearly four centuries. Though not dignified with the epithet of "Great, " he was beyond allquestion the greatest of the Parthian monarchs. Later times did him morejustice than his contemporaries, and, when the names of almost all theother kings had sunk into oblivion, retained his in honor, and placed iton a par with that of the original founder of Parthian independence. 

CHAPTER VII. 

_Reign of Phraates II. Expedition of Antiochus Sidetes against Parthia. Release of Demetrius. Defeat and Death of Sidetes. War of Phraates withthe Northern Nomads. His death and character. _

Mithridates was succeeded by his son, Phraates, the second monarch ofthe name, and the seventh Arsaces. This prince, entertaining, like hisfather, the design of invading Syria, and expecting to find someadvantage from having in his camp the rightful occupant of the Syrianthrone, treated the captive Demetrius with even greater kindness thanhis father had done, not only maintaining him handsomely, but evengiving him his sister Ehodogune, in marriage. Demetrius, however, wasnot to be reconciled to his captivity by any such blandishments, andemployed his thoughts chiefly in devising plans by which he mightescape. By the help of a friend he twice managed to evade the vigilanceof his guards, and to make his way from Hyrcania towards the frontiersof his own kingdom; but each time he was pursued and caught withouteffecting his purpose. The Parthian monarch was no doubt vexed at hispertinacity, and on the second occasion thought it prudent to feign, ifhe did not even really feel, offence: he banished his ungratefulbrother-in-law from his presence, but otherwise visited his crime withno severer penalty than ridicule. Choosing to see in his attempts tochange the place of his abode no serious design, but only the waywardconduct of a child, he sent him a present of some golden dice, implyingthereby that it was only for lack of amusement he had grown discontentedwith his Hyrcanian residence. 

Antiochus Sidetes, the brother of Demetrius, had been generally acceptedby the Syrians as their monarch, at the time when the news reached themof that prince's defeat and capture by Mithridates. He was an active andenterprising sovereign, though fond of luxury and display. For someyears (B. C. 140-137) the pretensions of Tryphon to the throne gave himfull occupation; but, having finally established his authority after ashort war, and punished the pretender with death, he found himself, inB. C. 137, at liberty to turn his arms against foreign enemies. He wouldprobably have at once attacked Parthia, but for the attitude of a nearerneighbor, which he regarded as menacing, and as requiring his immediateattention. Demetrius, before his departure for the East, had rewardedthe Jews for services rendered him in his war with Tryphon by an open, acknowledgment of their independence. Sidetes, though indebted to theJewish High Priest, Simon, for offers of aid against the same adversary, could not bring himself to pay the price for it which Demetrius hadthought reasonable--an independent Palestine appeared to him a dangerclose to his doors, and one that imperilled the very existence of theSyrian State. Accordingly, he had no sooner put down Tryphon than heresolved to pick a quarrel with the Jews, and to force them to resumetheir old position of vassalage to Syria. His general, Cendebseus, invaded their country, but was defeated near Azotus. Antiochus had totake the field in person. During two years, John Hyrcanus, who hadsucceeded his father, Simon (B. C. 135), baffled all his efforts; but atlast, in B. C. 133, he was forced to submit, to acknowledge the authorityof Syria, to dismantle Jerusalem, and to resume the payment of tribute. Sidetes then considered the time come for a Parthian expedition, and, having made great preparations, he set out for the East in the springof B. C. 129. 

It is impossible to accept without considerable reserve the accountsthat have come down to us of the force which Antiochus collected. According to Justin, it consisted of no more than 80, 000 fighting men, to which was attached the incredible number of 300, 000 camp-followers, the majority being composed of cooks, bakers, and actors. As in otherextreme cases the camp-followers do but equal or a little exceed thenumber of men fit for service, this estimate, which makes them nearlyfour times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. The latewriter, Orosius, corrects the error here indicated; but his accountseems to err in rating the supernumeraries too low. According to him, the armed force amounted to 300, 000, while the camp-followers, includinggrooms, sutlers, courtesans, and actors, were no more than a thirdof the number. From the two accounts, taken together, we are perhapsentitled to conclude that the entire host did not fall much short of400, 000 men. This estimate receives confirmation from an independentstatement made by Diodorus, with respect to the number who fell in thecampaign--a statement of which we shall have to speak later. 

The army of Phraates, according to two accounts of it (which, however, seem to represent a single original authority), numbered no more than120, 000. An attempt which he made to enlist in his service a body ofScythian mercenaries failed, the Scyths being willing to lend their aid, but arriving too late to be of any use. At the same time a defection ofthe subject princes deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents whichusually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support of his owncountrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these circumstances it is moresurprising that he was able to collect 120, 000 men than that he did notbring into the field a larger number. 

The Syrian troops, magnificently appointed and supported by a body ofJews under John Hyrcanus, advanced upon Babylon, receiving on theirway the adhesion of many of the Parthian tributaries, who professedthemselves disgusted by the arrogance and pride of their masters. Phraates, on his part, advanced to meet his enemies, and in person orby his generals engaged Antiochus in three battles, but without success. Antiochus was three times a conqueror. In a battle fought upon theriver Lycus (Zab) in further Assyria he defeated the Parthian general, Indates, and raised a trophy in honor of his victory. The exact sceneof the other combats is unknown, but they were probably in the sameneighborhood. The result of them was the conquest of Babylonia, and thegeneral revolt of the remaining Parthian provinces, which followed thecommon practice of deserting a falling house, and drew off or declaredfor the enemy. 

Under these circumstances Phraates, considering that the time was comewhen it was necessary for him to submit or to create a diversion byraising troubles in the enemy's territory, released Demetrius from hisconfinement, and sent him, supported by a body of Parthian troops, toreclaim his kingdom. He thought it probable that Antiochus, when theintelligence reached him, would retrace his steps, and return fromBabylon to his own capital. At any rate his efforts would be distracted;he would be able to draw fewer reinforcements from home; and he would beless inclined to proceed to any great distance from his own country. 

Antiochus, however, was either uninformed of the impending danger or didnot regard it as very pressing. The winter was approaching; and, insteadof withdrawing his troops from the occupied provinces and marchingthem back into Syria, he resolved to keep them where they were, merelydividing them, on account of their numbers, among the various citieswhich he had taken, and making them go into winter quarters. It was, no doubt, his intention to remain quiet during the two or three wintermonths, after which he would have resumed the war, and have endeavoredto penetrate through Media into Parthia Proper, where he might expecthis adversary to make his last stand. 

But Phraates saw that the position of affairs was favorable for strikinga blow before the spring came. The dispersion of his enemy's troopsdeprived him of all advantage from the superiority of their numbers. The circumstance of their being quartered in towns newly reduced, and unaccustomed to the rudeness and rapacity of soldiers andcamp-followers, made it almost certain that complications would arise, and that it would not be long before in some places the Parthians, so lately declared to be oppressors, would be hailed as liberators. Moreover, the Parthians were, probably, better able than theiradversaries to endure the hardships and severities of a campaign in thecold season. Parthia is a cold country, and the winters, both of thegreat plateau of Iran and of all the mountain tracts adjoining it, aresevere. The climate of Syria is far milder. Moreover, the troopsof Antiochus had, we are informed, been enervated by an excessiveindulgence on the part of their leader during the marches and halts ofthe preceding summer. Their appetites had been pampered; their habitshad become unmanly; their general tone was relaxed; and they were likelyto deteriorate still more in the wealthy and luxurious cities where theywere bidden to pass the winter. 

These various circumstances raised the spirits of Phraates, and made himhold himself in readiness to resume hostilities at a moment's notice. Nor was it long before the complications which he had foreseen began tooccur. The insolence of the soldiers quartered upon them exasperated theinhabitants of the Mesopotamian towns, and caused them to look back withregret to the time when they were Parthian subjects. The requisitionsmade on them for stores of all kinds was a further grievance. After awhile they opened communications with Phraates, and offered to returnto their allegiance if he would assist them against their oppressors. Phraates gladly listened to these overtures. At his instigation a plotwas formed like that which has given so terrible a significance to thephrase "Sicilian vespers. " It was agreed that on an appointed day allthe cities should break out in revolt: the natives should take arms, rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, and kill all, or as manyas possible. Phraates promised to be at hand with his army, to prevent, the scattered detachments from giving help to each other. It wascalculated that in this way the invaders might be cut off almost to aman without the trouble of even fighting a battle. 

But, before he proceeded to extremities, the Parthian prince determinedto give his adversary a chance of escaping the fate prepared for him bytimely concessions. The winter was not over; but the snow was beginningto melt through the increasing warmth of the sun's rays, and the dayappointed for the general rising was probably drawing near. Phraatesfelt that no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambassadors toAntiochus to propose peace, and to inquire on what conditions it wouldbe granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according to Diodotus, wasas follows: "If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius, fromcaptivity, and deliver him up without ransom, at the same time restoringall the provinces which had been taken from Syria, and consenting to paya tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had; but not otherwise. "To such terms it was, of course, impossible that Phraates should listen;and his ambassadors, therefore, returned without further parley. 

Soon afterwards the day appointed for the outbreak arrived. Apparently, no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops were everywhere quietlyenjoying themselves in their winter quarters, when, suddenly andwithout warning, they found themselves attacked by the natives. Takenat disadvantage, it was impossible for them to make a successfulresistance; and it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacredin their quarters. Antiochus, and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far as we hear, escaped into an open field and contended fortheir lives in just warfare. It had been the intention of the Syrianmonarch, when he took the field, to hasten to the protection of thetroops quartered nearest to him; but he no sooner commenced his marchthan he found himself confronted by Phraates, who was at the head ofhis entire army, having, no doubt, anticipated Antiochus's design andresolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious to engage atonce, as his force far outnumbered that commanded by his adversary;but the latter might have declined the battle, if he had so willed, andhave, at any rate, greatly protracted the struggle. He had a mountainregion--Mount Zagros, probably--within a short distance of him, andmight have fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at greatdisadvantage; but he was still at an age when caution is apt to beconsidered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true courage. Despite theadvice of one of his captains, he determined to accept the battle whichthe enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe whom he had three timesdefeated. But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by hisarmy. Though Antiochus fought strenuously, he was defeated, since histroops were without heart and offered but a poor resistance. Antiochushimself perished, either slain by the enemy or by his own hand. His son, Seleucus, a boy of tender age, and his niece, a daughter of Demetrius, who had accompanied him in his expedition, were captured. His troopswere either cut to pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of thoseslain in the battle, and in the previous massacre, was reckoned at300, 000. 

Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was the last which anySeleucid monarch conducted into these countries--the final attempt madeby Syria to repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces. HenceforthParthia was no further troubled by the power that had hitherto been hermost dangerous enemy, but was allowed to enjoy without molestation fromSyria the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in fact, had fromthis time a difficulty in preserving her own existence. The immediateresult of the destruction of Antiochus and his host was the revolt ofJudaea, which henceforth maintained its independence uninterruptedly. The dominions of the Seleucidae were reduced to Cilicia and SyriaProper, or the tract west of the Euphrates, between Amanus andPalestine. Internally, the state was agitated by constant commotionsfrom the claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty: externally, it was kept in continual alarm by the Egyptians, Arabians, or Romans. During the sixty years which elapsed between the return of Demetriusto his kingdom and the conversion of Syria into a Roman province, sheceased wholly to be formidable to her neighbors. Her flourishingperiod was gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which there was norecovery. It is surprising that the Romans did not step in earlier andterminate a rule which was but a little removed from anarchy. Rome, however, had other work on her hands; and the Syrian kingdom continuedto exist till B. C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund condition. 

But Phraates could not, without prophetic foresight, have counted onsuch utter prostration following as the result of a single--albeit aterrible--blow. Accordingly, we find him still exhibiting a dread of theSeleucid power even after his great victory. He had released Demetriustoo late to obtain any benefit from the hostile feeling which thatprince probably entertained towards his brother. Had he not released himtoo soon for his own safety? Was it not to be feared that the Syriansmight rally under one who was their natural leader, might rapidlyrecover their strength, and renew the struggle for the mastery ofWestern Asia? The first thought of the dissatisfied monarch was tohinder the execution of his own project. Demetrius was on his way toSyria, but had not yet arrived there, or, at any rate, his arrival hadnot been as yet reported. Was it not possible to intercept him? TheParthian king hastily sent out a body of horse, with orders to pursuethe Syrian prince at their best speed, and endeavor to capture himbefore he passed the frontier. If they succeeded, they were to bringhim hack to their master, who would probably have then committed hisprisoner to close custody. The pursuit, however, failed. Demetriushad anticipated, or at least feared, a change of purpose, and, havingprosecuted his journey with the greatest diligence, had reached his ownterritory before the emissaries of Phraates could overtake him. 

It is uncertain whether policy or inclination dictated the step whichPhraates soon afterwards took of allaying himself by marriage with theSeleucidae. He had formally given his sister, Ehodogune, as a wife toDemetrius, and the marriage had been fruitful, Rhodogune having borneDemetrius several children. The two houses of the Seleucidae andArsacidae were thus already allied to some extent. Phraates resolvedto strengthen the bond. The unmarried daughter of Demetrius whom hehad captured after his victory over Antiochus took his fancy; and hedetermined to make her his wife. At the same time he adopted othermeasures calculated to conciliate the Seleucid prince. He treated hiscaptive, Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, with the greatest respect. Tothe corpse of Antiochus he paid royal honors; and, having placed it in asilver coffin, he transmitted it to the Syrians for sepulture. 

Still, if we may believe Justin, he entertained the design of carryinghis arms across the Euphrates and invading Syria, in order to avengethe attack of Antiochus upon his territories. But events occurred whichforced him to relinquish this enterprise. The Scythians, whom he hadcalled to his aid under the pressure of the Syrian invasion, and who hadarrived too late to take part in the war, demanded the pay which theyhad been promised, and suggested that their arms should be employedagainst some other enemy. Phraates was unwilling either to requiteservices not rendered, or to rush needlessly into a fresh war merelyto gratify the avarice of his auxiliaries. He therefore peremptorilyrefused to comply with either suggestion. Upon this, the Scythiansdetermined to take their payment into their own hands, and began toravage Parthia and to carry off a rich booty. Phraates, who had removedthe headquarters of his government to Babylonia, felt it necessary toentrust affairs there to an officer, and to take the field in personagainst this new enemy, which was certainly not less formidable thanthe Syrians. He selected for his representative at the seat of Empirea certain Himerus (or Evemerus), a youth with whom he had a disgracefulconnection, and having established him as a sort of viceroy, marchedaway to the northeast, and proceeded to encounter the Scythians in thatremote region. Besides his native troops, he took with him a numberof Greeks, whom he had made prisoners in his war with Antiochus. Theirfidelity could not but be doubtful; probably, however, he thought thatat a distance from Syria they would not dare to fail him, and that withan enemy so barbarous as the Scythians they would have no temptation tofraternize. But the event proved him mistaken. The Greeks were sullen attheir captivity, and exasperated by some cruel treatment which theyhad received when first captured. They bided their time; and when, in abattle with the Scythians, they saw the Parthian soldiery hard pressedand in danger of defeat, they decided matters by going over in a bodyto the enemy. The Parthian army was completely routed and destroyed, andPhraates himself was among the slain. We are not told what became of thevictorious Greeks; but it is to be presumed that, like the Ten Thousand, they fought their way across Asia, and rejoined their own countrymen. 

Thus died Phraates I. , after a reign of about eight or nine years. Though not possessing the talents of his father, he was a brave andwarlike prince, active, enterprising, fertile in resources, and benton maintaining against all assailants the honor and integrity of theEmpire. In natural temperament he was probably at once soft and cruel. But, when policy required it, he could throw his softness aside and showhimself a hardy and intrepid warrior. Similarly, he could control hisnatural harshness, and act upon occasion with clemency and leniency. Hewas not, perhaps, without a grim humor, which led him to threaten morethan he intended, in order to see how men would comport themselves whengreatly alarmed. There is some evidence that he aimed at saying goodthings; though it must be confessed that the wit is not of a high order. Altogether he has more character than most Oriental monarchs; andthe monotony of Arsacid biography is agreeably interrupted by theidiosyncrasy which his words and conduct indicate. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

_Accession of Artabanus II. Position of Parthia. Growing pressure uponher, and general advance towards the south, of the Saka or Scyths. Causes and extent of the movement. Character and principal tribes of theSaka. Scythic war of Artabanus. His death. _

The successor of Phraates was his uncle, Artabanus, a son of Priapatius. It is probable that the late king had either left no son, or noneof sufficient age to be a fit occupant of the throne at a season ofdifficulty. The "Megistanes, " therefore, elected Artabanus in hisnephew's place, a man of mature age, and, probably, of some experiencein war. The situation of Parthia, despite her recent triumph over theSyro-Macedonians, was critical; and it was of the greatest importancethat the sceptre should be committed to one who would bring to thedischarge of his office those qualities of wisdom, promptness, andvigor, which a crisis demands. 

The difficulty of the situation was two-fold. In the first place, there was an immediate danger to be escaped. The combined Greeks andScythians, who had defeated the Parthian army and slain the monarch, might have been expected to push their advantage to the utmost, andseek to establish themselves as conquerors in the country which layapparently at their mercy. At any rate, the siege and sack of some ofthe chief towns was a probable contingency, if permanent occupationof the territory did not suit the views of the confederates. Thenew monarch had to rid Parthia of her invaders at as little cost aspossible, before he could allow himself to turn his attention to anyother matter whatsoever. Nor did this, under the circumstances, appearto be an easy task. The flower of the Parthian troops had been destroyedin the late battle, and it was not easy to replace them by anothernative army. The subject-nations were at no time to be depended uponwhen Parthia was reduced to straits, and at the present conjecture someof the most important were in a condition bordering upon rebellion. Himerus, the viceroy left by Phraates in Babylonia, had first driventhe Babylonians and Seleucians to desperation by his tyranny, and thenplunged into a war with the people of Mesene, which must have made itdifficult for him to send Artabanus any contingent. Fortunately for theParthians, the folly or moderation of their enemies rendered any greateffort on their part unnecessary. The Greeks, content with havingrevenged themselves, gave the new monarch no trouble at all: theScythians were satisfied with plundering and wasting the open country, after which they returned quietly to their homes. Artabanus foundhimself quit of the immediate danger which had threatened him almostwithout exertion of his own, and could now bend his thoughts to theposition of his country generally, and the proper policy to pursue underthe circumstances. 

For there was a second and more formidable danger impending over theState--a danger not casual and temporary like the one just escaped, butarising out of a condition of things in neighboring regions which hadcome about slowly, and which promised to be permanent. To give thereader the means of estimating this danger aright, it will be necessaryto take a somewhat wide view of the state of affairs on the northernand north-eastern frontiers of Parthia for some time previously to theaccession of Artabanus, to trace out the causes which were at work, producing important changes in these regions, and to indicate theresults which threatened, and those which were accomplished. Theopportunity will also serve for giving such an account of the chiefraces which here bordered the empire as will show the nature of theperil to which Parthia was exposed at this period. 

In the wide plains of Northern Asia, extending from the Arctic Ocean tothe Thian Chan mountains and the Jaxartes, there had been nurtured froma remote antiquity a nomadic population, at no time very numerous inproportion to the area over which it was spread, but liable on occasionsto accumulate, owing to a combination of circumstances, in this or thatportion of the region occupied, and at such times causing trouble to itsneighbors. From about the close of the third century B. C. Symptomsof such an accumulation had begun to display themselves in the tractimmediately north of the Jaxartes, and the inhabitants of the countriessouth of that river had suffered from a succession of raids and inroads, which were not regarded as dangerous, but which gave constant annoyance. Crossing the great desert of Kharesm by forced marches, some of thehordes invaded the green valleys of Hyrcania and Parthia, and carrieddesolation over those fair and flourishing districts. About the sametime other tribes entered the Bactrian territory and caused alarm to theGreek kingdom recently established in that province. It appears thatthe Parthian monarchs, unable to save their country from incursions, consented to pay a sort of black-mail to their invaders, by allowingthem the use of their pasture grounds at certain fixed times--probablyduring some months of each year. The Bactrian princes had to pay aheavier penalty. Province after province of their kingdom was swallowedup by the northern hordes, who gradually occupied Sogdiana, or the tractbetween the lower Jaxartes and the lower Oxus, whence they proceeded tomake inroads into Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, orAk Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the highlands between the upperJaxartes and upper Oxus, were permanently occupied by the invaders;and if the Bactrians had not compensated themselves for their losses byacquisitions of territory in Afghanistan and India, they would soonhave had no kingdom left. The hordes were always increasing in strengththrough the influx of fresh immigrants, and in lieu of Bactria a powernow stood arrayed on the north-eastern frontier of the Parthians, whichwas reasonably regarded with the most serious alarm and suspicion. 

The origin of the state of things here described is to be sought, according to the best authorities, in certain movements which tookplace about B. C. 200, in a remote region of inner Asia. At that time aTuranian people called the Yue-chi were expelled from their territory onthe west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu, whom some identified with the Huns. The Yue-chi separated into two bands; the smaller descended southwardsinto Thibet; the larger passed westwards, and after a hard struggledispossessed a people called 'Su' of the plains west of the river of Hi. These latter advanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes; and the Yue-chi notlong afterwards retreating from the Usiun, another nomadic race, passedthe 'Su' on the north and occupied the tracts between the Oxus and theCaspian. The Su were thus in the vicinity of the Bactrian Greeks; theYue-chi in the neighborhood of the Parthians. On the particulars ofthis account, which come from the Chinese historians, we cannot perhapsaltogether depend; but there is no reason to doubt the main fact, attested by a writer who visited the Yue-chi in B. C. 139, that they hadmigrated about the period mentioned from the interior of Asia, and hadestablished themselves sixty years later in the Caspian region. Such amovement would necessarily have thrown the entire previous populationof those parts into commotion, and would probably have precipitated themupon their neighbors. It accounts satisfactorily for the pressure of thenorthern hordes at this period on the Parthians, Bactrians, and eventhe Indians; and it completely explains the crisis in Parthian history, which we have now reached, and the necessity which lay upon the nationof meeting and, if possible, overcoming, an entirely new danger. 

In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen, to which in ancienttimes the civilized world was always liable from an outburst of northernbarbarism. Whether the peril has altogether passed away or not we neednot here inquire; but certainly in the old world there was always achance that civilization, art, refinement, luxury, might suddenly andalmost without warning be swept away by an overwhelming influx of savagehordes from the unpolished North. From the reign of Oyaxares, whenthe evil first showed itself, the danger was patent to all wise andfar-seeing governors both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to timeguarded against. The expeditions of Cyrus against the Massagetse, ofDarius Hystaspis against the European Scyths, of Alexander against theGetee, of Trajan and Probus across the Danube, were designed to checkand intimidate the northern nations, to break their power, and diminishthe likelihood of their taking the offensive. It was now more than fourcenturies since in this part of Asia any such effort had been made; andthe northern barbarians might naturally have ceased to fear the arms anddiscipline of the South. Moreover the circumstances of the timescarcely left them a choice. Pressed on continually more and more by thenewly-arrived Su and Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the Transoxianianregions were under the necessity of seeking new settlements, and couldonly attempt to find them in the quarter towards which they were drivenby the new-comers. Strengthened, probably, by daring spirits from amongtheir conquerors themselves they crossed the rivers and the desertsby which they had been hitherto confined, and advancing against theParthians, Bactrians, and Arians, threatened to carry all before them. We have seen how successful they were against the Bactrians. In Ariana, they passed the mountains, and, proceeding southwards, occupied thetract below the great lake wherein the Helmend terminates, which tookfrom them the name of Saeastane ("land of the Saka, " or Scyths)--a namestill to be traced in the modern "Seistan. " Further to the east theyeffected a lodgment in Kabul, and another in the the southern portion ofthe Indus valley, which for a time bore the name of Indo-Scythia. Theyeven crossed the Indus and attempted to penetrate into the interior ofIndia, but here they were met and repulsed by a native monarch, aboutthe year B. C. 56. 

The people engaged in this great movement are called, in a general way, by the classical writers, Sacse, or Scythse--i. E. Scyths. They consistedof a number of tribes, similar for the most part in language, habits, and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to the other nomadicraces of Central and Northern Asia. Of these tribes the principal werethe Massagetse ("great Jits, or Jats"), who occupied the country onboth sides of the lower course of the Oxus; the Dahse, who bordered theCaspian above Hyrcania, and extended thence to the latitude of Herat;the Tochari, who settled in the mountains between the upper Jaxartes andthe upper Oxus, where they gave name to the tract known as Tokhar-estan;the Asii, or Asiani, who were closely connected with the Tochari, and the Sakarauli (Saracucse?), who are found connected with both theTochari and the Asiani. Some of these tribes contained within themfurther sub-divisions; e. G. The Dahse, who comprised the Parni (orApariii), the Pissuri, and the Xanthii; and the Massagetse, who includedamong them Chorasmii, Attasii, and others. 

The general character of the barbarism in which these various races wereinvolved may be best learnt from the description given of one of them, the Massagetae, with but few differences, by Herodotus and Strabo. According to this description, the Massagetse were nomads, who movedabout in wagons or carts, accompanied by their flocks and herds, onwhose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each man had only onewife, but all the wives were held in common. They were good riders andexcellent archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, and used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, knives, and battle-axes. They hadlittle or no iron, but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their otherweapons, of bronze. They had also bronze breast-plates; but otherwisethe metal with which they adorned and protected their own persons, and the heads of their horses, was gold. To a certain extent they werecannibals. It was their custom not to let the aged among them die anatural death, but, when life seemed approaching its natural term, tooffer them up in sacrifice, --and then boil the flesh and feast on it. This mode of ending life was regarded as the best and most honorable;such as died of disease were not eaten but buried, and their friendsbewailed their misfortune. 

It may be added to this that we have sufficient reason to believe thatthe Massagetse and the other nomads of these parts regarded the useof poisoned arrows as legitimate in warfare, and employed the venom ofserpents, and the corrupted blood of man, to make the wounds which theyinflicted more deadly. 

Thus, what was threatened was not merely the conquest of one race byanother cognate to it, like that of the Medes by the Persians, or ofthe Greeks by Rome, but the obliteration of such art, civilization, and refinement as Western Asia had attained to in course of ages bythe successive efforts of Babylonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, andGreeks--the spread over some of the fairest regions of the earth of alow type of savagery--a type which in religion went no further than theworship of the sun; in art knew but the easier forms of metallurgy andthe construction of carts; in manners and customs, included cannibalism, the use of poisoned weapons, and a relation between the sexesdestructive alike of all delicacy and of all family affection. TheParthians were, no doubt, rude and coarse in their character as comparedwith the Persians; but they had been civilized to a certain extent bythree centuries of subjection to the Persians and the Greco-Macedoniansbefore they rose to power; they affected Persian manners; theypatronized Greek art, they appreciated the advantages of having in theirmidst a number of Greek states. Had the Massagetse and their kindredtribes of Sakas, Tochari, Dahse, Yue-chi, and Su, which now menaced theParthian power, succeeded in sweeping it away, the general declension ofall which is lovely or excellent in human life would have been marked. Scythicism would have overspread Western Asia. No doubt the conquerorswould have learned something from those whom they subjected; but itcannot be supposed that they would have learned much. The change wouldhave been like that which passed over the Empire of the West, whenGoths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, Heruli, depopulated its fairestprovinces and laid its civilization in the dust. The East would havebeen barbarized; the gains of centuries would have been lost; the workof Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, and other great benefactors of Asiatichumanity, have been undone; Western Asia would have sunk back into acondition not very much above that from which it was raised two thousandyears earlier by the primitive Chaldaeans and the Assyrians. 

Artabanus II. , the Parthian monarch who succeeded Phraates II. , appearsto have appreciated aright the perils of his position. He was notcontent, when the particular body of barbarians which had defeated andslain his predecessor, having ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to fold his arms and wait until he was again attacked. According to thebrief, but expressive words of Justin, he assumed the aggressive, andinvaded the country of the Tochari, one of the most powerful of theScythic tribes, which was now settled in a portion of the region thathad, till lately, belonged to the Bactrian kingdom. Artabanus evidentlyfelt that what was needed was to roll back the flood of invasionwhich had advanced so near to the sacred home of his nation; that thebarbarians required to be taught a lesson; that they must at least bemade to understand that Parthia was to be respected; or that, if thiscould not be done, the fate of the Empire was sealed. He therefore, witha gallantry and boldness that we cannot sufficiently admire--a boldnessthat seemed like rashness, but was in reality prudence--withoutcalculating too closely the immediate chances of battle, led his troopsagainst one of the most forward of the advancing tribes. But fortune, unhappily, was adverse. How the battle was progressing we are not told;but it appears that in the thick of an engagement Artabanus receiveda wound in the forearm, from the effects of which he died almostimmediately. The death of the leader decides in the East, almost to acertainty, the issue of a contest. We cannot doubt that the Parthians, having lost their monarch, were repulsed; that the expedition failed;and that the situation of affairs became once more at least asthreatening as it had been before Artabanus made his attempt. TwoParthian monarchs had now fallen within the space of a few years incombat with the aggressive Scyths--two Parthian armies had suffereddefeat. Was this to be always so? If it was, then Parthia had only tomake up her mind to fall, and, like the great Roman, to let it be hercare that she should fall grandly and with dignity. 

CHAPTER IX. 

_Accession of Mithridates II. Termination of the Scythic Wars. Commencement of the struggle with Armenia. Previous history of Armenia. Result of the first Armenian War. First contact of Rome with Parthia. Attitude of Rome towards the East at this time. Second Armenian War. Death of Mithridates. _

On the death of Artabanus II. , about B. C. 124, his son, Mithridates II. , was proclaimed king. Of this monarch, whose achievements (according toJustin) procured him the epithet of "the Great, " the accounts which havecome down to us are extremely scanty and unsatisfactory. Justin, who isour principal informant on the subject of the early Parthian history, has unfortunately confounded him with the third monarch of the name, whoascended the throne more than sixty years later, and has left usonly the slightest and most meagre outline of his actions. The otherclassical writers, only to a very small extent, supplement Justin'snarrative; and the result is that of a reign which was one of the mostimportant in the early Parthian series, the historical inquirer at thepresent day can form but a most incomplete conception. 

It appears, however, from the account of Justin, and from such othernotices as have reached us of the condition of things at this time inthe regions lying east of the Caspian, that Mithridates was entirelysuccessful where his father and his cousin had signally failed. Hegained a number of victories over the Scythic hordes; and effectuallychecked their direct progress towards the south, throwing them therebyupon the east and the south-east. Danger to Parthia from the Scythsseems after his reign to have passed away. They found a vent for theirsuperabundant population in Seistan, Afghanistan, and India, and ceasedto have any hopes of making an impression on the Arsacid kingdom. Mithridates, it is probable, even took territory from them. Theacquisition of parts of Bactria by the Parthians from the Scyths, whichis attested by Strabo, belongs, in all likelihood, to his reign; andthe extension of the Parthian dominion to Seistan may well date from thesame period. Justin tells us that he added many nations to the ParthianEmpire. The statements made of the extent of Parthia on the side ofSyria in the time of Mithridates the First render it impossible for usto discover these nations in the west: we are, therefore, compelled toregard them as consisting of races on the eastern frontier, who could atthis period only be outlying tribes of the recent Scythic immigration. 

The victories of Mithridates in the East encouraged him to turn hisarms in the opposite direction, and to make an attack on the importantcountry of Armenia, which bordered his north-western frontier. Armeniawas at the time under the government of a certain Ortoadistus, who seemsto have been the predecessor, and was perhaps the father, of the greatTigranes. Ortoadistus ruled the tract called by the Romans "ArmeniaMagna, " which extended from the Euphrates on the west to the mouth ofthe Araxes on the east, and from the valley of the Kur northwards toMount Niphates and the head streams of the Tigris towards the south. Thepeople over which he ruled was one of the oldest in Asia and had on manyoccasions shown itself impatient of a conqueror. Justin, on reachingthis point in his work, observes that he could not feel himselfjustified if, when his subject brought before him so mighty a kingdom, he did not enter at some length on its previous history. The modernhistorian would be even less excusable than Justin if he omitted sucha review, since, while he has less right to assume a knowledge of earlyArmenian history on the part of his readers, he has greater means ofgratifying their curiosity, owing to the recent discovery of sources ofinformation unknown to the ancients. 

Armenia first comes before us in Genesis, where it is mentioned as thecountry on whose mountains the ark rested. A recollection of it wasthenceforth retained in the semi-mythic traditions of the Babylonians. According to some, the Egyptian monarchs of the eighteenth andnineteenth dynasties carried their arms into its remote valleys, andexacted tribute from the petty chiefs who then ruled there. At any rate, it is certain that from about the ninth century B. C. It was well knownto the Assyrians, who were engaged from that time till about B. C. 640in almost constant wars with its inhabitants. At this period threeprincipal races inhabited the country--the Nairi, who were spread fromthe mountains west of Lake Van along both sides of the Tigris to Biron the Euphrates, and even further; the Urarda (Alarodii, or people ofArarat), who dwelt north and east of the Nairi, on the upper Euphrates, about the lake of Van, and probably on the Araxes; and the Minni, whosecountry lay south-east of the Urarda, in the Urumiyeh basin and theadjoining parts of Zagros. Of these three races, the Urarda were themost powerful, and it was with them that the Assyrians waged their mostbloody wars. The capital city of the Urarda was Van, on the easternshores of the lake; and here it was that their kings set up the mostremarkable of their inscriptions. Six monarchs, who apparently allbelong to one dynasty, left inscriptions in this locality commemorativeof their military expeditions or of their offerings to the gods. Thelater names of the series can be identified with those of kings whocontended with Assyrian monarchs belonging to the last, or Sargoniddynasty; and hence we are entitled approximately to fix the series tothe seventh and eighth centuries before our era. The Urarda must at thistime have exercised a dominion over almost the whole of the regionto which the name of Armenia commonly attaches. They were worthyantagonists of the Assyrians, and, though occasionally worsted infight, maintained their independence, at any rate, till the time ofAsshur-bani-pal (about B. C. 640), when the last king of the Van series, whose name is read as Bilat-duri, succumbed to the Assyrian power, andconsented to pay a tribute for his dominions. 

There is reason to believe that between the time when we obtain thisview of the primitive Armenian peoples and that at which we next haveany exact knowledge of the condition of the country--the time of thePersian monarchy--a great revolution had taken place in the region. The Nairi, Urarda, and Minni were Turanian, or, at any rate, non-Arian, races. Their congeners in Western Asia were the early Babylonians andthe Susianians, not the Medes, the Persians, or the Phrygians. But bythe time of Herodotus the Arian character of the Armenians had becomeestablished. Their close connection with the Phrygians was recognized. They had changed their national appellation; for while in the Assyrianperiod the terms Nairi and Urarda had preponderated, under the Persiansthey had come to be called Armenians and their country Armenia. Thepersonal names of individuals in the country, both men and women, hadacquired a decidedly Arian cast. Everything seems to indicate that astrange people had immigrated into the land, bringing with them a newlanguage, new manners and customs, and a new religious system. From whatquarter they had come, whether from Phrygia as Herodotus and Stephenbelieved, or, as we should gather from their language and religion, fromMedia, is perhaps doubtful; but it seems certain that from one quarteror another Armenia had been Arianized; the old Turanian character hadpassed away from it; immigrants had nocked in, and a new people hadbeen formed--the real Armenian of later times, and indeed of the presentday--by the admixture of ruling Arian tribes with a primitive Turanianpopulation, the descendants of the old inhabitants. 

The new race, thus formed, though perhaps not less brave and warlikethan the old, was less bent on maintaining its independence. Moses ofChorene, the Armenian historian, admits that from the time of the Medianpreponderance in Western Asia the Armenians held under them a subjectposition. That such was their position under the Persians is abundantlyevident;25 and, so far as appears, there was only one occasion duringthe entire Achaemenian period (B. C. 559 to B. C. 331) when they exhibitedany impatience of the Persian yoke, or made any attempt to freethemselves from it. In the early portion of the reign of DariusHystaspis they took part in a revolt raised by a Mede called Phraortes, and were not reduced to obedience without some difficulty. But fromhenceforth their fidelity to the Achaemenian Kings was unbroken; theypaid their tribute (apparently) without reluctance, and furnishedcontingents of troops to the Persian armies when called upon. AfterArbela they submitted without a struggle to Alexander; and when in thedivision of his dominions, which followed upon the battle of Ipsus, theyfell naturally to Seleucus, they acquiesced in the arrangement. It wasnot until Antiochus the Great suffered his great defeat at the hands ofthe Romans (B. C. 190) that Armenia bestirred itself, and, after probablyfour and a half centuries of subjection, became once more an independentpower. Even then the movement seems to have originated rather in theambition of a chief than in a desire for liberty on the part ofthe people. Artaxias had been governor of the Greater Armenia underAntiochus, and seized the opportunity afforded by the battle of Magnesiato change his title of satrap into that of sovereign. No war followed. Antiochus was too much weakened by his reverses to make any attempt toreduce Artaxias or recover Armenia; and the nation obtained autonomywithout having to undergo the usual ordeal of a bloody struggle. When atthe expiration of five-and-twenty years Epiphanes, the son of Antiochusthe Great, determined on an effort to reconquer the lost province, novery stubborn resistance was offered to him. Artaxias was defeated andmade prisoner in the very first year of the war (B. C. 165), and Armeniaseems to have passed again under the sway of the Seleucidae. 

It would seem that matters remained in this state for the space of aboutfifteen or sixteen years. When, however, Mithridates I. (Arsaces VI. ), about B. C. 150, had overrun the eastern provinces of Syria, and madehimself master in succession of Media, Elymais, and Babylonia, therevolutionary movement excited by his successes reached Armenia, and thestandard of independence was once more raised in that country. Accordingto the Armenian historians, an Arsacid prince, Wagharshag or Valarsaces, was established as sovereign by the influence of the Parthian monarch, but was allowed to rule independently. A reign of twenty-two years isassigned to this prince, whose kingdom is declared to have reached fromthe Caucasus to Nisibis, and from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. Hewas succeeded by his son, Arshag (Arsaces), who reigned thirteen years, and was, like his father, active and warlike, contending chiefly withthe people of Pontus. At his death the crown descended to his son, Ardashes, who is probably the Ortoadistus of Justin. 

Such were the antecedents of Armenia when Mithridates II. , havinggiven an effectual check to the progress of the Scythians in the east, determined to direct his arms towards the west, and to attack thedominions of his relative, the third of the Armenian Arsacidse. Ofthe circumstances of this war, and its results, we have scarcelyany knowledge. Justin, who alone distinctly mentions it, gives us nodetails. A notice, however, in Strabo, which must refer to about thistime, is thought to indicate with sufficient clearness the result of thestruggle, which seems to have been unfavorable to the Armenians. Strabosays that Tigranes, before his accession to the throne, was for a timea hostage among the Parthians. As hostages are only given by thevanquished party, we may assume that Ortoadistus (Ardashes) foundhimself unable to offer an effectual resistance to the Parthianking, and consented after a while to a disadvantageous peace, for hisobservance of which hostages were required by the victor. 

It cannot have been more than a few years after the termination of thiswar, which must have taken place towards the close of the second, orsoon after the beginning of the first century, that Parthia was for thefirst time brought into contact with Rome. 

The Great Republic, which after her complete victory over AntiochusIII. , B. C. 190, had declined to take possession of a single foot ofground in Asia, regarding the general state of affairs as not then ripefor an advance of Terminus in that quarter, had now for some time seenreason to alter its policy, and to aim at adding to its European anextensive Asiatic dominion. Macedonia and Greece having been absorbed, and Carthage destroyed (B. C. 148-146), the conditions of the politicalproblem seemed to be so far changed as to render a further advancetowards the east a safe measure; and accordingly, when it was seen thatthe line of the kings of Pergamus was coming to an end, the Senate seton foot intrigues which had for their object the devolution upon Romeof the sovereignty belonging to those monarchs. By clever management thethird Attalus was induced, in repayment of his father's obligationsto the Romans, to bequeath his entire dominions as a legacy to theRepublic. In vain did his illegitimate half-brother, Aristonicus, dispute the validity of so extraordinary a testament; the Romans, aidedby Mithridates IV. , then monarch of Pontus, easily triumphed over suchresistance as this unfortunate prince could offer, and having ceded totheir ally the portion of Phrygia which had belonged to the Pergamenekingdom, entered on the possession of the remainder. Having thusbecome an Asiatic power, the Great Republic was of necessity mixedup henceforth with the various movements and struggles which agitatedWestern Asia, and was naturally led to strengthen its position among theAsiatic kingdoms by such alliances as seemed at each conjuncture bestfitted for its interests. 

Hitherto no occasion had arisen for any direct dealings between Romeand Parthia. Their respective territories were still separated byconsiderable tracts, which were in the occupation of the Syrians, theCappadocians, and the Armenians. Their interests had neither clashed, nor as yet sufficiently united them to give rise to any diplomaticintercourse. But the progress of the two Empires in opposite directionswas continually bringing them nearer to each other; and events had nowreached a point at which the Empires began to have (or seem to have)such a community of interests as led naturally to an exchange ofcommunications. A great power had been recently developed in theseparts. In the rapid way so common in the East. Mithridates V. , ofPontus, the son and successor of Rome's ally, had, between B. C. 112 andB. C. 93, built up an Empire of vast extent, numerous population, andalmost inexhaustible resources. He had established his authority overArmenia Minor, Colchis, the entire east coast of the Black Sea, theChersonesus Taurica, or kingdom of the Bosporus, and even over the wholetract lying west of the Chersonese as far as the mouth of the Tyras, or Dniester. Nor had these gains contented him. He had obtained half ofPaphlagonia by an iniquitous compact with Nicomedes, King of Bithynia;he had occupied Galatia; and he was engaged in attempts to bringCappadocia under his influence. In this last-named project he wasassisted by the Armenians, with whose king, Tigranes, he had (about B. C. 96) formed a close alliance, at the same time giving him his daughter, Cleopatra, in marriage. Rome, though she had not yet determined on warwith Mithridates, was resolved to thwart his Cappadocian projects, andin B. C. 92 sent Sulla into Asia with orders to put down the puppet whomMithridates and Tigranes were establishing, and to replace upon theCappadocian throne a certain Ariobarzanes, whom they had driven fromhis kingdom. In the execution of this commission, Sulla was broughtinto hostile collision with the Armenians, whom he defeated with greatslaughter, and drove from Cappadocia together with their puppet king. Thus, not only did the growing power of Mithridates of Pontus, byinspiring Rome and Parthia with a common fear, tend to draw themtogether, but the course of events had actually given them a commonenemy in Tigranes of Armenia, who was equally obnoxious to both. 

For Tigranes, who, during the time that he was a hostage in Parthia, had contracted engagements towards the Parthian monarch which involveda cession of territory, and who in consequence of his promises had beenaided by the Parthians in seating himself on his father's throne thoughhe made the cession required of him in the first instance had soonafterwards repented of his good faith, had gone to war with hisbenefactors, recovered the ceded territory, and laid waste aconsiderable tract of country lying within the admitted limits ofthe Parthian kingdom. These proceedings had, of course, alienatedMithridates II. ; and we may with much probability ascribe to them thestep, which he now took, of sending an ambassador to Sulla. Orobazus, the individual selected, was charged to propose an alliance offensiveand defensive between the two countries. Sulla received the overturefavorably, but probably considered that it transcended his powers toconclude a treaty; and thus nothing more was effected by the embassythan the establishment of a good understanding between the two States. 

Soon after this Tigranes appears to have renewed his attacks uponParthia, which in the interval between B. C. 92 and B. C. 83 he greatlyhumbled, depriving it of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, at this timecalled Gordyene, and under rule of one of the Parthian tributary kings. Of the details of this war we have no account; and it is even uncertainwhether it fell within the reign of Mithridates II. Or no. Theunfortunate mistake of Justin, whereby he confounded this monarch withMithridates III. , has thrown this portion of the Parthian history intoconfusion, and has made even the successor of Mithridates II. Uncertain. 

Mithridates II. Probably died about B. C. 89, after a reign whichmust have exceeded thirty-five years. His great successes againstthe Scythians in the earlier portion of his reign were to some extentcounterbalanced by his losses to Tigranes in his old age; but on thewhole he must be regarded as one of the more vigorous and successful ofthe Parthian monarchs, and as combining courage with prudence. It is tohis credit that he saw the advantage of establishing friendly relationswith Rome at a time when an ordinary Oriental monarch might havedespised the distant Republic, and have thought it beneath his dignityto make overtures to so strange and anomalous a power. Whether hedefinitely foresaw the part which Rome was about to play in the East, we may doubt; but at any rate he must have had a prevision that thepart would not be trifling or insignificant. Of the private character ofMithridates we have no sufficient materials to judge. If it be true thathe put his envoy, Orobazus, to death on account of his having allowedSulla to assume a position at their conference derogatory to the dignityof the Parthian State, we must pronounce him a harsh master; but thetale, which rests wholly on the weak authority of the gossip-lovingPlutarch, is perhaps scarcely to be accepted. 

CHAPTER X. 

_Dark period of Parthian History. Doubtful succession of the Monarchs. Accession of Sanatrceces, ab. B. C. 76. Position of Parthia during theMithridatic Wars. Accession of Phraates III. His relations with Pompey. His death. Civil War between his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes. Deathof Mithridates. _

The successor of Mithridates II. Is unknown. It has been argued, indeed, that the reigns of the known monarchs of this period would not be undulylong if we regarded them as strictly consecutive, and placed no blankbetween the death of Mithridates II. And the accession of the nextArsaces whose name has come down to us. Sanatrodoeces, it has been said, may have been, and may, therefore, well be regarded as, the successorof Mithridates. But the words of the epitomizer of Trogus, placed atthe head of this chapter, forbid the acceptance of this theory. Theepitomizer would not have spoken of "many kings" as intervening betweenMithridates II. And Orodes, if the number had been only three. Theexpression implies, at least, four or five monarchs; and thus we haveno choice but to suppose that the succession of the kings is hereimperfect, and that at least one or two reigns were interposed betweenthose of the second Mithridates and of the monarch known as Sanatroeces, Sinatroces, or Sintricus. 

A casual notice of a Parthian monarch in a late writer may supply thegap, either wholly or in part. Lucian speaks of a certain Mnasciras asa Parthian king, who died at the advanced age of ninety-six. As thereis no other place in the Parthian history at which the succession isdoubtful, and as no such name as Mnascris occurs elsewhere in the list, it seems necessary, unless we reject Lucian's authority altogether, toinsert this monarch here. We cannot say, however, how long he reigned, or ascribe to him any particular actions; nor can we say definitelywhat king he either succeeded or preceded. It is possible that his reigncovered the entire interval between Mithridates II. And Sanatroeces; itis possible, on the other hand, that he had successors and predecessors, whose names have altogether perished. 

The expression used by the epitomizer of Trogus, and a few wordsdropped by Plutarch, render it probable that about this time there werecontentions between various members of the Arsacid family which issuedin actual civil war. Such contentions are a marked feature of the laterhistory; and, according to Plutarch, they commenced at this period. Wemay suspect, from the great age of two of the monarchs chosen, thatthe Arsacid stock was now very limited in number, that it offered nocandidates for the throne whose claims were indisputable, and thatconsequently at each vacancy there was a division of opinion among the"Megistanes, " which led to the claimants making appeal, if the electionwent against them, to the arbitrament of arms. 

The dark time of Parthian history is terminated by theaccession--probably in B. C. 76--of the king above mentioned as knownby the three names of Sanatroeces, Sinatroces, and Sintricus. The form, Sanatroeces, which appears upon the Paithian coins, is on that accountto be preferred. The king so called had reached when elected theadvanced age of eighty. It may be suspected that he was a son of thesixth Arsaces (Mithridates I. ), and consequently a brother of PhraatesII. He had, perhaps, been made prisoner by that Scythians in the courseof the disastrous war waged by that monarch, and had been retained incaptivity for above fifty years. At any rate, he appears to havebeen indebted to the Scythians in some measure for the crown which heacquired so tardily, his enjoyment of it having been secured by the helpof a contingent of troops furnished to him by the Scythian tribe of theSacauracae. 

The position of the Empire at the time of his accession was one ofconsiderable difficulty. Parthia, during the period of her civilcontentions, had lost much ground in the west, having been deprived byTigranes of at least two important provinces. At the same time she hadbeen witness of the tremendous struggle between Rome and Pontus whichcommenced in B. C. 88, was still continuing, and still far from decided, when Sanatroeces came to the throne. An octogenarian monarch was unfitto engage in strife, and if Sanatroeces, notwithstanding this drawback, had been ambitious of military distinction, it would have been difficultfor him to determine into which scale the interests of his countryrequired that he should cast the weight of his sword. On the one hand, Parthia had evidently much to fear from the military force and thecovetous disposition of Tigranes, king of Armenia, the son-in-law ofMithridates, and at this time his chosen alley. Tigranes had hithertobeen continually increasing in strength. By the defeat of Artanes, kingof Sophene, or Armenia Minor, he had made himself master of Armeniain its widest extent; by his wars with Parthia herself he had acquiredGordyene, or Northern Mesopotamia, and Adiabene, or the entire richtract east of the middle Tigris (including Assyria Proper and Arbelitis), as far, at any rate, as the course of the lower Zab; by means which arenot stated he had brought under subjection the king of the importantcountry of Media Artropatene, independent since the time of Alexander. Invited into Syria, about B. C. 83, by the wretched inhabitants, weariedwith the perpetual civil wars between the princes of the house of theSeleucidae, he had found no difficulty in establishing himself asking over Cilicia, Syria, and most of Phoenicia. About B. C. 80 hehad determined on building himself a new capital in the province ofGordyene, a capital of a vast size, provided with all the luxuriesrequired by an Oriental court, and fortified with walls which recalledthe glories of the ancient cities of the Assyrians. The position of thishuge town on the very borders of the Parthian kingdom, in a provincewhich had till very recently been Parthian, could be no otherwiseunderstood that as a standing menace to Parthia itself, the proclamationof an intention to extend the Armenian dominion southwards, and toabsorb at any rate all the rich and fertile country between Gordyeneand the sea. Thus threatened by Armenia, it was impossible forSanatroeces cordially to embrace the side of Mithridates, with whichArmenia and its king were so closely allied; it was impossible for himeven to wish that the two allies should be free to work their will onthe Asiatic continent unchecked by the power which alone had for thelast twelve years obstructed their ambitious projects. 

On the other hand, there was already among the Asiatic princes generallya deep distrust of Rome--a fear that in the new people, which hadcrept so quietly into Asia, was to be found a power more permanentlyformidable than the Macedonians, a power which would make up for wantof brilliancy and dash by a dogged perseverance in its aims, and astealthy, crafty policy, sure in the end to achieve great and strikingresults. The acceptance of the kingdom of Attalus had not, perhaps, alarmed any one; but the seizure of Phrygia during the minority ofMithridates, without so much as a pretext, and the practice, soonafterwards established, of setting up puppet kings, bound to do thebidding of their Roman allies, had raised suspicions; the ease withwhich Mithridates notwithstanding his great power and long preparation, had been vanquished in the first war (B. C. 88-84) had aroused fears; andSanatroeces could not but misdoubt the advisability of lending aid tothe Romans, and so helping them to obtain a still firmer hold on WesternAsia. Accordingly we find that when the final war broke out, in B. C. 74, his inclination was, in the first instance, to stand wholly aloof, andwhen that became impossible, then to temporize. To the applicationfor assistance made by Mithridates in B. C. 72 a direct negative wasreturned; and it was not until, in B. C. 69, the war had approached hisown frontier, and both parties made the most earnest appeals to him foraid, that he departed from the line of pure abstention, and had recourseto the expedient of amusing, both sides with promises, while hehelped neither. According to Plutarch, this line of procedure offendedLucullus, and had nearly induced him to defer the final struggle withMithridates and Tigranes, and turn his arms against Parthia. But theprolonged resistance of Nisibis, and the successes of Mithridates inPontus, diverted the danger; and the war rolling northwards, Parthia wasnot yet driven to take a side, but was enabled to maintain her neutralposition for some years longer. 

Meanwhile the aged Sanatroeces died, and was succeeded by his son, Phraates III. This prince followed at first his father's example, andabstained from mixing himself up in the Mithridatic war; but in B. C. 66, being courted by both sides, and promised the restoration of theprovinces lost to Tigranes, he made alliance with Pompey, and undertook, while the latter pressed the war against Mithridates, to find occupationfor the Armenian monarch in his own land. This engagement he executedwith fidelity. It had happened that the eldest living son of Tigranes, aprince bearing the same name as his father, having raised a rebellionin Armenia and been defeated, had taken refuge in Parthia with Phraates. Phraates determined to take advantage of this circumstance. The youngTigranes was supported by a party among his countrymen who wished to seea youthful monarch upon the throne; and Phraates therefore consideredthat he would best discharge his obligations to the Romans by fomentingthis family quarrel, and lending a moderate support to the youngerTigranes against his father. He marched an army into Armenia in theinterest of the young prince, overran the open country, and advancedon Artaxata, the capital. Tigranes, the king, fled at his approach, andbetook himself to the neighboring mountains. Artaxata was invested;but as the siege promised to be long, the Parthian monarch after atime withdrew, leaving the pretender with as many troops as he thoughtnecessary to press the siege to a successful issue. The result, however, disappointed his expectations. Scarcely was Phraates gone, when the oldking fell upon his son, defeated him, and drove him beyond his borders. He was forced, however, soon afterwards, to submit to Pompey, who, whilethe civil war was raging in Armenia, had defeated Mithridates and drivenhim to take refuge in the Tauric Chersonese. 

Phraates, now, naturally expected the due reward of his services, according to the stipulations of his agreement with Pompey. But thatgeneral was either dissatisfied with the mode in which the Parthian haddischarged his obligations, or disinclined to strengthen the power whichhe saw to be the only one in these parts capable of disputing with Romethe headship of Asia. He could scarcely prevent, and he does not seemto have tried to prevent, the recovery of Adiabene by the Parthians;but the nearer province of Gordyene to which they had an equal claim, he would by no means consent to their occupying. At first he destined itfor the younger Tigranes. When the prince offended him, he made it overto Ariobarzanes, the Cappadocian monarch. That arrangement not takingeffect, and the tract being disputed between Phraates and the elderTigranes, he sent his legate, Afranius, to drive the Parthians out ofthe country, and delivered it over into the hands of the Armenians. At the same time he insulted the Parthian monarch by refusing himhis generally recognized title of "King of Kings. " He thus entirelyalienated his late ally, who remonstrated against the injustice withwhich he was treated, and was only deterred from declaring war by thewholesome fear which he entertained of the Roman arms. 

Pompey, on his side, no doubt took the question into considerationwhether or no he should declare the Parthian prince a Roman enemy, andproceed to direct against him the available forces of the Empire. He hadpurposely made him hostile, and compelled him to take steps which mighthave furnished a plausible _casus belli_. But, on the whole, he foundthat he was not prepared to venture on the encounter. The war had notbeen formally committed to him; and if he did not prosper in it, hedreaded the accusations of his enemies at Rome. He had seen, moreover, with his own eyes; that the Parthians were an enemy far from despicable, and his knowledge of campaigning told him that success against them wasnot certain. He feared to risk the loss of all the glory which he hadobtained by grasping greedily at more, and preferred enjoying the fruitsof the good luck which had hitherto attended him to tempting fortune ona new field. He therefore determined that he would not allow himself tobe provoked into hostilities by the reproaches, the dictatorial words, or even the daring acts of the Parthian King. When Phraates demanded hislost provinces he replied, that the question of borders was one whichlay, not between Parthia and Rome, but between Parthia and Armenia. Whenhe laid it down that the Euphrates properly bounded the Roman territory, and charged Pompey not to cross it, the latter said he would keep tothe just bounds, whatever they were. When Tigranes complained that afterhaving been received into the Roman alliance he was still attacked bythe Parthian armies, the reply of Pompey was that he was willing toappoint arbitrators who should decide all the disputes between the twonations. The moderation and caution of these answers proved contagious. The monarchs addressed resolved to compose their differences, or at anyrate to defer the settlement of them to a more convenient time. Theyaccepted Pompey's proposal of an arbitration; and in a short time anarrangement was effected by which relations of amity were re-establishedbetween the two countries. 

It would seem that not very long after the conclusion of this peace andthe retirement of Pompey from Asia (B. C. 62), Phraates lost his life. Hewas assassinated by his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes; for what causewe are not told. Mithridates, the elder of the two, succeeded him(about B. C. 60); and, as all fear of the Romans had now passed awayin consequence of their apparently peaceful attitude, he returned soonafter his accession to the policy of his namesake, Mithridates II. , andresumed the struggle with Armenia from which his father had desisted. The object of the war was probably the recovery of the lost province ofGordyene, which, having been delivered to the elder Tigranes by Pompey, had remained in the occupation of the Armenians. Mithridates seems tohave succeeded in his enterprise. When we next obtain a distinct view ofthe boundary line which divides Parthia from her neighbors towards thenorth and the north-west, which is within five years of the probabledate of Mithridates's accession, we find Gordyene once more a Parthianprovince. As the later years of this intermediate lustre are a timeof civil strife, during which territorial gains can scarcely have beenmade, we are compelled to refer the conquest to about B. C. 39-57. Butin this case it must have been due to Mithridates III. , whose reign isfixed with much probability to the years B. C. 60-56. 

The credit which Mithridates had acquired by his conduct of the Armenianwar he lost soon afterwards by the severity of his home administration. There is reason to believe that he drove his brother, Orodes, intobanishment. At any rate, he ruled so harshly and cruelly that withina few years of his accession the Parthian nobles deposed him, and, recalling Orodes from his place of exile, set him up as king in hisbrother's room. Mithridates was, it would seem, at first allowed togovern Media as a subject monarch; but after a while his brother grewjealous of him, and deprived him of this dignity. Unwilling to acquiescein his disgrace, Mithridates fled to the Romans, and being favorablyreceived by Gabinius, then proconsul of Syria, endeavored to obtainhis aid against his countrymen. Gabinius, who was at once weak andambitious, lent a ready ear to his entreaties, and was upon the pointof conducting an expedition into Parthia, when he received a still moretempting invitation from another quarter. Ptolemy Auletes, expelledfrom Egypt by his rebellious subjects, asked his aid, and havingrecommendations from Pompey, and a fair sum of ready money to disburse, found little difficulty in persuading the Syrian proconsul to relinquishhis Parthian plans and march the force at his disposal into Egypt. Mithridates, upon this, withdrew from Syria, and re-entering theParthian territory, commenced a civil war against his brother, findingnumerous partisans, especially in the region about Babylon. It may besuspected that Seleucia, the second city in the Empire, embraced hiscause. Babylon, into which he had thrown himself, sustained a long siegeon his behalf, and only yielded when compelled by famine. Mithridatesmight again have become a fugitive; but he was weary of thedisappointments and hardships which are the ordinary lot of a pretender, and preferred to cast himself on the mercy and affection of his brother. Accordingly he surrendered himself unconditionally to Orodes; but thisprince, professing to place the claims of patriotism above those ofrelationship, caused the traitor who had sought aid from Rome to beinstantly executed. Thus perished Mithridates III. After a reign whichcannot have exceeded five years, in the winter of B. C. 56, or the earlyspring of B. C. 55. Orodes, on his death, was accepted as king by thewhole nation. 

CHAPTER XI. 

_Accession of Orodes I. Expedition of Crassus. His fate. Retaliatoryinroad of the Parthians into Syria under Pacorus, the son of Orodes. Defeat of Pacorus by Cassius. His recall. End of the first War withRome. _

The complete triumph of Orodes over Mithridates, and his fullestablishment in his kingdom, cannot be placed earlier than B. C. 56, andmost probably fell in B. C. 55. In this latter year Crassus obtained theconsulship at Rome, and, being appointed at the same time to the commandof the East, made no secret of his intention to march the Roman legionsacross the Euphrates, and engage in hostilities with the great Parthiankingdom. According to some writers, his views extended even further. Hespoke of the wars which Lucullus had waged against Tigranes and Pompeyagainst Mithridates of Pontus as mere child's play, and announced hisintention of carrying the Roman arms to Bactria, India, and the EasternOcean. The Parthian king was thus warned betimes of the impendingdanger, and enabled to make all such preparations against it as hedeemed necessary. More than a year elapsed between the assignment toCrassus of Syria as his province, and his first overt act of hostilityagainst Orodes. 

It cannot be doubted that this breathing-time was well spent by theParthian monarch. Besides forming his general plan of campaign at hisleisure, and collecting, arming, and exercising his native forces, he was enabled to gain over certain chiefs upon his borders, who hadhitherto held a semi-dependent position, and might have been expectedto welcome the Romans. One of these, Abgarus, prince of Osrhoene, or thetract east of the Euphrates about the city of Edessa, had been receivedinto the Roman alliance by Pompey, but, with the fickleness common amongOrientals, he now readily changed sides, and undertook to play a doublepart for the advantage of the Parthians. Another, Alchaudonius, an Arabsheikh of these parts, had made his submission to Rome even earlier; buthaving become convinced that Parthia was the stronger power of the two, he also went over to Orodes. The importance of these adhesions woulddepend greatly on the line of march which Crassus might determine tofollow in making his attack. Three plans were open to him. He mighteither throw himself on the support of Artavasdes, the Armenian monarch, who had recently succeeded his father Tigranes, and entering Armenia, take the safe but circuitous route through the mountains into Adiabene, and so by the left bank of the Tigris to Ctesiphon; or he might, likethe younger Cyrus, follow the course of the Euphrates to the latitude ofSeleucia, and then cross the narrow tract of plain which there separatesthe two rivers; or, finally, he might attempt the shortest but mostdangerous line across the Belik and Khabour, and directly through theMesopotamian desert. If the Armenian route were preferred, neitherAbgarus nor Alchaudonius would be able to do the Parthians much service;but if Crassus resolved on following either of the others, theiralliance could not but be most valuable. 

Crassus, however, on reaching his province, seemed in in haste to makea decision. He must have arrived in Syria tolerably early in the springbut his operations during the first year of his proconsulship wereunimportant. He seems at once to have made up his mind to attemptnothing more than a reconnaissance. Crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma, the modern Bir or Bireh-jik, he proceeded to ravage the open country, and to receive the submission of the Greek cities, which were numerousthroughout the region between the Euphrates and the Belik. The countrywas defended by the Parthian satrap with a small force; but this waseasily defeated, the satrap himself receiving a wound. One Greek cityonly, Zenodotium, offered resistance to the invader; its inhabitants, having requested and received a Roman garrison of one hundred men, rose upon them and put them barbarously to the sword; whereupon Crassusbesieged and took the place, gave it up to his army to plunder, andsold the entire population for slaves. He then, as winter drew near, determined to withdraw into Syria, leaving garrisons in the varioustowns. The entire force left behind is estimated at eight thousand men. 

It is probable that Orodes had expected a more determined attack, andhad retained his army near his capital until it should become evidentby which route the enemy would advance against him. Acting on an innercircle, he could readily have interposed his forces, on whicheverline the assailants threw themselves. But the tardy proceedings of hisantagonist made his caution superfluous. The first campaign was over, and there had scarcely been a collision between the troops of the twonations. Parthia had been insulted by a wanton attack, and had lost somedisaffected cities; but no attempt had been made to fulfil the grandboasts with which the war had been undertaken. 

It may be suspected that the Parthian monarch began now to despise hisenemy. He would compare him with Lucullus and Pompey, and understandthat a Roman army, like any other, was formidable, or the reverse, according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He would know that Crassuswas a sexagenarian, and may have heard that he had never yet shownhimself a captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubted whetherthe proconsul had any real intention of pressing the contest to adecision, and might not rather be expected, when he had enriched himselfand his troops with Mesopotamian plunder, to withdraw his garrisonsacross the Euphrates. Crassus was at this time showing the worst sideof his character in Syria, despoiling temples of their treasures, andaccepting money in lieu of contingents of troops from the dynasts ofSyria and Palestine. Orodes, under these circumstances, sent an embassyto him, which was well calculated to stir to action the most sluggishand poor-spirited of commanders. "If the war, " said his envoys, "wasreally waged by Rome, it must be fought out to the bitter end. But if, as they had good reason to believe, Crassus, against the wish of hiscountry, had attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his ownprivate gain, Arsaces would be moderate. He would have pity on theadvanced years of the proconsul, and would give the Romans back thosemen of theirs, who were not so much keeping watch in Mesopotamia ashaving watch kept on them. " Crassus, stung with the taunt, exclaimed, "He would return the ambassadors an answer at Seleucia. " Wagises, thechief ambassador, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling, and, glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the palm of one hand withthe fingers' of the other: "Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before yousee Seleucia. "

Still further to quicken the action of the Romans, before the winterwas well over, the offensive was taken against their adherents inMesopotamia. The towns which held Roman garrisons were attacked by theParthians in force; and, though we do not hear of any being captured, all of them were menaced, and all suffered considerably. 

If Crassus needed to be stimulated, these stimulants were effective; andhe entered on his second campaign with a full determination to compelthe Parthian monarch to an engagement, and, if possible, to dictatepeace to him at his capital. He had not, however, in his secondcampaign, the same freedom with regard to his movements that he hadenjoyed the year previous. The occupation of Western Mesopotamia crampedhis choice. It had, in fact, compelled him before quitting Syria todecline, definitely and decidedly, the overtures of Artavasdes, whostrongly urged on him to advance by way of Armenia, and promised himin that case an important addition to his forces. Crassus felt himselfcompelled to support his garrisons, and therefore to make Mesopotamia, and not Armenia, the basis of his operations, He crossed the Euphrates asecond time at the same point as before, with an army composed of 35, 000heavy infantry, 4, 000 light infantry, and 4, 000 horse. There was stillopen to him a certain choice of routes. The one preferred by his chiefofficers was the line of the Euphrates, known as that which the TenThousand had pursued in an expedition that would have been successfulbut for the death of its commander. Along this line water would beplentiful; forage and other supplies might be counted on to a certainextent; and the advancing army, resting on the river, could not besurrounded. Another, but one that does not appear to have been suggestedtill too late, was that which Alexander had taken against Darius; theline along the foot of the Mons Masius, by Edessa, and Nisibis, to Nineveh. Here too waters and supplies would have been readilyprocurable, and by clinging to the skirts of the hills the Romaninfantry would have set the Parthian cavalry at defiance. Between thesetwo extreme courses to the right and to the left were numerous slightlydivergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, all shorter than eitherof the two above-mentioned, and none offering any great advantage overthe remainder. 

It is uncertain what choice the proconsul would have made, had thedecision been left simply to his own judgment. Probably the Romans had amost dim and indistinct conception of the geographical character of theMesopotamian region, and were ignorant of its great difficulties. They remained also, it must be remembered, up to this time, absolutelyunacquainted with the Parthian tactics and accustomed as they were totriumph over every enemy against whom they fought, it would scarcelyoccur to them that in an open field they could suffer defeat. They wereready, like Alexander, to encounter any number of Asiatics, and onlyasked to be led against the foe as quickly as possible. When, therefore, Abgarus, the Osrhoene prince, soon after Crassus had crossed theEuphrates, rode into his camp, and declared that the Parthians did notintend to make a stand, but were quitting Mesopotamia and flying withtheir treasure to the remote regions of Hyrcania and Scythia, leavingonly a rear guard under a couple of generals to cover the retreat, it isnot surprising that the resolution was taken to give up the circuitousroute of the Euphrates, and to march directly across Mesopotamia in thehope of crushing the covering detachment, and coming upon the flyingmultitude encumbered with baggage, which would furnish a rich spoil tothe victors. In after times it was said that C. Cassius Longinus andsome other officers were opposed to this movement, add foresaw itsdanger; but it must be questioned whether the whole army did not readilyobey its leader's order, and commence without any forebodings its marchthrough Upper Mesopotamia. That region has not really the characterwhich the apologists for Roman disaster in later times gave to it. Itis a region of swelling hills, and somewhat dry gravelly plains. Itpossesses several streams and rivers, besides numerous springs. Atintervals of a few miles it was studded with cities and villages; nordid the desert really begin until the Khabour was crossed. The army ofCrassus had traversed it throughout its whole extent during the summerof the preceding year, and must have been well acquainted with both itsadvantages and drawbacks. But it is time that we should consider whatpreparations the Parthian monarch had made against the threatenedattack. He had, as already stated, come to terms with his outlyingvassals, the prince of Osrhoene, and the sheikh of the Scenite Arabs, and had engaged especially the services of the former against hisassailant. He had further, on considering the various possibilities ofthe campaign, come to the conclusion that it would be best to dividehis forces, and, while himself attacking Artavasdes in the mountainfastnesses of his own country, to commit the task of meeting and copingwith the Romans to a general of approved talents. It was of the greatestimportance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a junction with theRomans, and strengthening them in that arm in which they were especiallydeficient, the cavalry. Perhaps nothing short of an invasion of hiscountry by the Parthian king in person would have prevented Artavasdesfrom detaching a portion of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And nodoubt it is also true that Orodes had great confidence in his general, whom he may even have felt to be a better commander than himself. Surenas, as we must call him, since his name has not been preserved tous, was in all respects a person of the highest consideration. He wasthe second man in the kingdom for birth, wealth, and reputation. Incourage and ability he excelled all his countrymen; and he had thephysical advantages of commanding height and great personal beauty. Whenhe went to battle, he was accompanied by a train of a thousand camels, which carried his baggage; and the concubines in attendance on himrequired for their conveyance two hundred chariots. A thousand horsemanclad in mail, and a still greater number of light-armed, formedhis bodyguard. At the coronation of a Parthian monarch, it was hishereditary right to place the diadem on the brow of the new sovereign. When Orodes was driven into banishment it was he who brought him back toParthia in triumph. When Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assaultfirst mounted the breach and, striking terror into the defenders, tookthe city. Though less than thirty years of age at the time when he wasappointed commander, he was believed to possess, besides these variousqualifications, consummate prudence and sagacity. 

The force which Orodes committed to his brave and skillful lieutenantconsisted entirely of horse. This was not the ordinary character of aParthian army, which often comprised four or five times as many infantryas cavalry. It was, perhaps, rather fortunate accident than profoundcalculation that caused the sole employment against the Romans of thisarm. The foot soldiers were needed for the rough warfare of the Armenianmountains; the horse would, it was known, act with fair effect in thecomparatively open and level Mesopotamia. As the king wanted the footmenhe took them, and left to his general the troops which were not requiredfor his own operations. 

The Parthian horse, like the Persian, was of two kinds, standing instrong contrast the one to the other. The bulk of their cavalry was ofthe lightest and most agile description. Fleet and active coursers, withscarcely any caparison but a headstall and a single rein, were mountedby riders clad only in a tunic and trousers, and armed with nothingbut a strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in earlyboyhood made the rider almost one with his steed; and he could use hisweapons with equal ease and effect whether his horse was stationaryor at full gallop, and whether he was advancing towards or hurriedlyretreating from his enemy. His supply of missiles was almostinexhaustible, for when he found his quiver empty, he had only to retirea short distance and replenish his stock from magazines, borne onthe backs of camels, in the rear. It was his ordinary plan to keepconstantly in motion when in the presence of an enemy, to gallopbackwards and forwards, or round and round his square or column, nevercharging it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen andbarbed shafts which were driven by a practised hand from a bow ofunusual strength. Clouds of this light cavalry enveloped the advancingor the retreating foe, and inflicted grievous damage without, for themost part, suffering anything in return. 

But this was not the whole. In addition to these light troops, aParthian army comprised always a body of heavy cavalry, armed on anentirely different system. The strong horses selected for this servicewere clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, neck, chest, even theirsides and flanks, were protected by scale-armor of brass or iron, sewn, probably, upon leather. Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of thesame materials, and helmets of burnished iron. For an offensive weaponthey carried a long and strong spear or pike. They formed a serriedline in battle, bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom theycharged, and standing firm as an iron wall against the charges that weremade upon them. A cavalry answering to this in some respects had beenemployed by the later Persian monarchs, and was in use also among theArmenians at this period; but the Parthian pike was apparently moreformidable than the corresponding weapons of those nations, and thelight spear carried at this time by the cavalry of a Roman army was nomatch for it. 

The force entrusted to Surenas comprised troops of both theseclasses. No estimate is given us of their number, but it was probablyconsiderable. At any rate it was sufficient to induce him to make amovement in advance--to cross the Sinjar range and the river Khabour, and take up his position in the country between that stream and theBelik--instead of merely seeking to cover the capital. The presenceof the traitor Abgarus in the camp of Crassus was now of the utmostimportance to the Parthian commander. Abgarus, fully trusted, and at thehead of a body of light horse, admirably adapted for outpost service, was allowed, upon his own request, to scour the country in front of theadvancing Romans, and had thus the means of communicating freely withthe Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the movements andintentions of Crassus, while at the same time he suggested to Crassussuch a line of route as suited the views and designs of his adversary. Our chief authority for the details of the expedition tells us that heled the Roman troops through an arid and trackless desert, across plainswithout tree, or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed of alight shifting sand, which the wind raised into a succession of hillocksthat resembled the waves of an interminable sea. The soldiers, he says, fainted with the heat and with the drought, while the audacious Osrhoenescoffed at their complaints and reproaches, asking them whether theyexpected to find the border-tract between Arabia and Assyria a countryof cool streams and shady groves, of baths, and hostelries, like theirown delicious Campania. But our knowledge of the geographical characterof the region through which the march lay makes it impossible for us toaccept this account as true. The country between the Euphrates and theBelik, as already observed, is one of alternate hill and plain, neitherdestitute of trees nor ill-provided with water. The march through itcould have presented no great difficulties. All that Abgarus could do toserve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus to trust himselfto the open country, without clinging either to a river or to themountains, and, secondly, to bring him, after a hasty march, and in thefull heat of the day, into the presence of the enemy. Both these thingshe contrived to effect, and Surenas was, no doubt, so far beholden tohim. But the notion that he enticed the Roman army into a tracklessdesert, and gave it over, when it was perishing through weariness, hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its enraged enemy, is incontradiction with the topographical facts, and is not even maintainedconsistently by the classical writers. 

It was probably on the third or fourth day after he had quitted theEuphrates that Crassus found himself approaching his enemy. After ahasty and hot march he had approached the banks of the Belik, when hisscouts brought him word that they had fallen in with the Parthian army, which was advancing in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarushad recently quitted him on the plea of doing him some undefinedservice, but really to range himself on the side of his real friends, the Parthians. His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon theriver, and defer an engagement till the morrow; but he had no fears; hisson, Publius, who had lately joined him with a body of Gallic horse sentby Julius Caesar, was anxious for the fray; and accordingly the Romancommander gave the order to his troops to take some refreshment as theystood, and then to push forward rapidly. Surenas, on his side, had takenup a position on wooded and hilly ground, which concealed his numbers, and had even, we are told, made his troops cover their arms with clothsand skins, that the glitter might not betray them. But, as the Romansdrew near, all concealment was cast aside; the signal for battle wasgiven; the clang of the kettledrums arose on every side; the squadronscame forward in their brilliant array; and it seemed at first as if theheavy cavalry was about to charge the Roman host, which was formed in ahollow square with the light-armed in the middle, and with supportersof horse along the whole line, as well as upon the flanks. But, if thisintention was ever entertained, it was altered almost as soon as formed, and the better plan was adopted of halting at a convenient distance andassailing the legionaries with flight after flight of arrows, deliveredwithout a pause and with extraordinary force. The Roman endeavored tomeet this attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers; but they werequite unable to cope with the numbers and the superior weapons of theenemy, who forced them almost immediately to retreat, and take refugebehind the line of the heavy-armed. These were then once more exposed tothe deadly missiles, which pierced alike through shield and breast-plateand greaves, and inflicted the most fearful wounds. More than once thelegionaries dashed forward, and sought to close with their assailants, but in vain. The Parthian squadrons retired as the Roman infantryadvanced, maintaining the distance which they thought best betweenthemselves and their foe, whom they plied with their shafts asincessantly while they fell back as when they rode forward. For a whilethe Romans entertained the hope that the missiles would at last be allspent; but when they found that each archer constantly obtained a freshsupply from the rear, this expectation deserted them. It became evidentto Crassus that some new movement must be attempted; and, as a lastresource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom the Parthians werethreatening to outflank, to take such troops as he thought proper, and charge. The gallant youth was only too glad to receive the order. Selecting his Gallic cavalry, who numbered 1000, and adding to them 500other horsemen, 500 archers, and about 4000 legionaries, he advancedat speed against the nearest squadrons of the enemy. The Parthianspretended to be afraid, and beat a hasty retreat. Publius followedwith all the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out of the sight of hisfriends, pressing the flying foe, whom he believed to be panic-stricken. But when they had drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made astand, brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, and completelyenveloped him and his detachment with their light-armed. Publius madea desperate resistance. His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with theirhands and dragged the encumbered horsemen to the ground; or dismounting, slipped beneath the horses of their opponents, and stabbing them in thebelly, brought steed and rider down upon themselves. His legionariesoccupied a slight hillock, and endeavored to make a wall of theirshields, but the Parthian archers closed around them, and slew themalmost to a man. Of the whole detachment, nearly six thousand strong, nomore than 500 were taken prisoners, and scarcely one escaped. The youngCrassus might, possibly, had he chosen to make the attempt, have forcedhis way through the enemy to Ichnee, a Greek town not far distant; buthe preferred to share the fate of his men. Rather than fall into thehands of the enemy, he caused his shield-bearer to dispatch him; and hisexample was followed by his principal officers. The victors struck offhis head, and elevating it on a pike, returned to resume their attack onthe main body of the Roman army. 

The main body, much relieved by the diminution of the pressure uponthem, had waited patiently for Publius to return in triumph, regardingthe battle as well-nigh over and success as certain. After a time theprolonged absence of the young captain aroused suspicions, which grewinto alarms when messengers arrived telling of his extreme danger. Crassus, almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the word toadvance, and the army had moved forward a short distance, whenthe shouts of the returning enemy were heard, and the head of theunfortunate officer was seen displayed aloft, while the Parthiansquadrons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on their remainingfoes with increased vigor. The mailed horsemen approached close tothe legionaries and thrust at them with the long pikes while thelight-armed, galloping across the Roman front, discharged their unerringarrows over the heads of their own men. The Romans could neithersuccessfully defend themselves nor effectively retaliate. Stilltime brought some relief. Bowstrings broke, spears were blunted orsplintered, arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax; and whennight closed in both parties were almost equally glad of the cessationof arms which the darkness rendered compulsory. 

It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Persians, to bivouac at aconsiderable distance from an enemy. Accordingly, at nightfall theydrew off, having first shouted to the Romans that they would grant thegeneral one night in which to bewail his son; on the morrow they wouldcome and take him prisoner, unless he preferred the better course ofsurrendering himself to the mercy of Arsaces. A short breathing-spacewas thus allowed the Romans, who took advantage of it to retire towardsCarrhae, leaving behind them the greater part of their wounded, to thenumber of 4, 000. A small body of horse reached Carrhae about midnight, and gave the commandant such information as led him to put his men underarms and issue forth to the succor of the proconsul. The Parthians, though the cries of the wounded made them well aware of the Romanretreat, adhered to their system of avoiding night combats, andattempted no pursuit till morning. Even then they allowed themselves tobe delayed by comparatively trivial matters--the capture of the Romancamp, the massacre of the wounded, and the slaughter of the numerousstragglers scattered along the line of march--and made no haste toovertake the retreating army. The bulk of the troops were thus enabledto effect their retreat in safety to Carrhae, where, having theprotection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time secure. 

It might have been expected that the Romans would here have made astand. The siege of a fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if weunderstand by siege anything more than a very incomplete blockade. Andthe Parthians were notoriously inefficient against walls. There was achance, moreover, that Artavasdes might have been more successful thanhis ally, and, having repulsed the Parthian monarch, might march histroops to the relief of the Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughlydispirited, and would not listen to these suggestions. Provisions nodoubt ran short, since, as there had been no expectation of adisaster, no preparations had been made for standing a siege. The Greekinhabitants of the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to afalling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near; and the Parthian systemof abstaining from action during the night seemed to render escapetolerably easy. It was resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to theprotection of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to endeavor by arapid night march to reach the Armenian hills. The various officers seemto have been allowed to arrange matters for themselves. Cassius tookhis way towards the Euphrates, and succeeded in escaping with 500 horse. Octavius, with a division which is estimated at 5, 000 men, reached theoutskirts of the the hills at a place called Sinnaca, and found himselfin comparative security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made but poorprogress during the night; he had, however, arrived within littlemore than a mile of Octavius before the enemy, who would not stir tilldaybreak, overtook him. Pressed upon by their advancing squandrons, he, with his small band of 2, 000 legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied alow hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with the position ofSinnaca. Here the Parthian host beset him; and he would infallibly havebeen slain or captured at once, had not Octavius, deserting his placeof safety, descended to the aid of his commander. The united 7, 000 heldtheir own against the enemy, having the advantage of the ground, andhaving perhaps by the experience of some days learnt the weak points ofParthian warfare. 

Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure the person of the Romancommander. In the East an excessive importance is attached to thisproof of success; and there were reasons which made Crassus particularlyobnoxious to his antagonists. He was believed to have originated, andnot merely conducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of gold. He had refused with the utmost haughtiness all discussion of terms, andhad insulted the majesty of the Parthians by the declaration that hewould treat nowhere but at their capital. If he escaped, he wouldbe bound at some future time to repeat his attempt; if he were madeprisoner, his fate would be a terrible warning to others. But now, asevening approached, it seemed to the Parthian that the prize which heso much desired was about to elude his grasp. The highlands of Armeniawould be gained by the fugitives during the night, and further pursuitof them would be hopeless. It remained that he should effect by craftwhat he could no longer hope to gain by the employment of force; and tothis point all his efforts were now directed. He drew off his troopsand left the Romans without further molestation. He allowed some of hisprisoners to escape and rejoin their friends, having first contrivedthat they should overhear a conversation among his men, of which thetheme was the Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to come to termswith the Romans. He then, having allowed time for the report of hispacific intentions to spread, rode with a few chiefs towards the Romancamp, carrying his bow unstrung and his right hand stretched out intoken of amity. "Let the Roman General, " he said, "come forward with anequal number of attendants, and confer with me in the open space betweenthe armies on terms of peace. " The aged proconsul was disinclined totrust these overtures; but his men clamored and threatened, upon whichhe yielded, and went down into the plain, accompanied by Octavius anda few others. Here he was received with apparent honor, and terms werearranged; but Surenas required that they should at once be reduced towriting, "since, " he said, with pointed allusion to the bad faith ofPompey, "you Romans are not very apt to remember your engagements. " Amovement being requisite for the drawing up of the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers were induced to mount upon horses furnished bythe Parthians, who had no sooner seated the proconsul on his steed, than he proceeded to hurry him forward, with the evident intention ofcarrying him off to their camp. The Roman officers took the alarm andresisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian and killed one ofthe grooms who was hurrying Crassus away. A blow from behind stretchedhim on the ground lifeless. A general melee followed, and in theconfusion Crassus was killed, whether by one of his own side and withhis own consent, or by the hand of a Parthian is uncertain. Thearmy, learning the fate of their general, with but few exceptions, surrendered. Such as sought to escape under cover of the approachingnight were hunted down by the Bedouins who served under the Parthianstandard, and killed almost to a man. Of the entire army which hadcrossed the Euphrates, consisting of above 40, 000 men, not more than onefourth returned. One half of the whole number perished. Nearly 10, 000prisoners were settled by the victors in the fertile oasis of Margiana, near the northern frontier of the empire, where they intermarried withnative wives, and became submissive Parthian subjects. 

Such was the result of this great expedition, the first attempt of thegrasping and ambitious Romans, not so much to conquer Parthia, as tostrike terror into the heart of her people, and to degrade them tothe condition of obsequious dependants on the will and pleasure of the"world's lords. " The expedition failed so utterly, not from any wantof bravery on the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from anyabsolute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman tactics, but partlyfrom the incompetence of the commander, partly from the inexperience ofthe Romans, up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian warfare andin the best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose main arm isthe cavalry with a body of foot-soldiers, supported by an insignificantnumber of horse, must be at all times rash and dangerous. To directsuch an attack on the more open part of the country, where cavalry couldoperate freely, was wantonly to aggravate the peril. After the firstdisaster, to quit the protection of walls, when it had been obtained, was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus taken care to obtain thesupport of some of the desert tribes, if Armenia could not help him, and had he then advanced either by the way of the Mons Masius and theTigris, or along the line of the Euphrates, the issue of his attackmight have been different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia andCtesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Septimius Severas, andmight have taken and plundered those cities. He would no doubt haveexperienced difficulties in his retreat; but he might have come off noworse than Trajan, whose Parthian expedition has been generally regardedas rather augmenting than detracting from his reputation. But anignorant and inexperienced commander, venturing on a trial of armswith an enemy of whom he knew little or nothing, in their own country, without support or allies, and then neglecting every precautionsuggested by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by apretended friend, and marching straight into a net prepared for him, naturally suffered defeat. The credit of the Roman arms does not greatlysuffer by the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly enhanced. The latter showed, as they had shown in their wars against theSyro-Macedonians, that there somewhat loose and irregular array wascapable of acting with effect against the solid masses and well-orderedmovements of disciplined troops. They acquired by their use of the bow afame like that which the English archers obtained for the employment ofthe same weapon at Crecy and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romansto respect them, and to allow that there was at least one nation in theworld which could meet them on equal terms and not be worsted in theencounter. They henceforth obtained recognition from Graeco-Romanwriters--albeit a grudging and covert recognition--as the second Powerin the world, the admitted rival of Rome, the only real counterpoiseupon the earth to the power which ruled from the Euphrates to theAtlantic Ocean. 

While the general of King Orodes was thus successful against the Romansin Mesopotamia, the king himself had in Armenia obtained advantages ofalmost equal value, though of a different kind. Instead of contendingwith Artavasdes, he had come to terms with him, and had concluded aclose alliance, which he had sought to confirm and secure by unitinghis son, Pacorus, in marriage with a sister of the Armenian monarch. Aseries of festivities was being held to celebrate this auspiciousevent, when news came of Surenas's triumph, and of the fate of Crassus. According to the barbarous customs of the East, the head and hand of theslain proconsul accompanied the intelligence. We are told that atthe moment of the messenger's arrival the two sovereigns, with theirattendants, were amusing themselves with a dramatic entertainment. Bothmonarchs had a good knowledge of the Greek literature and language, inwhich Artavasdes had himself composed historical works and tragedies. The actors were representing the famous scene in the "Bacchae" ofEuripides, where Agave and the Bacchanals come upon the stage with themutilated remains of the murdered Pentheus, when the head of Crassus wasthrown in among them. Instantly the player who personated Agave seizedthe bloody trophy, and placing it on his thyrsus instead of the onehe was carrying, paraded it before the delighted spectators, while hechanted the well-known lines:

 From the mountain to the hall New-cut tendril, see, we bring-- Blessed prey!

The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please an Easternaudience: it was followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity and stillmore thoroughly Oriental. The Parthians, in derision of the motive whichwas supposed to have led Crassus to make his attack, had a quantity ofgold melted and poured it into his mouth. 

Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious troops, and seeking toannoy the disaffected Seleucians, by the performance of a farcicalceremony. He spread the report that Crassus was not killed but captured;and, selecting from among the prisoners the Roman most like him inappearance, he dressed the man in woman's clothes, mounted him upona horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of "Crassus" and"Imperator, " conducted him in triumph to the Grecian city. Before himwent, mounted on camels, a band, arrayed as trumpeters and lictors, thelictors' rods having purses suspended to them, and the axes in theirmidst being crowned with the bleeding heads of Romans. In the rearfollowed a train of Seloucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive ofthe effeminacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After this pretendedparade of his prisoner through the streets of the town, Surenas calleda meeting of the Seleucian senate, and indignantly denounced to them theindecency of the literature which he had found in the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true; but the Seleucians were not greatlyimpressed by the moral lesson read to them, when they remarked the trainof concubines that had accompanied Surenas himself in the field, andthought of the loose crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes, thatwas commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army. 

The political consequences of the great triumph which the Parthians hadachieved were less than might have been anticipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered to its extremest limit, the Euphrates; Armeniawas lost to the Roman alliance, and thrown for the time into completedependence upon Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited;and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently aggrievedby the unprovoked spoliation of their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms. But no general movement of the Oriental races took place. It might havebeen expected that the Syrians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Oappadocians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogetherOriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising against theirWestern lords and driving the Romans back upon Europe. It might havebeen thought that Parthia at least would have assumed the offensive inforce, and have made a determined effort to rid herself of neighbors whohad proved so troublesome. But though the conjuncture of circumstanceswas most favorable, the man was wanting. Had Mithridates or Tigranesbeen living, or had Surenas been king of Parthia, instead of a meregeneral, advantage would probably have been taken of the occasion, and Rome might have suffered seriously. But Orodes seems to have beenneither ambitious as a prince nor skilful as a commander; he lackedat any rate the keen and all-embracing glance which could sweepthe political horizon and, comprehending the exact character of thesituation, see at the same time how to make the most of it. He allowedthe opportunity to slip by without putting forth his strength or makingany considerable effort; and the occasion once lost never returned. 

In Parthia itself one immediate result of the expedition seems to havebeen the ruin of Surenas. His services to his sovereign had exceededthe measure which it is safe in the East for a subject to render to thecrown. The jealousy of his royal master was aroused, and he had to paythe penalty of over-much success with his life. Parthia was thus leftwithout a general of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second in commandduring the war with Crassus, had in no way distinguished himself throughthe campaign. This condition of things may account for the feebleness ofthe efforts made in B. C. 52 to retaliate on the Romans the damage doneby their invasion. A few weak bands only passed the Euphrates, and beganthe work of plunder and ravage, in which they were speedily disturbedby Cassius, who easily drove them back over the river. The next year, however, a more determined attempt was made. Orodes sent his son, Pacorus, the young bridegroom, to win his spurs in Syria, at the head ofa considerable force, and supported by the experience and authority ofan officer of ripe age, named Osaces. The army crossed the Euphratesunresisted, for Cassius, the governor, had with him only the brokenremains of Crassus's army, consisting of about two legions, and, deeminghimself too weak to meet the enemy in the open field, was content todefend the towns. The open country was consequently overrun; and athrill of mingled alarm and excitement passed through all the Romanprovinces in Asia. The provinces were at the time most inadequatelysupplied with Roman troops, through the desire of Csesar and Pompey tomaintain large armies about their own persons. The natives were for themost part disaffected and inclined to hail the Parthians as brethrenand deliverers. Excepting Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes ofCappadocia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) plaintivelydeclared, "not a friend on the Asiatic continent. And Cappadocia wasmiserably weak, " and open to attack on the side of Armenia. Had Orodesand Artavasdes acted in concert, and had the latter, while Orodes senthis armies into Syria, poured the Armenian forces into Cappadocia andthen into Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do), there wouldhave been the greatest danger to the Roman possessions. As it was, theexcitement in Asia Minor was extreme. Cicero marched into Cappadociawith the bulk of the Roman troops, and summoned to his aid Deiotaruswith his Galatians, at the same time writing to the Roman Senate toimplore reinforcements. Cassius shut himself up in Antioch, and allowedthe Parthian cavalry to pass him by, and even to proceed beyond thebounds of Syria into Cilicia. But the Parthians seem scarcely to haveunderstood the situation of their adversaries, or to have been aware oftheir own advantages. Instead of spreading themselves wide, raising thenatives, and leaving them to blockade the towns, while with their asyet unconquered squandrons they defied the enemy in the open country, wefind them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities, for which theywere wholly unfit, and confining themselves almost entirely to thenarrow valley of the Orontes. Under these circumstances we are notsurprised to learn that Cassius, having first beat them back fromAntioch, contrived to lead them into an ambush on the banks of theriver, and severely handled their troops, even killing the generalOsaces. The Parthians withdrew from the neighborhood of the Syriancapital after this defeat, which must have taken place about the end ofSeptember, and soon afterwards went into winter quarters in Oyrrhestica, or the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. Here they remainedduring the winter months under Pacorus, and it was expected that the warwould break out again with fresh fury in the spring; but Bibulus, the new proconsul of Syria, conscious of his military deficiencies, contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians themselves, and toturn the thoughts of Pacorus in another direction. He suggested toOrnodapantes, a Parthian noble, with whom he had managed to open acorrespondence, that Pacorus would be a more worthy occupant of theParthian throne than his father, and that he would consult well for hisown interests if he were to proclaim the young prince, and lead the armyof Syria against Orodes. These intrigues seem, to have first caused thewar to languish, and then produced the recall of the expedition. Orodessummoned Pacorus to return to Parthia before the plot contrived betweenhim and the Romans was ripe for execution; and Pacorus felt that nocourse was open to him but to obey. The Parthian legions recrossed theEuphrates in July, B. C. 50; and the First Roman War, which had lasted alittle more than four years, terminated without any real recovery by theRomans of the laurels that they had lost at Carrhae. 

CHAPTER XII. 

_Relations of Orodes with Pompey, and with Brutus and Cassius. SecondWar with Rome. Great Parthian Expedition against Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor. Defeat of Saxa. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem. Parthians driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death of Pacorus. Death ofOrodes. _

The civil troubles that had seemed to threaten Parthia from the ambitionof the youthful Pacorus passed away without any explosion. The sonshowed his obedience by returning home submissively when he mighthave flown to arms; and the father accepted the act of obedience as asufficient indication that no rebellion had been seriously meant. Wefind Pacorus not only allowed to live, but again entrusted a few yearslater with high office by the Parthian monarch; and on this occasion wefind him showing no signs of disaffection or discontent. 

Nine years, however, elapsed between the recall of the young princeand his reappointment to the supreme command against the Romans. Of theinternal condition of Parthia during this interval we have no account. Apparently, Orodes ruled quietly and peaceably, contenting himselfwith the glory which he had gained, and not anxious to tempt fortune byengaging in any fresh enterprise. It was no doubt a satisfaction tohim to see the arms of the Romans, instead of being directed upon Asia, employed in intestine strife; and we can well understand that he mighteven deem it for his interest to foment and encourage the quarrelswhich, at any rate for the time, secured his own empire from attack. Itappears that communications took place in the year B. C. 49 or 48 betweenhim and Pompey, a request for alliance being made by the latter, and ananswer being sent by Orodes, containing the terms upon which he wouldconsent to give Pompey effective aid in the war. If the Roman leaderwould deliver into his hands the province of Syria and make it whollyover to the Parthians, Orodes would conclude an alliance with him andsend help; but not otherwise. It is to the credit of Pompey that herejected these terms, and declined to secure his own private gain bydepriving his country of a province. Notwithstanding the failure ofthese negotiations and the imprisonment of his envoy Hirrus, when a fewmonths later, having lost the battle of Pharsalia, the unhappy Roman wasin need of a refuge from his great enemy, he is said to have proposedthrowing himself on the friendship, or mercy, of Orodes. He had hopes, perhaps, of enlisting the Parthian battalions in his cause, and ofrecovering power by means of this foreign aid. But his friends combatedhis design, and persuaded him that the risk, both to himself and to hiswife, Cornelia, was too great to be compatible with prudence. Pompeyyielded to their representations; and Orodes escaped the difficultyof having to elect between repulsing a suppliant, and provoking thehostility of the most powerful chieftain and the greatest general of theage. 

Caesar quitted the East in B. C. 47 without entering into anycommunication with Orodes. He had plenty of work upon his hands; andwhatever designs he may have even then entertained of punishing theParthian inroad into Syria, or avenging the defeat of Carrhae, he waswise enough to keep his projects to himself and to leave Asia withoutexasperating by threats or hostile movements the Power on which thepeace of the East principally depended. It was not until he had broughtthe African and Spanish wars to an end that he allowed his intention ofleading an expedition against Parthia to be openly talked about. InB. C. 34, four years after Pharsalia, having put down all his domesticenemies, and arranged matters, as he thought, satisfactorily at Rome, helet a decree be passed formally assigning to him "the Parthian War, " andsent the legions across the Adriatic on their way to Asia. What plan ofcampaign he may have contemplated is uncertain; but there cannot bea doubt that an expedition under his auspices would have been a mostserious danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her subjection. The military talents of the Great Dictator were of the most splendiddescription; his powers of organization and consolidation enormous;his prudence and caution equal to his ambition and his courage. Oncelaunched on a career of conquest in the East, it is impossible to saywhither he might not have carried the Roman eagles, or what countrieshe might not have added to the Empire. But Parthia was saved fromthe imminent peril without any effort of her own. The daggers of "theLiberators" struck down on the 15th of March, B. C. 44, the only man whomshe had seriously to fear; and with the removal of Julius passedaway even from Roman thought for many a years the design which he hadentertained, and which he alone could have accomplished. 

In the civil war that followed on the murder of Julius the Parthiansare declared to have actually taken a part. It appears that--aboutB. C. 46--a small body of Parthian horse-archers had been sent to theassistance of a certain Bassus, a Roman who amid the troubles of thetimes was seeking to obtain for himself something like an independentprincipality in Syria. The soldiers of Bassus, after a while (B. C. 43), went over in a body to Cassius, who was in the East collecting troopsfor his great struggle with Antony and Octavian; and thus a handful ofParthians came into his power. Of this circumstance he determined totake advantage, in order to obtain, if possible, a considerable body oftroops from Orodes. He presented each of the Parthian soldiers with asum of money, and dismissed them all to their homes, at the sametime seizing the opportunity to send some of his own officers, asambassadors, to Orodes, with a request for substantial aid. On receivingthis application the Parthian monarch appears to have come to theconclusion that it was to his interest to comply with it. Whether hemade conditions, or no, is uncertain; but he seems to have sent a prettynumerous body of horse to the support of the "Liberators" against theirantagonists. Perhaps he trusted to obtain from the gratitude of Cassiuswhat he had failed to extort from the fears of Pompey. Or, perhaps, hewas only anxious to prolong the period of civil disturbance in the RomanState, which secured his own territory from attack, and might ultimatelygive him an opportunity of helping himself to some portion of the Romandominions in Asia. 

The opportunity seemed to him to have arrived in B. C. 40. Philippihad been fought and lost. The "Liberators" were crushed. The strugglebetween the Republicans and the Monarchists had come to an end. But, instead of being united, the Roman world was more than ever divided; andthe chance of making an actual territorial gain at the expense of thetryant power appeared fairer than it had ever been before. Three rivalsnow held divided sway in the Roman State; each of them jealous ofthe other two, and anxious for his own aggrandizement. The two chiefpretenders to the first place were bitterly hostile; and while the onewas detained in Italy by insurrection against his authority, the otherwas plunged in luxury and dissipation, enjoying the first delights of alawless passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the East were, moreover, alienated by the recent exactions of the profligate Triumvir, who, to reward his parasites and favorites, had laid upon them a burdenthat they were scarcely able to bear. Further, the Parthians enjoyed atthis time the advantage of having a Roman officer of good position intheir service, whose knowledge of the Roman tactics, and influence inRoman provinces, might be expected to turn to their advantage. Underthese circumstances, when the spring of the year arrived, Antony beingstill in Egypt, and Octavian (as far as was known) occupied in the siegeof Perusia, the Parthian hordes, under Labienus and Pacorus, burst uponSyria in greater force than on any previous occasion. Overrunning withtheir numerous cavalry the country between the Euphrates and Antioch, and thence the valley of the Orontes, they had (as usual) somedifficulty with the towns. From Apamaea, placed (like Durham) on a rockypeninsula almost surrounded by the river, they were at first repulsed;but, having shortly afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa, the governor ofSyria, in the open field, they received the submission of Apamaea andAntioch, which latter city Saxa abandoned at their approach, flyingprecipitately into Cilicia. Encouraged by these successes, Labienus andPacorus agreed to divide their troops, and to engage simultaneously intwo great expeditions. Pacorus undertook to carry the Parthian standardthroughout the entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, whileLabienus determined to invade Asia Minor, and to see if he could notwrest some of its more fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditionswere crowned with success. Pacorus reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia, except the single city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for wantof a naval force. He then advanced into Palestine, which he found inits normal condition of intestine commotion. Hyrcanus and Antigonus, twoprinces of the Asmonsean house, were rivals for the Jewish crown; andthe latter, whom Hyrcanus had expelled, was content to make commoncause with the invader, and to be indebted to a rude foreigner forthe possession of the kingdom whereto he aspired. He offered Pacorus athousand talents, and five hundred Jewish women, if he would espousehis cause and seat him upon his uncle's throne. The offer was readilyembraced, and by the irresistible help of the Parthians a revolutionwas effected at Jerusalem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. A newpriest-king was set up in the person of Antigonus, the last Asmonseanprince, who held the capital for three years--B. C. 40-37--as a Parthiansatrap, the creature and dependant of the great monarchy on the furtherside of the Euphrates. Meanwhile in Asia Minor Labienus carried allbefore him. Decidius Saxa, having once more (in Cilicia) ventured upona battle, was not only defeated, but slain. Pamphylia, Lycia, and Cariawere overrun. Stratonicea was besieged; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken. According to some writers the Parthians even pillaged Lydia and Ionia, and were in possession of Asia to the shores of the Hellespont. It maybe said that for a full year Western Asia changed masters; the rule andauthority of Rome disappeared; and the Parthians were recognized as thedominant power. But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the autumnof B. C. 39 Antony, having set out from Italy to resume his command inthe East, despatched his lieutenant, Publius Ventidius, into Asia, withorders to act against Labienus and the triumphant Parthians. Ventidiuslanded unexpectedly on the coast of Asia Minor, and so alarmed Labienus, who had no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell back hurriedlytowards Cilicia, evacuating all the more western provinces, and at thesame time sending urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succor. Pacorussent a body of horse to his aid; but these troops, instead of puttingthemselves under his command, acted independently, and, in a rashattempt to surprise the Roman camp, were defeated by Ventidius, whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, leaving Labienus to his fate. The self-styled "Imperator, " upon this, deserted his men, and soughtsafety in flight; but his retreat was soon discovered, and he waspursued, captured, and put to death. 

The Parthians, meanwhile, alarmed at the turn which affairs hadtaken, left Antigonus to maintain their interests in Palestine, andconcentrated themselves in Northern Syria and Commagene, wherethey awaited the advance of the Romans. A strong detachment, underPharnapates, was appointed to guard the Syrian Gates, or narrow passover Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria. Here Ventidiusgained another victory. He had sent forward an officer named PompsediusSilo with some cavalry to endeavor to seize this post, and Pompaediushad found himself compelled to an engagement with Pharnapates, in whichhe was on the point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, who hadprobably feared for his subordinate's safety, appeared on the scene, and turned the scale in favor of the Romans. The detachment underPharnapates was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was among theslain. When news of this defeat reached Pacorus, he resolved to retreat, and withdrew his troops across the Euphrates. This movement he appearsto have executed without being molested by Ventidius, who thus recoveredSyria to the Romans towards the close of B. C. 39, or early in B. C. 38. 

But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish the contest. Hehad made himself popular among the Syrians by his mild and justadministration, and knew that they preferred his government to that ofthe Romans. He had many allies among the petty princes and dynasts, whooccupied a semi-independent position on the borders of the Parthian andRoman empires. Antigonus, whom he had established as king of the Jews, still maintained himself in Judaea against the efforts of Herod, to whomAugustus and Antony had assigned the throne. Pacorus therefore arrangedduring the remainder of the winter for a fresh invasion of Syria in thespring, and, taking the field earlier than his adversary expected, madeready to recross the Euphrates. We are told that if he had crossed atthe usual point, he would have found the Romans unprepared, the legionsbeing still in their winter quarters, some north and some south of therange of Taurus. Ventidius, however, contrived by a stratagem to inducehim to effect the passage at a different point, considerably lowerdown the stream, and in this way to waste some valuable time, whichhe himself employed in collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when theParthians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, the Roman generalwas prepared to engage them, and was not even loath to decide the fateof the war by a single battle. He had taken care to provide himself witha strong force of slingers, and had entrenched himself in a positionon high ground at some distance from the river. The Parthians, findingtheir passage of the Euphrates unopposed, and, when they fell in withthe enemy, seeing him entrenched, as though resolved to act only on thedefensive, became overbold; they thought the force opposed to them mustbe weak or cowardly, and might yield its position without a blow, ifbriskly attacked. Accordingly, as on a former occasion, they charged upthe hill on which the Roman camp was placed, hoping to take it by sheeraudacity. But the troops inside were held ready, and at the propermoment issued forth; the assailants found themselves in their turnassailed, and, fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were soon drivendown the declivity. The battle was renewed in plain below, where themailed horse of the Parthians made a brave resistance; but the slingersgalled them severely, and in the midst of the struggle it happened thatby ill-fortune Pacorus was slain. The result followed which is almostinvariable with an Oriental army: having lost their leader, the soldierseverywhere gave way; flight became universal, and the Romans gained acomplete victory. The Parthian army fled in two directions. Part madefor the bridge of boats by which it had crossed the Euphrates, but wasintercepted by the Romans and destroyed. Part turned northwards intoCommagene, and there took refuge with the king, Antiochus, who refusedto surrender them to the demand of Ventidius, and no doubt allowed themto return to their own country. 

Thus ended the great Parthian invasion of Syria, and with it ended theprospect of any further spread of the Arsacid dominion towards thewest. When the two great powers, Rome and Parthia, first came intocollision--when the first blow struck by the latter, the destruction ofthe army of Crassus, was followed up by the advance of their clouds ofhorse into Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor--when Apamsea, Antioch, andJerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius Saxa was defeated andslain, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Caria, Lydia, and Ionia occupied--it seemedas if Rome had found, not so much an equal as a superior; it looked asif the power heretofore predominant would be compelled to contracther frontier, and as if Parthia would advance hers to the Egean or theMediterranean. The history of the contest between the East and the West, between Asia and Europe, is a history of reactions. At one time one ofthe continents, at another time the other, is in the ascendant. The timeappeared to have come when the Asiatics were once more to recover theirown, and to beat back the European aggressor to his proper shoresand islands. The triumphs achieved by the Seljukian Turks betweenthe eleventh and the fifteenth centuries would in that case have beenanticipated by above a thousand years through the efforts of a kindred, and not dissimilar people. But it turned out that the effort made waspremature. While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted for thenational defence on the broad plains of inner Asia, it was illsuited for conquest, and, comparatively speaking, ineffective in morecontracted and difficult regions. The Parthian military system had notthe elasticity of the Roman--it did not in the same way adapt itself tocircumstances, or admit of the addition of new arms, or the indefiniteexpansion of an old one. However loose and seemingly flexible, itwas rigid in its uniformity; it never altered; it remained under thethirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under the first, improved indetails, perhaps, but essentially the same system. The Romans, onthe contrary, were ever modifying their system, ever learning newcombinations or new manoeuvres or new modes of warfare from theirenemies. They met the Parthian tactics of loose array, continuousdistant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of cavalry, withan increase in the number of their own horse, a larger employment ofauxiliary irregulars, and a greater use of the sling. At the same timethey learnt to take full advantage of the Parthian inefficiency againstwalls, and to practice against them the arts of pretended retreat andambush. The result was, that Parthia found she could make no impressionupon the dominions of Rome, and, having become persuaded of this by theexperience of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever theidea of attempting Western conquests. She took up, in fact, from thistime, a new attitude, Hitherto she had been consistently aggressive. Shehad labored constantly to extend herself at the expense successively ofthe Bactrians, the Scythians, the Syro-Macedonians, and the Armenians. She had proceeded from one aggression to another, leaving only shortintervals between her wars, and had always been looking out for somefresh enemy. Henceforth she became, comparatively speaking, pacific. Shewas content for the most part, to maintain her limits. She sought nonew foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated into a struggle for influenceover the kingdom of Armenia; and her hopes were limited to the reductionof that kingdom into a subject position. 

The death of Pacorus is said to have caused Orodes intense grief. Formany days he would neither eat nor speak; then his sorrow took anotherturn. He imagined that his son had returned; he thought continually thathe heard or saw him; he could do nothing but repeat his name. Every nowand then, however, he awoke to a sense of the actual fact, and mournedthe death of his favorite with tears. After a while this extreme griefwore itself out, and the aged king began to direct his attention oncemore to public affairs. He grew anxious about the succession. Of thethirty sons who still remained to him there was not one who had madehimself a name, or was in any way distinguished above the remainder. Inthe absence of any personal ground of preference, Orodes--who seemsto have regarded himself as possessing a right to nominate the son whoshould succeed him--thought the claims of primogeniture deserved to beconsidered, and selected as his successor, Phraa-tes, the eldest of thethirty. Not content with nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether thenomination would be accepted by the Megistanes, he proceeded further toabdicate in his favor, whereupon Phraates became king. The transactionproved a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of his brothers, who were the sons of a princess married to Orodes, whereas his ownmother was only a concubine, removed them by assassination, and when theex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the act added the crimeof parricide to fratricide by putting to death his aged father. Thusperished Orodes, after a reign of eighteen years--the most memorable inthe Parthian annals. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

_Reign of Phraates IV. His cruelties. Flight of Monceses to Antony. Antony's great Parthian Expedition, or Invasion of Media Atropatene. ItsComplete Failure. Subsequent Alliance of the Median King with Antony. War between Parthia and Media. Rebellion raised against Phraates byTiridates. Phraates expelled. He recovers his Throne with the help ofthe Scythians. His dealings with Augustus. His death and Character. _

The shedding of blood is like, "the letting out of water. " When it oncebegins, none can say where it will stop. The absolute monarch who, forhis own fancied security, commences a system of executions, is led onstep by step to wholesale atrocities from which he would have shrunkwith horror at the outset. Phraates had removed brothers whose superioradvantages of birth made them formidable rivals. He had punished withdeath a father who ventured to blame his act, and to forget that byabdication he had sunk himself to the position of a subject. Could hehave stopped here, it might have seemed that his severities proceedednot so much from cruelty of disposition as from political necessity;and historians, always tender in the judgments which they pass on kingsunder such circumstances, would probably have condoned or justified hisconduct. But the taste for bloodshed grows with the indulgence of it. In a short time the young king had killed all his remaining brothers, although their birth was no better than his own, and there was no validground for his fearing them; and soon afterwards, not content with themurder of his own relations, he began to vent his fury upon the Parthiannobles. Many of these suffered death; and such a panic seized the orderthat numbers quitted the country, and dispersed in different directions, content to remain in exile until the danger which threatened them shouldhave passed by. There, were others, however, who were not so patient. Abody of chiefs had fled to Antony, among whom was a certain Monseses, a nobleman of the highest rank, who seems to have distinguished himselfpreviously in the Syrian wars. This person represented to Antony thatPhraates had by his tyrannical and bloody conduct made himself hatefulto his subjects, and that a revolution could easily be effected. If theRomans would support him, he offered to invade Parthia; and he madeno doubt of wresting the greater portion of it from the hands of thetyrant, and of being himself accepted as king. In that, case he wouldconsent to hold his crown of the Romans, who might depend upon hisfidelity and gratitude. Antony is said to have listened to theseovertures, and to have been induced by them to turn his thoughts toan invasion of the Parthian kingdom. He began to collect troops andto obtain allies with this object. He entered into negotiations withArtavasdes, the Armenian king, who seems at this time to have been moreafraid of Rome than of Parthia, and engaged him to take a part inhis projected campaign. He spoke of employing Monseses in a separateexpedition. Under these circumstances Phraates became alarmed. He sent amessage to Monseses with promises of pardon and favor, which that chiefthought worthy of acceptance. Hereupon Monseses represented to Antonythat by a peaceful return he might perhaps do him as much service as byhaving recourse to arms; and though Antony was not persuaded, he thoughtit prudent to profess himself well satisfied, and to allow Monseses toquit him. His relations with Parthia, he said, might perhaps be placedon a proper footing without a war, and he was quite willing to trynegotiation. His ambassadors should accompany Monasses. They would beinstructed to demand nothing of Phraates but the restoration of theRoman standards taken from Crassus, and the liberation of such of thecaptive soldiers as were still living. '

But Antony had really determined on war. It may be doubted whether ithad required the overtures of Monseses to put a Parthian expedition intohis thoughts. He must have been either more or less than a man if thesuccesses of his lieutenants had not stirred in his mind some feeling ofjealousy, and some desire to throw their victories into the shade by agrand and noble achievement. Especially the glory of Ventidius, who hadbeen allowed the much-coveted honor of a triumph at Rome on account ofhis defeats of the Parthians in Cilicia and Syria, must have movedhim to emulation, and have caused him to cast about for some means ofexalting his own military reputation above that of his subordinates. For this purpose nothing, he must have known, would be so effectual asa real Parthian success, the inflicting on this hated and dreaded foeof an unmistakable humiliation, the dictating to them terms of peace ontheir own soil after some crushing and overwhelming disaster. And, afterthe victories of Ventidius, this did not appear to be so very difficult. The prestige of the Parthian name was gone. Roman soldiers could betrusted to meet them without alarm, and to contend with them withoutundue excitement or flurry. The weakness, as well as the strength, oftheir military system had come to be known; and expedients had beendevised by which its strong points were met and counterbalanced. At thehead of sixteen legions, Antony might well think that he could invadeParthia successfully, and not only avoid the fate of Crassus, but gatherlaurels which might serve him in good stead in his contest with hisgreat political rival. 

Nor can the Roman general be taxed with undue precipitation or withattacking in insufficient force. He had begun, as already noticed, withsecuring the co-operation of the Armenian king, Artavasdes, who promisedhim a contingent of 7000 foot and 6000 horse. His Roman infantry isestimated at 60, 000; besides which he had 10, 000 Gallic and Iberianhorse, and 30, 000 light armed and cavalry of the Asiatic allies. His ownarmy thus amounted to 100, 000 men; and, with the Armenian contingent, his entire force would have been 113, 000. It seems that it was hisoriginal intention to cross the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and thus toadvance almost in the footsteps of Crassus but when he reached the banksof the river (about midsummer B. C. 37) he found such preparationsmade to resist him that he abandoned his first design, and, turningnorthwards, entered Armenia, determined to take advantage of hisalliance with Artavasdes, and to attack Parthia with Armenia as thebasis of his operations. Artavasdes gladly received him, and persuadedhim, instead of penetrating into Parthia itself, to direct his armsagainst the territory of a Parthian subject-ally, the king of MediaAtropatene, whose territories adjoined Armenia on the southeast. Artavasdes pointed out that the Median monarch was absent from his owncountry, having joined his troops to those which Phraates had collectedfor the defence of Parthia. His territory therefore would be open toravage, and even Praaspa, his capital, might prove an easy prey. Theprospect excited Antony, who at once divided his troops, and havinggiven orders to Oppius Statianus to follow him leisurely with the moreunwieldy part of the army, the baggage-train, and the siege batteries, proceeded himself by forced marches to Praaspa with all the calvary andthe infantry of the better class. This town was situated at the distanceof nearly three hundred miles from the Armenian frontier; but the wayto it lay through well-cultivated plains, where food and water wereabundant. Antony performed the march without difficulty and at onceinvested the place. The walls were strong, and the defenders numerous, so that he made little impression; and when the Median king returned, accompanied by his Parthian suzerain, to the defence of his country, thecapital seemed in so little danger that it was resolved to direct thefirst attack on Statianus, who had not yet joined his chief. A mostsuccessful onslaught was made on this officer, who was surprised, defeated, and slain. Ten thousand Romans fell in the battle, and all thebaggage-wagons and engines of war were taken. A still worse result ofthe defeat was the desertion of Aitavasdes, who, regarding the case ofthe Romans as desperate, drew off his troops, and left Antony to his ownresources. 

The Roman general now found himself in great difficulties. He hadexhausted the immediate neighborhood of Praaspa, and was obliged to sendhis foraging-parties on distant expeditions, where, being beyond thereach of his protection, they were attacked and cut to pieces by theenemy. He had lost his siege-train, and found it impossible to constructanother. Such works as he attempted suffered through the sallies of thebesieged: and in some of these his soldiers behaved so ill that he wasforced to punish their cowardice by decimation. His supplies failed, and he had to feed his troops on barley instead of wheat. Meantime theautumnal equinox was approaching, and the weather was becoming cold. TheMedes and Parthians, under their respective monarchs, hung about him, impeded his movements, and cut off his stragglers, but carefully avoidedengaging him in a pitched battle. If he could have forced the city to asurrender, he would have been in comparative safety, for he might havegone into winter quarters there and have renewed the war in the ensuingspring. But all his assaults, with whatever desperation they were made, failed; and it became necessary to relinquish the siege and retire intoArmenia before the rigors of winter should set in. He could, however, with difficulty bring himself to make a confession of failure, andflattered himself for a while that the Parthians would consent topurchase his retirement by the surrender of the Crassian captives andstandards. Having lost some valuable time in negotiations, at which theParthians laughed, at length, when the equinox was passed, he broke upfrom before Praaspa, and commenced the work of retreat. There were tworoads by which he might reach the Araxes at the usual point of passage, One lay towards the left, through a plain and open country, probablythat through which he had come; the other, which was shorter, but moredifficult, lay to the right, leading across a mountain-tract, but onefairly supplied with water, and in which there were inhabited villages. Antony was advised that the Parthians had occupied the easier route, expecting that he would follow it, and intended to overwhelm him withtheir cavalry in the plains. He therefore took the road to theright through a rugged and inclement country--probably that betweenTahkt-i-Suleiman and Tabriz--and, guided by a Mardian who knew theregion well, proceeded to make his way back to the Araxes. His decisiontook the Parthians by surprise, and for two days he was unmolested. But by the third day they had thrown themselves across his path; andthenceforward, for nineteen consecutive days, they disputed with Antonyevery inch of his retreat, and inflicted on him the most seriousdamage. The sufferings of the Roman army during this time, says a modernhistorian of Rome, were unparalleled in their military annals. Theintense cold, the blinding snow and driving sleet, the want sometimesof provisions, sometimes of water, the use of poisonous herbs, and theharassing attacks of the enemy's cavalry and bowmen, which could only berepelled by maintaining the dense array of the phalanx or the tortoise, reduced the retreating army by one-third of its numbers. At length, after a march of 300 Roman, or 277 British, miles, they reached theriver Araxes, probably at the Julfa ferry, and, crossing it, foundthemselves in Armenia. But the calamities of the return were not yetended. Though it was arranged with Artavasdes that the bulk of the armyshould winter in Armenia, yet, before the various detachments couldreach their quarters in different parts of the country, eight thousandmore had perished through the effects of past sufferings or the severityof the weather. Altogether, out of the hundred thousand men whom Antonyled into Media Atropatene, less than seventy thousand remained tocommence the campaign which was threatened for the ensuing year. Wellmay the unfortunate commander have exclaimed as he compared his ownheavy losses with the light ones of Xenophon and his Greeks in thesesame regions, "Oh, those Ten Thousand! those Ten Thousand!"

On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia a quarrel broke out betweenPhraates and his Median vassal. The latter regarded himself as wrongedin the division made of the Roman spoils, and expressed himself with somuch freedom on the subject as to offend his suzerain. He then beganto fear that he had gone too far, and that Phraates would punish him bydepriving him of his sovereignty. Accordingly, he was anxious to obtaina powerful alliance, and on turning over in his mind all feasiblepolitical combinations it seems to have occurred to him that his lateenemy, Antony, might be disposed to take him under his protection. Hedoubtless knew that Artavasdes of Armenia had offended the Roman leaderby deserting him in the hour of his greatest peril, and felt that, ifAntony was intending to revenge himself on the traitor, he would be gladto have a friend on the Armenian border. He therefore sent an ambassadorof rank to Alexandria, where Antony was passing the winter, and boldlyproposed the alliance. Antony readily accepted it; he was intenselyangered by the conduct of the Armenian monarch, and determined onpunishing his defection; he viewed the Median alliance as of the utmostimportance in connection with the design, which he still entertained, of invading Parthia itself; and he saw in the powerful descendant ofAtropates a prince whom it would be well worth his while to bind to hiscause indissolubly. He therefore embraced the overtures made to himwith joy, and even rewarded the messenger who had brought them with aprincipality. After sundry efforts to entice Artavasdes into his power, which occupied him during most of B. C. 85, in the spring of B. C. 34 hesuddenly appeared in Armenia. His army, which had remained there fromthe previous campaign, held all the more important positions, and, as heprofessed the most friendly feelings towards Artavasdes, even proposingan alliance between their families, that prince, after some hesitation, at length ventured into his presence. He was immediately seized and putin chains. Armenia was rapidly overrun. Artaxias, whom the Armeniansmade king in the room of his father, was defeated and forced to takerefuge with the Parthians. Antony then arranged a marriage between thedaughter of the Median monarch and his own son by Cleopatra, Alexander, and, leaving garrisons in Armenia, carried off Artavasdes and a richbooty into Egypt. 

Phraates, during these transactions, stood wholly upon the defensive. Itmay not have been unpleasing to him to see Artavasdes punished. It musthave gratified him to observe how Antony was injuring his own cause byexasperating the Armenians, and teaching them to hate Rome even morethan they hated Parthia. But while Antony's troops held both Syria andArmenia, and the alliance between Media Atropatene and Rome continued, he could not venture to take any aggressive step or do aught but protecthis own frontier. He was obliged even to look on with patience, when, early in B. C. 33, Antony appeared once more in these parts, andadvancing to the Araxes, had a conference with the Median monarch, whereat their alliance was confirmed, troops exchanged, part of Armeniamade over to the Median king, and Jotapa, his daughter, given as a brideto the young Alexander, whom Antony designed to make satrap of the East. But no sooner had Antony withdrawn into Asia Minor in preparationfor his contest with Octavian than Phraates took the offensive. Incombination with Artaxias, the new Armenian king, he attacked Antony'sally; but the latter repulsed him by the help of his Roman troops. Soonafterwards, however, Antony recalled these troops without restoringto the Median king his own contingent; upon which the two confederatesrenewed their attack, and were successful. The Median prince wasdefeated and taken prisoner. Artaxias recovered Armenia and massacredall the Roman garrisons which he found in it. Both countries became oncemore wholly independent of Rome, and it is probable that Media returnedto its old allegiance. 

But the successes of Phraates abroad produced ill consequences athome. Elated by his victories, and regarding his position in Parthia asthereby secured, he resumed the series of cruelties towards his subjectswhich the Roman war had interrupted, and pushed them so far that aninsurrection broke out against his authority (B. C. 33), and he wascompelled to quit the country. The revolt was headed by a certainTiridates, who, upon its success, was made king by the insurgents. Phraates fled into Scythia, and persuaded the Scythians to embrace hiscause. These nomads, nothing loth, took up arms, and without any greatdifficulty restored Phraates to the throne from which his people hadexpelled him. Tiridates fled at their approach, and, having contrived tocarry off in his flight the youngest son of Phraates, presented himselfbefore Octavian, who was in Syria at the time on his return from Egypt(B. C. 30), surrendered the young prince into his hands, and requestedhis aid against the tyrant. Octavian accepted the valuable hostage, butwith his usual caution, declined to pledge himself to furnish any helpto the pretender; he might remain, he said, in Syria, if he so wished, and while he continued under Roman protection, a suitable provisionshould be made for his support, but, he must not expect armed resistanceagainst the Parthian monarch. To that monarch, when some yearsafterwards (B. C. 23) he demanded the surrender of his subject and therestoration of his young son, Octavian answered that he could not giveTiridates up to him, but he would restore him his son without a ransom. He should expect, however, that in return for this kindness the Parthianking would on his part deliver to the Romans the standards takenfrom Crassus and Antony, together with all who survived of the Romancaptives. It does not appear that Phraates was much moved by theEmperor's generosity. He gladly received his son; but he took no stepstowards the restoration of those proofs of Parthian victory whichthe Romans were so anxious to recover. It was not until B. C. 20, whenOctavian (now become Augustus) visited the East, and war seemed theprobable alternative if he continued obstinate, that the Parthianmonarch brought himself to relinquish the trophies which were as muchprized by the victors as the vanquished. In extenuation of his act wemust remember that he was unpopular with his subjects, and that Augustuscould at any moment have produced a pretender, who had once occupied, and with Roman help might easily have mounted for a second time, thethrone of the Arsacidse. 

The remaining years of Phraates--and he reigned for nearly twenty yearsafter restoring the standards--are almost unbroken by any event ofimportance. The result of the twenty years' struggle between Rome andParthia had been to impress either nation with a wholesome dread of theother. Both had triumphed on their own ground; both had failed when theyventured on sending expeditions into the enemy's territory. Each nowstood on its guard, watching the movements of its adversary acrossthe Euphrates. Both had become pacific. It is a well-known fact thatAugustus left it as a principle of policy to his successors that theRoman Empire had reached its proper limits, and could not with advantagebe extended further. This principle, followed with the utmost strictnessby Tiberius, was accepted as a rule by all the earlier Caesars, andonly regarded as admitting of rare and slight exceptions. Trajan was thefirst who, a hundred and thirty years after the accession of Augustus, made light of it and set it at defiance. With him re-awoke the spirit ofconquest, the aspiration after universal dominion. But in the meantimethere was peace--peace indeed not absolutely unbroken, for border warsoccurred, and Rome was tempted sometimes to interfere by arms in theinternal quarrels of her neighbors--but a general state of peace andamity prevailed--neither state made any grand attack on the other'sdominions--no change occurred in the frontier, no great battle testedthe relative strength of the two peoples. Such rivalry as remained wasexhibited less in arms than in diplomacy and showed itself mainly inendeavors on either side to obtain a predominant influence in Armenia. There alone during the century and a half that intervened between Antonyand Trajan did the interests of Rome and Parthia come into collision, and in connection with this kingdom alone did any struggle between thetwo countries continue. 

Phraates, after yielding to Augustus in the matter of the standards andprisoners, appears for many years to have studiously cultivated his goodgraces. In the interval between B. C. 11 and B. C. 7, distrustful of hissubjects, and fearful of their removing him in order to place one of hissons upon the Parthian throne, he resolved to send these possible rivalsout of the country; and on this occasion he paid Augustus the complimentof selecting Rome for his children's residence. The youths were four innumber, Vonones, Seraspadanes, Rhodaspes, and Phraates; two of them weremarried and had children; they resided at Rome during the remainder oftheir father's lifetime, and were treated as became their rank, beingsupported at the public charge and in a magnificent manner. The Romanwriters speak of these as "hostages" given by Phraates to the RomanEmperor; but this was certainly not the intention of the Parthianmonarch; nor could the idea well be entertained by the Romans at thetime of their residence. 

These amicable relations between the two sovereigns would probably havecontinued undisturbed till the death of one or the other, had not arevolution occured in Armenia, which tempted the Parthian king beyondhis powers of resistance. On the death of Artaxias (B. C. 20), Augustus, who was then in the East, had sent Tiberius into Armenia to arrangematters, and Tiberius had placed upon the throne a brother of Artaxias, named Tigranes. Tigranes died in B. C. 6, and the Armenians, withoutwaiting to know the will of the Roman Emperor, conferred the royal titleon his sons, for whose succession he had before his death paved theway by associating them with him in the government. Enraged at thisassumption of independence, Augustus sent an expedition into Armenia(B. C. 5), deposed the sons of Tigranes, and established on the throne acertain Artavasdes, whose birth and parentage are not known to us. Butthe Armenians were not now inclined to submit to foreign dictation;they rose in revolt against Artavasdes (ab. B. C. 2), defeated his Romansupporters, and expelled him from the kingdom. Another Tigranes was madeking; and, as it was pretty certain that the Romans would interferewith this new display of the spirit of independence, the Parthians werecalled in to resist the Roman oppressors. Armenia, was, in fact, tooweak to stand alone, and was obliged to lean upon one or other of thetwo great empires upon her borders. Her people had no clear politicalforesight, and allowed themselves to veer and fluctuate between the twoinfluences according as the feelings of the hour dictated. Rome had nowangered them beyond their very limited powers of endurance, and theyflew to Parthia for help, just as on other occasions we shall find themflying to Rome. Phraates could not bring himself to reject the Armenianovertures. Ever since the time of the second Mithridates it had been asettled maxim of Parthian policy to make Armenia dependent; and, evenat the cost of a rupture with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he mustrespond to the appeal made to him. The rupture might not come. Augustuswas now aged, and might submit to the affront without resenting it. He had lately lost the services of his best general, Tiberius, who, indignant at slights put upon him, had gone into retirement at Rhodes. He had no one that he could employ but his grandsons, youths who had notyet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates probably hoped that Augustuswould draw back before the terrors of a Parthian war under suchcircumstances, and would allow without remonstrance the passing ofArmenia into the position of a subject-ally of Parthia. 

But if these were his thoughts, he had miscalculated. Augustus, from thetime that he heard of the Armenian troubles, and of the support givento them by Parthia, seems never to have wavered in his determination tovindicate the claims of Rome to paramount influence in Armenia, and tohave only hesitated as to the person whose services he should employin the business. He would have been glad to employ Tiberius; but thatmorose prince had deserted him and, declining public life, had betakenhimself to Rhodes, where he was living in a self-chosen retirement. Caius, the eldest of his grandsons, was, in B. C. 2, only eighteen yearsof age; and, though the thoughts of Augustus at once turned in thisdirection, the extreme youth of the prince caused him to hesitatesomewhat; and the consequence was that Caius did not start for theEast till late in B. C. 1. Meanwhile a change had occured in Parthia. Phraates, who had filled the throne for above thirty-five years, ceasedto exist, and was succeeded by a young son, Phraataces, who reigned inconjunction with the queen-mother, Thermusa, or Musa. 

The circumstances which brought about this change were the following. Phraates IV. Had married, late in life, an Italian slave-girl, sent himas a present by Augustus; and she had borne him a son for whom she wasnaturally anxious to secure the succession. According to some, it wasunder her influence that the monarch had sent his four elder boys toRome, there to receive their education. At any rate, in the absence ofthese youths, Phraataces, the child of the slave-girl, became the chiefsupport of Phraates in the administration of affairs, and obtained aposition in Parthia which led him to regard himself as entitled to thethrone so soon as it should become vacant. Doubtful, however, of hisfather's goodwill, or fearful of the rival claims of his brothers, ifhe waited till the throne was vacated in the natural course of events, Phraataces resolved to anticipate the hand of time, and, in conjunctionwith his mother, administered poison to the old monarch, from theeffects of which he died. A just Nemesis for once showed itself in thatportion of human affairs which passes before our eyes. Phraates IV. , the parricide and fratricide, was, after a reign of thirty-five years, himself assassinated (B. C. 2) by a wife whom he loved only too fondlyand a son whom he esteemed and trusted. 

Phraates cannot but be regarded as one of the ablest of the Parthianmonarchs. His conduct of the campaign against Antony--one of the bestsoldiers that Rome ever produced--was admirable, and showed him a masterof guerilla warfare. His success in maintaining himself upon the thronefor five and thirty years, in spite of rivals, and notwithstanding thecharacter which he obtained for cruelty, implies, in such a state asParthia, considerable powers of management. His dealings with Augustusindicate much suppleness and dexterity. If he did not in the course ofhis long reign advance the Parthian frontier, at any rate he was notobliged to retract it. Apparently, he ceded nothing to the Scyths asthe price of their assistance. He maintained the Parthian supremacyover Northern Media. He lost no inch of territory to the Romans. It wasundoubtedly a prudent step on his part to soothe the irritated vanityof Rome by a surrender of useless trophies, and scarcely more usefulprisoners; and, we may doubt if this concession was not as effective asthe dread of the Parthian arms in producing that peace between thetwo countries which continued unbroken for above ninety years from thecampaign of Antony, and without serious interruption for yet anotherhalf century. If Phraates felt, as he might well feel after thecampaigns of Pacorus, that on the whole Rome was a more powerful statethan Parthia, and that consequently Parthia had nothing to gain but muchto lose in the contest with her western neighbor, he did well to allowno sentiment of foolish pride to stand in the way of a concessionthat made a prolonged peace between the two countries possible. Itis sometimes more honorable to yield to a demand than to meet it withdefiance; and the prince who removed a cause of war arising out of merenational vanity, while at the same time he maintained in all essentialpoints the interests and dignity of his kingdom, deserved well of hissubjects, and merits the approval of the historian. As a man, Phraateshas left behind him a bad name: he was cruel, selfish, and ungrateful, afratricide and a parricide; but as a king he is worthy of respect, and, in certain points, of admiration. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

_Short reigns of Phraataces, Orodes II. , and Vonones I. Accession ofArtabanus III. His relations with Germanicus and Tiberius. His War withPharasmanes of Iberia. His First Expulsion from his Kingdom, and returnto it. His peace with Rome. Internal troubles of the Parthian Kingdom. Second Expulsion and return of Artabanus. His Death. _

The accession of Phraataces made no difference in the attitude ofParthia towards Armenia. The young prince was as anxious as his fatherhad been to maintain the Parthian claims to that country, and at firstperhaps as inclined to believe that Augustus would not dispute them. Immediately upon his accession he sent ambassadors to Rome announcingthe fact, apologizing for the circumstances under which it had takenplace, and proposing a renewal of the peace which had subsisted betweenAugustus and his father. Apparently, he said nothing about Armenia, butpreferred a demand for the surrender of his four brothers, whom nodoubt he designed to destroy. The answer of Augustus was severe in theextreme. Addressing Phraataces by his bare name, without adding thetitle of king, he required him to lay aside the royal appellation, whichhe had arrogantly and without any warrant assumed, and at the same timeto withdraw his forces from Armenia. On the surrender of the Parthianprinces he kept silence, ignoring a demand which he had no intention ofaccording. It was clearly his design to set up one of the elder brothersas a rival claimant to Phraataces, or at any rate to alarm him with thenotion that, unless he made concessions, this policy would be adopted. But Phraataces was not to be frightened by a mere message. He respondedto Augustus after his own fashion, dispatching to him a letter whereinhe took to himself the favorite Parthian title of "king of kings, " andaddressed the Roman Emperor simply as "Caesar. " The attitude of defiancewould no doubt have been maintained, had Augustus confined himself tomenaces; when, however, it appeared that active measures would be taken, when Augustus, in B. C. 1, sent his grandson, Caius, to the East withorders to re-establish the Roman influence in Armenia even at the costof a Parthian war, and that prince showed himself in Syria with all themagnificent surroundings of the Imperial dignity, the Parthian monarchbecame alarmed. He had an interview with Caius in the spring of A. D. 1, upon an island in the Euphrates; where the terms of an arrangementbetween the two Empires were discussed and settled. The armies of thetwo chiefs were drawn up on the opposite banks of the river, facing oneanother; and the chiefs themselves, accompanied by an equal numberof attendants, proceeded to deliberate in the sight of both hosts. Satisfactory pledges having been given by the Parthian monarch, theprince and king in turn entertained each other on the borders of theirrespective dominions; and Caius returned into Syria, having obtained anengagement from the Parthians to abstain from any further interferencewith Armenian affairs. The engagement appears to have been honorablykept; for when, shortly afterward, fresh complications occurred, andCaius in endeavoring to settle them received his death-wound beforethe walls of an Armenian tower, we do not hear of Parthia as in any wayinvolved in the unfortunate occurrence. The Romans and their partisansin the country were left to settle the Armenian succession as theypleased; and Parthia kept herself wholly aloof from the matterstransacted upon her borders. 

One cause--perhaps the main cause of this abstinence, and of theengagement to abstain entered into by Phraataces, was doubtless theunsettled state of things in Parthia itself. The circumstances underwhich that prince had made himself king, though not unparalleled in theParthian annals, were such as naturally tended towards civil strife, and as were apt to produce in Parthia internal difficulties, if notdisorders or commotions. Phraataces soon found that he would have a hardtask to establish his rule. The nobles objected to him, not only for themurder of his father, but his descent from an Italian concubine, and theincestuous commerce which he was supposed to maintain with her. They hadperhaps grounds for this last charge. At any rate Phraataces provokedsuspicion by the singular favors and honors which he granted to a womanwhose origin was mean and extraction foreign. Not content with privatemarks of esteem and love, he departed from the practice of all formerParthian sovereigns in placing her effigy upon his coins; and heaccompanied this act with fulsome and absurd titles. Musa was styled, not merely "Queen, " but "Heavenly Goddess, " as if the realities of slaveorigin and concubinage could be covered by the fiction of an apotheosis. It is not surprising that the proud Parthian nobles were offended bythese proceedings, and determined to rid themselves of a monarch whomthey at once hated and despised. Within a few years of his obtainingthe throne an insurrection broke out against his authority; and after abrief struggle he was deprived of his crown and put to death. The noblesthen elected an Arsacid, named Orodes, whose residence at the time andrelationship to the former monarchs are uncertain. It seems probablethat, like most princes of the blood royal, he had taken refuge in aforeign country from the suspicions and dangers that beset allpossible pretenders to the royal dignity in Parthia, and was living inretirement, unexpectant of any such offer, when a deputation of Parthiannobles arrived and brought him the intelligence of his election. It might have been expected that, obtaining the crown under thesecircumstances, he would have ruled well; but, according to Josephus (whois here, unfortunately, our sole authority), he very soon displayed somuch violence and cruelty of disposition that his rule was felt to beintolerable; and the Parthians, again breaking into insurrection, ridthemselves of him, killing him either at a banquet or on a huntingexcursion. This done, they sent to Rome, and requested Augustus to allowVonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV. , to return to Parthia in orderthat he might receive his father's kingdom. The Emperor compliedreadily enough, since he regarded his own dignity as advanced by thetransaction; and the Parthians at first welcomed the object of theirchoice with rejoicings. But after a little time their sentimentsaltered. The young prince, bred up in Rome, and accustomed to therefinements of Western civilization, neglected the occupations whichseemed to his subjects alone worthy of a monarch's regard, absentedhimself from the hunting-field, took small pleasure in riding, when hepassed through the streets indulged in the foreign luxury of a litter, shrank with disgust from the rude and coarse feastings which formed aportion of the national manners. He had, moreover, brought with him fromthe place of his exile a number of Greek companions, whom the Parthiansdespised and ridiculed; and the favors bestowed on these foreigninterlopers were seen with jealousy and rage. It was in vain that heendeavored to conciliate his offended subjects by the openness of hismanners and the facility with which he allowed access to his person. Intheir prejudiced eyes virtues and graces unknown to the nation hithertowere not merits but defects, and rather increased, than diminished theiraversion. Having conceived a dislike for the monarch personally, theybegan to look back with dissatisfaction on their own act in sending forhim. "Parthia, " they said, "had indeed degenerated from her former selfto have requested a king to be sent her who belonged to another worldand had had a hostile civilization ingrained into him. " All the glorygained by destroying Crassus and repulsing Antony was utterly lost andgone, if the country was to be ruled by Caesar's bond-slave, and thethrone of the Arsacidse to be treated like a Roman province. It wouldhave been bad enough to have had a prince imposed on them by the willof a superior, if they had been conquered; it was worse, in all respectsworse, to suffer such an insult, when they had not even had war madeon them. Under the influence of such feelings as these, the Parthians, after tolerating Vonones for a few years, rose against him (ab. A. D. 16), and summoned Artabanus, an Arsacid who had grown to manhood amongthe Dahee of the Caspian region, but was at this time king of MediaAtropatene, to rule over them. 

It was seldom that a crown was declined in the ancient world; andArtabanus, on receiving the overture, at once expressed his willingnessto accept the proffered dignity. He invaded Parthia at the head of anarmy consisting of his own subjects, and engaged Vonones, to whom in hisdifficulties the bulk of the Parthian people had rallied. The engagementresulted in the defeat of the Median monarch, who returned to his owncountry, and, having collected a larger army, made a second invasion. This time he was successful. Vonones fled on horseback to Seleucia witha small body of followers; while his defeated army, following in histrack, was pressed upon by the victorious Mede, and suffered greatlosses. Artabanus, having entered Ctesiphon in triumph, was immediatelyproclaimed king. Vonones, escaping from Seleucia, took refuge amongthe Armenians; and, as it happened that just at this time the Armenianthrone was vacant, not only was an asylum granted him, but he was madeking of the country. It was impossible that Artabanus should tamelysubmit to an arrangement which would have placed his deadly enemy ina position to cause him constant annoyance. He, therefore, at onceremonstrated, both in Armenia and at Rome. As Rome now claimed theinvestiture of the Armenian monarchs, he sent an embassy to Tiberius, and threatened war if Vonones were acknowledged; while at the same timehe applied to Armenia and required the surrender of the refugee. Animportant section of the Armenian nation was inclined to grant hisdemand; Tiberius, who would willingly have supported Vonones, drew backbefore the Parthian threats; Vonones found himself in imminent danger, and, under the circumstances, determined on quitting Armenia andbetaking himself to the protection of the Roman governor of Syria. Thiswas Creticus Silanus, who received him gladly, gave him a guard, andallowed him the state and title of king. Meanwhile Artabanus laid claimto Armenia, and suggested as a candidate for the throne one of his ownsons, Orodes. 

Under these circumstances, the Roman Emperor, Tiberius, who had recentlysucceeded Augustus, resolved to despatch to the East a personage ofimportance, who should command the respect and attention of the Orientalpowers by his dignity, and impose upon them by the pomp and splendorwith which he was surrounded. He selected for this office Germanicus, his nephew, the eldest son of his deceased brother, Drusus, a prince ofmuch promise, amiable in his disposition, courteous and affable in hismanners, a good soldier, and a man generally popular. The more tostrike the minds of the Orientals, he gave Germanicus no usual title orprovince, but invested him with an extraordinary command over all theRoman dominions to the east of the Hellespont, thus rendering him a sortof monarch of Roman Asia. Full powers were granted him for making peaceor war, for levying troops, annexing provinces, appointing subjectkings, and performing other sovereign acts, without referring back toRome for instructions. A train of unusual magnificence accompanied himto his charge, calculated to impress the Orientals with the convictionthat this was no common negotiator. Germanicus arrived in Asia early inA. D. 18, and applied himself at once to his task. Entering Armenia atthe head of his troops, he proceeded to the capital, Artaxata, and, having ascertained the wishes of the Armenians themselves, determinedon his course of conduct. To have insisted on the restoration of Vononeswould have been grievously to offend the Armenians who had expelledhim, and at the same time to provoke the Parthians, who could not havetolerated a pretender in a position of power upon their borders; tohave allowed the pretensions of the Parthian monarch, and accepted thecandidature of his son, Orodes, would have lowered Rome in the opinionof all the surrounding nations, and been equivalent to an abdication ofall influence in the affairs of Western Asia. Germanicus avoided eitherextreme, and found happily a middle course. It happened that there wasa foreign prince settled in Armenia, who having grown up there hadassimilated himself in all respects to the Armenian ideas and habits, and had thereby won golden opinions from both the nobles and the people. This was Zeno, the son of Polemo, once king of the curtailed Pontus, and afterwards of the Lesser Armenia, an outlying Roman dependency. TheArmenians themselves suggested that Zeno should be their monarch; andGermanicus saw a way out of his difficulties in the suggestion. At theseat of government, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast multitude of thepeople, with the consent and approval of the principal nobles, he placedwith his own hand the diadem on the brow of the favored prince, andsaluted him as king under the new name of "Artaxias. " He then returnedinto Syria, where he was shortly afterwards visited by ambassadors fromthe Parthian monarch. Artabanus reminded him of the peace concludedbetween Rome and Parthia in the reign of Augustus, and assumed thatthe circumstances of his own appointment to the throne had in no wayinterfered with it. He would be glad, he said, to renew with Germanicusthe interchange of friendly assurances which had passed between hispredecessor, Phraataces, and Caius; and to accommodate the Romangeneral, he would willingly come to meet him as far as the Euphrates;meanwhile, until the meeting could take place, he must request thatVonones should be removed to a greater distance from the Parthianfrontier, and that he should not be allowed to continue thecorrespondence in which he was engaged with many of the Parthian noblesfor the purpose of raising fresh troubles. Germanicus replied politely, but indefinitely, to the proposal of an interview, which he may havethought unnecessary, and open to misconstruction. To the request for theremoval of Vonones he consented. Vonones was transferred from Syria tothe neighboring province of Cilicia; and the city of Pompeiopolis, builtby the great Pompey on the site of the ancient Soli, was assigned to himas his residence. With this arrangement the Parthian monarch appears tohave been contented. Vonones on the other hand was so dissatisfied withthe change that in the course of the next year (A. D. 19) he endeavoredto make his escape; his flight was, however, discovered, and, pursuitbeing made, he was overtaken and slain on the banks of the Pyramus. Thusperished ingloriously one of the least blamable and most unfortunate ofthe Parthian princes. 

After the death of Germanicus, in A. D. 19, the details of the Parthianhistory are for some years unknown to us. It appears that during thisinterval Artabanus [PLATE II. Fig. 5. ] was engaged in wars with severalof the nations upon his borders, and met with so much success that hecame after a while to desire, rather than fear, a rupture with Rome. Heknew that Tiberius was now an old man, and that he was disinclined toengage in distant wars; he was aware that Germanicus was dead; and hewas probably not much afraid of L. Vitellius, the governor of Syria, who had been recently deputed by Tiberius to administer that province. Accordingly in A. D. 34, the Armenian throne being once more vacantby the death of Artaxias (Zeno), he suddenly seized the country, andappointed his eldest son, whom Dio and Tacitus call simply Arsaces, tobe king. At the same time he sent ambassadors to require the restorationof the treasure which Vonones had carried off from Parthia and had leftbehind him in Syria or Cilicia. To this plain and definite demand wereadded certain vague threats, or boasts, to the effect that he wasthe rightful master of all the territory that had belonged of old toMacedonia or Persia, and that it was his intention to resume possessionof the provinces, whereto, as the representative of Cyrus and Alexander, he was entitled. He is said to have even commenced operations againstCappadocia, which was an actual portion of the Roman Empire, when hefound that Tiberius, so far from resenting the seizure of Armenia, had sent instructions to Vitellius, that he was to cultivate peacefulrelations with Parthia. Apparently he thought that a good opportunityhad arisen for picking a quarrel with his Western neighbor, and wasdetermined to take advantage of it. The aged despot, hidden in hisretreat of Capreae, seemed to him a pure object of contempt; and heentertained the confident hope of defeating his armies and annexingportions of his territory. 

[Illustration: PLATE 2. ]

But Tiberius was under no circumstances a man to be wholly despised. Simultaneously with the Parthian demands and threats intelligencereached him that the subjects of Artabanus were greatly dissatisfiedwith his rule, and that it would be easy by fomenting the discontent tobring about a revolution. Some of the nobles even went in person to Rome(A. D. 35), and suggested that if Phraates, one of the surviving sons ofPhraates IV. , were to appear under Roman protection upon the banks ofthe Euphrates, an insurrection would immediately break out. Artabanus, they said, among his other cruelties had put to death almost all theadult males of the Arsacid family; a successful revolution could not behoped for without an Arsacid leader; if Tiberius, however, woulddeliver to them the prince for whom they asked, this difficulty would beremoved, and there was then every reason to expect a happy issue tothe rebellion. The Emperor was not hard to persuade; he no doubt arguedthat, whatever became of the attempt and those engaged in it, one resultat least was certain--Artabanus would find plenty of work to occupy himat home, and would desist from his foreign aggressions. He thereforelet Phraates take his departure and proceed to Syria, glad to meet thedanger which had threatened him by craft and policy rather than by forceof arms. 

Artabanus soon became aware of the intrigue. He found that thechief conspirators in Parthia were a certain Sinnaces, a noblemandistinguished alike for his high birth and his great riches, anda eunuch named Abdus, who held a position about the court, and wasotherwise a personage of importance. It would have been easy to seizethese two men, and execute them; but Artabanus was uncertain how farthe conspiracy extended, and thought it most prudent to defer bringingmatters to a crisis. He therefore dissembled, and was content to causea delay, first by administering to Abdus a slow poison, and then byengaging Sinnaces so constantly in affairs of state that he had littleor no time to devote to plotting. Successful thus far by his own cunningand dexterity, he was further helped by a stroke of good fortune, onwhich he could not have calculated. Phraates, who thought that afterforty years of residence in Rome it was necessary to fit himself forthe position of Parthian king by resuming the long-disused habits of hisnation, was carried off, after a short residence in Syria, by a diseasewhich he was supposed to have contracted through the change in his modeof life. His death must for the time have paralyzed the conspirators, and have greatly relieved Artabanus. It was perhaps now, under thestimulus of a sudden change from feelings of extreme alarm to fanciedsecurity, that he wrote the famous letter to Tiberius, in which hereproached him for his cruelty, cowardice, and luxuriousness of living, and recommended him to satisfy the just desires of the subjects whohated him by an immediate suicide. 

This letter, if genuine, must be pronounced under any circumstancesa folly; and if really sent at this time, it may have had tragicalconsequences. It is remarkable that Tiberius, on learning the death ofPhraates, instead of relaxing, intensified his efforts. Not only did heat once send out to Syria another pretender, Tiridates, a nephew of thedeceased prince, in order to replace him, but he made endeavors, such aswe do not hear of before, to engage other nations in the struggle; andfurther, he enlarged the commission of Vitellius, giving him a generalsuperintendence over the affairs of the East. Thus Artabanus foundhimself in greater peril than ever, and if he had really indulged in thesilly effusion ascribed to him was rightly punished. Pharasmanes, kingof Iberia, a portion of the modern Georgia, incited by Tiberius, took the field (A. D. 35), and proclaimed his intention of placing hisbrother, Mithridates, on the Armenian throne. Having by corruptionsucceeded in bringing about the murder of Arsaces by his attendants, hemarched into Armenia, and became master of the capital without meetingany resistance. Artabanus, upon this, sent his son Orodes to maintainthe Parthian cause in the disputed province; but he proved no match forthe Iberian, who was superior in numbers, in the variety of his troops, and in familiarity with the localities. Pharasmanes had obtained theassistance of his neighbors, the Albanians, and, opening the passesof the Caucasus, had admitted through them a number of the Scythic orSarmatian hordes, who were always ready, when their swords were hired, to take a part in the quarrels of the south. Orodes was unable toprocure either mercenaries or allies, and had to contend unassistedagainst the three enemies who had joined their forces to oppose him. Forsome time he prudently declined an engagement; but it was difficult torestrain the ardor of his troops, whom the enemy exasperated by theirreproaches. After a while he was compelled to accept the battle whichPharasmanes incessantly offered. His force consisted entirely ofcavalry, while Pharasmanes had besides his horse a powerful body ofinfantry. The battle was nevertheless stoutly contested; and the victorymight have been doubtful, had it not happened that in a hand-to-handcombat between the two commanders Orodes was struck to the ground by hisantagonist, and thought by most of his own men to be killed. As usualunder such circumstances in the East, a rout followed. If we may believeJosephus, "many tens of thousands" were slain. Armenia was wholly lost;and Artabanus found himself left with diminished resources and tarnishedfame to meet the intrigues of his domestic enemies. 

Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In the spring of A. D. 36, having levied the whole force of the Empire, he took the field andmarched northwards, determined, if possible, to revenge himself onthe Iberians and recover his lost province. But his first efforts wereunsuccessful; and before he could renew them Vitellius put himself atthe head of his legions, and marching towards the Euphrates threatenedMesopotamia with invasion. Placed thus between two fires, the Parthianmonarch felt that he had no choice but to withdraw from Armenia andreturn to the defence of his own proper territories, which in hisabsence must have lain temptingly open to an enemy. His return causedVitellius to change his tactics. Instead of measuring his strengthagainst that which still remained to Artabanus, he resumed the weapon ofintrigue so dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish expenditure ofmoney to excite disaffection once more among the Parthian nobles. Thistime conspiracy was successful. The military disasters of the last twoyears had alienated from Artabanus the affections of those whom hisprevious cruelties had failed to disgust or alarm; and he found himselfwithout any armed force whereon he could rely, beyond a small body offoreign guards which he maintained about his person. It seemed to himthat his only safety was in flight; and accordingly he quitted hiscapital and removed himself hastily into Hyrcania, which was in theimmediate vicinity of the Scythian Dahse, among whom he had been broughtup. Here the natives were friendly to him, and he lived a retired life, "waiting" (as he said) "until the Parthians, who could judge an absentprince with equity, though they could not long continue faithful to apresent one, should repent of their behavior to him. "

Upon learning the flight of Artabamis, Vitellius advanced to the banksof the Euphrates, and introduced Tiridates into his kingdom. Fortunateomens were said to have accompanied the passage of the river; and thesewere followed by adhesions of greater importance. Ornospades, satrap ofMesopotamia, was the first to join the standard of the pretender witha large body of horse. He was followed by the conspirator Sinnaces, his father Abdageses, the keeper of the king's treasures, and otherpersonages of high position. The Greek cities in Mesopotamia readilyopened their gates to a monarch long domiciled at Rome, from whom theyexpected a politeness and refinement that would harmonize better withtheir feelings than the manners of the late king, bred up among theuncivilized Scyths. Parthian towns, like Halus and Artemita, followedtheir example. Seleucia, the second city in the Empire, received the newmonarch with an obsequiousness that bordered on adulation. Not contentwith paying him all customary royal honors, they appended to theiracclamations disparaging remarks upon his predecessor, whom theyaffected to regard as the issue of an adulterous intrigue, and as notrue Arsacid. Tiridates was pleased to reward the unseemly flatteryof these degenerate Greeks by a new arrangement of their constitution. Hitherto they had lived under the government of a Senate of ThreeHundred members, the wisest and wealthiest of the citizens, a certaincontrol being, however, secured to the people. Artabanus had recentlymodified the constitution in an aristocratic sense; and thereforeTiridates pursued the contrary course, and established an unbridleddemocracy in the place of a mixed government. He then entered Ctesiphon, the capital, and after waiting some days for certain noblemen, who hadexpressed a wish to attend his coronation but continually put off theircoming, he was crowned in the ordinary manner by the Surena of the timebeing, in the sight and amid the acclamations of a vast multitude. 

The pretender now regarded his work as completed, and forbore anyfurther efforts. The example of the Western provinces would, he assumed, be followed by the Eastern, and the monarch approved by Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and the capital would carry, as a matter of course, the restof the nation. Policy required that the general acquiescence shouldnot have been taken for granted. Tiridates should have made a militaryprogress through the East, no less than the West, and have sought outhis rival in the distant Hyrcania, and slain him, or driven him beyondthe borders. Instead of thus occupying himself, he was content tobesiege a stronghold where Artabanus had left his treasure and hisharem. This conduct was imprudent; and the imprudence cost him hiscrown. That fickle temper which Artabanus had noted in his countrymenbegan to work so soon as the new king was well installed in his office;the coveted post of chief vizier could but be assigned to one, and theselection of the fortunate individual was the disappointment of a hostof expectants; nobles absent from the coronation, whether by choice ornecessity, began to be afraid that their absence would cost them dear, when Tiridates had time to reflect upon it and to listen to theirdetractors. The thoughts of the malcontents turned towards theirdethroned monarch; and emissaries were despatched to seek him out, andput before him the project of a restoration. He was found in Hyrcania, in a miserable dress and plight, living on the produce of his bow. Atfirst he suspected the messengers, believing that their intention was toseize him and deliver him up to Tiridates; but it was not long ere theypersuaded him that, whether their affection for himself were true orfeigned, their enmity to Tiridates was real. They had indeed no worsecharges to bring against this prince than his youth, and the softnessof his Roman breeding; but they were evidently in earnest, and hadcommitted themselves too deeply to make it possible for them to retract. Artabanus, therefore, accepted their offers, and having obtained theservices of a body of Dahse and other Scyths, proceeded westward, retaining the miserable garb and plight in which he had been found, inorder to draw men to his side by pity; and making all haste, in orderthat his enemies might have less opportunity to prepare obstructions andhis friends less time to change their minds. He reached the neighborhoodof Ctesiphon while Tiridates was still doubting what he should do, distracted between the counsels of some who recommended an immediateengagement with the rebels before they recovered from the fatigues oftheir long march or grew accustomed to act together, and of others whoadvised a retreat into Mesopotamia, reliance upon the Armenians andother tribes of the north, and a union with the Roman troops, whichVitellius, on the first news of what had happened, had thrown acrossthe Euphrates. The more timid counsel had the support of Abdageses, whomTiridates had made his vizier, and therefore naturally prevailed, the prince himself being moreover of an unwarlike temper. It had, inappearance, much to recommend it; and if its execution had been in thehands of Occidentals might have succeeded. But, in the East, the firstmovement in retreat is taken as a confession of weakness and almost asan act of despair: an order to "retire" is regarded as a direction tofly. No sooner was the Tigris crossed and the march through Mesopotamiabegan, than the host of Tiridates melted away like an iceberg in theGulf Stream. The tribes of the Desert set the example of flight; and ina little time almost the whole army had dispersed, drawing off either tothe camp of the enemy or to their homes. Tiridates reached the Euphrateswith a mere handful of followers, and crossing into Syria found himselfonce more safe under the protection of the Romans. 

The flight of Tiridates gave Parthia back into the hands of its formerruler. Artabanus reoccupied the throne, apparently without having tofight a battle. He seems, however, not to have felt himself strongenough either to resume his designs upon Armenia, or to retaliate inany way upon the Romans for their support of Tiridates. Mithridates, the Iberian, was left in quiet possession of the Armenian kingdom, andVitellius found himself unmolested on the Euphrates. Tiberius, however, was anxious that the war with Parthia should be formally terminated, and, having failed in his attempts to fill the Parthian throne with aRoman nominee, was ready to acknowledge Artabanus, and eager to enterinto a treaty with him. He instructed Vitellius to this effect; and thatofficer (late in A. D. 36 or early in A. D. 37), having invited Artabanusto an interview on the Euphrates, persuaded him to terms which wereregarded by the Romans as highly honorable to themselves, thoughArtabanus probably did not feel them to be degrading to Parthia. Peaceand amity were re-established between the two nations. Rome, it may beassumed, undertook to withhold her countenance from all pretendersto the Parthian throne, and Parthia withdrew her claims upon Armenia. Artabanus was persuaded to send his son, Darius, with some otherParthians of rank, to Rome, and was thus regarded by the Romans ashaving given hostages for his good behavior. He was also induced tothrow a few grains of frankincense on the sacrificial fire which burntin front of the Roman standards and the Imperial images, an act whichwas accepted at Rome as one of submission and homage. The terms andcircumstances of the peace did not become known in Italy till Tiberiushad been succeeded by Caligula (March, A. D. 37). When known, theygave great satisfaction, and were regarded as glorious alike to thenegotiator, Vitellius, and to the prince whom he represented. The falsereport was spread that the Parthian monarch had granted to the newCsesar what his contempt and hatred would have caused him to refuseto Tiberius; and the inclination of the Romans towards their youngsovereign was intensified by the ascription to him of a diplomatictriumph which belonged of right to his predecessor. 

Contemporaneously with the troubles which have been above described, but reaching down, it would seem, a few years beyond them, were otherdisturbances of a peculiar character in one of the Western provincesof the Empire. The Jewish element in the population of Western Asia hadbeen one of importance from a date anterior to the rise, not only ofthe Parthian, but even of the Persian Empire. Dispersed colonies of Jewswere to be found in Babylonia, Armenia, Media, Susiana, Mesopotamia, andprobably in other Parthian provinces. These colonies dated from the timeof Nebuchadnezzar's captivity, and exhibited everywhere the remarkabletendency of the Jewish race to an increase disproportionate to that ofthe population among which they are settled. The Jewish element becameperpetually larger and more important in Babylonia and Mesopotamia, in spite of the draughts which were made upon it by Seleucus and otherSyrian princes. Under the Parthians, it would seem that the MesopotamianJews enjoyed generally the same sort of toleration, and the samepermission to exercise a species of self-government, which Jews andChristians enjoy now in many parts of Turkey. They formed a recognizedcommunity, had some cities which were entirely their own, possesseda common treasury, and from time to time sent up to Jerusalem theofferings of the people under the protection of a convoy of 30, 000 or40, 000 men. The Parthian kings treated them well, and no doubt valuedthem as a counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and Syrians of thispart of their Empire. They had no grievance of which to complain, and itmight have been thought very unlikely that any troubles would arisein connection with them; but circumstances seemingly trivial threwthe whole community into commotion, and led on to disasters of a verylamentable character. 

Two young Jews, Asinai and Anilai, brothers, natives of Nearda, the cityin which the treasury of the community was established, upon sufferingsome ill-treatment at the hands of the manufacturer who employed them, gave up their trade, and, withdrawing to a marshy district between twoarms of the Euphrates, made up their minds to live by robbery. A band ofneedy youths soon gathered about them, and they became the terror ofthe entire neighborhood. They exacted a blackmail from the peaceablepopulation of shepherds and others who lived near them, made occasionalplundering raids to a distance, and required an acknowledgment(bakhshish) from travellers. Their doings having become notorious, thesatrap of Babylonia marched against them with an army, intending tosurprise them on the Sabbath, when it was supposed that they would notfight; but his approach was discovered, it was determined to disregardthe obligation of Sabbatical rest, and the satrap was himself surprisedand completely defeated. Artabanus, having heard of the disaster, madeovertures to the brothers, and, after receiving a visit from them at hiscourt, assigned to Asinai, the elder of the two, the entire governmentof the Babylonian satrapy. The experiment appeared at first to havecompletely succeeded. Asinai governed the province with prudenceand zeal, and for fifteen years no complaint was made against hisadministration. But at the end of this time the lawless temper, held inrestraint for so long, reasserted itself, not, indeed, in Asinai, butin his brother. Anilai fell in love with the wife of a Parthian magnate, commander (apparently) of the Parthian troops stationed in Babylonia, and, seeing no other way of obtaining his wishes, made war upon thechieftain and killed him. He then married the object of his affections, and might perhaps have been content; but the Jews under Asinai'sgovernment remonstrated against the idolatries which the Parthian womanhad introduced into a Jewish household, and prevailed on Asinai torequire that she should be divorced. His compliance with their wishesproved fatal to him, for the woman, fearing the consequences, contrivedto poison Asinai; and the authority which he had wielded passed into thehands of Anilai, without (so far as we hear) any fresh appointment fromthe Parthian monarch. Anilai had, it appears, no instincts but thoseof a freebooter, and he was no sooner settled in the government than heproceeded to indulge them by attacking the territory of a neighboringsatrap, Mithridates, who was not only a Parthian of high rank, but hadmarried one of the daughters of Artabanus. Mithridates flew to arms todefend his province; but Anilai fell upon his encampment in the night, completely routed his troops, and took Mithridates himself prisoner. Having subjected him to a gross indignity, he was nevertheless afraid toput him to death, lest the Parthian king should avenge the slaughterof his relative on the Jews of Babylon, Mithridates was consequentlyreleased, and returned to his wife, who was so indignant at the insultwhereto he had been subjected that she left him no peace till hecollected a second army and resumed the war. Analai was no ways daunted. Quitting his stronghold in the marshes, he led his troops a distanceof ten miles through a hot and dry plain to meet the enemy, thusunnecessarily exhausting them, and exposing them to the attack of theirenemies under the most unfavorable circumstances. He was of coursedefeated with loss; but he himself escaped and revenged himself bycarrying fire and sword over the lands of the Babylonians, who hadhitherto lived peaceably under his protection. The Babylonians sent toNearda and demanded his surrender; but the Jews of Nearda, even if theyhad had the will, had no power to comply. A pretence was then made ofarranging matters by negotiation; but the Babylonians, having in thisway obtained a knowledge of the position which Anilai and his troopsoccupied, fell upon them in the night, when they were all either drunkor asleep, and at one stroke exterminated the whole band. 

Thus far no great calamity had occurred. Two Jewish robber-chiefs hadbeen elevated into the position of Parthian satraps; and the result hadbeen, first, fifteen years of peace, and then a short civil war, endingin the destruction of the surviving chief and the annihilation of theband of marauders. But the lamentable consequences of the commotion werenow to show themselves. The native Babylonians had always looked withdislike on the Jewish colony, and occasions of actual collision betweenthe two bodies had not been wholly wanting. The circumstances of theexisting time seemed to furnish a good excuse for an outbreak; andscarcely were Anilai and his followers destroyed, when the Jews ofBabylon were set upon by their native fellow-citizens. Unable to makean effectual resistance, they resolved to retire from the place, and, atthe immense loss which such a migration necessarily costs, they quittedBabylon and transferred themselves in great numbers to Seleucia. Herethey lived quietly for five years (about A. D. 34-39), but in the sixthyear (A. D. 40) fresh troubles broke out. The remnant of the Jews atBabylon were assailed, either by their old enemies or by a pestilence, and took refuge at Seleucia with their brethren. It happened that atSeleucia there was a feud of long standing between the Syrian populationand the Greeks. The Jews naturally joined the Syrians, who were akindred race, and the two together brought the Greeks under; whereuponthese last contrived to come to terms with the Syrians, and persuadedthem to join in an attack on the late allies. Against the combinedGreeks and Syrians the Jews were powerless, and in the massacre whichensued they lost above 50, 000 men. The remnant withdrew to Otesiphon;but even there the malice of their enemies pursued them, andthe persecution was only brought to an end by their quitting themetropolitan cities altogether, and withdrawing to the provincial townsof which they were the sole occupants. 

The narrative of these events derives its interest, not so much from anysympathy that we can feel with any of the actors in it as from thelight which it throws upon the character of the Parthian rule, and thecondition of the countries under Parthian government. In the detailsgiven we seem once more to trace a near resemblance between the Parthiansystem and that of the Turks; we seem to see thrown back into the mirrorof the past an image of those terrible conflicts and disorders whichhave passed before our own eyes in Syria and the Lebanon while underacknowledged Turkish sovereignty. The picture has the same features ofantipathies of race unsoftened by time and contact, of perpetual feudbursting out into occasional conflict, of undying religious animosities, of strange combinations, of fearful massacres, and of a governmentlooking tamely on, and allowing things for the most part to take theircourse. We see how utterly the Parthian system failed to blend togetheror amalgamate the conquered peoples; and not only so, but how impotentit was even to effect the first object of a government, the securing ofpeace and tranquillity within its borders. If indeed it were necessaryto believe that the picture brought before us represented truthfully thenormal condition of the people and countries with which it is concerned, we should be forced to conclude that Parthian government was merelyanother name for anarchy, and that it was only good fortune thatpreserved the empire from falling to pieces at this early date, withintwo centuries of its establishment But there is reason to believethat the reign of Artabanus III. Represents, not the normal, but anexceptional state of things--a state of things which could only arisein Parthia when the powers of government were relaxed in consequence ofrebellion and civil war. We must remember that Artabanus was actuallytwice driven from his kingdom, and that during the greater part of hisreign he lived in perpetual fear of revolt and insurrection. It isnot improbable that the culminating atrocities of the struggle abovedescribed synchronized with the second expulsion of the Parthianmonarch, and are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary weakness of theParthian rule as of the terrible strength of the forces which that rulefor the most part kept under control. 

The causes which led to the second expulsion of Artabanus are notdistinctly stated, but they were probably not very different from thosethat brought about the first. Artabanus was undoubtedly a harshruler; and those who fell under his displeasure, naturally fearing hisseverity, and seeing no way of meeting it but by a revolution, weredriven to adopt extreme measures. Something like a general combinationof the nobles against him seems to have taken place about the year A. D. 40; and it appears that he, on becoming aware of it, determined to quitthe capital and throw himself on the protection of one of the tributarymonarchs. This was Izates, the sovereign of Adiabene, or the tractbetween the Zab rivers, who is said to have been a convert to Judaism. On the flight of Artabanus to Izates it would seem that the Megistanesformally deposed him, and elected in his place a certain Kinnam, orKinnamus, an Arsacid who had been brought up by the king. Izates, whenhe interfered on behalf of the deposed monarch, was met by the objectionthat the newly-elected prince had rights which could not be setaside. The difficulty appeared insuperable; but it was overcome by thevoluntary act of Kinnamus, who wrote to Artabanus and offered to retirein his favor. Hereupon Artabanus returned and remounted his throne, Kinnamus carrying his magnanimity so far as to strip the diadem from hisown brow and replace it on the head of the old monarch. A condition ofthe restoration was a complete amnesty for all political offences, whichwas not only promised by Artabanus, but likewise guaranteed by Izates. 

It was very shortly after his second restoration to the throne thatArtabanus died. One further calamity must, however, be noticed as havingfallen within the limits of his reign. The great city of Seleucia, thesecond in the Empire, shortly after it had experienced the troublesabove narrated, revolted absolutely from the Parthian power, anddeclared itself independent. No account has reached us of thecircumstances which caused this revolt; but it was indicative ofa feeling that Parthia was beginning to decline, and that thedisintegration of the Empire was a thing that might be expected. TheSeleucians had at no time been contented with their position as Parthiansubjects. Whether they supposed that they could stand alone, or whetherthey looked to enjoying under Roman protection a greater degree ofindependence than had been allowed them by the Parthians, is uncertain. They revolted however, in A. D. 40, and declared themselves aself-governing community. It does not appear that the Romans lent themany assistance, or broke for their sake the peace established withParthia in A. D. 37. The Seleucians had to depend upon themselves alone, and to maintain their rebellion by means of their own resources. Nodoubt Artabanus proceeded at once to attack them, but his arms made noimpression. They were successful in defending their independence duringhis reign, and for some time afterwards, although compelled in theend to succumb and resume a subject position under their own masters. Artabanus seems to have died in August or September A. D. 42, the yearafter the death of Caligula. His checkered reign had covered a spacewhich cannot have fallen much short of thirty years. 

CHAPTER XV. 

_Doubts as to the successor of Artabanus III. First short reign ofGotarzes. He is expelled and Vardanes made king. Reign of Vardanes. Hisivar with Izates. His Death. Second reign of Gotarzes. His Contest withhis Nephew, Meherdates. His Death. Short and inglorious reign of VononesII. _

There is considerable doubt as to the immediate successor of Artabanus. According to Josephus he left his kingdom to his son, Bardanes orVardanes, and this prince entered without difficulty and at once uponthe enjoyment of his sovereignty. According to Tacitus, the person whoobtained the throne directly upon the death of Artabanus was his son, Gotarzes, who was generally accepted for king, and might have reignedwithout having his title disputed, had he not given indications of aharsh and cruel temper. Among other atrocities whereof he was guiltywas the murder of his brother, Artabanus, whom he put to death, togetherwith his wife and son, apparently upon mere suspicion. This bloodyinitiation of his reign spread alarm among the nobles, who thereupondetermined to exert their constitutional privilege of deposing anobnoxious monarch and supplying his place with a new one. Their choicefell upon Vardanes, brother of Gotarzes, who was residing in a distantprovince, 350 miles from the Court. [PLATE II. Fig. 8. ] Having enteredinto communications with this prince, they easily induced him to quithis retirement, and to take up arms against the tyrant. Vardanes wasambitious, bold and prompt: he had no sooner received the invitation ofthe Megistanes than he set out, and, having accomplished his journey tothe Court in the space of two days, found Gotarzes wholly unprepared tooffer resistance. Thus Vardanes became king without fighting a battle. Gotarzes fled, and escaped into the country of the Dahse, which lay eastof the Caspian Sea, and north of the Parthian province of Hyrcania. Herehe was allowed to reign for some time unmolested by his brother, and toform plans and make preparations for the recovery of his lost power. 

The statements of Tacitus are so circumstantial, and his authority asan historian is so great, that we can scarcely hesitate to accept thehistory as he delivers it, rather than as it is related by the Jewishwriter. It is, however, remarkable that the series of Parthian coinspresents an appearance of accordance rather with the latter thanthe former, since it affords no trace of the supposed first reign ofGotarzes in A. D. 42, while it shows Vardanes to have held the thronefrom Sept. A. D. 43 to at least A. D. 46. Still this does not absolutelycontradict Tacitus. It only proves that the first reign of Gotarzes wascomprised within a few weeks, and that before two months had passedfrom the death of Artabanus, the kingdom was established in the hands ofVardanes. That prince, after the flight of his brother, applied himselffor some time to the reduction of the Seleucians, whose continuedindependence in the midst of a Parthian province he regarded as adisgrace to the Empire. His efforts to take the town failed, however, of success. Being abundantly provisioned and strongly fortified, it waswell able to stand a siege; and the high spirit of its inhabitants madethem determined to resist to the uttermost. While they still heldout, Vardanes was called away to the East, where his brother had beengathering strength, and was once more advancing his pretensions. TheHyrcanians, as well as the Dahse, had embraced his cause, and Parthiawas threatened with dismemberment. Vardanes, having collected histroops, occupied a position in the plain region of Bactria, and thereprepared to give battle to his brother, who was likewise at the head ofa considerable army. Before, however, an engagement took place, Gotarzesdiscovered that there was a design among the nobles on either side torid themselves of both the brothers, and to set up a wholly new king. Apprehensive of the consequences, he communicated his discovery toVardanes; and the result was that the two brothers made up theirdifferences and agreed upon terms of peace. Gotarzes yielded his claimto the crown, and was assigned a residence in Hyrcania, which was, probably, made over to his government. Vardanes then returned to thewest, and, resuming the siege of Seleucia, compelled the rebel city to asurrender in the seventh year after it had revolted (A. D. 46. )

Successful thus far, and regarding his quarrel with his brotheras finally arranged, Vardanes proceeded to contemplate a militaryexpedition of the highest importance. The time, he thought, wasfavorable for reviving the Parthian claim to Armenia, and disputingonce more with Rome the possession of a paramount influence overthat country. The Roman government of the dependency, sinceArtabanus formally relinquished it to them, had been far from provingsatisfactory. Mithridates, their protege, had displeased them, and hadbeen summoned to Rome by Caligula, who kept him there a prisoner untilhis death. Armenia, left without a king, had asserted her independence;and when, after an absence of several years, Mithridates was authorizedby Claudius to return to his kingdom, the natives resisted him in arms, and were only brought under his rule by the combined help of the Romansand the Iberians. Forced upon a reluctant people by foreign arms, Mithridates felt himself insecure, and this feeling made him rule hissubjects with imprudent severity. Under these circumstances it seemedto Vardanes that it would not be very difficult to recover Armenia, andthus gain a signal triumph over the Romans. 

But to engage in so great a matter with a good prospect of success itwas necessary that the war should be approved, not only by himself, but by his principal feudatories. The most important of these was nowIzates, king of Adiabene and Gordyene who in the last reign had restoredArtabanus to his lost throne. Vardanes, before committing himself by anyovert act, appears to have taken this prince into his counsels, and tohave requested his opinion on affronting the Romans by an interferencewith Armenian affairs. Izates strenuously opposed the project. He had apersonal interest in the matter, since he had sent five of his boys toRome, to receive there a polite education, and he had also a profoundrespect for the Roman power and military system. He endeavored, both bypersuasion and reasoning, to induce Vardanes to abandon his design. Hisarguments may have been cogent, but they were not thought by Vardanesto have much force, and the result of the conference was that the GreatKing declared war against his feudatory. 

The war had, apparently, but just begun, when fresh troubles broke outin the north-east. Gotarzes had never ceased to regret his renunciationof his claims, and was now, on the invitation of the Parthian nobility, prepared to came forward again and contest the kingdom with his brother. Vardanes had to relinquish his attempt to coerce Izates, and to hastento Hyrcania in order to engage the troops which Gotarzes had collectedin that distant region. These he met and defeated more than once in thecountry between the Caspian and Herat; but the success of his militaryoperations failed to strengthen his hold upon the affections of hissubjects. Like the generality of the Parthian princes, he showed himselfharsh and cruel in the hour of victory, and in conquering an oppositionroused an opposition that was fiercer and more formidable. A conspiracywas formed against him shortly after his return from Hyrcania, and hewas assassinated while indulging in the national amusement of the chase. 

The murder of Vardanes was immediately followed by the restoration ofGotarzes to the throne. There may have been some who doubted his fitnessfor the regal office, and inclined to keep the throne vacant till theycould send to Rome and obtain from thence one of the younger and morecivilized Parthian princes. But we may be sure that the general desirewas not for a Romanized sovereign, but for a truly national king, oneborn and bred in the country. Gotarzes was proclaimed by common consent, and without any interval, after the death of Vardanes, and ascended theParthian throne before the end of the year A. D. 46. It is not likelythat his rule would have been resisted had he conducted himself well;but the cruelty of his temper, which had already once cost him hiscrown, again displayed itself after his restoration, and to this defectwas added a slothful indulgence yet more distasteful to his subjects. Some military expeditions which he undertook, moreover, failed ofsuccess, and the crime of defeat caused the cup of his offences to brimover. The discontented portion of his people, who were a strong party, sent envoys to the Roman Emperor, Claudius (A. D. 49), and begged that hewould surrender to them Meherdates, the grandson of Phraates IV. And sonof Vonones, who still remained at Rome in a position between that of aguest and a hostage. "They were not ignorant, " they said, "of the treatywhich bound the Romans to Parthia, nor did they ask Claudius to infringeit. " Their desire was not to throw off the authority of the Arsacidse, but only to exchange one Arsacid for another. The rule of Gotarzes hadbecame intolerable, alike to the nobility and the common people. He hadmurdered all his male relatives, or at least all that were within hisreach--first his brothers, then his near kinsmen, finally even thosewhose relationship was remote; nor had he stopped there; he hadproceeded to put to death their young children and their pregnant wives. He was sluggish in his habits, unfortunate in his wars, and had betakenhimself to cruelty, that men might not despise him for his want ofmanliness. The friendship between Rome and Parthia was a public matter;it bound the Romans to help the nation allied to them--a nation which, though equal to them in strength, was content on account of its respectfor Rome to yield her precedence. Parthian princes were allowed to behostages in foreign lands for the very reason that then it was alwayspossible, if their own monarch displeased them, for the people to obtaina king from abroad, brought up under milder influences. 

This harangue was made before the Emperor Claudius and the assembledSenate, Meherdates himself being also present. Claudius responded to itfavorably. He would follow the example of the Divine Augustus, and allowthe Parthians to take from Rome the monarch whom they requested. That prince, bred up in the city, had always been remarkable for hismoderation. He would (it was to be hoped) regard himself in his newposition, not as a master of slaves, but as a ruler of citizens. Hewould find that clemency and justice were the more appreciated by abarbarous nation, the less they had had experience of them Meherdatesmight accompany the Parthian envoys; and a Roman of rank, Caius Cassius, the prefect of Syria, should be instructed to receive them on theirarrival in Asia, and to see them safely across the Euphrates. 

The young prince accordingly set out, and reached the city of Zeugma insafety. Here he was joined, not only by a number of the Parthian nobles, but also by the reigning king of Osrhoene, who bore the usual name ofAbgarus. The Parthians were anxious that he should advance at his bestspeed and by the shortest route on Ctesiphon, and the Roman governor, Cassius, strongly advised the same course; but Meherdates fell underthe influence of the Osrhoene monarch, who is thought by Tacitus to havebeen a false friend, and to have determined from the first to do hisbest for Gotarzes. Abgarus induced Meherdates to proceed from Zeugmato his own capital, Edessa, and there detained him for several daysby means of a series of festivities. He then persuaded him, though thewinter was approaching, to enter Armenia, and to proceed against hisantagonist by the circuitous route of the Upper Tigris, instead of themore direct one through Mesopotamia. In this way much valuable timewas lost. The rough mountain-routes and snows of Armenia harassed andfatigued the pretender's troops, while Gotarzes was given an intervalduring which to collect a tolerably large body of soldiers. Still, thedelay was not very great. Meherdatos marched probably by Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh, or in other words, followed the course of the Tigris, whichhe crossed in the neighborhood of Mosul, after taking the small townwhich represented the ancient Nineveh. His line of march had now broughthim into Adiabene; and it seemed a good omen for the success of hiscause that Izates, the powerful monarch of that tract, declared in hisfavor, and brought a body of troops to his assistance. Gotarzes was inthe neighborhood, but was distrustful of his strength, and desirous ofcollecting a larger force before committing himself to the hazard of anengagement. He had taken up a strong position with the river Cormain his front, and, remaining on the defensive, contented himself withtrying by his emissaries the fidelity of his rival's troops and allies. The plan succeeded. After a little time, the army of Meherdates beganto melt away. Izates of Adiabene and Abgarus of Edessa drew off theircontingents, and left the pretender to depend wholly on his Parthiansupporters. Even their fidelity was doubtful, and might have given wayon further trial; Meherdates therefore resolved, before being whollydeserted, to try the chance of a battle. 

His adversary was now as willing to engage as himself, since he feltthat he was no longer outnumbered. The rivals met, and a fierce andbloody action was fought between the two armies, no important advantagebeing for a long time gained by either. At length Oarrhenes, the chiefgeneral on the side of Meherdates, having routed the troops opposedto him and pursued them too hotly, was intercepted by the enemy on hisreturn and either killed or made prisoner. This event proved decisive. The loss of their leader caused the army of Meherdates to fly; and hehimself, being induced to intrust his safety to a certain Parrhaces, adependent of his father's, was betrayed by this miscreant, loaded withchains, and given up to his rival. Gotarzes now proved less unmercifulthan might have been expected from his general character. Instead ofpunishing Meherdates with death, he thought it sufficient to insult himwith the names of "foreigner" and "Roman, " and to render it impossiblethat he should be again put forward as monarch by subjecting him tomutilation. The Roman historian supposes that this was done to casta slur upon Rome but it was a natural measure of precaution under thecircumstances, and had probably no more recondite motive than compassionfor the youth and inexperience of the pretender. 

Gotarzes, having triumphed over his rival, appears to have resolved oncommemorating his victory in a novel manner. Instead of striking a newcoin, like Vonones, he determined to place his achievement on record bymaking it the subject of a rock-tablet, which he caused to be engravedon the sacred mountain of Baghistan, adorned already with sculptures andinscriptions by the greatest of the Achaemenian monarchs. The bas-reliefand its inscription have been much damaged, both by the waste of agesand the rude hand of man; but enough remains to show that the conquerorwas represented as pursuing his enemies in the field, on horseback, while a winged Victory, flying in the air, was on the point of placing adiadem on his head. In the Greek legend which accompanied the sculpturehe was termed "Satrap of Satraps"--an equivalent of the ordinary title"King of Kings"; and his conquered rival was mentioned under the nameof Mithrates, a corrupt form of the more common or Mithridates orMeherdates. 

Very shortly after his victory Gotarzes died. His last year seems tohave been A. D. 51. According to Tacitus, he died a natural death, fromthe effects of disease; but, according to Josephus, he was the victim ofa conspiracy. The authority of Tacitus, here as elsewhere generally, is to be preferred; and we may regard Gotarzes as ending peacefully hisunquiet reign, which had begun in A. D. 42, immediately after the deathof his father, had been interrupted for four years--from A. D. 42 toA. D. 46--and had then been renewed and lasted from A. D. 46 to A. D. 51. Gotarzes was not a prince of any remarkable talents, or of a characterdiffering in any important respects from the ordinary Parthian type. Hewas perhaps even more cruel than the bulk of the Arsacidae, though histreatment of Meherdates showed that he could be lenient upon occasion. He was more prudent than daring, more politic than brave, more bent onmaintaining his own position than on advancing the power or dignityof his country. Parthia owed little or nothing to him. The internalorganization of the country must have suffered from his long wars withhis brother and his nephew; its external reputation was not increased byone whose foreign expeditions were uniformly unfortunate. 

The successor of Gotarzes was a certain Vonones. His relationship toprevious monarchs is doubtful--and may be suspected to have been remote. Gotarzes had murdered or mutilated all the Arsacidse on whom he couldlay his hands; and the Parthians had to send to Media upon his diseasein order to obtain a sovereign of the required blood. The coins ofVonones II. Are scarce, and have a peculiar rudeness. The only datefound upon them is one equivalent to A. D. 51; and it would seem thathis entire reign was comprised within the space of a few months. Tacitustells us that his rule was brief and inglorious, marked by no importantevents, either prosperous or adverse. He was succeeded by his son, Volagases I. , who appears to have ascended the throne before the yearA. D. 51 had expired. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

_Reign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails. His quarrelwith Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by the Dahce and Sacce. Secondattack of Volagases on Armenia. Tiridates established as King. Firstexpedition of Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of Vardanes. Second expedition of Corbulo. Armenia given to Tigranes. Revolt ofHyrcania. Third attack of Volagases on Armenia. Defeat of Paitus, and re-establishment of Tiridates. Last expedition of Corbulo, andarrangement of Terms of Peace. Tiridates at Rome. Probable time of theDeath of Volagases. _

Vonones the Second left behind him three sons, Volagases, Tiridates, andPaeorus. It is doubtful which of them was the eldest, but, on the whole, most probable that that position belonged to Paeorus. We are told thatVolagases obtained the crown by his brothers yielding up their claim tohim, from which we must draw the conclusion that both of them were hiselders. These circumstances of his accession will account for much ofhis subsequent conduct. It happened that he was able at once to bestowa principality upon Paeorus, to whom he felt specially indebted; but inorder adequately to reward his other benefactor, he found it necessaryto conquer a province and then make its government over to him. Hencehis frequent attacks upon Armenia, and his numerous wars with Rome forits possession, which led ultimately to an arrangement by which thequiet enjoyment of the Armenian throne was secured to Tiridates. 

The circumstances under which Volagases made his first attack uponArmenia were the following. Pharasmanes of Iberia, whose brother, Mithridates, the Romans had (in A. D. 47) replaced upon the Armenianthrone, had a son named Rhadamistus, whose lust of power was so greatthat to prevent his making an attempt on his own crown Pharasmanes foundit necessary to divert his thoughts to another quarter. 

Armenia, he suggested, lay near, and was a prize worth winning;Rhadamistus had only to ingratiate himself with the people, and thencraftily remove his uncle, and he would probably step with ease intothe vacant place. The son took the advice of his father, and in a littletime succeeded in getting Mithridates into his power, when he ruthlesslyput him to death, together with his wife and children. Rhadamistus then, supported by his father, obtained the object of his ambition, and becameking. It was known, however, that a considerable number of the Armenianswere adverse to a rule which had been brought about by treachery andmurder; and it was suspected that, if an attack were made upon him, he would not be supported with much zeal by his subjects. This was thecondition of things when Volagases ascended the Parthian throne, andfound himself in want of a principality with which he might reward theservices of Tiridates, his brother. It at once occurred to him that, ahappy chance presented him with an excellent opportunity of acquiringArmenia, and he accordingly proceeded, in the very year of hisaccession, to make an expedition against it. At first he carried allbefore him. The Iberian supporters of Rhadamistus fled without risking abattle; his Armenian subjects resisted weakly; Artaxata and Tigranocertaopened their gates; and the country generally submitted. Tiridatesenjoyed his kingdom for a few months; but a terrible pestilence, broughtabout by a severe winter and a want of proper provisions, decimated theParthian force left in garrison; and Volagases found himself obliged, after a short occupation, to relinquish his conquest. Rhadamistusreturned, and, although the Armenians opposed him in arms, contrived tore-establish himself. The Parthians did not renew their efforts, andfor three years--from A. D. 51 to A. D. 54--Rhadamistus was left in quietpossession of the Armenian kingdom. '

It appears to have been in this interval that the arms of Volagaseswere directed against one of his great feudatories, Izatos. As inEurope during the prevalence of the feudal system, so under the Parthiangovernment, it was always possible that the sovereign might be forced tocontend with one of the princes who owed him fealty. Volagases seems tohave thought that the position of the Adiabenian monarch was becomingtoo independent, and that it was necessary to recall him, by asharp mandate, to his proper position of subordinate and tributary. Accordingly, he sent him a demand that he should surrender the specialprivileges which had been conferred upon him by Artabanus III. , andresume the ordinary status of a Parthian feudatory. Izates, who fearedthat if he yielded he would find that this demand was only a prelude toothers more intolerable, replied by a positive refusal, and immediatelyprepared to resist an invasion. He sent his wives and children to thestrongest fortress within his dominions, collected all the grain thathis subjects possessed into fortified places, and laid waste the wholeof the open country, so that it should afford no sustenance to aninvading army. He then took up a position on the lower Zab, or Caprius, and stood prepared to resist an attack upon his territory. Volagasesadvanced to the opposite bank of the river, and was preparing to invadeAdiabene, when news reached him of an important attack upon hiseastern provinces. A horde of barbarians, consisting of Dahse and otherScythians, had poured into Parthia Proper, knowing that he was engagedelsewhere, and threatened to carry fire and sword through the entireprovince. The Parthian monarch considered that it was his first duty tomeet these aggressors; and leaving Izates unchastised, he marched awayto the north-east to repel the external enemy. 

Volagases, after defeating this foe, would no doubt have returned toAdiabene, and resumed the war with Izates, but in his absence thatprince died. Monobazus, his brother, who inherited his crown, couldhave no claim to the privileges which had been conferred for personalservices upon Izates; and consequently there was no necessity for thewar to be renewed. The bones of Izates were conveyed to the holy soilof Palestine and buried in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Monobazus wasaccepted by Volagases as his brother's successor without any apparentreluctance, and proved a faithful tributary, on whom his suzerain couldplace complete dependence. 

The quarrel with Izates, and the war with the Dahee and Sacse, may haveoccupied the years A. D. 52 and 53. At any rate it was not till A. D. 54, his fourth year, that Volagases resumed his designs against Armenia. Rhadamistus, though he had more than once had to fly the country, wasfound in possession as king, and for some time he opposed the progressof the Parthian arms; but, before the year was out, despairing ofsuccess, he again fled, and left Volagases to arrange the affairs ofArmenia at his pleasure. Tiridates was at once established as king, andArmenia brought into the position of a regular Parthian dependency. The claims of Rome were ignored. Volagases was probably aware that theImperial throne was occupied by a mere youth, not eighteen years old, one destitute of all warlike tastes, a lover of music and of the arts, who might be expected to submit to the loss of a remote province withoutmuch difficulty. He therefore acted as if Rome had no rights in thispart of Asia, established his brother at Artaxata, and did not somuch as send an embassy to Nero to excuse or explain his acts. Theseproceedings caused much uneasiness in Italy. If Nero himself cannotbe regarded as likely to have felt very keenly the blow struck at theprestige of the Empire, yet there were those among his advisers whocould well understand and appreciate the situation. The ministers of theyoung prince resolved that efforts on the largest scale should be made. Orders were at once issued for recruiting the Oriental legions, andmoving them nearer to Armenia; preparations were set on foot forbridging the Euphrates; Antiochus of Commagene, and Herod Agrippa II. , were required to collect troops and hold themselves in readiness toinvade Parthia; the Roman provinces bordering upon Armenia were placedunder new governors; above all, Corbulo, regarded as the best generalof the time, was summoned from Germany, and assigned the provinces ofCappadocia and Galatia, together with the general superintendence of thewar for retaining possession of Armenia. At the same time instructionswere sent out to Ummidius, proconsul of Syria, requiring him toco-operate with Corbulo; and arrangements were made to obviatethe clashing of authority which was to be feared between two equalcommanders. In the spring of A. D. 55 the Roman armies were ready to takethe field, and a struggle seemed impending which would recall the timesof Antony and Phraates. 

But, at the moment when expectation was at its height, and the clangof arms appeared about to resound throughout Western Asia, suddenly adisposition for peace manifested itself. Both Corbulo and Ummidiussent embassies to Volagases, exhorting him to make concessions, andapparently giving him to understand that something less was required ofhim than the restoration of Armenia to the Romans. Volagases listenedfavorably to the overtures, and agreed to put into the hands of theRoman commanders the most distinguished members of the royal family ashostages. At the same time he withdrew his troops from Armenia; whichthe Romans, however, did not occupy, and which continued, as it wouldseem, to be governed by Tiridates. The motive of the Parthian king inacting as he did is obvious. A revolt against his authority had brokenout in Parthia, headed by his son, Vardanes; and, until this internaltrouble should be suppressed, he could not engage with advantage in aforeign war. [PLATE III. Fig. 1. ] The reasons which actuated the Romangenerals are far more obscure. It is difficult to understand theiromission to press upon Volagases in his difficulties, or their readinessto accept the persons of a few hostages, however high their rank, as anequivalent for the Roman claim to a province. Perhaps the jealousy whichsubsequently showed itself in regard to the custody of the hostages mayhave previously existed between the two commanders, and they may haveeach consented to a peace disadvantageous to Rome through fear of theother's obtaining the chief laurels if war were entered on. 

[Illustration: PLATE 3. ]

The struggle for power between Volagases and his son Vardanes seems tohave lasted for three years--from A. D. 55 to A. D. 58. Its details areunknown to us; but Volagases must have been successful; and we mayassume that the pretender, of whom we hear no more, was put to death. No sooner was the contest terminated than Volagases, feeling that he wasnow free to act, took a high tone in his communications with Corbuloand Ummidius, and declared that not only must his brother, Tiridates, beleft in the undisturbed possession of Armenia but it must be distinctlyunderstood that he held it as a Parthian, and not as a Roman, feudatory. At the same time Tiridates began to exercise his authority over theArmenians with severity, and especially to persecute those whom hesuspected of inclining towards the Romans. Oorbulo appears to have feltthat it was necessary to atone for his three years of inaction by atlength prosecuting the war in earnest. He tightened the discipline ofthe legions, while he recruited them to their full strength, made freshfriends among the hardy races of the neighborhood, renewed the Romanalliance with Pharasmanes of Iberia, urged Antiochus of Commagene tocross the Armenian frontier, and taking the field himself, carried fireand sword over a large portion of the Armenian territory. Volagasessent a contingent of troops to the assistance of his feudatory, but wasunable to proceed to his relief in person, owing to the occurrence of arevolt in Hyrcania, which broke out, fortunately for the Romans, in thevery year that the rebellion of Vardanes was suppressed. Under thesecircumstances it is not surprising that Tiridates had recourse totreachery, or that on his treachery failing he continually lostground, and was at last compelled to evacuate the country and yield thepossession of it to the Romans. It is more remarkable that he prolongedhis resistance into the third year than that he was unable to continuethe straggle to a later date. He lost his capital, Artaxata, in A. D. 58, and Tigranocerta, the second city of Armenia, in A. D. 60. After thishe made one further effort from the side of Media, but the attempt wasunavailing; and on suffering a fresh defeat he withdrew altogether fromthe struggle, whereupon Armenia reverted to the Romans. They entrustedthe government to a certain Tigranes, a grandson of Archelaus, king ofCappadocia, but at the same time greatly diminished the extent of thekingdom by granting portions of it to neighboring princes. Pharasmanesof Iberia, Polemo of Pontus, Aristobulus of the Lesser Armenia, andAntiochus of Commagene, received an augmentation of their territoriesat the expense of the rebel state, which had shown itself incapable ofappreciating the blessings of Roman rule and had manifested a decidedpreference for the Parthians. 

But the fate of Armenia, and the position which she was to hold inrespect of the two great rivals, Rome and Parthia, were not yet decided. Hitherto Volagases, engaged in a contest with the Hyrcanians and withother neighboring nations, whereto the flames of war had spread, hadfound himself unable to take any personal part in the struggle in whichhis brother and vassal had been engaged in the west. Now matters inHyrcania admitted of arrangement, and he was at liberty to give hismain attention to Armenian affairs. His presence in the West had becomeabsolutely necessary. Not only was Armenia lost to him, but it had beenmade a centre from which his other provinces in this quarter mightbe attacked and harassed. Tigranes, proud of his newly-won crown, andanxious to show himself worthy of it, made constant incursions intoAdiabene, ravaging and harrying the fertile country far and wide. Monobazus, unable to resist him in the field, was beginning tocontemplate the transfer of his allegiance to Rome, as the only meansof escaping from the evils of a perpetual border war. Tiridates, discontented with the position whereto he found himself reduced, andangry that his brother had not given him more effective support, wasloud in his complaints, and openly taxed Volagases with an inertnessthat bordered on cowardice. Public opinion was inclined to accept andapprove the charge; and in Parthia public opinion could not be safelycontemned. Volagases found it necessary to win back his subjects'good-will by calling a council of the nobility, and making them a formaladdress: "Parthians, " he said, "when I obtained the first place amongyou by my brothers ceding their claims, I endeavored to substitute forthe old system of fraternal hatred and contention a new one of domesticaffection and agreement; my brother Pacorus received Media from my handsat once; Tiridates, whom you see now before you, I inducted shortlyafterwards into the sovereignty of Armenia, a dignity reckoned the thirdin the Parthian kingdom. Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful andsatisfactory footing. But these arrangements are now disturbed by theRomans, who have never hitherto broken their treaties with us to theirprofit, and who will now find that they have done so to their ruin. Iwill not deny that hitherto I have preferred to maintain my right to theterritories, which have come to me from my ancestors, by fair dealingrather than by shedding of blood--by negotiation rather than by arms;if, however, I have erred in this and have been weak to delay so long, Iwill now correct my fault by showing the more zeal. You at any ratehave lost nothing by my abstinence; your strength is intact, your gloryundiminished; you have added, moreover, to your reputation for valor thecredit of moderation--a virtue which not even the highest among men canafford to despise, and which the Gods view with special favor. " Havingconcluded his speech, he placed a diadem on the brow of Tiridates, proclaiming by this significant act his determination to restore him tothe Armenian throne. At the same time he ordered Monseses, a Parthiangeneral, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian monarch, to take the field andenter Armenia, while he himself with the main strength of the empireadvanced towards the Euphrates and threatened Syria with invasion. 

The results of the campaign which followed (A. D. 62) scarcely answeredto this magnificent opening. Monseses indeed, in conjunction withMonobazus, invaded Armenia, and, advancing to Tigranocerta, besiegedTigranes in that city, which, upon the destruction of Artaxata byCorbulo, had become the seat of government. Volagases himself proceededas far as Nisibis, whence he could threaten at the same time Armeniaand Syria. The Parthian arms proved, however, powerless to effectany serious impression upon Tigranocerta; and Volagases, being met atNisibis by envoys from Corbulo, who threatened an invasion of Parthiain retaliation of the Parthian attack upon Armenia, consented toan arrangement. A plague of locusts had spread itself over UpperMesopotamia, and the consequent scarcity of forage completely paralyzeda force which consisted almost entirely of cavalry. Volagases wasglad under the circumstances to delay the conflict which had seemedimpending, and readily agreed that his troops should suspend the siegeof Tigranocerta and withdraw from Armenia on condition that the Romanshould at the same time evacuate the province. He would send, he said, ambassadors to Rome who should arrange with Nero the footing upon whichArmenia was to be placed. Meanwhile, until the embassy returned, thereshould be peace--the Armenians should be left to themselves--neitherRome nor Parthia should maintain a soldier within the limits of theprovince, and any collision between the armies of the two countriesshould be avoided. 

A pause, apparently of some months' duration, followed. Towards theclose of autumn, however, a new general came upon the scene; and a newfactor was introduced into the political and military combinations ofthe period. L. Caesennius Paetus, a favorite of the Roman Emperor, but aman of no capacity, was appointed by Nero to take the main direction ofaffairs in Armenia, while Corbulo confined himself to the care of Syria, his special province. Corbulo had requested a coadjutor, probably notso much from an opinion that the war would be better conducted by twocommanders than by one, as from fear of provoking the jealousy of Nero, if he continued any longer to administer the whole of the East. Onthe arrival of Paetus, who brought one legion with him, an equitabledivision of the Roman forces was made between the generals. Each hadthree legions; and while Corbulo retained the Syrian auxiliaries, thoseof Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia were attached to the army of Paetus. But no friendly feeling united the leaders. Corbulo was jealous of therival whom he knew to have been sent out as a check upon him rather thanas a help; and Paetus was inclined to despise the slow and temporizingpolicy of the elder chief. The war, according to his views, required tobe carried on with more dash and vigor than had hitherto appeared inits conduct--cities should be stormed, he said--the whole countryplundered--severe examples made of the guilty. The object of the waralso should be changed--instead of setting up shadowy kings, his own aimwould be to reduce Armenia into the form of a province. 

The truce established in the early summer, when Volagases sent hisenvoys to Nero, expired in the autumn, on their return without adefinite reply; and the Roman commanders at once took the offensive andentered upon an autumn campaign, the second within the space of a year. Corbulo crossed the Euphrates in the face of a large Parthian army, which he forced to retire from the eastern bank of the river by meansof military engines worked from ships anchored in mid-stream. Hethen advanced and occupied a strong position in the hills at a littledistance from the river, where he caused his legions to construct anentrenched camp. Paetus, on his part, entered Armenia from Cappadociawith two legions, and, passing the Taurus range, ravaged a largeextent of country; winter, however, approaching, and the enemy nowhereappearing in force, he led back his troops across the mountains, and, regarding the campaign as finished, wrote a despatch to Nero boastingof his successes, sent one of his three legions to winter in Pontus, andplaced the other two in quarters between the Taurus and the Euphrates, at the same time granting furloughs to as many of the soldiers as choseto apply for them. A large number took advantage of his liberality, preferring no doubt the pleasures and amusements of the Syrian andCappadocian cities to the hardships of a winter in the Armenianhighlands. While matters were in this position Paetus suddenly heardthat Volagases was advancing against him. As once before at an importantcrisis, so now with the prospect of Armenia as the prize of victory, theParthians defied the severities of winter and commenced a campaign whentheir enemy regarded the season for war as over. In this crisis Paetusexhibited an entire unfitness for command. First, he resolved to remainon the defensive in his camp; then, affecting to despise the protectionof ramparts and ditches, he gave the order to advance and meet theenemy; finally, after losing a few scouts whom he had sent forward, hehastily retreated and resumed his old position, but at the same timeunwisely detached three thousand of his best foot to block the pass ofTaurus, through which Volagases was advancing. After some hesitationhe was induced to make Corbulo acquainted with his position; butthe message which he sent merely stated that he was expecting to beattacked. Corbulo was in no hurry to proceed to his relief, preferringto appear upon the scene at the last moment, when he would be hailed asa savior. 

Volagases, meanwhile, continued his march. The small force left byPaetus to block his progress was easily overpowered, and for the mostpart destroyed. The castle of Arsamosata, where Paetus had placed hiswife and child, and the fortified camp of the legions, were besieged. The Romans were challenged to a battle, but dared not show themselvesoutside their entrenchments. Having no confidence in their leader, thelegionaries despaired and began openly to talk of a surrender. As thedanger drew nearer, fresh messengers had been despatched to Corbulo, andhe had been implored to come at his best speed in order to save the poorremnant of a defeated army. That commander was on his march, by wayof Commagene and Cappadocia; it could not be very long before he wouldarrive; and the supplies in the camp of Paetus were sufficient to haveenabled him to hold out for weeks and months. But an unworthy terror hadseized both Paetus and his soldiers. Instead of holding out to the last, the alarmed chief proposed negotiations, and the result was that heconsented to capitulate. His troops were to be allowed to quit theirentrenchments and withdraw from the country, but were to surrender theirstrongholds and their stores. Armenia was to be completely evacuatedby the Romans; and a truce was to be observed and Armenia not againinvaded, until a fresh embassy, which Volagases proposed to send toRome, returned. Moreover, a bridge was to be made by the Romans over theArsanias, a tributary of the Euphrates, which, as it was of no immediateservice to the Parthians, could only be intended as a monument of theRoman defeat. Paetus assented to these terms, and they were carried out;not, however, without some further ignominy to the Romans. The Parthiansentered the Roman entrenchments before the legionaries had left them, and laid their hands on anything which they recognized as Armenianspoil. They even seized the soldiers' clothes and arms, which wererelinquished to them without a struggle, lest resistance should provokean outbreak. Paetus, once more at liberty; proceeded with unseemly hasteto the Euphrates, deserting his wounded and his stragglers, whom he leftto the tender mercies of the Armenians. At the Euphrates he effected ajunction with Corbulo, who was but three days' march distant when Paetusso gracefully capitulated. 

The chiefs, when they met, exchanged no cordial greeting. Corbulocomplained that he had been induced to make a useless journey, andto weary his troops to no purpose, since without any aid from him thelegions might have escaped from their difficulties by simply waitinguntil the Parthians had exhausted their stores, when they must haveretired. Paetus, anxious to obliterate the memory of his failure, proposed that the combined armies should at once enter Armenia andoverrun it, since Volagases and his Parthians had withdrawn. Corbuloreplied coldly--that "he had no such orders from the Emperor. He hadquitted his province to rescue the threatened legions from their peril;now that the peril was past, he must return to Syria, since it was quiteuncertain what the enemy might next attempt. It would be hard work forhis infantry, tired with the long marches it had made, to keep pace withthe Parthian cavalry, which was fresh and would pass rapidly through theplains. " The generals upon this parted. Paetus wintered in Cappadocia;Corbulo returned into Syria, where a demand reached him from Volagasesthat he would evacuate Mesopotamia. He agreed to do so on the conditionthat Armenia should be evacuated by the Parthians. To this Volagasesconsented; since he had re-established Tiridates as king, and theArmenians might be trusted, if left to themselves, to prefer Parthian toRoman ascendancy. 

There was now, again, a pause in the war for some months. The envoyssent by Volagases after the capitulation of Paetus reached Rome at thecommencement of spring (A. D. 63), and were there at once admitted toan audience. They proposed peace on the terms that Tiridates should berecognized as king of Armenia, but that he should go either to Rome, or to the head-quarters of the Roman legions in the East, in order toreceive investiture, either from the Emperor or his representative. Itwas with some difficulty that Nero was brought to believe in the successof Volagases, so entirely had he trusted the despatches of Paetus, whichrepresented the Romans as triumphant. When the state of affairs wasfully understood from the letters of Corbulo and the accounts given bya Roman officer who had accompanied the Parthian envoys, there wasno doubt or hesitation as to the course which should be pursued. The Parthian proposals must be rejected. Rome must not make peaceimmediately upon a disaster, or until she had retrieved her reputationand shown her power by again taking the offensive. Paetus was at oncerecalled, and the whole direction of the war given to Corbulo, whowas intrusted with a wide-spreading and extraordinary authority. TheParthian envoys were dismissed, but with gifts, which seemed to showthat it was not so much their proposals as the circumstances under whichthey had been made that were unpalatable. Another legion was sent tothe East; and the semi-independent princes and dynasts were exhorted tosupport Corbulo with zeal. That commander used his extraordinary powersto draw together, not so much a very large force, as one that could bethoroughly trusted; and, collecting his troops at Melitene (Malatiyeh), made his arrangements for a fresh invasion. 

Penetrating into Armenia by the road formerly followed by Lucullus, Corbulo, with three legions, and probably the usual proportion ofallies--an army of about 80, 000 men--advanced against the combinedArmenians and Parthians under Tiridates and Volagases, freely offeringbattle, and at the same time taking vengeance, as he proceeded, on theArmenian nobles who had been especially active in opposing Tigranes, the late Roman puppet-king. His march led him near the spot where thecapitulation of Paetus had occurred in the preceding winter; and it waswhile he was in this neighborhood that envoys from the enemy met himwith proposals for an accommodation. Corbulo, who had never shownhimself anxious to push matters to an extremity, readily accepted theovertures. The site of the camp of Paetus was chosen for the place ofmeeting; and there, accompanied by twenty horsemen each, Tiridates andthe Roman general held an interview. The terms proposed and agreed uponwere the same that Nero had rejected; and thus the Parthians could notbut be satisfied, since they obtained all for which they had asked. Corbulo, on the other hand, was content to have made the arrangementon Armenian soil, while he was at the head of an intact and unblemishedarmy, and held possession of an Armenian district; so that the termscould not seem to have been extorted by fear, but rather to have beenallowed as equitable. He also secured the immediate performance of aceremony at which Tiridates divested himself of the regal ensigns andplaced them at the foot of the statue of Nero; and he took securityfor the performance of the promise that Tiridates should go to Rome andreceive his crown from the hands of Nero, by requiring and obtainingone of his daughters as a hostage. In return, he readily undertook thatTiridates should be treated with all proper honor during his stay atRome, and on his journeys to and from Italy, assuring Volagases, who wasanxious on these points, that Rome regarded only the substance, and madeno account of the mere show and trappings of power. 

The arrangement thus made was honestly executed. After a delay of abouttwo years, for which it is difficult to account, Tiridates set outupon his journey. He was accompanied by his wife, by a number of nobleyouths, among whom were sons of Volagases and of Monobazus, and by anescort of three thousand Parthian cavalry. The long cavalcade passed, like a magnificent triumphal procession, through two thirds of theEmpire, and was everywhere warmly welcomed and sumptuously entertained. Each city which lay upon its route was decorated to receive it; andthe loud acclaims of the multitudes expressed their satisfaction at thenovel spectacle. The riders made the whole journey, except the passageof the Hellespont, by land, proceeding through Thrace and Illyricumto the head of the Adriatic, and then descending the peninsula. Theirentertainment was furnished at the expense of the state, and is saidto have cost the treasury 800, 000 sesterces (about L6250. ) a day thisoutlay was continued for nine months, and must have amounted inthe aggregate to above a million and a half of our money. The firstinterview of the Parthian prince with his nominal sovereign was atNaples, where Nero happened to be staying. According to the ordinaryetiquette of the Roman court, Tiridates was requested to lay aside hissword before approaching the Emperor; but this he declined to do; andthe difficulty seemed serious until a compromise was suggested, andhe was allowed to approach wearing his weapon, after it had first beencarefully fastened to the scabbard by nails. He then drew near, bentone knee to the ground, interlaced his hands, and made obeisance, at thesame time saluting the Emperor as his "lord. "

The ceremony of the investiture was performed afterwards at Rome. Onthe night preceding, the whole city was illuminated and decoratedwith garlands; the Forum, as morning approached, was filled with "thepeople, " arranged in their several tribes, clothed in white robes andbearing boughs of laurel; the Praetorians, in their splendid arms, weredrawn up in two lines from the further extremity of the Forum to theRostra, to maintain the avenue of approach clear; all the roofs of thebuildings on every side were thronged with crowds of spectators; atbreak of day Nero arrived in the attire appropriated to triumphs, accompanied by the members of the Senate and his body-guard, and tookhis seat on the Rostra in a curule chair. Tiridates and his suite werethen introduced between the two long lines of soldiers; and the prince, advancing to the Rostra, made an oration, which (as reported by Dio) wasof a sufficiently abject character. Nero responded proudly; and thenthe Armenian prince, ascending the Rostra by a way constructed for thepurpose, and sitting at the feet of the Roman Emperor, received from hishand, after his speech had been interpreted to the assembled Romans, thecoveted diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty. 

After a stay of some weeks, or possibly months, at Rome, during which hewas entertained by Nero with extreme magnificence, Tiridates returned, across the Adriatic and through Greece and Asia Minor, to his own land. The circumstances of his journey and his reception involved a concessionto Rome of all that could be desired in the way of formal and verbalacknowledgment. The substantial advantage, however, remained withthe Parthians. The Romans, both in the East and at the capital, wereflattered by a show of submission; but the Orientals must have concludedthat the long struggle had terminated in an acknowledgment by Rome ofParthia as the stronger power. Ever since the time of Lucullus, Armeniahad been the object of contention between the two states, both ofwhich had sought, as occasion served, to place upon the throne its ownnominees. Recently the rival powers had at one and the same time broughtforward rival claimants; and the very tangible issue had been raised, Was Tigranes or Tiridates to be king? When the claims of Tigranes werefinally, with the consent of Rome, set aside, and those of Tiridatesallowed, the real point in dispute was yielded by the Romans. AParthian, the actual brother of the reigning Parthian king, waspermitted to rule the country which Rome had long deemed her own. Itcould not be doubted that he would rule it in accordance with Parthianinterests. His Roman investiture was a form which he had been forced togo through; what effect could it have on him in the future, except tocreate a feeling of soreness? The arms of Volagases had been the realforce which had placed him upon the throne; and to those arms he musthave looked to support him in case of an emergency. Thus Armenia wasin point of fact relinquished to Parthia at the very time when it wasnominally replaced under the sovereignty of the Romans. 

There is much doubt as to the time at which Volagases I. Ceased toreign. The classical writers give no indication of the death of anyParthian king between the year A. D. 51, when they record the demise ofVonones II. , and about the year A. D. 90, when they speak of a certainPacorus as occupying the throne. Moreover, during this interval, whenever they have occasion to mention the reigning Parthian monarch, they always give him the name of Volagases. Hence it has been customaryamong writers on Parthian history to assign to Volagases I. The entireperiod between A. D. 51 and A. D. 90--a space of thirty-nine years. Recently, however, the study of the Parthian coins has shown absolutelythat Pacorus began to reign at least as early as A. D. 78, while it hasraised a suspicion that the space between A. D. 51 and A. D. 78 was sharedbetween two kings, one of whom reigned from A. D. 51 to about A. D. 62, and the other from about A. D. 62 to A. D. 78. It has been proposedto call these kings respectively Volagases I. And Artabanus IV. OrVolagases I. And Volagases II. , and Parthian history has been writtenon this basis; but it is confessed that the entire absence of anyintimation by the classical writers that there was any change ofmonarch in this space, or that the Volagases of whom they speak as acontemporary of Vespasian was any other than the adversary of Corbulo, is a very great difficulty in the way of this view being accepted; andit is suggested that the two kings which the coins indicate may havebeen contemporary monarchs reigning in different parts of Parthia. Tosuch a theory there can be no objection. The Parthian coins distinctlyshow the existence under the later Arsacidae of numerous pretenders, orrivals to the true monarch, of whom we have no other trace. In the timeof Volagases I. There was (we know) a revolt in Hyrcania, which wascertainly not suppressed as late as A. D. 75. The king who has beencalled Artabanus IV. Or Volagases II. May have maintained himselfin this region, while Volagases I. Continued to rule in the Westernprovinces and to be the only monarch known to the Romans and the Jews. If this be the true account of the matter, we may regard Volagases I. Ashaving most probably reigned from A. D. 51 to about A. D. 78--a space oftwenty-seven years. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

_Results of the Establishment of Tiridates in Armenia. Long period ofPeace between Parthia and Rome. Obscurity of Parthian History at thistime. Relations of Volagases I. With Vespasian. Invasion of Western Asiaby Alani. Death of Volagases I. And Character of his Reign. Accessionand Long Reign of Pacorus. Relations of Pacorus with Decebalus of Dacia. Internal Condition of Parthia during his Reign. Death of Pacorus andAccession of Chosroes. _

The establishment of Tiridates as king of Armenia, with the jointconsent of Volagases and Nero, inaugurated a period of peace betweenthe two Empires of Rome and Parthia, which exceeded half a century. Thisresult was no doubt a fortunate one for the inhabitants of Western Asia;but it places the modern historian of the Parthians at a disadvantage. Hitherto the classical writers, in relating the wars of theSyro-Macedonians and the Romans, have furnished materials for Parthianhistory, which, if not as complete as we might wish, have been at anyrate fairly copious and satisfactory. Now, for the space of half acentury, we are left without anything like a consecutive narrative, andare thrown upon scattered and isolated notices, which can form onlya most incomplete and disjointed narrative. The reign of Volagases I. Appears to have continued for about twelve years after the visit ofTiridates to Rome; and no more than three or four events are known ashaving fallen into this interval. Our knowledge of the reign of Pacorusis yet more scanty. But as the business of the workman is simply to makethe best use that he can of his materials, such a sketch of this darkperiod as the notices which have come down to us allow will now beattempted. 

When the troubles which followed upon the death of Nero shook the Romanworld, and after the violent ends of Galba and Otho, the governor ofJudaea, Vespasian, resolved to become a candidate for the imperial power(A. D. 69), Volagases was at once informed by envoys of the event, andwas exhorted to maintain towards the new monarch the same peacefulattitude which he had now for seven years observed towards hispredecessors. Volagases not only complied with the request, out sentambassadors in return to Vespasian, while he was still at Alexandria(A. D. 70), and offered to put at his disposal a body of forty thousandParthian cavalry. The circumstances of his position allowed Vespasian todecline this magnificent proposal, and to escape the odium whichwould have attached to the employment of foreign troops against hiscountrymen. His generals in Italy had by this time carried all beforethem; and he was able, after thanking the Parthian monarch, to informhim that peace was restored to the Roman world, and that he hadtherefore no need of auxiliaries. In the same friendly spirit in whichhe had made this offer, Volagases, in the next year (A. D. 71), sentenvoys to Titus at Zeugma, who presented to him the Parthian king'scongratulations on his victorious conclusion of the Jewish war, andbegged his acceptance of a crown of gold. The polite attention wascourteously received; and before allowing them to return to their masterthe young prince hospitably entertained the Parthian messengers at abanquet. 

Soon after this, circumstances occurred in the border state of Commagenewhich threatened a rupture of the friendly relations that had hithertosubsisted between Volagases and Vespasian. Caesennius Paetus, proconsulof Syria, the unsuccessful general in the late Armenian war, informedVespasian, early in A. D. 72, that he had discovered a plot, by whichCommagene, one of the Roman subject kingdoms, was to be detached fromthe Roman alliance, and made over to the Parthians. Antiochus, the agedmonarch, and his son Epiphanes were, according to Paetus, both concernedin the treason; and the arrangement with the Parthians was, he said, actually concluded. It would be well to nip the evil in the bud. If thetransfer of territory once took place, a most serious disturbance of theRoman power would follow. Commagene lay west of the Euphrates; andits capital city, Samosata (the modern Sumeisat), commanded one of thepoints where the great river was most easily crossed; so that, if theParthians held it, they would have a ready access at all times to theRoman provinces of Cappadocia, Cilicia, and Syria, with a perfectly saferetreat. These arguments had weight with Vespasian, who seems to havehad entire confidence in Paetus, and induced him to give the proconsulfull liberty to act as he thought best. Thus empowered, Paetus at onceinvaded Commagene in force, and meeting at first with no resistance(for the Commagenians were either innocent or unprepared), succeeded inoccupying Samosata by a _coup de main_. The aged king wished to yieldeverything without a blow; but his two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, were not to be restrained. They took arms, and, at the head of such aforce as they could hastily muster, met Paetus in the field, andfought a battle with him which lasted the whole day, and ended withoutadvantage to either side. But the decision of Antiochus was not to beshaken; he refused to countenance his sons' resistance, and, quittingCommagene, passed with his wife and daughters into the Roman provinceof Cilicia, where he took up his abode at Tarsus. The spirit of theCommagenians could not hold out against this defection; the forcecollected began to disperse; and the young princes found themselvesforced to fly, and to seek a refuge in Parthia, which they reachedwith only ten horsemen. Volagases received them with the courtesy andhospitality due to their royal rank; but as he had given them no helpin the struggle, so now he made no effort to reinstate them. All theexertion to which he could be brought was to write a letter on theirbehalf to Vespasian, in which he probably declared them guiltless of thecharges that had been brought against them by Paetus. Vespasian, at anyrate, seems to have become convinced of their innocence; for thoughhe allowed Commagene to remain a Roman province, he permitted the twoprinces with their father to reside at Rome, assigned the ex-monarch anample revenue, and gave the family an honorable status. 

It was probably not more than two or three years after the events abovenarrated, that Volagases found himself in circumstances which impelledhim to send a petition to the Roman Emperor for help. The Alani, a Scythian people, who had once dwelt near the Tanais and the LakeMseotis, or Sea of Azof, but who must now have lived further to theEast, had determined on a great predatory invasion of the countries westof the Caspian Gates, and having made alliance with the Hyrcanians, whowere in possession of that important pass, had poured into Media throughit, driven King Pacorus to the mountains, and overrun the whole ofthe open country. From hence they had passed on into Armenia, defeatedTiridates, in a battle, and almost succeeded in capturing him by meansof a lasso. Volagases, whose subject-kings were thus rudely treated, and who might naturally expect his own proper territories to be nextattacked, sent in this emergency a request to Vespasian for aid. Heasked moreover that the forces put at his disposal should be placedunder the command of either Titus or Domitian, probably not so much fromany value that he set on their military talents as from a convictionthat if a member of the Imperial family was sent, the force whichaccompanied him would be considerable. We are told that the question, whether help be given or no, was seriously discussed at Rome, and thatDomitian was exceedingly anxious that the troops should go, and beggedthat he might be their commander. But Vespasian was disinclined for anyexpenditure of which he did not recognize the necessity, and dislikedall perilous adventure. His own refusal of extraneous support, when offered by his rival, rendered it impossible for him to rejectVolagases's request without incurring the charge of ingratitude. TheParthians were therefore left to their own resources; and the resultseems to have been that the invaders, after ravaging and harrying Mediaand Armenia at their pleasure, carried off a vast number of prisonersand an enormous booty into their own country. Soon after this, Volagasesmust have died. The coins of his successor commence in June, A. D. 78, and thus he cannot have outlived by more than three years the irruptionof the Alani. If he died, as is most probable, in the spring of A. D. 78, his reign would have covered the space of twenty-seven years. It was aneventful one for Parthia. It brought the second period of struggle withthe Romans to an end by compromise which gave to Rome the shadow andto Parthia the substance of victory. And it saw the first completeddisintegration of the Empire in the successful revolt of Hyrcania--anevent of evil portent. Volagases was undoubtedly a monarch ofconsiderable ability. He conducted with combined prudence and firmnessthe several campaigns against Corbulo; he proved himself far superiorto Paetus; exposed to attacks in various quarters from many differentenemies, he repulsed all foreign invaders and, as against them, maintained intact the ancient dominions of the Arsacidae. He practicallyadded Arminia to the Empire. Everywhere success attended him, exceptagainst a domestic foe. Hyrcania seceded during his reign, and it maybe doubted whether Parthia ever afterwards recovered it. An example wasthus set of successful Arian revolt against the hitherto irresistibleTuranians, which may have tended in no slight degree to produce theinsurrection which eventually subverted the Parthian Empire. 

The successor of Volagases I. Was Pacorus, whom most writers on Parthianhistory have regarded as his son. There is, however, no evidence of thisrelationship; and the chief reason for regarding Pacorus as belongingeven to the same branch of the Arsacidse with Volagases I. Is his youthat his accession, indicated by the beardless head upon his early coins, which is no doubt in favor of his having been a near relation of thepreceding king. PLATE III. , Fig 1. The Parthian coins show that hisreign continued at least till A. D. 93; it may have lasted considerablylonger, for the earliest date on any coin of Chosroes is AEr. Seleuc. 421, or A. D. 110. The accession of Chosroes has been conjecturallyassigned to A. D. 108, which would allow to Pacorus the long reign ofthirty years. Of this interval it can only be said that, so far as ourknowledge goes, it was almost wholly uneventful. We know absolutelynothing of this Pacorus except that he gave encouragement to a personwho pretended to be Nero; that he enlarged and beautified Otesiphon;that he held friendly communications with Decebalus, the great Dacianchief, who was successively the adversary of Domitian and Trajan; andthat he sold the sovereignty of Osrhoene at a high price to the Edesseneprince who was cotemporary with him. The Pseudo-Nero in question appearsto have taken refuge with the Parthians in the year A. D. 89, and to havebeen demanded as an impostor by Domitian. Pacorus was at first inclinedto protect and to even assist him, but after a while was induced to givehim up, probably by a threat of hostilities. The communication withthe Dacian chief was most likely earlier. The Dacians, in one ofthose incursions into Maesia which they made during the first years ofDomitian, took captive a certain Callidromus, a Greek, if we may judgeby his name, slave to a Roman of some rank, named Liberius Maximus. Thisprisoner Decebalus (we are told) sent as a present to Pacorus, in whoseservice and favor he remained for a number of years. This circumstance, insignificant enough in itself, acquires an interest from the indicationwhich it gives of intercommunication between the enemies of Rome, evenwhen they were separated by vast spaces, and might have been thoughtto have been wholly ignorant of each other's existence. Decebalus canscarcely have been drawn to Pacorus by any other attraction than thatwhich always subsists between enemies of any great dominant power. Hemust have looked to the Parthian monarch as a friend who might make adiversion on his behalf upon occasion; and that monarch, by acceptinghis gift, must be considered to have shown a willingness to accept thiskind of relation. 

The sale of the Osrhoene territory to Abgarus by Pacorus was not a factof much consequence. It may indicate an exhaustion of his treasury, resulting from the expenditure of vast sums on the enlargement andadornment of the capital, but otherwise it has no bearing on the generalcondition of the Empire. Perhaps the Parthian feudatories generally paida price for their investiture. If they did not, and the case of Abgaruswas peculiar, still it does not appear that his purchase at all alteredhis position as a Parthian subject. It was not until they transferredtheir allegiance to Rome that the Osrhoene princes struck coins, orotherwise assumed the status of kings. Up to the time of M. Aureliusthey continued just as much subject to Parthia as before, and were farfrom acquiring a position of independence. 

There is reason to believe that the reign of Pacorus was a good dealdisturbed by internal contentions. We hear of an Artabanus as king ofParthia in A. D. 79; and the Parthian coins of about this period presentus with two very marked types of head, both of them quite unlike thatof Pacorus, which must be those of monarchs who either contended withPacorus for the crown, or ruled contemporaneously with him over otherportions of the Parthian Empire. [PLATE III. , Fig. 2. ] Again, towardsthe close of Pacorus's reign, and early in that of his recognizedsuccessor, Chosroes, a monarch called Mithridates is shown by the coinsto have borne sway for at least six years--from A. D. 107 to 113. Thismonarch commenced the practice of placing a Semitic legend upon hiscoins, which would seem to imply that he ruled in the western ratherthan the eastern provinces. The probability appears, on the whole, tobe that the disintegration which has been already noticed as havingcommenced under Volagases I. Was upon the increase. Three or fourmonarchs were ruling together in different portions of the Parthianworld, each claiming to be the true Arsaces, and using the full titlesof Parthian sovereignty upon his coins. The Romans knew but little ofthese divisions and contentions, their dealings being only with theArsacid who reigned at Ctesiphon and bore sway over Mesopotamia andAdiabene. 

Pacorus must have died about A. D. 108, or a little later. He left behindhim two sons, Exedares and Parthamasiris, but neither of these twoprinces was allowed to succeed him. The Parthian Megistanes assigned thecrown to Chosroes, the brother of their late monarch, perhaps regardingExedares and Parthamasiris as too young to administer the government ofParthia satisfactorily. If they knew, as perhaps they did, that thelong period of peace with Rome was coming to an end, and that they mightexpect shortly to be once more attacked by their old enemy, they mightwell desire to have upon the throne a prince of ripe years and approvedjudgment. A raw youth would certainly have been unfit to cope with theage, the experience, and the military genius of Trajan. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

_Reign of Chosroes. General condition of Oriental Affairs gives a handleto Trajan. Trajan's Schemes of Conquest. Embassy of Chosroes to Trajanfails. Great Expedition of Trajan. Campaign of A. D. 115. Campaign ofA. D. 116. Death of Trajan, and relinquishment of his Parthian Conquestsby Hadrian. Interview of Chosroes with Hadrian. Its Consequences. Deathof Chosroes and Accession of Volagases II. _

The general state of Oriental affairs at the accession of Chosroes seemsto have been the following. Upon the demise of Tiridates (about A. D. 100) Pacorus had established upon the Armenian throne one of his sons, named Exedares, or Axidares, and this prince had thenceforth reigned asking of Armenia without making any application to Rome for investiture, or acknowledging in any way the right of the Romans to interfere withthe Armenian succession. Trajan, sufficiently occupied in the West, hadborne this insult. When, however, in A. D. 114, the subjugation of Daciawas completed, and the Roman Emperor found his hands free, he resolvedto turn his arms towards Asia, and to make the Armenian difficultya pretext for a great military expedition, designed to establishunmistakably the supremacy of Rome throughout the East. The conditionof the East at once called for the attention of Rome, and waseminently favorable for the extension of her influence at this period. Disintegrating forces were everywhere at work, tending to produce aconfusion and anarchy which invited the interposition of a great power, and rendered resistance to such a power difficult. Christianity, whichwas daily spreading itself more and more widely, acted as a dissolventupon the previously-existing forms of society, loosening the old ties, dividing man from man by an irreconcilable division, and not giving muchindication as yet of its power to combine and unite. Judaism, embitteredby persecution, had from a nationality become a conspiracy; and thedisaffected adherents of the Mosaic system, dispersed through all thecountries of the East, formed an explosive element in the populationwhich involved the constant danger of a catastrophe. The Parthianpolitical system was also, as already remarked, giving symptoms ofbreaking up. Those bonds which for two centuries and a half had sufficedto hold together a heterogeneous kingdom extending from the Euphratesto the Indus, and from the Oxus to the Southern Ocean, were beginningto grow weak, and the Parthian Empire appeared to be falling to pieces. There seemed to be at once a call and an opportunity for a fresharrangement of the East, for the introduction of a unifying power, suchas Rome recognized in her own administrative system, which should compelthe crumbling atoms of the Oriental world once more into cohesion. 

To this call Trajan responded. His vast ambition had been whetted, rather than satiated, by the conquest of a barbarous nation, and asingle, not very valuable, province. In the East he might hope to add tothe Roman State half a dozen countries of world-wide repute, the seatsof ancient empires, the old homes of Asiatic civilization, countriesassociated with the immortal names of Sennacherib and Sardanapalus, Cyrus, Darius, and Alexander. The career of Alexander had an attractionfor him, which he was fain to confess; and he pleased himself byimitating, though he could not hope at his age to equal it. His Easternexpedition was conceived very much in the same spirit as that ofCrassus; but he possessed the military ability in which the Triumvirwas deficient, and the enemy whom he had to attack was grown lessformidable. 

Trajan commenced his Eastern expedition in A. D. 114, seven years afterthe close of the Dacian War. He was met at Athens in the autumn ofthat year by envoys from Chosroes, who brought him presents, and maderepresentations which, it was hoped, would induce him to consent topeace. Chosroes stated that he had deposed his nephew, Exedares, theArmenian prince whose conduct had been offensive to Rome; and proposedthat, as the Armenian throne was thereby vacant, it should be filled bythe appointment of Parthamasiris, Exedares's brother. This prince wouldbe willing, he said, to receive investiture at the hands of Rome; and herequested that Trajan would transmit to him the symbol of sovereignty. The accommodation suggested would have re-established the relations ofthe two countries towards Armenia on the basis on which they had beenplaced by the agreement between Volagases and Nero. It would havesaved the credit of Rome, while it secured to Parthia the substantialadvantage of retaining Armenia under her authority and protection. Trajan might well have consented to it, had his sole object been toreclaim the rights or to vindicate the honor of his country. But he haddistinctly made up his mind to aim, not at the re-establishment of anyformer condition of things, but at the placing of matters in the East onan entirely new footing. He therefore gave the ambassadors of Chosroesa cold reception, declined the gifts offered him, and replied to theproposals of accommodation that the friendship of kings was to bemeasured by deeds rather than by words--he would therefore say nothing, but when he reached Syria would act in a becoming manner. The envoysof the Parthian monarch were obliged to return with this unsatisfactoryanswer; and Chosroes had to wait and see what interpretation it wouldreceive from the course of events. 

During the later months of autumn, Trajan advanced from Athens toAntioch. At that luxurious capital, he mustered his forces and preparedfor the campaign of the ensuing year. Abgarus, the Osrhoene prince whohad lately purchased his sovereignty from Pacorus, sent an embassyto him in the course of the winter, with presents and an offer offriendship. Parthamasiris also entered into communications with him, first assuming the royal title, and then, when his letter received noanswer, dropping it, and addressing the Roman Emperor as a mere privateperson. Upon this act of self-humiliation, negotiations were commenced. Parthamasiris was encouraged to present himself at the Roman camp, andwas given to understand that he would there receive from Trajan, as Tiridates had received from Nero, the emblem of sovereignty andpermission to rule Armenia. The military preparations were, however, continued. Vigorous measures were taken to restore the discipline of theSyrian legions, which had suffered through the long tranquillity of theEast and the enervating influence of the climate. With the spring Trajancommenced his march. Ascending the Euphrates, to Samosata, and receivingas he advanced the submission of various semi-independent dynasts andprinces, he took possession of Satala and Elegeia, Armenian cities onor near the Euphrates, and establishing himself at the last-named place, waited for the arrival of Parthamasiris. That prince shortly rode intothe Roman camp, attended by a small retinue; and a meeting was arranged, at which the Parthian, in the sight of the whole Roman army, took thediadem from his brows and laid it at the feet of the Roman Emperor, expecting to have it at once restored to him. But Trajan had determinedotherwise. He made no movement; and the army, prepared no doubt for theoccasion, shouted with all their might, saluting him anew as Imperator, and congratulating him on his "bloodless victory. " Parthamasiris feltthat he had fallen into a trap, and would gladly have turned and fled;but he found himself surrounded by the Roman troops and virtually aprisoner. Upon this he demanded a private audience, and was conducted tothe Emperor's tent, where he made proposals which were coldly rejected, and he was given to understand that he must regard his crown asforfeited. It was further required of him that, to prevent false rumors, he should present himself a second time at the Emperor's tribunal, prefer his requests openly, and hear the Imperial decision. The Parthianconsented. With a boldness worthy of his high descent, he affirmed thathe had neither been defeated nor made prisoner, but had come of hisown free will to hold a conference with the Roman chief, in the fullexpectation of receiving from him, as Tiridates had received from Nero, the crown of Armenia, confident, moreover, that in any case he would"suffer no wrong, but be allowed to depart in safety. " Trajan answeredthat he did not intend to give the crown of Armenia to any one--thecountry belonged to the Romans, and should have a Roman governor. Asfor Parthamasiris, he was free to go whithersoever he pleased, and hisParthian attendants might accompany him. The Armenians, however, mustremain. They were Roman subjects, and owed no allegiance to Parthia. 

The tale thus told, with no appearance of shame, by the Roman historian, Dio Cassius, is sufficiently disgraceful to Trajan, but it does notreveal to us the entire baseness of his conduct. We learn from otherwriters, two of them contemporary with the events, that the pompousdismissal of Parthamasiris, with leave to go wherever he chose, wasa mere pretence. Trajan had come to the conclusion, if not beforethe interview, at any rate in the course of it, that the youth wasdangerous, and could not be allowed to live. He therefore sent troops toarrest him as he rode off from the camp, and when he offered resistancecaused him to be set upon and slain. This conduct he afterwards stroveto justify by accusing the young prince of having violated the agreementmade at the interview; but even the debased moral sense of his age wasrevolted by this act, and declared the grounds whereon he excused itinsufficient. Good faith and honor had been sacrificed (it was said)to expediency--the reputation of Rome had been tarnished--it would havebeen better, even if Parthamasiris were guilty, to have let him escape, than to have punished him at the cost of a public scandal. So stronglywas the disgrace felt that some (it seems) endeavored to exonerateTrajan from the responsibility of having contrived the deed, and tothrow the blame of it on Exedares, the ex-king of Armenia and brother ofParthamasiris. But Trajan had not sunk so low as to shift his fault onanother. He declared openly that the act was his own, and that Exedareshad had no part in it. 

The death of Parthamasiris was followed by the complete submission ofArmenia. Chosroes made no attempt to avenge the murder of his nephew, orto contest with Trajan the possession of the long-disputed territory. A little doubt seems for a short time to have been entertained by theRomans as to its disposal. The right of Exedares to be reinstated inhis former kingdom was declared by some to be clear; and it was probablyurged that the injuries which he had suffered at the hands of Chosroeswould make him a sure Roman ally. But these arguments had no weight withTrajan. He had resolved upon his course. An end should be put, at onceand forever, to the perpetual intrigues and troubles inseparable fromsuch relations as had hitherto subsisted between Rome and the Armeniankingdom. The Greater and the Lesser Armenia should be annexed to theEmpire, and should form a single Roman province. This settled, attentionwas turned to the neighboring countries. Alliance was made withAnchialus, king of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and presents were sentto him in return for those which his envoys had brought to Trajan. Anew king was given to the Albanians. Friendly relations were establishedwith the chiefs of the Iberi, Sauro-matse, Golchi, and even with thetribes settled on the Cimmerian Bosphorus. The nations of these partswere taught that Rome was the power which the inhabitants even ofthe remote East and North had most to fear; and a wholesome awe wasinstilled into them which would, it was hoped, conduce to the generaltranquillity of the Empire. 

But the objects thus accomplished, considerable as they were, didnot seem to the indefatigable Emperor sufficient for one year. Havingsettled the affairs of the North-east, and left garrisons in the chiefArmenian strongholds, Trajan marched southwards to Edessa, the capitalof the province of Gsrhoene, and there received the humble submissionof Abgarus, who had hitherto wavered between the two contending powers. Manisares, a satrap of these parts, who had a quarrel of his own withChosroes, also embraced his cause, while other chiefs wavered in theirallegiance to Parthia, but feared to trust the invader. Hostilitieswere commenced by attacks in two directions--southward against the tractknown as Anthemusia, between the Euphrates and the Khabour; and eastwardagainst Batnas, Nisibis, and the mountain region known as Gordyene, or the Mons Masius. Success attended both these movements; and, beforewinter set in, the Romans had made themselves masters of the whole ofUpper Mesopotamia, and had even pushed southwards as far as Singara, atown on the skirts of the modern Sinjar mountain-range. Mesopotarniawas at once, like Armenia, "reduced into the form of a Roman province. "Medals were issued representing the conqueror with these subjectcountries at his foot and the obsequious Senate conferred the title of"Parthicus" upon the Imperator, who had thus robbed the Parthians of twoprovinces. 

According to some, the headquarters of Trajan during the ensuing winterwere at Nisibis or Edessa, but the nexus of the narrative in Dio seemsrather to require, and the other ancient notices to allow, the beliefthat he returned to Syria and wintered at Antioch, leaving his generalsin possession of the conquered regions, with orders to make everypreparation for the campaign of the next year. Among other instructionswhich they received was the command to build a large fleet at Nisibis, where good timber was abundant, and to prepare for its transport to theTigris, at the point where that stream quits the mountains and enters onthe open country. Meanwhile, in the month of December, the magnificentSyrian capital, where Trajan had his headquarters, was visited by acalamity of a most appalling character. An earthquake, of a violence andduration unexampled in ancient times, destroyed the greater part of itsedifices, and buried in their ruins vast multitudes of the inhabitantsand of the strangers that had flocked into the town in consequence ofthe Imperial presence. Many Romans of the highest rank perished, andamong them M. Virgilianus Pedo, one of the consuls for the year. TheEmperor himself was in danger, and only escaped by creeping througha window of the house in which he resided; nor was his person quiteunscathed. Some falling fragments struck him; but fortunately theinjuries that he received were slight, and had no permanent consequence. The bulk of the surviving inhabitants, finding themselves houseless, orafraid to enter their houses if they still stood, bivouacked during theheight of the winter in the open air, in the Circus, and elsewhere aboutthe city. The terror which legitimately followed from the actual perilswas heightened by imaginary fears. It was thought that the Mons Casius, which towers above Antioch to the south-west, was about to be shatteredby the violence of the shocks, and to precipitate itself upon the ruinedtown. 

Nor were the horrors of the catastrophe confined to Antioch. Theearthquake was one of a series which carried destruction and devastationthrough the greater part of the East. In the Roman province of Asia, four cities were completely destroyed--Eleia, Myrina, Pitane, and Cyme. In Greece two towns were reduced to ruins, namely, Opus in Locris, andOritus. In Galatia three cities, unnamed, suffered the same fate. Itseemed as if Providence had determined that the new glories which Romewas gaining by the triumphs of her arms should be obscured by calamitiesof a kind that no human power could avert or control, and that despitethe efforts of Trajan to make his reign a time of success and splendor, it should go down to posterity as one of gloom, suffering, and disaster. 

Trajan, however, did not allow himself to be diverted from the objectsthat he had set before him by such trifling matters as the sufferings ofa certain number of provincial towns. With the approach of spring (A. D. 116) he was up and doing. His officers had obeyed his orders, and afleet had been built at Nisibis during the winter amply sufficient forthe purpose for which it was wanted. The ships were so constructed thatthey could be easily taken to pieces and put together again. Trajan hadthem conveyed on wagons to the Tigris at Jezireh, and there proceededto make preparations for passing the river and attacking Adiabene. By embarking on board some of his ships companies of heavy-armedand archers, who protected his working parties, and at the same timethreatening with other ships to cross at many different points, he wasable, though with much difficulty, to bridge the stream in the face ofa powerful body of the enemy, and to land his troops safely on theopposite bank. This done, his work was more than half accomplished. Chosroes remained aloof from the war, either husbanding his resources, or perhaps occupied by civil feuds, and left the defence of his outlyingprovinces to their respective governors. Mobarsapes, the Adiabenianmonarch, had set his hopes on keeping the invader out of his kingdom bydefending the line of the Tigris, and when that was forced he seemsto have despaired, and to have made no further effort. His towns andstrongholds were taken one after another, without their offering anyserious resistance. Nineveh, Arbela, and Gaugamala fell into the enemy'shands. Adenystrse, a place of great strength, was captured by a smallknot of Roman prisoners, who, when they found their friends near, roseupon the garrison, killed the commandant, and opened the gates to theircountrymen. In a short time the whole tract between the Tigris and theZagros mountains was overrun; resistance ceased; and the invader wasable to proceed to further conquests. 

It might have been expected that an advance would have at once beendirected on Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital; but Trajan, for some reasonwhich is not made clear to us, determined otherwise. He repassed theTigris into Mesopotamia, took Hatra (now el-Hadhr), at that time one ofthe most considerable places in those parts, and then, crossing to theEuphrates, descended its course to Hit and Babylon. No resistance wasoffered him, and he became master of the mighty Babylon without a blow. Seleucia seems also to have submitted; and it remained only to attackand take the capital in order to have complete possession of the entireregion watered by the two great rivers. For this purpose a fleet wasagain necessary, and, as the ships used on the upper Tigris had, itwould seem, been abandoned, Trajan conveyed a flotilla, which haddescended the Euphrates, across Mesopotamia on rollers, and launching itupon the Tigris, proceeded to the attack of the great metropolis. Hereagain the resistance that he encountered was trivial. Like Babylon andSeleucia, Ctesiphon at once opened its gates. The monarch had departedwith his family and his chief treasures, 6 and had placed a vast spacebetween himself and his antagonist. He was prepared to contend withhis Roman foe, not in battle array, but by means of distance, naturalobstacles, and guerilla warfare. He had evidently determined neitherto risk a battle nor stand a siege. As Trajan advanced, he retreated, seeming to yield all, but no doubt intending, if it should be necessary, to turn to bay at last, and in the meantime diligently fomenting thatspirit of discontent and disaffection which was shortly to render thefurther advance of the Imperial troops impossible. 

But, for the moment, all appeared to go well with the invaders. Thesurrender of Ctesiphon brought with it the submission of the wholeregion on the lower courses of the great rivers, and gave the conqueroraccess to the waters of a new sea. Trajan may be excused if he overratedhis successes, regarded himself as another Alexander, and deemed thatthe great monarchy, so long the rival of Rome, was now at last sweptaway, and that the entire East was on the point of being absorbed intothe Roman Empire. The capture by his lieutenants of the golden throneof the Parthian kings may well have seemed to him emblematic of thischange; and the flight of Chosroes into the remote and barbarous regionsof the far East may have helped to lull his adversary into a feeling ofcomplete security. Such a feeling is implied in the pleasure voyage ofthe conqueror down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf, in his embarkationon the waters of the Southern Sea, in the inquiries which he institutedwith respect to Indian affairs, and in the regret to which he gaveutterance, that his advanced years prevented him from making Indiathe term of his labors. No shadow of his coming troubles seems to haveflitted before the eyes of the Emperor during the weeks that he was thusoccupied--weeks which he passed in self-complacent contemplation of thepast and dreams of an impossible future. 

Suddenly, tidings of a most alarming kind dispelled his pleasingvisions, and roused him to renewed exertions. Revolt, he found, hadbroken out everywhere in his rear. At Seleucia, at Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa, the natives had flown to arms; his entire line of retreat wasbeset by foes, and he ran a risk of having his return cut off, andof perishing in the land which he had invaded. Trajan had hastily toretrace his stops, and to send his generals in all directions to checkthe spread of insurrection. Seleucia was recovered by Erucius Clarusand Julius Alexander, who punished its rebellion by delivering it to theflames. Lucius Quietus retook Nisibis, and plundered and burnt Edessa. Maximus, on the contrary, was defeated and slain by the rebels, whocompletely destroyed the Roman army under his orders. Trajan, perceivinghow slight his hold was upon the conquered populations, felt compelledto change his policy, and, as the only mode of pacifying, eventemporarily, the growing discontent, instead of making Lower Mesopotamiainto a Roman province, as he had made Armenia, Upper Mesopotamia, andAdiabene (or Assyria), he proceeded with much pomp and display to setup a native king. The prince selected was a certain Parthamaspates, amember of the royal family of the Arsacidse, who had previously sidedwith Rome against the reigning monarch. In a plain near Ctesiphon, where he had had his tribunal erected, Trajan, after a speech wherein heextolled the greatness of his own exploits, presented to the assembledRomans and natives this youth as King of Parthia, and with his own handplaced the diadem upon his brow. 

Under cover of the popularity acquired by this act the aged Emperor nowcommenced his retreat. The line of the Tigris was no doubt open to him, and along this he might have marched in peace to Upper Mesopotamia orArmenia; but either he preferred the direct route to Syria by wayof Hatra and Singara, or the insult offered to the Roman name bythe independent attitude which the people of the former place stillmaintained induced him to diverge from the general line of his course, and to enter the desert in order to chastise their presumption. Hatrawas a small town, but strongly fortified. The inhabitants at this timebelonged to that Arabian immigration which was always more and moreencroaching upon Mesopotamia. They were Parthian subjects, but appearto have had their own native kings. On the approach of Trajan, nothing daunted, they closed their gates, and prepared themselves forresistance. Though he battered down a portion of the wall, they repulsedall the attempts of his soldiers to enter through the breach, and whenhe himself came near to reconnoitre, they drove him off with theirarrows. His troops suffered from the heat, from the want of provisionsand fodder, from the swarms of flies which disputed with them everymorsel of their food and every drop of their drink, and finally fromviolent hail and thunderstorms. Trajan was forced to withdraw after atime without effecting anything, and to own himself baffled and defeatedby the garrison of a petty fortress. 

The year, A. D. 116, seems to have closed with this memorable failure. In the following spring, Chosroes, learning the retreat of the Romans, returned to Ctesiphqn, expelled Parthamaspates, who retired into Romanterritory, and re-established his authority in Susiana and SouthernMesopotamia. The Romans, however, still held Assyria (Adiabene) andUpper Mesopotamia, as well as Armenia, and had the strength of theEmpire been exerted to maintain these possessions, they might havecontinued in all probability to be Roman provinces, despite any effortsthat Parthia could have made to recover them. But in August, A. D. 117, Trajan died; and his successor, Hadrian, was deeply impressed with theopinion that Trajan's conquests had been impolitic, and that it wasunsafe for Rome to attempt under the circumstances of the time anyextension of the Eastern frontier. The first act of Hadrian was torelinquish the three provinces which Trajan's Parthian war had added tothe Empire, and to withdraw the legions within the Euphrates. Assyriaand Mesopotamia were at once reoccupied by the Parthians. Armeniaappears to have been made over by Hadrian to Parthamaspates, and to havethus returned to its former condition of a semi-independent kingdom, leaning alternately on Rome and Parthia. It has been asserted thatOsrhoene was placed likewise upon the same footing; but the numismaticevidence adduced in favor of this view is weak; and upon the wholeit appears most probable that, like the other Mesopotamian countries, Osrhoene again fell under the dominion of the Arsacidae. Rome thereforegained nothing by the great exertions which she had made, unless it werea partial recovery of her lost influence in Armenia, and a knowledge ofthe growing weakness of her Eastern rival--a knowledge which, though itproduced no immediate fruit, was of importance, and was borne in mindwhen, after another half-century of peace, the relations of the twoempires became once more unsatisfactory. 

The voluntary withdrawal of Hadrian from Assyria and Mesopotamia placedhim on amicable terms with Parthia during the whole of his reign. Chosroes and his successor could not but feel themselves underobligations to the monarch who, without being forced to it by a defeat, had restored to Parthia the most valuable of her provinces. On oneoccasion alone do we hear of any, even threatened, interruption ofthe friendly relations subsisting between the two powers; and then themisunderstanding, whatever it may have been, was easily rectified andpeace maintained. Hadrian, in A. D. 122, had an interview with Chosroeson his eastern frontier, and by personal explanations and assurancesaverted, we are told, an impending outbreak. Not long afterwards(A. D. 130, probably) he returned to Chosroes the daughter who had beencaptured by Trajan, and at the same time promised the restoration ofthe golden throne, on which the Parthians appear to have set a specialvalue. 

It must have been soon after he received back his daughter that Chosroesdied. His latest coins bear a date equivalent to A. D. 128; and the Romanhistorians give Volagases II. As king of Parthia in A. D. 133. Ithas been generally supposed that this prince was Chosroes' son, andsucceeded him in the natural course; but the evidence of the Parthiancoins is strong against these suppositions. According to them, Volagaseshad been a pretender to the Parthian throne as early as A. D. 78, and hadstruck coins both in that year and the following one, about the date ofthe accession of Pacorus. His attempt had, however, at that time failed, and for forty-one years he kept his pretensions in abeyance; but aboutA. D. 119 or 120 he appears to have again come forward, and to havedisputed the crown with Chosroes, or reigned contemporaneously withhim over some portion of the Parthian kingdom, till about A. D. 130, when--probably on the death of Chosroes--he was acknowledged as soleking by the entire nation. Such is the evidence of the coins, which inthis case are very peculiar, and bear the name of Volagases from firstto last. It seems to follow from them that Chosroes was succeeded, notby a son, but by a rival, an old claimant of the crown, who cannot havebeen much younger than Chosroes himself. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

_Reign of Volagases II. Invasion of the Alani. Communications betweenVolagases and Antoninus Pius. Death of Volagases II. And Accession ofVolagases III. Aggressive War of Volagases III. On Rome. Campaign ofA. D. 162. Verus sent to the East. Sequel of the War. Losses suffered byParthia. Death of Volagases III. _

Volagases II. Appears to have occupied the Parthian throne, after thedeath of Chosroes, for the space of nineteen years. His reign has ageneral character of tranquillity, which agrees well with the advancedperiod of life at which, according to the coins, he first becameactual king of Parthia. It was disturbed by only one actual outbreak ofhostilities, an occasion upon which Volagases stood upon the defensive;and on one other occasion was for a brief period threatened withdisturbance. Otherwise it seems to have been wholly peaceful. So faras appears, no pretenders troubled it. The coins show, for the yearsbetween A. D. 130 and A. D. 149, the head of but one monarch, a head of amarked type, which is impossible to be mistaken. [PLATE III. , Fig. 4. ]

The occasion upon which actual hostilities disturbed the repose ofVolagases was in A. D. 133, when, by the intrigues of Pharasmanes, king of the Iberians, a great horde of Alani from the tract beyond theCaucasus was induced to pour itself through the passes of that mountainchain upon the territories of both the Parthians and the RomansPharasmanes had previously shown contempt for the power of Rome byrefusing to pay court to Hadrian, when, in A. D. 130, he invited themonarchs of Western Asia generally to a conference. He had also, itwould seem, been insulted by Hadrian, who, when Pharasmanes sent him anumber of cloaks made of cloth-of-gold, employed them in the adornmentof three hundred convicts condemned to furnish sport to the Romans inthe amphitheatre. What quarrel he had with the Parthians we are nottold; but it is related that at his instigation the savage Alani, introduced within the mountain barrier, poured at one and the same timeinto Media Atropatene, which was a dependency of Parthia; intoArmenia, which was under Parthamaspates; and into the Roman province ofCappadocia. Volagases sent an embassy to Rome complaining of the conductof Pharasmanes, who appears to have been regarded as ruling under Romanprotection; and that prince was summoned to Rome in order to answer forhis conduct. But the Alanian inroad had to be dealt with at once. The Roman governor of Cappadocia, who was Arrian, the historian ofAlexander, by a mere display of force drove the barbarians from hisprovince. Volagases showed a tamer spirit; he was content to follow anexample, often set in the East, and already in one instance imitated byRome, but never adopted by any nation as a settled policy without fatalconsequences, and to buy at a high price the retreat of the invaders. 

It was to have been expected that Rome would have punished severely theguilt of Pharasmanes in exposing the Empire and its allies to horrorssuch as always accompany the inroads of a barbarous people. But thoughthe Iberian monarch was compelled to travel to Rome and make hisappearance before the Emperor's tribunal, yet Hadrian, so far frompunishing him, was induced to load him with benefits and honors. Hepermitted him to sacrifice in the Capitol, placed his equestrian statuein the temple of Bellona, and granted him an augmentation of territory. Volagases can scarcely have been pleased at these results of hiscomplaints; he bore them, however, without murmuring, and, when (in A. D. 138) Hadrian died and was succeeded by his adopted son, T. Aurelius, better known as Antoninus Pius, Volagases sent to Rome an embassy ofcongratulation, and presented the new monarch with a crown of gold. 

It was probably at this same time that he ventured to make an unpleasantdemand. Hadrian had promised that the golden throne which Trajan hadcaptured, in his expedition, and by which the Parthians set so muchstore, should be surrendered to them; but this promise he had failed toperform. Volagases appears to have thought that his successor mightbe more facile, and accordingly instructed his envoys to re-open thesubject, to remind Antoninus of the pledged faith of his adopted father, and to make a formal request for the delivery of the valued relic. Antoninus, however, proved as obdurate as Hadrian. He was not to bepersuaded by any argument to give back the trophy; and the envoys hadto return with the report that their representations upon the point hadbeen in vain, and had wholly failed to move the new Emperor. 

The history of Volagases II. Ends with this transaction. No events areassignable to the last ten years of his reign, which was probably aseason of profound repose, in the East as it was in the West--a periodhaving (as our greatest historian observes of it) "the rare advantageof furnishing very few materials for history, " which is, indeed (ashe says), "little more than the register of the crimes, follies, andmisfortunes of mankind. " The influence of Rome extended beyond hisborders. As in modern times it has become a proverb that when aparticular European nation is satisfied the peace of the world isassured, so in the days whereof we are treating it would seem thatRome had only to desire repose, for the surrounding nations to findthemselves tranquil. The inference appears to be that not only were thewars which occurred between Rome and her neighbors for the mostpart stirred up by herself, but that even the civil commotions whichdisturbed States upon her borders had very generally their origin inRoman intrigues, which, skilfully concealed from view, neverthelessdirected the course of affairs in surrounding States, and roused inthem, when Rome thought her interests required it, civil differences, disorders, and contentions. 

The successor of Volagasos II. Was Volagases III. , who was most probablyhis son, although of this there is no direct evidence. The Parthiancoins show that Volagases III. Ascended the throne in A. D. 148 or 149, and reigned till A. D. 190 or 191--a space of forty-two years. We mayassume that he was a tolerably young man at his accession, though theeffigy upon his earliest coins is well bearded, and that he was somewhattired of the long inactivity which had characterized the period of hisfather's rule. He seems very early to have meditated a war with Rome, and to have taken certain steps which betrayed his intentions; but, upontheir coming to the knowledge of Antoninus, and that prince writing tohim on the subject, Volagases altered his plans, and resolved to wait, at any rate, until a change of Emperor at Rome should give him achance of taking the enemy at a disadvantage. Thus it was not till A. D. 161--twelve years after his accession--that his original design wascarried out, and the flames of war were once more lighted in the East tothe ruin and desolation of the fairest portion of Western Asia. 

The good Antoninus was succeeded in the spring of A. D. 161 by hisadopted son, Marcus Aurelius, who at once associated with him in thegovernment the other adopted son of Antoninus, Lucius Verus. Upon this, thinking that the opportunity for which he had been so long waiting hadat last arrived, Volagases marched his troops suddenly into Armenia, expelled Sosemus, the king protected by the Romans, and established inhis place a certain Tigranes, a scion of the old royal stock, whom theArmenians regarded as their rightful monarch. News of this boldstroke soon reached the governors of the adjacent Roman provinces, and Severianus, prefect of Cappadocia, a Gaul by birth, incited bythe predictions of a pseudo-prophet of those parts, named Alexander, proceeded at the head of a legion into the adjoining kingdom, in thehope of crushing the nascent insurrection and punishing at once theArmenian rebels and their Parthian supporters. Scarcely, however, hadhe crossed the Euphrates, when he found himself confronted by anoverwhelming force, commanded by a Parthian called Chosroes, and wascompelled to throw himself into the city of Elegeia, where he wasimmediately surrounded and besieged. Various tales were told of hisconduct under these circumstances, and of the fate which overtook himthe most probable account being that after holding out for three dayshe and his troops were assailed on all sides, and, after a braveresistance, were shot down almost to a man. The Parthians then crossedthe Euphrates, and carried fire and sword through Syria. AttidiusCornelianus, the proconsul, having ventured to oppose them, wasrepulsed. Vague thoughts of flying to arms and shaking off the Romanyoke possessed the minds of the Syrians, and threatened to lead to someovert act. The Parthians passed through Syria into Palestine, and almostthe whole East seemed to lie open to their incursions. When these factswere reported at Rome, it was resolved to send Lucius Verus to the East. He was of an age to undergo the hardships of campaigning, and thereforebetter fitted than Marcus Aurelius to undertake the conduct of a greatwar. But, as his military talent was distrusted, it was considerednecessary to place at his disposal a number of the best Roman generalsof the time, whose services he might use while he claimed as his owntheir successes. Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and Martius Verus, were the most important of these officers; and it was by them, and notby Verus himself, that the military operations were, in fact, conducted. It was not till late in the year A. D. 162 that Verus, having withreluctance torn himself from Italy, appeared, with his lieutenants, upon the scene in Syria, and, after vainly offering them terms ofpeace, commenced hostilities against the triumphant Parthians. The youngEmperor did not adventure his own person in the field, but stationedhimself at Antioch, where he could enjoy the pleasures and amusements ofa luxurious capital, while he committed to his lieutenants the task ofrecovering Syria and Armenia, and of chastising the invaders. AvidiusCassius, to whom the Syrian legions were entrusted, had a hard task tobring them into proper discipline after their long period of inaction, but succeeded after a while by the use of almost unexampled severities. Attacked by Volagases within the limits of his province, he made asuccessful defence, and in a short time was able to take the offensive, to defeat Volagases in a great battle near Europus, and (A. D. 163) todrive the Parthians across the Euphrates. The Armenian war was at thesame time being pressed by Statius Priscus, who advanced without a checkfrom the frontier to the capital, Artaxata, which he took and (as itseems) destroyed. He then built a new city, which he strongly garrisonedwith Roman troops, and sent intelligence of his successes to Rome, whither Soaemus, the expelled monarch, had betaken himself. Soasmus wasupon this replaced on the Armenian throne, the task of settling him inthe government being deputed to a certain Thucydides, by whose efforts, together with those of Martius Verus, all opposition to the restoredmonarch was suppressed, and the entire country tranquillized. 

Rome had thus in the space of two years recovered her losses, and shownParthia that she was still well able to maintain the position in WesternAsia which she had acquired by the victories of Trajan. But such ameasure of success did not content the ambitious generals into whosehands the incompetence of Verus had thrown the real direction of thewar. Military distinction at this time offered to a Roman a path to thevery highest honors, each successful general becoming at once by forceof his position a candidate for the Imperial dignity. Of the variousable officers employed under Verus, the most distinguished and the mostambitious was Cassius--a chief who ultimately raised the standard ofrevolt against Aurelius, and lost his life in consequence. Cassius, after he had succeeded in clearing Syria of the invaders, was madeby Aurelius a sort of generalissimo; and being thus free to act as hechose, determined to carry the war into the enemy's country, and totry if he could not rival, or outdo, the exploits of Trajan fifty yearspreviously. Though we have no continuous narrative of his expedition, wemay trace its course with tolerable accuracy in the various fragmentarywritings which bear upon the history of the time--from Zeugma, whenhe crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, to Nicephorium, near thejunction of the Belik with the Euphrates; and thence down the course ofthe stream to Sura (Sippara?) and Babylon. At Sura a battle was fought, in which the Romans were victorious; and then the final efforts weremade, which covered Cassius with glory. The great city of Seleucia, upon the Tigris, which had a population of 400, 000 souls, was besieged, taken, and burnt, to punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants. Ctesiphon, upon the opposite side of the stream, was occupied, and thesummer palace of Volagases there situated was levelled with the ground. The various temples were plundered; secret places, where it was thoughttreasure might be hid, were examined, and a rich booty was carried offby the invaders. The Parthians, worsted in every encounter, ceased toresist; and all the conquests made by Trajan were recovered. Nor wasthis all. The Roman general, after conquering the Mesopotamian plain, advanced into the Zagros mountains, and occupied, at any rate, a portionof Media, thereby entitling his Imperial masters to add to the titlesof "Armeniacus, " and "Parthicus, " which they had already assumed, thefurther and wholly novel title of "Medicus. "

But Rome was not to escape the Nemesis which is wont to pursue theover-fortunate. During the stay of the army in Babylonia a diseasewas contracted of a strange and terrible character, whereto thesuperstitious fears of the soldiers assigned a supernatural origin. Thepestilence, they said, had crept forth from a subterranean cell in thetemple of Comsean Apollo at Seleucia, which those who were plunderingthe town rashly opened in the hope of its containing treasure, but whichheld nothing except this fearful scourge, placed there in primeval timesby the spells of the Chaldaeans. Such a belief, however fanciful, wascalculated to increase the destructive-power of the malady, and so tomultiply its victims. Vast numbers of the soldiers perished, we aretold, from its effects during the march homeward; their sufferings beingfurther aggravated by the failure of supplies, which was such that; manydied of famine. The stricken army, upon entering the Roman territory, communicated the infection to the inhabitants, and the return of Verusand his troops to Rome was a march of Death through the provinces. Thepestilence raged with special force throughout Italy, and spread as faras the Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean. According to one writer more thanone half of the entire population, and almost the whole Roman army, wascarried off by it. 

But though Rome suffered in consequence of the war, its general resultwas undoubtedly disadvantageous to the Parthians. The expeditionof Cassius was the first invasion of Parthia in which Rome hadbeen altogether triumphant. Trajan's campaign had brought about thesubmission of Armenia to the Romans; but it did not permanently depriveParthia of any portion of her actual territory. And the successes ofthe Emperor in his advance were almost balanced by the disasters whichaccompanied his retreat--disasters so serious as to cause a generalbelief that Hadrian's concessions sprang more from prudence than fromgenerosity. The war of Verus produced the actual cession to Rome of aParthian province, which continued thenceforth for centuries to be anintegral portion of the Roman Empire. Western Mesopotamia, or the tractbetween the Euphrates and the Khabour, passed under the dominion of Romeat this time; and, though not reduced to the condition of a province, was none the less lost to Parthia, and absorbed by Rome into herterritory. Parthia, moreover, was penetrated by the Roman arms moredeeply at this time than she had ever been previously, and was made tofeel, as she had never felt before, that in contending with Rome she wasfighting a losing battle. It added to the disgrace of her defeats, andto her own sense of their decisive character, that they were inflictedby a mere general, a man of no very great eminence, and one who was farfrom possessing the free command of those immense resources which Romehad at her disposal. 

Parthia had now, in fact, entered upon the third stage of her decline. The first was reached when she ceased to be an aggressive and wascontent to become a stationary power; the second set in when she beganto lose territory by the revolt of her own subjects; the third--whichcommences at this point--is marked by her inability to protect herselffrom the attacks of a foreign assailant. The causes of her decline werevarious. Luxury had no doubt done its ordinary work upon the conquerorsof rich and highly-civilized regions, softening down their originalferocity, and rendering them at once less robust in frame and less boldand venturesome in character. 

The natural law of exhaustion, which sooner or later affects allraces of any distinction, may also not improbably have come into play, rendering the Parthians of the age of Verus very degenerate descendantsof those who displayed such brilliant qualities when they contended withCrassus and Mark Antony. Loyalty towards the monarch, and the absolutedevotion of every energy to his service, which characterized, theearlier times, dwindled and disappeared as the succession becamemore and more disputed, and the kings less worthy of their subjects'admiration. The strength needed against foreign enemies was, moreover, frequently expended in civil broils; the spirit of patriotism declined;and tameness under insult and indignity took the place of that fiercepride and fiery self-assertion which had once characterized the people. 

The war with Rome terminated in the year A. D. 165. Volagases survivedits close for at least twenty-five years; but he did not venture at anytime to renew the struggle, or to make any effort for the recovery ofhis lost territory. Once only does he appear to have contemplated anoutbreak. When, about the year A. D. 174 or 175, Aurelius being occupiedin the west with repelling the attacks of the wild tribes upon theDanube, Avidius Cassius assumed the purple in Syria, and a civil warseemed to be imminent, Volagases appears to have shown an intention ofonce more taking arms and trying his fortune. A Parthian war was at thistime expected to break out by the Romans. But the crisis passed withoutan actual explosion. The promptness of Aurelius, who, on hearing thenews, at once quitted the Danube and marched into Syria, together withthe rapid collapse of the Cassian revolt, rendered it imprudent forVolagases to persist in his project. He therefore laid aside all thoughtof renewing hostilities with Rome; and, on the arrival of Aureliusin Syria, sent ambassadors to him with friendly assurances, who werereceived favorably by the philosophic Emperor. 

Four years after this Marcus Aurelius died, and was succeeded in thepurple by his youthful son, Lucius Aurelius Commodus. It might have beenexpected that the accession of this weak and inexperienced prince wouldhave induced Volagases to resume his warlike projects, and attempt therecovery of Mesopotamia. But the scanty history of the time whichhas come down to us shows no trace of his having entertained any suchdesign. He had probably reached the age at which repose becomes adistinct object of desire, and is infinitely preferred to activeexertion. At any rate, it is clear that he made no effort. The reignof Gommodus was from first to last untroubled by Oriental disturbance. Volgases III. Was for ten years contemporary with this mean andunwarlike prince; but Rome was allowed to retain her Parthian conquestsunmolested. At length, in A. D. 190 or 191, Volagases died, 56 and thedestinies of Parthia passed into the hands of a new monarch. 

CHAPTER XX. 

_Accession of Volagases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescennius Niger, Part taken by Parthia in the Contest between Niger and Severus, Mesopotamia revolts from Rome. First Eastern Expedition of Severus. ItsResults. Second Expedition. Successes of Severus. His Failure at Hatra. General Results of the War. Death of Volagases IV. _

On the death of Volagases III. , in A. D. 190 or 191, the Parthian crownfell to another prince of the same name, who was probably the eldest sonof the late monarch. This prince was scarcely settled upon the thronewhen the whole of Western Asia was violently disturbed by the commotionswhich shook the Roman Empire after the murder of Commodus. Thevirtuous Pertinax was allowed to reign but three months (A. D. 193, January--March). His successor was scarcely proclaimed when in threedifferent quarters the legionaries rose in arms, and, saluting theircommanders as "Emperors, " invested them with the purple. ClodiusAlbinus, in Britain; Severus, in Pannonia; and Pescennius Niger, inSyria, at one and the same time claimed the place which the wretchedJulianus had bought, and prepared themselves to maintain their rightsagainst all who should impugn them. It seems that, on the firstproclamation of Niger, and before it had become evident that he wouldhave to establish his authority by force of arms, either the Parthianmonarch, or at any rate princes who were among his dependants, sentto congratulate the new Emperor on his accession and to offer himcontingents of troops, if he required them. These spontaneous proposalswere at the first politely declined, since Niger expected to findhimself accepted joyfully as sovereign, and did not look to haveto engage in war. When, however, the news reached him that he hadformidable competitors, and that Severus, acknowledged Emperor at Rome, was about to set out for the East, at the head of vast forces, he sawthat it would be necessary for him, if he were to make head against hispowerful rival, to draw together troops from all quarters. Accordingly, towards the close of A. D. 193, he sent envoys to the princes beyond theEuphrates, and especially to the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Hatra, entreating them to send their troops at once to his aid. Volagases, under these circumstances, appears to have hesitated. He sent an answerthat he would issue orders to his satraps for the collection of a force, but made no haste to redeem his promise, and in fact refrained fromdespatching any body of distinctly Parthian troops to the assistance ofNiger in the impending struggle. 

While, however, thus abstaining from direct interference in the contestbetween the two Roman pretenders, Volagases appears to have allowed oneof his dependent monarchs to mix himself up in the quarrel. Hatra, atthis time the capital of an Arabian community, and the chief city ofcentral Mesopotamia (or the tract between the Sinjar and the Babylonianalluvium), was a dependency of Parthia, and though, like so many otherParthian dependencies, it possessed its native kings, cannot have beenin a position to engage in a great war without permission from theCourt of Ctesiphon. When, therefore, we find that Barsemius, the Kingof Hatra, not only received the envoys of Niger favorably, but actuallysent to his aid a body of archers, we must understand that Volagasessanctioned the measure. Probably he thought it prudent to secure thefriendship of the pretender whom he expected to be successful, butsought to effect this in the way that would compromise him least if theresult of the struggle should be other than he looked for. The sendingof his own troops to the camp of Niger would have committed himirretrievably; but the actions of a vassal monarch might with someplausibility be disclaimed. 

As the struggle between the two pretenders progressed in the earlymonths of A. D. 194, the nations beyond the Euphrates grew bolder, and allowed themselves to indulge their natural feelings of hostilitytowards the Romans. The newly subjected Mesopotamians flew to arms, massacred most of the Roman detachments stationed about their country, and laid siege to Nisibis, which since the cession Rome had made herhead-quarters. The natives of the region were assisted by their kindredraces across the Tigris, particularly by the people of Adiabene, who, like the Arabs of Hatra, were Parthian vassals. Severus had no soonerovercome his rival and slain him, than he hastened eastward with theobject of relieving the troops shut up in Nisibis, and of chastising therebels and their abettors. It was in vain that the Mesopotamians soughtto disarm his resentment by declaring that they had taken up arms in hiscause, and had been only anxious to distress and injure the partisans ofhis antagonist. Though they sent ambassadors to him with presents, andoffered to make restitution of the Roman spoil still in their hands, and of the Roman prisoners, it was observed that they said nothing aboutrestoring the strongholds which they had taken, or resuming the positionof Roman tributaries. On the contrary, they required that all Romansoldiers still in their country should be withdrawn from it, and thattheir independence should henceforth be respected. As Severus was notinclined to surrender Roman territory without a contest, war was at oncedeclared. His immediate adversaries were of no great account, being, asthey were, the petty kings of Osrhoene, Adiabene, and Hatra; but behindthem loomed the massive form of the Parthian State, which was attackedthrough them, and could not be indifferent to their fortunes. 

In the spring of A. D. 195, Severus, at the head of his troops, crossedthe Euphrates in person, and taking up his own quarters at Nisibis, which the Mesopotamians had been unable to capture, proceeded to employhis generals in the reduction of the rebels and the castigation oftheir aiders and abettors. Though his men suffered considerably from thescarcity and badness of the water, yet he seems to have found no greatdifficulty in reducing Mesopotamia once more into subjection. Havingbrought it completely under, and formally made Nisibis the capital, atthe same time raising it to the dignified position of a Roman colony, he caused his troops to cross the Tigris into Adiabene, and, thoughthe inhabitants offered a stout resistance, succeeded in making himselfmaster of the country. The Parthian monarch seems to have made no effortto prevent the occupation of this province. He stood probably on thedefensive, expecting to be attacked, in or near his capital. But Severuscould not afford to remain in these remote regions. He had still a rivalin the West in the person of Clodius Albinus, who might be expected todescend upon Italy, if it were left exposed to his attacks much longer. He therefore quitted the East early in A. D. 196, and returned to Romewith all speed, leaving Parthia very insufficiently chastised, and hisnew conquests very incompletely settled. 

Scarcely was he gone when the war broke out with greater violence thanever. Volagases took the offensive, recovered Adiabene, and crossing theTigris into Mesopotamia, swept the Romans from the open country. Nisibis alone, which two years before had defied all the efforts of theMesopotamians, held out against him, and even this stronghold waswithin a little of being taken. According to one writer, the triumphantParthians even crossed the Euphrates, and once more spread themselvesover the fertile plains of Syria. Severus was forced in A. D. 197 to makea second Eastern expedition to recover his lost glory and justify thetitles which he had taken. On his first arrival in Syria, he contentedhimself with expelling the Parthians from the province, nor was it tilllate in the year, that, having first made ample preparation, he crossedthe Euphrates into Mesopotamia. 

The success of any expedition against Parthia depended greatly on thedispositions of the semi-dependent princes, who possessed territoriesbordering upon those of the two great empires. Among these the mostimportant were at this time the kings of Armenia and Osrhoene. Armeniahad at the period of Niger's attempt been solicited by his emissaries;but its monarch had then refused to take any part in the civil conflict. Subsequently, however, he in some way offended Severus who, when hereached the East, regarded Armenia as a hostile State requiring instantsubjugation. It seems to have been in the summer of A. D. 197, soon afterhis first arrival in Syria, that Severus despatched a force against theArmenian prince, who was named (like the Parthian monarch of the time)Volagases. That prince mustered his troops and met the invaders at thefrontier of his kingdom. A battle seemed imminent; but ere the fortuneof war was tried the Armenian made an application for a truce, whichwas granted by the Roman leaders. A breathing-space being thus gained, Volagases sent ambassadors with presents and hostages to the Romanemperor in Syria, professed to be animated by friendly feelings towardsRome, and entreated Severus to allow him terms of peace. Severuspermitted himself to be persuaded; a formal treaty was made, and theArmenian prince even received an enlargement of his previous territoryat the hands of his mollified suzerain. 

The Osrhoenian monarch, who bore the usual name of Abgarus, made a morecomplete and absolute submission. He came in person into the emperor'scamp, accompanied by a numerous body of archers, and bringing withhim his sons as hostages. Severus must have hailed with especialsatisfaction the adhesion of this chieftain, which secured him theundisturbed possession of Western Mesopotamia as far as the junction ofthe Khabour with the Euphrates. It was his design to proceed himself bythe Euphrates route, while he sent detachments under other leadersto ravage Eastern Mesopotamia and Adiabene, which had evidentlybeen re-occupied by the Parthians. To secure his army from want, hedetermined, like Trajan, to build a fleet of ships in Upper Mesopotamia, where suitable timber abounded, and to march his army down the leftbank of the Euphrates into Babylonia, while his transports, laden withstores, descended the course of the river. In this way he reachedthe neighborhood of Ctesiphon without suffering any loss, and easilycaptured the two great cities of Babylon and Seleucia, which on hisapproach were evacuated by their garrisons. He then proceeded to theattack of Ctesiphon itself, passing his ships probably through one ofthe canals which united the Tigris with the Euphrates, or else (likeTrajan) conveying them on rollers across the neck of land whichseparates the two rivers. 

Volagases had taken up his own position at Ctesiphon, bent on defendinghis capital. It is possible that the approach of Severus by the line ofmarch which he pursued was unexpected, and that the sudden presence ofthe Romans before the walls of Ctesiphon came upon the Parthianmonarch as a surprise. He seems, at any rate, to have made but a poorresistance. It may be gathered, indeed, from one author that he met theinvaders in the open field, and fought a battle in defence of Ctesiphonbefore allowing himself to be shut up within its walls. But after thecity was once invested it appears to have been quickly taken. We hear ofno such resistance as that which was soon afterwards offered by Hatra. The soldiers of Severus succeeded in storming Ctesiphon on the firstassault; the Parthian monarch betook himself to flight, accompanied bya few horsemen; and the seat of empire thus fell easily--a secondtime within the space of eighty-two years--into the hands of a foreigninvader. The treatment of the city was such as we might expect fromthe ordinary character of Roman warfare. A general massacre of themale population was made. The soldiers wore allowed to plunder both thepublic and the private buildings at their pleasure. The precious metalsaccumulated in the royal treasury were seized, and the chief ornamentsof the palace were taken and carried off. Nor did blood and plundercontent the victors. After slaughtering the adult males they madeprize of the women and children, who were torn from their homes withoutcompunction and led into captivity, to the number of a hundred thousand. 

Notwithstanding the precautions which he had taken, Severus appearsto have become straitened for supplies about the time that he capturedCtesiphon. His soldiers were compelled for some days to exist on roots, which produced a dangerous dysentery. He found himself unable to pursueVolagases, and recognized the necessity of retreating before disasterovertook him. He could not, however, return by the route of theEuphrates, since his army had upon its advance completely exhausted theresources of the Euphrates region. The line of the Tigris was thereforepreferred for the retreat; and while the ships with difficulty madetheir way up the course of the stream, the army pursued its march uponthe banks, without, so far as appears, any molestation. It happened, however, that the route selected led Severus near to the small state ofHatra, which had given him special offence by supporting the causeof his rival, Niger; and it seemed to him of importance that theinhabitants should receive condign punishment for this act of audacity. He may also have hoped to eclipse the fame of Trajan by the capture of atown which had successfully resisted that hero. He therefore stoppedhis march in order to lay siege to the place, which he attacked withmilitary engines, and with all the other offensive means known at thetime to the Romans. His first attempt was, however, easily repulsed. The walls of the town were strong, its defenders brave and full ofenterprise. They burnt the siege-machines brought against them, andcommitted great havoc among the soldiers. Under these circumstancesdisorders broke out among the besiegers; mutinous words were heard;and the emperor thought himself compelled to have recourse to severemeasures of repression. Having put to death two of his chief officers, and then found it necessary to deny that he had given orders for theexecution of one of them, he broke up from before the place and removedhis camp to a distance. 

He had not, however, as yet relinquished the hope of bringing hisenterprise to a successful issue. In the security of his distant camphe constructed fresh engines in increased numbers, collected an abundantsupply of provisions, and made every preparation for renewing the siegewith effect at no remote period. The treasures stored up in thecity were reported to be great, especially those which the piety ofsuccessive generations had accumulated in the Temple of the Sun. Thisrich booty appealed forcibly to the cupidity of the emperor, while hishonor seemed to require that he should not suffer a comparativelypetty town to defy his arms with impunity. He, therefore, after a shortabsence retraced his steps, and appeared a second time before Hatrawitha stronger siege-train and a better appointed army than before. But theHatreni met his attack with a resolution equal to his own. They wereexcellent archers; they possessed a powerful force of cavalry; they knewtheir walls to be strong; and they were masters of a peculiar kindof fire, which was calculated to terrify and alarm, if not greatly toinjure, an enemy unacquainted with its qualities. Severus once morelost almost all his machines; the Hatrene cavalry severely handled hisforagers; his men for a long time made but little impression upon thewalls, while they suffered grievously from the enemy's slingers andarchers, from his warlike engines, and especially, we are told, fromthe fiery darts which were rained upon them incessantly. However, afterenduring these various calamities for a length of time, the perseveranceof the Romans was rewarded by the formation of a practicable breachin the outer wall; and the soldiers demanded to be led to the assault, confident in their power to force an entrance and carry the place. Butthe emperor resisted their inclination. He did not wish that the cityshould be stormed, since in that case it must have been given up toindiscriminate pillage, and the treasures which he coveted would havebecome the prey of the soldiery. The Hatreni, he thought, would maketheir submission, if he only gave them a little time, now that theymust see further resistance to be hopeless. He waited therefore a day, expecting an offer of surrender. But the Hatreni made no sign, and inthe night restored their wall where it had been broken down. 

Severus then made up his mind to sacrifice the treasures on which hisheart had been set, and, albeit with reluctance, gave the word for theassault. But now the legionaries refused. They had been forbidden toattack when success was certain and the danger trivial--they werenow required to imperil their lives while the result could not but bedoubtful. Perhaps they divined the emperor's motive in withholding themfrom the assault, and resented it; at any rate they openly declined toexecute his orders. After a vain attempt to force an entrance by meansof his Asiatic allies, Severus desisted from his undertaking. The summerwas far advanced the heat was great; disease had broken out among histroops; above all, they had become demoralized, and their obediencecould no longer be depended on. Severus broke up from before Hatra asecond time, after having besieged it for twenty days, and returned--bywhat route we are not told--into Syria. 

Nothing is more surprising in the history of this campaign than theinaction and apparent apathy of the Parthians. Volagases, after quittinghis capital, seems to have made no effort at all to hamper or harasshis adversary. The prolonged resistance of Hatra, the sufferings of theRomans, their increasing difficulties with respect to provisions, the injurious effect of the summer heats upon their unacclimatizedconstitutions, would have been irresistible temptations to a prince ofany spirit or energy, inducing him to advance as the Romans retired, to hang upon their rear, to cut off their supplies, and to render theirretreat difficult, if not disastrous. Volagases appears to haveremained wholly inert and passive. His conduct is only explicable by theconsideration of the rapid decline which Parthia was now undergoing, ofthe general decay of patriotic spirit, and the sea of difficulties intowhich a monarch was plunged who had to retreat before an invader. 

The expedition of Severus was on the whole glorious for Rome, anddisastrous for Parthia, though the glory of the victor was tarnishedat the close by his failure before Hatra. It cost Parthia a secondprovince. The Roman emperor not only recovered his previous position inMesopotamia, but overstepping the Tigris, established the Romandominion firmly in the fertile tract between that stream and the Zagrosmountain-range. The title of "Adiabenicus" became no empty boast. Adiabene, or the tract between the Zab rivers--probably including atthis time the entire low region at the foot of Zagros from the easternKhabour on the north to the Adhem towards the south--passed underthe dominion of Rome, the monarch of the country, hitherto a Parthianvassal, becoming her tributary. Thus the imperial standards were plantedpermanently at a distance less than a degree from the Parthiancapital, which, with the great cities of Seleucia and Babylon in itsneighborhood, was exposed to be captured almost at any moment by asudden and rapid inroad. 

Volagases survived his defeat by Severus about ten or eleven years. For this space Parthian history is once more a blank, our authoritiescontaining no notice that directly touches Parthia during the period inquestion. The stay of Severus in the East during the years A. D. 200 and201, would seem to indicate that the condition of the Oriental provinceswas unsettled and required the presence of the Imperator. But we hearof no effort made by Parthia at this time to recover her losses--ofno further collision between her troops and those of Rome; and we mayassume therefore that peace was preserved, and that the Parthian monarchacquiesced, however unwillingly, in the curtailment of his territory. Probably internal, no less than external, difficulties pressed upon him. The diminution of Parthian prestige which had been brought about by thesuccessive victories of Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Severus must haveloosened the ties which bound to Parthia the several vassal kingdoms. Her suzerainty had been accepted as that of the Asiatic nation mostcompetent to make head against European intruders, and secure the nativeraces in continued independence of a wholly alien power. It may wellhave appeared at this time to the various vassal states that theParthian vigor had become _effete_, that the qualities which hadadvanced the race to the leadership of Western Asia were gone, and thatunless some new power could be raised up to act energetically againstRome, the West would obtain complete dominion over the East, and Asiabe absorbed into Europe. Thoughts of this kind, fermenting among thesubject populations, would produce a general debility, a want both ofpower and of inclination to make any combined effort, a desire to waituntil an opportunity of acting with effect should offer. Hence probablythe deadness and apathy which characterize this period, and which seemat first sight so astonishing. Distrust of their actual leader paralyzedthe nations of Western Asia, and they did not as yet see their wayclearly towards placing themselves under any other guidance. 

Volagases IV. Reigned till A. D. 208-9, dying thus about two years beforehis great adversary, who expired at York, February 4, A. D. 211. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

_Struggle between the two Sons of Volagases IV. , Volagases V. And Artabanus. Continued Sovereignty of both Princes. Ambition ofCaracallus. His Proceedings in the East. His Resolve to quarrelwith Parthia. First Proposal made by him to Artabanus. Perplexityof Artabanus. Caracallus invades Parthia. His Successes, and Death. Macrinus, defeated by Artabanus, consents to Terms of Peace. Revolt ofthe Persians under Artaxerxes. Prolonged Struggle. Death of Artabanus, and Downfall of the Parthian Empire. _

On the death of Volagases IV. , the Parthian crown was disputed betweenhis two sons, Artabanus and Volagases. According to the classicalwriters, the contest resulted in favor of the former, whom they regardas undisputed sovereign of the Parthians, at any rate from the yearA. D. 216. It appears, however, from the Parthian coins, that both thebrothers claimed and exercised sovereignty during the entire termof seventeen or eighteen years which intervened between the death ofVolagases IV. And the revolt of the Persians. Artabanus must beyond alldoubt have acquired the sole rule in the western portions of the empire, since (from A. D. 216 to A. D. 226) he was the only monarch known to theRomans. But Volagases may at the same time have been recognized in themore eastern provinces, and may have maintained himself in power inthose remote regions without interfering with his brother's dominion inthe West. Still this division of the empire must naturally have tendedto weaken it; and the position of Volagases has to be taken into accountin estimating the difficulties under which the last monarch of theArsacid series found himself placed--difficulties to which, after astruggle, he was at last forced to succumb. Domestic dissension, warswith a powerful neighbor (Rome), and internal disaffection and rebellionformed a combination, against which the last Parthian monarch, albeit aman of considerable energy, strove in vain. But he strove bravely; andthe closing scenes of the empire, in which he bore the chief part, arenot unworthy of its best and palmiest days. 

An actual civil war appears to have raged between the two brothers forsome years. Caracallus, who in A. D. 211 succeeded his father, Severus, as Emperor of Rome, congratulated the Senate in A. D. 212 on the strifestill going on in Parthia, which could not fail (he said) to inflictserious injury on that hostile state. The balance of advantage seems atfirst to have inclined towards Volagases, whom Caracallus acknowledgedas monarch of Parthia in the year A. D. 215. But soon after this thefortune of war must have turned; for subsequently to the year A. D. 215, we hear nothing more of Volagases, but find Caracallus negotiating withArtabanus instead, and treating with him as undisputed monarch of theentire Parthian empire. That this was not his real position, appearsfrom the coins; but the classical evidence may be accepted as showingthat from the year A. D. 216, Volagases ceased to have much power, sinking from the rank of a rival monarch into that of a mere pretender, who may have caused some trouble to the established sovereign, but didnot inspire serious alarm. 

Artabanus, having succeeded in reducing his brother to this condition, and obtained a general acknowledgment of his claims, found himselfalmost immediately in circumstances of much difficulty. From the momentof his accession, Caracallus had exhibited an inordinate ambition; andthis ambition had early taken the shape of a special desire for theglory of Oriental conquests. The weak and dissolute son of Severusfancied himself, and called himself, a second Alexander; and thus he wasin honor bound to imitate that hero's marvellous exploits. The extensionof the Roman territory towards the East became very soon his greatobject, and he shrank from no steps, however base and dishonorable, which promised to conduce towards the accomplishment of his wishes. Asearly as A. D. 212 he summoned Abgarus, the tributary king of Osrhoene, into his presence, and when he unsuspectingly complied, seized him, threw him into prison, and declaring his territories forfeited, reduced them into the form of a Roman province. Successful in this boldproceeding, he attempted to deal with Armenia in the same way; but, though the monarch fell foolishly into the trap set for him, the nationwas not so easily managed. The Armenians flew to arms on learningthe imprisonment of their king and royal family; and when, three yearafterwards (A. D. 215), Caracallus sent a Roman army under Theocritus, one of his favorites, to chastise them, they inflicted a severe defeaton their assailant. But the desire of Caracallus to effect Orientalconquests was increased, rather than diminished, by this occurrence. Hehad sought a quarrel with Parthia as early as A. D. 214, when he demandedof Volagases the surrender of two refugees of distinction. The rupture, which he courted, was deferred by the discreditable compliance of theGreat King with his requisition. 

Volagases surrendered the two unfortunates; and the Roman Emperor wascompelled to declare himself satisfied with the concession. But a yearhad not elapsed before he had devised a new plan of attack and proceededto put it in execution. 

Volagases V. Was about this time compelled to yield the western capitalto his brother; and Artabanus IV. Became the representative of Parthianpower in the eyes of the Romans. Caracallus in the summer of A. D. 215, having transferred his residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, sentambassadors from the last-named place to Artabanus, who were to presentthe Parthian monarch with presents of unusual magnificence, and to makehim an unheard-of proposition. "The Roman Emperor, " said the despatchwith which they were intrusted, "could not fitly wed the daughter of asubject or accept the position of son-in-law to a private person. Noone could be a suitable wife to him who was not a princess. " He thereforeasked the Parthian monarch for the hand of his daughter. Rome andParthia divided between them the sovereignty of the world; united, asthey would be by this marriage, no longer recognizing any boundary asseparating them, they would constitute a power that could not but beirresistible. It would be easy for them to reduce under their sway allthe barbarous races on the skirts of their empires, and to hold them insubjection by a flexible system of administration and government. TheRoman infantry was the best in the world, and in steady hand-to-handfighting must be allowed to be unrivalled. The Parthians surpassed allnations in the number of their cavalry and in the excellency of theirarchers. If these advantages, instead of being separated, were combined, and the various elements on which success in war depends were thusbrought into harmonious union, there could be no difficulty inestablishing and maintaining a universal monarchy. Were that done, the Parthian spices and rare stuffs, as also the Roman metals andmanufactures, would no longer need to be imported secretly and in smallquantities by merchants, but, as the two countries would form togetherbut one nation and one state, there would be a free interchange amongall the citizens of their various products and commodities. 

The recital of this despatch threw the Parthian monarch into extremeperplexity. He did not believe that the proposals made to him wereserious, or intended to have an honorable issue. The project broachedappeared to him altogether extravagant, and such as no one in his sensescould entertain for a moment. Yet he was anxious not to offend themaster of two-and-thirty legions, nor even to give him a pretext fora rupture of amicable relations. Accordingly he temporized, contentinghimself with setting forth some objections to the request of Caracallus, and asking to be excused compliance with it. "Such a union, asCaracallus proposed, could scarcely, " he said, "prove a happy one. Thewife and husband, differing in language, habits, and mode of life, could not but become estranged from one another. There was no lack ofpatricians at Rome, possessing daughters with whom the emperor mightwed as suitably as the Parthian kings did with the females of their ownroyal house. It was not fit that either family should sully its blood bymixture with the other. "

There is some doubt whether Caracallus construed this response as anabsolute refusal, and thereupon undertook his expedition, or whether heregarded it as inviting further negotiation, and sent a second embassy, whose arguments and persuasions induced Artabanus to consent to theproposed alliance. The contemporary historian, Dio, states positivelythat Artabanus refused to give his daughter to the Roman monarch, andthat Caracallus undertook his expedition to avenge this insult; butHerodian, another contemporary, declares exactly the reverse. Accordingto him, the Roman Emperor, on receiving the reply of Artabanus, sent anew embassy to urge his suit, and to protest with oaths that he wasin earnest and had the most friendly intentions. Artabanus upon thisyielded, addressed Caracallus as his son-in-law, and invited him to comeand fetch home his bride. Herodian describes with much minuteness, and with a good deal of picturesque effect, the stately march of theImperial prince through the Parthian territory, the magnificent welcomewhich he received, and the peaceful meeting of the two kings in theplain before Ctesiphon, which was suddenly interrupted by the meditatedtreason of the crafty Roman. Taken at disadvantage, the Parthianmonarch with difficulty escaped, while his soldiers and other subjects, incapable of making any resistance, were slaughtered like sheep by theirassailants, who then plundered and ravaged the Parthian territory attheir will, and returned laden with spoil into Mesopotamia. In general, Dio is a more trustworthy authority than Herodian, and most moderns havetherefore preferred his version of the story. But it may be questionedwhether in this particular case the truth has not been best preservedby the historian on whom under ordinary circumstances we place lessdependence. If so disgraceful an outrage as that described by Herodianwas, indeed, committed by the head of the Roman State on a foreignpotentate, Dio, as a great State official, would naturally be anxiousto gloss it over. There are, moreover, internal difficulties in hisnarrative; and on more than one point of importance he contradicts notonly Herodian, but also Spartianus. It is therefore not improbable thatHerodian has given with most truth the general outline of the expeditionof Caracallus, though, with that love of effect which characterizes him, he may have unduly embellished the narrative. 

The advance of Caracallus was, if Spartianus is to be believed, throughBabylonia. The return may have been (as Dio seems to indicate that itwas) by the way of the Tigris, through Adiabene and Upper Mesopotamia. It was doubtless on the return that Caracallus committed a second andwholly wanton outrage upon the feelings of his adversary, by violatingthe sanctity of the Parthian royal sepulchres, and dispersing theircontents to the four winds. These tombs were situated at Arbela, inAdiabene, a place which seems to have been always regarded as in somesort a City of the Dead. The useless insult and impiety were worthy ofone who, like Caracallus, was "equally devoid of judgment and humanity, "and who has been pronounced by the most unimpassioned of historiansto have been "the common enemy of mankind. " A severe reckoning wasafterwards exacted for the indignity, which was felt by the Parthianswith all the keenness wherewith Orientals are wont to regard anyinfringement of the sanctity of the grave. 

Caracallus appears to have passed the winter at Edessa, amusing himselfwith hunting and charioteering after the fatigues of his campaign. Inthe spring he threatened another advance into Parthian territory, andthrew the Medes and Parthians into great alarm. He had not, however, theopportunity of renewing his attack. On April 8, A. D. 217, having quittedEdessa with a small retinue for the purpose of visiting a famous templeof the Moon-God near Carrhaa, he was surprised and murdered on the wayby Julius Martialis, one of his guards. His successor, Macrinus, thougha Praetorian prefect, was no soldier, and would willingly have retiredat once from the war. But the passions of the Parthians had been roused. Artahanus possessed the energy and spirit which most of the recentmonarchs had lacked; and though defeated when taken at disadvantage, andunable for some months to obtain any revenge, had employed the winterin the collection of a vast army, and was determined to exact a heavyretribution for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the wantonimpiety of Arbela. He had already taken the field and conducted histroops to the neighborhood of the Roman frontier when Caracallus losthis life. Macrinus was scarcely acknowledged emperor when he found thatthe Parthians were close at hand, that the frontier was crossed, andthat unless a treaty could be concluded he must risk a battle. 

Under these circumstances the unwarlike emperor hurriedly, sentambassadors to the Parthian camp, with an offer to restore all theprisoners made in the late campaign as the price of peace. Artabanusunhesitatingly rejected the overture, but at the same time informed hisadversary of the terms on which he was willing to treat. Macrinus, hesaid, must not only restore the prisoners, but must also consent torebuild all the towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, must make compensation for the injury done to the tombs of the kings, and further must cede Mesopotamia to the Parthians. It was impossiblefor a Roman Emperor to consent to such demands without first trying thefortune of war, and Macrinus accordingly made up his mind to fight abattle. The Parthian prince had by this time advanced as far as Nisibis, and it was in the neighborhood of that city that the great struggle tookplace. 

The battle of Nisibis, which terminated the long contest between Romeand Parthia, was the fiercest and best-contested which was ever foughtbetween the rival powers. It lasted for the space of three days. Thearmy of Artabanus was numerous and well-appointed: like almost everyParthian force, it was strong in cavalry and archers; and it hadmoreover a novel addition of considerable importance, consisting ofa corps of picked soldiers, clad in complete armor, and carrying longspears or lances, who were mounted on camels. The Roman legionarieswere supported by numerous light-armed troops, and a powerful body ofMauritanian cavalry. According to Dio, the first engagement was broughton accidentally by a contest which arose among the soldiers for thepossession of a watering-place. Herodian tells us that it commenced witha fierce assault of the Parthian cavalry, who charged the Romans withloud shouts, and poured into their ranks flight after flight of arrows. A long struggle followed. The Romans suffered greatly from the bows ofthe horse-archers, and from the lances of the corps mounted on camels;and though, when they could reach their enemy, they had always thesuperiority in close combat, yet after a while their losses from thecavalry and camels forced them to retreat. As they retired they strewedthe ground with spiked balls and other contrivances for injuring thefeet of animals; and this stratagem was so far successful thatthe pursuers soon found themselves in difficulties, and the armiesrespectively retired, without any decisive result, to their camps. 

The next day there was again a combat from morning to night, of whichwe have no description, but which equally terminated without any clearadvantage to either side. The fight was then renewed for the third timeon the third day, with the difference that the Parthians now directedall their efforts towards surrounding the enemy, and thus capturingtheir entire force. As they greatly outnumbered the Romans, these lastfound themselves compelled to extend their line unduly, in order to meetthe Parthian tactics; and the weakness of the extended line seems tohave given the Parthians an opportunity of throwing it into confusion, and thus causing the Roman defeat. Macrinus took to flight among thefirst; and his hasty retreat discouraged his troops, who soon afterwardsacknowledged themselves beaten, and retired within the lines of theircamp. Both armies had suffered severely. Herodian describes the heapsof dead as piled to such a height that the manoeuvres of the troops wereimpeded by them, and at last the two contending hosts could scarcelysee one another! Both armies, therefore, desired peace. The soldiersof Macrinus, who had never had much confidence in their leader, weredemoralized by ill success, and showed themselves inclined to throw offthe restraints of discipline. Those of Artabanus, a militia rather thana standing force, were unaccustomed to sustained efforts; and havingbeen now for some months in the field, had grown weary, and wished toreturn home. Macrinus under these circumstances re-opened negotiationswith his adversary. He was prepared to concede something more than hehad proposed originally, and he had reason to believe that the Parthianmonarch, having found the Roman resistance so stubborn, would be contentto insist on less. The event justified his expectations. Artabanusrelinquished his demand for the cession of Mesopotamia, and accepted apecuniary compensation for his wrongs. Besides restoring the captivesand the booty carried off by Caracallus in his raid, Macrinus had to paya sum exceeding a million and a half of our money. Rome thus concludedher transactions with Parthia, after nearly three centuries of struggle, by ignominiously purchasing a peace. 

It might have been expected that the glory of this achievement wouldhave brought the troubles of Artabanus to a close; and if they did notcause the pretender who still disputed his possession of the throne tosubmit, would at any rate have put an end to any disaffection on thepart of the subject nations that the previous ill-success of Parthia inher Roman wars might have provoked. But in the histories of nations andempires we constantly find that noble and gallant efforts to retrievedisaster and prevent the ruin consequent upon it come too late. Whenmatters have gathered to a head, when steps that commit importantpersons have been taken, when classes or races have been encouraged tocherish hopes, when plans have been formed and advanced to a certainpoint, the course of action that has been contemplated and arranged forcannot suddenly be given up. The cause of discontent is removed, but theeffects remain. Affections have been alienated, and the alienation stillcontinues. A certain additional resentment is even felt at the tardyrepentance, or revival, which seems to cheat the discontented of thatgeneral sympathy whereof without it they would have been secure. Indefault of their original grievance, it is easy for them to discoverminor ones, to exaggerate these into importance, and to find in thema sufficient reason for persistence in the intended course. Hencerevolutions often take place just when the necessity for them seemsto be past, and kingdoms perish at a time when they have begun to showthemselves deserving of a longer term of life. 

It is impossible at the present day to form any trustworthy estimateof the real value of those grounds of complaint which the Persians, incommon doubtless with other subject races, thought that they had againstthe Parthian rule. We can well understand that the supremacy of anydominant race is irksome to the aliens who have to submit to it;but such information as we possess fails to show us either anythingseriously oppressive in the general system of the Parthian government, or any special grievance whereof the Persians had to complain. TheParthians were tolerant; they did not interfere with the religiousprejudices of their subjects, or attempt to enforce uniformity of creedor worship. Their military system did not press over-heavily on thesubject peoples, nor is there any reason to believe that the scale oftheir taxation was excessive. Such tyranny as is charged upon certainParthian monarchs is not of a kind that would have been sensibly feltby the conquered nations, for it was exercised upon none who were notParthians. If we endeavor to form a distinct notion of the grievancesunder which the Persians suffered, they seem to have amounted to no morethan this: 1. That high offices, whether military or civil, were for themost part confined to those of Parthian blood, and not thrown open toParthian subjects generally; 2. That the priests of the Persian religionwere not held in any special honor, but placed merely on a par with thereligious ministers of the other subject races; 3. That no advantage inany respect was allowed to the Persians over the rest of the conqueredpeoples, notwithstanding that they had for so many years exercisedsupremacy over Western Asia, and given to the list of Asiatic worthiessuch names as those of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis. It must, however, be confessed that the account which has come down to us of the timesin question is exceedingly meagre and incomplete; that we cannot saywhether the Persians had not also other grounds of complaint besidesthose that are known to us; and, more especially, that we have no meansof determining what the actual pressure of the grievances complainedof was, or whether it did not reach to that degree of severity whichmoderns mostly hold to justify disaffection and rebellion. On the whole, perhaps, our conclusion must be, that the best justification of theoutbreak is to be found in its success. The Parthians had no right totheir position but such as arose out of the law of the stronger--

 The ancient rule, the good old plan, That those shall take who have the power, And those shall keep who can--

when the time came that they had lost this pre-eminence, superiorityin strength having passed from them to a nation hitherto counted amongtheir subjects, it was natural and right that the seat of authorityshould shift with the shift in the balance of power, and that theleadership of the Persians should be once more recognized. 

If the motives which actuated the nation of the Persians in risingagainst their masters are thus obscure and difficult to be estimated, still less can we form any decided judgment upon those which causedtheir leader, Artaxerxes, to attempt his perilous enterprise. Could wetrust implicitly the statement of Agathias, that Artaxerxes was himselfa Magus, initiated in the deepest mysteries of the Order, we should havegrounds for considering that religious zeal was, at any rate, a leadingmotive of his conduct. It is certain that among the principal changesconsequent upon his success was a religious revolution--the substitutionfor Parthian tolerance of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly enforceduniformity in religion, the establishment of the Magi in power, and thebloody persecution of all such as declined obedience to the precepts ofZoroaster. But the conjecture has been made, and cannot be refuted, that the proceedings of Artaxerxes in this matter should be ascribed topolicy rather than to bigotry, and in that case we could not regard him, as originally inspired by a religious sentiment. Perhaps it is best tosuppose that, like most founders of empires, he was mainly promptedby ambition; that he saw in the distracted state of Parthia and inthe awakening of hope among the subject races, an occasion of whichhe determined to avail himself as far as he could, and that hewas gradually led on to enlarge his views and to effect the greatrevolution, which he brought about, by the force of circumstances, thewishes of others, and the occurrence of opportunities which at first heneither foresaw nor desired. 

It has been observed, that Parthia was, during the whole reign ofArtaxerxes, distracted by the claims of a pretender, Volagases V. According to Moses of Chorene, two branches of the Arsacid family, bothof them settled in Bactria, were at feud with the reigning prince; andthese offended relatives carried their enmity to such a length as toconsider submission to a foreigner a less evil than subjection to the_de facto_ head of their house. The success of Artabanus in the waragainst Rome had no effect upon his domestic foes; and Artaxerxesundoubtedly knew that, if he raised the standard of revolt, he mightcount on a certain amount of support from discontented Arsacids andtheir followers. But his main reliance must have been on the Persians. The Persians had, in the original arrangements of the Parthian empire, been treated with a certain amount of favor. They had been allowed toretain their native monarchs, a concession which naturally involvedthe continuance of the nation's laws, customs, and traditions. Theirreligion had not been persecuted, and had even in the early timesattracted a considerable amount of Court favor. But it would seem thatlatterly the privileges of the nation had been diminished, while theirprejudices were wantonly shocked. The Magi had ceased to be regarded asof much account, and, if they still formed nominally a portion of theking's council, can have had little influence on the conduct of affairsby the government. Such a custom as that of burning the dead, whichseems to have been the rule in the later Parthian times, could neverhave maintained its ground, if the opinion of the Magi, or theircoreligionists, had been considered of much account. 

Encouraged by the dissensions prevailing in the Parthian royal house, strong in the knowledge of his fellow-countrymen's discontent, andperhaps thinking that the losses which Artabanus had sustained in histhree days' battle against the Romans under Macrinus had seriouslyweakened his military strength, Artaxerxes, tributary king of Persiaunder Parthia, about A. D. 220, or a little later, took up armsagainst his master, and in a little time succeeded in establishing theindependence of Persia Proper, or the modern province of Fars. Artabanusis said to have taken no steps at first to crush the rebellion, or tore-establish his authority over his revolted vassal. Thus the Persianmonarch, finding himself unmolested, was free to enlarge his plans, andhaving originally, as is probable, designed only the liberation of hisown people, began to contemplate conquests. Turning his arms eastwardsagainst Carmania (Kerman), he easily reduced that scantily-peopled tractunder his dominion, after which he made war towards the north, and addedto his kingdom some of the outlying regions of Media. Artabanus now atlength resolved to bestir himself, and collecting his forces, tookthe field in person. Invading Persia Proper, he engaged in a desperatestruggle with his rival. Three great battles were fought between thecontending powers. In the last, which took place in the plain ofHormuz, between Bebahan and Shuster, on the course of the Jerahi river, Artabanus was, after a desperate conflict, completely defeated, and notonly defeated but slain (A. D. 226). 

The victory of Hormuz did not, however, absolutely decide the contest, or determine at once that the Parthian empire should fall, and the newPersian kingdom succeed into its place. Artabanus had left sons; andthere were not wanting those among the feudatories of the empire, andeven among the neighboring potentates, who were well inclined to embracetheir cause. A certain Artavasdes seems to have claimed the throne, andto have been accepted as king, at least by a portion of the Parthians, in the year following the death of Artabanus (A. D. 227), when hecertainly issued coins. The Armenian monarch, who had been set on histhrone by Artabanus, and was uncle to the young princes, was especiallyanxious to maintain the Arsacids in power; he gave them a refuge inArmenia, collected an army on their behalf, and engaging Artaxerxes, iseven said to have defeated him in a battle. But his efforts, and thoseof Artavasdes, were unavailing. The arms of Artaxerxes in the endeverywhere prevailed. After a struggle, which cannot have lasted morethan a few years, the provinces of the old Parthian empire submitted;the last Arsacid prince fell into the hands of the Persian king; andthe founder of the new dynasty sought to give legitimacy to his rule bytaking to wife an Arsacid princess. 

Thus perished the great Parthian monarchy after an existence of nearlyfive centuries. Its end must be attributed in the main to internaldecay, working itself out especially in two directions. The Arsacidrace, with which the idea of the empire was bound up, instead ofclinging together with that close "union" which is "strength, " alloweditself to be torn to pieces by dissensions, to waste its force inquarrels, and to be made a handle of by every foreign invader, ordomestic rebel, who chose to use its name in order to cloak hisown selfish projects. The race itself does not seem to have becomeexhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the throne, neversank into mere weaklings or faineants, never shut themselves up in theirseraglios, or ceased to take a leading part, alike in civil broils, andin struggles with foreign rivals. But the hold which the race had onthe population, native and foreign, was gradually weakened by the feudswhich raged within it, by the profusion with which the sacred blood wasshed by those in whose veins it ran, and the difficulty of knowing whichliving member of it was its true head, and so entitled to the allegianceof those who wished to be faithful Parthian subjects. Further, thevigor of the Parthian soldiery must have gradually declined, and theirsuperiority over the mass of the nations under their dominion havediminished. We found reasons for believing that, as early as A. D. 58, Hyrcania succeeded in throwing off the Parthian yoke, and thus settingan example of successful rebellion to the subject peoples. The examplemay have been followed in cases of which we hear nothing; for thecondition of the more remote portions of the empire was for the mostpart unknown to the Romans. When Persia, about A. D. 220, revolted fromArtabanus, it was no doubt with a conviction that the Parthians were nolonger the terrible warriors who under Mithridates I. Had driven allthe armies of the East before them like chaff, or who under Orodes andPhraates IV. Had gained signal victories over the Romans. It is truethat Artabanus had contended not unsuccessfully with Macrinus. But theprestige of Parthia was far from being re-established by the result ofhis three days' battle. Rome retained as her own, notwithstanding hissuccess, the old Parthian province of Mesopotamia, and was thus, even inthe moment of her weakness, acknowledged by Parthia to be the stronger. The Persians are not likely to have been braver or more warlike at thetime of their revolt from Artabanus than in the days when they weresubjected by Mithridates. Any alteration, therefore, in the relativestrength of the two peoples must be ascribed to Parthian decline, since it cannot have been owing to Persian advance and improvement. Toconclude, we may perhaps allow something to the personal qualities ofArtaxerxes, who appears to have possessed all the merits of the typicalOriental conqueror. Artabanus was among the most able of the laterParthian monarchs; but his antagonist was more than this, possessingtrue military genius. It is quite possible that, if the leaders on thetwo sides had changed places, the victory might have rested, not withthe Persians, but with the Parthians. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

_On the Architecture and Ornamental Art of the Parthians. _

The modern historian of Architecture observes, when he reaches theperiod with which we have had to deal in this volume, that, with theadvent of Alexander, Oriental architecture disappears, and that itshistory is an absolute blank from the downfall of the Achaemenians inB. C. 331 to the rise of the Sassanians, about A. D. 226. The statementmade involves a certain amount of exaggeration; but still it expresses, roughly and strongly, a curious and important fact. The Parthians werenot, in any full or pregnant sense of the word, builders. They did notaim at leaving a material mark upon the world by means of edificesor other great works. They lacked the spirit which had impelledsuccessively the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Persians to coverWestern Asia with architectural monuments, proofs at once of the wealth, and the grand ideas, of those who raised them. Parthia, compared tothese pretentious empires, was retiring and modest. The monarchs, however rich they may have been, affected something of primitiverudeness and simplicity in their habits and style of life, theirdwellings and temples, their palaces and tombs. It is difficult indeedto draw the line in every case between pure Parthian work and Sassanian;but on the whole there is, no doubt, reason to believe that thearchitectural remains in Mesopotamia and Persia which belong to theperiod between Alexander and the Arab conquest, are mainly the work ofthe Sassanian or New Persian kingdom, and that comparatively few of themcan be ascribed with confidence to a time anterior to A. D. 227. Still acertain number, which have about them indications of greater antiquitythan the rest, or which belong to sites famous in Parthian rather thanin Persian times, may reasonably be regarded as in all probabilitystructures of the Arsacid period; and from these we may gather at leastthe leading characteristics of the Parthian architecture, its aimsand resources, its style and general effect, while from otherremains--scanty indeed, and often mutilated--we may obtain a tolerablenotion of their sculpture and other ornamental art. 

The most imposing remains which seem certainly assignable to theParthian period are those of Hatra, or El-Hadhr, visited by Mr. Layardin 1846, and described at length by Mr. Ross in the ninth volume of the"Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, " as well as by Mr. Fergusson, in his "History of Architecture. " Hatra became known as a place ofimportance in the early part of the second century after Christ. Itsuccessfully resisted Trajan in A. D. 116, and Severus in A. D. 198. Itis then described as a large and populous city, defended by strongand extensive walls, and containing within it a temple of the Sun, celebrated for the great value of its offerings. It enjoyed its ownkings at this time, who were regarded as of Arabian stock, and wereamong the more important of the Parthian tributary monarchs. By the yearA. D. 363 Hatra had gone to ruin, and is then described as "long sincedeserted. " Its flourishing period thus belongs to the space between A. D. 100 and A. D. 300; and its remains, to which Mr. Fergusson assigns thedate A. D. 250, must be regarded as probably at least a century earlier, and consequently as indicating the character of the architecturewhich prevailed under the later Parthians, and which, if Sassanianimprovements had not obliterated them, we should have found upon thesite of Ctesiphon. 

The city of Hatra was enclosed by a circular wall of great thickness, built of large square-cut stones, and strengthened at intervals ofabout 170 yards by square towers or bastions. [PLATE IV. Fig. 1. ] Itscircumference considerably exceeded three miles. Outside the wall was abroad and very deep ditch, and on the further side of the ditch wasan earthen rampart of considerable height and thickness. Two detachedforts, situated on eminences, commanded the approaches to the place, onetowards the east, and the other towards the north. The wall was piercedby four gateways, of which the principal one faced the east. 

[Illustration: PLATE 4. ]

The circular space within the walls was divided into two portions by awater-course passing across it from north to south, and running somewhateast of the centre, which thus divided the circle into two unequalparts. The eastern portion was left comparatively clear of buildings, and seems to have been used mainly as a burial-ground; in thewestern were the public edifices and the more important houses of theinhabitants. Of the former by far the most remarkable was one whichstood nearly in the centre of the city, and which has been called bysome a palace, by others a temple, but which may best be regarded ascombining both uses. [PLATE IV. Fig. 2. ] This building stood within awalled enclosure of an oblong square shape, about 800 feet long by 700broad. The wall surrounding it was strengthened with bastions, like thewall around the city. The enclosure comprised two courts, an inner andan outer. The outer court, which lay towards the east, and was firstentered, was entirely clear of buildings, while the inner courtcontained two considerable edifices. Of these the less important wasone which stretched from north to south across the entire inclosure, andabutted upon the outer court; this was confused in plan, and consistedchiefly of a number of small apartments, which have been regarded asguard-rooms. The other was a building of greater pretensions. It wascomposed mainly of seven vaulted halls, all of them parallel one toanother, and all facing eastward, three being of superior and four ofinferior size. The smaller halls (Nos. I. , III. , IV. , and VI. , on theplan) were about thirty feet long by twenty wide, and had a height ofthirty feet; the larger ones measured ninety feet in length, and werefrom thirty-five to forty feet broad, with a height of sixty feet. All were upon the same plan. They had semicircular vaulted roofs, nowindows, and received their light from the archway at the east end, which was either left entirely open, or perhaps closed with curtains. 

Externally, the eastern facade of the building, which was evidently itsmain front, had for ornament, besides the row of seven arches, a seriesof pillars, or rather pilasters, from which the arches sprang, somesculptures on the stones composing the arches, and one or two emblematicfigures in the spaces left between the pilasters. The sculptures onthe stones of the arches consisted either of human heads, or ofrepresentations of a female form, apparently floating in air. [PLATEIV. Fig. 3. ] An emblematic sculpture between the fourth and fifth archrepresented a griffin with twisted tail, raised about 5 feet above theground. The entire length of the facade was about 300 feet. 

The interior of the smaller halls had no ornament; but the larger oneswere decorated somewhat elaborately. Here the side walls were broken bythree squared pilasters, rising to the commencement of the vaulting, andterminated by a quasi-capital of ornamental work, consisting of a seriesof ovals, each oval containing in its centre a round ball of dark stone. 

Underneath these quasi-capitals, at the distance of from two to threefeet, ran a cornice, which crossed the pilasters, and extended the wholelength of the apartment, consisting of flowers and half-ovals, each ovalcontaining a half-ball of the same dark stone as the capitals. [PLATEIV. Fig. 4. ] Finally, on the pilasters, immediately below the cornice, were sculptured commonly either two or three human heads, the length ofeach head being about two feet, and the faces representing diverse typesof humanity, some old and some young, some male and some female, someapparently realistic, some idealized and more or less grotesque in theiraccompaniments. The drawing of the heads is said to have been full ofspirit, and their general effect is pronounced life-like and striking. 

The seven halls, which have been described, were divided into twogroups, of three and four respectively, by a low fence, which ran fromeast to west across the inner court, from the partition wall separatingthe third and fourth halls to the buildings which divided the innercourt from the outer. It is probable that this division separated themale and female apartments. The female ornamentation of the large hall(No. II. ) belonging to the southern group is perhaps an indication ofthe sex of its inmates; and another sign that these were the femalequarters is to be found in the direct communication existing betweenthis portion of the building and "the Temple" (No. VIII. ), which couldnot be reached from the male apartments except by a long circuit roundthe building. 

The "Temple" itself was an apartment of a square shape, each side beingabout forty feet. It was completely surrounded by a vaulted passage, into which light came from two windows at its south-west and north-westcorners. The Temple was entered by a single doorway, the position ofwhich was directly opposite an opening leading into the passage fromHall No. II. Above this doorway was a magnificent frieze, the characterof which is thought to indicate the religious purpose of the structure. [PLATE V. Fig. 1. ] The interior of the Temple was without ornamentation, vaulted, and except for the feeble light which entered by the singledoorway, dark. On the west side a portal led into the passage from theouter air. 

[Illustration: PLATE 5. ]

Besides these main apartments, the edifice which we are describingcontained a certain number of small rooms, lying behind the halls, andentered by doorways opening from them. One or two such rooms arefound behind each of the smaller halls; and another of somewhat largerdimensions lay behind the great hall (numbered VII. In the plan), forming the extreme north-western corner of the building. These roomswere vaulted and had no windows, receiving their only light from thesmall doorways by which they were entered. 

It is believed that the entire edifice, or at any rate the greaterportion of it, had an upper story. Traces of such a structure appearover the halls numbered I and VI. ; and it is thought that the storyextended over the entire range of halls. One traveller, on conjecturalgrounds, even assigns to the building an elevation of three stories, andventures to restore the second and third in the mode represented in thewoodcut. [PLATE V. Fig. 2. ] According to this author the upper portionof the edifice resembled in many respects the great palace of theSassanian monarchs, of which splendid remains still exist on the siteof Ctesiphon, where they are known as the Takht-i-Khuzroo, or Palace ofChosroes. That palace was, however, on a very different plan from theHatra one, comprising as it did one hall only, but of a size vastlysuperior to any of those at Hatra, and two wings, one on either side ofthe hall, made up of dwelling and sleeping apartments. 

The few windows which exist at Hatra are oblong square in shape, as ingeneral are the doorways connecting one apartment with another. In onecase there is an arched doorway, or niche, which has been blocked up. There are no passages except the one which surrounds "the Temple, " theapartments generally leading directly one into another. In some casesthe lintel of a doorway is formed of a single stone, and ornamented withvery delicate carving. The doorways are for the most part towards thecorners of apartments; that of the Temple, however, is in the centre ofits eastern wall. 

The general style of the buildings at Hatra has been said to be "Romanor Byzantine;" and it has even been supposed that in the style of theornaments and sculptured figures may be traced the corrupt taste andfeeble outline of the artists of Constantinople. But there is abundantreason to believe that the Hatra Palace was built nearly two centuriesbefore Constantinople came into existence; and, although the large-useof the round arch in vaulting may be due to the spread of Romanarchitectural ideas, yet there are no grounds for supposing that any butnative artists, Parthian subjects, were employed in the work, or thatit is other than a fair specimen of what was achieved by the Parthianbuilders during the later period of the empire. The palace of VolagasesIII. At Ctesiphon, which Avidius Cassius destroyed in his invasion, wasmost likely of the same general character--a combination of lofty hallssuitable for ceremonies and audiences with small and dark sleeping orliving rooms, opening out of them, the whole placed in the middle of apaved court, and the male apartments carefully divided from those of thewomen. 

The remains at Hatra are further remarkable for a considerable numberof reservoirs and tombs. The open space between the town proper andthe eastern wall and gate is dotted with edifices of a square shape, standing apart from one another, which are reasonably regarded assepulchres. These are built in a solid way, of hewn stone, and consisteither of one or two chambers. They vary in size from twenty feet squareto forty, and are generally of about the same height. Some are perfectlyplain, but the exteriors of others are ornamented with pilasters. Thereservoirs occur in the paved court which surrounds the main building;they have narrow apertures, but expand below the aperture into the shapeof a bell, and are carefully constructed of well-cut stones closelyfitted together. 

The material used at Hatra is uniformly a brownish gray limestone; andthe cutting is so clean and smooth that it is doubted whether the stoneshave needed any cement. If cement has been employed, at any rateit cannot now be seen, the stones everywhere appearing to touch oneanother. 

There are several buildings remaining in Persia, the date of whichcannot be much later than that of the Hatra edifice; but, as it is onthe whole more probable that they belong to the Sassanian than to theParthian period, no account of them will be given here. It will besufficient to observe that their architecture grows naturally out ofthat which was in use at Hatra, and that thus we are entitled to ascribeto Parthian times and to subjects of the Parthian Empire that impulseto Oriental architecture which awoke it to renewed life after a sleepof ages, and which in a short time produced such imposing results asthe Takht-i-Khuzroo at Ctesiphon, the ruins of Shapur, and the triumphalarch at Takht-i-Bostan. 

The decorative and fictile art of the Parthians has received noinconsiderable amount of illustration from remains discovered, in theyears 1850-1852, in Babylonia. In combination with a series of Parthiancoins were found by Mr. Loftus, on the site of the ancient Erech (nowWarka), a number of objects in clay, plaster, and metal, enabling usto form a fair idea of the mode in which purely Parthian edifices weredecorated during the best times of the empire, and of the style thatthen prevailed in respect of personal ornaments, domestic utensils, andother objects capable, more or less, of aesthetic handling. The remainsdiscovered comprised numerous architectural fragments in plaster andbrick; a large number of ornamental coffins; several statuettes interra-cotta; jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in earthenware; some smallglass bottles; and various personal decorations, such as beads, rings, and earrings. 

The architectural fragments consisted of capitals of pillars [PLATEV. Fig. 3], portions of cornices, and specimens of a sort of diaperingwhich seems to have been applied to screens or thin partitions. Thecapitals were somewhat heavy in design, and at first sight struck thespectator as barbarous; but they exhibited a good deal of ingeniousboldness, an absence of conventionality, and an occasional quaintnessof design not unworthy of a Gothic decorator. One especially, whichcombines the upper portion of a human figure, wearing the puffed-outhair or wig, which the Parthians affected, with an elegant leaf risingfrom the neck of the capital, and curving gracefully under the abacus, has decided merit, and is "suggestive of the later Byzantine style. " Thecornices occasionally reminded the discoverer of the remarkable friezeat El-Hadhr, and were characterized by the same freedom and boldnessof invention as the capitals. But the most curious remains were thefragments of a sort of screen work, pieces of plaster covered withgeometric designs upon both sides, the patterns on the two sidesdiffering. [PLATE V. Fig. 4. ] These designs, though unlike in manyrespects the arabesques of the Mohammedans, yet seemed on the whole tobe their precursors, the "geometric curves and tracery" appearingto "shadow forth the beauty and richness of a style which afterwardsfollowed the tide of Mohammedan conquest to the remotest corners of theknown world. "

The ornamental coffins were of a coarse glazed earthenware, bluish-greenin hue, and belonged to the kind which has been called "slipper-shaped. "[PLATE VI. Fig. 1. ] They varied in length from three feet to six, andhad a large aperture at their upper end, by means of which the body wasplaced in them, and a flat lid to close this aperture, ornamented likethe coffin, and fixed in its place by a fine lime cement. A secondaperture at the lower extremity of the coffin allowed for the escapeof the gases disengaged during decomposition. The ornamentation of thecoffins varied, but consisted generally of small figures of men, aboutsix or seven inches in length, the most usual figure being a warriorwith his arms akimbo and his legs astride, wearing on his head acoiffure, like that which is seen on the Parthian coins, and having asword hanging from the belt. [PLATE VI. Fig. 2. ]

[Illustration: PLATE 6. ]

Of the statuettes in terra-cotta, one of the most curious represented aParthian warrior, recumbent, and apparently about to drink out of a cupheld in the left hand. [PLATE VI. Fig. 3. ] The figure was clad in along coat of mail, with greaves on the legs and a helmet upon thehead. Others represented females; these had lofty head-dresses, whichsometimes rose into two peaks or horns, recalling the costume of Englishladies in the time of Henry IV. These figures were veiled and carefullydraped about the upper part of the person, but showed the face, and hadthe legs bare from the knee downwards. 

The jars, jugs, vases, and lamps greatly resembled those of the Assyrianand Babylonian periods, but were on the whole more elegant and artistic. The forms appended will give a tolerable idea of the general characterof these vessels. [PLATE VI. Fig. 4. ] They were of various sizes, andappear to have been placed in the tombs, partly as the offerings offriends and well-wishers, partly with the more superstitious object ofactually supplying the deceased with the drink and light needful for himon his passage from earth to the realms of the dead. 

The glass bottles were, perhaps, lachrymatories. They had no peculiarcharacteristics, but were almost exactly similar to objects of the samekind belonging to the times of the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires. Theyexhibited the same lovely prismatic colors, which have been so admiredin the glass of those kingdoms, an effect of decomposition, which, elsewhere generally disfiguring, in the case of this material enhancesthe original beauty of the object tenfold by clothing it in hues of theutmost brilliance and delicacy. 

The personal decorations consisted chiefly of armlets, bangles, beads, rings, and ear-rings. They were in gold, silver, copper, and brass. Someof the smaller gold ornaments, such as earrings, and small platesor beads for necklaces and fillets, were "of a tasteful and elegantdesign. " The finger-rings were coarser, while the toe-rings, armlets, and bangles, were for the most part exceedingly rude and barbarous. Head-dresses in gold, tall and pointed, are said to have been foundoccasionally; but the museums of Europe have not yet been able to secureany, as they are usually melted down by the finders. Broad ribbons ofgold, which may have depended like strings from a cap, are commoner, andwere seen by Mr. Loftus. Altogether, the ornaments indicated a stronglove of personal display, and the possession of considerable wealth, butno general diffusion of a correct taste, nor any very advanced skill indesign or metallurgy. 

Of purely aesthetic art--art, that is, into which the idea of the usefuldoes not enter at all--the Parthians appear scarcely to have had anidea. During the five centuries of their sway, they seem to have setup no more than some half dozen bas-reliefs. There is, indeed, onlyone such work which can be positively identified as belonging to theParthian period by the inscription which accompanies it. The otherpresumedly Parthian reliefs are adjudged to the people by art criticsmerely from their style and their locality, occurring as they do withinthe limits of the Parthian kingdom, and lacking the characteristicswhich attach to the art of those who preceded and of those who followedthe Parthians in these countries. 

[Illustration: PLATE 7. ]

The one certainly Parthian bas-relief is that which still exists on thegreat rock of Behistun, at the foot of the mountain, raised but slightlyabove the plain. It seems to have contained a series of tall figures, looking towards the right, and apparently engaged in a march orprocession, while above and between them were smaller figures onhorseback, armed with lances, and galloping in the same direction. Oneof these was attended by a figure of Fame or Victory, flying in the air, and about to place a diadem around his brow. The present condition ofthe sculpture is extremely bad. Atmospheric influences have worn awaythe larger figures to such an extent that they are discerned withdifficulty; and a recent Governor of Kirmanshah has barbarously insertedinto the middle of the relief an arched niche, in which he has placeda worthless Arabic inscription. It is with difficulty that we form anyjudgment of the original artistic merit of a work which presents itselfto us in such a worn and mutilated form; but, on the whole, we areperhaps justified in pronouncing that it must at its best have beenone of inferior quality, even when compared only with the similarproductions of Asiatics. The general character is rather that of theSassanian than of the Assyrian or Persian period. The human figures havea heavy clumsiness about them that is unpleasant to contemplate; thehorses are rudely outlined, and are too small for the men; the figureof Fame is out of all proportion to the hero whom she crowns, and thediadem which she places on his head is ridiculous, being nearly as largeas herself! On the other hand, there is spirit in the attitudes of bothmen and horses; the Fame floats well in air; and the relief is free fromthat coarse grotesqueness which offends us in the productions of theSassanian artists. 

Another, bas-relief, probably, but not quite certainly Parthian, existsin the gorge of Sir-pul-i-zohab, and has been recently published inthe great work of M. Flandin. [PLATE VIII. ] The inscription on thismonument, though it has not yet been deciphered, appears to be writtenin the alphabet found upon the Parthian coins. The monument seems torepresent a Parthian king, mounted on horseback, and receiving a chapletat the hand of a subject. The king wears a cap bound round with thediadem, the long ends of which depend over his shoulder. He is clothedin a close-fitting tunic and loose trowsers, which hang down uponhis boots, and wears also a short cloak fastened under the chin, andreaching nearly to the knee. The horse which he bestrides is small, butstrongly made; the tail is long, and the mane seems to be plaited. Thus far the representation, though somewhat heavy and clumsy, is notill-drawn; but the remaining figure--that of the Parthian subject--iswholly without merit. The back of the man is turned, but the legs are inprofile; one arm is ridiculously short, and the head is placed too nearthe left shoulder. It would seem that the artist, while he took painswith the representation of the monarch, did not care how ill he renderedthe subordinate figure, which he left in the unsatisfactory conditionthat may be seen in the preceding woodcut. 

[Illustration: PLATE 8. ]

A set of reliefs, discovered by the Baron de Bode in the year 1841, arealso thought by the best judges to be Parthian. The most important ofthem represents a personage of consequence, apparently a Magus, whoseems to be in the act of consecrating a sacred cippus, round whichhave been placed wreaths or chaplets. (PLATE IX. ) Fifteen spectators arepresent, arranged in two rows, one above the other, all except the firstof them standing. The first sits upon a rude chair or stool. The figuresgenerally are in an advanced stage of decay; but that of the Magusis tolerably well preserved, and probably indicates with sufficientaccuracy the costume and appearance of the great hierarchs under theParthians, The conical cap described by Strabo is very conspicuous. Below this the hair is worn in the puffed-out fashion of the laterParthian period. The upper lip is ornamented by moustaches, and the chincovered by a straight beard. The figure is dressed in a long sleevedtunic, over which is worn a cloak, fastened at the neck by a roundbrooch, and descending a little below the knees. The legs are encasedin a longer and shorter pair of trowsers, the former plain, the latterstriped perpendicularly. Round the neck is worn a collar or necklace;and on the right arm are three armlets and three bracelets. The conicalcap appears to be striped or fluted. 

[Illustration: PLATE 9. ]

On the same rock, but in no very evident connection with the mainrepresentation, is a second relief, in which a Parthian cavalier, armed with a bow and arrows, and a spear, contends with a wild animal, seemingly a bear. [PLATE X. Fig. 1. ] A long flowing robe here takesthe place of the more ordinary tunic and trowsers. On the head is worn arounded cap or tiara. The hair has the usual puffed-out appearance. Thebow is carried in the left hand, and the quiver hangs from, the saddlebehind the rider, while with his right hand he thrusts his spear intothe beast's neck. The execution of the whole tablet seems to have beenrude; but it has suffered so much from time and weather, that no verydecided judgment can be passed upon it. 

[Illustration: PLATE 10. ]

Another still ruder representation occurs also on another face of thesame rock. This consists of a female figure reclining upon a couch, andguarded by three male attendants, one at the head of the couch unarmed, and the remaining two at its foot, seated, and armed with spears. Thefemale has puffed-out hair, and carries in her right hand, which isoutstretched, a wreath or chaplet. One of the spearmen has a curiousrayed head-dress; and the other has a short streamer attached tothe head of his spear. Below the main tablet are three rudely carvedstanding figures, representing probably other attendants. 

This set of reliefs may perhaps be best regarded as forming a singleseries, the Parthian king being represented as engaged in hunting thebear, while the queen awaits his return upon her couch, and the chiefMagus attached to the court makes prayer for the monarch's safety. 

Such are the chief remains of Parthian aesthetic art. They conveyan idea of decline below the standard reached by the Persians of theAchaemenian times, which was itself a decline from the earlier art ofthe Assyrians. Had they been the efforts of a race devoid of models, they might fairly have been regarded as not altogether without promise. But, considered as the work of a nation which possessed the Achaemeniansculptures, and which had moreover, to a certain extent, access to Greekexamples, a they must be pronounced clumsy, coarse, and wanting in allthe higher qualities of Fine Art. It is no wonder that they are scantyand exceptional. The nation which could produce nothing better must havefelt that its vocation was not towards the artistic, and that its powershad better be employed in other directions, e. G. In conquest and inorganization. It would seem that the Parthians perceived this, andtherefore devoted slight attention to the Fine Arts, preferring tooccupy themselves mainly with those pursuits in which they excelled;viz. War, hunting, and government. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Customs of the Parthians--in Religion; in War; in their Embassies andDealings with Foreign Nations; at the Court; in Private Life. Extent ofthe Refinement to which they reached. Their gradual Decline in Taste andKnowledge. 

Very little is known as to the religion of the Parthians. It seemsprobable that during the Persian period they submitted to theZoroastrian system, which was generally maintained by the Achaemeniankings, acquiescing, like the great bulk of the conquered nations, inthe religious views of their conquerors; but as this was not theirown religion, we may conclude that they were at no time very zealousfollowers of the Bactrian prophet, and that as age succeeded age theybecame continually more lukewarm in their feelings, and more laxin their religious practice. The essence of Zoroastrian belief wasdualism--recognition of Ormazd as the great Principle of Good, and ofAhriman as the Principle of Evil. We need not doubt that, in word, theParthians from first to last admitted this antagonism, and professeda belief in Ormazd as the supreme god, and a dread of Ahriman and hisministers. But practically, their religious aspirations rested, not onthese dim abstractions, but on beings whose existence they could betterrealize, and whom they could feel to be less remote from themselves. The actual devotion of the Parthians was offered to the Sun and Moon, to deities who were supposed to preside over the royal house, and toancestral idols which each family possessed, and conveyed with it fromplace to place with every change of habitation. The Sun was saluted athis rising, was worshipped in temples, under the name of Mithra, withsacrifices and offerings; had statues erected in his honor, and wasusually associated with the lesser luminary. The deities of the royalhouse were probably either genii, ministers of Ormazd, to whom wascommitted the special protection of the monarchs and their families, like the _bagaha vithiya_ of the Persians, or else the ancestors ofthe reigning monarch, to whom a qualified divinity seems to have beenassigned in the later times of the empire. The Parthians kings usuallyswore by these deities on solemn occasions; and other members of theroyal family made use of the same oath. The main worship, however, ofthe great mass of the people, even when they were of the royal stock, was concentrated upon ancestral images, which had a place sacred to themin each house, and received the constant adoration of the household. 

In the early times of the empire the Magi were held in high repute, and most of the peculiar tenets and rites of the Magian religionwere professed and followed by the Parthians. Elemental worship waspractised. Fire was, no doubt, held sacred, and there was an especialreverence for rivers. Dead bodies were not burned, but were exposed tobe devoured by birds and beasts of prey, after which the dry bones werecollected and placed in tombs. The Magi formed a large portion of thegreat national council, which elected and, if need were, deposed thekings. But in course of time much laxity was introduced. The Arsacidmonarchs of Armenia allowed the Sacred Fire of Ormazd, which oughtto have been kept continually burning, to go out; and we can scarcelysuppose but that the Parthian Arsacidae shared their negligence. Respectfor the element of fire so entirely passed away, that we hear of thelater Parthians burning their dead. The Magi fell into disrepute, and, if not expelled from their place in the council, at any rate foundthemselves despised and deprived of influence. The later Parthianreligion can have been little more than a worship of the Sun and Moon, and of the teraphim, or sacred images, which were the most preciouspossession of each household. 

While thus lax and changeful in their own religious practice, theParthians were, naturally, tolerant of a variety of creeds among theirsubjects. Fire altars were maintained, and Zoroastrian zeal was allowedto nourish in the dependent kingdom of Persia. In the Greek cities theOlympian gods were permitted to receive the veneration of thousands, while in Babylon, Nearda, and Nisibis the Jews enjoyed the free exerciseof their comparatively pure and elevated religion. No restrictions seemto have been placed on proselytism, and Judaism certainly boasted manyconverts from the heathen in Adiabene, Charax Spasini, and elsewhere. Christianity also penetrated the Parthian provinces to a considerableextent, and in one Parthian country, at any rate, seems to have becomethe state religion. The kings of Osrhoene are thought to have beenChristians from the time of the Antonines, if not from that of our Lord;and a nourishing church was certainly established at Edessa before theend of the second century. The Parthian Jews who were witnesses of themiraculous events which signalized the day of Pentecost may have, insome cases, taken with them the new religion to the land where they hadtheir residence; or the Apostle, St. Thomas, may (as Eusebius declares)have carried the Gospel into the regions beyond the Euphrates, and haveplanted the Christian Church in the countries out of which the JewishChurch sprang. Besides the nourishing community of Edessa, which waspredominantly, if not wholly, Christian from the middle of the secondcentury, many converts were, we are told, to be found among theinhabitants of Persia, Media, Parthia Proper, and even Bactria. Theinfusion, however, was not sufficient to leaven to any serious extentthe corrupt mass of heathenism into which it was projected; and wecannot say that the general character of the Parthian empire, or of themanners and customs of its subjects, was importantly affected by the newreligion, though it had an extraordinary influence over individuals. 

The Parthians were essentially a warlike people; and the chief interestwhich attaches to them is connected with their military vigor andability. It is worth while to consider at some length the peculiaritiesof that military system which proved itself superior to the organizationof the Macedonians, and able to maintain for nearly three hundred yearsa doubtful contest with the otherwise irresistible Romans. 

We are told that the Parthians had no standing army. When war wasproclaimed and the monarch needed a force, he made his immediate vassalsacquainted with the fact, and requested each of them to marshal theirtroops, and bring them to a fixed rendezvous by a certain day. Thetroops thus summoned were of two kinds, Parthian and foreign. Thegovernors of the provinces, whether tributary kings or satraps, calledout the military strength of their respective districts, saw totheir arming and provisioning, and, marching each at the head of hiscontingent, brought a foreign auxiliary force to the assistance ofthe Great King. But the back-bone of the army, its main strength, theportion on which alone much reliance was placed, consisted of Parthians. Each Parthian noble was bound to call out his slaves and his retainers, to arm and equip them at his own expense, and bring them to therendezvous by the time named. The number of troops furnished by eachnoble varied according to his position and his means; we bear in oneinstance of their amounting to as many as 10, 000, while in anotherrecorded case the average number which each furnished was no more than125. The various contingents had their own baggage-trains, consistingordinarily of camels, in the proportion (as it would seem) of one toevery ten fighting-men. 

A Parthian army consisted usually of both horse and foot, but inproportions unusual elsewhere. The foot soldiers were comparatively fewin number, and were regarded as of small account. Every effort was madeto increase the amount and improve the equipment of the horsemen, whobore the brunt of every fight, and from whose exertions alone victorywas hoped. Sometimes armies consisted of horsemen only, or rather ofhorsemen followed by a baggage train composed of camels and chariots. 

The horse were of two kinds, heavy and light. The heavy horsemen worecoats of mail, reaching to their knees, composed of rawhide covered withscales of iron or steel, very bright, and capable of resisting a strongblow. They had on their heads burnished helmets of Margian steel, whoseglitter dazzled the spectator. Their legs seem not to have beengreaved, but encased in a loose trouser, which hung about the anklesand embarrassed the feet, if by any chance the horseman was forced todismount. They carried no shield, being sufficiently defended by theircoats of mail. Their offensive arms were a long spear, which was ofgreat strength and thickness, and a bow and arrows of unusual size. Theylikewise carried in their girdle a short sword or knife, which might beused in close combat. Their horses were, like themselves, protected by adefence of scale armor, which was either of steel or bronze. 

The light horse was armed with the same sort of bows and arrows as theheavy, but carried no spear and wore no armor. It was carefully trainedto the management of the horse and the bow, and was unequalled in therapidity and dexterity of its movements. The archer delivered his arrowswith as much precision and force in retreat as in advance, and wasalmost more feared when he retired than when he charged his foe. Besideshis arrows, the light horseman seems to have carried a sword, and he nodoubt wore also the customary knife in his belt. 

We are told by one writer that it was a practice of the Parthians tobring into battle a number of led horses, and that the riders from timeto time exchanged their tired steeds for fresh ones, thus obtaining agreat advantage over enemies who had no such practice. But the accountswhich we have of Parthian engagements make no reference to this usage, which we can therefore scarcely suppose to have been adopted to anylarge extent. It may be doubted, also, if the practice could ever beone of much value, since the difficulty of managing led horses amid thetumult of a battle would probably more than counterbalance the advantagederivable from relays of fresh steeds. 

During the later period of the monarchy, the Parthians, who had alwaysemployed camels largely in the conveyance of stores and baggage, aresaid to have introduced a camel corps into the army itself, and to havederived considerable advantage from the new arm. The camels could bearthe weight of the mailed warrior and of their own armor better thanhorses, and their riders were at once more safe in their elevatedposition and more capable of dealing effective blows upon the enemy. As a set-off, however, against those advantages, the spongy feet ofthe camel were found to be more readily injured by the _tribulus_, orcaltrop, than the harder feet of the horse, and the corps was thus moreeasily disabled than an equal force of cavalry, if it could be temptedto pass over ground on which caltrops had been previously scattered. 

The Parthian tactics were of a simple kind, and differed little fromthose of other nations in the same region, which have depended mainly ontheir cavalry. To surround their foe, to involve him in difficulties, to cut off: his supplies and his stragglers, and ultimately to bring himinto a position where he might be overwhelmed by missiles, was the aimof all Parthian commanders of any military capacity. Their warfare wassuited for defence rather than for attack, unless against contemptibleenemies. They were bad hands at sieges, and seldom ventured to engage inthem, though they would do so if circumstances required it. They weariedof long campaigns, and if they did not find victory tolerably easy, were apt to retire and allow their foe to escape, or baffle him bywithdrawing their forces into a distant and inaccessible region. Aftertheir early victories over Crassus and Antony, they never succeeded inpreventing the steady advance of a Roman army into their territory, or in repulsing a determined attack upon their capital. Still theygenerally had their revenge after a short time. It was easy for theRomans to overrun Mesopotamia, but it was not so easy for them to holdit; and it was scarcely possible for them to retire from it after anoccupation without disaster. The clouds of Parthian horse hung upontheir retreating columns, straitened them for provisions, galled themwith missiles, and destroyed those who could not keep up with the mainbody. The towns upon the line of their retreat revolted and shut theirgates, defying even such commanders as Severus and Trajan. Of the sixgreat expeditions of Rome against Parthia, one only, that of AvidiusCassius, was entirely successful. In every other case either thefailure of the expedition was complete, or the glory of the advance wastarnished by disaster and suffering during the retreat. 

The results of invading Parthia would have been even more calamitousto an assailant but for one weak point in the military system of theParthians. They were excessively unwilling to venture near an enemyat night, and as a general rule abstained from all military movementsduring the hours of darkness. As evening approached, they drew off to aconsiderable distance from their foe, and left him unmolested to retreatin any direction that he pleased. The reason of this probably was, notmerely that they did not fortify their camps; but that, depending whollyon their horses, and being forced to hobble or tether them at night, they could not readily get into fighting order on a sudden duringdarkness. Once or twice in the course of their history, we find themdeparting from their policy of extreme precaution, and recommencingthe pursuit of a flying foe before dawn; but it is noted as an unusualoccurrence. 

It was also a general principle of Parthian warfare to abstain fromcampaigning during the winter. So much depended upon the tension oftheir bow-strings, which any dampness relaxed, that their rule was tomake all their expeditions in the dry time of their year, which lastedfrom early in the spring until late in the autumn. The rule was, however, transgressed upon occasions. Phraates II. Made his attackupon Antiochus Sidetes, while the snow was still upon the ground; andVolagases I. Fell upon Paetus after the latter had sent his troops intowinter quarters. The Parthians could bear cold no less than heat; thoughit was perhaps rather in the endurance of the latter than of the formerthat they surpassed the Romans. The sun's rays were never too hot forthem; and they did not need water frequently or in large quantities. TheRomans believed that they increased their ability of bearing thirst bymeans of certain drugs which they consumed; but it may be questionedwhether they really employed any other remedies than habit andresolution. 

We find no use of chariots among the Parthians, except for theconveyance of the females, who accompanied the nobles upon theirexpeditions. The wives and concubines of the chiefs followed the campin great numbers; and women of a less reputable class, singers, dancers, and musicians, swelled the ranks of the supernumeraries. Many of thesewere Greeks from Seleucia and other Macedonian towns. The commissariatand transport departments are said to have been badly organized; butsome thousands of baggage camels always accompanied an army, carryingstores and provisions. Of these a considerable portion were laden witharrows, of which the supply was in this way rendered inexhaustible. 

The use of the elephant in war was still more rare in Parthia than thatof the chariot. While the Seleucid kings employed the animal to a largeextent, and its use was also probably known to the Greek princes ofBactria, the Arsacidae appear to have almost entirely neglected it. Onone occasion alone do we find their employment of it mentioned, andthen we hear of only a single animal, which is ridden by the monarch. Probably the unwieldy creature was regarded by the Parthians as tooheavy and clumsy for the light and rapid movements of their armies, and was thus disused during the period of their supremacy, though againemployed, after Parthia had fallen, by the Sassanidse. 

The Parthians entered into battle with much noise and shouting. Theymade no use of trumpets or horns, but employed instead the kettledrum, which resounded from all parts of the field when they made their onset. Their attack was furious. The mailed horsemen charged at speed, andoften drove their spears through the bodies of two enemies at a blow. The light horse and the foot, when any was present, delivered theirarrows with precision and with extraordinary force. But if theassailants were met with a stout resistance, the first vigor of theattack was rarely long maintained. The Parthian warriors grew quicklyweary of an equal contest, and, if they could not force their enemy togive way, soon changed their tactics. Pretending panic, dispersing, andbeating a hasty retreat, they endeavored to induce their foe to pursuehurriedly and in disorder, being ready at any moment to turn and takeadvantage of the least appearance of confusion. If these tactics failed, as they commonly did after they came to be known, the simulated flightwas generally converted into a real one; further conflict was avoided, or at any rate deferred to another occasion. 

When the Parthians wished to parley with an enemy, they unstrung theirbows, and advancing with the right hand outstretched, asked for aconference. They are accused by the Romans of sometimes using treacheryon such occasions, but, except in the single case of Crassus, the chargeof bad faith cannot be sustained against them. On solemn occasions, whenthe intention was to discuss grounds of complaint or to bring a warto an end by the arrangement of terms of peace, a formal meetingwas arranged between their representatives and those of their enemy, generally on neutral ground, as on an island in the Euphrates, or on abridge constructed across it. Here the chiefs of the respective nationsmet, accompanied by an equal number of guards, while the remainder oftheir forces occupied the opposite banks of the river. Matters werediscussed in friendly fashion, the Greek language being commonlyemployed as the vehicle of communication; after which festivitiesusually took place, the two chiefs mutually entertaining each other, or accepting in common the hospitalities of a third party. The terms ofpeace agreed upon were reduced to writing; hands were grasped as asign that faith was pledged; and oaths having been interchanged, the conference broke up, and the chiefs returned to their respectiveresidences. 

Besides negotiating by means of conferences, the Parthian monarchs oftensent out to neighboring states, and in return received from them formalembassies. The ambassadors in every case conveyed, as a matter ofcourse, gifts to the prince to whom they were accredited, which mightconsist of articles of value, or of persons. Augustus included anItalian slave-girl among the presents which he transmitted to PhraatesIV. ; and Artabanus III. Sent a Jewish giant to Tiberius. The objectof an embassy was sometimes simply to congratulate; but more often theambassadors were instructed to convey certain demands, or proposals, from their own prince to the head of the other nation, whereto hisassent was required, or requested. These proposals were commonlyformulated in a letter from the one prince to the other, which it wasthe chief duty of the ambassadors to convey safely. Free powers toconclude a treaty at their discretion were rarely, or never, entrustedto them. Their task was merely to deliver the royal letter, to explainits terms, if they were ambiguous, and to carry back to their ownmonarch the reply of the foreign sovereign. The sanctity of theambassadorial character was invariably respected by the Parthians, whoare never even taxed with a violation of it. 

As a security for the performance of engagements, or for the permanentmaintenance of a friendly attitude, it was usual in the East during theParthian period to require, and give, hostages. The princes who occupiedthe position of Parthian feudatories gave hostages to their suzerain, who were frequently their near relations, as sons or brothers. And apractice grew up of the Parthian monarchs themselves depositing theirown sons or brothers with the Roman Emperor, at first perhaps merely fortheir own security, but afterwards as pledges for their good behavior. Such hostages lived at the expense of the Roman court, and were usuallytreated with distinction. In the event of a rupture between theircountry and Rome, they had little to fear. Rome found her advantage inemploying them as rivals to a monarch with whom she had quarrelled, and did not think it necessary to punish them for his treachery orinconstancy. 

The magnificence of the Parthian court is celebrated in general termsby various writers, but not very many particulars have come down to usrespecting it. We know that it was migratory, moving from one of thechief cities of the empire to another at different seasons of the year, and that owing to the vast number of the persons composing it, there wasa difficulty sometimes in providing for their subsistence upon the road. The court comprised the usual extensive harem of an Oriental prince, consisting of a single recognized queen, and a multitude of secondarywives or concubines. The legitimate wife of the prince was commonlya native, and in most cases was selected from the royal race of theArsacidae but sometimes she was the daughter of a dependent monarch, and she might even be a slave raised by royal favor from that humbleposition. The concubines were frequently Greeks. Both wives andconcubines remained ordinarily in close seclusion, and we have littlemention of them, in the Parthian annals. But in one instance, at anyrate, a queen, brought up in the notions of the West, succeeded insetting Oriental etiquette at defiance, took the direction of affairsout of the hands of her husband, and subsequently ruled the empire inconjunction with her son. Generally, however, the Parthian kings wereremarkably free from the weakness of subservience to women, and managedtheir kingdom with a firm hand, without allowing either wives orministers to obtain any undue ascendency over them. In particular, wemay note that they never, so far as appears, fell under the balefulinfluence of eunuchs, who, from first to last, play a very subordinatepart in the Parthian history. 

The dress of the monarch was commonly the loose Median robe, which hadbeen adopted from the Medes by the Persians. This flowed down to thefeet in numerous folds, enveloping and concealing the entire figure. Trousers and a tunic were probably worn beneath it, the latter of linen, the former of silk or wool. As head-dress, the king wore either the merediadem, which was a band or ribbon, passed once or oftener round thehead, and terminating in two long ends which fell down behind, or else amore pretentious cap, which in the earlier times was a sort of Scythianpointed helmet, and in the later a rounded tiara, sometimes adorned withpearls or gems. His neck appears to have been generally encircled withtwo or three collars or necklaces, and he frequently wore ear-rings inhis ears. The beard was almost always cultivated, and, with the hair, was worn variously. Generally both hair and beard were carefully curled;but sometimes they depended in long straight locks, Mostly the beard waspointed, but occasionally it was worn square. In later times a fashionarose of puffing out the hair at either side extravagantly, so as togive it the appearance of a large bushy wig. 

In war the monarch seems to have exchanged his Median robe for a shortcloak, reaching half way down the thigh. His head was protected by ahelmet, and he carried the national arm of offence, the bow. He usuallytook the field on horseback, but was sometimes mounted on an elephant, trained to encounter the shock of battle. Gold and silver wereabundantly used in the trappings of his steed and in his arms. Hegenerally took the command, and mingled freely in the fight, though hemight sometimes shrink without reproach from adventuring his own person. His guards fought about him; and he was accompanied by attendants, whoseduty it was to assist him in mounting on horseback and dismounting. 

The status of the queen was not much below that of her royal consort. She wore a tiara far more elaborate than his, and, like him, exhibitedthe diadem. Her neck was encircled with several necklaces. As the titleof Theos, "God, " was often assumed by her husband, so she was allowedthe title of "Goddess", or "Heavenly Goddess". 

Separate apartments were of course assigned to the queen, and to theroyal concubines in the various palaces. These were buildings on amagnificent scale, and adorned with the utmost richness. Philostratus, who wrote in Parthian times, thus describes the royal palace at Babylon. "The palace is roofed with brass, and a bright light flashes from it. It has chambers for the women, and chambers for the men, and porticos, partly glittering with silver, partly with cloth-of-gold embroideries, partly with solid slabs of gold, let into the walls, like pictures. Thesubjects of the embroideries are taken from the Greek mythology, andinclude representations of Andromeda, of Amymone, and of Orpheus, whois frequently repeated. .. . Datis is moreover represented, destroyingNaxos with his fleet, and Artaphernes besieging Eretria, and Xerxesgaining his famous victories. You behold the occupation of Athens, andthe battle of Thermopylae, and other points still more characteristic ofthe great Persian war, rivers drunk up and disappearing from the faceof the earth, and a bridge stretched across the sea, and a canal cutthrough Athos. .. . One chamber for the men has a roof fashioned into avault like the heaven, composed entirely of sapphires, which are thebluest of stones, and resemble the sky in color. Golden images of thegods whom they worship, are set up about the vault, and show like starsin the firmament. This is the chamber in which the king delivers hisjudgments. Four golden magic-wheels hang from its roof, and threatenthe monarch with the Divine Nemesis, if he exalts himself above thecondition of man. These wheels are called 'the tongues of the gods, ' andare set in their places by the Magi who frequent the palace. "

The state and pomp which surrounded the monarch seem scarcely to havefallen short of the Achaemenian standard. Regarded as in some sortdivine during his life, and always an object of national worship afterhis death, the "Brother of the Sun and Moon" occupied a position farabove that of the most exalted of his subjects. Tributary monarchswere shocked, when, in times of misfortune, the "Great King" stoopedto solicit their aid, and appeared before them in the character of asuppliant, shorn of his customary splendor. Nobles coveted the dignityof "King's Friend, " and were content to submit to blows and buffetsat the caprice of their royal master, before whom they prostratedthemselves in adoration after each castigation. The Parthian monarchdined in solitary grandeur, extended on his own special couch, andeating from his own special table, which was placed at a greaterelevation than those of his guests. His "friend" sat on the ground athis feet, and was fed like a dog by scraps from his master's board. Guards, ministers, and attendants of various kinds surrounded him, and were ready at the slightest sign to do his bidding. Throughout thecountry he had numerous "Eyes" and "Ears"--officers who watched hisinterests and sent him word of whatever touched his safety. The bed onwhich the monarch slept was of gold, and subjects were forbidden to taketheir repose on couches of this rich material. No stranger could obtainaccess to him unless introduced by the proper officer; and it wasexpected that all who asked an audience would be prepared with somepresent of high value. For the gifts received the monarch made asuitable return, allowing those whom he especially favored to choose thepresents that they preferred. 

The power and dignity of the Parthian nobles was greater than thatusually enjoyed by any subjects of an Oriental king. Rank in Parthiabeing hereditary and not simply official, the "megistanes" were nomere creatures of the monarch, but a class which stood upon its ownindefeasible rights. As they had the privilege of electing to the throneupon a vacancy, and even that of deposing a duly elected monarch, theking could not but stand in wholesome awe of them, and feel compelled totreat them with considerable respect and deference. Moreover, they werenot without a material force calculated to give powerful support totheir constitutional privileges. Each stood at the head of a bodyof retainers accustomed to bear arms and to serve in the wars of theEmpire. Together these bodies constituted the strength of the army; andthough the royal bodyguard might perhaps have been capable of dealingsuccessfully with each group of retainers separately, yet such an_esprit de corps_ was sure to animate the nobles generally, that theywould make common cause in case one of their number were attacked, and would support him against the crown with the zeal inspired byself-interest. Thus the Parthian nobility were far more powerful andindependent than any similar class under the Achaemenian, Sassanian, Modern Persian, or Turkish sovereigns. They exercised a real controlover the monarch, and had a voice in the direction of the Empire. Likethe great feudal vassals of the Middle Ages, they from time to timequarrelled with their liege lord, and disturbed the tranquillity of thekingdom by prolonged and dangerous civil wars; but these contentionsserved to keep alive a vigor, a life, and a spirit of sturdyindependence very unusual in the East, and gave a stubborn strength tothe Parthian monarchy, in which Oriental governments have for the mostpart been wanting. 

There were probably several grades of rank among the nobles. The highestdignity in the kingdom, next to the Crown, was that of Surena, or"Field-Marshal;" and this position was hereditary in a particularfamily, which can have stood but a little below the royal house inwealth and consequence. The head of this noble house is stated to haveat one time brought into the field as many as 10, 000 retainers andslaves, of whom a thousand were heavy-armed. It was his right to placethe diadem on the king's brow at his coronation. The other nobles livedfor the most part on their domains, but took the field at the headof their retainers in case of war, and in peace sometimes served theoffices of satrap, vizier, or royal councillor. The wealth of the classwas great; its members were inclined to be turbulent, and, likethe barons of the European kingdoms, acted as a constant check andcounterpoise to the royal dignity. 

Next to war, the favorite employment of the king and of the nobleswas hunting. The lion continued in the wild state an occupant of theMesopotamian river-banks and marshes; and in other parts of the empirebears, leopards, and even tigers abounded. Thus the higher kinds ofsport were readily obtainable. The ordinary practice, however, ofthe monarch and his courtiers seems to have fallen short of the truesportsman's ideal. Instead of seeking the more dangerous kinds ofwild beasts in their native haunts, and engaging with them under theconditions designed by nature, the Parthians were generally contentwith a poorer and tamer method. They kept lions, leopards, and bears inenclosed parks, or "paradises, " and found pleasure in the pursuit andslaughter of these denaturalized and half-domesticated animals. Theemployment may still, even under these circumstances, have containedan element of danger which rendered it exciting; but it was a poorsubstitute for the true sport which the "mighty Hunter before the Lord"had first practised in these regions. 

The ordinary dress of the Parthian noble was a long loose robe reachingto the feet, under which he wore a vest and trousers. Bright andvaried colors were affected, and sometimes dresses were interwoven orembroidered with gold. In seasons of festivity garlands of fresh flowerswere worn upon the head. A long knife or dagger was carried at alltimes, which might be used either as an implement or as a weapon. 

In the earlier period of the empire the Parthian was noted as a spareliver; but, as time went on, he aped the vices of more civilizedpeoples, and became an indiscriminate eater and a hard drinker. Gameformed a main portion of his diet; but he occasionally indulged in pork, and probably in other sorts of butcher's meat. He ate leavened bread, with his meat, and various kinds of vegetables. The bread, which wasparticularly light and porous, seems to have been imported sometimes bythe Romans, who knew it as _panis aquaticus_ or _panis Parthicus_. Dateswere also consumed largely by the Parthians, and in some parts of thecountry grew to an extraordinary size. A kind of wine was made fromthem; and this seems to have been the intoxicating drink in whichthe nation generally indulged too freely. That made from the dates ofBabylon was the most highly esteemed, and was reserved for the use ofthe king and the higher order of satraps. 

Of the Parthian feasts, music was commonly an accompaniment. The flute, the pipe, the drum, and the instrument called eambuca, appear to havebeen known to them; and they understood how to combine these instrumentsin concerted harmony. They are said to have closed their feasts withdancing--an amusement of which they were inordinately fond--but this wasprobably the case only with the lower class of people. Dancing in theEast, if not associated with religion, is viewed as degrading, and, except as a religious exercise, is not indulged in by respectablepersons. 

The separation of the sexes was very decided in Parthia. The women tooktheir meals, and passed the greater portion of their life, apart fromthe men. Veils were commonly worn, as in modern Mohammedan countries;and it was regarded as essential to female delicacy that women, whethermarried or single, should converse freely with no males but either theirnear relations or eunuchs. Adultery was punished with great severity;but divorce was not difficult, and women of rank released themselvesfrom the nuptial bond on light grounds of complaint, without muchtrouble. Polygamy was the established law; and every Parthian wasentitled, besides his chief wife, to maintain as many concubines as hethought desirable. Some of the nobles supported an excessive number; butthe expenses of the seraglio prevented the generality from taking muchadvantage of the indulgence which the law permitted. 

The degree of refinement and civilization which the Parthians reachedis difficult to determine with accuracy. In mimetic art their remainscertainly do not show much taste or sense of beauty. There is someground to believe that their architecture had merit; but the existingmonuments can scarcely be taken as representations of pure Parthianwork, and may have owed their excellence (in some measure, at any rate)to foreign influence. Still, the following particulars, for which thereis good evidence, seem to imply that the nation had risen in reality farabove that "barbarism" which it was the fashion of the Greek and Romanwriters to ascribe to it. In the first place, the Parthians had aconsiderable knowledge of foreign languages. Plutarch tells us thatOrodes, the opponent of Crassus, was acquainted with the Greek languageand literature, and could enjoy the representation of a play ofEuripides. The general possession of such knowledge, at any rate by thekings and the upper classes, seems to be implied by the use of the Greekletters and language in the legends upon coins and in inscriptions. Other languages were also to some extent cultivated. The later kingsalmost invariably placed a Semitic legend upon their coins; and there isone instance of a Parthian prince adopting an Aryan legend of thetype known as Bactrian. Josephus, moreover, regarded the Parthians asfamiliar with Hebrew, or Syro-Chaldaic, and wrote his history ofthe Jewish War in his own native tongue, before he put out his Greekversion, for the benefit especially of the Parthians, among whom hedeclares that he had many readers. 

Though the Parthians had, so far as we can tell, no native literature, yet writing was familiar to them, and was widely used in matters ofbusiness. Not only were negotiations carried on with foreign powersby means of despatches, but the affairs of the empire generally wereconducted by writing. A custom-house system was established along thefrontier, and all commodities liable to duty that entered the countrywere registered in a book at the time of entry by the custom-houseofficer. In the great cities where the Court passed a portion of theyear, account was kept of the arrival of strangers, whose names anddescriptions were placed upon record by the keepers of the gates. Theorders of the Crown were signified in writing to the satraps; and theydoubtless corresponded with the Court in the same way. In the earliertimes the writing material commonly used was linen; but shortly beforethe time of Pliny, the Parthians began to make paper from the papyrus, which grew in the neighborhood of Babylon, though they still employed inpreference the old material. 

There was a considerable trade between Parthia and Rome, carried onby means of a class of merchants. Parthia imported from Rome variousmetals, and numerous manufactured articles of a high class. Herprincipal exports were textile fabrics and spices. The textile fabricsseem to have been produced chiefly in Babylonia, and to have consistedof silks, carpets, and coverlets. The silks were largely used by theRoman ladies. The coverlets, which were patterned with various colors, fetched enormous prices, and were regarded as fit adornments of theImperial palace. Among the spices exported, the most celebrated worebdellium, and the _juncus odoratus_ or odoriferous bulrush. 

The Parthians had many liberal usages which imply a fairly advancedcivilization. Their tolerance of varieties in religion has been alreadymentioned. Even in political matters they seem to have been free fromthe narrowness which generally characterizes barbarous nations. Theybehaved well to prisoners, admitted foreigners freely to offices of hightrust, gave an asylum to refugees, and treated them with respect andkindness, were scrupulous observers of their pledged word, and eminentlyfaithful to their treaty obligations. On the other hand, it must beadmitted that they had some customs which indicate a tinge of barbarism. They used torture for the extraction of answers from reluctant persons, employed the scourge to punish trifling offences, and, in certaincases, condescended to mutilate the bodies of their dead enemies. Theiraddiction to intemperance is also a barbaric trait. They were, no doubt, on the whole, less civilized than either the Greeks or Romans; but thedifference does not seem to have been so great as represented by theclassical writers. 

Speaking broadly, the position that they occupied was somewhat similarto that which the Turks hold in the system of modern Europe. They had amilitary strength which caused them to be feared and respected, a vigorof administration which was felt to imply many sterling qualities. Acertain coarseness and rudeness attached to them which they found itimpossible to shake off; and this drawback was exaggerated by theirrivals into an indication of irreclaimable barbarity. Except in respectof their military prowess, it may be doubtful if justice is done them byany classical writer. They were not merely the sole rival which dared tostand up against Rome in the interval between B. C. 65 and A. D. 226, butthey were a rival falling in many respects very little below the greatpower whose glories have thrown them so much into the shade. Theymaintained from first to last a freedom unknown to later Rome;they excelled the Romans in toleration and in liberal treatmentof foreigners, they equalled them in manufactures and in materialprosperity, and they fell but little short of them in the extent andproductiveness of their dominions. They were the second power in theworld for nearly three centuries, and formed a counterpoise to Romewhich greatly checked Roman decline, and, by forcing the Empire to exertitself, prevented stagnation and corruption. 

It must, however, be confessed, that the tendency of the Parthianswas to degenerate. Although the final blow was struck in an unexpectedquarter, and perhaps surprised the victors as much as the vanquished, still it is apparent that for a considerable space before the revolt ofArtaxerxes the Parthian Empire had shown signs of failing strength, andhad tended rapidly towards decay and ruin. The constant quarrels amongthe Arsacidae and the incipient disintegration of the Empire have beennoticed. It may be added here that a growing barbarism, a decline in artand letters, is observable in the Parthian remains, such as have usuallybeen found to accompany the decrepitude of a nation. The coinage hasfrom first to last a somewhat rude character, which indicates that itis native, and not the production of Greek artists. But on the earliercoins the type, though not indicative of high art, is respectable, andthe legends are, with few exceptions, perfectly correct and classical. Barbarism first creeps in about the reign of Gotarzes, A. D. 42-51. Itincreases as time goes on, until, from about A. D. 133, the Greek legendupon the coins becomes indistinct and finally unintelligible, theletters being strewn about the surface of the coin, like dead soldiersover a field of battle. It is, clear that the later directors ofthe mint were completely ignorant of Greek, and merely attempted toreproduce on the coin some semblance of a language which neither theynor their countrymen understood. Such a condition of a coinage is almostwithout parallel, and indicates a want of truth and honesty in theconduct of affairs which implies deep-seated corruption. The Parthiansmust have lost the knowledge of Greek about A. D. 130, yetstill a pretence of using the language was kept up. On thetetra-drachms--comparatively rare coins--no important mistake wascommitted; but on the more usual drachm, from the time of Gotarzes, themost absurd errors were introduced, and thenceforth perpetuated. Theold inscription was, in a certain sense, imitated, but every word of itceased to be legible: the old figures disappeared in an indistincthaze, and--if we except the head and name of the king (written now in aSemitic character)--the whole emblazonment of the coin became unmeaning. A degeneracy less marked, but still sufficiently clear to the numismaticcritic, is observable in the heads of the kings, which, in the earliertimes, if a little coarse, are striking and characteristic; while in thelater they sink to a conventional type, rudely and poorly rendered, andso uniform that the power of distinguishing one sovereign fromanother rests no longer upon feature, but upon mere differences in thearrangement of hair, or beard, or head-dress.