THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

By

JEFFERSON DAVIS

PREFACE. 

The object of this work has been from historical data to show that theSouthern States had rightfully the power to withdraw from a Union intowhich they had, as sovereign communities, voluntarily entered; that thedenial of that right was a violation of the letter and spirit of thecompact between the States; and that the war waged by the FederalGovernment against the seceding States was in disregard of thelimitations of the Constitution, and destructive of the principles ofthe Declaration of Independence. 

The author, from his official position, may claim to have known much ofthe motives and acts of his countrymen immediately before and during thewar of 1861-'65, and he has sought to furnish material far the futurehistorian, who, when the passions and prejudices of the day shall havegiven place to reason and sober thought, may, better than acontemporary, investigate the causes, conduct, and results of the war. 

The incentive to undertake the work now offered to the public was thedesire to correct misapprehensions created by industriously circulatedmisrepresentations as to the acts and purposes of the people and theGeneral Government of the Confederate States. By the reiteration of suchunappropriate terms as "rebellion" and "treason, " and the asseverationthat the South was levying war against the United States, those ignorantof the nature of the Union, and of the reserved powers of the States, have been led to believe that the Confederate States were in thecondition of revolted provinces, and that the United States were forcedto resort to arms for the preservation of their existence. To those whoknew that the Union was formed for specific enumerated purposes, andthat the States had never surrendered their sovereignty it was apalpable absurdity to apply to them, or to their citizens when obeyingtheir mandates, the terms "rebellion" and "treason"; and, further, it isshown in the following pages that the Confederate States, so far frommaking war or seeking to destroy the United States, as soon as they hadan official organ, strove earnestly, by peaceful recognition, toequitably adjust all questions growing out of the separation from theirlate associates. 

Another great perversion of truth has been the arraignment of the menwho participated in the formation of the Confederacy and who bore armsin its defense, as the instigators of a controversy leading to disunion. Sectional issues appear conspicuously in the debates of the Conventionwhich framed the Federal Constitution, and its many compromises weredesigned to secure an equilibrium between the sections, and to preservethe interests as well as the liberties of the several States. Africanservitude at that time was not confined to a section, but wasnumerically greater in the South than in the North, with a tendency toits continuance in the former and cessation in the latter. It thereforethus early presents itself as a disturbing element, and the provisionsof the Constitution, which were known to be necessary for its adoption, bound all the States to recognize and protect that species of property. When at a subsequent period there arose in the Northern States anantislavery agitation, it was a harmless and scarcely noticed movementuntil political demagogues seized upon it as a means to acquire power. Had it been left to pseudo-philanthropists and fanatics, most zealouswhere least informed, it never could have shaken the foundations of theUnion and have incited one section to carry fire and sword into theother. That the agitation was political in its character, and wasclearly developed as early as 1803, it is believed has been establishedin these pages. To preserve a sectional equilibrium and to maintain theequality of the States was the effort on one side, to acquire empire wasthe manifest purpose on the other. This struggle began before the men ofthe Confederacy were born; how it arose and how it progressed it hasbeen attempted briefly to show. Its last stage was on the question ofterritorial governments; and, if in this work it has not beendemonstrated that the position of the South was justified by theConstitution and the equal rights of the people of all the States, itmust be because the author has failed to present the subject with asufficient degree of force and clearness. 

In describing the events of the war, space has not permitted, and theloss of both books and papers has prevented, the notice of very manyentitled to consideration, as well for the humanity as the gallantry ofour men in the unequal combats they fought. These numerous omissions, itis satisfactory to know, the official reports made at the time and thesubsequent contributions which have been and are being published by theactors, will supply more fully and graphically than could have been donein this work. 

Usurpations of the Federal Government have been presented, not in aspirit of hostility, but as a warning to the people against the dangersby which their liberties are beset. When the war ceased, the pretext onwhich it had been waged could no longer be alleged. The emancipationproclamation of Mr. Lincoln, which, when it was issued, he humorouslyadmitted to be a nullity, had acquired validity by the action of thehighest authority known to our institutions--the people assembled intheir several State Conventions. The soldiers of the Confederacy hadlaid down their arms, had in good faith pledged themselves to abstainfrom further hostile operations, and had peacefully dispersed to theirhomes; there could not, then, have been further dread of them by theGovernment of the United States. The plea of necessity could, therefore, no longer exist for hostile demonstration against the people and Statesof the deceased Confederacy. Did vengeance, which stops at the grave, subside? Did real peace and the restoration of the States to theirformer rights and positions follow, as was promised on the restorationof the Union? Let the recital of the invasion of the reserved powers ofthe States, or the people, and the perversion of the republican form ofgovernment guaranteed to each State by the Constitution, answer thequestion. For the deplorable fact of the war, for the cruel manner inwhich it was waged, for the sad physical and yet sadder moral results itproduced, the reader of these pages, I hope, will admit that the South, in the forum of conscience, stands fully acquitted. 

Much of the past is irremediable; the best hope for a restoration in thefuture to the pristine purity and fraternity of the Union, rests on theopinions and character of the men who are to succeed this generation:that they maybe suited to that blessed work, one, whose public course isended, invokes them to draw their creed from the fountains of ourpolitical history, rather than from the lower stream, polluted as it hasbeen by self-seeking place-hunters and by sectional strife. 

THE AUTHOR. 

CONTENTS. 

Introduction

PART I. 

CHAPTER I. 

African Servitude. --A Retrospect. --Early Legislation with Regard to theSlave-Trade. --The Southern States foremost in prohibiting it. --A CommonError corrected. --The Ethical Question never at Issue in SectionalControversies. --The Acquisition of Louisiana. --The MissouriCompromise. --The Balance of Power. --Note. --The Indiana Case. 

CHAPTER II. 

The Session of 1849-'50. --The Compromise Measures. --Virtual Abrogationof the Missouri Compromise. --The Admission of California. --The FugitiveSlave Law. --Death of Mr. Calhoun. --Anecdote of Mr. Clay. 

CHAPTER III. 

Reëlection to the Senate. --Political Controversies inMississippi. --Action of the Democratic State Convention. --Defeat of theState-Rights Party. --Withdrawal of General Quitman and Nomination of theAuthor as Candidate for the Office of Governor. --The Canvass and itsResult. --Retirement to Private Life. 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Author enters the Cabinet. --Administration of the WarDepartment. --Surveys for a Pacific Railway. --Extension of theCapitol. --New Regiments organized. --Colonel Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General. --A Bit of Civil-Service Reform. --Reëlection to theSenate. --Continuity of the Pierce Cabinet. --Character of FranklinPierce. 

CHAPTER V. 

The Territorial Question. --An Incident at the White House. --The Kansasand Nebraska Bill. --The Missouri Compromise abrogated in 1850, not in1854. --Origin of "Squatter Sovereignty. "--Sectional Rivalry and itsConsequences. --The Emigrant Aid Societies. --"The Bible and Sharpe'sRifles. "--False Pretensions as to Principle. --The Strife in Kansas. --ARetrospect. --The Original Equilibrium of Power and its Overthrow. --Usurpations of the Federal Government. --The Protective Tariff. --Origin and Progress of Abolitionism. --Who were the Friends ofthe Union?--An Illustration of Political Morality. 

CHAPTER VI. 

Agitation continued. --Political Parties: their Origin, Changes, andModifications. --Some Account of the "Popular Sovereignty, " or"Non-Intervention, " Theory. --Rupture of the Democratic Party. --The JohnBrown Raid. --Resolutions introduced by the Author into the Senate on theRelations of the States, the Federal Government, and the Territories;their Discussion and Adoption. 

CHAPTER VII. 

A Retrospect. --Growth of Sectional Rivalry. --The Generosity ofVirginia. --Unequal Accessions of Territory. --The Tariff and itsEffects. --The Republican Convention of 1860, its Resolutions and itsNominations. --The Democratic Convention at Charleston, its Divisions andDisruption. --The Nominations at Baltimore. --The "Constitutional-Union"Party and its Nominees. --An Effort in Behalf of Agreement declined byMr. Douglas. --The Election of Lincoln and Hamlin. --Proceedings in theSouth. --Evidences of Calmness and Deliberation. --Mr. Buchanan'sConservatism and the weakness of his Position. --Republican Taunts. --The"New York Tribune, " etc. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Conference with the Governor of Mississippi. --The Author censured as"too slow. "--Summons to Washington. --Interview with the President. --HisMessage. --Movements in Congress. --The Triumphant Majority. --TheCrittenden Proposition. --Speech of the Author on Mr. Green'sResolution. --The Committee of Thirteen. --Failure to agree. --The"Republicans" responsible for the Failure. --Proceedings in the House ofRepresentatives. --Futility of Efforts for an Adjustment. --The Old Yearcloses in Clouds. 

CHAPTER IX. 

Preparations for Withdrawal from the Union. --Northern Precedents. --NewEngland Secessionists. --Cabot, Pickering, Quincy, etc. --On theAcquisition of Louisiana. --The Hartford Convention. --The MassachusettsLegislature on the Annexation of Texas, etc. , etc. 70

CHAPTER X. 

False Statements of the Grounds for Separation. --Slavery not the Cause, but an Incident. --The Southern People not "Propagandists" ofSlavery. --Early Accord among the States with regard to AfricanServitude. --Statement of the Supreme Court. --Guarantees of theConstitution. --Disregard of Oaths. --Fugitives from Service and the"Personal Liberty Laws. "--Equality in the Territories the ParamountQuestion. --The Dred Scott Case. --Disregard of the Decision of theSupreme Court. --Culmination of Wrongs. --Despair of theirRedress. --Triumph of Sectionalism. 

PART II. 

_THE CONSTITUTION. _

CHAPTER I. 

The Original Confederation. --"Articles of Confederation and PerpetualUnion. "--Their Inadequacy ascertained. --Commercial Difficulties. --TheConference at Annapolis. --Recommendation of a General Convention. --Resolution of Congress. --Action of the Several States. --Conclusionsdrawn therefrom. 

CHAPTER II. 

The Convention of 1787. --Diversity of Opinion. --Luther Martin's Accountof the Three Parties. --The Question of Representation. --Compromiseeffected. --Mr. Randolph's Resolutions. --The Word "National"condemned. --Plan of Government framed. --Difficulty with Regard toRatification, and its Solution. --Provision for Secession from theUnion. --Views of Mr. Gerry and Mr. Madison. --False Interpretations. --Close of the Convention. 

CHAPTER III. 

Ratification of the Constitution by the States. --Organization of the NewGovernment. --Accession of North Carolina and Rhode Island. --Correspondence between General Washington and the Governor of RhodeIsland. 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Constitution not adopted by one People "in the Aggregate. "--A GreatFallacy exposed. --Mistake of Judge Story. --Colonial Relations. --TheUnited Colonies of New England. --Other Associations. --Independence ofCommunities traced from Germany to Great Britain, and from Great Britainto America. --Mr. Everett's "Provincial People. "--Origin and Continuanceof the Title "United States. "--No such Political Community as the"People of the United States. "

CHAPTER V. 

The Preamble to the Constitution. --"We, the People. "

CHAPTER VI. 

The Preamble to the Constitution--subject continued. --Growth of theFederal Government and Accretions of Power. --Revival of OldErrors. --Mistakes and Misstatements. --Webster, Story, and Everett. --Who"ordained and established" the Constitution?

CHAPTER VII. 

Verbal Cavils and Criticisms. --"Compact, " "Confederacy, " "Accession, "etc. --The "New Vocabulary. "--The Federal Constitution a Compact, and theStates acceded to it. --Evidence of the Constitution itself and ofContemporary Records. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Sovereignty

CHAPTER IX. 

The same Subject continued. --The Tenth Amendment. --Fallaciesexposed. --"Constitution, " "Government, " and "People" distinguished fromeach other. --Theories refuted by Facts. --Characteristics ofSovereignty. --Sovereignty identified. --Never thrown away. 

CHAPTER X. 

A Recapitulation. --Remarkable Propositions of Mr. Gouverneur Morris inthe Convention of 1787, and their Fate. --Further Testimony. --Hamilton, Madison, Washington, Marshall, etc. --Later Theories. --Mr. Webster: hisViews at Various Periods. --Speech at Capon Springs. --State Rights not aSectional Theory. 

CHAPTER XI. 

The Right of Secession. --The Law of Unlimited Partnerships. --The"Perpetual Union" of the Articles of Confederation and the "More PerfectUnion" of the Constitution. --The Important Powers conferred upon theFederal Government and the Fundamental Principles of the Compact thesame in both Systems. --The Right to resume Grants, when failing tofulfill their Purposes, expressly and distinctly asserted in theAdoption of the Constitution. 

CHAPTER XII. 

Coercion the Alternative to Secession. --Repudiation of it by theConstitution and the Fathers of the Constitutional Era. --Differencebetween Mr. Webster and Mr. Hamilton. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Some Objections considered. --The New States. --AcquiredTerritory. --Allegiance, false and true. --Difference betweenNullification and Secession. --Secession a Peaceable Remedy. --No Appealto Arms. --Two Conditions noted. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

Early Foreshadowings. --Opinions of Mr. Madison and Mr. RufusKing. --Safeguards provided. --Their Failure. --State Interposition. --TheKentucky and Virginia Resolutions. --Their Endorsement by the People inthe Presidential Elections of 1800 and Ensuing Terms. --South Carolinaand Mr. Calhoun. --The Compromise of 1833. --Action of Massachusetts in1843-'45. --Opinions of John Quincy Adams. --Necessity for Secession. 

CHAPTER XV. 

A Bond of Union necessary after the Declaration ofIndependence. --Articles of Confederation. --The Constitution of theUnited States. --The Same Principle for obtaining Grants of Power inboth. --The Constitution an Instrument enumerating the Powersdelegated. --The Power of Amendment merely a Power to amend the DelegatedGrants. --A Smaller Power was required for Amendment than for aGrant. --The Power of Amendment is confined to Grants of theConstitution. --Limitations on the Power of Amendment. 

PART III. 

_SECESSION AND CONFEDERATION. _

CHAPTER I. 

Opening of the New Year. --The People in Advance of theirRepresentatives. --Conciliatory Conduct of Southern Members ofCongress. --Sensational Fictions. --Misstatements of the Count ofParis. --Obligations of a Senator. --The Southern Forts andArsenals. --Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens. --The Alleged "Caucus" and itsResolutions. --Personal Motives and Feelings. --The Presidency not aDesirable Office. --Letter from the Hon. C. C. Clay. 

CHAPTER II. 

Tenure of Public Property ceded by the States. --Sovereignty and EminentDomain. --Principles asserted by Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, andother States. --The Charleston Forts. --South Carolina sends Commissionersto Washington. --Sudden Movement of Major Anderson. --Correspondence ofthe Commissioners with the President. --Interviews of the Author with Mr. Buchanan. --Major Anderson. --The Star of the West. --The President'sSpecial Message. --Speech of the Author in the Senate. --FurtherProceedings and Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter. --Mr. Buchanan'sRectitude in Purpose and Vacillation in Action. 

CHAPTER III. 

Secession of Mississippi and Other States. --Withdrawal ofSenators. --Address of the Author on taking Leave of the Senate. --Answerto Certain Objections. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Threats of Arrest. --Departure from Washington. --Indications of PublicAnxiety. --"Will there be war?"--Organization of the "Army ofMississippi. "--Lack of Preparations for Defense in the South. --Evidencesof the Good Faith and Peaceable Purposes of the Southern People. 

CHAPTER V. 

Meeting of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States. --Adoptionof a Provisional Constitution. --Election of President andVice-President. --Notification to the Author of his Election. --His Viewswith Regard to it. --Journey to Montgomery. --Interview with JudgeSharkey. --False Reports of Speeches on the Way. --InauguralAddress. --Editor's Note. 

CHAPTER VI. 

The Confederate Cabinet. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Early Acts of the Confederate Congress. --Laws of the United Statescontinued in Force. --Officers of Customs and Revenue continued inOffice. --Commission to the United States. --Navigation of theMississippi. --Restrictions on the Coasting-Trade removed. --Appointmentof Commissioners to Washington. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Peace Conference. --Demand for "a Little Bloodletting. "--Planproposed by the Conference. --Its Contemptuous Reception and Treatment inthe United States Congress. --Failure of Last Efforts at Reconciliationand Reunion. --Note. --Speech of General Lane, of Oregon. 

CHAPTER IX. 

Northern Protests against Coercion. --The "New York Tribune, " Albany"Argus, " and "New York Herald. "--Great Public Meeting in NewYork. --Speeches of Mr. Thayer, ex-Governor Seymour, ex-ChancellorWalworth, and Others. --The Press in February, 1861. --Mr. Lincoln'sInaugural. --The Marvelous Change or Suppression of ConservativeSentiment. --Historic Precedents. 

CHAPTER X. 

Temper of the Southern People indicated by the Action of the ConfederateCongress. --The Permanent Constitution. --Modeled after the FederalConstitution. --Variations and Special Provisions. --Provisions withRegard to Slavery and the Slave-Trade. --A False Assertionrefuted. --Excellence of the Constitution. --Admissions of Hostile orImpartial Criticism. 

CHAPTER XI. 

The Commission to Washington City. --Arrival of Mr. Crawford. --Mr. Buchanan's Alarm. --Note of the Commissioners to the NewAdministration. --Mediation of Justices Nelson and Campbell. --TheDifficulty about Forts Sumter and Pickens. --Mr. Secretary Seward'sAssurances. --Duplicity of the Government at Washington. --Mr. Fox's Visitto Charleston. --Secret Preparations for Coercive Measures. --Visit of Mr. Lamon. --Renewed Assurances of Good Faith. --Notification to GovernorPickens. --Developments of Secret History. --Systematic and ComplicatedPerfidy exposed. 

CHAPTER XII. 

Protests against the Conduct of the Government of the UnitedStates. --Senator Douglas's Proposition to evacuate the Forts, andExtracts from his Speech in Support of it. --General Scott'sAdvice. --Manly Letter of Major Anderson, protesting against the Actionof the Federal Government. --Misstatements of the Count ofParis. --Correspondence relative to Proposed Evacuation of the Fort. --ACrisis. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

A Pause and a Review. --Attitude of the Two Parties. --Sophistry exposedand Shams torn away. --Forbearance of the Confederate Government. --Whowas the Aggressor?--Major Anderson's View, and that of a NavalOfficer. --Mr. Horace Greeley on the Fort Sumter Case. --The Bombardmentand Surrender. --Gallant Action of ex-Senator Wigfall. --Mr. Lincoln'sStatement of the Case. 

PART IV. 

_THE WAR. _

CHAPTER I. 

Failure of the Peace Congress. --Treatment of the Commissioners. --TheirWithdrawal. --Notice of an Armed Expedition. --Action of the ConfederateGovernment. --Bombardment and Surrender of Fort Sumter. --Its Reductionrequired by the Exigency of the Case. --Disguise thrown off. --PresidentLincoln's Call for Seventy-five Thousand Men. --His Fiction of"Combinations. "--Palpable Violation of the Constitution. --Action ofVirginia. --Of Citizens of Baltimore. --The Charge of Precipitationagainst South Carolina. --Action of the Confederate Government. --TheUniversal Feeling. 

CHAPTER II. 

The Supply of Arms; of Men. --Love of the Union. --Secessionistsfew. --Efforts to prevent the Final Step. --Views of the People. --Effecton their Agriculture. --Aid from African Servitude. --Answer to theClamors on the Horrors of Slavery. --Appointment of a Commissary-General. --His Character and Capacity. --Organization, Instruction, and Equipment of the Army. --Action of Congress. --The Law. --ItsSignification. --The Hope of a Peaceful Solution early entertained;rapidly diminished. --Further Action of Congress. --Policy of theGovernment for Peace. --Position of Officers of United StatesArmy. --The Army of the States, not of the Government. --The ConfederateLaw observed by the Government. --Officers retiring from United StatesArmy. --Organization of Bureaus. 

CHAPTER III. 

Commissioners to purchase Arms and Ammunition. --My Letter to CaptainSemmes. --Resignations of Officers of United States Navy. --OurDestitution of Accessories for the Supply of Naval Vessels. --SecretaryMallory. --Food-Supplies. --The Commissariat Department. --TheQuartermaster's Department. --The Disappearance of Delusions. --The Supplyof Powder. --Saltpeter. --Sulphur. --Artificial Niter-Beds. --Services ofGeneral G. W. Rains. --Destruction at Harper's Ferry of Machinery. --TheMaster Armorer. --Machinery secured. --Want of Skillful Employees. --Difficulties encountered by Every Department of the Executive Branchof the Government. 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Proclamation for Seventy-five Thousand Men by President Lincolnfurther examined. --The Reasons presented by him to Mankind for theJustification of his Conduct shown to be Mere Fictions, having noRelation to the Question. --What is the Value of Constitutional Liberty, of Bills of Rights, of Limitations of Powers, if they may betransgressed at Pleasure?--Secession of South Carolina. --Proclamation ofBlockade. --Session of Congress at Montgomery. --Extracts from thePresident's Message. --Acts of Congress. --Spirit of the People. --Secession of Border States. --Destruction of United States Property byOrder of President Lincoln. 

CHAPTER V. 

Maryland first approached by Northern Invasion. --Denies to United StatesTroops the Right of Way across her Domain. --Mission of JudgeHandy. --Views of Governor Hicks. --His Proclamation. --Arrival ofMassachusetts Troops at Baltimore. --Passage through the Citydisputed. --Activity of the Police. --Burning of Bridges. --Letter ofPresident Lincoln to the Governor. --Visited by Citizens. --Action of theState Legislature. --Occupation of the Relay House. --The City Armssurrendered. --City in Possession of United States Troops. --Remonstrancesof the City to the Passage of Troops disregarded. --Citizens arrested;also, Members of the Legislature. --Accumulation of Northern Forces atWashington. --Invasion of West Virginia by a Force underMcClellan. --Attack at Philippi; at Laurel Hill. --Death of GeneralGarnett. 

CHAPTER VI. 

Removal of the Seat of Government to Richmond. --Message to Congress atRichmond. --Confederate Forces in Virginia. --Forces of the Enemy. --Letterto General Johnston. --Combat at Bethel Church. --Affair atRomney. --Movements of McDowell. --Battle of Manassas. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Conference with the Generals after the Battle. --Order to pursue theEnemy. --Evidences of a Thorough Rout. --"Sweet to die for such aCause. "--Movements of the Next Day. --What more it was practicable todo. --Charge against the President of preventing the Capture ofWashington. --The Failure to pursue. --Reflection on the President. --General Beauregard's Report. --Endorsement upon it. --Strengthof the Opposing Forces. --Extracts relating to the Battle, from theNarrative of General Early. --Resolutions of Congress. --Efforts toincrease the Efficiency of the Army. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-'99. --Their Influence on PoliticalAffairs. --Kentucky declares for Neutrality. --Correspondence of GovernorMagoffin with the President of the United States and the President ofthe Confederate States. --Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky, byMajor-General Polk. --His Correspondence with the KentuckyCommissioners. --President Lincoln's View of Neutrality. --Acts of theUnited States Government. --Refugees. --Their Motives of Expatriation. --Address of ex-Vice-President Breckinridge to the People of theState. --The Occupation of Columbus secured. --The Purpose of theUnited States Government. --Battle of Belmont. --Albert Sidney Johnstoncommands the Department. --State of Affairs. --Line of Defense. -Efforts toobtain Arms; also Troops. 

CHAPTER IX. 

The Coercion of Missouri. --Answers of the Governors of States toPresident Lincoln's Requisition for Troops. --Restoration of FortsCaswell and Johnson to the United States Government. --Condition ofMissouri similar to that of Kentucky. --Hostilities, how initiated inMissouri. --Agreement between Generals Price and Harney. --Its FavorableEffects. --General Harney relieved of Command by the United StatesGovernment because of his Pacific Policy. --Removal of Public Arms fromMissouri. --Searches for and Seizure of Arms. --Missouri on the Side ofPeace. --Address of General Price to the People. --Proclamation ofGovernor Jackson. --Humiliating Concessions of the Governor to the UnitedStates Government, for the sake of Peace. --Demands of the FederalOfficers. --Revolutionary Principles attempted to be enforced by theUnited States Government. --The Action at Booneville. --The Patriot Armyof Militia. --Further Rout of the Enemy. --Heroism and Self-sacrifice ofthe People. --Complaints and Embarrassments--Zeal: its effects. --Actionof Congress. --Battle of Springfield. --General Price. --Battle atLexington. --Bales of Hemp. --Other Combats. 

CHAPTER X. 

Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise takes command in Western Virginia. --HisMovements. --Advance of General John B. Floyd. --Defeats theEnemy. --Attacked by Rosecrans. --Controversy between Wise andFloyd. --General R. E. Lee takes the Command in West Virginia. --Movementon Cheat Mountain. --Its Failure. --Further Operations. --WinterQuarters. --Lee sent to South Carolina. 

CHAPTER XI. 

The Issue. --The American Idea of Government. --Who was responsible forthe War?--Situation of Virginia. --Concentration of the Enemy againstRichmond. --Our Difficulty. --Unjust Criticisms. --The Facts setforth. --Organization of the Army. --Conference at FairfaxCourt-House. --Inaction of the Army. --Capture of Romney. --Troops orderedto retire to the Valley. --Discipline. --General Johnston regards hisPosition as unsafe. --The First Policy. --Retreat of GeneralJohnston. --The Plans of the Enemy. --Our Strength magnified by theEnemy. --Stores destroyed. --The Trent Affair. 

CHAPTER XII. 

Supply of Arms at the Beginning of the War; of Powder; of Batteries; ofother Articles. --Contents of Arsenals. --Other Stores, Mills, etc. --FirstEfforts to obtain Powder, Niter, and Sulphur. --Construction of Millscommenced. --Efforts to supply Arms, Machinery, Field-Artillery, Ammunition, Equipment, and Saltpeter. --Results in 1862. --GovernmentPowder-Mills; how organized. --Success. --Efforts to obtainLead. --Smelting-Works. --Troops, how armed. --Winter of 1862. --Supplies. --Niter and Mining Bureau. --Equipment of First Armies. --Receipts byBlockade-Runners. --Arsenal at Richmond. --Armories at Richmond andFayetteville. --A Central Laboratory built at Macon. --Statement ofGeneral Gorgas. --Northern Charge against General Floyd answered. --Charge of Slowness against the President answered. --Quantities ofArms purchased that could not be shipped in 1861. --Letter of Mr. Huse. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Extracts from my Inaugural. --Our Financial System: Receipts andExpenditures of the First Year. --Resources, Loans, and Taxes. --Loansauthorized. --Notes and Bonds. --Funding Notes. --Treasury Notes guaranteedby the States. --Measure to reduce the Currency. --Operation of theGeneral System. --Currency fundable. --Taxation. --PopularAversion. --Compulsory Reduction of the Currency. --Tax Law. --SuccessfulResult. --Financial Condition of the Government at its Close. --Sourceswhence Revenue was derived. --Total Public Debt. --System of Direct Taxesand Revenue. --The Tariff. --War-Tax of Fifty Cents on a HundredDollars. --Property subject to it. --Every Resource of the Country to bereached. --Tax paid by the States mostly. --Obstacle to the taking of theCensus. --The Foreign Debt. --Terms of the Contract. --Premium. --Falsecharge against me of Repudiation. --Facts stated. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

Military Laws and Measures. --Agricultural Productsdiminished. --Manufactures flourishing. --The Call for Volunteers. --TheTerm of Three Years. --Improved Discipline. --The Law assailed. --ImportantConstitutional Question raised. --Its Discussion at Length. --Power of theGovernment over its own Armies and the Militia. --Object ofConfederations. --The War-Powers granted. --Two Modes of raising Armies inthe Confederate States. --Is the Law necessary and proper?--Congress isthe Judge under the Grant of Specific Power. --What is meant byMilitia. --Whole Military Strength divided into Two Classes. --Powers ofCongress. --Objections answered. --Good Effects of the Law. --TheLimitations enlarged. --Results of the Operations of these Laws. --Act forthe Employment of Slaves. --Message to Congress. --"Died of aTheory. "--Act to use Slaves as Soldiers passed. --Not Time to put it inOperation. 

APPENDIXES. 

[Transcriber's Note: There is no Appendix A. ]

APPENDIX B. 

Speech of the Author on the Oregon Question

APPENDIX C. 

Extracts from Speeches of the Author on the Resolutions of Compromiseproposed by Mr. Clay

On the Reception of a Memorial from Inhabitants of Pennsylvania andDelaware, praying that Congress would adopt Measures for an Immediateand Peaceful Dissolution of the Union

On the Resolutions of Mr. Clay relative to Slavery in the Territories

APPENDIX D. 

Speech of the Author on the Message of the President of the UnitedStates, transmitting to Congress the "Lecompton Constitution" of Kansas

APPENDIX E. 

Address of the Author to Citizens of Portland, Maine

Address of the Author at a Public Meeting in Faneuil Hall, Boston; withthe Introductory Remarks by Caleb Cushing

APPENDIX F. 

Speech of the Author in the Senate, on the Resolutions relative to theRelations of the States, the Federal Government, and the Territories

APPENDIX G. 

Correspondence between the Commissioners of South Carolina and thePresident of the United States (Mr. Buchanan), relative to the Forts inthe Harbor of Charleston

APPENDIX H. 

Speech of the Author on a Motion to print the Special Message of thePresident of the United States of January 9, 1861

APPENDIX I. 

Correspondence and Extracts from Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter, from the Affair of the Star of the West, January 9, 1861, to theWithdrawal of the Envoy of South Carolina from Washington, February 8, 1861

APPENDIX K. 

The Provisional Constitution of the Confederate States, adopted February8, 1861

The Constitution of the United States and the Permanent Constitution ofthe Confederate States, in Parallel Columns

APPENDIX L. 

Correspondence between the Confederate Commissioners, Mr. SecretarySeward, and Judge Campbell

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Jefferson Davis, aged Thirty-two

J. C. Calhoun

Briarfield, Early Residence of Mr. Davis

The First Confederate Cabinet

Alexander H. Stephens

General P. G. T. Beauregard

Members of President's Staff

General A. S. Johnston

General Robert E. Lee

Battle of Manassas (Map)

INTRODUCTION. 

A duty to my countrymen; to the memory of those who died in defense of acause consecrated by inheritance, as well as sustained by conviction;and to those who, perhaps less fortunate, staked all, and lost all, savelife and honor, in its behalf, has impelled me to attempt thevindication of their cause and conduct. For this purpose I have decidedto present an historical sketch of the events which preceded andattended the struggle of the Southern States to maintain their existenceand their rights as sovereign communities--the creators, not thecreatures, of the General Government. 

The social problem of maintaining the just relation betweenconstitution, government, and people, has been found so difficult, thathuman history is a record of unsuccessful efforts to establish it. Agovernment, to afford the needful protection and exercise proper carefor the welfare of a people, must have homogeneity in its constituents. It is this necessity which has divided the human race into separatenations, and finally has defeated the grandest efforts which conquerorshave made to give unlimited extent to their domain. When our fathersdissolved their connection with Great Britain, by declaring themselvesfree and independent States, they constituted thirteen separatecommunities, and were careful to assert and preserve, each for itself, its sovereignty and jurisdiction. 

At a time when the minds of men are straying far from the lessons ourfathers taught, it seems proper and well to recur to the originalprinciples on which the system of government they devised was founded. The eternal truths which they announced, the rights which they declared"_unalienable_, " are the foundation-stones on which rests thevindication of the Confederate cause. 

He must have been a careless reader of our political history who has notobserved that, whether under the style of "United Colonies" or "UnitedStates, " which was adopted after the Declaration of Independence, whether under the articles of Confederation or the compact of Union, there everywhere appears the distinct assertion of State sovereignty, and nowhere the slightest suggestion of any purpose on the part of theStates to consolidate themselves into one body. Will any candid, well-informed man assert that, at any time between 1776 and 1790, aproposition to surrender the sovereignty of the States and merge them ina central government would have had the least possible chance ofadoption? Can any historical fact be more demonstrable than that theStates did, both in the Confederation and in the Union, retain theirsovereignty and independence as distinct communities, voluntarilyconsenting to federation, but never becoming the fractional parts of anation? That such opinions should find adherents in our day, may beattributable to the natural law of aggregation; surely not to aconscientious regard for the terms of the compact for union by theStates. 

In all free governments the constitution or organic law is supreme overthe government, and in our Federal Union this was most distinctly markedby limitations and prohibitions against all which was beyond theexpressed grants of power to the General Government. In the foreground, therefore, I take the position that those who resisted violations of thecompact were the true friends, and those who maintained the usurpationof undelegated powers were the real enemies of the constitutional Union. 

PART I. 

CHAPTER I. 

 African Servitude. --A Retrospect. --Early Legislation with Regard to the Slave-Trade. --The Southern States foremost in prohibiting it. --A Common Error corrected. --The Ethical Question never at Issue in Sectional Controversies. --The Acquisition of Louisiana. --The Missouri Compromise. --The Balance of Power. --Note. --The Indiana Case. 

Inasmuch as questions growing out of the institution of negro servitude, or connected with it, will occupy a conspicuous place in what is tofollow, it is important that the reader should have, in the very outset, a right understanding of the true nature and character of thosequestions. No subject has been more generally misunderstood or morepersistently misrepresented. The institution itself has ceased to existin the United States; the generation, comprising all who took part inthe controversies to which it gave rise, or for which it afforded apretext, is passing away; and the misconceptions which have prevailed inour own country, and still more among foreigners remote from the fieldof contention, are likely to be perpetuated in the mind of posterity, unless corrected before they become crystallized by tacit acquiescence. 

It is well known that, at the time of the adoption of the FederalConstitution, African servitude existed in all the States that wereparties to that compact, unless with the single exception ofMassachusetts, in which it had, perhaps, very recently ceased to exist. The slaves, however, were numerous in the Southern, and very few in theNorthern, States. This diversity was occasioned by differences ofclimate, soil, and industrial interests--not in any degree by moralconsiderations, which at that period were not recognized, as an elementin the question. It was simply because negro labor was more profitablein the South than in the North that the importation of negro slaves hadbeen, and continued to be, chiefly directed to the Southern ports. [1]For the same reason slavery was abolished by the States of the Northernsection (though it existed in several of them for more than fifty yearsafter the adoption of the Constitution), while the importation of slavesinto the South continued to be carried on by Northern merchants andNorthern ships, without interference in the traffic from any quarter, until it was prohibited by the spontaneous action of the Southern Statesthemselves. 

The Constitution expressly forbade any interference by Congress with theslave-trade--or, to use its own language, with the "migration orimportation of such persons" as any of the States should think proper toadmit--"prior to the year 1808. " During the intervening period of morethan twenty years, the matter was exclusively under the control of therespective States. Nevertheless, every Southern State, withoutexception, either had already enacted, or proceeded to enact, lawsforbidding the importation of slaves. [2] Virginia was the first of allthe States, North or South, to prohibit it, and Georgia was the first toincorporate such a prohibition in her organic Constitution. 

Two petitions for the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade werepresented February 11 and 12, 1790, to the very first Congress convenedunder the Constitution. [3] After full discussion in the House ofRepresentatives, it was determined, with regard to the first-mentionedsubject, "that Congress have no authority to interfere in theemancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of theStates"; and, with regard to the other, that no authority existed toprohibit the migration or importation of such persons as the Statesmight think proper to admit--"prior to the year 1808. " So distinct andfinal was this statement of the limitations of the authority of Congressconsidered to be that, when a similar petition was presented two orthree years afterward, the Clerk of the House was instructed to returnit to the petitioner. [4]

In 1807, Congress, availing itself of the very earliest moment at whichthe constitutional restriction ceased to be operative, passed an actprohibiting the importation of slaves into any part of the United Statesfrom and after the first day of January, 1808. This act was passed withgreat unanimity. In the House of Representatives there were one hundredand thirteen (113) yeas to five (5) nays; and it is a significant fact, as showing the absence of any sectional division of sentiment at thatperiod, that the five dissentients were divided as equally as possiblebetween the two sections: two of them were from Northern and three fromSouthern States. [5]

The slave-trade had thus been finally abolished some months before thebirth of the author of these pages, and has never since had legalexistence in any of the United States. The question of the maintenanceor extinction of the system of negro servitude, already existing in anyState, was one exclusively belonging to such State. It is obvious, therefore, that no subsequent question, legitimately arising in Federallegislation, could properly have any reference to the merits or thepolicy of the institution itself. A few zealots in the North afterwardcreated much agitation by demands for the abolition of slavery withinthe States by Federal intervention, and by their activity andperseverance finally became a recognized party, which, holding thebalance of power between the two contending organizations in thatsection, gradually obtained the control of one, and to no small degreecorrupted the other. The dominant idea, however, at least of theabsorbed party, was sectional aggrandizement, looking to absolutecontrol, and theirs is the responsibility for the war that resulted. 

No moral nor sentimental considerations were really involved in eitherthe earlier or later controversies which so long agitated and finallyruptured the Union. They were simply struggles between differentsections, with diverse institutions and interests. 

It is absolutely requisite, in order to a right understanding of thehistory of the country, to bear these truths clearly in mind. Thephraseology of the period referred to will otherwise be essentiallydeceptive. The antithetical employment of such terms as _freedom_ and_slavery_, or "anti-slavery" and "pro-slavery, " with reference to theprinciples and purposes of contending parties or rival sections, has hadimmense influence in misleading the opinions and sympathies of theworld. The idea of freedom is captivating, that of slavery repellent tothe moral sense of mankind in general. It is easy, therefore, tounderstand the effect of applying the one set of terms to one party, theother to another, in a contest which had no just application whatever tothe essential merits of freedom or slavery. Southern statesmen mayperhaps have been too indifferent to this consideration--in their ardentpursuit of principles, overlooking the effects of phrases. 

This is especially true with regard to that familiar but most fallaciousexpression, "the extension of slavery. " To the reader unfamiliar withthe subject, or viewing it only on the surface, it would perhaps neveroccur that, as used in the great controversies respecting theTerritories of the United States, it does not, never did, and nevercould, imply the addition of a single slave to the number alreadyexisting. The question was merely whether the slaveholder should bepermitted to go, with his slaves, into territory (the common property ofall) into which the non-slaveholder could go with _his_ property of anysort. There was no proposal nor desire on the part of the SouthernStates to reopen the slave-trade, which they had been foremost insuppressing, or to add to the number of slaves. It was a question of thedistribution, or dispersion, of the slaves, rather than of the"extension of slavery. " Removal is not extension. Indeed, ifemancipation was the end to be desired, the dispersion of the negroesover a wider area among additional Territories, eventually to becomeStates, and in climates unfavorable to slave-labor, instead ofhindering, would have promoted this object by diminishing thedifficulties in the way of ultimate emancipation. 

The distinction here defined between the distribution, or dispersion, ofslaves and the extension of slavery--two things altogether different, although so generally confounded--was early and clearly drawn undercircumstances and in a connection which justify a fuller notice. 

Virginia, it is well known, in the year 1784, ceded to the UnitedStates--then united only by the original Articles of Confederation--hervast possessions northwest of the Ohio, from which the great States ofOhio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota, have since been formed. In 1787--before the adoption of the FederalConstitution--the celebrated "Ordinance" for the government of thisNorthwestern Territory was adopted by the Congress, with the fullconsent, and indeed at the express instance, of Virginia. This Ordinanceincluded six definite "Articles of compact between the original Statesand the people and States in the said Territory, " which were to "forever remain unalterable unless by common consent. " The sixth of thesearticles ordains that "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntaryservitude in the said Territory, otherwise than in the punishment ofcrimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. "

In December, 1805, a petition of the Legislative Council and House ofRepresentatives of the Indiana Territory--then comprising all the areanow occupied by the States of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, andWisconsin--was presented to Congress. It appears from the proceedings ofthe House of Representatives that several petitions of the same purportfrom inhabitants of the Territory, accompanied by a letter from WilliamHenry Harrison, the Governor (afterward President of the United States), had been under consideration nearly two years earlier. The prayer ofthese petitions was for a _suspension_ of the sixth article of theOrdinance, so as to permit the introduction of slaves into theTerritory. The whole subject was referred to a select committee of sevenmembers, consisting of representatives from Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Kentucky, and New York, and the delegatefrom the Indiana Territory. 

On the 14th of the ensuing February (1806), this committee made a reportfavorable to the prayer of the petitioners, and recommending asuspension of the prohibitory article for ten years. In their report thecommittee, after stating their opinion that a qualified suspension ofthe article in question would be beneficial to the people of the IndianaTerritory, proceeded to say:

 "The suspension of this article is an object almost universally desired in that Territory. It appears to your committee to be a question entirely different from that between slavery and freedom, inasmuch as it would merely occasion the removal of persons, already slaves, from one part of the country to another. The good effects of this suspension, in the present instance, would be to accelerate the population of that Territory, hitherto retarded by the operation of that article of compact; as slaveholders emigrating into the Western country might then indulge any preference which they might feel for a settlement in the Indiana Territory, instead of seeking, as they are now compelled to do, settlements in other States or countries permitting the introduction of slaves. The condition of the slaves themselves would be much ameliorated by it, as it is evident, from experience, that the more they are separated and diffused the more care and attention are bestowed on them by their masters, each proprietor having it in his power to increase their comforts and conveniences in proportion to the smallness of their numbers. "

These were the dispassionate utterances of representatives of every partof the Union--men contemporary with the origin of the Constitution, speaking before any sectional division had arisen in connection with thesubject. It is remarkable that the very same opinions which they expressand arguments which they adduce had, fifty years afterward, come to bedenounced and repudiated by one half of the Union as partisan andsectional when propounded by the other half. 

No final action seems to have been taken on the subject before theadjournment of Congress, but it was brought forward at the next sessionin a more imposing form. On the 20th of January, 1807, the Speaker laidbefore the House of Representatives a letter from Governor Harrison, inclosing certain resolutions formally and _unanimously_ adopted by theLegislative Council and House of Representatives of the IndianaTerritory, in favor of the suspension of the sixth article of theOrdinance and the introduction of slaves into the Territory, which theysay would "meet the approbation of at least nine tenths of the goodcitizens of the same. " Among the resolutions were the following:

 "_Resolved unanimously_, That the abstract question of liberty and slavery is not considered as involved in a suspension of the said article, inasmuch as the number of slaves in the United States _would not be augmented_ by this measure. 

 "_Resolved unanimously_, That the suspension of the said article would be equally advantageous to the Territory, to the States from whence the negroes would be brought, and to the negroes themselves.... 

 "The States which are overburdened with negroes would be benefited by their citizens having an opportunity of disposing of the negroes which they can not comfortably support, or of removing with them to a country abounding with all the necessaries of life; and the negro himself would exchange a scanty pittance of the coarsest food for a plentiful and nourishing diet, and a situation which admits not the most distant prospect of emancipation for one which presents no considerable obstacle to his wishes. "

These resolutions were submitted to a committee drawn, like the former, from different sections of the country, which again reported favorably, reiterating in substance the reasons given by the former committee. Their report was sustained by the House, and a resolution to suspend theprohibitory article was adopted. The proposition failed, however, in theSenate, and there the matter seems to have been dropped. The proceedingsconstitute a significant and instructive episode in the politicalhistory of the country. 

The allusion which has been made to the Ordinance of 1787, renders itproper to notice, very briefly, the argument put forward during thediscussion of the Missouri question, and often repeated since, that theOrdinance afforded a precedent in support of the claim of a power inCongress to determine the question of the admission of slaves into theTerritories, and in justification of the prohibitory clause applied in1820 to a portion of the Louisiana Territory. 

The difference between the Congress of the Confederation and that of theFederal Constitution is so broad that the action of the former can, inno just sense, be taken as a precedent for the latter. The Congress ofthe Confederation represented the States in their sovereignty, eachdelegation having one vote, so that all the States were of equal weightin the decision of any question. It had legislative, executive, and insome degree judicial powers, thus combining all departments ofgovernment in itself. During its recess a committee known as theCommittee of the States exercised the powers of the Congress, which wasin spirit, if not in fact, an assemblage of the States. 

On the other hand, the Congress of the Constitution is only thelegislative department of the General Government, with powers strictlydefined and expressly limited to those delegated by the States. It isfurther held in check by an executive and a judiciary, and consists oftwo branches, each having peculiar and specified functions. 

If, then, it be admitted--which is at least very questionable--that theCongress of the Confederation had rightfully the power to exclude slaveproperty from the territory northwest of the Ohio River, that power musthave been derived from its character as an assemblage of the sovereignStates; not from the Articles of Confederation, in which no indicationof the grant of authority to exercise such a function can be found. TheCongress of the Constitution is expressly prohibited from the assumptionof any power not distinctly and specifically delegated to it as thelegislative branch of an organized government. What was questionable inthe former case, therefore, becomes clearly inadmissible in the latter. 

But there is yet another material distinction to be observed. TheStates, owners of what was called the Northwestern Territory, werecomponent members of the Congress which adopted the Ordinance for itsgovernment, and gave thereto their full and free consent. The Ordinancemay, therefore, be regarded as virtually a treaty between the Stateswhich ceded and those which received that extensive domain. In the othercase, Missouri and the whole region affected by the Missouri Compromise, were parts of the territory acquired from France under the name ofLouisiana; and, as it requires two parties to make or amend a treaty, France and the Government of the United States should have coöperated inany amendment of the treaty by which Louisiana had been acquired, andwhich guaranteed to the inhabitants of the ceded territory "all therights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, "and "the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religionthey profess. "--("State Papers, " vol. Ii, "Foreign Relations, " p. 507. )

For all the reasons thus stated, it seems to me conclusive that theaction of the Congress of the Confederation in 1787 could not constitutea precedent to justify the action of the Congress of the United Statesin 1820, and that the prohibitory clause of the Missouri Compromise waswithout constitutional authority, in violation of the rights of a partof the joint owners of the territory, and in disregard of theobligations of the treaty with France. 

The basis of sectional controversy was the question of the balance ofpolitical power. In its earlier manifestations this was undisguised. Thepurchase of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, and thesubsequent admission of a portion of that Territory into the Union as aState, afforded one of the earliest occasions for the manifestation ofsectional jealousy, and gave rise to the first threats, or warnings(which proceeded from New England), of a dissolution of the Union. Yet, although negro slavery existed in Louisiana, no pretext was made of thatas an objection to the acquisition. The ground of opposition is franklystated in a letter of that period from one Massachusetts statesman toanother--"that the influence of _our_ part of the Union must bediminished by the acquisition of more weight at the other extremity. "[6]

Some years afterward (in 1819-'20) occurred the memorable contest withregard to the admission into the Union of Missouri, the second Statecarved out of the Louisiana Territory. The controversy arose out of aproposition to attach to the admission of the new State a provisoprohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude therein. The vehementdiscussion that ensued was continued into the first session of adifferent Congress from that in which it originated, and agitated thewhole country during the interval between the two. It was the firstquestion that ever seriously threatened the stability of the Union, andthe first in which the sentiment of opposition to slavery in theabstract was introduced as an adjunct of sectional controversy. It wasclearly shown in debate that such considerations were altogetherirrelevant; that the number of existing slaves would not be affected bytheir removal from the older States to Missouri; and, moreover, that theproposed restriction would be contrary to the spirit, if not to theletter, of the Constitution. [7] Notwithstanding all this, therestriction was adopted, by a vote almost strictly sectional, in theHouse of Representatives. It failed in the Senate through the firmresistance of the Southern, aided by a few patriotic and conservativeNorthern, members of that body. The admission of the new State, withoutany restriction, was finally accomplished by the addition to the bill ofa section for ever prohibiting slavery in all that portion of theLouisiana Territory lying north of thirty-six degrees and thirtyminutes, north latitude, except Missouri--by implication leaving theportion south of that line open to settlement either with or withoutslaves. 

This provision, as an offset to the admission of the new State withoutrestriction, constituted the celebrated Missouri Compromise. It wasreluctantly accepted by a small majority of the Southern members. Nearlyhalf of them voted against it, under the conviction that it wasunauthorized by the Constitution, and that Missouri was entitled todetermine the question for herself, as a matter of right, not of bargainor concession. Among those who thus thought and voted were some of thewisest statesmen and purest patriots of that period. [8]

This brief retrospect may have sufficed to show that the question of theright or wrong of the institution of slavery was in no wise involved inthe earlier sectional controversies. Nor was it otherwise in those of alater period, in which it was the lot of the author of these memoirs tobear a part. They were essentially struggles for sectional equality orascendancy--for the maintenance or the destruction of that balance ofpower or equipoise between North and South, which was early recognizedas a cardinal principle in our Federal system. It does not follow thatboth parties to this contest were wholly right or wholly wrong in theirclaims. The determination of the question of right or wrong must be leftto the candid inquirer after examination of the evidence. The object ofthese preliminary investigations has been to clear the subject of theobscurity produced by irrelevant issues and the glamour of ethicalillusions. 

[Footnote 1: It will be remembered that, during her colonial condition, Virginia made strenuous efforts to prevent the importation of Africans, and was overruled by the Crown; also, that Georgia, under Oglethorpe, did prohibit the introduction of African slaves until 1752, when theproprietors surrendered the charter, and the colony became a part of theroyal government, and enjoyed the same privileges as the othercolonies. ]

[Footnote 2: South Carolina subsequently (in 1803) repealed her lawforbidding the importation of slaves. The reason assigned for thisaction was the impossibility of enforcing the law without the aid of theFederal Government, to which entire control of the revenues, revenuepolice, and naval forces of the country had been surrendered by theStates. "The geographical situation of our country, " said Mr. Lowndes, of South Carolina, in the House of Representatives on February 14, 1804, "is not unknown. With navigable rivers running into the heart of it, itwas impossible, with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren ... Engaged in this trade, from introducing them [the negroes] into thecountry. The law was completely evaded.... Under these circumstances, sir, it appears to me to have been the duty of the Legislature to repealthe law, and remove from the eyes of the people the spectacle of itsauthority being daily violated. "

The effect of the repeal was to permit the importation of negroes intoSouth Carolina during the interval from 1803 to 1808. It in probablethat an extensive _contraband_ trade was carried on by the New Englandslavers with other ports, on account of the lack of means to enforce thelaws of the Southern States forbidding it. ]

[Footnote 3: One from the Society of Friends assembled at Philadelphiaand New York, the other from the Pennsylvania society of variousreligious denominations combined for the abolition of slavery. 

For report of the debate, see Benton's "Abridgment, " vol. I, pp. 201-207, _et seq. _]

[Footnote 4: See Benton's "Abridgment, " vol. I, p. 397. ]

[Footnote 5: One was from New Hampshire, one from Vermont, two fromVirginia, and one from South Carolina. --(Benton's "Abridgment, " vol. Iii, p. 519. )

No division on the final vote in the Senate. ]

[Footnote 6: Cabot to Pickering, who was then Senator fromMassachusetts. --(See "Life and Letters of George Cabot, " by H. C. Lodge, p. 334. )]

[Footnote 7: The true issue was well stated by the Hon. Samuel A. Foot, a representative from Connecticut, in an incidental reference to it indebate on another subject, a few weeks after the final settlement of theMissouri case. He said: "The Missouri question did not involve thequestion of freedom or slavery, but merely _whether slaves now in thecountry might be permitted to reside in the proposed new State; andwhether Congress or Missouri possessed the power to decide_. "]

[Footnote 8: The votes on the proposed _restriction_, which eventuallyfailed of adoption, and on the _compromise_, which was finally adopted, are often confounded. The advocacy of the former measure was exclusivelysectional, no Southern member voting for it in either House. On theadoption of the compromise line of thirty-six degrees and thirtyminutes, the vote in the Senate was 34 yeas to 10 nays. The Senateconsisted of forty-four members from twenty-two States, equally dividedbetween the two sections--Delaware being classed as a Southern State. Among the yeas were all the Northern votes, except two fromIndiana--being 20--and 14 Southern. The nays consisted of 2 from theNorth, and 8 from the South. 

In the House of Representatives, the vote was 134 yeas to 42 nays. Ofthe yeas, 95 were Northern, 39 Southern; of the nays, 5 Northern, and 37Southern. 

Among the nays in the Senate were Messrs. James Barbour and JamesPleasants, of Virginia; Nathaniel Macon, of North Carolina; JohnGaillard and William Smith, of South Carolina. In the House, Philip P. Barbour, John Randolph, John Tyler, and William S. Archer, of Virginia;Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina (one of the authors of theConstitution); Thomas W. Cobb, of Georgia; and others of more or lessnote. 

(See speech of the Hon. D. L. Yulee, of Florida, in the United StatesSenate, on the admission of California, August 6, 1850, for a carefuland correct account of the compromise. That given in the second chapterof Benton's "Thirty Years' View" is singularly inaccurate; that ofHorace Greeley, in his "American Conflict, " still more so. )]

CHAPTER II. 

 The Session of 1849-'50. --The Compromise Measures. --Virtual Abrogation of the Missouri Compromise. --The Admission of California. --The Fugitive Slave Law. --Death of Mr. Calhoun. --Anecdote of Mr. Clay. 

The first session of the Thirty-first Congress (1849-'50) was amemorable one. The recent acquisition from Mexico of New Mexico andCalifornia required legislation by Congress. In the Senate the billsreported by the Committee on Territories were referred to a selectcommittee, of which Mr. Clay, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, was chairman. From this committee emanated the bills which, takentogether, are known as the compromise measures of 1850. 

With some others, I advocated the division of the newly acquiredterritory by an extension to the Pacific Ocean of the MissouriCompromise line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude. This was not because of any inherent merit or fitness in that line, butbecause it had been accepted by the country as a settlement of thesectional question which, thirty years before, had threatened a ruptureof the Union, and it had acquired in the public mind a prescriptiverespect which it seemed unwise to disregard. A majority, however, decided otherwise, and the line of political conciliation was thenobliterated, as far as it lay in the power of Congress to do so. Ananalysis of the vote will show that this result was effected almostexclusively by the representatives of the North, and that the South wasnot responsible for an action which proved to be the opening ofPandora's box. [9]

However objectionable it may have been in 1820 to adopt that politicalline as expressing a geographical definition of different sectionalinterests, and however it may be condemned as the assumption by Congressof a function not delegated to it, it is to be remembered that the acthad received such recognition and _quasi_-ratification by the people ofthe States as to give it a value which it did not originally possess. Pacification had been the fruit borne by the tree, and it should nothave been recklessly hewed down and cast into the fire. The frequentassertion then made was that all discrimination was unjust, and that thepopular will should be left untrammeled in the formation of new States. This theory was good enough in itself, and as an abstract propositioncould not be gainsaid; but its practical operation has but poorlysustained the expectations of its advocates, as will be seen when wecome to consider the events that occurred a few years later in Kansasand elsewhere. Retrospectively viewed under the mellowing light of time, and with the calm consideration we can usually give to the irremediablepast, the compromise legislation of 1850 bears the impress of thatsectional spirit so widely at variance with the general purposes of theUnion, and so destructive of the harmony and mutual benefit which theConstitution was intended to secure. 

The refusal to divide the territory acquired from Mexico by an extensionof the line of the Missouri Compromise to the Pacific was a consequenceof the purpose to admit California as a State of the Union before it hadacquired the requisite population, and while it was mainly under thecontrol of a military organization sent from New York during the warwith Mexico and disbanded in California upon the restoration of peace. The inconsistency of the argument against the extension of the line wasexhibited in the division of the Territory of Texas by that parallel, and payment to the State of money to secure her consent to the partitionof her domain. In the case of Texas, the North had everything to gainand nothing to lose by the application of the practice of geographicalcompromise on an arbitrary line. In the case of California, theconditions were reversed; the South might have been the gainer and theNorth the loser by a recognition of the same rule. 

The compensation which it was alleged that the South received was a moreeffective law for the rendition of fugitives from service or labor. Butit is to be remarked that this law provided for the execution by theGeneral Government of obligations which had been imposed by the Federalcompact upon the several States of the Union. The benefit to be derivedfrom a fulfillment of that law would be small in comparison with theevil to result from the plausible pretext that the States had thus beenrelieved from a duty which they had assumed in the adoption of thecompact of union. Whatever tended to lead the people of any of theStates to feel that they could be relieved from their constitutionalobligations by transferring them to the General Government, or that theymight thus or otherwise evade or resist them, could not fail to be likethe tares which the enemy sowed amid the wheat. The union of States, formed to secure the permanent welfare of posterity and to promoteharmony among the constituent States, could not, without changing itscharacter, survive such alienation as rendered its parts hostile to thesecurity, prosperity, and happiness of one another. 

It was reasonably argued that, as the Legislatures of fourteen of theStates had enacted what were termed "personal liberty laws, " whichforbade the coöperation of State officials in the rendition of fugitivesfrom service and labor, it became necessary that the General Governmentshould provide the requisite machinery for the execution of the law. Theresult proved what might have been anticipated--that those communitieswhich had repudiated their constitutional obligations, which hadnullified a previous law of Congress for the execution of a provision ofthe Constitution, and had murdered men who came peacefully to recovertheir property, would evade or obstruct, so as to render practicallyworthless, _any_ law that could be enacted for that purpose. In theexceptional cases in which it might be executed, the event would beattended with such conflict between the State and Federal authorities asto produce consequent evils greater than those it was intended tocorrect. 

It was during the progress of these memorable controversies that theSouth lost its most trusted leader, and the Senate its greatest andpurest statesman. He was taken from us--

 "Like a summer-dried fountain, When our need was the sorest;"--

when his intellectual power, his administrative talent, his love ofpeace, and his devotion to the Constitution, might have avertedcollision; or, failing in that, he might have been to the South thePalinurus to steer the bark in safety over the perilous sea. Truly didMr. Webster--his personal friend, although his greatest politicalrival--say of him in his obituary address, "There was nothing groveling, or low, or meanly selfish, that came near the head or the heart of Mr. Calhoun. " His prophetic warnings speak from the grave with the wisdom ofinspiration. Would that they could have been appreciated by hiscountrymen while he yet lived!

 Note. --While the compromise measures of 1850 were pending, and the excitement concerning them was at its highest, I one day overtook Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, and Mr. Berrien, of Georgia, in the Capitol grounds. They were in earnest conversation. It was the 7th of March--the day on which Mr. Webster had delivered his great speech. Mr. Clay, addressing me in the friendly manner which he had always employed since I was a schoolboy in Lexington, asked me what I thought of the speech. I liked it better than he did. He then suggested that I should "join the compromise men, " saying that it was a measure which he thought would probably give peace to the country for thirty years--the period that had elapsed since the adoption of the compromise of 1820. Then, turning to Mr. Berrien, he said, "You and I will be under ground before that time, but our young friend here may have trouble to meet. " I somewhat impatiently declared my unwillingness to transfer to posterity a trial which they would be relatively less able to meet than we were, and passed on my way. 

[Footnote 9: The vote in the Senate on the proposition to continue theline of the Missouri Compromise through the newly acquired territory tothe Pacific was twenty-four yeas, to thirty-two nays. Reckoning Delawareand Missouri as Southern States, the vote of the two sections wasexactly equal. The yeas were _all_ cast by Southern Senators; the nayswere all Northern, except two from Delaware, one from Missouri, and onefrom Kentucky. ]

CHAPTER III. 

 Reëlection to the Senate. --Political Controversies in Mississippi. --Action of the Democratic State Convention. --Defeat of the State-Rights Party. --Withdrawal of General Quitman and Nomination of the Author as Candidate for the Office of Governor. --The Canvass and its Result. --Retirement to Private Life. 

I had been reëlected by the Legislature of Mississippi as my ownsuccessor, and entered upon a new term of service in the Senate on March4, 1851. 

On my return to Mississippi in 1851, the subject chiefly agitating thepublic mind was that of the "compromise" measures of the previous year. Consequent upon these was a proposition for a convention of delegates, from the people of the Southern States respectively, to consider whatsteps ought to be taken for their future peace and safety, and thepreservation of their constitutional rights. There was diversity ofopinion with regard to the merits of the measures referred to, but thedisagreement no longer followed the usual lines of party division. Theywho saw in those measures the forerunner of disaster to the South had nosettled policy beyond a convention, the object of which should be todevise new and more effectual guarantees against the perils ofusurpation. They were unjustly charged with a desire to destroy theUnion--a feeling entertained by few, very few, if by any, inMississippi, and avowed by none. 

There were many, however, who held that the principles of theDeclaration of Independence, and the purposes for which the Union wasformed, were of higher value than the mere Union itself. Independenceexisted before the compact of union between the States; and, if thatcompact should be broken in part, and therefore destroyed in whole, itwas hoped that the liberties of the people in the States might still bepreserved. Those who were most devoted to the Union of the Constitutionmight, consequently, be expected to resist most sternly any usurpationof undelegated power, the effect of which would be to warp the FederalGovernment from its proper character, and, by sapping the foundation, todestroy the Union of the States. 

My recent reëlection to the United States Senate had conferred upon mefor six years longer the office which I preferred to all others. I couldnot, therefore, be suspected of desiring a nomination for any otheroffice from the Democratic Convention, the meeting of which was thendrawing near. Having, as a Senator of the State, freely participated indebate on the measures which were now exciting so much interest in thepublic mind, it was very proper that I should visit the people indifferent parts of the State and render an account of my stewardship. 

My devotion to the Union of our fathers had been so often and sopublicly declared; I had, on the floor of the Senate, so defiantlychallenged any question of my fidelity to it; my services, civil andmilitary, had now extended through so long a period, and were sogenerally known--that I felt quite assured that no whisperings of envyor ill will could lead the people of Mississippi to believe that I haddishonored their trust by using the power they had conferred on me todestroy the Government to which I was accredited. Then, as afterward, Iregarded the separation of the States as a great, though not thegreatest, evil. 

I returned from my tour among the people at the time appointed for themeeting of the nominating convention of the Democratic (or State-Rights)party. During the previous year the Governor, General John A. Quitman, had been compelled to resign his office to answer an indictment againsthim for complicity with the "filibustering" expeditions against Cuba. The charges were not sustained; many of the Democratic party ofMississippi, myself included, recognized a consequent obligation torenominate him for the office of which he had been deprived. When, however, the delegates met in party convention, the committee appointedto select candidates, on comparison of opinions, concluded that, in viewof the effort to fix upon the party the imputation of a purpose ofdisunion, some of the antecedents of General Quitman might endangersuccess. A proposition was therefore made, in the committee onnominations, that I should be invited to become a candidate, and that, if General Quitman would withdraw, my acceptance of the nomination andthe resignation of my place in the United States Senate, which it wasknown would result, was to be followed by the appointment by theGovernor of General Quitman to the vacated place in the Senate. Ioffered no objection to this arrangement, but left it to General Quitmanto decide. He claimed the nomination for the governorship, or nothing, and was so nominated. 

To promote the success of the Democratic nominees, I engaged actively inthe canvass, and continued in the field until stricken down by disease. This occurred just before the election of delegates to a StateConvention, for which provision had been made by the Legislature, andthe canvass for which, conducted in the main upon party lines, was inprogress simultaneously with that for the ordinary State officers. TheDemocratic majority in the State when the canvass began was estimated ateight thousand. At this election, in September, for delegates to theState Convention, we were beaten by about seven thousand five hundredvotes. Seeing in this result the foreshadowing of almost inevitabledefeat, General Quitman withdrew from the canvass as a candidate, andthe Executive Committee of the party (empowered to fill vacancies)called on me to take his place. My health did not permit me to leavehome at that time, and only about six weeks remained before the electionwas to take place; but, being assured that I was not expected to takeany active part, and that the party asked only the use of my name, Iconsented to be announced, and immediately resigned from the UnitedStates Senate. Nevertheless, I soon afterward took the field in person, and worked earnestly until the day of election. I was defeated, but themajority of more than seven thousand votes, that had been cast a shorttime before against the party with which I was associated, was reducedto less than one thousand. [10]

In this canvass, both before and after I became a candidate, no argumentor appeal of mine was directed against the perpetuation of the Union. Believing, however, that the signs of the time portended danger to theSouth from the usurpation by the General Government of undelegatedpowers, I counseled that Mississippi should enter into the proposedmeeting of the people of the Southern States, to consider what could andshould be done to insure our future safety, frankly stating myconviction that, unless such action were taken then, sectional rivalrywould engender greater evils in the future, and that, if the controversywas postponed, "the last opportunity for a peaceful solution would belost, then the issue would have to be settled by blood. "

[Footnote 10: The following letter, written in 1853 to the Hon. WilliamJ. Brown, of Indiana, formerly a member of Congress from that State, andsubsequently published, relates to the events of this period, andaffords nearly contemporaneous evidence in confirmation of thestatements of the text:

"Washington D. C. , _May 7, 1853_. 

"My dear Sir: I received the 'Sentinel' containing your defense of meagainst the fate accusation of disunionism, and, before I had returnedto you the thanks to which you are entitled, I received this day the St. Joseph 'Valley Register, ' marked by you, to call my attention to anarticle in answer to your defense, which was just in all things, saveyour too complimentary terms. 

"I wish I had the letter quoted from, that you might publish the wholeof that which is garbled to answer a purpose. In a part of the letternot published, I put such a damper on the attempt to fix on me thedesire to break up our Union, and presented other points in a form solittle acceptable to the unfriendly inquirers, that the publication ofthe letter had to be drawn out of them. 

"At the risk of being wearisome, but encouraged by your markedfriendship, I will give you a statement in the case. The meeting ofOctober, 1849, was a convention of delegates equally representing theWhig and Democratic parties in Mississippi. The resolutions weredecisive as to equality of right in the South with the North to theTerritories acquired from Mexico, and proposed a convention of theSouthern States. I was not a member, but on invitation addressed theConvention. The succeeding Legislature instructed me, as a Senator, toassert this equality, and, under the existing circumstances, to resistby all constitutional means the admission of California as a State. At acalled session of the Legislature in 1850, a self-constituted committeecalled on me, by letter, for my views. They were men who had enacted orapproved the resolutions of the Convention of 1849, and instructed me, as members of the Legislature, in regular session, in the early part ofthe year 1850. To them I replied that I adhered to the policy they hadindicated and instructed me in their official character to pursue. 

"I pointed out the mode in which their policy could, in my opinion, beexecuted without bloodshed or disastrous convulsion, but in terms ofbitter scorn alluded to such as would insult me with a desire to destroythe Union, for which my whole life proved me to be a devotee. 

"Pardon the egotism, in consideration of the occasion, when I say to youthat my father and my uncles fought through the Revolution of 1776, giving their youth, their blood, and their little patrimony to theconstitutional freedom which I claim as my inheritance. Three of mybrothers fought in the war of 1812. Two of them were comrades of theHero of the Hermitage, and received his commendation for gallantry atNew Orleans. At sixteen years of age I was given to the service of mycountry; for twelve years of my life I have borne its arms and servedit, zealously, if not well. As I feel the infirmities, which sufferingmore than age has brought upon me, it would be a bitter reflection, indeed, if I was forced to conclude that my countrymen would hold allthis light when weighed against the empty panegyric which a time-servingpolitician can bestow upon the Union, for which he never made asacrifice. 

"In the Senate I announced that, if any respectable man would call me adisunionist, I would answer him in monosyllables.... But I have oftenasserted the right, for which the battles of the Revolution werefought--the right of a people to change their government whenever it wasfound to be oppressive, and subversive of the objects for whichgovernments are instituted--and have contended for the independence andsovereignty of the States, a part of the creed of which Jefferson wasthe apostle, Madison the expounder, and Jackson the consistent defender. 

"I have written freely, and more than I designed. Accept my thanks foryour friendly advocacy. Present me in terms of kind remembrance to yourfamily, and believe me, very sincerely yours, "Jefferson Davis. 

"Note. --No party in Mississippi ever advocated disunion. They differedas to the mode of securing their rights in the Union, and on the powerof a State to secede--neither advocating the exercise of the power. 

"J. D. "]

CHAPTER IV. 

 The Author enters the Cabinet. --Administration of the War Department. --Surveys for a Pacific Railway. --Extension of the Capitol. --New Regiments organized. --Colonel Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General. --A Bit of Civil-Service Reform. --Reëlection to the Senate. --Continuity of the Pierce Cabinet. --Character of Franklin Pierce. 

Happy in the peaceful pursuits of a planter; busily engaged in cares forservants, in the improvement of my land, in building, in rearinglive-stock, and the like occupations, the time passed pleasantly awayuntil my retirement was interrupted by an invitation to take a place inthe Cabinet of Mr. Pierce, who had been elected to the Presidency of theUnited States in November, 1852. Although warmly attached to Mr. Piercepersonally, and entertaining the highest estimate of his character andpolitical principles, private and personal reasons led me to decline theoffer. This was followed by an invitation to attend the ceremony of hisinauguration, which took place on the 4th of March, 1853. While inWashington, on this visit, I was induced by public considerations toreconsider my determination and accept the office of Secretary of War. The public records of that period will best show how the duties of thatoffice were performed. 

While in the Senate, I had advocated the construction of a railway toconnect the valley of the Mississippi with the Pacific coast; and, whenan appropriation was made to determine the most eligible route for thatpurpose, the Secretary of War was charged with its application. We hadthen but little of that minute and accurate knowledge of the interior ofthe continent which was requisite for a determination of the problem. Several different parties were therefore organized to examine thevarious routes supposed to be practicable within the northern andsouthern limits of the United States. The arguments which I had used asa Senator were "the military necessity for such means of transportation, and the need of safe and rapid communication with the Pacific slope, tosecure its continuance as a part of the Union. "

In the organization and equipment of these parties, and in the selectionof their officers, care was taken to provide for securing full andaccurate information upon every point involved in the determination ofthe route. The only discrimination made was in the more prompt andthorough equipment of the parties for the extreme northern line, andthis was only because that was supposed to be the most difficult ofexecution of all the surveys. 

In like manner, my advocacy while in the Senate of an extension of theCapitol, by the construction of a new Senate-Chamber and Hall ofRepresentatives, may have caused the appropriation for that object to beput under my charge as Secretary of War. 

During my administration of the War Department, material changes weremade in the models of arms. Iron gun-carriages were introduced, andexperiments were made which led to the casting of heavy guns hollow, instead of boring them after casting. Inquiries were made with regard togunpowder, which subsequently led to the use of a coarser grain forartillery. 

During the same period the army was increased by the addition of tworegiments of infantry and two of cavalry. The officers of theseregiments were chosen partly by selection from those already in servicein the regular army and partly by appointment from civil life. In makingthe selections from the army, I was continually indebted to theassistance of that pure-minded and accurately informed officer, ColonelSamuel Cooper, the Adjutant-General, of whom it may be proper here tosay that, although his life had been spent in the army, and he, ofcourse, had the likes and dislikes inseparable from men who are broughtinto close contact and occasional rivalry, I never found in his officialrecommendations any indication of partiality or prejudice toward anyone. 

When the first list was made out, to be submitted to the President, adifficulty was found to exist, which had not occurred either to ColonelCooper or myself. This was, that the officers selected purely on theirmilitary record did not constitute a roster conforming to thatdistribution among the different States, which, for politicalconsiderations, it was thought desirable to observe--that is to say, thenumber of such officers of Southern birth was found to bedisproportionately great. Under instructions from the President, thelist was therefore revised and modified in accordance with this newelement of geographical distribution. This, as I am happy to remember, was the only occasion in which the current of my official action, whileSecretary of War, was disturbed in any way by sectional or politicalconsiderations. 

Under former administrations of the War Office it had not been customaryto make removals or appointments upon political grounds, except in thecase of clerkships. To this usage I not only adhered, but extended it toinclude the clerkships also. The Chief Clerk, who had been removed by mypredecessor, had peculiar qualifications for the place; and, althoughknown to me only officially, he was restored to the position. It willprobably be conceded by all who are well informed on the subject thathis restoration was a benefit to the public service. [11]

[The reader desirous for further information relative to theadministration of the War Department during this period may find it inthe various official reports and estimates of works of defenseprosecuted or recommended, arsenals of construction and depots of armsmaintained or suggested, and foundries employed, during the Presidencyof Mr. Pierce, 1853-'57. ]

Having been again elected by the Legislature of Mississippi as Senatorto the United States, I passed from the Cabinet of Mr. Pierce, on thelast day of his term (March 4, 1857), to take my seat in the Senate. 

The Administration of Franklin Pierce presents the only instance in ourhistory of the continuance of a Cabinet for four years without a singlechange in its _personnel_. When it is remembered that there was muchdissimilarity if not incongruity of character among the members of thatCabinet, some idea may be formed of the power over men possessed andexercised by Mr. Pierce. Chivalrous, generous, amiable, true to hisfriends and to his faith, frank and bold in the declaration of hisopinions, he never deceived any one. And, if treachery had ever comenear him, it would have stood abashed in the presence of his truth, hismanliness, and his confiding simplicity. 

[Footnote 11: Soon after my entrance upon duty as secretary of War, General Jesup, the Quartermaster-General, presented to me a list ofnames from which to make selection of a clerk for his department. Observing that he had attached certain figures to these names, I askedwhether the figures were intended to indicate the relativequalifications, or preference in his estimation, of the severalapplicants; and, upon his answer in the affirmative, without furtherquestion, authorized him to appoint "No. 1" of his list. A day or twoafterward, certain Democratic members of Congress called on me andpolitely inquired whether it was true that I had appointed a Whig to aposition in the War Office. "Certainly not, " I answered. "We thought youwere not aware of it, " said they, and proceeded to inform me that Mr. ----, the recent appointee to the clerkship just mentioned, was a Whig. After listening patiently to this statement, I answered that it was theywho were deceived, not I. I had appointed a clerk. He had been appointedneither as a Whig nor as a Democrat, but merely as the fittest candidatefor the place in the estimation of the chief of the bureau to which itbelonged. I further gave them to understand that the same principle ofselection would be followed in similar cases, so far as my authorityextended. After some further discussion of the question, the visitorswithdrew, dissatisfied with the result of the interview. 

The Quartermaster-General, on hearing of this conversation, hastened toinform me that it was all a mistake--that the appointee to the officehad been confounded with his father, who was a well-known Whig, but thathe (the son) was a Democrat. I assured the General that this wasaltogether immaterial, adding that it was "a very pretty quarrel" as itstood, and that I had no desire to effect a settlement of it on anyinferior issue. Thenceforward, however, I was but little troubled withany pressure for political appointments in the department. ]

CHAPTER V. 

 The Territorial Question. --An Incident at the White House. --The Kansas and Nebraska Bill. --The Missouri Compromise abrogated in 1850, not in 1854. --Origin of "Squatter Sovereignty. "--Sectional Rivalry and its Consequences. --The Emigrant Aid Societies. --"The Bible and Sharpe's Rifles. "--False Pretensions as to Principle. --The Strife in Kansas. --A Retrospect. --The Original Equilibrium of Power and its Overthrow. --Usurpations of the Federal Government. --The Protective Tariff. --Origin and Progress of Abolitionism. --Who were the Friends of the Union?--An Illustration of Political Morality. 

The organization of the Territory of Kansas was the first question thatgave rise to exciting debate after my return to the Senate. Thecelebrated Kansas-Nebraska Bill had become a law during theAdministration of Mr. Pierce. As this occupies a large space in thepolitical history of the period, it is proper to state some factsconnected with it, which were not public, but were known to me and toothers yet living. 

The declaration, often repeated in 1850, that climate and the will ofthe people concerned should determine their institutions when theyshould form a Constitution, and as a State be admitted into the Union, and that no legislation by Congress should be permitted to interferewith the free exercise of that will when so expressed, was but theannouncement of the fact so firmly established in the Constitution, thatsovereignty resided alone in the States, and that Congress had onlydelegated powers. It has been sometimes contended that, because theCongress of the Confederation, by the Ordinance of 1787, prohibitedinvoluntary servitude in all the Northwestern Territory, the framers ofthe Constitution must have recognized such power to exist in theCongress of the United States. Hence the deduction that the prohibitoryclause of what is known as the Missouri Compromise was justified by theprecedent of the Ordinance of 1787. To make the action of the Congressof the Confederation a precedent for the Congress of the United Statesis to overlook the great distinction between the two. 

The Congress of the Confederation represented the States in theirsovereignty, and, as such representatives, had legislative, executive, and, in some degree, judicial power confided to it. Virtually, it was anassemblage of the States. In certain cases a majority of nine Stateswere required to decide a question, but there is no express limitation, or restriction, such as is to be found in the ninth and tenth amendmentsto the Constitution of the United States. The General Government of theUnion is composed of three departments, of which the Congress is thelegislative branch, and which is checked by the revisory power of thejudiciary, and the veto power of the Executive, and, above all, isexpressly limited in legislation to powers expressly delegated by theStates. If, then, it be admitted, which is certainly questionable, thatthe Congress of the Confederation had power to exclude slave propertynorthwest of the Ohio River, that power must have been derived from itscharacter as representing the States in their sovereignty, for noindication of such a power is to be found in the Articles ofConfederation. 

If it be assumed that the absence of a prohibition was equivalent to theadmission of the power in the Congress of the Confederation, theassumption would avail nothing in the Congress under the Constitution, where power is expressly limited to what had been delegated. Morebriefly, it may be stated that the Congress of the Confederation could, like the Legislature of a State, do what had not been prohibited; butthe Congress of the United States could only do what had been expresslypermitted. It is submitted whether this last position is not conclusiveagainst the possession of power by the United States Congress tolegislate slavery into or exclude it from Territories belonging to theUnited States. 

This subject, which had for more than a quarter of a century been one ofangry discussion and sectional strife, was revived, and found occasionfor renewed discussion in the organization of Territorial governmentsfor Kansas and Nebraska. The Committees on Territories of the two Housesagreed to report a bill in accordance with that recognized principle, provided they could first be assured that it would receive favorableconsideration from the President. This agreement was made on Saturday, and the ensuing Monday was the day (and the only day for two weeks) onwhich, according to the order of business established by the rules ofthe House of Representatives, the bill could be introduced by theCommittee of that House. 

On Sunday morning, the 22d of January, 1854, gentlemen of each Committeecalled at my house, and Mr. Douglas, chairman of the Senate Committee, fully explained the proposed bill, and stated their purpose to be, through my aid, to obtain an interview on that day with the President, to ascertain whether the bill would meet his approbation. The Presidentwas known to be rigidly opposed to the reception of visits on Sunday forthe discussion of any political subject; but in this case it was urgedas necessary, in order to enable the Committee to make their report thenext day. I went with them to the Executive mansion, and, leaving themin the reception-room, sought the President in his private apartments, and explained to him the occasion of the visit. He thereupon met thegentlemen, patiently listened to the reading of the bill and theirexplanations of it, decided that it rested upon sound constitutionalprinciples, and recognized in it only a return to that rule which hadbeen infringed by the compromise of 1820, and the restoration of whichhad been foreshadowed by the legislation of 1850. This bill was not, therefore, as has been improperly asserted, a measure inspired by Mr. Pierce or any of his Cabinet. Nor was it the first step taken toward therepeal of the conditions or obligations expressed or implied by theestablishment, in 1820, of the politico-sectional line of thirty-sixdegrees and thirty minutes. That compact had been virtually abrogated, in 1850, by the refusal of the representatives of the North to apply itto the territory then recently acquired from Mexico. In May, 1854, theKansas-Nebraska Bill was passed; its purpose was declared in the billitself to be to carry into practical operation the "propositions andprinciples established by the compromise measures of 1850" The "MissouriCompromise, " therefore, was not repealed by that bill--its virtualrepeal by the legislation of 1850 was recognized as an existing fact, and it was declared to be "inoperative and void. "

It was added that the "true intent and meaning" of the act was "not tolegislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude ittherefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form andregulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only tothe Constitution of the United States. "

From the terms of this bill, as well as from the arguments that wereused in its behalf, it is evident that its purpose was to leave theTerritories equally open to the people of all the States, with everyspecies of property recognized by any of them; to permit climate andsoil to determine the current of immigration, and to secure to thepeople themselves the right to form their own institutions according totheir own will, as soon as they should acquire the right ofself-government; that is to say, as soon as their numbers should entitlethem to organize themselves into a State, prepared to take its place asan equal, sovereign member of the Federal Union. The claim, afterwardadvanced by Mr. Douglas and others, that this declaration was intendedto assert the right of the first settlers of a Territory, in itsinchoate, rudimental, dependent, and transitional condition, todetermine the character of its institutions, constituted the doctrinepopularly known as "squatter sovereignty. " Its assertion led to thedissensions which ultimately resulted in a rupture of the Democraticparty. 

Sectional rivalry, the deadly foe of the "domestic tranquillity" and the"general welfare, " which the compact of union was formed to insure, nowinterfered, with gigantic efforts, to prevent that free migration whichhad been promised, and to hinder the decision by climate and theinterests of the inhabitants of the institutions to be established bythese embryo States. Societies were formed in the North to supply moneyand send emigrants into the new Territories; and a famous preacher, addressing a body of those emigrants, charged them to carry with them toKansas "the Bible and Sharpe's rifles. " The latter were of course to beleveled against the bosoms of their Southern brethren who might migrateto the same Territory, but the use to be made of the Bible in the samefraternal enterprise was left unexplained by the reverend gentleman. 

The war-cry employed to train the Northern mind for the deedscontemplated by the agitators was "No extension of slavery!" Was thissentiment real or feigned? The number of slaves (as has already beenclearly shown) would not have been increased by their transportation tonew territory. It could not be augmented by further importation, for thelaw of the land made that piracy. Southern men were the leading authorsof that enactment, and the public opinion of their descendants, strongerthan the law, fully sustained it. The climate of Kansas and Nebraska wasaltogether unsuited to the negro, and the soil was not adapted to thoseproductions for which negro labor could be profitably employed. If, then, any negroes held to service or labor, as provided in the compactof union, had been transported to those Territories, they would havebeen such as were bound by personal attachment mutually existing betweenmaster and servant, which would have rendered it impossible for theformer to consider the latter as property convertible into money. Aswhite laborers, adapted to the climate and its products, flowed into thecountry, negro labor would have inevitably become a tax to those whoheld it, and their emancipation would have followed that condition, asit has in all the Northern States, old or new--Wisconsin furnishing thelast example. [12] It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the"war-cry" was employed by the artful to inflame the minds of the lessinformed and less discerning; that it was adopted in utter disregard ofthe means by which negro emancipation might have been peaceablyaccomplished in the Territories, and with the sole object of obtainingsectional control and personal promotion by means of popular agitation. 

The success attending this artifice was remarkable. To such an extentwas it made available, that Northern indignation was aroused on theabsurd accusation that the South had destroyed "that sacred instrument, the compromise of 1820. " The internecine war which raged in Kansas forseveral years was substituted for the promised peace under the operationof the natural laws regulating migration to new countries. For thefratricide which dyed the virgin soil of Kansas with the blood of thosewho should have stood shoulder to shoulder in subduing the wilderness;for the frauds which corrupted the ballot-box and made the name ofelection a misnomer--let the authors of "squatter sovereignty" and thefomenters of sectional hatred answer to the posterity for whose peaceand happiness the fathers formed the Federal compact. 

In these scenes of strife were trained the incendiaries who afterwardinvaded Virginia under the leadership of John Brown; and at this timegerminated the sentiments which led men of high position to sustain, with their influence and their money, this murderous incursion into theSouth. [13]

Now was seen the lightning of that storm, the distant muttering of whichhad been heard so long, and against which the wise and the patriotic hadgiven solemn warning, regarding it as the sign which portended adissolution of the Union. 

Diversity of interests and of opinions among the States of theConfederation had in the beginning presented great difficulties in theway of the formation of a more perfect union. The compact was the resultof compromise between the States, at that time generally distinguishedas navigating and agricultural, afterward as Northern and Southern. Whenthe first census was taken, in 1790, there was but little numericaldifference in the population of these two sections, and (includingStates about to be admitted) there was also an exact equality in thenumber of States. Each section had, therefore, the power ofself-protection, and might feel secure against any danger of Federalaggression. If the disturbance of that equilibrium had been theconsequence of natural causes, and the government of the whole hadcontinued to be administered strictly for the general welfare, therewould have been no ground for complaint of the result. 

Under the old Confederation the Southern States had a large excess ofterritory. The acquisition of Louisiana, of Florida, and of Texas, afterward greatly increased this excess. The generosity and patriotismof Virginia led her, before the adoption of the Constitution, to cedethe Northwest Territory to the United States. The "Missouri Compromise"surrendered to the North all the newly acquired region not included inthe State of Missouri, and north of the parallel of thirty-six degreesand a half. The northern part of Texas was in like manner given up bythe compromise of 1850; and the North, having obtained, by thosesuccessive cessions, a majority in both Houses of Congress, took toitself all the territory acquired from Mexico. Thus, by the action ofthe General Government, the means were provided permanently to destroythe original equilibrium between the sections. 

Nor was this the only injury to which the South was subjected. Under thepower of Congress to levy duties on imports, tariff laws were enacted, not merely "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense andgeneral welfare of the United States, " as authorized by theConstitution, but, positively and primarily, for the protection againstforeign competition of domestic manufactures. The effect of this was toimpose the main burden of taxation upon the Southern people, who wereconsumers and not manufacturers, not only by the enhanced price ofimports, but indirectly by the consequent depreciation in the value ofexports, which were chiefly the products of Southern States. Theimposition of this grievance was unaccompanied by the consolation ofknowing that the tax thus borne was to be paid into the public Treasury, for the increase of price accrued mainly to the benefit of themanufacturer. Nor was this all: a reference to the annual appropriationswill show that the disbursements made were as unequal as the burdensborne--the inequality in both operating in the same direction. 

These causes all combined to direct immigration to the Northern section;and with the increase of its preponderance appeared more and moredistinctly a tendency in the Federal Government to pervert functionsdelegated to it, and to use them with sectional discrimination againstthe minority. 

The resistance to the admission of Missouri as a State, in 1820, wasevidently not owing to any moral or constitutional considerations, butmerely to political motives; and the compensation exacted for grantingwhat was simply a right, was the exclusion of the South from equality inthe enjoyment of territory which justly belonged equally to both, andwhich was what the enemies of the South stigmatized as "slaveterritory, " when acquired. 

The sectional policy then indicated brought to its support the passionsthat spring from man's higher nature, but which, like all passions, ifmisdirected and perverted, become hurtful and, it may be, destructive. The year 1835 was marked by the public agitation for the abolition ofthat African servitude which existed in the South, which antedated theUnion, and had existed in every one of the States that formed theConfederation. By a great misconception of the powers belonging to theGeneral Government, and the responsibilities of citizens of the NorthernStates, many of those citizens were, little by little, brought to theconclusion that slavery was a sin for which _they_ were answerable, andthat it was the duty of the Federal Government to abate it. Though, atthe date above referred to, numerically so weak, when compared witheither of the political parties at the North, as to excite noapprehension of their power for evil, the public demonstrations of theAbolitionists were violently rebuked generally at the North. The partywas contemned on account of the character of its leaders, and the moreodious because chief among them was an Englishman, one Thompson, who wassupposed to be an emissary, whose mission was to prepare the way for adissolution of the Union. Let us hope that it was reverence for theobligations of the Constitution as the soul of the Union that suggestedlurking danger, and rendered the supposed emissary for its destructionso odious that he was driven from a Massachusetts hall where heattempted to lecture. But bodies in motion will overcome bodies at rest, and the unreflecting too often are led by captivating names far from theprinciples they revere. 

Thus, by the activity of the propagandists of abolitionism, and themisuse of the sacred word Liberty, they recruited from the ardentworshipers of that goddess such numbers as gave them in many NorthernStates the balance of power between the two great political forces thatstood arrayed against each other; then and there they came to be courtedby both of the great parties, especially by the Whigs, who had becomethe weaker party of the two. Fanaticism, to which is usually accordedsincerity as an extenuation of its mischievous tenets, affords the bestexcuse to be offered for the original abolitionists, but that can not beconceded to the political associates who joined them for the purpose ofacquiring power; with them it was but hypocritical cant, intended todeceive. Hence arose the declaration of the existence of an"irrepressible conflict, " because of the domestic institutions ofsovereign, self-governing States--institutions over which neither theFederal Government nor the people outside of the limits of such Stateshad any control, and for which they could have no moral or legalresponsibility. 

Those who are to come after us, and who will look without prejudice orexcitement at the record of events which have occurred in our day, willnot fail to wonder how men professing and proclaiming such a beliefshould have so far imposed upon the credulity of the world as to be ableto arrogate to themselves the claim of being the special friends of aUnion contracted in order to insure "domestic tranquillity" among thepeople of the States united; that _they_ were the advocates of peace, oflaw, and of order, who, when taking an oath to support and maintain theConstitution, did so with a mental reservation to violate one of theprovisions of that Constitution--one of the conditions of thecompact--without which the Union could never have been formed. The toneof political morality which could make this possible was well indicatedby the toleration accorded in the Senate to the flippant, inconsequential excuse for it given by one of its most eminentexemplars--"Is thy servant a dog, that he should do thisthing?"--meaning thereby, not that it would be the part of a dog to_violate_ his oath, but to _keep_ it in the matter referred to. (SeeAppendix D. )

[Footnote 12: Extract from a speech of Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in theSenate of the United States, May 17, 1860: "There is a relationbelonging to this species of property, unlike that of the apprentice orthe hired man, which awakens whatever there is of kindness or ofnobility of soul in the heart of him who owns it; this can only bealienated, obscured, or destroyed, by collecting this species ofproperty into such masses that the owner is not personally acquaintedwith the individuals who compose it. In the relation, however, which canexist in the Northwestern Territories, the mere domestic connection ofone, two, or at most half a dozen servants in a family, associating withthe children as they grow up, attending upon age as it declines, therecan be nothing against which either philanthropy or humanity can make anappeal. Not even the emancipationist could raise his voice; for this isthe high-road and the open gate to the condition in which the masterswould, from interest, in a few years, desire the emancipation of everyone who may thus be taken to the northwestern frontier. "]

[Footnote 13: See "Report of Senate Committee of Inquiry into the JohnBrown Raid. "]

CHAPTER VI. 

 Agitation continued. --Political Parties: their Origin, Changes, and Modifications. --Some Account of the "Popular Sovereignty, " or "Non-Intervention, " Theory. --Rupture of the Democratic Party. --The John Brown Raid. --Resolutions introduced by the Author into the Senate on the Relations of the States, the Federal Government, and the Territories; their Discussion and Adoption. 

The strife in Kansas and the agitation of the territorial question inCongress and throughout the country continued during nearly the whole ofMr. Buchanan's Administration, finally culminating in a disruption ofthe Union. Meantime the changes, or modifications, which had occurred orwere occurring in the great political parties, were such as may requirea word of explanation to the reader not already familiar with theirhistory. 

The _names_ adopted by political parties in the United States have notalways been strictly significant of their principles. The old Federalparty inclined to nationalism, or consolidation, rather thanfederalization, of the States. On the other hand, the party originallyknown as Republican, and afterward as Democratic, can scarcely claim tohave been distinctively or exclusively such in the primary sense ofthese terms, inasmuch as no party has ever avowed opposition to thegeneral principles of government by the people. The fundamental idea ofthe Democratic party was that of the sovereignty of the States and thefederal, or confederate, character of the Union. Other elements haveentered into its organization at different periods, but this has beenthe vital, cardinal, and abiding principle on which its existence hasbeen perpetuated. The Whig, which succeeded the old Federal party, though by no means identical with it, was, in the main, favorable to astrong central government, therein antagonizing the transatlantictraditions connected with its name. The "Know-Nothing, " or "American, "party, which sprang into existence on the decadence of the Whigorganization, based upon opposition to the alleged overgrowth of thepolitical influence of naturalized foreigners and of the Roman CatholicChurch, had but a brief duration, and after the Presidential election of1856 declined as rapidly as it had arisen. 

At the period to which this narrative has advanced, the "Free-Soil, "which had now assumed the title of "Republican" party, had grown to amagnitude which threatened speedily to obtain entire control of theGovernment. Based, as has been shown, upon sectional rivalry andopposition to the growth of the Southern equally with the NorthernStates of the Union, it had absorbed within itself not only theabolitionists, who were avowedly agitating for the destruction of thesystem of negro servitude, but other diverse and heterogeneous elementsof opposition to the Democratic party. In the Presidential election of1856, their candidates (Fremont and Dayton) had received 114 of a totalof 296 electoral votes, representing a popular vote of 1, 341, 264 in atotal of 4, 053, 967. The elections of the ensuing year (1857) exhibited adiminution of the so-called "Republican" strength, and the Thirty-fifthCongress, which convened in December of that year, was decidedlyDemocratic in both branches. In the course of the next two years, however, the Kansas agitation and another cause, to be presentlynoticed, had so swollen the ranks of the so-called Republicans, that, inthe House of Representatives of the Thirty-sixth Congress, which met inDecember, 1859, neither party had a decided majority, the balance ofpower being held by a few members still adhering to the virtuallyextinct Whig and "American, " or Know-Nothing, organizations, and a stillsmaller number whose position was doubtful or irregular. More than eightweeks were spent in the election of a Speaker; and a so-called"Republican" (Mr. Pennington, of New Jersey) was finally elected by amajority of one vote. The Senate continued to be decidedly Democratic, though with an increase of the so-called "Republican" minority. 

The cause above alluded to, as contributing to the rapid growth of theso-called Republican party after the elections of the year 1857, was thedissension among the Democrats, occasioned by the introduction of thedoctrine called by its inventors and advocates "popular sovereignty, " or"non-intervention, " but more generally and more accurately known as"squatter sovereignty. " Its character has already been concisely statedin the preceding chapter. Its origin is generally attributed to GeneralCass, who is supposed to have suggested it in some general expressionsof his celebrated "Nicholson letter, " written in December, 1847. On the16th and 17th of May, 1860, it became necessary for me in a debate, inthe Senate, to review that letter of Mr. Cass. From my remarks thenmade, the following extract is taken:

 "The Senator [Mr. Douglas] might have remembered, if he had chosen to recollect so unimportant a thing, that I once had to explain to him, ten years ago, the fact that I repudiated the doctrine of that letter at the time it was published, and that the Democracy of Mississippi had well-nigh crucified me for the construction which I placed upon it. There were men mean enough to suspect that the construction I gave to the Nicholson letter was prompted by the confidence and affection I felt for General Taylor. At a subsequent period, however, Mr. Cass thoroughly reviewed it. He uttered (for him) very harsh language against all who had doubted the true construction of his letter, and he construed it just as I had done during the canvass of 1848. It remains only to add that I supported Mr. Cass, not because of the doctrine of the Nicholson letter, but in despite of it; because I believed a Democratic President, with a Democratic Cabinet and Democratic counselors in the two Houses of Congress, and he as honest a man as I believed Mr. Cass to be, would be a safer reliance than his opponent, who personally possessed my confidence as much as any man living, but who was of, and must draw his advisers from, a party the tenets of which I believed to be opposed to the interests of the country, as they were to all my political convictions. 

 "I little thought at that time that my advocacy of Mr. Cass upon such grounds as these, or his support by the State of which I am a citizen, would at any future day be quoted as an endorsement of the opinions contained in the Nicholson letter, as those opinions were afterward defined. But it is not only upon this letter, but equally upon the resolutions of the Convention as constructive of that letter, that the Senator rested his argument. [I will here say to the Senator that, if at any time I do him the least injustice, speaking as I do from such notes as I could take while he progressed, I will thank him to correct me. ]

 "But this letter entered into the canvass; there was a doubt about its construction: there were men who asserted that they had positive authority for saying that it meant that the people of a Territory could only exclude slavery when the Territory should form a Constitution and be admitted as a State. This doubt continued to hang over the construction, and it was that doubt alone which secured Mr. Cass the vote of Mississippi. If the true construction had been certainly known, he would have had no chance to get it. "

Whatever meaning the generally discreet and conservative statesman, Mr. Cass, may have intended to convey, it is not at all probable that heforesaw the extent to which the suggestions would be carried and theconsequences that would result from it. 

In the organization of a government for California in 1850, the theorywas more distinctly advanced, but it was not until after the passage ofthe Kansas-Nebraska Bill, in 1854, that it was fully developed under theplastic and constructive genius of the Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, ofIllinois. The leading part which that distinguished Senator had borne inthe authorship and advocacy of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which affirmedthe right of the people of the Territories "to form and regulate theirdomestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitutionof the United States, " had aroused against him a violent storm ofdenunciation in the State which he represented and other NorthernStates. He met it very manfully in some respects, defended his actionresolutely, but in so doing was led to make such concessions ofprinciple and to attach such an interpretation to the bill as would haverendered it practically nugatory--a thing to keep the promise of peaceto the ear and break it to the hope. 

The Constitution expressly confers upon Congress the power to admit newStates into the Union, and also to "dispose of and make all needfulrules and regulations respecting the territory or other propertybelonging to the United States. " Under these grants of power, theuniform practice of the Government had been for Congress to lay off anddivide the common territory by convenient boundaries for the formationof future States; to provide executive, legislative, and judicialdepartments of government for such Territories during their temporaryand provisional period of pupilage; to delegate to these governmentssuch authority as might be expedient--subject always to the supervisionand controlling government of the Congress. Finally, at the proper time, and on the attainment by the Territory of sufficient strength andpopulation for self-government, to receive it into the Union on afooting of entire equality with the original States--sovereign andself-governing. All this is no more inconsistent with the trueprinciples of "popular sovereignty, " properly understood, than thetemporary subjection of a minor to parental control is inconsistent withthe doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, or the exceptionaldiscipline of a man-of-war or a military post with the principles ofrepublican freedom. 

The usual process of transition from a territorial condition to that ofa State was, in the first place, by an act of Congress authorizing theinhabitants to elect representatives for a convention to form a StateConstitution, which was then submitted to Congress for approval andratification. On such ratification the supervisory control of Congresswas withdrawn, and the new State authorized to assume its sovereignty, and the inhabitants of the Territory became citizens of a State. In thecases of Tennessee in 1796, and Arkansas and Michigan in 1836, thefailure of the inhabitants to obtain an "enabling act" of Congress, before organizing themselves, very nearly caused the rejection of theirapplications for admission as States, though they were eventuallygranted on the ground that the subsequent approval and consent ofCongress could heal the prior irregularity. The entire control ofCongress over the whole subject of territorial government had never beenquestioned in earlier times. Necessarily conjoined with the _power_ ofthis protectorate, was of course the _duty_ of exercising it for thesafety of the persons and property of all citizens of the United States, permanently or temporarily resident in any part of the domain belongingto the States in common. 

Logically carried out, the new theory of "popular sovereignty" wouldapply to the first adventurous pioneers settling in the wildernessbefore the organization of any Territorial government by Congress, aswell as afterward. If "sovereignty" is inherent in a thousand or fivethousand persons, there can be no valid ground for denying its existencein a dozen, as soon as they pass beyond the limits of the Stategovernments. The advocates of this novel doctrine, however, if rightlyunderstood, generally disavowed any claim to its application prior tothe organization of a territorial government. 

The Territorial Legislatures, to which Congress delegated a portion ofits power and duty to "make all needful rules and regulations respectingthe Territory, " were the mere agents of Congress, exercising anauthority subject to Congressional supervision and control--an authorityconferred only for the sake of convenience, and liable at any time to berevoked and annulled. Yet it is proposed to recognize in theseprovisional, subordinate, and temporary legislative bodies, a power notpossessed by Congress itself. This is to claim that the creature isendowed with an authority not possessed by the creator, or that thestream has risen to an elevation above that of its source. 

Furthermore, in contending for a power in the Territorial Legislaturespermanently to determine the fundamental, social, and politicalinstitutions of the Territory, and thereby virtually to prescribe thoseof the future State, the advocates of "popular sovereignty" wereinvesting those dependent and subsidiary bodies with powers far aboveany exercised by the Legislatures of the fully organized and sovereignStates. The authority of the State Legislatures is limited, both by theFederal Constitution and by the respective State Constitutions fromwhich it is derived. This latter limitation did not and could not existin the Territories. 

Strange as it may seem, a theory founded on fallacies so flimsy andleading to conclusions so paradoxical was advanced by eminent andexperienced politicians, and accepted by many persons, both in the Northand in the South--not so much, perhaps, from intelligent conviction asunder the delusive hope that it would afford a satisfactory settlementof the "irrepressible conflict" which had been declared. The terms"popular sovereignty" and "non-intervention" were plausible, specious, and captivating to the public ear. Too many lost sight of the elementarytruth that political sovereignty does not reside in unorganized orpartially organized masses of individuals, but in the people ofregularly and permanently constituted States. As to the"non-intervention" proposed, it meant merely the abnegation by Congressof its duty to protect the inhabitants of the Territories subject to itscontrol. 

The raid into Virginia under John Brown--already notorious as afanatical partisan leader in the Kansas troubles--occurred in October, 1859, a few weeks before the meeting of the Thirty-sixth Congress. Insignificant in itself and in its immediate results, it afforded astartling revelation of the extent to which sectional hatred andpolitical fanaticism had blinded the conscience of a class of persons incertain States of the Union; forming a party steadily growing strongerin numbers, as well as in activity. Sympathy with its purposes ormethods was earnestly disclaimed by the representatives of all partiesin Congress; but it was charged, on the other hand, that it was only thenatural outgrowth of doctrines and sentiments which for some years hadbeen freely avowed on the floors of both Houses. A committee of theSenate made a long and laborious investigation of the facts, with novery important or satisfactory results. In their final report, June 15, 1860, accompanying the evidence obtained and submitted, this Committeesaid:

 "It [the incursion] was simply the act of lawless ruffians, under the sanction of no public or political authority, distinguishable only from ordinary felonies by the ulterior ends in contemplation by them, and by the fact that the money to maintain the expedition, and the large armament they brought with them, had been contributed and furnished by the citizens of other States of the Union under circumstances that must continue to jeopard the safety and peace of the Southern States, and against which Congress has no power to legislate. 

 "If the several States [adds the Committee], whether from motives of policy or a desire to preserve the peace of the Union, if not from fraternal feeling, do not hold it incumbent on them, after the experience of the country, to guard in future by appropriate legislation against occurrences similar to the one here inquired into, the Committee can find no guarantee elsewhere for the security of peace between the States of the Union. "

On February 2, 1860, the author submitted, in the Senate of the UnitedStates, a series of resolutions, afterward slightly modified to read asfollows

 "1. _Resolved_, That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the States, adopting the same, acted severally as free and independent sovereignties, delegating a portion of their powers to be exercised by the Federal Government for the increased security of each against dangers, _domestic_ as well as foreign; and that any intermeddling by any one or more States, or by a combination of their citizens, with the domestic institutions of the others, on any pretext whatever, political, moral, or religious, with the view to their disturbance or subversion, is in violation of the Constitution, insulting to the States so interfered with, endangers their domestic peace and tranquillity--objects for which the Constitution was formed--and, by necessary consequence, tends to weaken and destroy the Union itself. 

 "2. _Resolved_, That negro slavery, as it exists in fifteen States of this Union, composes an important portion of their domestic institutions, inherited from our ancestors, and existing at the adoption of the Constitution, by which it is recognized as constituting an important element in the apportionment of powers among the States, and that no change of opinion or feeling on the part of the non-slaveholding States of the Union in relation to this institution can justify them or their citizens in open or covert attacks thereon, with a view to its overthrow; and that all such attacks are in manifest violation of the mutual and solemn pledge to protect and defend each other, given by the States respectively, on entering into the constitutional compact which formed the Union, and are a manifest breach of faith and a violation of the most solemn obligations. 

 "3. _Resolved_, That the Union of these States rests on the equality of rights and privileges among its members, and that it is especially the duty of the Senate, which represents the States in their sovereign capacity, to resist all attempts to discriminate either in relation to persons or property in the Territories, which are the common possessions of the United States, so as to give advantages to the citizens of one State which are not equally assured to those of every other State. 

 "4. _Resolved_, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly character, possesses power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common Territories, and there hold and enjoy the same while the territorial condition remains. 

 "5. _Resolved_, That if experience should at any time prove that the judiciary and executive authority do not possess means to insure adequate protection to constitutional rights in a Territory, and if the Territorial government shall fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies for that purpose, it will be the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency. [14]

 "6. _Resolved_, That the inhabitants of a Territory of the United States, when they rightfully form a Constitution to be admitted as a State into the Union, may then, for the first time, like the people of a State when forming a new Constitution, decide for themselves whether slavery, as a domestic institution, shall be maintained or prohibited within their jurisdiction; and they shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission. 

 "7. _Resolved_, That the provision of the Constitution for the rendition of fugitives from service or labor, 'without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed, ' and that the laws of 1793 and 1850, which were enacted to secure its execution, and the main features of which, being similar, bear the impress of nearly seventy years of sanction by the highest judicial authority, should be honestly and faithfully observed and maintained by all who enjoy the benefits of our compact of union; and that all acts of individuals or of State Legislatures to defeat the purpose or nullify the requirements of that provision, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are hostile in character, subversive of the Constitution, and revolutionary in their effect. "[15]

After a protracted and earnest debate, these resolutions were adopted_seriatim_, on the 24th and 25th of May, by a decided majority of theSenate (varying from thirty-three to thirty-six yeas against from two totwenty-one nays), the Democrats, both Northern and Southern, sustainingthem unitedly, with the exception of one adverse vote (that of Mr. Pugh, of Ohio) on the fourth and sixth resolutions. The Republicans all votedagainst them or refrained from voting at all, except that Mr. Teneyck, of New Jersey, voted for the fifth and seventh of the series. Mr. Douglas, the leader if not the author of "popular sovereignty, " wasabsent on account of illness, and there were a few other absentees. 

The conclusion of a speech, in reply to Mr. Douglas, a few days beforethe vote was taken on these resolutions, is introduced here as the bestevidence of the position of the author at that period of excitement andagitation:

 Conclusion of Reply to Mr. Douglas, _May 17, 1860_. 

 "Mr. President: I briefly and reluctantly referred, because the subject had been introduced, to the attitude of Mississippi on a former occasion. I will now as briefly say that in 1851, and in 1860, Mississippi was, and is, ready to make every concession which it becomes her to make to the welfare and the safety of the Union. If, on a former occasion, she hoped too much from fraternity, the responsibility for her disappointment rests upon those who failed to fulfill her expectations. She still clings to the Government as our fathers formed it. She is ready to-day and to-morrow, as in her past and though brief yet brilliant history, to maintain that Government in all its power, and to vindicate its honor with all the means she possesses. I say brilliant history; for it was in the very morning of her existence that her sons, on the plains of New Orleans, were announced, in general orders, to have been the admiration of one army and the wonder of the other. That we had a division in relation to the measures enacted in 1850, is true; that the Southern rights men became the minority in the election which resulted, is true; but no figure of speech could warrant the Senator in speaking of them as subdued--as coming to him or anybody else for quarter. I deemed it offensive when it was uttered, and the scorn with which I repelled it at the instant, time has only softened to contempt. Our flag was never borne from the field. We had carried it in the face of defeat, with a knowledge that defeat awaited it; but scarcely had the smoke of the battle passed away which proclaimed another victor, before the general voice admitted that the field again was ours. I have not seen a sagacious, reflecting man, who was cognizant of the events as they transpired at the time, who does not say that, within two weeks after the election, our party was in a majority; and the next election which occurred showed that we possessed the State beyond controversy. How we have wielded that power it is not for me to say. I trust others may see forbearance in our conduct--that, with a determination to insist upon our constitutional rights, then and now, there is an unwavering desire to maintain the Government, and to uphold the Democratic party. 

 "We believe now, as we have asserted on former occasions, that the best hope for the perpetuity of our institutions depends upon the coöperation, the harmony, the zealous action, of the Democratic party. We cling to that party from conviction that its principles and its aims are those of truth and the country, as we cling to the Union for the fulfillment of the purposes for which it was formed. Whenever we shall be taught that the Democratic party is recreant to its principles; whenever we shall learn that it can not be relied upon to maintain the great measures which constitute its vitality--I for one shall be ready to leave it. And so, when we declare our tenacious adherence to the Union, it is the Union of the Constitution. If the compact between the States is to be trampled into the dust; if anarchy is to be substituted for the usurpation and consolidation which threatened the Government at an earlier period; if the Union is to become powerless for the purposes for which it was established, and we are vainly to appeal to it for protection--then, sir, conscious of the rectitude of our course, the justice of our cause, self-reliant, yet humbly, confidingly trusting in the arm that guided and protected our fathers, we look beyond the confines of the Union for the maintenance of our rights. An habitual reverence and cherished affection for the Government will bind us to it longer than our interests would suggest or require; but he is a poor student of the world's history who does not understand that communities at last must yield to the dictates of their interests. That the affection, the mutual desire for the mutual good, which existed among our fathers, may be weakened in succeeding generations by the denial of right, and hostile demonstration, until the equality guaranteed but not secured within the Union may be sought for without it, must be evident to even a careless observer of our race. It is time to be up and doing. There is yet time to remove the causes of dissension and alienation which are now distracting, and have for years past divided, the country. 

 "If the Senator correctly described me as having at a former period, against my own preferences and opinions, acquiesced in the decision of my party; if, when I had youth, when physical vigor gave promise of many days, and the future was painted in the colors of hope, I could thus surrender my own convictions, my own prejudices, and coöperate with my political friends according to their views of the best method of promoting the public good--now, when the years of my future can not be many, and experience has sobered the hopeful tints of youth's gilding; when, approaching the evening of life, the shadows are reversed, and the mind turns retrospectively, it is not to be supposed that I would abandon lightly, or idly put on trial, the party to which I have steadily adhered. It is rather to be assumed that conservatism, which belongs to the timidity or caution of increasing years, would lead me to cling to, to be supported by, rather than to cast off, the organization with which I have been so long connected. If I am driven to consider the necessity of separating myself from those old and dear relations, of discarding the accustomed support, under circumstances such as I have described, might not my friends who differ from me pause and inquire whether there is not something involved in it which calls for their careful revision?

 "I desire no divided flag for the Democratic party. 

 "Our principles are national; they belong to every State of the Union; and, though elections may be lost by their assertion, they constitute the only foundation on which we can maintain power, on which we can again rise to the dignity the Democracy once possessed. Does not the Senator from Illinois see in the sectional character of the vote be received, [16] that his opinions are not acceptable to every portion of the country? Is not the fact that the resolutions adopted by seventeen States, on which the greatest reliance must be placed for Democratic support, are in opposition to the dogma to which he still clings, a warning that, if he persists and succeeds in forcing his theory upon the Democratic party, its days are numbered? We ask only for the Constitution. We ask of the Democracy only from time to time to declare, as current exigencies may indicate, what the Constitution was intended to secure and provide. Our flag bears no new device. Upon its folds our principles are written in living light; all proclaiming the constitutional Union, justice, equality, and fraternity of our ocean-bound domain, for a limitless future. "

[Footnote 14: The words, "within the limits of its constitutionalpowers, " were subsequently added to this resolution, on the suggestionof Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, with the approval of the mover. ]

[Footnote 15: The speech of the author, delivered on the 7th of Mayensuing, in exposition of these resolutions, will be found in AppendixF. ]

[Footnote 16: In the Democratic Convention, which had been recently heldin Charleston. (See the ensuing chapter. )]

CHAPTER VII

 A Retrospect. --Growth of Sectional Rivalry. --The Generosity of Virginia. --Unequal Accessions of Territory. --The Tariff and its Effects. --The Republican Convention of 1860, its Resolutions and its Nominations. --The Democratic Convention at Charleston, its Divisions and Disruption. --The Nominations at Baltimore. --The "Constitutional-Union" Party and its Nominees. --An Effort in Behalf of Agreement declined by Mr. Douglas. --The Election of Lincoln and Hamlin. --Proceedings in the South. --Evidences of Calmness and Deliberation. --Mr. Buchanan's Conservatism and the weakness of his Position. --Republican Taunts. --The "New York Tribune, " etc. 

When, at the close of the war of the Revolution, each of the thirteencolonies that had been engaged in that contest was severallyacknowledged by the mother-country, Great Britain, to be a free andindependent State, the confederation of those States embraced an area soextensive, with climate and products so various, that rivalries andconflicts of interest soon began to be manifested. It required all thepower of wisdom and patriotism, animated by the affection engendered bycommon sufferings and dangers, to keep these rivalries under restraint, and to effect those compromises which it was fondly hoped would insurethe harmony and mutual good offices of each for the benefit of all. Itwas in this spirit of patriotism and confidence in the continuance ofsuch abiding good will as would for all time preclude hostileaggression, that Virginia ceded, for the use of the confederated States, all that vast extent of territory lying north of the Ohio River, out ofwhich have since been formed five States and part of a sixth. Theaddition of these States has accrued entirely to the preponderance ofthe Northern section over that from which the donation proceeded, and tothe disturbance of that equilibrium which existed at the close of thewar of the Revolution. 

It may not be out of place here to refer to the fact that the grievanceswhich led to that war were directly inflicted upon the Northerncolonies. Those of the South had no material cause of complaint; but, actuated by sympathy for their Northern brethren, and a devotion to theprinciples of civil liberty and community independence, which they hadinherited from their Anglo-Saxon ancestry, and which were set forth inthe Declaration of Independence, they made common cause with theirneighbors, and may, at least, claim to have done their full share in thewar that ensued. 

By the exclusion of the South, in 1820, from all that part of theLouisiana purchase lying north of the parallel of thirty-six degreesthirty minutes, and not included in the State of Missouri, by theextension of that line of exclusion to embrace the territory acquiredfrom Texas; and by the appropriation of _all_ the territory obtainedfrom Mexico under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, both north and southof that line, it may be stated with approximate accuracy that the Northhad monopolized to herself more than three fourths of all that had beenadded to the domain of the United States since the Declaration ofIndependence. This inequality, which began, as has been shown, in themore generous than wise confidence of the South, was employed to obtainfor the North the lion's share of what was afterward added at the costof the public treasure and the blood of patriots. I do not care toestimate the relative proportion contributed by each of the twosections. 

Nor was this the only cause that operated to disappoint the reasonablehopes and to blight the fair prospects under which the original compactwas formed. The effects of discriminating duties upon imports have beenreferred to in a former chapter--favoring the manufacturing region, which was the North; burdening the exporting region, which was theSouth; and so imposing upon the latter a double tax: one, by theincreased price of articles of consumption, which, so far as they wereof home production, went into the pockets of the manufacturer; theother, by the diminished value of articles of export, which was so muchwithheld from the pockets of the agriculturist. In like manner the powerof the majority section was employed to appropriate to itself an unequalshare of the public disbursements. These combined causes--the possessionof more territory, more money, and a wider field for the employment ofspecial labor--all served to attract immigration; and, with increasingpopulation, the greed grew by what it fed on. 

This became distinctly manifest when the so-called "Republican"Convention assembled in Chicago, on May 16, 1860, to nominate acandidate for the Presidency. It was a purely sectional body. There werea few delegates present, representing an insignificant minority in the"border States, " Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri;but not one from any State south of the celebrated political line ofthirty-six degrees thirty minutes. It had been the invariable usage withnominating conventions of all parties to select candidates for thePresidency and Vice-Presidency, one from the North and the other fromthe South; but this assemblage nominated Mr. Lincoln, of Illinois, forthe first office, and for the second, Mr. Hamlin, of Maine--bothNortherners. Mr. Lincoln, its nominee for the Presidency, had publiclyannounced that the Union "could not permanently endure, half slave andhalf free. " The resolutions adopted contained some carefully wordeddeclarations, well adapted to deceive the credulous who were opposed tohostile aggressions upon the rights of the States. In order toaccomplish this purpose, they were compelled to create a fictitiousissue, in denouncing what they described as "the new dogma that theConstitution, of its own force, carries slavery into any or all of theTerritories of the United States"--a "dogma" which had never been heldor declared by anybody, and which had no existence outside of their ownassertion. There was enough in connection with the nomination to assurethe most fanatical foes of the Constitution that their ideas would bethe rule and guide of the party. 

Meantime, the Democratic party had held a convention, composed as usualof delegates from all the States. They met in Charleston, SouthCarolina, on April 23d, but an unfortunate disagreement with regard tothe declaration of principles to be set forth rendered a nominationimpracticable. Both divisions of the Convention adjourned, and met againin Baltimore in June. Then, having finally failed to come to anagreement, they separated and made their respective nominations apart. Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, was nominated by the friends of the doctrineof "popular sovereignty, " with Mr. Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, for theVice-Presidency. Both these gentlemen at that time were Senators fromtheir respective States. Mr. Fitzpatrick promptly declined thenomination, and his place was filled with the name of Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, a distinguished citizen of Georgia. 

The Convention representing the conservative, or State-Rights, wing ofthe Democratic-party (the President of which was the Hon. Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts), on the first ballot, unanimously made choice of JohnC. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, then Vice-President of the United States, for the first office, and with like unanimity selected General JosephLane, then a Senator from Oregon, for the second. The resolutions ofeach of these two conventions denounced the action and policy of theAbolition party, as subversive of the Constitution, and revolutionary intheir tendency. 

Another convention was held in Baltimore about the same period[17] bythose who still adhered to the old Whig party, reënforced by the remainsof the "American" organization, and perhaps some others. This Conventionalso consisted of delegates from all the States, and, repudiating allgeographical and sectional issues, and declaring it to be "both the partof patriotism and of duty to recognize no political principle other thanthe Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and theenforcement of the laws, " pledged itself and its supporters "tomaintain, protect, and defend, separately and unitedly, those greatprinciples of public liberty and national safety against all enemies athome and abroad. " Its nominees were Messrs. John Bell, of Tennessee, andEdward Everett, of Massachusetts, both of whom had long beendistinguished members of the Whig party. 

The people of the United States now had four rival tickets presented tothem by as many contending parties, whose respective position andprinciples on the great and absorbing question at issue may be brieflyrecapitulated as follows:

1. The "Constitutional-Union" Party, as it was now termed, led byMessrs. Bell and Everett, which ignored the territorial controversyaltogether, and contented itself, as above stated, with a simpledeclaration of adherence to "the Constitution, the Union, and theenforcement of the laws. "

2. The party of "popular sovereignty, " headed by Douglas and Johnson, who affirmed the right of the people of the Territories, in theirterritorial condition, to determine their own organic institutions, independently of the control of Congress; denying the power or duty ofCongress to protect the persons or property of individuals or minoritiesin such Territories against the action of majorities. 

3. The State-Rights party, supporting Breckinridge and Lane, who heldthat the Territories were open to citizens of all the States, with theirproperty, without any inequality or discrimination, and that it was theduty of the General Government to protect both persons and property fromaggression in the Territories subject to its control. At the same timethey admitted and asserted the right of the people of a Territory, onemerging from their territorial condition to that of a State, todetermine what should then be their domestic institutions, as well asall other questions of personal or proprietary right, withoutinterference by Congress, and subject only to the limitations andrestrictions prescribed by the Constitution of the United States. 

4. The so-called "Republicans, " presenting the names of Lincoln andHamlin, who held, in the language of one of their leaders, [18] that"slavery can exist only by virtue of municipal law"; that there was "nolaw for it in the Territories, and no power to enact one"; and thatCongress was "bound to prohibit it in or exclude it from any and everyFederal Territory. " In other words, they asserted the right and duty ofCongress to exclude the citizens of half the States of the Union fromthe territory belonging in common to all, unless on condition of thesacrifice or abandonment of their property recognized by theConstitution--indeed, of the _only_ species of their property distinctlyand specifically recognized as such by that instrument. 

On the vital question underlying the whole controversy--that is, whetherthe Federal Government should be a Government of the whole for thebenefit of all its equal members, or (if it should continue to exist atall) a sectional Government for the benefit of a part--the first threeof the parties above described were in substantial accord as against thefourth. If they could or would have acted unitedly, they, couldcertainly have carried the election, and averted the catastrophe whichfollowed. Nor were efforts wanting to effect such a union. 

Mr. Bell, the Whig candidate, was a highly respectable and experiencedstatesman, who had filled many important offices, both State andFederal. He was not ambitious to the extent of coveting the Presidency, and he was profoundly impressed by the danger which threatened thecountry. Mr. Breckinridge had not anticipated, and it may safely be saiddid not eagerly desire, the nomination. He was young enough to wait, andpatriotic enough to be willing to do so, if the weal of the countryrequired it. Thus much I may confidently assert of both those gentlemen;for each of them authorized me to say that he was willing to withdraw, if an arrangement could be effected by which the divided forces of thefriends of the Constitution could be concentrated upon some one moregenerally acceptable than either of the three who had been presented tothe country. When I made this announcement to Mr. Douglas--with whom myrelations had always been such as to authorize the assurance that hecould not consider it as made in an unfriendly spirit--he replied thatthe scheme proposed was impracticable, because his friends, mainlyNorthern Democrats, if he were withdrawn, would join in the support ofMr. Lincoln, rather than of any one that should supplant _him_(Douglas); that he was in the hands of his friends, and was sure theywould not accept the proposition. 

It needed but little knowledge of the _status_ of parties in the severalStates to foresee a probable defeat if the conservatives were tocontinue divided into three parts, and the aggressives were to be heldin solid column. But angry passions, which are always bad counselors, had been aroused, and hopes were still cherished, which proved to beillusory. The result was the election, by a minority, of a Presidentwhose avowed principles were necessarily fatal to the harmony of theUnion. 

Of 303 _electoral_ votes, Mr. Lincoln received 180, but of the _popular_suffrage of 4, 676, 853 votes, which the electors represented, he obtainedonly 1, 866, 352--something over a third of the votes. This discrepancywas owing to the system of voting by "general ticket"--that is, castingthe State votes as a unit, whether unanimous or nearly equally divided. Thus, in New York, the total popular vote was 675, 156, of which 362, 646were cast for the so-called Republican (or Lincoln) electors, and312, 510 against them. Now York was entitled to 35 electoral votes. Divided on the basis of the popular vote, 19 of these would have beencast for Mr. Lincoln, and 16 against him. But under the "general ticket"system the entire 35 votes were cast for the Republican candidates, thusgiving them not only the full strength of the majority in their favor, but that of the great minority against them superadded. So of otherNorthern States, in which the small majorities on one side operated withthe weight of entire unanimity, while the virtual unanimity in theSouthern States, on the other side, counted nothing more than a meremajority would have done. 

The manifestations which followed this result, in the Southern States, did not proceed, as has been unjustly charged, from chagrin at theirdefeat in the election, or from any personal hostility to thePresident-elect, but from the fact that they recognized in him therepresentative of a party professing principles destructive to "theirpeace, their prosperity, and their domestic tranquillity. " Thelong-suppressed fire burst into frequent flame, but it was stillcontrolled by that love of the Union which the South had illustrated inevery battle-field, from Boston to New Orleans. Still it was hoped, against hope, that some adjustment might be made to avert the calamitiesof a practical application of the theory of an "irrepressible conflict. "Few, if any, then doubted the right of a State to withdraw its grantsdelegated to the Federal Government, or, in other words, to secede fromthe Union; but in the South this was generally regarded as the remedy oflast resort, to be applied only when ruin or dishonor was thealternative. No rash or revolutionary action was taken by the SouthernStates, but the measures adopted were considerate, and executedadvisedly and deliberately. The Presidential election occurred (as faras the popular vote, which determined the result, was concerned) inNovember, 1860. Most of the State Legislatures convened soon afterwardin regular session. In some cases special sessions were convoked for thepurpose of calling State Conventions--the recognized representatives ofthe sovereign will of the people--to be elected expressly for thepurpose of taking such action as should be considered needful and properunder the existing circumstances. 

These conventions, as it was always held and understood, possessed allthe power of the people assembled in mass; and therefore it was concededthat they, and they only, could take action for the withdrawal of aState from the Union. The consent of the respective States to theformation of the Union had been given through such conventions, and itwas only by the same authority that it could properly be revoked. Thetime required for this deliberate and formal process precludes the ideaof hasty or passionate action, and none who admit the primary power ofthe people to govern themselves can consistently deny its validity andbinding obligation upon every citizen of the several States. Not onlywas there ample time for calm consideration among the people of theSouth, but for due reflection by the General Government and the peopleof the Northern States. 

President Buchanan was in the last year of his administration. Hisfreedom from sectional asperity, his long life in the public service, and his peace-loving and conciliatory character, were all guaranteesagainst his precipitating a conflict between the Federal Government andany of the States; but the feeble power that he possessed in the closingmonths of his term to mold the policy of the future was painfullyevident. Like all who had intelligently and impartially studied thehistory of the formation of the Constitution, he held that the FederalGovernment had no rightful power to coerce a State. Like the sages andpatriots who had preceded him in the high office that he filled, hebelieved that "our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never bycemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If it can notlive in the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congressmay possess many means of preserving it by conciliation, but the swordwas not placed in their hand to preserve it by force. "--(Message ofDecember 3, 1860. )

Ten years before, Mr. Calhoun addressing the Senate with all theearnestness of his nature and with that sincere desire to avert thedanger of disunion which those who knew him best never doubted, hadasked the emphatic question, "How can the Union be saved?" He answeredhis question thus:

 "There is but one way by which it can be [saved] with any certainty; and that is by a full and final settlement, on the principles of justice, of all the questions at issue between the sections. The South asks for justice--simple justice--and less she ought not to take. She has no compromise to offer but the Constitution, and no concession or surrender to make.... 

 "Can this be done? Yes, easily! Not by the weaker party; for it can of itself do nothing--not even protect itself--but by the stronger.... But will the North agree to do this? It is for her to answer this question. But, I will say, she can not refuse if she has half the love of the Union which she professes to have, nor without exposing herself to the charge that her love of power and aggrandizement is far greater than her love of the Union. "

During the ten years that intervened between the date of this speech andthe message of Mr. Buchanan cited above, the progress of sectionaldiscord and the tendency of the stronger section to unconstitutionalaggression had been fearfully rapid. With very rare exceptions, therewere none in 1850 who claimed the right of the Federal Government toapply coercion to a State. In 1860 men had grown to be familiar withthreats of driving the South into submission to any act that theGovernment, in the hands of a Northern majority, might see fit toperform. During the canvass of that year, demonstrations had been madeby _quasi_-military organizations in various parts of the North, whichlooked unmistakably to purposes widely different from those enunciatedin the preamble to the Constitution, and to the employment of means notauthorized by the powers which the States had delegated to the FederalGovernment. 

Well-informed men still remembered that, in the Convention which framedthe Constitution, a proposition was made to authorize the employment offorce against a delinquent State, on which Mr. Madison remarked that"the use of force against a State would look more like a declaration ofwar than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be consideredby the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by whichit might have been bound. " The Convention expressly refused to conferthe power proposed, and the clause was lost. While, therefore, in 1860, many violent men, appealing to passion and the lust of power, wereinciting the multitude, and preparing Northern opinion to support a warwaged against the Southern States in the event of their secession, therewere others who took a different view of the case. Notable among suchwas the "New York Tribune, " which had been the organ of theabolitionists, and which now declared that, "if the cotton States wishedto withdraw from the Union, they should be allowed to do so"; that "anyattempt to compel them to remain, by force, would be contrary to theprinciples of the Declaration of Independence and to the fundamentalideas upon which human liberty is based"; and that, "if the Declarationof Independence justified the secession from the British Empire of threemillions of subjects in 1776, it was not seen why it would not justifythe secession of five millions of Southerners from the Union in 1861. "Again, it was said by the same journal that, "sooner than compromisewith the South and abandon the Chicago platform, " they would "let theUnion slide. " Taunting expressions were freely used--as, for example, "If the Southern people wish to leave the Union, we will do our best toforward their views. "

All this, it must be admitted, was quite consistent with theoft-repeated declaration that the Constitution was a "covenant withhell, " which stood as the caption of a leading abolitionist paper ofBoston. That signs of coming danger so visible, evidences of hostilityso unmistakable, disregard of constitutional obligations so wanton, taunts and jeers so bitter and insulting, should serve to increaseexcitement in the South, was a consequence flowing as much from reasonand patriotism as from sentiment. He must have been ignorant of humannature who did not expect such a tree to bear fruits of discord anddivision. 

[Footnote 17: May 19, 1860. ]

[Footnote 18: Horace Greeley, "The American Conflict, " vol. I, p. 322. ]

CHAPTER VIII. 

 Conference with the Governor of Mississippi. --The Author censured as "too slow. "--Summons to Washington. --Interview with the President. --His Message. --Movements in Congress. --The Triumphant Majority. --The Crittenden Proposition. --Speech of the Author on Mr. Green's Resolution. --The Committee of Thirteen. --Failure to agree. --The "Republicans" responsible for the Failure. --Proceedings in the House of Representatives. --Futility of Efforts for an Adjustment. --The Old Year closes in Clouds. 

In November, 1860, after the result of the Presidential election wasknown, the Governor of Mississippi, having issued his proclamationconvoking a special session of the Legislature to consider the proprietyof calling a convention, invited the Senators and Representatives of theState in Congress, to meet him for consultation as to the character ofthe message he should send to the Legislature when assembled. 

While holding, in common with my political associates, that the right ofa State to secede was unquestionable, I differed from most of them as tothe probability of our being permitted peaceably to exercise the right. The knowledge acquired by the administration of the War Department forfour years, and by the chairmanship of the Military Committee of theSenate at two different periods, still longer in combined duration, hadshown me the entire lack of preparation for war in the South. Thefoundries and armories were in the Northern States, and there werestored all the new and improved weapons of war. In the arsenals of theSouthern States were to be found only arms of the old and rejectedmodels. The South had no manufactories of powder, and no navy to protectour harbors, no merchant-ships for foreign commerce. It was evident tome, therefore, that, if we should be involved in war, the odds againstus would be far greater than what was due merely to our inferiority inpopulation. Believing that secession would be the precursor of warbetween the States, I was consequently slower and more reluctant thanothers, who entertained a different opinion, to resort to that remedy. 

While engaged in the consultation with the Governor just referred to, atelegraphic message was handed to me from two members of Mr. Buchanan'sCabinet, urging me to proceed "immediately" to Washington. This dispatchwas laid before the Governor and the members of Congress from the Statewho were in conference with him, and it was decided that I should complywith the summons. I was afterward informed that my associates consideredme "too slow, " and they were probably correct in the belief that I wasbehind the general opinion of the people of the State as to thepropriety of prompt secession. [19]

On arrival at Washington, I found, as had been anticipated, that mypresence there was desired on account of the influence which it wassupposed I might exercise with the President (Mr. Buchanan) in relationto his forthcoming message to Congress. On paying my respects to thePresident, he told me that he had finished the rough draft of hismessage, but that it was still open to revision and amendment, and thathe would like to read it to me. He did so, and very kindly accepted allthe modifications which I suggested. The message was, however, afterwardsomewhat changed, and, with great deference to the wisdom andstatesmanship of its author, I must say that, in my judgment, the lastalterations were unfortunate--so much so that, when it was read in theSenate, I was reluctantly constrained to criticise it. Compared, however, with documents of the same class which have since beenaddressed to the Congress of the United States, the reader ofPresidential messages must regret that it was not accepted by Mr. Buchanan's successors as a model, and that his views of the Constitutionhad not been adopted as a guide in the subsequent action of the FederalGovernment. 

The popular movement in the South was tending steadily and rapidlytoward the secession of those known as "planting States"; yet, whenCongress assembled on December 3, 1860 the representatives of the peopleof all those States took their seats in the House, and they were allrepresented in the Senate, except South Carolina, whose Senators hadtendered their resignation to the Governor immediately on theannouncement of the result of the Presidential election. Hopes werestill cherished that the Northern leaders would appreciate the impendingperil, would cease to treat the warnings, so often given, as idlethreats, would refrain from the bravado, so often and so unwiselyindulged, of ability "to whip the South" in thirty, sixty, or ninetydays, and would address themselves to the more manly purpose of devisingmeans to allay the indignation, and quiet the apprehensions, whetherwell, founded or not, of their Southern brethren. But the debates ofthat session manifest, on the contrary, the arrogance of a triumphantparty, and the determination to reap to the uttermost the full harvestof a party victory. 

Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, the oldest and one of the most honoredmembers of the Senate, [20] introduced into that body a joint resolutionproposing certain amendments to the Constitution--among them therestoration and incorporation into the Constitution of the geographicalline of the Missouri Compromise, with other provisions, which it washoped might be accepted as the basis for an adjustment of thedifficulties rapidly hurrying the Union to disruption. But the earnestappeals of that venerable statesman were unheeded by Senators of theso-called Republican party. Action upon his proposition was postponedfrom time to time, on one pretext or another, until the last day of thesession--when seven States had already withdrawn from the Union andestablished a confederation of their own--and it was then defeated by amajority of one vote. [21]

Meantime, among other propositions made in the Senate were twointroduced early in the session, which it may be proper specially tomention. One of these was a resolution offered by Mr. Powell, ofKentucky, which, after some modification by amendment, when finallyacted upon, had taken the following form:

 "_Resolved_, That so much of the President's message as relates to the present agitated and distracted condition of the country, and the grievances between the slaveholding and the non-slave holding States, be referred to a special committee of thirteen members, and that said committee be instructed to inquire into the present condition of the country, and report by bill or otherwise. "

The other was a resolution offered by Mr. Green, of Missouri, to thefollowing effect:

 "_Resolved_, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire into the propriety of providing by law for establishing an armed police force at all necessary points along the line separating the slaveholding States from the non-slaveholding States, for the purpose of maintaining the general peace between those States, of preventing the invasion of one State by citizens of another, and also for the efficient execution of the fugitive-slave laws. "

In the discussion of these two resolutions I find, in the proceedings ofthe Senate on December 10th, as reported in the "Congressional Globe, "some remarks of my own, the reproduction of which will serve to exhibitmy position at that period--a position which has since been oftenmisrepresented:

 "Mr. President, if the political firmament seemed to me dark before, there has been little in the discussion this morning to cheer or illumine it. When the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky was presented--not very hopeful of a good result--I was yet willing to wait and see what developments it might produce. This morning, for the first time, it has been considered; and what of encouragement have we received? One Senator proposes, as a cure for the public evil impending over us, to invest the Federal Government with such physical power as properly belongs to monarchy alone; another announces that his constituents cling to the Federal Government, if its legislative favors and its Treasury secure the works of improvement and the facilities which they desire; while another rises to point out that the evils of the land are of a party character. Sir, we have fallen upon evil times indeed, if the great convulsion which now shakes the body-politic to its center is to be dealt with by such nostrums as these. Men must look more deeply, must rise to a higher altitude; like patriots they must confront the danger face to face, if they hope to relieve the evils which now disturb the peace of the land, and threaten the destruction of our political existence. 

 "First of all, we must inquire what is the cause of the evils which beset us? The diagnosis of the disease must be stated before we are prepared to prescribe. Is it the fault of our legislation here? If so, then it devolves upon us to correct it, and we have the power. Is it the defect of the Federal organization, of the fundamental law of our Union? I hold that it is not. Our fathers, learning wisdom from the experiments of Rome and of Greece--the one a consolidated republic, and the other strictly a confederacy--and taught by the lessons of our own experiment under the Confederation, came together to form a Constitution for 'a more perfect union, ' and, in my judgment, made the best government which has ever been instituted by man. It only requires that it should be carried out in the spirit in which it was made, that the circumstances under which it was made should continue, and no evil can arise under this Government for which it has not an appropriate remedy. Then it is outside of the Government--elsewhere than to its Constitution or to its administration--that we are to look. Men must not creep in the dust of partisan strife and seek to make points against opponents as the means of evading or meeting the issues before us. The fault is not in the form of the Government, nor does the evil spring from the manner in which it has been administered. Where, then, is it? It is that our fathers formed a Government for a Union of friendly States; and though under it the people have been prosperous beyond comparison with any other whose career is recorded in the history of man, still that Union of friendly States has changed its character, and sectional hostility has been substituted for the fraternity in which the Government was founded. 

 "I do not intend here to enter into a statement of grievances; I do not intend here to renew that war of crimination which for years past has disturbed the country, and in which I have taken a part perhaps more zealous than useful; but I call upon all men who have in their hearts a love of the Union, and whose service is not merely that of the lip, to look the question calmly but fully in the face, that they may see the true cause of our danger, which, from my examination, I believe to be that a sectional hostility has been substituted for a general fraternity, and thus the Government rendered powerless for the ends for which it was instituted. The hearts of a portion of the people have been perverted by that hostility, so that the powers delegated by the compact of union are regarded not as means to secure the welfare of all, but as instruments for the destruction of a part--the minority section. How, then, have we to provide a remedy? By strengthening this Government? By instituting physical force to overawe the States, to coerce the people living under them as members of sovereign communities to pass under the yoke of the Federal Government? No, sir; I would have this Union severed into thirty-three fragments sooner than have that great evil befall constitutional liberty and representative government. Our Government is an agency of delegated and strictly limited powers. Its founders did not look to its preservation by force; but the chain they wove to bind these States together was one of love and mutual good offices. They had broken the fetters of despotic power; they had separated themselves from the mother-country upon the question of community independence; and their sons will be degenerate indeed if, clinging to the mere name and forms of free government, they forge and rivet upon their posterity the fetters which their ancestors broke.... 

 "The remedy for these evils is to be found in the patriotism and the affection of the people, if it exists; and, if it does not exist, it is far better, instead of attempting to preserve a forced and therefore fruitless Union, that we should peacefully part and each pursue his separate course. It is not to this side of the Chamber that we should look for propositions; it is not here that we can ask for remedies. Complaints, with much amplitude of specification, have gone forth from the members on this side of the Chamber heretofore. It is not to be expected that they will be renewed, for the people have taken the subject into their own hands. States, in their sovereign capacity, have now resolved to judge of the infractions of the Federal compact, and of the mode and measure of redress. All we can usefully or properly do is to send to the people, thus preparing to act for themselves, evidence of error, if error there be; to transmit to them the proofs of kind feeling, if it actuates the Northern section, where they now believe there is only hostility. If we are mistaken as to your feelings and purposes, give a substantial proof, that here may begin that circle which hence may spread out and cover the whole land with proofs of fraternity, of a reaction in public sentiment, and the assurance of a future career in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Constitution. All else is idle. I would not give the parchment on which the bill would be written that is to secure our constitutional rights within the limits of a State, where the people are all opposed to the execution of that law. It is a truism in free governments that laws rest upon public opinion, and fall powerless before its determined opposition. 

 "The time has passed, sir, when appeals might profitably be made to sentiment. The time has come when men must of necessity reason, assemble facts, and deal with current events. I may be permitted in this to correct an error into which one of my friends fell this morning, when he impressed on us the great value of our Union as measured by the amount of time and money and blood which were spent to form this Union. It cost very little time, very little money, and no blood. It was one of the most peaceful transactions that mark the pages of human history. Our fathers fought the war of the Revolution to maintain the rights asserted in their Declaration of Independence. "

 Mr. Powell: "The Senator from Mississippi will allow me to say that I spoke of the Government, not of the Union. I said time and money and blood had been required to form the Government. "

 Mr. Davis: "The Government is the machinery established by the Constitution; it is the agency created by the States when they formed the Union. Our fathers, I was proceeding to say, having fought the war of the Revolution, and achieved their independence--each State for itself, each State standing out an integral part, each State separately recognized by the parent Government of Great Britain--these States as independent sovereignties entered into confederate alliance. After having tried the Confederation and found it to be a failure, they, of their own accord, came peacefully together, and in a brief period made a Constitution, which was referred to each State and voluntarily ratified by each State that entered the Union; little time, little money, and no blood being expended to form this Government, the machine for making the Union useful and beneficial. Blood, much and precious, was expended to vindicate and to establish community independence, and the great American idea that all governments rest on the consent of the governed, and that the people may at their will alter or abolish their government, however or by whomsoever instituted. 

 "But our existing Government is not the less sacred to me because it was not sealed with blood. I honor it the more because it was the free-will offering of men who chose to live together. It rooted in fraternity, and fraternity supported its trunk and all its branches. Every bud and leaflet depends entirely on the nurture it receives from fraternity as the root of the tree. When that is destroyed, the trunk decays, and the branches wither, and the leaves fall; and the shade it was designed to give has passed away for ever. I cling not merely to the name and form, but to the spirit and purpose of the Union which our fathers made. It was for domestic tranquillity; not to organize within one State lawless bands to commit raids upon another. It was to provide for the common defense; not to disband armies and navies, lest they should serve the protection of one section of the country better than another. It was to bring the forces of all the States together to achieve a common object, upholding each the other in amity, and united to repel exterior force. All the custom-house obstructions existing between the States were destroyed; the power to regulate commerce transferred to the General Government. Every barrier to the freest intercourse was swept away. Under the Confederation it had been secured as a right to each citizen to have free transit over all the other States; and under the Union it was designed to make this more perfect. Is it enjoyed? Is it not denied? Do we not have mere speculative question of what is property raised in defiance of the clear intent of the Constitution, offending as well against its letter as against its whole spirit? This must be reformed, or the Government our fathers instituted is destroyed. I say, then, shall we cling to the mere forms or idolize the name of Union, when its blessings are lost, after its spirit has fled? Who would keep a flower, which had lost its beauty and its fragrance, and in their stead had formed a seed-vessel containing the deadliest poison? Or, to drop the figure, who would consent to remain in alliance with States which used the power thus acquired to invade his tranquillity, to impair his defense, to destroy his peace and security? Any community would be stronger standing in an isolated position, and using its revenues to maintain its own physical force, than if allied with those who would thus war upon its prosperity and domestic peace; and reason, pride, self-interest, and the apprehension of secret, constant danger would impel to separation. 

 "I do not comprehend the policy of a Southern Senator who would seek to change the whole form of our Government, and substitute Federal force for State obligation and authority. Do we want a new Government that is to overthrow the old? Do we wish to erect a central Colossus, wielding at discretion the military arm, and exercising military force over the people and the States? This is not the Union to which we were invited; and so carefully was this guarded that, when our fathers provided for using force to put down insurrection, they required that the fact of the insurrection should be communicated by the authorities of the State before the President could interpose. When it was proposed to give to Congress power to execute the laws against a delinquent State, it was refused on the ground that that would be making war on the States; and, though I know the good purpose of my honorable friend from Missouri is only to give protection to constitutional rights, I fear his proposition is to rear a monster, which will break the feeble chain provided, and destroy rights it was intended to guard. That military Government which he is about to institute, by passing into hostile hands, becomes a weapon for his destruction, not for his protection. All dangers which we may be called upon to confront as independent communities are light, in my estimation, compared with that which would hang over us if this Federal Government had such physical force; if its character was changed from a representative agent of States to a central Government, with a military power to be used at discretion against the States. To-day it may be the idea that it will be used against some State which nullifies the Constitution and the laws; some State which passes laws to obstruct or repeal the laws of the United States; some State which, in derogation of our rights of transit under the Constitution, passes laws to punish a citizen found there with property recognized by the Constitution of the United States, but prohibited by the laws of that State. 

 "But how long might it be before that same military force would be turned against the minority section which had sought its protection; and that minority thus become mere subjugated provinces under the great military government that it had thus contributed to establish? The minority, incapable of aggression, is, of necessity, always on the defensive, and often the victim of the desertion of its followers and the faithlessness of its allies. It therefore must maintain, not destroy, barriers. 

 "I do not know that I fully appreciate the purpose of my friend from Missouri; whether, when he spoke of establishing military posts along the borders of the States, and arming the Federal Government with adequate physical power to enforce constitutional rights (I suppose he meant obligations), he meant to confer upon this Federal Government a power which it does not now possess to coerce a State. If he did, then, in the language of Mr. Madison, he is providing, not for a union of States, but for the destruction of States; he is providing, under the name of Union, to carry on a war against States; and I care not whether it be against Massachusetts or Missouri, it is equally objectionable to me; and I will resist it alike in the one case and in the other, as subversive of the great principle on which our Government rests; as a heresy to be confronted at its first presentation, and put down there, lest it grow into proportions which will render us powerless before it. 

 "The theory of our Constitution, Mr. President, is one of peace, of equality of sovereign States. It was made by States and made for States; and for greater assurance they passed an amendment, doing that which was necessarily implied by the nature of the instrument, as it was a mere instrument of grants. But, in the abundance of caution, they declared that everything which had not been delegated was reserved to the States, or to the people--that is, to the State governments as instituted by the people of each State, or to the people in their sovereign capacity. 

 "I need not, then, go on to argue from the history and nature of our Government that no power of coercion exists in it. It is enough for me to demand the clause of the Constitution which confers the power. If it is not there, the Government does not possess it. That is the plain construction of the Constitution--made plainer, if possible, by its amendment. 

 "This Union is dear to me as a Union of fraternal States. It would lose its value if I had to regard it as a Union held together by physical force. I would be happy to know that every State now felt that fraternity which made this Union possible; and, if that evidence could go out, if evidence satisfactory to the people of the South could be given that that feeling existed in the hearts of the Northern people, you might burn your statute-books and we would cling to the Union still. But it is because of their conviction that hostility, and not fraternity, now exists in the hearts of the people, that they are looking to their reserved rights and to their independent powers for their own protection. If there be any good, then, which we can do, it is by sending evidence to them of that which I fear does not exist--the purpose of your constituents to fulfill in the spirit of justice and fraternity all their constitutional obligations. If you can submit to them that evidence, I feel confidence that, with the assurance that aggression is henceforth to cease, will terminate all the measures for defense. Upon you of the majority section it depends to restore peace and perpetuate the Union of equal States; upon us of the minority section rests the duty to maintain our equality and community rights; and the means in one case or the other must be such as each can control. "

The resolution of Mr. Powell was eventually adopted on the 18th ofDecember, and on the 20th the Committee was appointed, consisting ofMessrs. Powell and Crittenden, of Kentucky; Hunter, of Virginia; Toombs, of Georgia; Davis, of Mississippi; Douglas, of Illinois; Bigler, ofPennsylvania; Rice, of Minnesota; Collamer, of Vermont; Seward, of NewYork; Wade, of Ohio; Doolittle, of Wisconsin; and Grimes, of Iowa. Thefirst five of the list, as here enumerated, were Southern men; the nextthree were Northern Democrats, or Conservatives; the last five, Northern"Republicans, " so called. 

The supposition was that any measure agreed upon by the representativesof the three principal divisions of public opinion would be approved bythe Senate and afterward ratified by the House of Representatives. TheCommittee therefore determined that a majority of each of its threedivisions should be required in order to the adoption of any propositionpresented. The Southern members declared their readiness to accept anyterms that would secure the honor of the Southern States and guaranteetheir future safety. The Northern Democrats and Mr. Crittenden generallycoöperated with the State-Rights Democrats of the South; but theso-called "Republican" Senators of the North rejected every propositionwhich it was hoped might satisfy the Southern people, and check theprogress of the secession movement. After fruitless efforts, continuedfor some ten days, the Committee determined to report the journal oftheir proceedings, and announce their inability to attain anysatisfactory conclusion. This report was made on the 31st ofDecember--the last day of that memorable and fateful year, 1860. 

Subsequently, on the floor of the Senate, Mr. Douglas, who had been amember of the Committee, called upon the opposite side to state whatthey were willing to do. He referred to the fact that they had rejectedevery proposition that promised pacification; stated that Toombs, ofGeorgia, and Davis, of Mississippi, as members of the Committee, hadbeen willing to renew the Missouri Compromise, as a measure ofconciliation, but had met no responsive willingness on the part of theirassociates of the opposition; and he pressed the point that, as they hadrejected every overture made by the friends of peace, it was nowincumbent upon _them_ to make a positive and affirmative declaration oftheir purposes. 

Mr. Seward, of New York, as we have seen, was a member of thatCommittee--the man who, in 1858, had announced the "irrepressibleconflict, " and who, in the same year, speaking of and for abolitionism, had said: "It has driven you back in California and in Kansas; it willinvade your soil. " He was to be the Secretary of State in the incomingAdministration, and was very generally regarded as the "power behind thethrone, " greater than the throne itself. He was present in the Senate, but made no response to Mr. Douglas's demand for a declaration ofpolicy. 

Meantime the efforts for an adjustment made in the House ofRepresentatives had been equally fruitless. Conspicuous among theseefforts had been the appointment of a committee of thirty-threemembers--one from each State of the Union--charged with a duty similarto that imposed upon the Committee of Thirteen in the Senate, but theyhad been alike unsuccessful in coming to any agreement. It is true that, a few days afterward, they submitted a majority and two minorityreports, and that the report of the majority was ultimately adopted bythe House; but, even if this action had been unanimous, and had beentaken in due time, it would have been practically futile on account ofits absolute failure to provide or suggest any solution of theterritorial question, which was the vital point in controversy. 

No wonder, then, that, under the shadow of the failure of every effortin Congress to find any common ground on which the sections could berestored to amity, the close of the year should have been darkened by acloud in the firmament, which had lost even the silver lining so longseen, or thought to be seen, by the hopeful. 

[Footnote 19: The following extract from a letter of the Hon. O. R. Singleton, then a Representative of Mississippi in the United StatesCongress, in regard to the subject treated, is herewith annexed:

 "Canton, Mississippi, _July 14, 1877_. 

 "In 1860, about the time the ordinance of secession was passed by the South Carolina Convention, and while Mississippi, Alabama, and other Southern States were making active preparations to follow her example, a conference of the Mississippi delegation in Congress, Senators and Representatives, was asked for by Governor J. J. Pettus, for consultation as to the course Mississippi ought to take in the premises. 

 "The meeting took place in the fall of 1860, at Jackson, the capital; the whole delegation being present, with perhaps the exception of one Representative. 

 "The main question for consideration was: 'Shall Mississippi, as soon as her Convention can meet, pass an ordinance of secession, thus placing herself by the side of South Carolina, regardless of the action of other States; or shall she endeavor to hold South Carolina in check, and delay action herself, until other States can get ready, through their conventions, to unite with them, and then, on a given day and at a given hour, by concert of action, all the States willing to do so, secede in a body?'

 "Upon the one side, it was argued that South Carolina could not be induced to delay action a single moment beyond the meeting of her Convention, and that our fate should be hers, and to delay action would be to have her crushed by the Federal Government; whereas, by the earliest action possible, we might be able to avert this calamity. On the other side, it was contended that delay might bring the Federal Government to consider the emergency of the case, and perhaps a compromise could be effected; but, if not, then the proposed concert of action would at least give dignity to the movement, and present an undivided Southern front. 

 "The debate lasted many hours, and Mr. Davis, with perhaps one other gentleman in that conference, opposed immediate and separate State action, declaring himself opposed to secession as long as the hope of a peaceable remedy remained. He did not believe we ought to precipitate the issue, as he felt certain from his knowledge of the people, North and South, that, once there was a clash of arms, the contest would be one of the most sanguinary the world had ever witnessed. 

 "A majority of the meeting decided that no delay should be interposed to separate State action, Mr. Davis being on the other side; but, after the vote was taken and the question decided, Mr. Davis declared he would stand by whatever action the Convention representing the sovereignty of the State of Mississippi might think proper to take. 

 "After the conference was ended, several of its members were dissatisfied with the course of Mr. Davis, believing that he was entirely opposed to secession, and was seeking to delay action upon the part of Mississippi, with the hope that it might be entirely averted. 

 "In some unimportant respects my memory may be at fault, and possibly some of the inferences drawn may be incorrect; but every material statement made, I am sure, is true, and if need, can be, easily substantiated by other persons. 

 "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "

 (Signed) "O. R. Singleton. "]

[Footnote 20: Mr. Crittenden had been a life-long Whig. His firstentrance into the Senate was in 1817, and he was a member of that bodyat various periods during the ensuing forty-four years. He wasAttorney-General in the Whig Cabinets of both General Harrison and Mr. Fillmore, and supported the Bell and Everett ticket in 1860. ]

[Footnote 21: The vote was nineteen yeas to twenty nays; total, thirty-nine. As the consent of two thirds of each House is necessary topropose an amendment for action by the States, twenty-six of the votescast in the Senate would have been necessary to sustain the proposition. It actually failed, therefore, by _seven_ votes, instead of _one_. ]

CHAPTER IX. 

 Preparations for withdrawal from the Union. --Northern Precedents. --New England Secessionists. --Cabot, Pickering, Quincy, etc. --On the Acquisition of Louisiana. --The Hartford Convention. --The Massachusetts Legislature on the Annexation of Texas, etc. , etc. 

The Convention of South Carolina had already (on the 20th of December, 1860) unanimously adopted an ordinance revoking her delegated powers andwithdrawing from the Union. Her representatives, on the following day, retired from their seats in Congress. The people of the other plantingStates had been only waiting in the lingering hope that some actionmight be taken by Congress to avert the necessity for action similar tothat of South Carolina. In view of the failure of all overtures forconciliation during the first month of the session, they were now makingtheir final preparations for secession. This was generally admitted tobe an unquestionable right appertaining to their sovereignty as States, and the only _peaceable_ remedy that remained for the evils already feltand the dangers apprehended. 

In the prior history of the country, repeated instances are found of theassertion of this right, and of a purpose entertained at various timesto put it in execution. Notably is this true of Massachusetts and otherNew England States. The acquisition of Louisiana, in 1803, had createdmuch dissatisfaction in those States, for the reason, expressed by aneminent citizen of Massachusetts, [22] that "the influence of our [theNortheastern] part of the Union must be diminished by the acquisition ofmore weight at the other extremity. " The project of a separation wasfreely discussed, with no intimation, in the records of the period, ofany idea among its advocates that it could be regarded as treasonable orrevolutionary. 

Colonel Timothy Pickering, who had been an officer of the war of theRevolution, afterward successively Postmaster-General, Secretary of War, and Secretary of State, in the Cabinet of General Washington, and, stilllater, long a representative of the State of Massachusetts in the Senateof the United States, was one of the leading secessionists of his day. Writing from Washington to a friend, on the 24th of December, 1803, hesays:

 "I will not yet despair. I will rather anticipate a _new confederacy_, exempt from the corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic democrats of the South. There will be (and our children, at farthest, will see it) a separation. The white and black population will mark the boundary. "[23]

In another letter, written a few weeks afterward (January 29, 1804), speaking of what he regarded as wrongs and abuses perpetrated by thethen existing Administration, he thus expresses his views of the remedyto be applied:

 "The principles of our Revolution point to the remedy--_a separation_. That this can be accomplished, and without spilling one drop of blood, I have little doubt.... 

 "I do not believe in the practicability of a long-continued Union. A _Northern Confederacy_ would unite congenial characters and present a fairer prospect of public happiness; while the Southern States, having a similarity of habits, might be left to 'manage their own affairs in their own way. ' If a separation were to take place, our mutual wants would render a friendly and commercial intercourse inevitable. The Southern States would require the naval protection of the _Northern Union_, and the products of the former would be important to the navigation and commerce of the latter.... 

 "It [the separation] must begin, in Massachusetts. The proposition would be welcomed in Connecticut; and could we doubt of New Hampshire? But New York must be associated; and how is her concurrence to be obtained? She must be made the center of the Confederacy. Vermont and New Jersey would follow of course, and Rhode Island of necessity. "[24]

Substituting South Carolina for Massachusetts; Virginia for New York;Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, for New Hampshire, Vermont, and RhodeIsland; Kentucky for New Jersey, etc. , etc. , we find the suggestions of1860-'61 only a reproduction of those thus outlined nearly sixty yearsearlier. 

Mr. Pickering seems to have had a correct and intelligent perception ofthe altogether pacific character of the secession which he proposed, andof the mutual advantages likely to accrue to both sections from apeaceable separation. Writing in February, 1804, he explicitly disavowsthe idea of hostile feeling or action toward the South, expressinghimself as follows:

 "While thus contemplating the only means of maintaining our ancient institutions in morals and religion, and our equal rights, we wish no ill to the Southern States and those naturally connected with them. The public debts might be equitably apportioned between the new confederacies, and a separation somewhere about the line above suggested would divide the different characters of the existing Union. The manners of the Eastern portion of the States would be sufficiently congenial to form a Union, and their interests are alike intimately connected with agriculture and commerce. A friendly and commercial intercourse would be maintained with the States in the Southern Confederacy as at present. Thus all the advantages which have been for a few years depending on the general Union would be continued to its respective portions, without the jealousies and enmities which now afflict both, and which peculiarly embitter the condition of that of the North. It is not unusual for two friends, when disagreeing about the mode of conducting a common concern, to separate and manage, each in his own way, his separate interest, and thereby preserve a useful friendship, which without such separation would infallibly be destroyed. "[25]

Such were the views of an undoubted patriot who had participated in theformation of the Union, and who had long been confidentially associatedwith Washington in the administration of its Government, looking at thesubject from a Northern standpoint, within fifteen years after theorganization of that Government under the Constitution. Whether hisreasons for advocating a dissolution of the Union were valid andsufficient, or not, is another question which it is not necessary todiscuss. His authority is cited only as showing the opinion prevailingin the North at that day with regard to the _right_ of secession fromthe Union, if deemed advisable by the ultimate and irreversible judgmentof the people of a sovereign State. 

In 1811, on the bill for the admission of Louisiana as a State of theUnion, the Hon. Josiah Quincy, a member of Congress from Massachusetts, said

 "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States from their moral obligation; and as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation--amicably if they can, violently if they must. "

Mr. Poindexter, delegate from what was then the Mississippi Territory, took exception to these expressions of Mr. Quincy, and called him toorder. The Speaker (Mr. Varnum, of Massachusetts) sustained Mr. Poindexter, and decided that the suggestion of a dissolution of theUnion was out of order. An appeal was taken from this decision, _and itwas reversed_. Mr. Quincy proceeded to vindicate the propriety of hisposition in a speech of some length, in the course of which he said:

 "Is there a principle of public law better settled or more conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason than that the violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three; would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more in the political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils!"

It is to be remembered that these men--Cabot, Pickering. Quincy, andothers--whose opinions and expressions have been cited, were notDemocrats, misled by extreme theories of State rights, but leaders andexpositors of the highest type of "Federalism, and of a strong centralGovernment. " This fact gives their support of the right of secession thegreater significance. 

The celebrated Hartford Convention assembled in December, 1814. Itconsisted of delegates chosen by the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with an irregular or imperfectrepresentation from the other two New England States, New Hampshire andVermont, [26] convened for the purpose of considering the grievancescomplained of by those States in connection with the war with GreatBritain. They sat with closed doors, and the character of theirdeliberations and discussions has not been authentically disclosed. Itwas generally understood, however, that the chief subject of theirconsiderations was the question of the withdrawal of the States theyrepresented from the Union. The decision, as announced in theirpublished report, was adverse to the expediency of such a measure atthat time, and under the then existing conditions; but they proceeded toindicate the circumstances in which a dissolution of the Union mightbecome expedient, and the mode in which it should be effected; and theirtheoretical plan of separation corresponds very nearly with thatactually adopted by the Southern States nearly fifty years afterward. They say:

 "If the Union be destined to dissolution by reason of the multiplied abuses of bad administration, it should, if possible, be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent. Some _new form of confederacy_ should be substituted among those States which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each other. Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of the times; but they may be traced to implacable combinations of individuals or of States to monopolize power and office, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests of commercial sections of the Union. Whenever it shall appear that the causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement will be preferable to an alliance by constraint among nominal friends, but real enemies. "

The omission of the single word "commercial, " which does not affect theprinciple involved, is the only modification necessary to adapt thisextract exactly to the condition of the Southern States in 1860-'61. 

The obloquy which has attached to the members of the Hartford Conventionhas resulted partly from a want of exact knowledge of their proceedings, partly from the secrecy by which they were veiled, but mainly because itwas a recognized effort to paralyze the arm of the Federal Governmentwhile engaged in a war arising from outrages committed upon Americanseamen on the decks of American ships. The indignation felt was no doubtaggravated by the fact that those ships belonged in a great extent tothe people who were now plotting against the war-measures of theGovernment, and indirectly, if not directly, giving aid and comfort tothe public enemy. Time, which has mollified passion, and revealed manythings not then known, has largely modified the first judgment passed onthe proceedings and purposes of the Hartford Convention; and, but forthe circumstances of existing war which surrounded it, they might havebeen viewed as political opinions merely, and have receivedjustification instead of censure. 

Again, in 1844-'45 the measures taken for the annexation of Texas evokedremonstrances, accompanied by threats of a dissolution of the Union fromthe Northeastern States. The Legislature of Massachusetts, in 1844, adopted a resolution, declaring, in behalf of that State, that "theCommonwealth of Massachusetts, faithful to the compact between thepeople of the United States, according to the plain meaning and intentin which it was understood by them, is sincerely anxious for itspreservation; but that it is determined, as it doubts not the otherStates are, _to submit to undelegated powers in no body of men onearth_"; and that "the project of the annexation of Texas, unlessarrested on the threshold, _may tend to drive these States into adissolution of the Union_. "

Early in the next year (February 11, 1845), the same Legislature adoptedand communicated to Congress a series of resolutions on the samesubject, in one of which it was declared that, "as the powers oflegislation granted in the Constitution of the United States to Congressdo not embrace a case of the admission of a foreign state or foreignterritory, by legislation, into the Union, such an act of admissionwould have _no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts_"--language which must have meant that the admission of Texas would be ajustifiable ground for secession, unless it was intended to announce thepurpose of nullification. 

It is evident, therefore, that the people of the South, in the crisiswhich confronted them in 1860, had no lack either of precept or ofprecedent for their instruction and guidance in the teaching and theexample of our brethren of the North and East. The only practicaldifference was, that the North threatened and the South acted. 

[Footnote 22: George Cabot, who had been United States Senator fromMassachusetts for several years during the Administration ofWashington. --(See "Life of Cabot, " by Lodge, p. 334. )]

[Footnote 23: See "Life of Cabot, " p. 491; letter of Pickering toHigginson. ]

[Footnote 24: Pickering to Cabot, "Life of Cabot, " pp. 338-340. ]

[Footnote 25: Letter to Theodore Lyman, "Life of Cabot, " pp. 445, 446. ]

[Footnote 26: Maine was not then a State. ]

CHAPTER X. 

 False Statements of the Grounds for Separation. --Slavery not the Cause, but an Incident. --The Southern People not "Propagandists" of Slavery. --Early Accord among the States with regard to African Servitude. --Statement of the Supreme Court. --Guarantees of the Constitution. --Disregard of Oaths. --Fugitives from Service and the "Personal Liberty Laws. "--Equality in the Territories the Paramount Question. --The Dred Scott Case. --Disregard of the Decision of the Supreme Court. --Culmination of Wrongs. --Despair of their Redress. --Triumph of Sectionalism. 

At the period to which this review of events has advanced, one State hadalready withdrawn from the Union. Seven or eight others were preparingto follow her example, and others yet were anxiously and doubtfullycontemplating the probably impending necessity of taking the sameaction. The efforts of Southern men in Congress, aided by thecoöperation of the Northern friends of the Constitution, had failed, bythe stubborn refusal of a haughty majority, controlled by "radical"purposes, to yield anything to the spirit of peace and conciliation. This period, coinciding, as it happens, with the close of a calendaryear, affords a convenient point to pause for a brief recapitulation ofthe causes which had led the Southern States into the attitude they thenheld, and for a more full exposition of the constitutional questionsinvolved. 

The reader of many of the treatises on these events, which have been putforth as historical, if dependent upon such alone for information, mightnaturally enough be led to the conclusion that the controversies whicharose between the States, and the war in which they culminated, werecaused by efforts on the one side to extend and perpetuate humanslavery, and on the other to resist it and establish human liberty. TheSouthern States and Southern people have been sedulously represented as"propagandists" of slavery, and the Northern as the defenders andchampions of universal freedom, and this view has been so arrogantlyassumed, so dogmatically asserted, and so persistently reiterated, thatits authors have, in many cases, perhaps, succeeded in bringingthemselves to believe it, as well as in impressing it widely upon theworld. 

The attentive reader of the preceding chapters--especially if he hascompared their statements with contemporaneous records and otheroriginal sources of information--will already have found evidence enoughto enable him to discern the falsehood of these representations, and toperceive that, to whatever extent the question of slavery may haveserved as an _occasion_, it was far from being the _cause_ of theconflict. 

I have not attempted, and shall not permit myself to be drawn into anydiscussion of the merits or demerits of slavery as an ethical or even asa political question. It would be foreign to my purpose, irrelevant tomy subject, and would only serve--as it has invariably served, in thehands of its agitators--to "darken counsel" and divert attention fromthe genuine issues involved. 

As a mere historical fact, we have seen that African servitude amongus--confessedly the mildest and most humane of all institutions to whichthe name "slavery" has ever been applied--existed in all the originalStates, and that it was recognized and protected in the fourth articleof the Constitution. Subsequently, for climatic, industrial, andeconomical--not moral or sentimental--reasons, it was abolished in theNorthern, while it continued to exist in the Southern States. Mendiffered in their views as to the abstract question of its right orwrong, but for two generations after the Revolution there was nogeographical line of demarkation for such differences. The Africanslave-trade was carried on almost exclusively by New England merchantsand Northern ships. Mr. Jefferson--a Southern man, the founder of theDemocratic party, and the vindicator of State rights--was in theory aconsistent enemy to every form of slavery. The Southern States took thelead in prohibiting the slave-trade, and, as we have seen, one of them(Georgia) was the first State to incorporate such a prohibition in herorganic Constitution. Eleven years after the agitation on the Missouriquestion, when the subject first took a sectional shape, the abolitionof slavery was proposed and earnestly debated in the VirginiaLegislature, and its advocates were so near the accomplishment of theirpurpose, that a declaration in its favor was defeated only by a smallmajority, and that on the ground of expediency. At a still later period, abolitionist lecturers and teachers were mobbed, assaulted, andthreatened with tar and feathers in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and other States. One of them(Lovejoy) was actually killed by a mob in Illinois as late as 1837. 

These facts prove incontestably that the sectional hostility whichexhibited itself in 1820, on the application of Missouri for admissioninto the Union, which again broke out on the proposition for theannexation of Texas in 1844, and which reappeared after the Mexican war, never again to be suppressed until its fell results had been fullyaccomplished, was not the consequence of any difference on the abstractquestion of slavery. It was the offspring of sectional rivalry andpolitical ambition. It would have manifested itself just as certainly ifslavery had existed in all the States, or if there had not been a negroin America. No such pretension was made in 1803 or 1811, when theLouisiana purchase, and afterward the admission into the Union of theState of that name, elicited threats of disunion from therepresentatives of New England. The complaint was not of slavery, but of"the acquisition of more weight at the other extremity" of the Union. Itwas not slavery that threatened a rupture in 1832, but the unjust andunequal operation of a protective tariff. 

It happened, however, on all these occasions, that the line ofdemarkation of sectional interests coincided exactly or very nearly withthat dividing the States in which negro servitude existed from those inwhich it had been abolished. It corresponded with the prediction of Mr. Pickering, in 1803, that, in the separation certainly to come, "thewhite and black population would mark the boundary"--a prediction madewithout any reference to slavery as a source of dissension. 

Of course, the diversity of institutions contributed, in some minordegree, to the conflict of interests. There is an action and reaction ofcause and consequence, which limits and modifies any general statementof a political truth. I am stating general principles--not definingmodifications and exceptions with the precision of a mathematicalproposition or a bill in chancery. The truth remains intact andincontrovertible, that the existence of African servitude was in no wisethe cause of the conflict, but only an incident. In the latercontroversies that arose, however, its effect in operating as a leverupon the passions, prejudices, or sympathies of mankind, was so potentthat it has been spread, like a thick cloud, over the whole horizon ofhistoric truth. 

As for the institution of negro servitude, it was a matter entirelysubject to the control of the States. No power was ever given to theGeneral Government to interfere with it, but an obligation was imposedto protect it. Its existence and validity were distinctly recognized bythe Constitution in at least three places:

First, in that part of the second section of the first article whichprescribes that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportionedamong the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective members, which shall be determined byadding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound toservice for a term of years, and, excluding Indians not taxed, threefifths of all other persons. " "_Other_ persons" than "_free_ persons"and those "bound to service for a term of years" must, of course, havemeant those permanently bound to service. 

Secondly, it was recognized by the ninth section of the same article, which provided that "the migration or importation of such persons as anyof the States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not beprohibited by Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred andeight. " This was a provision inserted for the protection of theinterests of the slave-trading New England States, forbidding anyprohibition of the trade by Congress for twenty years, and thusvirtually giving sanction to the legitimacy of the demand which thattrade was prosecuted to supply, and which was its only object. 

Again, and in the third place, it was specially recognized, and anobligation imposed upon every State, not only to refrain frominterfering with it in any other State, but in certain cases to aid inits enforcement, by that clause, or paragraph, of the second section ofthe fourth article which provides as follows:

 "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. "

The President and Vice-President of the United States, every Senator andRepresentative in Congress, the members of every State Legislature, and"all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and ofthe several States, " were required to take an oath (or affirmation) tosupport the Constitution containing these provisions. It is easy tounderstand how those who considered them in conflict with the "higherlaw" of religion or morality might refuse to take such an oath or holdsuch an office--as the members of some religious sects refuse to takeany oath at all or to bear arms in the service of their country--but itis impossible to reconcile with the obligations of honor or honesty theconduct of those who, having taken such an oath, made use of the powersand opportunities of the offices held under its sanctions to nullify itsobligations and neutralize its guarantees. The halls of Congressafforded the vantage-ground from which assaults were made upon theseguarantees. The Legislatures of various Northern States enacted laws tohinder the execution of the provisions made for the rendition offugitives from service; State officials lent their aid to the work ofthwarting them; and city mobs assailed the officers engaged in the dutyof enforcing them. 

With regard to the provision of the Constitution above quoted, for therestoration of fugitives from service or labor, my own view was, and is, that it was not a proper subject for legislation by the FederalCongress, but that its enforcement should have been left to therespective States, which, as parties to the compact of union, shouldhave been held accountable for its fulfillment. Such was actually thecase in the earlier and better days of the republic. No fugitiveslave-law existed, or was required, for two years after the organizationof the Federal Government, and, when one was then passed, it was merelyas an incidental appendage to an act regulating the mode of rendition offugitives from _justice_--not from service or labor. [27]

In 1850 a more elaborate law was enacted as part of the celebratedcompromise of that year. But the very fact that the Federal Governmenthad taken the matter into its own hands, and provided for its executionby its own officers, afforded a sort of pretext to those States whichhad now become hostile to this provision of the Constitution, not onlyto stand aloof, but in some cases to adopt measures (generally known as"personal liberty laws") directly in conflict with the execution of theprovisions of the Constitution. 

The preamble to the Constitution declared the object of its founders tobe, "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestictranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the generalwelfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and ourposterity. " Now, however (in 1860), the people of a portion of theStates had assumed an attitude of avowed hostility, not only to theprovisions of the Constitution itself, but to the "domestictranquillity" of the people of other States. Long before the formationof the Constitution, one of the charges preferred in the Declaration ofIndependence against the Government of Great Britain, as justifying theseparation of the colonies from that country, was that of having"excited domestic insurrections among us. " Now, the mails were burdenedwith incendiary publications, secret emissaries had been sent, and inone case an armed invasion of one of the States had taken place for thevery purpose of exciting "domestic insurrection. "

It was not the passage of the "personal liberty laws, " it was not thecirculation of incendiary documents, it was not the raid of John Brown, it was not the operation of unjust and unequal tariff laws, nor allcombined, that constituted the intolerable grievance, but it was thesystematic and persistent struggle to deprive the Southern States ofequality in the Union--generally to discriminate in legislation againstthe interests of their people; culminating in their exclusion from theTerritories, the common property of the States, as well as by theinfraction of their compact to promote domestic tranquillity. 

The question with regard to the Territories has been discussed in theforegoing chapters, and the argument need not be repeated. There was, however, one feature of it which has not been specially noticed, although it occupied a large share of public attention at the time, andconstituted an important element in the case. This was the action of theFederal judiciary thereon, and the manner in which it was received. 

In 1854 a case (the well-known "Dred Scott case") came before theSupreme Court of the United States, involving the whole question of the_status_ of the African race and the rights of citizens of the SouthernStates to migrate to the Territories, temporarily or permanently, withtheir slave property, on a footing of equality with the citizens ofother States with _their_ property of any sort. This question, as wehave seen, had already been the subject of long and energeticdiscussion, without any satisfactory conclusion. All parties, however, had united in declaring, that a decision by the Supreme Court of theUnited States--the highest judicial tribunal in the land--would beaccepted as final. After long and patient consideration of the case, in1857, the decision of the Court was pronounced in an elaborate andexhaustive opinion, delivered by Chief-Justice Taney--a man eminent as alawyer, great as a statesman, and stainless in his moralreputation--seven of the nine judges who composed the Court, concurringin it. The salient points established by this decision were:

 1. That persons of the African race were not, and could not be, acknowledged as "part of the people, " or citizens, under the Constitution of the United States;

 2. That Congress had no right to exclude citizens of the South from taking their negro servants, as any other property, into any part of the common territory, and that they were entitled to claim its protection therein;

 3. And, finally, as a consequence of the principle just above stated, that the Missouri Compromise of 1820, in so far as it prohibited the existence of African servitude north of a designated line, was unconstitutional and void. [28] (It will be remembered that it had already been declared "inoperative and void" by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854. )

Instead of accepting the decision of this then august tribunal--theultimate authority in the interpretation of constitutional questions--asconclusive of a controversy that had so long disturbed the peace and wasthreatening the perpetuity of the Union, it was flouted, denounced, andutterly disregarded by the Northern agitators, and served only tostimulate the intensity of their sectional hostility. 

What resource for justice--what assurance of tranquillity--whatguarantee of safety--now remained for the South? Still forbearing, stillhoping, still striving for peace and union, we waited until a sectionalPresident, nominated by a sectional convention, elected by a sectionalvote--and that the vote of a minority of the people--was about to beinducted into office, under the warning of his own distinct announcementthat the Union could not permanently endure "half slave and half free";meaning thereby that it could not continue to exist in the condition inwhich it was formed and its Constitution adopted. The leader of hisparty, who was to be the chief of his Cabinet, was the man who had firstproclaimed an "irrepressible conflict" between the North and the South, and who had declared that abolitionism, having triumphed in theTerritories, would proceed to the invasion of the States. Even then theSouthern people did not finally despair until the temper of thetriumphant party had been tested in Congress and found adverse to anyterms of reconciliation consistent with the honor and safety of allparties. 

No alternative remained except to seek the security out of the Unionwhich they had vainly tried to obtain within it. The hope of our peoplemay be stated in a sentence. It was to escape from injury and strife inthe Union, to find prosperity and peace out of it. The mode andprinciples of their action will next be presented. 

[Footnote 27: "There was but little necessity in those times, nor longafter, for an act of Congress to authorize the recovery of fugitiveslaves. The laws of the free States and, still more, the force of publicopinion were the owners' best safeguards. Public opinion was against theabduction of slaves; and, if any one was seduced from his owner, it wasdone furtively and secretly, without show or force, and as any othermoral offense would be committed. State laws favored the owner, and to agreater extent than the act of Congress did or could. In Pennsylvaniathere was an act (it was passed in 1780, and only repealed in 1847)discriminating between the traveler and sojourner and the permanentresident, allowing the former to remain six months in the State beforehis slaves would become subject to the emancipation laws; and, in thecase of a Federal officer, allowing as much more time as his dutiesrequired him to remain. New York had the same act, only varying in time, which was nine months. While these two acts were in force, and supportedby public opinion, the traveler and sojourner was safe with his slavesin those States, and the same in the other free States. There was notrouble about fugitive slaves in those times. "--(Note to Benton's"Abridgment of Debates, " vol. I, p. 417. )]

[Footnote 28: The Supreme Court of the United States in stating (throughChief-Justice Taney) their decision in the "Dred Scott case, " in 1857, say: "In that portion of the United States where the labor of the negrorace was found to be unsuited to the climate and unprofitable to themaster, but few slaves were held at the time of the Declaration ofIndependence; and, when the Constitution was adopted, it had entirelyworn out in one of them, and measures had been taken for its gradualabolition in several others. But this change had not been produced byany change of opinion in relation to this race, but because it wasdiscovered from experience that slave-labor was unsuited to the climateand productions of these States; for some of these States, when it hadceased, or nearly ceased, to exist, were actively engaged in theslave-trade; procuring cargoes on the coast of Africa, and transportingthem for sale to those parts of the Union where their labor was found tobe profitable and suited to the climate and productions. And thistraffic was openly carried on, and fortunes accumulated by it, withoutreproach from the people of the States where they resided. "

This statement, it must be remembered, does not proceed from anypartisan source, but is extracted from a judicial opinion pronounced bythe highest court in the country. In illustration of the truthfulness ofthe latter part of it, may be mentioned the fact that a citizen of RhodeIsland (James D'Wolf), long and largely concerned in the slave-trade, was sent from that State to the Senate of the United States as late asthe year 1821. In 1825 he resigned his seat in the Senate and removed toHavana, where he lived for many years, actively engaged in the samepursuit, as president of a slave-trading company. The story is told ofhim that, on being informed that the "trade" was to be declared piracy, he smiled and said, "So much the better for us--the Yankees will be theonly people not scared off by such a declaration. "]

PART II. 

THE CONSTITUTION. 

CHAPTER I. 

 The Original Confederation. --"Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. "--Their Inadequacy ascertained. --Commercial Difficulties. --The Conference at Annapolis. --Recommendation of a General Convention. --Resolution of Congress. --Action of the Several States. --Conclusions drawn therefrom. 

When certain American colonies of Great Britain, each acting for itself, although in concert with the others, determined to dissolve theirpolitical connection with the mother-country, they sent theirrepresentatives to a general Congress of those colonies, and throughthem made a declaration that the Colonies were, and of right ought tobe, "free and independent States. " As such they contracted an alliancefor their "common defense, " successfully resisted the effort to reducethem to submission, and secured the recognition by Great Britain oftheir separate independence; each State being distinctly recognizedunder its own name--not as one of a group or nation. That this was notmerely a foreign view is evident from the second of the "Articles ofConfederation" between the States, adopted subsequently to theDeclaration of Independence, which is in these words: "Each Stateretains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expresslydelegated to the United States in Congress assembled. "

These "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between theStates, " as they were styled in their title, were adopted by eleven ofthe original States in 1778, and by the other two in the course of thethree years next ensuing, and continued in force until 1789. During thisperiod the General Government was vested in the Congress alone, in whicheach State, through its representatives, had an equal vote in thedetermination of all questions whatever. The Congress exercised all theexecutive as well as legislative powers delegated by the States. Whennot in session the general management of affairs was intrusted to a"Committee of the States, " consisting of one delegate from each State. Provision was made for the creation, by the Congress, of courts having acertain specified jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases, and forthe settlement of controversies between two or more States in a modespecifically prescribed. 

The Government thus constituted was found inadequate for some necessarypurposes, and it became requisite to reorganize it. The first idea ofsuch reorganization arose from the necessity of regulating thecommercial intercourse of the States with one another and with foreigncountries, and also of making some provision for payment of the debtcontracted during the war for independence. These exigencies led to aproposition for a meeting of commissioners from the various States toconsider the subject. Such a meeting was held at Annapolis in September, 1786; but, as only five States (New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) were represented, the Commissioners declinedto take any action further than to recommend another Convention, with awider scope for consideration. As they expressed it, it was their"unanimous conviction that it may essentially tend to advance theinterests of the Union, if the States, by whom they have beenrespectively delegated, would themselves concur, and use their endeavorsto procure the concurrence of the other States, in the appointment ofcommissioners, to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into consideration the situation of the United States, to devisesuch further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render theConstitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of theUnion, and to report such an act for that purpose to the United Statesin Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and afterwardconfirmed by the Legislatures of every State, will effectually providefor the same. "

It is scarcely necessary to remind the well-informed reader that theterms, "Constitution of the Federal Government, " employed above, and"Federal Constitution, " as used in other proceedings of that period, donot mean the instrument to which we now apply them; and which was notthen in existence. They were applied to the system of governmentformulated in the Articles of Confederation. This is in strict accordwith the definition of the word constitution, given by an eminentlexicographer:[29] "The body of fundamental laws, as contained inwritten documents or prescriptive usage, which constitute the form ofgovernment for a nation, state, community, association, or society. "[30]Thus we speak of the British Constitution, which is an unwritten systemof "prescriptive usage"; of the Constitution of Massachusetts or ofMississippi, which is the fundamental or organic law of a particularState embodied in a written instrument; and of the Federal Constitutionof the United States, which is the fundamental law of an association ofStates, at first as embraced in the Articles of Confederation, andafterward as revised, amended, enlarged, and embodied in the instrumentframed in 1787, and subsequently adopted by the various States. Themanner in which this revision was effected was as follows. Acting on thesuggestion of the Annapolis Convention, the Congress, on the 21st of theensuing February (1787), adopted the following resolution:

 "_Resolved_, That, in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient that, on the second Monday in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union. "

The language of this resolution, substantially according with that ofthe recommendation made by the commissioners at Annapolis a few monthsbefore, very clearly defines the objects of the proposed Convention andthe powers which it was thought advisable that the States should conferupon their delegates. These were, "solely and expressly, " as follows:

 1. "To revise the Articles of Confederation with reference to the 'situation of the United States';

 2. "To devise such alterations and provisions therein as should seem to them requisite in order to render 'the Federal Constitution, ' or 'Constitution of the Federal Government, ' adequate to 'the exigencies of the Union, ' or 'the exigencies of the Government and the preservation of the Union';

 3. "To report the result of their deliberations--that is, the 'alterations and provisions' which they should agree to recommend--to Congress and the Legislatures of the several States. "

Of course, their action could be only advisory until ratified by theStates. The "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, " under whichthe States were already united, provided that no alteration should bemade in any of them, "unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congressof the United States, and afterward confirmed by the Legislatures ofevery State. "

The Legislatures of the various States, with the exception of RhodeIsland, adopted and proceeded to act upon these suggestions by theappointment of delegates--some of them immediately upon therecommendation of the Annapolis Commissioners in advance of that of theCongress, and the others in the course of a few months after theresolution adopted by Congress. The instructions given to thesedelegates in all cases conformed to the recommendations which have beenquoted, and in one case imposed an additional restriction or limitation. As this is a matter of much importance, in order to a rightunderstanding of what follows, it may be advisable to cite in detail theaction of the several States, italicizing such passages as are speciallysignificant of the duties and powers of the delegates to the Convention. 

The General Assembly of Virginia, after reciting the recommendation madeat Annapolis, enacted: "That seven commissioners be appointed by jointballot of both Houses of Assembly, who, or any three of them, are herebyauthorized, as deputies from this Commonwealth, to meet such deputies asmay be appointed and authorized by other States, to assemble inconvention at Philadelphia, as above recommended, and to join with themin devising and discussing _all such alterations and further provisionsas may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to theexigencies of the Union, and in reporting such an act for that purposeto the United States in Congress, as, when agreed to by them, and dulyconfirmed by the several States_, will effectually provide for thesame. "

The Council and Assembly of New Jersey issued commissions to theirdelegates to meet such commissioners as have been, or may be, appointedby _the other States of the Union_, at the city of Philadelphia, in theCommonwealth of Pennsylvania, on the second Monday in May next, "_for thepurpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to tradeand other important objects, and of devising such other provisions asshall appear to be necessary to render the Constitution of the FederalGovernment adequate to the exigencies thereof_. "

The act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania constituted andappointed certain deputies, designated by name, "with powers to meetsuch deputies as may be _appointed and authorized by the other States_... And to join with them in devising, deliberating on, and discussing_all such alterations and further provisions_ as may be necessary _torender the Federal Constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of theUnion_, and in reporting such act or acts for that purpose, to theUnited States in Congress assembled, as, _when agreed to by them andduly confirmed by the several States_, will effectually provide for thesame. "

The General Assembly of North Carolina enacted that commissioners shouldbe appointed by joint ballot of both Houses, "to meet and confer withsuch deputies as may be _appointed by the other States_ for similarpurposes, and with them to discuss and decide upon _the most effectualmeans to remove the defects of our Federal Union, and to procure theenlarged purposes which it was intended to effect; and that they reportsuch an act to the General Assembly of this State, as, when agreed to bythem_, will effectually provide for the same. " (In the case of thisState alone nothing is said of a report to Congress. Neither NorthCarolina nor any other State, however, fails to make mention of thenecessity of a submission of any action taken to the several States forratification. )

The commissions issued to the representatives of South Carolina, by theGovernor, refer to an act of the Legislature of that State authorizingtheir appointment "to meet such deputies or commissioners as may be_appointed and authorized by other of the United States_, " at the timeand place designated, and to join with them "in devising and discussingall _such alterations, clauses, articles, and provisions_, as may bethought necessary _to render the Federal Constitution entirely adequate_to the actual situation and future good government of the _ConfederateStates_, " and to "join in reporting such an act to the United States inCongress assembled, as, _when approved and agreed to by them, and dulyratified and confirmed by the several States_, will effectually providefor the exigencies of the Union. " In these commissions the expression, "alterations, clauses, articles, and provisions, " clearly indicates thecharacter of the duties which the deputies were expected to discharge. 

The General Assembly of Georgia "ordained" the appointment of certaincommissioners, specified by name, who were "authorized, as deputies fromthis State, to meet such deputies as may be _appointed and authorized byother States_, to assemble in convention at Philadelphia, and to joinwith them in devising and discussing _all such alterations and furtherprovisions_ as may be necessary _to render the Federal Constitutionadequate to the exigencies of the Union_, and in reporting such an actfor that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, _whenagreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States_, willeffectually provide for the same. "

The authority conferred upon their delegates by the Assembly of New Yorkand the General Court of Massachusetts was in each case expressed in theexact words of the advisory resolution of Congress: they were instructedto meet the delegates of the other States "for the sole and expresspurpose of _revising the Articles of Confederation_, and reporting toCongress and to the several Legislatures _such alterations andprovisions therein_ as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmedby the several States, _render the Federal Constitution adequate to theexigencies of the Union_. "

The General Assembly of Connecticut designated the delegates of thatState by name, and empowered them, in conference with the delegates ofother States, "to discuss upon such alterations and provisions, agreeable to the general principles of republican government, as theyshall think proper to render the Federal Constitution adequate to theexigencies of the Government and the preservation of the Union, " and"_to report such alterations and provisions as may be agreed to by amajority of the United States in convention_, to the Congress of theUnited States and to the General Assembly of this State. "

The General Court of New Hampshire authorized and empowered the deputiesof that State, _in conference with those of other States_, "to discussand decide upon the most effectual means _to remedy the defects of ourFederal Union, and to procure and secure the enlarged purposes which itwas intended to effect_"--language almost identical with that of NorthCarolina, but, like the other States in general, instructed them toreport the result of their deliberations to Congress for the action ofthat body, and subsequent confirmation "by the several States. "

The delegates from Maryland were appointed by the General Assembly ofthat State, and instructed "to meet such deputies as may be appointedand authorized _by any other of the United States_, to assemble inconvention at Philadelphia, _for the purpose of revising the Federalsystem_, and to join with them in considering such alterations andfurther provisions, " etc. --the remainder of their instructions being inthe same words as those given to the Georgia delegates. 

The instructions given to the deputies of Delaware were substantially inaccord with the others--being almost literally identical with those ofPennsylvania--but the following proviso was added: "So, always, andprovided, that such alterations or further provisions, or any of them, do not extend to that part of the fifth article of the Confederation ofthe said States, finally ratified on the first day of March, in the year1781, which declares that, '_in determining questions in the UnitedStates in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote_. '"

Rhode Island, as has already been mentioned, sent no delegates. 

From an examination and comparison of the enactments and instructionsabove quoted, we may derive certain conclusions, so obvious that theyneed only to be stated:

1. In the first place, it is clear that the delegates to the Conventionof 1787 represented, not _the people of the United States_ in mass, ashas been most absurdly contended by some political writers, but _thepeople_ of the several States, _as States_--just as in the Congress ofthat period--Delaware, with her sixty thousand inhabitants, havingentire equality with Pennsylvania, which had more than four hundredthousand, or Virginia, with her seven hundred and fifty thousand. 

2. The object for which they were appointed was not to organize a _new_Government, but "solely and expressly" to amend the "FederalConstitution" already existing; in other words, "to revise the Articlesof Confederation, " and to suggest such "alterations" or additional"provisions" as should be deemed necessary to render them "adequate tothe exigencies of the Union. "

3. It is evident that the term "Federal Constitution, " or itsequivalent, "Constitution of the Federal Government, " was as freely andfamiliarly applied to the system of government established by theArticles of Confederation--undeniably a league or compact between Statesexpressly retaining their sovereignty and independence--as to thatamended system which was substituted for it by the Constitution thatsuperseded those articles. 

4. The functions of the delegates to the Convention were, of course, only to devise, deliberate, and discuss. No validity could attach to anyaction taken, unless and until it should be afterward ratified by theseveral States. It is evident, also, that what was contemplated was theprocess provided in the Articles of Confederation for their ownamendment--first, a recommendation by the Congress; and, afterward, ratification "by the Legislatures of every State, " before the amendmentshould be obligatory upon any. The departure from this condition, whichactually occurred, will presently be noticed. 

[Footnote 29: Dr. Worcester. ]

[Footnote 30: This definition is very good as far as it goes, but "theform of government" is a phrase which falls short of expressing all thatshould be comprehended. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say, "whichconstitute the form, _define the powers, and prescribe the functions_ ofgovernment, " etc. The words in italics would make the definition morecomplete. ]

CHAPTER II. 

 The Convention of 1787. --Diversity of Opinion. --Luther Martin's Account of the Three Parties. --The Question of Representation. --Compromise effected. --Mr. Randolph's Resolutions. --The Word "National" condemned. --Plan of Government framed. --Difficulty with Regard to Ratification, and its Solution. --Provision for Secession from the Union. --Views of Mr. Gerry and Mr. Madison. --False Interpretations. --Close of the Convention. 

When the Convention met in Philadelphia, in May, 1787, it soon becameevident that the work before it would take a wider range and involvemore radical changes in the "Federal Constitution" than had at firstbeen contemplated. Under the Articles of Confederation the GeneralGovernment was obliged to rely upon the governments of the severalStates for the execution of its enactments. Except its own officers andemployees, and in time of war the Federal army and navy, it couldexercise no control upon individual citizens. With regard to the States, no compulsory or coercive measures could be employed to enforce itsauthority, in case of opposition or indifference to its exercise. Thislast was a feature of the Confederation which it was not desirable norpossible to change, and no objection was made to it; but it wasgenerally admitted that some machinery should be devised to enable theGeneral Government to exercise its legitimate functions by means of amandatory authority operating directly upon the individual citizenswithin the limits of its constitutional powers. The necessity for suchprovision was undisputed. 

Beyond the common ground of a recognition of this necessity there was awide diversity of opinion among the members of the Convention. LutherMartin, a delegate from Maryland, in an account of its proceedings, afterward given to the Legislature of that State, classifies thesedifferences as constituting three parties in the Convention, which hedescribes as follows:

 "One party, whose object and wish it was to abolish and annihilate all State governments, and to bring forward one General Government over this extensive continent of a monarchical nature, under certain restrictions and limitations. Those who openly avowed this sentiment were, it is true, but few; yet it is equally true that there was a considerable number, who did not openly avow it, who were, by myself and many others of the Convention, considered as being in reality favorers of that sentiment.... 

 "The second party was not for the abolition of the State governments nor for the introduction of a monarchical government under any form; but they wished to establish such a system as could give their own States undue power and influence in the government over the other States. 

 "A third party was what I considered truly federal and republican. This party was nearly equal in number with the other two, and was composed of the delegates from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and in part from Maryland; also of some individuals from other representations. This party were for proceeding upon terms of federal equality: they were for taking our present federal system as the basis of their proceedings, and, as far as experience had shown that other powers were necessary to the Federal Government, to give those powers. They considered this the object for which they were sent by their States, and what their States expected from them. "

In his account of the second party above described, Mr. Martin refers tothose representatives of the larger States who wished to establish anumerical basis of representation in the Congress, instead of the equalrepresentation of the States (whether large or small) which existedunder the Articles of Confederation. There was naturally muchdissatisfaction on the part of the greater States--Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Massachusetts--whose population atthat period exceeded that of all the others combined, but which, in theCongress, constituted less than one third of the voting strength. On theother hand, the smaller States were tenacious of their equality in theUnion. Of the very smallest, one, as we have seen, had sent norepresentatives to the Convention, and the other had instructed herdelegates, unconditionally, to insist upon the maintenance of absoluteequality in the Congress. This difference gave more trouble than anyother question that came before the Convention, and for some timethreatened to prove irreconcilable and to hinder any final agreement. Itwas ultimately settled by a compromise. Provision was made for therepresentation of the people of the States in one branch of the FederalLegislature (the House of Representatives) in proportion to theirnumbers; in the other branch (the Senate), for the equal representationof the States as such. The perpetuity of this equality was furthermoreguaranteed by a stipulation that no State should ever be deprived of itsequal suffrage in the Senate without its own consent. [31] Thiscompromise required no sacrifice of principle on either side, and noprovision of the Constitution has in practice proved more entirelysatisfactory. 

It is not necessary, and would be beyond the scope of this work, toundertake to give a history of the proceedings of the Convention of1787. That may be obtained from other sources. All that is requisite forthe present purpose is to notice a few particulars of specialsignificance or relevancy to the subject of inquiry. 

Early in the session of the Convention a series of resolutions wasintroduced by Mr. Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, embodying a proposedplan of government, which were considered in committee of the wholeHouse, and formed the basis of a protracted discussion. The first ofthese resolutions, as amended before a vote was taken, was in thesewords:

 "_Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this committee that a national Government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary. "

This was followed by other resolutions--twenty-three in all, as adoptedand reported by the committee--in which the word "national" occurredtwenty-six times. 

The day after the report of the committee was made, Mr. Ellsworth, ofConnecticut, moved to strike out the words "national Government" in theresolution above quoted, and to insert the words "Government of theUnited States, " which he said was the proper title. "He wished also theplan to go forth as an amendment of the Articles of Confederation. "[32]That is to say, he wished to avoid even the appearance of undertaking toform a _new_ government, instead of reforming the old one, which was theproper object of the Convention. This motion was agreed to withoutopposition, and, as a consequence, the word "national" was stricken outwherever it occurred, and nowhere makes its appearance in theConstitution finally adopted. The prompt rejection, after introduction, of this word "national, " is obviously much more expressive of the intentand purpose of the authors of the Constitution than its mere absencefrom the Constitution would have been. It is a clear indication thatthey did not mean to give any countenance to the idea which, "scotched, not killed, " has again reared its mischievous crest in these latterdays--that the government which they organized was a consolidated_nationality_, instead of a confederacy of sovereign members. 

Continuing their great work of revision and reorganization, theConvention proceeded to construct the framework of a government for theConfederacy, strictly confined to certain specified and limited powers, but complete in all its parts, legislative, executive, and judicial, andprovided with the means for discharging all its functions withoutinterfering with the "sovereignty, freedom, and independence" of theconstituent States. 

All this might have been done without going beyond the limits of theircommission "to revise the Articles of Confederation, " and to considerand report such "alterations and provisions" as might seem necessary to"render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies ofgovernment and the preservation of the Union. " A serious difficulty, however, was foreseen. The thirteenth and last of the aforesaid articleshad this provision, which has already been referred to: "The Articles ofthis Confederation _shall be inviolably observed by every State, and theunion shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration, at any timehereafter, be made in any of them_, unless such alteration be agreed toin a Congress of the United States, and be afterward confirmed by theLegislatures of _every State_. "

It is obvious, from an examination of the records, as has already beenshown, that the original idea in calling a Convention was, that theirrecommendations should take the course prescribed by thisarticle--first, a report to the Congress, and then, if approved by thatbody, a submission to the various Legislatures for final action. Therewas no reason to apprehend the non-concurrence of Congress, in which amere majority would determine the question; but the consent of theLegislatures of "_every State_" was requisite in order to finalratification, and there was serious reason to fear that this consentcould not be obtained. Rhode Island, as we have seen, had declined tosend any representatives to the Convention; of the three delegates fromNew York, two had withdrawn; and other indications of dissatisfactionhad appeared. In case of the failure of a single Legislature to ratify, the labors of the Convention would go for naught, under a strictadherence to the letter of the article above cited. The danger of atotal frustration of their efforts was imminent. 

In this emergency the Convention took the responsibility of transcendingthe limits of their instructions, and recommending a procedure which wasin direct contravention of the letter of the Articles of Confederation. This was the introduction of a provision into the new Constitution, thatthe ratification of _nine_ States should be sufficient for itsestablishment among themselves. In order to validate this provision, itwas necessary to refer it to authority higher than that of Congress andthe State Legislatures--that is, to the People of the States, assembled, by their representatives, in convention. Hence it was provided, by theseventh and last article of the new Constitution, that "the ratificationof the _Conventions_ of nine States" should suffice for itsestablishment "between the States so ratifying the same. "

There was another reason, of a more general and perhaps more controllingcharacter, for this reference to conventions for ratification, even ifentire unanimity of the State Legislatures could have been expected. Under the American theory of republican government, conventions of thepeople, duly elected and accredited as such, are invested with theplenary power inherent in the people of an organized and independentcommunity, assembled in mass. In other words, they represent andexercise what is properly the _sovereignty_ of the people. StateLegislatures, with restricted powers, do not possess or representsovereignty. Still less does the Congress of a union or confederacy ofStates, which is by two degrees removed from the seat of sovereignty. Wesometimes read or hear of "delegated sovereignty, " "dividedsovereignty, " with other loose expressions of the same sort; but no suchthing as a division or delegation of sovereignty is possible. 

In order, therefore, to supersede the restraining article above citedand to give the highest validity to the compact for the delegation ofimportant powers and functions of government to a common agent, anauthority above that of the State Legislatures was necessary. Mr. Madison, in the "Federalist, "[33] says: "It has been heretofore notedamong the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States ithad received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. "This objection would of course have applied with greater force to theproposed Constitution, which provided for additional grants of powerfrom the States, and the conferring of larger and more varied powersupon a General Government, which was to act upon individuals instead ofStates, if the question of its confirmation had been submitted merely tothe several State Legislatures. Hence the obvious propriety of referringit to the respective _people_ of the States in their sovereign capacity, as provided in the final article of the Constitution. 

In this article provision was deliberately made for the _secession_ (ifnecessary) of a part of the States from a union which, when formed, hadbeen declared "perpetual, " and its terms and articles to be "inviolablyobserved by every State. "

Opposition was made to the provision on this very ground--that it wasvirtually a dissolution of the Union, and that it would furnish aprecedent for future secessions. Mr. Gerry, a distinguished member fromMassachusetts--afterward Vice-President of the United States--said, "Ifnine out of thirteen (States) can dissolve the compact, six out of ninewill be just as able to dissolve the future one hereafter. "

Mr. Madison, who was one of the leading members of the Convention, advocating afterward, in the "Federalist, " the adoption of the newConstitution, asks the question, "On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can besuperseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?" Heanswers this question "by recurring to the absolute necessity of thecase; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendentlaw of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety andhappiness of society are the objects at which all political institutionsaim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. " Heproceeds, however, to give other grounds of justification:

 "It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the Federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? _The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. _ The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate. "

Mr. Madison's idea of the propriety of _veiling_ any statement of theright of secession until the occasion arises for its exercise, whetherright or wrong in itself, is eminently suggestive as explanatory of thecaution exhibited by other statesmen of that period, as well as himself, with regard to that "delicate truth. "

The only possible alternative to the view here taken of the seventharticle of the Constitution, as a provision for the secession of anynine States, which might think proper to avail themselves of it, fromunion with such as should refuse to do so, and the formation of anamended or "more perfect union" with one another, is to regard it as aprovision for the continuance of the old Union, or Confederation, underaltered conditions, by the majority which should accede to them, with arecognition of the right of the recusant minority to withdraw, secede, or stand aloof. The idea of compelling any State or States to enter intoor to continue in union with the others by _coercion_, is as absolutelyexcluded under the one supposition as under the other--with reference toone State or a minority of States, as well as with regard to a majority. The article declares that "the ratification of the Conventions of nineStates shall be sufficient for the establishment of thisConstitution"--not between all, but--"_between the States so ratifyingthe same_. " It is submitted whether a fuller justification of this rightof the nine States to form a new Government is not found in the fact ofthe sovereignty in each of them, making them "a law unto themselves, "and therefore the final judge of what the necessities of each communitydemand. 

Here--although, perhaps, in advance of its proper place in theargument--the attention of the reader may be directed to the refutation, afforded by this article of the Constitution, of that astonishingfiction, which has been put forward by some distinguished writers oflater date, that the Constitution was established by the people of theUnited States "in the aggregate. " If such had been the case, the will ofa majority, duly ascertained and expressed, would have been binding uponthe minority. No such idea existed in its formation. It was not evenestablished by the _States in the aggregate_, nor was it proposed thatit should be. It was submitted for the acceptance of each separately, the time and place at their own option, so that the dates ofratification did extend from December 7, 1787, to May 29, 1790. The longperiod required for these ratifications makes manifest the absurdity ofthe assertion, that it was a decision by the votes of one people, or onecommunity, in which a majority of the votes cast determined the result. 

We have seen that the delegates to the Convention of 1787 were chosen bythe several States, _as States_--it is hardly necessary to add that theyvoted in the Convention, as in the Federal Congress, by States--eachState casting one vote. We have seen, also, that they were sent for the"sole and express purpose" of revising the Articles of Confederation anddevising means for rendering the Federal Constitution, "adequate to theexigencies of government and the preservation of the Union"; that theterms "Union, " "United States, " "Federal Constitution;" and"Constitution of the Federal Government, " were applied to the oldConfederation in precisely the same sense in which they are used underthe new; that the proposition to constitute a "national" Government wasdistinctly rejected by the Convention; that the right of any State, orStates, to withdraw from union with the others was practicallyexemplified, and that the idea of coercion of a State, or compulsorymeasures, was distinctly excluded under any construction that can be putupon the action of the Convention. 

To the original copy of the Constitution, as set forth by its framersfor the consideration and final action of the people of the States, wasattached the following words:

 "Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the twelfth. In witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names. "

[Followed by the signatures of "George Washington, President, and deputyfrom Virginia, " and the other delegates who signed it. ]

This attachment to the instrument--a mere attestation of itsauthenticity, and of the fact that it had the unanimous consent _of allthe States_ then present by their deputies--not _of all the deputies_, for some of them refused to sign it--has been strangely construed bysome commentators as if it were a part of the Constitution, and impliedthat it was "done, " in the sense of completion of the work. [34]

But the work was not _done_ when the Convention closed its labors andadjourned. It was scarcely begun. There was no validity or binding forcewhatever in what had been already "done. " It was still to be submittedto the States for approval or rejection. Even if a majority of eight outof thirteen States had ratified it, the refusal of the ninth would haverendered it null and void. Mr. Madison, who was one of the mostdistinguished of its authors and signers, writing after it was completedand signed, but before it was ratified, said: "It is time now torecollect that the powers [of the Convention] were merely advisory andrecommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understoodby the Convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned andproposed a Constitution, which is to be of no more consequence than thepaper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbationof those to whom it is addressed. "--("Federalist, " No. XL. )

The mode and terms in which this approval was expressed will beconsidered in the next chapter. 

[Footnote 31: Constitution, Article V. ]

[Footnote 32: See Elliott's "Debates, " vol. V, p. 214. This reference istaken from "The Republic of Republics, " Part III, chapter vii, p. 217. This learned, exhaustive, and admirable work, which contains a wealth ofhistorical and political learning, will be freely used, by kind consentof the author, without the obligation of a repetition of specialacknowledgment in every case. A like liberty will be taken with the lateDr. Bledsoe's masterly treatise on the right of secession, published in1866, under the title, "Is Davis a Traitor? or, Was Secession aConstitutional Right?"]

[Footnote 33: No. Xliii. ]

[Footnote 34: See "Republic of Republics, " Part II, chapters xiii andxiv. ]

CHAPTER III. 

 Ratification of the Constitution by the States. --Organization of the New Government. --Accession of North Carolina and Rhode Island. --Correspondence between General Washington and the Governor of Rhode Island. 

The amended system of union, or confederation (the terms are employedindiscriminately and interchangeably by the statesmen of that period), devised by the Convention of 1787, and embodied, as we have seen, in theConstitution which they framed and have set forth, was now to beconsidered and acted on by the people of the several States. This theydid in the highest and most majestic form in which the sanction oforganized communities could be given or withheld--not throughambassadors, or Legislatures, or deputies with limited powers, butthrough conventions of delegates chosen expressly for the purpose andclothed with the plenary authority of sovereign people. The action ofthese conventions was deliberate, cautious, and careful. There was muchdebate, and no little opposition to be conciliated. Eleven States, however, ratified and adopted the new Constitution within the twelvemonths immediately following its submission to them. Two of thempositively rejected it, and, although they afterward acceded to it, remained outside of the Union in the exercise of their sovereign right, which nobody then denied--North Carolina for nine months, Rhode Islandfor nearly fifteen, after the new Government was organized and went intooperation. In several of the other States the ratification was effectedonly by small majorities. 

The terms in which this action was expressed by the several States andthe declarations with which it was accompanied by some of them areworthy of attention. 

Delaware was the first to act. Her Convention met on December 3, 1787, and ratified the Constitution on the 7th. The readiness of this least inpopulation, and next to the least in territorial extent, of all theStates, to accept that instrument, is a very significant fact when weremember the jealous care with which she had guarded against anyinfringement of her sovereign Statehood. Delaware alone had givenspecial instructions to her deputies in the Convention not to consent toany sacrifice of the principle of equal representation in Congress. Thepromptness and unanimity of her people in adopting the new Constitutionprove very clearly, not only that they were satisfied with thepreservation of that principle in the Federal Senate, but that they didnot understand the Constitution, in any of its features, as compromisingthe "sovereignty, freedom, and independence" which she had so especiallycherished. The ratification of their Convention is expressed in thesewords:

 "We, the deputies of _the people of the Delaware State_, in convention met, having taken into our serious consideration the Federal Constitution proposed and agreed upon by the deputies of the United States at a General Convention held at the city of Philadelphia on the 17th day of September, A. D. 1787, have _approved of, assented to, and ratified and confirmed_, and by these presents do, in virtue of the powers and authority to us given for that purpose, for and in behalf of ourselves and our constituents, fully, freely, and entirely, _approve of, assent to, ratify, and confirm_ the said Constitution. 

 "Done in convention at Dover, December 7, 1787. "

This, and twelve other like acts, gave to the Constitution "all the lifeand validity it ever had, or could have, as to the thirteen united orassociated States. "

Pennsylvania acted next (December 12, 1787), the ratification not beingfinally accomplished without strong opposition, on grounds which will bereferred to hereafter. In announcing its decision, the Convention ofthis State began as follows:

 "In the name of _the people of Pennsylvania_. Be it known unto all men that we, _the delegates of the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania_, in General Convention assembled, " etc. , etc. , concluding with these words: "By these presents, do, _in the name and by the authority of the same people_, and for ourselves, assent to and ratify the foregoing Constitution for the United States of America. "

In New Jersey the ratification, which took place on the 18th ofDecember, was unanimous. This is no less significant and instructivethan the unanimity of Delaware, from the fact that the New Jerseydelegation, in the Convention that framed the Constitution, had takenthe lead in behalf of the federal, or State-rights, idea, in oppositionto that of nationalism, or consolidation. William Patterson, adistinguished citizen (afterward Governor) of New Jersey, had introducedinto that Convention what was known as "the Jersey plan, " embodyingthese State-rights principles, as distinguished from the various"national" plans presented. In defending them, he had said, aftercalling for the reading of the credentials of delegates:

 "Can we, on this ground, form a national Government? I fancy not. Our commissions give a complexion to the business; and can we suppose that, when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the people will approve our proceedings?

 "We are met here as the deputies of _thirteen independent, sovereign States, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation_, and annihilate the sovereignties of our States, who have sent us here for other purposes?"

Again, on a subsequent day, after stating that he was not there topursue his own sentiments of government, but of those who had sent him, he had asked:

 "Can we, _as representatives of independent States_, annihilate the essential powers of independency? Are not the votes of this Convention taken on every question under the idea of independency?"

The fact that this State, which, through her representatives, had takenso conspicuous a part in the maintenance of the principle of Statesovereignty, ratified the Constitution with such readiness andunanimity, is conclusive proof that, in her opinion, that principle wasnot compromised thereby. The conclusion of her ordinance of ratificationis in these words:

 "Now be it known that we, the delegates of _the State of New Jersey_, chosen by the people thereof for the purpose aforesaid, having maturely deliberated on and considered the aforesaid proposed Constitution, do hereby, for and on behalf of the _people of the said State of New Jersey_, agree to, ratify, and confirm the same, and every part thereof. 

 "Done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the members present, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1787. "

Georgia next, and also unanimously, on January 2, 1788, declared, through "_the delegates of the State of Georgia_, in convention met, pursuant to the provisions of the [act of the] Legislature aforesaid ... In virtue of the powers and authority given us [them] by _the people ofthe said State_, for that purpose, " that they did "fully and entirelyassent to, ratify, and adopt the said Constitution. "

Connecticut (on the 9th of January) declares her assent with equaldistinctness of assertion as to the source of the authority: "In thename of _the people of the State of Connecticut_, we, the delegates of_the people of the said State_, in General Convention assembled, pursuant to an act of the Legislature in October last ... Do assent to, ratify, and adopt the Constitution reported by the Convention ofdelegates in Philadelphia. "

In Massachusetts there was a sharp contest. The people of that Statewere then--as for a long time afterward--exceedingly tenacious of theirState independence and sovereignty. The proposed Constitution wassubjected to a close, critical, and rigorous examination with referenceto its bearing upon this very point. The Convention was a large one, andsome of its leading members were very distrustful of the instrumentunder their consideration. It was ultimately adopted by a very closevote (187 to 168), and then only as accompanied by certain proposedamendments, the object of which was to guard more expressly against anysacrifice or compromise of State sovereignty, and under an assurance, given by the advocates of the Constitution, of the certainty that thoseamendments would be adopted. The most strenuously urged of these wasthat ultimately adopted (in substance) as the tenth amendment to theConstitution, which was intended to take the place of the second Articleof Confederation, as an emphatic assertion of the continued freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the States. This will be consideredmore particularly hereafter. 

In terms substantially identical with those employed by the otherStates, Massachusetts thus announced her ratification:

 "In convention of the delegates of _the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts_, 1788. The Convention having impartially discussed and fully considered the Constitution for the United States of America, reported [etc. ] ... Do, in the name and in behalf of _the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts_, assent to and ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America. "

This was accomplished on February 7, 1788. 

Maryland followed on the 28th of April, and South Carolina on the 23d ofMay, in equivalent expressions, the ratification of the former beingmade by "the delegates of _the people of Maryland_, " speaking, as theydeclared, for ourselves, and in the name and on the behalf of _thepeople of this State_; that of the latter, "in convention of _the peopleof the State of South Carolina_, by their representatives, ... In thename and behalf of _the people of this State_. "

But South Carolina, like Massachusetts, demanded certain amendments, andfor greater assurance accompanied her ordinance of ratification with thefollowing distinct assertion of the principle afterward embodied in thetenth amendment:

 "This Convention doth also declare that _no section or paragraph_ of the said Constitution warrants a construction that _the States do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them_ and vested in the General Government of the Union. "

"The delegates of _the people of the State of New Hampshire_, " inconvention, on the 21st of June, "in the name and behalf of _the peopleof the State of New Hampshire_, " declared their approval and adoption ofthe Constitution. In this State, also, the opposition was formidable(the final vote being 57 to 46), and, as in South Carolina, it was"explicitly declared that all powers not expressly and particularlydelegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the severalStates, to be by them exercised. "

The debates in the Virginia Convention were long and animated. Some ofthe most eminent and most gifted men of that period took part in them, and they have ever since been referred to for the exposition which theyafford of the interpretation of the Constitution by its authors andtheir contemporaries. Among the members were Madison, Mason, andRandolph, who had also been members of the Convention at Philadelphia. Mr. Madison was one of the most earnest advocates of the newConstitution, while Mr. Mason was as warmly opposed to its adoption; soalso was Patrick Henry, the celebrated orator. It was assailed withgreat vehemence at every vulnerable or doubtful point, and was finallyratified June 26, 1788, by a vote of 89 to 79--a majority of only ten. 

This ratification was expressed in the same terms employed by otherStates, by "the delegates of _the people of Virginia_ ... In the nameand in behalf of _the people of Virginia_. " In so doing, however, likeMassachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, Virginia demandedcertain amendments as a more explicit guarantee against consolidation, and accompanied the demand with the following declaration:

 "That the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will, " etc. , etc. 

Whether, in speaking of a possible _resumption_ of powers by "the peopleof the United States, " the Convention had in mind the action of such apeople _in the aggregate_--political community which did not exist, andof which they, could hardly have entertained even an idealconception--or of the people of Virginia, for whom they were speaking, and of the other United States then taking similar action--is a questionwhich scarcely admits of argument, but which will be more fullyconsidered in the proper place. 

New York, the eleventh State to signify her assent, did so on July 26, 1788, after an arduous and protracted discussion, and then by a majorityof but three votes--30 to 27. Even this small majority was secured onlyby the recommendation of certain material amendments, the adoption ofwhich by the other States it was at first proposed to make a conditionprecedent to the validity of the ratification. This idea was abandonedafter a correspondence between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison, and, instead of conditional ratification, New York provided for theresumption of her grants; but the amendments were put forth with acircular letter to the other States, in which it was declared that"nothing but the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision" of theobjectionable features of the Constitution, "and an invinciblereluctance to separating from our sister States, could have prevailedupon a sufficient number to ratify it without stipulating for previousamendments. "

The ratification was expressed in the usual terms, as made "_by thedelegates of the people of the State of New York_ ... In the name and inbehalf of the people" of the said State. Accompanying it was adeclaration of the principles in which the assent of New York wasconceded, one paragraph of which runs as follows:

 "That the powers of government may be _reassumed_ by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by the said Constitution, clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the people of the several _States_, or to their respective State governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the said Constitution which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution, but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers or as inserted for greater caution. "

The acceptance of these eleven States having been signified to theCongress, provision was made for putting the new Constitution inoperation. This was effected on March 4, 1789, when the Government wasorganized, with George Washington as President, and John Adams, Vice-President; the Senators and Representatives elected by the Stateswhich had acceded to the Constitution, organizing themselves as aCongress. 

Meantime, two States were standing, as we have seen, unquestioned andunmolested, in an attitude of absolute independence. The Convention ofNorth Carolina, on August 2, 1788, had rejected the proposedConstitution, or, more properly speaking, had withheld her ratificationuntil action could be taken upon the subject-matter of the followingresolution adopted by her Convention:

 "_Resolved_, That a declaration of rights, asserting and securing from encroachment the great principles of civil and religious liberty, and the unalienable rights of the people, together with amendments to the most ambiguous and exceptionable parts of the said Constitution of government, ought to be laid before Congress and the Convention of the States that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the said Constitution, for their consideration, previous to the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid on the part of the State of North Carolina. "

More than a year afterward, when the newly organized Government had beenin operation for nearly nine months, and when--although no convention ofthe States had been called to revise the Constitution--North Carolinahad good reason to feel assured that the most important provisions ofher proposed amendments and "declaration of rights" would be adopted, she acceded to the amended compact. On November 21, 1789, her Conventionagreed, "in behalf of the freemen, citizens, and inhabitants of _theState of North Carolina_, " to "adopt and ratify" the Constitution. 

In Rhode Island the proposed Constitution was at first submitted to adirect vote of the people, who rejected it by an overwhelming majority. Subsequently--that is, on May 29, 1790, when the reorganized Governmenthad been in operation for nearly fifteen months, and when it had becomereasonably certain that the amendments thought necessary would beadopted--a convention of the people of Rhode Island acceded to the newUnion, and ratified the Constitution, though even then by a majority ofonly two votes in sixty-six--34 to 32. The ratification was expressed insubstantially the same language as that which has now been so repeatedlycited:

 "We, the delegates of the people of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in convention, ... In the name and behalf of _the people of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations_, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the said Constitution. "

It is particularly to be noted that, during the intervals between theorganization of the Federal Government under the new Constitution andthe ratification of that Constitution by, North Carolina and RhodeIsland, respectively, those States were absolutely independent andunconnected with any other political community, unless they beconsidered as still representing the "United States of America, " whichby the Articles of Confederation had been declared a "perpetual union. "The other States had seceded from the former union--not in a body, butseparately, each for itself--and had formed a new association, leavingthese two States in the attitude of foreign though friendly powers. There was no claim of any right to control their action, as if they hadbeen mere geographical or political divisions of one great consolidatedcommunity or "nation. " Their accession to the Union was desired, buttheir freedom of choice in the matter was never questioned. And then itis to be noted, on _their_ part, that, like the house of Judah, theyrefrained from any attempt to force the seceding sisters to return. 

As illustrative of the relations existing during this period between theUnited States and Rhode Island, it may not be uninstructive to refer toa letter sent by the government of the latter to the President andCongress, and transmitted by the President to the Senate, with thefollowing note:

 "United States, _September 26, 1789_. 

 "Gentlemen of the Senate: Having yesterday received a letter written in this month by the Governor of Rhode Island, at the request and in behalf of the General Assembly of that State, addressed to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the eleven United States of America in Congress assembled, I take the earliest opportunity of laying a copy of it before you. "

 (Signed) "GEORGE WASHINGTON. "

Some extracts from the communication referred to are annexed:

 "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, _In General Assembly, September Session, 1789_. 

 "_To the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the eleven United States of America in Congress assembled:_

 "The critical situation in which the people of this State are placed engages us to make these assurances, on their behalf, of their attachment and friendship to their sister States, and of their disposition to cultivate mutual harmony and friendly intercourse. They know themselves to be a handful, comparatively viewed, and, although they now stand as it were alone, they have not separated themselves or departed from the principles of that Confederation, which was formed by the sister States in their struggle for freedom and in the hour of danger.... 

 "Our not having acceded to or adopted the new system of government formed and adopted by most of our sister States, we doubt not, has given uneasiness to them. That we have not seen our way clear to it, consistently with our idea of the principles upon which we all embarked together, has also given pain to us. We have not doubted that we might thereby avoid present difficulties, but we have apprehended future mischief.... 

 "Can it be thought strange that, with these impressions, they [the people of this State] should wait to see the proposed system organized and in operation?--to see what further checks and securities would be agreed to and established by way of amendments, before they could adopt it as a Constitution of government for themselves and their posterity?... 

 "We are induced to hope that we shall not be altogether considered as foreigners having no particular affinity or connection with the United States; but that trade and commerce, upon which the prosperity of this State much depends, will be preserved as free and open between this State and the United States, as our different situations at present can possibly admit.... 

 "We feel ourselves attached by the strongest ties of friendship, kindred, and interest, to our sister States; and we can not, without the greatest reluctance, look to any other quarter for those advantages of commercial intercourse which we conceive to be more natural and reciprocal between them and us. 

 "I am, at the request and in behalf of the General Assembly, your most obedient, humble servant. "

 (Signed) "John Collins, _Governor_. 

 "_His Excellency, the President of the United States. _"

 [American State Papers, _Vol. I_, Miscellaneous. ]

CHAPTER IV. 

 The Constitution not adopted by one People "in the Aggregate. "--A Great Fallacy exposed. --Mistake of Judge Story. --Colonial Relations. --The United Colonies of New England. --Other Associations. --Independence of Communities traced from Germany to Great Britain, and from Great Britain to America. --Mr. Everett's "Provincial People. "--Origin and Continuance of the Title "United States. "--No such Political Community as the "People of the United States. "

The historical retrospect of the last three chapters and the extractsfrom the records of a generation now departed have been presented asnecessary to a right understanding of the nature and principles of thecompact of 1787, on which depended the questions at issue in thesecession of 1861 and the contest that ensued between the States. 

We have seen that the united colonies, when they declared theirindependence, formed a league or alliance with one another as "UnitedStates. " This title antedated the adoption of the Articles ofConfederation. It was assumed immediately after the Declaration ofIndependence, and was continued under the Articles of Confederation; thefirst of which declared that "the style of this confederacy shall be'The United States of America'"; and this style was retained--withoutquestion--in the formation of the present Constitution. The name was notadopted as antithetical to, or distinctive from, "confederate, " as someseem to have imagined. If it has any significance now, it must have hadthe same under the Articles of Confederation, or even before they wereadopted. 

It has been fully shown that the States which thus became and continuedto be "united, " whatever form their union assumed, acted and continuedto act as distinct and sovereign political communities. The monstrousfiction that they acted as _one people "in their aggregate capacity"_has not an atom of fact to serve as a basis. 

To go back to the very beginning, the British colonies never constitutedone people. Judge Story, in his "Commentaries" on the Constitution, seems to imply the contrary, though he shrinks from a direct assertionof it, and clouds the subject by a confusion of terms. He says: "Now, itis apparent that none of the colonies before the Revolution were, in themost large and general sense, independent or sovereign communities. Theywere all originally settled under and subjected to the British Crown. "And then he proceeds to show that they were, in their colonialcondition, not _sovereign_--a proposition which nobody disputed. Ascolonies, they had no claim, and made no pretension, to sovereignty. They were subject to the British Crown, unless, like the Plymouthcolony, "a law unto themselves, " but they were _independent of eachother_--the only point which has any bearing upon their subsequentrelations. There was no other bond between them than that of theircommon allegiance to the Government of the mother-country. As anillustration of this may be cited the historical fact that, when JohnStark, of Bennington memory, was before the Revolution engaged in ahunting expedition in the Indian country, he was captured by the savagesand brought to Albany, in the colony of New York, for a ransom; but, inasmuch as he belonged to New Hampshire, the government of New Yorktook no action for his release. There was not even enough community offeeling to induce individual citizens to provide money for the purpose. 

There were, however, local and partial confederacies among the NewEngland colonies, long before the Declaration of Independence. As earlyas the year 1643 a Congress had been organized of delegates fromMassachusetts, Plymouth, New Haven, and Connecticut, under the style of"The United Colonies of New England. " The objects of this confederacy, according to Mr. Bancroft, were "protection against the encroachments ofthe Dutch and French, security against the tribes of savages, theliberties of the gospel in purity and in peace. "[35] The general affairsof the company were intrusted to commissions, two from each colony; butthe same historian tells us that "to each its respective localjurisdiction was carefully reserved, " and he refers to this as evidencethat the germ-principle of State-rights was even then in existence. "Thus remarkable for unmixed simplicity" (he proceeds) "was the form ofthe first confederated government in America.... There was no president, except as a moderator of its meetings, and the larger State [_sic_], Massachusetts, superior to all the rest in territory, wealth, andpopulation, had no greater number of votes than New Haven. But thecommissioners were in reality little more than a deliberative body; theypossessed no executive power, and, while they could decree a war and alevy of troops, it remained for the States to carry their votes intoeffect. "[36]

This confederacy continued in existence for nearly fifty years. Betweenthat period and the year 1774, when the first Continental Congress metin Philadelphia, several other temporary and provisional associations ofcolonies had been formed, and the people had been taught the advantagesof union for a common purpose; but they had never abandoned orcompromised the great principle of community independence. That form ofself-government, generated in the German forests before the days of theCæsars, had given to that rude people a self-reliance and patriotismwhich first checked the flight of the Roman eagles, which elsewhere hadbeen the emblem of their dominion over the known world. Thisprinciple--the great preserver of all communal freedom and of mutualharmony--was transplanted by the Saxons into England, and theresustained those personal rights which, after the fall of the Heptarchy, were almost obliterated by the encroachments of Norman despotism; but, having the strength and perpetuity of truth and right, were reassertedby the mailed hands of the barons at Runnymede for their own benefit andthat of their posterity. Englishmen, the early settlers, brought thisidea to the wilds of America, and it found expression in many formsamong the infant colonies. 

Mr. Edward Everett, in his Fourth-of-July address, delivered in New Yorkin 1861, following the lead of Judge Story, and with even less caution, boldly declares that, "before their independence of England wasasserted, they [the colonies] constituted _a provincial people_. " Tosustain this position--utterly contrary to all history as it is--he isunable to adduce any valid American authority, but relies almostexclusively upon loose expressions employed in debate in the BritishParliament about the period of the American Revolution--such as "thatpeople, " "that loyal and respectable people, " "this enlightened andspirited people, " etc. , etc. The speakers who made use of thiscolloquial phraseology concerning the inhabitants of a distantcontinent, in the freedom of extemporaneous debate, were not framingtheir ideas with the exactitude of a didactic treatise, and could littlehave foreseen the extraordinary use to be made of their expressionsnearly a century afterward, in sustaining a theory contradictory tohistory as well as to common sense. It is as if the familiar expressionsoften employed in our own time, such as "the people of Africa, " or "thepeople of South America, " should be cited, by some ingenious theorist ofa future generation, as evidence that the subjects of the Khedive andthose of the King of Dahomey were but "one people, " or that thePeruvians and the Patagonians belonged to the same political community. 

Mr. Everett, it is true, quotes two expressions of the ContinentalCongress to sustain his remarkable proposition that the colonies were "apeople. " One of these is found in a letter addressed by the Congress toGeneral Gage in October, 1774, remonstrating against the erection offortifications in Boston, in which they say, "We entreat your Excellencyto consider what a tendency this conduct must have to irritate and force_a free people_, hitherto well disposed to peaceable measures, intohostilities. " From this expression Mr. Everett argues that the Congressconsidered themselves the representatives of "a people. " But, byreference to the proceedings of the Congress, he might readily haveascertained that the letter to General Gage was written in behalf of"_the town of Boston and Province of Massachusetts Bay_, " the people ofwhich were "considered by all America as suffering in the common causefor their noble and spirited opposition to oppressive acts ofParliament. " The avowed object was "to entreat his Excellency, from theassurance we have of the peaceable disposition of _the inhabitants ofthe town of Boston and of the Province of Massachusetts Bay_, todiscontinue his fortifications. "[37] These were the "people" referred toby the Congress; and the children of the Pilgrims, who occupied at thatperiod the town of Boston and Province of Massachusetts Bay, would havebeen not a little astonished to be reckoned as "one people, " in anyother respect than that of the "common cause, " with the Roman Catholicsof Maryland, the Episcopalians of Virginia, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, or the Baptists of Rhode Island. 

The other citation of Mr. Everett is from the first sentence of theDeclaration of Independence: "When in the course of human events itbecomes necessary for _one people_ to dissolve the political bands whichhave connected them with another, " etc. , etc. This, he says, characterizes "the good people" of the colonies as "one people. "

Plainly, it does no such thing. The misconception is so palpable asscarcely to admit of serious answer. The Declaration of Independenceopens with a general proposition. "One people" is equivalent to saying"_any_ people. " The use of the correlatives "one" and "another" was thesimple and natural way of stating this general proposition. "One people"applies, and was obviously intended to apply, to all cases of the samecategory--to that of New Hampshire, or Delaware, or South Carolina, orof any other people existing or to exist, and whether acting separatelyor in concert. It applies to any case, and all cases, of dissolution ofpolitical bands, as well as to the case of the British colonies. It doesnot, either directly or by implication, assert their unification, andhas no bearing whatever upon the question. 

When the colonies united in sending representatives to a Congress inPhiladelphia, there was no purpose--no suggestion of a purpose--to mergetheir separate individuality in one consolidated mass. No such ideaexisted, or with their known opinions could have existed. They did notassume to become a united colony or province, but styled themselves"united colonies"--colonies united for purposes of mutual counsel anddefense, as the New England colonies had been united more than a hundredyears before. It was as "_United States_"--not as a state, or unitedpeople--that these colonies--still distinct and politically independentof each other--asserted and achieved their independence of themother-country. As "United States" they adopted the Articles ofConfederation, in which the separate sovereignty, freedom, andindependence of each was distinctly asserted. They were "united States"when Great Britain acknowledged the absolute freedom and independence ofeach, distinctly and separately recognized by name. France and Spainwere parties to the same treaty, and the French and Spanish idioms stillexpress and perpetuate, more exactly than the English, the true ideaintended to be embodied in the title--_les États Unis_, or _los EstadosUnidos_--the States united. 

It was without any change of title--still as "United States"--withoutany sacrifice of individuality--without any compromise ofsovereignty--that the same parties entered into a new and amendedcompact with one another under the present Constitution. Larger and morevaried powers were conferred upon the common Government for the purposeof insuring "a more perfect union"--not for that of destroying orimpairing the integrity of the contracting members. 

The point which now specially concerns the argument is the historicalfact that, in all these changes of circumstances and of government, there has never been one single instance of action by the "people of theUnited States in the aggregate, " or as one body. Before the era ofindependence, whatever was done by the people of the colonies was doneby the people of each colony separately and independently of each other, although in union by their delegates for certain specified purposes. Since the assertion of their independence, the people of the UnitedStates have never acted otherwise than as the people of each State, severally and separately. The Articles of Confederation were establishedand ratified by the several States, either through conventions of theirpeople or through the State Legislatures. The Constitution whichsuperseded those articles was framed, as we have seen, by delegateschosen and empowered by the several States, and was ratified byconventions of the people of the same States--all acting in entireindependence of one another. This ratification alone gave it force andvalidity. Without the approval and ratification of the people of theStates, it would have been, as Mr. Madison expressed it, "of no moreconsequence than the paper on which it was written. " It was neversubmitted to "the people of the United States in the aggregate, " or _asa people_. Indeed, no such political community as the people of theUnited States in the aggregate exists at this day or ever did exist. Senators in Congress confessedly represent the States as equal units. The House of Representatives is not a body of representatives of "thepeople of the United States, " as often erroneously asserted; but theConstitution, in the second section of its first article, expresslydeclares that it "shall be composed of members chosen by _the people ofthe several States_. "

Nor is it true that the President and Vice-President are elected, as itis sometimes vaguely stated, by vote of the "whole people" of the Union. Their election is even more unlike what such a vote would be than thatof the representatives, who in numbers at least represent the strengthof their respective States. In the election of President andVice-President the Constitution (Article II) prescribes that "_eachState_ shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof maydirect, a number of electors" for the purpose of choosing a Presidentand Vice-President. The number of these electors is based partly uponthe equal sovereignty, partly upon the unequal population of therespective States. 

It is, then, absolutely true that there has never been any such thing asa vote of "the people of the United States in the aggregate"; no suchpeople is recognized by the Constitution; and no such politicalcommunity has ever existed. It is equally true that no officer ordepartment of the General Government formed by the Constitution derivesauthority from a majority of the whole people of the United States, orhas ever been chosen by such majority. As little as any other is theUnited States Government a government of a majority of the mass. 

[Footnote 35: Bancroft's "History of the United States, " vol. I, chap. Ix. ]

[Footnote 36: Bancroft's "History of the United States, " vol. I, chap. Ix. ]

[Footnote 37: "American Archives, " fourth series, vol. I, p. 908. ]

CHAPTER V. 

 The Preamble to the Constitution. --"We, the People. "

The preamble to the Constitution proposed by the Convention of 1787 isin these words:

 "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. "

The phraseology of this preamble has been generally regarded as thestronghold of the advocates of consolidation. It has been interpreted asmeaning that "we, the people of the United States, " as a collectivebody, or as a "nation, " in our aggregate capacity, had "ordained andestablished" the Constitution _over_ the States. 

This interpretation constituted, in the beginning, the most seriousdifficulty in the way of the ratification of the Constitution. It wasprobably this to which that sturdy patriot, Samuel Adams, ofMassachusetts, alluded, when he wrote to Richard Henry Lee, "I stumbleat the threshold. " Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Convention, on thethird day of the session, and in the very opening of the debate, attacked it vehemently. He said, speaking of the system of governmentset forth in the proposed Constitution:

 "That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest veneration for those gentlemen [its authors]; but, sir, give me leave to demand, What right had they to say, _We, the people_? My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, Who authorized them to speak the language of '_We, the people_, ' instead of _We, the States_? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the States be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great consolidated national government of the people of all the States. "[38]

Again, on the next day, with reference to the same subject, he said:"When I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my interrogationwas obvious. The fate of this question and of America may depend onthis. Have they said, We, the States? Have they made a proposal of acompact between States? If they had, this would be a confederation: itis otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The question turns, sir, on that poor little thing--the expression, 'We, the people, 'instead of the States of America. "[39]

The same difficulty arose in other minds and in other conventions. 

The scruples of Mr. Adams were removed by the explanations of others, and by the assurance of the adoption of the amendments thoughtnecessary--especially of that declaratory safeguard afterward embodiedin the tenth amendment--to be referred to hereafter. 

Mr. Henry's objection was thus answered by Mr. Madison:

 "Who are parties to it [the Constitution]? The people--but _not the people as composing one great body_; but the people as composing _thirteen sovereignties_: were it, as the gentleman [Mr. Henry] asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it: were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this State, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through the intervention of the Legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent, derivative authority of the Legislatures of the States, whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. "[40]

It must be remembered that this was spoken by one of the leading membersof the Convention which formed the Constitution, within a few monthsafter that instrument was drawn up. Mr. Madison's hearers could readilyappreciate his clear answer to the objection made. The "people" intendedwere those of the respective States--the only organized communities ofpeople exercising sovereign powers of government; and the idea intendedwas the ratification and "establishment" of the Constitution by directact of the people in their conventions, instead of by act of theirLegislatures, as in the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. Theexplanation seems to have been as satisfactory as it was simple andintelligible. Mr. Henry, although he fought to the last against theratification of the Constitution, did not again bring forward thisobjection, for the reason, no doubt, that it had been fully answered. Indeed, we hear no more of the interpretation which suggested it, fromthat period, for nearly half a century, when it was revived, and hassince been employed, to sustain that theory of a "great consolidatednational government" which Mr. Madison so distinctly repudiated. 

But _we_ have access to sources of information, not then available, which make the intent and meaning of the Constitution still plainer. When Mr. Henry made his objection, and Mr. Madison answered it, thejournal of the Philadelphia Convention had not been published. That bodyhad sat with closed doors, and among its rules had been the following:

 "That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of the House, without the leave of the House. 

 "That members only be permitted to inspect the journal. 

 "That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or communicated, without leave. "[41]

We can understand, by reference to these rules, how Mr. Madison shouldhave felt precluded from making allusion to anything that had occurredduring the proceedings of the Convention. But the secrecy then coveringthose proceedings has long since been removed. The manuscript journal, which was intrusted to the keeping of General Washington, President ofthe Convention, was deposited by him, nine years afterward, among thearchives of the State Department. It has since been published, and wecan trace for ourselves the origin, and ascertain the exactsignificance, of that expression, "We, the people, " on which PatrickHenry thought the fate of America might depend, and which has been sogrossly perverted in later years from its true intent. 

The original language of the preamble, reported to the Convention by acommittee of five appointed to prepare the Constitution, as we find itin the proceedings of August 6, 1787, was as follows:

 "We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish, the following Constitution for the government of ourselves and our posterity. "

There can be no question here what was meant: it was "_the people of theStates_, " designated by name, that were to "ordain, declare, andestablish" the compact of union for themselves and their posterity. There is no ambiguity nor uncertainty in the language; nor was there anydifference in the Convention as to the use of it. The preamble, asperfected, was submitted to vote on the next day, and, as the journalinforms us, "it passed _unanimously_ in the affirmative. "

There was no subsequent change of opinion on the subject. The reason forthe modification afterward made in the language is obvious. It was foundthat unanimous ratification of all the States could not be expected, andit was determined, as we have already seen, that the consent of _nine_States should suffice for the establishment of the new compact "betweenthe States so ratifying the same. " _Any_ nine would be sufficient to putthe proposed government in operation as to them, thus leaving theremainder of the thirteen to pursue such course as might be to eachpreferable. When this conclusion was reached, it became manifestlyimpracticable to designate beforehand the consenting States by name. Hence, in the final revision, the specific enumeration of the thirteenStates was omitted, and the equivalent phrase "people of the UnitedStates" inserted in its place--plainly meaning the people of such Statesas should agree to unite on the terms proposed. The imposing fabric ofpolitical delusion, which has been erected on the basis of this simpletransaction, disappears before the light of historical record. 

Could the authors of the Constitution have foreseen the perversion to bemade of their obvious meaning, it might have been prevented by an easyperiphrasis--such as, "We, the people of the States hereby united, " orsomething to the same effect. The word "people" in 1787, as in 1880, was, as it is, a collective noun, employed indiscriminately, either as aunit in such expressions as "this people, " "a free people, " etc. , or ina distributive sense, as applied to the citizens or inhabitants of onestate or country or a number of states or countries. When the Conventionof the colony of Virginia, in 1774, instructed their delegates to theCongress that was to meet in Philadelphia, "to obtain a redress of thosegrievances, without which _the people of America_ can neither be safe, free, nor happy, " it was certainly not intended to convey the idea thatthe people of the American Continent, or even of the British colonies inAmerica, constituted one political community. Nor did Edmund Burke haveany such meaning when he said, in his celebrated speech in Parliament, in 1775, "The people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. "

We need go no further than to the familiar language of King James'stranslation of the Bible for multiplied illustrations of thisindiscriminate use of the term, both in its collective and distributivesenses. For example, King Solomon prays at the dedication of the temple:

 "That thine eyes may be open unto the supplication ... Of _thy people_ Israel, to hearken unto them in all that they call for unto thee. For thou didst separate them from among _all the people_ of the earth, to be thine inheritance. " (1 Kings viii, 52, 53. )

Here we have both the singular and plural senses of the same word--_onepeople_, Israel, and _all the people of the earth_--in two consecutivesentences. In "the people of the earth, " the word _people_ is usedprecisely as it is in the expression "the people of the United States"in the preamble to the Constitution, and has exactly the same force andeffect. If in the latter case it implies that the people ofMassachusetts and those of Virginia were mere fractional parts of onepolitical community, it must in the former imply a like unity among thePhilistines, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians, and all other "people of the earth, " except the Israelites. Scores ofexamples of the same sort might be cited if it were necessary. [42]

In the Declaration of Independence we find precisely analogous instancesof the employment of the singular form for both singular and pluralsenses--"one people, " "a free people, " in the former, and "the goodpeople of these colonies" in the latter. Judge Story, in the excess ofhis zeal in behalf of a theory of consolidation, bases upon this lastexpression the conclusion that the assertion of independence was the actof "_the whole people_ of the united colonies" as a unit; overlooking orsuppressing the fact that, in the very same sentence, the coloniesdeclare themselves "free and independent _States_"--not a free andindependent _state_--repeating the words "independent States" threetimes. 

If, however, the Declaration of Independence constituted one "_wholepeople_" of the colonies, then that geographical section of it, formerlyknown as the colony of Maryland, was in a state of revolt or "rebellion"against the others, as well as against Great Britain, from 1778 to 1781, during which period Maryland refused to ratify or be bound by theArticles of Confederation, which, according to this theory, was bindingupon her, as a majority of the "whole people" had adopted it. _Afortiori_, North Carolina and Rhode Island were in a state of rebellionin 1789-'90, while they declined to ratify and recognize theConstitution adopted by the other eleven fractions of this unitedpeople. Yet no hint of any such pretension--of any claim of authorityover them by the majority--of any assertion of "the supremacy of theUnion"--is to be found in any of the records of that period. 

It might have been unnecessary to bestow so much time and attention inexposing the absurdity of the deductions from a theory so false, but forthe fact that it has been specious enough to secure the countenance ofmen of such distinction as Webster, Story, and Everett; and that it hasbeen made the plea to justify a bloody war against that principle ofState sovereignty and independence, which was regarded by the fathers ofthe Union as the corner-stone of the structure and the basis of the hopefor its perpetuity. 

[Footnote 38: Elliott's "Debates" (Washington edition, 1836), vol. Iii, p. 54. ]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. , p. 72. ]

[Footnote 40: Elliott's "Debates" (Washington edition, 1836), vol. Iii, pp. 114, 115. ]

[Footnote 41: Journal of the Federal Convention, May 29, 1787, 1Elliott's "Debates. "]

[Footnote 42: For a very striking illustration, see Deuteronomy vii, 6, 7. ]

CHAPTER VI. 

 The Preamble to the Constitution--subject continued. --Growth of the Federal Government and Accretions of Power. --Revival of Old Errors. --Mistakes and Misstatements. --Webster, Story, and Everett. --Who "ordained and established" the Constitution?

In the progressive growth of the Government of the United States inpower, splendor, patronage, and consideration abroad, men have been ledto exalt the place of the _Government_ above that of the _States_ which_created_ it. Those who would understand the true principles of theConstitution can not afford to lose sight of the essential _plurality_of idea invariably implied in the term "United States, " wherever it isused in that instrument. No such unit as the United States is evermentioned therein. We read that "no title of nobility shall be grantedby the United States, and no person holding any office of profit ortrust under _them_ shall, without the consent of Congress, accept, "etc. [43] "The President ... Shall not receive, within that period, anyother emolument from the United States, or any of _them_. "[44] "The lawsof the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under_their_ authority, " etc. [45] "Treason against the United States shallconsist only in levying war against _them_, or in adhering to _their_enemies. "[46] The Federal character of the Union is expressed by thisvery phraseology, which recognizes the distinct integrity of itsmembers, not as fractional parts of one great unit, but as componentunits of an association. So clear was this to contemporaries, that itneeded only to be pointed out to satisfy their scruples. We have seenhow effectual was the answer of Mr. Madison to the objections raised byPatrick Henry. Mr. Tench Coxe, of Pennsylvania, one of the ablestpolitical writers of his generation, in answering a similar objection, said: "If the Federal Convention had meant to exclude the idea of'union'--that is, of several and separate sovereignties joining in aconfederacy--they would have said, 'We, the people of America'; forunion necessarily involves the idea of competent States, which completeconsolidation excludes. "[47]

More than forty years afterward, when the gradual accretions to thepower, _prestige_, and influence of the central Government had grown tosuch extent as to begin to hide from view the purposes for which it wasfounded, those very objections, which in the beginning had beenanswered, abandoned, and thrown aside, were brought to light again, andpresented to the country as expositions of the true meaning of theConstitution. Mr. Webster, one of the first to revive some of thoseearly misconceptions so long ago refuted as to be almost forgotten, andto breathe into them such renewed vitality as his commanding geniuscould impart, in the course of his well-known debate in the Senate withMr. Hayne, in 1830, said:

 "It can not be shown that the Constitution is a compact between State governments. The Constitution itself, in its very front, refutes that proposition: it declares that it is ordained and established by the people of the United States. So far from saying that it is established by the governments of the several States, it does not even say that it is established by the people of the several States; but it pronounces that it is established by the people of the United States in the aggregate. "[48]

Judge Story about the same time began to advance the same theory, butmore guardedly and with less rashness of statement. It was not untilthirty years after that it attained its full development in theannunciations of sectionists rather than statesmen. Two such may sufficeas specimens:

Mr. Edward Everett, in his address delivered on the 4th of July, 1861, and already referred to, says of the Constitution: "That instrument doesnot purport to be a 'compact, ' but a constitution of government. Itappears, in its first sentence, not to have been entered into by theStates, but to have been ordained and established by the people of theUnited States for themselves and their 'posterity. ' The States are notnamed in it; nearly all the characteristic powers of sovereignty areexpressly granted to the General Government and expressly prohibited tothe States. "[49] Mr. Everett afterward repeats the assertion that "theStates are not named in it. "[50]

But a yet more extraordinary statement of the "one people" theory isfound in a letter addressed to the London "Times, " in the same year, 1861, on the "Causes of the Civil War, " by Mr. John Lothrop Motley, afterward Minister to the Court of St. James. In this letter Mr. Motleysays of the Constitution of the United States:

 "It was not a compact. Who ever heard of a compact to which there were no parties? or who ever heard of a compact made by a single party with himself? Yet the name of no State is mentioned in the whole document; the States themselves are only mentioned to receive commands or prohibitions; and the 'people of the United States' is the single party by whom alone the instrument is executed. 

 "The Constitution was not drawn up by the States, it was not promulgated in the name of the States, it was not ratified by the States. The States never acceded to it, and possess no power to secede from it. It was 'ordained and established' over the States by a power superior to the States; by the people of the whole land in their aggregate capacity, " etc. 

It would be very hard to condense a more amazing amount of audacious andreckless falsehood in the same space. In all Mr. Motley's array of boldassertions, there is not one single truth--unless it be, perhaps, that"the Constitution was not drawn up by the States. " Yet it was drawn upby their delegates, and it is of such material as this, derived fromwriters whose reputation gives a semblance of authenticity to theirstatements, that history is constructed and transmitted. 

One of the most remarkable--though, perhaps, the least important--ofthese misstatements is that which is also twice repeated by Mr. Everett--that the name of no State is mentioned in the whole document, or, as he puts it, "the States are not named in it. " Very little carefulexamination would have sufficed to find, in the second section of thevery first article of the Constitution, the names of every one of thethirteen then existent States distinctly mentioned, with the number ofrepresentatives to which each would be entitled, in case of acceding tothe Constitution, until a census of their population could be taken. Themention there made of the States by name is of no special significance;it has no bearing upon any question of principle; and the denial of itis a purely gratuitous illustration of the recklessness of those fromwhom it proceeds, and the low estimate put on the intelligence of thoseaddressed. It serves, however, to show how much credence is to be givento their authority as interpreters and expounders. 

The reason why the names of the ratifying States were not mentioned hasalready been given: it was simply because it was not known which Stateswould ratify. But, as regards mention of "the several States, " "eachState, " "any State, " "particular States, " and the like, the Constitutionis full of it. I am informed, by one who has taken the pains to examinecarefully that document with reference to this very point, that--withoutincluding any mention of "the United States" or of "foreign states, " andexcluding also the amendments--the Constitution, in its original draft, makes mention of the States, _as_ States, no less than _seventy_ times;and of these seventy times, only _three_ times in the way of prohibitionof the exercise of a power. In fact, it is full of statehood. Leave outall mention of the States--I make no mere verbal point or quibble, butmean the States in their separate, several, distinct capacity--and whatwould remain would be of less account than the play of the Prince ofDenmark with the part of _Hamlet_ omitted. 

But, leaving out of consideration for the moment all minor questions, the vital and essential point of inquiry now is, by what authority theConstitution was "ordained and established. " Mr. Webster says it wasdone "by the people of the United States in the aggregate;" Mr. Everettrepeats substantially the same thing; and Mr. Motley, taking a stepfurther, says that "it was 'ordained and established' by a _powersuperior to the States_--by the people of the whole land in theiraggregate capacity. "

The advocates of this mischievous dogma assume the existence of anunauthorized, undefined power of a "whole people, " or "people of thewhole land, " operating through the agency of the PhiladelphiaConvention, to impose its decrees upon the States. They forget, in thefirst place, that this Convention was composed of delegates, not of anyone people, but of distinct States; and, in the second place, that theiraction had no force or validity whatever--in the words of Mr. Madison, that it was of no more consequence than the paper on which it waswritten--until approved and ratified by a sufficient number of States. The meaning of the preamble, "We, the people of the United States ... Doordain and establish this Constitution, " is ascertained, fixed, anddefined by the final article: "The ratification of the conventions of_nine States_ shall be sufficient for the _establishment_ of thisConstitution between _the States so ratifying_ the same. " If it wasalready established, what need was there of further establishment? Itwas not ordained or established at all, until ratified by the requisitenumber of States. The announcement in the preamble of course hadreference to that expected ratification, without which the preamblewould have been as void as the body of the instrument. The assertionthat "it was not ratified by the States" is so plainly and positivelycontrary, to well-known fact--so inconsistent with the language of theConstitution itself--that it is hard to imagine what was intended by it, unless it was to take advantage of the presumed ignorance of the subjectamong the readers of an English journal, to impose upon them, apreposterous fiction. It was State ratification alone--the ratificationof the _people_ of each State, independently of all other people--thatgave force, vitality, and validity to the Constitution. 

Judge Story, referring to the fact that the voters assembled in theseveral States, asks where else they could have assembled--a pertinentquestion on our theory, but the idea he evidently intended to convey wasthat the voting of "the people" by States was a mere matter ofgeographical necessity, or local convenience; just as the people of aState vote by counties; the people of a county by towns, "beats, " or"precincts"; and the people of a city by wards. It is hardly necessaryto say that, in all organized republican communities, majorities govern. When we speak of the will of the people of a community, we mean the willof a majority, which, when constitutionally expressed, is binding on anyminority of the same community. 

If, then, we can conceive, and admit for a moment, the possibility that, when the Constitution was under consideration, the people of the UnitedStates were politically "one people"--a collective unit--two deductionsare clearly inevitable: In the first place, each geographical divisionof this great community would have been entitled to vote according toits relative population; and, in the second, the expressed will of thelegal majority would have been binding upon the whole. A denial of thefirst proposition would be a denial of common justice and equal rights;a denial of the second would be to destroy all government and establishmere anarchy. 

Now, _neither_ of these principles was practiced or proposed or evenimagined in the case of the action of the people of the United States(if they were one political community) upon the proposed Constitution. On the contrary, seventy thousand people in the State of Delaware hadprecisely the same weight--one vote--in its ratification, as sevenhundred thousand (and more) in Virginia, or four hundred thousand inPennsylvania. Would not this have been an intolerable grievance andwrong--would no protest have been uttered against it--if these had beenfractional parts of one community of people?

Again, while the will of the consenting majority _within_ any State wasbinding on the opposing minority in the same, no majority, ormajorities, of States or people had any control whatever upon the peopleof _another_ State. The Constitution was established, not "_over_ theStates, " as asserted by Motley, but "_between_ the States, " and only"between _the States so ratifying_ the same. " Little Rhode Island, withher seventy thousand inhabitants, was not a mere fractional part of "thepeople of the whole land, " during the period for which she held aloof, but was as free, independent, and unmolested, as any other sovereignpower, notwithstanding the majority of more than three millions of "thewhole people" on the other side of the question. 

Before the ratification of the Constitution--when there was some excusefor an imperfect understanding or misconception of the termsproposed--Mr. Madison thus answered, in advance, the objections made onthe ground of this misconception, and demonstrated its fallacy. Hewrote:

 "That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by objectors--the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation--is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a _majority_ of the people of the Union nor from that of a _majority_ of _the States_. It must result from the _unanimous_ assent of the several _States that are parties to it_, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. "[51]

It is a tedious task to have to expose the misstatements, both of factand of principle, which have occupied so much attention, but it isrendered necessary by the extent to which they have been imposed uponthe acceptance of the public, through reckless assertion and confidentand incessant repetition. 

 "'I remember, ' says Mr. Webster, 'to have heard Chief-Justice Marshall ask counsel, who was insisting upon the authority of an act of legislation, _if he thought an act of legislation could create or destroy a fact, or change the truth of history_? "Would it alter the fact, " said he, "if a Legislature should solemnly enact that Mr. Hume never wrote the History of England?" A Legislature may alter the law, ' continues Mr. Webster, 'but no power can reverse a fact. ' Hence, if the Convention of 1787 had expressly declared that the Constitution was [to be] ordained by 'the people of the United States _in the aggregate_, ' or by the people of America as one nation, this would not have destroyed the fact that it was ratified by each State for itself, and that each State was bound only by 'its own voluntary act. '" (Bledsoe. )

But the Convention, as we have seen, said no such thing. No suchcommunity as "the people of the United States in the aggregate" is knownto it, or ever acted on it. It was ordained, established, and ratifiedby the people of the several States; and no theories or assertions of alater generation can change or conceal this fixed fact, as it standsrevealed in the light of contemporaneous records. 

[Footnote 43: Article I, section 9, clause 8. ]

[Footnote 44: Article II, section 1, clause 6. ]

[Footnote 45: Article III, section 2. ]

[Footnote 46: Article III, section 3. ]

[Footnote 47: "American Museum, " February, 1788. ]

[Footnote 48: Benton's "Abridgment, " vol. X, p. 448. ]

[Footnote 49: See address by Edward Everett at the Academy of Music, NewYork, July 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 50: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 51: "Federalist, " No. Xxxix. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

 Verbal Cavils and Criticisms. --"Compact, " "Confederacy, " "Accession, " etc. --The "New Vocabulary. "--The Federal Constitution a Compact, and the States acceded to it. --Evidence of the Constitution itself and of Contemporary Records. 

I have habitually spoken of the Federal Constitution as a compact, andof the parties to it as sovereign States. These terms should not, and inearlier times would not, have required explanation or vindication. Butthey have been called in question by the modern school of consolidation. These gentlemen admit that the Government under the Articles ofConfederation was a compact. Mr. Webster, in his rejoinder to Mr. Hayne, on the 27th of January, 1830, said:

 "When the gentleman says the Constitution is a compact between the States, he uses language exactly applicable to the old Confederation. He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789. He describes fully that old state of things then existing. The Confederation was, in strictness, a compact; the States, as States, were parties to it. We had no other General Government. But that was found insufficient and inadequate to the public exigencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and undertook to establish a better. They undertook to form a General Government, which should stand on a new basis--not a confederacy, not a league, not a compact between States, but a Constitution. "[52]

Again, in his discussion with Mr. Calhoun, three years afterward, hevehemently reiterates the same denial. Of the Constitution, he says:"Does it call itself a compact? Certainly not. It uses the word'compact' but once, and that when it declares that the States shallenter into no compact. [53] Does it call itself a league, a confederacy, a subsisting treaty between the States? Certainly not. There is not aparticle of such language in all its pages. "[54]

The artist, who wrote under his picture the legend "This is a horse, "made effectual provision against any such cavil as that preferred by Mr. Webster and his followers, that the Constitution is not a compact, because it is not "so nominated in the bond. " As well as I canrecollect, there is no passage in the "Iliad" or the "Æneid" in whicheither of those great works "calls itself, " or is called by its author, an epic poem, yet this would scarcely be accepted as evidence that theyare not epic poems. In an examination of Mr. Webster's remarks, I do notfind that he announces them to be either a speech or an argument; yettheir claim to both these titles will hardly be disputed--notwithstanding the verbal criticism on the Constitution just quoted. 

The distinction attempted to be drawn between the language proper to aconfederation and that belonging to a constitution, as indicating twodifferent ideas, will not bear the test of examination and applicationto the case of the United States. It has been fully shown, in previouschapters, that the terms "Union, " "Federal Union, " "FederalConstitution, " "Constitution of the Federal Government, " and the like, were used--not merely in colloquial, informal speech, but in publicproceedings and official documents--with reference to the Articles ofConfederation, as freely as they have since been employed under thepresent Constitution. The former Union was--as Mr. Webster expresslyadmits--as nobody denies--a compact between States, yet it nowhere"calls itself" "a compact"; the word does not occur in it even the onetime that it occurs in the present Constitution, although thecontracting States are in both prohibited from entering into any"treaty, confederation, or alliance" with one another, or with anyforeign power, without the consent of Congress; and the contracting orconstituent parties are termed "United States" in the one just as in theother. 

Mr. Webster is particularly unfortunate in his criticisms upon what heterms the "new vocabulary, " in which the Constitution is styled acompact, and the States which ratified it are spoken of as having"acceded" to it. In the same speech, last quoted, he says:

 "This word 'accede, ' not found either in the Constitution itself or in the ratification of it by any one of the States, has been chosen for use here, doubtless not without a well-considered purpose. The natural converse of accession is secession; and therefore, when it is stated that the people of the States acceded to the Union, it may be more plausibly argued that they may secede from it. If, in adopting the Constitution, nothing was done but acceding to a compact, nothing would seem necessary, in order to break it up, but to secede from the same compact. But the term is wholly out of place. Accession, as a word applied to political associations, implies coming into a league, treaty, or confederacy, by one hitherto a stranger to it; and secession implies departing from such league or confederacy. The people of the United States have used no such form of expression in establishing the present Government. "[55]

Repeating and reiterating in many forms what is substantially the sameidea, and attributing the use of the terms which he attacks to anulterior purpose, Mr. Webster says:

 "This is the reason, sir, which makes it necessary to abandon the use of constitutional language for a new vocabulary, and to substitute, in the place of plain, historical facts, a series of assumptions. This is the reason why it is necessary to give new names to things; to speak of the Constitution, not as a constitution, but as a compact; and of the ratifications by the people, not as ratifications, but as acts of accession. "[56]

In these and similar passages, Mr. Webster virtually concedes that, ifthe Constitution _were_ a compact; if the Union _were_ a confederacy; ifthe States _had_, as States, severally acceded to it--all whichpropositions he denies--then the sovereignty of the States and theirright to secede from the Union would be deducible. 

Now, it happens that these very terms--"compact, " "confederacy, ""accede, " and the like--were the terms in familiar use by the authors ofthe Constitution and their associates with reference to that instrumentand its ratification. Other writers, who have examined the subject sincethe late war gave it an interest which it had never commanded before, have collected such an array of evidence in this behalf that it isnecessary only to cite a few examples. 

The following language of Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, in the Conventionof 1787, has already been referred to: "If nine out of thirteen Statescan dissolve _the compact_, six out of nine will be just as able todissolve _the new one_ hereafter. "

Mr. Gouverneur Morris, one of the most pronounced advocates of a strongcentral government, in the Convention, said: "He came here to form _acompact_ for the good of Americans. He was ready to do so with all theStates. He hoped and believed they all would enter into such a_compact_. If they would not, he would be ready to join with any Statesthat would. But, as the _compact_ was to be voluntary, it is in vain forthe Eastern States to insist on what the Southern States will neveragree to. "[57]

Mr. Madison, while inclining to a strong government, said: "In the caseof a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of _the pact_has always been understood, " etc. [58]

Mr. Hamilton, in the "Federalist, " repeatedly speaks of the newgovernment as a "_confederate republic_" and a "_confederacy_, " andcalls the Constitution a "compact. " (See especially Nos. IX. And LXXXV. )

General Washington--who was not only the first President under the newConstitution, but who had presided over the Convention that drew itup--in letters written soon after the adjournment of that body tofriends in various States, referred to the Constitution as a _compact_or treaty, and repeatedly uses the terms "accede" and "accession, " andonce the term "secession. "

He asks what the opponents of the Constitution in Virginia would do, "ifnine other States should _accede_ to the Constitution. "

Luther Martin, of Maryland, informs us that, in a committee of theGeneral Convention of 1787, protesting against the proposed violation ofthe principles of the "perpetual union" already formed under theArticles of Confederation, he made use of such language as this:

 "Will you tell us we ought to trust you because you now enter into a solemn _compact_ with us? This you have done before, and now treat with the utmost contempt. Will you now make an appeal to the Supreme Being, and call on Him to guarantee your observance of this _compact_? The same you have formerly done for your observance of the Articles of Confederation, which you are now violating in the most wanton manner. "[59]

It is needless to multiply the proofs that abound in the writings of the"fathers" to show that Mr. Webster's "new vocabulary" was the verylanguage they familiarly used. Let two more examples suffice, fromauthority higher than that of any individual speaker or writer, howevereminent--from authority second only, if at all inferior, to that of thetext of the Constitution itself--that is, from the acts or ordinances ofratification by the States. They certainly ought to have beenconclusive, and should not have been unknown to Mr. Webster, for theyare the language of Massachusetts, the State which he represented in theSenate, and of New Hampshire, the State of his nativity. 

The ratification of Massachusetts is expressed in the following terms:

 "COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 

 "The Convention, having impartially discussed and fully considered a Constitution for the United States of America, reported to Congress by the convention of delegates from the United States of America, and submitted to us by a resolution of the General Court of the said Commonwealth, passed the 25th day of October last past, and acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe, in affording the people of the United States, in the course of his Providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn COMPACT with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity--do, in the name and in behalf of the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America. "

The ratification of New Hampshire is expressed in precisely the samewords, save only the difference of date of the resolution of theLegislature (or "General Court") referred to, and also the use of theword "State" instead of "Commonwealth. " Both distinctly accept it as a_compact_ of the States "with each other"--which Mr. Webster, a son ofNew Hampshire and a Senator from Massachusetts, declared it was not; andnot only so, but he repudiated the very "vocabulary" from which thewords expressing the doctrine were taken. 

It would not need, however, this abounding wealth of contemporaneousexposition--it does not require the employment of any particular wordsin the Constitution--to prove that it was drawn up as a compact betweensovereign States entering into a confederacy with each other, and thatthey ratified and acceded to it separately, severally, andindependently. The very structure of the whole instrument and the factsattending its preparation and ratification would suffice. The languageof the final article would have been quite enough: "The ratification ofthe conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishmentof this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same. " This isnot the "language" of a superior imposing a mandate upon subordinates. The consent of the contracting parties is necessary to its validity, andthen it becomes not the acceptance and recognition of an authority"_over_" them--as Mr. Motley represents--but of a compact _between_them. The simple word "between" is incompatible with any other idea thanthat of a compact by independent parties. 

If it were possible that any doubt could still exist, there is oneprovision in the Constitution which stamps its character as a compacttoo plainly for cavil or question. The Constitution, which had alreadyprovided for the representation of the States in both Houses ofCongress, thereby bringing the matter of representation within the powerof amendment, in its fifth article contains a stipulation that "noState, without its [own] consent, shall be deprived of its equalsuffrage in the Senate. " If this is not a compact between the States, the smaller States have no guarantee for the preservation of theirequality of representation in the United States Senate. If theobligation of a contract does not secure it, the guarantee itself isliable to amendment, and may be swept away at the will of three fourthsof the States, without wrong to any party--for, according to thistheory, there is no party of the second part. 

[Footnote 52: Gales and Seaton's "Register of Congressional Debates, "vol. Vi, Part I, p. 93. ]

[Footnote 53: The words "with another State or with a foreign power"should have been added to make this statement accurate. ]

[Footnote 54: "Congressional Debates, " vol. Ix, Part I, p. 563. ]

[Footnote 55: "Congressional Debates, " vol. Ix, Part I, p. 566. ]

[Footnote 56: Ibid. , pp. 557, 558. ]

[Footnote 57: "Madison Papers, " pp. 1081, 1082. ]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. , p. 1184. ]

[Footnote 59: Luther Martin's "Genuine Information, " in Wilbur Curtiss's"Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, " p. 29. ]

CHAPTER VIII. 

 Sovereignty. 

"The term 'sovereign' or 'sovereignty, '" says Judge Story, "is used indifferent senses, which often leads to a confusion of ideas, andsometimes to very mischievous and unfounded conclusions. " Without anydisrespect for Judge Story, or any disparagement of his great learningand ability, it may safely be added that he and his disciples havecontributed not a little to the increase of this confusion of ideas andthe spread of these mischievous and unfounded conclusions. There is nogood reason whatever why it should be used in different senses, or whythere should be any confusion of ideas as to its meaning. Of all theterms employed in political science, it is one of the most definite andintelligible. The definition of it given by that accurate and lucidpublicist, Burlamaqui, is simple and satisfactory--that "sovereignty isa right of commanding in the last resort in civil society. "[60] Theoriginal seat of this sovereignty he also declares to be in the people. "But, " he adds, "when once the people have transferred their right to asovereign [i. E. , a monarch], they can not, without contradiction, besupposed to continue still masters of it. "[61] This is in strict accordwith the theory of American republicanism, the peculiarity of which isthat the people _never do_ transfer their right of sovereignty, eitherin whole or in part. They only delegate to their governments theexercise of such of its functions as may be necessary, subject always totheir own control, and to reassumption whenever such government fails tofulfill the purposes for which it was instituted. 

I think it has already been demonstrated that, in this country, the onlypolitical community--the only independent corporate unit through whichthe people can exercise their sovereignty, is the State. Minorcommunities--as those of counties, cities, and towns--are merelyfractional subdivisions of the State; and these do not affect theevidence that there was not such a political community as the "people ofthe United States in the aggregate. "

That the States were severally sovereign and independent when they wereunited under the Articles of Confederation, is distinctly asserted inthose articles, and is admitted even by the extreme partisans ofconsolidation. Of right, they are still sovereign, unless they havesurrendered or been divested of their sovereignty; and those who denythe proposition have been vainly called upon to point out the process bywhich they have divested themselves, or have been divested of it, otherwise than by usurpation. 

Since Webster spoke and Story wrote upon the subject, however, thesovereignty of the States has been vehemently denied, or explained awayas only a partial, imperfect, mutilated sovereignty. Paradoxicaltheories of "divided sovereignty" and "delegated sovereignty" havearisen, to create that "confusion of ideas" and engender those"mischievous and unfounded conclusions, " of which Judge Story speaks. Confounding the sovereign authority of the _people_ with the delegatedpowers conferred by them upon their _governments_, we hear of aGovernment of the United States "sovereign within its sphere, " and ofState governments "sovereign in _their_ sphere"; of the surrender by theStates of _part_ of their sovereignty to the United States, and thelike. Now, if there be any one great principle pervading the FederalConstitution, the State Constitutions, the writings of the fathers, thewhole American system, as clearly as the sunlight pervades the solarsystem, it is that _no_ government is sovereign--that all governmentsderive their powers from the people, and exercise them in subjection tothe will of the people--not a will expressed in any irregular, lawless, tumultuary manner, but the will of the organized political community, expressed through authorized and legitimate channels. The founders ofthe American republics never conferred, nor intended to confer, sovereignty upon either their State or Federal Governments. 

If, then, the people of the States, in forming a Federal Union, surrendered--or, to use Burlamaqui's term, transferred--or if they meantto surrender or transfer--_part_ of their sovereignty, to whom was thetransfer made? Not to "the people of the United States in theaggregate"; for there was no such people in existence, and they did notcreate or constitute such a people by merger of themselves. Not to theFederal Government; for they disclaimed, as a fundamental principle, thesovereignty of any government. There was no such surrender, no suchtransfer, in whole or in part, expressed or implied. They retained, andintended to retain, their sovereignty in its integrity--undivided andindivisible. 

"But, indeed, " says Mr. Motley, "the words 'sovereign' and 'sovereignty'are purely inapplicable to the American system. In the Declaration ofIndependence the provinces declare themselves 'free and independentStates, ' but the men of those days knew that the word 'sovereign' was aterm of feudal origin. When their connection with a time-honored feudalmonarchy was abruptly severed, the word 'sovereign' had no meaning forus. "[62]

If this be true, "the men of those days" had a very extraordinary way ofexpressing their conviction that the word "had no meaning for us. " Wehave seen that, in the very front of their Articles of Confederation, they set forth the conspicuous declaration that each State retained "its_sovereignty_, freedom, and independence. "

Massachusetts--the State, I believe, of Mr. Motley's nativity andcitizenship--in her original Constitution, drawn up by "men of thosedays, " made this declaration:

 "The people inhabiting the territory formerly called the Province of Massachusetts Bay do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a free, _sovereign_, and independent body politic, or State, by the name of _The Commonwealth of Massachusetts_. "

New Hampshire, in her Constitution, as revised in 1792, had identicallythe same declaration, except as regards the name of the State and theword "State" instead of "Commonwealth. "

Mr. Madison, one of the most distinguished of the men of that day and ofthe advocates of the Constitution, in a speech already once referred to, in the Virginia Convention of 1788, explained that "We, the people, " whowere to establish the Constitution, were the people of "thirteenSOVEREIGNTIES. "[63]

In the "Federalist, " he repeatedly employs the term--as, for example, when he says: "Do they [the fundamental principles of the Confederation]require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the Statesshould be regarded as distinct and independent SOVEREIGNS? They _are_ soregarded by the Constitution proposed. "[64]

Alexander Hamilton--another contemporary authority, no lessillustrious--says, in the "Federalist":

 "It is inherent in the nature of _sovereignty_, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of _sovereignty_, is now enjoyed by the government of _every State_ in the Union. "[65]

In the same paragraph he uses these terms, "sovereign" and"sovereignty, " repeatedly--always with reference to the States, respectively and severally. 

Benjamin Franklin advocated equality of suffrage in the Senate as ameans of securing "the _sovereignties_ of the individual States. "[66]James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said sovereignty "is in the people beforethey make a Constitution, and remains in them, " and described the peopleas being "thirteen independent sovereignties. "[67] Gouverneur Morris, who was, as well as Wilson, one of the warmest advocates in theConvention of a strong central government, spoke of the Constitution as"a _compact_, " and of the parties to it as "each enjoying _sovereign_power. "[68] Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, declared that the Government"was instituted by a number of _sovereign States_. "[69] OliverEllsworth, of the same State, spoke of the States as "sovereignbodies. "[70] These were all eminent members of the Convention whichformed the Constitution. 

There was scarcely a statesman of that period who did not leave onrecord expressions of the same sort. But why multiply citations? It isvery evident that the "men of those days" entertained very differentviews of sovereignty from those set forth by the "new lights" of ourday. Far from considering it a term of feudal origin, "purelyinapplicable to the American system, " they seem to have regarded it as avery vital principle in that system, and of necessity belonging to theseveral States--and I do not find a single instance in which theyapplied it to any political organization, except the States. 

Their ideas were in entire accord with those of Vattel, who, in hischapter "Of Nations or Sovereign States, " writes, "Every _nation_ thatgoverns itself, under what form soever, without any dependence onforeign power, is a _sovereign state_. "[71]

In another part of the same chapter he gives a lucid statement of thenature of a confederate republic, such as ours was designed to be. Hesays:

 "Several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without each in particular ceasing to be _a perfect state_. They will form together a federal republic: the deliberations in common will offer no violence to _the sovereignty of each member_, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfill the engagements into which he has very willingly entered. "[72]

What this celebrated author means here by a person, is explained by asubsequent passage: "The law of nations is the law of sovereigns; statesfree and independent are moral persons. "[73]

[Footnote 60: "Principes du Droit Politique, " chap. V, section I; also, chap. Vii, section 1. ]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. , chap. Vii, section 12. ]

[Footnote 62: "Rebellion Record, " vol. I, Documents, p. 211. ]

[Footnote 63: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. Iii, p. 114, edition of 1836. ]

[Footnote 64: "Federalist, " No. Xl. ]

[Footnote 65: Ibid, No. Lxxxi. ]

[Footnote 66: See Elliott's "Debates, " vol. V, p. 266. ]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. , vol. Ii, p. 443. ]

[Footnote 68: See "Life of Gouverneur Morris, " vol. Iii, p. 193. ]

[Footnote 69: See "Writings of John Adams, " vol. Vii, letter of RogerSherman. ]

[Footnote 70: See Eliott's "Debates, " vol. Ii, p. 197. ]

[Footnote 71: "Law of Nations, " Book I, chap. I, section 4. ]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. , section 10. ]

[Footnote 73: Ibid. , section 12. ]

CHAPTER IX. 

 The same Subject continued. --The Tenth Amendment. --Fallacies exposed. --"Constitution, " "Government, " and "People" distinguished from each other. --Theories refuted by Facts. --Characteristics of Sovereignty. --Sovereignty identified. --Never thrown away. 

If any lingering doubt could have existed as to the reservation of theirentire sovereignty by the people of the respective States, when theyorganized the Federal Union, it would have been removed by the adoptionof the tenth amendment to the Constitution, which was not only one ofthe amendments proposed by various States when ratifying thatinstrument, but the particular one in which they substantially agreed, and upon which they most urgently insisted. Indeed, it is quite certainthat the Constitution would never have received the assent andratification of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and perhaps other States, but for a well-grounded assurance that thesubstance of this amendment would be adopted as soon as the requisiteformalities could be complied with. That amendment is in these words:

 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. "

The full meaning of this article may not be as clear to us as it was tothe men of that period, on account of the confusion of ideas by whichthe term "people"--plain enough to them--has since been obscured, andalso the ambiguity attendant upon the use of the little conjunction_or_, which has been said to be the most equivocal word in our language, and for that reason has been excluded from indictments in the Englishcourts. The true intent and meaning of the provision, however, may beascertained from an examination and comparison of the terms in which itwas expressed by the various States which proposed it, and whose ideasit was intended to embody. 

Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in their ordinances of ratification, expressing the opinion "that certain amendments and alterations in thesaid Constitution would remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions ofmany of the good people of this Commonwealth [State (New Hampshire)], and more effectually guard against an undue administration of theFederal Government, " each recommended several such amendments, puttingthis at the head in the following form:

 "That it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are _reserved to the several States_, to be by them exercised. "

Of course, those stanch republican communities meant _the people of theStates_--not their _governments_, as something distinct from theirpeople. 

New York expressed herself as follows:

 "That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to _the people of the several States, or to their respective State governments, to whom they may have granted the same_; and that those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers or as inserted merely for greater caution. "

South Carolina expressed the idea thus:

 "This Convention doth also declare that no section or paragraph of the said Constitution warrants a construction that _the States do not retain_ every power not expressly relinquished by them and vested in the General Government of the Union. "

North Carolina proposed it in these terms:

 "Each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the departments of the General Government. "

Rhode Island gave in her long-withheld assent to the Constitution, "infull confidence" that certain proposed amendments would be adopted, thefirst of which was expressed in these words:

 "That Congress shall guarantee _to each State_ its SOVEREIGNTY, _freedom, and independence_, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated to the United States. "

This was in May, 1790, when nearly three years had been given todiscussion and explanation of the new Government by its founders andothers, when it had been in actual operation for more than a year, andwhen there was every advantage for a clear understanding of its natureand principles. Under such circumstances, and in the "full confidence"that this language expressed its meaning and intent, the people of RhodeIsland signified their "accession" to the "Confederate Republic" of theStates already united. 

No objection was made from any quarter to the principle asserted inthese various forms; or to the amendment in which it was finallyexpressed, although many thought it unnecessary, as being merelydeclaratory of what would have been sufficiently obvious withoutit--that the functions of the Government of the United States werestrictly limited to the exercise of such powers as were expresslydelegated, and that the people of the several States retained allothers. 

Is it compatible with reason to suppose that people so chary of thedelegation of specific powers or functions could have meant to surrenderor transfer the very basis and origin of all power--their inherentsovereignty--and this, not by express grant, but by implication?

Mr. Everett, following, whether consciously or not, in the line of Mr. Webster's ill-considered objection to the term "compact, " takesexception to the sovereignty of the States on the ground that "the_word_ 'sovereignty' does not occur" in the Constitution. He admits thatthe States were sovereign under the Articles of Confederation. How couldthey relinquish or be deprived of their sovereignty without even amention of it--when the tenth amendment confronts us with thedeclaration that _nothing_ was surrendered by implication--thateverything was reserved unless expressly delegated to the United Statesor prohibited to the States? Here is an attribute which they certainlypossessed--which nobody denies, or can deny, that they _did_possess--and of which Mr. Everett says no mention is made in theConstitution. In what conceivable way, then, was it lost or alienated?

Much has been said of the "prohibition" of the exercise by the States ofcertain functions of sovereignty; such as, making treaties, declaringwar, coining money, etc. This is only a part of the general compact, bywhich the contracting parties covenant, one with another, to abstainfrom the separate exercise of certain powers, which they agree tointrust to the management and control of the union or general agency ofthe parties associated. It is not a prohibition imposed upon them fromwithout, or from above, by any external or superior power, but isself-imposed by their free consent. The case is strictly analogous tothat of individuals forming a mercantile or manufacturing copartnership, who voluntarily agree to refrain, as individuals, from engaging in otherpursuits or speculations, from lending their individual credit, or fromthe exercise of any other right of a citizen, which they may thinkproper to subject to the consent, or intrust to the management of thefirm. 

The prohibitory clauses of the Constitution referred to are not at all adenial of the full sovereignty of the States, but are merely anagreement among them to exercise certain powers of sovereignty inconcert, and not separately and apart. 

There is one other provision of the Constitution, which is generallyadduced by the friends of centralism as antagonistic to Statesovereignty. This is found in the second clause of the sixth article, asfollows:

 "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "

This enunciation of a principle, which, even if it had not beenexpressly declared, would have been a necessary deduction from theacceptance of the Constitution itself, has been magnified and pervertedinto a meaning and purpose entirely foreign to that which plaininterpretation is sufficient to discern. Mr. Motley thus dilates on thesubject:

 "Could language be more imperial? Could the claim to State 'sovereignty' be more completely disposed of at a word? How can that be sovereign, acknowledging no superior, supreme, which has voluntarily accepted a supreme law from something which it acknowledges as superior?"[74]

The mistake which Mr. Motley--like other writers of the sameschool--makes is one which is disposed of by a very simple correction. The States, which ordained and established the Constitution, _accepted_nothing besides what they themselves _prescribed_. They acknowledged nosuperior. The supremacy was both in degree and extent only that whichwas delegated by the States to their common agent. 

There are some other considerations which may conduce to a clearerunderstanding of this supremacy of the Constitution and the laws made inpursuance thereof:

1. In the first place, it must be remembered that, when the FederalConstitution was formed, each then existing State already had its ownConstitution and code of statute laws. It was, no doubt, primarily withreference to these that the provision was inserted, and not in theexpectation of future conflicts or discrepancies. It is in this lightalone that Mr. Madison considers it in explaining and vindicating it inthe "Federalist. "[75]

2. Again, it is to be observed that the supremacy accorded to thegeneral laws of the United States is expressly limited to those enactedin conformity with the Constitution, or, to use the exact language, "made in pursuance thereof. " Mr. Hamilton, in another chapter of the"Federalist, " calls particular attention to this, saying (and theitalics are all his own) "that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the_enumerated_ and _legitimate_ objects of its jurisdiction, will becomethe supreme law of the land, " and that the State functionaries willcoöperate in their observance and enforcement with the GeneralGovernment, "_as far as its just and constitutional authorityextends_. "[76]

3. In the third place, it is not the _Government_ of the United Statesthat is declared to be supreme, but the _Constitution_ and the laws andtreaties made in accordance with it. The proposition was made in theConvention to organize a government consisting of "supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers, " but it was not adopted. Its deliberaterejection is much more significant and conclusive than if it had neverbeen proposed. Correction of so gross an error as that of confoundingthe Government with the Constitution ought to be superfluous, but socrude and confused are the ideas which have been propagated on thesubject, that no misconception seems to be too absurd to be possible. Thus, it has not been uncommon, of late years, to hear, even in thehighest places, the oath to support the Constitution, which is taken byboth State and Federal officers, spoken of as an oath "to support _theGovernment_"--an obligation never imposed upon any one in this country, and which the men who made the Constitution, with their recentreminiscences of the Revolution, the battles of which they had foughtwith halters around their necks, would have been the last to prescribe. Could any assertion be less credible than that they proceeded toinstitute another supreme government which it would be treason toresist?

This confusion of ideas pervades the treatment of the whole subject ofsovereignty. Mr. Webster has said, and very justly so far as theseUnited States are concerned: "The sovereignty of government is an ideabelonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing is known inNorth America. Our governments are all limited. In Europe sovereignty isof feudal origin, and imports no more than the state of the sovereign. It comprises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives, and powers. But with us all power is with the people. They alone are sovereign, andthey erect what governments they please, and confer on them such powersas they please. None of these governments are sovereign, in the Europeansense of the word, all being restrained by written constitutions. "[77]

But the same intellect, which can so clearly discern and so lucidlydefine the general proposition, seems to be covered by a cloud of thickdarkness when it comes to apply it to the particular case in issue. Thus, a little afterward, we have the following:

 "There is no language in the whole Constitution applicable to a confederation of States. If the States be parties, as States, what are their rights, and what their respective covenants and stipulations? and where are their rights, covenants, and stipulations expressed? In the Articles of Confederation they did make promises, and did enter into engagements, and did plight the faith of each State for their fulfillment; but in the Constitution there is nothing of that kind. The reason is that, in the Constitution, it is the people who speak and not the States. The people ordain the Constitution, and therein address themselves to the States and to the Legislatures of the States in the language of injunction and prohibition. "[78]

It is surprising that such inconsistent ideas should proceed from asource so eminent. Its author falls into the very error which he hadjust before so distinctly pointed out, in confounding the people of theStates with their governments. In the vehemence of his hostility toState sovereignty, he seems--as all of his disciples seem--unable evento comprehend that it means the sovereignty, not of State governments, but of people who make them. With minds preoccupied by the unreal ideaof one great people of a consolidated nation, these gentlemen areblinded to the plain and primary truth that the only way in which thepeople ordained the Constitution was as the people of States. When Mr. Webster says that "in the Constitution it is the people who speak, andnot the States, " he says what is untenable. The States _are_ the people. The people do not speak, never have spoken, and never can speak, intheir sovereign capacity (without a subversion of our whole system), otherwise than as the people of States. 

There are but two modes of expressing their sovereign will known to thepeople of this country. One is by direct vote--the mode adopted by RhodeIsland in 1788, when she rejected the Constitution. The other is themethod, more generally pursued, of acting by means of conventions ofdelegates elected expressly as representatives of the sovereignty of thepeople. Now, it is not a matter of opinion or theory or speculation, buta plain, undeniable, historical _fact_, that there never has been anyact or expression of sovereignty in either of these modes by thatimaginary community, "the people of the United States in the aggregate. "_Usurpations of power_ by the _Government_ of the United States, theremay have been, and may be again, but there has never been either asovereign convention or a direct vote of the "whole people" of theUnited States to demonstrate its existence as a corporate unit. Everyexercise of sovereignty by any of the people of this country that hasactually taken place has been by the people of States _as_ States. Inthe face of this fact, is it not the merest self-stultification to admitthe sovereignty of the people and deny it to the States, in which alonethey have community existence?

This subject is one of such vital importance to a right understanding ofthe events which this work is designed to record and explain, that itcan not be dismissed without an effort in the way of recapitulation andconclusion, to make it clear beyond the possibility of misconception. 

According to the American theory, every individual is endowed withcertain unalienable rights, among which are "life, liberty, and thepursuit of happiness. " He is entitled to all the freedom, in these andin other respects, that is consistent with the safety and the rights ofothers and the weal of the community, but political sovereignty, whichis the source and origin of all the powers of _government_--legislative, executive, and judicial--belongs to, and inheres in, the people of anorganized political community. It is an attribute of the _whole people_of such a community. It includes the power and necessarily the duty ofprotecting the rights and redressing the wrongs of individuals, ofpunishing crimes, enforcing contracts, prescribing rules for thetransfer of property and the succession of estates, making treaties withforeign powers, levying taxes, etc. The enumeration of particulars mightbe extended, but these will suffice as illustrations. 

These powers are of course exercised through the agency of governments, but the governments are _only_ agents of the sovereign--responsible toit, and subject to its control. This sovereign--the people, in theaggregate, of each political community--delegates to the government theexercise of such powers, or functions, as it thinks proper, but in anAmerican republic never transfers or surrenders sovereignty. _That_remains, unalienated and unimpaired. It is by virtue of this sovereigntyalone that the Government, its authorized agent, commands the obedienceof the individual citizen, to the extent of its derivative, dependent, and delegated authority. The ALLEGIANCE of the citizen is due to thesovereign alone. 

Thus far, I think, all will agree. No American statesman or publicistwould venture to dispute it. Notwithstanding the inconsiderate orill-considered expressions thrown out by some persons about the unity ofthe American people from the beginning, no respectable authority hasever had the hardihood to deny that, before the adoption of the FederalConstitution, the only sovereign political community was the people ofthe State--the people of _each State_. The ordinary exercise of what aregenerally termed the powers of sovereignty was by and through theirrespective governments; and, when they formed a confederation, a portionof those powers was intrusted to the General Government, or agency. Under the Confederation, the Congress of the United States representedthe collective power of the States; but the people of each State alonepossessed sovereignty, and consequently were entitled to the allegianceof the citizen. 

When the Articles of Confederation were amended, when the newConstitution was substituted in their place and the General Governmentreorganized, its structure was changed, additional powers were conferredupon it, and thereby subtracted from the powers theretofore exercised bythe State governments; but the seat of sovereignty--the source of allthose delegated and dependent powers--was not disturbed. There was a newGovernment or an amended Government--it is entirely immaterial in whichof these lights we consider it--but no new PEOPLE was created orconstituted. The people, in whom alone sovereignty inheres, remainedjust as they had been before. The only change was in the form, structure, and relations of their governmental agencies. 

No doubt, the States--the people of the States--if they had been sodisposed, might have merged themselves into one great consolidatedState, retaining their geographical boundaries merely as matters ofconvenience. But such a merger must have been distinctly and formallystated, not left to deduction or implication. 

Men do not alienate even an estate, without positive and express termsand stipulations. But in this case not only was there no expresstransfer--no formal surrender--of the preëxisting sovereignty, but itwas expressly provided that nothing should be _understood_ as even_delegated_--that everything was reserved, unless granted in expressterms. The monstrous conception of the creation of a new people, invested with the whole or a great part of the sovereignty which hadpreviously belonged to the people of each State, has not a syllable tosustain it in the Constitution, but is built up entirely upon thepalpable misconstruction of a single expression in the preamble. 

In denying that there is any such collective unit as the people of theUnited States in the aggregate, of course I am not to be understood asdenying that there is such a political organization as the UnitedStates, or that there exists, with large and distinct powers, a_Government_ of the United States; but it is claimed that the Union, asits name implies, is constituted of States. As a British author, [79]referring to the old Teutonic system, has expressed the same idea, theStates are the integers, the United States the multiple which resultsfrom them. The Government of the United States derives its existencefrom the same source, and exercises its functions by the will of thesame sovereignty that creates and confers authority upon the Stategovernments. The people of each State are, in either case, the source. The only difference is that, in the creation of the State governments, each sovereign acted alone; in that of the Federal Government, theyacted in coöperation with the others. Neither the whole nor any part oftheir sovereignty has been surrendered to either Government. 

To whom, in fine, _could_ the States have surrendered their sovereignty?Not to the mass of the people inhabiting the territory possessed by allthe States, for there was no such community in existence, and they tookno measures for the organization of such a community. If they hadintended to do so, the very style, "United States, " would have been apalpable misnomer, nor would treason have been defined as levying waragainst _them_. Could it have been transferred to the Government of theUnion? Clearly not, in accordance with the ideas and principles of thosewho made the Declaration of Independence, adopted the Articles ofConfederation, and established the Constitution of the United States;for in each and all of these the corner-stone is the inherent andinalienable sovereignty of the people. To have transferred sovereigntyfrom the people to a Government would have been to have fought thebattles of the Revolution in vain--not for the freedom and independenceof the States, but for a mere change of masters. Such a thought orpurpose could not have been in the heads or hearts of those who moldedthe Union, and could have found lodgment only when the ebbing tide ofpatriotism and fraternity had swept away the landmarks which theyerected who sought by the compact of union to secure and perpetuate theliberties then possessed. The men who had won at great cost theindependence of their respective States were deeply impressed with thevalue of union, but they could never have consented, like "the baseJudean, " to fling away the priceless pearl of State sovereignty for anypossible alliance. 

[Footnote 74: "Rebellion Record, " vol. I, Documents, p. 213. ]

[Footnote 75: "Federalist, " No. Xliv. ]

[Footnote 76: "Federalist, " No. Xxvii. ]

[Footnote 77: "Congressional Debates, " vol. Ix, Part I, p. 565. ]

[Footnote 78: Ibid. , p. 566. ]

[Footnote 79: Sir Francis Palgrave, quoted by Mr. Calhoun, "Congressional Debates, " vol. Ix, Part I, p. 541. ]

CHAPTER X. 

 A Recapitulation. --Remarkable Propositions of Mr. Gouverneur Morris in the Convention of 1787, and their Fate. --Further Testimony. --Hamilton, Madison, Washington, Marshall, etc. --Later Theories. --Mr. Webster: his Views at Various Periods. --Speech at Capon Springs. --State Rights not a Sectional Theory. 

Looking back for a moment at the ground over which we have gone, I thinkit may be fairly asserted that the following propositions have beenclearly and fully established:

1. That the States of which the American Union was formed, from themoment when they emerged from their colonial or provincial condition, became severally sovereign, free, and independent States--not one State, or nation. 

2. That the union formed under the Articles of Confederation was acompact between the States, in which these attributes of "sovereignty, freedom, and independence, " were expressly asserted and guaranteed. 

3. That, in forming the "more perfect union" of the Constitution, afterward adopted, the same contracting powers formed an _amendedcompact_, without any surrender of these attributes of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, either expressed or implied: on the contrary, that, by the tenth amendment to the Constitution, limiting the power ofthe Government to its express grants, they distinctly guarded againstthe presumption of a surrender of anything by implication. 

4. That political sovereignty resides, neither in individual citizens, nor in unorganized masses, nor in fractional subdivisions of acommunity, but in the people of an organized political body. 

5. That no "republican form of government, " in the sense in which thatexpression is used in the Constitution, and was generally understood bythe founders of the Union--whether it be the government of a State or ofa confederation of States--is possessed of any sovereignty whatever, butmerely exercises certain powers delegated by the sovereign authority ofthe people, and subject to recall and reassumption by the same authoritythat conferred them. 

6. That the "people" who organized the first confederation, the peoplewho dissolved it, the people who ordained and established theConstitution which succeeded it, the only people, in fine, known orreferred to in the phraseology of that period--whether the term was usedcollectively or distributively--were the people of the respectiveStates, each acting separately and with absolute independence of theothers. 

7. That, in forming and adopting the Constitution, the States, or thepeople of the States--terms which, when used with reference to actsperformed in a sovereign capacity, are precisely equivalent to eachother--formed a new _Government_, but no new _people_; and that, consequently, no new sovereignty was created--for sovereignty in anAmerican republic can belong only to a people, never to agovernment--and that the Federal Government is entitled to exercise onlythe powers delegated to it by the people of the respective States. 

8. That the term "people, " in the preamble to the Constitution and inthe tenth amendment, is used distributively; that the only "people ofthe United States" known to the Constitution are the people of eachState in the Union; that no such political community or corporate unitas one people of the United States then existed, has ever beenorganized, or yet exists; and that no political action by the people ofthe United States in the aggregate has ever taken place, or ever cantake place, under the Constitution. 

The fictitious idea of _one_ people of the United States, contradictedin the last paragraph, has been so impressed upon the popular mind byfalse teaching, by careless and vicious phraseology, and by theever-present spectacle of a great Government, with its army and navy, its custom-houses and post-offices, its multitude of office-holders, andthe splendid prizes which it offers to political ambition, that thetearing away of these illusions and presentation of the original fabric, which they have overgrown and hidden from view, have no doubt beenunwelcome, distasteful, and even repellent to some of my readers. Theartificial splendor which makes the deception attractive is evenemployed as an argument to prove its reality. 

The glitter of the powers delegated to the agent serves to obscure theperception of the sovereign power of the principal by whom they areconferred, as, by the unpracticed eye, the showy costume and conspicuousfunctions of the drum-major are mistaken for emblems ofchieftaincy--while the misuse or ambiguous use of the term "Union" andits congeners contributes to increase the confusion. 

So much the more need for insisting upon the elementary truths whichhave been obscured by these specious sophistries. The reader reallydesirous of ascertaining truth is, therefore, again cautioned againstconfounding two ideas so essentially distinct as that of _government_, which is derivative, dependent, and subordinate, with that of the_people_, as an organized political community, which is sovereign, without any other than self-imposed limitations, and such as proceedfrom the general principles of the personal rights of man. 

It has been said, in a foregoing chapter, that the authors of theConstitution could scarcely have anticipated the idea of such acommunity as the people of the United States in one mass. Perhaps thisexpression needs some little qualification, for there is rarely afallacy, however stupendous, that is wholly original. A carefulexamination of the records of the Convention of 1787 exhibits one orperhaps two instances of such a suggestion--both by the same person--andthe result in each case is strikingly significant. 

The original proposition made concerning the office of President of theUnited States contemplated his election by the Congress, or, as it wastermed by the proposer, "the national Legislature. " On the 17th of July, this proposition being under consideration, Mr. Gouverneur Morris movedthat the words "national Legislature" be stricken out, and "citizens ofthe United States" inserted. The proposition was supported by Mr. JamesWilson--both of these gentlemen being delegates from Pennsylvania, andboth among the most earnest advocates of centralism in the Convention. 

Now, it is not at all certain that Mr. Morris had in view an election bythe citizens of the United States "in the aggregate, " voting as _onepeople_. The language of his proposition is entirely consistent with theidea of as election by the citizens of each State, voting separately andindependently, though it is ambiguous, and may admit of the otherconstruction. But this is immaterial. The proposition was submitted to avote, and received the approval of only _one State_--Pennsylvania, ofwhich Mr. Morris and Mr. Wilson were both representatives. _Nine_ Statesvoted against it. [80]

Six days afterward (July 23d), in a discussion of the proposedratification of the Constitution by Conventions of the people of eachState, Mr. Gouverneur Morris--as we learn from Mr. Madison--"moved thatthe reference of the plan [i. E. , of the proposed Constitution] be madeto one General Convention, chosen and authorized by the people, toconsider, amend, and establish the same. "[81]

Here the issue seems to have been more distinctly made between the twoideas of people of the States and one people in the aggregate. The fateof the latter is briefly recorded in the two words, "not seconded. " Mr. Morris was a man of distinguished ability, great personal influence, andundoubted patriotism, but, out of all that assemblage--comprising, as itdid, such admitted friends of centralism as Hamilton, King, Wilson, Randolph, Pinckney, and others--there was not one to sustain him in theproposition to incorporate into the Constitution that theory which nowpredominates, the theory on which was waged the late bloody war, whichwas called a "war for the Union. " It failed for want of a second, anddoes not even appear in the official journal of the Convention. The veryfact that such a suggestion was made would be unknown to us but for therecord kept by Mr. Madison. 

The extracts which have been given, in treating of special branches ofthe subject, from the writings and speeches of the framers of theConstitution and other statesmen of that period, afford ample proof oftheir entire and almost unanimous accord with the principles which havebeen established on the authority of the Constitution itself, the actsof ratification by the several States, and other attestations of thehighest authority and validity. I am well aware that isolatedexpressions may be found in the reports of debates on the General andState Conventions and other public bodies, indicating the existence ofindividual opinions seemingly inconsistent with these principles; thatloose and confused ideas were sometimes expressed with regard tosovereignty, the relations between governments and people, and kindredsubjects; and that, while the plan of the Constitution was underdiscussion, and before it was definitely reduced to its present shape, there were earnest advocates in the Convention of a more consolidatedsystem, with a stronger central government. But these expressions ofindividual opinion only prove the existence of a small minority ofdissentients from the principles generally entertained, and whichfinally prevailed in the formation of the Constitution. None of theseever avowed such extravagances of doctrine as are promulgated in thisgeneration. No statesman of that day would have ventured to risk hisreputation by construing an obligation to support the Constitution as anobligation to adhere to the Federal Government--a construction whichwould have insured the sweeping away of any plan of union embodying it, by a tempest of popular indignation from every quarter of the country. None of them suggested such an idea as that of the amalgamation of thepeople of the States into one consolidated mass--unless it was suggestedby Mr. Gouverneur Morris in the proposition above referred to, in whichhe stood alone among the delegates of twelve sovereign States assembledin convention. 

As to the features of centralism, or nationalism, which they didadvocate, all the ability of this little minority of really gifted menfailed to secure the incorporation of any one of them into theConstitution, or to obtain their recognition by any of the ratifyingStates. On the contrary, the very men who had been the leading advocatesof such theories, on failing to secure their adoption, loyally acceptedthe result, and became the ablest and most efficient supporters of theprinciples which had prevailed. Thus, Mr. Hamilton, who had favored theplan of a President and Senate, both elected to hold office for life (orduring good behavior), with a veto power in Congress on the action ofthe State Legislatures, became, through the "Federalist, " in conjunctionwith his associates, Mr. Madison and Mr. Jay, the most distinguishedexpounder and advocate of the Constitution, as then proposed andafterward ratified, with all its Federal and State-rights features. Inthe ninth number of that remarkable series of political essays, hequotes, adopts, and applies to the then proposed Constitution, Montesquieu's description of a "CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, " a term which he(Hamilton) repeatedly employs. 

In the eighty-first number of the same series, replying to apprehensionsexpressed by some that a State might be brought before the Federalcourts to answer as defendant in suits instituted against her, he repelsthe idea in these plain and conclusive terms. The italics are my own:

 "It is inherent in the nature of _sovereignty_ not to be amenable to the suit of any individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the _attributes of sovereignty_, is now enjoyed by the government of _every State in the Union_. Unless, therefore, there is _a surrender of this immunity_ in the plan of the Convention, _it will remain with the States_, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.... The contracts between _a nation_ and individuals are only binding on the conscience of _the sovereign_, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action, independent of _the sovereign will_. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident that it could not be done without _waging war_ against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the Federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a preëxisting right of the State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarranted. "[82]

This extract is very significant, clearly showing that Mr. Hamiltonassumed as undisputed propositions, in the first place, that the Statewas _the_ "SOVEREIGN"; secondly, that this sovereignty could not bealienated, unless by express surrender; thirdly, that no such surrenderhad been made; and, fourthly, that the idea of applying coercion to aState, even to enforce the fulfillment of a duty, would be equivalent towaging war against a State--it was "altogether forced andunwarrantable. "

In a subsequent number, Mr. Hamilton, replying to the objection that theConstitution contains no bill or declaration of rights, argues that itwas entirely unnecessary, because in reality the people--that is, ofcourse, the people, respectively, of the several States, who were theonly people known to the Constitution or to the country--had surrenderednothing of their inherent sovereignty, but retained it unimpaired. Hesays: "Here, in strictness, the people _surrender nothing_; and, as they_retain everything_, they have no need of particular reservations. " Andagain: "I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense andto the extent they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in theproposed Constitution, but would be absolutely dangerous. They wouldcontain various exceptions to _powers not granted_, and on this veryaccount would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than weregranted. For why declare that things shall not be done, which there isno power to do?"[83] Could language be more clear or more complete invindication of the principles laid down in this work? Mr. Hamiltondeclares, in effect, that the grants to the Federal Government in theConstitution are not surrenders, but delegations of power by the peopleof the States; that sovereignty remains intact where it was before; andthat the delegations of power were strictly limited to those expresslygranted--in this, merely anticipating the tenth amendment, afterwardadopted. 

Finally, in the concluding article of the "Federalist, " he bearsemphatic testimony to the same principles, in the remark that "everyConstitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a greatvariety of particulars, in which _thirteen independent States_ are to beaccommodated in their interests or opinions of interest.... Hence thenecessity of molding and arranging all the particulars, which are tocompose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy _all the parties_ tothe compact. "[84] There is no intimation here, or anywhere else, of theexistence of any such idea as that of the aggregated people of one greatconsolidated state. It is an incidental enunciation of the same truthsoon afterward asserted by Madison in the Virginia Convention--that thepeople who ordained and established the Constitution were "not thepeople as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteensovereignties". 

Mr. Madison, in the Philadelphia Convention, had at first held views ofthe sort of government which it was desirable to organize, similar tothose of Mr. Hamilton, though more moderate in extent. He, too, however, cordially conformed to the modifications in them made by his colleagues, and was no less zealous and eminent in defending and expounding theConstitution as finally adopted. His interpretation of its fundamentalprinciples is so fully shown in the extracts which have already beengiven from his contributions to the "Federalist" and speeches in theVirginia Convention, that it would be superfluous to make any additionalcitation from them. 

The evidence of Hamilton and Madison--two of the most eminent of theauthors of the Constitution, and the two preeminent contemporaryexpounders of its meaning--is the most valuable that could be offeredfor its interpretation. That of all the other statesmen of the periodonly tends to confirm the same conclusions. The illustrious Washington, who presided over the Philadelphia Convention, in his correspondence, repeatedly refers to the proposed Union as a "Confederacy" of States, ora "confederated Government, " and to the several States as "acceding, " orsignifying their "accession, " to it, in ratifying the Constitution. Herefers to the Constitution itself as "a compact or treaty, " andclassifies it among compacts or treaties between "men, bodies of men, orcountries. " Writing to Count Rochambeau, on January 8, 1788, he saysthat the proposed Constitution "is to be submitted to conventions chosenby _the people in the several States_, and by them approved orrejected"--showing what _he_ understood by "the people of the UnitedStates, " who were to ordain and establish it. These same people--thatis, "the people of the several States"--he says, in a letter toLafayette, April 28, 1788, "retain everything they do not, by expressterms, give up. " In a letter written to Benjamin Lincoln, October 26, 1788, he refers to the expectation that North Carolina will accede tothe Union, and adds, "Whoever shall be found to enjoy the confidence of_the States_ so far as to be elected Vice-President, " etc. --showing thatin the "confederated Government, " as he termed it, the States were stillto act independently, even in the selection of officers of the GeneralGovernment. He wrote to General Knox, June 17, 1788, "I can not but hopethat the States which may be disposed to make a secession will thinkoften and seriously on the consequences. " June 28, 1788, he wrote toGeneral Pinckney that New Hampshire "had acceded to the newConfederacy, " and, in reference to North Carolina, "I should beastonished if that State should withdraw from the Union. "

I shall add but two other citations. They are from speeches of JohnMarshall, afterward the most distinguished Chief Justice of the UnitedStates--who has certainly never been regarded as holding high views ofState rights--in the Virginia Convention of 1788. In the first case, hewas speaking of the power of the States over the militia, and is thusreported:

 "The State governments did not derive their powers from the General Government; but each government derived its powers from the people, and each was to act according to the powers given it. Would any gentleman deny this?... Could any man say that this power was not retained by the States, as they had not given it away? For (says he) does not a power remain till it is given away? The State Legislatures had power to command and govern their militia before, and have it still, undeniably, unless there be something in this Constitution that takes it away.... 

 "He concluded by observing that the power of governing the militia was not vested in the States by implication, because, being possessed of it antecedently to the adoption of the Government, and not being divested of it by any grant or restriction in the Constitution, they must necessarily be as fully possessed of it as ever they had been, and it could not be said that the States derived any powers from that system, but retained them, though not acknowledged in any part of it. "[85]

In the other case, the special subject was the power of the Federaljudiciary. Mr. Marshall said, with regard to this: "I hope that nogentleman will think that a State can be called at the bar of theFederal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not manycases, in which the Legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet theState is not sued? Is it rational to suppose that the sovereign powershall be dragged before a court?"[86]

Authorities to the same effect might be multiplied indefinitely byquotation from nearly all the most eminent statesmen and patriots ofthat brilliant period. My limits, however, permit me only to refer thosein quest of more exhaustive information to the original records, or tothe "Republic of Republics, " in which will be found a most valuablecollection and condensation of the teaching of the fathers on thesubject. There was no dissent, at that period, from the interpretationof the Constitution which I have set forth, as given by its authors, except in the objections made by its adversaries. Those objections wererefuted and silenced, until revived, long afterward, and presented asthe true interpretation, by the school of which Judge Story was the mosteffective founder. 

At an earlier period--but when he had already served for several yearsin Congress, and had attained the full maturity of his powers--Mr. Webster held the views which were presented in a memorial to Congress ofcitizens of Boston, December 15, 1819, relative to the admission ofMissouri, drawn up and signed by a committee of which he was chairman, and which also included among its members Mr. Josiah Quincy. He speaksof the States as enjoying "_the exclusive possession of sovereignty_"over their own territory, calls the United States "the AmericanConfederacy, " and says, "The only _parties to the Constitution_, contemplated by it originally, were the _thirteen confederated States_. "And again: "As between the original States, the representation rests on_compact and plighted faith_; and your memorialists have no wish thatthat compact should be disturbed, or that plighted faith in theslightest degree violated. "

It is satisfactory to know that in the closing year of his life, whenlooking retrospectively, with judgment undisturbed by any extraneousinfluence, he uttered views of the Government which must stand the testof severest scrutiny and defy the storms of agitation, for they arefounded on the rock of truth. In letters written and addresses deliveredduring the Administration of Mr. Fillmore, he repeatedly applies to theConstitution the term "compact, " which, in 1833, he had so vehementlyrepudiated. In his speech at Capon Springs, Virginia, in 1851, he says:

 "If the South were to violate any part of the Constitution intentionally and systematically, and persist in so doing year after year, and no remedy could be had, would the North be any longer bound by the rest of it? And if the North were, deliberately, habitually, and of fixed purpose, to disregard one part of it, would the South be bound any longer to observe its other obligations?... 

 "How absurd it is to suppose that, when different parties enter into a compact for certain purposes, either can disregard any one provision, and expect, nevertheless, the other to observe the rest!... 

 "I have not hesitated to say, and I repeat, that, if the Northern States refuse, willfully and deliberately, to carry into effect that part of the Constitution which respects the restoration of fugitive slaves, and Congress provide no remedy, the South would no longer be bound to observe the compact. A bargain can not be broken on one side, and still bind the other side. "[87]

The principles which have been set forth in the foregoing chapters, although they had come to be considered as peculiarly Southern, were notsectional in their origin. In the beginning and earlier years of ourhistory they were cherished as faithfully and guarded as jealously inMassachusetts and New Hampshire as in Virginia or South Carolina. It wasin these principles that I was nurtured. I have frankly proclaimed themduring my whole life, always contending in the Senate of the UnitedStates against what I believed to be the mistaken construction of theConstitution taught by Mr. Webster and his adherents. While I honoredthe genius of that great man, and held friendly personal relations withhim, I considered his doctrines on these points--or rather the doctrinesadvocated by him during the most conspicuous and influential portions ofhis public career--to be mischievous, and the more dangerous to thewelfare of the country and the liberties of mankind on account of thesignal ability and magnificent eloquence with which they were argued. 

[Footnote 80: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. I, p. 239; "Madison Papers, " pp. 1119-1124. ]

[Footnote 81: "Madison Papers, " p. 1184. ]

[Footnote 82: "Federalist, " No. Lxxxi. ]

[Footnote 83: "Federalist, " No. Lxxxiv. ]

[Footnote 84: Ibid. , No. Lxxxv. ]

[Footnote 85: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. Iii, pp. 389-391. ]

[Footnote 86: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. Iii, p. 503. ]

[Footnote 87: Curtis's "Life of Webster, " chap. Xxxvii, vol. Ii, pp. 518, 519. ]

CHAPTER XI. 

 The Right of Secession. --The Law of Unlimited Partnerships. --The "Perpetual Union" of the Articles of Confederation and the "More Perfect Union" of the Constitution. --The Important Powers conferred upon the Federal Government and the Fundamental Principles of the Compact the same in both Systems. --The Right to resume Grants, when failing to fulfill their Purposes, expressly and distinctly asserted in the Adoption of the Constitution. 

The Right of Secession--that subject which, beyond all others, ignorance, prejudice, and political rancor have combined to cloud withmisstatements and misapprehensions--is a question easily to bedetermined in the light of what has already been established with regardto the history and principles of the Constitution. It is not somethingstanding apart by itself--a factious creation, outside of andantagonistic to the Constitution--as might be imagined by one derivinghis ideas from the political literature most current of late years. Sofar from being against the Constitution or incompatible with it, wecontend that, if the right to secede is not prohibited to the States, and no power to prevent it expressly delegated to the United States, itremains as reserved to the States or the people, from whom all thepowers of the General Government were derived. 

The compact between the States which formed the Union was in the natureof a partnership between individuals without limitation of time, and therecognized law of such partnerships is thus stated by an eminent lawyerof Massachusetts in a work intended for popular use:

 "If the articles between the partners do not contain an agreement that the partnership shall continue for a specified time, it may be dissolved at the pleasure of either partner. But no partner can exercise this power wantonly and injuriously to the other partners, without making himself responsible for the damage he thus causes. If there be a provision that the partnership shall continue a certain time, this is binding. "[88]

We have seen that a number of "sovereign, free, and independent" States, during the war of the Revolution, entered into a partnership with oneanother, which was not only unlimited in duration, but expresslydeclared to be a "perpetual union. " Yet, when that Union failed toaccomplish the purposes for which it was formed, the parties withdrew, separately and independently, one after another, without any questionmade of their right to do so, and formed a new association. One of thedeclared objects of this new partnership was to form "a more perfectunion. " This certainly did not mean more perfect in respect of duration;for the former union had been declared perpetual, and perpetuity admitsof no addition. It did not mean that it was to be more indissoluble; forthe delegates of the States, in ratifying the former compact of union, had expressed themselves in terms that could scarcely be made morestringent. They then said:

 "And we do further _solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents_, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which, by the said confederation, are submitted to them; and that the articles thereof shall be _inviolably observed_ by the States we respectively represent; and that _the Union shall be perpetual_. "[89]

The formation of a "more perfect union" was accomplished by theorganization of a government more complete in its various branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, and by the delegation to thisGovernment of certain additional powers or functions which hadpreviously been exercised by the Governments of the respectiveStates--especially in providing the means of operating directly uponindividuals for the enforcement of its legitimately delegated authority. There was no abandonment nor modification of the essential principle ofa _compact_ between sovereigns, which applied to the one case as fullyas to the other. There was not the slightest intimation of so radical arevolution as the surrender of the sovereignty of the contractingparties would have been. The additional powers conferred upon theFederal Government by the Constitution were merely transfers of some ofthose possessed by the State governments--not subtractions from thereserved and inalienable sovereignty of the political communities whichconferred them. It was merely the institution of a new agent who, however enlarged his powers might be, would still remain subordinate andresponsible to the source from which they were derived--that of thesovereign people of each State. It was an amended Union, not aconsolidation. 

It is a remarkable fact that the very powers of the Federal Governmentand prohibitions to the States, which are most relied upon by theadvocates of centralism as incompatible with State sovereignty, were inforce under the old Confederation when the sovereignty of the States wasexpressly recognized. The General Government had then, as now, theexclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, makingtreaties and alliances, maintaining an army and navy, granting lettersof marque and reprisal, regulating coinage, establishing and controllingthe postal service--indeed, nearly all the so-called "characteristicpowers of sovereignty" exercised by the Federal Government under theexisting Constitution, except the regulation of commerce, and of levyingand collecting its revenues directly, instead of through theinterposition of the State authorities. The exercise of thesefirst-named powers was prohibited to the States under the old compact, "without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, " but noone has claimed that the Confederation had thereby acquired sovereignty. 

Entirely in accord with these truths are the arguments of Mr. Madison inthe "Federalist, " to show that the great principles of the Constitutionare substantially the same as those of the Articles of Confederation. Hesays:

 "I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They _are_ so regarded by the Constitution proposed.... Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the General Government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that, in the new Government as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. "

"The truth is, " he adds, "that the great principles of the Constitutionproposed by the Convention may be considered _less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles ofConfederation_. "[90]

In the papers immediately following, he establishes this position indetail by an analysis of the principal powers delegated to the FederalGovernment, showing that the spirit of the original instructions to theConvention had been followed in revising "the Federal Constitution" andrendering it "adequate to the exigencies of government and thepreservation of the Union. "[91]

The present Union owes its very existence to the dissolution, byseparate secession of its members, of the former Union, which, as wehave thus seen, as to its _organic principles_, rested upon preciselythe same foundation. The right to withdraw from the association results, in either case, from the same principles--principles which, I think, have been established on an impregnable basis of history, reason, law, and precedent. 

It is not contended that this right should be resorted to forinsufficient cause, or, as the writer already quoted on the law ofpartnership says, "wantonly and injuriously to the other partners, "without responsibility of the seceding party for any damage thus done. No association can be dissolved without a likelihood of the occurrenceof incidental questions concerning common property and mutualobligations--questions sometimes of a complex and intricate sort. If awrong be perpetrated, in such case, it is a matter for determination bythe means usually employed among independent and sovereignpowers--negotiation, arbitration, or, in the failure of these, by war, with which, unfortunately, Christianity and civilization have not yetbeen able entirely to dispense. But the suggestion of possible evilsdoes not at all affect the question of right. There is no greatprinciple in the affairs either of individuals or of nations that is notliable to such difficulties in its practical application. 

But, we are told, there is no mention made of secession in theConstitution. Mr. Everett says: "The States are not named in it; theword sovereignty does not occur in it; the right of secession is as muchignored in it as the procession of the equinoxes. " We have seen how veryuntenable is the assertion that the States are not named in it, and howmuch pertinency or significance in the omission of the _word_"sovereignty. " The pertinent question that occurs is, Why was so obviousan attribute of sovereignty not expressly renounced if it was intendedto surrender it? It certainly existed; it was not surrendered; thereforeit still exists. This would be a more natural and rational conclusionthan that it has ceased to exist because it is not mentioned. 

The simple truth is, that it would have been a very extraordinary thingto incorporate into the Constitution any express provision for thesecession of the States and dissolution of the Union. Its foundersundoubtedly desired and hoped that it would be perpetual; against theproposition for power to coerce a State, the argument was that it wouldbe a means, not of preserving, but of destroying, the Union. It was notfor them to make arrangements for its termination--a calamity whichthere was no occasion to provide for in advance. Sufficient for theirday was the evil thereof. It is not usual, either in partnershipsbetween men or in treaties between governments, to make provision for adissolution of the partnership or a termination of the treaty, unlessthere be some special reason for a limitation of time. Indeed, intreaties, the usual formula includes a declaration of their_perpetuity_; but in either case the power of the contracting parties, or of any of them, to dissolve the compact, on terms not damaging to therights of the other parties, is not the less clearly understood. It wasnot necessary in the Constitution to affirm the right of secession, because it was an attribute of sovereignty, and the States had reservedall which they had not delegated. 

The right of the people of the several States to resume the powersdelegated by them to the common agency, was not left without positiveand ample assertion, even at a period when it had never been denied. Theratification of the Constitution by Virginia has already been quoted, inwhich the people of that State, through their Convention, did expressly"declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, _may be resumed bythem_, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury oroppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with themand at their will. "[92]

New York and Rhode Island were no less explicit, both declaring that"the powers of government _may be reassumed by the people_ whenever itshall become necessary to their happiness. "[93]

These expressions are not mere _obiter dicta_, thrown out incidentally, and entitled only to be regarded as an expression of opinion by theirauthors. Even if only such, they would carry great weight as thedeliberately expressed judgment of enlightened contemporaries, but theyare more: they are parts of the very acts or ordinances by which theseStates ratified the Constitution and acceded to the Union, and can notbe detached from them. If they are invalid, the ratification itself wasinvalid, for they are inseparable. By inserting these declarations intheir ordinances, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, formally, officially, and permanently, declared their interpretation of theConstitution as recognizing the right of secession by the resumption oftheir grants. By accepting the ratifications with this declarationincorporated, the other States as formally accepted the principle whichit asserted. 

I am well aware that it has been attempted to construe thesedeclarations concerning the right of _the people_ to reassume theirdelegations of power--especially in the terms employed by Virginia, "people of the United States"--as having reference to the idea of _onepeople_, in mass, or "in the aggregate. " But it can scarcely be possiblethat any candid and intelligent reader, who has carefully considered theevidence already brought to bear on the subject, can need furtherargument to disabuse his mind of that political fiction. The "people ofthe United States, " from whom the powers of the Federal Government were"derived, " _could have been_ no other than the people who ordained andratified the Constitution; and this, it has been shown beyond the powerof denial, was done by the people of _each State_, severally andindependently. No other _people_ were known to the authors of thedeclarations above quoted. Mr. Madison was a leading member of theVirginia Convention, which made that declaration, as well as of thegeneral Convention that drew up the Constitution. We have seen what_his_ idea of "the people of the United States" was--"not the people ascomposing one great body, but the people as composing thirteensovereignties. "[94] Mr. Lee, of Westmoreland ("Light-Horse Harry"), inthe same Convention, answering Mr. Henry's objection to the expression, "We, the people, " said: "It [the Constitution] is now submitted to _thepeople of Virginia_. If we do not adopt it, it will be always null andvoid as to us. Suppose it was found proper for our adoption, andbecoming the government of _the people of Virginia_, by what styleshould it be done? Ought we not to make use of the name of the people?No other style would be proper. "[95] It would certainly be superfluous, after all that has been presented heretofore, to add any furtherevidence of the meaning that was attached to these expressions by theirauthors. "The people of the United States" were in their minds thepeople of Virginia, the people of Massachusetts, and the people of everyother State that should agree to unite. They _could_ have meant onlythat the people of their respective States who had delegated certainpowers to the Federal Government, in ratifying the Constitution and_acceding_ to the Union, reserved to themselves the right, in event ofthe failure of their purposes, to "resume" (or "reassume") those powersby _seceding_ from the same Union. 

Finally, the absurdity of the construction attempted to be put uponthese expressions will be evident from a very brief analysis. If theassertion of the right of reassumption of their powers was meant for theprotection of _the whole people_--the people in mass--the people "in theaggregate"--of a consolidated republic--against whom or what was it toprotect them? By whom were the powers granted to be perverted to theinjury or oppression of the whole people? By themselves or by some ofthe States, all of whom, according to this hypothesis, had beenconsolidated into one? As no danger could have been apprehended fromeither of these, it must have been against the _Government_ of theUnited States that the provision was made; that is to say, the wholepeople of a republic make this declaration against a Governmentestablished by themselves and entirely subject to their own control, under a Constitution which contains provision for its own amendment bythis very same "whole people, " whenever they may think proper! Is it nota libel upon the statesmen of that generation to attribute to theirgrave and solemn declarations a meaning so vapid and absurd?

To those who argue that the grants of the Constitution are fatal to thereservation of sovereignty by the States, the Constitution furnishes aconclusive answer in the amendment which was coeval with the adoption ofthe instrument, and which declares that all powers not delegated to theGovernment of the Union were reserved to the States or to the people. Assovereignty was not delegated by the States, it was necessarilyreserved. It would be superfluous to answer arguments against impliedpowers of the States; none are claimed by implication, because all notdelegated by the States remained with them, and it was only in anabundance of caution that they expressed the right to resume such partsof their unlimited power as was delegated for the purposes enumerated. As there be those who see danger to the perpetuity of the Union in thepossession of such power by the States, and insist that our fathers didnot intend to bind the States together by a compact no better than "arope of sand, " it may be well to examine their position. From what havedangers to the Union arisen? Have they sprang from too great restrictionon the exercise of the granted powers, or from the assumption by theGeneral Government of power claimed by implication? The whole record ofour Union answers, from the latter only. 

Was this tendency to usurpation caused by the presumption of paramountauthority in the General Government, or by the assertion of the right ofa State to resume the powers it had delegated? Reasonably and honestlyit can not be assigned to the latter. Let it be supposed that the "wholepeople" had recognized the right of a State of the Union, peaceably andindependently, to resume the powers which, peaceably and independently, she had delegated to the Federal Government, would not this have beenpotent to restrain the General Government from exercising its functionsto the injury and oppression of such State? To deny that effect would beto suppose that a dominant majority would be willing to drive a Statefrom the Union. Would the admission of the right of a State to resumethe grants it had made, have led to the exercise of that right for lightand trivial causes? Surely the evidence furnished by the nations, bothancient and modern, refutes the supposition. In the language of theDeclaration of Independence, "All experience hath shown that mankind aremore disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to rightthemselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. " Wouldnot real grievances be rendered more tolerable by the consciousness ofpower to remove them; and would not even imaginary wrongs be embitteredby the manifestation of a purpose to make them perpetual? To ask thesequestions is to answer them. 

The wise and brave men who had, at much peril and great sacrifice, secured the independence of the States, were as little disposed tosurrender the sovereignty of the States as they were anxious to organizea General Government with adequate powers to remedy the defects of theConfederation. The Union they formed was not to destroy the States, butto "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. "

[Footnote 88: Parsons, "Rights of a Citizen, " chap. Xx, section 3. ]

[Footnote 89: Ratification appended to Articles of Confederation. (SeeElliott's "Debates, " vol. I, p. 113. )]

[Footnote 90: "Federalist, " No. Xl. ]

[Footnote 91: Ibid. , Nos. Xli-xliv. ]

[Footnote 92: See Elliott's "Debates, " vol. I, p. 360. ]

[Footnote 93: Ibid. , pp. 361, 369. ]

[Footnote 94: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. Iii, p. 114. ]

[Footnote 95: Ibid. , p. 71. ]

CHAPTER XII. 

 Coercion the Alternative to Secession. --Repudiation of it by the Constitution and the Fathers of the Constitutional Era. --Difference between Mr. Webster and Mr. Hamilton. 

The alternative to secession is coercion. That is to say, if no suchright as that of secession exists--if it is forbidden or precluded bythe Constitution--then it is a wrong; and, by a well settled principleof public law, for every wrong there must be a remedy, which in thiscase must be the application of force to the State attempting towithdraw from the Union. 

Early in the session of the Convention which formed the Constitution, itwas proposed to confer upon Congress the power "to call forth the forceof the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its dutyunder the articles thereof. " When this proposition came to beconsidered, Mr. Madison observed that "a union of the States containingsuch an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use offorce against a State would look more like a declaration of war than aninfliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the partyattacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might bebound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render thisrecourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. " Thismotion was adopted _nem. Con. _, and the proposition was never againrevived. [96] Again, on a subsequent occasion, speaking of an appeal toforce, Mr. Madison said: "Was such a remedy eligible? Was itpracticable?... Any government for the United States, formed on thesupposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutionalproceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious asthe government of Congress. "[97] Every proposition looking in any way tothe same or a similar object was promptly rejected by the convention. George Mason, of Virginia, said of such a proposition: "Will not thecitizens of the invaded State assist one another, until they rise as oneman and shake off the Union altogether?"[98]

Oliver Ellsworth, in the ratifying Convention of Connecticut, said:"This Constitution does not attempt to coerce _sovereign bodies, States_, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to suchbodies but that of an armed force. If we should attempt to execute thelaws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent State, it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the samecalamity. "[99]

Mr. Hamilton, in the Convention of New York, said: "To coerce the Statesis one of the maddest projects that was ever devised.... What picturedoes this idea present to our view? A complying State at war with anon-complying State: Congress marching the troops of one State into thebosom of another ... Here is a nation at war with itself. Can anyreasonable man be well disposed toward a government which makes war andcarnage the only means of supporting itself--a government that can existonly by the sword?... But can we believe that one State will ever sufferitself to be used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream--itis impossible. "[100]

Unhappily, our generation has seen that, in the decay of the principlesand feelings which animated the hearts of all patriots in that day, thisthing, like many others then regarded as impossible dreams, has beenonly too feasible, and that States have permitted themselves to be usedas instruments, not merely for the coercion, but for the destruction ofthe freedom and independence of their sister States. 

Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, although the mover of theoriginal proposition to authorize the employment of the forces of theUnion against a delinquent member, which had been so signally defeatedin the Federal Convention, afterward, in the Virginia Convention, madean eloquent protest against the idea of the employment of force againsta State. "What species of military coercion, " said he, "could theGeneral Government adopt for the enforcement of obedience to itsdemands? Either an army sent into the heart of a delinquent State, orblocking up its ports. Have we lived to this, then, that, in order tosuppress and exclude tyranny, it is necessary to render the mostaffectionate friends the most bitter enemies, set the father against theson, and make the brother slay the brother? Is this the happy expedientthat is to preserve liberty? Will it not destroy it? If an army be onceintroduced to force us, if once marched into Virginia, figure toyourselves what the dreadful consequence will be: the most lamentablecivil war must ensue. "[101]

We have seen already how vehemently the idea of even _judicial_ coercionwas repudiated by Hamilton, Marshall, and others. The suggestion of_military_ coercion was uniformly treated, as in the above extracts, with still more abhorrence. No principle was more fully and firmlysettled on the highest authority than that, under our system, therecould be no coercion of a State. 

Mr. Webster, in his elaborate speech of February 16, 1833, arguingthroughout against the sovereignty of the States, and in the course ofhis argument sadly confounding the ideas of the Federal Constitution andthe Federal Government, as he confounds the sovereign people of theStates with the State governments, says: "The States _can not_ omit toappoint Senators and electors. It is not a matter resting in Statediscretion or State pleasure.... No member of a State Legislature canrefuse to proceed, at the proper time, to elect Senators to Congress, orto provide for the choice of electors of President and Vice-President, any more than the members can refuse, when the appointed day arrives, tomeet the members of the other House, to count the votes for thoseofficers and ascertain who are chosen. "[102] This was before theinvention in 1877 of an electoral commission to relieve Congress of itsconstitutional duty to count the vote. Mr. Hamilton, on the contrary, fresh from the work of forming the Constitution, and familiar with itsprinciples and purposes, said: "It is certainly true that the StateLegislatures, by forbearing the appointment of Senators, may destroy thenational Government. "[103]

It is unnecessary to discuss the particular question on which these twogreat authorities are thus directly at issue. I do not contend that theState Legislatures, of their own will, have a right to forego theperformance of any Federal duty imposed upon them by the Constitution. But there is a power beyond and above that of either the Federal orState governments--the power of the people of the State, who ordainedand established the Constitution, as far as it applies to themselves, reserving, as I think has been demonstrated, the right to reassume thegrants of power therein made, when they deem it necessary for theirsafety or welfare to do so. At the behest of this power, it certainlybecomes not only the right, but the duty, of their State Legislature torefrain from any action implying adherence to the Union, or partnership, from which the sovereign has withdrawn. 

[Footnote 96: "Madison Papers, " pp. 732, 761. ]

[Footnote 97: Ibid. , p. 822. ]

[Footnote 98: Ibid. , p. 914. ]

[Footnote 99: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. Ii, p. 199. ]

[Footnote 100: Ibid. , pp. 232, 233. ]

[Footnote 101: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. Iii, p. 117. ]

[Footnote 102: "Congressional Debates, " vol. Ix, Part I, p. 566. ]

[Footnote 103: "Federalist, " No. Lix. ]

CHAPTER XIII. 

 Some Objections considered. --The New States. --Acquired Territory. --Allegiance, false and true. --Difference between Nullification and Secession. --Secession a Peaceable Remedy. --No Appeal to Arms. --Two Conditions noted. 

It would be only adding to a superabundance of testimony to quotefurther from the authors of the Constitution in support of theprinciple, unquestioned in that generation, that the people whogranted--that is to say, of course, the people of the severalStates--might resume their grants. It will require but few words todispose of some superficial objections that have been made to theapplication of this doctrine in a special case. 

It is sometimes said that, whatever weight may attach to principlesfounded on the sovereignty and independence of the original thirteenStates, they can not apply to the States of more recentorigin--constituting now a majority of the members of the Union--becausethese are but the offspring or creatures of the Union, and must ofcourse be subordinate and dependent. 

This objection would scarcely occur to any instructed mind, though itmay possess a certain degree of specious plausibility for the untaught. It is enough to answer that the entire equality of the States, in everyparticular, is a vital condition of their union. Every new member thathas been admitted into the partnership of States came in, as isexpressly declared in the acts for their admission, on a footing ofperfect equality in every respect with the original members. Thisequality is as complete as the equality, before the laws, of the sonwith the father, immediately on the attainment by the former of hislegal majority, without regard to the prior condition of dependence andtutelage. The relations of the original States to one another and to theUnion can not be affected by any subsequent accessions of new members, as the Constitution fixes those relations permanently, and furnishes thenormal standard which is applicable to all. The Boston memorial toCongress, referred to in a foregoing chapter, as prepared by a committeewith Mr. Webster at its head, says that the new States "are universallyconsidered as admitted into the Union upon the same footing as theoriginal States, and as possessing, in respect to the Union, the samerights of _sovereignty, freedom, and independence_, as the otherStates. "

But, with regard to States formed of territory acquired by purchase fromFrance, Spain, and Mexico, it is claimed that, as they were bought bythe United States, they belong to the same, and have no right towithdraw at will from an association the property which had beenpurchased by the other parties. 

Happy would it have been if the equal rights of the people of _all_ theStates to the enjoyment of territory acquired by the common treasurecould have been recognized at the proper time! There would then havebeen no secession and no war. 

As for the sordid claim of ownership of States, on account of the moneyspent for the land which they contain--I can understand the ground of aclaim to some interest in the soil, so long as it continues to be publicproperty, but have yet to learn in what way the United States everbecame purchaser of the _inhabitants_ or of their political rights. 

Any question in regard to property has always been admitted to be matterfor fair and equitable settlement, in case of the withdrawal of a State. 

The treaty by which the Louisiana territory was ceded to the UnitedStates expressly provided that the inhabitants thereof should be"admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of theFederal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States. "[104] In all otheracquisitions of territory the same stipulation is either expressed orimplied. Indeed, the denial of the right would be inconsistent with thecharacter of American political institutions. 

Another objection made to the right of secession is based upon obscure, indefinite, and inconsistent ideas with regard to _allegiance_. Itassumes various shapes, and is therefore somewhat difficult to meet, but, as most frequently presented, may be stated thus: that the citizenowes a double allegiance, or a divided allegiance--partly to his State, partly to the United States: that it is not possible for either of thesepowers to release him from the allegiance due to the other: that theState can no more release him from his obligations to the Union than theUnited States can absolve him from his duties to his State. This is themost moderate way in which the objection is put. The extremecentralizers go further, and claim that allegiance to the Union, or, asthey generally express it, to _the Government_--meaning thereby theFederal Government--is paramount, and the obligation to the State onlysubsidiary--if, indeed, it exists at all. 

This latter view, if the more monstrous, is at least the more consistentof the two, for it does not involve the difficulty of a dividedallegiance, nor the paradoxical position in which the other places thecitizen, in case of a conflict between his State and the other membersof the Union, of being necessarily a rebel against the GeneralGovernment or a traitor to the State of which he is a citizen. 

As to _true_ allegiance, in the light of the principles which have beenestablished, there can be no doubt with regard to it. The primary, paramount allegiance of the citizen is due to the sovereign only. Thatsovereign, under our system, is the people--the people of the State towhich he belongs--the people who constituted the State government whichhe obeys, and which protects him in the enjoyment of his personalrights--the people who alone (as far as he is concerned) ordained andestablished the Federal Constitution and Federal Government--the peoplewho have reserved to themselves sovereignty, which involves the power torevoke all agencies created by them. The obligation to support the Stateor Federal Constitution and the obedience due to either State or FederalGovernment are alike derived from and dependent on the allegiance due tothis sovereign. If the sovereign abolishes the State government andordains and establishes a new one, the obligation of allegiance requireshim to transfer his obedience accordingly. If the sovereign withdrawsfrom association with its confederates in the Union, the allegiance ofthe citizen requires him to follow the sovereign. Any other course isrebellion or treason--words which, in the cant of the day, have been sogrossly misapplied and perverted as to be made worse than unmeaning. Hisrelation to the Union arose from the membership of the State of which hewas a citizen, and ceased whenever his State withdrew from it. He cannot owe obedience--much less allegiance--to an association from whichhis sovereign has separated, and thereby withdrawn him. 

Every officer of both Federal and State governments is required to takean oath to support the Constitution, a compact the binding force ofwhich is based upon the sovereignty of the States--a sovereigntynecessarily carrying with it the principles just stated with regard toallegiance. Every such officer is, therefore, virtually sworn tomaintain and support the sovereignty of all the States. 

Military and naval officers take, in addition, an oath to obey thelawful orders of their superiors. Such an oath has never been understoodto be eternal in its obligations. It is dissolved by the death, dismissal, or resignation of the officer who takes it; and suchresignation is not a mere optional right, but becomes an imperative dutywhen continuance in the service comes to be in conflict with theultimate allegiance due to the sovereignty of the State to which hebelongs. 

A little consideration of these plain and irrefutable truths would showhow utterly unworthy and false are the vulgar taunts which attribute"treason" to those who, in the late secession of the Southern States, were loyal to the only sovereign entitled to their allegiance, and whichstill more absurdly prate of the violation of oaths to support "_theGovernment_, " an oath which nobody ever could have been legally requiredto take, and which must have been ignorantly confounded with theprescribed oath to support the Constitution. 

Nullification and secession are often erroneously treated as if theywere one and the same thing. It is true that both ideas spring from thesovereign right of a State to interpose for the protection of its ownpeople, but they are altogether unlike as to both their extent and thecharacter of the means to be employed. The first was a temporaryexpedient, intended to restrain action until the question at issue couldbe submitted to a convention of the States. It was a remedy which itssupporters sought to apply within the Union; a means to avoid the lastresort--separation. If the application for a convention should fail, orif the State making it should suffer an adverse decision, the advocatesof that remedy have not revealed what they proposed as the nextstep--supposing the infraction of the compact to have been of thatcharacter which, according to Mr. Webster, dissolved it. 

Secession, on the other hand, was the assertion of the inalienable rightof a people to change their government, whenever it ceased to fulfillthe purposes for which it was ordained and established. Under our formof government, and the cardinal principles upon which it was founded, itshould have been a peaceful remedy. The withdrawal of a State from aleague has no revolutionary or insurrectionary characteristic. Thegovernment of the State remains unchanged as to all internal affairs. Itis only its external or confederate relations that are altered. To termthis action of a sovereign a "rebellion, " is a gross abuse of language. So is the flippant phrase which speaks of it as an appeal to the"arbitrament of the sword. " In the late contest, in particular, therewas no appeal by the seceding States to the arbitrament of arms. Therewas on their part no invitation nor provocation to war. They stood in anattitude of self-defense, and were attacked for merely exercising aright guaranteed by the original terms of the compact. They neithertendered nor accepted any challenge to the wager of battle. The man whodefends his house against attack can not with any propriety be said tohave submitted the question of his right to it to the arbitrament ofarms. 

Two moral obligations or restrictions upon a seceding State certainlyexist: in the first place, not to break up the partnership without goodand sufficient cause; and, in the second, to make an equitablesettlement with former associates, and, as far as may be, to avoid theinfliction of loss or damage upon any of them. Neither of theseobligations was violated or neglected by the Southern States in theirsecession. 

[Footnote 104: Ray's "Louisiana Digest, " vol. I, p. 24. ]

CHAPTER XIV. 

 Early Foreshadowings. --Opinions of Mr. Madison and Mr. Rufus King. --Safeguards provided. --Their Failure. --State Interposition. --The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. --Their Endorsement by the People in the Presidential Elections of 1800 and Ensuing Terms. --South Carolina and Mr. Calhoun. --The Compromise of 1833. --Action of Massachusetts in 1843-'45. --Opinions of John Quincy Adams. --Necessity for Secession. 

From the earliest period, it was foreseen by the wisest of our statesmenthat a danger to the perpetuity of the Union would arise from theconflicting interests of different sections, and every effort was madeto secure each of these classes of interests against aggression by theother. As a proof of this, may be cited the following extract from Mr. Madison's report of a speech made by himself in the PhiladelphiaConvention on the 30th of June, 1787:

 "He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of citizens or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defense. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and small States; it lay between the Northern and Southern; and, if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. "[105]

Mr. Rufus King, a distinguished member of the Convention fromMassachusetts, a few days afterward, said, to the same effect: "He wasfully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interestsdid not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great andsmall States, but between the Southern and Eastern. For this reason hehad been ready to yield something, in the proportion of representatives, for the security of the Southern.... He was not averse to giving them astill greater security, but did not see how it could be done. "[106]

The wise men who formed the Constitution were not seeking to bind theStates together by the material power of a majority; nor were they soblind to the influences of passion and interest as to believe that paperbarriers would suffice to restrain a majority actuated by either or bothof these motives. They endeavored, therefore, to prevent the conflictsinevitable from the ascendancy of a sectional or party majority, by sodistributing the powers of government that each interest might hold acheck upon the other. It was believed that the compromises made withregard to representation--securing to each State an equal vote in theSenate, and in the House of Representatives giving the States a weightin proportion to their respective population, estimating the negroes asequivalent to three fifths of the same number of free whites--would havethe effect of giving at an early period a majority in the House ofRepresentatives to the South, while the North would retain theascendancy in the Senate. Thus it was supposed that the two greatsectional interests would be enabled to restrain each other within thelimits of purposes and action beneficial to both. 

The failure of these expectations need not affect our reverence for theintentions of the fathers, or our respect for the means which theydevised to carry them into effect. That they were mistaken, both as tothe maintenance of the balance of sectional power and as to the fidelityand integrity with which the Congress was expected to conform to theletter and spirit of its delegated authority, is perhaps to be ascribedless to lack of prophetic foresight, than to that over-sanguineconfidence which is the weakness of honest minds, and which wasnaturally strengthened by the patriotic and fraternal feelings resultingfrom the great struggle through which they had then but recently passed. They saw, in the sufficiency of the authority delegated to the FederalGovernment and in the fullness of the sovereignty retained by theStates, a system the strict construction of which was so eminentlyadapted to indefinite expansion of the confederacy as to embrace everyvariety of production and consequent diversity of pursuit. Carried outin the spirit in which it was devised, there was in this system noelement of disintegration, but every facility for an enlargement of thecircle of the family of States (or nations), so that it scarcely seemedunreasonable to look forward to a fulfillment of the aspiration of Mr. Hamilton, that it might extend over North America, perhaps over thewhole continent. 

Not at all incompatible with these views and purposes was therecognition of the right of the States to reassume, if occasion shouldrequire it, the powers which they had delegated. On the contrary, themaintenance of this right was the surest guarantee of the perpetuity ofthe Union, and the denial of it sounded the first serious note of itsdissolution. The conservative efficiency of "_State interposition_, " formaintenance of the essential principles of the Union against aggressionor decadence, is one of the most conspicuous features in the debates ofthe various State Conventions by which the Constitution was ratified. Perhaps their ideas of the particular form in which this interpositionwas to be made may have been somewhat indefinite; and left to be reducedto shape by the circumstances when they should arise, but the principleitself was assumed and asserted as fundamental. But for a firm relianceupon it, as a sure resort in case of need, it may safely be said thatthe Union would never have been formed. It would be unjust to the wisdomand sagacity of the framers of the Constitution to suppose that theyentirely relied on paper barriers for the protection of the rights ofminorities. Fresh from the defense of violated charters and faithlessaggression on inalienable rights, it might, _a priori_, be assumed thatthey would require something more potential than mere promises toprotect them from human depravity and human ambition. That they did sois to be found in the debates both of the General and the StateConventions, where State interposition was often declared to be thebulwark against usurpation. 

At an early period in the history of the Federal Government, the Statesof Kentucky and Virginia found reason to reassert this right of Stateinterposition. In the first of the famous resolutions drawn by Mr. Jefferson in 1798, and with some modification adopted by the Legislatureof Kentucky in November of that year, it is declared that, "whensoeverthe General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are_unauthoritative, void, and of no force_; that to this compact eachState acceded as a State, and is an integral party; that thisGovernment, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or finaljudge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that wouldhave made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of itspowers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties havingno common judge, _each party has an equal right to judge for itself, aswell of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress_. "

In the Virginia resolutions, drawn by Mr. Madison, adopted on the 24thof December, 1798, and reaffirmed in 1799, the General Assembly of thatState declares that "it views the powers of the Federal Government asresulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limitedby the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting thatcompact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grantsenumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in dutybound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and formaintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, andliberties, appertaining to them. " Another of the same series ofresolutions denounces the indications of a design "to consolidate theStates by degrees into one sovereignty. "

These, it is true, were only the resolves of two States, and they weredissented from by several other State Legislatures--not so much on theground of opposition to the general principles asserted as on that oftheir being unnecessary in their application to the alien and seditionlaws, which were the immediate occasion of their utterance. Nevertheless, they were the basis of the contest for the Presidency in1800, which resulted in their approval by the people in the triumphantelection of Mr. Jefferson. They became part of the accepted creed of theRepublican, Democratic, State-Rights, or Conservative party, as it hasbeen variously termed at different periods, and as such they wereratified by the people in every Presidential election that took placefor sixty years, with two exceptions. The last victory obtained underthem, and when they were emphasized by adding the construction of themcontained in the report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia Legislature in1799, was at the election of Mr. Buchanan--the last President chosen byvote of a party that could with any propriety be styled "national, " incontradistinction to sectional. 

At a critical and memorable period, that pure spirit, luminousintellect, and devoted adherent of the Constitution, the great statesmanof South Carolina, invoked this remedy of State interposition againstthe Tariff Act of 1828, which was deemed injurious and oppressive to hisState. No purpose was then declared to coerce the State, as such, butmeasures were taken to break the protective shield of her authority andenforce the laws of Congress upon her citizens, by compelling them topay outside of her ports the duties on imports, which the State haddeclared unconstitutional, and had forbidden to be collected in herports. 

There remained at that day enough of the spirit in which the Union hadbeen founded--enough of respect for the sovereignty of States and ofregard for the limitations of the Constitution--to prevent a conflict ofarms. The compromise of 1833 was adopted, which South Carolina agreed toaccept, the principle for which she contended being virtually conceded. 

Meantime there had been no lack, as we have already seen, of assertionsof the sovereign rights of the States from other quarters. Thedeclaration of these rights by the New England States and theirrepresentatives, on the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, on theadmission of the State of that name in 1811-'12, and on the question ofthe annexation of Texas in 1843-'45, have been referred to in anotherplace. Among the resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature, inrelation to the proposed annexation of Texas, adopted in February, 1845, were the following:

 "2. _Resolved_, That there has hitherto been no precedent of the admission of a foreign state or foreign territory into the Union by legislation. And as the powers of legislation, granted in the Constitution of the United States to Congress, do not embrace a case of the admission of a foreign state or foreign territory, by legislation, into the Union, such an act of admission _would have no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts_. 

 "3. _Resolved_, That the power, _never having been granted by the people of Massachusetts_, to admit into the Union States and Territories not within the same when the Constitution was adopted, _remains with the people, and can only be exercised in such way and manner as the people shall hereafter designate and appoint_. "[107]

To these stanch declarations of principles--with regard to which(leaving out of consideration the particular occasion that called themforth) my only doubt would be whether they do not express too decided adoctrine of nullification--may be added the avowal of one of the mostdistinguished sons of Massachusetts, John Quincy Adams, in his discoursebefore the New York Historical Society, in 1839:

 "Nations" (says Mr. Adams) "acknowledge no judge between them upon earth; and their governments, from necessity, must, in their intercourse with each other, decide when the failure of one party to a contract to perform its obligations absolves the other from the reciprocal fulfillment of its own. But this last of earthly powers is not necessary to the freedom or independence of States connected together by the immediate action of the people of whom they consist. To the people alone is there reserved as well the dissolving as the constituent power, and that power can be exercised by them only under the tie of conscience, binding them to the retributive justice of Heaven. 

 "With these qualifications, we may admit the same right as vested in the _people of every State_ in the Union, with reference to the General Government, which was exercised by the people of the united colonies with reference to the supreme head of the British Empire, of which they formed a part; and under these limitations have the people of each State in the Union a right to secede from the confederated Union itself. 

 "Thus stands the RIGHT. But the indissoluble link of union between the people of the several States of this confederated nation is, after all, not in the RIGHT, but in the HEART. If the day should ever come (may Heaven avert it!) when the affections of the people of these States shall be alienated from each other, when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or collision of interests shall fester into hatred, the bonds of political association will not long hold together parties no longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly sympathies; and _far better will it be for the people of the disunited States to part in friendship with each other than to be held together by constraint_. Then will be the time for reverting to the precedents which occurred at the formation and adoption of the Constitution, to form again a _more perfect Union, by dissolving that which could no longer bind_, and to leave the separated parts to be reunited by the law of political gravitation to the center. "

Perhaps it is unfortunate that, in earlier and better times, when theprospect of serious difficulties first arose, a convention of the Stateswas not assembled to consider the relations of the various States andthe Government of the Union. As time rolled on, the General Government, gathering with both hands a mass of undelegated powers, reached thatposition which Mr. Jefferson had pointed out as an intolerable evil--theclaim of a right to judge of the extent of its own authority. Of thosethen participating in public affairs, it was apparently useless to askthat the question should be submitted for decision to the parties to thecompact, under the same conditions as those which controlled theformation and adoption of the Constitution; otherwise, a conventionwould have been utterly fruitless, for at that period, when aggressionfor sectional aggrandizement had made such rapid advances, it canscarcely be doubted that more than a fourth, if not a majority ofStates, would have adhered to that policy which had been manifested foryears in the legislation of many States, as well as in that of theFederal Government. What course would then have remained to the SouthernStates? Nothing, except either to submit to a continuation of what theybelieved and felt to be violations of the compact of union, breaches offaith, injurious and oppressive usurpation, or else to assert thesovereign right to reassume the grants they had made, since those grantshad been perverted from their original and proper purposes. 

Surely the right to resume the powers delegated and to judge of thepropriety and sufficiency of the causes for doing so are alikeinseparable from the possession of sovereignty. Over sovereigns there isno common judge, and between them can be no umpire, except by their ownagreement and consent. The necessity or propriety of exercising theright to withdraw from a confederacy or union must be determined by eachmember for itself. Once determined in favor of withdrawal, all thatremains for consideration is the obligation to see that no wanton damageis done to former associates, and to make such fair settlement of commoninterests as the equity of the case may require. 

[Footnote 105: "Madison Papers, " p. 1006. ]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. , pp. 1057, 1058. ]

[Footnote 107: "Congressional Globe, " vol. Xiv, p. 299. ]

CHAPTER XV. 

 A Bond of Union necessary after the Declaration of Independence. --Articles of Confederation. --The Constitution of the United States. --The Same Principle for obtaining Grants of Power in both. --The Constitution an Instrument enumerating the Powers delegated. --The Power of Amendment merely a Power to amend the Delegated Grants. --A Smaller Power was required for Amendment than for a Grant. --The Power of Amendment is confined to Grants of the Constitution. --Limitations on the Power of Amendment. 

In July, 1776, the Congress of the thirteen united colonies declaredthat "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free andindependent States. " The denial of this asserted right and the attemptedcoercion made it manifest that a bond of union was necessary, for thecommon defense. 

In November of the next year, viz. , 1777, articles of confederation andperpetual union were entered into by the thirteen States under the styleof "The United States of America. " The government instituted was to beadministered by a congress of delegates from the several States, andeach State to have an equal voice in legislation. The Government soformed was to act through and by the States, and, having no power toenforce its requisitions upon the States, embarrassment was earlyrealized in its efforts to provide for the exigencies of war. After thetreaty of peace and recognition of the independence of the States, thedifficulty of raising revenue and regulating commerce was so great as tolead to repeated efforts to obtain from the States additional grants ofpower. Under the Articles of Confederation no amendment of them could bemade except by the unanimous consent of the States, and this it had notbeen found possible to obtain for the powers requisite to the efficientdischarge of the functions intrusted to the Congress. Hence arose theproceedings for a convention to amend the articles of confederation. Theresult was the formation of a new plan of government, entitled "TheConstitution of the United States of America. "

This was submitted to the Congress, in order that, if approved by them, it might be referred to the States for adoption or rejection by theseveral conventions thereof, and, if adopted by nine of the States, itwas to be the compact of union between the States so ratifying the same. 

The new form of government differed in many essential particulars fromthe old one. The delegates, intent on the purpose to give greaterefficiency to the government of the Union, proposed greatly to enlargeits powers, so much so that it was not deemed safe to confide them to asingle body, and they were consequently distributed between threeindependent departments of government, which might be a check upon oneanother. The Constitution did not, like the Articles of Confederation, declare that the States had agreed to a perpetual union, but distinctlyindicated the hope of its perpetuity by the expression in the preambleof the purpose to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and ourposterity. " The circumstances under which the Union of the Constitutionwas formed justified the hope of its perpetuity, but the brief existenceof the Confederation may have been a warning against the renewal of theassertion that the compact should be perpetual. 

A remedy for the embarrassment which had been realized, under theArticles of Confederation, in obtaining amendments to correct anydefects in grants of power, so as to render them effective for thepurpose for which they were given, was provided by its fifth article. Itis here to be specially noted that new grants of power, as asked for bythe Convention, were under the Articles of Confederation only to beobtained from the unanimous assent of the States. Therefore it followedthat two of the States which did not ratify the Constitution were, solong as they retained that attitude, free from its obligations. Thus itis seen that the same principle in regard to obtaining grants ofadditional power for the Federal Government formed the rule for theUnion as it had done for the Confederation; that is, that the consent ofeach and every State was a prerequisite. The apprehension which justlyexisted that several of the States might reject the Constitution, andunder the rule of unanimity defeat it, led to the seventh article of theConstitution, which, provided that the ratification by the conventionsof nine States should be sufficient for the establishment of theConstitution between the States ratifying it, which of coursecontemplated leaving the others, more or less in number, separate anddistinct from the nine States forming a new government. Thus was theUnion to be a voluntary compact, and all the powers of its government tobe derived from the assent of each of its members. 

These powers as proposed by the Constitution were so extensive as tocreate alarm and opposition by some of the most influential men in manyof the States. It is known that the objection of the patriot SamuelAdams was only overcome by an assurance that such an amendment as thetenth would be adopted. Like opposition was by like assurance elsewhereovercome. That article is in these words: "The powers not delegated tothe United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to theStates, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. "

Amendment, however, of the delegated powers was made more easy than ithad been under the Confederation. Ratification by three fourths of theStates was sufficient under the Constitution for the adoption of anamendment to it. As this power of amendment threatens to be the Aaron'srod which will swallow up the rest, I propose to give it specialexamination. What is the Constitution of the United States? The wholebody of the instrument, the history of its formation and adoption, aswell as the tenth amendment, added in an abundance of caution, clearlyshow it to be an instrument enumerating the powers delegated by theStates to the Federal Government, their common agent. It is specificallydeclared that all which was not so delegated was reserved. On this massof reserved powers, those which the States declined to grant, theFederal Government was expressly forbidden to intrude. Of what valuewould this prohibition have been, if three fourths of the States could, without the assent of a particular State, invade the domain which thatState had reserved for its own exclusive use and control?

It has heretofore, I hope, been satisfactorily demonstrated that theStates were sovereigns before they formed the Union, and that they havenever surrendered their sovereignty, but have only intrusted by theircommon agent certain functions of sovereignty to be used for theircommon welfare. 

Among the powers delegated was one to amend the Constitution, which, itis submitted, was merely the power to amend the delegated grants, andthese were obtained by the separate and independent action of each Stateacceding to the Union. When we consider how carefully each clause wasdiscussed in the General Convention, and how closely each wasscrutinized in the conventions of the several States, the conclusion cannot be avoided that all was specified which it was intended to bestow, and not a few of the wisest in that day held that too much power hadbeen conferred. 

Aware of the imperfection of everything devised by man, it was foreseenthat, in the exercise of the functions intrusted to the GeneralGovernment, experience might reveal the necessity of modification--i. E. , amendment--and power was therefore given to amend, in a certain manner, the delegated trusts so as to make them efficient for the purposesdesigned, or to prevent their misconstruction or abuse to the injury oroppression of any of the people. In support of this view I refer to thehistorical fact that the first ten amendments of the Constitution, nearly coeval with it, all refer either to the powers delegated, or aredirected to the greater security of the rights which were guarded byexpress limitations. 

The distinction in the mind of the framers of the Constitution betweenamendment and delegation of power seems to me clearly drawn by the factthat the Constitution itself, which was a proposition to the States togrant enumerated powers, was only to have effect between the ratifyingStates; but the fifth article provided that amendments to theConstitution might be adopted by three fourths of the States, andthereby be valid as part of the Constitution. It thus appears that asmaller power was required for an amendment than for a grant, and thenatural if not necessary conclusion is, that it was because an amendmentmust belong to, and grow out of, a grant previously made. If a so-calledamendment could have been the means of obtaining a new power, is it tobe supposed that those watchful guardians of community independence, forwhich the war of the Revolution had been fought, would have beenreconciled to the adoption of the Constitution, by the declaration thatthe powers not delegated are reserved to the States? Unless the power ofamendment be confined to the grants of the Constitution, there can be nosecurity to the reserved rights of a minority less than a fourth of theStates. I submit that the word "amendment" necessarily implies animprovement upon something which is possessed, and can have no properapplication to that which did not previously exist. 

The apprehension that was felt of this power of amendment by the framersof the Constitution is shown by the restrictions placed upon theexercise of several of the delegated powers. For example: power wasgiven to admit new States, but no new State should be erected within thejurisdiction of any other State, nor be formed by the junction of two ormore States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislaturesof those States; and the power to regulate commerce was limited by theprohibition of an amendment affecting, for a certain time, the migrationor importation of persons whom any of the existing States should thinkproper to admit; and by the very important provision for the protectionof the smaller States and the preservation of their equality in theUnion, that the compact in regard to the membership of the two Houses ofCongress should not be so amended that any "State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. " Theselimitations and prohibitions on the power of amendment all refer toclauses of the Constitution, to things which existed as part of theGeneral Government; they were not needed, and therefore not to be foundin relation to the reserved powers of the States, on which the GeneralGovernment was forbidden to intrude by the ninth article of theamendments. 

In view of the small territory of the New England States, comparativelyto that of the Middle and Southern States, and the probability of thecreation of new States in the large Territory of some of these latter, it might well have been anticipated that in the course of time the NewEngland States would become less than one fourth of the members of theUnion. Nothing is less likely than that the watchful patriots of thatregion would have consented to a form of government which should give toa majority of three fourths of the States the power to deprive them oftheir dearest rights and privileges. Yet to this extremity the new-borntheory of the power of amendment would go. Against this insidiousassault, this wooden horse which it is threatened to introduce into thecitadel of our liberties, I have sought to warn the inheritors of ourfree institutions, and earnestly do invoke the resistance of all truepatriots. 

PART III. 

SECESSION AND CONFEDERATION. 

CHAPTER I. 

 Opening of the New Year. --The People in Advance of their Representatives. --Conciliatory Conduct of Southern Members of Congress. --Sensational Fictions. --Misstatements of the Count of Paris. --Obligations of a Senator. --The Southern Forts and Arsenals. --Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens. --The Alleged "Caucus" and its Resolutions. --Personal Motives and Feelings. --The Presidency not a Desirable Office. --Letter from the Hon. C. C. Clay. 

With the failure of the Senate Committee of Thirteen to come to anyagreement, the last reasonable hope of a pacific settlement ofdifficulties within the Union was extinguished in the minds of thosemost reluctant to abandon the effort. The year 1861 opened, as we haveseen, upon the spectacle of a general belief, among the people of theplanting States, in the necessity of an early secession, as the onlypossible alternative left them. 

It has already been shown that the calmness and deliberation, with whichthe measures requisite for withdrawal were adopted and executed, affordthe best refutation of the charge that they were the result of haste, passion, or precipitation. Still more contrary to truth is theassertion, so often recklessly made and reiterated, that the people ofthe South were led into secession, against their will and their betterjudgment, by a few ambitious and discontented politicians. 

The truth is, that the Southern people were in advance of theirrepresentatives throughout, and that these latter were not agitators orleaders in the popular movement. They were in harmony with its greatprinciples, but their influence, with very few exceptions, was exertedto restrain rather than to accelerate their application, and to allayrather than to stimulate excitement. As sentinels on the outer wall, thepeople had a right to look to them for warning of approaching danger;but, as we have seen, in that last session of the last Congress thatpreceded the disruption, Southern Senators, of the class generallyconsidered extremists, served on a committee of pacification, and stroveearnestly to promote its objects. Failing in this, they still exertedthemselves to prevent the commission of any act that might result inbloodshed. 

Invention has busied itself, to the exhaustion of its resources, in thecreation of imaginary "cabals, " "conspiracies, " and "intrigues, " amongthe Senators and Representatives of the South on duty in Washington atthat time. The idle gossip of the public hotels, the sensational rumorsof the streets, the _canards_ of newspaper correspondents--whatever wasfloating through the atmosphere of that anxious period--however lightlyregarded at the moment by the more intelligent, has since been drawnupon for materials to be used in the construction of what has beenwidely accepted as authentic history. Nothing would seem to be tooabsurd for such uses. Thus, it has been gravely stated that a caucus ofSouthern Senators, held in the early part of January, "resolved toassume to themselves the political power of the South"; that they tookentire control of all political and military operations; that theyissued instructions for the passage of ordinances of secession, and forthe seizure of forts, arsenals, and custom-houses; with much more of thelike groundless fiction. A foreign prince, who served for a time in theFederal Army, and has since undertaken to write a history of "The CivilWar in America"--a history the incomparable blunders of which areredeemed from suspicion of willful misstatement only by the writer'signorance of the subject--speaks of the Southern representatives ashaving "kept their seats in Congress in order to be able to paralyze itsaction, forming, at the same time, a center whence they issueddirections to their friends in the South to complete the dismembermentof the republic. "[108] And again, with reference to the secession ofseveral States, he says that "the word of command issued by _thecommittee at Washington was_ promptly obeyed. "[109]

Statements such as these are a travesty upon history. That therepresentatives of the South held conference with one another and tookcounsel together, as men having common interests and threatened bycommon dangers, is true, and is the full extent of the truth. That theycommunicated to friends at home information of what was passing is to bepresumed, and would have been most obligatory if it had not been thatthe published proceedings rendered such communication needless. But thatany such man, or committee of men, should have undertaken to direct themighty movement then progressing throughout the South, or to control, through the telegraph and the mails, the will and the judgment ofconventions of the people, assembled under the full consciousness of thedignity of that sovereignty which they represented, would have been anextraordinary degree of folly and presumption. 

The absurdity of the statement is further evident from a considerationof the fact that the movements which culminated in the secession of theseveral States began before the meeting of Congress. They were notinaugurated, prosecuted, or controlled by the Senators andRepresentatives in Congress, but by the Governors, Legislatures, andfinally by the delegates of the people in conventions of the respectiveStates. I believe I may fairly claim to have possessed a full share ofthe confidence of the people of the State which I in part represented;and proof has already been furnished to show how little effect my owninfluence could have upon their action, even in the negative capacity ofa brake upon the wheels, by means of which it was hurried on toconsummation. 

As for the imputation of holding our seats as a vantage-ground inplotting for the dismemberment of the Union--in connection with whichthe Count of Paris does me the honor to single out my name for specialmention--it is a charge so dishonorable, if true, to its object--sodisgraceful, if false, to its author--as to be outside of the properlimit of discussion. It is a charge which no accuser ever made in mypresence, though I had in public debate more than once challenged itsassertion and denounced its falsehood. It is enough to say that I alwaysheld, and repeatedly avowed, the principle that a Senator in Congressoccupied the position of an ambassador from the State which herepresented to the Government of the United States, as well as in somesense a member of the Government; and that, in either capacity, it wouldbe dishonorable to use his powers and privileges for the destruction orfor the detriment of the Government to which he was accredited. Actingon this principle, as long as I held a seat in the Senate, my bestefforts were directed to the maintenance of the Constitution, the Unionresulting from it, and to make the General Government an effective agentof the States for its prescribed purpose. As soon as the paramountallegiance due to Mississippi forbade a continuance of these efforts, Iwithdrew from the position. To say that during this period I did nothingsecretly, in conflict with what was done or professed openly, would bemerely to assert my own integrity, which would be worthless to those whomay doubt it, and superfluous to those who believe in it. What has beensaid on the subject for myself, I believe to be also true of my Southernassociates in Congress. 

With regard to the forts, arsenals, etc. , something more remains to besaid. The authorities of the Southern States immediately after, and insome cases a few days before, their actual secession, took possession(in every instance without resistance or bloodshed) of forts, arsenals, custom-houses, and other public property within their respective limits. I do not propose at this time to consider the question of their right todo so; that may be more properly done hereafter. But it may not be outof place briefly to refer to the statement, often made, that the absenceof troops from the military posts in the South, which enabled the Statesso quietly to take such possession, was the result of collusion andprearrangement between the Southern leaders and the Federal Secretary ofWar, John B. Floyd, of Virginia. It is a sufficient answer to thisallegation to state the fact that the absence of troops from theseposts, instead of being exceptional, was, and still is, their ordinarycondition in time of peace. At the very moment when these sentences arebeing written (in 1880), although the army of the United States is twiceas large as in 1860; although four years of internal war and a yetlonger period of subsequent military occupation of the South havehabituated the public to the presence of troops in their midst, to anextent that would formerly have been startling if not offensive;although allegations of continued disaffection on the part of theSouthern people have been persistently reiterated, for partypurposes--yet it is believed that the forts and arsenals in the Statesof the Gulf are in as defenseless a condition, and as liable to quietseizure (if any such purpose existed), as in the beginning of the year1861. Certainly, those within the range of my personal information areoccupied, as they were at that time, only by ordnance-sergeants orfort-keepers. 

There were, however, some exceptions to this general rule--especially inthe defensive works of the harbor of Charleston, the forts at Key Westand the Dry Tortugas, and those protecting the entrance of PensacolaBay. The events which occurred in Charleston Harbor will be moreconveniently noticed hereafter. The island forts near the extremesouthern point of Florida were too isolated and too remote frompopulation to be disturbed at that time; but the situation longmaintained at the mouth of Pensacola Bay affords a signal illustrationof the forbearance and conciliatory spirit that animated Southerncounsels. For a long time, Fort Pickens, on the island of Santa Rosa, atthe entrance to the harbor, was occupied only by a small body of Federalsoldiers and marines--less than one hundred, all told. Immediatelyopposite, and in possession of the other two forts and the adjacentnavy-yard, was a strong force of volunteer troops of Florida and Alabama(which might, on short notice, have been largely increased), ready andanxious to attack and take possession of Fort Pickens. That they couldhave done so is unquestionable, and, if mere considerations of militaryadvantage had been consulted, it would surely have been done. But thelove of peace and the purpose to preserve it, together with a revulsionfrom the thought of engaging in fraternal strife, were more potent thanconsiderations of probable interest. During the anxious period ofuncertainty and apprehension which ensued, the efforts of the SouthernSenators in Washington were employed to dissuade (they could not_command_) from any aggressive movement, however justifiable, that mightlead to collision. These efforts were exerted through written andtelegraphic communications to the Governors of Alabama and Florida, theCommander of the Southern troops, and other influential persons near thescene of operations. The records of the telegraph-office, if preserved, will no doubt show this to be a very moderate statement of thoseefforts. It is believed that by such influence alone a collision wasaverted; and it is certain that its exercise gave great dissatisfactionat the time to some of the ardent advocates of more active measures. Itmay be that _they_ were right, and that we, who counseled delay andforbearance, were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen theultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and theperfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, ouradvice would have been different. 

Certain resolutions, said to have been adopted in a meeting of Senatorsheld on the evening of the 5th of January, [110] have been magnified, bythe representations of artful commentators on the events of the period, into something vastly momentous. 

The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we couldnot longer advise delay, and even that was unimportant under thecircumstances, for three of the States concerned had taken final actionon the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated tothem. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which wehad all become convinced by the experience of the previous month--thatour long-cherished hopes had proved illusory--that further efforts inCongress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained, except that theStates should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges oftheir wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended theformation of a confederacy among the seceding States as early aspossible after their secession--advice the expediency of which couldhardly be questioned, either by friend or foe. As to the "instructions"asked for with regard to the propriety of continuing to hold theirseats, I suppose it must have been caused by some diversity of opinionwhich then and long afterward continued to exist; and the practicalvalue of which must have been confined to Senators of States which didnot actually secede. For myself, I can only say that no advice couldhave prevailed on me to hold a seat in the Senate after receiving noticethat Mississippi had withdrawn from the Union. The best evidence that myassociates thought likewise is the fact that, although no instructionswere given them, they promptly withdrew on the receipt of officialinformation of the withdrawal of the States which they represented. 

It will not be amiss here briefly to state what were my position andfeelings at the period now under consideration, as they have been thesubject of gross and widespread misrepresentation. It is not onlyuntrue, but absurd, to attribute to me motives of personal ambition tobe gratified by a dismemberment of the Union. Much of my life had beenspent in the military and civil service of the United States. Whateverreputation I had acquired was identified with their history; and, iffuture preferment had been the object, it would have led me to cling tothe Union as long as a shred of it should remain. If any, judging afterthe event, should assume that I was allured by the high officesubsequently conferred upon me by the people of the Confederate States, the answer to any such conclusion has been made by others, to whom itwas well known, before the Confederacy was formed, that I had no desireto be its President. When the suggestion was made to me, I expressed adecided objection, and gave reasons of a public and permanent characteragainst being placed in that position. 

Furthermore, I then held the office of United States Senator fromMississippi--one which I preferred to all others. The kindness of thepeople had three times conferred it upon me, and I had no reason to fearthat it would not be given again, as often as desired. So far fromwishing to change this position for any other, I had specially requestedmy friends (some of whom had thought of putting me in nomination for thePresidency of the United States in 1860) not to permit "my name to beused before the Convention for any nomination whatever. "

I had been so near the office for four years, while in the Cabinet ofMr. Pierce, that I saw it from behind the scenes, and it was to me anoffice in no wise desirable. The responsibilities were great; the labor, the vexations, the disappointments, were greater. Those who haveintimately known the official and personal life of our Presidents cannot fail to remember how few have left the office as happy men as whenthey entered it, how darkly the shadows gathered around the setting sun, and how eagerly the multitude would turn to gaze upon another orb justrising to take its place in the political firmament. 

Worn by incessant fatigue, broken in fortune, debarred by publicopinion, prejudice, or tradition, from future employment, the wisest andbest who have filled that office have retired to private life, toremember rather the failure of their hopes than the success of theirefforts. He must, indeed, be a self-confident man who could hope to fillthe chair of Washington with satisfaction to himself, with the assuranceof receiving on his retirement the meed awarded by the people to thatgreat man, that he had "lived enough for life and for glory, " or even offeeling that the sacrifice of self had been compensated by the servicerendered to his country. 

The following facts were presented in a letter written several years agoby the Hon. C. C. Clay, of Alabama, who was one of my most intimateassociates in the Senate, with reference to certain misstatements towhich his attention had been called by one of my friends:

 "The import is, that Mr. Davis, disappointed and chagrined at not receiving the nomination of the Democratic party for President of the United States in 1860, took the lead on the assembling of Congress in December, 1860, in a 'conspiracy' of Southern Senators 'which planned the secession of the Southern States from the Union, ' and 'on the night of January 5, 1861, ... Framed the scheme of revolution which was implicitly and promptly followed at the South. ' In other words, that Southern Senators (and, chief among them, Jefferson Davis), then and there, instigated and induced the Southern States to secede. 

 "I am quite sure that Mr. Davis neither expected nor desired the nomination for the Presidency of the United States in 1860. He never evinced any such aspiration, by word or sign, to me--with whom he was, I believe, as intimate and confidential as with any person outside of his own family. On the contrary, he requested the delegation from Mississippi not to permit the use of his name before the Convention. And, after the nomination of both Douglas and Breckinridge, he conferred with them, at the instance of leading Democrats, to persuade them to withdraw, that their friends might unite on some second choice--an office he would never have undertaken, had he sought the nomination or believed he was regarded as an aspirant. 

 "Mr. Davis did not take an active part in planning or hastening secession. I think he only _regretfully_ consented to it, as a political necessity for the preservation of popular and State rights, which were seriously threatened by the triumph of a sectional party who were pledged to make war on them. I know that some leading men, and even Mississippians, thought him too moderate and backward, and found fault with him for not taking a leading part in secession. 

 "No 'plan of secession' or 'scheme of revolution' was, to my knowledge, discussed--certainly none matured--at the caucus, 5th of January, 1861, unless, forsooth, the resolutions appended hereto be so held. They comprise the sum and substance of what was said and done. I never heard that the caucus advised the South 'to accumulate munitions of war, ' or 'to organize and equip an army of one hundred thousand men, ' or determined 'to hold on as long as possible to the Southern seats. ' So far from it, a majority of Southern Senators seemed to think there would be no war; that the dominant party in the North desired separation from the South, and would gladly let their 'erring sisters go in peace. ' I could multiply proofs of such a disposition. As to holding on to their seats, no Southern Legislature advised it, no Southern Senator who favored secession did so but one, and none others wished to do so, I believe. 

 "The 'plan of secession, ' if any, and the purpose of secession, unquestionably, originated, not in Washington City, or with the Senators or Representatives of the South, but among the people of the several States, many months before it was attempted. They followed no leaders at Washington or elsewhere, but acted for themselves, with an independence and unanimity unprecedented in any movement of such magnitude. Before the meeting of the caucus of January 5, 1861, South Carolina had seceded, and Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had taken the initial step of secession, by calling conventions for its accomplishment. Before the election of Lincoln, all the Southern States, excepting one or two, had pledged themselves to separate from the Union upon the triumph of a sectional party in the Presidential election, by acts or resolutions of their Legislatures, resolves of both Democratic and Whig State Conventions, and of primary assemblies of the people--in every way in which they could commit themselves to any future act. Their purpose was proclaimed to the world through the press and telegraph, and criticised in Congress, in the Northern Legislatures, in press and pulpit, and on the hustings, during many months before Congress met in December, 1860. 

 "Over and above all these facts, the reports of the United States Senate show that, prior to the 5th of January, 1861, Southern Senators united with Northern Democratic Senators in an effort to effect pacification and prevent secession, and that Jefferson Davis was one of a committee appointed by the Senate to consider and report such a measure; that it failed because the Northern Republicans opposed everything that looked to peace; that Senator Douglas arraigned them as trying to precipitate secession, referred to Jefferson Davis as one who sought conciliation, and called upon the Republican Senators to tell what they would do, if anything, to restore harmony and prevent disunion. They did not even deign a response. Thus, by their sullen silence, they made confession (without avoidance) of their stubborn purpose to hold up no hand raised to maintain the Union.... "

[Footnote 108: "History of the Civil war, " by the Count of Paris;American translation, vol. I, p. 122. ]

[Footnote 109: Ibid, p. 125. ]

[Footnote 110: Subjoined are the resolutions referred to, adopted by theSenators from Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. Messrs. Toombs, of Georgia, and Sebastian, of Arkansas, are said to have been absent from the meeting:

 "_Resolved_, That, in our opinion, each of the States should, as soon as may be, secede from the Union. 

 "_Resolved_, That provision should be made for a convention to organize a confederacy of the seceding States: the Convention to meet not later than the 15th of February, at the city of Montgomery, in the State of Alabama. 

 "_Resolved_, That, in view of the hostile legislation that is threatened against the seceding States, and which may be consummated before the 4th of March, we ask instructions whether the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date, for the purpose of defeating such legislation. 

 "_Resolved_, That a committee be and are hereby appointed, consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out the objects of this meeting. "]

CHAPTER II. 

 Tenure of Public Property ceded by the States. --Sovereignty and Eminent Domain. --Principles asserted by Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and other States. --The Charleston Forts. --South Carolina sends Commissioners to Washington. --Sudden Movement of Major Anderson. --Correspondence of the Commissioners with the President. --Interviews of the Author with Mr. Buchanan. --Major Anderson. --The Star of the West. --The President's Special Message. --Speech of the Author in the Senate. --Further Proceedings and Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter. --Mr. Buchanan's Rectitude in Purpose and Vacillation in Action. 

The sites of forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other public property ofthe Federal Government were ceded by the States, within whose limitsthey were, subject to the condition, either expressed or implied, thatthey should be used solely and exclusively for the purposes for whichthey were granted. The ultimate ownership of the soil, or eminentdomain, remains with the people of the State in which it lies, by virtueof their sovereignty. Thus, the State of Massachusetts has declaredthat--

 "The sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth extend to all places within the boundaries thereof, subject only to such rights of _concurrent jurisdiction_ as have been or may be granted over any places ceded by the Commonwealth to the United States. "[111]

In the acts of cession of the respective States, the terms andconditions on which the grant is made are expressed in various forms andwith differing degrees of precision. The act of New York, granting theuse of a site for the Brooklyn Navy-Yard, may serve as a specimen. Itcontains this express condition:

 "The United States are to retain such use and jurisdiction, _so long as said tract shall be applied to the defense and safety of the city and port of New York, and no longer_.... But the jurisdiction hereby ceded, and the exemption from taxation herein granted, shall continue in respect to said property, and to each portion thereof, _so long as the same shall remain the property of the United States_, and be used for the purposes aforesaid, _and no longer_. " The cession of the site of the Watervliet Arsenal is made in the same or equivalent terms, except that, instead of "defense and safety of the city and port of New York, " etc. , the language is, "defense and safety _of the said State_, and no longer. "

South Carolina in 1805, by legislative enactment, ceded to the UnitedStates, in Charleston Harbor and on Beaufort River, various forts andfortifications, and sites for the erection of forts, on the followingconditions, viz. :

 "That, if the United States shall not, within three years from the passing of this act, and notification thereof by the Governor of this State to the Executive of the United States, repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein; in such case this grant or cession shall be void and of no effect. "--("Statutes at Large of South Carolina, " vol. V, p. 501. )

It will hardly be contended that the conditions of this grant werefulfilled, and, if it be answered that the State did not demand therestoration of the forts or sites, the answer certainly fails after1860, when the controversy arose, and the unfounded assertion was madethat those forts and sites had been purchased with the money, and weretherefore the property, of the United States. The terms of the cessionsufficiently manifest that they were free-will offerings of such fortsand sites as belonged to the State; and public functionaries were boundto know that, by the United States law of March 20, 1794, it wasprovided "that no purchase shall be made where such lands are theproperty of a State. "--(Act to provide for the defense of certain portsand harbors of the United States. )

The stipulations made by Virginia, in ceding the ground for FortressMonroe and the Rip Raps, on the 1st of March, 1821, are as follows:

 "_An Act ceding to the United States the lands on Old Point Comfort, and the shoal called the Rip Raps. _

 "_Whereas_, It is shown to the present General Assembly that the Government of the United States is solicitous that certain lands at Old Point Comfort, and at the shoal called the Rip Raps, should be, with the right of property and entire jurisdiction thereon, vested in the said United States for the purpose of fortification and other objects of national defense:

 "1. _Be it enacted by the General Assembly_, That it shall be lawful and proper for the Governor of this Commonwealth, by conveyance or deeds in writing under his hand and the seal of the State, to transfer, assign, and make over unto the said United States the right of property and title, as well as all the jurisdiction which this Commonwealth possesses over the lands and shoal at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps:... 

 "2. _And be it further enacted_, That, _should the said United States at any time abandon the said lands and shoal, or appropriate them to any other purposes than those indicated in the preamble to this act, that then, and in that case, the same shall revert to and revest in this Commonwealth_. "[112]

By accepting such grants, under such conditions, the Government of theUnited States assented to their propriety, and the principle that holdsgood in any one case is of course applicable to all others of the samesort, whether expressly asserted in the act of cession or not. Indeed, no express declaration would be necessary to establish a conclusionresulting so directly from the nature of the case, and the settledprinciples of sovereignty and eminent domain. 

A State withdrawing from the Union would necessarily assume the controltheretofore exercised by the General Government over all public defensesand other public property within her limits. It would, however, be butfair and proper that adequate compensation should be made to the othermembers of the partnership, or their common agent, for the value of theworks and for any other advantage obtained by the one party, or lossincurred by the other. Such equitable settlement, the seceding States ofthe South, without exception, as I believe, were desirous to make, andprompt to propose to the Federal authorities. 

On the secession of South Carolina, the condition of the defenses ofCharleston Harbor became a subject of anxiety with all parties. Of thethree forts in or at the entrance of the harbor, two were unoccupied, but the third (Fort Moultrie) was held by a garrison of but little morethan one hundred men--of whom only sixty-three were said to beeffectives--under command of Major Robert Anderson, of the FirstArtillery. 

About twelve days before the secession of South Carolina, therepresentatives in Congress from that State had called on the Presidentto assure him, in anticipation of the secession of the State, that nopurpose was entertained by South Carolina to attack, or in any waymolest, the forts held by the United States in the harbor ofCharleston--at least until opportunity could be had for an amicablesettlement of all questions that might arise with regard to these fortsand other public property--provided that no reënforcements should besent, and the military _status_ should be permitted to remain unchanged. The South Carolinians understood Mr. Buchanan as approving of thissuggestion, although declining to make any formal pledge. 

It appears, nevertheless, from subsequent developments, that both beforeand after the secession of South Carolina preparations were secretlymade for reënforcing Major Anderson, in case it should be deemednecessary by the Government at Washington. [113] On the 11th of Decemberinstructions were communicated to him, from the War Department, of whichthe following is the essential part:

 "You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude, but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps, whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act. "[114]

These instructions were afterward modified--as we are informed by Mr. Buchanan--so as, instead of requiring him to defend himself "to the lastextremity, " to direct him to do so as long as any reasonable hoperemained of saving the fort. [115]

Immediately after the secession of the State, the Convention of SouthCarolina deputed three distinguished citizens of that State--Messrs. Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr--to proceed toWashington, "to treat with the Government of the United States for thedelivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and alsofor an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all otherproperty held by the Government of the United States, as agent of theconfederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; andgenerally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements properto be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and forthe continuance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth and theGovernment at Washington. "

The Commissioners, in the discharge of the duty intrusted to them, arrived in Washington on the 26th of December. Before they couldcommunicate with the President, however--indeed, on the morning aftertheir arrival--they were startled, and the whole country electrified, bythe news that, during the previous night, Major Anderson had "secretlydismantled Fort Moultrie, "[116] spiked his guns, burned hisgun-carriages, and removed his command to Fort Sumter, which occupied amore commanding position in the harbor. This movement changed the wholeaspect of affairs. It was considered by the Government and people ofSouth Carolina as a violation of the implied pledge of a maintenance ofthe _status quo_; the remaining forts and other public property were atonce taken possession of by the State; and the condition of publicfeeling became greatly exacerbated. An interview between the Presidentand the Commissioners was followed by a sharp correspondence, which wasterminated on the 1st of January, 1861, by the return to theCommissioners of their final communication, with an endorsement statingthat it was of such a character that the President declined to receiveit. The negotiations were thus abruptly broken off. This correspondencemay be found in the Appendix. [117]

In the mean time, Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, had resigned hisposition early in December, on the ground of the refusal of thePresident to send reënforcements to Charleston. On the occupation ofFort Sumter by Major Anderson, Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, taking theground that it was virtually a violation of a pledge given or implied bythe Government, had asked that the garrison should be entirely withdrawnfrom the harbor of Charleston, and, on the refusal of the President toconsent to this, had tendered his resignation, which was promptlyaccepted. [118]

This is believed to be a correct outline of the earlier facts withregard to the Charleston forts, and in giving it I have done so, as faras possible, without prejudice, or any expression of opinion upon themotives of the actors. 

The kind relations, both personal and political, which had long existedbetween Mr. Buchanan and myself, had led him, occasionally, during hispresidency, to send for me to confer with him on subjects that causedhim anxiety, and warranted me in sometimes calling upon him to offer myopinion on matters of special interest or importance. Thus it was that Ihad communicated with him freely in regard to the threatening aspect ofevents in the earlier part of the winter of 1860-'61. When he told me ofthe work that had been done, or was doing, at Fort Moultrie--that is, the elevation of its parapet by crowning it with barrels of sand--Ipointed out to him the impolicy as well as inefficiency of the measure. It seemed to me impolitic to make ostensible preparations for defense, when no attack was threatened; and the means adopted were inefficient, because any ordinary field-piece would knock the barrels off theparapet, and thus to render them only hurtful to the defenders. Heinquired whether the expedient had not been successful at Fort Brown, onthe Rio Grande, in the beginning of the Mexican war, and was answeredthat the attack on Fort Brown had been made with small-arms, or at greatdistance. 

After the removal of the garrison to the stronger and safer position ofFort Sumter, I called upon him again to represent, from my knowledge ofthe people and the circumstances of the case, how productive themovement would be of discontent, and how likely to lead to collision. One of the vexed questions of the day was, by what authority thecollector of the port should be appointed, and the rumor was, thatinstructions had been given to the commanding officer at Fort Sumter notto allow vessels to pass, unless under clearance from the United Statescollector. It was easy to understand that, if a vessel were fired uponunder such circumstances, it would be accepted as the beginning ofhostilities--a result which both he and I desired to avert, as thegreatest calamity that could be foreseen or imagined. My opinion was, that the wisest and best course would be to withdraw the garrisonaltogether from the harbor of Charleston. 

The President's objection to this was, that it was his bounden duty topreserve and protect the property of the United States. To this Ireplied, with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I wouldpledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores andmunitions in the fort, and an ordnance-sergeant with a few men left incharge of them, they would not be disturbed. As a further guarantee, Ioffered to obtain from the Governor of South Carolina full assurancethat, in case any marauders or lawless combination of persons shouldattempt to seize or disturb the property, he would send from the citadelof Charleston an adequate guard to protect it and to secure its keepersagainst molestation. 

The President promised me to reflect upon this proposition, and toconfer with his Cabinet upon the propriety of adopting it. All Cabinetconsultations are secret; which is equivalent to saying that I neverknew what occurred in that meeting to which my proposition wassubmitted. The result was not communicated to me, but the events whichfollowed proved that the suggestion was not accepted. 

Major Anderson, who commanded the garrison, had many ties andassociations that bound him to the South. He performed his part like thetrue soldier and man of the finest sense of honor that he was; but thatit was most painful to him to be charged with the duty of holding thefort as a threat to the people of Charleston is a fact known to manyothers as well as to myself. We had been cadets together. He was myfirst acquaintance in that corps, and the friendship then formed wasnever interrupted. We had served together in the summer and autumn of1860, in a commission of inquiry into the discipline, course of studies, and general condition of the United States Military Academy. At theclose of our labors the commission had adjourned, to meet again inWashington about the end of the ensuing November, to examine the reportand revise it for transmission to Congress. Major Anderson's duties inCharleston Harbor hindered him from attending this adjourned meeting ofthe commission, and he wrote to me, its chairman, to explain the causeof his absence. That letter was lost when my library and private paperswere "captured" from my home in Mississippi. If any one has preserved itas a trophy of war, its publication would show how bright was the honor, how broad the patriotism of Major Anderson, and how fully he sympathizedwith me as to the evils which then lowered over the country. 

In comparing the past and the present among the mighty changes whichpassion and sectional hostility have wrought, one is profoundly andpainfully impressed by the extent to which public opinion has driftedfrom the landmarks set up by the sages and patriots who formed theconstitutional Union, and observed by those who administered itsgovernment down to the time when war between the States was inaugurated. Mr. Buchanan, the last President of the old school, would as soon havethought of aiding in the establishment of a monarchy among us as ofaccepting the doctrine of coercing the States into submission to thewill of a majority, in mass, of the people of the United States. Whendiscussing the question of withdrawing the troops from the port ofCharleston, he yielded a ready assent to the proposition that thecession of a site for a fort, for purposes of public defense, lapses, whenever that fort should be employed by the grantee against the Stateby which the cession was made, on the familiar principle that any grantfor a specific purpose expires when it ceases to be used for thatpurpose. Whether on this or any other ground, if the garrison of FortSumter had been withdrawn in accordance with the spirit of theConstitution of the United States, from which the power to applycoercion to a State was deliberately and designedly excluded, and ifthis had been distinctly assigned as a reason for its withdrawal, thehonor of the United States Government would have been maintained intact, and nothing could have operated more powerfully to quiet theapprehensions and allay the resentment of the people of South Carolina. The influence which such a measure would have exerted upon the Stateswhich had not yet seceded, but were then contemplating the adoption ofthat extreme remedy, would probably have induced further delay; and themellowing effect of time, with a realization of the dangers to beincurred, might have wrought mutual forbearance--if, indeed, anythingcould have checked the madness then prevailing among the people of theNorthern States in their thirst for power and forgetfulness of theduties of federation. 

It would have been easy to concede this point. The little garrison ofFort Sumter served only as a menace; for it was utterly incapable ofholding the fort if attacked, and the poor attempt soon afterward madeto reënforce and provision it, by such a vessel as the Star of the West, might by the uncharitable be readily construed as a scheme to provokehostilities. Yet, from my knowledge of Mr. Buchanan, I do not hesitateto say that he had no such wish or purpose. His abiding hope was toavert a collision, or at least to postpone it to a period beyond theclose of his official term. The management of the whole affair was whatTalleyrand describes as something worse than a crime--a blunder. Whatever treatment the case demanded, should have been prompt; to waitwas fatuity. 

The ill-advised attempt secretly to throw reënforcements and provisionsinto Fort Sumter, by means of the steamer Star of the West, resulted inthe repulsion of that vessel at the mouth of the harbor, by theauthorities of South Carolina, on the morning of the 9th of January. Onher refusal to heave-to, she was fired upon, and put back to sea, withher recruits and supplies. A telegraphic account of this event washanded me, a few hours afterward, when stepping into my carriage to goto the Senate-chamber. Although I had then, for some time, ceased tovisit the President, yet, under the impulse of this renewed note ofdanger to the country, I drove immediately to the Executive mansion, andfor the last time appealed to him to take such prompt measures as wereevidently necessary to avert the impending calamity. The result was evenmore unsatisfactory than that of former efforts had been. 

On the same day the special message of the President on the state of theUnion, dated the day previous (8th of January), was submitted toCongress. This message was accompanied by the _first_ letter of theSouth Carolina Commissioners to the President, with his answer, but ofcourse _not_ by their rejoinder, which he had declined to receive. Mr. Buchanan, in his memoirs, complains that, immediately after the readingof his message, this rejoinder (which he terms an "insulting letter")was presented by me to the Senate, and by that body received and enteredupon its journal. [119] The simple truth is, that, regarding it asessential to a complete understanding of the transaction, and itspublication as a mere act of justice to the Commissioners, I presentedand had it read in the Senate. But its appearance upon the journal aspart of the proceedings, instead of being merely a document introducedas part of my remarks, was the result of a discourteous objection, madeby a so-called "Republican" Senator, to the reading of the document bythe Clerk of the Senate at my request. This will be made manifest by anexamination of the debate and proceedings which ensued. [120] Thediscourtesy recoiled upon its author and supporters, and gave the lettera vantage-ground in respect of prominence which I could not haveforeseen or expected. 

The next day (January 10th) the speech was delivered, the greater partof which may be found in the Appendix[121]--the last that I ever made inthe Senate of the United States, except in taking leave, and by thesentiments of which I am content that my career, both before and since, should be judged. 

The history of Fort Sumter during the remaining period, until theorganization of the Confederate Government, may be found in thecorrespondence given in the Appendix. [122] From this it will be seenthat the authorities of South Carolina still continued to refrain fromany act of aggression or retaliation, under the provocation of thesecret attempt to reënforce the garrison, as they had previously underthat of its nocturnal transfer from one fort to another. 

Another Commissioner (the Hon. I. W. Hayne) was sent to Washington bythe Governor of South Carolina, to effect, if possible, an amicable andpeaceful transfer of the fort, and settlement of all questions relatingto property. This Commissioner remained for nearly a month, endeavoringto accomplish the objects of his mission, but was met only by evasiveand unsatisfactory answers, and eventually returned without havingeffected anything. 

There is one passage in the last letter of Colonel Hayne to thePresident which presents the case of the occupancy of Fort Sumter by theUnited States troops so clearly and forcibly that it may be proper toquote it. He writes as follows:

 "You say that the fort was garrisoned for our protection, and is held for the same purposes for which it has been ever held since its construction. Are you not aware, that to hold, in the territory of a foreign power, a fortress against her will, avowedly for the purpose of protecting her citizens, is perhaps the highest insult which one government can offer to another? But Fort Sumter was never garrisoned at all until South Carolina had dissolved her connection with your Government. This garrison entered it in the night, with every circumstance of secrecy, after spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages and cutting down the flag-staff of an adjacent fort, which was then abandoned. South Carolina had not taken Fort Sumter into her own possession, only because of her misplaced confidence in a Government which deceived her. "

Thus, during the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's Administration, matterswent rapidly from bad to worse. The old statesman, who, with all hisdefects, had long possessed, and was entitled still to retain, theconfidence due to extensive political knowledge and love of his countryin all its parts--who had, in his earlier career, looked steadily to theConstitution, as the mariner looks to the compass, for guidance--retiredto private life at the expiration of his term of office, having effectednothing to allay the storm which had been steadily gathering during hisadministration. 

Timid vacillation was then succeeded by unscrupulous cunning; and, forfutile efforts, without hostile collision, to impose a claim ofauthority upon people who repudiated it, were substituted measures whichcould be sustained only by force. 

[Footnote 111: "Revised Statutes of Massachusetts, " 1836, p. 56. ]

[Footnote 112: See "Revised Statutes of Virginia. "]

[Footnote 113: "Buchanan's Administration, " chap. Ix, p. 165, and chap. Xi, pp. 212-214. ]

[Footnote 114: "Buchanan's Administration, " chap. Ix, p. 166. ]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 116: Ibid. , chap. X, p. 180. ]

[Footnote 117: See Appendix G. ]

[Footnote 118: "Buchanan's Administration, " chap. X, pp. 187, 188. ]

[Footnote 119: "Buchanan's Administration, " chap. X, p. 184. ]

[Footnote 120: See "Congressional Globe, " second session, Thirty-fifthCongress, Part I, p. 284, _et seq. _]

[Footnote 121: See Appendix I. ]

[Footnote 122: Ibid. ]

CHAPTER III. 

 Secession of Mississippi and Other States. --Withdrawal of Senators. --Address of the Author on taking Leave of the Senate. --Answer to Certain Objections. 

Mississippi was the second State to withdraw from the Union, herordinance of secession being adopted on the 9th of January, 1861. Shewas quickly followed by Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, and, in the course of the same month, by Georgia on the 18th, and Louisianaon the 26th. The Conventions of these States (together with that ofSouth Carolina) agreed in designating Montgomery, Alabama, as the place, and the 4th of February as the day, for the assembling of a congress ofthe seceding States, to which each State Convention, acting as thedirect representative of the sovereignty of the people thereof, appointed delegates. 

Telegraphic intelligence of the secession of Mississippi had reachedWashington some considerable time before the fact was officiallycommunicated to me. This official knowledge I considered it proper toawait before taking formal leave of the Senate. My associates fromAlabama and Florida concurred in this view. Accordingly, having receivednotification of the secession of these three States about the same time, on the 21st of January Messrs. Yulee and Mallory, of Florida, Fitzpatrick and Clay, of Alabama, and myself, announced the withdrawalof the States from which we were respectively accredited, and took leaveof the Senate at the same time. 

In the action which she then took, Mississippi certainly had no purposeto levy war against the United States, or any of them. As her Senator, Iendeavored plainly to state her position in the annexed remarksaddressed to the Senate in taking leave of the body:

 "I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are terminated here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I should appear in the Senate to announce that fact to my associates, and I will say but very little more. The occasion does not invite me to go into argument; and my physical condition would not permit me to do so, if it were otherwise; and yet it seems to become me to say something on the part of the State I here represent on an occasion so solemn as this. 

 "It is known to Senators who have served with me here that I have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of State sovereignty, the right of a State to secede from the Union. Therefore, if I had not believed there was justifiable cause, if I had thought that Mississippi was acting without sufficient provocation, or without an existing necessity, I should still, under my theory of the Government, because of my allegiance to the State of which I am a citizen, have been bound by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I do think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled them then that, if the state of things which they apprehended should exist when their Convention met, they should take the action which they have now adopted. 

 "I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine with the advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the Union, and to disregard its constitutional obligations by the nullification of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification and secession, so often confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic principles. Nullification is a remedy which it is sought to apply within the Union, and against the agent of the States. It is only to be justified when the agent has violated his constitutional obligations, and a State, assuming to judge for itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and appeals to the other States of the Union for a decision; but, when the States themselves and when the people of the States have so acted as to convince us that they will not regard our constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, arises the doctrine of secession in its practical application. 

 "A great man who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often been arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union--his determination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other States--that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful, to be within the limits of State power, not to disturb the Union, but only to be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the States for their judgment. 

 "Secession belongs to a different class of remedies. It is to be justified upon the basis that the States are sovereign. There was a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again when a better comprehension of the theory of our Government, and the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent any one from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus may reclaim the grants which it has made to any agent whomsoever. 

 "I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of Mississippi, believing it to be necessary and proper, and should have been bound by their action if my belief had been otherwise; and this brings me to the important point which I wish, on this last occasion, to present to the Senate. It is by this confounding of nullification and secession that the name of a great man whose ashes now mingle with his mother earth has been evoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase, 'to execute the laws, ' was an expression which General Jackson applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States, and upon the people of the United States. They have no relation to any foreign country. It is a perversion of terms--at least, it is a great misapprehension of the case--which cites that expression for application to a State which has withdrawn from the Union. You may make war on a foreign state. If it be the purpose of gentlemen, they may make war against a State which has withdrawn from the Union; but there are no laws of the United States to be executed within the limits of a seceded State. A State, finding herself in the condition in which Mississippi has judged she is--in which her safety requires that she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the Union--surrenders all the benefits (and they are known to be many), deprives herself of the advantages (and they are known to be great), severs all the ties of affection (and they are close and enduring), which have bound her to the Union; and thus divesting herself of every benefit--taking upon herself every burden--she claims to be exempt from any power to execute the laws of the United States within her limits. 

 "I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned before the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue of a fugitive slave in Boston. My opinion then was the same that it is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not influenced in my opinions because the case is my own, I refer to that time and that occasion as containing the opinion which I then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I then said that if Massachusetts--following her purpose through a stated line of conduct--chose to take the last step, which separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but I will say to her, Godspeed, in memory of the kind associations which once existed between her and the other States. 

 "It has been a conviction of pressing necessity--it has been a belief that we are to be deprived in the Union of the rights which our fathers bequeathed to us--which has brought Mississippi to her present decision. She has heard proclaimed the theory that all men are created free and equal, and this made the basis of an attack upon her social institutions; and the sacred Declaration of Independence has been invoked to maintain the position of the equality of the races. That Declaration of Independence is to be construed by the circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The communities were declaring their independence; the people of those communities were asserting that no man was born--to use the language of Mr. Jefferson--booted and spurred, to ride over the rest of mankind; that men were created equal--meaning the men of the political community; that there was no divine right to rule; that no man inherited the right to govern; that there were no classes by which power and place descended to families; but that all stations were equally within the grasp of each member of the body politic. These were the great principles they announced; these were the purposes for which they made their declaration; these were the ends to which their enunciation was directed. They have no reference to the slave; else, how happened it that among the items of arraignment against George III was that he endeavored to do just what the North has been endeavoring of late to do, to stir up insurrection among our slaves? Had the Declaration announced that the negroes were free and equal, how was the prince to be arraigned for raising up insurrection among them? And how was this to be enumerated among the high crimes which caused the colonies to sever their connection with the mother-country? When our Constitution was formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable; for there we find provision made for that very class of persons as property; they were not put upon the footing of equality with white men--not even upon that of paupers and convicts; but, so far as representation was concerned, were discriminated against as a lower caste, only to be represented in the numerical proportion of three fifths. So stands the compact which binds us together. 

 "Then, Senators, we recur to the principles upon which our Government was founded; and when you deny them, and when you deny to us the right to withdraw from a Government which, thus perverted, threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim our independence and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility to others, not to injure any section of the country, not even for our own pecuniary benefit, but from the high and solemn motive of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and which it is our duty to transmit unshorn to our children. 

 "I find in myself perhaps a type of the general feeling of my constituents toward yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward you, Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you, whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to whom I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well; and such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I represent toward those whom you represent. I, therefore, feel that I but express their desire when I say I hope, and they hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we must part. They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring disaster on every portion of the country, and, if you will have it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and thus, putting our trust in God and in our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may. 

 "In the course of my service here, associated at different times with a great variety of Senators, I see now around me some with whom I have served long; there have been points of collision, but, whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here. I carry with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have given which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction has not been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our parting, to offer you my apology for any pain which, in the heat of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence unencumbered by the remembrance of any injury received, and having discharged the duty of making the only reparation in my power for any injury offered. 

 "Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to bid you a final adieu. "

There are some who contend that we should have retainedour seats and "fought for our rights in the Union. " Couldanything be less rational or less consistent than that a Senator, an ambassador from his State, should insist upon representingit in a confederacy from which the State has withdrawn?What was meant by "fighting in the Union" I have neverquite understood. If it be to retain a seat in Congress for thepurpose of crippling the Government and rendering it unable toperform its functions, I can certainly not appreciate the idea ofhonor that sanctions the suggestion. Among the advantagesclaimed for this proposition by its supporters was that of thwartingthe President in the appointment of his Cabinet and otherofficers necessary for the administration of public affairs. Would this have been to maintain the Union formed by theStates? Would such have been the Government which Washingtonrecommended as a remedy for the defects of the originalConfederation, the greatest of which was the paralysis of theaction of the general agent by the opposition or indifference ofthe States? Sad as have been the consequences of the warwhich followed secession--disastrous in its moral, material, andpolitical relations--still we have good cause to feel proud thatthe course of the Southern States has left no blot nor stain uponthe honor and chivalry of their people. 

 "And if our children must obey, They must, but--thinking on our day-- 'Twill less debase them to submit. "

CHAPTER IV. 

 Threats of Arrest. --Departure from Washington. --Indications of Public Anxiety. --"Will there be war?"--Organization of the "Army of Mississippi. "--Lack of Preparations for Defense in the South. --Evidences of the Good Faith and Peaceable Purposes of the Southern People. 

During the interval between the announcement by telegraph of thesecession of Mississippi and the receipt of the official notificationwhich enabled me to withdraw from the Senate, rumors were in circulationof a purpose, on the part of the United States Government, to arrestmembers of Congress preparing to leave Washington on account of thesecession of the States which they represented. This threat receivedlittle attention from those most concerned. Indeed, it was thought thatit might not be an undesirable mode of testing the question of the rightof a State to withdraw from the Union. 

No attempt, however, was made to arrest any of the retiring members;and, after a delay of a few days in necessary preparations, I leftWashington for Mississippi, passing through southwestern Virginia, EastTennessee, a small part of Georgia, and north Alabama. A deep interestin the events which had recently occurred was exhibited by the people ofthese States, and much anxiety was indicated as to the future. Manyyears of agitation had made them familiar with the idea of separation. Nearly two generations had risen to manhood since it had begun to bediscussed as a possible alternative. Few, very few, of the Southernpeople had ever regarded it as a desirable event, or otherwise than as alast resort for escape from evils more intolerable. It was a calamity, which, however threatened, they had still hoped might be averted, orindefinitely postponed, and they had regarded with contempt, rather thananger, the ravings of a party in the North, which denounced theConstitution and the Union, and persistently defamed their brethren ofthe South. 

Now, however, as well in Virginia and Tennessee, neither of which hadyet seceded, as in the more Southern States, which had already takenthat step, the danger so often prophesied was perceived to be at thedoor, and eager inquiries were made as to what would happennext--especially as to the probability of war between the States. 

The course which events were likely to take was shrouded in the greatestuncertainty. In the minds of many there was the not unreasonable hope(which had been expressed by the Commissioner sent from Mississippi toMaryland) that the secession of six Southern States--certainly soon tobe followed by that of others--would so arouse the sober thought andbetter feeling of the Northern people as to compel their representativesto agree to a Convention of the States, and that such guarantees wouldbe given as would secure to the South the domestic tranquillity andequality in the Union which were rights assured under the Federalcompact. There were others, and they the most numerous class, whoconsidered that the separation would be final, but peaceful. For my ownpart, while believing that secession was a right, and properly apeaceable remedy, I had never believed that it would be permitted to bepeaceably exercised. Very few in the South at that time agreed with me, and my answers to queries on the subject were, therefore, as unexpectedas they were unwelcome. 

On my arrival at Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, I found that theConvention of the State had made provision for a State army, and hadappointed me to the command, with the rank of major-general. Fourbrigadier-generals, appointed in like manner by the Convention, wereawaiting my arrival for assignment to duty. After the preparation of thenecessary rules and regulations, the division of the State intodistricts, the apportionment among them of the troops to be raised, andthe appointment of officers of the general staff, as authorized by theordinance of the Convention, such measures as were practicable weretaken to obtain the necessary arms. The State had few serviceableweapons, and no establishment for their manufacture or repair. This fact(which is true of other Southern States as of Mississippi) is a clearproof of the absence of any desire or expectation of war. If the purposeof the Northern States to make war upon us because of secession had beenforeseen, preparation to meet the consequences would have beencontemporaneous with the adoption of a resort to that remedy--a remedythe possibility of which had for many years been contemplated. Had theSouthern States possessed arsenals, and collected in them the requisitesupplies of arms and munitions, such preparation would not only haveplaced them more nearly on an equality with the North in the beginningof the war, but might, perhaps, have been the best conservator of peace. 

Let us, the survivors, however, not fail to do credit to the generouscredulity which could not understand how, in violation of the compact ofUnion, a war could be waged against the States, or why they should beinvaded because their people had deemed it necessary to withdraw from anassociation which had failed to fulfill the ends for which they hadentered into it, and which, having been broken to their injury by theother parties, had ceased to be binding upon them. It is a satisfactionto know that the calamities which have befallen the Southern States werethe result of their credulous reliance on the power of the Constitution, that, if it failed to protect their rights, it would at least suffice toprevent an attempt at coercion, if, in the last resort, they peacefullywithdrew from the Union. 

When, in after times, the passions of the day shall have subsided, andall the evidence shall have been collected and compared, thephilosophical inquirer, who asks why the majority of the strongersection invaded the peaceful homes of their late associates, will beanswered by History: "The lust of empire impelled them to wage againsttheir weaker neighbors a war of subjugation. "

CHAPTER V. 

 Meeting of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States. --Adoption of a Provisional Constitution. --Election of President and Vice-President. --Notification to the Author of his Election. --His Views with Regard to it. --Journey to Montgomery. --Interview with Judge Sharkey. --False Reports of Speeches on the Way. --Inaugural Address. --Editor's Note. 

The congress of delegates from the seceding States convened atMontgomery, Alabama, according to appointment, on the 4th of February, 1861. Their first work was to prepare a provisional Constitution for thenew Confederacy, to be formed of the States which had withdrawn from theUnion, for which the style "Confederate States of America" was adopted. The powers conferred upon them were adequate for the performance of thisduty, the immediate necessity for which was obvious and urgent. ThisConstitution was adopted on the 8th of February, to continue in forcefor one year, unless superseded at an earlier date by a permanentorganization. It is printed in an appendix, and for convenience ofreference the permanent Constitution, adopted several weeks afterward, is exhibited in connection with it, and side by side with theConstitution of the United States, after which it was modeled. [123] Theattention of the reader is invited to these documents and to acomparison of them, although a more particular notice of the permanentConstitution will be more appropriate hereafter. 

On the next day (9th of February) an election was held for the chiefexecutive offices, resulting, as I afterward learned, in my election tothe Presidency, with the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, asVice-President. Mr. Stephens was a delegate from Georgia to thecongress. 

While these events were occurring, having completed the most urgent ofmy duties at the capital of Mississippi, I had gone to my home, Brierfield, in Warren County, and had begun, in the homely butexpressive language of Mr. Clay, "to repair my fences. " While thusengaged, notice was received of my election to the Presidency of theConfederate States, with an urgent request to proceed immediately toMontgomery for inauguration. 

As this had been suggested as a probable event, and what appeared to meadequate precautions had been taken to prevent it, I was surprised, and, still more, disappointed. For reasons which it is not now necessary tostate, I had not believed my self as well suited to the office as someothers. I thought myself better adapted to command in the field; andMississippi had given me the position which I preferred to anyother--the highest rank in her army. It was, therefore, that I afterwardsaid, in an address delivered in the Capitol, before the Legislature ofthe State, with reference to my election to the Presidency of theConfederacy, that the duty to which I was thus called was temporary, andthat I expected soon to be with the Army of Mississippi again. 

While on my way to Montgomery, and waiting in Jackson, Mississippi, forthe railroad train, I met the Hon. William L. Sharkey, who had filledwith great distinction the office of Chief-Justice of the State. He saidhe was looking for me to make an inquiry. He desired to know if it wastrue, as he had just learned, that I believed there _would_ be war. Myopinion was freely given, that there would be war, long and bloody, andthat it behooved every one to put his house in order. He expressed muchsurprise, and said that he had not believed the report attributing thisopinion to me. He asked how I supposed war could result from thepeaceable withdrawal of a sovereign State. The answer was, that it wasnot my opinion that war _should_ be occasioned by the exercise of thatright, but that it _would_ be. 

Judge Sharkey and I had not belonged to the same political party, hebeing a Whig, but we fully agreed with regard to the question of thesovereignty of the States. He had been an advocate of nullification--adoctrine to which I had never assented, and which had at one time beenthe main issue in Mississippi politics. He had presided over thewell-remembered Nashville Convention in 1849, and had possessed muchinfluence in the State, not only as an eminent jurist, but as a citizenwho had grown up with it, and held many offices of honor and trust. 

On my way to Montgomery, brief addresses were made at various places, atwhich there were temporary stoppages of the trains, in response to callsfrom the crowds assembled at such points. Some of these addresses weregrossly misrepresented in sensational reports made by irresponsiblepersons, which were published in Northern newspapers, and were notconsidered worthy of correction under the pressure of the momentousduties then devolving upon me. These false reports, which represented meas invoking war and threatening devastation of the North, have sincebeen adopted by partisan writers as authentic history. It is asufficient answer to these accusations to refer to my farewell addressto the Senate, already given, as reported for the press at the time, and, in connection therewith, to my inaugural address at Montgomery, onassuming the office of President of the Confederate States, on the 18thof February. These two addresses, delivered at an interval of a month, during which no material change of circumstances had occurred, being onebefore and the other after the date of the sensational reports referredto, are sufficient to stamp them as utterly untrue. The inaugural wasdeliberately prepared, and uttered as written, and, in connection withthe farewell speech to the Senate, presents a clear and authenticstatement of the principles and purposes which actuated me on assumingthe duties of the high office to which I had been called. 

 INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 

 "_Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, Friends, and Fellow-Citizens:_

 "Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Magistrate of the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned to me with humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people. Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government to take the place of this, which by its greater moral and physical power will be better able to combat with many difficulties that arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope that the beginning of our career, as a Confederacy, may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the separate existence and independence we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain. 

 "Our present political position has been achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the American idea that governments rest on the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established. The declared purpose of the compact of the Union from which we have withdrawn was to 'establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity'; and when, in the judgment of the sovereign States composing this Confederacy, it has been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that, so far as they are concerned, the Government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined to be 'inalienable. ' Of the time and occasion of its exercise they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct; and He who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we have labored to preserve the Government of our fathers in its spirit. 

 "The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United States, and which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in the Bills of Rights of the States subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the sovereign States here represented have proceeded to form this Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each State its government has remained; so that the rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent through which they communicated with foreign nations is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measure of defense which their honor and security may require. 

 "An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of commodities required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest and that of all those to whom we would sell, and from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of these commodities. There can, however, be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the Northeastern States of the American Union. It must follow, therefore, that mutual interest will invite to good-will and kind offices on both parts. If, however, passion or lust of dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those States, we must prepare to meet the emergency and maintain, by the final arbitrament of the sword, the position which we have assumed among the nations of the earth. 

 "We have entered upon the career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy with our late associates of the Northern States, we have vainly endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause. 

 "As a consequence of our new condition and relations, and with a view to meet anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide for the speedy and efficient organization of branches of the Executive department having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military affairs, and the postal service. For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. But this, as well as other subjects appropriate to our necessities, have doubtless engaged the attention of Congress. 

 "With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in so far as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from sectional conflicts, which have interfered with the pursuit of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that States from which we have recently parted may seek to unite their fortunes to ours under the Government which we have instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision; but beyond this, if I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the whole. When this does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which must and should result in separation. 

 "Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights, and promote our own welfare, the separation by the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check, the cultivation of our fields has progressed as heretofore, and, even should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, and in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of the producer and consumer can only be interrupted by exterior force which would obstruct the transmission of our staples to foreign markets--a course of conduct which would be as unjust, as it would be detrimental, to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad. 

 "Should reason guide the action of the Government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be dictated by even the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but, if the contrary should prove true, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. In the mean time there will remain to us, besides the ordinary means before suggested, the well known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy. 

 "Experience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this which your kindness has conferred, has taught me that toil and care and disappointment are the price of official elevation. You will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate; but you shall not find in me either want of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to me the highest in hope, and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance of the duties required at my hands. 

 "We have changed the constituent parts, but not the system of government. The Constitution framed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning. 

 "Thus instructed as to the true meaning and just interpretation of that instrument, and ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, and that powers delegated are to be strictly construed, I will hope by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the good-will and confidence which welcome my entrance into office. 

 "It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon a people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve animates and actuates the whole; where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in the balance against honor and right and liberty and equality. Obstacles may retard, but they can not long prevent, the progress of a movement sanctified by its justice and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our Fathers to guide and protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which by his blessing they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their posterity. With the continuance of his favor ever gratefully acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, and to prosperity. "

Note, _relative to the Election of President of the Confederate Statesunder the Provisional Constitution, and some Other Subjects referred toin the Foregoing Chapters. _

Statements having been made, seeming to imply that I was a candidate"for the Presidency of the Confederate States; that my election was theresult of a misunderstanding, or of accidental complications"; and alsothat I held "extreme views, " and entertained at that period aninadequate conception of the magnitude of the war probably to be waged, information on the subject has been contributed by several distinguishedmembers of the Provisional Congress, who still survive. From a number oftheir letters which have been published, the annexed extracts are given, parts being omitted which refer to matters not of historical interest. 

From a communication of the Hon. Alexander M. Clayton, of Mississippi, to the Memphis "Appeal" of June 21, 1870:

 "... I was at the time a member of the Provisional Congress from Mississippi. Believing that Mr. Davis was the choice of the South for the position of President, before repairing to Montgomery I addressed him a letter to ascertain if he would accept it. He replied that it was not the place he desired; that, if he could have his choice, he would greatly prefer to be in active service as commander-in-chief of the army, but that he would give himself to the cause in any capacity whatever. That was the only letter of which I have any knowledge that he wrote on the subject, and that was shown to only a very few persons, and only when I was asked if Mr. Davis would accept the presidency.... 

 "There was no electioneering, no management, on the part of any one. Each voter was left to determine for himself in whose hands the destinies of the infant Confederacy should be placed. By a law as fixed as gravitation itself, and as little disturbed by outside influences, the minds of members centered upon Mr. Davis. 

 "After a few days of anxious, intense labor, the Provisional Constitution was framed, and it became necessary to give it vitality by putting some one at the head of the new Government.... 

 "Without any effort on the part of the friends of either [Messrs. Davis or Stephens], the election was made without the slightest dissent. Of the accidental complications referred to, I have not the least knowledge, and always thought that the election of Mr. Davis arose from the spontaneous conviction of his peculiar fitness. I have consulted no one on the subject, and have appended my name only to avoid resting an important fact upon anonymous authority. Very respectfully yours, "

 (Signed) "Alexander M. Clayton. "

From the Hon. J. A. P. Campbell, of Mississippi, now a Justice of theSupreme Court of that State:

 "... If there was a delegate from Mississippi, or any other State, who was opposed to the election of Jefferson Davis as President of the Confederate States, I never heard of the fact. I had the idea that Mr. Davis did not desire to be President, and preferred to be in the military service, but no other man was spoken of for President within my hearing.... 

 "It is within my personal knowledge that the statement of the interview, that Mr. Davis did not have a just appreciation of the serious character of the contest between the seceding States and the Union, is wholly untrue. Mr. Davis, more than any man I ever heard talk on the subject, had a correct apprehension of the consequences of secession and of the magnitude of the war to be waged to coerce the seceding States. While at Montgomery, he expressed the belief that heavy fighting must occur, and that Virginia was to be the chief battle-ground. Years prior to secession, in his address before the Legislature and people of Mississippi, Mr. Davis had earnestly advised extensive preparation for the possible contingency of secession. 

 "After the formation of the Confederate States, he was far in advance of the Constitutional Convention and the Provisional Congress, and, as I believe, of any man in it, in his views of the gravity of the situation and the probable extent and duration of the war, and of the provision which should be made for the defense of the seceding States. Before secession, Mr. Davis thought war would result from it; and, after secession, he expressed the view that the war commenced would be an extensive one. What he may have thought at a later day than the early part of 1862, I do not know; but it is inconceivable that the 'interview' can be correct as to that. 

 "The idea that Mr. Davis was so 'extreme' in his views is a new one. He was extremely conservative on the subject of secession. 

 "The suggestion that Mississippi would have preferred General Toombs or Mr. Cobb for President has no foundation in fact. My opinion is, that no man could have obtained a single vote in the Mississippi delegation against Mr. Davis, who was then, as he is now, the most eminent and popular of all the citizens of Mississippi.... Very respectfully, "

 (Signed) "J. A. P. Campbell. "

From the Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana:

 ".... My recollections of what transpired at the time are very vivid and positive.... 

 "Who should be President, was the absorbing question of the day. It engaged the attention of all present, and elicited many letters from our respective constituencies. The general inclination was strongly in favor of Mr. Davis. In fact, no other name was so prominently or so generally mentioned. The name of Mr. Rhett, of South Carolina, was probably more frequently mentioned than that of any other person, next to Mr. Davis. 

 "The rule adopted at our election was that each State should have one vote, to be delivered in open session, _viva voce_, by one of the delegates as spokesman for his colleagues. The delegates of the different States met in secret session to select their candidate and spokesman. 

 "Of what occurred in these various meetings I can not speak authoritatively as to other States, as their proceedings were considered secret. I can speak positively, however, of what took place at a meeting of the delegates from Louisiana. We, the Louisiana delegates, without hesitation, and unanimously, after a very short session, decided in favor of Mr. Davis. No other name was mentioned; the claims of no one else were considered, or even alluded to. There was not the slightest opposition to Mr. Davis on the part of any of our delegation; certainly none was expressed; all appeared enthusiastic in his favor, and, I have no reason to doubt, felt so. Nor was the feeling induced by any solicitation on the part of Mr. Davis or his friends. Mr. Davis was not in or near Montgomery at the time. He was never heard from on this subject, so far as I knew. He was never announced as a candidate. We were seeking the best man to fill the position, and the conviction at the time, in the minds of a large majority of the delegates, that Mr. Davis was the best qualified, from both his civil and military knowledge and experience, induced many to look upon Mr. Davis as the best selection that could be made. 

 "This conviction, coupled with his well-recognized conservative views--for in no sense did we consider Mr. Davis extreme, either in his views or purposes--was the deciding consideration which controlled the votes of the Louisiana delegation. Of this I have not the least doubt. I remain, respectfully, very truly yours, etc. "

 (Signed) "Duncan F. Kenner. "

From the Hon. James Chesnut, of South Carolina:

 ".... Before leaving home I had made up my mind as to who was the fittest man to be President, and who to be Vice-President; Mr. Davis for the first, and Mr. Stephens for the second. And this was known to all my friends as well as to my colleagues. 

 "Mr. Davis, then conspicuous for ability, had long experience in civil service, was reputed a most successful organizer and administrator of the military department of the United States when he was Secretary of War, and came out of the Mexican war with much _éclat_ as a soldier. Possessing a combination of these high and needful qualities, he was regarded by nearly the whole South as the fittest man for the position. I certainly so regarded him, and did not change my mind on the way to Montgomery.... 

 "Georgia was a great State--great in numbers, comparatively great in wealth, and great in the intellectual gifts and experiences of many of her sons. Conspicuous among them were Stephens, Toombs, and Cobb. In view of these facts, it was thought by all of us expedient--nay, more, positively right and just--that Georgia should have a corresponding weight in the counsels and conduct of the new Government. 

 "Mr. Stephens was also a man of conceded ability, of high character, conservative, devoted to the rights of the States, and known to be a power in his own State; hence all eyes turned to him to fill the second place. 

 "Howell Cobb became President of the Convention, and General Toombs Secretary of State. These two gifted Georgians were called to these respective positions because of their experience, ability, and ardent patriotism.... 

 "Mr. Rhett was a very bold and frank man. So was Colonel Keitt; and they, as always, avowed their opinions and acted upon them with energy. Nevertheless, the vote of the delegation was cast for Mr. Davis.... "

 (Signed) "James Chesnut. "

From the Hon. W. Porcher Miles, of Virginia, formerly of South Carolina, and a member of the Provisional Congress of 1861:

 "Oak Ridge, _January 27, 1880_. 

 ".... To the best of my recollection there was entire unanimity in the South Carolina delegation at Montgomery on the subject of the choice of a President. I think it very likely that Keitt, from his warm personal friendship for Mr. Toombs, may at first have preferred him. I have no recollections of Chesnut's predilections. I think there was no question that Mr. Davis was the choice of our delegation and of the whole people of South Carolina.... I do not think Mr. Rhett ever attempted to influence the course of his colleagues, either in this or in matters generally before the Congress. Nor do I think his personal influence in the delegation was as great as that of some other members of it. If I were to select any one as having a special influence with us, I would consider Mr. Robert Barnwell as the one. His singularly pure and elevated character, entire freedom from all personal ambition or desire for place or position (he declined Mr. Davis's offer of a seat in the Cabinet), as well as his long experience in public life and admirably calm and well-balanced mind, all combined to make his influence with his colleagues very great. But neither could he be said 'to lead' the delegation. He had no desire, and never made any attempt to do so. I think there was no delegation in the Congress, the individual members of which were more independent in coming to their own conclusions of what was right and expedient to be done. There was always the frankest and freest interchange of opinions among them, but every one determined his own course for himself. "

[Footnote 123: See Appendix K. ]

CHAPTER VI. 

 The Confederate Cabinet. 

After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the formation of my Cabinet, that is, the heads of the executive departments authorized by the lawsof the Provisional Congress. The unanimity existing among our peoplemade this a much easier and more agreeable task than where the rivalriesin the party of an executive have to be consulted and accommodated, often at the expense of the highest capacity and fitness. Unencumberedby any other consideration than the public welfare, having no friends toreward or enemies to punish, it resulted that not one of those whoformed my first Cabinet had borne to me the relation of close personalfriendship, or had political claims upon me; indeed, with two of them Ihad no previous acquaintance. 

It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, of South Carolina, should be Secretary of State. I had known him intimately during a tryingperiod of our joint service in the United States Senate, and he had wonalike my esteem and regard. Before making known to him my wish in thisconnection, the delegation of South Carolina, of which he was a member, had resolved to recommend one of their number to be Secretary of theTreasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with characteristic delicacy, declined toaccept my offer to him. 

I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to Mr. Toombs, ofGeorgia, whose knowledge on subjects of finance had particularlyattracted my notice when we served together in the United States Senate. Mr. Barnwell having declined the State Department, and a colleague ofhis, said to be peculiarly qualified for the Treasury Department, havingbeen recommended for it, Mr. Toombs was offered the State Department, for which others believed him to be well qualified. 

Mr. Mallory, of Florida, had been chairman of the Committee on NavalAffairs in the United States Senate, was extensively acquainted with theofficers of the navy, and for a landsman had much knowledge of nauticalaffairs; therefore he was selected for Secretary of the Navy. 

Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, had a very high reputation as a lawyer, andmy acquaintance with him in the Senate had impressed me with thelucidity of his intellect, his systematic habits and capacity for labor. He was therefore invited to the post of Attorney-General. 

Mr. Reagan, of Texas, I had known for a sturdy, honest Representative inthe United States Congress, and his acquaintance with the territoryincluded in the Confederate States was both extensive and accurate. These, together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated him aspeculiarly fit for the office of Postmaster-General. 

Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, had a high reputation for knowledge offinance. He bore an unimpeachable character for integrity and closeattention to duties, and, on the recommendation of the delegation fromSouth Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury, and provedhimself entirely worthy of the trust. 

Mr. Walker, of Alabama, was a distinguished member of the bar of northAlabama, and was eminent among the politicians of that section. He wasearnestly recommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably known to me, and was therefore selected for the War Department. His was the only namepresented from Alabama. 

The executive departments having been organized, my attention was firstdirected to preparation for military defense, for, though I, in commonwith others, desired to have a peaceful separation, and sentcommissioners to the United States Government to effect, if possible, negotiations to that end, I did not hold the common opinion that wewould be allowed to depart in peace, and therefore regarded it as animperative duty to make all possible preparation for the contingency ofwar. 

CHAPTER VII. 

 Early Acts of the Confederate Congress. --Laws of the United States continued in Force. --Officers of Customs and Revenue continued in Office. --Commission to the United States. --Navigation of the Mississippi. --Restrictions on the Coasting-Trade removed. --Appointment of Commissioners to Washington. 

The legislation of the Confederate Congress furnishes the best evidenceof the temper and spirit which prevailed in the organization of theConfederate Government. The very first enactment, made on the 9th ofFebruary, 1861--the day after the adoption of the ProvisionalConstitution--was this:

 "That all the laws of the United States of America in force and in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of November last, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the Confederate States, be and the same are hereby continued in force until altered or repealed by the Congress. "[124]

The next act, adopted on the 14th of February, was one continuing inoffice until the 1st of April next ensuing all officers connected withthe collection of customs and the assistant treasurers intrusted withthe keeping of the moneys arising therefrom, who were engaged in theperformance of such duties within any of the Confederate States, withthe same powers and functions which they had been exercising under theGovernment of the United States. [125]

The Provisional Constitution itself, in the second section of its sixtharticle, had ordained as follows:

 "The Government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for the settlement of all matters between the States forming it and their other late confederates of the United States, in relation to the public property and public debt at the time of their withdrawal from them; these States hereby declaring it to be their wish and earnest desire to adjust everything pertaining to the common property, common liabilities, and common obligations of that Union, upon the principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith. "[126]

In accordance with this requirement of the Constitution, the Congress, on the 15th of February--before my arrival at Montgomery--passed aresolution declaring "that it is the sense of this Congress that acommission of three persons be appointed by the President-elect, asearly as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to theGovernment of the United States of America, for the purpose ofnegotiating friendly relations between that Government and theConfederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questionsof disagreement between the two Governments, upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith. "[127]

Persistent and to a great extent successful efforts were made to inflamethe minds of the people of the Northwestern States by representing tothem that, in consequence of the separation of the States, they wouldlose the free navigation of the Mississippi River. At that early periodin the life of the Confederacy, the intercourse between the North andSouth had been so little interrupted, that the agitators, whose vocationit was to deceive the masses of the people, could not, or should not, have been ignorant that, as early as the 25th of February, 1861, an actwas passed by the Confederate Congress, and approved by the President, "to declare and establish the free navigation of the Mississippi River. "That act began with the announcement that "the peaceful navigation ofthe Mississippi River is hereby declared free to the citizens of any ofthe States upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigabletributaries, " and its provisions secure that freedom for "all ships, boats, or vessels, " with their cargoes, "without any duty or hindrance, except light-money, pilotage, and other like charges. "[128]

By an act approved on the 26th of February, all laws which forbade theemployment in the coasting-trade of vessels not enrolled or licensed, and all laws imposing discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goodsimported in them, were repealed. [129] These acts and all otherindications manifest the well-known wish of the people of theConfederacy to preserve the peace and encourage the most unrestrictedcommerce with all nations, surely not least with their late associates, the Northern States. Thus far, the hope that peace might be maintainedwas predominant; perhaps, the wish was father to the thought that therewould be no war between the States lately united. Indeed, all the lawsenacted during the first session of the Provisional Congress show howconsistent were the purposes and actions of its members with theiroriginal avowal of a desire peacefully to separate from those with whomthey could not live in tranquillity, albeit the Government had beenestablished to promote the common welfare. Under this state of feelingthe Government of the Confederacy was instituted. 

My own views and inclinations, as has already been fully shown, were inentire accord with the disposition manifested by the requirement of theProvisional Constitution and the resolution of the Congress aboverecited, for the appointment of a commission to negotiate friendlyrelations with the United States and an equitable and peaceablesettlement of all questions which would necessarily arise under the newrelations of the States toward one another. Next to the organization ofa Cabinet, that of such a commission was accordingly one of the veryfirst objects of attention. Three discreet, well-informed, anddistinguished citizens were selected as said Commissioners, andaccredited to the President of the Northern States, Mr. Lincoln, to theend that by negotiation all questions between the two Governments mightbe so adjusted as to avoid war, and perpetuate the kind relations whichhad been cemented by the common trials, sacrifices, and glories of thepeople of all the States. If sectional hostility had been engendered bydissimilarity of institutions, and by a mistaken idea of moralresponsibilities, and by irreconcilable creeds--if the family could nolonger live and grow harmoniously together--by patriarchal teachingolder than Christianity, it might have been learned that it was betterto part, to part peaceably, and to continue, from one to another, thegood offices of neighbors who by sacred memories were forbidden ever tobe foes. The nomination of the members of the commission was made on the25th of February--within a week after my inauguration--and confirmed byCongress on the same day. The Commissioners appointed were Messrs. A. B. Roman, of Louisiana; Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia; and John Forsyth, of Alabama. Mr. Roman was an honored citizen, and had been Governor ofhis native State. Mr. Crawford had served with distinction in Congressfor several years. Mr. Forsyth was an influential journalist, and hadbeen Minister to Mexico under appointment of Mr. Pierce near the closeof his term, and continued so under that of Mr. Buchanan. Thesegentlemen, moreover, represented the three great parties which hadineffectually opposed the sectionalism of the so-called "Republicans. "Ex-Governor Roman had been a Whig in former years, and one of the"Constitutional Union, " or Bell-and-Everett, party in the canvass of1860. Mr. Crawford, as a State-rights Democrat, had supported Mr. Breckinridge; and Mr. Forsyth had been a zealous advocate of the claimsof Mr. Douglas. The composition of the commission was therefore such asshould have conciliated the sympathy and coöperation of every element ofconservatism with which they might have occasion to deal. Theircommissions authorized and empowered them, "in the name of theConfederate States, to meet and confer with any person or persons dulyauthorized by the Government of the United States, being furnished withlike power and authority, and with him or them to agree, treat, consult, and negotiate" concerning all matters in which the parties were bothinterested. No secret instructions were given them, for there wasnothing to conceal. The objects of their mission were open and avowed, and its inception and conduct throughout were characterized by franknessand good faith. How this effort was received, how the Commissioners werekept waiting, and, while fair promises were held to the ear, howmilitary preparations were pushed forward for the unconstitutional, criminal purpose of coercing States, let the shameful record of thattransaction attest. 

[Footnote 124: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, ConfederateStates of America, p. 27. ]

[Footnote 125: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, ConfederateStates of America, pp. 27, 28. ]

[Footnote 126: See Provisional Constitution, Appendix K, _in loco_. ]

[Footnote 127: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, ConfederateStates of America, p. 92. ]

[Footnote 128: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, ConfederateStates of America, pp. 36-38. ]

[Footnote 129: Ibid. , p. 38. ]

CHAPTER VIII. 

 The Peace Conference. --Demand for "a Little Bloodletting. "--Plan proposed by the Conference. --Its Contemptuous Reception and Treatment in the United States Congress. --Failure of Last Efforts at Reconciliation and Reunion. --Note. --Speech of General Lane, of Oregon. 

While the events which have just been occupying our attention wereoccurring, the last conspicuous effort was made within the Union to staythe tide of usurpation which was driving the Southern States intosecession. This effort was set on foot by Virginia, the General Assemblyof which State, on the 19th of January, 1861, adopted a preamble andresolutions, deprecating disunion, and inviting all such States as werewilling to unite in an earnest endeavor to avert it by an adjustment ofthe then existing controversies to appoint commissioners to meet inWashington, on the 4th of February, "to consider, and, if practicable, agree upon some suitable adjustment. " Ex-President John Tyler, andMessrs. William C. Rives, John W. Brockenbrugh, George W. Summers, andJames A. Seddon--five of the most distinguished citizens of theState--were appointed to represent Virginia in the proposed conference. If they could agree with the Commissioners of other States upon any planof settlement requiring amendments to the Federal Constitution, theywere instructed to communicate them to Congress, with a view to theirsubmission to the several States for ratification. 

The "border States" in general promptly acceded to this proposition ofVirginia, and others followed, so that in the "Peace Congress, " orconference, which assembled, according to appointment, on the 4th, andadjourned on the 27th of February, twenty-one States were eventuallyrepresented, of which fourteen were Northern, or "non-slaveholding, " andseven slaveholding States. The six States which had already seceded wereof course not of the number represented; nor were Texas and Arkansas, the secession of which, although not consummated, was obviouslyinevitable. Three of the Northwestern States--Michigan, Wisconsin, andMinnesota--and the two Pacific States--Oregon and California--also heldaloof from the conference. In the case of these last two, distance andlack of time perhaps hindered action. With regard to the other three, their reasons for declining to participate in the movement were notofficially assigned, and are therefore only subjects for conjecture. Some remarkable revelations were afterward made, however, with regard tothe action of one of them. It appears, from correspondence read in theSenate on the 27th of February, that the two Senators from Michigan hadat first opposed the participation of that State in the conference, onthe ground that it was, as one of them expressed it, "a step towardobtaining that concession which the imperious slave power so insolentlydemands. "[130]--that is to say, in plain terms, they objected to itbecause it might lead to a compromise and pacification. Finding, however, that most of the other Northern States were represented--someof them by men of moderate and conciliatory temper--that writer hadsubsequently changed his mind, and at a late period of the session ofthe conference recommended the sending of delegations of "true, unflinching men, " who would be "in favor of the Constitution as itis"--that is, who would oppose any amendment proposed in the interestsof harmony and pacification. 

The other Senator exhibits a similar alarm at the prospect of compromiseand a concurrent change of opinion. He urges the sending of"stiff-backed" men, to thwart the threatened success of the friends ofpeace, and concludes with an expression of the humane and patrioticsentiment that "without a little bloodletting" the Union would not be"worth a rush. "[131] With such unworthy levity did these leaders ofsectional strife express their exultation in the prospect of theconflict, which was to drench the land with blood and enshroud thousandsof homes in mourning!

It is needless to follow the course of the deliberations of the PeaceConference. It included among its members many men of distinction andeminent ability, and some of unquestionable patriotism, from every partof the Union. The venerable John Tyler presided, and took an active andardent interest in the efforts made to effect a settlement and avert theimpending disasters. A plan was finally agreed upon by a majority of theStates represented, for certain amendments to the Federal Constitution, which it was hoped might be acceptable to all parties and put an end tofurther contention. In its leading features this plan resembled that ofMr. Crittenden, heretofore spoken of, which was still pending in theSenate, though with some variations, which were regarded as lessfavorable to the South. It was reported immediately to both Houses ofthe United States Congress. In the Senate, Mr. Crittenden promptlyexpressed his willingness to accept it as a substitute for his ownproposition, and eloquently urged its adoption. But the arrogance of asectional majority inflated by recent triumph was too powerful to beallayed by the appeals of patriotism or the counsels of wisdom. The planof the Peace Conference was treated by the majority with thecontemptuous indifference shown to every other movement forconciliation. Its mere consideration was objected to by the extremeradicals, and, although they failed in this, it was defeated on a vote, as were the Crittenden propositions. 

With the failure of these efforts, which occurred on the eve of theinauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and the accession to power of a partyfounded on a basis of sectional aggression, and now thoroughly committedto its prosecution and perpetuation, expired the last hopes ofreconciliation and union. 

Note. --In the course of the debate in the Senate on these gravepropositions, a manly and eloquent speech was made on the 2d of March, 1861, by the Hon. Joseph Lane, a Senator from Oregon, who had been thecandidate of the Democratic State-rights party for the Vice-Presidencyof the United States, in the canvass of 1860. Some passages of thisspeech seem peculiarly appropriate for insertion here. General Lane wasreplying to a speech of Mr. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, afterwardPresident of the United States:

 "Mr. President, the Senator from Tennessee complains of my remarks on his speech. He complains of the tone and temper of what I said. He complains that I replied at all, as I was a Northern Senator. Mr. President, I am a citizen of this Union and a Senator of the United States. My residence is in the North, but I have never seen the day, and I never shall, when I will refuse justice as readily to the South as to the North. I know nothing but my country, the whole country, the Constitution, and the equality of the States--the equal right of every man in the common territory of the whole country; and by that I shall stand. 

 "The Senator complains that I replied at all, as I was a Northern Senator, and a Democrat whom he had supported at the last election for a high office. Now, I was, as I stated at the time, surprised at the Senator's speech, because I understood it to be for coercion, as I think it was understood by almost everybody else, except, as we are now told, by the Senator himself; and I still think it amounted to a coercion speech, notwithstanding the soft and plausible phrases by which he describes it--a speech for the execution of the laws and the protection of the Federal property. Sir, if there is, as I contend, the right of secession, then, whenever a State exercises that right, this Government has no laws in that State to execute, nor has it any property in any such State that can be protected by the power of this Government. In attempting, however, to substitute the smooth phrases 'executing the laws' and 'protecting public property' for coercion, for civil war, we have an important concession: that is, that this Government dare not go before the people with a plain avowal of its real purposes and of their consequences. No, sir; the policy is to inveigle the people of the North into civil war, by masking the design in smooth and ambiguous terms. "--("Congressional Globe, " second session, Thirty-sixth Congress, p. 1347. )

[Footnote 130: See letter of Hon. S. K. Bingham to Governor Blair, ofMichigan, in "Congressional Globe, " second session, Thirty-sixthCongress, Part II, p. 1247. ]

[Footnote 131: See "Congressional Globe, " _ut supra_. As this letter, last referred to, is brief and characteristic of the temper of thetypical so-called Republicans of the period, it may be inserted entire:

 "Washington, _February_ 11, 1861. 

 "My dear Governor: Governor Bingham and myself telegraphed you on Saturday, at the request of Massachusetts and New York, to send delegates to the Peace or Compromise Congress. They admit that we were right, and that they were wrong; that no Republican State should have sent delegates; but they are here, and can not get away; Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and there is danger of Illinois; and now they beg us, for God's sake, to come to their rescue, and save the Republican party from rupture. I hope you will send _stiff-backed_ men, or none. The whole thing was gotten up against my judgment and advice, and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope, as a matter of courtesy to some of our erring brethren, that you will send the delegates. 

 "Truly your friend, "(Signed) Z. Chandler. 

 "His Excellency Austin Blair. "

 "P. S. --Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would be awful. Without a _little bloodletting_, this Union will not, in my estimation, be worth a rush. "

The reader should not fall into the mistake of imagining that the"erring brethren, " toward whom a concession of courtesy is recommendedby the writer of this letter, were the people of the seceding, or evenof the border, States. It is evident from the context that he means thepeople of those so-called "Republican" States which had fallen into theerror of taking part in a plan for peace, which might have averted thebloodletting recommended. ]

CHAPTER IX. 

 Northern Protests against Coercion. --The "New York Tribune, " Albany "Argus, " and "New York Herald. "--Great Public Meeting in New York. --Speeches of Mr. Thayer, ex-Governor Seymour, ex-Chancellor Walworth, and Others. --The Press in February, 1861. --Mr. Lincoln's Inaugural. --The Marvelous Change or Suppression of Conservative Sentiment. --Historic Precedents. 

It is a great mistake, or misstatement of fact, to assume that, at theperiod under consideration, the Southern States stood alone in theassertion of the principles which have been laid down in this work, withregard to the right of secession and the wrong of coercion. Down to theformation of the Confederate Government, the one was distinctlyadmitted, the other still more distinctly disavowed and repudiated, bymany of the leaders of public opinion in the North of bothparties--indeed, any purpose of direct coercion was disclaimed by nearlyall. If presented at all, it was in the delusive and ambiguous guise of"the execution of the laws" and "protection of the public property. "

The "New York Tribune"--the leading organ of the party which triumphedin the election of 1860--had said, soon after the result of thatelection was ascertained, with reference to secession: "We hold, withJefferson, to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolishforms of government that have become oppressive or injurious; and, ifthe cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Unionthan in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secedemay be a revolutionary right, _but it exists nevertheless_; and we donot see how one party can have _a right to do what another party has aright to prevent_. We must ever resist the asserted right of any Stateto remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof: _towithdraw from the Union is quite another matter_. And, whenever aconsiderable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, _we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep her in. We hopenever to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residueby bayonets_. "[132]

The only liberty taken with this extract has been that of presentingcertain parts of it in italics. Nothing that has ever been said by theauthor of this work, in the foregoing chapters, on the floor of theSenate, or elsewhere, more distinctly asserted the right of secession. Nothing that has been quoted from Hamilton, or Madison, or Marshall, orJohn Quincy Adams, more emphatically repudiates the claim of right torestrain or coerce a State in the exercise of its free choice. Nothingthat has been said since the war which followed could furnish a morestriking condemnation of its origin, prosecution, purposes, and results. A comparison of the sentiments above quoted, with the subsequent careerof the party, of which that journal was and long had been the recognizedorgan, would exhibit a striking incongruity and inconsistency. 

The "Tribune" was far from being singular among its Northerncontemporaries in the entertainment of such views, as Mr. Greeley, itschief editor, has shown by many citations in his book, "The AmericanConflict. " The Albany "Argus, " about the same time, said, in languagewhich Mr. Greeley characterizes as "clear and temperate": "We sympathizewith and justify the South as far as this: their rights have beeninvaded to the extreme limit possible within the forms of theConstitution; and, beyond this limit, their feelings have been insultedand their interests and honor assailed by almost every possible form ofdenunciation and invective; and, if we deemed it certain that the real_animus_ of the Republican party could be carried into theadministration of the Federal Government, and become the permanentpolicy of the nation, we should think that all the instincts ofself-preservation and of manhood rightfully impelled them to a resort torevolution and a separation from the Union, and we would applaud themand wish them godspeed in the adoption of such a remedy. "

Again, the same paper said, a day or two afterward: "If South Carolinaor any other State, through a convention of her people, shall formallyseparate herself from the Union, probably both the present and the nextExecutive will simply let her alone and _quietly allow all the functionsof the Federal Government within her limits to be suspended. Any othercourse would be madness_; as it would at once enlist all the SouthernStates in the controversy and plunge the whole country into a civilwar.... As a matter of policy and wisdom, therefore, independent of thequestion of right, we should deem resort to force most disastrous. "

The "New York Herald"--a journal which claimed to be independent of allparty influences--about the same period said: "Each State is organizedas a complete government, holding the purse and wielding the sword, possessing the right to break the tie of the confederation as a nationmight break a treaty, and to repel coercion as a nation might repelinvasion.... Coercion, if it were possible, is out of the question. "

On the 31st of January, 1861--after six States had already seceded--agreat meeting was held in the city of New York, to consider the perilouscondition of the country. At this meeting Mr. James S. Thayer, "anold-line Whig, " made a speech, which was received with great applause. The following extracts from the published report of Mr. Thayer's speechwill show the character of the views which then commanded the cordialapproval of that metropolitan audience:

 "We can at least, in an authoritative way and a practical manner, arrive at the basis of a _peaceable separation_. [Cheers. ] We can at least by discussion enlighten, settle, and concentrate the public sentiment in the State of New York upon this question, and save it from that fearful current, which circuitously but certainly sweeps madly on, through the narrow gorge of 'the enforcement of the laws, ' to the shoreless ocean of civil war! [Cheers. ] Against this, under all circumstances, in every place and form, we must now and at all times oppose a resolute and unfaltering resistance. The public mind will bear the avowal, and let us make it--that, if a revolution of force is to begin, _it shall be inaugurated at home_. And if the incoming Administration shall attempt to carry out the line of policy that has been foreshadowed, we announce that, when the hand of Black Republicanism turns to blood-red, and seeks _from the fragment of the Constitution to construct a scaffolding for coercion--another name for execution_--we will reverse the order of the French Revolution, and save the blood of the people by making those who would inaugurate a reign of terror the first victims of a national guillotine!" [Enthusiastic applause. ]

And again:

 "It is announced that the Republican Administration will enforce the laws against and in all the seceding States. A nice discrimination must be exercised in the performance of this duty. You remember the story of William Tell.... Let an arrow winged by the Federal bow strike the heart of an American citizen, and who can number the avenging darts that will cloud the heavens in the conflict that will ensue? [Prolonged applause. ] What, then, is the duty of the State of New York? What shall we say to our people when we come to meet this state of facts? That the Union must be preserved? But, if that can not be, what then? _Peaceable separation. _ [Applause. ] Painful and humiliating as it is, let us temper it with all we can of love and kindness, so that we may yet be left in a comparatively prosperous condition, in friendly relations with another Confederacy. " [Cheers. ]

At the same meeting ex-Governor Horatio Seymour asked the question--onwhich subsequent events have cast their own commentary--whether"successful coercion by the North is less revolutionary than successfulsecession by the South? Shall we prevent revolution [he added] by beingforemost in over-throwing the principles of our Government, and all thatmakes it valuable to our people and distinguishes it among the nationsof the earth?"

The venerable ex-Chancellor Walworth thus expressed himself:

 "It would be as brutal, in my opinion, to send men to butcher our own brothers of the Southern States as it would be to massacre them in the Northern States. We are told, however, that it is our duty to, and we must, enforce the laws. But why--and what laws are to be enforced? There were laws that were to be enforced in the time of the American Revolution.... Did Lord Chatham go for enforcing those laws? No, he gloried in defense of the liberties of America. He made that memorable declaration in the British Parliament, 'If I were an American citizen, instead of being, as I am, an Englishman, I never would submit to such laws--never, never, never!'" [Prolonged applause. ]

Other distinguished speakers expressed themselves in similarterms--varying somewhat in their estimate of the propriety of thesecession of the Southern States, but all agreeing in emphatic andunqualified reprobation of the idea of coercion. A series ofconciliatory resolutions was adopted, one of which declares that "civilwar will not restore the Union, but will defeat for ever itsreconstruction. "

At a still later period--some time in the month of February--the "FreePress, " a leading paper in Detroit, had the following:

 "If there shall not be a change in the present seeming purpose to yield to no accommodation of the national difficulties, and if troops shall be raised in the North to march against the people of the South, _a fire in the rear will be opened upon such troops_, which will either stop their march altogether or wonderfully accelerate it. "

The "Union, " of Bangor, Maine, spoke no less decidedly to the sameeffect:

 "The difficulties between the North and the South must be compromised, or the separation of the States _shall be peaceable_. If the Republican party refuse to go the full length of the Crittenden amendment--_which is the very least the South can or ought to take_--then, here in Maine, not a Democrat will be found who will raise his arm against his brethren of the South. From one end of the State to the other let the cry of the Democracy be, Compromise or Peaceable Separation!"

That these were not expressions of isolated or exceptional sentiment isevident from the fact that they were copied with approval by otherNorthern journals. 

Mr. Lincoln, when delivering his inaugural address, on the 4th of March, 1861, had not so far lost all respect for the consecrated traditions ofthe founders of the Constitution and for the majesty of the principle ofState sovereignty as openly to enunciate the claim of coercion. Whilearguing against the right to secede, and asserting his intention "tohold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to theGovernment, and collect the duties and imposts, " he says that, "beyondwhat may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, nousing of force against or among the people anywhere, " and appends tothis declaration the following pledge:

 "Where hostility to the United States shall be so great as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object. While the strict legal right may exist of the Government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices. "

These extracts will serve to show that the people of the South were notwithout grounds for cherishing the hope, to which they so fondly clung, that the separation would, indeed, be as peaceable in fact as it was, ontheir part, in purpose; that the conservative and patriotic feelingstill existing in the North would control the elements of sectionalhatred and bloodthirsty fanaticism; and that there would be really "nowar. "

And here the ingenuous reader may very naturally ask, What became of allthis feeling? How was it that, in the course of a few weeks, it haddisappeared like a morning mist? Where was the host of men who haddeclared that an army marching to invade the Southern States shouldfirst pass over their dead bodies? No _new_ question had arisen--nochange in the attitude occupied by the seceding States--no cause forcontroversy not already existing when these utterances were made. Andyet the sentiments which they expressed were so entirely swept away bythe tide of reckless fury which soon afterward impelled an armedinvasion of the South, that (with a few praiseworthy but powerlessexceptions) scarcely a vestige of them was left. Not only were theyobliterated, but seemingly forgotten. 

I leave to others to offer, if they can, an explanation of this strangephenomenon. To the student of human nature, however, it may not seemaltogether without precedent, when he remembers certain other instanceson record of mutations in public sentiment equally sudden andextraordinary. Ten thousand swords that would have leaped from theirscabbards--as the English statesman thought--to avenge even a look ofinsult to a lovely queen, hung idly in their places when she was led tothe scaffold in the midst of the vilest taunts and execrations. The casethat we have been considering was, perhaps, only an illustration of thegeneral truth that, in times of revolutionary excitement, the higher andbetter elements are crushed and silenced by the lower and baser--not somuch on account of their greater extent, as of their greater violence. 

[Footnote 132: "New York Tribune" of November 9, 1860, quoted in "TheAmerican Conflict, " vol. I, chap. Xxiii, p. 359. ]

CHAPTER X. 

 Temper of the Southern People indicated by the Action of the Confederate Congress. --The Permanent Constitution. --Modeled after the Federal Constitution. --Variations and Special Provisions. --Provisions with Regard to Slavery and the Slave-Trade. --A False Assertion refuted. --Excellence of the Constitution. --Admissions of Hostile or Impartial Criticism. 

The conservative temper of the people of the Confederate States wasconspicuously exhibited in the most important product of the earlylabors of their representatives in Congress assembled. The ProvisionalConstitution, although prepared only for temporary use, and necessarilyin some haste, was so well adapted for the purposes which it wasintended to serve, that many thought it would have been wise to continueit in force indefinitely, or at least until the independency of theConfederacy should be assured. The Congress, however, deeming it bestthat the system of Government should emanate from the people, accordingly, on the 11th of March, prepared the permanent Constitution, which was submitted to and ratified by the people of the respectiveStates. 

Of this Constitution--which may be found in an appendix, [133] side byside with the Constitution of the United States--the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, who was one of its authors, very properly says:

 "The whole document utterly negatives the idea, which so many have been active in endeavoring to put in the enduring form of history, that the Convention at Montgomery was nothing but a set of 'conspirators, ' whose object was the overthrow of the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and the erection of a great 'slavery oligarchy, ' instead of the free institutions thereby secured and guaranteed. This work of the Montgomery Convention, with that of the Constitution for a Provisional Government, will ever remain, not only as a monument of the wisdom, forecast, and statesmanship of the men who constituted it, but an everlasting refutation of the charges which have been brought against them. These works together show clearly that their only leading object was to sustain, uphold, and perpetuate the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the United States. "[134]

The Constitution of the United States was the model followed throughout, with only such changes as experience suggested for better practicalworking or for greater perspicuity. The preamble to both instruments isthe same in substance, and very nearly identical in language. The words"We, the people of the United States, " in one, are replaced by "We, thepeople of the Confederate States, " in the other; and the grossperversion which has been made of the former expression is precluded inthe latter merely by the addition of the explanatory clause, "each Stateacting in its sovereign and independent character"--an explanationwhich, at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the UnitedStates, would have been deemed entirely superfluous. 

The official term of the President was fixed at six instead of fouryears, and it was provided that he should not be eligible forreëlection. This was in accordance with the original draft of theConstitution of 1787. [135]

The President was empowered to remove officers of his Cabinet, or thoseengaged in the diplomatic service, at his discretion, but in all othercases removal from office could be made only for cause, and the causewas to be reported to the Senate. [136]

Congress was authorized to provide by law for the admission of "theprincipal officer in each of the executive departments" (or Cabinetofficers) to a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilegeof taking part in the discussion of subjects pertaining to hisdepartment. [137] This wise and judicious provision, which would havetended to obviate much delay and misunderstanding, was, however, neverput into execution by the necessary legislation. 

Protective duties for the benefit of special branches of industry, whichhad been so fruitful a source of trouble under the Government of theUnited States, were altogether prohibited. [138] So, also, were bountiesfrom the Treasury, [139] and extra compensation for services rendered byofficers, contractors, or employees, of any description. [140]

A vote of two thirds of each House was requisite for the appropriationof money from the Treasury, unless asked for by the chief of adepartment and submitted to Congress by the President, or for payment ofthe expenses of Congress, or of claims against the Confederacyjudicially established and declared. [141] The President was alsoauthorized to approve any one appropriation and disapprove any other inthe same bill. [142]

With regard to the impeachment of Federal officers, it was intrusted, asformerly, to the discretion of the House of Representatives, with theadditional provision, however, that, in the case of any judicial orother officer exercising his functions solely within the limits of aparticular State, impeachment might be made by the Legislature of suchState--the trial in all cases to be by the Senate of the ConfederateStates. [143]

Any two or more States were authorized to enter into compacts with eachother for the improvement of the navigation of rivers flowing between orthrough them. [144] A vote of two thirds of each House--the Senate votingby States--was required for the admission of a new State. [145]

With regard to amendments of the Constitution, it was made obligatoryupon Congress, on the demand of any three States, concurring in theproposed amendment or amendments, to summon a convention of all theStates to consider and act upon them, voting by States, but restrictedin its action to the particular propositions thus submitted. If approvedby such convention, the amendments were to be subject to finalratification by two thirds of the States. [146]

Other changes or modifications, worthy of special notice, related tointernal improvements, bankruptcy laws, duties on exports, suits in theFederal courts, and the government of the Territories. [147]

With regard to slavery and the slave-trade, the provisions of thisConstitution furnish an effectual answer to the assertion, so oftenmade, that the Confederacy was founded on slavery, that slavery was its"corner-stone, " etc. Property in slaves, _already existing_, wasrecognized and guaranteed, just as it was by the Constitution of theUnited States; and the rights of such property in the common Territorieswere protected against any such hostile discrimination as had beenattempted in the Union. But the "extension of slavery, " in the onlypractical sense of that phrase, was more distinctly and effectuallyprecluded by the Confederate than by the Federal Constitution. This willbe manifest on a comparison of the provisions of the two relative to theslave-trade. These are found at the beginning of the ninth section ofthe first article of each instrument. The Constitution of the UnitedStates has the following:

 "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importations, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. "

The Confederate Constitution, on the other hand, ordained as follows:

 "1. The importation of negroes of the African race from any foreign country, other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United States of America, is hereby forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same. 

 "2. Congress shall also have the power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy. "

In the case of the United States, the only prohibition is against anyinterference by Congress with the slave-trade for a term of years, andit was further legitimized by the authority given to impose a duty uponit. The term of years, it is true, had long since expired, but there wasstill no prohibition of the trade by the Constitution; it was after 1808entirely within the discretion of Congress either to encourage, tolerate, or prohibit it. 

Under the Confederate Constitution, on the contrary, the Africanslave-trade was "_hereby forbidden_, " positively and unconditionally, from the beginning. Neither the Confederate Government nor that of anyof the States could permit it, and the Congress was expressly "required"to enforce the prohibition. The only discretion in the matter intrustedto the Congress was, whether or not to permit the introduction of slavesfrom any of the United States or their Territories. 

Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, had said: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery inthe States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. " Now, if there was no purpose on thepart of the Government of the United States to interfere with theinstitution of slavery within its already existing limits--a propositionwhich permitted its propagation within those limits by naturalincrease--and inasmuch as the Confederate Constitution precluded anyother than the same natural increase, we may plainly perceive thedisingenuousness and absurdity of the pretension by which a factitioussympathy has been obtained in certain quarters for the war upon theSouth, on the ground that it was a war in behalf of freedom againstslavery. [148] I had no direct part in the preparation of the ConfederateConstitution. No consideration of delicacy forbids me, therefore, tosay, in closing this brief review of that instrument, that it was amodel of wise, temperate, and liberal statesmanship. Intelligentcriticism, from hostile as well as friendly sources, has been compelledto admit its excellences, and has sustained the judgment of a popularNorthern journal which said, a few days after it was adopted andpublished:

 "The new Constitution is the Constitution of the United States with various modifications and some very important and most desirable improvements. We are free to say that the invaluable reforms enumerated should be adopted by the United States, with or without a reunion of the seceded States, and as soon as possible. But why not accept them with the propositions of the Confederate States on slavery as a basis of reunion?"[149]

[Footnote 133: See Appendix K. ]

[Footnote 134: "War between the States, " vol. Ii, col. Xix, p. 389. ]

[Footnote 135: See Article II, section 1. ]

[Footnote 136: Ibid. , section 2, ¶ 3. ]

[Footnote 137: Article I, section 6, ¶ 2. ]

[Footnote 138: Article I, section 8, ¶ 1. ]

[Footnote 139: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 140: Ibid. , section 9, ¶ 10. ]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. , ¶ 9. ]

[Footnote 142: Ibid. , section 7, ¶ 2. ]

[Footnote 143: Ibid. , section 2, ¶ 5. ]

[Footnote 144: Ibid. , section 10, ¶ 3. ]

[Footnote 145: Article IV, section 3, ¶ 1. ]

[Footnote 146: Article V. ]

[Footnote 147: Article I, section 8, ¶¶ 1 and 4, section 9, ¶ 6; ArticleIII, section 2, ¶ 1; Article IV, section 3, ¶ 3. ]

[Footnote 148: As late as the 22d of April, 1861, Mr. Seward, UnitedStates Secretary of State, in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, Minister toFrance, since made public, expressed the views and purposes of theUnited States Government in the premises as follows. It may be proper toexplain that, by what he is pleased to term "the revolution, " Mr. Sewardmeans the withdrawal of the Southern States; and that the wordsitalicized are, perhaps, not so distinguished in the original. He says:"The Territories will remain in all respects the same, whether therevolution shall succeed or shall fail. _The condition of slavery in theseveral States will remain just the same, whether it succeed or fail. _There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffectedStates are to be conquered by the United States if the revolution fails;for the rights of the States and _the condition of every being in them_will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms ofadministration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shallfail. In the one case, the States would be federally connected with thenew Confederacy; in the other, they would, as now, be members of theUnited States; _but their Constitutions and laws, customs, habits, andinstitutions, in either ease, will remain the same_. "]

[Footnote 149: "New York Herald, " March 19, 1861. ]

CHAPTER XI. 

 The Commission to Washington City. --Arrival of Mr. Crawford. --Mr. Buchanan's Alarm. --Note of the Commissioners to the New Administration. --Mediation of Justices Nelson and Campbell. --The Difficulty about Forts Sumter and Pickens. --Mr. Secretary Seward's Assurances. --Duplicity of the Government at Washington. --Mr. Fox's Visit to Charleston. --Secret Preparations for Coercive Measures. --Visit of Mr. Lamon. --Renewed Assurances of Good Faith. --Notification to Governor Pickens. --Developments of Secret History. --Systematic and Complicated Perfidy exposed. 

The appointment of Commissioners to proceed to Washington, for thepurpose of establishing friendly relations with the United States andeffecting an equitable settlement of all questions relating to thecommon property of the States and the public debt, has already beenmentioned. No time was lost in carrying this purpose into execution. Mr. Crawford--first of the Commissioners--left Montgomery on or about the27th of February, and arrived in Washington two or three days before theexpiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of office as President of the UnitedStates. Besides his official credentials, he bore the following letterto the President, of a personal or semi-official character, intended tofacilitate, if possible, the speedy accomplishment of the objects of hismission:

 "_To the President of the United States. _

 "Sir: Being animated by an earnest desire to unite and bind together our respective countries by friendly ties, I have appointed Martin J. Crawford, one of our most esteemed and trustworthy citizens, as special Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Government of the United States; and I have now the honor to introduce him to you, and to ask for him a reception and treatment corresponding to his station, and to the purposes for which he is sent. 

 "Those purposes he will more particularly explain to you. Hoping that through his agency these may be accomplished, I avail myself of this occasion to offer to you the assurance of my distinguished consideration. "

 (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

 "Montgomery, _February 27, 1861_. "

It may here be mentioned, in explanation of my desire that thecommission, or at least a part of it, should reach Washington before theclose of Mr. Buchanan's term, that I had received an intimation fromhim, through a distinguished Senator of one of the border States, [150]that he would be happy to receive a Commissioner or Commissioners fromthe Confederate States, and would refer to the Senate any communicationthat might be made through such a commission. 

Mr. Crawford--now a Judge of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the onlysurviving member of the commission--in a manuscript account, which hehas kindly furnished, of his recollections of events connected with it, says that, on arriving in Washington at the early hour of half-past fouro'clock in the morning, he was "surprised to see Pennsylvania Avenue, from the old National to Willard's Hotel, crowded with men hurrying, some toward the former, but most of the faces in the direction of thelatter, where the new President [Mr. Lincoln, President-elect], thegreat political almoner, for the time being, had taken up his lodgings. At this point, " continues Judge Crawford, "the crowd swelled toastonishing numbers of expectant and hopeful men, awaiting anopportunity, either to see Mr. Lincoln himself, or to communicate withhim through some one who might be so fortunate as to have access to hispresence. "

Describing his reception in the Federal capital, Judge Crawford says:

 "The feverish and emotional condition of affairs soon made the presence of the special Commissioner at Washington known throughout the city. Congress was still, of course, in session; Senators and members of the House of Representatives, excepting those of the Confederate States, who had withdrawn, were in their seats, and the manifestations of anxious care and gloomy forebodings were plainly to be seen on all sides. This was not confined to sections, but existed among the men of the North and West as well as those of the South.... 

 "Mr. Buchanan, the President, was in a state of most thorough alarm, not only for his home at Wheatland, but for his personal safety. [151] In the very few days which had elapsed between the time of his promise to receive a Commissioner from the Confederate States and the actual arrival of the Commissioner, he had become so fearfully panic-stricken, that he declined either to receive him or to send any message to the Senate touching the subject-matter of his mission. 

 "The Commissioner had been for several years in Congress before the Administration of Mr. Buchanan, as well as during his official term, and had always been in close political and social relations with him; yet he was afraid of a public visit from him. He said that he had only three days of official life left, and could incur no further dangers or reproaches than those he had already borne from the press and public speakers of the North. 

 "The intensity of the prevalent feeling increased as the vast crowds, arriving by every train, added fresh material; and hatred and hostility toward our new Government were manifested in almost every conceivable manner. "

Another of the Commissioners (Mr. Forsyth) having arrived in Washingtonon the 12th of March--eight days after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln--the two Commissioners then present, Messrs. Forsyth andCrawford, addressed to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, a note informinghim of their presence, stating the friendly and peaceful purposes oftheir mission, and requesting the appointment of a day, as early aspossible, for the presentation to the President of the United States oftheir credentials and the objects which they had in view. This letterwill be found in the Appendix, [152] with other correspondence whichensued, published soon after the events to which it relates. Theattention of the reader is specially invited to these documents, but, asadditional revelations have been made since they were first published, it will be proper, in order to a full understanding of the transactionsto which they refer, to give here a brief statement of the facts. 

No _written_ answer to the note of the Commissioners was delivered tothem for twenty-seven days after it was written. The paper of Mr. Seward, in reply, without signature or address, dated March 15th, [153]was "filed, " as he states, on that day, in the Department of State, buta copy of it was not handed to the Commissioners until the 8th of April. But an oral answer had been made to the note of the Commissioners at amuch earlier date, for the significance of which it will be necessary tobear in mind the condition of affairs at Charleston and Pensacola. 

Fort Sumter was still occupied by the garrison under command of MajorAnderson, with no material change in the circumstances since the failureof the attempt made in January to reënforce it by means of the Star ofthe West. This standing menace at the gates of the chief harbor of SouthCarolina had been tolerated by the government and people of that State, and afterward by the Confederate authorities, in the abiding hope thatit would be removed without compelling a collision of forces. FortPickens, on one side of the entrance to the harbor of Pensacola, wasalso occupied by a garrison of United States troops, while the two forts(Barrancas and McRee) on the other side were in possession of theConfederates. Communication by sea was not entirely precluded, however, in the case of Fort Pickens; the garrison had been strengthened, and afleet of Federal men-of-war was lying outside of the harbor. Thecondition of affairs at these forts--especially at Fort Sumter--was asubject of anxiety with the friends of peace, and the hope of settlingby negotiation the questions involved in their occupation had been oneof the most urgent motives for the prompt dispatch of the Commissionersto Washington. 

The letter of the Commissioners to Mr. Seward was written, as we haveseen, on the 12th of March. The oral message, above mentioned, wasobtained and communicated to the Commissioners through the agency of twoJudges of the Supreme Court of the United States--Justices Nelson, ofNew York, and Campbell, of Alabama. On the 15th of March, according tothe statement of Judge Campbell, [154] Mr. Justice Nelson visited theSecretaries of State and of the Treasury and the Attorney-General(Messrs. Seward, Chase, and Bates), to dissuade them from undertaking toput in execution any policy of coercion. "During the term of the SupremeCourt he had very carefully examined the laws of the United States toenable him to attain his conclusions, and from time to time he hadconsulted the Chief Justice [Taney] upon the questions which hisexamination had suggested. His conclusion was that, without very seriousviolations of Constitution and statutes, coercion could not besuccessfully effected by the executive department. I had made [continuesJudge Campbell] a similar examination, and I concurred in hisconclusions and opinions. As he was returning from his visit to theState Department, we casually met, and he informed me of what he haddone. He said he had spoken to these officers at large; that he wasreceived with respect and listened to with attention by all, withapprobation by the Attorney-General, and with great cordiality by theSecretary of State; that the Secretary had expressed gratification tofind so many impediments to the disturbance of peace, and only wishedthere had been more. He stated that the Secretary told him there was apresent cause of embarrassment: that the Southern Commissioners haddemanded recognition, and a refusal would lead to irritation andexcitement in the Southern States, and would cause a counter-irritationand excitement in the Northern States, prejudicial to a peacefuladjustment. Justice Nelson suggested that I might be of service. "

The result of the interview between these two distinguished gentlemen, we are informed, was another visit, by both of them, to the StateDepartment, for the purpose of urging Mr. Seward to reply to theCommissioners, and assure them of the desire of the United StatesGovernment for a friendly adjustment. Mr. Seward seems to have objectedto an immediate recognition of the Commissioners, on the ground that thestate of public sentiment in the North would not sustain it, inconnection with the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, which hadbeen determined on. "The evacuation of Sumter, " he said, "is as much asthe Administration can bear. "

Judge Campbell adds: "I concurred in the conclusion that the evacuationof Sumter involved responsibility, and stated that there could not betoo much caution in the adoption of measures so as not to shock or toirritate the public sentiment, and that the evacuation of Sumter wassufficient for the present in that direction. I stated that I would seethe Commissioners, and I would write to Mr. Davis to that effect. Iasked him what I should say as to Sumter and as to Pickens. _Heauthorized me to say that, before that letter could reach him_ [Mr. Davis], _he would learn by telegraph that the order for the evacuationof Sumter had been made_. He said the condition of Pickens wassatisfactory, and there would be no change made there. " The italics inthis extract are my own. 

The letter in which this promise was communicated to me has been lost, but it was given in substantially the terms above stated as authorizedby Mr. Seward--that the order for the evacuation of the fort would beissued before the letter could reach me. The same assurance was given, on the same day, to the Commissioners. Judge Campbell tells us that Mr. Crawford was slow to consent to refrain from pressing the demand forrecognition. "It was only after some discussion and the expression ofsome objections that he consented" to do so. This consent was clearlyone part of a stipulation, of which the other part was the pledge thatthe fort would be evacuated in the course of a few days. Mr. Crawfordrequired the pledge of Mr. Seward to be reduced to writing, with JudgeCampbell's personal assurance of its genuineness and accuracy. [155] Thiswritten statement was exhibited to Judge Nelson, before its delivery, and approved by him. The fact that the pledge had been given in his nameand behalf was communicated to Mr. Seward the same evening by letter. Hewas cognizant of, consenting to, and in great part the author of, thewhole transaction. 

It will be observed that not only the Commissioners in Washington, butthe Confederate Government at Montgomery also, were thus assured on thehighest authority--that of the Secretary of State of the United States, the official organ of communication of the views and purposes of hisGovernment--of the intention of that Government to order the evacuationof Fort Sumter within a few days from the 15th of March, and not todisturb the existing _status_ at Fort Pickens. Moreover, this was notthe mere statement of a fact, but a _pledge_, given as the considerationof an appeal to the Confederate Government and its Commissioners torefrain from embarrassing the Federal Administration by prosecuting anyfurther claims at the same time. As such a pledge, it was accepted, and, while its fulfillment was quietly awaited, the Commissioners forbore tomake any further demand for reply to their note of the 12th of March. 

Five days having elapsed in this condition of affairs, the Commissionersin Washington telegraphed Brigadier-General Beauregard, commander of theConfederate forces at Charleston, inquiring whether the fort had beenevacuated, or any action taken by Major Anderson indicating theprobability of an evacuation. Answer was made to this dispatch, that thefort had not been evacuated, that there were no indications of such apurpose, but that Major Anderson was still working on its defenses. Thisdispatch was taken to Mr. Seward by Judge Campbell. Two interviewsoccurred in relation to it, at both of which Judge Nelson was alsopresent. Of the result of these interviews, Judge Campbell states: "Thelast was full and satisfactory. The Secretary was buoyant and sanguine;he spoke of his ability to carry through his policy with confidence. Heaccounted for the delay as accidental, and _not involving the integrityof his assurance that the evacuation would take place_, and that Ishould know whenever any change was made in the resolution in referenceto Sumter or to Pickens. I repeated this assurance in writing to JudgeCrawford, _and informed Governor Seward in writing what I hadsaid_. "[156]

It would be incredible, but for the ample proofs which have since beenbrought to light, that, during all this period of reiterated assurancesof a purpose to withdraw the garrison from Fort Sumter, and of excusesfor delay on account of the difficulties which embarrassed it, theGovernment of the United States was assiduously engaged in devisingmeans for furnishing supplies and reënforcements to the garrison, withthe view of retaining possession of the fort!

Mr. G. V. Fox, afterward Assistant Secretary of the United States Navy, had proposed a plan for reënforcing and furnishing supplies to thegarrison of Fort Sumter in February, during the Administration of Mr. Buchanan. In a letter published in the newspapers since the war, hegives an account of the manner in which the proposition was renewed tothe new Administration and its reception by them, as follows:

 "On the 12th of March I received a telegram from Postmaster-General Blair to come to Washington. I arrived there on the 13th. Mr. Blair having been acquainted with the proposition I presented to General Scott, under Mr. Buchanan's Administration, sent for me to tender the same to Mr. Lincoln, informing me that Lieutenant-General Scott had advised the President that the fort could not be relieved, and must be given up. Mr. Blair took me at once to the White House, and I explained the plan to the President. Thence we adjourned to Lieutenant-General Scott's office, where a renewed discussion of the subject took place. The General informed the President that my plan was practicable in February, but that the increased number of batteries erected at the mouth of the harbor since that time rendered it impossible in March. 

 "Finding that there was great opposition to any attempt at relieving Fort Sumter, and that Mr. Blair alone sustained the President in his policy of refusing to yield, I judged that my arguments in favor of the practicability of sending in supplies would be strengthened by a visit to Charleston and the fort. The President readily agreed to my visit, if the Secretary of War and General Scott raised no objection. 

 "Both these gentlemen consenting, I left Washington on the 19th of March, and, passing through Richmond and Wilmington, reached Charleston on the 21st. "

Thus we see that, at the very moment when Mr. Secretary Seward wasrenewing to the Confederate Government, through Judge Campbell, hispositive assurance that "the evacuation _would_ take place, " thisemissary was on his way to Charleston to obtain information and devisemeasures by means of which this promise might be broken. 

On his arrival in Charleston, Mr. Fox tells us that he sought aninterview with Captain Hartstein, of the Confederate Navy, and throughthis officer obtained from Governor Pickens permission to visit FortSumter. He fails, in his narrative, to state what we learn from GovernorPickens himself, [157] that this permission was obtained "expressly uponthe pledge of 'pacific purposes. '" Notwithstanding this pledge, heemployed the opportunity afforded by his visit to mature the details ofhis plan for furnishing supplies and reënforcements to the garrison. Hedid not, he says, communicate his plan or purposes to Major Anderson, the commanding officer of the garrison, having discernment enough, perhaps, to divine that the instincts of that brave and honest soldierwould have revolted at and rebuked the duplicity and perfidy of thewhole transaction. The result of his visit was, however, reported atWashington, his plan was approved by President Lincoln, and he was sentto New York to make arrangements for putting it in execution. 

 "In a very few days after" (says Governor Pickens, in the message already quoted above), "another confidential agent, Colonel Lamon, was sent by the President [Mr. Lincoln], who informed me that he had come to try and arrange for the removal of the garrison, and, when he returned from the fort, asked if a war-vessel could not be allowed to remove them. I replied that no war-vessel could be allowed to enter the harbor on any terms. He said he believed Major Anderson preferred an ordinary steamer, and I agreed that the garrison might be thus removed. He said he hoped to return in a very few days for that purpose. "

This, it will be remembered, occurred while Mr. Fox was making active, though secret, preparations for his relief expedition. 

Colonel, or Major, Lamon, as he is variously styled in thecorrespondence, did not return to Charleston, as promised. About the30th of March (which was Saturday) a telegram from Governor Pickens wasreceived by the Commissioners in Washington, making inquiry with regardto Colonel Lamon, and the meaning of the protracted delay to fulfill thepromise of evacuation. This was fifteen days after the originalassurance of Mr. Seward that the garrison would be withdrawnimmediately, and ten days after his explanation that the delay was"accidental. " The dispatch of Governor Pickens was taken by JudgeCampbell to Mr. Seward, who appointed the ensuing Monday (1st of April)for an interview and answer. At that interview Mr. Seward informed JudgeCampbell that "the President was concerned about the contents of thetelegram--_there was a point of honor involved_; that Lamon had noagency from him, nor title to speak. "[158] (This late suggestion of thepoint of _honor_ would seem, under the circumstances, to have been madein a spirit of sarcastic pleasantry, like Sir John Falstaff's celebrateddiscourse on the same subject. ) The only substantial result of theconversation, however, was the written assurance of Mr. Seward, to becommunicated to the Commissioners, that "the Government will notundertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to GovernorPickens. "

This, it will be observed, was a very material variation from thepositive pledge previously given, and reiterated, to the Commissioners, to Governor Pickens, and to myself directly, that the fort was to beforthwith evacuated. Judge Campbell, in his account of the interview, says: "I asked him [Mr. Seward] whether I was to understand that therehad been a change in his former communications. His answer was, 'None. '"[159]

About the close of the same week (the first in April), the patience ofthe Commissioners having now been wellnigh exhausted, and the hostilepreparations of the Government of the United States, notwithstanding thesecrecy with which they were conducted, having become matter of generalrumor, a letter was addressed to Mr. Seward, upon the subject, by JudgeCampbell, in behalf of the Commissioners, again asking whether theassurances so often given were well or ill founded. To this theSecretary returned answer in writing: "_Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see. _"

This was on the 7th of April. [160] The very next day (the 8th) thefollowing official notification (without date or signature) was read toGovernor Pickens, of South Carolina, and General Beauregard, inCharleston, by Mr. Chew, an official of the _State Department_ (Mr. Seward's) in Washington, who said--as did a Captain or LieutenantTalbot, who accompanied him--that it was from the President of theUnited States, and delivered by him to Mr. Chew on the 6th--the day_before_ Mr. Seward's assurance of "_faith fully kept_. "

 "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, will be made, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort. "[161]

Thus disappeared the last vestige of the plighted faith and pacificpledges of the Federal Government. 

In order fully to appreciate the significance of this communication, andof the time and circumstances of its delivery, it must be borne in mindthat the naval expedition which had been secretly in preparation forsome time at New York, under direction of Captain Fox, was now ready tosail, and might reasonably be expected to be at Charleston almostimmediately after the notification was delivered to Governor Pickens, and before preparation could be made to receive it. Owing tocross-purposes or misunderstandings in the Washington Cabinet, however, and then to the delay caused by a severe storm at sea, this expectationwas disappointed, and the Confederate commander at Charleston hadopportunity to communicate with Montgomery and receive instructions forhis guidance, before the arrival of the fleet, which had been intendedto be a surprise. 

In publications made since the war by members of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, it has been represented that, during the period of the disgracefultransactions above detailed, there were dissensions and divisions in theCabinet--certain members of it urging measures of prompt and decidedcoercion; the Secretary of State favoring a pacific or at least adilatory policy; and the President vacillating for a time between thetwo, but eventually adopting the views of the coercionists. In thesestatements it is represented that the assurances and pledges, given byMr. Seward to the Confederate Government and its Commissioners, weregiven on his own authority, and without the consent or approval of thePresident of the United States. The absurdity of any such attempt todisassociate the action of the President from that of his Secretary, andto relieve the former of responsibility for the conduct of the latter, is too evident to require argument or comment. It is impossible tobelieve that, during this whole period of nearly a month, Mr. Lincolnwas ignorant of the communications that were passing between theConfederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward, through the distinguishedmember of the Supreme Court--still holding his seat as such--who wasacting as intermediary. On one occasion, Judge Campbell informs us thatthe Secretary, in the midst of an important interview, excused himselffor the purpose of conferring with the President before giving a finalanswer, and left his visitor for some time, awaiting his return fromthat conference, when the answer was given, avowedly and directlyproceeding from the President. 

If, however, it were possible to suppose that Mr. Seward was acting onhis own responsibility, and practicing a deception upon his own chief, as well as upon the Confederate authorities, in the pledges which hemade to the latter, it is nevertheless certain that the principal factswere brought to light within a few days after the close of the effortsat negotiation. Yet the Secretary of State was not impeached and broughtto trial for the grave offense of undertaking to conduct the mostmomentous and vital transactions that had been or could be broughtbefore the Government of the United States, without the knowledge and inopposition to the will of the President, and for having involved theGovernment in dishonor, if not in disaster. He was not even dismissedfrom office, but continued to be the chief officer of the Cabinet andconfidential adviser of the President, as he was afterward of theensuing Administration, occupying that station during two consecutiveterms. No disavowal of his action, no apology nor explanation, was evermade. Politically and legally, the President is unquestionablyresponsible in all cases for the action of any member of his Cabinet, and in this case it is as preposterous to attempt to dissever from himthe moral, as it would be impossible to relieve him of the legal, responsibility that rests upon the Government of the United States forthe systematic series of frauds perpetrated by its authority. 

On the other hand, Mr. Seward, throughout the whole negotiation, wasfully informed of the views of his colleagues in the Cabinet and of thePresident. Whatever his real hopes or purposes may have been in thebeginning, it is positively certain that long before the end, and whilestill reiterating his assurances that the garrison would be withdrawn, he knew that it had been _determined_, and that active preparations werein progress, to strengthen it. 

Mr. Gideon Welles, who was Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Lincoln'sCabinet, gives the following account of one of the transactions of theperiod:

 "One evening in the latter part of the month of March, there was a small gathering at the Executive Mansion, while the Sumter question was still pending. The members of the Cabinet were soon individually and quietly invited to the council-chamber, where, as soon as assembled, the President informed them he had just been advised by General Scott that it was expedient to evacuate Fort Pickens, as well as Fort Sumter, which last was assumed at military headquarters to be a determined fact, in conformity with the views of Secretary Seward and the General-in-Chief.... 

 "A brief silence followed the announcement of the amazing recommendation of General Scott, when Mr. Blair, who had been much annoyed by the vacillating course of the General-in-Chief in regard to Sumter, remarked, looking earnestly at Mr. Seward, that it was evident the old General was playing politician in regard to both Sumter and Pickens; for it was not possible, if there was a defense, for the rebels to take Pickens; and the Administration would not be justified if it listened to his advice and evacuated either. Very soon thereafter, I think at the next Cabinet meeting, the President announced his decision that _supplies should be sent to Sumter_, and issued confidential orders to that effect. All were gratified with this decision, except Mr. Seward, who still remonstrated, _but preparations were immediately commenced to fit out an expedition to forward supplies_. "[162]

This account is confirmed by a letter of Mr. Montgomery Blair. [163] Thedate of the announcement of the President's final purpose is fixed byMr. Welles, in the neat paragraph to that above quoted, as the 28th ofMarch. This was four days before Mr. Seward's assurance given JudgeCampbell--after conference with the President--that there would be nodeparture from the pledges previously given (which were that the fort_would be evacuated_), and ten days before his written renewal of theassurance--"_Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see!_" Thisassurance, too, was given at the very moment when a messenger from hisown department was on the way to Charleston to notify the Governor ofSouth Carolina that faith would _not_ be kept in the matter. 

It is scarcely necessary to say that the Commissioners had, with goodreason, ceased to place any confidence in the promises of the UnitedStates Government, before they ceased to be made. On the 8th of Aprilthey sent the following dispatch to General Beauregard:

 "Washington, _April 8, 1861_. 

 "General G. T. Beauregard: Accounts uncertain, because of the constant vacillation of this Government. We were reassured yesterday that the status of Sumter would not be changed without previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have no faith in them. The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this time. 

 "M. J. Crawford. "

On the same day the announcement made to Governor Pickens through Mr. Chew was made known. The Commissioners immediately applied for adefinitive answer to their note of March 12th, which had been permittedto remain in abeyance. The paper of the Secretary of State, dated March15th, was thereupon delivered to them. This paper, with the finalrejoinder of the Commissioners and Judge Campbell's letters to theSecretary of April 13th and April 20th, respectively, will be found inthe Appendix. 

Negotiation was now at an end, and the Commissioners withdrew fromWashington and returned to their homes. Their last dispatch, beforeleaving, shows that they were still dependent upon public rumor and thenewspapers for information as to the real purposes and preparations ofthe Federal Administration. It was in these words:

 "Washington, _April 10, 1861_. 

 "General G. T. Beauregard: The 'Tribune' of to-day declares the main object of the expedition to be the relief of Sumter, and that a force will be landed which will overcome all opposition. 

 "Roman, Crawford, and Forsyth. "

The annexed extracts from my message to the Confederate Congress at theopening of its special session, on the 29th of April, will serve as arecapitulation of the events above narrated, with all of comment that itwas then, or is now, considered necessary to add:

 [_Extracts from President's Message to the Confederate Congress, of April 29, 1861. _]

 "... Scarce had you assembled in February last, when, prior even to the inauguration of the Chief Magistrate you had elected, you expressed your desire for the appointment of Commissioners, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two Governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith. 

 "It was my pleasure, as well as my duty, to coöperate with you in this work of peace. Indeed, in my address to you, on taking the oath of office, and before receiving from you the communication of this resolution, I had said that, as a necessity, not as a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separating, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us to peaceably pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will then have been fulfilled. 

 "It was in furtherance of these accordant views of the Congress and the Executive, that I made choice of three discreet, able, and distinguished citizens, who repaired to Washington. Aided by their cordial coöperation and that of the Secretary of State, every effort compatible with self-respect and the dignity of the Confederacy was exhausted, before I allowed myself to yield to the conviction that the Government of the United States was determined to attempt the conquest of this people, and that our cherished hopes of peace were unobtainable. 

 "On the arrival of our Commissioners in Washington on the 5th of March, [164] they postponed, at the suggestion of a friendly intermediator, doing more than giving informal notice of their arrival. This was done with a view to afford time to the President of the United States, who had just been inaugurated, for the discharge of other pressing official duties in the organization of his Administration, before engaging his attention to the object of their mission. 

 "It was not until the 12th of the month that they officially addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of the purpose of their arrival, and stating in the language of their instructions their wish to make to the Government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the Government of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution of these great questions; that it was neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which was not founded on the strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure their late confederates. 

 "To this communication, no formal reply was received until the 8th of April. During the interval, the Commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve to avoid war, if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were received from the Government of the United States of its peaceful intentions--of its determination to evacuate Fort Sumter; and, further, that no measure would be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States; that, in the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the Commissioners. 

 "The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the course of the United States Government toward our Commissioners in Washington. For proof of this, I refer to the annexed documents marked, (?) taken in connection with further facts, which I now proceed to relate. 

 "Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations, in New York and other Northern ports, for an extensive military and naval expedition. These preparations were commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly completed; and on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, transports and vessels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies, sailed from Northern ports, bound southward. 

 "Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the Commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication of the 12th of March, and the reply, dated on the 15th of the previous month, was obtained, from which it appears that, during the whole interval, while the Commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever, to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make; and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations. 

 "That these assurances were given, has been virtually confessed by the Government of the United States, by its act of sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use force, if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter. 

 "No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the conduct of the Government of the United States toward the Confederacy can be required, than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this notice. 

 "According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels composing the expedition, and designed for the relief of Fort Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbor on the 9th of April. Yet our Commissioners in Washington were detained under assurances that notice should be given of any military movement. The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was so given at a late hour on the 8th of April, the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to arrive. 

 "That this manoeuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at Charleston to ask and receive instructions of the Government. " ... 

[Footnote 150: Mr. Hunter, of Virginia. ]

[Footnote 151: This statement is in accord with a remark which Mr. Buchanan made to the author at an earlier period of the same session, with regard to the violence of Northern sentiment then lately indicated, that he thought it not impossible that his homeward route would belighted by burning effigies of himself, and that on reaching his home hewould find it a heap of ashes. ]

[Footnote 152: See Appendix L. ]

[Footnote 153: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 154: See letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel George W. Munfordin "Papers of the Southern Historical Society, " appended to "SouthernMagazine" for February, 1874. ]

[Footnote 155: "In the course of this conversation I told Judge Crawfordthat it was fair to tell him that the opinion at Washington was, thesecession movements were short-lived; that his Government would witherunder sunshine, and that the effect of these measures might be assupposed; that they might have a contrary effect, but that I did notconsider the effect. I wanted, above all other things, peace. I waswilling to accept whatever peace might bring, whether union or disunion. I did not look beyond peace. He said he was willing to take all therisks of sunshine. "--(Letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel Munford, asabove. )]

[Footnote 156: Letter to Colonel Munford, above quoted. The italics arenot in the original. ]

[Footnote 157: Message to the Legislature of South Carolina, November, 1861. ]

[Footnote 158: Letter to Colonel Munford, above cited. ]

[Footnote 159: Letter to Munford. ]

[Footnote 160: Judge Campbell, in his letter to Mr. Seward of April 13, 1861 (see Appendix L), written a few days after the transaction, givesthis date. In his letter to Colonel Munford, written more than twelveyears afterward, he says "Sunday, April 8th. "]

[Footnote 161: For this and other documents quoted relative to thetransactions of the period, see "The Record of Fort Sumter, " compiled byW. A. Harris, Columbia, South Carolina, 1862. ]

[Footnote 162: "Lincoln and Seward, " New York, 1874, pp. 57, 58. Theitalics are not in the original. ]

[Footnote 163: Ibid. , pp. 64-69. ]

[Footnote 164: Mr. Crawford, as we have seen, had arrived some daysearlier. The statement in the message refers to the arrival of the fullcommission, or a majority of it. ]

CHAPTER XII. 

 Protests against the Conduct of the Government of the United States. --Senator Douglas's Proposition to evacuate the Forts, and Extracts from his Speech in Support of it. --General Scott's Advice. --Manly Letter of Major Anderson, protesting against the Action of the Federal Government. --Misstatements of the Count of Paris. --Correspondence relative to Proposed Evacuation of the Fort. --A Crisis. 

The course pursued by the Government of the United States with regard tothe forts had not passed without earnest remonstrance from the mostintelligent and patriotic of its own friends during the period of theevents which constitute the subject of the preceding chapter. In theSenate of the United States, which continued in executive session forseveral weeks after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it was the subjectof discussion. Mr. Douglas, of Illinois--who was certainly not suspectedof sympathy with secession, or lack of devotion to the Union--on the15th of March offered a resolution recommending the withdrawal of thegarrisons from all forts within the limits of the States which hadseceded, except those at Key West and the Dry Tortugas. In support ofthis resolution he said:

 "We certainly can not justify the holding of forts there, much less the recapturing of those which have been taken, unless we intend to reduce those States themselves into subjection. I take it for granted, no man will deny the proposition, that whoever permanently holds Charleston and South Carolina is entitled to the possession of Fort Sumter. Whoever permanently holds Pensacola and Florida is entitled to the possession of Fort Pickens. Whoever holds the States in whose limits those forts are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there is something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that makes it important for us to hold it for the general defense of the whole country, its commerce and interests, instead of being useful only for the defense of a particular city or locality. It is true that Forts Taylor and Jefferson, at Key West and Tortugas, are so situated as to be essentially national, and therefore important to us without reference to our relations with the seceded States. Not so with Moultrie, Johnson, Castle Pinckney, and Sumter, in Charleston Harbor; not so with Pulaski, on the Savannah River; not so with Morgan and other forts in Alabama; not so with those other forts that were intended to guard the entrance of a particular harbor for local defense.... 

 "We can not deny that there is a Southern Confederacy, _de facto_, in existence, with its capital at Montgomery. We may regret it. _I_ regret it most profoundly; but I can not deny the truth of the fact, painful and mortifying as it is.... I proclaim boldly the policy of those with whom I act. We are for peace. "

Mr. Douglas, in urging the maintenance of _peace_ as a motive for theevacuation of the forts, was no doubt aware of the full force of hiswords. He knew that their continued occupation was virtually adeclaration of war. 

The General-in-Chief of the United States Army, also, it is well known, urgently advised the evacuation of the forts. But the most strikingprotest against the coercive measures finally adopted was that of MajorAnderson himself. The letter in which his views were expressed has beencarefully suppressed in the partisan narratives of that period andwellnigh lost sight of, although it does the highest honor to hispatriotism and integrity. It was written on the same day on which theannouncement was made to Governor Pickens of the purpose of the UnitedStates Government to send supplies to the fort, and is worthy ofreproduction here:[165]

 [_Letter of Major Anderson, United States Army, protesting against Fox's Plan for relieving Fort Sumter_. ]

 "Fort Sumter, S. C. , _April 8, 1861_. 

 "_To Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army_. 

 "Colonel: I have the honor to report that the resumption of work yesterday (Sunday) at various points on Morris Island, and the vigorous prosecution of it this morning, apparently strengthening all the batteries which are under the fire of our guns, shows that they either have just received some news from Washington which has put them on the _qui vive_, or that they have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations here. I am preparing, by the side of my barbette guns, protection for our men from the shells which will be almost continually bursting over or in our work. 

 "I had the honor to receive, by yesterday's mail, the letter of the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess that what he there states surprises me very greatly--following, as it does, and contradicting so positively, the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was 'authorized' to make. I trust that this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such would be attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout our country. It is, of course, now too late for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of Captain Fox. I fear that its result can not fail to be disastrous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls, the loss of life (as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in unloading her will more than pay for the good to be accomplished by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain possession of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong works which must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the United States Government. 

 "We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one night. The boats will have to, therefore, rely at night entirely upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon's remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be carried out. [166]

 "We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in this war, which I see is to be thus commenced. That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific means to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer!

 "I am, Colonel, very respectfully, "Your obedient servant, "Robert Anderson, "_Major 1st Artillery, commanding_. "

This frank and manly letter, although written with the reservenecessarily belonging to a communication from an officer to his militarysuperiors, expressing dissatisfaction with orders, fully vindicatesMajor Anderson from all suspicion of complicity or sympathy with the badfaith of the Government which he was serving. It accords entirely withthe sentiments expressed in his private letter to me, already mentionedas lost or stolen, and exhibits him in the attitude of faithfulperformance of a duty inconsistent with his domestic ties and repugnantto his patriotism. 

The "relief squadron, " as with unconscious irony it was termed, wasalready under way for Charleston, consisting, according to their ownstatement, of eight vessels, carrying twenty-six guns and about fourteenhundred men, including the troops sent for reënforcement of thegarrison. 

These facts became known to the Confederate Government, and it wasobvious that no time was to be lost in preparing for, and if possibleanticipating the impending assault. The character of the instructionsgiven General Beauregard in this emergency may be inferred from theensuing correspondence, which is here reproduced from contemporarypublications:

 "Charleston, _April 8th_. 

 "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_. 

 "An authorized messenger from President Lincoln just informed Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter peaceably, or otherwise by force. 

 (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard. "

 "Montgomery, _10th_. 

 "General G. T. Beauregard, _Charleston_. 

 "If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington Government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed, in such a manner as you may determine, to reduce it. Answer. 

 (Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_. "

 "Charleston, _April 10th_. 

 "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_. 

 "The demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o'clock. 

 (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard. "

 "Montgomery, _April 10th_. 

 "General Beauregard, _Charleston_. 

 "Unless there are especial reasons connected with your own condition, it is considered proper that you should make the demand at an early hour. 

 (Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_. "

 "Charleston, _April 10th_. 

 "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War, Montgomery_. 

 "The reasons are special for twelve o'clock. 

 (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard. "

 "Headquarters Provisional Army, C. S. A. , "Charleston, S. C. , _April 11, 1861, 2_ P. M. 

 "Sir: The Government of the Confederate States has hitherto forborne from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sumter, in the hope that the Government of the United States, with a view to the amicable adjustment of all questions between the two Governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would voluntarily evacuate it. There was reason at one time to believe that such would be the course pursued by the Government of the United States; and, under that impression, my Government has refrained from making any demand for the surrender of the fort. 

 "But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of one of their harbors, and necessary to its defense and security. 

 "I am ordered by the Government of the Confederate States to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aides, Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself and command, together with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post in the United States which you may elect. The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down. 

 "Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time, await your answer. 

 "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard, "_Brigadier-General commanding_. 

 "Major Robert Anderson, "_Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C. _"

 "Headquarters Fort Sumter, S. C. , _April 11, 1861_. 

 "General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; and to say in reply thereto that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honor and of my obligations to my Government prevents my compliance. 

 "Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms proposed, and for the high compliment paid me, "I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed) "Robert Anderson, "_Major U. S. Army, commanding_. 

 "To Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard, "_Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A. _"

 "Montgomery, _April 11th_. 

 "General Beauregard, _Charleston_. 

 "We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter, if Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that, in the mean time, he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be employed against Fort Sumter. You are thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable. 

 (Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_. "

 "Headquarters Provisional Army, C. S. A. , "Charleston, _April 11, 1861, 11_ P. M. 

 "Major: In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to my aides, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition of your supplies, and that you would in a few days be starved out if our guns did not batter you to pieces--or words to that effect--and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal observation and your written answer to my Government. 

 "If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree that in the mean time you will not use your guns against us, unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into such an agreement with you. You are therefore requested to communicate to them an open answer. 

 "I remain, Major, very respectfully, "Your obedient servant, (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard, "_Brigadier-General commanding_. 

 "Major Robert Anderson, "_Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C. _"

 "Headquarters Fort Sumter, S. C. , _2. 30_ A. M. , _April 12, 1861_. 

 "General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your second communication of the 11th instant, by Colonel Chesnut, and to state, in reply, that, cordially uniting with you in the desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant, should I not receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my Government, or additional supplies; and that I will not, in the mean time, open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort, or the flag of my Government, by the forces under your command, or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears. 

 "I have the honor to be, General, "Your obedient servant, (Signed) "Robert Anderson, "_Major U. S. Army, commanding_. 

 "To Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard, "_Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A. _"

 "Fort Sumter, S. C. , _April 12, 1861, _3. 20_ A. M. 

 "Sir: By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding the provisional forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. 

 "We have the honor to be, very respectfully, "Your obedient servants, (Signed) "James Chesnut, Jr, "_Aide-de-camp_. 

 (Signed) "Stephen D. Lee, "_Captain S. C. Army, and Aide-de-camp_. 

 "Major Robert Anderson, "_United States Army, commanding Fort Sumter_. "

It is essential to a right understanding of the last two letters to givemore than a superficial attention to that of Major Anderson, bearing inmind certain important facts not referred to in the correspondence. Major Anderson had been requested to state the time at which he _wouldevacuate_ the fort, if unmolested, agreeing in the mean time not to usehis guns against the city and the troops defending it unless _FortSumter_ should be first attacked by them. On these conditions GeneralBeauregard offered to refrain from opening fire upon him. In his replyMajor Anderson promises to evacuate the fort on the 15th of April, _provided_ he should not, before that time, receive "controllinginstructions" or "additional supplies" from his Government. Hefurthermore offers to pledge himself not to open fire upon theConfederates, unless in the mean time compelled to do so by some hostileact against the fort _or the flag of his Government_. 

Inasmuch as it was known to the Confederate commander that the"controlling instructions" were already issued, and that the "additionalsupplies" were momentarily expected; inasmuch, also, as any attempt tointroduce the supplies would compel the opening of fire upon the vesselsbearing them under the flag of the United States--thereby releasingMajor Anderson from his pledge--it is evident that his conditions couldnot be accepted. It would have been merely, after the avowal of ahostile determination by the Government of the United States, to awaitan inevitable conflict with the guns of Fort Sumter and the naval forcesof the United States in combination; with no possible hope of avertingit, unless in the improbable event of a delay of the expected fleet fornearly four days longer. (In point of fact, it arrived off the harbor onthe same day, but was hindered by a gale of wind from entering it. )There was obviously no other course to be pursued than that announced inthe answer given by General Beauregard. 

It should not be forgotten that, during the early occupation of FortSumter by a garrison the attitude of which was at least offensive, norestriction had been put upon their privilege of purchasing inCharleston fresh provisions, or any delicacies or comforts not directlytending to the supply of the means needful to hold the fort for anindefinite time. 

[Footnote 165: See "The Record of Fort Sumter, " p. 37. ]

[Footnote 166: The Count of Paris libels the memory of Major Anderson, and perverts the truth of history in this, as he has done in otherparticulars, by saying, with reference to the visit of Captain Fox tothe fort, that, "having visited Anderson at Fort Sumter, _a plan hadbeen agreed upon between them for revictualing the garrison_. "--("CivilWar in America, " authorized translation, vol. I, chap. Iv, p. 137. ) Foxhimself says, in his published letter, "I made no arrangements withMajor Anderson in for supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of myplan"; and Major Anderson, in the letter above, says the idea had been"merely hinted at" by Captain Fox, and that Colonel Lamon had led him tobelieve that it had been abandoned. ]

CHAPTER XIII. 

 A Pause and a Review. --Attitude of the Two Parties. --Sophistry exposed and Shams torn away. --Forbearance of the Confederate Government. --Who was the Aggressor?--Major Anderson's View, and that of a Naval Officer. --Mr. Horace Greeley on the Fort Sumter Case. --The Bombardment and Surrender. --Gallant Action of ex-Senator Wigfall. --Mr. Lincoln's Statement of the Case. 

Here, in the brief hour immediately before the outburst of thelong-gathering storm, although it can hardly be necessary for the readerwho has carefully considered what has already been written, we may pausefor a moment to contemplate the attitude of the parties to the contestand the grounds on which they respectively stand. I do not now refer tothe original causes of controversy--to the comparative claims ofStatehood and Union, or to the question of the right or the wrong ofsecession--but to the proximate and immediate causes of conflict. 

The fact that South Carolina _was_ a State--whatever her relations mayhave been to the other States--is not and can not be denied. It isequally undeniable that the ground on which Fort Sumter was built wasceded by South Carolina to the United States _in trust_ for the defenseof her own soil and her own chief harbor. This has been shown, by ampleevidence, to have been the principle governing all cessions by theStates of sites for military purposes, but it applies with special forceto the case of Charleston. The streams flowing into that harbor, fromsource to mouth, lie entirely within the limits of the State of SouthCarolina. No other State or combination of States could have anydistinct interest or concern in the maintenance of a fortress at thatpoint, unless as a means of aggression against South Carolina herself. The practical view of the case was correctly stated by Mr. Douglas, whenhe said: "I take it for granted that whoever permanently holdsCharleston and South Carolina is entitled to the possession of FortSumter. Whoever permanently holds Pensacola and Florida is entitled tothe possession of Fort Pickens. Whoever holds the States in whose limitsthose forts are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless thereis something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that makesit important for us to hold it for the general defense of the wholecountry, its commerce and interests, instead of being useful only forthe defense of a particular city or locality. "

No such necessity could be alleged with regard to Fort Sumter. The claimto hold it as "public property" of the United States was utterlyuntenable and unmeaning, apart from a claim of coercive control over theState. If South Carolina was a mere province, in a state of openrebellion, the Government of the United States had a right to retain itshold of any fortified place within her limits which happened to be inits possession, and it would have had an equal right to acquirepossession of any other. It would have had the same right to send anarmy to Columbia to batter down the walls of the State Capitol. Thesubject may at once be stripped of the sophistry which would make adistinction between the two cases. The one was as really an act of waras the other would have been. The right or the wrong of either dependedentirely upon the question of the rightful power of the FederalGovernment to coerce a State into submission--a power which, as we haveseen, was unanimously rejected in the formation of the FederalConstitution, and which was still unrecognized by many, perhaps by amajority, even of those who denied the right of a State to secede. 

If there existed any hope or desire for a peaceful settlement of thequestions at issue between the States, either party had a right todemand that, pending such settlement, there should be no hostile graspupon its throat. This grip had been held on the throat of South Carolinafor almost four months from the period of her secession, and no forcibleresistance to it had yet been made. Remonstrances and patient, persistent, and reiterated attempts at negotiation for its removal hadbeen made with two successive Administrations of the Government of theUnited States--at first by the State of South Carolina, and by theGovernment of the Confederate States after its formation. These effortshad been met, not by an open avowal of coercive purposes, but byevasion, prevarication, and perfidy. The agreement of one Administrationto maintain the _status quo_ at the time when the question arose, wasviolated in December by the removal of the garrison from its originalposition to the occupancy of a stronger. Another attempt was made toviolate it, in January, by the introduction of troops concealed belowthe deck of the steamer Star of the West, [167] but this was thwarted bythe vigilance of the State service. The protracted course of fraud andprevarication practiced by Mr. Lincoln's Administration in the months ofMarch and April has been fully exhibited. It was evident that noconfidence whatever could be reposed in any pledge or promise of theFederal Government as then administered. Yet, notwithstanding all this, no resistance, other than that of pacific protest and appeals for anequitable settlement, was made, until after the avowal of a purpose ofcoercion, and when it was known that a hostile fleet was on the way tosupport and enforce it. At the very moment when the Confederatecommander gave the final notice to Major Anderson of his purpose to openfire upon the fort, that fleet was lying off the mouth of the harbor, and hindered from entering only by a gale of wind. 

The forbearance of the Confederate Government, under the circumstances, is perhaps unexampled in history. It was carried to the extreme verge, short of a disregard of the safety of the people who had intrusted tothat government the duty of their defense against their enemies. Theattempt to represent us as the _aggressors_ in the conflict which ensuedis as unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb inthe familiar fable. He who makes the assault is not necessarily he thatstrikes the first blow or fires the first gun. To have awaited furtherstrengthening of their position by land and naval forces, with hostilepurpose now declared, for the sake of having them "fire the first gun, "would have been as unwise as it would be to hesitate to strike down thearm of the assailant, who levels a deadly weapon at one's breast, untilhe has actually fired. The disingenuous rant of demagogues about "firingon the flag" might serve to rouse the passions of insensate mobs intimes of general excitement, but will be impotent in impartial historyto relieve the Federal Government from the responsibility of the assaultmade by sending a hostile fleet against the harbor of Charleston, tocoöperate with the menacing garrison of Fort Sumter. After the assaultwas made by the hostile descent of the fleet, the reduction of FortSumter was a measure of defense rendered absolutely and immediatelynecessary. 

Such clearly was the idea of the commander of the Pawnee, when hedeclined, as Captain Fox informs us, without orders from a superior, tomake any effort to enter the harbor, "there to inaugurate civil war. "The straightforward simplicity of the sailor had not been perverted bythe shams of political sophistry. Even Mr. Horace Greeley, with all hisextreme partisan feeling, is obliged to admit that, "whether thebombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter shall or shall not be justifiedby posterity, it is clear that the Confederacy had no alternative butits own dissolution. "[168]

According to the notice given by General Beauregard, fire was openedupon Fort Sumter, from the various batteries which had been erectedaround the harbor, at half-past four o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 12th of April, 1861. The fort soon responded. It is not the purposeof this work to give minute details of the military operation, as theevents of the bombardment have been often related, and are generallywell known, with no material discrepancy in matters of fact among thestatements of the various participants. It is enough, therefore, to addthat the bombardment continued for about thirty-three or thirty-fourhours. The fort was eventually set on fire by shells, after having beenpartly destroyed by shot, and Major Anderson, after a resolute defense, finally surrendered on the 13th--the same terms being accorded to himwhich had been offered two days before. It is a remarkablefact--probably without precedent in the annals of war--that, notwithstanding the extent and magnitude of the engagement, the numberand caliber of the guns, and the amount of damage done to inanimatematerial on both sides, especially to Fort Sumter, nobody was injured oneither side by the bombardment. The only casualty attendant upon theaffair was the death of one man and the wounding of several others bythe explosion of a gun in the firing of a salute to their flag by thegarrison on evacuating the fort the day after the surrender. 

A striking incident marked the close of the bombardment. Ex-SenatorLouis T. Wigfall, of Texas--a man as generous as he was recklesslybrave--when he saw the fort on fire, supposing the garrison to behopelessly struggling for the honor of its flag, voluntarily and withoutauthority, went under fire in an open boat to the fort, and climbingthrough one of its embrasures asked for Major Anderson, and insistedthat he should surrender a fort which it was palpably impossible that hecould hold. Major Anderson agreed to surrender on the same terms andconditions that had been offered him before his works were battered inbreach, and the agreement between them to that effect was promptlyratified by the Confederate commander. Thus unofficially was inauguratedthe surrender and evacuation of the fort. 

The President of the United States, in his message of July 4, 1861, tothe Federal Congress convened in extra session, said:

 "It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew--they were expressly notified--that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. "

Mr. Lincoln well knew that, if the brave men of the garrison werehungry, they had only him and his trusted advisers to thank for it. Theyhad been kept for months in a place where they ought not to have been, contrary to the judgment of the General-in-Chief of his army, contraryto the counsels of the wisest statesmen in his confidence, and theprotests of the commander of the garrison. A word from him would haverelieved them at any moment in the manner most acceptable to them andmost promotive of peaceful results. 

But, suppose the Confederate authorities had been disposed to yield, andto consent to the introduction of supplies for the maintenance of thegarrison, what assurance would they have had that nothing further wouldbe attempted? What reliance could be placed in any assurances of theGovernment of the United States after the experience of the attempted_ruse_ of the Star of the West and the deceptions practiced upon theConfederate Commissioners in Washington? He says we were "expresslynotified" that nothing more "would _on that occasion_ be attempted"--thewords in italics themselves constituting a very significant thoughunobtrusive and innocent-looking limitation. But we had been just asexpressly notified, long before, that the garrison would be withdrawn. It would be as easy to violate the one pledge as it had been to breakthe other. 

Moreover, the so-called notification was a mere memorandum, withoutdate, signature, or authentication of any kind, sent to GovernorPickens, not by an accredited agent, but by a subordinate employee ofthe State Department. Like the oral and written pledges of Mr. Seward, given through Judge Campbell, it seemed to be carefully and purposelydivested of every attribute that could make it binding and valid, incase its authors should see fit to repudiate it. It was as empty andworthless as the complaint against the Confederate Government based uponit, is disingenuous. 

[Footnote 167: See the report of her commander, Captain McGowan, whosays he took on board, in the harbor of New York, four officers and twohundred soldiers. Arriving off Charleston, he says, "_The soldiers werenow all put below_, and no one allowed on deck except our own crew. "]

[Footnote 168: "American Conflict, " vol. I, chap, xxix, p. 449. ]

PART IV. 

_THE WAR. _

CHAPTER I. 

 Failure of the Peace Congress. --Treatment of the Commissioners. --Their Withdrawal. --Notice of an Armed Expedition. --Action of the Confederate Government. --Bombardment and Surrender of Fort Sumter. --Its Reduction required by the Exigency of the Case. --Disguise thrown off. --President Lincoln's Call for Seventy-five Thousand Men. --His Fiction of "Combinations. "--Palpable Violation of the Constitution. --Action of Virginia. --Of Citizens of Baltimore. --The Charge of Precipitation against South Carolina. --Action of the Confederate Government. --The Universal Feeling. 

The Congress, initiated by Virginia for the laudable purpose ofendeavoring, by constitutional means, to adjust all the issues whichthreatened the peace of the country, failed to achieve anything thatwould cause or justify a reconsideration by the seceded States of theiraction to reclaim the grants they had made to the General Government, and to maintain for themselves a separate and independent existence. 

The Commissioners sent by the Confederate Government, after having beenshamefully deceived, as has been heretofore fully set forth, left theUnited States capital to report the result of their mission to theConfederate Government. 

The notice received, that an armed expedition had sailed for operationsagainst the State of South Carolina in the harbor of Charleston, inducedthe Confederate Government to meet, as best it might, this assault, inthe discharge of its obligation to defend each State of the Confederacy. To this end the bombardment of the formidable work, Fort Sumter, wascommenced, in anticipation of the reënforcement which was then moving tounite with its garrison for hostilities against South Carolina. 

The bloodless bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter occurred on April13, 1861. The garrison was generously permitted to retire with thehonors of war. The evacuation of that fort, commanding the entrance tothe harbor of Charleston, which, if in hostile hands, was destructive ofits commerce, had been claimed as the right of South Carolina. Thevoluntary withdrawal of the garrison by the United States Government hadbeen considered, and those best qualified to judge believed it had beenpromised. Yet, when instead of the fulfillment of just expectations, instead of the withdrawal of the garrison, a hostile expedition wasorganized and sent forward, the urgency of the case required itsreduction before it should be reënforced. Had there been delay, the moreserious conflict between larger forces, land and naval, would scarcelyhave been bloodless, as the bombardment fortunately was. The event, however, was seized upon to inflame the mind of the Northern people, andthe disguise which had been worn in the communications with theConfederate Commissioners was now thrown off, and it was cunninglyattempted to show that the South, which had been pleading for peace andstill stood on the defensive, had by this bombardment inaugurated a waragainst the United States. But it should be stated that the threatsimplied in the declarations that the Union could not exist part slaveand part free, and that the Union should be preserved, and the denial ofthe right of a State peaceably to withdraw, were virtually a declarationof war, and the sending of an army and navy to attack was the result tohave been anticipated as the consequence of such declaration of war. 

On the 15th day of the same month, President Lincoln, introducing hisfarce "of combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinarycourse of judicial proceedings, " called forth the military of theseveral States to the number of seventy-five thousand, and commanded"the persons composing the combinations" to disperse, etc. It can butsurprise any one in the least degree conversant with the history of theUnion, to find States referred to as "persons composing combinations, "and that the sovereign creators of the Federal Government, the States ofthe Union, should be commanded by their agent to disperse. The levy ofso large an army could only mean war; but the power to declare war didnot reside in the President--it was delegated to the Congress only. If, however, it had been a riotous combination or an insurrection, it musthave been, according to the Constitution, against the State; and thepower of the President to call forth the militia to suppress it, wasdependent upon an application from the State for that purpose; it couldnot precede such application, and still less could it be rightfullyexercised against the will of a State. The authorities on this subjecthave been heretofore cited, and need not be referred to again. 

Suffice it to say that, by section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution, the United States are bound to protect each State against invasion andagainst domestic violence, whenever application shall have been made bythe Legislature, or by the Executive when the Legislature can not beconvened; and that to fail to give protection against any invasionwhatsoever would be a dereliction of duty. To add that there could be nojustification for the invasion of a State by an army of the UnitedStates, is but to repeat what has been said, on the absence of anyauthority in the General Government to coerce a State. In any possibleview of the case, therefore, the conclusion must be, that the calling onsome of the States for seventy-five thousand militia to invade otherStates which were asserted to be still in the Union, was a palpableviolation of the Constitution, and the usurpation of undelegated power, or, in other words, of power reserved to the States or to the people. 

It might, therefore, have been anticipated that Virginia--one of whosesons wrote the Declaration of Independence, another of whose sons ledthe armies of the United States in the Revolution which achieved theirindependence, and another of whose sons mainly contributed to theadoption of the Constitution of the Union--would not have been slow, inthe face of such events, to reclaim the grants she had made to theGeneral Government, and to withdraw from the Union, to the establishmentof which she had so largely contributed. 

Two days had elapsed between the surrender of Fort Sumter and theproclamation of President Lincoln calling for seventy-five thousandmilitia as before stated. Two other days elapsed, and Virginia passedher ordinance of secession, and two days thereafter the citizens ofBaltimore resisted the passage of troops through that city on their wayto make war upon the Southern States. Thus rapidly did the current ofevents bear us onward from peace to the desolating war which was soon toensue. 

The manly effort of the unorganized, unarmed citizens of Baltimore toresist the progress of armies for the invasion of her Southern sisters, was worthy of the fair fame of Maryland; becoming the descendants of themen who so gallantly fought for the freedom, independence, andsovereignty of the States. 

The bold stand, then and thereafter taken, extorted a promise from theExecutive authorities that no more troops should be sent through thecity of Baltimore, which promise, however, was only observed until, byartifice, power had been gained to disregard it. 

Virginia, as has been heretofore stated, passed her ordinance ofsecession on the 17th of April. It was, however, subject to ratificationby the people at an election to be held on the fourth Thursday of May. She was in the mean time, like her Southern sisters, the object ofNorthern hostilities, and, having a common cause with them, properlyanticipated the election of May by forming an alliance with theConfederate States, which was ratified by the Convention on the 25th ofApril. 

The Convention for that alliance set forth that Virginia, looking to aspeedy union with the Confederate States, and for the purpose of meetingpressing exigencies, agreed that "the whole military force and militaryoperations, offensive and defensive, of said Commonwealth, in theimpending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chiefcontrol and direction of the President of the said Confederate States. "The whole was made subject to the approval and ratification of theproper authorities of both governments respectively. 

To those who criticise South Carolina as having acted precipitately inwithdrawing from the Union, it may be answered that interveningoccurrences show that her delay could not have changed the result; and, further, that her prompt action had enabled her better to prepare forthe contingency which it was found impossible to avert. Thus she wasprepared in the first necessities of Virginia to send to her troopsorganized and equipped. 

Before the convention for coöperation with the Confederate States hadbeen adopted by Virginia, that knightly soldier, General Bonham, ofSouth Carolina, went with his brigade to Richmond; and, throughout theSouthern States, there was a prevailing desire to rush to Virginia, where it was foreseen that the first great battles of the war were to befought; so that, as early as the 22d of April, I telegraphed to GovernorLetcher that, in addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitionshad been made for thirteen regiments, eight to rendezvous at Lynchburg, four at Richmond, and one at Harper's Ferry. Referring to an applicationthat had been made to him from Baltimore, I wrote: "Sustain Baltimore ifpracticable. We will reënforce you. " The universal feeling was that of acommon cause and common destiny. There was no selfish desire to lingeraround home, no narrow purpose to separate local interests from thecommon welfare. The object was to sustain a principle--the broadprinciple of constitutional liberty, the right of self-government. 

The early demonstrations of the enemy showed that Virginia was liable toinvasion from the north, from the east, and from the west. Though thelarger preparation indicated that the most serious danger to beapprehended was from the line of the Potomac, the first conflictsoccurred in the east. 

The narrow peninsula between the James and York Rivers had topographicalfeatures well adapted to defense. It was held by General John B. Magruder, who skillfully improved its natural strength by artificialmeans, and there, on the ground memorable as the field of the lastbattle of the Revolution, in which General Washington compelled LordCornwallis to surrender, Magruder, with a small force, held for a longtime the superior forces of the enemy in check. 

CHAPTER II. 

 The Supply of Arms; of Men. --Love of the Union. --Secessionists few. --Efforts to prevent the Final Step. --Views of the People. --Effect on their Agriculture. --Aid from African Servitude. --Answer to the Clamors on the Horrors of Slavery. --Appointment of a Commissary-General. --His Character and Capacity. --Organization, Instruction, and Equipment of the Army. --Action of Congress. --The Law. --Its Signification. --The Hope of a Peaceful Solution early entertained; rapidly diminished. --Further Action of Congress. --Policy of the Government for Peace. --Position of Officers of United States Army. --The Army of the States, not of the Government. --The Confederate Law observed by the Government. --Officers retiring from United States Army. --Organization of Bureaus. 

The question of supplying arms and munitions of war was the firstconsidered, because it was the want for which it was the most difficultto provide. Of men willing to engage in the defense of their country, there were many more than we could arm. 

Though the prevailing sentiment of the Southern people was a cordialattachment to the Union as it was formed by their fathers, their lovewas for the spirit of the compact, for the liberties it was designed tosecure, for the self-government and State sovereignty which had been wonby separation from the mother-country, and transmitted to them by theirRevolutionary sires as a legacy for their posterity for ever. The numberof those who desired to dissolve the Union, even though the Constitutionshould be faithfully observed--those who, in the language of the day, were called "secessionists _per se_"--was so small as not to be felt inany popular decision; but the number of those who held that the Stateshad surrendered their sovereignty, and had no right to secede from theUnion, was so inappreciably small, if indeed any such existed, that Ican not recall the fact of a single Southern advocate of that opinion. The assertion of the right is not to be confounded with a readiness toexercise it. Many who had no doubt as to the right, looked upon itsexercise with reluctance amounting to sorrow, and claimed that it shouldbe the last resort, only to be adopted as the alternative to a surrenderof the equality in the Union of States, free, sovereign, andindependent. Of that class, forming a large majority of the people ofMississippi, I may speak with the confidence of one who belonged to it. Thus, after the Legislature of Mississippi had enacted a law for aconvention which, representing the sovereignty of the State, shouldconsider the propriety of passing an ordinance to reassume the grantsmade to the General Government, and withdraw from the Union, I, as aUnited States Senator of Mississippi, retained my position in theSenate, and sought by every practicable mode to obtain such measures aswould allay the excitement and afford to the South such security aswould prevent the final step, the ordinance of secession from the Union. 

When the last hope of preserving the Union of the Constitution wasextinguished, and the ordinance of secession was enacted by theConvention of Mississippi, which was the highest authority known underour form of government, the question of the expediency of adopting thatremedy was no longer open to inquiry by one who acknowledged hisallegiance as due to the State of which he was a citizen. To evade theresponsibilities resulting from the decree of his sovereign, the people, would be craven; to resist it would be treason. The instincts andaffections of the citizens of Mississippi led them with great unanimityto the duty of maintaining and defending their State, without pausing toask what would be the consequences of refusing obedience to its mandate. A like feeling pervaded all of the seceding States, and it was not onlyfor the military service, but for every service which would strengthenand sustain the Confederacy, that an enthusiasm pervading all classes, sexes, and ages was manifested. 

Though our agricultural products had been mainly for export, insomuchthat in the planting States the necessary food-supplies were to aconsiderable extent imported from the West, and it would require thatthe habits of the planters should be changed from the cultivation ofstaples for export to the production of supplies adequate for homeconsumption and the support of armies in the field, yet, even under theembarrassments of war, this was expected, and for a long time the resultjustified the expectation, extraordinary as it must appear when viewedby comparison with other people who have been subjected to a likeordeal. Much of our success was due to the much-abused institution ofAfrican servitude, for it enabled the white men to go into the army, andleave the cultivation of their fields and the care of their flocks, aswell as of their wives and children, to those who, in the language ofthe Constitution, were "held to service or labor. " A passing remark mayhere be appropriate as to the answer thus afforded to the clamor aboutthe "horrors of slavery. "

Had these Africans been a cruelly oppressed people, restlesslystruggling to be freed from their bonds, would their masters have daredto leave them, as was done, and would they have remained as they did, continuing their usual duties, or could the proclamation of emancipationhave been put on the plea of a military necessity, if the fact had beenthat the negroes were forced to serve, and desired only an opportunityto rise against their masters? It will be remembered that, when theproclamation was issued, it was confessed by President Lincoln to be anullity beyond the limit within which it could be enforced by theFederal troops. 

To direct the production, preservation, collection, and distribution offood for the army required a man of rare capacity and character at thehead of the subsistence department. It was our good fortune to have suchan one in Colonel L. B. Northrop, who was appointed commissary-generalat the organization of the bureaus of the executive department of theConfederate Government. He had been an officer of the United StatesArmy, had served in various parts of the South, had been for some timeon duty in the commissariat, and, to the special and general knowledgethus acquired, added strong practical sense and incorruptible integrity. Of him and the operations of the subsistence department I shall havemore to say hereafter, when treating of the bureaus of the Confederacy. 

Assured of an army as large as the population of the Confederate Statescould furnish, and a sufficient supply of subsistence for such an army, at least until the chances of war should interfere with production andtransportation, the immediate object of attention was the organization, instruction, and equipment of the army. 

As heretofore stated, there was a prevailing belief that there would beno war, or, if any, that it would be of very short duration. Thereforethe first bill which passed the provisional Congress provided forreceiving troops for short periods--as my memory serves, for sixty days. The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the heroic ColonelBartow, who sealed his devotion to the cause with his life's blood onthe field of Manassas, in deference to my earnest remonstrance againstsuch a policy, returned with the bill to the House (the Congress thenconsisted of but one House), and procured a modification by which theterm of service was extended to twelve months unless sooner discharged. 

I had urged upon him, in our conference, the adoption of a much longerperiod, but he assured me that one year was as much as the Congresswould agree to. On this, as on other occasions, that Congress showed agenerous desire to yield their preconceived opinions to my objections asfar as they consistently could, and, there being but one House, it waseasier to change the terms of a bill after conference with the Executivethan when, under the permanent organization, objections had to beformally communicated in a message to that branch of Congress in whichthe bill originated, and when the whole proceeding was of record. 

This first act to provide for the public defense became a law on the28th of February, 1861, and its fifth section so clearly indicates theopinions and expectations prevailing when the Confederation was formed, that it is inserted here:

 "That the President be further authorized to receive into the service of this Government such forces now in the service of said States (Confederate States) as may be tendered, or who may volunteer by consent of their State, in such numbers as he may require for any time not less than twelve months unless sooner discharged. "

The supremacy of the States is the controlling idea. The President wasauthorized to receive from the several States the arms and munitionswhich they might desire to transfer to the Government of the ConfederateStates, and he was also authorized to receive the forces which theStates might tender, or any which should volunteer by the _consent oftheir State_, for any time not less than twelve months unless soonerdischarged; and such forces were to be received with their officers bycompanies, battalions, or regiments, and the President, by and with theadvice and consent of Congress, was to appoint such general officer orofficers for said forces as might be necessary for the service. 

It will be seen that the arms and munitions within the limits of theseveral States were regarded as entirely belonging to them; that theforces which were to constitute the provisional army could only be drawnfrom the several States by their consent, and that these were to beorganized under State authority and to be received with their officersso appointed; that the lowest organization was to be that of a companyand the highest that of a regiment, and that the appointment of generalofficers to command these forces was confided to the Government of theConfederate States, should the assembling of large bodies of troopsrequire organization above that of a regiment; and it will also beobserved that provision was made for the discharge of the forces soprovided for, before the term of service fixed by the law. No one willfail to perceive how little was anticipated a war of the vastproportions and great duration which ensued, and how tenaciously thesovereignty and self-government of the States were adhered to. At alater period (March 16, 1861) the Congress adopted resolutionsrecommending to the respective States to "cede the forts, arsenals, navy-yards, dock-yards, and other public establishments within theirrespective limits to the Confederate States, " etc. 

The hope which was early entertained of a peaceful solution of theissues pending between the Confederate States and the United Statesrapidly diminished, so that we find on the 6th of March that theCongress, in its preamble to an act to provide for the public defense, begins with the declaration that, "in order to provide speedily forcesto repel invasion, " etc. , authorized the President to employ themilitia, and to ask for and accept the services of any number ofvolunteers, not exceeding one hundred thousand, and to organizecompanies into battalions, battalions into regiments, and regiments intobrigades and divisions. As in the first law, the President wasauthorized to appoint the commanding officer of such brigades anddivisions, the commissions only to endure while the brigades were inservice. 

On the same day (March 6, 1861) was enacted the law for theestablishment and organization of the Army of the Confederate States ofAmerica, this being in contradistinction to the provisional army, whichwas to be composed of troops tendered by the States, as in the firstact, and volunteers received, as in the second act, to constitute aprovisional army. That the wish and policy of the Government was peaceis again manifested in this act, which, in providing for the militaryestablishment of the Confederacy, fixed the number of enlisted men ofall arms at nine thousand four hundred and twenty. Due care was taken toprevent the appointment of incompetent or unworthy persons to beofficers of the army, and the right to promotion up to and including thegrade of colonel was carefully guarded, and beyond this the professionalcharacter of the army was recognized as follows: "Appointments to therank of brigadier-general, after the army is organized, shall be made byselection from the army. " There being no right of promotion above thegrade of colonel in the Army of the United States, selection forappointment to the rank of general had no other restriction than thenecessity for confirmation by the Senate. The provision just quotedimposed the further restriction of requiring the person nominated byselection to have previously been an officer of the Army of theConfederate States. 

Regarding the Army of the United States as belonging neither to asection of the Union nor to the General Government, but to the Statesconjointly while they remained united, it follows as a corollary of theproposition that, when disintegration occurred, the undivided_personnel_ composing the army would be left free to choose their futureplace of service. Therefore, provision was made for securing toofficers, who should leave the Army of the United States and join thatof the Confederate States, the same relative rank in the latter whichthey held in the former. 

 "Be it further enacted that all officers who have resigned, or who may within six months tender their resignations, from the Army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed to original vacancies in the Army of the Confederate States, the commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the relative rank of officers of each grade shall be determined by their former commissions in the United States Army, held anterior to the secession of these Confederate States from the United States. "

The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was ofthe States, not of the Government, and was to secure to officersadhering to the Confederate States the same relative rank which they hadbefore those States had withdrawn from the Union. It was clearly theintent of the law to embrace in this provision only those officers whohad resigned or who should resign from the United States Army to enterthe service of the Confederacy, or who, in other words, should thus betransferred from one service to the other. It is also to be noted that, in the eleventh section of the act to which this was amendatory, theright of promotion up to the grade of colonel, in established regimentsand corps, was absolutely secured, but that appointments to the highergrade should be by selection, at first without restriction, but afterthe army had been organized the selection was confined to the army, thusrecognizing the profession of arms, and relieving officers from thehazard, beyond the limit of their legal right to promotion, of beingsuperseded by civilians through favoritism or political influence. 

How well the Government of the Confederacy observed both the letter andthe spirit of the law will be seen by reference to its action in thematter of appointments. It is a noteworthy fact that the three highestofficers in rank, and whose fame stands unchallenged either forefficiency or zeal, were all so indifferent to any question of personalinterest, that they had received their appointment before they wereaware it was to be conferred. Each brought from the Army of the UnitedStates an enviable reputation, such as would have secured to him, had hechosen to remain in it, after the war commenced, any position hisambition could have coveted. Therefore, against considerations ofself-interest, and impelled by devotion to principle, they severed theties, professional and personal, which had bound them from their youthup to the time when the Southern States, asserting the consecrated truththat all governments rest on the consent of the governed, decided towithdraw from the Union they had voluntarily entered, and the NorthernStates resolved to coerce them to remain in it against their will. Theseofficers were--first, Samuel Cooper, a native of New York, a graduate ofthe United States Military Academy in 1815, and who served continuouslyin the army until March 7, 1861, with such distinction as secured to himthe appointment of Adjutant-General of the United States Army. Second, Albert Sidney Johnston, a native of Kentucky, a graduate of the UnitedStates Military Academy in 1826, served conspicuously in the army until1834, then served in the army of the Republic of Texas, and then in theUnited States Volunteers in the war with Mexico. Subsequently hereëntered the United States Army, and for meritorious conduct attainedthe rank of brevet brigadier-general. After the secession of Texas, hisadopted State, he resigned his commission in the United States Army, May3, 1861, and traveled by land from California to Richmond to offer hisservices to the Confederacy. Third, Robert E. Lee, a native of Virginia, a graduate of the United States Military Academy in 1829, when he wasappointed in the Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and servedcontinuously and with such distinction as to secure for him in 1847brevets of three grades above his corps commission. He resigned from theArmy of the United States, April 25, 1861, upon the secession ofVirginia, in whose army he served until it was transferred to theConfederate States. 

Samuel Cooper was the first of these to offer his services to theConfederacy at Montgomery. Having known him most favorably andintimately as Adjutant-General of the United States Army when I wasSecretary of War, the value of his services in the organization of a newarmy was considered so great that I invited him to take the position ofAdjutant-General of the Confederate Army, which he accepted without aquestion either as to relative rank or anything else. The highest gradethen authorized by law was that of brigadier-general, and thatcommission was bestowed upon him. 

When General Albert Sidney Johnston reached Richmond he called upon me, and for several days at various intervals we conversed with the freedomand confidence belonging to the close friendship which had existedbetween us for many years. Consequent upon a remark made by me, he askedto what duty I would assign him, and, when answered, to serve in theWest, he expressed his pleasure at service in that section, but inquiredhow he was to raise his command, and for the first time learned that hehad been nominated and confirmed as a general in the Army of theConfederacy. 

The third, General Robert E. Lee, had been commissioned by the State ofVirginia as major-general and commander of her army. When that army wastransferred, after the accession of Virginia to the Confederate States, he was nominated to be brigadier-general in the Confederate Army, butwas left for obvious reasons in command of the forces in Virginia. Afterthe seat of government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, thecourse of events on the Southern Atlantic coast induced me to directGeneral Lee to repair thither. Before leaving, he said that, while hewas serving in Virginia, he had never thought it needful to inquireabout his rank; but now, when about to go into other States and to meetofficers with whom he had not been previously connected, he would liketo be informed upon that point. Under recent laws, authorizingappointments to higher grades than that of his first commission, he hadbeen appointed a full general; but so wholly had his heart and his mindbeen consecrated to the public service, that he had not remembered, ifhe ever knew, of his advancement. 

In organizing the bureaus, it was deemed advisable to select, for thechief of each, officers possessing special knowledge of the duties to beperformed. The best assurance of that qualification was believed to beservice creditably rendered in the several departments of the UnitedStates Army before resigning from it. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Myers, who had held many important trusts in the United StatesQuartermaster's Department, was appointed Quartermaster-General of theConfederacy, with the rank of colonel. 

Captain L. B. Northrop, a gallant officer of the United States Dragoons, and who, by reason of a wound disabling him to perform regimental duty, had been employed in the subsistence department, was, after resigningfrom the United States Army, appointed Commissary-General of theConfederate States Army, with the rank of colonel. I have heretoforealluded to the difficult task thus imposed on him, and the success withwhich he performed it, and would be pleased here to enter into a fullerrecital, but have not the needful information in regard to hisadministration of that department. 

Surgeon L. P. Moore, an officer of recognized merit in the United StatesMedical Department, from which he had resigned to join the Confederacy, was appointed the Surgeon-General of the Confederate States Army. As inthe case of other departments, there was in this a want of the storesrequisite, as well for the field as the hospital. 

To supply medicines which were declared by the enemy to be contraband ofwar, our medical department had to seek in the forest for substitutes, and to add surgical instruments and appliances to the small stock onhand as best they could. 

It would be quite beyond my power to do justice to the skill andknowledge with which the medical corps performed their arduous task, andregret that I have no report from the Surgeon-General, Moore, whichwould enable me to do justice to the officers of his corps, as well inregard to their humanity as to their professional skill. 

In no branch of our service were our needs so great and our means tomeet them relatively so small as in the matter of ordnance and ordnancestores. The Chief of Ordnance, General Gorgas, had been an ordnanceofficer of the United States Army, and resigned to join the Confederacy. He has favored me with a succinct though comprehensive statement, whichhas enabled me to write somewhat fully of that department; but, for thebetter understanding of its operations, the reader is referred to theordnance report elsewhere. 

CHAPTER III. 

 Commissioners to purchase Arms and Ammunition. --My Letter to Captain Semmes. --Resignations of Officers of United States Navy. --Our Destitution of Accessories for the Supply of Naval Vessels. --Secretary Mallory. --Food-Supplies. --The Commissariat Department. --The Quartermaster's Department. --The Disappearance of Delusions. --The Supply of Powder. --Saltpeter. --Sulphur. -- Artificial Niter-Beds. --Services of General G. W. Rains. -- Destruction at Harper's Ferry of Machinery. --The Master Armorer. --Machinery secured. --Want of Skillful Employees. -- Difficulties encountered by Every Department of the Executive Branch of the Government. 

On the third day after my inauguration at Montgomery, an officer ofextensive information and high capacity was sent to the North, to makepurchases of arms, ammunition, and machinery; and soon afterward anotherofficer was sent to Europe, to buy in the market as far as possible, and, furthermore, to make contracts for arms and munitions to bemanufactured. Captain (afterward Admiral) Semmes, the officer who wassent to the North, would have been quite successful but for theintervention of the civil authorities, preventing the delivery of thevarious articles contracted for. The officer who was sent to Europe, Major Huse, found few serviceable arms upon the market; he, however, succeeded in making contracts for the manufacture of large quantities, being in advance of the agents sent from the Northern Government for thesame purpose. For further and more detailed information, reference ismade to the monograph of the Chief of Ordnance. 

My letter of instructions to Captain Semmes was as follows:

 "Montgomery, Alabama, _February 21, 1861_. 

 "Dear Sir: As agent of the Confederate States, you are authorized to proceed, as hereinafter set forth, to make purchases, and contracts for machinery and munitions, or for the manufacture of arms and munitions of war. 

 "Of the proprietor of the ---- Powder Company, in ----, you will probably be able to obtain cannon- and musket-powder--the former to be of the coarsest grain; and also to engage with him for the establishment of a powder-mill at some point in the limits of our territory. 

 "The quantity of powder to be supplied immediately will exceed his stock on hand, and the arrangement for further supply should, if possible, be by manufacture in our own territory; if this is not practicable, means must be sought for further shipments from any and all sources which are reliable. 

 "At the arsenal at Washington you will find an artisan named ----, who has brought the cap-making machine to its present state of efficiency, and who might furnish a cap-machine, and accompany it to direct its operations. If not in this, I hope you may in some other way be able to obtain a cap-machine with little delay, and have it sent to the Mount Vernon Arsenal, Alabama. 

 "We shall require a manufactory for friction-primers, and you will, if possible, induce some capable person to establish one in our country. The demand of the Confederate States will be the inducement in this as in the case of the powder-mill proposed. 

 "A short time since, the most improved machinery for the manufacture of rifles, intended for the Harper's Ferry Armory, was, it was said, for sale by the manufacturer. If it be so at this time, you will procure it for this Government, and use the needful precaution in relation to its transportation. Mr. ---- ----, of the Harper's Ferry Armory, can give you all the information in that connection which you may require. Mr. Ball, the master armorer at Harper's Ferry, is willing to accept service under our Government, and could probably bring with him skilled workmen. If we get the machinery, this will be important. 

 "Machinery for grooving muskets and heavy guns is, I hope, to be purchased ready made. If not, you will contract for its manufacture and delivery. You will endeavor to obtain the most improved shot for rifled cannon, and persons skilled in the preparation of that and other fixed ammunition. Captain G. W. Smith and Captain Lovell, late of the United States Army, and now of New York City, may aid you in your task; and you will please say to them that we will be happy to have their services in our army. 

 "You will make such inquiries as your varied knowledge will suggest in relation to the supply of guns of different calibers, especially the largest. I suggest the advantage, if to be obtained, of having a few of the fifteen-inch guns, like the one cast at Pittsburg. 

 "I have not sought to prescribe so as to limit your inquiries, either as to object or place, but only to suggest for your reflection and consideration the points which have chanced to come under my observation. You will use your discretion in visiting places where information of persons or things is to be obtained for the furtherance of the object in view. Any contracts made will be sent to the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, for his approval; and the contractor need not fear that delay will be encountered in the action of this Government. 

 "Very respectfully yours, etc. , (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

Captain Semmes had also been directed to seek for vessels which wouldserve for naval purposes, and, after his return, reported that he couldnot find any vessels which in his judgment were, or could be made, available for our uses. The Southern officers of the navy who were incommand of United States vessels abroad, under an idea more creditableto their sentiment than to their knowledge of the nature of ourconstitutional Union, brought the vessels they commanded into the portsof the North, and, having delivered them to the authorities of theUnited States Government, generally tendered their resignations, andrepaired to the States from which they had been commissioned in thenavy, to serve where they held their allegiance to be due. The theorythat they owed allegiance to their respective States was founded on thefact that the Federal Government was of the States; the sequence was, that the navy belonged to the States, not to their agent the FederalGovernment; and, when the States ceased to be united, the naval vesselsand armament should have been divided among the owners. While we honorthe sentiment which caused them to surrender their heart-boundassociations, and the profession to which they were bred, on which theyrelied for subsistence, to go, with nothing save their swords andfaithful hearts, to fight, to bleed, and to die if need be, in defenseof their homes and a righteous cause, we can but remember how much waslost by their view of what their honor and duty demanded. Far, however, be it from their countrymen, for that or any other consideration, towish that their fidelity to the dictates of a conscientious beliefshould have yielded to any temptation of interest. The course theypursued shows how impossible it was that they should have done so, forwhat did they not sacrifice to their sense of right! We were doublybereft by losing our share of the navy we had contributed to build, andby having it all employed to assail us. The application of theappropriations for the Navy of the United States had been such that theconstruction of vessels had been at the North, though much of the timberused and other material employed was transported from the South toNorthern ship-yards. Therefore, we were without the accessories needfulfor the rapid supply of naval vessels. 

While attempting whatever was practicable at home, we sent a competent, well-deserving officer of the navy to England to obtain there andelsewhere, by purchase or by building, vessels which could betransformed into ships of war. These efforts and their results will benoticed more fully hereafter. 

It may not be amiss to remark here that, if the anticipations of ourpeople were not realized, it was not from any lack of the zeal andability of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory. As was heretoforestated, his fondness for and aptitude in nautical affairs had led him toknow much of vessels, their construction and management, and, aschairman of the Committee on United States Naval Affairs, he hadsuperadded to this a very large acquaintance with officers of the UnitedStates Navy, which gave him the requisite information for the mostuseful employment of the instructed officers who joined our service. 

At the North many had been deceived by the fictions of preparations atthe South for the war of the sections, and among ourselves were few whorealized how totally deficient the Southern States were in all which wasnecessary to the active operations of an army, however gallant the menmight be, and however able were the generals who directed and led them. From these causes, operating jointly, resulted undue caution at theNorth and overweening confidence at the South. The habits of our peoplein hunting, and protecting their stock in fields from the ravages offerocious beasts, caused them to be generally supplied with the armsused for such purposes. The facility with which individuals traveledover the country led to very erroneous ideas as to the difficulties oftransporting an army. The small amount of ammunition required in time ofpeace gave no measure of the amount requisite for warlike operations, and the products of a country, which insufficiently supplied food forits inhabitants when peaceful pursuits were uninterrupted, would servebut a short time to furnish the commissariat of a large army. It was, ofcourse, easy to foresee that, if war was waged against the secedingStates by all of those which remained in the Union, the large supply ofprovisions which had been annually sent from the Northwest to the Southcould not, under the altered circumstances, be relied on. That ourpeople did not more immediately turn their attention to the productionof food-supplies, may be attributed to the prevailing delusion thatsecession would not be followed by war. To the able officer then at thehead of the commissariat department, Colonel L. B. Northrop, much creditis due for his well-directed efforts to provide both for immediate andprospective wants. It gives me the greater pleasure to say this, becausethose less informed of all he did, and skillfully tried to do, have beenprofuse of criticism, and sparing indeed of the meed justly his due. Adequate facilities for transportation might have relieved the localwant of supplies, especially in Virginia, where the largest bodies oftroops were assembled; but, unfortunately, the quartermaster'sdepartment was scarcely less provided than that of the commissary. Notonly were the railroads insufficient in number, but they were poorlyfurnished with rolling stock, and had been mainly dependent uponNorthern foundries and factories for their rails and equipment. Even theskilled operatives of the railroads were generally Northern men, andtheir desertion followed fast upon every disaster which attended theConfederate arms. In addition to other causes which have been mentioned, the idea that Cotton was king, and would produce foreign intervention, as well as a desire of the Northern people for the return of peace andthe restoration of trade, exercised a potent influence in preventing ouragriculturists from directing at an early period their capital and laborto the production of food-supplies rather than that of our staple forexport. As one after another the illusions vanished, and the materialnecessities of a great war were recognized by our people, never didpatriotic devotion exhibit brighter examples of the sacrifice ofself-interest and the abandonment of fixed habits and opinions, or moreeffective and untiring effort to meet the herculean task which was setbefore them. Being one of the few who regarded secession and war asinevitably connected, my early attention was given to the organizationof military forces and the procurement and preparation of the munitionsof war. If our people had not gone to war without counting the cost, they were, nevertheless, involved in it without means of providing forits necessities. It has been heretofore stated that we had nopowder-mills. It would be needless to say that the new-born Governmenthad no depots of powder, but it may be well to add that, beyond thesmall supply required for sporting purposes, our local traders had nostock on hand. Having no manufacturing industries which requiredsaltpeter, very little of that was purchasable in our markets. The samewould have been the case in regard to sulphur, but for the fact that ithad been recently employed in the clarification of sugar-cane juice, andthus a considerable amount of it was found in New Orleans. Promptmeasures were taken to secure a supply of sulphur, and parties wereemployed to obtain saltpeter from the caves, as well as from the earthof old tobacco-houses and cellars; and artificial niter-beds were madeto provide for prospective wants. Of soft wood for charcoal there wasabundance, and thus materials were procured for the manufacture ofgunpowder to meet the demand which would arise when the limited quantitypurchased by the Confederate Government at the North should beexhausted. 

It was our good fortune to secure the services of an able and scientificsoldier, General G. W. Rains, who, to a military education, addedexperience in a large manufacturing establishment, and to him wasconfided the construction of a powder-mill, and the manufacture ofpowder, both for artillery and small-arms. The appalling contemplationof the inauguration of a great war, without powder or a navy to secureits importation from abroad, was soon relieved by the extraordinaryefforts of the ordnance department and the well-directed skill ofGeneral Rains, to whom it is but a just tribute to say that, beginningwithout even instructed workmen, he had, before the close of the war, made what, in the opinion of competent judges, has been pronounced to bethe best powder-mill in the world, and in which powder of every varietyof grain was manufactured of materials which had been purified fromthose qualities which cause its deterioration under long exposure to amoist atmosphere. 

The avowed purpose and declared obligation of the Federal Government wasto occupy and possess the property belonging to the United States, yetone of the first acts was to set fire to the armory at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, the only establishment of the kind in the Southern States, andthe only Southern depository of the rifles which the General Governmenthad then on hand. 

What conclusion is to be drawn from such action? To avoid attributing abreach of solemn pledges, it must be supposed that Virginia wasconsidered as out of the Union, and a public enemy, in whose borders itwas proper to destroy whatever might be useful to her of the commonproperty of the States lately united. 

As soon as the United States troops had evacuated the place, thecitizens and armorers went to work to save the armory as far as possiblefrom destruction, and to secure valuable material stored in it. Themaster armorer, Armistead Ball, so bravely and skillfully directed theseefforts, that a large part of the machinery and materials was saved fromthe flames. The subduing of the fire was a dangerous and difficult task, and great credit is due to those who, under the orders of Master ArmorerBall, attempted and achieved it. When the fire was extinguished, thework was continued and persevered in until all the valuable machineryand material had been collected, boxed, and shipped to Richmond, aboutthe end of the summer of 1861. The machinery thus secured was dividedbetween the arsenals at Richmond, Virginia, and Fayetteville, NorthCarolina, and, when repaired and put in working condition, supplied tosome extent the want which existed in the South of means for thealteration and repair of old or injured arms, and finally contributed toincrease the very scanty supply of arms with which our country wasfurnished when the war began. The practice of the Federal Government, which had kept the construction and manufacture of the material of warat the North, had consequently left the South without the requisitenumber of skilled workmen by whose labor machinery could at once be madefully effective if it were obtained; indeed, the want of such employeesprevented the small amount of machinery on hand from being worked to itsfull capacity. The gallant Master Armorer Ball, whose capacity, zeal, and fidelity deserve more than a passing notice, was sent with that partof the machinery assigned to the Fayetteville Arsenal. The toil, theanxiety, and responsibility of his perilous position at Harper's Ferry, where he remained long after the protecting force of the Confederatearmy retired, had probably undermined a constitution so vigorous that, in the face of a great exigency, no labor seemed too great or too longfor him to grapple with and endure. So, like a ship which, after havingweathered the storm, goes down in the calm, the master armorer, soonafter he took his quiet post at Fayetteville, was "found dead in hisbed. "

The difficulties which on every side met the several departments of theexecutive branch of the Government one must suppose were but littleappreciated by many, whose opportunities for exact observation were thebest, as one often meets with self-complacent expressions as to modes ofachieving readily what prompt, patient, zealous effort proved to beinsurmountable. In the progress of this work, it is hoped, will bepresented not only the magnitude of the obstacles, but the spirit andcapacity with which they were encountered by the unseen and muchundervalued labors of the officers of the several departments, on whomdevolved provision for the civil service, as well as for the armies inthe field. Already has the report of General St. John, Commissary-General of Subsistence, of the operations of that department, justbefore the close of the war, exposed the hollowness of many sensationalpictures intended to fix gross neglect or utter incapacity on theExecutive. 

The hoped-for and expected monograms of other chiefs of bureaus willsilence like criticisms on each, so far as they are made by those whoare not willfully blind, or maliciously intent on the circulation offalsehood. 

CHAPTER IV. 

 The Proclamation for Seventy-five Thousand Men by President Lincoln further examined. --The Reasons presented by him to Mankind for the Justification of his Conduct shown to be Mere Fictions, having no Relation to the Question. --What is the Value of Constitutional Liberty, of Bills of Rights, of Limitations of Powers, if they may be transgressed at Pleasure?--Secession of South Carolina. --Proclamation of Blockade. --Session of Congress at Montgomery. --Extracts from the President's Message. --Acts of Congress. --Spirit of the People. --Secession of Border States. --Destruction of United States Property by Order of President Lincoln. 

If any further evidence had been required to show that it was thedetermination of the Northern people not only to make no concessions tothe grievances of the Southern States, but to increase them to the lastextremity, it was furnished by the proclamation of President Lincoln, issued on April 15, 1861. This proclamation, which has already beenmentioned, requires a further examination, as it was the officialdeclaration, on the part of the Government of the United States, of thewar which ensued. In it the President called for seventy-five thousandmen to suppress "combinations" opposed to the laws, and obstructingtheir execution in seven sovereign States which had retired from theUnion. Seventy-five thousand men organized and equipped are a powerfularmy, and, when raised to operate against these States, nothing elsethan war could be intended. The words in which he summoned this forcewere these: "Whereas the laws of the United States have been for sometime past, and now are, opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed bythe ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested inthe marshals by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, by virtue ofthe power in me vested by the Constitution and laws, " etc. 

The power granted in the Constitution is thus expressed: "The Congressshall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute thelaws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. "[169] Itwas to the Congress, not the Executive, to whom the power was delegated, and thus early was commenced a long series of usurpations of powersinconsistent with the purposes for which the Union was formed, anddestructive of the fraternity it was designed to perpetuate. 

On November 6, 1860, the Legislature of South Carolina assembled andgave the vote of the State for electors of a President of the UnitedStates. On the next day an act was passed calling a State Convention toassemble on December 17th, to determine the question of the withdrawalof the State from the United States. Candidates for membership wereimmediately nominated. All were in favor of secession. The Conventionassembled on December 17th, and on the 20th passed "an ordinance todissolve the union between the State of South Carolina and other Statesunited with her under the compact entitled 'The Constitution of theUnited States of America. '" The ordinance began with these words: "We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, dodeclare and ordain, " etc. The State authorities immediately conformed tothis action of the Convention, and the laws and authority of the UnitedStates ceased to be obeyed within the limits of the State. About fourmonths afterward, when the State, in union with others which had joinedher, had possessed herself of the forts within her limits, which theUnited States Government had refused to evacuate, President Lincolnissued the above-mentioned proclamation. 

The State of South Carolina is designated in the proclamation as acombination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course ofjudicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law. This designation does not recognize the State, or manifest anyconsciousness of its existence, whereas South Carolina was one of thecolonies that had declared her independence, and, after a long andbloody war, she had been recognized as a sovereign State by GreatBritain, the only power to which she had ever owed allegiance. The factthat she had been one of the colonies in the original Congress, had beena member of the Confederation, and subsequently of the Union, strengthens, but surely can not impair, her claim to be a State. ThoughPresident Lincoln designated her as a "combination, " it did not make hera combination. Though he refused to recognize her as a State, it did notmake her any less a State. By assertion, he attempted to annihilateseven States; and the war which followed was to enforce therevolutionary edict, and to establish the supremacy of the GeneralGovernment on the ruins of the blood-bought independence of the States. 

By designating the State as a "combination, " and considering that undersuch a name it might be in a condition of insurrection, he assumed tohave authority to raise a great military force and attack the State. Yet, even if the fact had been as assumed, if an insurrection hadexisted, the President could not lawfully have derived the power heexercised from such condition of affairs. The provision of theConstitution is as follows: "The United States shall guarantee to everyState in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protecteach of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), againstdomestic violence. "[170] So the guarantee availed not at all to justifythe act which it was presented to excuse--the fact being that a State, and not an "unlawful combination, " as asserted, was the object ofassault, and the case one of making war. For a State or union of Statesto attack with military force another State, is to make war. By theConstitution, the power to make war is given solely to Congress. "Congress shall have power to declare war, " says the Constitution. [171]And, again, "to raise and support armies. "[172] Thus, under a perverteduse of language, the Executive at Washington did that which heundeniably had no power to do, under a faithful observance of theConstitution. 

To justify himself to Congress and the people, or, rather, before theface of mankind, for this evasion of the Constitution of his country, President Lincoln, in his message to Congress, of July 4, 1861, resortedto the artifice of saying, "It [meaning the proceedings of theConfederate States] presents to the whole family of man the questionwhether a constitutional republic or democracy--a government of thepeople by the same people--can, or can not, maintain its territorialintegrity against its own domestic foes?"

The answer to this question is very plain. In the nature of things, nounion can be formed except by separate, independent, and distinctparties. Any other combination is not a union; and, upon the destructionof any of these elements in the parties, the union _ipso facto_ ceases. If the Government is the result of a union of States, then these Statesmust be separate, sovereign, and distinct, to be able to form a union, which is entirely an act of their own volition. Such a government asours had no power to maintain its existence any longer than thecontracting parties pleased to cohere, because it was founded on thegreat principle of voluntary federation, and organized "to establishjustice and insure domestic tranquillity. "[173] Any departure from thisprinciple by the General Government not only perverts and destroys itsnature, but furnishes a just cause to the injured State to withdraw fromthe union. A new union might subsequently be formed, but the originalone could never by coercion be restored. Any effort on the part of theothers to force the seceding State to consent to come back is an attemptat subjugation. It is a wrong which no lapse of time or combination ofcircumstances can ever make right. A forced union is a politicalabsurdity. No less absurd is President Lincoln's effort to dissever thesovereignty of the people from that of the State; as if there could be aState without a people, or a sovereign people without a State. 

But the question which Mr. Lincoln presents "to the whole family of man"deserves a further notice. The answer which he seems to infer would begiven "by the whole family of man" is that such a government as hesupposes "can maintain its territorial integrity against its owndomestic foes. " And, therefore, he concluded that he was right in thejudgment of "the whole family of man" in commencing hostilities againstus. He says, "So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call outthe war power of the Government. " That is the power to make war againstforeign nations, for the Government has no other war power. Plantinghimself on this position, he commenced the devastation and bloodshedwhich followed to effect our subjugation. 

Nothing could be more erroneous than such views. The supposed case whichhe presents is entirely unlike the real case. The Government of theUnited States is like no other government. It is neither a"constitutional republic or democracy, " nor has it ever been thuscalled. Neither is it a "government of the people by the same people";but it is known and designated as "the Government of the United States. "It is an anomaly among governments. Its authority consists solely ofcertain powers delegated to it, as a common agent, by an association ofsovereign and independent States. These powers are to be exercised onlyfor certain specified objects; and the purposes, declared in thebeginning of the deed or instrument of delegation, were "to form a moreperfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, providefor the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure theblessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. "

The beginning and the end of all the powers of the Government of theUnited States are to be found in that instrument of delegation. All itspowers are there expressed, defined, and limited. It was only to thatinstrument Mr. Lincoln as President should have gone to learn hisduties. That was the chart which he had just solemnly pledged himself tothe country faithfully to follow. He soon deviated widely from it--andfatally erroneous was his course. The administration of the affairs of agreat people, at a most perilous period, is decided by the answer whichit is assumed "the whole family of man" would give to a supposedcondition of human affairs which did not exist and which could notexist. This is the ground upon which the rectitude of his cause wasplaced. He says, "No choice was left but to call out the war power ofthe Government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction byforce for its preservation. "

"Here, " he says, "no choice was left but to call out the war power ofthe Government. " For what purpose must he call out this war power? Heanswers, by saying, "and so to resist force employed for its destructionby force for its preservation. " But this which he asserts is not a fact. There was no "force employed for its destruction. " Let the reader turnto the record of the facts in Part III of this work, and peruse thefruitless efforts for peace which were made by us, and which Mr. Lincolndid not deign to notice. The assertion is not only incorrect, in statingthat force was employed by us, but also in declaring that it was for thedestruction of the Government of the United States. On the contrary, wewished to leave it alone. Our separation did not involve itsdestruction. To such fiction was Mr. Lincoln compelled to resort to giveeven apparent justice to his cause. He now goes to the Constitution forthe exercise of his war power, and here we have another fiction. 

On April 19th, four days later, President Lincoln issued anotherproclamation, announcing a blockade of the ports of seven confederatedStates, which was afterward extended to North Carolina and Virginia. Itfurther declared that all persons who should under their authoritymolest any vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo onboard, should be treated as pirates. In their efforts to subjugate us, the destruction of our commerce was regarded by the authorities atWashington as a most efficient measure. It was early seen that, althoughacts of Congress established ports of entry where commerce existed, theymight be repealed, and the ports nominally closed or declared to beclosed; yet such a declaration would be of no avail unless sustained bya naval force, as these ports were located in territory not subject tothe United States. An act was subsequently passed authorizing thePresident of the United States, in his discretion, to close our ports, but it was never executed. 

The scheme of blockade was resorted to, and a falsehood was asserted onwhich to base it. Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dallas: "You will say (toLord John Russell) that, by our own laws and the laws of nature and thelaws of nations, this Government has a clear right to suppressinsurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which havebeen seized by insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is aproper means to that end. "[174] This is the same doctrine of"combinations" fabricated by the authorities at Washington to serve asthe basis of a bloody revolution. Under the laws of nations, separategovernments when at war blockade each other's ports. This is decided tobe justifiable. But the Government of the United States could notconsent to justify its blockade of our ports on this ground, as it wouldbe an admission that the Confederate States were a separate and distinctsovereignty, and that the war was prosecuted only for subjugation. It, therefore, assumed that the withdrawal of the Southern States from theUnion was an insurrection. 

Was it an insurrection? When certain sovereign and independent Statesform a union with limited powers for some general purposes, and any oneor more of them, in the progress of time, suffer unjust and oppressivegrievances for which there is no redress but in a withdrawal from theassociation, is such withdrawal an insurrection? If so, then of whatadvantage is a compact of union to States? Within the Union areoppressions and grievances; and the attempt to go out brings war andsubjugation. The ambitious and aggressive States obtain possession ofthe central authority which, having grown strong in the lapse of time, asserts its entire sovereignty over the States. Whichever of them deniesit and seeks to retire, is declared to be guilty of insurrection, itscitizens are stigmatized as "rebels, " as if they had revolted against amaster, and a war of subjugation is begun. If this action is oncetolerated, where will it end? Where is the value of constitutionalliberty? What strength is there in bills of rights--in limitations ofpower? What new hope for mankind is to be found in writtenconstitutions, what remedy which did not exist under kings or emperors?If the doctrines thus announced by the Government of the United Statesare conceded, then, look through either end of the political telescope, and one sees only an empire, and the once famous Declaration ofIndependence trodden in the dust as a "glittering generality, " and thecompact of union denounced as a "flaunting lie. " Those who submit tosuch consequences without resistance are not worthy of the liberties andthe rights to which they were born, and deserve to be made slaves. Suchmust be the verdict of mankind. 

Men do not fight to make a fraternal union, neither do nations. Thesemilitary preparations of the Government of the United States signifiednothing less than the subjugation of the Southern States, so that, byone devastating blow, the North might grasp for ever that supremacy ithad so long coveted. 

To be prepared for self-defense, I called Congress together atMontgomery on April 29th, and, in the message of that date, thus spokeof the proclamation of the President of the United States: "Apparentlycontradictory as are the terms of this singular document, one point isunmistakably evident. The President of the United States calls for anarmy of seventy-five thousand men, whose first service is to be thecapture of our forts. It is a plain declaration of war, which I am notat liberty to disregard, because of my knowledge that, under theConstitution of the United States, the President is usurping a powergranted exclusively to Congress. "

I then proceeded to say that I did not feel at liberty to disregard thefact that many of the States seemed quite content to submit to theexercise of the powers assumed by the President of the United States, and were actively engaged in levying troops for the purpose indicated inthe proclamation. Meantime, being deprived of the aid of Congress, I hadbeen under the necessity of confining my action to a call on the Statesfor volunteers for the common defense, in accordance with authoritypreviously conferred on me. I stated that there were then in the field, at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, andPulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand more were on theirway to Virginia; that it was proposed to organize and hold in readinessfor instant action, in view of the existing exigencies of the country, an army of one hundred thousand men; and that, if a further force shouldbe needed, Congress would be appealed to for authority to call it intothe field. Finally, that the intent of the President of the UnitedStates, already developed, to invade our soil, capture our forts, blockade our ports, and wage war against us, rendered it necessary toraise means to a much larger amount than had been done, to defray theexpenses of maintaining independence and repelling invasion. 

A brief summary of the internal affairs of the Government followed, and, notwithstanding frequent declarations of the peaceful intentions of thewithdrawing States had been made in the most solemn manner, it wasdeemed not to be out of place to repeat them once more; and, therefore, the message closed with these words: "We protest solemnly, in the faceof mankind, that we desire peace at any sacrifice, save that of honor. In independence we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession ofany kind from the States with which we have lately been confederated. All we ask is to be let alone--that those who never held power over usshall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, we must, resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension isabandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready toenter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutuallybeneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firmreliance on that Divine Power which covers with its protection the justcause, we must continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government. "

At this session Congress passed acts authorizing the President to usethe whole land and naval force to meet the necessities of the war thuscommenced; to issue to private armed vessels letters of marque; inaddition to the volunteer force authorized to be raised, to accept theservices of volunteers, to serve during the war; to receive into theservice various companies of the different arms; to make a loan of fiftymillions of dollars in bonds and notes; and to hold an election forofficers of the permanent Government under the new Constitution. An actwas also passed to provide revenue from imports; another, relative toprisoners of war; and such others as were necessary to complete theinternal organization of the Government, and establish theadministration of public affairs. 

In every portion of the country there was exhibited the most patrioticdevotion to the common cause. Transportation companies freely tenderedthe use of their lines for troops and supplies. Requisitions for troopswere met with such alacrity that the number offering their services inevery instance greatly exceeded the demand and the ability to arm them. Men of the highest official and social position served as volunteers inthe ranks. The gravity of age and the zeal of youth rivaled each otherin the desire to be foremost in the public defense. 

The appearance of the proclamation of the President of the UnitedStates, calling out seventy-five thousand men, was followed by theimmediate withdrawal of the States of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and their union with the Confederate States. The former State, thus placed on the frontier and exposed to invasion, began to prepare for a resolute defense. Volunteers were ordered to beenrolled and held in readiness in every part of the State. ColonelRobert E. Lee, having resigned his commission in the United Statescavalry, was on April 22d nominated and confirmed by the StateConvention of Virginia as "Commander-in-Chief of the military and navalforces of the Commonwealth. "

Already the Northern officer in charge had evacuated Harper's Ferry, after having attempted to destroy the public buildings there. His reportsays: "I gave the order to apply the torch. In three minutes or less, both of the arsenal buildings, containing nearly fifteen thousand standof arms, together with the carpenter's shop, which was at the upper endof a long and connected series of workshops of the armory proper, werein a blaze. There is every reason for believing the destruction wascomplete. " Mr. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, on April 22d repliedto this report in these words: "I am directed by the President of theUnited States to communicate to you, and through you to the officers andmen under your command at Harper's Ferry Armory, the approbation of theGovernment of your and their judicious conduct there, and to tender youand them the thanks of the Government for the same. " At the same timethe ship-yard at Norfolk was abandoned after an attempt to destroy it. About midnight of April 20th, a fire was started in the yard, whichcontinued to increase, and before daylight the work of destructionextended to two immense ship-houses, one of which contained the entireframe of a seventy-four-gun ship, and to the long ranges of stores andoffices on each side of the entrance. The great ship Pennsylvania wasburned, and the frigates Merrimac and Columbus, and the Delaware, Raritan, Plymouth, and Germantown were sunk. A vast amount of machinery, valuable engines, small-arms, and chronometers, was broken up andrendered entirely useless. The value of the property destroyed wasestimated at several millions of dollars. 

This property thus destroyed had been accumulated and constructed withlaborious care and skillful ingenuity during a course of years tofulfill one of the objects of the Constitution, which was expressed inthese words, "To provide for the common defense" (see Preamble of theConstitution). It had belonged to all the States in common, and to eachone equally with the others. If the Confederate States were stillmembers of the Union, as the President of the United States asserted, where can he find a justification of these acts?

In explanation of his policy to the Commissioners sent to him by theVirginia State Convention, he said, referring to his inaugural address, "As I then and therein said, I now repeat, the power confided in me willbe used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging tothe Government. " Yet he tendered the thanks of the Government to thosewho applied the torch to destroy this property belonging, as he regardedit, to the Government. 

How unreasonable, how blind with rage must have been that administrationof affairs which so quickly brought the Government to the necessity ofdestroying its own means of defense in order, as it publicly declared, "to maintain its life"! It would seem as if the passions that rule thesavage had taken possession of the authorities at the United Statescapital! In the conflagrations of vast structures, the wantondestruction of public property, and still more in the issue of _lettresde cachet_ by the Secretary of State, who boasted of the power of hislittle bell over the personal liberties of the citizen, the people saw, or might have seen, the rapid strides toward despotism made under themask of preserving the Union. Yet these and similar measures weretolerated because the sectional hate dominated in the Northern Statesover the higher motives of constitutional and moral obligation. 

[Footnote 169: Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 8. ]

[Footnote 170: Constitution of the United States, Article IV, section4. ]

[Footnote 171: Article I, section 8. ]

[Footnote 172: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 173: Constitution of the United States, preamble. ]

[Footnote 174: Diplomatic correspondence, May 21, 1861. ]

CHAPTER V. 

 Maryland first approached by Northern Invasion. --Denies to United States Troops the Right of Way across her Domain. --Mission of Judge Handy. --Views of Governor Hicks. --His Proclamation. --Arrival of Massachusetts Troops at Baltimore. --Passage through the City disputed. --Activity of the Police. --Burning of Bridges. --Letter of President Lincoln to the Governor. --Visited by Citizens. --Action of the State Legislature. --Occupation of the Relay House. --The City Arms surrendered. --City in Possession of United States Troops. --Remonstrances of the City to the Passage of Troops disregarded. --Citizens arrested; also, Members of the Legislature. --Accumulation of Northern Forces at Washington. --Invasion of West Virginia by a Force under McClellan. --Attack at Philippi; at Laurel Hill. --Death of General Garnett. 

The border State of Maryland was the outpost of the South on thefrontier first to be approached by Northern invasion. The firstdemonstration against State sovereignty was to be made there, and in herfate were the other slaveholding States of the border to have warning ofwhat they were to expect. She had chosen to be, for the time at least, neutral in the impending war, and had denied to the United States troopsthe right of way across her domain in their march to invade the SouthernStates. The Governor (Hicks) avowed a desire, not only that the Stateshould avoid war, but that she should be a means for pacifying thosemore disposed to engage in combat. 

Judge Handy, a distinguished citizen of Mississippi, who was born inMaryland, had, in December, 1860, been sent as a commissioner from theState of his adoption to that of his birth, and presented his views andthe object of his mission to Governor Hicks, who, in his response(December 19, 1860), declared his purpose to act in full concert withthe other border States, adding, "I do not doubt the people of Marylandare ready to go with the people of those States for weal or woe. "[175]Subsequently, in answer to appeals for and against a proclamationassembling the Legislature, in order to have a call for a Stateconvention, Governor Hicks issued an address, in which, arguing thatthere was no necessity to define the position of Maryland, he wrote: "Ifthe action of the Legislature would be simply to declare that Marylandwas with the South in sympathy and feeling; that she demands from theNorth the repeal of offensive, unconstitutional statutes, and appeals toit for new guarantees; that she will wait a reasonable time for theNorth to purge her statute-books, to do justice to her Southernbrethren; and, if her appeals are vain, will make common cause with hersister border States in resistance to tyranny, if need be, it would onlybe saying what the whole country well knows, " etc. 

On the 18th of April, 1861, Governor Hicks issued a proclamationinvoking them to preserve the peace, and said, "I assure the people thatno troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defenseof the national capital. " On the same day Mayor Brown, of the city ofBaltimore, issued a proclamation in which, referring to that of theGovernor above cited, he said, "I can not withhold my expression ofsatisfaction at his resolution that no troops shall be sent fromMaryland to the soil of any other State. " It will be remembered that thecapital was on a site which originally belonged to Maryland, and wasceded by her for a special use, so that troops to defend the capitalmight be considered as not having been sent out of Maryland. It will beremembered that these proclamations were three days after therequisition made by the Secretary of War on the States which had notseceded for their quota of troops to serve in the war about to beinaugurated against the South, and that rumors existed at the time inBaltimore that troops from the Northeast were about to be sent throughthat city toward the South. On the next day, viz. , the 19th of April, 1861, a body of troops arrived at the railroad depot; the citizensassembled in large numbers, and, though without arms, disputed thepassage through the city. They attacked the troops with the loose stonesfound in the street, which was undergoing repair, and with suchdetermination and violence, that some of the soldiers were wounded, andthey fired upon the multitude, killing a few and wounding many. 

The police of Baltimore were very active in their efforts to preventconflict and preserve the peace; they rescued the baggage and munitionsof the troops, which had been seized by the multitude; and the rearportion of the troops was, by direction of Governor Hicks, sent back tothe borders of the State. The troops who had got through the city tookthe railroad at the Southern Depot and passed on. The militia of thecity was called out, and by evening quiet was restored. During thenight, on a report that more Northern troops were approaching the cityby the railroads, the bridges nearest to the city were destroyed, as itwas understood, by orders from the authorities of Baltimore. 

On the 20th of April President Lincoln wrote in reply to Governor Hicksand Mayor Brown, saying, "For the future, troops must be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore. " On the nextday, the 21st, Mayor Brown and other influential citizens, by request ofthe President, visited him. The interview took place in presence of theCabinet and General Scott, and was reported to the public by the Mayorafter his return to Baltimore. From that report I make the followingextracts. Referring to the President, the Mayor uses the followinglanguage:

 "The protection of Washington, he asseverated with great earnestness, was the sole object of concentrating troops there, and he protested that none of the troops brought through Maryland were intended for any purposes hostile to the State, or aggressive as against the Southern States.... He called on General Scott for his opinion, which the General gave at great length, to the effect that troops might be brought through Maryland without going through Baltimore, etc.... The interview terminated with the distinct assurance, on the part of the President, that no more troops would be sent through Baltimore, unless obstructed in their transit in other directions, and with the understanding that the city authorities should do their best to restrain their own people. 

 "The Mayor and his companions availed themselves of the President's full discussion of the questions of the day to urge upon him respectfully, but in the most earnest manner, a course of policy which would give peace to the country, and especially the withdrawal of all orders contemplating the passage of troops through any part of Maryland. "

The Legislature of the State of Maryland appointed commissioners to theConfederate Government to suggest to it the cessation of impendinghostilities until the meeting of Congress at Washington in July. Commissioners with like instructions were also sent to Washington. In myreply to the Commissioners, dated 25th of May, 1861, I referred to theuniform expression of desire for peace on the part of the ConfederateGovernment, and added:

 "In deference to the State of Maryland, it again asserts in the most emphatic terms that its sincere and earnest desire is for peace; but that, while the Government would readily entertain any proposition from the Government of the United States tending to a peaceful solution of the present difficulties, the recent attempts of this Government to enter into negotiations with that of the United States were attended with results which forbid any renewal of proposals from it to that Government.... Its policy can not but be peace--peace with all nations and people. "

On the 5th of May, the Relay House, at the junction of the Washingtonand Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, was occupied by United States troopsunder General Butler, and, on the 13th of the same month, he moved aportion of the troops to Baltimore, and took position on FederalHill--thus was consummated the military occupation of Baltimore. On thenext day, reënforcements were received; and, on the same day, thecommanding General issued a proclamation to the citizens, in which heannounced to them his purpose and authority to discriminate betweencitizens, those who agreed with him being denominated "well disposed, "and the others described with many offensive epithets. The initiatorystep of the policy subsequently developed was found in one sentence:"Therefore, all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are herebyrequested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of theiroccupations may be known and understood, and all misconstruction oftheir doings avoided. "

There soon followed a demand for the surrender of the arms stored by thecity authorities in a warehouse. The police refused to surrender themwithout the orders of the police commissioners. The policecommissioners, upon representation that the demand of General Butler wasby order of the President, decided to surrender the arms under protest, and they were accordingly removed to Fort McHenry. 

Baltimore was now disarmed. The Army of the United States had control ofthe city. There was no longer necessity to regard the remonstrance ofBaltimore against sending troops through the city, and that moreconvenient route was henceforth to be employed. George P. Kane, Marshalof the Police of Baltimore, who had rendered most efficient service forthe preservation of peace, as well in the city of Baltimore as at LocustPoint, where troops were disembarked to be dispatched to Washington, wasarrested at home by a military force, and sent to Fort McHenry, and aprovost-marshal was appointed by General Banks, who had succeeded to thecommand. The excuse given for the arrest of Marshal Kane was that he wasbelieved to be cognizant of combinations of men waiting for anopportunity to unite with those in rebellion against the United StatesGovernment. Whether the suspicion were well or ill founded, itconstituted a poor excuse for depriving a citizen of his liberty withoutlegal warrant and without proof. But this was only the beginning ofunbridled despotism and a reign of terror. The Mayor and PoliceCommissioners, Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, and John W. Davis, held a meeting, and, after preparing a protest against the suspension oftheir functions in the appointment of a provost-marshall, resolved that, while they would do nothing to "obstruct the execution of such measuresas Major-General Banks may deem proper to take, on his ownresponsibility, for the preservation of the peace of the city and ofpublic order, they can not, consistently with their views of officialduty and of the obligations of their oaths of office, recognize theright of any of the officers and men of the police force, as such, toreceive orders or directions from any other authority than from thisBoard; and that, in the opinion of the Board, the forcible suspension oftheir functions suspends at the same time the active operations of thepolice law. "[176] The Provost-Marshal, with the plenary powers conferredupon him, commenced a system of search and seizure, in private houses, of arms and munitions of every description. 

On the 1st of July, General Banks announced that, "in pursuance oforders issued from the headquarters at Washington for the preservationof the public peace in this department, I have arrested, and do detainin custody of the United States, the late members of the Board ofPolice--Messrs. Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, Charles D. Hinks, and John W. Davis. " If the object had been to preserve order by anyproper and legitimate method, the effective means would palpably havebeen to rely upon men whose influence was known to be great, and whoseintegrity was certainly unquestionable. The first-named of thecommissioners I knew well. He was of an old Maryland family, honored fortheir public services, and himself adorned by every social virtue. Old, unambitious, hospitable, gentle, loving, he was beloved by the peopleamong whom his long life had been passed. Could such a man be the justobject of suspicion, if, when laws had been silenced, suspicion couldjustify arrest and imprisonment? Those who knew him will accept as ajust description:

 "In action faithful, and in honor clear, Who broke no promise, served no private end, Who gained no title, and who lost no friend. "

Thenceforward, arrests of the most illustrious became the rule. In aland where freedom of speech was held to be an unquestioned right, freedom of thought ceased to exist, and men were incarcerated foropinion's sake. 

In the Maryland Legislature, the Hon. S. Teacle Wallis, from a committeeto whom was referred the memorial of the police commissioners arrestedin Baltimore, made a report upon the unconstitutionality of the act, and"appealed in the most earnest manner to the whole people of the country, of all parties, sections, and opinions, to take warnings by theusurpations mentioned, and come to the rescue of the free institutionsof the country. "[177]

For no better reason, so far as the public was informed, than a vote infavor of certain resolutions, General Banks sent his provost-marshal toFrederick, where the Legislature was in session; a cordon of pickets wasplaced around the town to prevent any one from leaving it without awritten permission from a member of General Banks's staff; policedetectives from Baltimore then went into the town and arrested sometwelve or thirteen members and several officers of the Legislature, which, thereby left without a quorum, was prevented from organizing, andit performed the only act which it was competent to do, i. E. , adjourned. S. Teacle Wallis, the author of the report in defense of theconstitutional rights of citizens, was among those arrested. Henry May, a member of Congress, who had introduced a resolution which he hopedwould be promotive of peace, was another of those arrested and throwninto prison. Senator Kennedy, of the same State, presented a report ofthe Legislature to the United States Senate, reciting the outrageinflicted upon Maryland in the persons of her municipal officers andcitizens, and, after some opposition, merely obtained an order to haveit printed. Governor Hicks, whose promises had been so cheering in thebeginning of the year, sent his final message to the Legislature onDecember 3, 1861. In that, referring to the action of the MarylandLegislature at its several sessions before that when the arrest of itsmembers prevented an organization, he wrote, "This continued until theGeneral Government had ample reason to believe it was about to gothrough the farce of enacting an ordinance of secession, when thetreason was summarily stopped by the dispersion of the traitors.... "After referring to the elections of the 13th of June and the 6th ofNovember, he says, the people have "declared, in the most emphatictones, what I have never doubted, that Maryland has no sympathy with therebellion, and desires to do her full share in the duty of suppressingit. " It would be more easy than gracious to point out the inconsistencybetween his first statements and this last. The conclusion is inevitablethat he kept himself in equipoise, and fell at last, as men withoutconvictions usually do, upon the stronger side. 

Henceforth the story of Maryland is sad to the last degree, onlyrelieved by the gallant men who left their homes to fight the battle ofState rights when Maryland no longer furnished them a field on whichthey could maintain the rights their fathers left them. This was a fatedoubly sad to the sons of the heroic men who, under the designation ofthe "Maryland Line, " did so much in our Revolutionary struggle to securethe independence of the States; of the men who, at a later day, foughtthe battle of North Point; of the people of a land which had furnishedso many heroes and statesmen, and gave the great Chief-Justice Taney tothe Supreme Court of the United States. 

Though Maryland did not become one of the Confederate States, she wasendeared to the people thereof by many most enduring ties. Last inorder, but first in cordiality, were the tender ministrations of hernoble daughters to the sick and wounded prisoners who were carriedthrough the streets of Baltimore; and it is with shame we remember thatbrutal guards on several occasions inflicted wounds upon gentlewomen whoapproached these suffering prisoners to offer them the relief of whichthey so evidently stood in need. 

The accumulation of Northern forces at and near Washington City, made itevident that the great effort of the invasion would be from that point, while assaults of more or less vigor might be expected upon allimportant places which the enemy, by his facilities for transportation, could reach. The concentration of Confederate troops in Virginia wasbegun, and they were sent forward as rapidly as practicable to thepoints threatened with attack. 

It was soon manifest that, besides the army at Washington, whichthreatened Virginia, there was a second one at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, under Major-General Patterson, designed to move throughWilliamsport and Martinsburg, and another forming in Ohio, under thecommand of Major-General McClellan, destined to invade the westerncounties of Virginia. 

This latter force, having landed at Wheeling on May 26th, advanced asfar as Grafton on the 29th. At this time Colonel Porterfield, with thesmall force of seven hundred men, sent forward by Governor Letcher, ofVirginia, was at Philippi. On the night of June 2d he was attacked byGeneral McClellan, with a strong force, and withdrew to Laurel Hill. Reënforcements under General Garnett were sent forward and occupied thehill, while Colonel Pegram, the second in command, held Rich Mountain. On July 11th the latter was attacked by two columns of the enemy, and, after a vigorous defense, fell back on the 12th, losing many of his men, who were made prisoners. General Garnett, hearing of this reverse, attempted to fall back, but was pursued by McClellan, and, whilestriving to rally his rear guard, was killed. Five hundred of his menwere taken prisoners. This success left the Northern forces inpossession of that region. 

The difficult character of the country in which the battle was fought, as well from mountain acclivity as dense wood, rendered a minuteknowledge of the roads of vast importance. There is reason to believethat competent guides led the enemy, by roads unknown to our army, tothe flank and rear of its position, and thus caused the sacrifice ofthose who had patriotically come to repel the invasion of the verypeople who furnished the guides to the enemy. It was treacheryconfounding the counsels of the brave. Thus occurred the disaster ofRich Mountain and Laurel Hill. 

General Robert Garnett was a native of Virginia, and a graduate of theUnited States Military Academy. He served in Mexico, on the staff ofGeneral Z. Taylor, and was conspicuous for gallantry and good conduct, especially in the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista. Recognizing hisallegiance as due to the State of Virginia, from which he was appointeda cadet, and thence won his various promotions in the army, he resignedhis commission when the State withdrew from the Union, and earnestly andusefully served as aide-de-camp to General R. E. Lee, thecommander-in-chief of the Army of Virginia, until she acceded to theConfederacy. 

When Western Virginia was invaded, he offered his services to go to herdefense, and, relying confidently on the sentiment, so strong in his ownheart, of devotion to the State by all Virginians, he believed it wasonly needful for him to have a nucleus around which the people couldrally to resist the invasion of their country. How sadly he wasdisappointed, and how bravely he struggled against adverse fortune, andhow gallantly he died in the discharge of his duty, are memories which, though sad, bear with them to his friends the consolation that themanner of his death was worthy of the way in which he lived, and thateven his life was an offering he was not unwilling to make for thewelfare and honor of Virginia. 

He fell while commanding the rear guard, to save his retreating army, thus exemplifying the highest quality of man, self-sacrifice for others, and such devotion and fortitude as made Ney the grandest figure inBonaparte's retreat from Moscow. 

[Footnote 175: "Annual Cyclopædia, " vol. I, p. 443. ]

[Footnote 176: "Baltimore American, " June 28, 1861. ]

[Footnote 177: New York "World", August 6, 1861. ]

CHAPTER VI. 

 Removal of the Seat of Government to Richmond. --Message to Congress at Richmond. --Confederate Forces in Virginia. --Forces of the Enemy. --Letter to General Johnston. --Combat at Bethel Church. --Affair at Romney. --Movements of McDowell. --Battle of Manassas. 

The Provisional Congress, in session at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 21stof May, 1861, resolved "that this Congress will adjourn on Tuesday next, to meet again on the 20th day of July at Richmond, Virginia. " Theresolution further authorized the President to have the severalexecutive departments, with their archives, removed at such intermediatetime as he might determine, and added a proviso that, if any publicemergency should "render it impolitic to meet in Richmond, " he shouldcall the Congress together at some other place to be selected by him. 

The hostile demonstrations of the United States Government againstVirginia caused the President, at an early day after the adjournment ofCongress, to proceed to Richmond and to direct the executivedepartments, with their archives, to be removed to that place as soon ascould be conveniently done. 

In the message delivered to the Congress at its meeting in Richmond, according to adjournment, I gave the following explanation of my conductunder the resolution above cited: "Immediately after your adjournment, the aggressive movement of the enemy required prompt, energetic action. The accumulation of his forces on the Potomac sufficiently demonstratedthat his efforts were to be directed against Virginia, and from no pointcould necessary measures for her defense and protection be soeffectively decided as from her own capital. "

On my arrival in Richmond, General R. E. Lee, as commander of the Armyof Virginia, was found there, where he had established his headquarters. He possessed my unqualified confidence, both as a soldier and a patriot, and the command he had exercised over the Army of Virginia, before heraccession to the Confederacy, gave him that special knowledge which atthe time was most needful. As has been already briefly stated, troopshad previously been sent from other States of the Confederacy to the aidof Virginia. The forces there assembled were divided into three armies, at positions the most important and threatened: one, under General J. E. Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, covering the valley of the Shenandoah;another, under General P. G. T. Beauregard, at Manassas, covering thedirect approach from Washington to Richmond; and the third, underGenerals Huger and Magruder, at Norfolk and on the Peninsula between theJames and York Rivers, covering the approach to Richmond from theseaboard. 

The first and second of these armies, though separated by the BlueRidge, had such practicable communication with each other as to rendertheir junction possible when the necessity should be foreseen. They bothwere confronted by forces greatly superior in numbers to their own, andit was doubtful which would first be the object of attack. Harper'sFerry was an important position, both for military and politicalconsiderations, and, though unfavorably situated for defense against anenemy which should seek to turn its position by crossing the Potomacabove, it was desirable to hold it as long as was consistent withsafety. The temporary occupation was especially needful for the removalof the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there, andwhich the enemy had failed to destroy, though he had for that purposefired the buildings before his evacuation of the post. Thedemonstrations of General Patterson, commanding the Federal army in thatregion, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on being allowed toretire to a position nearer to Winchester. Under these circumstances, anofficial letter was addressed to him, from which the following extractis made:

 "Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, "Richmond, _June 13, 1861_. 

 "_To_ General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Harper's Ferry, Virginia_. 

 "Sir: ... You had been heretofore instructed to exercise your discretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry, and taking the field to check the advance of the enemy.... The ineffective portion of your command, together with the baggage and whatever else would impede your operations in the field, it would be well to send, without delay, to the Manassas road. Should you not be sustained by the population of the Valley, so as to enable you to turn upon the enemy before reaching Winchester, you will continue slowly to retire to the Manassas road, upon some of the passes of which it is hoped you will be able to make an effective stand, even against a very superior force. To this end, it might be well to send your engineer to make a reconnaissance and construct such temporary works as may be useful and proper.... For these reasons it has been with reluctance that any attempt was made to give you specific instructions, and you will accept assurances of the readiness with which the freest exercise of discretion on your part will be sustained. 

 "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed) "S. Cooper, "_Adjutant and Inspector-General_. "

The earliest combat in this quarter, and which, in the inexperience ofthe time, was regarded as a great battle, may claim a passing notice, asexemplifying the extent to which the individuality, self-reliance, andhabitual use of small-arms by the people of the South was a substitutefor military training, and, on the other hand, how the want of suchtraining made the Northern new levies inferior to the like kind ofSouthern troops. 

A detached work on the right of General Magruder's line was occupiedJune 11, 1861, by the First Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers andthree hundred and sixty Virginians under the command of an educated, vigilant, and gallant soldier, then Colonel D. H. Hill, First RegimentNorth Carolina Volunteers, subsequently a lieutenant-general in theConfederate service. He reports that this small force was "engaged forfive and a half hours with four and a half regiments of the enemy atBethel Church, nine miles from Hampton. The enemy made three distinctand well-sustained charges, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Ourcavalry pursued them for six miles, when their retreat became a totalrout. "

On the other side, Frederick Townsend, colonel of Third Regiment of theenemy's forces, after stating with much minuteness the orders and lineof march, describes how, "about five or six miles from Hampton, a heavyand well-sustained fire of canister and small-arms was opened upon theregiment, " and how it was afterward discovered to be a portion of theirown column which had fired upon them. After due care for the wounded anda recognition of their friends, the column proceeded, and the Coloneldescribes his regiment as moving to the attack "in line of battle, as ifon parade, in the face of a severe fire of artillery and small-arms. "Subsequently, the description proceeds, "a company of my regiment hadbeen separated from the regiment by a thickly-hedged ditch, " and marchedin the adjoining field in line with the main body. Not being aware ofthe separation of that company, the Colonel states that, therefore, "upon seeing among the breaks in the hedge the glistening of bayonets inthe adjoining field, I immediately concluded that the enemy wereoutflanking, and conceived it to be my duty to immediately retire andrepel that advance. "[178]

Without knowing anything of the subsequent career of the Colonel fromwhose report these extracts have been made, or of the officers whoopened fire upon him while he was marching to the execution of theorders under which they were all acting, it is fair to suppose that, after a few months' experience, such scenes as are described could nothave occurred, and these citations have been made to show the value ofmilitary training. 

In further exemplification of the difference between the troops of theConfederate States and those of the United States, before either hadbeen trained in war, I will cite an affair which occurred on the upperPotomac. Colonel A. P. Hill, commanding a brigade at Romney, in WesternVirginia, having learned that the enemy had a command at thetwenty-first bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, decided toattack it and to destroy the bridge, so as to interrupt the use of thatimportant line of the enemy's communication. For this purpose he orderedColonel John C. Vaughn, of the Third Tennessee Volunteers, to proceedwith a detachment of two companies of his regiment and two companies ofthe Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers to the position where the enemy werereported to be posted. 

Colonel Vaughn reports that on June 18, 1861, at 8 P. M. , he moved withhis command as ordered, marched eighteen miles, and, at 5 A. M. The nextmorning, found the enemy on the north bank of the Potomac in somestrength of infantry and with two pieces of artillery. He had nopicket-guards. 

After reconnaissance, the order to charge was given. It was necessary, in the execution of the order, to ford the river waist-deep, whichColonel Vaughn reports "was gallantly executed in good order but withgreat enthusiasm. As we appeared in sight at a distance of four hundredyards, the enemy broke and fled in all directions, firing as they ranonly a few random shots.... The enemy did not wait to fire theirartillery, which we captured, both guns loaded; they were, however, spiked by the enemy before he fled. From the best information, theirnumber was between two and three hundred. "

Colonel Vaughn further states that, in pursuance of orders, he fired thebridge and then retired, bringing away the two guns and the enemy'sflag, and other articles of little value which had been captured, andarrived at brigade headquarters in the evening, with his command in highspirits good condition. 

Colonel A. P. Hill, the energetic brigade commander who directed thisexpedition, left the United States Army when the State, which had givenhim to the military service of the General Government, passed herordinance of secession. The vigilance and enterprise he manifested onthis early occasion in the war of the States gave promise of thebrilliant career which gained for him the high rank of alieutenant-general, and which there was nothing for his friends toregret save the honorable death which he met upon the field of battle. 

Colonel Vaughn, the commander of the detachment, was new to war. Hispaths had been those of peace, and his home in the mountains of EastTennessee might reasonably have secured him from any expectation that itwould ever be the theatre on which armies were to contend, and that he, in the mutation of human affairs, would become a soldier. He lived untilthe close of the war, and, on larger fields than that on which he firstappeared, proved that, though not educated for a soldier, he hadendowments which compensated for that disadvantage. 

The activity and vigilance of Stuart, afterward so distinguished ascommander of cavalry in the Army of Virginia, and the skill and daringof Jackson, soon by greater deeds to become immortal, checked, punished, and embarrassed the enemy in his threatened advances, and his movementsbecame so devoid of a definite purpose that one was at a loss to divinethe object of his campaign, unless it was to detain General Johnstonwith his forces in the Valley of the Shenandoah, while General McDowell, profiting by the feint, should make the real attack upon GeneralBeauregard's army at Manassas. However that may be, the evidence finallybecame conclusive that the enemy under General McDowell was moving toattack the army under General Beauregard. The contingency had thereforearisen for that junction which was necessary to enable us to resist thevastly superior numbers of our assailant; for, though the most strenuousand not wholly unsuccessful exertions had been made to reënforce boththe Armies of the Shenandoah and of the Potomac, they yet remained farsmaller than those of the enemy confronting them, and made a junction ofour forces indispensable whenever the real point of attack should beascertained. For this movement we had the advantage of an interior line, so that, if the enemy should discover it after it commenced, he couldnot counteract it by adopting the same tactics. The success of thispolicy, it will readily be perceived, depended upon the time ofexecution, for, though from different causes, failure would equallyresult if done too soon or too late. The determination as to which armyshould be reënforced from the other, and the exact time of the transfer, must have been a difficult problem, as both the generals appear to havebeen unable to solve it (each asking reënforcements from the other). 

On the 9th of July General Johnston wrote an official letter, from whichI make the following extracts:

 "Headquarters, Winchester, _July 9, 1861_. 

 "General: ... Similar information from other sources gives me the impression that the reënforcements arriving at Martinsburg amount to seven or eight thousand. I have estimated the enemy's force hitherto, you may remember, at eighteen thousand. Additional artillery has also been received. They were greatly superior to us in that arm before. 

 "The object of reënforcing General Patterson must be an advance upon this place. Fighting here against great odds seems to me more prudent than retreat. 

 "I have not asked for reënforcements, because I supposed that the War Department, informed of the state of affairs everywhere, could best judge where the troops at its disposal are most required.... 

 "Most respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed) "Joseph E. Johnston, "_Brigadier-General, etc. _"

 "If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest as soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might with _great expedition_ furnish five or six thousand men for a few days. 

 "J. E. J. "

As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point ofthe enemy's movement, I wrote to General Johnston, urging him to makepreparations for a junction with General Beauregard, and to hisobjections, and the difficulties he presented, replied at great length, endeavoring to convince him that the troops he described as embarrassinga hasty march might be withdrawn in advance of the more effectiveportion of his command. Writing with entire confidence, I kept no copyof my letters, and, when subsequent events caused the wish to refer tothem, I requested General Johnston to send me copies of them. He repliedthat his tent had been blown down, and his papers had been scattered. His letters to me, which would show the general purport of mine to him, have shared the fate which during or soon after the close of the warbefell most of the correspondence I had preserved, and his retainedcopies, if still in his possession, do not appear to have been deemed ofsufficient importance to be inserted in his published "Narrative. "

On the 17th of July, 1861, the following telegram was sent by theAdjutant-General:

 "Richmond, _July 17, 1861_. 

 "_To_ General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_. 

 "General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion. 

 (Signed) "S. Cooper, "_Adjutant and Inspector-General_. "

The confidence reposed in General Johnston, sufficiently evinced by theimportant command intrusted to him, was more than equal to theexpectation that he would do all that was practicable to execute theorder for a junction, as well as to secure his sick and baggage. For theexecution of the one great purpose, that he would allow no minorquestion to interfere with that which was of vital importance, and forwhich he was informed all his "effective force" would "be needed. "

The order referred to was the telegram inserted above, in which thesending the sick to Culpepper Court-House might have been after orbefore the effective force had moved to the execution of the main andonly positive part of the order. All the arrangements were left to thediscretion of the General. It seems strange that any one has construedthis expression as meaning that the movement for a junction was left tothe discretion of that officer, and that the forming of a junction--theimperious necessity--should have been termed in the order "all thearrangement, " instead of referring that word to its proper connection, the route and mode of transportation. The General had no margin on whichto institute a comparison as to the importance of his remaining in theValley, according to his previous assignment, or going where he wasordered by competent authority. 

It gives me pleasure to state that, from all the accounts received atthe time, the plans of General Johnston, for masking his withdrawal toform a junction with General Beauregard, were conducted with markedskill, and, though all of his troops did not arrive as soon as expectedand needed, he has satisfactorily shown that the failure was not due toany defect in his arrangements for their transportation. 

The great question of uniting the two armies had been decided atRichmond. The time and place depended on the enemy, and, when it wasseen that the real attack was to be against the position at Manassas, the order was sent to General Johnston to move to that point. Hisletters of the 12th and 15th instant expressed his doubts about hispower to retire from before the superior force of General Patterson, therefore the word "practicable" was in this connection the equivalentof possible. That it was, at the time, so understood by GeneralJohnston, is shown by his reply to the telegram. 

 "Headquarters, Winchester, _July 18, 1861_. 

 "General: I have had the honor to receive your telegram of yesterday. 

 "General Patterson, who had been at Bunker Hill since Monday, seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to the east of Winchester. 

 "Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beauregard to-day.... 

 (Signed) "Joseph E. Johnston. 

 "General S. Cooper. "

After General Johnston commenced his march to Manassas, he sent to me atelegram, the substance of which, as my memory serves and the replyindicates, was an inquiry as to the relative position he would occupytoward General Beauregard. I returned the following answer:

 "Richmond, _July 20, 1861_. 

 "General J. E. Johnston, _Manassas Junction, Virginia_. 

 "You are a general in the Confederate Army, possessed of the power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for the success of the object in which you coöperate. The zeal of both assures me of harmonious action. 

 (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

General Johnston, by his promotion to the grade of general, as well ashis superior rank as a brigadier over Brigadier-General Beauregard, gavehim precedence; so there was no need to ask which of the two wouldcommand the whole, when their troops should join and do duty together. Therefore his inquiry, as it was revolved in my mind, created ananxiety, not felt before, lest there should be some unfortunatecomplication, or misunderstanding, between these officers, when theirforces should be united. Regarding the combat of the 18th of July as theprecursor of a battle, I decided, at the earliest moment, to go inperson to the army. 

As has been heretofore stated, Congress was to assemble on the 20th ofJuly, to hold its first session at the new capital, Richmond, Virginia. My presence on that occasion and the delivery of a message were requiredby usage and law. After the delivery of the message to Congress onSaturday, the 20th of July, I intended to leave in the afternoon forManassas, but was detained until the next morning, when I left by rail, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Colonel J. R. Davis, to confer with thegenerals on the field. As we approached Manassas Railroad junction, acloud of dust was visible a short distance to the west of the railroad. It resembled one raised by a body of marching troops, and recalled to myremembrance the design of General Beauregard to make the Rappahannockhis second line of defense. It was, however, subsequently learned thatthe dust was raised by a number of wagons which had been sent to therear for greater security against the contingencies of the battle. Thesound of the firing had now become very distinct, so much so as to leaveno doubt that a general engagement had commenced. Though that event hadbeen anticipated as being near at hand after the action of the 18th, itwas both hoped and desired that it would not occur quite so soon, themore so as it was not known whether the troops from the Valley had yetarrived. 

On reaching the railroad junction, I found a large number of men, bearing the usual evidence of those who leave the field of battle undera panic. They crowded around the train with fearful stories of a defeatof our army. The railroad conductor announced his decision that therailroad train should proceed no farther. Looking among those who wereabout us for one whose demeanor gave reason to expect from him acollected answer, I selected one whose gray beard and calm face gavebest assurance. He, however, could furnish no encouragement. Our line, he said, was broken, all was confusion, the army routed, and the battlelost. I asked for Generals Johnston and Beauregard; he said they were onthe field when he left it. I returned to the conductor and told him thatI must go on; that the railroad was the only means by which I couldproceed, and that, until I reached the headquarters, I could not get ahorse to ride to the field where the battle was ragging. He finallyconsented to detach the locomotive from the train, and, for myaccommodation, to run it as far as the army headquarters. In this mannerColonel Davis, aide-de-camp, and myself proceeded. 

At the headquarters we found the Quartermaster General, W. L. Cabell, and the Adjutant-General, Jordan, of General Beauregard's staff, whocourteously agreed to furnish us horses, and also to show us the route. While the horses were being prepared, Colonel Jordan took occasion toadvise my aide-de-camp, Colonel Davis, of the hazard of going to thefield, and the impropriety of such exposure on my part. The horses wereafter a time reported ready, and we started to the field. The stragglerssoon became numerous, and warnings as to the fate which awaited us if weadvanced were not only frequent but evidently sincere. 

There were, however, many who turned back, and the wounded generallycheered upon meeting us. I well remember one, a mere stripling, who, supported on the shoulders of a man, who was bearing him to the rear, took off his cap and waved it with a cheer, that showed within thatslender form beat the heart of a hero--breathed a spirit that would darethe labors of Hercules. 

As we advanced, the storm of the battle was rolling westward, and itsfury became more faint. When I met General Johnston, who was upon a hillwhich commanded a general view of the field of the afternoon'soperations, and inquired of him as to the state of affairs, he repliedthat we had won the battle. I left him there and rode still farther tothe west. Several of the volunteers on General Beauregard's staff joinedme, and a command of cavalry, the gallant leader of which, Captain JohnF. Lay, insisted that I was too near the enemy to be without an escort. We, however, only saw one column near to us that created a doubt as towhich side it belonged; and, as we were riding toward it, it wassuggested that we should halt until it could be examined with afield-glass. Colonel Chesnut dismounted so as the better to use hisglass, and at that moment the column formed into line, by which the windstruck the flag so as to extend it, and it was plainly revealed to bethat of the United States. 

Our cavalry, though there was present but the squadron previouslymentioned, and from a statement of the commander of which I will makesome extracts, dashed boldly forward to charge. The demonstration wasfollowed by the immediate retreat of what was, I believe, the last, thereabout, of the enemy's forces maintaining their organization, andshowing a disposition to dispute the possession of the field of battle. In riding over the ground, it seemed quite possible to mark the line ofa fugitive's flight. Here was a musket, there a cartridge-box, there ablanket or overcoat, a haversack, etc. , as if the runner had strippedhimself, as he went, of all impediments to speed. 

As we approached toward the left of our line, the signs of an utter routof the enemy were unmistakable, and justified the conclusion that thewatchword of "On to Richmond!" had been changed to "Off for Washington!"

On the extreme left of our field of operations, I found the troops whoseopportune arrival had averted impending disaster, and had so materiallycontributed to our victory. Some of them had, after arriving at theManassas Railroad junction, hastened to our left; theirbrigadier-general, E. K. Smith, was wounded soon after getting intoaction, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Elzy, by whom itwas gallantly and skillfully led to the close of the battle; others, under the command of General (then Colonel) Early, made a rapid march, under the pressing necessity, from the extreme right of our line to andbeyond our left, so as to attack the enemy in flank, thus inflicting onhim the discomfiture his oblique movement was designed to inflict on us. All these troops and the others near to them had hastened into actionwithout supplies or camp-equipage; weary, hungry, and without shelter, night closed around them where they stood, the blood-stained victors ona hard-fought field. 

It was reported to me that some of the troops had been so long withoutfood as to be suffering severe hunger, and that no supplies could be gotwhere they were. I made several addresses to them, all to the effectthat their position was that best adapted to a pursuit of the enemy, andthat they should therefore remain there; adding that I would go to theheadquarters and direct that supplies should be sent to them promptly. 

General (then Colonel) Early, commanding a brigade, informed me of somewounded who required attention; one, Colonel Gardner, was, he said, at ahouse not far from where we were. I rode to see him, found him in severepain, and from the twitching, visible and frequent, seemed to bethreatened with tetanus. A man sat beside him whose uniform was that ofthe enemy; but he was gentle, and appeared to be solicitously attentive. He said that he had no morphine, and did not know where to get any. Ifound in a short time a surgeon who went with me to Colonel Gardner, having the articles necessary in the case. Before leaving ColonelGardner, he told me that the man who was attending to him might, withouthindrance, have retreated with his comrades, but had kindly remainedwith him, and he therefore asked my protection for the man. I took thename and the State of the supposed good Samaritan, and at armyheadquarters directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner. Thesequel will be told hereafter. 

It was then late, and we rode back in the night, say seven miles, to thearmy headquarters. I had not seen General Beauregard on the field, anddid not find him at his quarters when we returned; the promise made tothe troops was therefore communicated to a staff-officer, who said hewould have the supplies sent out. At a later hour when I met GeneralBeauregard and informed him of what had occurred, he stated that, because of a false alarm which had reached him, he had ordered thetroops referred to from the left to the right of our line, so as to bein position to repel the reported movement of the enemy against thatflank. That such an alarm should have been credited, and a night marchordered on account of it, shows how little the completeness of thevictory was realized. 

[Footnote 178: see "Rebellion Record, " vol. Ii, pp. 164, 165. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

 Conference with the Generals after the Battle. --Order to pursue the Enemy. --Evidences of a Thorough Rout. --"Sweet to die for such a Cause. "--Movements of the Next Day. --What more it was practicable to do. --Charge against the President of preventing the Capture of Washington. --The Failure to pursue. --Reflection on the President. --General Beauregard's Report. --Endorsement upon it. --Strength of the Opposing Forces. --Extracts relating to the Battle, from the Narrative of General Early. --Resolutions of Congress. --Efforts to increase the Efficiency of the Army. 

At a late hour of the night, I had a conference with Generals Johnstonand Beauregard; the Adjutant-General of the latter, Colonel Jordan, waspresent, and sat opposite to me at the table. 

When, after some preliminary conversation, I asked whether any troopshad been sent in pursuit of the enemy, I was answered in the negative. Upon further inquiry as to what troops were in the best position forpursuit, and had been least fatigued during the day, General Bonham'sbrigade was named. I then suggested that he should be ordered inpursuit; a pause ensued, until Colonel Jordan asked me if I woulddictate the order. I at once dictated an order for immediate pursuit. Some conversation followed, the result of which was a modification ofthe order by myself, so that, instead of immediate pursuit, it should becommenced at early dawn. Colonel Jordan spoke across the table to me, saying, "If you will send the order as you first dictated it, the enemywon't stop till he gets into the Potomac. " I believe I remember thewords very nearly, and am quite sure that I do remember themsubstantially. On the 25th of March, 1878, I wrote to General Beauregardas follows:

 "Dear Sir: Permit me to ask you to recall the conference held between General Johnston, yourself, and myself, on the night after the close of the battle of Manassas; and to give me, if you can, a copy of the order which I dictated, and which your adjutant-general, T. J. Jordan, wrote at my dictation, directing Brigadier-General Bonham to follow the retreating enemy. If you can not furnish a copy of the order, please give me your recollection of its substance. 

 "Yours respectfully, (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

To this letter General Beauregard courteously replied that hisorder-book was in New York, in the hands of a friend, to whom he wouldwrite for a copy of the order desired if it should be in said book, andthat he would also write to his adjutant, General Jordan, for hisrecollection of the order if it had not been inscribed in theorder-book. 

On the 24th of April General Beauregard forwarded to me the answer tohis inquiries in my behalf, as follows:

 "New York, 63 Broadway, _April 18, 1878_. 

 "My dear General: In answer to your note, I hasten to say that properly Mr. Davis is not to be held accountable for our failure to pursue McDowell from the field of Manassas the night of the 21st of July, 1861. 

 "As to the order, to which I presume Mr. Davis refers in his note to you, I recollect the incident very distinctly. 

 "The night of the battle, as I was about to ascend to your quarters over my office, Captain E. P. Alexander, of your staff, informed me that Captain ----, attached to General Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah, reported that he had been as far forward as Centreville, where he had seen the Federal army completely routed and in full flight toward Washington. 

 "This statement I at once repeated to Mr. Davis, General Johnston, and yourself, whom I found seated around your table--Mr. Davis at the moment writing a dispatch to General Cooper. 

 "As soon as I had made my report, Mr. Davis with much animation asserted the necessity for an urgent pursuit that night by Bonham, who, with his own brigade and that of Longstreet, was in close proximity to Centreville at the moment. So I took my seat at the same table with you, and wrote the order for pursuit, substantially at the dictation of Mr. Davis. But, while writing, either I happened to remember, or Captain Alexander himself--as I am inclined to believe--called me aside to remind me that his informant was known among us of the old army as ---- ----, because of eccentricities, and in contradistinction with others of the same name. When I repeated this reminder, Mr. Davis recalled the _sobriquet_, as he had a precise personal knowledge of the officers of the old army. He laughed heartily, as did all present. 

 "The question of throwing General Bonham forward that night, upon the unverified report of Captain ----, was now briefly discussed, with a unanimous decision against it; therefore, the order was not dispatched. 

 "It is proper to add in this connection that, so far as I am aware--and I had the opportunity of knowing what occurred--this was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Manassas in which he exercised any voice as to the movement of the troops. Profoundly pleased with the results achieved by the happy juncture of the two Confederate armies upon the very field of battle, his bearing toward the generals who commanded them was eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion; and, I repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to a forward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to interfere by opinion or authority touching what the Confederate forces should or should not do. 

 "You having at the close of the day surrendered the command, which had been left in your hands, over both Confederate armies during the engagement, General Johnston was that night in chief command. He was decidedly averse to an immediate offensive, and emphatically discountenanced it as impracticable. 

 "Very truly, your friend, (Signed) "Thomas Jordan. 

 "General P. G. T. Beauregard, _New Orleans, Louisiana_. "

General Beauregard, in his letter forwarding the above, wrote, "Theaccount given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred thererespecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection. "

It was a matter of importance, as I regarded it, to follow closely onthe retreating enemy, but it was of no consequence then or now as to whoissued the order for pursuit, and, unless requested, I should not havedictated one, preferring that the generals to whom the operations wereconfided should issue all orders to the troops. I supposed the order, asmodified by myself, had been sent. I have found, however, since theclose of the war, that it was not, but that an order to the same effectwas sent on the night of the 21st of July, for a copy of which I amindebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier, andpatriot, General Bonham. It is as follows:

 "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Manassas, _July 21, 1861_. 

 "(Special Orders, No. 140. )

 "I. General Bonham will send, as early as practicable in the morning, a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong force of cavalry, and one field-battery, to scour the country and roads to his front, toward Centreville. He will carry with him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our wounded, all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital stores, subsistence, and baggage, which will be sent immediately to these headquarters. 

 "General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men. 

 "Should it appear, while this command is occupied as directed, that it is insufficient for the purposes indicated, General Bonham will call on the nearest brigade commander for support. 

 "II. Colonel P. St. George Cocke, commanding, will dispatch at the same time, for similar purposes, a command of the same size and proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the road _via_ Stone Bridge; and another command of two companies of infantry and one of cavalry on the road by which the enemy retreated toward and _via_ Sudley's Mills. 

 "By command of Brigadier-General Beauregard:

 (Signed) "Thomas Jordan, _A. A. Adjutant-General. _

 "To Brigadier-General Bonham. "

Impressed with the belief that the enemy was very superior to us, bothin numbers and appointments, I had felt apprehensive that, unlesspressed, he would recover from the panic under which he fled from thefield, rally on his reserves, and renew the contest. Therefore it wasthat I immediately felt the necessity for a pursuit of the fugitives, and insisted that the troops on the extreme left should retain theirposition during the night of the 21st, as has been heretofore stated. Inconference with the generals that night, this subject was considered, and I dictated an order for a movement on the rear of the enemy at earlydawn, which, on account of the late hour at which it was given, differedvery little from one for an immediate movement. A rainfall, extraordinary for its violence and duration, occurred on the morning ofthe succeeding day, so that, over places where during the battle onecould scarcely get a drink of water, rolled torrents which, in theafternoon of the 22d, it was difficult to cross. 

From these and other causes, the troops were scattered to such an extentthat but few commands could have been assembled for immediate service. It was well for us that the enemy, instead of retiring in order, so asto be rallied and again brought to the attack, left hope behind, andfled in dismay to seek for safety beyond the Potomac. 

Each hour of the day following the battle added to the evidence of athorough rout of the enemy. Abandoned wagons, stores, guns, caissons, small-arms, and ammunition, proved his complete demoralization. As faras our cavalry went, no hostile force was met, and all the indicationsfavored the conclusion that the purpose of invasion had for the timebeen abandoned. 

The victory, though decisive and important, both in its moral andphysical effect, had been dearly bought by the sacrifice of the lives ofmany of our bravest and best, who at the first call of their country hadrushed to its defense. 

When riding to the front, I met an ambulance bearing General Barnard Beefrom the field, where he had been mortally wounded, after his patriotismhad been illustrated by conspicuous exhibitions of skill, daring, andfortitude. Soon after, I learned that my friend Colonel Bartow hadheroically sealed with his life-blood his faith in the sanctity of ourcause. He had been the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs inthe Provisional Congress, and, after the laws were enacted to providefor the public defense, he went to the field to maintain them. It is tosuch virtuous and devoted citizens that a country is indebted for itsprosperity and honor, as well in peace as in war. 

Reference has been made to the dispersion of our troops after thebattle, and in this connection the following facts are mentioned: In theafternoon of the 22d, with a guide, supposed to be cognizant of thepositions at which the different commands would be found, I went tovisit the wounded, and among them a youth of my family, who, it wasreported to me, was rapidly sinking. After driving many miles, andwitnessing very painful scenes, but seldom finding the troops in theposition where my guide supposed them to be, and always disappointed innot discovering him I particularly sought, I was, at the approach ofnight, about to abandon the search, when, accidentally meeting anofficer of the command to which the youth belonged, I was directed tothe temporary hospital to which the wounded of that command had beenremoved. It was too late; the soul of the young soldier had just lefthis body; the corpse lay before me. Around him were many gentle boys, suffering in different degrees from the wounds they had received. Onebright, refined-looking youth from South Carolina, severely if notfatally wounded, responded to my expression of sympathy by the heroicdeclaration that it was "sweet to die for such a cause. "

Many kindred spirits ascended to the Father from that field of theirglory. The roll need not be recorded here; it has a more enduringdepository than the pen can make--the traditions of a grateful people. 

The victory at Manassas was certainly extraordinary, not only on accountof the disparity of numbers and the inferiority of our arms, but alsobecause of many other disadvantages under which we labored. We had nodisciplined troops, and, though our citizens were generally skilled inthe use of small-arms, which, with their high pride and courage, mightcompensate for the want of training while in position, theseinadequately substituted military instruction when manoeuvres had to beperformed under fire, and could not make the old-fashioned musket equalto the long-range, new-model muskets with which the enemy was supplied. The disparity in artillery was still greater, both in the number andkind of guns; but, thanks to the skill and cool courage of the Rev. Captain W. N. Pendleton, his battery of light, smooth-bore guns, mannedprincipally by the youths whose rector he had been, proved moreeffective in battle than the long-range rifle-guns of the enemy. Thecharacter of the ground brought the forces into close contact, and thericochet of the round balls carried havoc into the columns of the enemy, while the bolts of their rifle-guns, if they missed their object, penetrated harmlessly into the ground. 

The field was very extensive, broken, and wooded. The senior general hadso recently arrived that he had no opportunity minutely to learn theground, and the troops he brought were both unacquainted with the fieldand with those with whom they had to coöperate. To all this must beadded the disturbing fact that the plan of battle, as originallydesigned, was entirely changed by the movement of the enemy on ourextreme left, instead of right and center, as anticipated. Theoperations, therefore, had to be conducted against the plan of theenemy, instead of on that which our generals had prepared and explainedto their subordinate commanders. The promptitude with which the troopsmoved, and the readiness with which our generals modified theirpreconceived plans to meet the necessities as they were developed, entitled them to the commendation so liberally bestowed at the time bytheir countrymen at large. 

General Johnston had been previously promoted to the highest grade inour army, and I deemed it but a fitting reward for the services renderedby General Beauregard that he should be promoted to the same grade;therefore, I addressed to him the following letter:

 "Manassas, Virginia, _July 21, 1861. _

 "Sir: Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas, and on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are promoted to be a general in the army of the Confederate States of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly commissioned accordingly. 

 "Yours, etc. , (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. 

 "General P. G. T. Beauregard, etc. "

The 22d, the day after the battle, was spent in following up the line ofthe retreating foe, and collecting the large supplies of arms, ofammunition, and other military stores. The supplies of the army were ona scale of such luxurious extravagance as to excite the surprise ofthose accustomed only to our rigid economy. The anticipation of an easyvictory had caused many to come to the battle as to a joyous feast, andthe signs left behind them of the extent to which they had beendisappointed in the entertainment, constituted the staple of manylaughable stories, which were not without their value because of thelesson they contained as to the uncertainties of war, and themortification that usually follows vain boasting. Among the articlesabandoned by the enemy in his flight were some which excited a justindignation, and which indicated the shameless disregard of all theusages of honorable warfare. They were handcuffs, the fit appendage of apoliceman, but not of a soldier who came to meet his foeman hilt tohilt. These were reported to have been found in large numbers; some ofthem were sent to Richmond. 

On the night of the 22d I held a second conference with GeneralsJohnston and Beauregard. All the revelations of the day were of the mostsatisfactory character as to the completeness of our victory. The largeamount gained of fine artillery, small-arms, and ammunition, all ofwhich were much needed by us, was not the least gratifying consequenceof our success. The generals, like myself, were well content with whathad been done. 

I propounded to them the inquiry as to what more it was practicable todo. They concurred as to their inability to cross the Potomac, and tothe further inquiry as to an advance to the south side of the Potomac, General Beauregard promptly stated that there were strong fortificationsthere, occupied by garrisons, which had not been in the battle, and weretherefore not affected by the panic which had seized the defeated army. He described those fortifications as having wide, deep ditches, withpalisades, which would prevent the escalade of the works. Turning toGeneral Johnston, he said, "They have spared no expense. " It was furtherstated in explanation that we had no sappers and miners, nor even thetools requisite to make regular approaches. If we had possessed both, the time required for such operations would have more than sufficed forGeneral Patterson's army and other forces to have been brought to thatlocality in such numbers as must have rendered the attempt, with ourpresent means, futile. 

This view of the matter rests on the supposition that the fortificationsand garrisons described did actually exist, of which there seemed thento be no doubt. If the reports which have since reached us be true, thatthere were at that time neither fortifications nor troops stationed onthe south bank of the Potomac; that all the enemy's forces fled to thenorth side of the river, and even beyond; that the panic of the routedarmy infected the whole population of Washington City; and that nopreparation was made, or even contemplated, for the destruction of thebridge across the Potomac--then it may have been, as many have asserted, that our army, following close upon the flying enemy, could have enteredand taken possession of the United States capital. These reports, however, present a condition of affairs altogether at variance with theinformation on which we had to act. Thus it was, and, so far as I knew, for the reasons above stated, that an advance to the south bank of thePotomac was not contemplated as the immediate sequence of the victory atManassas. What discoveries would have been made and what results wouldhave ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank ofthe river, to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions uponwhich it would be useless to enter. 

After the conference of the 22d, and because of it, I decided to returnto Richmond and employ all the power of my office to increase thestrength of the army, so as the better to enable it to meet the publicneed, whether in offensive-defensive or purely defensive operations, asopportunity should offer for the one, or the renewal of invasion requirethe other. 

A short time subsequent to my return, a message was brought to me fromthe prison, to the effect that a non-commissioned officer, captured atManassas, claimed to have a promise of protection from me. The name wasgiven Hulburt, of Connecticut. I had forgotten the name he gave when Isaw him; but, believing that I would recognize the person who hadattended to Colonel Gardner, and to whom only such a promise had beengiven, the officer in charge was directed to send him to me. When hecame, I had no doubt of his identity, and explained to him that I haddirected that he should not be treated as a prisoner, but that, in themultitude of those wearing the same uniform as his, some neglect ormistake had arisen, for which I was very sorry, and that he should beimmediately released and sent down the river to the neighborhood ofFortress Monroe, where he would be among his own people. He then told methat he had a sister residing a few miles in the country, whom he wouldbe very glad to visit. Permission was given him to do so, and a timefixed at which he was to report for transportation; and so he left, withmanifestations of thankfulness for the kindness with which he had beentreated. In due time a newspaper was received, containing an account ofhis escape, and how he had lingered about the suburbs of Richmond andmade drawings of the surrounding fortifications. The treachery was asgreat as if his drawings had been valuable, which they could not havebeen, as we had only then commenced the detached works which weredesigned as a system of defenses for Richmond. 

When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field of Manassas, and therejoicing over the victory had spread over the land and spent itsexuberance, some, who, like Job's war-horse, "snuffed the battle fromafar, " but in whom the likeness there ceased, censoriously asked why thefruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of WashingtonCity. Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in thatbattle, instead of the easier task of justification, chose the harderone of exculpation for the imputed failure. Their ill-advised zeal, combined perhaps with malice against me, induced the allegation that thePresident had prevented the generals from making an immediate andvigorous pursuit of the routed enemy. 

This, as other stories had been, was left to the correction which timeit was hoped would bring, the sooner because it was expected to berefuted by the reports of the commanding generals with whom I hadconferred on that subject immediately after the battle. 

After considerable time had elapsed, it was reported to me that a memberof Congress, who had served on that occasion as a volunteer aide toGeneral Beauregard, had stated in the House of Representatives that Ihad prevented the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat at Manassas. 

This gave to the rumor such official character and dignity as seemed tome to entitle it to notice not theretofore given, wherefore I addressedto General Johnston the following inquiry, which, though restricted inits terms to the allegation, was of such tenor as left it to his optionto state all the facts connected with the slander, if he should chooseto do me that justice, or should see the public interest involved in thecorrection, which, as stated in my letter to him, was that which gave itin my estimation its claim to consideration, and had caused me toaddress him on the subject:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _November 3, 1861. _

 "General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of the Potomac. _

 "Sir: Reports have been, and are being, widely circulated to the effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that view might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have acquired importance from the fact that they have served to create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass the Administration in its further efforts to reënforce the armies of the Potomac, and generally to provide for the public defense. For these public considerations, I call upon you, as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake. 

 "Very respectfully, yours, etc. , (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

 "Headquarters, Centreville, _November 10, 1861_. 

 "To his Excellency the President. 

 "Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d inst. , in which you call upon me, 'as the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by you on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether you obstructed the pursuit after the victory of Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake?'

 "To the first question I reply, No. The pursuit was 'obstructed' by the enemy's troops at Centreville, as I have stated in my official report. In that report I have also said why no advance was made upon the enemy's capital (for reasons) as follows:

 "The apparent freshness of the United States troops at Centreville, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation, prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital. 

 "To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible for the army to advance farther than it has done--to the line of Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at Upton's, Munson's, and Mason's Hills. After a conference at Fairfax Court-House with the three senior general officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present position. 

 "Most respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed) "J. E. Johnston. "

This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had beenindustriously circulated that I had prevented the immediate pursuit ofthe enemy, and had obstructed active operations after the battle ofManassas, and thus had caused the failure to reap the proper fruits ofthe victory. 

No specific inquiry was made by me as to the part I took in theconferences of the 21st and 22d of July, but a general reference wasmade to them. The entire silence of General Johnston in regard to thoseconferences is noticeable from the fact that, while his answer wasstrictly measured by the terms of my inquiry as to pursuit, he added astatement about a conference at Fairfax Court-House, which occurred inthe autumn, say October, and could have had no relation to the questionof pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas, or other activeoperations therewith connected. The reasons stated in my letter formaking an inquiry, naturally pointed to the conferences of the 21st and22d of July, but surely not to a conference held months subsequent tothe battle, and on a question quite different from that of hot pursuit. In regard to the matter of this subsequent conference I shall have moreto say hereafter. 

I left the field of Manassas, proud of the heroism of our troops inbattle, and of the conduct of the officers who led them. Anxious torecognize the claim of the army on the gratitude of the country, it wasmy pleasing duty to bear testimony to their merit in every availableform. Those who left the field and did not return to share its glory, itwas wished, should only be remembered as exceptions proving a rule. 

With all the information possessed at the time by the commandinggenerals, the propriety of maintaining our position, while seekingobjects more easily attained than the capture of the United Statescapital, seemed to me so demonstrable as to require no otherjustification than the statements to which I have referred in connectionwith the conference of the 22d of July. It would have seemed to me then, as it does now, to be less than was due to the energy and fortitude ofour troops, to plead a want of transportation and supplies for a marchof about twenty miles through a country which had not then been denudedby the ravages of war. 

Under these impressions, and with such feelings, I wrote to GeneralBeauregard as follows:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _August 4, 1861. _

 "General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia. _

 "My Dear Sir: ... I think you are unjust to yourself in putting your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the knowledge since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed. You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you, in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic. Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full; let us rather show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than, by dwelling on possibilities recently developed, give form and substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge after the event. 

 "With sincere esteem, I am your friend, (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

I had declared myself content and gratified with the conduct of thetroops and the officers, and supposed the generals, in recognition of myefforts to aid them by increasing their force and munitions, as well asby my abstinence from all interference with them upon the field, wouldhave neither cause nor motive to reflect upon me in their reports, andit was with equal surprise and regret that in this I found myselfmistaken. General Johnston, in his report, represented the order to himto make a junction with General Beauregard as a movement left to hisdiscretion, with the condition that, if made, he should first send hissick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House. I felt constrained to putupon his report when it was received the following endorsement:

 "The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report as received by him about one o'clock on the morning of the 18th of July is inaccurately reported. The following is a copy:

 "'Richmond, _July 17, 1861_. 

 "'General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_. 

 "'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements, exercise your discretion. 

 "'S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_. '

 "The word 'after' is not found in the dispatch before the words 'sending your sick, ' as is stated in the report; so that the argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move 'if practicable' had reference to General Johnston's letters of the 12th and 15th of July, representing the relative strength and positions of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to effect the movement. "

Upon the receipt of General Beauregard's report of the battle ofManassas, I found that it contained matter which seemed to me out ofplace, and therefore addressed to him the following letter:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _October 30, 1861_. 

 "General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_. 

 "Sir: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper publications purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to be a synopsis of your report of the battle of the 21st of July last, and in which it is represented that you have been overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and the liberation of Maryland. 

 "I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has been to-day submitted to my inspection. It appears, by official endorsement, to have been received by the Adjutant-General on the 18th of October, though it is dated August 26, 1861. 

 "With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised, because, if we did differ in opinion as to the measure and purposes of contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate place in the report of a battle; further, because it seemed to be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense; and, especially, because no such plan as that described was submitted to me. It is true that, some time before it was ordered, you expressed a desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby practicable to make it with safety to the Valley of Virginia. Hence, I believe, was secured the success by which it was attended. 

 "If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you say was submitted to me through Colonel Chesnut, allow me to request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it. "

 "Very respectfully yours, etc. , "

 (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

As General Beauregard did not think proper to omit that portion of hisreport to which objection was made, it necessitated, when the entirereport was transmitted to Congress, the placing of an endorsement uponit, reviewing that part of the report which I considered objectionable. The Congress, in its discretion, ordered the publication of the report, except that part to which the endorsement referred, thereby judiciouslysuppressing both the endorsement and the portion of the report to whichit related. In this case, and _every other_ official report eversubmitted to me, I made neither alteration nor erasure. 

That portion of the report which was suppressed by the Congress has, since the war, found its way into the press, but the endorsement whichbelonged to it has not been published. As part of the history of thetime, I will here present both in their proper connection:

 "General S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond Virginia. _

 "Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I propose--I hope not unreasonably--first to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle. 

 "Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with a decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or turn my position in this quarter was immediately impending, I dispatched, on July 13th, one of my staff, Colonel James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the consideration of the President a plan of operations substantially as follows:

 "I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as possible, the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of the Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient force to garrison his strong works at Winchester, and to guard the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes was to march hither with all of his command not essential for the defense of the position of Acquia Creek. These junctions having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous attack of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow, as soon as he approached my advanced position, at and around Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat, and the destruction or capture of his army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenandoah, under General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces and rejoined as he returned by the detachment left to hold the mountain-passes, was to march back rapidly into the Valley, fall upon and crush Patterson with a superior force, wheresoever he might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from Winchester for Manassas. 

 "Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to enable me to enter them with him or, if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would reënforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent (General McClellan) and able to defeat that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights, and the defense of their homes and families from an offensive invader, and then march to the investment of Washington, in the rear, while I resumed the offensive in front. This plan of operations, you are aware, was not acceptable at the time, from considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance its proposed advantages. Informed of these views, and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of Bull Run, the enemy having developed his purpose, by the advance on and occupation of Fairfax Court-House, from which my advance brigade had been withdrawn. 

 "The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph on July 17th, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine, should the movement in his judgment be deemed advisable. General Holmes was also directed to push forward with two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry. "[179]

 "ENDORSEMENT. 

 "The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was not, as herein reported, to form a junction, 'should the movement in his judgment be deemed advisable. ' The following is an accurate copy of the order:

 "'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements, exercise your discretion. '

 "The words 'if practicable' had reference to letters of General Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as compared with his own. 

 "The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department, can not be found among its files, nor any reference to any decision made upon it; and it was not known that the army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message, to be verbally delivered, was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a victory. The junction was made, the victory was won; but the consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why no such consequences could result are given in the closing passages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the responsibility can not be transferred to the Government at Richmond, which certainly would have united in any feasible plan to accomplish such desirable results. 

 "If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail to permit proper investigation, it must have been pronounced to be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it impossible are the following:

 "1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chesnut, on the supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show his effective force to have been only eleven thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in his front, ready to take possession of the Valley of Virginia on his withdrawal. 

 "2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett in Western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut's arrival in Richmond. 

 "3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail. 

 "4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battle-field would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and victory did the generals on the field propose an advance on the capital, nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt such a movement. 

 "It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on file in the War Department, as recited at the close of the report, showing what were the causes which prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. 

 (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

It has not been my purpose to describe the battles of the war. To thereports of the officers serving on the field, in the armies of bothGovernments, the student of history must turn for knowledge of thedetails, and it will be the task of the future historian, fromcomparison of the whole, to deduce the truth. 

It is fortunate for the cause of justice that error andmisrepresentation have, in their inconsistencies and improbabilities, the elements of self-destruction, while truth is in its natureconsistent and therefore self-sustaining. To such general remarks inregard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriateto the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from timeto time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well toelucidate obscurity as to correct error. 

From the official reports it appears that the strength of the two armieswas: Confederate, 30, 167 men of all arms, with 29 guns;[180] Federal, 35, 732 men, [181] with a body of cavalry, of which only one company isreported, and a large artillery force not shown in the tabularstatement. Of these troops, some on both sides were not engaged in thebattle. This, it is believed, was the case to a much larger extent onour side than on that of the enemy. He selected the point of attack, andcould concentrate his troops for that purpose, but we were guarding aline of some seven miles front, and therefore widely dispersed. 

For the purpose above stated, extracts are herein inserted from anarrative in the "Operations on the Line of Bull Run in June and July, 1861, including the First Battle of Manassas. " The name of the author, J. A. Early, will, to all who know him, be a sufficient guarantee forthe accuracy of the statements, and for the justice of the conclusionsannounced. To those who do not know him, it may be proper to state thathe was educated as a soldier; after leaving the army became a lawyer, but, when his country was involved in war with Mexico, he volunteeredand served in a regiment of his native State, Virginia. After that warterminated, he returned to the practice of his profession, which he wasactively pursuing when the controversy between the sections caused thecall of a convention to decide whether Virginia should secede from theUnion. He was sent, by the people of the county in which he resided, torepresent them in that convention. There he opposed to the last theadoption of the ordinance for secession; but, when it was decided, against his opinion, to resort to the remedy of withdrawal from theUnion, he, true to his allegiance to the State of which he was acitizen, paused not to cavil or protest, but at once stepped forth todefend her against a threatened invasion. The sword that had rusted inpeace gleamed brightly in war. He rose to the high grade oflieutenant-general. None have a more stainless record as a soldier, nonehave shown a higher patriotism or purer fidelity through all the bittertrials to which we have been subjected since open war was ended andnominal peace began. 

Extracts from the narrative of General J. A. Early, of events occurringwhen he was colonel of the Twenty-fourth Regiment of Virginia Infantryand commanding a brigade:

 "On June 19, 1861, I arrived at Manassas Junction and reported to General P. G. T. Beauregard, the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment having been previously sent to him, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hairsten, from Lynchburg, where I had been stationed under the orders of General Robert E. Lee, for the purpose of organizing the Virginia troops which were being mustered into service at that place.... 

 "On the morning of July 18th, my brigade was moved, by order of General Beauregard, to the left of Camp Walker, on the railroad, and remained there some time.... 

 "On falling back, General Ewell, in pursuance of his instructions, had burned the bridges on the railroad over Pope's Run, from Fairfax Station to Union Mills, and while I was at Camp Walker I saw the smoke ascending from the railroad-bridge over Bull Run, which was burned that morning. 

 "The burning of this bridge had not been included in the previous instructions to Ewell, and I have always been at a loss to know why it was now fired. That bridge certainly was not necessary to the enemy for crossing Bull Run, either with his troops or wagons, as that stream was easily fordable at numerous places, both above and below. The bridge was, moreover, susceptible of easy defense, as there were deep cuts leading to it on both sides. The only possible purpose to be subserved by the burning of that bridge would have been the prevention for a short time of the running of trains over it by the enemy, in the event of our defeat, or evacuation of Manassas without a fight. As it was, we were afterward greatly inconvenienced by its destruction. " ... 

The attack made on the 18th is described as directed against our rightcenter, and as having been met and repulsed in a manner quite creditableto our raw troops, of whom he writes:

 "On the 19th they were occupied in the effort to strengthen their position by throwing up the best defenses they could with the implements at hand, which consisted of a very few picks and spades, some rough bowie-knives, and the bayonets of the muskets.... The position was a very weak one, as the banks on the opposite side of Bull Run overlooked and commanded those on the south side, which were but a few feet above the water's edge, and there was an open field in rear of the strip of woods on our side of the stream, for a considerable distance up and down it, which exposed all of our movements on that side to observation from the opposite one, as the strip of woods afforded but a thin veil which could be seen through.... 

 "About dusk on the 19th, brigade commanders were summoned to a conference at McLean's house by General Beauregard, and he then informed us of the fact that General Johnston had been ordered, at his instance, from the Valley, and was marching to coöperate with us. He stated that Johnston would march directly across the Blue Ridge toward the enemy's right flank, and would probably attack on that flank at dawn the next morning. Before he had finished his statement of the plans he proposed pursuing in the event of Johnston's attack on the enemy's right flank, a party of horsemen rode up in front of the house, and, dismounting, one of them walked in and reported himself as Brigadier-General T. J. Jackson, who had arrived with the advanced brigade of Johnston's troops by the way of Manassas Gap Railroad, and he stated that his brigade was about twenty-five hundred strong. This information took General Beauregard very much by surprise, and, after ascertaining that General Jackson had taken the cars at Piedmont Station, General Beauregard asked him if General Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct road, so as to get on the enemy's right flank. General Jackson replied with some little hesitation, and, as I thought at the time, in rather a stolid manner, that he thought not; that he thought the purpose was to transport the whole force by railroad from Piedmont Station. This was the first time I ever saw General Jackson, and my first impressions of him were not very favorable from the manner in which he gave his information. I subsequently ascertained very well how it was that he seemed to know so little, in the presence of the strangers among whom he found himself, of General Johnston's intended movements, and I presume nothing but the fact of General Beauregard being his superior in rank, and his being ordered to report to him, could have elicited as much information from him, under the circumstances, as was obtained. After General Jackson had given the information above stated, and received instructions where to put his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to develop fully his plans for the next day. The information received from General Jackson was wholly unexpected, but General Beauregard said he thought Jackson was not correctly informed, and was mistaken; that he was satisfied General Johnston was marching with the rest of his troops and would attack the enemy's right flank early next day as he had before stated. Upon this hypothesis, he directed that when General Johnston's attack began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge from the character of the musketry-fire, we should cross Bull Run from our several positions, and move upon the enemy so as to attack him on his left flank and rear. He said that he had no doubt General Johnston's attack would be a complete surprise to the enemy; that the latter would not know what to think of it; that when he turned to meet that attack, and soon found himself assailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised and would not know what to do; that the effect would become a complete rout--a perfect Waterloo; and that, when the enemy took to flight, we would pursue, cross the Potomac, and arouse Maryland.... 

 "During the 20th General Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him assuming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard and himself. 

 "Early on the morning of the 21st (Sunday), we heard the enemy's guns open from the heights north of Bull Run, from which they had opened on the 18th, and I soon received orders for the movement of my brigade.... 

 "Upon arriving there (McLean's Ford), I found General Jones had returned to the intrenchments with his brigade, and I was informed by him that General Beauregard had directed that I should join him (General Beauregard) with my brigade.... He then asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard to go to him, and, on my replying in the negative, he informed me that he had such an order for me in a note to him. He sent to one of his staff-officers for the note, and showed it to me. The note was one directing him to fall back behind Bull Run, and was in pencil. At the foot of it were these words: 'Send Early to me. ' This was all the order that I received to move to the left, and it was shown to me a very little after twelve o'clock.... Chisholm, who carried the note to Jones, in which was contained the order I received, passed me at McLean's Ford going on to Jones about, or a little after, eleven o'clock. If I had not received the order until 2 P. M. , it would have been impossible for me to get on the field at the time I reached it, about 3. 30 P. M. Colonel Chisholm informed me that the order was for all the troops to fall back across Bull Run.... I was met by Colonel John S. Preston, one of the General's aides, who informed me that General Beauregard had gone where the fighting was ... But that General Johnston was just in front, and his directions were that we should proceed to the left, where there was a heavy fire of musketry.... When we reached General Johnston, he expressed great gratification at our arrival, but it was very perceptible that his anticipations were not sanguine. He gave me special instructions as to my movements, directing me to clear our lines completely before going to the front.... In some fields on the left of our line we found Colonel Stuart with a body of cavalry and some pieces of artillery, belonging, as I understood, to a battery commanded by Lieutenant Beckham.... I found Stuart already in position beyond our extreme left, and, as I understood it, supporting and controlling Beckham's guns, which were firing on the enemy's extreme right flank, thus rendering very efficient service. I feel well assured that Stuart had but _two_ companies of cavalry with him, as these were all I saw when he afterward went in pursuit of the enemy. As I approached the left, a young man named Saunders came galloping to me from Stuart with the information that the enemy was about retreating, and a request to hurry on. This was the first word of encouragement we had received since we reached the vicinity of the battle. I told the messenger to inform Stuart that I was then moving as rapidly as my men could move; but he soon returned with another message informing me that the other was a mistake, that the enemy had merely retired behind the ridge in front to form a new flanking column, and cautioning me to be on my guard. This last information proved to be correct. It was the last effort of the enemy to extend his right beyond our left, and was met by the formation of my regiments in his front.... The hill on which the enemy's troops were was Chinn's Hill, so often referred to in the accounts of this battle, and the one next year, on the same field.... An officer came to me in a gallop, and entreated me not to fire on the troops in front, and I was so much impressed by his earnest manner and confident tone, that I halted my brigade on the side of the hill, and rode to the top of it, when I discovered, about a hundred and fifty yards to my right, a regiment bearing a flag which was drooping around the staff in such a manner as not to be distinguishable from the Confederate flag of that day. I thought that, if the one that had been in front of me was a Virginia regiment, this must also be a Confederate one; but one or two shots from Beckham's guns on the left caused the regiment to face about, when its flag unfurled, and I discovered it to be the United States flag. I forthwith ordered my brigade forward, but it did not reach the top of the hill soon enough to do any damage to the retiring regiment, which retreated precipitately down the hill and across the Warrenton Pike. At that time there was very little distinction between the dress of some of the Federal regiments and some of ours. As soon as the misrepresentation in regard to the character of the troops was corrected, my brigade advanced to the top of the hill that had been occupied by the enemy, and we ascertained that his troops had retired precipitately, and a large body of them was discovered in the fields in rear of Dogan's house, and north of the turnpike. Colonel Cocke, with one of his regiments, now joined us, and our pieces of artillery were advanced and fired upon the enemy's columns with considerable effect, causing them to disperse, and we soon discovered that they were in full retreat.... When my column was seen by General Beauregard, he at first thought it was a column of the enemy, having received erroneous information that such a column was on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The enemy took my troops, as they approached his right, for a large body of our troops from the Valley; and as my men, moving by flank, were stretched out at considerable length, from weariness, they were greatly over-estimated. We scared the enemy worse than we hurt him.... 

 "We saw the evidences of the flight all along our march, and unmistakable indications of the overwhelming character of the enemy's defeat in abandoned muskets and equipments. It was impossible for me to pursue the enemy farther, as well because I was utterly unacquainted with the crossings of the Run and the woods in front, as because most of the men belonging to my brigade had been marching the greater part of the day and were very much exhausted. But pursuit with infantry would have been unavailing, as the enemy's troops retreated with such rapidity that they could not have been overtaken by any other than mounted troops. On the next day we found a great many articles that the routed troops had abandoned in their flight, showing that no expense or trouble had been spared by the enemy in equipping his army.... In my movement after the retreat of the enemy commenced, I passed the Carter house and beyond our line of battle. The enemy had by this time entirely disappeared, and, having no knowledge of the country whatever, being on the ground for the first time, besides not observing any movement of troops from our line, I halted, with the expectation of receiving further orders. Observing some men near the Carter house, I rode to it, and found some five or six Federal soldiers, who had collected some wounded there of both sides, and among them Colonel Gardner, of the Eighth Georgia Regiment, who was suffering from a very painful wound in the leg, which was fractured just above the ankle.... Just after my return from the house where I saw Colonel Gardner, President Davis, in company with several gentlemen, rode to where my command was, and addressed a few stirring remarks to my regiments, in succession, which received him with great enthusiasm. 

 "I briefly informed Mr. Davis of the orders I had received, and the movements of my brigade, and asked him what I should do under the circumstances. He told me that I had better get my men into line, and wait for further orders. I then requested him to inform Generals Johnston and Beauregard of my position, and my desire to receive orders. I also informed him of the condition in which I had found Colonel Gardner, and also of Colonel Jones being in the neighborhood badly wounded, requesting him to have a surgeon sent to their relief, as all of mine were in the rear attending to the wounded of their regiments. While we were talking, we saw a body of troops moving on the opposite side of Bull Run, some distance below us. 

 "Mr. Davis then left me, going to the house where Colonel Gardner was, and I moved my brigade some half a mile farther, and formed it in line across the peninsula formed by a very considerable bend in Bull Run above the stone bridge. I put out a line of pickets in front, and my brigade bivouacked in this position for the night. By the time all these dispositions were made it was night, and I then rode back with Captain Gardner over the route I had moved on, as I knew no other, in order to find General Johnston or General Beauregard, so that I might receive orders, supposing that there would be a forward movement early in the morning. I first went to the Lewis house, which I found to be a hospital filled with wounded men; but was unable to get any information about either of the generals. I then rode toward Manassas, and, after going some distance in that direction, I met an officer who inquired for General Johnston, stating that he was on his staff. I informed him that I was looking for General Johnston also, as well as for General Beauregard, and supposed they were at Manassas; but he said that he was just from Manassas, and neither of the generals was there.... At about twelve o'clock at night I lay down in the field in rear of my command, on a couple of bundles of wheat in the straw. My men had no rations with them. I had picked up a haversack on the field, which was filled with hard biscuits, and had been dropped by some Yankee in his flight, and out of its contents I made my own supper, distributing the rest among a number of officers who had nothing. 

 "Very early next morning, I sent Captain Gardner to look out for the generals, and get orders for my command. He went to Manassas, and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to remain where I was until further orders, and to send for the camp-equipage, rations, etc. , of my command. A number of the men spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and picked up a great many knapsacks, India-rubber cloths, blankets, overcoats, etc. , as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy.... 

 "After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the field, north of the Warrenton pike, and to some hospitals in the vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley road, back of the field of battle, at which Colonel Jones, of the Fourth Alabama, had been, which was in charge of a surgeon of a Rhode Island regiment, whose name was Harris, I think. I asked him if he had what he wanted for the men under his care, and he told me he would like to have some morphine, of which his supply was short. I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry, who rode up at the time, to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of medical saddle-pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at different points near the field, and asked if there would be any objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much service to them. I gave him the permission to get not only that, but anything else that would tend to the comfort of his patients. There did not come within my observation any instance of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemy's wounded; nor did I see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them. The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (appointed by the Federal Congress), in regard to 'rebel atrocities, ' were very grossly exaggerated, or manufactured from the whole cloth.... 

 "On the night following the battle, when I was looking for Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear of the battle-field, I discovered that the greater part of the troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state of confusion. I saw companies looking for their regiments, and squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as far as I went toward Manassas. It was very apparent that no considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the left could have been brought into a condition next day for an advance toward Washington.... 

 "The dispute as to who planned the battle, or commanded on the field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought was concerned. He made a movement on our left which was wholly unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a defensive battle on that flank, by bringing up reënforcements from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered, and hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire until reënforcements could be brought up. According to the statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to General Johnston, as commander-in-chief, while the movements of all the reënforcements as they arrived were unquestionably directed by the latter. According to the statement of both, the movement of Elzey's brigade to the left averted a great danger, and both concur in attributing the turning of the tide of battle to the movement of my brigade against the enemy's extreme right flank (General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the battle-flag, and General Johnston in his 'Narrative' recently published). 

 "General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty assigned him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can there be in it?

 "General Johnston assumes the responsibility for the failure to advance on Washington, and why, then, should an effort be made to shift it on any one else? He certainly was commander-in-chief, and had the privilege of advancing if he thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army is idle. If the Bull Run bridge had not been burned on the 18th, our supplies could have been run to Alexandria, if we could have advanced, as easily as to Manassas, for the enemy had repaired the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance as far as Washington. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments had about fourteen six-horse wagons each, and that would have furnished enough for the brigade, if the Seventh Louisiana had none. In 1862 we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking-utensils, and we started from the battle-field of second Manassas with no rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely dependent on the country, which, in July, 1861, was teeming with supplies, but in August and September, 1862, was nearly depleted. The pretense, therefore, that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by the want of transportation and of supplies is wholly untenable. "

I will now make the promised extracts from reminiscences of Colonel(then Captain) Lay, which were sent to a friend, and handed to me for myuse. The paper bears date February 13, 1878. After some preliminarymatter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies, the narrative proceeds:

 "I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6. 30 A. M. , July 21, 1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his headquarters. About 7. 30 A. M. I accompanied him and General Johnston to a position near to Mitchell's Ford, where for some hours we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position near and to the left of the Lewis house.... About 3. 15 P. M. , Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to the left and in front of the Lewis house and commenced firing. I was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy, producing perfect confusion and demoralization.... I rode to join my brother, Colonel Lay, whom I saw going toward my command from General Johnston. He reported to me that General Johnston said: 'Now is your time; push the pursuit. ' I started at once on a trot, was passing General Johnston, who gave some orders, and I understood him to say, 'Salute the President in passing. ' ... I saluted, and passed on at a gallop. 

 "I halted at Bull Run to water my horses--then suffering--and to confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General Philip St. George Cocke. 

 "I passed on, ... When to my astonishment I saw the President near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him, and said that he was much farther forward than he should be; that the forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, and very few of our troops in front of the Run, and advised him to retire; that I was then about to charge.... 

 "We made the charge; a small body of the enemy broke before we reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our left.... After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley Church, and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale, to Captains Tillinghast, Ricketts, and other badly wounded United States officers, and was going on until a superior force should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over the field to my quarters at Manassas a little before daylight--I and my little gallant squadron--having been actively in the saddle, I think, more than twenty hours.... 

 (Signed) "John F. Lay, _"Late Colonel of Cavalry, C. S. A. _

 "N. B. : It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker (then Captain Walker, of the battery referred to) is now in my office, and confirms my recollection.... J. F. L. "

The quartermaster-general of General Beauregard's command, W. L. Cabell, states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August, 1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard'sforces before the battle of Manassas, that as nearly as he couldremember it was as follows, viz. :

 One four-horse wagon to each company. One " " " for field and staff (regimental). One " " " " ammunition. One " " " " hospital purposes. Two " " wagons " each battery of artillery. Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes. One ambulance for each regiment. 

Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive untilthe day (or probably two days) after the battle. 

If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the fieldtransportation reported above could surely have been distributed so asto supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Earlystates, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by want of transportation. 

The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by thecircumstances, had corresponding gratification among all classes and inall sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress, then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the Presidentfrom the field of Manassas, adopted resolutions expressive of theirthanks to the most high God, and inviting the people of the ConfederateStates to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mightydeliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which hadcaused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons, and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy;assuring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined "thenames of the gallant dead as the champions of free and constitutionalliberty. "

If universal gratulation at our success inspired an overweeningconfidence, it also begat increased desire to enter the militaryservice; and, but for our want of arms and munitions, we could haveenrolled an army little short of the number of able-bodied men in theConfederate States. 

I have given so much space to the battle of Manassas because it was thefirst great action of the war, exciting intense feeling, and producingimportant moral results among the people of the Confederacy; andfurther, because it was made the basis of misrepresentation, and unjustreflection upon the chief Executive, which certainly had no plausiblepretext in the facts, and can not be referred to a reasonable desire topromote the successful defense of our country. 

Impressed with the conviction that time would naturally work to ourdisadvantage, as training was more necessary to make soldiers of theNorthern people than of our own; and further, because of their largerpopulation, as well as their greater facility in obtaining recruits fromforeign countries, the Administration continued assiduously to exertevery faculty to increase the efficiency of the army by addition to itsnumbers, by improving its organization, and by supplying the needfulmunitions and equipments. Inactivity is the prolific source of evil toan army, especially if composed of new levies, who, like ours, hadhurried from their homes at their country's call. For these, and otherreasons more readily appreciated, it was thought desirable that all ouravailable forces should be employed as actively as might be practicable. 

On the 1st of August, 1861, I wrote to General J. E. Johnston, atManassas, as follows:

 "We are anxiously looking for the official reports of the battle of Manassas, and have present need to know what supplies and wagons were captured. I wish you would have prepared a statement of your wants in transportation and supplies of all kinds, to put your army on a proper footing for active operations.... 

 "I am, as ever, your friend, (Signed) "Jefferson Davis. "

[Footnote 179: The foregoing was copied from "The Land we Love, " forFebruary, 1867 (vol. Ii, No. 4). ]

[Footnote 180: General Beauregard's report. ]

[Footnote 181: General McDowell's return, July 16, 17, 1861. ]

CHAPTER VIII. 

 The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-'99. --Their Influence on Political Affairs. --Kentucky declares for Neutrality. --Correspondence of Governor Magoffin with the President of the United States and the President of the Confederate States. --Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky, by Major-General Polk. --His Correspondence with the Kentucky Commissioners. --President Lincoln's View of Neutrality. --Acts of the United States Government. --Refugees. --Their Motives of Expatriation. --Address of ex-Vice-President Breckinridge to the People of the State. --The Occupation of Columbus secured. --The Purpose of the United States Government. --Battle of Belmont. --Albert Sidney Johnston commands the Department. --State of Affairs. --Line of Defense. -Efforts to obtain Arms; also Troops. 

Kentucky, the eldest daughter of Virginia, had moved contemporaneouslywith her mother in the assertion of the cardinal principles announced inthe resolutions of 1798-'99. She then by the properly constitutedauthority did with due solemnity declare that the Government of theUnited States was the result of a compact between the States to whicheach acceded as a State; that it possessed only delegated powers, ofwhich it was not the exclusive or final judge; and that, as in all casesof compact among parties having no common judge, "each party has anequal right to judge for itself as well of infractions as of the modeand measure of redress. " Thus spoke Kentucky in the first years of herexistence as a sovereign. The great truth announced in her series ofresolutions was the sign under which the Democracy conquered in 1800, and which constituted the corner-stone of the political edifice of whichJefferson was the architect, and which stood unshaken for sixty yearsfrom the time its foundation was laid. During this period, the growth, prosperity, and happiness of the country seemed unmistakably to confirmthe wisdom of the voluntary union of free sovereign States under awritten compact confining the action of the General Government to theexpressly enumerated powers which had been delegated therein. Wheninfractions of the compact had been deliberately and persistently made, when the intent was clearly manifested to pervert the powers of theGeneral Government from the purposes for which they had been conferred, and to use them for the injury of a portion of the States, which werethe integral parties to the compact, some of them resolved to judge forthemselves of the "mode and measure of redress, " and to exercise theright, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence to be theunalienable endowment of every people, to alter or abolish any form ofgovernment, and to institute a new one, "laying its foundation on suchprinciples, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shallseem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. " By no rationalmode of construction, in view of the history of the Declaration ofIndependence, or of the resolutions of Kentucky, can it be claimed thatthe word "people" had any other meaning than that of a distinctcommunity, such as the people of each colony who by their delegates inthe Congress declared themselves to be henceforth a State; and that noneother than the people of each State could, by the resolutions of1798-'99, have been referred to as the final judge of infractions oftheir compact, and of the remedy which should be applied. 

Kentucky made no decision adverse to this right of a State, but shedeclared, in the impending conflict between the States seceding from andthose adhering to the Federal Government, that she would hold theposition of neutrality. If the question was to be settled by a war ofwords, that was feasible; but, if the conflict was to be one of arms, itwas utterly impracticable. To maintain neutrality under suchcircumstances would have required a power greater than that of both thecontestants, or a moral influence commanding such respect for her wishesas could hardly have been anticipated from that party which had, inviolation of right, inflicted the wrongs which produced the withdrawalof some of the States, and had uttered multiplied threats of coercion ifany State attempted to exercise the rights defined in the resolutions of1798-'99. If, however, any such hope may have been entertained, but fewmoons had filled and waned before the defiant occupation of herterritory and the enrollment of her citizens as soldiers in the army ofinvasion must have dispelled the illusion. 

The following correspondence took place in August, between GovernorMagoffin, of Kentucky, and President Lincoln--also between the Governorand myself, as President of the Confederate States--relative to theneutrality of the State:

 "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department, "Frankfort, _August 19, 1861_. 

 To his Excellency Abraham Lincoln, _President of the United States_. 

 "Sir: From the commencement of the unhappy hostilities now pending in this country, the people of Kentucky have indicated an earnest desire and purpose, as far as lay in their power, while maintaining their original political status, to do nothing by which to involve themselves in the war. Up to this time they have succeeded in securing to themselves and to the State peace and tranquillity as the fruits of the policy they adopted. My single object now is to promote the continuance of these blessings to this State. 

 "Until within a brief period the people of Kentucky were quiet and tranquil, free from domestic strife, and undisturbed by internal commotion. They have resisted no law, rebelled against no authority, engaged in no revolution, but constantly proclaimed their firm determination to pursue their peaceful avocations, earnestly hoping that their own soil would be spared the presence of armed troops, and that the scene of conflict would be kept removed beyond the border of their State. By thus avoiding all occasions for the introduction of bodies of armed soldiers, and offering no provocation for the presence of military force, the people of Kentucky have sincerely striven to preserve in their State domestic peace and avert the calamities of sanguinary engagements. 

 "Recently a large body of soldiers have been enlisted in the United States army and collected in military camps in the central portion of Kentucky. This movement was preceded by the active organization of companies, regiments, etc. , consisting of men sworn into the United States service, under officers holding commissions from yourself. Ordnance, arms, munitions, and supplies of war are being transported into the State, and placed in large quantities in these camps. In a word, an army is now being organized and quartered within the State, supplied with all the appliances of war, without the consent or advice of the authorities of the State, and without consultation with those most prominently known and recognized as loyal citizens. This movement now imperils that peace and tranquillity which from the beginning of our pending difficulties have been the paramount desire of this people, and which, up to this time, they have so secured to the State. 

 "Within Kentucky there has been, and is likely to be, no occasion for the presence of military force. The people are quiet and tranquil, feeling no apprehension of any occasion arising to invoke protection from the Federal arm. They have asked that their territory be left free from military occupation, and the present tranquillity of their communication left uninvaded by soldiers. They do not desire that Kentucky shall be required to supply the battle-field for the contending armies, or become the theatre of the war. 

 "Now, therefore, as Governor of the State of Kentucky, and in the name of the people I have the honor to represent, and with the single and earnest desire to avert from their peaceful homes the horrors of war, I urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the State. If such action as is here urged be promptly taken, I firmly believe the peace of the people of Kentucky will be preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be averted from a people now peaceful and tranquil. 

 "I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. Magoffin. "

 "Washington, _August 24, 1861_. 

 "To his Excellency B. Magoffin, _Governor of the State of Kentucky. _

 "Sir: Your letter of the 19th instant, in which you 'urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within that State, ' is received. 

 "I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge upon this subject; but I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented. 

 "I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. 

 "I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky. 

 "In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky. 

 "While I have conversed on this subject with many of the eminent men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other person except your Excellency and the bearers of your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky, or to disband it. One very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time. 

 "Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her limits; and, with this impression, I must respectfully decline to so remove it. 

 "I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with regret I search for, and can not find, in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union. 

 "Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln. "

 "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department, "Frankfort, _August 24, 1861_. 

 "Hon. Jefferson Davis, _Richmond, Virginia. _

 "Sir: Since the commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending in the country, the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire and purpose to maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent parties. They have earnestly striven by their policy to avert from themselves the calamity of war, and protect their own soil from the presence of contending armies. Up to this period they have enjoyed comparative tranquillity and entire domestic peace. 

 "Recently a military force has been enlisted and quartered by the United States authorities within this State. I have on this day addressed a communication and dispatched commissioners to the President of the United States, urging the removal of these troops from the soil of Kentucky, and thus exerting myself to carry out the will of the people in the maintenance of a neutral position. The people of this State desire to be free from the presence of the soldiers of either belligerent, and to that end my efforts are now directed. 

 "Although I have no reason to presume that the Government of the Confederate States contemplate or have ever proposed any violation of the neutral attitude thus assumed by Kentucky, there seems to be some uneasiness felt among the people of some portion of the State, occasioned by the collection of bodies of troops along their southern frontier. In order to quiet this apprehension, and to secure to the people their cherished object of peace, this communication is to present these facts and elicit an authoritative assurance that the Government of the Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the position indicated as assumed by Kentucky. 

 "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. Magoffin. "

 "Richmond, _August 28, 1861. _

 "To Hon. B. Magoffin, _Governor of Kentucky, etc. _

 "Sir: I have received your letter informing me that 'since the commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending in the country, the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire to maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent parties. ' In the same communication you express your desire to elicit 'an authoritative assurance that the Government of the Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the neutral position of Kentucky. '

 "In reply to this request, I lose no time in assuring you that the Government of the Confederate States neither desires nor intends to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky. The assemblage of troops in Tennessee, to which you refer, had no other object than to repel the lawless invasion of that State by the forces of the United States, should their Government seek to approach it through Kentucky, without respect for its position of neutrality. That such apprehensions were not groundless has been proved by the course of that Government in the States of Maryland and Missouri, and more recently in Kentucky itself, in which, as you inform me, 'a military force has been enlisted and quartered by the United States authorities. '

 "The Government of the Confederate States has not only respected most scrupulously the neutrality of Kentucky, but has continued to maintain the friendly relations of trade and intercourse which it has suspended with the United States generally. 

 "In view of the history of the past, it can scarcely be necessary to assure your Excellency that the Government of the Confederate States will continue to respect the neutrality of Kentucky so long as her people will maintain it themselves. 

 "But neutrality, to be entitled to respect, must be strictly maintained between both parties; or, if the door be opened on the one side for the aggressions of one of the belligerent parties upon the other, it ought not to be shut to the assailed when they seek to enter it for purposes of self-defense. 

 "I do not, however, for a moment believe that your gallant State will suffer its soil to be used for the purpose of giving an advantage to those who violate its neutrality and disregard its rights, over others who respect both. 

 "In conclusion, I tender to your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration and regard, and am, sir, very respectfully, "Yours, etc. , Jefferson Davis. "

Movements by the Federal forces in southwestern Kentucky revealed suchdesigns as made it absolutely necessary that General Polk, commandingthe Confederate forces in that section, should immediately occupy thetown of Columbus, Kentucky; a position of much strategic importance onthe shore of the Mississippi River. 

That position was doubly important, because it commanded the oppositeshore in Missouri, and was the gateway on the border of Tennessee. 

Two States of the Confederacy were therefore threatened by theanticipated movement of the enemy to get possession of Columbus. 

Major-General Polk, therefore, crossed the State line, took possessionof Hickman on September 3d, and on the 4th secured Columbus. GeneralGrant, who took command at Cairo on September 2d, being thusanticipated, seized Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, andoccupied it in force on the 5th and 6th. 

After the occupation, under date of September 4th, I received thefollowing dispatch from Major-General Polk: "The enemy having descendedthe Mississippi River some three or four days since, and seated himselfwith cannon and entrenched lines opposite the town of Columbus, Kentucky, making such demonstrations as left no doubt upon the minds ofany of their intention to seize and forcibly possess said town, Ithought proper, under the plenary power delegated to me, to direct asufficient portion of my command both by the river way and land toconcentrate at Columbus, as well to offer to its citizens thatprotection they unite to a man in accepting, as also to prevent, intime, the occupation by the enemy of a point so necessary to thesecurity of western Tennessee. The demonstration on my part has had thedesired effect. The enemy has withdrawn his forces even before I hadfortified my position. It is my intention to continue to occupy and holdthis place. " On the same day I sent the following reply to Major-GeneralPolk: "Your telegram received; the necessity must justify the action. "

The Legislature of Kentucky passed resolutions and appointed a committeeto inquire into the action of General Polk, from which the annexedcorrespondence resulted:

 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MAJOR-GENERAL POLK AND THE AUTHORITIES OF KENTUCKY. 

 _Resolutions of the Kentucky Senate relative to the Violation of the Neutrality of Kentucky. _

 "_Resolved by the Senate_, That the special committee of the Senate, raised for the purpose of considering the reported occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by Confederate troops, take into consideration the occupation of Paducah and other places in Kentucky by the Federal authorities, and report thereon when the true state of the case shall have been ascertained. That the Speaker appoint three members of the Senate to visit southern Kentucky, who are directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by Confederate and Federal forces, and report in writing at as early a day as practicable. 

 "In Senate of Kentucky, Saturday, September 7, A. D. 1861. 

 "Twice read and adopted. 

 "Attest: (Signed) J. H. Johnson, S. S. 

 "In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the Speaker appointed as said committee Messrs. John M. Johnson, William B. Read, and Thornton F. Marshall. 

 "Attest: (Signed) J. H. Johnson, S. S. "

 _Letter of Hon. J. M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of the Kentucky Senate, to General Polk_. 

 "Columbus, Kentucky, _September 9, 1861. _

 "To Major-General Polk, _commanding forces, etc. _

 "Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith a resolution of the Senate of Kentucky, adopted by that body upon the reception of the intelligence of the military occupation of Hickman, Chalk Bank, and Columbus, by the Confederate troops under your command. I need not say that the people of Kentucky are profoundly astonished that such an act should have been committed by the Confederates, and especially that they should have been the first to do so with an equipped and regularly organized army. 

 "The people of Kentucky, having with great unanimity determined upon a position of neutrality in the unhappy war now being waged, and which they had tried in vain to prevent, had hoped that one place at least in this great nation might remain uninvaded by passion, and through whose good office something might be done to end the war, or at least to mitigate its horrors, or, if this were not possible, that she might be left to choose her destiny without disturbance from any quarter. 

 "In obedience to the thrice-repeated will of the people, as expressed at the polls, and in their name, I ask you to withdraw your forces from the soil of Kentucky. 

 "I will say, in conclusion, that all the people of the State await, in deep suspense, your action in the premises. 

 "I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, etc. , (Signed) "John M. Johnson, "_Chairman of Committee_. "

 _Letter from General Polk to the Kentucky Commissioners. _

 Columbus, Kentucky, _September 9, 1861. _

 To J. M. Johnson, _Chairman of Committee, Senate of Kentucky. _

 "Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, conveying to me a copy of a resolution of the Senate of Kentucky, under which a committee (of which you are chairman) was raised 'for the purpose of considering the reported occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by the Confederate troops, and that they take into consideration the reported occupation of Paducah and other points in Kentucky by the Federal authorities, and report thereon'; also, that they be 'directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and Federal forces, and report, in writing, at as early a day as practicable. '

 "From the terms of the resolution, it appears your office, as committee-men, was restricted merely to collecting the facts in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and Federal forces, and to report thereon in writing, at as early a day as possible. In answer to these resolutions, I have respectfully to say that, so far as the Confederate forces are concerned, the facts are plain, and shortly stated. The Government which they represent, recognizing as a fundamental principle the right of sovereign States to take such a position as they choose in regard to their relations with other States, was compelled by that principle to concede to Kentucky the right to assume the position of neutrality, which she has chosen in the passing struggle. This it has done on all occasions, and without an exception. The cases alluded to by his Excellency, Governor Magoffin, in his recent message, as 'raids, ' I presume, are the cases of the steamers Cheney and Orr. The former was the unauthorized and unrecognized act of certain citizens of Alabama, and the latter the act of citizens of Tennessee and others, and was an act of reprisal. They can not, therefore, be charged, in any sense, as acts of the Confederate Government. 

 "The first and only instance in which the neutrality of Kentucky has been disregarded is that in which the troops under my command, and by my direction, took possession of the place I now hold, and so much of the territory between it and the Tennessee line as was necessary for me to pass over in order to reach it. This act finds abundant justification in the history of the concessions granted to the Federal Government by Kentucky ever since the war began, notwithstanding the position of neutrality which she had assumed, and the firmness with which she proclaimed her intention to maintain it. That history shows the following among other facts: In January, the House of Representatives of Kentucky passed anti-coercion resolutions--only four dissenting. The Governor, in May, issued his neutrality proclamation. The address of the Union Central Committee, including Mr. James Speed, Mr. Prentice, and other prominent Union men, in April, proclaimed neutrality as the policy of Kentucky, and claimed that an attempt to coerce the South should induce Kentucky to make common cause with her, and take part in the contest on her side, 'without counting the cost. ' The Union speakers and papers, with few exceptions, claimed, up to the last election, that the Union vote was strict neutrality and peace. These facts and events gave assurance of the integrity of the avowed purpose of your State, and we were content with the position she assumed. 

 "Since the election, however, she has allowed the seizure in her port (Paducah) of property of citizens of the Confederate States; she has, by her members in the Congress of the United States, voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war against the Confederate States; she has allowed the Federal Government to cut timber from her forests for the purpose of building armed boats for the invasion of the Southern States; she is permitting to be enlisted in her territory, troops, not only of her own citizens, but of the citizens of other States, for the purpose of being armed and used in offensive warfare against the Confederate States. At Camp Robinson, in the county of Garrard, there are now ten thousand troops, if the newspapers can be relied upon, in which men from Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois are mustered with Kentuckians into the service of the United States, and armed by that Government for the avowed purpose of giving aid to the disaffected in one of the Confederate States, and of carrying out the designs of that Government for their subjugation. Notwithstanding all these and other acts of a similar character, the Confederate States have continued to respect the attitude which Kentucky had assumed as a neutral, and forborne from reprisals, in the hope that Kentucky would yet enforce respect for her position on the part of the Government of the United States. 

 "Our patient expectation has been disappointed, and it was only when we perceived that this continued indifference to our rights and our safety was about to culminate in the seizure of an important part of her territory by the United States forces for offensive operations against the Confederate States, that a regard for self-preservation demanded of us to seize it in advance. We are here, therefore, not by choice, but of necessity, and as I have had the honor to say, in a communication addressed to his Excellency Governor Magoffin, a copy of which is herewith inclosed and submitted as a part of my reply, so I now repeat in answer to your request, that I am prepared to agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee (which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government) that the Federal troops shall not be allowed to enter nor occupy any part of Kentucky for the future. 

 "In view of the facts thus submitted, I can not but think the world at large will find it difficult to appreciate the 'profound astonishment' with which you say the people of Kentucky received the intelligence of the occupation of this place. 

 "I have the honor to be, respectfully, "Your obedient servant, etc. , "Leonidas Polk, "_Major-General commanding_. "

 _Letter from General Polk to Governor Magoffin. _

 "Columbus, Kentucky, _September 3, 1861_. 

 "Governor Magoffin, _Frankfort, Kentucky_. 

 "I should have dispatched to you immediately, as the troops under my command took possession of this position, the very few words I addressed to the people here; but my duties since that time have so preoccupied me, that I have but now the first leisure moment to communicate with you. It will be sufficient for me to inform you (as my short address herewith will do) that I had information, on which I could rely, that the Federal forces intended, and were preparing to seize Columbus. I need not describe to you the danger resulting to western Tennessee from such occupation. 

 "My responsibility could not permit me quietly to lose to the command intrusted to me so important a position. In evidence of the accuracy of the information I possessed, I will state that, as the Confederate force approached this place, the Federal troops were found in formidable numbers in position upon the opposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus. The citizens of the town had fled with terror, and not a word of assurance of safety or protection had been addressed to them. Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been informed by highly respected citizens of your State that certain representatives of the Federal Government are seeking to take advantage of its own wrong, are setting up complaints against my acts of occupation, and are making it a pretest for seizing other points. Upon this proceeding I have no comments to make. But I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee (which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government) that the Federal troops shall not be allowed to enter or occupy any part of Kentucky in the future. 

 "I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed)

 "Leonidas Polk, "_Major-General commanding_. "

However willing the government of Kentucky might have been to accede tothe proposition of General Polk, and which from his knowledge of theviews of his own Government he was fully justified in offering, theState of Kentucky had no power, moral or physical, to prevent the UnitedStates Government from using her soil as best might suit its purposes inthe war it was waging for the subjugation of the seceded States. President Lincoln, in his message of the previous July, had distinctlyand reproachfully spoken of the idea of neutrality as existing in someof the border States. He said: "To prevent the Union forces passing oneway, or the disunion the other, over their soil, would be disunioncompleted.... At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands ofsecession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade. "

The acts of the Federal Government corresponded with the views announcedby its President. Briefly, but conclusively, General Polk showed in hisanswer that the United States Government paid no respect to the neutralposition which Kentucky wished to maintain; that it was armed, but notneutral, for the arms and the troops assembled on her soil were for theinvasion of the South; and that he occupied Columbus to prevent theenemy from taking possession of it. When our troops first enteredColumbus they found the inhabitants had been in alarm fromdemonstrations of the United States forces, but that they felt no dreadof the Confederate troops. As far as the truth could be ascertained, adecided majority of the people of Kentucky, especially its southwesternportion, if left to a free choice, would have joined the Confederacy inpreference to remaining in the Union. Could they have foreseen what in ashort time was revealed, there can be little doubt that mule contracts, and other forms of bribery, would have proved unavailing to make her thepassive observer of usurpations destructive of the personal andpolitical rights of which she had always been a most earnest advocate. With the slow and sinuous approach of the serpent, the GeneralGovernment, little by little, gained power over Kentucky, and then, throwing off the mask, proceeded to outrages so regardless of law andthe usages of English-speaking people, as could not have beenanticipated, and can only be remembered with shame by those who honorthe constitutional Government created by the States. While artfullyurging the maintenance of the Union as a duty of patriotism, theConstitution which gave the Union birth was trampled under foot, and theexcesses of the Reign of Terror which followed the French Revolutionwere reënacted in our land, once the vaunted home of law and liberty. Men who had been most honored by the State, and who had reflected backmost honor upon it, were seized without warrant, condemned withouttrial, because they had exercised the privilege of free speech, and foradhering to the principles which were the bed-rock on which our fathersbuilded our political temple. Members of the Legislature vacated theirseats and left the State to avoid arrest, the penalty hanging over themfor opinion's sake. The venerable Judge Monroe, who had presided overthe United States District Court for more than a generation, driven fromthe land of his birth, the State he had served so long and so well, withfeeble step, but upright conscience and indomitable will, sought aresting place among those who did not regard it a crime to adhere to theprinciples of 1776 and of 1787, and the declaratory affirmation of themin the resolutions of 1793-'99. About the same time others of greatworth and distinction, impelled by the feeling that "where liberty isthere is my country, " left the land desecrated by despotic usurpation, to join the Confederacy in its struggle to maintain the personal andpolitical liberties which the men of the Revolution had left as aninheritance to their posterity. Space would not suffice for a completelist of the refugees who became conspicuous in the military events ofthe Confederacy; let a few answer for the many: J. C. Breckinridge, thelate Vice-President of the United States, and whose general andwell-deserved popularity might have reasonably led him to expect in theUnion the highest honors the States could bestow; William Preston, George W. Johnston, S. B. Buckner, John H. Morgan, and a host of others, alike meritorious and alike gratefully remembered. When the passions ofthe hour shall have subsided, and the past shall be reviewed withdiscrimination and justice, the question must arise in every reflectingmind, Why did such men as these expatriate themselves, and surrender allthe advantages which they had won by a life of honorable effort in theland of their nativity? To such inquiry the answer must be, theusurpations of the General Government foretold to them the wreck ofconstitutional liberty. The motives which governed them may best belearned from the annexed extracts from the statement made in the addressof Mr. Breckinridge to the people of Kentucky, whom he had representedin both Houses of the United States Congress, with such distinguishedability and zeal for the general welfare as to place him in the frontrank of the statesmen of his day:

 "Bowling Green, Kentucky, _October 8, 1861_. 

 "In obedience, as I supposed, to your wishes, I proceeded to Washington, and at the special session of Congress, in July, spoke and voted against the whole war policy of the President and Congress; demanding, in addition, for Kentucky, the right to refuse, not men only, but money also, to the war, for I would have blushed to meet you with the confession that I had purchased for you exemption from the perils of the battle-field, and the shame of waging war against your Southern brethren, by hiring others to do the work you shrunk from performing. During that memorable session a very small body of Senators and Representatives, even beneath the shadow of a military despotism, resisted the usurpations of the Executive, and, with what degree of dignity and firmness, they willingly submit to the judgment of the world. 

 "Their efforts were unavailing, yet they may prove valuable hereafter, as another added to former examples of many protest against the progress of tyranny. 

 "On my return to Kentucky, at the close of the late special session of Congress, it was my purpose immediately to resign the office of Senator. The verbal and written remonstrances of many friends in different parts of the State induced me to postpone the execution of my purpose; but the time has arrived to carry it into effect, and accordingly I now hereby return the trust into your hands.... In the House of Representatives it was declared that the South should be reduced to 'abject submission, ' or their institutions be overthrown. In the Senate it was said that, if necessary, the South should be depopulated and repeopled from the North; and an eminent Senator expressed a desire that the President should be made dictator. This was superfluous, since they had already clothed him with dictatorial powers. In the midst of these proceedings, no plea for the Constitution is listened to in the North; here and there a few heroic voices are feebly heard protesting against the progress of despotism, but, for the most part, beyond the military lines, mobs and anarchy rule the hour. 

 "The great mass of the Northern people seem anxious to sunder every safeguard of freedom; they eagerly offer to the Government what no European monarch would dare to demand. The President and his generals are unable to pick up the liberties of the people as rapidly as they are thrown at their feet.... In every form by which you could give direct expression to your will, you declared for neutrality. A large majority of the people at the May and August elections voted for the neutrality and peace of Kentucky. The press, the public speakers, the candidates--with exceptions in favor of the Government at Washington so rare as not to need mention--planted themselves on this position. You voted for it, and you meant it. You were promised it, and you expected it.... Look now at the condition of Kentucky, and see how your expectations have been realized--how these promises have been redeemed.... General Anderson, the military dictator of Kentucky, announces in one of his proclamations that he will arrest no one who does not act, write, or speak in opposition to Mr. Lincoln's Government. It would have completed the idea if he had added, or think in opposition to it. Look at the condition of our State under the rule of our new protectors. They have suppressed the freedom of speech and of the press. They seize people by military force upon mere suspicion, and impose on them oaths unknown to the laws. Other citizens they imprison without warrant, and carry them out of the State, so that the writ of _habeas corpus_ can not reach them. 

 "Every day foreign armed bands are making seizures among the people. Hundreds of citizens, old and young, venerable magistrates, whose lives have been distinguished by the love of the people, have been compelled to fly from their homes and families to escape imprisonment and exile at the hands of Northern and German soldiers, under the orders of Mr. Lincoln and his military subordinates. While yet holding an important political trust, confided by Kentucky, I was compelled to leave my home and family, or suffer imprisonment and exile. If it is asked why I did not meet the arrest and seek a trial, my answer is, that I would have welcomed an arrest to be followed by a judge and jury; but you well know that I could not have secured these constitutional rights. I would have been transported beyond the State, to languish in some Federal fortress during the pleasure of the oppressor. Witness the fate of Morehead and his Kentucky associates in their distant and gloomy prison. 

 "The case of the gentleman just mentioned is an example of many others, and it meets every element in a definition of despotism. If it should occur in England it would be righted, or it would overturn the British Empire. He is a citizen and native of Kentucky. As a member of the Legislature, Speaker of the House, Representative in Congress from the Ashland district, and Governor of the State, you have known, trusted, and honored him during a public service of a quarter of a century. He is eminent for his ability, his amiable character, and his blameless life. Yet this man, without indictment, without warrant, without accusation, but by the order of President Lincoln, was seized at midnight, in his own house, and in the midst of his own family, and led through the streets of Louisville, as I am informed, with his hands crossed and pinioned before him--was carried out of the State and district, and now lies a prisoner in a fortress in New York Harbor, a thousand miles away.... 

 "The Constitution of the United States, which these invaders unconstitutionally swear every citizen whom they unconstitutionally seize to support, has been wholly abolished. It is as much forgotten as if it lay away back in the twilight of history. The facts I have enumerated show that the very rights most carefully reserved by it to the States and to individuals have been most conspicuously violated.... Your fellow-citizen, (Signed) "John C. Breckinridge. "

Such was the "neutrality" suffered by the Confederacy from governmentsboth at home and abroad. 

The chivalric people of Kentucky showed their sympathy with the justcause of the people of the Southern States, by leaving the home wherethey could not serve the cause of right against might, and nobly sharedthe fortunes of their Southern brethren on many a blood-dyed field. Inlike manner did the British people see with disapprobation theirGovernment, while proclaiming neutrality, make new rules, and give newconstructions to old ones, so as to favor our enemy and embarrass us. The Englishman's sense of fair-play, and the manly instinct whichpredisposes him to side with the weak, gave us hosts of friends, but alltheir good intentions were paralyzed or foiled by their wily Ministerfor Foreign Affairs, and his coadjutor on this side, the artful, unscrupulous United States Secretary of State. 

I have thus presented the case of Kentucky, not because it was the onlyState where false promises lulled the people into delusive security, until, by gradual approaches, usurpation had bound them hand and foot, and where despotic power crushed all the muniments of civil libertywhich the Union was formed to secure, but because of the attempt, whichhas been noticed, to arraign the Confederacy for invasion of the Statein disregard of her sovereignty. 

The occupation of Columbus by the Confederate forces was only just soonenough to anticipate the predetermined purpose of the FederalGovernment, all of which was plainly set forth in the letter of GeneralPolk to the Governor of Kentucky, and his subsequent letter to theKentucky commissioners. 

Missouri, like Kentucky, had wished to preserve peaceful relations inthe contest which it was foreseen would soon occur between the Northernand the Southern States. When the Federal Government denied to her theprivilege of choosing her own position, which betokened no hostility tothe General Government, and she was driven to the necessity of decidingwhether or not her citizens should be used for the subjugation of theSouthern States, her people and their representative, the Stategovernment, repelled the arbitrary assumption of authority by militaryforce to control her government and her people. 

Among other acts of invasion, the Federal troops had occupied Belmont, avillage in Missouri opposite to Columbus, and with artillery threatenedthat town, inspiring terror in its peaceful inhabitants. After theoccupation of Columbus, under these circumstances of full justification, a small Confederate force, Colonel Tappan's Arkansas regiment, andBeltzhoover's battery, were thrown across the Mississippi to occupy andhold the village, in the State of Missouri, then an ally, and soon tobecome a member, of the Confederacy. On the 6th of November GeneralGrant left his headquarters at Cairo with a land and naval force, andencamped on the Kentucky shore. This act and a demonstration made bydetachments from his force at Paducah were probably intended to inducethe belief that he contemplated an attack on Columbus, thus concealinghis real purpose to surprise the small garrison at Belmont. General Polkon the morning of the 7th discovered the landing of the Federal forceson the Missouri shore, some seven miles above Columbus, and, diviningthe real purpose of the enemy, detached General Pillow with fourregiments of his division, say two thousand men, to reënforce thegarrison at Belmont. Very soon after his arrival, the enemy commenced anassault which was sternly resisted, and with varying fortune, forseveral hours. The enemy's front so far exceeded the length of our lineas to enable him to attack on both flanks, and our troops were finallydriven back to the bank of the river with the loss of their battery, which had been gallantly and efficiently served until nearly all itshorses had been killed, and its ammunition had been expended. The enemyadvanced to the bank of the river below the point to which our men hadretreated, and opened an artillery-fire upon the town of Columbus, towhich our guns from the commanding height responded with such effect asto drive him from the river bank. In the mean time General Polk had atintervals sent three regiments to reënforce General Pillow. Upon thearrival of the first of these, General Pillow led it to a favorableposition, where it for some time steadily resisted and checked theadvance of the enemy. General Pillow, with great energy and gallantry, rallied his repulsed troops and brought them again into action. GeneralPolk now proceeded in person with two other regiments. Whether from thisor some other cause, the enemy commenced a retreat. General Pillow, whose activity and daring on the occasion were worthy of all praise, ledthe first and second detachments, by which he had been reënforced, toattack the enemy in the rear, and General Polk, landing further up theriver, moved to cut off the enemy's retreat; but some embarrassment andconsequent delay which occurred in landing his troops caused him to betoo late for the purpose for which he crossed, and to become only a partof the pursuing force. 

One would naturally suppose that the question about which there would bethe greatest certainty would be the number of troops engaged in abattle, yet there is nothing in regard to which we have such conflictingaccounts. It is fairly concluded, from the concurrent reports, that theenemy attacked us on both flanks, and that in the beginning of theaction we were outnumbered; but the obstinacy with which the conflictwas maintained and the successive advances and retreats which occurredin the action indicate that the disparity could not have been verygreat, and therefore that, after the arrival of our reënforcements, ourtroops must have become numerically superior. The dead and wounded leftby the enemy upon the field, the arms, ammunition, and military storesabandoned in his flight, so incontestably prove his defeat, that hisclaim to have achieved a victory is too preposterous for discussion. Though the forces engaged were comparatively small to those insubsequent battles of the war, six hours of incessant combat, withrepeated bayonet-charges, must place this in the rank of the moststubborn engagements, and the victors must accord to the vanquished themeed of having fought like Americans. One of the results of the battle, which is at least significant, is the fact that General Grant, who hadsuperciliously refused to recognize General Polk as one with whom hecould exchange prisoners, did, after the battle, send a flag of truce toget such privileges as are recognized between armies acknowledging eachother to be "foemen worthy of their steel. "

General Polk reported as follows: "We pursued them to their boats, sevenmiles, and then drove their boats before us. The road was strewed withtheir dead and wounded, guns, ammunition, and equipments. The number ofprisoners taken by the enemy, as shown by their list furnished, was onehundred and six, all of whom have been returned by exchange. Aftermaking a liberal allowance to the enemy, a hundred of their prisonersstill remain in my hands, one stand of colors, and a fraction over onethousand stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other militarystores. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, was six hundred andforty one; that of the enemy was probably not less than twelve hundred. "

Meanwhile, Albert Sidney Johnston, a soldier of great distinction in theUnited States Army, where he had attained the rank of brigadier-generalby brevet, and was in command of the Department of California, resignedhis commission, and came overland from San Francisco to Richmond, totender his services to the Confederate States. Though he had been bred asoldier, and most of his life had been spent in the army, he had notneglected such study of political affairs as properly belongs to thecitizen of a republic, and appreciated the issue made between Statesclaiming the right to resume the powers they had delegated to a generalagent and the claims set up by that agent to coerce States, hiscreators, and for whom he held a trust. 

He was a native of Kentucky, but his first military appointment was fromLouisiana, and he was a volunteer in the war for independence by Texas, and for a time resided in that State. Much of his military service hadbeen in the West, and he felt most identified with it. On the 10th ofSeptember, 1861, he was assigned to command our Department of the West, which included the States of Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, the Indiancountry, and the western part of Mississippi. 

General Johnston, on his arrival at Nashville, found that he lacked notonly men, but the munitions of war and the means of obtaining them. Menwere ready to be enlisted, but the arms and equipments had nearly allbeen required to fit out the first levies. Immediately on his survey ofthe situation, he determined to occupy Bowling Green in Kentucky, andordered Brigadier-General S. B. Buckner, with five thousand men, to takepossession of the position. This invasion of Kentucky was an act ofself-defense rendered necessary by the action of the government ofKentucky, and by the evidences of intended movements of the forces ofthe United States. It was not possible to withdraw the troops fromColumbus in the west, nor from Cumberland Ford in the east, to whichGeneral Felix K. Zollicoffer had advanced with four thousand men. Acompliance with the demands of Kentucky would have opened the frontiersof Tennessee and the Mississippi River to the enemy; besides, it wasessential to the defense of Tennessee. 

East of Columbus, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Hopkinsville weregarrisoned with small bodies of troops; and the territory betweenColumbus and Bowling Green was occupied by moving detachments whichcaused the supposition that a large military force was present andcontemplated an advance. A fortified camp was established at CumberlandGap as the right of General Johnston's line, and an important point forthe protection of East Tennessee against invasion. Thus General Johnstonlocated his line of defense, from Columbus on the west to the CumberlandMountains on the east, with his center at Bowling Green, which wasoccupied and intrenched. It was a good base for military operations, wasa proper depot for supplies, and, if fortified, could be held againstlargely superior numbers. 

On October 28th General Johnston took command at Bowling Green. Hestates his force to have been twelve thousand men, and that the enemy'sforce at that time was estimated to be double his own, or twenty-fourthousand. He says: "The enemy's force increased more rapidly than ourown, so that by the last of November it numbered fifty thousand, andcontinued to increase until it ran up to between seventy-five and onehundred thousand. My force was kept down by disease, so that it numberedabout twenty-two thousand. "

The chief anxiety of the commander of the department was to procure armsand men. On the next day after his arrival at Nashville, he wrote to theGovernor of Alabama, "I shall beg to rely on your Excellency to furnishus as rapidly as possible, at this point, with every arm it may be inyour power to provide--I mean small-arms for infantry and cavalry. " TheGovernor replied, "It is out of the power of Alabama to afford you anyassistance in the way of arms. " The Governor of Georgia replied to thesame request on September 18th, "It is utterly impossible for me tocomply with your request. " General Bragg, in command at Pensacola, writes in reply on September 27th: "The mission of Colonel Buckner willnot be successful, I fear, as our extreme Southern country has beenstripped of both arms and men. We started early in this matter, and havewellnigh exhausted our resources. " On September 19th General Johnstontelegraphed to me: "Thirty thousand stand of arms are a necessity to mycommand. I beg you to order them, or as many as can be got, to beinstantly procured and sent with dispatch. " The Secretary of Warreplied: "The whole number received by us, by that steamer, was eighteenhundred, and we purchased of the owners seventeen hundred and eighty, making in all thirty-five hundred Enfield rifles, of which we have beencompelled to allow the Governor of Georgia to have one thousand forarming troops to repel an attack now hourly threatened at Brunswick. Ofthe remaining twenty-five hundred, I have ordered one thousand sent toyou, leaving us but fifteen hundred for arming several regiments nowencamped here, and who have been awaiting their arms for severalmonths.... We have not an engineer to send you. The whole engineer corpscomprises only six captains together with three majors, of whom one ison bureau duty. You will be compelled to employ the best material withinyour reach, by detailing officers from other corps, and by employingcivil engineers. "

These details are given to serve as an illustration of the deficienciesexisting in every department of the military service in the first yearsof the war. In this respect much relief came from the well-directedefforts of Governor Harris and the Legislature of Tennessee. Acap-factory, ordnance-shops, and workshops were established. Thepowder-mills at Nashville turned out about four-hundred pounds a day. Twelve or fourteen batteries were fitted out at Memphis. Laws werepassed to impress and pay for the private arms scattered throughout theState, and the utmost efforts were made to collect and adapt them tomilitary uses. The returns make it evident that, during most of theautumn of 1861, fully one half of General Johnston's troops wereimperfectly armed, and whole brigades remained without weapons formonths. 

No less energetic were the measures taken to concentrate and recruit hisforces. General Hardee's command was moved from northeastern Arkansas, and sent to Bowling Green, which added four thousand men to the troopsthere. The regiment of Texan rangers was brought from Louisiana, andsupplied with horses and sent to the front. Five hundred Kentuckiansjoined General Buckner on his advance, and five regiments were graduallyformed and filled up. A cavalry company under John H. Morgan was alsoadded. At this time (September, 1861), General Johnston, under theauthority granted to him by the Government, made a requisition forthirty thousand men from Tennessee, ten thousand from Mississippi, andten thousand from Arkansas. The Arkansas troops were directed to be sentto General McCulloch for the defense of their own frontier. The Governorof Mississippi sent four regiments, when this source of supply wasclosed. 

Up to the middle of November only three regiments were mustered in underthis call from Tennessee, but, by the close of December, the number ofmen who joined was from twelve to fifteen thousand. Two regiments, fifteen hundred strong, had joined General Polk. 

In Arkansas, five companies and a battalion had been organized, and wereready to join General McCulloch. 

A speedy advance of the enemy was now indicated, and an increase offorce was so necessary that further delay was impossible. GeneralJohnston, therefore, determined upon a levy _en masse_ in hisdepartment. He made a requisition on the Governors of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, to call out every able-bodied member of themilitia into whose hands arms could be placed, or to provide a volunteerforce large enough to use all the arms that could be procured. In hisletters to these Governors, he plainly presents his view of the postureof affairs on December 24th, points out impending dangers, and showsthat to his applications the response had not been such as the emergencydemanded. He says:

 "It was apprehended by me that the enemy would attempt to assail the South, not only by boats and troops moving down the river, to be assembled during the fall and winter, but by columns marching inland, threatening Tennessee, by endeavoring to turn the defenses of Columbus. Further observation confirms me in this opinion; but I think the means employed for the defense of the river will probably render it comparatively secure. The enemy will energetically push toward Nashville the heavy masses of troops now assembled between Louisville and Bowling Green. The general position of Bowling Green is good and commanding; but the peculiar topography of the place and the length of the line of the Barren River as a line of defense, though strong, require a large force to defend it. There is no position equally defensive as Bowling Green, nor line of defense as good as the Barren River, between the Barren and the Cumberland at Nashville; so that it can not be abandoned without exposing Tennessee, and giving vastly the vantage-ground to the enemy. It is manifest that the Northern generals appreciate this; and, by withdrawing their forces from western Virginia and east Kentucky, they have managed to add them to the new levies from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and to concentrate a force in front of me variously estimated at from sixty to one hundred thousand men, and which I believe will number seventy-five thousand. To maintain my position, I have only about seventeen thousand men in this neighborhood. It is impossible for me to obtain additions to my strength from Columbus; the generals in command in that quarter consider that it would imperil that point to diminish their force, and open Tennessee to the enemy. General Zollicoffer can not join me, as he guards the Cumberland, and prevents the invasion and possible revolt of East Tennessee. "

On June 5th General Johnston was reënforced by the brigades of Floyd andManey from western Virginia. He also sent a messenger to Richmond to askthat a few regiments might be detached from the several armies in thefield, and sent to him to be replaced by new levies. He said: "I do notask that my force shall be made equal to that of the enemy; but, ifpossible, it should be raised to fifty thousand men. " Meantime such anappearance of menace had been maintained as led the enemy to believethat our force was large, and that he might be attacked at any time. Frequent and rapid expeditions through the sparsely settled country gaverise to rumors which kept alive this apprehension. 

CHAPTER IX. 

 The Coercion of Missouri. --Answers of the Governors of States to President Lincoln's Requisition for Troops. --Restoration of Forts Caswell and Johnson to the United States Government. -- Condition of Missouri similar to that of Kentucky. -- Hostilities, how initiated in Missouri. --Agreement between Generals Price and Harney. --Its Favorable Effects. --General Harney relieved of Command by the United States Government because of his Pacific Policy. --Removal of Public Arms from Missouri. --Searches for and Seizure of Arms. --Missouri on the Side of Peace. --Address of General Price to the People. -- Proclamation of Governor Jackson. --Humiliating Concessions of the Governor to the United States Government, for the sake of Peace. --Demands of the Federal Officers. --Revolutionary Principles attempted to be enforced by the United States Government. --The Action at Booneville. --The Patriot Army of Militia. --Further Rout of the Enemy. --Heroism and Self-sacrifice of the People. --Complaints and Embarrassments--Zeal: its effects. --Action of Congress. --Battle of Springfield. --General Price. --Battle at Lexington. --Bales of Hemp. --Other Combats. 

To preserve the Union in the spirit and for the purposes for which itwas established, an equilibrium between the States, as grouped insections, was essential. When the Territory of Missouri constitutionallyapplied for admission as a State into the Union, the struggle betweenState rights and that sectional aggrandizement which was seeking todestroy the existing equilibrium gave rise to the contest which shookthe Union to its foundation, and sowed the seeds of geographicaldivisions, which have borne the most noxious weeds that have choked ourpolitical vineyard. Again, in 1861, Missouri appealed to theConstitution for the vindication of her rights, and again did usurpationand the blind rage of a sectional party disregard the appeal, and assumepowers, not only undelegated, but in direct violation of the fourthsection of the fourth article of the Constitution, which every Federalofficer had sworn to maintain, and which secured to every State arepublican government, and protection against invasion. 

If it be contended that the invasion referred to must have been by otherthan the troops of the United States, and that their troops weretherefore not prohibited from entering a State against its wishes, andfor purposes hostile to its policy, the section of the Constitutionreferred to fortifies the fact, heretofore noticed, of the refusal ofthe Convention, when forming the Constitution, to delegate to theFederal Government power to coerce a State. By its last clause it wasprovided that not even to suppress domestic violence could the GeneralGovernment, on its own motion, send troops of the United States into theterritory of one of the States. That section reads thus:

 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the Legislature, or of the executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence. "

Surely, if Federal troops could not be sent into a State without itsapplication, even to protect it against domestic violence, still lesscould it be done to overrule the will of its people. That, instead of anobligation upon the citizens of other States to respond to a call by thePresident for troops to invade a particular State, it was in April, 1861, deemed a high crime to so use them: reference is here made to thepublished answers of the Governors of States, which had not seceded, tothe requisition made upon them for troops to be employed against theStates which had seceded. 

Governor Letcher, of Virginia, replied to the requisition of the UnitedStates Secretary of War as follows:

 "I am requested to detach from the militia of the State of Virginia the quota designated in a table which you append, to serve as infantry or riflemen, for the period of three months, unless sooner discharged. 

 "In reply to this communication, I have only to say that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object--an object, in my judgment, not within the purview of the Constitution, or the Act of 1795--will not be complied with. "

Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:

 "Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically, Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States. "

Governor Harris, of Tennessee, replied:

 "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those of our Southern brothers. "

Governor Jackson, of Missouri, answered:

 "Requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical, and can not be complied with. "

Governor Rector, of Arkansas, replied:

 "In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas, to subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury. "

Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, responded to the requisition fortroops from that State as follows:

 "Your dispatch is received, and, if genuine--which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt--I have to say, in reply, that I regard the levy of troops made by the Administration, for the purpose of subjugating the States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina. "

Governor Ellis, who had lived long enough to leave behind him anenviable reputation, was a fair representative of the conservatism, gallantry, and tenacity in well-doing, of the State over which hepresided. He died too soon for his country's good, and the Confederacyseriously felt the loss of his valuable services. The prompt andspirited answer he gave to the call upon North Carolina to furnishtroops for the subjugation of the Southern States, was the fittingcomplement of his earlier action in immediately restoring to the FederalGovernment Forts Johnson and Caswell, which had been seized withoutproper authority. In communicating his action to President Buchanan, hewrote:

 "My information satisfies me that this popular outbreak was caused by a report, very generally credited, but which, for the sake of humanity, I hope is not true, that it was the purpose of the Administration to coerce the Southern States, and that troops were on their way to garrison the Southern ports, and to begin the work of subjugation.... Should I receive assurance that no troops will be sent to this State prior to the 4th of March next, then all will be peace and quiet here, and the property of the United States will be fully protected, as heretofore. If, however, I am unable to get such assurances, I will not undertake to answer for the consequences. 

 "The forts in this State have long been unoccupied, and their being garrisoned at this time will unquestionably be looked upon as a hostile demonstration, and will in my opinion certainly be resisted. "

The plea so constantly made by the succeeding Administration, as anexcuse for its warlike acts, that the duty to protect the publicproperty required such action, is shown by this letter of Governor Ellisto have been a plea created by their usurpations, but for which theremight have been peace, as well as safety to property, and, what was ofgreater worth, the lives, the liberties, and the republican institutionsof the country. 

There was great similarity in the condition of Missouri to that ofKentucky. They were both border States, and, by their institutions andthe origin of a large portion of their citizens, were identified withthe South. Both sought to occupy a neutral position in the impendingwar, and offered guarantees of peace and order throughout theirterritory if left free to control their own affairs. Both refused tofurnish troops to the United States Government for the unconstitutionalpurpose of coercing the Southern States. Both, because of their strongeraffinity to the South than to the North, were the objects of suspicion, and consequent military occupation by the troops of the United StatesGovernment. At the inception of this unwarrantable proceeding, an effortwas made by the Governor of Missouri to preserve the rights of the Statewithout disturbing its relations to the United States Government. If ithad been the policy of the Government to allow to Missouri the controlof her domestic affairs, and an exemption from being a party to theviolation of the Constitution in making war against certain of theStates, the above-described effort of the Governor might and probablywould have been successful. The form and purpose of that effort appearin the compact entered into between Major-General Price, commanding themilitia or "Missouri State Guard, " and General Harney, of the UnitedStates Army, commanding the Department of the West, a geographicaldivision which included the State of Missouri. 

During a temporary absence of General Harney, Captain Lyon, commandingUnited States forces at St. Louis, initiated hostilities against theState of Missouri under the following circumstances:

In obedience to the militia law of the State, an annual encampment wasdirected by the Governor for instruction in tactics. Camp Jackson, nearSt. Louis, was designated for the encampment of the militia of thecounty in 1861. Here for some days companies of State militia, amountingto about eight hundred men, under command of Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, were being exercised, as is usual upon such occasions. Theypresented no appearance of a hostile camp. There were no sentinels toguard against surprise; visitors were freely admitted; it was thepicnic-ground for the ladies of the city, and everything wore the aspectof merry-making rather than that of grim-visaged war. 

Suddenly, Captain (afterward General) Nathaniel Lyon appeared with anoverwhelming force of Federal troops, surrounded this holidayencampment, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Resistance wasimpracticable, and none was attempted; the militia surrendered, and wereconfined as prisoners; but prisoners of what? There was no war, and nowarrant for their arrest as offenders against the law. It is left forthe usurpers to frame a vocabulary suited to their act. 

After the return of General Harney, Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, ofthe Missouri militia, appealed to him from his prison, the St. LouisArsenal, on May 11, 1861, representing that, "in accordance with thelaws of the State of Missouri, which have been existing for some years, and in obedience to the orders of the Governor, on Monday last I enteredinto an encampment with the militia force of St. Louis County for thepurpose of instructing the same in accordance with the laws of theUnited States and of this State. " He further sets forth that everyofficer and soldier of his command had taken an oath to sustain theConstitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Missouri, and that while in the peaceable performance of their duties theencampment was surrounded by the command of Captain N. Lyon, UnitedStates Army, and a surrender demanded, to which General Frost replied asfollows:

 "Camp Jackson, _May 10, 1861_. 

 "Sir: I, never for a moment having conceived the idea that so illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army, am wholly unprepared to defend my command from this unwarranted attack, and shall therefore be forced to comply with your demand. 

 "I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "D. Frost, "_Brigadier-General, commanding Camp Jackson, M. M. _

 "Captain N. Lyon, _commanding United States troops_. "

General Frost's letter to General Harney continues: "My command was, inaccordance with the above, deprived of their arms, and surrendered intothe hands of Captain Lyon; after which, while thus disarmed andsurrounded, a fire was opened on a portion of it by his troops, and anumber of my men put to death, together with several innocentlookers-on, men, women, and children. " On the occasion of the attackupon Camp Jackson, "a large crowd of citizens, men, women, and children, were gathered around, gazing curiously at these strange proceedings, when a volley was fired into them, killing ten and wounding twentynon-combatants, mostly women and children. A reign of terror was at onceestablished, and the most severe measures were adopted by the Federalsto overawe the excitement and the rage of the people. "[182]

The massacre at Camp Jackson produced intense excitement throughout theState. The Legislature, upon receipt of the news, passed several billsfor the enrollment and organization of the militia, and to conferspecial powers upon the Governor of the State. By virtue of these, general officers were appointed, chief of whom was Sterling Price. 

Because of the atrocities at St. Louis, and the violent demonstrationsconsequent upon them, not only in St. Louis but elsewhere in the State, General Price, well known to be what was termed "a Union man, " and notonly by his commission as commander-in-chief of the militia of theState, but also, and even more, because of his influence among thepeople, was earnestly solicited by influential citizens of St. Louis tounite with General Harney in a joint effort to restore order andpreserve peace. With the sanction of Governor Jackson he proceeded toSt. Louis, the headquarters of the Department of the West, and, aftersome preliminary conference, entered into the following agreement, which, being promulgated to the people, was received with generalsatisfaction, and for a time allayed excitement. The agreement was asfollows:

 "St. Louis, _May 21, 1861_. 

 "The undersigned, officers of the United States Government and of the government of the State of Missouri, for the purpose of removing misapprehension and of allaying public excitement, deem it proper to declare publicly that they have this day had a personal interview in this city, in which it has been mutually understood, without the semblance of dissent on either part, that each of them has no other than a common object, equally interesting and important to every citizen of Missouri--that of restoring peace and good order to the people of the State in subordination to the laws of the General and State governments. 

 "It being thus understood, there seems no reason why every citizen should not confide in the proper officers of the General and State governments to restore quiet, and, as among the best means of offering no counter-influences, we mutually commend to all persons to respect each other's rights throughout the State, making no attempt to exercise unauthorized powers, as it is the determination of the proper authorities to suppress all unlawful proceedings which can only disturb the public peace. General Price, having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes with the sanction of the Governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintaining order within the State among the people thereof. General Harney publicly declares that, this object being assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements that might otherwise create excitement and jealousy, which he most earnestly desires to avoid. 

 "We, the undersigned, do therefore mutually enjoin upon the people of the State to attend to their civil business, of whatever sort it may be, and it is hoped that the unquiet elements which have threatened so seriously to disturb the public peace may soon subside, and be remembered only to be deplored. 

 "W. S. Harney, "_Brigadier-General commanding. _

 "Sterling Price, "_Major-General Missouri State Guard. _"

The distinct position of General Harney, that the military force of theUnited States should not be used in Missouri except in case ofnecessity, together with the emphatic declaration of General Price thathe had the power and would use it to preserve peace and order inMissouri, seemed to remove all danger of collision in that State betweenthe Federal and local forces. In conformity with this understanding, General Price returned to the capital of the State, and sent to theirhomes the militia who had been assembled there by the Governor for thedefense of the capital against an anticipated attack by the troops ofthe United States. 

Those who desired to preserve peace in Missouri had just cause to begratified at the favorable prospect now presented. Those who desired warhad equal ground for dissatisfaction. A few days after the promulgationof the agreement between General Price and General Harney, the latterwas removed from command, as many believed, because of his successfulefforts to allay excitement and avoid war. Rumors had been incirculation that the Missourians were driving the "Union men" from theirhomes, and many letters purporting to be written in different parts ofthe State represented the persecution of Union men. It was suspectedthat many of them were written in St. Louis, or inspired by the cabal. An incident related in confirmation of the justice of this suspicion is, that General Harney received a letter from St. Joseph, stating thatex-Governor Stewart and a number of the most respectable men in St. Joseph had been driven from their homes, and that, unless soldiers weresoon sent, the Union men would all have to leave. He called upon theHon. F. P. Blair, an influential citizen of St. Louis, and asked him ifhe knew the writer of the letter. The reply was: "Oh, yes, he isperfectly reliable; you can believe anything he says. "[183] GeneralHarney said he would write immediately to General Price. Dissatisfactionwas then manifested at such delay; but, two or three days later, aletter from ex-Governor Stewart was published in the "St. Joseph News, "in which was a marked paragraph of the copy sent to General Harney:"Neither I nor any other Union man has been driven out of St. Joe. "[184]An attempt has been made to evade the conclusion that General Harney wasrelieved from command because of his pacific policy. The argument is, that the order was dated the 16th of May, and his agreement with GeneralPrice was on the 21st of the same month, an argument more specious thanfair, as it appears from the letter of President Lincoln of May 18, 1861, to Hon. F. P. Blair, that the order sent from the War Departmentto him was to be delivered or withheld at his discretion, and that itwas not delivered until the 30th of the month, and until after GeneralHarney had not only entered into his agreement with General Price, buthad declined to act upon sensational stories of persecution, on whichapplications were made to send troops into the interior of Missouri. During the days this order was held for his removal, with discretionarypower to deliver or withhold it, the above-recited events occurred, andthey may fairly be considered as having decided the question of hisremoval from that command. 

The principal United States arsenal at the West was that near to St. Louis. To it had been transferred a large number of the altered musketssent from Springfield, Massachusetts, so that in 1861 the arms in thatarsenal were, perhaps, numerically second only to those at Springfield. These arms, by a conjunction of deceptive and bold measures, wereremoved from the arsenal in Missouri and transported to Illinois. Towhom did those arms belong? Certainly to those whose money had made orpurchased them. That is, to the States in common, not to their agent theGeneral Government, or to a portion of the States which might be in acondition to appropriate them to their special use, and in disregard ofthe rights of their partners. 

Not satisfied with removing the public arms from the limits of Missouri, the next step was that, in total disrespect of the constitutional rightof the citizens to bear arms for their own defense, and to be free fromsearches and seizures except by warrants duly issued, the officers ofthe General Government proceeded to search the houses of citizens in St. Louis, and to seize arms wherever they were found. 

Missouri had refused to engage in war against her sister States of theSouth; therefore she was first to be disarmed, and then to be made thevictim of an invasion characterized by such barbarous atrocities asshame the civilization of the age. The wrongs she suffered, the braveefforts of her unarmed people to defend their hearthstones and theirliberties against the desecration and destruction of both, form amelancholy chapter in the history of the United States, which all whowould cherish their fair fame must wish could be obliterated. 

These acts of usurpation and outrage, as well upon the political aspersonal rights of the people of Missouri, aroused an intense feeling inthat State. It will be remembered that Governor Jackson had responded tothe call of Mr. Lincoln upon him for troops with the just indignation ofone who understood the rights of the State, and the limited powers ofthe General Government. His stern refusal to become a party to the warupon the South made him the object of special persecution. By his sidein this critical juncture stood the gallant veteran, General Price. Tothe latter was confided the conduct of the military affairs of theState, and, after exhausting every effort to maintain order by peacefulmeans, and seeing that the Government would recognize no other methodthan that of force, he energetically applied himself to raise troops, and procure arms so as to enable the State to meet force by force. During this and all the subsequent period, the Governor and the Generalwere ably seconded by the accomplished, gallant, and indefatigableLieutenant-Governor, Reynolds. 

The position of Missouri in 1860-'61 was unquestionably that ofopposition to the secession of the State. The people generously confidedin the disposition of the General Government to observe their rights, and continued to hope for a peaceful settlement of the questions thenagitating the country. This was evinced by the fact that not a singlesecessionist was elected to the State Convention, and that GeneralPrice, an avowed "Union man, " was chosen as President of the Convention. Hence the general satisfaction with the agreement made between GeneralsHarney and Price for the preservation of peace and non-intervention bythe army of the United States. General Harney, the day before the orderfor his removal was communicated to him, wrote to the War Department, expressing his confidence in the preservation of peace in Missouri, andused this significant expression: "Interference by unauthorized partiesas to the course I shall pursue can alone prevent the realization ofthese hopes. "[185] The "unauthorized parties" here referred to could nothave been the people or the government of Missouri. Others than theymust have been the parties wishing to use force, provocative ofhostilities. 

As has been heretofore stated, after his agreement with General Harneyat St. Louis, General Price returned to the capital and dismissed totheir homes the large body of militia that had been there assembled. 

After the removal of General Harney, believed to be in consequence ofhis determination to avoid the use of military force against the peopleof Missouri, reports were rife of a purpose on the part of theAdministration at Washington to disarm the citizens of Missouri who didnot sympathize with the views of the Federal Government, and to put armsinto the hands of those who could be relied on to enforce them. On the4th of June General Price issued an address to the people of Missouri, and in reference to that report said: "The purpose of such a movementcould not be misunderstood; and it would not only be a palpableviolation of the agreement referred to, and an equally plain violationof our constitutional rights, but a gross indignity to the citizens ofthis State, which would be resisted to the last extremity. "

The call of President Lincoln for seventy-five thousand volunteersremoved any preëxisting doubt as to the intent to coerce the Stateswhich should claim to assert their right of sovereignty. Missouri, whileavowing her purpose to adhere to the Union, had asserted her right toexercise supreme control over her domestic affairs, and this put her inthe category of a State threatened by the proceedings of the UnitedStates Government. To provide for such contingency as might beanticipated, Governor Jackson, on the 13th of June, issued a call forfifty thousand volunteers, and Major-General Price took the field incommand. In this proclamation Governor Jackson said:

 "A series of unprovoked and unparalleled outrages has been inflicted on the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth, and upon the rights and liberties of its people, by wicked and unprincipled men professing to act under the authority of the Government of the United States. "

In his endeavor to maintain the peace of the State, and to avert, ifpossible, from its borders a civil war, he caused the aforementionedagreement to be made with the commander of the Northern forces in theState, by which its peace might be preserved. That officer was promptlyremoved by his Government. The Governor then, upon the increase ofhostile actions, proposed, at an interview with the new officercommanding the forces of the United States Government, to disband theState Guard, and break up its organization; to disarm all companies thathad been armed by the State; to pledge himself not to organize themilitia under the military bill; that no arms or munitions of war shouldbe brought into the State; that he would protect the citizens equally inall their rights, regardless of their political opinions; that he wouldrepress all insurrectionary movements within the State; would repel allattempts to invade it, from whatever quarter, and by whomsoever made;and would maintain a strict neutrality and preserve the peace of theState. And, further, if necessary, he would invoke the assistance of theUnited States troops to carry out the pledges. The only conditions tothis proposition made by the Governor were that the United StatesGovernment should undertake to disarm the "Home Guard" which it hadillegally organized and armed throughout the State, and pledge itselfnot to occupy with its troops any localities in the State not occupiedby them at that time. 

The words of a Governor of a State who offered such truly generous termsdeserve to be inserted: "Nothing but the most earnest desire to avertthe horrors of civil war from our beloved State could have tempted me topropose these humiliating terms. They were rejected by the Federalofficers. "

These demanded not only the disorganization and disarming of the Statemilitia and the nullification of the military bill, but they refused todisarm their own "Home Guard, " and insisted that the Government of theUnited States should enjoy an unrestricted right to move and station itstroops throughout the State whenever and wherever it might, in theopinion of its officers, be necessary either for the protection of its"loyal subjects" or for the repelling of invasion; and they plainlyannounced that it was the intention of the Administration to takemilitary occupation of the whole State, and to reduce it, as avowed byGeneral Lyon, to the "exact condition of Maryland. "

We have already stated that the revolutionary measures which the UnitedStates Government had undertaken to enforce involved the subjection ofevery State, either by voluntary submission or subjugation. However mucha State might desire peace and neutrality, its own will could not elect. The scheme demanded the absolute sovereignty of the Government of theUnited States, or, in other words, the extinguishment of theindependence and sovereignty of the State. Human actions are not onlythe fruit of the ruling motive, but they are also the evidence of theexistence of that motive. Thus, when we see the Governor of the State ofMissouri offering such generous terms to the government of the UnitedStates in order to preserve peace and neutrality, and the latter, rejecting them, avow its intention to do its will with the authorities, the property, and the citizens of the State, and proceed with militaryforce to do it, its actions are both the evidence and the fruit of itstheory. These measures were revolutionary in the extreme. They involvedthe entire subversion of those principles on which the American Unionwas founded, and of the compact or Constitution of that Union. TheGovernment of the United States, in the hands of those who wielded itsauthority, was made the bloody instrument to establish these usurpationson the ruins of the crushed hopes of mankind for permanent freedom underconstitutional government. For the justness and truthfulness of theseallegations I appeal to the impartial and sober judgment of posterity. 

The volunteers who were assembled under this proclamation of GovernorJackson, of June 13th, had few arms except their squirrel-rifles andshot-guns, and could scarcely be said to have any military equipments. The brigadier-generals who were appointed were assigned to geographicaldivisions, and, with such men as they could collect, reported inobedience to their orders at Booneville and Lexington. On the 20th ofJune, 1861, General Lyon and Colonel F. P. Blair, with an estimatedforce of seven thousand well-armed troops, having eight pieces ofartillery, ascended the Missouri River, and debarked about five milesbelow Booneville. To oppose them, the Missourians had there about eighthundred men, poorly armed, without a piece of artillery, and but littleammunition. With courage which must be commended at the expense of theirdiscretion, they resolved to engage the enemy, and, after a combat of anhour and a half or more, retired, having inflicted heavy loss upon theenemy, and suffering but little themselves. This first skirmish betweenthe Federal troops and the Missouri militia inspired confidence in theirfellow-citizens, and checked the contemptuous terms in which the militiahad been spoken of by the enemy. Governor Jackson, with some two hundredand fifty to three hundred of the militia engaged in the action atBooneville, started toward the southwestern portion of the State. Hemarched in the direction of a place called Cole Camp, and, when withintwelve or fifteen miles of it, learned that a force of seven hundred toone thousand of the enemy had been sent to that point by General Lyonand Colonel Blair, with the view of intercepting his retreat. Thedesign, however, was frustrated by an expedition consisting of aboutthree hundred and fifty men, commanded by Colonel O'Kane, who hadassembled them in a very few hours in the neighborhood south of theenemy's camp. There were no pickets out except in the neighborhood ofJackson's forces, and Colonel O'Kane surprised the enemy where they wereasleep in two large barns. The attack was made at daybreak, the enemyrouted after suffering the heavy loss of two hundred and six killed andmore wounded, and more than a hundred prisoners. Three hundred andsixty-two muskets with bayonets were captured. The Missourians lost fourkilled and fifteen or twenty wounded. 

General Price, with a view to draw his army from the baseline of theenemy, the Missouri River, ordered his troops to the southwesternportion of the State. The column from Lexington marched withouttransportation, without tents or blankets, and relied for subsistence onthe country through which it passed, being in the mean time closelypursued by the enemy. The movement was successfully made, and a junctioneffected in Cedar County with the forces present with Governor Jackson. The total when assembled was about thirty-six hundred men. 

 "This, then, was the patriot army of Missouri. It was a heterogeneous mass representing every condition of Western life. There were the old and young, the rich and poor, the grave and gay, the planter and laborer, the farmer and clerk, the hunter and boatman, the merchant and woodsman. At least five hundred of these men were entirely unarmed. Many had only the common rifle and shot-gun. None were provided with cartridges or canteens. They had eight pieces of cannon, but no shells, and very few solid shot, or rounds of grape and canister. 

 "Rude and almost incredible devices were made to supply these wants: trace-chains, iron rods, hard pebbles, and smooth stones were substituted for shot; and evidence of the effect of such rough missiles was to be given in the next encounter with the enemy. "[186]

Governor Jackson continued his march toward southwestern Missouri. Hehad received reliable intelligence that he was pursued by General Lyonfrom the northeast, and by Lane and Sturgis from the northwest, theirsupposed object being to form a junction in his rear, and hesubsequently learned that a column numbering three thousand had beensent out from St. Louis to intercept his retreat, and had arrived at thetown of Carthage, immediately in his front. These undisciplined, poorlyarmed Missourians were, therefore, in a position which would haveappalled less heroic men--a large hostile force in their rear, andanother, nearly equal in numbers to their own, disputing their passagein front. They, however, cheerfully moved forward, attacked the enemy inposition, and, after a severe engagement, routed him, pursued him to asecond position, from which he was again driven, falling back toCarthage, where he made his last stand, and, upon being driven fromwhich, as was subsequently ascertained, continued his retreat all night. The killed and wounded of the enemy, left along the route of his retreatover a space of ten miles, were estimated at from one hundred and fiftyto two hundred killed, and from three to four hundred wounded. Severalhundred muskets were captured, and the Missourians were better preparedfor future conflicts. Our loss was between forty and fifty killed, andfrom one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty wounded. [187]

If any shall ask why I have entered into such details of engagementswhere the forces were comparatively so small, and the results so littleaffected the final issue of the war, the reply is, that such heroism andself-sacrifice as these undisciplined, partially armed, unequipped mendisplayed against superior numbers, possessed of all the appliances ofwar, claim special notice as bearing evidence not only of the virtue ofthe men, but the sanctity of the cause which could so inspire them. Unsupported, save by the consciousness of a just cause, without othersympathy than that which the Confederate States fully gave, despisingthe plea of helplessness, and defying the threats of a powerfulGovernment to crush her, Missouri, without arms or other militarypreparation, took up the gauntlet thrown at her feet, and dared to makewar in defense of the laws and liberties of her people. 

My motive for promptly removing the seat of government, after authoritywas given by the Provisional Congress, has been heretofore stated, butproximity to the main army of the enemy, and the flanking attacks bywhich the new capital was threatened, did not diminish the anxiety, which had been felt before removal from Montgomery, in regard to affairsin Missouri, the "far West" of the Confederacy. 

The State, which forty years before had been admitted to the Union, against sectional resistance to the right guaranteed by theConstitution, and specifically denominated in the treaty for theacquisition of Louisiana, now, because her Governor refused to furnishtroops for the unconstitutional purpose of coercing States, became thesubject of special hostility and the object of extraordinary efforts forher subjugation. 

The little which it would have been possible for the Confederacy to doto promote her military efficiency was diminished by the anomalouscondition in which the State troops remained until some time in thesecond year of the war. A strange misapprehension led to unreasonablecomplaints, under the supposition that Missouri was generally neglected, and her favorite officer, General Price, was not accorded a commissioncorresponding to his merit and the wishes of the people. It is due tothat gallant soldier and true patriot, that it should here be statedthat he was not a party to any such complaints, knew they wereunfounded, and realized that his wishes for the defense of Missouri werefully reciprocated by the Executive of the Confederacy; all of which wasmanifested in the correspondence between us, before Missouri hadtendered any troops to the Confederate States. It was his statement ofthe difficulties and embarrassments which surrounded him that caused meto write to the Governor of Missouri on the 21st of December, 1861, stating to him my anxiety to have the troops of Missouri tendered andorganized into brigades and divisions, so that they might be renderedmore effective, and we be better able to provide for them by theappointment of general officers and otherwise. 

For a full understanding of the nature and degree of the complaints andembarrassments referred to, I here insert my reply to letters sent to meby the Hon. John B. Clarke, M. C. , of Missouri:

 Richmond, Virginia, _January 8, 1862_. 

 "Hon. John B. Clarke, _Richmond_, _Virginia_. 

 "Sir: I have received the two letters from Governor Jackson sent by you this day. The Governor speaks of delay by the authorities of Richmond, and neglect of the interests of Missouri, and expresses the hope that he has said enough to be well understood by me. 

 "When I remember that he wrote in reply to my call upon him to hasten the tender of Missouri troops, so that they should be put upon the footing of those of other States, and with a knowledge that as militia of the State I had no power to organize or appoint commanders for them, and that it was his duty to attend to their wants, but that I had sent an agent of the Confederate Government as far as practicable to furnish the necessary supplies to the militia of Missouri actually in service, I can only say, I hope he is not understood by me. It is but a short time since, in a conversation of hours, I fully explained to you the ease so far as I am connected with it, and there is nothing for me to add to what you then seemed to consider conclusive. 

 "Very respectfully yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

As is usually the case when citizens are called from their ordinarypursuits for the purposes of war, the people of Missouri did not thenrealize the value of preparation in camp, and were reluctant to enrollthemselves for long periods. The State, even less than the ConfederateGovernment, could not supply them with the arms, munitions, and equipagenecessary for campaigns and battles and sieges. Under all thesedisadvantages, it is a matter of well-grounded surprise that they wereable to achieve so much. The Missourians who fought at Vicksburg, andwho, after that long, trying, and disastrous siege, asked, when in thecamp of parolled prisoners, not if they could get a furlough, not ifthey might go home when released, but how soon they might hope to beexchanged and resume their places in the line of battle, show of whatmetal the Missouri troops were made, and of what they were capable whentempered in the fiery furnace of war. 

I can recall few scenes during the war which impressed me more deeplythan the spirit of those worn prisoners waiting for the exchange thatwould again permit them to take the hazards of battle for the cause oftheir country. 

This memory leads me to recur with regret to my inability, in thebeginning of the war, to convince the Governor of Missouri of thenecessity for thorough organization and the enrollment of men for longterms, instead of loose combinations of militia for periods always shortand sometimes uncertain. 

General Price possessed an extraordinary power to secure the personalattachment of his troops, and to inspire them with a confidence whichserved in no small degree as a substitute for more thorough training. His own enthusiasm and entire devotion to the cause he served wereinfused throughout his followers, and made them all their country's own. To Lord Wellington has been attributed the remark that he did not wantzeal in a soldier, and to Napoleon the apothegm that Providence is onthe side of the heavy battalions. Zeal was oftentimes our maindependence, and on many a hard-fought field served to drive our smallbattalions, like a wedge, through the serried ranks of the enemy. 

The Confederate States, yet in their infancy, and themselves engaged inan unequal struggle for existence, by act of their Congress declaredthat, if Missouri was engaged in repelling a lawless invasion of herterritory by armed forces, it was their right and duty to aid the peopleand government of said State in resisting such invasion, and in securingthe means and the opportunity of expressing their will upon allquestions affecting their rights and liberties. With small means, compared to their wants, the Confederate Congress, on the 6th of August, appropriated one million dollars "to aid the people of the State ofMissouri in the effort to maintain, within their own limits, theconstitutional liberty which it is the purpose of the Confederate Statesin the existing war to vindicate, " etc. 

In the next battle after that of Carthage, which has been noticed, Missourians were no longer to be alone. General McCullough, commanding abrigade of Confederate troops, marched from Arkansas to make a junctionwith General Price, then threatened with an attack by a large force ofthe enemy under General Lyon, which was concentrated near Springfield, Missouri. The battle was fiercely contested, but finally won by ourtroops. In this action General Lyon was killed while gallantlyendeavoring to rally his discomfited troops, and lead them to thecharge. While we can not forget the cruel wrongs he had inflicted andsought still further to impose upon an unoffending people, we mustaccord to him the redeeming virtue of courage, and recognize his abilityas a soldier. On this occasion General Price exhibited in two instancesthe magnanimity, self-denial, and humanity which ever characterized him. General McCulloch claimed the right to command as an officer of theConfederate States Army. General Price, though he ranked him by a grade, replied that "he was not fighting for distinction, but for the defenseof the liberties of his countrymen, and that it mattered but little whatposition he occupied. He said he was ready to surrender not only thecommand, but his life, as a sacrifice to the cause. "[188] He surrenderedthe command and took a subordinate position, though "he felt assured ofvictory. "

The second instance was an act of humanity to his bitterest enemy. General Lyon's "surgeon came in for his body, under a flag of truce, after the close of the battle, and General Price sent it in his ownwagon. But the enemy, in his flight, left the body unshrouded inSpringfield. The next morning, August 11th, Lieutenant-Colonel GustavusElgin and Colonel R. H. Musser, two members of Brigadier GeneralClarke's staff, caused the body to be properly prepared forburial. "[189]

After the battle of Springfield, General McCulloch returned with hisbrigade to his former position in Arkansas. John C. Fremont had beenappointed a general, and assigned to the command made vacant by thedeath of General Lyon. He signalized his entrance upon the duty by aproclamation, confiscating the estates and slave property of "rebels. "

"On the 10th of September, when General Price was about to go into camp, he learned that a detachment of Federal troops was marching fromLexington to Warrensburg, to seize the funds of the bank in that place, and to arrest and plunder the citizens of Johnson County, in accordancewith General Fremont's proclamation and instructions. "[190] GeneralPrice resumed his march, and, pressing rapidly forward with his mountedmen, arrived about daybreak at Warrensburg, where he learned that theenemy had hastily fled about midnight. He then decided to move with hiswhole force against Lexington. He found the enemy in strongintrenchments, and well supplied with artillery. 

The place was stubbornly defended. The siege proper commenced on the18th of September, 1861, and with varying fortunes. Fierce combatscontinued through that day and the next. On the morning of the 20thGeneral Price ordered a number of bales of hemp to be transported to thepoint from which the advance of his troops had been repeatedly repulsed. They were ranged in a line for a breastwork, and, when rolled before themen as they advanced, formed a moving rampart which was proof againstshot, and only to be overcome by a sortie in force, which the enemy didnot dare to make. On came the hempen breastworks, while Price'sartillery continued an effective fire. In the afternoon of the 20th theenemy hung out a white flag, upon which General Price ordered acessation of firing, and sent to ascertain the object of the signal. TheFederal forces surrendered as prisoners of war, to the number ofthirty-five hundred; also, seven pieces of artillery, over threethousand stand of muskets, a considerable number of sabres, a valuablesupply of ammunition, a number of horses, a large amount of commissary'sstores, and other property. Here were also recovered the great seal ofthe State and the public records, and about nine hundred thousanddollars of which the Bank of Lexington had been robbed. General Pricecaused the money to be at once returned to the bank. 

After the first day of the siege of Lexington, General Price learnedthat Lane and Montgomery, from Kansas, with about four thousand men, andGeneral Sturgis, with fifteen hundred cavalry, were on the north side ofthe Missouri River, advancing to reënforce the garrison at Lexington. Atthe same time, and from the same direction, Colonel Saunders, with abouttwenty-five hundred Missourians, was coming to the aid of General Price. General D. R. Atchison, who had long been a United States Senator fromMissouri, and at the time of his resignation was President _pro tem. _ ofthe Senate, was sent by General Price to meet the command of ColonelSaunders and hasten them forward. He joined them on the north bank ofthe river, and, after all but about five hundred had been ferried over, General Atchison still remaining with these, they were unexpectedlyattacked by the force from Kansas. The ground was densely wooded, andpartially covered with water. The Missourians, led and cheered by onethey had so long and deservedly honored, met the assault with suchdetermination, and fighting with the skill of woodsmen and hunters, thatthey put the enemy to rout, pursuing him for a distance of ten miles, and inflicting heavy loss upon him, while that of the Missourians wasbut five killed and twenty wounded. 

The expedient of the bales of hemp was a brilliant conception, notunlike that which made Tarik, the Saracen warrior, immortal, and gavehis name to the northern pillar of Hercules. 

The victories in Missouri which have been noticed, and which so farexceeded what might have been expected from the small forces by whichthey were achieved, had caused an augmentation of the enemy's troops toan estimated number of seventy thousand. Against these the army ofGeneral Price could not hope successfully to contend; he thereforeretired toward the southwestern part of the State. 

The want of supplies and transportation compelled him to disband aportion of his troops; with the rest he continued his retreat to Neosho. By proclamation of Governor Jackson, the Legislature had assembled atthis place, and had passed the ordinance of secession. If other evidencewere wanting, the fact that, without governmental aid, without amilitary chest, without munitions of war, the campaign which has beendescribed had so far been carried on by the voluntary service of thecitizens, and the free-will offerings of the people, must be conclusivethat the ordinance of secession was the expression of the popular willof Missouri. 

The forces of Missouri again formed a junction with the Confederatetroops under General McCulloch, and together they moved to Pineville, inMcDonald County. 

[Footnote 182: See "Confederate First and Second Missouri Brigades, "Bevier, pp. 24-26. ]

[Footnote 183: See "Life of General Wm. S. Harney, " by L. U. Reavis, p. 373. ]

[Footnote 184: See Ibid. , p. 373. ]

[Footnote 185: See "Life of General Wm. S. Harney, " by L. U. Reavis, p. 72]

[Footnote 186: Bevier, pp. 35, 36. ]

[Footnote 187: Bevier, pp. 86-88. ]

[Footnote 188: Bevier, p. 41. ]

[Footnote 189: Ibid. , pp. 49, 50. ]

[Footnote 190: Ibid. , p. 54. ]

CHAPTER X. 

 Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise takes command in Western Virginia. --His Movements. --Advance of General John B. Floyd. --Defeats the Enemy. --Attacked by Rosecrans. --Controversy between Wise and Floyd. --General R. E. Lee takes the Command in West Virginia. --Movement on Cheat Mountain. --Its Failure. --Further Operations. --Winter Quarters. --Lee sent to South Carolina. 

In June, 1861, Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise, who was well andfavorably known to the people of the Kanawha Valley, in his enthusiasmfor their defence and confidence in his ability to rally them to resistthe threatened invasion of that region, offered his services for thatpurpose. With a small command, which was to serve as a nucleus to theforce he hoped to raise, he was sent thither. His success was as greatas could have been reasonably expected, and, after the small butbrilliant affair on Scary Creek, he prepared to give battle to the enemythen advancing up the Kanawha Valley under General Cox; but the defeatof our forces at Laurel Hill, which has been already noticed, uncoveredhis right flank and endangered his rear, which was open to approach byseveral roads; he therefore fell back to Lewisburg. 

Brigadier-General John B. Floyd had in the mean time raised a brigade insouthwestern Virginia, and advanced to the support of General Wise. Unfortunately, there was a want of concert between these two officers, which prevented their entire coöperation. General Floyd engaged theenemy in several brilliant skirmishes, when he found that his right wasthreatened by a force which was approaching on that flank, with theapparent purpose of crossing the Gauley River at the Carnifex Ferry soas to strike his line of communication with Lewisburg. He crossed theriver with his brigade and a part of Wise's cavalry, leaving thatgeneral to check any advance which Cox might make. General Floyd'smovement was as successful as it was daring; he met the enemy's forces, defeated and dispersed them, but the want of coöperation betweenGenerals Wise and Floyd prevented a movement against General Cox. 

Floyd intrenched himself on the Gauley, in a position of great naturalstrength, but the small force under his command and the fact that he wasseparated from that of General Wise probably induced General Rosecrans, commanding the enemy's forces in the Cheat Mountain, to advance andassail the position. Though his numbers were vastly superior, the attackwas a failure; after a heavy loss on the part of the enemy, he fell backafter nightfall. During the night Floyd crossed the river and withdrewto the camp of General Wise, to form a junction of the two forces, andtogether they fell back toward Sewell's Mountain. The unfortunatecontroversy between these officers, which had prevented coöperation inthe past, grew more bitter, and each complained of the other in termsthat left little hope of future harmony; and this want of coöperationled to confusion, and threatened further reverses. 

General Loring had succeeded General Garnett, and was in command of theremnant of the force defeated at Laurel Hill. His headquarters were atValley Mountain. General R. E. Lee, on duty at Richmond, aiding thePresident in the general direction of military affairs, was now orderedto proceed to western Virginia. It was hoped that, by his military skilland deserved influence over men, he would be able to retrieve thedisaster we had suffered at Laurel Hill, and, by combining all ourforces in western Virginia on one plan of operations, give protection tothat portion of our country. Such reënforcement as could be furnishedhad been sent to Valley Mountain, the headquarters of General Loring. Thither General Lee promptly proceeded. The duty to which he wasassigned was certainly not attractive by the glory to be gained or theease to be enjoyed, but Lee made no question as to personal preference, and, whatever were his wishes, they were subordinate to what wasbelieved to be the public interest. 

The season had been one of extraordinary rains, rendering themountain-roads, ordinarily difficult, almost impassable. Withunfaltering purpose and energy, he crossed the Alleghany Mountains, and, learning that the main encampment of the enemy was in the valley ofTygart River and Elk Run, Randolph County, he directed his march towardthat position. The troops under the immediate command ofBrigadier-General H. R. Jackson, together with those underBrigadier-General Loring, were about thirty-five hundred men. The forceof the enemy, as far as it could be ascertained, was very much greater. In the detached work at Cheat Mountain Pass, we learned by aprovision-return, found upon the person of a captured staff-officer, that there were three thousand men, being but a fraction less than ourwhole force. After a careful reconnaissance, and a full conference withGeneral Loring, Lee decided to attack the main encampment of the enemyby a movement of his troops converging upon the valley from threedirections. The colonel of one of his regiments, who had reconnoiteredthe position of the works at Cheat Mountain Pass, reported that it wasfeasible to turn it and carry it by assault, and he was assigned to thatduty. General Lee ordered other portions of his force to take positionon the spurs overlooking the enemy's main encampment, while he led threeregiments to the height below and nearest to the position of the enemy. The instructions were that the officer sent to turn the position atCheat Mountain Pass should approach it at early dawn, and immediatelyopen fire, which was to be the signal for the concerted attack by therest of the force. It rained heavily during the day, and, after atoilsome night-march, the force led by General Lee, wet, weary, hungry, and cold, gained their position close to and overlooking the enemy'sencampment. In their march they had surprised and captured the picket, without a gun being fired, so that no notice had been given of theirapproach. 

The officer who had been sent to attack the work at Cheat Mountain Passfound on closer examination that he had been mistaken as to thepracticability of taking it by assault, and that the heavy abatis whichcovered it was advanced beyond the range of his rifles. Not havingunderstood that his firing was to be the signal for the general attack, and should therefore be opened, whether it would be effective or not, hewithdrew without firing a musket. 

The height occupied by General Lee was shrouded in fog, and, as morninghad dawned without the expected signal, he concluded that some mishaphad befallen the force which was to make it. By a tortuous path he wentdown the side of the mountain low enough to have a distinct view of thecamp. He saw the men, unconscious of the near presence of an enemy, engaged in cleaning their arms, cooking, and other morning occupations;then returning to his command, he explained to his senior officers whathe had seen, and expressed his belief that, though the plan of attackhad failed, the troops there with him could surprise and capture thecamp. The officers withdrew, conferred with their men, and reported tothe General that the troops were not in condition for the enterprise. Asthe fog was then lifting, and they would soon be revealed to the enemybelow, whose numbers were vastly superior to his own, he withdrew hiscommand by the route they had come, and without observation returned tohis camp. Beyond some skirmishes with outposts and reconnoiteringparties, our troops had not been engaged, and in these affairs ourreported loss was comparatively small. 

Colonel John A. Washington, aide-de-camp of General Lee, was killed, while making a reconnaissance, by a party in ambuscade. The loss of thisvaluable and accomplished officer was much regretted by his general andall others who knew him. 

The report that Rosecrans and Cox had united their commands and wereadvancing upon Wise and Floyd caused General Lee to move at once totheir support. He found General Floyd at Meadow Bluff and General Wiseat Sewell Mountain. The latter position being very favorable fordefense, the troops were concentrated there to await the threatenedattack by Rosecrans, who advanced and took position in sight of GeneralLee's intrenched camp, and, having remained there for more than a week, withdrew in the night without attempting the expected attack. 

The weak condition of his artillery-horses and the bad state of theroads, made worse by the retiring army, prevented General Lee fromattempting to pursue; and the approach of winter, always rigorous inthat mountain-region, closed the campaign with a small but brilliantaction in which General H. R. Jackson repelled an attack of a greatlysuperior force, inflicting severe loss on the assailants, and losing butsix of his own command. 

With the close of active operations, General Lee returned to Richmond, and, though subjected to depreciatory criticism by the carpet-knightswho make campaigns on assumed hypotheses, he with characteristicself-abnegation made no defense of himself, not even presenting anofficial report of his night-march in the Cheat Mountain, but orally hestated to me the facts which have formed the basis of this sketch. Myestimate of General Lee, my confidence in his ability, zeal, andfidelity, rested on a foundation not to be shaken by such criticism as Ihave noticed. I had no more doubt then, than after his fame had beensecurely established, that, whenever he had the opportunity to prove hisworth, he would secure public appreciation. Therefore, as affairs on thecoast of South Carolina and Georgia were in an unsatisfactory condition, he was directed to go there and take such measures for the defense, particularly of Savannah and Charleston, as he should find needful. Lestthe newspaper attack should have created unjust and unfavorableimpressions in regard to him, I thought it desirable to write toGovernor Pickens and tell him what manner of man he was who had beensent to South Carolina. 

After the withdrawal of the Confederate army from Fairfax Court-Houseand the positions which had been occupied in front of that place, amovement was made by the enemy to cross the Potomac near Leesburg, wherewe had, under the command of Brigadier General N. S. Evans, of SouthCarolina, four regiments of infantry (i. E. , the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Mississippi, and the Eighth Virginia), commandedrespectively by Colonels Barksdale, Featherston, Burt, and Hunton, asmall detachment of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenifer, and somepieces of artillery. 

On the 21st of October the enemy commenced crossing the river atEdwards's Ferry. A brigade was thrown over and met by the ThirteenthMississippi, which held them in check at the point of crossing. In themean time another brigade was thrown over at Ball's Bluff, and, astroops continued to cross at that point, where the Eighth Virginia hadengaged them, General Evans ordered up the Seventeenth and EighteenthMississippi, and the three regiments made such an impetuous attack as todrive back the enemy to the bluff, and their leader, Colonel Baker, having fallen, a panic seemed to seize the command, so that they rushedheadlong down the bluff, and crowded into the flat-boats, which weretheir means of transportation, in such numbers that they were sunk, andmany of the foe were drowned in their attempt to swim the river. Theloss of the enemy, prisoners included, exceeded the number of our troopsin the action. The Confederate loss was reported to be thirty-sixkilled, one hundred and seventeen wounded, and two captured; total, onehundred and fifty-five. Among the killed was the gallant Colonel Burt, amuch-respected citizen of Mississippi, where he had held high civilstation, and where his death was long deplored. 

CHAPTER XI. 

 The Issue. --The American Idea of Government. --Who was responsible for the War?--Situation of Virginia. --Concentration of the Enemy against Richmond. --Our Difficulty. --Unjust Criticisms. --The Facts set forth. --Organization of the Army. --Conference at Fairfax Court-House. --Inaction of the Army. --Capture of Romney. --Troops ordered to retire to the Valley. --Discipline. --General Johnston regards his Position as unsafe. --The First Policy. --Retreat of General Johnston. --The Plans of the Enemy. --Our Strength magnified by the Enemy. --Stores destroyed. --The Trent Affair. 

It has been shown that the Southern States, by their representatives inthe two Houses of Congress, consistently endeavored even to the lastday, when they were by their constituents permitted to remain in thehalls of Federal legislation, to maintain the Constitution, and preservethe Union which the States had by their independent action ordained andestablished. On the other hand, proof has been adduced to show that theNorthern States, by a majority of their representatives in the Congress, had persisted in agitation injurious to the welfare and tranquillity ofthe Southern States, and at the last moment had refused to make anyconcessions, or to offer any guarantees to check the current towardsecession of the complaining States, whose love for the Union renderedthem willing to accept less than justice should have readily accorded. The issue was then presented between submission to empire of the North, or the severance of those ties consecrated by many memories, andstrengthened by those habits which render every people reluctant tosever long-existing associations. 

The authorities heretofore cited have, I must believe, conclusivelyshown that the question of changing their government was one that theStates had the power to decide by virtue of the unalienable rightannounced in the Declaration of Independence, and which had been proudlydenominated the American idea of government. The hope and the wish ofthe people of the South were that the disagreeable necessity ofseparation would be peacefully met, and be followed by such commercialregulations as would least disturb the prosperity and future intercourseof the separated States. Every step taken by the Confederate Governmentwas directed toward that end. The separation of the States having beendecided on, it was sought to effect it in such manner as would be justto the parties concerned, and preserve as far as possible, underseparate governments, the fraternal and mutually beneficial relationswhich had existed between the States when united, and which it was theobject of their compact of union to secure. To all the proofs heretoforeoffered I confidently refer for the establishment of the fact thatwhatever of bloodshed, of devastation, or shock to republican governmenthas resulted from the war, is to be charged to the Northern States. Theinvasions of the Southern States, for purposes of coercion, were inviolation of the written Constitution, and the attempt to subjugatesovereign States, under the pretext of "preserving the Union, " was alikeoffensive to law, to good morals, and the proper use of language. TheUnion was the voluntary junction of free and independent States; tosubjugate any of them was to destroy constituent parts, and necessarily, therefore, must be the destruction of the Union itself. 

That the Southern States were satisfied with a Federal Government suchas their fathers had formed, was shown by their adoption of aConstitution so little differing from the instrument of 1787. It wasagainst the violations of that instrument, and usurpations offensive totheir pride and injurious to their interests, that they remonstrated, argued, and finally appealed to the inherent, undelegated power of theStates to judge of their wrongs, and of the "mode and measure ofredress. "

After many years of fruitless effort to secure from their Northernassociates a faithful observance of the compact of union; after itsconditions had been deliberately and persistently broken, and the signsof the times indicated further and more ruthless violations of theirrights as equals in the Union, the Southern States, preferring apeaceful separation to continuance in a hostile Union, decided toexercise their sovereign right to withdraw from an association which hadfailed to answer the ends for which it was formed. It has been shown howthey endeavored to effect the change with strict regard to theprinciples controlling a dissolution of partnership, and how earnestlythey desired to remain in friendly relations to the Northern States, andhow all their overtures were rejected. When they pleaded for peace, theUnited States Government deceptively delayed to answer, while makingready for war. To the calm judgment of mankind is submitted thequestion, Who was responsible for the war between the States?

Virginia, whose history, from the beginning of the Revolution of 1776, had been a long course of sacrifices for the benefit of her sisterStates, and for the preservation of the Union she had mainly contributedto establish, clung to it with the devotion of a mother. It has beenshown how her efforts to check dissolution were persisted in when theaggrieved were hopeless and the aggressors reckless, and how hermediations were rejected in the "Peace Congress, " which on her motionhad been assembled. Sorrowing over the failure of this, her blessedthough unsuccessful attempt to preserve the Union _of the Constitution_, she was not permitted to mourn as a neutral, but was required by theUnited States Government to choose between furnishing troops tosubjugate her Southern sisters or the reclamation of the grants she hadmade to the Federal Government when she became a member of the Union. The first was a violation of the letter and the spirit of theConstitution; the second was a reserved right. The voice of Henry calledto her from the ground; the spirits of Washington and Jefferson movedamong her people. 

There was but one course consistent with her stainless reputation andoften-declared tenets, as to the liberties of her people, which shecould have adopted. As in 1776, reluctantly she bowed to the necessityof separation from the Crown, so in 1861 the ordinance of secession wasadopted. Having exhausted all other means, she took the last resort, and, if for this she was selected as the first object of assault, "methinks the punishment exceedeth the offense. "

The large resources and full preparation of the United States Governmentenabled it to girt Virginia as with a wall of fire. It has been shownthat she was threatened from the east, from the north, and from thewest. The capital of the State and of the Confederacy, Richmond, was theobjective point, and on this the march of three columns concentrated. Onthe east, the advance of the enemy was on several occasions feasible, when we consider the number of his forces at and about Fortress Monroe, in comparison with the small means retained for the defense of thecapital. On the north, the most formidable army of the enemy wasassembled; to oppose it we had the comparatively small Army of thePotomac. This being regarded as the line on which the greatest dangerwas apprehended, our efforts were mostly directed toward giving it therequisite strength. Troops, as rapidly as they could be raised andarmed, were sent forward for that purpose. From the beginning to theclose of the war, we mainly relied for the defense of the capital on itsaged citizens, boys too young for service, and the civil employees ofthe executive departments. On several occasions these were called out toresist an attack. They answered with alacrity, and always borethemselves gallantly, more than once repelling the enemy in the openfield. Had it been practicable to do so, it would surely have beenproper to keep a large force in reserve for the defense of the capital, so often and vauntingly proclaimed to be the object of the enemy'scampaign. Perhaps the propriety of such provision gave currency andcredence to rumors that we had a large force at Richmond. This even ledto the application for a detachment from it to reënforce our Army of thePotomac, which caused me to write to General J. E. Johnston at Manassas, Virginia, on September 5, 1861, as follows:

 "You have again been deceived as to the forces here. We never have had anything near to twenty thousand men, and have now but little over one fourth of that number.... Since the date of your glorious victory the enemy have grown weaker in numbers, and far weaker in the character of their troops, so that I had felt it remained with us to decide whether another battle should soon be fought or not. Your remark indicates a different opinion.... I wish I could send additional force to occupy Loudon, but my means are short of the wants of each division I am laboring to protect. One ship-load of small-arms would enable me to answer all demands, but vainly have I hoped and waited. "

Then, there, and everywhere, our difficulty was the want of arms andmunitions of war. Lamentable cries came to us from the West for thesupplies which would enable patriotic citizens to defend their homes. The resource upon which the people had so confidently relied, theprivate arms in the hands of citizens, proved a sad delusion, andelsewhere it has been shown how deficient we were in ammunition, or themeans of providing it. The simple fact was, the country had gone to warwithout counting the cost. 

Undue elation over our victory at Manassas was followed bydissatisfaction at what was termed the failure to reap the fruits ofvictory; and rumors, for which there could be no better excuse thanpartisan zeal, were circulated that the heroes of the hour wereprevented from reaping the fruits of the victory by the interference ofthe President. Naturally there followed another rumor, that the inactionof the victorious army, to which reënforcements continued to be sent, was due to the policy of the President; and he also was heldresponsible, and with more apparent justice, for the failure to organizethe troops of the several States, as the law contemplated, into brigadesand divisions composed of the soldiers of each. 

Though these unjust criticisms weakened the power of the Government tomeet its present and provide for its future necessities, I bore them insilence, lest to vindicate myself should injure the public service byturning the public censure to the generals on whom the hopes of thecountry rested. That motive no longer exists; and, to justify the faithof those who, without a defense continued to uphold my hands, I proposeto set forth the facts by correspondence and otherwise. So far as, indoing this, blame shall be transferred from me to others, it will be theincident, not the design, as it would be most gratifying to me only tonotice for praise each and all who wore the gray. 

The fiction of my having prevented the pursuit of the enemy after thevictory of Manassas was exploded after it had acquired an authoritativeand semi-official form in the manner and for the reasons heretofore setforth. It only remains, therefore, to notice the other points indicatedabove:

First, the organization of the army. 

Disease and discontent are known to be the attendants of armies lyingunemployed in camps, especially, as in our case, when the troops werecomposed of citizens called from their homes under the idea of apressing necessity, and with the hope of soon returning to them. 

Our citizen soldiers were a powerful political element, and theircorrespondence, finding its way to the people through the press and tothe halls of Congress by direct communication with the members, wasfelt, by its influence both upon public opinion and general legislation. Members of Congress, and notably the Vice-President, contended that menshould be allowed to go home and attend to their private affairs whilethere were no active operations, and that there was no doubt but thatthey would return whenever there was to be a battle. The experience ofwar soon taught our people the absurdity of such ideas, and before itsclose probably none would have uttered them. 

There were very many men out of the army who were anxious to enter it, but for whom we had not arms. This gave rise to the remark, morehumorous than profound, that we "stood around the camps with clubs tokeep one set in and an other set out. " Had this been true, it wascertainly justifiable to refuse to exchange a trained man for a recruit. All who have seen service know that one old soldier is, in campaign, equal to several who have everything of military life to learn. 

A marked characteristic of the Southern people was individuality, andtime was needful to teach them that the terrible machine, a disciplinedarmy, must be made of men who had surrendered their freedom of will. Themost distinguished of our citizens were not the slowest to learn thelesson, and perhaps no army ever more thoroughly knew it than did thatwhich Lee led into Pennsylvania, and none ever had a leader who in hisown conduct better illustrated the lesson. 

Our largest army in 1861 was that of the Potomac. It had been formed bythe junction of the forces under General J. E. Johnston with those underGeneral P. G. T. Beauregard, with such additions as could be hurriedlysent forward to meet the enemy on the field of Manassas. They werecombined into brigades and divisions as pressing exigencies required. 

By the act of February 28, 1861, the President was authorized to receivecompanies, battalions, and regiments to form a part of the provisionalarmy of the Confederate States, and, with the advice and consent ofCongress, to appoint general officers for them; and by the act of March6th the President was to apportion the staff and general officers amongthe respective States from which the volunteers were received. It willthus be seen that the States generously surrendered their right topreserve for those volunteers the character of State troops and toappoint general officers when furnishing a sufficient number ofregiments to require such grade for their command; but, in giving theirvolunteers to form the provisional army of the Confederacy, it wasdistinctly suggested that the general officers should be so appointed asto make a just apportionment among the States furnishing the troops. 

During the repose which followed the battle of Manassas, it was deemedproper that the regiments of the different States should be assembled inbrigades together, and, as far as consistent with the public service, that the spirit of the law should be complied with by the assignment ofbrigadier-generals of the same State from which the troops were drawn. Instructions to that end were therefore given, and again and againrepeated, but were for a long time only partially complied with, untilthe delay formed the basis of the argument that those who had byassociation become thoroughly acquainted would more advantageously beleft united. In the mean time, frequent complaints came to me from thearmy, of unjust discrimination, the law being executed in regard to thetroops of some States but not of others, and of serious discontentarising therefrom. 

The duty to obey the law was imperative, and neither the Executive northe officers of the army had any right to question its propriety. I, however, considered the policy of that law wise, and was not surprisedwhen it was stated to me that the persistent obstruction to itsexecution was repressing the spirit to volunteer in places to whichcomplaints of such supposed favoritism had been transmitted. 

About the 1st of October, at the request of General Johnston, I went tohis headquarters, at Fairfax Court-House, for the purpose of conference. 

At the time of this visit to the army, the attention of the generalofficers, who then met me in conference, was called to the obligationcreated by law to organize the troops, when the numbers tendered by anyState permitted it, into brigades and divisions composed of theregiments, battalions, or companies of such State, and to assign generaland staff officers in the ratio of the troops thus received. After myreturn to the capital, the importance of the subject weighed so heavilyupon me as to lead to correspondence with the generals, which will bebest understood by the following extracts from my letters to them--whichare here appended:

 "Major-General G. W. Smith, _Army of Potomac_. 

 "... How have you progressed in the solution of the problem I left--the organization of the troops with reference to the States, and term of service? If the volunteers continue their complaints that they are commanded by strangers and do not get justice, and that they are kept in camp to die when reported for hospital by the surgeon, we shall soon feel a reaction in the matter of volunteering. Already I have been much pressed on both subjects, and have answered by promising that the generals would give due attention, and, I hoped, make satisfactory changes. The authority to organize regiments into brigades and the latter into divisions is by law conferred only on the President; and I must be able to assume responsibility of the action taken by whomsoever acts for me in that regard. By reference to the law, you will see that, in surrendering the sole power to appoint general officers, it was nevertheless designed, as far as should be found consistent, to keep up the State relation of troops and generals. Kentucky has a brigadier, but not a brigade; she has, however, a regiment--that regiment and brigadier might be associated together. Louisiana had regiments enough to form a brigade, but no brigadier in either corps; all of the regiments were sent to that corps commanded by a Louisiana general. Georgia has regiments now organized into two brigades; she has on duty with that army two brigadiers, but one of them serves with other troops. Mississippi troops were scattered as if the State were unknown. Brigadier-General Clark was sent to remove a growing dissatisfaction, but, though the State had nine regiments there, he (Clark) was put in command of a post and depot of supplies. These nine regiments should form two brigades. Brigadiers Clark and (as a native of Mississippi) Whiting should be placed in command of them, and the regiments for the war put in the army man's brigade. Both brigades should be put in the division commanded by General Van Dorn, of Mississippi. Thus would the spirit and intent of the law be complied with, disagreeable complaint be spared me, and more of content be assured under the trials to which you look forward. It is needless to specify further. I have been able in writing to you to speak freely, and you have no past associations to disturb the judgment to be passed upon the views presented. I have made and am making inquiries as to the practicability of getting a corps of negroes for laborers to aid in the construction of an intrenched line in rear of your present position. 

 "Your remarks on the want of efficient staff-officers are realized in all their force, and I hope, among the elements which constitute a staff-officer for volunteers, you have duly estimated the qualities of forbearance and urbanity. Many of the privates are men of high social position, of scholarship and fortune. Their pride furnishes the motive for good conduct, and, if wounded, is turned from an instrument of good to one of great power for evil.... "

 "Richmond, Virginia, _October 16, 1861_. 

 "General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_. 

 "... I have thought often upon the questions of reorganization which were submitted to you, and it has seemed to me that, whether in view of disease, or the disappointment and suffering of a winter cantonment on a line of defense, or of a battle to be fought in and near your position, it was desirable to combine the troops, by a new distribution, with as little delay as practicable. They will be stimulated to extraordinary effort when so organized, in that the fame of their State will be in their keeping, and that each will feel that his immediate commander will desire to exalt rather than diminish his services. You pointed me to the fact that you had observed that rule in the case of the Louisiana and Carolina troops, and you will not fail to perceive that others find in the fact a reason for the like disposal of them. In the hour of sickness, and the tedium of waiting for spring, men from the same region will best console and relieve each other. The maintenance of our cause rests on the sentiments of the people. Letters from the camp, complaining of inequality and harshness in the treatment of the men, have already dulled the enthusiasm which filled our ranks with men who by birth, fortune, education, and social position were the equals of any officer in the land. The spirit of our military law is manifested in the fact that the State organization was limited to the regiment. The volunteers come in sufficient numbers to have brigadiers, but have only colonels. It was not then intended (is the necessary conclusion) that those troops should be under the immediate command of officers above the grade of colonel. The spirit of the law, then, indicates that brigades should be larger than customary, the general being charged with the care, the direction, the preservation of the men, rather than the internal police. "

 "Richmond, Virginia, _October_ 20, 1861. 

 "General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_. 

 "My Dear General:... Two rules have been applied in the projected reorganization of the Army of the Potomac:

 "1. As far as practicable, to keep regiments from the same State together; 2. To assign generals to command the troops of their own State. I have not overlooked the objections to each, but the advantages are believed to outweigh the disadvantages of that arrangement. In distributing the regiments of the several States it would, I think, be better to place the regiments for the war in the same brigade of the State, and assign to those brigades the brigadiers whose services could least easily be dispensed with. For this, among other reasons, I will mention but one: the commission of a brigadier expires upon the breaking up of his brigade (see the law for their appointment). Of course, I would not for slight cause change the relations of troops and commanders, especially where it has been long continued and endeared by the trials of battle; but it is to be noted that the regiment was fixed as the unit of organization, and made the connecting link between the soldier and his home. Above that, all was subject to the discretion of the Confederate authorities, save the pregnant intimation in relation to the distribution of generals among the several States. It was generous and confiding to surrender entirely to the Confederacy the appointment of generals, and it is the more incumbent on me to carry out as well as may be the spirit of the volunteer system. "

 "Richmond, _May 10, 1862_. 

 "General J. E. Johnston. 

 "... Your attention has been heretofore called to the law in relation to the organization of brigades and divisions--orders were long since given to bring the practice and the law into conformity. Recently reports have been asked for from the commanders of separate armies as to the composition of their respective brigades and divisions. I have been much harassed, and the public interest has certainly suffered, by the delay to place the regiments of some of the States in brigades together, it being deemed that unjust discrimination was made against them, and also by the popular error which has existed as to the number of brigadiers to which appointments could be specially urged on the grounds of residence. While some have expressed surprise at my patience when orders to you were not observed, I have at least hoped that you would recognize the desire to aid and sustain you, and that it would produce the corresponding action on your part. The reasons formerly offered have one after another disappeared, and I hope you will, as you can, proceed to organize your troops as heretofore instructed, and that the returns will relieve us of the uncertainty now felt as to the number and relations of the troops, and the commands of the officers having brigades and divisions.... I will not dwell on the lost opportunity afforded along the line of northern Virginia, but must call your attention to the present condition of affairs and probable action of the enemy, if not driven from his purpose to advance on the Fredericksburg route.... 

 "Very truly yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

On the 26th of May General Johnston's attention was again called to theorganization of the ten Mississippi regiments into two brigades, and wasreminded that the proposition had been made to him in the previousautumn, with an expression of my confidence that the regiments would bemore effective in battle if thus associated. 

I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was responsible forinaction by the Army of the Potomac, in the latter part of 1861 and inthe early part of 1862. After the explosion of the fallacy that I hadprevented the pursuit of the enemy from Manassas in July, 1861, myassailants have sought to cover their exposure by a change of time andplace, locating their story at Fairfax Court-House, and dating it in theautumn of 1861. 

When at that time and place I met General Johnston for conference, hecalled in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith. The question for consideration was, What course should be adoptedfor the future action of the army? and the preliminary inquiry by me wasas to the number of the troops there assembled. To my surprise anddisappointment, the effective strength was stated to be but littlegreater than when it fought the battle of the 21st of the precedingJuly. The frequent reënforcements which had been sent to that army innowise prepared me for such an announcement. To my inquiry as to whatforce would be required for the contemplated advance into Maryland, thelowest estimate made by any of them was about twice the number therepresent for duty. How little I was prepared for such a condition ofthings will be realized from the fact that previous suggestions by thegenerals in regard to a purpose to advance into Maryland had induced me, when I went to that conference, to take with me some drawings made bythe veteran soldier and engineer, Colonel Crozêt, of the falls of thePotomac, to show the feasibility of crossing the river at that point. Very little knowledge of the condition and military resources of thecountry must have sufficed to show that I had no power to make such anaddition to that army without a total disregard of the safety of otherthreatened positions. It only remained for me to answer that I had notpower to furnish such a number of troops; and, unless the militiabearing their private arms should be relied on, we could not possiblyfulfill such a requisition until after the receipt of the small-armswhich we had early and constantly striven to procure from abroad, andhad for some time expected. 

After I had written the foregoing, and all the succeeding chapters onkindred subjects, a friend, in October, 1880, furnished me with a copyof a paper relating to the conference at Fairfax Court-House, whichseems to require notice at my hands. 

Therefore I break the chain of events to insert here some remarks inregard to it. 

The paper appears to have been written by General G. W. Smith, and tohave received the approval of Generals Beauregard and J. E. Johnston, and to bear date the 31st of January, 1862. 

It does not agree in some respects with my memory of what occurred, andis not consistent with itself. It was not necessary that I should learnin that interview the evil of inactivity. My correspondence of anteriordate might have shown that I was fully aware of it, and my suggestionsin the interview certainly did not look as if it was necessary toimpress me with the advantage of action. 

In one part of the paper it is stated that the reënforcements asked forwere to be "seasoned soldiers, " such as were there present, and who weresaid to be in the "finest fighting condition. " This, if such aproposition had been made, would have exposed its absurdity, as well asthe loophole it offered for escape, by subsequently asserting that thetroops furnished were not up to the proposed standard. 

In another part of the paper it is stated that there were hope andexpectation that, before the end of the winter, arms would be introducedinto the country, and that then we could successfully invade that of theenemy; but this supply of arms, however abundant, could not furnish"seasoned soldiers, " and the two propositions are thereforeinconsistent. In one place it is written that "it was felt it might bebetter to run the risk of almost certain destruction fighting upon theother side of the Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying out anddeterioration of this army during a winter, " etc. ; but, when it wasproposed to cross into eastern Maryland on a steamer in our possessionfor a partial campaign, difficulties arose like the lion in the path ofthe sluggard, so that the proposition was postponed and never executed. In like manner the other expedition in the Valley of Virginia wasachieved by an officer not of this council, General T. J. Jackson. 

In one place it is written that the President stated, "At that time noreënforcements could be furnished to the army of the character askedfor. " In another place he is made to say he could not take any troopsfrom the points named, and, "without arms from abroad, could notreënforce that army. " Here, again, it is clear from the answer that theproposition had been for such reënforcement as additional arms wouldenable him to give. Those arms he expected to receive, barring thedangers of the sea, and of the enemy, which obstacles alone preventedthe "positive assurance that they would be received at all. "

It was, as stated, with deep regret and bitter disappointment that Ifound, notwithstanding our diligent efforts to reënforce this armybefore and after the battle of Manassas, that its strength had butlittle increased, and that the arms of absentees and discharged men wererepresented by only twenty-five hundred on hand. I can not suppose thatGeneral Johnston could have noticed the statement that his request forconference had set forth the object of it to be to discuss the questionof reënforcement. He would have known that in Richmond, where all thereturns were to be found, any consideration of reënforcement, by thewithdrawal of troops from existing garrisons, could best be decided. Very little experience or a fair amount of modesty without anyexperience would serve to prevent one from announcing his conclusionthat troops could be withdrawn from a place or places without knowinghow many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence. 

I was at the conference by request; the confidence felt in thoseofficers is shown by the fact that I met them alone, and did not requireany minutes to be made of the meeting. About four months afterward apaper was prepared to make a record of the conversation; the fact wasconcealed from me, whereas, both for accuracy and frankness, it shouldhave been submitted to me, even if there had been nothing due to ourofficial relations. Twenty years after the event, I learned of thissecret report, by one party, without notice having been given to theother, of a conversation said to have lasted two hours. 

I have noticed the improbabilities and inconsistencies of the paper, and, without remark, I submit to honorable men the concealment from mein which it was prepared, whereby they may judge of the chances for suchco-intelligence as needs must exist between the Executive and thecommanders of armies to insure attainable success. 

The position at Fairfax Court-House, though it would answer very well asa point from which to advance, was quite unfavorable for defense; andwhen I so remarked, the opinion seemed to be that to which the generalshad previously arrived. It, therefore, only remained to consider whatchange of position should be made in the event of the enemy threateningsoon to advance. But in the mean time I hoped that something could bedone by detachments from the army to effect objects less difficult thanan advance against his main force, and particularly indicated the lowerpart of Maryland, where a small force was said to be ravaging thecountry and oppressing our friends. This, I thought, might be feasibleby the establishment of a battery near to Acquia Creek, where thechannel of the Potomac was said to be so narrow that our guns couldprevent the use of the river by the enemy's boats, and, by employing asteamboat lying there, troops enough could be sent over some night todefeat that force, and return before any large body could beconcentrated against them. The effect of the battery and of theexpedition, it was hoped, would be important in relieving our friendsand securing recruits from those who wished to join us. Previously, General Johnston's attention had been called to possibilities in theValley of the Shenandoah, and that these and other like things were notdone, was surely due to other causes than "the policy of theAdministration, " as will appear by the letters hereto annexed:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _August_ 1, 1861. 

 "General J. E. Johnston:

 "... General Lee has gone to western Virginia, and I hope may be able to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, or, failing in that, will be able to organize and post our troops so as to check the enemy, after which he will return to this place. 

 "The movement of Banks will require your attention. It may be a _ruse_, but, if a real movement, when your army has the requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike him in rear or flank, and thus add another to your many claims to your country's gratitude.... We must be prompt to avail ourselves of the weakness resulting from the exchange of the new and less reliable forces of the enemy, for those heretofore in service, as well as of the moral effect produced by their late defeat.... 

 "I am, as ever, your friend, "Jefferson Davis. "

From the correspondence which occurred after the conference at FairfaxCourt-House, I select a reply made to General Smith, who had written tome in advocacy of the views he had then expressed about largereënforcements to the Army of the Potomac, for an advance into Maryland. Nothing is more common than that a general, realizing the wants of thearmy with which he is serving, and the ends that might be achieved ifthose wants were supplied, should overlook the necessities of others, and accept rumors of large forces which do not exist, and assume theabsence of danger elsewhere than in his own front. 

 "Richmond, Virginia, _October_ 10, 1861. 

 "Major-General G. W. Smith, _Army of the Potomac_. 

 "... Your remarks about the moral effect of repressing the hope of the volunteers for an advance are in accordance with the painful impression made on me when, in our council, it was revealed to me that the Army of the Potomac had been reduced to about one half the legalized strength, and that the arms to restore the numbers were not in depot. As I there suggested, though you may not be able to advance into Maryland and expel the enemy, it may be possible to keep up the spirits of your troops by expeditions such as that particularly spoken of against Sickles's brigade on the lower Potomac, or Banks's above. By destroying the canal and making other rapid movements wherever opportunity presents, to beat detachments or to destroy lines of communication.... 

 "Very truly, your friend, "Jefferson Davis". 

 "Richmond, Virginia, _November_ 18, 1861. 

 "General J. E. Johnston. 

 "... If a large force should be landed on the Potomac below General Holmes, with the view to turn or to attack him, the value of the position between Dumfries and Fredericksburg will be so great that I wish you to give to that line your personal inspection. With a sufficient force, the enemy may be prevented from leaving his boats, should he be able to cross the river. To make our force available at either of the points which he may select, it will be necessary to improve the roads connecting the advance posts with the armies of the Potomac and of the Acquia, as well as with each other, and to have the requisite teams to move heavy guns with celerity.... 

 "Very respectfully yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

In November, 1861, reports became current that the enemy wereconcentrating troops west of the Valley of the Shenandoah with a view toa descent upon it. That vigilant, enterprising, and patriotic soldier, General T. J. Jackson, whose steadiness under fire at the first battleof Manassas had procured for him the _sobriquet_ of "Stonewall, " wasthen on duty as district commander of the Shenandoah Valley. 

He was a West Virginian; and, though he had not acquired the fame whichsubsequently shed such luster upon his name, he possessed awell-deserved confidence among the people of that region. Ever watchfuland daring in the discharge of any duty, he was intensely anxious toguard his beloved mountains of Virginia. This, stimulating his devotionto the general welfare of the Confederacy, induced him to desire tomarch against the enemy, who had captured Romney. On the 20th ofNovember, 1861, he wrote to the War Department, proposing an expeditionto Romney, in western Virginia. It was decided to adopt his proposition, endorsed by the commander of the department, and, further to insuresuccess, though not recommended in the endorsement, his old brigade, then in the Army of the Potomac, was selected as a part of the commandwith which he was to make the campaign. General Johnston remonstratedagainst this transfer, and the correspondence is subjoined for a fullerunderstanding of the matter:

 "Headquarters, Valley District, _November_ 20, 1861. 

 "Hon. J. P. Benjamin, _Secretary of War_. 

 "Sir: I hope you will pardon me for requesting that, at once, all the troops under General Loring be ordered to this point. Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute secrecy respecting military operations, I have made it a point to say but little respecting my proposed movements in the event of sufficient reënforcements arriving, but, since conversing with Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. T. Preston upon his return from General Loring, and ascertaining the disposition of the General's forces, I venture to respectfully urge that, after concentrating all his troops here, an attempt should be made to capture the Federal forces at Romney. The attack on Romney would probably induce McClellan to believe that the Army of the Potomac had been so weakened as to justify him in making an advance on Centreville; but, should this not induce him to advance, I do not believe anything will during the present winter. Should the Army of the Potomac be attacked, I would be at once prepared to reënforce it with my present volunteer force, increased by General Loring's. After repulsing the enemy at Manassas, let the troops that marched on Romney return to the Valley and move rapidly westward to the waters of the Monongahela and Little Kanawha. Should General Kelley be defeated, and especially should he be captured, I believe that, by a judicious disposition of the militia, a few cavalry, and a small number of field-pieces, no additional forces would be required for some time in this district. I deem it of very great importance that northwestern Virginia be occupied by Confederate troops this winter. At present, it is to be presumed that the enemy are not expecting an attack there, and the resources of that region necessary for the subsistence of our troops are in greater abundance than in almost any other season of the year. Postpone the occupation of that section until spring, and we may expect to find the enemy prepared for us, and the resources to which I have referred greatly exhausted. I know that what I have proposed will be an arduous undertaking, and can not be accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal comfort, but I feel that the troops will be prepared to make this sacrifice when animated by the prospects of important results to our cause and distinction to themselves. It may be urged, against this plan, that the enemy will advance on Staunton or Huntersville. I am well satisfied that such a step would but make their destruction more certain. Again, it may be said that General Floyd will be cut off. To avoid this, if necessary, the General has only to fall back toward the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. When northwestern Virginia is occupied in force, the Kanawha Valley, unless it be the lower part of it, must be evacuated by the Federal forces, or otherwise their safety will be endangered by forcing a column across from the Little Kanawha between them and the Ohio River. Admitting that the season is too far advanced, or that from other causes all can not be accomplished that has been named, yet, through the blessing of God, who has thus far so wonderfully prospered our cause, much more may be expected from General Loring's troops, according to this programme, than can be expected from them where they are. If you decide to order them here, I trust that, for the purpose of saving time, all the infantry, cavalry, and artillery will be directed to move immediately upon the reception of the order. The enemy, about five thousand strong, have been for some time slightly fortifying at Romney, and have completed their telegraph from that place to Green Spring Depot. Their forces at and near Williamsport are estimated as high as five thousand, but as yet I have no reliable information of their strength beyond the Potomac. Your most obedient servant, "T. J. Jackson, _Major-General, P. A. C. S. _"

 "Headquarters, Centreville, _November_ 21, 1861. 

 "Respectfully forwarded. I submit that the troops under General Loring might render valuable services by taking the field with General Jackson, instead of going into winter-quarters, as now proposed. 

 "J. E. Johnston, _General_. "

 "Headquarters, Centreville, _November_ 22, 1861. 

 "General Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_. 

 "Sir: I have received Major-General Jackson's plan of operations in his district, for which he asks for reënforcements. It seems to me that he proposes more than can well be accomplished in that high, mountainous country at this season. If the means of driving the enemy from Romney (preventing the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and incursions by marauders into the counties of Jefferson, Berkeley, and Morgan) can be supplied to General Jackson, and with them those objects, accomplished, we shall have reason to be satisfied, so far as the Valley district is concerned. The wants of other portions of the frontier--Acquia district, for instance--make it inexpedient, in my opinion, to transfer to the Valley district so large a force as that asked for by Major-General Jackson. It seems to me to be now of especial importance to strengthen Major-General Holmes, near Acquia Creek. The force there is very small, compared with the importance of the position. Your obedient servant, "J. E. Johnston, _General_. 

 "[Endorsement. ]

 "Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War:

 "S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_. 

 "_November 25, 1861_. "

 "Richmond, Virginia, _November_ 10, 1861. 

 "General J. E. Johnston, _Manassas, Virginia_. 

 "Sir: The Secretary of War has this morning laid before me yours of the 8th instant. I fully sympathize with your anxiety for the Army of the Potomac. If indeed mine be less than yours, it can only be so because the south, the west, and the east, presenting like cause for solicitude, have in the same manner demanded my care. Our correspondence must have assured you that I fully concur in your view of the necessity for unity in command, and I hope by a statement of the case to convince you that there has been no purpose to divide your authority by transferring the troops specified in order No. 206 from the center to the left of your department. The active campaign in the Greenbrier region was considered as closed for the season. There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a portion of his forces from that mountain-region toward the Valley of Virginia, and that he has sent troops and munitions from the east by the way of the Potomac Canal toward the same point. The failure to destroy his communications by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and by the Potomac Canal has left him in possession of great advantages for that operation. General Jackson, for reasons known to you, was selected to command the division of the Valley, but we had only the militia and one mounted regiment within the district assigned to him. The recent activity of the enemy, the capture of Romney, etc. , required that he should have for prompt service a body of Confederate troops to coöperate with the militia of that district. You suggest that such force should be drawn from the army at the Greenbrier; this was originally considered, and abandoned, because they could not reach him in time to anticipate the enemy's concentration, and also because General Jackson was a stranger to them, and time was wanting for the growth of that confidence between the commander and his troops, the value of which need not be urged upon you. We could have sent to him from this place an equal number of regiments, being about double the numerical strength of those specified in the order referred to, but they were parts of a brigade now in the Army of the Potomac, or were southern troops, and were ignorant of the country in which they were to serve, and all of them unknown to General Jackson. The troops sent were his old brigade, had served in the Valley, and had acquired a reputation which would give confidence to the people of that region upon whom the General had to rely for his future success. Though the troops sent to you are, as you say, 'raw, ' they have many able officers, and will, I doubt not, be found reliable in the hour of danger. Their greater numbers will to you, I hope, more than compensate for the experience of those transferred; while, in the Valley, the latter, by the moral effect their presence will produce, will more than compensate for the inferiority of their numbers. I have labored to increase the Army of the Potomac, and, so far from proposing a reduction of it, did not intend to rest content with an exchange of equivalents. In addition to the troops recently sent to you, I expected soon to send further reënforcements by withdrawing a part of the army from the Greenbrier Mountains. I have looked hopefully forward to the time when our army could assume the offensive, and select the time and place where battles were to be fought, so that ours should be alternations of activity and repose, theirs the heavy task of constant watching. When I last visited your headquarters, my surprise was expressed at the little increase of your effective force above that of the 21st of July last, notwithstanding the heavy reënforcements which, in the mean time, had been sent to you. Since that visit I have frequently heard of the improved health of the troops, of the return of many who had been absent sick; and some increase has been made by reënforcements. You can, then, imagine my disappointment at the information you give, that, on the day before the date of your letter, the army at your position was yet no stronger than on the 21st of July. I can only repeat what has been said to you in our conference at Fairfax Court-House, that we are restricted in our capacity to reënforce by the want of arms. Troops to bear the few arms you have in store have been ordered forward. Your view of the magnitude of the calamity of defeat of the Army of the Potomac is entirely concurred in, and every advantage which is attainable should be seized to increase the power of your present force. I will do what I can to augment its numbers, but you must remember that our wants greatly exceed our resources. 

 "Banks's brigade, we learn, has left the position occupied when I last saw you. Sickles is said to be yet in the lower Potomac, and, when your means will enable you to reach him, I still hope he may be crushed. 

 "I will show this reply to the Secretary of War, and hope there will be no misunderstanding between you in future. The success of the army requires harmonious coöperation. 

 "Very respectfully, etc. , "Jefferson Davis. "

After General Jackson commenced his march, the cold became unexpectedlysevere, and, as he ascended into the mountainous region, the slopes werecovered with ice, which impeded his progress, the more because hishorses were smooth-shod; but his tenacity of purpose, fidelity, anddaring, too well known to need commendation, triumphed over everyobstacle, and he attained his object, drove the enemy from Romney andits surroundings, took possession of the place, and prevented thethreatened concentration. Having accomplished this purpose, and beingassured that the enemy had abandoned that section of country, hereturned with his old brigade to the Valley of the Shenandoah, leavingthe balance of his command at Romney. General Loring, the senior officerthere present, and many others of the command so left, appealed to theWar Department to be withdrawn. Their arguments were, as well as Iremember, these: that the troops, being from the South, wereunaccustomed to, and unprepared for, the rigors of a mountain winter;that they were strangers to the people of that section; that theposition had no military strength, and, at the approach of spring, wouldbe accessible to the enemy by roads leading from various quarters. 

After some preliminary action, an order was issued from the War Officedirecting the troops to retire to the Valley. As that order has been thesubject of no little complaint, both by civil and militaryfunctionaries, my letter to the General commanding the department, inexplanation of the act of the Secretary of War, is hereto annexed:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _February_ 14, 1862. 

 "General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of Northern Virginia, Centreville, Virginia_. 

 "General: I have received your letter of the 5th instant. While I admit the propriety in all cases of transmitting orders through you to those under your command, it is not surprising that the Secretary of War should, in a case requiring prompt action, have departed from this, the usual method, in view of the fact that he had failed more than once in having his instructions carried out when forwarded to you in the proper manner. You will remember that you were directed, on account of the painful reports received at the War Department in relation to the command at Romney, to repair to that place, and, after the needful examination, to give the orders proper in the case. You sent your adjutant- (inspector?) general, and I am informed that he went no farther than Winchester, to which point the commander of the expedition had withdrawn; leaving the troops, for whom anxiety had been excited, at Romney. Had you given your personal attention to the case, you must be assured that the confidence reposed in you would have prevented the Secretary from taking any action before your report had been received. In the absence of such security, he was further moved by what was deemed reliable information, that a large force of the enemy was concentrating to capture the troops at Romney, and by official report that place had no natural strength and little strategic importance. To insure concert of action in the defense of our Potomac frontier, it was thought best to place all the forces for this object under one command. The reasons which originally induced the adding of the Valley district to your department exist in full force at present, and I can not, therefore, agree to its separation from your command. 

 "I will visit the Army of the Potomac as soon as other engagements will permit, although I can not realize your complimentary assurance that great good to the army will result from it; nor can I anticipate the precise time when it will be practicable to leave my duties here. 

 "Very respectfully and truly yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

To complaints by General Johnston that the discipline of his army wasinterfered with by irregular action of the Secretary of War, and itsnumerical strength diminished by furloughs granted directly by the WarDepartment, I replied, after making inquiry at the War Office, by aletter, a copy of which is hereto annexed:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _March_ 4, 1862. 

 "General J. E. Johnston, _Centreville, Virginia_. 

 "Dear Sir: Yours of the 1st instant received prompt attention, and I am led to the conclusion that some imposition has been practiced upon you. The Secretary of War informs me that he has not granted leaves of absence or furloughs to soldiers of your command for a month past, and then only to divert the current which threatened by legislation to destroy your army by a wholesale system of furloughs. Those which you inform me are daily received must be spurious. The authority to reënlist and change from infantry to artillery, the Secretary informs me, has been given but in four cases--three on the recommendation of General Beauregard, and specially explained to you some time since; the remaining case was that of a company from Wheeling, which was regarded as an exceptional one. I wish, therefore, that you would send to the Adjutant-General the cases of recent date in which the discipline of your troops has been interfered with in the two methods stated, so that an inquiry may be made into the origin of the papers presented. The law in relation to reënlistment provides for reorganization, and was under the policy of electing the officers. 

 "The concession to army opinions was limited to the promotion by seniority after the organization of the companies and regiments had been completed. The reorganization was not to occur before the expiration of the present term. A subsequent law provides for filling up the twelve months' companies by recruits for the war, but the organization ceases with the term of the twelve months' men. Be assured of readiness to protect your proper authority, and I do but justice to the Secretary of War in saying that he can not desire to interfere with the discipline and organization of your troops. He has complained that his orders are not executed, and I regret that he was able to present to me so many instances to justify that complaint, which were in no wise the invasion of your prerogative as a commander in the field. 

 "You can command my attention at all times to any matter connected with your duties, and I hope that full co-intelligence will secure full satisfaction. Very truly yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

A fortnight after this letter, I received from General Johnston noticethat his position was considered unsafe. Many of his letters to me havebeen lost, and I have thus far not been able to find the one giving thenotice referred to, but the reply which is annexed clearly indicates thesubstance of the letter which was answered. 

 "Richmond, Virginia, _February_ 28, 1862. 

 "General J. E. Johnston: ... Your opinion that your position may be turned whenever the enemy chooses to advance, and that he will be ready to take the field before yourself, clearly indicates prompt effort to disencumber yourself of everything which would interfere with your rapid movement when necessary, and such thorough examination of the country in your rear as would give you exact knowledge of its roads and general topography, and enable you to select a line of greater natural advantages than that now occupied by your forces. 

 "The heavy guns at Manassas and Evansport, needed elsewhere, and reported to be useless in their present position, would necessarily be abandoned in any hasty retreat. I regret that you find it impossible to move them. 

 "The subsistence stores should, when removed, be placed in positions to answer your future wants. Those can not be determined until you have furnished definite information as to your plans, especially the line to which you would remove in the contingency of retiring. The Commissary-General had previously stopped further shipments to your army, and given satisfactory reasons for the establishment at Thoroughfare. [191] ... 

 "I need not urge on your consideration the value to our country of arms and munitions of war: you know the difficulty with which we have obtained our small supply; that, to furnish heavy artillery to the advanced posts, we have exhausted the supplies here which were designed for the armament of the city defenses. Whatever can be, should be done to avoid the loss of these guns.... 

 "As has been my custom, I have only sought to present general purposes and views. I rely upon your special knowledge and high ability to effect whatever is practicable in this our hour of need. Recent disasters have depressed the weak, and are depriving us of the aid of the wavering. Traitors show the tendencies heretofore concealed, and the selfish grow clamorous for local and personal interests. At such an hour, the wisdom of the trained and the steadiness of the brave possess a double value. The military paradox that impossibilities must be rendered possible, had never better occasion for its application. 

 "The engineers for whom you asked have been ordered to report to you, and further additions will be made to your list of brigadier-generals. Let me hear from you often and fully. 

 "Very truly and respectfully yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

 "Richmond, Virginia, _March_ 6, 1862. 

 "General J. E. Johnston:... Notwithstanding the threatening position of the enemy, I infer from your account of the roads and streams that his active operations must be for some time delayed, and thus I am permitted to hope that you will be able to mobilize your army by the removal of your heavy ordnance and such stores as are not required for active operations, so that, whenever you are required to move, it may be without public loss and without impediment to celerity. I was fully impressed with the difficulties which you presented when discussing the subject of a change of position. To preserve the efficiency of your army, you will, of course, avoid all needless exposure; and, when your army has been relieved of all useless encumbrance, you can have no occasion to move it while the roads and the weather are such as would involve serious suffering, because the same reasons must restrain the operations of the enemy.... 

 "Very respectfully yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

At the conference at Fairfax Court-House, heretofore referred to, I wassadly disappointed to find that the strength of that army had beenlittle increased, notwithstanding the reënforcements sent to it sincethe 21st of July, and that to make an advance the generals required anadditional force, which it was utterly impracticable for me to supply. Soon thereafter the army withdrew to Centreville, a better position fordefense but not for attack, and thereby suggestive of the abandonment ofan intention to advance. The subsequent correspondence with GeneralJohnston during the winter expressed an expectation that the enemy wouldresume the offensive, and that the position then held was geographicallyunfavorable. There was a general apprehension at Richmond that thenorthern frontier of Virginia would be abandoned, and a correspondingearnestness was exhibited to raise the requisite force to enable ourarmy to take the offensive. On the 10th of March I telegraphed toGeneral Johnston: "Further assurance given to me this day that you shallbe promptly and adequately reënforced, so as to enable you to maintainyour position, and resume first policy when the roads will permit. " Thefirst policy was to carry the war beyond our own border. 

Five days thereafter, I received notice that our army was in retreat, and replied as follows:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _March_ 15, 1862. 

 "General J. E. Johnston, _Headquarters Army of the Potomac_. 

 "General: I have received your letter of the 13th instant, giving the first official account I have received of the retrograde movement of your army. 

 "Your letter would lead me to infer that others had been sent to apprise me of your plans and movements. If so, they have not reached me; and, before the receipt of yours of the 13th, I was as much in the dark as to your purposes, condition, and necessities as at the time of our conversation on the subject about a month since. 

 "It is true I have had many and alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp-equipage, and provisions, indicating precipitate retreat; but, having heard of no cause for such a sudden movement, I was at a loss to believe it. 

 "I have not the requisite topographical knowledge for the selection of your new position. I had intended that you should determine that question; and for this purpose a corps of engineers was furnished to make a careful examination of the country to aid you in your decision. 

 "The question of throwing troops into Richmond is contingent upon reverses in the West and Southeast. The immediate necessity for such a movement is not anticipated. 

 "Very respectfully yours, "Jefferson Davis. "

On the same day I sent the following telegram:

 "Richmond, Virginia, _March_ 15, 1862. 

 "General J. E. Johnston, _Culpepper Court-House, Virginia_. 

 "Your letter of the 13th received this day, being the first information of your retrograde movement. I have no report of your reconnaissance, and can suggest nothing as to the position you should take except it should be as far in advance as consistent with your safety. 

 "Jefferson Davis. "

To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where he should takeposition, I replied that I would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river, to which he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages. An elevated bankcommanded the north side of the river, overlooking the bridge, and anopen field beyond it, across which the enemy must pass to reach thebridge, which, if left standing, was an invitation to seek thatcrossing. Upon inquiring whether the south bank of the river continuedto command the other side down to Fredericksburg, General Johnstonanswered that he did not know; that he had not been at Fredericksburgsince he passed there in a stage on his way to West Point, when he wasfirst appointed a cadet. I then proposed that we should go toFredericksburg, to inform ourselves upon that point. On arriving atFredericksburg, a reconnaissance soon manifested that the hills on theopposite side commanded the town and adjacent river-bank, and thereforeFredericksburg could only be defended by an army occupying the oppositehills, for which our force was inadequate. In returning to the house ofMr. Barton, where I was a guest, I found a number of ladies hadassembled there to welcome me, and who, with anxiety, inquired as to theresult of our reconnaissance. Upon learning that the town was notconsidered defensible against an enemy occupying the heights on theother side, and that our force was not sufficient to hold those heightsagainst such an attack as might be anticipated, the general answer was, with a self-sacrificing patriotism too much admired to be forgotten, "Ifthe good of our cause requires the defense of the town to be abandoned, let it be done. " The purposes of the enemy were then unknown to us. IfGeneral Johnston's expectation of a hostile advance in great forceshould be realized, our course must depend partly upon receiving thereënforcement we had reason to expect from promises previously given andrenewed, as was announced to General Johnston in my telegram of 10th ofMarch, 1862, in these words:

 "Further assurance given to me this day that you shall be promptly and adequately reënforced, so as to enable you to maintain your position, and resume first policy when the roads will permit. "

No immediate decision could therefore be made, and I returned toRichmond, to wait the further development of the enemy's plans, and toprepare as best we might to counteract them. 

The feeling heretofore noticed as arousing in Virginia a determinationto resist the abandonment of her northern frontier, and which caused theassurance of reënforcements, bore fruit in the addition of about thirtythousand men, by a draft made by the Governor of the State. These, it istrue, were not the disciplined, seasoned troops which were asked for bythe generals in the conference at Fairfax Court-House, but they were ofsuch men as often during the war won battles for the Confederacy. Thedevelopment of the enemy's plans, for which we had to wait, proved that, instead of advancing in force against our position at Centreville, hehad, before the retreat of our army commenced, decided to move down thePotomac for a campaign against Richmond, from the Peninsula as a base. The conflagration at Centreville gave notice of its evacuation, and anadvance was made as far as Manassas, but, as appears by GeneralMcClellan's report, with no more important design than to attack ourrear guard, if it should be encountered. In the report on the conduct ofthe war by a committee of the United States Congress, evidence is foundof much vacillation before the conclusion was finally reached ofabandoning the idea of a direct advance upon Richmond for that ofconcentrating their army at the mouth of the Chesapeake. Whatever doubtor apprehension continued to exist about uncovering the city ofWashington by removing their main army from before it, was of coursedispelled by the retreat of our army, and the burning of bridges behindit. In this last-mentioned fact, General McClellan says he found thestrongest reason to believe that there was no immediate danger of ourarmy returning. 

There was an apparent advantage to the enemy in the new base for hisoperations which was sufficiently illustrated by the events of the lastyear of the war. Had we possessed an army as large as the enemysupposed, it would have been possible for us at the same time to checkhis advance from the East and to march against his capital, with fairprospect of capturing it, before the army he had sent against Yorktowncould have been brought back for the defense of Washington. On this ason other occasions he greatly magnified the force we possessed, and onthis as on other occasions it required the concentration of our troopssuccessfully to resist a detachment of his. Accepting as a necessitythe withdrawal of the main portion of our army from northern Virginia tomeet the invasion from the seaboard, it was regretted that earlier andmore effective means were not employed for the mobilization of the army, a desirable measure in either contingency of advance or retreat, or atthe least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate as to secure theremoval of our ordnance, subsistence, and quartermasters' stores, whichhad been collected on the line occupied in 1861 and the early part of1862. 

A distinguished officer of our army, who has since the war made valuablecontributions to the history of its operations--especially valuable aswell for their accuracy as for their freedom from personal or partisanbias--writes thus of the retreat from Centreville:

 "A very large amount of stores and provisions had been abandoned for want of transportation, and among the stores was a very large quantity of clothing, blankets etc. , which had been provided by the States south of Virginia for their own troops. The pile of trunks along the railroad was appalling to behold. All these stores, clothing, trunks, etc. , were consigned to the flames by a portion of our cavalry left to carry out the work of their destruction. The loss of stores at this point and at White Plains on the Manassas Gap Railroad, where a large amount of meat had been salted and stored, was a very serious one to us, and embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, as it put us at once on a running stock. "

The same officer--and the value of his opinion will be recognized by allwho know him, wherefore I give his name, General J. A. Early--in acommunication subsequent to that from which I have just quoted, writes, in regard to the loss of supplies:

 "I believe that all might have been carried off from Manassas if the railroads had been energetically operated. The rolling-stock of the Orange and Alexandria, Manassas Gap, and Virginia Central Railroads ought to have been sufficient for the purpose of removing everything in the two weeks allowed, if properly used. "

The enemy's plans, the development of which, as has been already stated, was necessary for the determination of our own movements, were soonthereafter found to be the invasion of Virginia from the seaboard, andthe principal portion of our army was consequently ordered to thePeninsula, between the York River and the James. Thus the northernfrontier of Virginia, which, in the first year of the war, had been themain field of skirmishes, combats, and battles, of advance and retreat, and the occupation and evacuation of fortified positions, ceased for atime to tremble beneath the tread of contending armies. 

To the foregoing narration of events immediately connected with theefforts of the Confederate Government to maintain its existence at home, may here be properly added an incident bearing on its foreign relationsin the first year of the war. 

Our efforts for the recognition of the Confederate States by theEuropean powers, in 1861, served to make us better known abroad, toawaken a kindly feeling in our favor, and cause a respectful regard forthe effort we were making to maintain the independence of the Stateswhich Great Britain had recognized, and her people knew to be ourbirthright. 

On the 8th of November, 1861, an outrage was perpetrated by an armedvessel of the United States, in the forcible detention, on thehigh-seas, of a British mail steamer, making one of her regular tripsfrom one British port to another, and the seizure, on that unarmedvessel, of our Commissioners, Mason and Slidell, who with theirsecretaries were bound for Europe on diplomatic service. The seizure wasmade by an armed force against the protest of the Captain of the vessel, and of Commander Williams, R. N. , the latter speaking as therepresentative of her Majesty's Government. The Commissioners onlyyielded when force, which they could not resist, was used to remove themfrom the mail-steamer, and convey them to the United States vessel ofwar. 

This outrage was the more marked because the United States had beenforemost in resisting the right of "visit and search, " and had made itthe cause of the War of 1812 with Great Britain. 

When intelligence of the event was received in England, it excited thegreatest indignation among the people; and her Majesty's Government, bynaval and other preparations, unmistakably exhibited the purpose toredress the wrong. 

The Commissioners and their secretaries had been transported to theharbor of Boston, and imprisoned in its main fortress. 

Diplomatic correspondence resulted from this event. The BritishGovernment demanded the immediate and unconditional release of theCommissioners, "in order that they may again be placed under Britishprotection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has beencommitted. "

In the mean time, Captain Wilkes, commander of the vessel which had madethe visit and search of the Trent, returned to the United States and wasreceived with general plaudit, both by the people and the Government. The House of Representatives passed a vote of thanks, an honor notheretofore bestowed except for some deed deserving well of the country. In the midst of all this exultation at the seizure of our Commissionerson board of a British merchant-ship, came the indignant and stern demandfor the restoration of those Commissioners to the British protectionfrom which they had been taken, and an apology for the aggression. Itwas little to be expected, after such explicit commendation of the act, that the United States Government would accede to the demand; andtherefore the War and Navy Departments of the British Government madeactive and extensive provision to enforce it. The haughty temperdisplayed toward four gentlemen arrested on an unarmed ship subsided inview of a demand to be enforced by the army and navy of Great Britain, and the United States Secretary of State, after a wordy and ingeniousreply to the Minister of Great Britain at Washington City, wrote: "Thefour persons in question are now held in military custody at FortWarren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfullyliberated. Your lordship will please indicate a time and place forreceiving them. "

There was a time when the Government and the people of the United Stateswould not have sanctioned such aggression on the right of friendly shipsto pass unquestioned on the high way of nations, and the right of aneutral flag to protect everything not contraband of war; but that was atime when arrogance and duplicity had not led them into false positions, and when the roar of the British lion could not make Americans retractwhat they had deliberately avowed. 

[Footnote 191: Thoroughfare Gap was the point at which theCommissary-General had placed a meat-packing establishment]

CHAPTER XII. 

 Supply of Arms at the Beginning of the War; of Powder; of Batteries; of other Articles. --Contents of Arsenals. --Other Stores, Mills, etc. --First Efforts to obtain Powder, Niter, and Sulphur. --Construction of Mills commenced. --Efforts to supply Arms, Machinery, Field-Artillery, Ammunition, Equipment, and Saltpeter. --Results in 1862. --Government Powder-Mills; how organized. --Success. --Efforts to obtain Lead. -- Smelting-Works. --Troops, how armed. --Winter of 1862. -- Supplies. --Niter and Mining Bureau. --Equipment of First Armies. --Receipts by Blockade-Runners. --Arsenal at Richmond. --Armories at Richmond and Fayetteville. --A Central Laboratory built at Macon. --Statement of General Gorgas. -- Northern Charge against General Floyd answered. --Charge of Slowness against the President answered. --Quantities of Arms purchased that could not be shipped in 1861. --Letter of Mr. Huse. 

At the beginning of the war the arms within the limits of theConfederacy were distributed as follows:

 Rifles. Muskets. At Richmond (State) about 4, 000Fayetteville, North Carolina " 2, 000 25, 000Charleston, South Carolina " 2, 000 20, 000Augusta, Georgia " 3, 000 28, 000Mount Vernon, Alabama " 2, 000 20, 000Baton Rouge, Louisiana " 2, 000 27, 000 --------- ---------- Total 15, 000 120, 000

There were at Richmond about sixty thousand old flint-muskets, and atBaton Rouge about ten thousand old Hall's rifles and carbines. At LittleRock, Arkansas, there were a few thousand stands, and a few at the TexasArsenal, increasing the aggregate of serviceable arms to about onehundred and forty-three thousand. Add to these the arms owned by theseveral States and by military organizations, and it would make a totalof one hundred and fifty thousand for the use of the armies of theConfederacy. The rifles were of the caliber . 54, known as Mississippirifles, except those at Richmond taken from Harper's Ferry, which wereof the new-model caliber . 58; the muskets were the old flint lock, caliber . 69, altered to percussion. There were a few boxes of sabers ateach arsenal, and some short artillery-swords. A few hundredholster-pistols were scattered about. There were no revolvers. 

There was before the war little powder or ammunition of any kind storedin the Southern States, and this was a relic of the war with Mexico. Itis doubtful if there were a million of rounds of small-arms cartridges. The chief store of powder was that captured at Norfolk; there was, besides, a small quantity at each of the Southern arsenals, in all sixtythousand pounds, chiefly old cannon-powder. The percussion-caps did notexceed one quarter of a million, and there was no lead on hand. Therewere no batteries of serviceable field-artillery at the arsenals, but afew old iron guns mounted on Gribeauval carriages fabricated about 1812. The States and the volunteer companies did, however, possess someserviceable batteries. But there were neither harness, saddles, bridles, blankets, nor other artillery or cavalry equipments. 

To furnish one hundred and fifty thousand men, on both sides of theMississippi, in May, 1861, there were no infantry accoutrements, nocavalry arms or equipments, no artillery and, above all, no ammunition;nothing save arms, and these almost wholly the old pattern smooth-boremuskets, altered to percussion from flint locks. 

Within the limits of the Confederate States the arsenals had been usedonly as depots, and no one of them, except that at Fayetteville, NorthCarolina, had a single machine above the grade of a foot-lathe. Exceptat Harper's Ferry Armory, all the work of preparation of material hadbeen carried on at the North; not an arm, not a gun, not a gun-carriage, and, except during the Mexican War, scarcely a round of ammunition, hadfor fifty years been prepared in the Confederate States. There wereconsequently no workmen, or very few, skilled in these arts. Powder, save perhaps for blasting, had not been made at the South. No saltpeterwas in store at any Southern point; it was stored wholly at the North. There were no worked mines of lead except in Virginia, and the situationof those made them a precarious dependence. The only cannon-foundryexisting was at Richmond. Copper, so necessary for field-artillery andfor percussion-caps, was just being obtained in East Tennessee. Therewas no rolling-mill for bar-iron south of Richmond, and but fewblast-furnaces and these, with trifling exceptions, were in the borderStates of Virginia and Tennessee. 

The first efforts made to obtain powder were by orders sent to theNorth, which had been early done both by the Confederate Government andby some of the States. These were being rapidly filled when the attackwas made on Fort Sumter. The shipments then ceased. Niter wascontemporaneously sought for in north Alabama and Tennessee. Betweenfour and five hundred tons of sulphur were obtained in New Orleans, atwhich place it had been imported for use in the manufacture of sugar. Preparations for the construction of a large powder-mill were promptlycommenced by the Government, and two small, private mills in EastTennessee were supervised and improved. On June 1, 1861, there wasprobably two hundred and fifty thousand pounds only, chiefly ofcannon-powder, and about as much niter, which had been imported byGeorgia. There were the two powder-mills above mentioned, but we had noexperience in making powder, or in extracting niter from naturaldeposits, or in obtaining it by artificial beds. 

For the supply of arms an agent was sent to Europe, who made contractsto the extent of nearly half a million dollars. Some small-arms had beenobtained from the North, and also important machinery. The machinery atHarper's Ferry Armory had been saved from the flames by the heroicconduct of the operatives, headed by Mr. Armistead M. Ball, the masterarmorer. Of the machinery so saved, that for making rifle-muskets wastransported to Richmond, and that for rifles with sword-bayonets toFayetteville, North Carolina. In addition to the injuries suffered bythe machinery, the lack of skilled workmen caused much embarrassment. Inthe mean time the manufacture of small-arms was undertaken at NewOrleans and prosecuted with energy, though with limited success. 

In field-artillery the manufacture was confined almost entirely to theTredegar Works in Richmond. Some castings were made in New Orleans, andattention was turned to the manufacture of field and siege artillery atNashville. A small foundry at Rome, Georgia, was induced to undertakethe casting of the three-inch iron rifle, but the progress was veryslow. The State of Virginia possessed a number of old four-pounder ironguns which were reamed out to get a good bore, and rifled with threegrooves, after the manner of Parrott. The army at Harper's Ferry andthat at Manassas were supplied with old batteries of six-pounder gunsand twelve-pounder howitzers. A few Parrott guns, purchased by the Stateof Virginia, were with General Magruder at Big Bethel. 

For the ammunition and equipment required for the infantry andartillery, a good laboratory and workshop had been established atRichmond. The arsenals were making preparations for furnishingammunition and knapsacks; but generally, what little was done in thisregard was for local purposes. Such was the general condition ofordnance and ordnance stores in May, 1861. 

The progress of development, however, was steady. A refinery ofsaltpeter was established near Nashville during the summer, whichreceived the niter from its vicinity, and from the caves in East andMiddle Tennessee. Some inferior powder was made at two small mills inSouth Carolina. North Carolina established a mill near Raleigh; and astamping-mill was put up near New Orleans, and powder made there beforethe fall of the city. Small quantities were also received through theblockade. It was estimated that on January 1, 1862, there were fifteenhundred seacoast-guns of various caliber in position from Evansport, onthe Potomac, to Fort Brown, on the Rio Grande. If their caliber wasaveraged at thirty-two pounder, and the charge at five pounds, it would, at forty rounds per gun, require six hundred thousand pounds of powderfor them. The field-artillery--say three hundred guns, with two hundredrounds to the piece--would require one hundred and twenty-five thousandpounds; and the small-arm cartridges--say ten million--would consume onehundred and twenty-five thousand pounds more, making in all eighthundred and fifty thousand pounds. Deducting two hundred and fiftythousand pounds, supposed to be on hand in various shapes, and theincrement is six hundred thousand pounds for the year 1861. Of this, perhaps two hundred thousand pounds had been made at the Tennessee andother mills, leaving four hundred thousand pounds to be supplied throughthe blockade, or before the beginning of hostilities. 

The liability of powder to deteriorate in damp atmospheres results fromthe impurity of the niter used in its manufacture, and this it is notpossible to detect by any of the usual tests. Security, therefore, inthe purchase, depends on the reliability of the maker. To us, who had torely on foreign products and the open market, this was equivalent to nosecurity at all. It was, therefore, as well for this reason as becauseof the precariousness of thus obtaining the requisite supply, necessarythat we should establish a Government powder-mill. It was our goodfortune to have a valuable man whose military education and scientificknowledge had been supplemented by practical experience in a largemanufactory of machinery. He, General G. W. Rains, was at the timeresident in the State of New York; but, when his native State, NorthCarolina, seceded from the Union and joined the Confederacy, true to thehighest instincts of patriotism, he returned to the land of his birth, and only asked where he could be most useful. The expectations which hisreputation justified, caused him to be assigned to the task of making agreat powder-mill, which should alike furnish an adequate supply, andgive assurance of its possessing all the requisite qualities. Thisproblem, which, under the existing circumstances, seemed barelypossible, was fully solved. Not only was powder made of every variety ofgrain and exact uniformity in each, but the niter was so absolutelypurified that there was no danger of its deterioration in service. HadAdmiral Semmes been supplied with such powder, it is demonstrated, bythe facts which have since been established, that the engagement betweenthe Alabama and the Kearsarge would have resulted in a victory for theformer. 

These Government powder-mills were located at Augusta, Georgia, andsatisfactory progress was made in the construction during the year. Allthe machinery, including the very heavy rollers, was made in theConfederate States. Contracts were made abroad for the delivery of niterthrough the blockade; and, for obtaining it immediately, we resorted tocaves, tobacco-houses, cellars, etc. The amount delivered from Tennesseewas the largest item in the year's supply, but the whole was quiteinadequate to existing and prospective needs. 

The consumption of lead was mainly met by the Virginia lead-mines atWytheville, the yield from which was from sixty to eighty thousandpounds per month. Lead was also collected by agents in considerablequantities throughout the country, and the battle-field of Manassas wasclosely gleaned, from which much lead was collected. A laboratory forthe smelting of other ores was constructed at Petersburg, Virginia, andwas in operation before midsummer of 1862. 

By the close of 1861, eight arsenals and four depots had been suppliedwith materials and machinery, so as to be efficient in producing thevarious munitions and equipments, the want of which had caused earlyembarrassment. Thus a good deal had been done to produce the neededmaterial of war, and to refute the croakers who found in our povertyapplication for the maxim, "_Ex nihilo nihil fit. _"

The troops were, however, still very poorly armed and equipped. The oldsmooth-bore musket was the principal weapon of the infantry; theartillery had mostly the six-pounder gun and the twelve-pounderhowitzer; and the cavalry were armed with such various weapons as theycould get--sabers, horse-pistols, revolvers, Sharp's carbines, musketoons, short Enfield rifles, Holt's carbines, muskets cut off, etc. Equipments were in many cases made of stout cotton domestic, stitched intriple folds and covered with paint or rubber varnish. But, poor as werethe arms, enough of them, such as they were, could not be obtained toarm the troops pressing forward to defend their homes and theirpolitical rights. 

In December, 1861, arms purchased abroad began to come in, and a goodmany Enfield rifles were in the hands of the troops at the battle ofShiloh. The winter of 1862 was the period when our ordnance deficiencieswere most keenly felt. Powder was called for on every hand; and theequipments most needed were those we were least able to supply. Theabandonment of the line of the Potomac and the upper Mississippi fromColumbus to Memphis did somewhat, however, the pressure for heavyartillery; and, after the fall of 1862, when the powder-mills at Augustahad got into full operation, there was no further inability to meet allrequisitions for ammunition. To provide the iron needed for cannon andprojectiles, it had been necessary to stimulate by contracts the miningand smelting of its ores. 

But it was obviously beyond the power of even the great administrativecapacity of the chief of ordnance, General J. Gorgas, to whose monographI am indebted for these details, to add, to his already burdensomelabors, the numerous and increasing cares of obtaining the material fromwhich ammunition, arms, and equipments were to be manufactured. On hisrecommendation a niter and mining bureau was organized, and Colonel St. John, who had been hitherto assigned to duty in connection withprocuring supplies of niter and iron, was appointed to be chief of thisbureau. A large, difficult, and most important field of operations wasthus assigned to him, and well did he fulfill its requirements. To hisrecent experience was added scientific knowledge, and to both, untiring, systematic industry, and his heart's thorough devotion to the cause heserved. The tree is known by its fruit, and he may confidently point toresults as the evidence on which he is willing to stand for judgment. Briefly, they will be noticed. 

Niter was to be obtained from caves and other like sources, and by theformation of niter-beds, some of which had previously been begun atRichmond. These beds were located at Columbia, South Carolina, Charleston, Savannah, Augusta, Mobile, Selma, and various other points. At the close of 1864 there were two million eight hundred thousand feetof earth collected, and in various stages of nitrification, of which alarge proportion was presumed to yield one and a half pound of niter perfoot of earth. The whole country was laid off into districts, each ofwhich was under the charge of an officer, who obtained details ofworkmen from the army, and made his monthly reports. Thus the niterproduction, in the course of a year, was brought up to something likehalf of the total consumption. The district from which the most constantyield could be relied on had its chief office at Greensboro, NorthCarolina, a region which had no niter-caves in it. The niter wasobtained from lixiviation of nitrous earth found under old houses, barns, etc. The supervision of the production of iron, lead, copper, andall the minerals which needed development, as well as the manufacture ofsulphuric and nitric acids (the latter required for the supply of thefulminate of mercury for percussion-caps), without which the firearms ofour day would have been useless, was added to the niter bureau. Such wasthe progress that, in a short time, the bureau was aiding or managingsome twenty to thirty furnaces with an annual yield of fifty thousandtons or more of pig-iron. The lead- and copper-smelting works erectedwere sufficient for all wants, and the smelting of zinc of good qualityhad been achieved. The chemical works were placed at Charlotte, NorthCarolina, to serve as a reserve when the supply from abroad might be cutoff. 

In equipping the armies first sent into the field, the supply ofaccessories was embarrassingly scant. There were arms, such as theywere, for over one hundred thousand men, but no accoutrements norequipments, and a meager supply of ammunition. In time the knapsackswere supplanted by haversacks, which the women could make. But soldiers'shoes and cartridge-boxes must be had; leather was also needed forartillery-harness and for cavalry-saddles; and, as the amount of leatherwhich the country could furnish was quite insufficient for all thesepurposes, it was perforce apportioned among them. Soldiers' shoes werethe prime necessity. Therefore, a scale was established, by which firstshoes and then cartridge-boxes had the preference; after these, artillery-harness, and then saddles and bridles. To economize leather, the waist and cartridge-box belts were made of prepared cotton clothstitched in stitched in three or four thicknesses. Bridle-reins werelikewise so made, and then cartridge-boxes were thus covered, except theflap. Saddle-skirts, too, were made of heavy cotton cloth stronglystitched. To get leather, each department procured its quota of hides, made contracts with the tanners, obtained hands for them by exemptionsfrom the army, got transportation over the railroads for the hides andfor supplies. To the varied functions of this bureau was finally addedthat of assisting the tanners to procure the necessary supplies for thetanneries. A fishery, even, was established on Cape Fear River to getoil for mechanical purposes, and at the same time food for the workmen. In cavalry equipments the main thing was to get a good saddle whichwould not hurt the back of the horse. For this purpose various patternswere tried, and reasonable success was obtained. One of the mostdifficult wants to supply in this branch of the service was thehorseshoe for cavalry and artillery. The want of iron and of skilledlabor was strongly felt. Every wayside blacksmith-shop accessible, especially those in and near the theatre of operations, was employed. These, again, had to be supplied with material, and the employeesexempted from service. 

It early became manifest that great reliance must be placed on theintroduction of articles of prime necessity through the blockaded ports. A vessel, capable of stowing six hundred and fifty bales of cotton, waspurchased by the agent in England, and kept running between Bermuda andWilmington. Some fifteen to eighteen successive trips were made beforeshe was captured. Another was added, which was equally successful. Thesevessels were long, low, rather narrow, and built for speed. They weremostly of pale sky-color, and, with their lights out and with fuel thatmade little smoke, they ran to and from Wilmington with considerableregularity. Several others were added, and devoted to bringing inordnance, and finally general supplies. Depots of stores were likewisemade at Nassau and Havana. Another organization was also necessary, thatthe vessels coming in through the blockade might have their returncargoes promptly on their arrival These resources were also supplementedby contracts for supplies brought through Texas from Mexico. 

The arsenal in Richmond soon grew into very large dimensions, andproduced all the ordnance stores that the army required, except cannonand small-arms, in quantities sufficient to supply the forces in thefield. The arsenal at Augusta was very serviceable to the armies servingin the south and west, and turned out a good deal of field-artillerycomplete. The Government powder-mills were entirely successful. Thearsenal and workshops at Charleston were enlarged, steam introduced, andgood work done in various departments. The arsenal at Mount Vernon, Alabama, was moved to Selma, in that State, where it grew into a largeand well-ordered establishment of the first class. Mount Vernon Arsenalwas dismantled, and served to furnish lumber and timber for useelsewhere. At Montgomery, shops were kept up for the repair ofsmall-arms and the manufacture of articles of leather. There were manyother small establishments and depots. 

The chief armories were at Richmond and Fayetteville, North Carolina. The former turned out about fifteen hundred stands per month, and thelatter only four hundred per month, for want of operatives. To meet thewant of cavalry arms, a contract was made for the construction inRichmond of a factory for Sharp's carbines; this being built, it wasthen converted into a manufactory of rifle-carbines, caliber . 58. Smaller establishments grew up at Asheville, North Carolina, and atTallahassee, Alabama. A great part of the work of the armories consistedin the repair of arms. In this manner the gleanings of the battle-fieldswere utilized. Nearly ten thousand stands were saved from the field ofManassas, and from those about Richmond in 1862 about twenty-fivethousand excellent arms. All the stock of inferior arms disappeared fromthe armories during the first two years of the war, and were replaced bya better class of arms, rifled and percussioned. Placing the good armslost previous to July, 1863, at one hundred thousand, there must havebeen received from various sources four hundred thousand stands ofinfantry arms in the first two years of the war. 

Among the obvious requirements of a well-regulated service was onecentral laboratory of sufficient capacity to prepare all ammunition, andthus to secure the vital advantage of absolute uniformity. Authority wastherefore granted to concentrate this species of work at Macon, Georgia. Plans of the buildings and of the machinery required were submitted andapproved, and the work was begun with energy. The pile of buildings hada façade of six hundred feet, was designed with taste, and comprehendedevery possible appliance for good and well-organized work. The buildingswere nearly ready for occupation at the close of the war, and some ofthe machinery had arrived at Bermuda. This project preceded that of ageneral armory for the Confederacy, and was much nearer completion. These, with the admirable powder-mills at Augusta, would have beencompleted, and with them the Government would have been in a conditionto supply arms and ammunition to three hundred thousand men. To thesewould have been added a foundry for heavy guns at Selma or Brierfield, Alabama, where the strongest cast iron in the country had been made. 

Thus has been briefly sketched the development of the resources fromwhich our large armies were supplied with arms and ammunition, while ourcountry was invaded on land and water by armies much larger than ourown. It will be seen under what disadvantages our people successfullyprosecuted the (to them) new pursuits of mining and manufacturing. Thechief of ordnance was General J. Gorgas, a man remarkable for hisscientific attainment, for the highest administrative capacity and moralpurity, all crowned by zeal and fidelity to his trust, in which heachieved results greatly disproportioned to the means at his command. Hecloses his excellent monograph in the following words:

 "We began in April, 1861, without an arsenal, laboratory, or powder-mill of any capacity, and with no foundry or rolling-mill, except in Richmond, and, before the close of 1863, or within a little over two years, we supplied them. During the harassments of war, while holding our own in the field defiantly and successfully against a powerful enemy; crippled by a depreciated currency; throttled with a blockade that deprived us of nearly all the means of getting material or workmen; obliged to send almost every able-bodied man to the field; unable to use the slave-labor, with which we were abundantly supplied, except in the most unskilled departments of production; hampered by want of transportation even of the commonest supplies of food; with no stock on hand even of articles such as steel, copper, leather, iron, which we must have to build up our establishments--against all these obstacles, in spite of all these deficiencies, we persevered at home, as determinedly as did our troops in the field, against a more tangible opposition; and in that short period created, almost literally out of the ground, foundries and rolling-mills at Selma, Richmond, Atlanta, and Macon; smelting-works at Petersburg, chemical works at Charlotte, North Carolina; a powder-mill far superior to any in the United States and unsurpassed by any across the ocean; and a chain of arsenals, armories, and laboratories equal in their capacity and their improved appointments to the best of those in the United States, stretching link by link from Virginia to Alabama. "

The same officer writes:

 "It was a charge often repeated at the North against General Floyd, that, as Secretary of War, he had with traitorous intent abused his office by sending arms to the South just before the secession of the States. The transactions which gave rise to this accusation were in the ordinary course of an economical administration of the War Department. After it had been determined to change the old flint-lock muskets which the United States possessed to percussion, it was deemed cheaper to bring all the flint-lock arms in store at Southern arsenals to the Northern arsenals and armories for alteration, rather than to send the necessary machinery and workmen to the South. Consequently, the Southern arsenals were stripped of their deposits, which were sent to Springfield, Watervliet, Pittsburg, St. Louis, and other points. After the conversion had been effected, the denuded Southern arsenals were again supplied with about the same number, perhaps slightly augmented, that had formerly been stored there. The quota deposited at the Charleston Arsenal, where I was stationed in 1860, arrived there full a year before the opening of the war. "

The charge was made early in the war that I was slow in procuring armsand munitions of war from Europe. We were not only in advance of theGovernment of the United States in the markets of Europe, but the factspresented in the following extracts from a letter of our agent, CalebHuse, dated December 30, 1861, and addressed to Major C. C. Anderson, will serve to place the matter in its proper light:

 "London, _December_ 30, 1861. 

 "Dear Major: We are all waiting with almost breathless anxiety for the arrival of the answer from the United States to the unqualified demand of England for the captured commissioners. Will Mr. Lincoln disregard the international writ of _habeas corpus_ served by Great Britain? We shall soon know. If the prisoners are given up, the affair will result in great inconvenience to us in the way of shipping goods. 

 "I have now more than enough to load three 'Bermudas, ' and can not ship a package, though I have a steamer off the wharf, all ready to receive her cargo. We are literally fighting two governments here. Government watchmen guard the wharf where our goods are stowed and others in the neighborhood, night and day--and the wharfinger has orders not to ship or deliver, by land or water, any goods marked W. D. , without first acquainting the honorable Board of Customs. I have applied myself to ship to Bermuda, offering to give bonds to double the amount of value of the goods, that they should be held in Bermuda, subject to the direction of her Majesty's representative in Bermuda. I ... Has applied for permission to ship to Cardenas, agreeing to hold the goods subject to the order of the Spanish authorities--but all without avail, and our army must suffer for the want of blankets, overcoats, shoes, socks, field forges, arms, and ammunition, which have been collected to an amount more than double that I have yet received. 

 "It is miserable to have to look at the immense pile of packages in the warehouse at St. Andrews Wharf, and not be able to send anything--only read the following: twenty-five thousand rifles; two thousand barrels of powder; five hundred thousand caps; ten thousand friction-tubes; five hundred thousand cartridges; thirteen thousand accoutrements; thirteen thousand knapsacks; thirteen thousand gun-slings; forty-four thousand three hundred and twenty-eight pairs of socks; sixteen thousand four hundred and eighty-four blankets; two hundred and twenty-six saddles; saddlers' tools; artillery-harness; leather, etc. Very truly yours, "Caleb Huse. "

CHAPTER XIII. 

 Extracts from my Inaugural. --Our Financial System: Receipts and Expenditures of the First Year. --Resources, Loans, and Taxes. --Loans authorized. --Notes and Bonds. --Funding Notes. --Treasury Notes guaranteed by the States. --Measure to reduce the Currency. --Operation of the General System. --Currency fundable. --Taxation. --Popular Aversion. --Compulsory Reduction of the Currency. --Tax Law. --Successful Result. --Financial Condition of the Government at its Close. --Sources whence Revenue was derived. --Total Public Debt. --System of Direct Taxes and Revenue. --The Tariff. --War-Tax of Fifty Cents on a Hundred Dollars. --Property subject to it. --Every Resource of the Country to be reached. --Tax paid by the States mostly. --Obstacle to the taking of the Census. --The Foreign Debt. --Terms of the Contract. --Premium. --False charge against me of Repudiation. --Facts stated. 

In my inaugural address in 1862 I said:

 "The first year of our history has been the most eventful in the annals of this continent. A new Government has been established, and its machinery put in operation over an area exceeding seven hundred thousand square miles. The great principles upon which we have been willing to hazard everything that is dear to man, have made conquests for us which could never have been achieved by the sword. Our Confederacy has grown from six to thirteen States; and Maryland, already united to us by hallowed memories and material interests, will, I believe, when enabled to speak with unstifled voice, connect her destiny with the South. Our people have rallied with unexampled unanimity to the support of the great principles of constitutional government, with firm resolve to perpetuate by arms the rights which they could not peacefully secure. A million of men, it is estimated, are now standing in hostile array and waging war along a frontier of thousands of miles. Battles have been fought, sieges have been conducted, and, although the contest is not ended, and the tide for the moment is against us, the final result in our favor is not doubtful.... Fellow-citizens, after the struggles of ages had consecrated the right of the Englishman to constitutional representative government, our colonial ancestors were forced to vindicate that birthright by an appeal to arms. Success crowned their efforts, and they provided for their posterity a peaceful remedy against future aggression. 

 "The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most odious and the least responsible form of despotism, has denied us both the right and the remedy. Therefore, we are in arms to renew such sacrifices as our forefathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty. "

The financial system which had been adopted from necessity provedadequate at this early period to supply all the wants of the Governmentand of the people. An unexpected and very large increase of expenditureshad resulted from the great enlargement of the necessary means ofdefense. Yet the Government entered on its second year without afloating debt and with its credit unimpaired. The total expenditures ofthe first year, ending February 1, 1862, amounted to one hundred andseventy million dollars. A statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, comprising the period from the organization of the Government to August1, 1862, presents the following results:

Expenditures: War Department $298, 376, 549 41 Navy " 14, 605, 777 86Civil and miscellaneous 15, 766, 503 43 --------------- Total $328, 748, 830 70Outstanding requisitions 18, 524, 128 15 --------------- Total expenditures 347, 272, 958 85 Total receipts 302, 482, 096 60 ---------------Deficient Treasury notes authorized 16, 755, 165 00 " " " to be provided 28, 035, 697 25 --------------- $44, 790, 862 25

The receipts were derived as follows:

Customs $1, 437, 399 96War-tax 10, 539, 910 70Miscellaneous 1, 974, 769 33 $13, 952, 079 99Loans, bonds, February, 1861 15, 000, 000 00Bonds, August, 1861 22, 613, 346 61Call certificates, December, 1861 37, 515, 200 00Treasury notes, April, 1861 22, 799, 900 00Demand notes, August, 1861 187, 130, 670 00One and two dollar notes 846, 900 00Due banks 2, 645, 000 00 $288, 551, 016 61 --------------- Total receipts $302, 503, 096 60

Such was the result presented by the Treasury of a Government that hadbeen in existence only eighteen months. It commenced that existencewithout a treasury, and, without the sinews and the munitions of war, was in less than two months invaded on every side by an implacable foe. Its ways and means consisted in loans and taxes, and to these itresorted. On February 28th I was authorized by Congress to borrow, atany time within twelve months, fifteen million dollars, or less, asmight be needed. It was to be applied to the payment of appropriationsfor the support of the Government, and for the public defense. Certificates of stock or bonds, payable in ten years at eight per cent. Interest, were issued. For the payment of the interest and principal ofthis loan a tax or duty of one eighth of one per cent. Per pound waslaid on all cotton exported. On March 9th an issue of one milliondollars in Treasury notes of fifty dollars and upward was authorized, payable in one year from date, at 3. 65 per cent. Interest, andreceivable for all public debts except the export duty on cotton. Areissue was authorized for a year. On May 16th a loan of fifty milliondollars in bonds, payable after twenty years at eight per cent. Interest, was authorized. The bonds were "to be sold for specie, military stores, or for the proceeds of sales of raw produce ormanufactured articles, to be paid in the form of specie or with foreignbills of exchange. " The bonds could not be issued in fractional parts ofa hundred dollars, or be exchanged for Treasury notes or the notes ofany bank, corporation, or individual. In lieu of any amount of thesebonds, not exceeding twenty million dollars, an equal amount of Treasurynotes, without interest, in denominations of five dollars and upward, was authorized to be issued. These notes were payable in two years inspecie, and were receivable for all debts or taxes except the exportduty on cotton. They were also convertible into bonds payable in tenyears at eight per cent. Interest. On August 19th another issue ofTreasury notes, amounting with those then issued to one hundred milliondollars, was authorized. They were of the denominations of five dollarsand upward. They were receivable for the war-tax and all other publicdues except the export duty on cotton. These notes were convertible intotwenty-year bonds, bearing eight per cent. Interest, of which the issuewas limited to one hundred million dollars. Thirty millions were to be asubstitute for the same amount, authorized by the act of May 16, 1861. These bonds could be exchanged for specie, military and naval stores, orfor the proceeds of raw produce and manufactured articles. On December19th ten million dollars in Treasury notes were issued to pay theadvance of the banks. On December 24th an additional issue of fiftymillions of Treasury notes like those of the act of August 19th wasauthorized. An additional issue of thirty millions of bonds was alsoauthorized. On April 12, 1862, an issue of Treasury notes, certificatesof stock and bonds, as the public necessities might require, to theamount of two hundred and fifteen millions, was authorized. Of these, fifty millions in Treasury notes were issued without reserve, tenmillions in Treasury notes retained as a reserve fund to pay any suddenor unexpected call for deposits, and one hundred and sixty-five millionscertificates of stock or bonds. Bonds to the amount of fifty milliondollars, payable in ten years at six per cent. Interest, were authorizedand made exchangeable for any of the above Treasury notes. All thesenotes and bonds were subject to the same conditions as those of the actsof August 19 and December 24, 1861. On April 17th five millions ofTreasury notes were authorized to be issued in denominations of one andtwo dollars, which were receivable for all public dues except the cottonduty. An amount of Treasury notes bearing interest at two cents per dayon each hundred dollars, as a substitute for as much of the one hundredand sixty-five millions of bonds authorized, was also authorized to beissued. On September 19, 1862, three million five hundred thousanddollars in bonds was authorized to be issued to meet a contract for sixiron-clad vessels of war. On September 23, 1862, the amount of Treasurynotes under the denomination of five dollars was increased from fivemillion to ten million dollars, and a further issue of bonds orcertificates of stock, to the amount of fifty million dollars, wasauthorized. 

On March 23, 1863, an effort was made to remove from circulation some ofthe issues of Treasury notes by funding them. For this purpose it wasprovided that all Treasury notes, not bearing interest, issued prior toDecember, 1862, should be fundable in eight per cent. Bonds or stockduring the ensuing thirty days, and during the succeeding three monthsin seven per cent. Bonds or stock, after which they ceased to befundable. All Treasury notes not bearing interest, and issued afterDecember 1, 1862, until ten days after the passage of the act, were madefundable in seven per cent. Bonds or stock during the ensuing fourmonths, and afterward only in four per cent. Thirty years bonds. Callcertificates were made fundable in thirty years bonds at eight percent. , and all outstanding on the ensuing July 1st were deemed bonds atsix per cent. , payable in thirty years. A monthly issue of Treasurynotes, without interest, to the amount of fifty million dollars, wasalso authorized. These were made fundable during the first year of theirissue in six per cent. Thirty years bonds, and after the expiration ofthe year in four per cent. Thirty years bonds. The further issue of callcertificates was suspended; but Treasury notes fundable in the six percent. Bonds might be converted, at the pleasure of the holder, into suchcertificates at five per cent. Interest, which were reconvertible intolike notes within six months, or afterward exchanged for thirty yearssix per cent. Bonds. Treasury notes fundable in four per cent. Bondswere convertible in like manner at four per cent. All disposable meansin the Treasury were to be applied to the purchase of Treasury notes, bearing no interest, until the amount in circulation did not exceed onehundred and seventy-five millions. The issue of five million dollars, innotes of two dollars, one dollar, and fifty cents, was also authorized. It was further provided in this act that six per cent. Bonds, as abovementioned, might be sold to any of the States for Treasury notes, and, being guaranteed by any of the States, they might be used to purchaseTreasury notes. The whole amount of such bonds could not exceed twohundred million dollars. Treasury notes so purchased were not to bereissued. The issue of six per cent. Coupon bonds to the amount of onehundred million dollars, which were to be applied only to the absorptionof Treasury notes, was also authorized. The coupons were payable eitherin the currency in which interest on other bonds was paid, or in cottoncertificates pledging the Government to pay the same in cotton of NewOrleans middling quality, delivered at the rate of eight pence sterlingper pound. 

An important measure was adopted on February 17, 1864, the object ofwhich was to reduce the currency and to authorize a new issue of notesand bonds. All Treasury notes above the denomination of five dollars, and not bearing interest, were, if offered within a short period, madefundable in registered twenty years bonds at four per cent. At the sametime a new issue of Treasury notes was authorized, and made receivablefor all public dues, except customs duties, at the rate of two dollarsfor three of the old. The issue of other Treasury notes, after the 1stof the ensuing April, was prohibited. 

To pay the expenses of the Government an issue of five hundred milliondollars in six per cent. Bonds was authorized. For the payment ofinterest the receipts of the export and import duties, payable inspecie, were pledged. 

A review of this statement of the legislation of Congress will clearlypresent the financial system of the Government. The first action of theProvisional Congress was confined to the adoption of a tariff law, andan act for a loan of fifteen million dollars, with a pledge of a smallexport duty on cotton, to provide for the redemption of the debt. At thenext session, after the commencement of the war, provision was made forthe issue of twenty million dollars in Treasury notes, and for borrowingthirty million dollars in bonds. At the same time the tariff wasrevised, and preparatory measures taken for the levy of internal taxes. After the purpose of subjugation became manifest by the action of theCongress of the United States, early in July, 1861, and the certainty ofa long war was demonstrated, there arose the necessity that a financialsystem should be devised on a basis sufficiently large for the vastproportions of the approaching contest. The plan then adopted wasfounded on the theory of issuing Treasury notes, convertible at thepleasure of the holder into eight per cent. Bonds, with the interestpayable in coin. It was assumed that any tendency to depreciation, whichmight arise from the over-issue of the currency, would be checked by theconstant exercise of the holder's right to fund the notes at a liberalinterest, payable in specie. The success of this system depended on theability of the Government constantly to pay the interest in specie. Themeasures, therefore, adopted to secure that payment consisted in thelevy of an internal tax, termed a war tax, and the appropriation of therevenue from imports. 

The first operation of this plan was quite successful. The interest waspaid from the reserve of coin existing in the country, and experiencesustained the expectations of those who devised the system. 

Wheat, in the beginning of the year 1862, was selling at one dollar andthirty cents per bushel, thus but little exceeding its average price intime of peace. The other agricultural products of the country were atsimilarly moderate rates, thus indicating that there was no excess ofcirculation. At the same time the premium on coin had reached abouttwenty per cent. But it had become apparent that the commerce of ourcountry was threatened with permanent suspension by reason of theconduct of neutral nations, who virtually gave aid to the United StatesGovernment by sanctioning its declaration of a blockade. These neutralnations treated our invasion by our former limited and special agent asthough it were the attempt of a sovereign to suppress a rebellionagainst lawful authority. This exceptional cause heightened the premiumon specie, because it indicated the exhaustion of our reserve, withoutthe possibility of renewing the supply. 

At the inauguration of the permanent Government, in February, 1862, apopular aversion to internal taxation had been so strongly manifested asto indicate its partial failure. This will be further explainedpresently in our statement of the system of taxation. 

Under all these circumstances the effort was made to avoid the increasein the volume of notes in circulation, by offering inducements tovoluntary funding. The measures adopted for that purpose were butpartially successful. Meanwhile the intervening exigencies from thefortunes of war permitted no delay. The issues of Treasury notes wereincreased until, in December, 1863, the currency in circulation amountedto more than six hundred million dollars, or more than threefold theamount required by the business of the country. The evil effects of thisfinancial condition were but too apparent. In addition to the difficultypresented to the necessary operations of the Government, and theefficient conduct of the war, the most deplorable of all its resultswas, undoubtedly, its corrupting influence on the morals of the people. The possession of large amounts of Treasury notes led to a desire forinvestment; and, with a constantly increasing volume of currency, therewas an equally constant increase of price in all objects of investment. This effect stimulated purchase by the apparent certainty of profit, anda spirit of speculation was thus fostered, which had so debasing aninfluence and such ruinous consequences that it became our highest dutyto remove the cause by prompt and stringent measures. 

I therefore recommended to Congress, in December, 1863, the compulsoryreduction of the currency to the amount required by the business of thecountry, accompanied by a pledge that, under no stress of circumstances, would the amount be increased. I stated that, if the currency was notgreatly and promptly reduced, the existing scale of inflated priceswould not only continue, but, by the very fact of the large amounts thusmade requisite in the conduct of the war, these prices would reach ratesstill more extravagant, and the whole system would fall under its ownweight, rendering the redemption of the debt impossible, and destroyingits value in the hands of the holder. If, on the contrary, a fundeddebt, with interest secured by adequate taxation, could be substitutedfor the outstanding currency, its entire amount would be made availableto the holder, and the Government would be in a condition, beyond thereach of any probable contingency, to prosecute the war to a successfulissue. 

This recommendation was followed by the passage of the act of February17, 1864, above mentioned. One of its features is the tax levied on thecirculation. Regarding the Government when contracting a debt as theagent of the people, its debt is their debt. As the currency was heldexclusively by ourselves, it was obvious that, if each person, heldTreasury notes in exact proportion to the valuation of his whole estate, each would in fact owe himself the amount of the notes held by him; and, were it possible to distribute the currency among the people in thisexact proportion, a tax levied on the currency alone, to an amountsufficient to reduce it to its proper limits, would afford the best ofall remedies. Under such circumstances, the notes remaining in the handsof each holder after the payment of his tax would be worth quite as muchas the whole sum previously held, for it would have an equal purchasingcapacity. 

After this law had been in operation for one year, it was manifest thatit had the desired effect of withdrawing from circulation the largeexcess of Treasury notes which had been issued. On July 1, 1864, theoutstanding amount was estimated at two hundred and thirty milliondollars. The estimate of the amount funded under this act, about thistime, was three hundred million dollars, while new notes were authorizedto be issued to the extent of two thirds of the sum received under itsprovisions. The chief difficulty apprehended in connection with ourfinances, up to the close of the war, resulted from the depreciation ofour Treasury notes, which was to be attributed to the increasingredundancy in amount and the diminishing confidence in their ultimateredemption. 

The financial condition of the Government, near its close, is verycorrectly represented in the report of the Treasury Department. Thetotal receipts of the Treasury for the two quarters ending on September30, 1864, amounted to $415, 191, 550, which sum, added to the balance, $308, 282, 722, that remained in the Treasury on April 1, 1864, formed atotal of $723, 474, 272. Of this total, not far from half, that is to say, $342, 560, 327, were applied to the extinction of the public debt; whilethe total expenditures were $272, 378, 505, leaving a balance in theTreasury on October 1, 1864, of $108, 435, 440. The sources from whichthis revenue was derived were as follows:

Four per cent. Registered bonds, act of February 17, 1864 $13, 363, 500Six per cent. Bonds, $500, 000, 000 loan, act of February 17, 1864 14, 481, 050Four per cent. Call certificates, act of February 17, 1864 20, 978, 100Tax on old issue of certificates redeemed $14, 440, 566Repayments by disbursing officers 20, 115, 830Treasury notes, act of February 17, 1864 277, 576, 950War-tax 42, 294, 314Sequestrations 1, 338, 732Customs 50, 004Export duty 4, 320Coin seized by the Secretary of War 1, 653, 200Premium on loans 4, 822, 249Soldiers' tax 908, 622

The total amount of the public debt on October 1, 1864, on the books ofthe Register of the Treasury, was $1, 147, 970, 208, of which $530, 340, 090were funded debt, bearing interest, and $283, 880, 150 were Treasury notesof the new issue, and the remainder consisted of the former issue ofTreasury notes which were converted into other forms of debt, and ceasedto exist on December 31st. In consequence, however, of the absence ofcertain returns from distant officers, the true amount of the debt wasless by $21, 500, 000 than appeared on the books of the Register; so thatthe total public debt, on October 1st, might have been fairly consideredto have been $1, 126, 381, 095. Of this amount, $541, 340, 090 consisted offunded debt, and the balance unfunded debt, or Treasury notes. Theforeign debt is omitted in these statements. It amounted to £2, 200, 000, and was provided for by about two hundred and fifty thousand bales ofcotton collected by the Government. [192]

The aggregate appropriations called for by the different departments ofthe Government for the six months ending on June 30, 1865, amounted to$438, 416, 504. It was estimated that the remains of former appropriationswould, on January 1, 1865, amount to a balance of $467, 416, 504. Noadditional appropriations were therefore required for the ensuing sixmonths. 

A system of measures by which to obtain a revenue from direct taxes andduties was commenced at the first session of Congress under theprovisional Government. The officers who, at the time of the adoption ofthe provisional Constitution, held any office connected with thecollection of the customs, duties, and imposts in the several States ofthe Confederacy, or as assistant treasurers intrusted with the keepingof moneys arising therefrom, were continued in office with the samepowers and subject to the same duties. The tariff laws of the UnitedStates were continued in force until they might be altered. The freelist was enlarged so as to embrace many articles of necessity;additional ports and places of entry were established; restrictive lawswere repealed, and foreign vessels were admitted to the coasting-trade. A lighthouse bureau was organized; a lower rate of duties was imposed ona number of enumerated articles, and an export duty of one eighth of onecent per pound was imposed on all cotton exported in the raw state. Atthe second session, in May, a complete tariff law was enacted, with alower scale of duties than had previously existed. On August 19, 1861, awar-tax of fifty cents on each hundred dollars of certain classes ofproperty was levied for the special purpose of paying the principal andinterest of the public debt, and of supporting the Government. Thedifferent classes of property on which the tax was levied were asfollows: real estate of all kinds; slaves; merchandise; bank-stocks;railroad and other corporation stocks; money at interest, or invested byindividuals in the purchase of bills, notes, and other securities formoney, except the bonds of the Confederate States, and cash on hand, oron deposit; cattle, horses, and mules; gold watches, gold and silverplate, pianos, and pleasure-carriages. There were some exemptions, suchas the property of educational, charitable, and religious institutions, and of a head of a family having property worth less than five hundreddollars. An act was passed for the sequestration of the property ofalien enemies, as a retaliatory measure, to offset the confiscation actof the United States. 

On April 24, 1863, a new act was passed relative to internal or directtaxes. It was designed to reach, as far as practicable, every resourceof the country except the capital invested in real estate and slaves, and, by means of an income-tax and a tax in kind on the produce of thesoil, as well as by licenses on business occupations and professions, tocommand resources sufficient for the wants of the country. On February17, 1864, an amendment to this last-mentioned act was passed. It leviedadditional taxes on all business of individuals, of copartnerships andcorporations, also on trades, sales, liquor-dealers, hotel-keepers, distillers, and a tax in kind on agriculturists. On June 10, 1864, anact was passed which levied a tax equal to one fifth of the amount ofthe existing tax upon all subjects of taxation for the year. 

Within six months after the passage of the war-tax of August 19, 1861, the popular aversion to internal taxation by the General Government hadso influenced the legislation of the several States that only in SouthCarolina, Mississippi, and Texas were the taxes actually collected fromthe people. The quotas of the remaining States had been raised by theissue of bonds and State Treasury notes. The public debt of the countrywas thus actually increased instead of being diminished by the taxationimposed by Congress. 

At the first and second sessions of Congress in 1862 no means wereprovided by taxation for maintaining the Government. The legislation wasconfined to authorizing further sales of bonds and issues of Treasurynotes. An obstacle had arisen against successful taxation. About twothirds of the entire taxable property of the Confederate Statesconsisted in land and slaves. Under the provisional Constitution, whichceased to be in force on February 22, 1862, the power of Congress tolevy taxes was not restricted by any other condition than that "allduties, imposts, and excises should be uniform throughout the States ofthe Confederacy. " But in the permanent Constitution, which took effecton the same day (February 22d), it was specially provided that"representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the severalStates according to their respective numbers, which shall be determinedby adding to the whole number of free persons--including those bound toservice for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed--threefifths of all slaves. " According to the received construction of theConstitution of the United States, which had been acquiesced in forsixty years, taxes on lands and slaves were direct taxes. In repeating, without modification, in our Constitution this language of the UnitedStates Constitution, our Convention necessarily seems to have intendedto attach to it the meaning which had been sanctioned by long anduninterrupted acquiescence--thus deciding that taxes on lands and slaveswere direct taxes. Our Constitution further ordered that a census shouldbe made within three years after the first meeting of Congress, and that"no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportionto the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken. "

So long as there seemed to be a probability of being able to carry outthese provisions of the Constitution fully, and in conformity with theintentions of its authors, there was an obvious difficulty in framingany system of taxation. A law which should exempt from the burden twothirds of the property of the country would be as unfair to the ownersof the remaining third as it would be inadequate to meet therequirements of the public service. The urgency of the need, however, was such that, after great embarrassment, the law of April 24, 1863, above mentioned, was framed. Still, a very large proportion of theseresources was unavailable for some time, and, the intervening exigenciespermitting of no delay, a resort to further issues of Treasury notesbecame unavoidable. 

The foreign debt of the Confederate States at the close of the war wastwenty-two hundred thousand pounds. The earliest proposals on which thisdebt was contracted were issued in London and Paris in March, 1863. Thebonds bore interest at seven per cent. Per annum, in sterling, payablehalf-yearly. They were exchangeable for cotton on application, at theoption of the holder, or redeemable at par in sterling, in twenty years, by half-yearly drawings, commencing March 1, 1864. The special securityof these bonds was the engagement of the Government to deliver cotton tothe holders. Each bond, _at the option of the holder_, was convertibleat its nominal amount into cotton at the rate of sixpence sterling foreach pound of cotton--say four thousand pounds of cotton for each bondof a hundred pounds, or twenty-five hundred francs; and this could bedone at any time not later than six months after the ratification of atreaty of peace between the belligerents. Sixty days after the notice, the cotton was to be delivered, if in a state of peace, at the ports ofCharleston, Savannah, Mobile, or New Orleans; if at war, at points inthe interior of the country, within ten miles of a railroad, or a streamnavigable to the ocean. The delivery was to be made free of all charges, except the export duty of one eighth of one cent per pound. The qualityof the cotton was to be the standard of New Orleans middling. An annualsinking fund of five per cent. Was provided for, whereby two and a halfper cent. Of the bonds unredeemed by cotton should be drawn by lothalf-yearly, so as finally to extinguish the loan in twenty years fromthe first drawing. The bonds were issued at ninety per cent. , payable ininstallments. The loan soon stood in the London market at five per cent. Premium. The amount asked for was three million pounds. The amount ofapplications in London and Paris exceeded fifteen million pounds. 

Great efforts had previously been made by agents of the United StatesGovernment to reflect upon the credit of the Confederate States, byresuscitating an almost forgotten accusation of repudiation against theState of Mississippi, and especially by an emissary sent to GreatBritain, than whom no one knew better how false were the attempts toimplicate my name in that charge. The slanderous tongues of Northernhatred even went so far as to style me "the father of repudiation. " Howunjust all such assertions were, will be manifest by a simple statementof the case. [193]

We should not omit to refer once more to the most prolific source ofsectional strife and alienation, which is believed to have been thequestion of the tariff, or duties upon imports. Its influence extendedto and affected subjects with which it was not visibly connected, andfinally assumed a form surely not contemplated in the original formationof the Union. In the Articles of Confederation, the first Constitutionof the United States, the theory was that of direct taxation, and themanner was to impose upon the States an amount which each was to furnishto the common Treasury to defray expenses for the common defense andgeneral welfare. 

During the period of our colonial existence, the policy of the BritishGovernment had been to suppress the growth of manufacturing industry. Itwas forcibly expressed by Lord North in the declaration that "not ahobnail should be made in the American colonies. " The consequence wasthat in the War of the Revolution our armies and people suffered so muchfrom the want of the most necessary supplies that General Washington, after we had achieved our independence, expressed the opinion that theGovernment should by bounties, encourage the manufacture of suchmaterials as were necessary in time of war. 

In the Convention which framed the Constitution for a "more perfectUnion, " one of the greatest difficulties in agreeing upon its terms wasfound in the different interests of the States, but, among thecompromises which were made, there prominently appears the purpose of astrict equality in the burdens to be borne, as well as the blessings tobe enjoyed, by the people of the several States. For a long time afterthe formation of the "more perfect Union, " but little capital wasinvested in manufacturing establishments; and, though in the early partof the present century the amount had considerably increased, theproducts were yet quite insufficient for the necessary supplies of ourarmies in the War of 1812. Government contracts, high prices, and tosome extent, no doubt, patriotic impulses, led to the investment ofcapital in the articles required for the prosecution of the war. Withthe restoration of peace and the renewal of commerce, prices naturallydeclined, and it was represented that the investments made inmanufacturing establishments were so unprofitable as to involve the ruinof those who had made them. The Congress of the United States, in 1816, from motives at least to be commended for their generosity, enacted alaw to protect from the threatened ruin those of their countrymen whohad employed their capital for purposes demanded by the general welfareand common defense. These good intentions, if it be conceded that thedanger was real which it was designed to avert, were most unfortunate asthe beginning of a policy the end of which was fraught with the greatestevils that have ever befallen the Union. By the Constitution of 1789power was conferred upon Congress--

 "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. "

In the exercise of this delegated trust, tariff laws were enacted, andhad been in operation to the satisfaction of all parts of the Union, from the organization of the Government down to 1816; but throughoutthat period all of those laws were based upon the principle of dutiesfor revenue. It was true, and of course it was known, that such dutieswould give incidental protection to any industry producing an article onwhich the duty was levied; but, while the money was collected for thepurposes enumerated, and the rate kept down to the lowest revenuestandard, the consumer had no cause to complain of the indirect benefitreceived by the manufacturer, and the history of the time shows that itproduced no discontent. Not so with the tariff law of 1816: thoughsustained by men from all sections of the Union, and notably by sostrict a constructionist as Mr. Calhoun, there were not wanting thosewho saw in it a departure from the limitation of the Constitution, andsternly opposed it as the usurpation of a power to legislate for thebenefit of a class. The law derived much of its support from theassurance that it was only a temporary measure, and intended to shieldthose whose patriotism had exposed them to danger, thus presenting thenot uncommon occurrence of a good case making a bad precedent. For thefirst time a tariff law had protection for its object, and for the firsttime it produced discontent. In the law there was nothing whichnecessarily gave to it or in its terms violated the obligation thatduties should be uniform throughout the United States. The fact that itaffected the sections differently was due to physical causes--that is, geographical differences. The streams of the Southern Atlantic Statesran over wide plains into the sea; their last falls were remote fromocean navigation; and their people, almost exclusively agricultural, resided principally on this plain, and as near to the seaboard ascircumstances would permit. In the Northern Atlantic States thehighlands approached more nearly to the sea, and the rivers made theirlast leap near to harbors of commerce. Water-power being relied onbefore the steam-engine had been made, and ships the medium of commercebefore railroads and locomotives were introduced, it followed that thestaples of the Southern plains were economically sent to the water-powerof the North to be manufactured. This remark, of course, applies to sucharticles as were not exported to foreign countries, and is intended toexplain how the North became the seat of manufactures, and the Southremained agricultural. From this it followed that legislation for thebenefit of manufacturers became a Northern policy. It was not, as hasbeen erroneously stated, because of the agricultural character of theSouthern people, that they were opposed to the policy inaugurated by thetariff act of 1816. This is shown by the fact that anterior to that timethey had been the friends of manufacturing industry, without referenceto its location. As long as duties were imposed for revenue, so that theobject was to supply the common Treasury, it had been cheerfully borne, and the agriculture of one section and the manufacturing of another wereproperly regarded as handmaids, and not unfrequently referred to as themeans of strengthening and perpetuating the bonds by which the Stateswere united. When duties were imposed, not for revenue, but as a bountyto a particular industry, it was regarded both as unjust and withoutwarrant, expressed or implied, in the Constitution. 

Then arose the controversy, quadrennially renewed and with increasingprovocation, in 1820, in 1824, and in 1828--each stage intensifying thediscontent, arising more from the injustice than the weight of theburden borne. It was not the twenty-shilling ship-money tax, but theviolation of Magna Charta, which Hampden and his associates resisted. Itwas not the stamp duty nor the tea-tax, but the principle involved intaxation without representation, against which our colonial fathers tookup arms. So the tariff act in 1828, known at the time as "the bill ofabominations, " was resisted by Southern representatives, because it wasthe invasion of private rights in violation of the compact by which theStates were united. In the last stage of the proceeding, after thefriends of the bill had advocated it as a measure for protecting capitalinvested in manufactures, Mr. Drayton, of South Carolina, moved to amendthe title so that it should read, "An act to increase the duties uponcertain imports, for the purpose of increasing the profits of certainmanufacturers, " and stated his purpose for desiring to amend the titleto be that, upon some case which would arise under the execution of thelaw, an appeal might be made to the Supreme Court of the United Statesto test its constitutionality. Those who had passed the bill refused toallow the opportunity to test the validity of a tax imposed for theprotection of a particular industry. Though the debates showed clearlyenough the purpose to be to impose duties for protection, thephraseology of the law presented it as enacted to raise revenue, andtherefore the victims of the discrimination were deprived of an appealto the tribunal instituted to hear and decide on the constitutionalityof a law. 

South Carolina, oppressed by onerous duties and stung by the injusticeof a refusal to allow her the ordinary remedy against unconstitutionallegislation, asserted the right, as a sovereign State, to nullify thelaw. This conflict between the authority of the United States and one ofthe States threatened for a time such disastrous consequences as toexcite intense feeling in all who loved the Union as the fraternalfederation of equal States. Before an actual collision of arms occurred, Congress wisely adopted the compromise act of 1833. By that the fact ofprotection remained, but the principle of duties for revenue wasrecognized by a sliding scale of reduction, and it was hoped thequestion had been placed upon a basis that promised a permanent peace. The party of protective duties, however, came into power about the closeof the period when the compromise measure had reached the result itproposed, and the contest was renewed with little faith on the part ofthe then dominant party and with more than all of its former bitterness. The cause of the departure from a sound principle of a tariff forrevenue, which had prevailed during the first quarter of a century, andthe adoption in 1816 of the rule imposing duties for protection, wasstated by Mr. McDuffie to be that politicians and capitalists had seizedupon the subject and used it for their own purposes--the former forpolitical advancement, the latter for their own pecuniary profit--andthat the question had become one of partisan politics and sectionalenrichment. Contemporaneously with this theory of protective duties, arose the policy of making appropriations from the common Treasury forlocal improvements. As the Southern representatives were mainly thosewho denied the constitutional power to make such expenditures, itnaturally resulted that the mass of those appropriations were made forNorthern works. Now that direct taxes had in practice been so whollyabandoned as to be almost an obsolete idea, and now that the Treasurywas supplied by the collection of duties upon imports, two goldenstreams flowed steadily to enrich the Northern and manufacturing regionby the impoverishment of the Southern and agricultural section. In thetrain of wealth and demand for labor followed immigration and the morerapid increase of population in the Northern than in the SouthernStates. I do not deny the existence of other causes, such as the fertileregion of the Northwest, the better harbors, the greater amount ofshipping of the Northeastern States, and the prejudice of Europeansagainst contact with the negro race; but the causes I have first statedwere, I think, the chief, and those only which are referable to theaction of the General Government. It was not found that the possessionof power mitigated the injustice of its use by the North, and discontenttherefore was steadily accumulating, and, as stated in the beginning ofthis chapter, I think was due to class legislation in the form ofprotective duties and its consequences more than to any or all othercauses combined. Turning from the consideration of this question in itssectional aspect, I now invite attention to its general effect upon thecharacter of our institutions. If the common Treasury of the States had, as under the Confederation, been supplied by direct taxation, who candoubt that a rigid economy would have been the rule of the Government;that representatives would have returned to their tax-payingconstituents to justify appropriations for which they had voted byshowing that they were required for the general welfare, and wereauthorized by the Constitution under which they were acting? When themoney was obtained by indirect taxation, so that but few could see thesource from which it was derived, it readily followed that aconstituency would ask, not why the representative had voted for theexpenditure of money, but how much he had got for his own district, andperhaps he might have to explain why he did not get more. Is it doubtfulthat this would lead to extravagance, if not to corruption? Nothingcould be more fatal to the independence of the people and the libertiesof the States than dependence for support upon the public Treasury, whether it be in the form of subsidies, of bounties, or restrictions ontrade for the benefit of special interests. In the decline of the RomanEmpire, the epoch in which the hopelessness of renovation was mademanifest was that in which the people accepted corn from the publicgranaries: it preceded but a little the time when the post of emperorbecame a matter of purchase. How far would it differ from this ifconstituencies should choose their representatives, not for theirintegrity, not for their capacity, not for their past services, butbecause of their ability to get money from the public Treasury for thebenefit of their local interests; and how far would it differ from apurchase of the office if a President were chosen because of the favorhe would show to certain moneyed interests?

Now that fanaticism can no longer inflame the prejudices of theuninformed, it may be hoped that our statesmen will review the past, andgive to our country a future in accordance with its early history, andpromotive of true liberty. 

[Footnote 192: These bales were the security for the foreign cottonbonds, and were seized by the United States Government. Was it notliable to the bondholders?]

[Footnote 193: The facts with regard to the Mississippi "Union Bank"bonds may be briefly stated as follows:

The Constitution of Mississippi required that no law should ever bepassed "to raise a loan of money on the credit of the State, or topledge the faith of the State for the payment or redemption of any loanor debt, " unless such law should be proposed and adopted by theLegislature, then published for three months previous to the nextregular election, and finally reënacted by the succeeding Legislature. The object was to enable the people of the State to consider thequestion intelligently, and to indicate and exercise their will upon itby the election of representatives to the ensuing Legislature, whoseviews upon the subject would be known, and with such instructions, express or implied, as they might think proper to give. 

In 1837 a law was passed by the Legislature for incorporating the "UnionBank of Mississippi, " with a capital of fifteen million five hundredthousand dollars, "to be raised by means of a loan to be obtained by thedirectors of the institution. " In order to secure this loan, thestockholders were required to give mortgages on productive andunencumbered property, to be in all cases of value greater, by a fixedratio, than the amount of their stock. When the stock had been thussecured, as a further guarantee for the redemption of the loan, theGovernor was directed to issue bonds, in the name and behalf of theState, equal in amount to the stock secured by mortgage on privateproperty. No bonds as thus directed were ever issued. 

This act was duly promulgated to the people, and duly reënacted by thesucceeding Legislature on the 5th of February, 1838, in strictaccordance with the Constitution. 

Ten days afterward, however, viz. , on the 15th of February, theLegislature passed an act _supplemental_ to the act chartering the UnionBank, which materially changed or abolished the essential conditions forthe pledge of the credit of the State. By this supplemental act theGovernor was instructed, as soon as the books of subscription should beopened, to "_subscribe for_, in behalf of the State, fifty thousand_shares of the stock of the original capital of said bank_, to be paidfor out of the proceeds of the State bonds to be executed to the saidbank, as already provided for in the said charter. " This act was passedin the ordinary mode of legislation, and was not referred, published, nor reënacted, as prescribed by the Constitution. As soon as thedirectory was organized and the books of subscription were opened, andbefore the mortgages required by the charter were executed, theGovernor, in behalf of the State, subscribed for fifty thousand sharesof the stock, and issued the bonds of the State for five milliondollars, payable to the order of the bank. 

These bonds were sold to Nicholas Biddle, President of the United StatesBank of Pennsylvania, and by him sent to Great Britain as collateralsecurity for a loan previously made. None of the money received for themwent into the Treasury of the State of Mississippi, nor was any of itused for a public improvement. All the consideration ever received bythe State was its stock in the Union Bank. The bank soon failed, and thestock became utterly worthless. 

Before the bonds became due, the Governor of the State had declared themto be null and void, among other causes, in consequence of the failureto sell them at par, as required by the "supplemental act, " under whichthey were issued. 

It is not necessary here to discuss the question of the validity ornullity of the bonds. The object is merely to state the principal facts. 

While these events were occurring, and until a period several yearssubsequent to their consummation, I, who had just resigned my commissionin the army, was a private citizen, had never held any civil office, andtook no part in political affairs. Indeed, I have never at any timebefore, during, or since those events, held any civil office under theState government, and neither had nor could have had any part in shapingthe policy of the State. When brought out as a candidate for office, mynomination was opposed by that section of my party which advocated"repudiation, " on account of my opinions in favor of the payment of thebonds. 

As a private citizen, it may be stated that I held that the question ofthe validity of the bonds should be decided by the courts. TheConstitution of Mississippi authorized suit to be brought against theState in such cases in her own courts, and this I regarded as the propercourse to be pursued by the bondholders, holding that the State would bebound by the judicial decision, if it should sustain the validity of theclaim. This course, however, was not adopted until long afterward, whenthe question had become complicated with political issues, whichrendered the effort to obtain a settlement entirely nugatory. 

When I was a member of the Senate of the United States, my officialinfluence was exerted to promote the objects of a citizen ofMississippi, who, with quasi-credentials from the United StatesSecretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, went to London to propose to thebondholders an arrangement by which the claim, or the greater portion ofit, might be paid by private subscription, on consideration of thecancellation of the bonds. This effort failed, from a mistaken estimateon the part of some of the principal bondholders, to whom theproposition was made, of the extent to which State pride would induceour citizens to contribute, and to the belief in a power to coercepayment. The gentleman who bore the proposal, indignant at the offensivemanner of its rejection, and conscious of the disinterestedness of hismotives, abandoned the negotiation in disgust, and the opportunity waslost. ]

CHAPTER XIV. 

 Military Laws and Measures. --Agricultural Products diminished. --Manufactures flourishing. --The Call for Volunteers. --The Term of Three Years. --Improved Discipline. --The Law assailed. --Important Constitutional Question raised. --Its Discussion at Length. --Power of the Government over its own Armies and the Militia. --Object of Confederations. --The War-Powers granted. --Two Modes of raising Armies in the Confederate States. --Is the Law necessary and proper?--Congress is the Judge under the Grant of Specific Power. --What is meant by Militia. --Whole Military Strength divided into Two Classes. --Powers of Congress. --Objections answered. --Good Effects of the Law. --The Limitations enlarged. --Results of the Operations of these Laws. --Act for the Employment of Slaves. --Message to Congress. --"Died of a Theory. "--Act to use Slaves as Soldiers passed. --Not Time to put it in Operation. 

The agricultural products were diminished every year during the war. Itsdemands diminished the number of cultivators, and their labors were moreextensively devoted to grain-crops. The amount of the cotton-crop wasgreatly reduced, and numbers of bales were destroyed when in danger offalling into the hands of the enemy. 

The manufacturing industry became more extensive than ever before, andin many branches more highly developed. The results in the ordnancedepartment of the Government, stated elsewhere in these pages, serve asan illustration of the achievements in many branches of industry. 

During the first year of the war the authority granted to the Presidentto call for volunteers in the army for a short period was sufficient tosecure all the military force which we could fit out and useadvantageously. As it became evident that the contest would be long andsevere, better measures of preparation were enacted. I was authorized tocall out and place in the military service for three years, unless thewar should sooner end, all white men residents of the Confederate Statesbetween the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and to continuethose already in the field until three years from the date of theirenlistment. But those under eighteen years and over thirty-five wererequired to remain ninety days. The existing organization of companies, regiments, etc. , was preserved, but the former were filled up to thenumber of one hundred and twenty-five men. This was the first steptoward placing the army in a permanent and efficient condition. The termof service being lengthened, the changes by discharges and by receivingrecruits were diminished, so that, while additions were made to theforces already in the field, the discipline was greatly improved. At thesame time, on March 13, 1862, General Robert E. Lee was "charged withthe conduct of the military operations of the armies of the Confederacy"under my direction. Nevertheless, the law upon which our success sogreatly depended was assailed with unexpected criticism in variousquarters. A constitutional question of high importance was raised, whichtended to involve the harmony of coöperation, so essential in thiscrisis, between the General and the State governments. It was advancedprincipally by the Governor of Georgia, Hon. Joseph E. Brown, and thefollowing extracts are taken from my reply to him, dated

 Executive Department, Richmond, _May_ 29, 1862. 

 "I propose, from my high respect for yourself and for other eminent citizens who entertain opinions similar to yours, to set forth somewhat at length my own views on the power of the Confederate Government over its own armies and the militia, and will endeavor not to leave without answer any of the positions maintained in your letters. 

 "The main, if not the only, purpose for which independent states form unions, or confederations, is to combine the power of the several members in such manner as to form one united force in all relations with foreign powers, whether in peace or in war. Each state, amply competent to administer and control its own domestic government, yet too feeble successfully to resist powerful nations, seeks safety by uniting with other states in like condition, and by delegating to some common agent the use of the combined strength of all, in order to secure advantageous commercial relations in peace, and to carry on hostilities with effect in war. 

 "Now, the powers delegated by the several States to the Confederate Government, which is their common agent, are enumerated in the eighth section of the Constitution; each power being distinct, specific, and enumerated in paragraphs separately numbered. The only exception is the eighteenth paragraph, which by its own terms is made dependent on those previously enumerated, as follows: '18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, ' etc. 

 "Now the _war-powers_ granted to the Congress are conferred in the following paragraphs: No. 1 'gives authority to raise revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for _the common defense_, and carry on the Government, ' etc. No. 11, 'To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water. ' No. 12, 'To raise and support armies, but no appropriations of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. ' No. 13, 'To provide and maintain a navy. ' No. 14, 'To make rules for the government and regulation of _the land and naval forces_. '

 "It is impossible to imagine a more broad, ample, and unqualified delegation of the whole war power of each State than is here contained, with the solitary limitation of the appropriations to two years. The States not only gave power to raise money for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies (in the plural), to provide and maintain a navy, to govern and regulate both land and naval forces, but they went further, and covenanted, by the third paragraph of the tenth section, not 'to engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. '

 "I know of but two modes of raising armies within the Confederate States, viz. , voluntary enlistment and draft, or conscription. I perceive, in the delegation of power to raise armies, no restriction as to the mode of procuring troops. I see nothing which confines Congress to one class of men, nor any greater power to receive volunteers than conscripts into its service. I see no limitation by which enlistments are to be received of individuals only, but not of companies, or battalions, or squadrons, or regiments. I find no limitation of time of service, but only of duration of appropriation. I discover nothing to confine Congress to waging war within the limits of the Confederacy, nor to prohibit offensive war. In a word, when Congress desires to raise an army, and passes a law for that purpose, the solitary question is under the eighteenth paragraph, viz. , 'Is the law one that is necessary and proper to execute the power to raise armies?'

 "On this point you say: `But did the necessity exist in this case? The conscription act can not aid the Government in increasing its supply of _arms_ or _provisions_, but can only enable it to call a larger number of men into the field. The difficulty has never been to get _men_. The States have already furnished the Government more than it can arm, ' etc. 

 "I would have very little difficulty in establishing to your entire satisfaction that the passage of the law was not only necessary, but that it was absolutely indispensable; that numerous regiments of twelve months' men were on the eve of being disbanded, whose places could not be supplied by raw levies in the face of superior numbers of the foe, without entailing the most disastrous results; that the position of our armies was so critical as to fill the bosom of every patriot with the liveliest apprehension; and that the provisions of this law were effective in warding off a pressing danger. But I prefer to answer your objection on other and broader grounds. 

 "I hold that, when a specific power is granted by the Constitution, like that now in question, 'to raise armies, ' Congress is the judge whether the law passed for the purpose of executing that power is 'necessary and proper. ' It is not enough to say that armies might be raised in other ways, and that, therefore, this particular way is not 'necessary. ' The same argument might be used against _every_ mode of raising armies. To each successive mode suggested, the objection would be that other modes were practicable, and that, therefore, the particular mode used was not 'necessary. ' The true and only test is to inquire whether the law is intended and calculated to carry out the object; whether it devises and creates an instrumentality for executing the specific power granted; and, if the answer be in the affirmative, the law is constitutional. None can doubt that the conscription law is calculated and intended to 'raise armies'; it is, therefore, 'necessary and proper' for the execution of that power, and is constitutional, unless it comes in conflict with some other provision of our Confederate compact. 

 "You express the opinion that this conflict exists, and support your argument by the citation of those clauses which refer to the militia. There are certain provisions not cited by you, which are not without influence on my judgment, and to which I call your attention. They will aid in defining what is meant by 'militia, ' and in determining the respective powers of the States and the Confederacy over them. 

 "The several States agree 'not to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace. '[194] They further stipulate that, 'a well-regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. '[195]

 "'That no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the _land_ or _naval forces_, or in _the militia_ when in actual service in times of war or public danger. '[196]

 "What, then, are militia? They can only be created by law. The arms-bearing inhabitants of a State are liable to become its militia, if the law so order; but, in the absence of a law to that effect, the men of a State capable of bearing arms are no more militia than they are seamen. 

 "The Constitution also tells us that militia are not _troops_, nor are they any part of the _land_ or _naval forces_; for militia exist in time of peace, and the Constitution forbids the States to keep troops in time of peace, and they are expressly distinguished and placed in a separate category from land or naval forces in the sixteenth paragraph above quoted; and the words _land_ and _naval forces_ are shown by paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, to mean the Army and Navy of the Confederate States. 

 "Now, if militia are not the citizens taken singly, but a body created by law; if they are not troops; if they are no part of the Army and Navy of the Confederacy, we are led directly to the definition, quoted by the Attorney-General, that militia are 'a body of soldiers in a State enrolled for discipline. ' In other words, the term 'militia' is a collective term meaning a body of men organized, and can not be applied to the separate individuals who compose the organization. 

 "The Constitution divides the whole military strength of the States into only two classes of organized bodies: one, the armies of the Confederacy; the other, the militia of the States. 

 "In the delegation of power to the Confederacy, after exhausting the subject of declaring war, raising and supporting armies, and providing a navy, in relation to all which the grant of authority to Congress is _exclusive_, the Constitution proceeds to deal with the other organized body, the militia; and, instead of delegating power to Congress alone, or reserving it to the States alone, the power is divided as follows, viz. : Congress is to have power 'to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the _Confederate_ States, suppress insurrections, and _repel invasions_. '[197]

 "'To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States; _reserving_ to _the States respectively the appointment of the officers_, and the _authority of training the militia_, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. '[198]

 "Congress, then, has the power to provide for _organizing_ the arms-bearing people of the State into militia. Each _State_ has the power to officer and _train_ them when organized. 

 "_Congress_ may call forth the militia to execute Confederate laws; the _State_ has not surrendered the power to call them forth to execute State laws. 

 "Congress may call them forth to repel invasion; so may the State, for the power is impliedly reserved of governing all the militia, except the part in actual service of the Confederacy. 

 "I confess myself at a loss to perceive in what manner these careful and well-defined provisions of the Constitution, regulating the organization and government of the militia, can be understood as applying in the remotest degree to the armies of the Confederacy, nor can I conceive how the grant of _exclusive_ power to declare and carry on war by armies raised and supported by the Confederacy is to be restricted or diminished by the clauses which grant a _divided_ power over the militia. On the contrary, the delegation of authority over the militia, so far as granted, appears to me to be plainly an _additional_ enumerated power intended to strengthen the hands of the Confederate Government in the discharge of its paramount duty, the common defense of the States. 

 "You state, after quoting the twelfth, fifteenth, and sixteenth grants of power to Congress, that 'these grants of power all relate to the same subject-matter, and are all contained in the same section of the Constitution, and, by a well-known rule of construction, must be taken as a whole and construed together. '

 "This argument appears to me unsound. _All_ the powers of Congress are enumerated in one section, and the three paragraphs quoted can no more control each other by reason of their location in the same section than they can control any of the other paragraphs preceding, intervening, or succeeding. So far as the subject-matter is concerned, I have already endeavored to show that the armies mentioned in the twelfth paragraph are a subject-matter as distinct from the militia mentioned in the fifteenth and sixteenth as they are from the navy mentioned in the thirteenth. Nothing can so mislead as to construe together, and as a whole, the carefully separated clauses which define the different powers to be exercised over distinct subjects by the Congress. 

 "But you add that, 'by the grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies without qualification, the framers of the Constitution intended the regular armies of the Confederacy, and not armies composed of the whole militia of all the States. '

 "I must confess myself somewhat at a loss to understand this position. If I am right that the militia is a body of enrolled State soldiers, it is not possible in the nature of things that armies raised by the Confederacy can 'be composed of the whole militia of all the States. ' The militia may be called forth in whole or in part into the Confederate service, but do not thereby become part of the 'armies raised' by Congress. They remain militia, and go home when the emergency which provoked their call has ceased. Armies raised by Congress are of course raised out of the _same population_ as the militia organized by the States, and to deny to Congress the power to draft a citizen into the army, or to receive his voluntary offer of services, because he is a member of the State militia, is to deny the power to raise an army at all; for, practically, all men fit for service in the army may be embraced in the militia organization of the several States. You seem, however, to suggest, rather than directly to assert, that the conscript law may be unconstitutional, because it comprehends all arms-bearing men between eighteen and thirty-five years; at least, this is an inference which I draw from your expression, 'armies composed of the _whole_ militia of _all_ the States. ' But it is obvious that, if Congress have power to draft into the armies raised by it any citizens at all (without regard to the fact whether they are, or not, members of militia organizations), the power must be coextensive with the exigencies of the occasion, or it becomes illusory; and the extent of the exigency must be determined by Congress; for the Constitution has left the power without any other check or restriction than the Executive veto. Under ordinary circumstances, the power thus delegated to Congress is scarcely felt by the States. At the present moment, when our very existence is threatened by armies vastly superior in numbers to ours, the necessity for defense has induced a call, not for 'the whole militia of all the States, ' not for any militia, but for men to compose _armies_ for the Confederate States. 

 "Surely there is no mystery in this subject. During our whole past history, as well as during our recent one year's experience as a new Confederacy, the militia 'have been called forth to repel invasion' in numerous instances, and they never came otherwise than as bodies organized by the States with their company, field, and _general officers_; and, when the emergency had passed, they went home again. I can not perceive how any one can interpret the conscription law as taking away from the States the power to appoint officers to their militia. You observe on this point in your letter that, unless your construction is adopted, 'the very object of the States in reserving the power of appointing the officers is defeated, and that portion of the Constitution is not only a nullity, but the whole military power of the States, and the entire control of the militia, with the appointment of the officers, is vested in the Confederate Government, whenever it chooses to call its own action "raising an army, " and not "calling forth the militia. "'

 "I can only say, in reply to this, that the power of Congress depends on the real nature of the act it proposes to perform, not on the name given to it; and I have endeavored to show that its action is really that of 'raising an army, ' and bears no semblance to 'calling forth the militia. ' I think I may safely venture the assertion that there is not one man out of a thousand of those who will do service under the conscription act that will describe himself while in the Confederate service as being a militiaman; and, if I am right in this assumption, the popular understanding concurs entirely with my own deductions from the Constitution as to the meaning of the word 'militia. '

 "My answer has grown to such a length, that I must confine myself to one more quotation from your letter. You proceed: 'Congress shall have power to _raise armies_. How shall it be done? The answer is clear. In conformity to the provisions of the Constitution, which expressly provides that, when the militia of the States are called forth to _repel invasion_, and employed in the service of the Confederate States, which is now the case, the State shall appoint the officers. 

 "I beg you to observe that the answer which you say is clear is not an answer to the question put. The question is, How are armies to be raised? The answer given is, that, when militia are called upon to repel invasion, the State shall appoint the officers. 

 "There seems to me to be a conclusive test on this whole subject. By our Constitution, Congress may declare war, _offensive_ as well as _defensive_. It may acquire territory. Now, suppose that, for good cause and to right unprovoked injuries, Congress should declare war against Mexico and invade Sonora. The militia could not be called forth in such a case, the right to call it being limited 'to repel invasions. ' Is it not plain that the law now under discussion, if passed under such circumstances, could by no possibility be aught else than a law to 'raise an army'? Can one and the same law be construed into a 'calling forth the militia, ' if the war be defensive, and a 'raising of armies, ' if the war be offensive?

 "At some future day, after our independence shall have been established, it is no improbable supposition that our present enemy may be tempted to abuse his naval power by depredations on our commerce, and that we may be compelled to assert our rights by offensive war. How is it to be carried on? Of what is the army to be composed? If this Government can not call on its arms-bearing population otherwise than as militia, and if the militia can only be called forth to repel invasion, we should be utterly helpless to vindicate our honor or protect our rights. War has been well styled 'the terrible litigation of nations. ' Have we so formed our Government that in this litigation we must never be plaintiffs? Surely this can not have been the intention of the framers of our compact. 

 "In no respect in which I can view this law can I find just reason to distrust the propriety of my action in approving and signing it; and the question presented involves consequences, both immediate and remote, too momentous to permit me to leave your objections unanswered. 

 "Jefferson Davis. "

The operation of this law was suspended in the States of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, because of their occupation by the armies of theFederal Government. The opposition to it, where its execution wascontinued, soon became limited, and before June 1st its good effectswere seen in the increased strength and efficiency of our armies. At thesame time I was authorized to commission officers to form bands of"Partisan Rangers, " either of infantry or cavalry, which weresubsequently confined to cavalry alone. On September 27, 1862, all whitemen between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five were placed in themilitary service for three years. All persons subject to enrollmentmight be enrolled wherever found, and were made subject to theprovisions of the law. Authority was also given for the reception ofvolunteers from the States in which the law was suspended. On February11, 1864, it was enacted by Congress that all white men between the agesof seventeen and fifty should be in the military service for the war;also, that all then in the service between the ages of eighteen andforty-five should be retained during the war. An enrollment was alsoordered of all persons between the ages of seventeen and eighteen andbetween forty-five and fifty years, who should constitute a reserve forState defense and detail duty. On February 17th all male free negroesbetween the ages of eighteen and fifty years were made liable to performduties with the army, or in connection with the military defenses of thecountry in the way of work upon the fortifications, or in Governmentworks for the production or preparation of materials of war, or inmilitary hospitals. The Secretary of War was also authorized to employfor the same duties any number of negro slaves not exceeding twentythousand. 

In the operation of the military laws we found the exemption frommilitary duty accorded by the law to all persons engaged in certainspecified pursuits or professions to be unwise. Indeed, it seems to beindefensible in theory. The defense of home, family, and country isuniversally recognized as the paramount political duty of every memberof society; and, in a form of government where each citizen enjoys anequality of rights and privileges, nothing can be more invidious than anunequal distribution of duties or obligations. No pursuit nor positionshould relieve any one who is able to do active duty from enrollment inthe army, unless his functions or services are more useful to thedefense of his country in another sphere. But the exemption from serviceof entire classes should be wholly abandoned. 

The act of February 17, 1864 (above mentioned), which authorized theemployment of slaves, produced less results than had been anticipated. It, however, brought forward the question of the employment of thenegroes as soldiers in the army, which was warmly advocated by some andas ardently opposed by others. My own views upon it were expressedfreely and frequently in intercourse with members of Congress, andemphatically in my message of November 7, 1864, when, urging uponCongress the consideration of the propriety of a radical modification ofthe theory of the law, I said:

 "Viewed merely as property, and therefore as the subject of impressment, the service or labor of the slave has been frequently claimed for short periods in the construction of defensive works. The slave, however, bears another relation to the state--that of a person. The law of last February contemplates only the relation of the slave to the master, and limits the impressment to a certain term of service. 

 "But, for the purposes enumerated in the act, instruction in the manner of camping, marching, and packing trains is needful, so that even in this limited employment length of service adds greatly to the value of the negro's labor. Hazard is also encountered in all the positions to which negroes can be assigned for service with the army, and the duties required of them demand loyalty and zeal. 

 "In this aspect the relation of person predominates so far as to render it doubtful whether the private right of property can consistently and beneficially be continued, and it would seem proper to acquire for the public service the entire property in the labor of the slave, and to pay therefor due compensation, rather than to impress his labor for short terms; and this the more especially as the effect of the present law would vest this entire property in all cases where the slave might be recaptured after compensation for his loss had been paid to the private owner. Whenever the entire property in the service of a slave is thus acquired by the Government, the question is presented by what tenure he should be held. Should he be retained in servitude, or should his emancipation be held out to him as a reward for faithful service, or should it be granted at once on the promise of such service; and if emancipated what action should be taken to secure for the freed man the permission of the State from which he was drawn to reside within its limits after the close of his public service? The permission would doubtless be more readily accorded as a reward for past faithful service, and a double motive for zealous discharge of duty would thus be offered to those employed by the Government--their freedom and the gratification of the local attachment which is so marked a characteristic of the negro and forms so powerful an incentive to his action. The policy of engaging to liberate the negro on his discharge after service faithfully rendered seems to me preferable to that of granting immediate manumission, or that of retaining him in servitude. If this policy should commend itself to the judgment of Congress, it is suggested that, in addition to the duties heretofore performed by the slave, he might be advantageously employed as a pioneer and engineer laborer, and, in that event, that the number should be augmented to forty thousand. 

 "Beyond this limit and these employments it does not seem to me desirable under existing circumstances to go. 

 "A broad, moral distinction exists between the use of slaves as soldiers in defense of their homes and the incitement of the same persons to insurrection against their masters. The one is justifiable, if necessary, the other is iniquitous and unworthy of civilized people; and such is the judgment of all writers on public law, as well as that expressed and insisted on by our enemies in all wars prior to that now waged against us. By none have the practices of which they are now guilty been denounced with greater severity than by themselves in the two wars with Great Britain, in the last and in the present century, and in the Declaration of Independence in 1776, when an enumeration was made of the wrongs which justified the revolt from Great Britain. The climax of atrocity was deemed to be reached only when the English monarch was denounced as having 'excited domestic insurrection among us. '

 "The subject is to be viewed by us, therefore, solely in the light of policy and our social economy. When so regarded, I must dissent from those who advise a general levy and arming of the slaves for the duty of soldiers. Until our white population shall prove insufficient for the armies we require and can afford to keep in the field, to employ as a soldier the negro, who has merely been trained to labor, and, as a laborer, the white man accustomed from his youth to the use of arms, would scarcely be deemed wise or advantageous by any; and this is the question now before us. But should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation, or of the employment of the slave as a soldier, there seems no reason to doubt what should then be our decision. Whether our view embraces what would, in so extreme a case, be the sum of misery entailed by the dominion of the enemy, or be restricted solely to the effect upon the welfare and happiness of the negro population themselves, the result would be the same. The appalling demoralization, suffering, disease, and death, which have been caused by partially substituting the invaders' system of police for the kind relation previously subsisting between the master and slave, have been a sufficient demonstration that external interference with our institution of domestic slavery is productive of evil only. If the subject involved no other consideration than the mere right of property, the sacrifices heretofore made by our people have been such as to permit no doubt of their readiness to surrender every possession in order to secure independence. But the social and political question which is exclusively under the control of the several States has a far wider and more enduring importance than that of pecuniary interest. In its manifold phases it embraces the stability of our republican institutions, resting on the actual political equality of all its citizens, and includes the fulfillment of the task which has been so happily begun--that of Christianizing and improving the condition of the Africans who have by the will of Providence been placed in our charge. Comparing the results of our own experience with those of the experiments of others who have borne similar relations to the African race, the people of the several States of the Confederacy have abundant reason to be satisfied with the past, and to use the greatest circumspection in determining their course. These considerations, however, are rather applicable to the improbable contingency of our need of resorting to this element of assistance than to our present condition. If the recommendation above, made for the training of forty thousand negroes for the service indicated, shall meet your approval, it is certain that even this limited number, by their preparatory training in intermediate duties, would form a more valuable reserve force in case of urgency than threefold their number suddenly called from field-labor, while a fresh levy could to a certain extent supply their places in the special service for which they are now employed. "

Subsequent events advanced my views from a prospective to a present needfor the enrollment of negroes to take their place in the ranks. Strenuously I argued the question with members of Congress who called toconfer with me. To a member of the Senate (the House in which we mostneeded a vote) I stated, as I had done to many others, the fact ofhaving led negroes against a lawless body of armed white men, and theassurance which the experiment gave me that they might, under properconditions, be relied on in battle, and finally used to him theexpression which I believe I can repeat exactly: "If the Confederacyfalls, there should be written on its tombstone, 'Died of a theory. '"General Lee was brought before a committee to state his opinion as tothe probable efficiency of negroes as soldiers, and disappointed theprobable expectation by his unqualified advocacy of the proposedmeasure. 

After much discussion in Congress, a bill authorizing the President toask for and accept from their owners such a number of able-bodied negromen as he might deem expedient subsequently passed the House, but waslost in the Senate by one vote. The Senators of Virginia opposed themeasure so strongly that only legislative instruction could secure theirsupport of it. Their Legislature did so instruct them, and they votedfor it. Finally, the bill passed, with an amendment providing that notmore than twenty-five per cent. Of the male slaves between the ages ofeighteen and forty-five should be called out. But the passage of the acthad been so long delayed that the opportunity was lost. There did notremain time enough to obtain any result from its provisions. 

[Footnote 194: Article I, section 10, paragraph 3. ]

[Footnote 195: Ibid. , section 9, Part XIII. ]

[Footnote 196: Ibid. , section 9, paragraph 16. ]

[Footnote 197: Section 8, paragraph 15. ]

[Footnote 198: Ibid. , paragraph 16. ]

APPENDIXES. 

[Transcriber's Note: There is no Appendix A. ]

APPENDIX B. 

THE OREGON QUESTION. 

Extracts from speech of Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, in the House ofRepresentatives, February 6, 1846, on the resolution to terminate thejoint occupation of the Oregon Territory. 

Mr. Chairman: In negotiations between governments, in attempts to modifyexisting policies, the circumstances of the time most frequently decidebetween success and failure. 

How far the introduction of this question may affect our foreignintercourse, the future only can determine; but I invite attention tothe present posture of affairs. Amicable relations, after a seriousinterruption, have been but recently restored between the United Statesand Mexico. The most delicate and difficult of questions, the adjustmentof a boundary between us, remains unsettled; and many eyes are fixedupon our minister at Mexico, with the hope that he may negotiate atreaty which will remove all causes of dispute, and give to usterritorial limits, the ultimate advantages of which it would bedifficult to over-estimate. 

If, sir, hereafter we shall find that, by this excited discussion, portentous of a war with England, unreasonable demands upon the part ofMexico should be encouraged, the acquisition of California be defeated, that key to Asiatic commerce be passed from our hands for ever--whatwill we have gained to compensate so great a loss? We know the influencewhich Great Britain exercises over Mexico; we should not expect her tobe passive, nor doubt that the prospect of a war between England and theUnited States would serve to revive the former hopes and to renew therecent enmity of Mexico. 

Sir, I have another hope, for the fulfillment of which the signs of thetimes seem most propitious. An unusually long exemption from a generalwar has permitted the bonds of commerce to extend themselves around thecivilized world, and nations from remote quarters of the globe have beendrawn into that close and mutual dependence which foretold unshackledtrade and a lasting peace. In the East, there appeared a rainbow whichpromised that the waters of national jealousy and proscription wereabout to recede from the earth for ever, and the spirit of free trade tomove over the face thereof. 

In perspective, we saw the ports of California united to the ports andforests of Oregon, and our countrymen commanding the trade of thePacific. The day seemed at hand when the overcharged granaries of theWest should be emptied to the starving millions of Europe and Asia; whenthe canvas-winged doves of our commerce should freely fly forth from theark, and return across every sea with the olive of every land. Shallobjects like these be endangered by the impatience of petty ambition, the promptings of sectional interest, or the goadings of fanatic hate?Shall the good of the whole be surrendered to the voracious demands ofthe few? Shall class interests control the great policy of our country, and the voice of reason be drowned in the clamor of causelessexcitement? If so, not otherwise, we may agree with him who wouldreconcile us to the evils of war by the promise of "emancipation fromthe manufacturers of Manchester and Birmingham"; or leave unanswered theheresy boldly announced, though by history condemned, that war is thepurifier, blood is the aliment, of free institutions. Sir, it is truethat republics have often been cradled in war, but more often they havemet with a grave in that cradle. Peace is the interest, the policy, thenature of a popular government. War may bring benefits to a few, butprivation and loss are the lot of the many. An appeal to arms should bethe last resort, and only by national rights or national honor can it bejustified. 

To those who have treated this as a case involving the national honor, Ireply that, whenever that question shall justly be raised, I trust anAmerican Congress will not delay for weeks to discuss the chances, orestimate the sacrifices, which its maintenance may cost. But, sir, instead of rights invaded or honor violated, the question before us is, the expediency of terminating an ancient treaty, which, if it be unwise, it can not be dishonorable, to continue. Yet, throughout this longdiscussion, the recesses and vaulted dome of this hall have reëchoed toinflammatory appeals and violent declamations on the sanctity ofnational honor; and then, as if to justify them, followed reflectionsmost discreditable to the conduct of our Government. The charge madeelsewhere has been repeated here, that we have trodden upon Mexico, butcowered under England. 

Sir, it has been my pride to believe that our history was unstained byan act of injustice or of perfidy; that we stood recorded before theworld as a people haughty to the strong, generous to the weak; andnowhere has this character been more exemplified than in our intercoursewith Mexico. We have been referred to the treaty of peace that closedour last war with Great Britain, and told that our injuries wereunredressed, because the question of impressment was not decided. Thereare other decisions than those made by commissioners, and sometimes theyoutlast the letter of a treaty. On sea and land we settled the questionof impressment before negotiations were commenced at Ghent. Further, itshould be remembered that there was involved within that question acardinal principle of each Government. The power of expatriation, andits sequence, naturalization, were denied by Great Britain; and hence aright asserted to impress native-born Britons, though naturalized ascitizens of the United States. This violated a principle which lies atthe foundation of our institutions, and could never be permitted; but, not being propagandists, we could afford to leave the political opinionunnoticed, after having taught a lesson which would probably prevent anyfuture attempt to exercise it to our injury. Let the wisdom of thatpolicy be judged by subsequent events.... 

Mr. Davis then proceeded to state and argue at length the historicalquestions involved, making copious citations from original authorities. He continued:

Waiving the consideration of any sinister motive or sectional hate whichmay have brought allies to the support of the resolution now before us, I will treat it as simply aiming at the object which in common wedesire--to secure the whole of Oregon to the United States. 

Thus considered, the dissolution of the Oregon convention becomes a merequestion of time. As a friend to the extension of our Union, andtherefore prone to insist upon its territorial claims, I have thoughtthis movement premature; that we should have put ourselves in thestrongest attitude for the enforcement of our claims before we fixed aday on which negotiations should be terminated. That nation negotiatesto most advantage which is best prepared for war. Gentlemen have treatedthe idea of preparation for war as synonymous with the raising of anarmy. It is not so; indeed, that is the last measure, and should only beresorted to when war has become inevitable; and then a very short timewill always be, I trust, sufficient. But, sir, there are preparationswhich require years, and can only be made in a state of peace. Such arethe fortifications of the salient points and main entrances of ourcoast. For twenty-odd years Southern men have urged the occupation ofthe Tortugas. Are those who have so long opposed appropriations for thatpurpose ready to grant them now in such profusion that the labor ofthree years may be done in one? No, sir; the occasion, by increasing thedemand for money elsewhere, must increase the opposition. That rock, which Nature placed like a sentinel to guard the entrance into theMediterranean of our continent, and which should be Argus-eyed to watchit, will stand without an embrasure to look through. 

How is the case in Oregon? Our settlements there must be protected, andunder present circumstances an army of operations in that country mustdraw its food from this; but we have not a sufficient navy to keep opena line of communication by sea around Cape Horn; and the rugged routeand the great distance forbid the idea of supplying it by transportationacross the mountains. Now, let us see what time and the measures morepointedly recommended by the President would effect. Our jurisdictionextended into Oregon, the route guarded by stockades and troops, a newimpulse would be given to immigration: and in two or three years thesettlement on the Willamette might grow into a colony, whose flocks andherds and granaries would sustain an army, whenever one should berequired. 

By agencies among the Indian tribes, that effective ally of GreatBritain, which formerly she has not scrupled to employ, would berendered friendly to our people. In the mean time, roads could beconstructed for the transportation of munitions of war. Then we shouldbe prepared to assert, and effectively maintain, our claims to theirultimate limits. 

I could not depreciate my countrymen; I would not vaunt the prowess ofan enemy; but, sir, I tell those gentlemen who, in this debate, havefound it so easy to drive British troops out of Oregon, that, betweenEngland and the United States, if hostilities occur in that remoteterritory, the party must succeed which has bread within the country.... 

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, the opinion has gone forth that nopolitician dares to be the advocate of peace when the question of war ismooted. That will be an evil hour--the sand of our republic will benearly run--when it shall be in the power of any demagogue, or fanatic, to raise a war-clamor, and control the legislation of the country. Theevils of war must fall upon the people, and with them the war-feelingshould originate. We, their representatives, are but a mirror to reflectthe light, and never should become a torch to fire the pile. But, sir, though gentlemen go, torch in hand, among combustible materials, theystill declare there is no danger of a fire. War-speeches and measuresthreatening war are mingled with profuse assurances of peace. Sir, wecan not expect, we should not require, our adversary to submit to morethan we would bear; and I ask, after the notice has been given and thetwelve months have expired, who would allow Great Britain to exerciseexclusive jurisdiction over Oregon? If we would resist such act by forceof arms, before ourselves performing it we should prepare for war. 

Some advocates of this immediate notice have urged their policy byreference to a resolution of the Democratic Baltimore Convention, andcontended that the question was thereby closed to members of theDemocratic party. That resolution does not recommend immediate notice, but recommends "the reannexation of Texas" and the "reoccupation ofOregon" at the "earliest practicable period. " The claim is strongly madeto the "whole of Oregon"; and the resolution seems directed morepointedly to space than time. Texas and Oregon were united in theresolution; and, had there been a third question involving ourterritorial extension, I doubt not it would have been united with theother two. The addition of territory to our Union is part of theDemocratic faith, and properly was placed in the declaration of ourpolicy at that time. To determine whether that practicable period hasarrived is now the question; and those who cordially agree upon theprinciple of territorial enlargement have differed, and may continuestill to differ, on that question. Sir, though it is demonstrable thathaste may diminish but can not increase our chances to secure the wholeof Oregon, yet, because Southern men have urged the wisdom of delay, wehave had injurious comparisons instituted between our conduct on Texasannexation and Oregon occupation. Is there such equality between thecases that the same policy must apply to each? Texas was peopled, thetime was present when it must be acquired, or the influences active todefeat our annexation purpose would probably succeed, and the country belost to us for ever. Oregon is, with a small exception, still awilderness; our claim to ultimate sovereignty can not be weakened duringthe continuance of the Oregon convention. That ill-starred partnershiphas robbed us of the advantages which an early occupation would havegiven to our people in the fur-trade of the country, and we are nowrapidly advancing to a position from which we can command the entireTerritory. In Texas annexation we were prompted by other and higherconsiderations than mere interest. Texas had been a member of ourfamily: in her infancy had been driven from the paternal roof, surrendered to the government of harsh, inquisitorial Spain; but, trueto her lineage, preserved the faith of opposition to monarchicaloppression. She now returned, and asked to be admitted to the hearth ofthe homestead. She pointed to the band of noble sons who stood aroundher and said: "Here is the remnant of my family; the rest I gave asacrifice at the altar of our fathers' God--the God of Liberty. " One, two, three, of the elder sisters strove hard to close the door upon her;but the generous sympathy, the justice of the family, threw it wideopen, and welcomed her return. Such was the case of Texas; is there aparallel in Oregon?

But who are those that arraign the South, imputing to us motives ofsectional aggrandizement? Generally, the same who resisted Texasannexation, and now most eagerly press on the immediate occupation ofthe whole of Oregon. The source is worthy the suspicion. These were themen whose constitutional scruples resisted the admission of a countrygratuitously offered to us, but who now look forward to gaining Canadaby conquest. These, the same who claim a weight to balance Texas, whilethey attack others as governed by sectional considerations. 

Sir, this doctrine of a political balance between different sections ofour Union is not of Southern growth. We advocated the annexation ofTexas as a "great national measure"; we saw in it the extension of theprinciples intrusted to our care; and, if in the progress of thequestion it assumed a sectional hue, the coloring came from theopposition that it met--an opposition based, not upon a showing of theinjury it would bring to them, but upon the supposition that benefitswould be obtained by us. 

Why is it that Texas is referred to, and treated as a Southern measuremerely, though its northern latitude is 42°? And why has the West sooften been reminded of its services upon Texas annexation? Is it todivide the South and West? If so, let those who seek this object ceasefrom their travail, for their end can never be obtained. A commonagricultural interest unites us in a common policy, and the hand thatsows seeds of dissension between us will find, if they spring from theground, that the foot of fraternal intercourse will tread them back toearth. 

The streams that rise in the West flow on and are accumulated into therivers of the South; they bear the products of one to the other, andbind the interests of the whole indissolubly together. The wishes of theone wake the sympathies of the other. On Texas annexation the voice ofMississippi found an echo in the West, and Mississippi reëchoes the callof the West on the question of Oregon. Though this Government has donenothing adequate to the defense of Mississippi, though by war she hasmuch to lose and nothing to gain, yet she is willing to encounter it, ifnecessary to maintain our rights in Oregon. Her Legislature has recentlyso resolved, and her Governor, in a late message, says, "If war comes, to us it will bring blight and desolation, yet we are ready for thecrisis. " Sir, could there be a higher obligation on the representativeof such a people than to restrain excitement--than to oppose a policythat threatens an unnecessary war?... 

Mr. Chairman, why have such repeated calls been made upon the South torally to the rescue? When, where, or how, has she been laggard ordeserter?

In 1776 the rights of man were violated in the outrages upon theNorthern colonies, and the South united in a war for their defense. In1812 the flag of our Union was insulted, our sailors' rights invaded;and, though the interests infringed were mainly Northern, war wasdeclared, and the opposition to its vigorous prosecution came not fromthe South. We entered it for the common cause, and for the common causewe freely met its sacrifices. If, sir, we have not been the "war partyin peace, " neither have we been the "peace party in war, " and I willleave the past to answer for the future. 

If we have not sought the acquisition of provinces by conquest, neitherhave we desired to exclude from our Union such as, drawn by the magnetof free institutions, have peacefully sought for admission. From sire toson has descended our federative creed, opposed to the idea of sectionalconflict for private advantage, and favoring the wider expanse of ourunion. If envy and jealousy and sectional strife are eating like rustinto the bonds our fathers expected to bind us, they come from causeswhich our Southern atmosphere has never furnished. As we have shared inthe toils, so we have gloried in the triumphs, of our country. In ourhearts, as in our history, are mingled the names of Concord, and Camden, and Saratoga, and Lexington, and Plattsburg, and Chippewa, and Erie, andMoultrie, and New Orleans, and Yorktown, and Bunker Hill. Groupedtogether, they form a record of the triumphs of our cause, a monument ofthe common glory of our Union. What Southern man would wish it less byone of the Northern names of which it is composed? Or where is he who, gazing on the obelisk that rises from the ground made sacred by theblood of Warren, would feel his patriot's pride suppressed by localjealousy? Type of the men, the event, the purpose, it commemorates, thatcolumn rises, stern, even severe in its simplicity; neither niche normolding for parasite or creeping thing to rest on; composed of materialthat defies the waves of time, and pointing like a finger to the sourceof noblest thought. Beacon of freedom, it guides the present generationto retrace the fountain of our years and stand beside its source; tocontemplate the scene where Massachusetts and Virginia, as strongerbrothers of the family, stood foremost to defend our common rights; andremembrance of the petty jarrings of to-day are buried in the noblerfriendship of an earlier time. 

Yes, sir, and when ignorance, led by fanatic hate, and armed by alluncharitableness, assails a domestic institution of the South, I try toforgive, for the sake of the righteous among the wicked--our naturalallies, the Democracy of the North. Thus, sir, I leave to silentcontempt the malign predictions of the member from Ohio, who spoke inthe early stage of this discussion, while it pleases me to remember themanly and patriotic sentiments of the gentleman who sits near me [Mr. McDowell], and who represents another portion of that State. In him Irecognize the feelings of our Western brethren; his were the sentimentsthat accord with their acts in the past, and which, with a few ignobleexceptions, I doubt not they will emulate, if again the necessity shouldexist. Yes, sir, if ever they hear that the invader's foot has beenpressed upon our soil, they will descend to the plain like an avalanche, rushing to bury the foe. 

In conclusion, I will say that, free from any forebodings of evil, abovethe influence of taunts, beyond the reach of treasonable threats, andconfiding securely in the wisdom and patriotism of the Executive, Ishrink from the assertion of no right, and will consent to norestrictions on the discretion of the treaty-making power of ourGovernment. 

APPENDIX C. 

SPEECHES, AND EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES, OF THE AUTHOR IN THE SENATE OF THEUNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF THE THIRTY-FIRST CONGRESS, 1849-1850. 

Speech of Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in the Senate of the United States, on the resolutions of compromise proposed by Mr. Clay, January 29, 1850:

I do not rise to continue the discussion, but, as it has been made anhistorical question as to what the position of the Senate was twelveyears ago, and, as with great regret I see this, the conservative branchof the Government, tending toward that fanaticism which seems to prevailwith the majority in the United States, I wish to read from the journalsof that date the resolutions then adopted, and to show that they wentfurther than the honorable Senator from Kentucky has stated. I take itfor granted, from the date to which the honorable Senator has alluded, he means the resolutions introduced by the honorable Senator from SouthCarolina [Mr. Calhoun], not now in his seat, and to which the Senatorfrom Kentucky proposed certain amendments. Of the resolutions introducedby the Senator from South Carolina, I will read the fifth in the series, that to which the honorable Senator from Kentucky must have alluded. Itis in these words:

"_Resolved_, That the intermeddling of any State or States, or theircitizens, to abolish slavery in the District, or any of the Territories, on the ground, or under the pretext, that it is immoral or sinful, orthe passage of any act or measure of Congress with that view, would be adirect and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholdingStates. "

Such is the general form of the proposition. It was variously modified, but never, in my opinion, improved. On the 27th, the fifth resolutionbeing again under consideration, Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, moved to amendthe amendment by striking out all after the word "resolved, " and insert:

"That the interference, by the citizens of any of the States, with aview to the abolition of slavery in this District, is endangering therights and security of the people of the District; and that any act ormeasure of Congress designed to abolish slavery in this District wouldbe a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the States ofVirginia and Maryland; a just cause of alarm to the people of theslaveholding States, and have a direct and inevitable tendency todisturb and endanger the Union. 

"_And, resolved_, That it would be highly inexpedient to abolish slaverywithin any district of country set apart for the Indian tribes, where itnow exists, or in Florida, the only Territory of the United States inwhich it now exists, because of the serious alarm and just apprehensionswhich would be thereby excited in the States sustaining that domesticinstitution; because the people of that Territory have not asked it tobe done, and, when admitted into the Union, will be exclusively entitledto decide that question for themselves; because it would be in violationof the stipulations of the treaty between the United States and Spain ofthe 22d of February, 1819; and, also, because it would be in violationof a solemn compromise, made at a memorable and critical period in thehistory of this country, by which, while slavery was prohibited north, it was admitted south, of the line of thirty-six degrees and thirtyminutes north latitude. "

But this resolution was not finally adopted. Upon the motion of Mr. Buchanan to amend said amendment, by striking out the second clausethereof, commencing with the word "resolved, " it was determined in theaffirmative, and finally the resolution which here follows wassubstituted in place of the second clause:

"That the interference by the citizens of any of the States, with a viewto the abolition of slavery in this District, is endangering the rightsand security of the people of the District; and that any act or measureof Congress designed to abolish slavery in this district, would be aviolation of the faith implied in the cessions by the States of Virginiaand Maryland; a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholdingStates, and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb andendanger the Union. "

This was the form in which the resolution was finally adopted, passingby a vote of thirty-six to eight. Here, then, was fully and broadlyasserted the danger resulting from the interference in the question ofslavery in the District of Columbia, as trenching upon the rights of theslaveholding States. Twelve years only have elapsed, yet this briefperiod has swept away even the remembrance of principles then deemedsacred and necessary to secure the safety of the Union. Now, anhonorable and distinguished Senator, to whom the country has beeninduced to look for something that would heal the existing dissensions, instead of raising new barriers against encroachment, dashes down thoseheretofore erected and augments the existing danger. A representativefrom one of the slaveholding States raises his voice for the first timein disregard of this admitted right. Nor, Mr. President, did he stophere. The boundary of a State, with which we have no more right tointerfere than with the boundary of the State of Kentucky, is encroachedupon. The United States, sir, as the agent for Texas, had a right tosettle the question of boundary between Texas and Mexico. Texas was notannexed as a Territory, but was admitted as a State, and, at the periodof her admission, her boundaries were established by her Congress. She, by the terms of annexation, gave to the United States the right todefine her boundary by treaty with Mexico; but the United States, in thetreaty made with Mexico subsequent to the war with that country, received from Mexico not merely a cession of the territory that wasclaimed by Texas, but much that lay beyond the asserted limits. Shallwe, then, acting simply as the cogent of Texas in the settlement of thisquestion of boundary, take from the principal for whom we act thatterritory which belongs to her, to which we asserted her title againstMexico, and appropriate it to ourselves? Why, sir, it would be aviolation of justice, and of a principle of law which is so plain thatit does not require one to have been bred to the profession of law tounderstand it. The principle I refer to is, that an agent can not takefor his own benefit anything resulting from the matter in controversy, after having acquired it as belonging to the principal for whom he acts. The agent can not appropriate to himself rights acquired for his client. The right of Texas, therefore, to that boundary was made complete by thetreaty of peace, which silenced the only rival claim to the territory. It was distinctly defined by the acts of her Congress, before the timeof annexation; and I have only to refer to those acts to show that theboundary of Texas was the Rio Bravo del Norte, from its mouth to itssource. What justice, or even decent regard for fairness, can there be, now that Texas has acceded to annexation upon certain terms, to proposea change of boundary, in violation of those terms, and by the power wehold over her as a part of the Union? Can this power extend so far as totake from her a portion of her territory, or to assert that there is aportion to which she is not entitled?

These constitute with me two great objections to the propositions of thehonorable Senator from Kentucky; but, without stating all the objectionsthat I have, and they are very many, I will merely point out a few ofthe prominent points to which I object in the argument of the Senator. He assumes as facts things which are mere matters of opinion, and, Ithink, of erroneous and injurious opinion. But, deferring the discussionto another occasion, I desire at present merely to notice the assertionof the honorable Senator, that slavery would never under anycircumstances be established in California. This, though stated as afact, is but a mere opinion--an opinion with which I do not accord. Itwas to work the gold-mines on this continent that the Spaniards firstbrought Africans to the country. The European races now engaged inworking the mines of California sink under the burning heat and suddenchanges of the climate to which the African race are altogether betteradapted. The production of rice, sugar, and cotton, is no better adaptedto slave-labor than the digging, washing, and quarrying of thegold-mines. 

We, sir, have not asked that slavery should be established inCalifornia. We have only asked that there should be no restriction; thatclimate and soil should be left free to establish the institution ornot, as experience should determine. Sir, after the agitation of thesubject within these halls and elsewhere has prevented the introductionof slavery--by preventing the emigration of slaveholders with theirproperty--are we now to be told that the question is settled? More thanthat: when we have acquired territory over which the Constitution of theUnited States is thereby extended, and which the citizens of the UnitedStates have a right to occupy, and to establish therein what laws theyplease, in accordance with the principles of the Constitution--in whichthey have a right to establish what institutions they please--it is nowclaimed that the municipal regulations which previously existed shallstill govern the people, and that a portion of the citizens of theUnited States shall thus be precluded from going there with theirproperty. This rule has, however, in discussion here, only been appliedto the property of slaveholders; as though slaves were the only propertyunder the laws of Mexico prohibited from entering California. It is tobe remembered that the late Secretary of the Treasury, in a report toCongress, stated that the Mexican law prohibited the entrance of somesixty articles of commerce; this was prohibition by law of Congress, andslavery has never been so prohibited. It never has been prohibited bythe Mexican Congress in California; and the only prohibition ever issuedwas that contained in the edict of a usurper, under the specious pretextthat it was necessary, in order to oppose the invasion of the country bySpain. This decree was recognized by a subsequent Congress, so far as topass a law authorizing payment for slaves so liberated. It was theemancipation of all the slaves in Mexico; an act, if you please, ofabolition, not of prohibition; not, whatever construction may be placedupon it, done in the forms of law and requirements of theirConstitution. But we have not proposed to inquire into the legality ofthe abolition, neither has any Southern man asked that that decreeshould be repealed, or that those liberated under its provisions shouldbe returned to slavery. We only claim that there shall be an equality ofimmunities and privileges among citizens of all parts of the UnitedStates; that Mexican law shall not be applied so as to create inequalitybetween citizens, by preventing the immigration of any. 

But, sir, we are called on to receive this as a measure of compromise!Is a measure in which we of the minority are to receive nothing acompromise? I look upon it as but a modest mode of taking that, theclaim to which has been more boldly asserted by others; and, that I maybe understood upon this question, and that my position may go forth tothe country in the same columns that convey the sentiments of theSenator from Kentucky, I here assert that never will I take less thanthe Missouri compromise line extended to the Pacific Ocean, with thespecific recognition of the right to hold slaves in the territory belowthat line; and that, before such Territories are admitted into the Unionas States, slaves may be taken there from any of the United States atthe option of their owners. I can never consent to give additional powerto a majority to commit further aggressions upon the minority in thisUnion; and will never consent to any proposition which will have such atendency, without a full guarantee or counteracting measure is connectedwith it. I forbear commenting at any further length upon thepropositions embraced in the resolutions at this time. 

Remarks of Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in the Senate of the UnitedStates, on the question of the reception of a memorial from inhabitantsof Pennsylvania and Delaware, presented by Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, praying that Congress would adopt measures for an immediate and peacefuldissolution of the Union. February 8, 1850. 

Mr. President: I rise merely to make a few remarks upon the right ofpetition, and to notice the error which I think has pervaded thecomparisons that have been instituted between certain resolutions whichwere presented by the Senator from North Carolina and the petition whichit is now proposed shall be received. The resolutions which werepresented from North Carolina were published in yesterday's paper, and, after reading them, I think they refer to a state of case which thepeople of North Carolina might properly present as their grievance. Theywere resolutions for preserving the Union, calling upon Congress to takeall measures in its power for that purpose. This was all legitimate. They had a right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances; and, if it were in our power to redress those grievances, if it were withinthe legitimate functions of our legislation, we were bound to receivethe petition and respectfully consider it. This case is exactly thereverse. Here is no grievance, unless the Union is a grievance to thosewho petition. And they call upon Congress to do that which every onemust admit Congress has no power to do--to dissolve peaceably the unionof the States. Then, sir, in the first place, there is no grievance; inthe next place, there is no power; and, beyond all that, it is offensiveto the Senate. It is offensive to recommend legislation for thedissolution of the Union--offensive to the Senate and to the wholecountry. If this Union is ever to be dissolved, it must be by the actionof the States and their people. Whatever power Congress holds, it boldsunder the Constitution, and that power is but a part of the Union. Congress has no power to legislate upon that which will be thedestruction of the whole foundation upon which its authority rests. 

I recollect, a good many years ago, that the Senator from Massachusetts[Mr. John Davis], who addressed the Senate this morning, very pointedlydescribed the right of petition as a very humble right--as the mereright to beg. This is my own view. The right peaceably to assemble, Ihold as the right which it was intended to grant to the people; that wasthe only right which had ever been denied in our colonial condition. Theright of petition had never been denied by Parliament. It was intendedonly to secure to the people, I say, the right peaceably to assemble, whenever they choose to do so, with intent to petition for a redress ofgrievances. 

But, sir, the right of petition, though but a poor right--the mere rightto beg--may yet be carried to such an extent that we are bound to abateit as a nuisance. If the avenues to the Capitol were to be obstructed, so that members would find themselves unable to reach the halls oflegislation, because hordes of beggars presented themselves in the waycalling for relief, it would be a nuisance that would require to beabated, and Congress, in self-defense, would be compelled to removethem. But such a collection of beggars would not be half so great anevil as the petitions presented here on the subject of slavery. Theydisturb the peace of the country; they impede and pervert legislation bythe excitement they create; they do more to prevent rationalinvestigation and proper action in this body than any, if not all, othercauses. Good, if ever designed, has never resulted, and it would bedifficult to suppose that good is expected ever to flow from them. Why, then, should we be bound to receive such petitions to the detriment ofthe public business; or, rather, why are they presented? I am not ofthose who believe we should be turned from the path of duty byout-of-door clamor, or that the evil can be removed by partialconcession. To receive is to give cause for further demands, and ourdirect and safe course is rejection. 

Yes, sir, their reception would serve only to embarrass Congress, todisturb the tranquillity of the country, and to peril the Union of theStates. By every obligation, therefore, that rests upon us under theConstitution, upon every great principle upon which the Constitution isfounded, we are bound to abate this as a great and growing evil. Thispetition, sir, was well described by the Senator from Pennsylvania asbeing spurious; and I have been assured of the fact, from other sourcesof information, that petitions are sent round in reference to othersubjects--of temperance, generally--and, after a long list of names hasbeen obtained, the caption is cut off, and the list of signaturesattached to an abolition caption and sent here to excite one section ofthe Union against the other, to disturb the country, and distract thelegislation of Congress, to execute which we have our seats in thisChamber. For the reasons first stated, I voted to receive theresolutions that were presented by the Senator from North Carolina, andfor the reasons I have just given shall vote to reject this petition. 

Conclusion of speech of Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, in the Senateof the United States, on the resolutions of Mr. Clay, relative toslavery in the Territories, etc. , February 13 and 14, 1850. 

... Sir, it has been asked on several occasions during the presentsession, What ground of complaint has the South? Is this agitation inthe two halls of Congress, in relation to the domestic institutions ofthe South, no subject for complaint? Is the denunciation heaped upon usby the press of the North, and the attempts to degrade us in the eyes ofChristendom--to arraign the character of our people and the character ofour fathers, from whom our institutions are derived--no subject forcomplaint? Is this sectional organization, for the purpose of hostilityto our portion of the Union, no subject for complaint? Would it not, between foreign nations--nations not bound together and restrained as weare by compact--would it not, I say, be just cause for war? Whatdifference is there between organizations for circulating incendiarydocuments and promoting the escape of fugitives from a neighboring Stateand the organization of an armed force for the purpose of invasion? Sir, a State relying securely on its own strength would rather court the openinvasion than the insidious attack. And for what end, sir, is all thisaggression? They see that the slaves in their present condition in theSouth are comfortable and happy; they see them advancing inintelligence; they see the kindest relations existing between them andtheir masters; they see them provided for in age and sickness, ininfancy and in disability; they see them in useful employment, restrained from the vicious indulgences to which their inferior natureinclines them; they see our penitentiaries never filled, and ourpoor-houses usually empty. Let them turn to the other hand, and they seethe same race in a state of freedom at the North; but, instead of thecomfort and kindness they receive at the South, instead of being happyand useful, they are, with few exceptions, miserable, degraded, fillingthe penitentiaries and poor-houses, objects of scorn, excluded in someplaces from the schools, and deprived of many other privileges andbenefits which attach to the white men among whom they live. And yetthey insist that elsewhere an institution which has proved beneficial tothis race shall be abolished, that it may be substituted by a state ofthings which is fraught with so many evils to the race which they claimto be the object of their solicitude! Do they find in the history of St. Domingo, and in the present condition of Jamaica, under the recentexperiments which have been made upon the institution of slavery in theliberation of the blacks, before God, in his wisdom, designed it shouldbe done--do they there find anything to stimulate them to futureexertion in the cause of abolition? Or should they not find theresatisfactory evidence that their past course was founded in error? Andis it not the part of integrity and wisdom, as soon as they can, toretrace their steps? Should they not immediately cease from a coursemischievous in every stage, and finally tending to the greatestcatastrophe? We may dispute about measures, but, as long as parties havenationality, as long as it is a difference of opinion betweenindividuals passing into every section of the country, it threatens nodanger to the Union. If the conflicts of party were the only cause ofapprehension, this Government might last for ever--the last page ofhuman history might contain a discussion in the American Congress uponthe meaning of some phrase, the extent of the power conferred by somegrant of the Constitution. It is, sir, these sectional divisions whichweaken the bonds of union and threaten their final rupture. It is notdifferences of opinion--it is geographical lines, rivers andmountains--which divide State from State, and make different nations ofmankind. 

Are these no subjects of complaint for us? And do they furnish no causefor repentance to you? Have we not a right to appeal to you as brethrenof this Union? Have we not a right to appeal to you, as brethren boundby the compact of our fathers, that you should, with due regard to yourown rights and interests and constitutional obligations, do all that isnecessary to preserve our peace and promote our prosperity?

If, sir, the seeds of disunion have been sown broadcast over this land, I ask by whose hand they have been scattered? If, sir, we are nowreduced to a condition when the powers of this Government are heldsubservient to faction; if we can not and dare not legislate for theorganization of territorial governments--I ask, sir, who is responsiblefor it? And I can with proud reliance say, it is not the South--it isnot the South! Sir, every charge of disunion which is made on that partof the South which I in part represent, and whose sentiments I wellunderstand, I here pronounce to be grossly calumnious. The conduct ofthe State of Mississippi in calling a convention has already beenintroduced before the Senate; and on that occasion I stated, and nowrepeat, that it was the result of patriotism, and a high resolve topreserve, if possible, our constitutional Union; that all itsproceedings were conducted with deliberation, and it was composed of thefirst men of the State. 

The Chief-Justice--a man well known for his high integrity, for hispowerful intellect, for his great legal attainments, and his ability inquestions of constitutional law-presided over that Convention. Aftercalm and mature deliberation, resolutions were adopted, not in thespirit of disunion, but announcing, in the first resolution of theseries, their attachment to the Union. They call on their brethren ofthe South to unite with them in their holy purpose of preserving theConstitution, which is its only bond and reliable hope. This was theirobject; and for this and for no other purpose do they propose to meet ingeneral convention at Nashville. As I stated on a former occasion, thiswas not a party movement in Mississippi. The presiding officer belongsto the political minority in the State; the two parties in the Statewere equally represented in the numbers of the Convention, and itsdeliberations assumed no partisan or political character whatever. Itwas the result of primary meetings in the counties; an assemblage of menknown throughout the State, having first met and intimated to thosecounties a time when the State Convention should, if deemed proper, beheld. Every movement was taken with deliberation, and every movementthen taken was wholly independent of the action of anybody else; unlessit be intended, by the remarks made here, to refer its action to thegreat principles of those who have gone before us, and who have left usthe rich legacy of the free institutions under which we live. If it beattempted to assign the movement to the nullification tenets of SouthCarolina, as my friend near me seemed to understand, then I say you mustgo further back, and impute it to the State rights and strict-construction doctrines of Madison and Jefferson. You must refer these intheir turn to the principles in which originated the Revolution andseparation of these then colonies from England. You must not stop there, but go back still further, to the bold spirit of the ancient barons ofEngland. That spirit has come down to us, and in that spirit has all theaction since been taken. We will not permit aggressions. We will defendour rights; and, if it be necessary, we will claim from this Government, as the barons of England claimed from John, the grant of another _MagnaCharta_ for our protection. 

Sir, I can but consider it as a tribute of respect to the character forcandor and sincerity which the South maintains, that every movementwhich occurs in the Southern States is closely scrutinized, and theassertion of a determination to maintain their constitutional rights isdenounced as a movement of disunion; while violent denunciations againstthe Union are now made, and for years have been made, at the North byassociations, by presses and conventions, yet are allowed to passunnoticed as the idle wind--I suppose for the simple reason that nobodybelieved there was any danger in them. It is, then, I say, a tributepaid to the sincerity of the South, that every movement of hers iswatched with such jealousy; but what shall we think of the love for theUnion of those in whom this brings us corresponding change of conduct, who continue the wanton aggravations which have produced and justify theaction they deprecate? Is it well, is it wise, is it safe, to disregardthese manifestations of public displeasure, though it be the displeasureof a minority? Is it proper, or prudent, or respectful, when arepresentative, in accordance with the known will of his constituents, addresses you the language of solemn warning, in conformity to his dutyto the Constitution, the Union, and to his own conscience, that hiscourse should be arraigned as the declaration of ultra and dangerousopinions? If these warnings were received in the spirit in which theyare given, it would augur better for the country. It would give hopeswhich are now denied us, if the press of the country, that great leverof public opinion, would enforce these warnings, and bear them to everycottage, instead of heaping abuse upon those whose love of ease wouldprompt them to silence--whose speech, therefore, is evidence ofsincerity. Lightly and loosely, representatives of Southern people havebeen denounced as disunionists by that portion of the Northern presswhich most disturbs the harmony and endangers the perpetuity of theUnion. Such, even, has been my own case, though the man does not breatheat whose door the charge of disunion might not as well be laid as atmine. The son of a Revolutionary soldier, attachment to this Union wasamong the first lessons of my childhood; bred to the service of mycountry, from boyhood to mature age, I wore its uniform. Through thebrightest portion of my life I was accustomed to see our flag, historicemblem of the Union, rise with the rising and fall with the setting sun. I look upon it now with the affection of early love, and seek topreserve it by a strict adherence to the Constitution, from which it hadits birth, and by the nurture of which its stars have come so much tooutnumber its original stripes. Shall that flag, which has gatheredfresh glory in every war, and become more radiant still by the conquestof peace--shall that flag now be torn by domestic faction, and troddenin the dust by sectional rivalry? Shall we of the South, who have sharedequally with you all your toils, all your dangers, all your adversities, and who equally rejoice in your prosperity and your fame--shall we bedenied those benefits guaranteed by our compact, or gathered as thecommon fruits of a common country? If so, self-respect requires that weshould assert them; and, as best we may, maintain that which we couldnot surrender without losing your respect as well as our own. 

If, sir, this spirit of sectional aggrandizement--or, if gentlemenprefer, this love they bear the African race--shall cause the disunionof these States, the last chapter of our history will be a sadcommentary upon the justice and the wisdom of our people. That thisUnion, replete with blessings to its own citizens, and diffusive of hopeto the rest of mankind, should fall a victim to a selfish aggrandizementand a pseudo-philanthropy, prompting one portion of the Union to warupon the domestic rights and peace of another, would be a deepreflection on the good sense and patriotism of our day and generation. But, sir, if this last chapter in our history shall ever be written, thereflective reader will ask, Whence proceeded this hostility of the Northagainst the South? He will find it there recorded that the South, inopposition to her own immediate interests, engaged with the North in theunequal struggle of the Revolution. He will find again, that, whenNorthern seamen were impressed, their brethren of the South consideredit cause for war, and entered warmly into the contest with the haughtypower then claiming to be mistress of the seas. He will find that theSouth, afar off, unseen and unheard, toiling in the pursuits ofagriculture, had filled the shipping and supplied the staple formanufactures, which enriched the North. He will find that she was thegreat consumer of Northern fabrics--that she not only paid for thesetheir fair value in the markets of the world, but that she also paidtheir increased value, derived from the imposition of revenue duties. And, if, still further, he seeks for the cause of this hostility, it atlast is to be found in the fact that the South held the African race inbondage, being the descendants of those who were mainly purchased fromthe people of the North. And this was the great cause. For this theNorth claimed that the South should be restricted from futuregrowth--that around her should be drawn, as it were, a sanitary cordonto prevent the extension of a "moral leprosy"; and, if for that it shallbe written that the South resisted, it would be but in keeping withevery page she has added to the history of our country. 

It depends on those in the majority to say whether this last chapter inour history shall be written or not. It depends on them now to decidewhether the strife between the different sections shall be arrestedbefore it has become impossible, or whether it shall proceed to a finalcatastrophe. I, sir--and I only speak for myself--am willing to meet anyfair proposition--to settle upon anything which promises security forthe future; anything which assures me of permanent peace, and I amwilling to make whatever sacrifice I may properly be called on to renderfor that purpose. Nor, sir, is it a light responsibility. If I strictlymeasured my conduct by the late message of the Governor, and the recentexpressions of opinion in my State, I should have no power to accept anyterms save the unqualified admission of the equal rights of the citizensof the South to go into any of the Territories of the United States withany and every species of property held among us. I am willing, however, to take my share of the responsibility which the crisis of our countrydemands. I am willing to rely on the known love of the people Irepresent for the whole country, and the abiding respect which I knowthey entertain for the Union of these States. If, sir, I distrustedtheir attachment to our Government, and if I believed that they had thatrestless spirit of disunion which has been ascribed to the South, Ishould know full well that I had no such foundation as this to relyupon--no such great reserve in the heart of the people to fall back uponin the hour of accountability. 

Mr. President, is there such incompatibility of interest between the twosections of this country that they can not profitably live together?Does the agriculture of the South injure the manufactures of the North?On the other hand, are they not their life-blood? And think you, if oneportion of the Union, however great it might be in commerce andmanufactures, was separated from all the agricultural districts, that itwould long maintain its supremacy? If any one so believes, let him turnto the written history of commercial states: let him look upon themoldering palaces of Venice; let him ask for the faded purple of Tyre, and visit the ruins of Carthage; there he will see written the fate ofevery country which rests its prosperity on commerce and manufacturesalone. United we have grown to our present dignity and power--united wemay go on to a destiny which the human mind cannot measure. Separated, Ifeel that it requires no prophetic eye to see that the portion of thecountry which is now scattering the seeds of disunion to which I havereferred will be that which will suffer most. Grass will grow on thepavements now worn by the constant tread of the human throng which waitson commerce, and the shipping will abandon your ports for those whichnow furnish the staples of trade. And we who produce the great staplesupon which your commerce and manufactures rest, we will produce thosestaples still; shipping will fill our harbors; and why may we not foundthe Tyre of modern commerce within our own limits? Why may we not bringthe manufacturers to the side of agriculture, and commerce, too, theready servant of both?

But, sir, I have no disposition to follow this subject. I certainly canderive no pleasure from the contemplation of anything which can impairthe prosperity of any portion of this Union; and I only refer to it thatthose who suppose we are tied by interest or fear should look thequestion in the face and understand that it is mainly a feeling ofattachment to the Union which has long bound, and now binds, the South. But, Mr. President, I ask Senators to consider how long affection can beproof against such trial, and injury, and provocation, as the South iscontinually receiving. 

The case in which this discrimination against the South is attempted, the circumstances under which it was introduced, render it especiallyoffensive. It will not be difficult to imagine the feeling with which aSouthern soldier during the Mexican war received the announcement thatthe House of Representatives had passed that odious measure, the WilmotProviso; and that he, although then periling his life, abandoning allthe comforts of home, and sacrificing his interests, was, by theLegislature of his country, marked as coming from a portion of the Unionwhich was not entitled to the equal benefits of whatever might resultfrom the service to which he was contributing whatever power hepossessed. Nor will it be difficult to conceive, of the many sons of theSouth whose blood has stained those battle-fields, whose ashes nowmingle with Mexican earth, that some, when they last looked on the flagof their country, may have felt their dying moments embittered by therecollection that that flag cast not an equal shadow of protection overthe land of their birth, the graves of their parents, and the homes oftheir children, so soon to be orphans. Sir, I ask Northern Senators tomake the case their own--to carry to their own firesides the idea ofsuch intrusion and offensive discrimination as is offered to us--realizethese irritations, so galling to the humble, so intolerable to thehaughty, and wake, before it is too late, from the dream that the Southwill tamely submit. Measure the consequences to us of your assumption, and ask yourselves whether, as a free, honorable, and brave people, youwould submit to it?

It is essentially the characteristic of the chivalrous that they neverspeculate upon the fears of any man, and I trust that no suchspeculations will be made upon the idea that may be entertained in anyquarter that the South, from fear of her slaves, is necessarily opposedto a dissolution of the Union. She has no such fear; her slaves would beto her now, as they were in the Revolution, an element of militarystrength. I trust that no speculations will be made upon either thecondition or the supposed weakness of the South. They will bring saddisappointments to those who indulge them. Rely upon her devotion to theUnion, rely upon the feeling of fraternity she inherited and has neverfailed to manifest; rely upon the nationality and freedom from seditionwhich have in all ages characterized an agricultural people; give herjustice, sheer justice, and the reliance will never fail you. 

Then, Mr. President, I ask that some substantial proposition may be madeby the majority in regard to this question. It is for those who have thepower to pass it to propose one. It is for those who are threatening uswith the loss of that which we are entitled to enjoy, to state, if therebe any compromise, what that compromise is. We are unable to pass anymeasure, if we propose it; therefore I have none to suggest. We areunable to bend you to any terms which we may offer; we are under the banof your purpose: therefore from you, if from anywhere, the propositionmust come. I trust that we shall meet it, and bear the responsibility asbecomes us; that we shall not seek to escape from it; that we shall notseek to transfer to other places, or other times, or other persons, thatresponsibility which devolves upon us; and I hope the earnestness whichthe occasion justifies will not be mistaken for the ebullition ofpassion, nor the language of warning be construed as a threat. Wecannot, without the most humiliating confession of the supremacy offaction, evade our constitutional obligations, and our obligations underthe treaty with Mexico to organize governments in the Territories ofCalifornia and New Mexico. I trust that we will not seek to escape fromthe responsibility, and leave the country unprovided for, unless by anirregular admission of new States; that we will act upon the goodexample of Washington in the case of Tennessee, and of Jefferson in thecase of Louisiana; that we will not, if we abandon those high standards, do more than come down to modern examples; that we will not go furtherthan to permit those who have the forms of government, under theConstitution, to assume sovereignty over territory of the United States;that we may at least, I say, assert the right to know who they are, howmany they are--where they voted, how they voted--and whose certificateis presented to us of the fact, before it is conceded to them todetermine the fundamental law of the country, and to prescribe theconditions on which other citizens of the United States may enter it. Toreach all this knowledge, we must go through the intermediate stage ofterritorial government. 

How will you determine what is the seal, and who are the officers, of acommunity unknown as an organized body to the Congress of the UnitedStates? Can the right be admitted in that community to usurp thesovereignty over territory which belongs to the States of the Union? Allthese questions must be answered before I can consent to any suchirregular proceeding as that which is now presented in the case ofCalifornia. 

Mr. President, thanking the Senate for the patience they have showntoward me, I again express the hope that those who have the power tosettle this distracting question--those who have the ability to restorepeace, concord, and lasting harmony to the United States--will give ussome substantial proposition, such as magnanimity can offer, and such aswe can honorably accept. I, being one of the minority in the Senate andthe Union, have nothing to offer, except an assurance of coöperation inanything which my principles will allow me to adopt, and which promisespermanent, substantial security. 

APPENDIX D. 

Speech of Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in the Senate of the United States(chiefly in answer to Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, on the message of thePresident of the United States transmitting to Congress the "LecomptonConstitution" of Kansas), February 8, 1858:

I wish to express not only my concurrence with the message of thePresident, but my hearty approbation of the high motive which actuatedhim when he wrote it. In that paper breathes the sentiment of a patriot, and it stands out in bold contrast with the miserable slang by which hewas pursued this morning. It may serve the purposes of a man who littleregards the Union to perpetrate a joke on the hazard of its dissolution. It may serve the purpose of a man who never looks to his own heart tofind there any impulses of honor, to arraign everybody, the Presidentand the Supreme Court, and to have them impeached and vilified on hismere suspicion. It ill becomes such a man to point to Southerninstitutions as to him a moral leprosy, which he is to pursue to the endof extermination, and, perverting everything, ancient and modern, tobring it tributary to his own malignant purposes. Not even could thatclause of the Constitution which refers to the importation or migrationof persons be held up to public consideration by the Senator [Mr. Fessenden] in a studied argument, save as a permission for theslave-trade. Then, everything that is most prominent in relation to theprotection of property in that instrument he holds to have been sweptaway by a statute which prohibited the further importation of Africans. The language of that clause of the Constitution is far broader than theimportation of Africans. It is not confined or limited at all to thatsubject. It says:

"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States nowexisting shall think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by theCongress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed onsuch importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. "

That was a power given to Congress far broader than the slave-trade; andyet the Senator gravely argues that, when that prohibition against thefurther importation of Africans took place by act of Congress, thenceforward the constitutional shield, which had been thrown overslave property, fell. Sir, it is the only private property in the UnitedStates which is specifically recognized in the Constitution andprotected by it. 

There was a time when there was a higher and holier sentiment among themen who represented the people of this country. As far back as the timeof the Confederation, when no narrow, miserable prejudice betweenNorthern and Southern men governed those who ruled the States, acommittee of three, two of whom were Northern men, reporting upon whatthey considered the bad faith of Spain in Florida, in relation tofugitive slaves, proposed that negotiations should be instituted torequire Spain to surrender, as the States did then surrender, allfugitives escaped into their limits. Hamilton and Sedgwick from theNorth, and Madison from the South, made that report--men, the loftinessof whose purpose and genius might put to shame the puny efforts now madeto disturb that which lies at the very foundation of the Governmentunder which we live. 

A man not knowing into what presence he was introduced, coming into thisChamber, might, for a large part of this session, have supposed thathere stood the representatives of belligerent States, and that, insteadof men assembled here to confer together for the common welfare, for thegeneral good, he saw here ministers from States preparing to make warupon each other; and then he would have felt that vain, indeed, was thevaunting of the prowess of one to destroy another. Or if, sir, he hadknown more--if he had recognized the representatives of the States ofthe Union--still he would have traced through this same eternal, pettyagitation about sectional success, that limit which can not fail, however the Senator from New York (Mr. Seward) may regret it, to bringabout a result which every man should, from his own sense of honor, feel, when he takes his seat in this Chamber, that he is morally boundto avoid as long as he retains possession of his seat. 

To express myself more distinctly: I hold that a Senator, while he sitshere as the representative of a State in the Federal Government, is inthe relation of a minister to a friendly court, and that the moment hesees this Government in hostility to his own, the day he resolves tomake war on this Government, his honor and the honor of his State compelhim to vacate the seat he holds. 

It is a poor evasion for any man to say: "I make war on the rights ofone whole section; I make war on the principles of the Constitution; andyet, I uphold the Union, and I desire to see it protected. " Underminethe foundation, and still pretend that he desires the fabric to stand!Common sense rejects it. No one will believe the man who makes theassertion, unless he believes him under the charitable supposition thathe knows not what he is doing. 

Sir, we are arraigned, day after day, as the aggressive power. WhatSouthern Senator, during this whole session, has attacked any portion, or any interest, of the North? In what have we now, or ever, back to theearliest period of our history, sought to deprive the North of anyadvantage it possessed? The whole charge is, and has been, that we seekto extend our own institutions into the common territory of the UnitedStates. Well and wisely has the President of the United States pointedto that common territory as the joint possession of the country. Jointlywe held it, jointly we enjoyed it in the earlier period of our country;but when, Senator from New York [Mr. Seward], though I did not believethat natural causes, if permitted to flow in their own channel, wouldhave produced any other result than the introduction of slave propertyinto the Territory of Kansas, I am free to admit that I have not yetreached the conclusion that that property would have permanentlyremained there. That is a question which interest decides. Vermont wouldnot keep African slaves, because they were not valuable to her; neitherwill any population, whose density is so great as to trade rapidly onthe supply of bread, be willing to keep and maintain an improvidentpopulation, to feed them in infancy, to care for them in sickness, toprotect them in age. And thus it will be found in the history ofnations, that, whenever population has reached that density in thetemperate zones, serfdom, villenage, or slavery, whatever it has beencalled, has disappeared. 

Ours presents a new problem, one not stated by those who wrote on it inthe earlier period of our history. It is the problem of a semi-tropicalclimate, the problem of malarial districts, of staple products. Thisproduces a result different from that which would be found in thefarming districts and cooler climates. A race suited to our labor existsthere. Why should we care whether they go into other Territories or not?Simply because of the war which is made against our institutions; simplybecause of the want of security which results from the action of ouropponents in the Northern States. Had you made no political war upon us, had you observed the principles of our confederacy as States, that thepeople of each State were to take care of their domestic affairs, or, inthe language of the Kansas bill, to be left perfectly free to form andregulate their institutions in their own way, then, I say, within thelimits of each State the population there would have gone on to attendto their own affairs, and would have had little regard to whether thisspecies of property, or any other, was held in any other portion of theUnion. You have made it a political war. We are on the defensive. Howfar are you to push us?

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. Clay] has been compelled to notice theresolutions of his State; nor does that State stand alone. To what issueare you now pressing us? To the conclusion that, because within thelimits of a Territory slaves are held as property, a State is to beexcluded from the Union. I am not in the habit of paying lip-service tothe Union. The Union is strong enough to confer favors; it is strongenough to command service. Under these circumstances, the man deservesbut little credit who sings pæans to its glory. If, through a life, nownot a short one, a large portion of which has been spent in the publicservice, I have given no better proof of my affection for this Unionthan by declarations, I have lived to little purpose, indeed. I think Ihave given evidence, in every form in which patriotism is ever subjectedto a test, and I trust, whatever evil may be in store for us by thosewho wage war on the Constitution and our rights under it, that I shallbe able to turn at least to the past and say, "Up to that period when Iwas declining into the grave, I served a Government I loved, and servedit with my whole heart. " Nor will I stop to compare services with thosegentlemen who have fair phrases, while they undermine the veryfoundation of the temple our fathers built. If, however, there be thosehere who do really love the Union, and the Constitution, which is thelife-blood of the Union, the time has come when we should look calmly, though steadily, the danger which besets us in the face. 

Violent speeches, denunciatory of people in any particular section ofthe Union, the arraignment of institutions which they inherited andintend to transmit, as leprous spots on the body-politic, are not themeans by which fraternity is to be preserved, or this Union renderedperpetual. These were not the arguments which our fathers made when, through the struggles of the Revolutionary War, they laid the foundationof the Union. These are not the principles on which our Constitution, abundle of compromises, was made. Then the navigating and theagricultural States did not war to see which could most injure theother; but each conceded something from that which it believed to be itsown interest to promote the welfare of the other. Those debates, whilethey brought up all that straggle which belongs to opposite interestsand opposite localities, show none of that bitterness which, sounfortunately, characterizes every debate in which this body isinvolved. 

The meanest thing--I do not mean otherwise than the smallestthing--which can arise among us, incidentally, runs into this sectionalagitation, as though it were an epidemic and gave its type to everydisease. Not even could the committees of this body, when we firstassembled, before any one had the excuse of excitement to plead, beorganized without sectional agitation springing up. Forcibly, I supposegravely and sincerely, it was contended here that a great wrong was donebecause New York, the great commercial State, and the emporium ofcommerce within her limits, was not represented upon the Committee ofCommerce. This will go forth to remote corners, and descend, perhaps, toafter-times, as an instance in which the Democratic party of the Senatebehaved with unfairness toward its opponents; for with it will notdescend the fact that the Democratic party only arranged for itself itsown portion of the committees, taking the control of them, and leftblanks on the committees to be filled by the Opposition; that theOpposition did fill the blanks; that the Opposition had both theSenators from New York, but did not choose to put either of them on thatcommittee, though it afterward formed the basis and staple of theircomplaint. 

Mr. President, I concur with my friend from Virginia [Mr. Hunter], andwhen I rose I did not intend to consume anything like so much time as Ihave occupied. I think there are points, which have been sprung upon theSenate to-day and heretofore, that require to be answered and to be met. Like my friend from Virginia, I shall feel that it devolves on me, as arepresentative in part of that constituency which is peculiarlyassailed, on another occasion to meet, and, if I am able, to answer, theallegations and accusations which have been heaped, as well on thesection in which I live as upon every man who has performed his duty byextending over them the protection for which our Constitution andGovernment were formed. 

APPENDIX E. 

In the summer of 1858, Mr. Davis being in Portland, Maine, a vastconcourse of its citizens assembled in front of his hotel to offer him awelcome to their city, whereupon he made to them an address, from whichthe following extracts are given:

Fellow-Citizens: Accept my sincere thanks for this manifestation of yourkindness. Vanity does not lead me so far to misconceive your purpose asto appropriate the demonstration to myself; but it is not the lessgratifying to me to be made the medium through which Maine tenders anexpression of regard to her sister, Mississippi. It is, moreover, withfeelings of profound gratification that I witness this indication ofthat national sentiment and fraternity which made us, and which alonecan keep us, one people. At a period but as yesterday, when comparedwith the life of nations, these States were separate, and in somerespects opposing colonies; their only relation to each other was thatof a common allegiance to the Government of Great Britain. So separate, indeed almost hostile, was their attitude, that when General Stark, ofBennington memory, was captured by savages on the head-waters of theKennebec, he was subsequently taken by them to Albany, where they wentto sell furs, and again led away a captive, without interference on thepart of the inhabitants of that neighboring colony to demand or obtainhis release. United as we now are, were a citizen of the United States, as an act of hostility to our country, imprisoned or slain in anyquarter of the world, whether on land or sea, the people of each andevery State of the Union, with one heart and with one voice, woulddemand redress, and woe be to him against whom a brother's blood criedto as from the ground! Such is the fruit of the wisdom and the justicewith which our fathers bound contending colonies into confederation, andblended different habits and rival interests into an harmonious whole, so that, shoulder to shoulder, they entered on the trial of theRevolution, and step with step trod its thorny paths until they reachedthe height of national independence, and founded the constitutionalrepresentative liberty which is our birthright.... 

By such men, thus trained and ennobled, our Constitution was framed. Itstands a monument of principle, of forecast, and, above all, of thatliberality which made each willing to sacrifice local interest, individual prejudice, or temporary good to the general welfare and theperpetuity of the republican institutions which they had passed throughfire and blood to secure. The grants were as broad as were necessary forthe functions of the general agent, and the mutual concessions weretwice blessed, blessing him who gave and him who received. Whatever wasnecessary for domestic government--requisite in the social organizationof each community--was retained by the States and the people thereof;and these it was made the duty of all to defend and maintain. Such, invery general terms, is the rich political legacy our fathers bequeathedto us. Shall we preserve and transmit it to posterity? Yes, yes, theheart responds; and the judgment answers, the task is easily performed. It but requires that each should attend to that which most concerns him, and on which alone he has rightful power to decide and to act; that eachshould adhere to the terms of a written compact, and that all shouldcoöperate for that which interest, duty, and honor demand. 

For the general affairs of our country, both foreign and domestic, wehave a national Executive and a national Legislature. Representativesand Senators are chosen by districts and by States, but their actsaffect the whole country, and their obligations are to the whole people. He, who, holding either seat, would confine his investigations to themere interests of his immediate constituents, would be derelict to hisplain duty; and he who would legislate in hostility to any section wouldbe morally unfit for the station, and surely an unsafe depositary, ifnot a treacherous guardian, of the inheritance with which we areblessed. No one more than myself recognizes the binding force of theallegiance which the citizen owes to the State of his citizenship, but, that State being a party to our compact, a member of the Union, fealtyto the Federal Constitution is not in opposition to, but flows from theallegiance due to, one of the United States. Washington was not less aVirginian when he commanded at Boston, nor did Gates or Greene weakenthe bonds which bound them to their several States by their campaigns inthe South. In proportion as a citizen loves his own State will he striveto honor her by preserving her name and her fame, free from the tarnishof having failed to observe her obligations and to fulfill her duties toher sister States. Each page of our history is illustrated by the namesand deeds of those who have well understood and discharged theobligation. Have we so degenerated that we can no longer emulate theirvirtues? Have the purposes for which our Union was formed lost theirvalue? Has patriotism ceased to be a virtue, and is narrow sectionalismno longer to be counted a crime? Shall the North not rejoice that theprogress of agriculture in the South has given to her great staple thecontrolling influence of the commerce of the world, and putmanufacturing nations under bond to keep the peace with the UnitedStates?

Shall the South not exult in the fact that the industry and perseveringintelligence of the North have placed her mechanical skill in the frontranks of the civilized world; that our mother-country, whose haughtyminister, some eighty-odd years ago, declared that not a hobnail shouldbe made in the colonies which are now the United States, was brought, some four years ago, to recognize our preëminence by sending acommission to examine our workshops and our machinery, to perfect theirown manufacture of the arms requisite for their defense? Do not ourwhole people, interior and seaboard, North, South, East, and West, alikefeel proud of the hardihood, the enterprise, the skill, and the courageof the Yankee sailor, who has borne our flag far as the ocean bears itsfoam, and caused the name and character of the United States to be knownand respected wherever there is wealth enough to woo commerce, andintelligence to honor merit? So long as we preserve and appreciate theachievements of Jefferson and Adams, of Franklin and Madison, ofHamilton, of Hancock, and of Rutledge, men who labored for the wholecountry, and lived for mankind, we can not sink to the petty strifewhich would sap the foundations and destroy the political fabric ourfathers erected and bequeathed as an inheritance to our posterity forever. 

Since the formation of the Constitution, a vast extension of territoryand the varied relations arising therefrom have presented problems whichcould not have been foreseen. It is just cause for admiration, evenwonder, that the provisions of the fundamental law should have been sofully adequate to all the wants of a government, new in itsorganization, and new in many of the principles on which it was founded. Whatever fears may have once existed as to the consequences ofterritorial expansion must give way before the evidence which the pastaffords. The General Government, strictly confined to its delegatedfunctions, and the State left in the undisturbed exercise of all else, we have a theory and practice which fit our Government for immeasurabledomain, and might, under a millennium of nations, embrace mankind. 

From the slope of the Atlantic our population, with ceaseless tide, haspoured into the wide and fertile valley of the Mississippi, with eddyingwhirl has passed to the coast of the Pacific; from the West and the Eastthe tides are rushing toward each other, and the mind is carried to theday when all the cultivable land will be inhabited, and the Americanpeople will sigh for more wilderness to conquer. But there is here aphysico-political problem presented for our solution. Were it purelyphysical, your past triumphs would leave but little doubt of yourcapacity to solve it. A community which, when less than twenty thousand, conceived the grand project of crossing the White Mountains, andunaided, save by the stimulus which jeers and prophecies of failuregave, successfully executed the herculean work, might well be impatientif it were suggested that a physical problem was before us too difficultfor mastery. The history of man teaches that high mountains and widedeserts have resisted the permanent extension of empire, and have formedthe immutable boundaries of states. From time to time, under some ableleader, have the hordes of the upper plains of Asia swept over theadjacent country, and rolled their conquering columns over SouthernEurope. Yet, after the lapse of a few generations, the physical law towhich I have referred has asserted its supremacy, and the boundaries ofthose states differ little now from those which were obtained threethousand years ago. 

Rome flew her conquering eagles over the then known world, and has nowsubsided into the little territory on which the great city wasoriginally built. The Alps and the Pyrenees have been unable to restrainimperial France; but her expansion was a feverish action, her advanceand her retreat were tracked with blood, and those mountain-ridges arethe reëstablished limits of her empire. Shall the Rocky Mountains provea dividing barrier to us? Were ours a central, consolidated Government, instead of a Union of sovereign States, our fate might be learned fromthe history of other nations. Thanks to the wisdom and independentspirit of our forefathers, this is not the case. Each State having solecharge of its local interests and domestic affairs, the problem, whichto others has been insoluble, to us is made easy. Rapid, safe, and easycommunication between the Atlantic and the Pacific will givecointelligence, unity of interest, and coöperation among all parts ofour continent-wide republic. The network of railroads which bind theNorth and the South, the slope of the Atlantic and the valley of theMississippi, together, testifies that our people have the power toperform, in that regard, whatever it is their will to achieve. 

We require a railroad to the States of the Pacific for present uses; thetime no doubt will come when we shall have need of two or three, it maybe more. Because of the desert character of the interior country, thework will be difficult and expensive. It will require the efforts of aunited people. The bickerings of little politicians, the jealousies ofsections, must give way to dignity of purpose and zeal for the commongood. If the object be obstructed by contention and division as towhether the route shall be Northern, Southern, or central, thehandwriting is on the wall, and it requires little skill to see thatfailure is the interpretation of the inscription. You are practicalpeople, and may ask, How is that contest to be avoided? By taking thequestion out of the hands of politicians altogether. Let the Governmentgive such aid as it is proper for it to render to the company whichshall propose the most feasible plan; then leave to capitalists, withjudgments sharpened by interest, the selection of the route, and thedifficulties will diminish, as did those which you overcame when youconnected your harbor with the Canadian provinces. 

It would be to trespass on your kindness, and to violate the proprietiesof the occasion, were I to detain the vast concourse which stands beforeme, by entering on the discussion of controverted topics, or by furtherindulging in the expression of such reflections as circumstancessuggest. I came to your city in quest of health and repose. From themoment I entered it you have showered upon me kindness and hospitality. Though my experience has taught me to anticipate good rather than evilfrom my fellow-man, it had not prepared me to expect such unremittingattentions as have here been bestowed. I have been jocularly asked inrelation to my coming here, whether I had secured a guarantee for mysafety, and lo! I have found it. I stand in the midst of thousands of myfellow-citizens. But, my friends, I came neither distrusting norapprehensive.... 

In the autumn of 1858 Mr. Davis visited Boston, and was invited toaddress a public meeting at Faneuil Hall. He was introduced by the Hon. Caleb Cushing, with whom he had been four years associated in theCabinet of President Pierce. Mr. Cushing's speech, on account of itsgreat merit, is inserted here, except some complimentary portions of it. 

Mr. President--Fellow Citizens: I present myself before you at theinstance of your chairman, not so much in order to occupy your time withobservations of my own, as to prepare you for that higher gratificationwhich you are to receive from the remarks of the eminent man herepresent to address you in the course of the evening. I will briefly andonly suggest to you such reflections as are appropriate to that duty. 

We are assembled here, my friends, at the call of the Democratic wardand county committee of Suffolk, for the purpose of ratifying thenominations made at the late Democratic State Convention--the nominationof our distinguished and honored fellow-citizen [Hon. Erasmus D. Beach]who has already addressed to you the words of wisdom and of patriotism;as also the nomination of others of our fellow-citizens, whom--if wemay--we ought, whom the welfare and the honor of our Commonwealth demandof us, to place in power in the stead of the existing authorities of theCommonwealth. I would to God it were in our power to say with confidencethat shall be done! ["It can be done. "] We do say that it shall notdepend upon us that it shall not be done. We do say that in so far asdepends upon us it shall be done; and whatsoever devoted love of ourcountry and our Commonwealth; whatsoever of our noble and holyprinciples; whatsoever desire to vindicate our Commonwealth from thestain that has so long rested upon the name may prompt us to do, that wewill do, leaving the result to the good providence of God. 

I say we are invited here by the ward and county committee to ratifythese nominations, and we do ratify them with our whole heart. And wepledge our most earnest efforts at the polls to give success to thesenominations. That call is comprehensive; it is addressed not only toDemocrats, but to all national men, and so it should be. We know fullwell that there are multitudes of men in this Commonwealth who opposethe Democratic party, but who are yet impelled toward us by sympathy forthe principles we profess, and by the repulsion they have toward theopinions and purposes of the leaders of the Republican party. Theysympathize with our principles, and we invite them to coöperate with usin the maintenance of the principles of the Constitution and in thevindication of the Commonwealth--all national men, whatsoever may havebeen their past party affinities. But, while we do so, we declare thatit is our belief that the Democratic party is now recognized as thatonly existing national party in the United States--the onlyconstitutional party--the only party which by its present principles iscompetent to govern these United States, whose principles are based uponthe Constitution--the only party with a platform coextensive with thisgreat Union--this is the great Democratic party. I have heard again andagain, remonstrances have been addressed to me more than once, becauseof the condemnation which Democratic speakers so continually utter aboutthe unnationality as well as the unconstitutionality of the Republicanparty. 

Let us reflect a moment; let us recall to mind that the honor of theexisting organization of this Federal Administration was by the votes ofthe people of these United States sustained when James Buchanan wasnominated for the Presidency, and that he is a worthy representative ofthe Democratic party. Let us reflect also that John C. Fremont wasnominated as the candidate of the Republican party. I pray you, gentlemen, to reflect upon the different methods by which thesenominations were presented to the people of the United States. On theone hand, there assembled at the Democratic Convention, at Cincinnati, the delegates of every one of the States in the Union. That Conventionwas national in its constitution, national in its character, national inits purpose, and cordially presented to the suffrages of the people ofthe United States a national candidate, a candidate of the whole UnitedStates; and that candidate was elected not by the votes of one sectionof the Union alone, or another section of the Union alone, but by theconcurrent votes of the South and the North. 

How was it on the other side? On the other side there assembled aconvention which, by the very tenor of its call, was confined to sixteenof the thirty-one States of the Union, which, by the very tenor of itscall, excluded from its councils fifteen of the thirty-one States of theUnion, a convention in which appeared the representatives of onlysixteen of the States of the Union--nay, I mistake--as to the remainingfifteen States of the Union, in their name, pretendedly in their nameand their behalf, there appeared one man--one man only--and he aself-appointed delegate by pretension from the State of Maryland. Thatwas the Convention which presented John C. Fremont to the people of theUnited States. I say that was a sectional Convention, a sectionalnomination, a sectional party; and no reasoning, no remonstrances, noprotestations, can discharge the Republican party from the ineffaceablestigma of that sectional Convention, that sectional nomination, and thatsectional candidate for the suffrages of the United States. That partyitself has placed upon its back that shirt of Nessus which clings to itand stings it to death. I repeat, then, and I say it in confidence andvindication, in so far as regards my own belief, I say it in all goodspirit toward multitudes of men in this Commonwealth of the Whig andAmerican parties in their heretofore organization; I say it tomultitudes of men who have been betrayed by the passions of the hourinto joining the sectional combinations of the Republican party; I saythat in the Democratic party and in that alone is the tower of strengthfor the liberties, the position, and the honor of the United States. Butwhy need I indulge in these reflections in proof of my proposition?Gentlemen, we have here this evening the living proof, the visible, tangible, audible, incontestable, immortal proof, that the position ofthe Democratic party, in the existing organization of parties, is thenational, constitutional party of the United States. Gentlemen, I askyou to challenge your memories, and look upon the history of the pastfour years of the United States, and can you point me to a Republicanassembly here, in the city of Boston, or anywhere else; can you point mein the last four years of our history to any occasion on which FaneuilHall has been crowded to its utmost capability with a Republicanassembly in which appeared any one of those preëminent statesmen of theSouthern States to honor not merely their States, but these UnitedStates? When, sir, did that ever happen? When, sir, was that a possiblefact, morally speaking, that any eminent Southern statesman appeared ina Republican assembly in any one of the States of this Union? Therenever was a Republican assembly--an assembly of the Republican party infifteen of these States--and I again ask, when, in the remaining sixteenStates, was there ever convened an assembly of the Republican partywhich, by reason of bigotry, proscriptive bigotry, of unnational hatredof the South, and of determined insult of all Southern statesmen, didnot render it an impossible fact that any Southern statesman should thusmake his appearance as a member in such Republican Convention? You knowit is so, gentlemen; and yet, have we not a common country? Did thosethirteen colonies which, commencing with that combat at Concord, andfollowing it with that battle at Bunker's Hill, and pursuing it in everybattlefield of this continent, did those thirteen colonies form onecountry or thirteen countries? Nay, did they form two countries, or onecountry? I would imagine when I listen to a Republican speech here inthe State of Massachusetts, when I read a Republican address inMassachusetts, I would imagine fifteen States of this Union--ourfellow-citizens or fellow-sufferers, our fellow-heroes of theRevolution--I would imagine not that they are our countrymen endeared tous by ties of consanguinity, but that they are from some foreigncountry, that they belong to some French or British or Mexican enemies. There never was a day in which the forces of war were marshaled againstthe most flagrant abuses toward these United States; there never was awar in which these United States have been engaged, never even in thedeath-struggle of the Revolution, never in our war for maritimeindependence, never in our war with France and Mexico, never was there atime when any party in these United States expressed, avowed, proclaimed, ostentatiously proclaimed more intense hostility to theBritish, French, Mexican enemy, than I have heard uttered or proclaimedconcerning our fellow-citizens--brothers in the fifteen States of thisUnion. It is the glory of the Democratic party that we can assume theburden of our nationality for the Union; that we can make all duesacrifices in order to show our reprobation of sectionalism, that we ofthe North can sacrifice to the South, from dear attachment to ourfellow-citizens of the South, and they in the South in like manner meetwith us upon that ground, in order to show their love for the FederalUnion, and at the risk of encountering local prejudices. In theDemocratic party alone, as parties are now organized, is this catholic, generous, universal spirit to be found. I say, then, the Democraticparty has such a character of constitutionality and of nationality. 

And now, gentlemen, I have allowed myself unthinkingly to be carriedbeyond my original purpose. I return to it to remind you that here amongus is a citizen of one of the Southern States, eloquent among the mosteloquent in debate, wise among the wisest in council, and brave amongthe bravest in the battle-field. A citizen of a Southern State who knowsthat he can associate with you, the representatives of the Democracy andthe nationality of Massachusetts, that he can associate with you onequal footing with the fellow-citizens and common members of theseUnited States. 

My friends, there are those here present, and in fact there is no onehere present of whom it can not be said that, in memory and admirationat least, and if not in the actual fact, yet in proud and boundingmemory, they have been able to tread the glorious tracks of thevictorious achievements of Jefferson Davis on the fields of Monterey andBuena Vista, and all have heard or have read the accents of eloquenceaddressed by him to the Senate of the United States; and there is one atleast who, from his own personal observation, can bear witness to thefact of the surpassing wisdom of Jefferson Davis in the administrationof the Government of the United States. Such a man, fellow-citizens, youare this evening to hear, and to hear as a beautiful illustration of theworking of our republican institutions of these United States; of therepublican institutions which in our own country, our own republic, asin the old republics of Athens and of Rome, exhibit the samecombinations of the highest military and civic qualities in the sameperson. It must naturally be so, for in a republic every citizen is asoldier, and every soldier a citizen. Not in these United States on theoccurrence of foreign war is that spectacle exhibited which we have sorecently seen in our mother-country, of the administration of thecountry going abroad begging and stealing soldiers throughout Europe andAmerica. No! And while I ask you, my friends, to ponder this fact inrelation to that disastrous struggle of giants which so recentlyoccurred in our day--the Crimean War--I ask you whether any Englishgentleman, any member of the British House of Commons, any member of theBritish House of Peers, abandoned the ease of home, abandoned his easyhours at home, and went into the country among his friends, tenants, andfellow-countrymen, volunteering there to raise troops for the service ofEngland in that hour of her peril; did any such fact occur? No! But herein these United States we had examples, and illustrious ones, of thefact that men, eminent in their place in Congress, abandoned theirstations and their honors to go among fellow-citizens of their ownStates, and there raise troops with which to vindicate the honor and theflag of their country. Of such men was Jefferson Davis. 

There is now living one military man of prominent distinction in thepublic eye of England and the United States--I mean Sir Colin Campbell, now Lord Clyde of Clydesdale. He deserves the distinction he enjoys, forhe has redeemed the British flag on the ensanguined, burning plains ofIndia. He has restored the glory of the British name in Asia. I honorhim. Scotland, England, Wales, and Ireland are open, for their counties, as well as their countries, and their poets, orators, and statesmen, andtheir generals, belong to our history as well as theirs. I will neverdisavow Henry V on the plains of Agincourt; never Oliver Cromwell on thefields of Marston Moor and Naseby; never Sarsfield on the banks of theBoyne. The glories and honors of Sir Colin Campbell are the glories ofthe British race, and the races of Great Britain and Ireland, from whomwe are descended. 

But what gained Sir Colin Campbell the opportunity to achieve thoseglorious results in India? Remember that, and let us see what it was. Onone of those bloody battles fought by the British before the fortress ofSebastopol, in the midst of the perils, the most perilous of all thebattle-fields England ever encountered in Europe, in one of the bloodycharges of the Russian cavalry, there was an officer--a man who felt andwho possessed sufficient confidence in the troops he commanded, and inthe authority of his own voice and example--received that charge not inthe ordinary, commonplace, and accustomed manner, by forming his troopsinto a hollow square, and thus arresting the charge, but by forming intotwo diverging lines, and thus receiving upon the rifles of hisHighlandmen the charge of the Russian cavalry and repelling it. How allEngland rang with the glory of that achievement! How the general voiceof England placed upon the brows of Sir Colin Campbell the laurels ofthe future mastership of victory for the arms of England! And well theymight do so. But who originated that movement; who set the example ofthat gallant operation--who but Colonel Jefferson Davis, of the FirstMississippi Regiment, on the field of Buena Vista? He was justlyentitled to the applause of the restorer of victory to the arms of theUnion. Gentlemen, in our country, in this day, such a man, such a masterof the art of war, so daring in the field, such a man may not onlyaspire to the highest places in the executive government of the Union, but such a man may acquire what nowhere else, since the days of Cimonand Miltiades, of the Cincinnati and the Cornelii of Athens and of Rome, has been done by the human race, the combination of eminent powers, ofintellectual cultivation, and of eloquence with the practical, qualitiesof a statesman and general. 

But, gentlemen, I am again betrayed beyond my purpose. Sir [addressingGeneral Davis], we welcome you to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Youmay not find here the ardent skies of your own sunny South, but you willfind as ardent hearts, as warm and generous hands to welcome you to ourCommonwealth. We welcome you to the city of Boston, and you have alreadyexperienced how open-hearted, how generous, how free from all possibletaint of sectional thought are the hospitality and cordiality of thecity of Boston. We welcome you to Faneuil Hall. Many an eloquent voicehas in all times resounded from the walls of Faneuil Hall. It is saidthat no voice is uttered by man in this air we breathe but enters intothat air. It continues there immortal as the portion of the universeinto which it has passed. If it be so, how instinct is Faneuil Hall withthe voice of the great, good, and glorious of past generations, and ofour own, whose voices have echoed through its walls, whose eloquentwords have thrilled the hearts of hearers, as if a pointed sword werepassing them through and through. Here Adams aroused his countrymen inthe War of Independence, and Webster invoked them almost with the dyingbreath of his body--invoked with that voice of majesty and power whichhe alone possessed--invoked them to a union between the North and South. Ay, sir, and who, if he were here present, who from those blest abodeson high from which he looks down upon us would congratulate us for thisscene. First, and above all, because his large heart would haveappreciated the spectacle of a statesman eminent among the most eminentof the Southern States here addressing an assembly of the people in thecity of Boston. Because, in the second place, he would have rememberedthat, though divided from you by party relations, in one of the criticalhours of his fame and his honor, your voice was not wanting for hisvindication in the Congress of the United States. Sir, again, I say wewelcome you to Faneuil Hall. 

And now, my fellow-citizens, I will withdraw myself and present to youthe Hon. Jefferson Davis. 

Address of Jefferson Davis, at Faneuil Hall, Boston, October 12, 1858. 

Countrymen, Brethren, Democrats: Most happy am I to meet you, and tohave received here renewed assurance--of that which I have so longbelieved--that the pulsation of the Democratic heart is the same inevery parallel of latitude, on every meridian of longitude, throughoutthe United States. It required not this to confirm me in a belief I haveso long and so happily enjoyed. Your own great statesman [the Hon. CalebCushing], who has introduced me to this assembly, has been too longassociated with me, too nearly connected, we have labored too manyhours, until one day ran into another, in the cause of our country, forme to fail to understand that a Massachusetts Democrat has a heart aswide as the Union, and that its pulsations always beat for the libertyand happiness of his country. Neither could I be unaware that such wasthe sentiment of the Democracy of New England. For it was my fortunelately to serve under a President drawn from the neighboring State ofNew Hampshire, and I know that he spoke the language of his heart, for Ilearned it in four years of intimate relations with him, when he said heknew "no North, no South, no East, no West, but sacred maintenance ofthe common bond and true devotion to the common brotherhood. " Never, sir, in the past history of our country, never, I add, in its futuredestiny, however bright it may be, did or will a man of higher and purerpatriotism, a man more devoted to the common weal of his country, holdthe helm of our great ship of state, than Franklin Pierce. 

I have heard the resolutions read and approved by this meeting; I haveheard the address of your candidate for Governor; and these, added tothe address of my old and intimate friend, General Cushing, bear to mefresh testimony, which I shall be happy to carry away with me, that theDemocracy, in the language of your own glorious Webster, "still lives";lives, not as his great spirit did, when it hung 'twixt life and death, like a star upon the horizon's verge, but lives like the germ that isshooting upward; like the sapling that is growing to a mighty tree, andI trust it may redeem Massachusetts to her glorious place in the Union, when she led the van of the defenders of State rights. 

When I see Faneuil Hall thus thronged it reminds me of another meeting, when it was found too small to contain the assembly that met here, onthe call of the people, to know what should be done in relation to thetea-tax, and when, Faneuil Hall being too small, they went to the oldSouth Church, which still stands a monument of your early day. I hopethe time will soon come when many Democratic meetings in Boston will betoo large for Faneuil Hall. I am welcomed to this hall, so venerable forall the associations of our early history; to this hall of which you areso justly proud, and the memories of which are part of the inheritanceof every American citizen; and I felt, as I looked upon it, andremembered how many voices of patriotic fervor have filled it--how herethe first movement originated from which the Revolution sprang; how herebegan the system of town meetings and free discussion--that, though mytheme was more humble than theirs, as befitted my humbler powers, I hadenough to warn me that I was assuming much to speak in this sacredchamber. But, when I heard your distinguished orator say that wordsuttered here could never die, that they lived and became a part of thecircumambient air, I feel a hesitation which increases upon me with theremembrance of his expressions. But, if those voices which breathed thefirst impulse into the colonies--now the United States--to proclaimindependence, and to unite for resistance against the power of themother-country--if those voices live here still, how must they fare whocome here to preach treason to the Constitution and to assail the unionof these States? It would seem that their criminal hearts would fearthat those voices, so long slumbering, would break silence, that thoseforms which hang upon these walls behind me might come forth, and thatthe sabers so long sheathed would leap from their scabbards to drivefrom this sacred temple those who desecrate it as did the money-changerswho sold doves in the temple of the living God. 

Here you have, to remind you, and to remind all who enter this hall, theportraits of those men who are dear to every lover of liberty, and partand parcel of the memory of every American citizen; and highest amongthem all I see you have placed Samuel Adams and John Hancock. You haveplaced them the highest, and properly; for they were two, the only two, excepted from the proclamation of mercy, when Governor Gage issued hisanathema against them and against their fellow-patriots. These men, thusexcepted from the saving grace of the crown, now occupy the highestplaces in Faneuil Hall, and thus seem to be the highest in the reverenceof the people of Boston. This is one of the instances in which we findtradition so much more reliable than history; for tradition has bornethe name of Samuel Adams to the remotest of the colonies, and the newStates formed out of what was territory of the old colonies; and thereit is a name as sacred among us as it is among you. 

We all remember how early he saw the necessity of communityindependence. How, through the dim mists of the future, and in advanceof his day, he looked forward to the proclamation of the independence ofMassachusetts; how he steadily strove, through good report and evilreport, with a great, unwavering heart, whether in the midst of hisfellow-citizens, cheered by their voices, or communing with his ownheart, when driven from his home, his eyes were still fixed upon hisfirst, last hope, the community independence of Massachusetts! Always acommanding figure, we see him, at a later period, the leader in thecorrespondence which waked the feelings of the other colonies to unitedfraternal association--the people of Massachusetts with the people ofthe other colonies--there we see his letters acknowledging the receiptof rice of South Carolina, and the money of New York andPennsylvania--all these poured in to relieve Boston of the sufferingsinflicted upon her when the port was closed by the despotism of theBritish crown--we see the beginning of that which insured thecoöperation of the colonies throughout the desperate struggle of theRevolution. And we there see that which, if the present generation betrue to the memory of their sires, to the memory of the noble men fromwhom they descended, will perpetuate for them that spirit of fraternityin which the Union began. But it is not here alone, nor in reminiscencesconnected with the objects which present themselves within this hall, that the people of Boston have much to excite their patriotism and carrythem back to the great principles of the Revolutionary struggle. Wherewill you go and not meet some monument to inspire such sentiments? Go toLexington and Concord, where sixty brave countrymen came with theirfowling-pieces to oppose six hundred veterans--where they forced thoseveterans back, pursuing them on the road, fighting from every barn, andbush, and stock, and stone, till they drove them, retreating, to theships from which they went forth! And there stand those monuments ofyour early patriotism, Breed's and Bunker's Hills, whose soil drank themartyr-blood of men who lived for their country and died for mankind!Can it be that any of you should tread that soil and forget the greatpurposes for which those men died? While, on the other side, rise theheights of Dorchester, where once stood the encampment of the Virginian, the man who came here, and did not ask, Is this a town of Virginia? but, Is this a town of my brethren? The steady courage and cautious wisdom ofWashington availed to drive the British troops out from the city whichthey had so confidently held. Here, too, you find where once the oldLiberty Tree, connected with so many of your memories, grew. You askyour legend, and learn that it was cut down for firewood by Britishsoldiers, as some of your meeting-houses were destroyed; they burned theold tree, and it warmed the soldiers long enough to leave town, and, hadthey burned it a little longer, its light would have shown Washingtonand his followers where their enemies were. 

But they are gone, and never again shall a hostile foot set its imprintupon your soil. Your harbor is being fortified, to prevent an unexpectedattack on your city by a hostile fleet. But woe to the enemy whose fleetshall bear him to your shores to set his footprint upon your soil; hegoes to a prison or to a grave! American fortifications are not builtfrom any fear of invasion, they are intended to guard points wheremarine attacks can be made; and, for the rest, the hearts of Americansare our ramparts. 

But, my friends, it is not merely in these associations, so connectedwith the honorable pride of Massachusetts, that one who visits Bostonfinds much for gratification, hope, and instruction. If I were selectinga place where the advocate of strict construction, the extreme expounderof democratic State-rights doctrine should go for his texts, I wouldsend him into the collections of your historical associations. Insteadof going to Boston as a place where only consolidation would be found, he would find written, in letters of living light, that sacred creed ofState rights which has been miscalled the ultra opinions of the South;he could find among your early records that this Faneuil Hall, theproperty of the town at the time when Massachusetts was under a colonialgovernment, administered by a man appointed by the British crown, guarded by British soldiers, was refused to a British Governor in whichto hold a British festival, because he was going to bring with him theagents for collecting, and naval officers sent here to enforce, anoppressive tax upon your Commonwealth. Such was the proud spirit ofindependence manifested even in your colonial history. Such is the greatfoundation-stone on which may be erected an eternal monument of Staterights. And so, in an early period of our country, you findMassachusetts leading the movements, prominent of all the States, in theassertion of that doctrine which has been recently so much belied. Having achieved your independence, having passed through theConfederation, you assented to the formation of our presentconstitutional Union. You did not surrender your sovereignty. Yourfathers had sacrificed too much to claim, as a reward of their toil, merely that they should have a change of masters; and a change ofmasters it would have been had Massachusetts surrendered her Statesovereignty to the central Government, and consented that that centralGovernment should have the power to coerce a State. But, if this powerdoes not exist, if this sovereignty has not been surrendered, then, whocan deny the words of soberness and truth spoken by your candidate thisevening, when he has pleaded to you the cause of State independence, andthe right of every community to be judge of its own domestic affairs?This is all we have ever asked--we of the South, I mean--for I standbefore you as one of those who have always been called the ultra men ofthe South, and I speak, therefore, for that class; and I tell you thatyour candidate for Governor has uttered to-night everything which wehave claimed as a principle for our protection. And I have found thesame condition of things in the neighboring State of Maine. I have foundthat the Democrats there asserted the same broad constitutionalprinciple for which we have been contending, by which we are willing tolive, for which we are willing to die!

In this state of the case, my friends, why is the country agitated? Theold controversies have passed away, or they have subsided, and have beencovered up by one dark pall of somber hue, which increases with everypassing year. Why is it, then, I say, that you are thus agitated inrelation to the domestic affairs of other communities? Why is it thatthe peace of the country is disturbed in order that one people may judgeof what another people may do? Is there any political power to authorizesuch interference? If so, where is it? You did not surrender yoursovereignty. You gave to the Federal Government certain functions. Itwas your agent, created for specified purposes. It can do nothing savethat which you have given it power to perform. Where is the grant? Hasit a right to determine what shall be property? Surely not; that belongsto every community to decide for itself; you judge in your case--everyother State must judge in its case. The Federal Government has no powerto destroy property. Do you pay taxes, then, to an agent, that he maydestroy your property? Do you support him for that purpose? It is anabsurdity on the face of it. To ask the question is to answer it. TheGovernment is instituted to protect, not to destroy, property. And, inabundance of caution, your fathers provided that the Federal Governmentshould not take private property for its own use unless by making duecompensation therefor. It is prohibited from attempting to destroyproperty. One of its great purposes was protection to the States. Whenever that power is made a source of danger, we destroy the purposefor which the Government was formed. 

Why, then, have you agitators? With Pharisaical pretension it issometimes said it is a moral obligation to agitate, and I suppose theyare going through a sort of vicarious repentance for other men's sins. With all due allowance for their zeal, we ask, how do they decide thatit is a sin? By what standard do they measure it? Not the Constitution;the Constitution recognizes the property in slaves in many forms, andimposes obligations in connection with that recognition. Not the Bible;that justifies it. Not the good of society; for, if they go where itexists, they find that society recognizes it as good. What, then, istheir standard? The good of mankind? Is that seen in the diminishedresources of the country? Is that seen in the diminished comfort of theworld? Or is not the reverse exhibited? Is there, in the cause ofChristianity, a motive for the prohibition of the system which is theonly agency through which Christianity has reached that inferior race, the only means by which they have been civilized and elevated? Or istheir piety manifested in denunciation of their brethren, who aredeterred from answering their denunciation only by the contempt whichthey feel for a mere brawler, who intends to end his brawling only inempty words?

What, my friends, must be the consequences? Good or evil? They have beenevil, and evil they must be only to the end. Not one particle of goodhas been done to any man, of any color, by this agitation. It has beeninsidiously working the purpose of sedition, for the destruction of thatUnion on which our hopes of future greatness depend. 

On the one side, then, you see agitation tending slowly and steadily tothat separation of States, which, if you have any hope connected withthe liberty of mankind; if you have any national pride connected withmaking your country the greatest on the face of the earth; if you haveany sacred regard for the obligations which the deeds and the blood ofyour fathers entailed upon you, that hope should prompt you to rejectanything that would tend to destroy the result of that experiment whichthey left it to you to conclude and perpetuate. On the other hand, ifeach community, in accordance with the principles of our Government, should regard its domestic interests as a part of the common whole, andstruggle for the benefit of all, this would steadily lead us tofraternity, to unity, to coöperation, to the increase of our happinessand the extension of the benefits of our useful example over mankind. The flag of the Union, whose stars have already more than doubled theiroriginal number, with its ample folds may wave, the recognized flag ofevery State or the recognized protector of every State upon theContinent of America. 

In connection with the view which I have presented of the early idea ofcommunity independence, I will add the very striking fact that one ofthe colonies, about the time they had resolved to unite for the purposeof achieving their independence, addressed the Colonial Congress to knowin what condition it would be in the interval between its separationfrom the Government of Great Britain and the establishment of agovernment on this continent. The answer of the Colonial Congress wasexactly what might have been expected--exactly what State-rightsDemocracy would answer to-day to such an inquiry--that they "had nothingto do with it. " If such sentiment had continued, if it had governed inevery State, if representatives had been chosen upon it, then your hallsof Federal legislation would not have been disturbed about the questionof the domestic institutions of the different States. The peace of thecountry would not be hazarded by the arraignment of the family relationsof people over whom the Government has no control. If in harmony workingtogether, with co-intelligence for the conservation of the interests ofthe country--if protection to the States and the other great ends forwhich the Government was established, had been the aim and united effortof all--what effects would not have been produced? As our Governmentincreases in expansion it would increase in its beneficent effect uponthe people; we should, as we grow in power and prosperity, also grow infraternity, and it would be no longer a wonder to see a man coming froma Southern State to address a Democratic audience in Boston. 

But I have referred to the fact that Massachusetts stood preëminentlyforward among those who asserted community independence: and thisreminds me of another incident. President Washington visited Boston whenJohn Hancock was Governor, and Hancock refused to call upon thePresident, because he contended that any man who came within the limitsof Massachusetts must yield rank and precedence to the Governor of theState. He eventually only surrendered the point on account of hispersonal regard and respect for the character of George Washington. Ihonor him for this, and value it as one of the early testimonies infavor of State rights. I wish all our Governors had the same regard forthe dignity of the State as had the great and glorious John Hancock. 

In the beginning the founders of this Government were true democraticState-rights men. Democracy was State rights, and State rights wasdemocracy, and it is so to-day. Your resolutions breathe it. TheDeclaration of Independence embodied the sentiments which had lived inthe hearts of the country for many years before its formal assertion. Our fathers asserted the great principle--the right of the people tochoose their own government--and that government rested upon the consentof the governed. In every form of expression it uttered the same idea, community independence and the dependence of the Union upon thecommunities of which it consisted. It was an American declaration of theunalienable right of man; it was a general truth, and I wish it wereaccepted by all men. But I have said that this State sovereignty--thiscommunity independence--has never been surrendered, and that there is nopower in the Federal Government to coerce a State. Will any one ask me, then, how a State is to be held to the fulfillment of its obligations?My answer is, by its honor. The obligation is the more sacred to observeevery feature of the compact, because there is no power to enforce it. The great error of the Confederation was, that it attempted to act uponthe States. It was found impracticable, and our present form ofgovernment was adopted, which acts upon individuals, and is not designedto act upon States. The question of State coercion was raised in theConvention which framed the Constitution, and, after discussion, theproposition to give power to the General Government to enforce againstany State obedience to the laws was rejected. It is upon the ground thata State can not be coerced that observance of the compact is a sacredobligation. It was upon this principle that our fathers depended for theperpetuity of a fraternal Union, and for the security of the rights thatthe Constitution was designed to preserve. The fugitive slave compact inthe Constitution of the United States implied that the States shouldfulfill it voluntarily. They expected the States to legislate so as tosecure the rendition of fugitives; and in 1778 it was a matter ofcomplaint that the Spanish colony of Florida did not restore fugitivenegroes from the United States who escaped into that colony, and acommittee, composed of Hamilton, of New York, Sedgwick, ofMassachusetts, and Mason, of Virginia, reported resolutions in theCongress, instructing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to address the_chargé d'affaires_ at Madrid to apply to his Majesty of Spain to issueorders to his governor to compel them to secure the rendition offugitive negroes. This was the sentiment of the committee, and theyadded, also, that the States would return any slaves from Florida whomight escape into their limits. 

When the constitutional obligation was imposed, who could have doubtedthat every State, faithful to its obligations, would comply with therequirements of the Constitution, and waive all questions as to whetherthe institution should or should not exist in another community overwhich they had no control? Congress was at last forced to legislate onthe subject, and they have continued, up to a recent period, tolegislate, and this has been one of the causes by which you have beendisturbed. You have been called upon to make war against a law whichneed never to have been enacted, if each State had done the duty whichshe was called upon by the Constitution to perform. 

Gentlemen, this presents one phase of agitation--negro agitation: thereis another and graver question, it is in relation to the prohibition byCongress of the introduction of slave property into the Territories. What power does Congress possess in this connection? Has it the right tosay what shall be property anywhere? If it has, from what clause of theConstitution does it derive that power? Have other States the power toprescribe the condition upon which a citizen of another State shallenter upon and enjoy territory--common property of all? Clearly not. Shall the inhabitants who first go into the Territory deprive anycitizen of the United States of those rights which belong to him as anequal owner of the soil? Certainly not. Sovereign jurisdiction can onlypass to these inhabitants when the States, the owners of that Territoryshall recognize their right to become an equal member of the Union. Until then, the Constitution and the laws of the Union must be the rulegoverning within the limits of a Territory. 

The Constitution recognizes all property, and gives equal privileges toevery citizen of the States; and it would be a violation of itsfundamental principles to attempt any discrimination. 

There is nothing of truth or justice with which to sustain thisagitation, or ground for it, unless it be that it is a very good bridgeover which to pass into office; a little stock of trade in politicsbuilt up to aid men who are missionaries staying at home; reformers ofthings which they do not go to learn; preachers without a congregation;overseers without laborers and without wages; war-horses who snuff thebattle afar off and cry: "Aha! aha! I am afar off. "

Thus it is that the peace of the Union is disturbed; thus it is thatbrother is arrayed against brother; thus it is that the people come toconsider not how they can promote each other's interests, but how theymay successfully war upon them. And among the things most odious to mymind is to find a man who enters upon a public office, under thesanction of the Constitution, and taking an oath to support theConstitution--the compact between the States binding each for the commondefense and general welfare of the other--and retaining to himself amental reservation that he will war upon the institutions and theproperty of any of the States of the Union. It is a crime too low tocharacterize as it deserves before this assembly. It is one which woulddisgrace a gentleman--one which a man with self-respect would nevercommit. To swear that he will support the Constitution, to take anoffice which belongs in many of its relations to all the States, and touse it as a means of injuring a portion of the States of whom he is thusan agent, is treason to everything that is honorable in man. It is thebase and cowardly attack of him who gains the confidence of another inorder that he may wound him. But I have often heard it argued, and Ihave seen it published: I have seen a petition that was circulated forsigners, announcing that there was an incompatibility between thedifferent sections of the Union; that it had been tried long enough, andthat they must get rid of those sections in which the curse of slaveryexisted. Ah! those sages, so much wiser than our fathers, have found outthat there is incompatibility in that which existed when the Union wasformed. They have found an incompatibility inconsistent with union, inthat which existed when South Carolina sent her rice to Boston, andMaryland and Pennsylvania and New York brought in their funds for herrelief. The fact is that, from that day to this, the difference betweenthe people of the colonies has been steadily diminishing, and thepossible advantages of union in no small degree augmented. The varietyof product of soil and of climate has been multiplied, both by theexpansion of our country and by the introduction of new tropicalproducts not cultivated at that time; so that every motive to unionwhich your fathers had, in a diversity which should give prosperity tothe country, exists in a higher degree to-day than when this Union wasformed, and this diversity is fundamental to the prosperity of thepeople of the several sections of the country. 

It is, however, to-day, in sentiment and interest, less than on the daywhen the Declaration of Independence was made. Diversity thereis--diversity of character--but it is not of that extreme kind whichproves incompatibility; for your Massachusetts man, when he comes intoMississippi, adopts our opinions and our institutions, and frequentlybecomes the most extreme man among us. As our country has extended, asnew products have been introduced into it, this Union and the free tradethat belongs to it have been of increasing value. And I say, moreover, that it is not an unfortunate circumstance that this diversity ofpursuit and character still remains. Originally it sprang in no smalldegree from natural causes. Massachusetts became a manufacturing andcommercial State because of her fine harbors--because of herwater-power, making its last leap into the sea, so that the ship ofcommerce brought the staple to the manufacturing power. This made you acommercial and a manufacturing people. In the Southern States greatplains interpose between the last leaps of the streams and the sea. Those plains were cultivated in staple crops, and the sea brought theirproducts to your streams to be manufactured. This was the firstbeginning of the differences. 

Then your longer and more severe winters, your soil not so favorable foragriculture, in a degree kept you a manufacturing and a commercialpeople. Even after the cause had passed away--after railroads had beenbuilt--after the steam-engine had become a motive power for a large partof manufacturing machinery, the natural causes from which your peopleobtained a manufacturing ascendancy and ours became chieflyagriculturists continued to act in a considerable measure to preservethat relation. Your interest is to remain a manufacturing, and ours toremain an agricultural people. Your prosperity, then, is to receive ourstaple and to manufacture it, and ours to sell it to you and buy themanufactured goods. This is an interweaving of interests which makes usall the richer and happier. 

But this accursed agitation, this intermeddling with the affairs ofother people, is that alone which will promote a desire in the mind ofany one to separate these great and glorious States. The seeds ofdissension may be sown by invidious reflections. Men may be goaded bythe constant attempts to infringe upon rights and to disturbtranquillity, and in the resentment which follows it is not possible totell how far the wave may rush. I therefore plead to you now to arrest afanaticism which has been evil in the beginning and must be evil in theend. You may not have the numerical power requisite; and those at adistance may not understand how many of you there are desirous to put astop to the course of this agitation. For me, I have learned since Ihave been in New England the vast mass of true State-rights Democrats tobe found within its limits--though not represented in the halls ofCongress. And if it comes to the worst--if, availing themselves of amajority in the two Houses of Congress, they should attempt to trampleupon the Constitution; if they should attempt to violate the rights ofthe States; if they should attempt to infringe upon our equality in theUnion--I believe that even in Massachusetts, though it has not had arepresentative in Congress for many a day, the State-rights Democracy, in whose breasts beats the spirit of the Revolution, can and will whipthe black Republicans. I trust we shall never be thus purified, as itwere, by fire; but that the peaceful, progressive revolution of theballot-box will answer all the glorious purposes of the Constitution andthe Union. And I marked that the distinguished orator and statesman whopreceded me, in addressing you, used the words "national" and"constitutional" in such relation to each other as to show that in hismind the one was a synonym of the other. I say so: we became national bythe Constitution, the bond for uniting the States, and national andconstitutional are convertible terms. 

Your candidate for the high office of Governor--whom I have been once ortwice on the point of calling Governor, and whom I hope I may be ablesoon to call so--in his remarks to you has presented the same idea inanother form. And well may Massachusetts orators, without evenperceiving what they are saying, utter sentiments which lie at thefoundation of your colonial as well as your subsequent politicalhistory, which existed in Massachusetts before the Revolution, and haveexisted ever since, whenever the true spirit which comes down from theRevolutionary sires has swelled and found utterance within her limits. 

It has been not only, my friends, in this increasing and mutualdependence of interest that we have found new ties to you. Those bondsare both material and mental. Every improvement or invention, everyconstruction of a railroad, has formed a new reason for our being one. Every new achievement, whether it has been in arts or science, in war orin manufactures, has constituted for us a new bond and a new sentimentholding us together. 

Why, then, I would ask, do we see these lengthened shadows which followin the course of our political history? Is it because our sun isdeclining to the horizon? Are they the shadows of evening, or are they, as I hopefully believe, but the mists which are exhaled by the sun as itrises, but which are to be dispersed by its meridian glory? Are they butthe little evanishing clouds that flit between the people and the greatobjects for which the Constitution was established? I hopefully looktoward the reaction which will establish the fact that our sun is stillin the ascendant--that that cloud which has so long covered ourpolitical horizon is to be dispersed--that we are not again to bedivided on parallels of latitude and about the domestic institutions ofStates--a sectional attack on the prosperity and tranquillity of anation--but only by differences in opinion upon measures of expediency, upon questions of relative interest, by discussions as to the powers ofthe States and the rights of the States, and the powers of the FederalGovernment--such discussion as is commemorated in this picture of yourown great and glorious Webster, when he specially addressed our best, most tried, and greatest man, the pure and incorruptible Calhoun, represented as intently listening to catch the accents of eloquence thatfell from his lips. Those giants strove each for his conviction, notagainst a section--not against each other; they stood to each other inthe relation of personal affection and esteem, and never did I see Mr. Webster so agitated, never did I hear his voice falter, as when hedelivered the eulogy on John C. Calhoun. 

But allusion was made to my own connection with your great and favoritedeparted statesman. Of that I will only say, on this occasion, that veryearly in my Congressional life Mr. Webster was arraigned for an offensewhich affected him most deeply. He was no accountant, and all knew that. He was arraigned on a pecuniary charge--the misapplication of what isknown as the secret-service fund--and I was one of the committee thathad to investigate the charge. I endeavored to do justice. I endeavoredto examine the evidence with a view to ascertain the truth. It is true Iremembered that he was an eminent American statesman. It is true that asan American I hoped he would come out without a stain upon his garments. But I entered upon the investigation to find the truth and to dojustice. The result was, he was acquitted of every charge that was madeagainst him, and it was equally my pride and my pleasure to vindicatehim in every form which lay within my power. No one that knew DanielWebster could have believed that he would ever ask whether a charge wasmade against a Massachusetts man or a Mississippian. No! It belonged toa lower, to a later, and I trust a shorter-lived race of statesmen, whomeasure all facts by considerations of latitude and longitude. 

I honor that sentiment which makes us oftentimes too confident, and todespise too much the danger of that agitation which disturbs the peaceof the country. I respect that feeling which regards the Union as toostrong to be broken. But, at the same time, in sober judgment, it willnot do to treat too lightly the danger which has existed and stillexists. I have heard our Constitution and Union compared to the graniteshores which face the sea, and, dashing back the foam of the waves, stand unmoved by their fury. Now I accept the simile: and I have stoodupon the shore, and I have seen the waves of the sea dash upon thegranite of your own shores which frowns over the ocean, have seen thespray thrown back from the cliffs. But, when the tide had ebbed, I sawthat the rock was seamed and worn; and, when the tide was low, thepieces that had been riven from the granite rock were lying at its base. 

And thus the waves of sectional agitation are dashing themselves againstthe granite patriotism of the land. But even that must show the seamsand scars of the conflict. Sectional hostility will follow. The dangerlies at your door, and it is time to arrest it. Too long have we allowedthis influence to progress. It is time that men should go back to thefirst foundation of our institutions. They should drink the waters ofthe fountain at the source of our colonial and early history. 

You, men of Boston, go to the street where the massacre occurred in1770. There you should learn how your fathers strove for communityrights. And near the same spot you should learn how proudly thedelegation of democracy came to demand the removal of the troops fromBoston, and how the venerable Samuel Adams stood asserting the rights ofdemocracy, dauntless as Hampden, clear and eloquent as Sidney; and howthey drove out the myrmidons who had trampled on the rights of thepeople. 

All over our country, these monuments, instructive to the presentgeneration, of what our fathers did, are to be found. In the library ofyour association for the collection of your early history, I found aletter descriptive of the reading of the church service to his army byGeneral Washington, during one of those winters when the army wasill-clad and without shoes, when he built a little log-cabin for ameeting-house, and there, reading the service to them his sight failedhim, he put on his glasses and, with emotion which manifested thereality of his feelings, said, "I have grown gray in serving my country, and now I am growing blind. "

By the aid of your records you may call before you the day when thedelegation of the army of the democracy of Boston demanded compliancewith its requirements for the removal of the troops. A painfullythrilling case will be found in the heroic conduct of your fathers'friends, the patriots in Charleston, South Carolina. The prisoners wereput upon the hulks, where the small-pox existed, and where they werebrought on shore to stay the progress of the infection, and wereoffered, if they would enlist in his Majesty's service, release from alltheir sufferings, present and prospective; while, if they would not, therations would be taken from their families, and they would be sent backto the hulks and again exposed to the infection. Emaciated as they were, with the prospect of being returned to confinement, and their familiesturned out into the streets, the spirit of independence, the devotion toliberty, was so supreme in their breasts, that they gave one loud huzzafor General Washington, and went to meet death in their loathsomeprison. From these glorious recollections, from the emotions which theycreate, when the sacrifices of those who gave you the heritage ofliberty are read in your early history, the eye is directed to ourpresent condition. Mark the prosperity, the growth, the honorable careerof your country under the voluntary union of independent States. I donot envy the heart of that American whose pulse does not beat quicker, and who does not feel within him a high exultation and pride, in thepast glory and future prospects of his country. With these prospects areassociated--if we are only wise, true, and faithful, if we shunsectional dissension--all that man can conceive of the progression ofthe American people. And the only danger which threatens those highprospects is that miserable spirit which, disregarding the obligationsof honor, makes war upon the Constitution; which induces men to assumepowers they do not possess, trampling as well upon the great principleswhich lie at the foundation of the Declaration of Independence, and theConstitution of the Union, as upon the honorable obligations which werefixed upon them by their fathers. They with internecine strife wouldsacrifice themselves and their brethren to a spirit which is a disgraceto our common country. With these views, it will not be surprising, tothose who most differ from me, that I feel an ardent desire for thesuccess of this State-rights Democracy; that, convinced as I am of theill consequences of the described heresies unless they be corrected; ofthe evils upon which they would precipitate the country unless they arerestrained--I say, none need be surprised if, prompted by suchaspirations, and impressed by such forebodings as now open themselvesbefore me, I have spoken freely, yielding to motives I would suppressand can not avoid. I have often, elsewhere than in the State of which Iam a citizen, spoken in favor of that party which alone is national, inwhich alone lies the hope of preserving the Constitution and theperpetuation of the Government and of the blessings which it wasordained and established to secure. 

My friends, my brethren, my countrymen, I thank you for the patientattention you have given me. It is the first time it has ever befallenme to address an audience here. It will probably be the last. Residingin a remote section of the country, with private as well as publicduties to occupy the whole of my time, it would only be for a veryhurried visit, or under some such necessity for a restoration to healthas brought me here this season, that I could ever expect to remain longamong you, or in any other portion of the Union than the State of whichI am a citizen. 

I have staid long enough to feel that generous hospitality which evincesitself to-night, which has evinced itself in Boston since I have beenhere, and showed itself in every town and village of New England where Ihave gone. I have staid here, too, long enough to learn that, though notrepresented in Congress, there is a large mass of as true Democrats asare to be found in any portion of the Union within the limits of NewEngland. Their purposes, their construction of the Constitution, theirhopes for the future, their respect for the past, is the same as thatwhich exists among my beloved brethren in Mississippi.... 

In the hour of apprehension I shall turn back to my observations here, in this consecrated hall, where men so early devoted themselves toliberty and community independence; and I shall endeavor to impress uponothers, who know you only as you are represented in the two Houses ofCongress, how true and how many are the hearts that beat forconstitutional liberty, and faithfully respect every clause andguarantee which the Constitution contains for any and every portion ofthe Union. 

APPENDIX F. 

Speech of Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in the Senate of the United States, on the resolutions offered by him relative to the relations of theStates, the Federal Government, and the Territories, May 7, 1860. 

Mr. President: Among the many blessings for which we are indebted to ourancestry is that of transmitting to us a written Constitution; a fixedstandard to which, in the progress of events, every case may bereferred, and by which it may be measured. But for this, the wise menwho formed our Government dared not have hoped for its perpetuity; forthey saw, floating down the tide of time, wreck after wreck, marking theshort life of every republic which had preceded them. With this, however, to check, to restrain, and to direct their posterity, theymight reasonably hope the Government they founded should last for ever;that it should secure the great purposes for which it was ordained andestablished; that it would be the shield of their posterity equally inevery part of the country, and equally in all time to come. It was thiswhich mainly distinguished the formation of our Government from thoseconfederacies or republics which had preceded it; and this is the bestfoundation for our hope to-day. The resolutions which have been read, and which I had the honor to present to the Senate, are little more thanthe announcement of what I hold to be the clearly-expressed declarationsof the Constitution itself. To that fixed standard it is sought, at thistime, when we are drifting far from the initial point, and when cloudsand darkness hover over us, to bring back the Government, and to testour condition to-day by the rules which our fathers laid down for us inthe beginning. 

The differences which exist between different portions of the country, the rivalries and the jealousies of to-day, though differing in degree, are exactly of the nature of those which preceded the formation of theConstitution. Our fathers were aware of the different interests of thenavigating and planting States, as they were then regarded. They soughtto compose those difficulties, and, by compensating advantages given byone to the other, to form a Government equal and just in its operation, and which, like the gentle showers of heaven, should fall twice blessed, blessing him that gives and him that receives. This beneficial actionand reaction between the different interests of the country constitutedthe bond of union and the motive of its formation. They constitute itto-day, if we are sufficiently wise to appreciate our interests, andsufficiently faithful to observe our trust. Indeed, with the extensionof territory, with the multiplication of interests, with the varieties, increasing from time to time, of the products of this great country, thebonds which bind the Union together should have increased. Rationallyconsidered, they have increased, because the free trade which wasestablished in the beginning has now become more valuable to the peopleof the United States than their trade with all the rest of the world. 

I do not propose to argue questions of natural rights and inherentpowers. I plant my reliance upon the Constitution; that Constitutionwhich you have all sworn to support; that Constitution which you havesolemnly pledged yourself to maintain while you hold the seat you nowoccupy in the Senate; to which you are bound in its spirit and in itsletter, not grudgingly, but willingly, to render your obedience andsupport as long as you hold office under the Federal Government. 

When the tempter entered the garden of Eden and induced our commonmother to offend against the law which God had given to her throughAdam, he was the first teacher of that "higher law" which sets the willof the individual above the solemn rule which he is bound, as a part ofevery community, to observe. From the effect of the introduction of thathigher law in the garden of Eden, and the fall consequent upon it, camesin into the world; and from sin came death and banishment andsubjugation, as the punishment of sin; the loss of life, unfetteredliberty, and perfect happiness followed from that first great law whichwas given by God to fallen man. 

Why, then, shall we talk about natural rights? Who is to define them?Where is the judge who is to sit over the court to try natural rights?What is the era at which you will fix the date by which you willdetermine the breadth, the length, and the depth of those called therights of nature? Shall it be after the fall, when the earth was coveredwith thorns, and man had to earn his bread in the sweat of his brow? Orshall it be when there was equality between the sexes, when he lived inthe garden, when all his wants were supplied, and when thorns andthistles were unknown on the face of the earth? Shall it be then? Shallit be after the flood, when, for the first sin committed after thewaters retired from the face of the earth, the doom of slavery was fixedupon the mongrel descendants of Ham? If after the flood, and after thatdecree, how idle is all this prating about natural rights as standingabove the obligations of civil government! The Constitution is the lawsupreme to every American. It is the plighted faith of our fathers; itis the hope of our posterity. I say, then, I come not to argue questionsoutside of or above the Constitution, but to plead the cause of right, of law and order, under the Constitution and to plead it to those whohave sworn to abide by that obligation. 

One of the fruitful sources, as I hold it, of the errors which prevailin our country, is the theory that this is a Government of one people;that the Government of the United States was formed by a mass. TheGovernment of the United States is a compact between the sovereignmembers who formed it; and, if there be one feature common to all thecolonies planted upon the shores of America, it is desire for communityindependence. It was for this the Puritan, the Huguenot, the Catholic, the Quaker, the Protestant, left the land of their nativity, and, guidedby the shadows thrown by the fires of European persecution, they soughtand found the American refuge of civil and religious freedom. While theyexisted as separate and distinct colonies they were not forbearingtoward each other. They oppressed opposite religions. They did not comehere with the enlarged idea of no established religion. The Puritansdrove out the Quakers; the Church-of-England men drove out theCatholics. Persecution reigned through the colonies, except, perhaps, that of the Catholic colony of Maryland; but the rule was--persecution. Therefore, I say the common idea, and the only common idea, wascommunity independence--the right of each independent people to do asthey pleased in their domestic affairs. 

The Declaration of Independence was made by the colonies, each foritself. The recognition of their independence was not for the coloniesunited, but for each of the colonies which had maintained itsindependence; and so, when the Constitution was formed, the delegateswere not elected by the people _en masse_, but they came from each oneof the States; and when the Constitution was formed it was referred, notto the people _en masse_, but to the States severally, and severally bythem ratified and approved. But, if there be anything which enforcesthis idea more than another, it is the unequal dates at which itreceived this approval. From first to last, nearly two years and a halfelapsed; and the Government went into operation something like a year--Ibelieve more than a year--before the last ratification was made. Is itthen contended that, by this ratification and adoption of theConstitution, the States surrendered that sovereignty which they hadpreviously gained? Can it be that men who braved the perils of theocean, the privations of the wilderness, who fought the war of theRevolution, in the hour of their success, when all was sunshine andpeace around them, came voluntarily forward to lay down that communityindependence for which they had suffered so much and so long? Reasonforbids it; but, if reason did not furnish a sufficient answer, theaction of the States themselves forbids it. The great State of NewYork--great, relatively, then, as she is now--manifested her wisdom innot receiving merely that implication which belongs to the occasion, which was accepted by the other States, but she required the positiveassertion of that retention of her sovereignty and power over all heraffairs as the condition on which she ratified the Constitution itself. I read from Elliott's "Debates" (page 327). Among her resolutions ofratification is the following:

"That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoeverit shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by the said Constitution clearlydelegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments ofthe Government thereof, remain to the people of the several States, orto their respective State governments to which they may have granted thesame. "

North Carolina, with the Scotch caution which subsequent events have sowell justified, in 1788 passed this resolution:

"_Resolved_, That a declaration of rights, asserting and securing fromencroachments the great principles of civil and religious liberty, andthe unalienable rights of the people, together with amendments to themost ambiguous and exceptionable parts of the said Constitution ofGovernment, ought to be laid before Congress and the convention of theStates that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the saidConstitution, for their consideration, previous to the ratification ofthe Constitution aforesaid, on the part of the State of North Carolina. "

And in keeping with this North Carolina withheld her ratification; sheallowed the Government to be formed with the number of States which wasrequired to put it in operation, and still she remained out of theUnion, asserting and recognized in the independence which she hadmaintained against Great Britain, and which she had no idea ofsurrendering to any other power; and the last State which ratified theConstitution long after it had in fact gone into effect, Rhode Island, in the third of her resolutions, says:

"III. That the powers of government may be reassumed by the peoplewhensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness. That the rightsof the States respectively to nominate and appoint all State officers, and every other power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the saidConstitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, orthe departments of Government thereof, remain to the people of theseveral States, or their respective State governments to whom they mayhave granted the same. "

Here the use of the phrase "State governments" shows how utterlyunwarrantable the construction has been, to say that the reference herewas to the whole people of the States--to the people of all theStates--and not to the people of each of the States severally. 

I spoke, however, Mr. President, but a moment ago, of the difference ofpolitics, products, population, constituting the great motive for theUnion. It was, indeed, its necessity. Had all the people been alike--hadtheir institutions all been the same--there would have been no interestto bring them together; there would have been no cause or necessity forany restraint being imposed upon them. It was the fact that theydiffered which rendered it necessary to have some law governing theirintercourse. It was the fact that their products were opposite--thattheir pursuits were various--that rendered it the great interest of thepeople that they should have free trade existing among each other; thatfree trade which Franklin characterized as being between the States suchas existed between the counties of England. 

Since that era, however, a fiber then unknown in the United States, andthe production of which is dependent upon the domestic institution ofAfrican slavery, has come to be cultivated in such amounts, to enter sointo the wearing apparel of the world, so greatly to add to the comfortof the poor, that it may be said to-day that that little fiber, cotton, wraps the commercial world and binds it to the United States in bonds tokeep the peace with us which no Government dare break. It has built upthe Northern States. It is their great manufacturing interest to-day. Itsupports their shipping abroad. It enables them to purchase in themarkets of China, when the high premium to be paid on the milled dollarwould otherwise exclude them from that market. These are a part of theblessings resulting from that increase and variety of product whichcould not have existed if we had all been alike; which would have beenlost to-day unless free trade between the United States was stillpreserved. 

And here it strikes me as somewhat strange that a book recently issuedhas received the commendation of a large number of the representativesof the manufacturing and commercial States, though, apart from itsfalsification of statistics and low abuse of Southern States, institutions, and interests, the great feature which stands prominentlyout from it is the arraignment of the South for using their surplusmoney in buying the manufactures of the North. How a manufacturing andcommercial people can be truly represented by those who would inculcatesuch doctrines as these, is to me passing strange. Is it vain boastingwhich renders you anxious to proclaim to the world that we buy ourbuckets, our rakes, and our shovels from you? No, there is too much goodsense in the people for that; and, therefore, I am left at a loss tounderstand the motive, unless it be that deep-rooted hate which makesyou blind to your own interest when that interest is weighed in thebalance with the denunciation and detraction of your brethren of theSouth. 

The great principle which lay at the foundation of this fixed standard, the Constitution of the United States, was the equality of rightsbetween the States. This was essential; it was necessary; it was a stepwhich had to be taken first, before any progress could be made. It wasthe essential requisite of the very idea of sovereignty in the State; ofa compact voluntarily entered into between sovereigns; and it is thatequality of right under the Constitution on which we now insist. Butmore: when the States united they transferred their forts, theirarmament, their ships, and their right to maintain armies and navies, tothe Federal Government. It was the disarmament of the States, under theoperation of a league which made the warlike operations, the powers ofdefense, common to them all. Then, with this equality of the States, with this disarmament of the States, if there had been nothing in theConstitution to express it, I say the protection of every constitutionalright would follow as a necessary incident, and could not be denied byany one who could understand and would admit the true theory of such aGovernment. 

We claim protection, first, because it is our right; secondly, becauseit is the duty of the General Government; and, thirdly, because we haveentered into a compact together, which deprives each State of the powerof using all the means which it might employ for its own defense. Thisis the general theory of the right of protection. What is the exceptionto it? Is there an exception? If so, who made it? Does the Constitutiondiscriminate between different kinds of property? Did the Constitutionattempt to assimilate the institutions of the different Statesconfederated together? Was there a single State in this Union that wouldhave been so unfaithful to the principles which had prompted them intheir colonial position, and which had prompted them, at a still earlierperiod, to seek and try the temptations of the wilderness; is there onewhich would have consented to allow the Federal Government to control orto discriminate between her institutions and those of her confederateStates?

But, if it be contended that this is argument, and that you needauthority, I will draw it from the fountain; from the spring before ithad been polluted; from the debates in the formation of theConstitution; from the views of those who at least it will be admittedunderstood what they were doing. 

Mr. Randolph, it will be recollected, introduced a _projet_ for aGovernment, consisting of a series of resolutions. Among them was onewhich proposed to give Congress the power "to call forth the force ofthe Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its dutyunder the articles thereof. " That was, to give Congress the power tocoerce the States; to bring the States into subjection to the FederalGovernment. Now, sir, let us see how that was treated; and first I willrefer to one whose wisdom, as we take a retrospective view, seems to memarvelous. Not conspicuous in debate, at least not among the names whichfirst occur when we think of that bright galaxy of patriots andstatesmen, he was the man who, above all others, it seems to me, laidhis finger upon every danger, and indicated the course which that dangerwas to take. I refer to Mr. Mason. 

"Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confederation wasdeficient in not providing for coercion and punishment againstdelinquent States, but argued very cogently that punishment could not, in the nature of things, be executed on the States collectively; and, therefore, that such a Government was necessary as could directlyoperate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt requiredit. "[199]

Mr. Madison, who has been called sometimes the father of theConstitution, upon the same question, said:

"A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to providefor its own destruction. The use of force against a State would lookmore like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, andwould probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution ofall previous compacts by which it might be bound. "

Mr. Hamilton, who, if I were to express a judgment by way of comparison, I would say was the master intellect of the age in which he lived, whosemind seemed to penetrate profoundly every question with which hegrappled, and who seldom failed to exhaust the subject which hetreated--Mr. Hamilton, in speaking of the various powers necessary tomaintain a Government, came to clause four:

"4. Force, by which may be understood a _coercion of laws, or coercionof arms_. Congress have not the former, except in few cases. Inparticular States, this coercion is nearly sufficient; though he heldit, in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military forceis absolutely necessary in large communities. Massachusetts is nowfeeling this necessity, and making provision for it. But how can thisforce be exerted on the States collectively? It is impossible. Itamounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers, also, will not beidle spectators. They will interpose; the confusion will increase; and adissolution of the Union will ensue. "

The consequence was, the proposition was lost. In support of this sameidea of community independence, which I have suggested, the argumentupon the proposition least likely to have exhibited it, that to givepower to restrain the slave-trade, shows the Northern and Southern menall arguing and presenting different views, yet concurred in this, thatthere could be no power to restrain a State from importing what shepleased. As the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer] looks somewhatsurprised at my statement, I will refer to the authority. Mr. Rutledgesaid:

"Religion and humanity had nothing to do with this question. Interestalone is the governing principle with nations. The true question atpresent is, whether the Southern States shall or shall not be parties tothe Union. If the Northern States consult their interest, they will notoppose the increase of slaves, which will increase the commodities ofwhich they will become the carriers. "[200]

Mr. Pinckney: "South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibitsthe slave-trade. In every proposed extension of the powers of Congress, that State has expressly and watchfully excepted that of meddling withthe importation of negroes. If the States be all left at liberty on thissubject, South Carolina may, perhaps, by degrees, do of herself what iswished, as Virginia and Maryland already have done. "[201]

"Mr. Sherman was for leaving the clause as it stands. He disapproved ofthe slave-trade; yet, as the States were now possessed of the right toimport slaves, as the public good did not require it to be taken fromthem, and as it was expedient to have as few objections as possible tothe proposed scheme of government, he thought it best to leave thematter as we find it. "[202]

"Mr. Baldwin had conceived national objects alone to be before theConvention: not such as, like the present, were of a local nature. Georgia was decided on this point. That State has always hithertosupposed a General Government to be the pursuit of the central States, who wished to have a vortex for everything; that her distance wouldpreclude her from equal advantage; and that she could not prudentlypurchase it by yielding national powers. From this, it might beunderstood in what light she would view an attempt to abridge one of herfavorite prerogatives. 

"If left to herself, she may probably put a stop to the evil. As oneground for this conjecture, he took notice of the sect of ----, which, he said was a respectable class of people who carried their ethicsbeyond the mere _equality of men_, extending their humanity to theclaims of the whole animal creation. "[203]

"Mr. Gerry thought we had nothing to do with the conduct of the Statesas to slaves, but ought to be careful not to give any sanction toit. "[204]

"Mr. King thought the subject should be considered in a political lightonly. If two States will not agree to the Constitution, as stated on oneside, he could affirm with equal belief, on the other, that great andequal opposition would be experienced from the other States. He remarkedon the exemption of slaves from duty, while every other import wassubjected to it, as an inequality that could not fail to strike thecommercial sagacity of the Northern and Middle States. "[205]

Here, as will be observed, everywhere was recognized and admitted thedoctrine of community independence and State equality--no interferencewith the institutions of a State--no interference even prospectivelysave and except with their consent; and thus it followed that at onetime it was proposed to except, from the power to prohibit the furtherintroduction of Africans, those States which insisted upon retaining thepower; and finally it was agreed that a date should be fixed beyondwhich, probably, none of them desired to retain it. These were Statesacting in their sovereign capacity; they possessed power to do as theypleased; and that was the view which they took of it. I ask, then, howare we, their descendants, those holding under their authority, toassume a power which they refused to admit, upon principles eternal andlying at the foundation of the Constitution itself?

If, then, there be no such distinction or discrimination; if protectionbe the duty (and who will deny it?) with which this Government ischarged, and for which the States pay taxes, because of which theysurrendered their armies and their navies; if general protection be thegeneral duty, I ask, in the name of reason and constitutional right--Iask you to point me to authority by which a discrimination is madebetween slave-property and any other. Yet this is the question nowfraught with evil to our country. It is this which has raised thehurricane threatening to sweep our political institutions before it. This is the dark spot which some already begin to fear may blot out theconstellation of the Union from the political firmament of mankind. Doesit not become us, then, calmly to consider it, justly to weigh it; tohold it in balances from which the dust has been blown, in order that wemay see where truth, right, and the obligations of the Constitutionrequire us to go?

It may be pardoned to one who, from his earliest youth up, has beenconnected with a particular party, who has always believed that thewelfare and the safety of the country most securely rested with thatparty, who has seen in the triumph of Democracy the triumph of theUnion, and who has believed for years past that the downfall ofDemocracy would be its destruction--it may be pardoned, I say, undersuch circumstances as these, to such a person as that, to refer even inthis connection to that feature of the particular point which I amdiscussing, which has been brought forward by the recent action of thatparty. States met together to consult as brethren, to see whether theycould agree as well upon the candidate as upon the creed, and it wasapparent that division had entered into our ranks. After days ofdiscussion, we saw that party convention broken. We saw the enemies ofDemocracy waiting to be invited to its funeral, and jestingly lookinginto the blank faces of those of us to whom the telegraph brought thesad intelligence. I hope this is, however, but the mist of the morning. I have faith in the Democracy, and that it still lives. I have faith inthe patriotism and in the good sense of the Democracy, that they willassert the truth, boldly pronounce it, meet the issue, and I trust inthe good sense and patriotism of the people for their success. 

In this connection, it may be permissible to review our present partycondition. For a long time two parties divided the people of the UnitedStates. The controversy was mainly upon questions of expediency;sometimes of constitutionality. They divided men in all of the States. The contest was sometimes won by one, and sometimes by the other. TheWhig party lives now but in history, yet it has a history of which anyof its members may be proud. It bore the high but not successful part ofstemming the tide of popular impulse, and thus failed to attain thehighest power. Differing from them upon the points at issue, I offer thehomage of my respect to those who, adhering to what they believed to betrue, go down sooner than find success in the abandonment of principle. With the disappearance of that party--and perhaps for the very reasonsthat caused its disappearance--up rose radical organizations who strodeso far beyond progressive Democracy that Democracy took the place nowleft vacant by the old Whig party, and became the reservoir into whichall conservatism was poured. Therefore it is that so many of those men, eminent in their day, eminent for their services, eminent in theirhistory, have approved of the Democratic party in the present conditionof the country as the only conservative element which remains in ourpolitics. In the midst of this radicalism, of this revolutionarytendency, it becomes not the regret of a partisan merely; it is thesadness of an American citizen, that the party on which the conservativehopes of the country hang has been threatened with division, andpossibly may not hereafter be united. Thanks to a sanguine temperament, thanks to an abiding faith, thanks to a confidence in the Providencewhich has so long ruled for good the destiny of my country, I believe itwill reunite, and reunite upon sound and acceptable principles. Atleast, I hope so. 

From the postulates which I have laid down result the fourth and fifthresolutions. They are the two which I expect to be opposed. They containthe assertion of the equality of rights of all the people of the UnitedStates in the Territories, and they declare the obligation of theCongress to see these rights protected. I admit that the United Statesmay acquire eminent domain. I admit that the United States may havesovereignty over territory; otherwise the sovereign jurisdiction whichwe obtained by conquest or treaty would not pass to us. I deny thattheir agent, the Federal Government, under the existing Constitution, can have eminent domain; I deny that it can have sovereignty. I considerit as the mere agent of the States--an agent of limited power; and thatit can do nothing save that which the Constitution empowers it toperform; and that, though the treaty or the deed of cession may director control, it can not enlarge or expand the powers of the Congress;that it is not sovereign in any essential particular. It has functionsto perform, and those functions I propose now to consider. 

The power of Congress over the Territories--a subject not well definedin the Constitution of the United States--has been drawn from varioussources by different advocates of that power. One has found it in thegrant of power to dispose of the Territory and other public property. That is to say, because the agent was authorized to sell a particularthing, or to dispose of it by grant or barter, therefore he hassovereign power over that and all else which the principal, constitutinghim an agent, may hereafter acquire! The property, besides the land, consisted of forts, of ships, of armaments, and other things which hadbelonged to the States in their separate capacity, and were turned overto the Government of the Confederation, and transferred to theGovernment of the United States, and of this, together with the land sotransferred, the Federal Government had the power to dispose; and ofterritory thereafter acquired, of arms thereafter made or purchased, offorts thereafter constructed, or custom-houses, or docks, or lights, orbuoys; of all these, of course, it had power to dispose. It had thepower to create them; it must, of necessity, have had the power todispose of them. It was only necessary to confer the power to dispose ofthose things which the Federal Government did not create, of thosethings which came to it from the States, and over which they mightsignify their will for its control. 

I look upon it as the mere power to dispose of, for considerations andobjects defined in the trust, the land held in the United States, noneof which then was within the limits of the States, and the other publicproperty which the United States received from the States after theformation of the Union. I do not agree with those who say the Governmenthas no power to establish a temporary and civil government within aTerritory. I stand half-way between the extremes of squatter sovereigntyand of Congressional sovereignty. I hold that the Congress has power toestablish a civil government; that it derives it from the grants of theConstitution--not the one which is referred to; and I hold that thatpower is limited and restrained, first, by the Constitution itself, andthen by every rule of popular liberty and sound discretion, to thenarrowest limits which the necessities of the case require. The Congresshas power to defend the territory, to repel invasion, to suppressinsurrection; the Congress has power to see the laws executed. For thisit may have a civil magistracy--territorial courts. It has the power toestablish a Federal judiciary. To that Federal judiciary, from theselocal courts, may come up to be decided questions with regard to thelaws of the United States and the Constitution of the United States. These, combined, give power to establish a temporary government, sufficient, perhaps, for the simple wants of the inhabitants of aTerritory, until they shall acquire the population, until they shallhave the resources and the interests which justify them in becoming aState. I am sustained in this view of the case by an opinion of theSupreme Court of the United States in 1845, in the case of Pollard'sLessee _vs_. P. Hagan (3 Howard, 222, 223), in which the Court say:

"Taking the legislative acts of the United States, and the States ofVirginia and Georgia, and their deeds of cession to the United States, and giving to each separately, and to all jointly, a fairinterpretation, we must come to the conclusion that it was the intentionof the parties to invest the United States with the eminent domain ofthe country ceded, both national and municipal, for the purposes oftemporary government; and to hold it in trust for the performance of thestipulations and conditions expressed in the deeds of cession and thelegislative acts connected with them. "

This was a question of land. It was land lying between high and lowwater, over which the United States claimed to have and to exerciseauthority, because of the terms on which Alabama had been admitted intothe Union. In that connection the Court say, in the same case:

"When Alabama was admitted into the Union, on an equal footing with theoriginal States, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date ofthe cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the publiclands remaining in the possession and under the control of the UnitedStates for the temporary purpose provided for in the deeds of cessionand the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained in theUnited States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the publiclands; and if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to theUnited States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative;because the United States has no constitutional capacity to exercisemunicipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain within the limitsof a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expresslygranted. "

Another case arose not long afterward, in which not land, but religion, was involved, where suit was brought against the municipality of NewOrleans because they would not allow a dead body to be exposed at aplace where, according to the religious rites of those interested, itwas deemed they had a right thus to expose it. On that the Supreme Courtsay, speaking of the ordinance for the government of Louisiana:

"So far as they conferred political rights and secured civil andreligious liberties (which are political rights) the laws of Congresswere all suspended by the State Constitution; nor is any part of them inforce, unless they were adopted by the Constitution of Louisiana, aslaws of the State. "[206]

Thus we find the Supreme Court sustaining the proposition that theFederal Government has power to establish a temporary civil governmentwithin the limits of a Territory, but that it can enact no law whichwill endure beyond the temporary purposes for which such government wasestablished. In other cases the decisions of the Court run in the sameline; and in 1855 the then Attorney-General, most learned in hisprofession--and in what else is he not learned, for he may be said to bea man of universal acquirements?--Attorney-General Cushing then foretoldwhat must have been the decision of the Supreme Court on the MissouriCompromise, anticipating the decision subsequently made in the case ofDred Scott; that decision for which the venerable justices have been sooften and so violently arraigned. He foretold it as the necessaryconsequence from the line of precedents descending from 1842, affirmedand reaffirmed in different cases, and now bearing on a case similar inprinciple, and only different in the mere reference to the subjectinvolved from those which had gone before. As connected with thedecision which had agitated the peace of the country; as theanticipation of that decision before it was made, viewing it as thenecessary consequence of the decisions which the court had made before;if it be the pleasure of the Senate, I ask my friend from South Carolina[Mr. Chesnut] to read for me a letter of the Attorney-General, being anofficial answer made by him in relation to the military reservationwhich was involved in the question before him. 

Mr. Chesnut read from the "Opinions of the Attorneys-General, " vol. Vii, page 575:

"The Supreme Court has determined that the United States never held anymunicipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in the territoryof which any of the new States have been formed, except for temporarypurposes, and to execute the trusts created by the deeds of cession.... 

"By the force of the same principle, and in the same line ofadjudications, the Supreme Court would have had to decide that theprovision of the act of March 6, 1820, which undertakes to determine inadvance the municipal law of all that portion of the original provinceof Louisiana which lies north of the parallel 36° 30' north latitude, was null and void _ab incepto_, if it had not been repealed by a recentact of Congress. (Compare iv, Statutes at Large, p. 848, and x, Statutesat Large, p. 289. ) For an act of Congress which pretends of right, andwithout consent or compact, to impose on the municipal power of any newState or States limitations and restrictions not imposed on all, iscontrary to the fundamental condition of the Confederation, according towhich there is to be equality of right between the old and new States'in all respects whatsoever. '"

Mr. Davis: It was not long after this official opinion of theAttorney-General before the case arose on which the decision was madewhich has so agitated the country. Fortunate indeed was it for thepublic peace that land and religion had been decided--those questions onwhich men might reason had been the foundation of judicialdecision--before that which drives all reason, it seems, from the mindof man, came to be presented the question whether Cuffee should be keptin his normal condition or not; the question whether the Congress of theUnited States could decide what might or might not be property in aTerritory--the case being that of an officer of the army sent into aTerritory to perform his public duty, having taken with him his negroslave. The court, however, in giving their decision in this case--ortheir opinion, if it suits gentlemen better--have gone into the questionwith such clearness, such precision, and such amplitude, that it willrelieve me from the necessity of arguing it any further than to make areference to some sentences contained in that opinion. And here let mesay, I can not see how those who agreed on a former occasion that theconstitutional right of the slaveholder to take his property into theTerritory--the constitutional power of the Congress and theconstitutional power of the Territory to legislate upon thatsubject--should be a judicial question, can now attempt to escape theoperation of an opinion which covers the exact political question which, it was known beforehand, the Court would be called upon to decide. Decided in strictness of technical language, it was known it could notbe. Hundreds, thousands, a vast variety of cases may arise, andcenturies elapse, and leave that Court, if our Union still exists, deciding questions in relation to that character of property in theTerritories; but the great and fundamental idea was that, after thirtyyears of angry controversy, dividing the people and paralyzing the armof the Federal Government, some umpire should be sought which wouldcompose the difficulty and set it upon a footing to leave us in futureto proceed in peace; and that umpire was selected which the Constitutionhad provided to decide questions of law. I ask my friend to read someextracts from the decision. 

Mr. Chesnut read as follows, from the case of Dred Scott _vs. _ Sandford, pp. 55-57:

"The Territory being a part of the United States, the Government and thecitizen both enter it under the authority of the Constitution, withtheir respective rights defined and marked out; and the FederalGovernment can exercise no power over his person or property beyond whatthat instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it hasreserved.... 

"The powers over person and property, of which we speak, are not onlynot granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they areforbidden to exercise them. And this prohibition is not confined to theStates, but the words are general, and extend to the whole territoryover which the Constitution gives it power to legislate, including thoseportions of it remaining under territorial government, as well as thatcovered by States. It is a total absence of power everywhere within thedominion of the United States, and places the citizens of a Territory, so far as these rights are concerned, on the same footing with citizensof the States, and guards them as firmly and plainly against any inroadswhich the General Government might attempt under the plea of implied orincidental powers. And if Congress itself can not do this--if it isbeyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government--it will beadmitted, we presume, that it could not authorize a territorialgovernment to exercise them. It could confer no power on any localgovernment, established by its authority, to violate the provisions ofthe Constitution.... 

"And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the masterin the slave, and makes no distinction between that description ofproperty and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, actingunder the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or denyto it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have beenprovided for the protection of private property against theencroachments of the Government.... 

"This is done in plain words--too plain to be misunderstood. And no wordcan be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater powerover slave-property, or which entitles property of that kind to lessprotection than property of any other description. The only powerconferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protectingthe owner in his rights. 

"Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the Court that the actof Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning propertyof this kind, in the territory of the United States north of the linetherein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and istherefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of hisfamily, were made free by being carried into this territory, even ifthey had been carried there by the owner, with the intention of becominga permanent resident. "

Mr. Davis: Here, then, Mr. President, I say the umpire selected as thereferee in the controversy has decided that neither the Congress nor itsagent, the territorial government, has the power to invade or impair theright of property within the limits of a Territory. I will not inquirewhether it be technically a decision or not. It was obligatory on thosewho selected the umpire and agreed to abide by the award. 

It is well known to those who have been associated with me in the twoHouses of Congress that, from the commencement of the question, I havebeen the determined opponent of what is called squatter sovereignty. Inever gave it countenance, and I am now least of all disposed to give itquarter. In 1848 it made its appearance for good purposes. It wasushered in by a great and good man. He brought it forward because ofthat distrust which he had in the capacity of the Government to bear therude shock to which it was exposed. His apprehension, no doubt, to someextent sharpened and directed his patriotism, and his reflection led himto a conclusion to which, I doubt not, to-day he adheres as tenaciouslyas ever; but from which it was my fortune, good or ill, to dissent whenhis letter was read to me in manuscript--I being, together with someother persons, asked, though not by the writer, whether or not it shouldbe sent. At the first blush I believed it to be a fallacy--a fallacyfraught with mischief; that it escaped an issue which was upon us whichit was our duty to meet; that it escaped it by a side path, which led toa greater danger. I thought it a fallacy which would surely be exploded. I doubted then, and still more for some time afterward, when held to adread responsibility for the position which I occupied. I doubtedwhether I should live to see that fallacy exploded. It has been morespeedily, and, to the country, more injuriously than I anticipated. Inthe mean time, what has been its operation? Let Kansas speak--the firstgreat field on which the trial was made. What was then the consequence?The Federal Government withdrawing control, leaving the contendingsections, excited to the highest point upon this question, each to sendforth its army, Kansas became the battle-field, and Kansas the cry, which wellnigh led to civil war. This was the first fruit. More deadlythan the fatal upas, its effect was not limited to the mere spot ofground on which the dew fell from its leaves, but it spread throughoutthe United States; it kindled all which had been collected for years ofinflammable material. It was owing to the strength of our Government andthe good sense of the quiet masses of the people that it did not wrapour country in one widespread conflagration. 

What right had Congress then, or what right has it now, to abdicate anypower conferred upon it as trustee of the States? What right hadCongress then, or has it now, to shrink from the performance of a dutybecause the mere counters spread on the table may be swept off, whenthey have not answered the purposes for which they were placed? What isit to you, or me, or any one, when we weigh our own continuation inplace against the great interests of which we are conservators; againstthe welfare of the country, and the liberty of our posterity to theremotest ages? What is it, I say, which can be counted in the balance onour side against the performance of that duty which is imposed upon us?If any one believes Congress has not the constitutional power, he actsconscientiously in insisting upon Congress not usurping it. If any onebelieves that the squatters upon the lands of the United States within aTerritory are invested with sovereignty, having won it by some of thoseprocesses unknown to history, without grant, or without revolution, without money and without price, he, adhering to the theory, may pursueit to its conclusion. To the first class, those who claim sovereignpower over the Territories for Congress, I say, lay your hand upon theConstitution, and find there the warrant of your authority. Of thesecond, those of whom I have last spoken, I ask, in the Constitution, reason, right, or justice, what is there to sustain your theory?

The phraseology which has been employed on this question seems to me tobetray a strange confusion of ideas--to speak of a sovereignty, aplenary legislative power deriving its power from an agent; asovereignty, held subject to articles with the formation of which thatsovereignty had nothing to do; a compact to which it was not a party!You say to a sovereign: "A and B have agreed on certain terms betweenthemselves, and you must govern your conduct according to them; yet I donot deny your sovereignty!" That is, the power to do as they please, provided it conforms to the rule which others chose to lay down! Canthis be a definition of sovereignty?

But again, sir, nothing seems to me more illogical than the argumentthat this power is acquired by a grant from the Congress, connected withthe other argument that Congress have not got the power to do the actthemselves; that is to say, that the recipient takes more than the giverpossessed; that a Territorial Legislature can do anything which a StateLegislature can do, and that "subject to the Constitution" means merelythe restraints imposed upon both. This is confounding the whole theoryand the history of our Government. The States were the grantors; theymade the compact; they gave the Federal agent its powers; they inhibitedthemselves from doing certain things, and all else they retained tothemselves. This Federal agent got just so much as the States chose togive--no more. It could do nothing save by warrant of the authority ofthe grant made by the States. Therefore its powers are not comparable tothe powers of the State Legislature, because one is the creature ofgrant, and the other the exponent of sovereign power. The Supreme Courthave covered the whole ground of the relation of the Congress to theTerritorial Legislatures--the agent of the States and the agent of theCongress--and the restrictions put upon the one are those put upon theother, in language so clear as to render it needless further to laborthe subject. 

In 1850, following the promulgation of this notion of squattersovereignty, we had the idea of non-intervention introduced into theSenate of the United States, and it is strange to me how that idea hasexpanded. It seems to have been more malleable than gold; to have beenhammered out to an extent that covers boundless regions undiscovered bythose who proclaimed the doctrine. Non-intervention then meant, as thedebates show, that Congress should neither prohibit nor establishslavery in the Territories. That I hold to now. Will any one supposethat Congress then meant by non-intervention that Congress shouldlegislate in no regard in respect to property in slaves? Why, sir, thevery acts which they passed at the time refute it. There is the fugitiveslave law, and that abomination of laws which assumed to confiscate theproperty of a citizen who should attempt to bring it into this Districtwith intent to remove it to sell it at some other time and at some otherplace. Congress acted then upon the subject--acted beyond the limit ofits authority, as I believed, confidently believed; and, if ever thatact comes before the Supreme Court, I feel satisfied they will declareit null and void. Are we to understand that those men, thus acting atthe very moment, intended by non-intervention to deny and repudiate thelaws they were then creating? The man who stood most prominently theadvocate of the measures of that year, who, great in many periods of ourhistory, perhaps shone then with the brightest light his genius everemitted--I refer to Henry Clay--has given his own view on this subject;and I suppose he may be considered as the highest authority. On June 18, 1850, I had introduced an amendment to the compromise bill, providing:

"And that all laws, or parts of laws, usages, or customs, preëxisting inthe Territories acquired by the United States from Mexico, and which insaid Territories restrict, abridge, or obstruct, the full enjoyment ofany right of person or property of a citizen of the United States, asrecognized or guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the UnitedStates, are hereby declared and shall be held as repealed. "

Upon that, Mr. Clay said:

"Mr. President: I thought that upon this subject there had been a clearunderstanding in the Senate that the Senate would not decide itself uponthe _lex loci_ as it respects slavery; that the Senate would not allowthe Territorial Legislature to pass any law upon that question. In otherwords, that it would leave the operation of the local law, or of theConstitution of the United States upon that local law, to be decided bythe proper and competent tribunal--the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates. "--(_Appendix to Congressional Globe_, Thirty-first Congress, first session, p. 916. )

That was the position taken by Mr. Clay, the leader. A mere sentencewill show with what view I regarded the dogma of non-intervention whenthat amendment was offered. I said:

"But what is non-intervention seems to vary as often as the light andshade of every fleeting cloud. It has different meanings in every State, in every county, in every town. If non-intervention means that we shallnot have protection for our property in slaves, then I always was, andalways shall be, opposed to it. If it means that we shall not have theprotection of the law because it would favor slaveholders, that Congressshall not legislate so as to secure to us the benefits of theConstitution, then I am opposed to non-intervention, and shall always beopposed to it. "--(_Appendix to Congressional Globe_, Thirty-firstCongress, first session, p. 919. )

Mr. Downs, one of the Committee of Thirteen, and an advocate of themeasures, said:

"What I understand by non-intervention is, an interposition of Congressprohibiting, or establishing, or interfering with slavery. "--(_Appendixto Congressional Globe_, Thirty-first Congress, first session, p. 99. )

By what species of legerdemain this doctrine of non-intervention hascome to extend to a paralysis of the Government on the whole subject, toexclude the Congress from any kind of legislation whatever, I am at aloss to conceive. Certain it is, it was not the theory of that period, and it was not contended for in all the controversies we had then. I hadno faith in it then; I considered it an evasion; I held that the duty ofCongress ought to be performed; that the issue was before us, and oughtto be met, the sooner the better; that truth would prevail if presentedto the people; borne down to-day, it would rise up to-morrow; and Istood then on the same general plea which I am making now. The Senatorfrom Illinois [Mr. Douglas] and myself differed at that time, as Ipresume we do now. We differed radically then. He opposed everyproposition which I made, voting against propositions to give power to aTerritorial Legislature to protect slave-property which should be takenthere; to remove the obstructions of the Mexican laws; voting for aproposition to exclude the conclusion that slavery might be taken there;voting for the proposition expressly to prohibit its introduction;voting for the proposition to keep in force the laws of Mexico whichprohibited it. Some of these votes, it is but just to him I should say, I think he gave perforce of his instructions; but others of them, Ithink it is equally fair to suppose, were outside of the limits of anyinstructions which could have been given before the fact. 

In 1854, advancing in this same general line of thought, the Congress, in enacting territorial bills, left out a provision which had beforebeen usually contained in them, requiring the Legislature of theTerritory to submit its laws to the Congress of the United States. Ithas been sometimes assumed that this was the recognition of the power ofthe Territorial Legislature to exercise plenary legislation, as mightthat of a State. It will be remembered that, when our present form ofgovernment was instituted, there were those who believed the FederalGovernment should have the power of revision over the laws of a State. It was long and ably contended for in the Convention which formed theConstitution; and one of the compromises which was made was an appellatepower--to lodge power in the Supreme Court to decide all questions ofconstitutional law. 

But did this omission of the obligation to send here the laws of theTerritories work this grant of power to the Territorial Legislature?Certainly not; it could not; and that it did not is evinced by the factthat, at a subsequent period, the organic act was revised because thelegislation of the Territory of Kansas was offensive to the Congress ofthe United States. Congress could not abdicate its authority; it couldnot abandon its trust; and, when it omitted the requirement that thelaws should be sent back, it created a _casus_ which required it to actwithout the official records being laid before it, as they would havebeen if the obligation had existed. That was all the difference. It wasnot enforcing upon the agent the obligation to send the information. Itleft Congress, as to its power, just where it was. I find myselfphysically unable to go as fully into the subject as I intended, andtherefore, omitting a reference to those acts, suffice it to say thathere was the recognition of the obligation of Congress to interposeagainst a Territorial Legislature for the protection of personal right. That is what we ask of Congress now. I am not disposed to ask thisCongress to go into speculative legislation. I am not one of those whowould willingly see this Congress enact a code to be applied to allTerritories and for all time to come. I only ask that cases, as theyarise, may be met according to the exigency. I ask that when personaland property rights in the Territories are not protected, then theCongress, by existing laws and governmental machinery, shall interveneand provide such means as will secure in each case, as far as may be, anadequate remedy. I ask no slave code, nor horse code, nor machine code. I ask that the Territorial Legislature be made to understand beforehandthat the Congress of the United States does not concede to them thepower to interfere with the rights of person or property guaranteed bythe Constitution, and that it will apply the remedy, if the TerritorialLegislature should so far forget its duty, so far transcend its power, as to commit that violation of right. That is the announcement of thefifth resolution. 

 * * * * *

These are the general views which I entertain of our right of protectionand the duty of the Government. They are those which are entertained bythe constituency I have the honor to represent, whose delegation hasrecently announced those principles at Charleston. I honor them, and Iapprove their conduct. I think their bearing was worthy of themother-State which sent them there; and I doubt not she will receivethem with joy and gratitude. They have asserted and vindicated herequality of right. By that asserted equality of right I doubt not shewill stand. For weal or for woe, for prosperity or adversity, for thepreservation of the great blessings which we enjoy, or the trial of anew and separate condition, I trust Mississippi never will surrender thesmallest atom of the sovereignty, independence, and equality, to whichshe was born, to avoid any danger or any sacrifice to which she mayhereby be exposed. 

The sixth resolution of the series declares at what time a State mayform a Constitution and decide upon her domestic institutions. I denythis right to the territorial condition, because the Territory belongsin common to the States. Every citizen of the United States, as a jointowner of that Territory, has a right to go into it with any propertywhich he may possess. These territorial inhabitants require municipallaw, police, and government. They should have them, but they should berestricted to their own necessities. They have no right within theirmunicipal power to attempt to decide the rights of the people of theStates. They have no right to exclude any citizen of the United Statesfrom owning and equally enjoying this common possession; it is for thepurpose of preserving order, and giving protection to rights of personand property, that a municipal territorial government should beinstituted. 

The last resolution refers to a law founded on a provision of theConstitution, which contains an obligation of faith to every State ofthe Union; and that obligation of faith has been violated by thirteenStates of the Confederacy--as many as originally fought the battles ofthe Revolution and established the Confederation. Is it to be expectedthat a compact thus broken in part, violated in its important features, will be regarded as binding in all else? Is the free trade which theNorth sought in the formation of the Union, and for which the Statesgenerally agreed to give Congress the power to regulate commerce, to betrampled under foot by laws of obstruction, not giving to the citizensof the South that free transit across the territory of the NorthernStates which we might claim from any friendly state under Christendom;and is Congress to stand powerless by, on the doctrine ofnon-intervention? We have a right to claim abstinence from interferencewith our rights from any Government on the earth. Shall we claim no morefrom that which we have constituted for our own purposes, and which wesupport by draining our own means for its support?

We have had agitation, changing in its form, and gathering intensity, for the last forty years. It was first for political power, and directedagainst new States; now it has assumed a social form, is all-prevailing, and has reached the point of revolution and civil war. For it was onlylast fall that an overt act was committed by men who were sustained byarms and money, raised by extensive combination among thenon-slaveholding States, to carry treasonable war against the State ofVirginia, because now, as before the Revolution, and ever since, sheheld the African in bondage. This is part of the history and marks thenecessity of the times. It warns us to stop and reflect, to go back tothe original standard, to measure our acts by the obligation of ourfathers, by the pledges they made one to the other, to see whether weare conforming to our plighted faith, and to ask seriously, solemnly, looking each other inquiringly in the face, what we should do to saveour country. 

This agitation being at first one of sectional pride for politicalpower, has at last degenerated or grown up to (as you please) a trade. There are men who habitually set aside a portion of money which they areannually to apply to what are called "charitable purposes"--that is tosay, so far as I understand it, to support some vagrant lecturer, whosepurpose is agitation and mischief wherever he goes. This constitutes, therefore, a trade; a class of people are thus employed--employed formischief, for incendiary purposes, perhaps not always understood bythose who furnish the money; but such is the effect; such is the resultof their action; and in this state of the case I call upon the Senate toaffirm the great principles on which our institutions rest. In no spiritof crimination have I stated the reasons why I present it. For thesereasons I call upon them now to restrain the growth of evil passion, andto bring back the public sense as far as in them lies, by earnest andunited effort, if it may be, to crown our country with peace, and startit once more in its primal channel on a career of progressive prosperityand justice. 

The majority section can not be struggling for additional power in orderto preserve their rights. If any of them ever believed in what is calledSouthern aggression, they know now they have the majority in therepresentative districts and in the electoral college. They can not, therefore, fear an invasion of their rights. They need no additionalpolitical power to protect them from that. The argument, then, or thereason on which this agitation commenced, has passed away; and yet weare asked, if a party hostile to our institutions shall gain possessionof the Government, that we shall stand quietly by, and wait for an overtact. Overt act! Is not a declaration of war an overt act? What would bethought of a country that, after a declaration of war, and while theenemy's fleets were upon the sea, should wait until a city had beensacked before it would say that war existed, or resistance should bemade? The power of resistance consists, in no small degree, in meetingthe evil at the outer gate. I can speak for myself--and I have no rightto speak for others--when I say, that, if I belonged to a partyorganized on the basis of making war on any section or interest in theUnited States, if I know myself, I would instantly quit it. We have madeno war against you. We have asked no discrimination in our favor. Weclaim to have but the Constitution fairly and equally administered. Toconsent to less than this would be to sink in the scale of manhood;would be to make our posterity so degraded that they would curse thisgeneration for robbing them of the rights their Revolutionary fathersbequeathed them.... 

Among the great purposes declared in the preamble of the Constitution isone to provide for the general welfare. Provision for the generalwelfare implies general fraternity. This Union was not expected to beheld together by coercion; the power of force as a means was denied. They sought, however, to bind it perpetually together with that whichwas stronger than triple bars of brass and steel--the ceaseless currentof kind offices, renewing and renewed in an eternal flow, and gatheringvolume and velocity as it rolled. It was a function intended not for theinjury of any. It declared its purpose to be the benefit of all. Concessions which were made between the different States in theConvention prove the motive. Each gave to the other what was necessaryto it; what each could afford to spare. Young as a nation, our triumphsunder this system have had no parallel in human history. We have tamed awilderness; we have spanned a continent. We have built up a granary thatsecures the commercial world against the fear of famine. Higher than allthis, we have achieved a moral triumph. We have received, by hundreds ofthousands, a constant tide of immigrants--energetic, if not welleducated, fleeing, some from want, some from oppression, some from thepenalties of violated law--received them into our society; and by thegentle suasion of a Government which exhibits no force, by removing wantand giving employment, they have subsided into peaceful citizens, andhave increased the wealth and power of our country. 

If, then, this temple so blessed, and to the roof of which we were aboutto look to see it extended over the continent, giving a protecting armto infant republics that need it--if this temple is tottering on itspillars, what, I ask, can be a higher or nobler duty for the Senate toperform than to rush to its pillars and uphold them, or be crushed inthe attempt? We have tampered with a question which has grown inmagnitude by each year's delay. It requires to be plainly met--the truthto be told. The patriotism and the sound sense of the people, wheneverthe Federal Government from its high places of authority shall proclaimthe truth in unequivocal language, will, in my firm belief, receive andapprove it. But so long as we deal, like the Delphic oracle, in words ofdouble meaning, so long as we attempt to escape from responsibility, andexhibit our fear to declare the truth by the fact that we do not actupon it, we must expect speculative theory to occupy the mind of thepublic, and error to increase as time rolls on. But, if the sad fateshould be ours, for this most minute cause, to destroy our Government, the historian who shall attempt philosophically to examine the questionwill, after he has put on his microscopic glasses and discovered it, becompelled to cry out, "Veritably so the unseen insect in the course oftime destroys the mighty oak!" Now, I believe--may I not say I believe?if not, then I hope--there is yet time, by the full, explicitdeclaration of the truth, to disabuse the popular mind, to arouse thepopular heart, to expose the danger from lurking treason andill-concealed hostility; to rally a virtuous people to their country'srescue, who, circling closer and deeper as the storm gathers fury, around the ark of their fathers' covenant, will place it in security, there happily to remain a sign of fraternity, justice, and equality, toour remotest posterity. 

[Footnote 199: Elliott's "Debates, " vol. V, p. 133. ]

[Footnote 200: Ibid. , p. 457. ]

[Footnote 201: Elliot's "Debates, " vol. V, p. 457. ]

[Footnote 202: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 203: Ibid, p. 459. ]

[Footnote 204: Ibid. ]

[Footnote 205: Ibid. , p. 460. ]

[Footnote 206: Permoli _vs_. First Municipality, 3 Howard, 610. ]

APPENDIX G. 

Correspondence between the Commissioners of South Carolina and thePresident of the United States (Mr. Buchanan) relative to the forts inthe harbor of Charleston. 

_Letter of the Commissioners to the President_. 

Washington, _December_ 28, 1860. 

Sir: We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers fromthe Convention of the People of South Carolina, under which we are"authorized and empowered to treat with the Government of the UnitedStates for the delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and otherreal estate, with their appurtenances, within the limits of SouthCarolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for adivision of all other property held by the Government of the UnitedStates as agent of the confederated States of which South Carolina wasrecently a member; and generally to negotiate as to all other measuresand arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relationof the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between thisCommonwealth and the Government at Washington. "

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we nowdo, with an official copy of the ordinance of secession, by which theState of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to theGovernment of the United States, and has declared her perfectsovereignty and independence. 

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were readyto negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raisedby the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enterupon this negotiation with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessaryand hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as tosecure mutual respect, general advantage, and a future of good-will andharmony beneficial to all the parties concerned. 

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assuranceimpossible. We came here the representatives of an authority whichcould, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession ofthe forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in amanner that, we can not doubt, determined to trust to your honor ratherthan to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the UnitedStates, acting, as we are assured, not only without but against yourorders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, toa most important extent, the condition of affairs under which we came. 

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us ofall doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall beconducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to anyarrangements by which our mutual interests might be amicably adjusted. 

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal ofthe troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, asour recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloodyissue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment. 

We have the honor, sir, to be, very respectfully, your obedientservants, R. W. BARNWELL, }J. H. ADAMS, } _Commissioners_. JAMES L. ORR, }

To the President of the United States. 

_Reply of the President to the Commissioners_. 

Washington City, _December_ 30, 1860. 

Gentlemen: I have the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst. , together with a copy of your "full powers from the Convention of thePeople of South Carolina, " authorizing you to treat with the Governmentof the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the ordinance bearing date on the 20th inst. , declaring that "the union now subsisting between South Carolina andother States, under the name of 'The United States of America, ' ishereby dissolved. "

In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position asPresident of the United States was clearly defined in the message toCongress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, "apart from theexecution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executivehas no authority to decide what shall be the relations between theFederal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no suchdiscretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretoforeexisting between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of thatState. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the powerof recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-threesovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of aforeign _de facto_ government--involving no such responsibility. Anyattempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. Itis, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question, in allits bearings. "

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as privategentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing tocommunicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to thatbody upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnestdesire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject byCongress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration ofa civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of theFederal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regretthat, in your opinion, "the events of the last twenty-four hours renderthis impossible. " In conclusion, you urge upon me "the immediatewithdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston, " stating that, "under present circumstances, they are a standing menace, which rendersnegotiation impossible, and, as our present experience shows, threatensspeedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settledwith temperance and judgment. "

The reason for this change in your position is that, since your arrivalin Washington, "an officer of the United States, acting as we (you) areassured, not only without your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort andoccupied another, thus altering, to a most important extent, thecondition of affairs under which we (you) came. " You also allege thatyou came here "the representatives of an authority which could at anytime within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts inCharleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we(you) can not doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor rather thanto its own power. "

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those allegedpledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message ofthe 3d of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of theUnited States in South Carolina, that it "has been purchased for a fairequivalent 'by the consent of the Legislature of the State, for theerection of forts, magazines, arsenals, ' etc. , and over these theauthority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly grantedby the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attemptwill be made to expel the United States from this property by force;but, if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command ofthe forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In sucha contingency, the responsibility for consequences would rightfully restupon the heads of the assailants. " This being the condition of theparties on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives fromSouth Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had anearnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best meansof preventing a collision between the parties, for the purpose ofsparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, thatit would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. Theydid so accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three ofthem presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives fromSouth Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is acopy:

"To his Excellency James Buchanan, _President of the United States_:

"In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express toyou our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, norany body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will eitherattack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston, previously to the action of the Convention, and, we hope and believe, not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between theState and the Federal Government, provided that no reënforcements shallbe sent into those forts, and their relative military _status_ shallremain as at present. 

"John McQueen, "William Porcher Miles, "M. L. Bonham, "W. W. Boyce, "Lawrence M. Keitt. 

"Washington, _December 9, 1860_. "

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that, at the time thepaper was presented to me, I objected to the word "provided, " as itmight be construed into an agreement, on my part, which I never wouldmake. They said that nothing was further from their intention; they didnot so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evidentthey could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting intheir individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influencefor the purpose expressed. The event has proved that they havefaithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received aline from any one of them, or from any member of the Convention on thesubject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this Ifreely expressed, not to reënforce the forts in the harbor, and thusproduce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until Ihad certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper Ireceived most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peacemight still be preserved, and that time might thus be gained forreflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge. 

But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered into apositive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my part, from the natureof my official duties, impossible. 

The world knows that I have never sent any reënforcements to the fortsin Charleston Harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any changeto be made "in their relative military _status_. "

Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by theSecretary of War, on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but notbrought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows:

"_Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major_ Anderson, _FirstArtillery, commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina_:

"You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that acollision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course, with reference tothe military force and forts in this harbor, which shall guard againstsuch a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasingthe force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to thepresent excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubton the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt byviolence to obtain possession of the public works, or to interfere withtheir occupancy. But, as the counsel of rash and impulsive persons maypossibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems itproper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappya contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give yousuch instructions. 

"You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend toprovoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evidentand imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construedinto the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to holdpossession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are todefend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force willnot permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; butan attack on or attempt to take possession of either of them will beregarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command intoeither of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power ofresistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive stepswhenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostileact. 

"D. P. Butler, _Assistant Adjutant-General_. 

"Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, _December 11, 1860_. 

"This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buel. 

"John B. Floyd, _Secretary of War_. "

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson beforehis removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in regard to aparticular which does not, in any degree, affect the present question. Under these circumstances it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon hisown responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had"tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act" on the partof the authorities of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still he is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that heshould not be condemned without a fair hearing. 

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left FortMoultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were tocommand him to return to his former position, and there to await thecontingencies presented in his instructions. This could only have beendone, with any degree of safety to the command, by the concurrence ofthe South Carolina authorities. But, before any steps could possiblyhave been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the28th instant, that "the Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze atCastle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the27th) to Fort Moultrie. " Thus the authorities of South Carolina, withoutwaiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as youhave expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, butagainst my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removalwas made, seized, by a military force, two of the three Federal forts inthe harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy period of ourhistory, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day(the 27th instant) that possession of these two forts was taken, thePalmetto flag was raised over the Federal Custom-House and Post-Officein Charleston; and on the same day every officer of thecustoms--collector, naval officers, surveyor, and appraisers--resignedtheir offices. And this, although it was well known, from the languageof my message, that as an executive officer I felt myself bound tocollect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston we now find three forts confronting eachother, over all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago;but now over two of them this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmettoflag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all thesecircumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops fromthe harbor of Charleston, and am informed that, without this, negotiation is impossible. This I can not do; this I will not do. Suchan idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. Noallusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myselfand any human being. But the inference is, that I am bound to withdrawthe troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the UnitedStates in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in commandof all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change hisposition from one of them to another. I can not admit the justice of anysuch inference. 

At this point of writing I have received information, by telegram, fromCaptain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston, that "it hasto-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force of arms. " It is estimatedthat the munitions of war belonging to the United States in this arsenalare worth half a million of dollars. 

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add that, while it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the publicproperty of the United States, against hostile attacks from whateverquarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defense can be construed into a menaceagainst the city of Charleston. 

With great personal regard, I remain

Yours, very respectfully, JAMES BUCHANAN. 

To Honorable Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, James L. Orr. 

_Reply of the Commissioners to the President_. 

Washington, D. C. , _January_ 1, 1861. 

Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th ofthe same month, as commissioners from South Carolina. 

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that"your position as President of the United States was clearly defined inthe message to Congress of the 3d instant, " that you possess "no powerto change the relations heretofore existing between South Carolina andthe United States, much less to acknowledge the independence of thatState"; and that, consequently, you could meet us only as privategentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness tocommunicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deemit only necessary to say that, the State of South Carolina having, inthe exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies allour political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to thecharacter in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State hadsimply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order toreach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which yourconstitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We camehere, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, andperfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make uponthe subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was amplerecognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered ourpresence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both tothe State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct severalimportant misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen. 

You say, "It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be madeof the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power toprevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard tothe possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, 'the events of the lasttwenty-four hours render this impossible. '" We expressed no suchopinion, and the language which you quote as ours is altered in itssense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What wedid say was, "But the events of the last twenty-four hours render _suchan assurance_ impossible. " Place that "assurance, " as contained in ourletter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it. 

Again, professing to quote our language, you say: "Thus the authoritiesof South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, anddoubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer hadacted not only without, but against my orders, " etc. We expressed nosuch opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted was applied solely and entirely to_our assurance_, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon yourown declaration--a declaration which, at that time, it was impossiblefor the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, withoutfollowing this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet thechief points of the argument. 

Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention, inthe existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the UnitedStates. She called a convention of her people to put her declaration inforce. The Convention met and passed the ordinance of secession. Allthis you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughlyconsidered. In your annual message you declared that you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you werebound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of theUnited States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt wasmade to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question ofproperty was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire tosettle it without collision. You did not reënforce the garrisons in theharbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officerfrom the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase hissupply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the samegarrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. Youaccepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of yourCabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. Youcompelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to return immediately tothe arsenal forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. Youexpressed, not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of ourpublic characters, whose testimony will be placed upon the recordwhenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination ofthis controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military_status_ of the forts, if commissioners should be sent to theGovernment, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. Youreceived and acted on assurances from the highest official authoritiesof South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb yourpossession of the forts and property of the United States, if you wouldnot disturb their existing condition until commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members ofthe House of Representatives a written memorandum that no such attemptshould be made, "provided that no reënforcements shall be sent intothose forts, and their relative military _status_ shall remain as atpresent. " And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such apaper, although you "considered it as nothing more in effect than thepromise of highly honorable gentlemen, " as an obligation on one sidewithout corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (ifwe are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did sendreënforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received itbefore you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity withsuch an understanding. 

Besides all this, you had received formal and official notice, from theGovernor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed commissioners andwere on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition underwhich we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointedfor an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at threeo'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movementof Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, andyou postponed our meeting until half-past two o'clock on Friday, inorder that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and wecalled upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. Withthe facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusivefact that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson hadviolated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledgewas instantly redeemed he was dishonored, denial was impossible; you didnot deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from itsobligations on two grounds: 1. That _we_ terminated all negotiation bydemanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troopsfrom the harbor of Charleston; and, 2. That the authorities of SouthCarolina, instead of asking explanation and giving you the opportunityto vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the UnitedStates. We will examine both. 

In the first place, we deny positively that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand bythis on the record. In it we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to assure you of our readinessto commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire tosettle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated theevents, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of theseevents was given us, we could not proceed; and then, having made thisrequest for explanation, we added: "And, in conclusion, we would urgeupon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor ofCharleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible, " etc. "Under presentcircumstances!" What circumstances? Why, clearly the occupation of FortSumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in theface of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter which would or could have preventedyou from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restorationof the _status_ to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawnthe troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we _demanded_nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-fourhours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which thenegotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of thetroops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passageof your letter. Referring to it, you say: "This I can not do; this Iwill not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possiblecontingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communicationbetween myself and any human being. "

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say that yourconversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression thatyou did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops fromCharleston Harbor. And, in support of this impression, we would add thatwe have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possiblepublic reputation and the most unsullied integrity--men whose name andfame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place theirtestimony beyond cavil--that such suggestions had been made to and urgedupon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnestdiscussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urgeupon you a policy which had to recommend it its own wisdom and theweight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authoritiesof South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you theopportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property ofthe United States, we would observe, first, that, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defense, for the opportunity for decision wasafforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington onWednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of thehighest consideration--men who had striven successfully to lift you toyour great office--who had been your tried and true friends through thetroubles of your Administration--sought you and entreated you to act--toact at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so--ifthe commander had acted without and against your orders, and inviolation of your pledges--you would restore the _status_ you hadpledged your honor to maintain. 

You refused to decide. Your Secretary of War--your immediate and properadviser in this whole matter--waited anxiously for your decision, untilhe felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what theauthorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at anymoment of that time would have avoided the subsequent complications. But, if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was thecondition of things? For the last sixty days, you have had in CharlestonHarbor not force enough to hold the forts against an equal enemy. Two ofthem were empty; one of those two, the most important in the harbor. Itcould have been taken at any time. You ought to know, better than anyman, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of those who puttheir trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by FortSumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained fromsecuring, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faithsent on their commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you noharm, wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare youunnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their commissionersleft, than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe hisaction. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was ahostile act in the highest sense--one only justified in the presence ofa superior enemy and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for thedestruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to asafer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without yourassurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, "not onlywithout orders, but against orders. " What the State did was in simpleself-defense; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was asmuch war as firing a volley; and, war being thus begun, until thosecommencing it explained their action, and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we arewriting, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, thatreënforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that, when the firstgun shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuousconsistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentiallywarlike, supported by regular reënforcement, and terminating in defeator victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, amongthe many things which you have said, there is one thing you can notsay--you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopesthat delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this"tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the partof the authorities of South Carolina" (which is the only justificationof Major Anderson), you are forced to admit "has not _yet_ beenalleged. " But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force whatyou have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and, by refusing todisavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation oforders into a legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issuewhat it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has beenrecorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumterwill live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony ofCarolina faith. 

By your course you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be itso. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of SouthCarolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justiceas well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great dutywhich lies before her, hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly. 

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leavingus without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or ofthe restoration of the _status quo_ existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reënforce thegarrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that wepropose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon. 

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servants, R. W. BARNWELL, }J. H. ADAMS, } _Commissioners_. JAMES L. ORR, }

To his Excellency the President of the United States. 

The last communication is endorsed as follows:

Executive Mansion, 3½ _o'clock, Wednesday_. 

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character thathe declines to receive it. 

APPENDIX H. 

Speech on the state of the country, by Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in theSenate of the United States, January 10, 1861--a motion to print thespecial message of the President of the United States, of January 9th, being under consideration. 

Mr. Davis: Mr. President, when I took the floor yesterday, I intended toengage somewhat in the argument which has heretofore prevailed in theSenate upon the great questions of constitutional right, which havedivided the country from the beginning of the Government. I intended toadduce some evidences, which I thought were conclusive, in favor of theopinions which I entertain; but events, with a current hurrying on as itprogresses, have borne me past the point where it would be useful for meto argue, by the citing of authorities, the question of rights. To-day, therefore, it is my purpose to deal with events. Abstract argument hasbecome among the things that are past. We have to deal now with facts;and, in order that we may meet those facts and apply them to our presentcondition, it is well to inquire what is the state of the country. TheConstitution provides that the President shall, from time to time, communicate information on the state of the Union. The message which isnow under consideration gives us very little, indeed, beyond that whichthe world--less, indeed, than reading men generally--knew before it wascommunicated. 

What, Senators, to-day is the condition of the country? From everycorner of it comes the wailing cry of patriotism, pleading for thepreservation of the great inheritance we derived from our fathers. Isthere a Senator who does not daily receive letters appealing to him touse even the small power which one man here possesses to save the richinheritance our fathers gave us? Tears are trickling down the sternfaces of men who have bled for the flag of their country, and arewilling now to die for it; but patriotism stands powerless before theplea that the party about to come into power laid down a platform, andthat come what will, though ruin stare us in the face, consistency mustbe adhered to, even though the Government be lost. 

In this state of the case, then, we turn and ask, What is the characterof the Administration? What is the Executive department doing? Whatassurance have we there for the safety of the country? But we come backfrom that inquiry with a mournful conviction that feeble hands now holdthe reins of state; that drivelers are taken in as counselors, notprovided by the Constitution; that vacillation is the law; and thepolicy of this great Government is changed with every changing rumor ofthe day; nay, more, it is changing with every new phase of causelessfear. In this state of the case, after complications have beenintroduced into the question, after we were brought to the verge of war, after we were hourly expecting by telegraph to learn that the conflicthad commenced, after nothing had been done to insure the peace of theland, we are told in this last hour that the question is thrown at thedoor of Congress, and here rests the responsibility. 

Had the garrison at Charleston, representing the claim of the Governmentto hold the property in a fort there, been called away thirty days, nay, ten days ago, peace would have spread its pinions over this land, andcalm negotiation would have been the order of the day. Why was it notrecalled? No reason yet has been offered, save that the Government isbound to preserve its property; and yet look from North to South, fromEast to West, wherever we have constructed forts to defend Statesagainst a foreign foe, and everywhere you find them without a garrison, except at a few points where troops are kept for special purposes; notto coerce or to threaten a State, but stationed in seacoastfortifications, there merely for the purposes of discipline andinstruction as artillerists. You find all the other forts in the handsof fort-keepers and ordnance-sergeants, and, before a moral andpatriotic people, standing safely there as the property of the country. 

I asked in this Senate, weeks ago: "What causes the peril that is nowimminent at Fort Moultrie; is it the weakness of the garrison?" and thenI answered, "No, it is its presence, not its weakness. " Had anordnance-sergeant there represented the Federal Government, had therebeen no troops, no physical power to protect it, I would have pledged mylife upon the issue that no question ever would have been made as to itsseizure. Now, not only there, but elsewhere, we find movements of troopsfurther to complicate this question, and probably to precipitate us uponthe issue of civil war; and, worse than all, this Government, reposingon the consent of the governed; this Government, strong in theaffections of the people; this Government (I describe it as our fathersmade it) is now furtively sending troops to occupy positions lest "themob" should seize them. When before in the history of our land was itthat a mob could resist the sound public opinion of the country? Whenbefore was it that an unarmed magistrate had not the power, by crying, "I command the peace, " to quell a mob in any portion of the land? Yetnow we find, under cover of night, troops detached from one position tooccupy another. Fort Washington, standing in its lonely grandeur, andoverlooking the home of the Father of his Country, near by the placewhere the ashes of Washington repose, built there to prevent a foreignfoe from coming up the Potomac with armed ships to take thecapital--Fort Washington is garrisoned by marines sent secretly awayfrom the navy yard at Washington. And Fort McHenry, memorable in ourhistory as the place where, under bombardment, the star-spangled bannerfloated through the darkness of night, the point which was consecratedby our national song--Fort McHenry, too, has been garrisoned by adetachment of marines, sent from this place in an extra train, and sentunder cover of the night, so that even the mob should not know it. 

Senators, the responsibility is thrown at the door of Congress. Let ustake it. It is our duty in this last hour to seize the pillars of ourGovernment and uphold them, though we be crushed in the fall. Then whatis our policy? Are we to drift into war? Are we to stand idly by, andallow war to be precipitated upon the country? Allow an officer of thearmy to make war? Allow an unconfirmed head of a department to make war?Allow a general of the army to make war? Allow a President to make war?No, sir. Our fathers gave to Congress the power to declare war, and evento Congress they gave no power to make war upon a State of the Union. Itcould not have been given, except as a power to dissolve the Union. When, then, we see, as is evident to the whole country, that we aredrifting into a war between the United States and an individual State, does it become the Senate to sit listlessly by and discuss abstractquestions, and read patchwork from the opinions of men now mingled withthe dust? Are we not bound to meet events as they come before us, manfully and patriotically to struggle with the difficulties which nowoppress the country?

In the message yesterday, we were even told that the District ofColumbia was in danger. In danger of what? From whom comes the danger?Is there a man here who dreads that the deliberations of this body areto be interrupted by an armed force? Is there one who would not preferto fall with dignity at his station, the representative of a great andpeaceful Government, rather than to be protected by armed bands? And yetthe rumor is--and rumors seem now to be so authentic that we credit themrather than other means of information--that companies of artillery areto be quartered in this city to preserve peace, where the laws haveheretofore been supreme, and that this District is to become a camp bycalling out every able-bodied man within its limits to bear arms underthe militia law. Are we invaded? Is there an insurrection? Are there twoSenators here who would not be willing to go forth as a file, and putdown any resistance which showed itself in this District against theGovernment of the United States? Is the reproach meant against these, myfriends from the South, who advocate Southern rights and State rights?If so, it is a base slander. We claim our rights under the Constitution;we claim our rights reserved to the States; and we seek by no bruteforce to gain any advantage which the law and the Constitution do notgive us. We have never appealed to mobs. We have never asked for thearmy and the navy to protect us. On the soil of Mississippi, not thefoot of a Federal soldier has been impressed since 1819, when, flyingfrom the yellow fever, they sought refuge within the limits of ourState; and on the soil of Mississippi there breathes not a man who asksfor any other protection than that which our Constitution gives us, thatwhich our strong arms afford, and the brave hearts of our people willinsure in every contingency. 

Senators, we are rapidly drifting into a position in which this is tobecome a government of the army and navy; in which the authority of theUnited States is to be maintained, not by law, not by constitutionalagreement between the States, but by physical force; and will you standstill and see this policy consummated? Will you fold your arms, thedegenerate descendants of those men who proclaimed the eternal principlethat government rests on the consent of the governed; and that everypeople have a right to change, modify, or abolish a government when itceases to answer the ends for which it was established, and permit thisGovernment imperceptibly to slide from the moorings where it wasoriginally anchored, and become a military despotism? It was well saidby the Senator from New York [Mr. Seward], whom I do not now see in hisseat--well said in a speech wherein I found but little to commend--thatthis Union could not be maintained by force, and that a Union of forcewas a despotism. It was a great truth, come from what quarter it may. That was not the Government instituted by our fathers; and against it, so long as I live, with heart and hand, I will rebel. 

This brings me to a passage in the message which says:

"I certainly had no right to make aggressive war upon any State; and Iam perfectly satisfied that the Constitution has wisely withheld thatpower even from Congress"--very good--"but the right and the duty to usemilitary force defensively against those who resist the Federal officersin the exercise of their legal functions, and against those who assailthe power of the Federal Government, are clear and undeniable. "

Is it so? Where does he get it? Our fathers were so jealous of astanding army, that they scarcely would permit the organization andmaintenance of any army! Where does he get the "clear and undeniable"power to use the force of the United States in the manner he thereproposes? To execute a process, troops may be summoned in a possecomitatus; and here, in the history of our Government, it is not to beforgotten that in the earlier and, as it is frequently said, the betterdays of the republic--and painfully we feel that they were betterindeed--a President of the United States did not recur to the army; hewent to the people of the United States. Vaguely and confusedly, indeed, did the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Johnson] bring forward the case ofthe great man, Washington, as one in which he had used a means which, heargued, was equivalent to the coercion of a State; for he said thatWashington used the military power against a portion of a people of theState; and why might he not as well have used it against the wholeState? Let me tell that Senator that the case of General Washington hasno such application as he supposes. It was a case of insurrection in theState of Pennsylvania; and the very message from which he readcommunicated the fact that Governor Mifflin thought it was necessary tocall the militia of the adjoining States to aid him. PresidentWashington coöperated with Governor Mifflin; he called the militia ofadjoining States to coöperate with those of Pennsylvania. He used themilitia, not as a standing army. It was by the consent of the Governor;it was by his advice. It was not the invasion of the State; it was notthe coercion of the State; but it was aiding the State to put downinsurrection, and in the very manner provided for in the Constitutionitself. 

But, I ask again, what power has the President to use the army and navyexcept to execute process? Are we to have drum-head courts substitutedfor those which the Constitution and laws provide? Are we to havesergeants sent over the land instead of civil magistrates? Not sothought the elder Adams; and here, in passing, I will pay him a tributehe deserves, as the one to whom, more than any other man among the earlyfounders of this Government, credit is due for the military principleswhich prevail in its organization. Associated with Mr. Jeffersonoriginally, in preparing the rules and articles of war, Mr. Adamsreverted through the long pages of history back to the empire of Rome, and drew from that foundation the very rules and articles of war whichgovern in our country to-day, and drew them thence because he said theyhad brought two nations to the pinnacle of glory--referring to theRomans and the Britons, whose military law was borrowed from them. Mr. Adams, however, when an insurrection occurred in the same State ofPennsylvania, not only relied upon the militia, but his orders, throughSecretary McHenry, required that the militia of the vicinage should beemployed; and, though he did order troops from Philadelphia, he requiredthe militia of the northern counties to be employed as long as they wereable to execute the laws; and the orders given to Colonel McPherson, then in New Jersey, were, that Federal troops should not go across theJersey line except in the last resort. I say, then, when we trace ourhistory to its early foundation, under the first two Presidents of theUnited States, we find that this idea of using the army and the navy toexecute the laws at the discretion of the President was one not evenentertained, still less acted upon, in any case. 

Then, Senators, we are brought to consider passing events. A littlegarrison in the harbor of Charleston now occupies a post which, I amsorry to say, it gained by the perfidious breach of an understandingbetween the parties concerned; and here, that I may do justice to onewho had not the power, on this floor at least, to right himself--who hasno friend here to represent him--let me say that remark does not applyto Major Anderson; for I hold that, though his orders were not sodesigned, as I am assured, they did empower him to go from one post toanother, and to take his choice of the posts in the harbor ofCharleston; but in so doing he committed an act of hostility. When hedismantled Fort Moultrie, when he burned the carriages and spiked theguns bearing upon Fort Sumter, he put Carolina in the attitude of anenemy of the United States; and yet he has not shown that there was anyjust cause for apprehension. Vague rumors had reached him--and causelessfear seems now to be the impelling motive of every public act--vaguerumors of an intention to take Fort Moultrie. But, sir, a soldier shouldbe confronted by an overpowering force before he spikes his guns andburns his carriages. A soldier should be confronted by a public enemybefore he destroys the property of the United States lest it should fallinto the hands of such an enemy. Was that fort built to make war uponCarolina? Was an armament put into it for such a purpose? Or was itbuilt for the protection of Charleston Harbor; and was it armed to makethat protection effective? If so, what right had any soldier to destroythat armament lest it should fall into the hands of Carolina?

Some time since I presented to the Senate resolutions which embodied myviews upon this subject, drawing from the Constitution itself the dataon which I based those resolutions. I then invoked the attention of theSenate in that form to the question as to whether garrisons should bekept within a State against the consent of that State. Clear was I then, as I am now, in my conclusion. No garrison should be kept within aState, during a time of peace, if the State believes the presence ofthat garrison to be either offensive or dangerous. Our army ismaintained for common defense; our forts are built out of the commonTreasury, to which every State contributes; and they are perverted fromthe purpose for which they were erected whenever they are garrisonedwith a view to threaten, to intimidate, or to control a State in anyrespect. 

Yet, we are told this is no purpose to coerce a State; we are told thatthe power does not exist to coerce a State; but the Senator fromTennessee [Mr. Johnson] says it is only a power to coerce individuals;and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Wade] seems to look upon this latterpower as a very harmless power in the hands of the President, though theresults of such coercion might be to destroy the State. What is a State?Is it land and houses? Is it taxable property? Is it the organization ofthe local government? Or is it all these combined with the people whopossess them? Destroy the people, and yet not make war upon the State!To state the proposition is to answer it, by reason of its veryabsurdity. It is like making desolation, and calling it peace. Therebeing, as it is admitted on every hand, no power to coerce a State, Iask what is the use of a garrison within a State where it needs nodefense? The answer from every candid mind must be, there is none. Theanswer from every patriotic breast must be, peace requires under allsuch circumstances that the garrison should be withdrawn. Let the Senateto-day, as the responsibility is thrown at our door, pass thoseresolutions, or others which better express the idea contained in them, and you have taken one long step toward peace, one long stride towardthe preservation of the Government of our fathers. 

The President's message of December, however, has all thecharacteristics of a diplomatic paper, for diplomacy is said to abhorcertainty as Nature abhors a vacuum; and it was not within the power ofman to reach any fixed conclusion from that message. When the countrywas agitated, when opinions were being formed, when we were driftingbeyond the power ever to return, this was not what we had a right toexpect from the Chief Magistrate. One policy or the other he ought tohave taken. If believing this to be a government of force, if believingit to be a consolidated mass, and not a confederation of States, heshould have said: "No State has a right to secede; every State issubordinate to the Federal Government, and the Federal Government mustempower me with physical means to reduce to subjugation the Stateasserting such a right. " If not, if a State-rights man and aDemocrat--as for many years it has been my pride to acknowledge ourvenerable Chief Magistrate to be--then another line of policy shouldhave been taken. The Constitution gave no power to the FederalGovernment to coerce a State; the Constitution gave an army for thepurposes of common defense, and to preserve domestic tranquillity; butthe Constitution never contemplated using that army against a State. AState exercising the sovereign function of secession is beyond the reachof the Federal Government, unless we woo her with the voice offraternity, and bring her back to the enticements of affection. Onepolicy or the other should have been taken; and it is not for me to saywhich, though my opinion is well known; but one policy or the othershould have been pursued. He should have brought his opinion to oneconclusion or another, and to-day our country would have been safer thanit is. 

What is the message before us? Does it benefit the case? Is there asolution offered here? We are informed in it of propositions made bycommissioners from South Carolina. We are not informed even as to howthey terminated. No countervailing proposition is presented; nosuggestion is made. We are left drifting loosely, without chart orcompass. 

There is in our recent history, however, an event which might havesuggested a policy to be pursued. When foreigners having no citizenshipwithin the United States declared war against it and made war upon it;when the inhabitants of a Territory, disgraced by institutions offensiveto the laws of every State of the Union, held this attitude ofrebellion; when the Executive there had power to use troops, he firstsent commissioners of peace to win them back to their duty. When SouthCarolina, a sovereign State, resumes the grants she had delegated; whenSouth Carolina stands in an attitude which threatens within a shortperiod to involve the country in a civil war unless the policy of theGovernment be changed, no suggestion is made to us that this Governmentmight send commissioners to her; no suggestion is made to us that betterinformation should be sought; there is no policy of peace, but we aretold the army and navy are in the hands of the President of the UnitedStates, to be used against those who assail the power of the FederalGovernment. 

Then, my friends, are we to allow events to drift onward to this fatalconsummation? Are we to do nothing to restore peace? Shall we not, inaddition to the proposition I have already made, to withdraw the forcewhich complicates the question, send commissioners there in order thatwe may learn what this community desire, what this community will do, and put the two Governments upon friendly relations?

I will not weary the Senate by going over the argument of coercion. Myfriend from Ohio [Mr. Pugh], I may say, has exhausted the subject. Ithank him, because it came appropriately from one not identified by hisposition with South Carolina. It came more effectively from him than itwould have done from me, had I (as I have not) a power to present it asforcibly as he has done. Sirs, let me say, among the painful reflectionswhich have crowded upon me by day and by night, none have weighed moreheavily upon my heart than the reflection that our separation severs theties which have so long bound us to our Northern friends, of whom we areglad to recognize the Senator as a type. 

Now let us return a moment to consider what would have been the state ofthe case if the garrison at Charleston had been withdrawn. The fortwould have stood there, not dismantled, but unoccupied. It would havestood there in the hands of an ordnance-sergeant. Commissioners wouldhave come to treat of all questions with the Federal Government, ofthese forts as well as others. They would have remained there to answerthe ends for which they were constructed--the ends of defense. If SouthCarolina was an independent State, then she might hold to us such arelation as Rhode Island held after the dissolution of the Confederationand before the formation of the Union, when Rhode Island appealed to thesympathies existing between the States connected in the struggles of theRevolution, and asked that a commercial war should not be waged uponher. These forts would have stood there then to cover the harbor of afriendly State; and, if the feeling which once existed among the peopleof the States had subsisted still, and that fort had been attacked, brave men from every section would have rushed to the rescue, and thereimperiled their lives in the defense of a State identified with theirearly history, and still associated in their breasts with affectionatememories; the first act of this kind would have been one appealing toevery generous motive of those people, again to reconsider the questionof how we could live together, and through that bloody ordeal to havebrought us into the position in which our fathers left us. There needhave been no collision, as there could have been no question of propertywhich that State was not ready to meet. If it was a question of dollarsand cents, they came here to adjust it. If it was a question of coveringan interior State, their interests were identical. In whatever way thequestion could have been presented, the consequence would have been torelieve the Government of the charge of maintaining the fort, and tothrow it upon the State which had resolved to be independent. 

Thus we see that no evil could have resulted. We have yet to learn whatevil the opposite policy may bring. Telegraphic intelligence, by the manwho occupied the seat on the right of me in the old Chamber, was neverrelied on. He was the wisest statesman I ever knew--a man whoseprophetic vision foretold all the trials through which we are nowpassing; whose clear intellect, elaborating everything, borrowingnothing from anybody, seemed to dive into the future, and to unveilthose things which are hidden to other eyes. Need I say I mean Calhoun?No other man than he would have answered this description. I say, then, not relying upon telegraphic dispatches, we still have informationenough to notify us that we are on the verge of civil war; that civilwar is in the hands of men irresponsible, as it seems to us; their actsunknown to us; their discretion not covered by any existing law orusage; and we now have the responsibility thrown upon us, whichjustifies us in demanding information to meet an emergency in which thecountry is involved. 

Is there any point of pride which prevents us from withdrawing thatgarrison? I have heard it said by a gallant gentleman, to whom I make nospecial reference, that the great objection was an unwillingness tolower the flag. To lower the flags! Under what circumstances? Does anyman's courage impel him to stand boldly forth to take the life of hisbrethren? Does any man insist upon going upon the open field with deadlyweapons to fight his brother on a question of courage? There is no pointof pride. These are your brethren; and they have shed as much glory uponthat flag as any equal number of men in the Union. They are the men, andthat is the locality, where the first Union flag was unfurled, and wherewas fought a gallant battle before our independence was declared--notthe flag with thirteen stripes and thirty-three stars, but a flag with across of St. George, and the long stripes running through it. When thegallant Moultrie took the British Fort Johnson and carried it, for thefirst time, I believe, did the Union flag fly in the air; and that wasin October, 1775. When he took the position and threw up a temporarybattery with palmetto-logs and sand, upon the site called Fort Moultrie, that fort was assailed by the British fleet, and bombarded until the oldlogs, clinging with stern tenacity, were filled with balls, but the flagstill floated there, and, though many bled, the garrison conquered. Those old logs are gone; the eroding current is even taking away thesite where Fort Moultrie stood; the gallant men who held it now minglewith the earth; but their memories live in the hearts of a brave people, and their sons yet live, and they, like their fathers, are ready tobleed and to die for the cause in which their fathers triumphed. Glorious are the memories clinging around that old fort which now, forthe first time, has been abandoned--abandoned not even in the presenceof a foe, but under the imaginings that a foe might come; and gunsspiked and carriages burned where the band of Moultrie bled, and, withan insufficient armament, repelled the common foe of all the colonies. Her ancient history compares proudly with the present. 

Can there, then, be a point of pride upon so sacred a soil as this, where the blood of the fathers cries to heaven against civil war? Canthere be a point of pride against laying upon that sacred soil to-daythe flag for which our fathers died? My pride, Senators, is different. My pride is that that flag shall not set between contending brothers;and that, when it shall no longer be the common flag of the country, itshall be folded up and laid away like a vesture no longer used; that itshall be kept as a sacred memento of the past, to which each of us canmake a pilgrimage and remember the glorious days in which we were born. 

In the answer of the commissioners which I caused to be read yesterday, I observed that they referred to Fort Sumter as remaining a memento ofCarolina faith. It is an instance of the accuracy of the opinion which Ihave expressed. It stood without a garrison. It commanded the harbor, and the fort was known to have the armament in it capable of defense. Did the Carolinians attack it? Did they propose to seize it? It stoodthere safe as public property; and there it might have stood to the endof the negotiations without a question, if a garrison had not been sentinto it. It was the faith on which they relied, that the FederalGovernment would take no position of hostility to them, that constitutedits safety, and by which they lost the advantage they would have had inseizing it when unoccupied. 

I think that something is due to faith as well as fraternity; and Ithink one of the increasing and accumulative obligations upon us towithdraw the garrison from that fort is from the manner in which it wastaken--taken, as we heard by the reading of the paper yesterday, whileCarolina remained under the assurance that the _status_ would not beviolated; while I was under that assurance, and half a dozen otherSenators now within the sound of my voice felt secure under the samepledge, that nothing would be done until negotiations had terminated, unless it was to withdraw the garrison. Then we, the Federal Government, broke the faith; we committed the first act of hostility; and from thisfirst act of hostility arose all those acts to which reference is madein the message as unprovoked aggressions--the seizing of fortselsewhere. Why were they seized? Self-preservation is the first law ofnature; and when they no longer had confidence that this FederalGovernment would not seize the forts constructed for their defense, anduse them for their destruction, they only obeyed the dictates ofself-preservation when they seized the forts to prevent the enemy fromtaking possession of them as a means of coercion, for they then werecompelled to believe this Federal Government had become an enemy. 

Now, what is the remedy? To assure them that you do not intend to usephysical force against them is your first remedy; to assure them thatyou intend to consider calmly all the propositions which they make, andto recognize the rights which the Union was established to secure; thatyou intend to settle with them upon a basis in accordance with theDeclaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. When you do that, peace will prevail over the land, and force become athing that no man will consider necessary. 

I am here confronted with a question which I will not argue. Theposition which I have taken necessarily brings me to its consideration. Without arguing it, I will merely state it. It is the right of a Stateto withdraw from the Union. The President says it is not aconstitutional right. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Wade], and his ally, the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Johnson], argued it as no right at all. Well, let us see. What is meant by a constitutional right? Is it meantto be a right derived from the Constitution--a grant made in theConstitution? If that is what is meant, of course we all see at oncethat we do not derive it in that way. Is it intended that it is not aconstitutional right, because it is not granted in the Constitution?That shows, indeed, but a poor appreciation of the nature of ourGovernment. All that is not granted in the Constitution belongs to theStates; and nothing but what is granted in the Constitution belongs tothe Federal Government; and, keeping this distinction in view, itrequires but little argument to see the conclusion at which wenecessarily arrive. Did the States surrender their sovereignty to theFederal Government? Did the States agree that they never could withdrawfrom the Federal Union?

I know it has been argued here that the Confederation said the Articlesof Confederation were to be a perpetual bond of union, and that theConstitution was made to form a more perfect union; that is to say, aGovernment beyond perpetuity, or one day, or two or three days, afterdoomsday. But that has no foundation in the Constitution itself; it hasno basis in the nature of our Government. The Constitution was a compactbetween independent States; it was not a national Government; and henceMr. Madison answered with such effectiveness to Patrick Henry, in theConvention of Virginia, which ratified the Constitution, denying hisproposition that it was to form a nation, and stating to him theconclusive fact that "we sit here as a convention of the State to ratifyor reject that Constitution; and how, then, can you say that it forms anation, and is adopted by the mass of the people?" It was not adopted bythe mass of the people, as we all know historically; it was adopted byeach State; each State, voluntarily ratifying it, entered the Union; andthat Union was formed whenever nine States should enter it; and, inabundance of caution, it was stated, in the resolutions of ratificationof three of the States, that they still possessed the power to withdrawthe grants which they had delegated, whenever they should be used totheir injury or oppression. I know it is said that this meant the peopleof all the States; but that is such an absurdity that I suppose ithardly necessary to answer it--for to speak of an elective Governmentrendering itself injurious and oppressive to the whole body of thepeople by whom it is elected is such an absurdity that no man canbelieve it; and to suppose that a State convention, speaking for aState, and having no authority to speak for anybody else, would say thatit was declaring what the people of the other States would do, would bean assumption altogether derogatory to the sound sense and well-knownsentiments of the men who formed the Constitution and ratified it. 

But in abundance of caution not only was this done, but the tenthamendment of the Constitution declared that all which had not beendelegated was reserved to the States or to the people. Now, I ask, whereamong the delegated grants to the Federal Government do you find anypower to coerce a State; where among the provisions of the Constitutiondo you find any prohibition on the part of a State to withdraw; and, ifyou find neither one nor the other, must not this power be in that greatdepository, the reserved rights of the States? How was it ever taken outof that source of all power to be given to the Federal Government? Itwas not delegated to the Federal Government; it was not prohibited tothe States; it necessarily remains, then, among the reserved powers ofthe States. 

This question has been so forcibly argued by the Senator from Louisiana[Mr. Benjamin] that I think it unnecessary to pursue it. Three times theproposition was made to give power to coerce the States, in theConvention, and as often refused--opposed as a proposition to make waron a State, and refused on the ground that the Federal Government couldnot make war upon a State. The Constitution was to form a Government forsuch States as should unite; it had no application beyond those whoshould voluntarily adopt it. Among the delegated powers there is nonewhich interferes with the exercise of the right of secession by a State. As a right of sovereignty it remained to the States under theConfederation; and, if it did not, you arraign the faith of the men whoframed the Constitution to which you appeal, for they provided that nineStates should secede from thirteen. Eleven did secede from the thirteen, and put themselves in the very position which, by a great abuse oflanguage, is to-day called treason, against the two States of NorthCarolina and Rhode Island; they still claiming to adhere to theperpetual Articles of Confederation, these eleven States absolvingthemselves from the obligations which arose under them. 

The Senator from Tennessee, to whom I must refer again--and I do sobecause he is a Southern Senator--taking the most hostile ground againstus, refers to the State of Tennessee, and points to the time when thatState may do those things which he has declared it an absurdity for anyState to perform. I will read a single paragraph from his speech, showing what his language is, in order that I may not, by anypossibility, produce an impression upon others which his language doesnot justify. Here are the expressions to which I refer. I call theSenator's attention to them:

"If there are grievances, why can not we all go together, and write themdown and point them out to our Northern friends after we have agreed onwhat those grievances were, and say: 'Here is what we demand; here ourwrongs are enumerated; upon these terms we have agreed; and now, afterwe have given you a reasonable time to consider these additionalguarantees in order to protect ourselves against these wrongs, if yourefuse them, then, having made an honorable effort, having exhausted allother means, we may declare the association to be broken up, and we maygo into an act of revolution. ' We can then say to them, 'You haverefused to give us guarantees that we think are needed for theprotection of our institutions and for the protection of our otherinterests. ' When they do this, I will go as far as he who goes thefarthest. "

Now, it does appear that he will go that far; and he goes a littlefurther than anybody, I believe, who has spoken in vindication of theright, for he says:

"We do not intend that you shall drive us out of this House that wasreared by the hands of our fathers. It is our House. It is theconstitutional House. We have a right here; and because you come forwardand violate the ordinances of this House, I do not intend to go out;and, if you persist in the violation of the ordinances of the House, weintend to eject you from the building and retain the possessionourselves. "

I wonder if this is what caused the artillery companies to be orderedhere, and the militia of this city to be organized? I think it was amere figure of speech. I do not believe the Senator from Tennesseeintended to kick you out of the House; and, if he did, let me say toyou, in all sincerity, we who claim the constitutional right of a Stateto withdraw from the Union do not intend to help him. He says, however, and this softens it a little:

"We do not think, though, that we have just cause for going out of theUnion now. We have just cause of complaint; but we are for remaining inthe Union, and fighting the battle like men. "

What does that mean? In the name of common sense, I ask how are we tofight in the Union? We take an oath of office to maintain theConstitution of the United States. The Constitution of the United Stateswas formed for domestic tranquillity; and how, then, are we to fight inthe Union? I have heard the proposition from others; but I have notunderstood it. I understand how men fight when they assume attitudes ofhostility; but I do not understand how men, remaining connected togetherin a bond as brethren, sworn to mutual aid and protection, still proposeto fight each other. I do not understand what the Senator means. If hechooses to answer my question, I am willing to hear him, for I do notunderstand how we are to fight in the Union. 

Mr. Johnson, of Tennessee: When my speech is taken altogether, I thinkmy meaning can be very easily understood. What I mean by fighting thebattle in the Union is, I think, very distinctly and clearly set forthin my speech; and, if the Senator will take it from beginning to end, Iapprehend that he will have no difficulty in ascertaining what I meant. But, for his gratification upon this particular point, I will repeat, insubstance, what I then said as to fighting the battle in the Union. Imeant that we should remain here under the Constitution of the UnitedStates and contend for all its guarantees; and by preserving theConstitution and all its guarantees we would preserve the Union. Ourtrue place, to maintain these guarantees and to preserve theConstitution, is in the Union, there to fight our battle. How? Byargument; by appeals to the patriotism, to the good sense, and to thejudgment of the whole country; by showing the people that theConstitution had been violated; that all its guarantees were notcomplied with; and I have entertained the hope that, when they werepossessed of that fact, there would be found patriotism and honestyenough in the great mass of the people, North and South, to come forwardand do what was just and right between the contending sections of thecountry. I meant that the true way to fight the battle was for us toremain here and occupy the places assigned to us by the Constitution ofthe country. Why did I make that statement? It was because on the 4thday of March next we shall have six majority in this body; and if, assome apprehended, the incoming Administration shall show any dispositionto make encroachments upon the institution of slavery, encroachmentsupon the rights of the States, or any other violation of theConstitution, we, by remaining in the Union, and standing at our places, will have the power to resist all these encroachments. How? We have thepower even to reject the appointment of the Cabinet officers of theincoming President. Then, should we not be fighting the battles in theUnion, by resisting even the organization of the Administration in aconstitutional mode, and thus, at the very start, disable anAdministration which was likely to encroach on our rights and to violatethe Constitution of the country? So far as appointing even a Ministerabroad is concerned, the incoming Administration will have no powerwithout our consent, if we remain here. It comes into office handcuffed, powerless to do harm. We, standing here, hold the balance of power inour hands; we can resist it at the very threshold effectually; and do itinside of the Union, and in our House. The incoming Administration hasnot even the power to appoint a postmaster whose salary exceeds onethousand dollars a year, without consultation with and the acquiescenceof the Senate of the United States. The President has not even the powerto draw his salary--his twenty-five thousand dollars per annum--unlesswe appropriate it. I contend, then, that the true place to fight thebattle is in the Union, and within the provisions of the Constitution. The army and navy cannot be sustained without appropriations byCongress; and, if we were apprehensive that encroachments would be madeon the Southern States and on their institutions, in violation of theConstitution, we could prevent him from having a dollar even to feed hisarmy or his navy. 

Mr. Davis: I receive the answer from the Senator, and I think Icomprehend now that he is not going to use any force, but it is a sortof fighting that is to be done by votes and words; and I think, therefore, the President need not bring artillery and order out themilitia to suppress them. I think, altogether, we are not in danger ofmuch bloodshed in the mode proposed by the Senator from Tennessee. 

Mr. Johnson: I had not quite done; but if the Senator is satisfied--

Mr. Davis: Quite satisfied. I am entirely satisfied that the answer ofthe Senator shows me he did not intend to fight at all; that it was amere figure of speech, and does not justify converting the Federalcapital into a military camp. But it is a sort of revolution which heproposes; it is a revolution under the forms of the Government. Now, Ihave to say, once for all, that, as long as I am a Senator here, I willnot use the powers I possess to destroy the very Government to which Iam accredited. I will not attempt, in the language of the Senator, tohandcuff the President. I will not attempt to destroy the Administrationby refusing any officers to administer its functions. I should vote, asI have done in Administrations to which I stood in nearest relation, against a bad nomination; but I never would agree, under the forms ofthe Constitution, and with the powers I bear as a Senator of the UnitedStates, to turn those powers to the destruction of the Government I wassent to support. I leave that to gentlemen who take the oath with amental reservation. It is not my policy. If I must have revolution, Isay let it be a revolution such as our fathers made when they weredenied their natural rights. 

So much for that. It has quieted apprehension; and I hope that theartillery will not be brought here; that the militia will not be calledout; and that the female schools will continue their sessions asheretofore. [Laughter. ] The authority of Mr. Madison, however, wasrelied on by the Senator from Tennessee; and he read fairly an extractfrom Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Webster, and I give him credit forreading what it seems to me destroys his whole argument. It is thisclause:

"The powers of the Government being exercised, as in other elective andresponsible governments, under the control of its constituents, thepeople, and the Legislatures of the States, and subject to therevolutionary rights of the people in extreme cases. "

Now, sir, we are confusing language very much. Men speak of revolution;and when they say revolution they mean blood. Our fathers meant nothingof the sort. When they spoke of revolution they meant an unalienableright. When they declared as an unalienable right the power of thepeople to abrogate and modify their form of government whenever it didnot answer the ends for which it was established, they did not mean thatthey were to sustain that by brute force. They meant that it was aright; and force could only be invoked when that right was wrongfullydenied. Great Britain denied the right in the case of the colonies, andtherefore our revolution for independence was bloody. If Great Britainhad admitted the great American doctrine, there would have been no bloodshed; and does it become the descendants of those who proclaimed this asthe great principle on which they took their place among the nations ofthe earth, now to proclaim, if that is a right, it is one which you canonly get as the subjects of the Emperor of Austria may get their rights, by force overcoming force? Are we, in this age of civilization andpolitical progress, when political philosophy had advanced to the pointwhich seemed to render it possible that the millennium should now beseen by prophetic eyes--are we now to roll back the whole current ofhuman thought, and again to return to the mere brute force whichprevails between beasts of prey, as the only method of settlingquestions between men?

If the Declaration of Independence be true (and who here gainsays it?), every community may dissolve its connection with any other communitypreviously made, and have no other obligation than that which resultsfrom the breach of an alliance between States. Is it to be supposed;could any man, reasoning _a priori_, come to the conclusion that the menwho fought the battles of the Revolution for community independence--that the men who struggled against the then greatest military power onthe face of the globe in order that they might possess those unalienablerights which they had declared--terminated their great efforts bytransmitting posterity to a condition in which they could only gainthose rights by force? If so, the blood of the Revolution was shed invain; no great principles were established; for force was the law ofnature before the battles of the Revolution were fought. 

I see, then--if gentlemen insist on using the word "revolution" in thesense of a resort to force--a very great difference between theiropinion and that of Mr. Madison. Mr. Madison put the rights of thepeople over and above everything else, and he said this was theGovernment _de jure_ and _de facto_. Call it by what name you will, heunderstood ours to be a Government of the people. The people never haveseparated themselves from those rights which our fathers had declared tobe unalienable. They did not delegate to the Federal Government thepowers which the British Crown exercised over the colonies; they did notachieve their independence for any purpose so low as that. They left usto the inheritance of freemen, living in independent communities, theStates united for the purposes which they thought would bless posterity. It is in the exercise of this reserved right as defined by Mr. Madison, as one to which all the powers of Government are subject, that thepeople of a State in convention have claimed to resume the functionswhich in like manner they had made to the Federal Government.... 

The question which now presents itself to the country is, What shall wedo with events as they stand? Shall we allow this separation to betotal? Shall we render it peaceful, with a view to the chance that, whenhunger shall brighten the intellects of men, and the teachings of hardexperience shall have tamed them, they may come back, in the spirit ofour fathers, to the task of reconstruction? Or will they have thatseparation partial; will they give to each State all its military power;will they give to each State its revenue power; will they still preservethe common agent, and will they thus carry on a Government differentfrom that which now exists, yet not separating the States so entirely asto make the work of reconstruction equal to a new creation; notseparating them so as to render it utterly impossible to administer anyfunctions of the Government in security and peace?

I waive the question of duality, considering that a dual Executive wouldbe the institution of a King Log. I consider a dual legislativedepartment would be to bring into antagonism the representatives of twodifferent countries, to war perpetually, and thus to continue, notunion, but the irrepressible conflict. There is no duality possible(unless there be two confederacies) which seems to me consistent withthe interests of either or of both. It might be that two confederaciescould be so organized as to answer jointly many of the ends of ourpresent Union; it might be that States, agreeing with each other intheir internal policy--having a similarity of interests and an identityof purpose--might associate together, and that these two confederaciesmight have relations to each other so close as to give them a unitedpower in time of war against any foreign nation. These things arepossibilities; these things it becomes us to contemplate; these thingsit devolves on the majority section to consider now; for with everymotion of that clock is passing away your opportunity. It was greaterwhen we met on the first Monday in December than it is now; it isgreater now than it will be on the first day of next week. We havewaited long; we have come to the conclusion that you mean to do nothing. In the Committee of Thirteen, where the resolutions of the Senator fromKentucky [Mr. Crittenden] were considered, various attempts were made, but no prospect of any agreement on which it was possible for us tostand, in security for the future, could be matured. I offered aproposition, which was but the declaration of that which theConstitution announces; but that which the Supreme Court had, from timeto time, and from an early period asserted; but that which was necessaryfor equality in the Union. Not one single vote of the Republican portionof that committee was given for the proposition. 

Looking, then, upon separation as inevitable, not knowing how thatseparation is to occur, or at least what States it is to embrace, thereremains to us, I believe, as the consideration which is most useful, theinquiry, How can this separation be effected so as to leave to us thepower, whenever we shall have the will, to reconstruct? It can only bedone by adopting a policy of peace. It can only be done by denying tothe Federal Government all power to coerce. It can only be done byreturning to the point from which we started, and saying, "This is aGovernment of fraternity, a Government of consent, and it shall not beadministered in a departure from those principles. "

I do not regard the failure of our constitutional Union, as very manydo, to be the failure of self-government--to be conclusive in all futuretime of the unfitness of man to govern himself. Our State governmentshave charge of nearly all the relations of person and property. ThisFederal Government was instituted mainly as a common agent for foreignpurposes, for free trade among the States, and for common defense. Representative liberty will remain in the States after they areseparated. Liberty was not crushed by the separation of the coloniesfrom the mother-country, then the most constitutional monarchy and thefreest Government known. Still less will liberty be destroyed by theseparation of these States, to prevent the destruction of the spirit ofthe Constitution by the mal-administration of it. There will beinjury--injury to all; differing in degree, differing in manner. Theinjury to the manufacturing and navigating States will be to theirinternal prosperity. The injury to the Southern States will be mainly totheir foreign commerce. All will feel the deprivation of that high prideand power which belong to the flag now representing the greatestrepublic, if not the greatest Government, upon the face of the globe. Iwould that it still remained to consider what we might calmly haveconsidered on the first Monday in December--how this could be avoided;but events have rolled past that point. You would not make propositionswhen they would have been effective. I presume you will not make themnow; and I know not what effect they would have if you did. Yourpropositions would have been most welcome if they had been made beforeany question of coercion, and before any vain boasting of power; forpride and passion do not often take counsel of pecuniary interest, atleast among those whom I represent. But you have chosen to take thepolicy of clinging to words [the Chicago platform], in disregard ofpassing events, and have hastened them onward. It is true, as shown bythe history of all revolutions, that they are most precipitated andintensified by obstinacy and vacillation. The want of a policy, theobstinate adherence to unimportant things, have brought us to acondition where I close my eyes, because I can not see anything thatencourages me to hope. 

In the long period which elapsed after the downfall of the greatrepublics of the East, when despotism seemed to brood over the civilizedworld, and only here and there constitutional monarchy even was able torear its head--when all the great principles of republican andrepresentative government had sunk deep, fathomless, into the sea ofhuman events--it was then that the storm of our Revolution moved thewaters. The earth, the air, and the sea became brilliant; and from thefoam of ages rose the constellation which was set in the politicalfirmament, as a sign of unity and confederation and communityindependence, coexistent with confederate strength. That constellationhas served to bless our people. Nay, more; its light has been thrown onforeign lands, and its regenerative power will outlive, perhaps, theGovernment as a sign for which it was set. It may be pardoned to me, sir, who, in my boyhood, was given to the military service, and who havefollowed, under tropical suns and over northern snows, the flag of theUnion, if I here express the deep sorrow which always overwhelms me whenI think of taking a last leave of that object of early affection andproud association; feeling that henceforth it is not to be the bannerwhich, by day and by night, I was ready to follow; to hail with therising and bless with the setting sun. But God, who knows the hearts ofmen, will judge between you and us, at whose door lies theresponsibility. Men will see the efforts made, here and elsewhere; thatwe have been silent when words would not avail, and have curbed animpatient temper, and hoped that conciliatory counsels might do thatwhich could not be effected by harsh means. And yet, the only responsewhich has come from the other side has been a stolid indifference, asthough it mattered not: "Let the temple fall, we do not care!" Sirs, remember that such conduct is offensive, and that men may becomeindifferent even to the objects of their early attachments. 

If our Government should fail, it will not be from the defect of thesystem, though each planet was set to revolve in an orbit of its own, each moving by its own impulse, yet being all attracted by theaffections and interests which countervailed each other; there was noinherent tendency to disruption. It has been the perversion of theConstitution; it has been the substitution of theories of morals forprinciples of government; it has been forcing crude opinions upon thedomestic institutions of others, which has disturbed these planets intheir orbit; it is this which threatens to destroy the constellationwhich, in its power and its glory, had been gathering stars one afteranother, until, from thirteen, it had risen to thirty-three. 

If we accept the argument of to-day in favor of coercion as the theoryof our Government, its only effect will be to precipitate men who havepride and self-reliance into the assertion of the freedom andindependence to which they were born. Our fathers would never haveentered into a confederate Government which had within itself the powerof coercion; they would not agree to remain one day in such a Governmentafter I had the power to get out of it. To argue that the man whofollows the mandate of his State, resuming her sovereign jurisdictionand power, is disloyal to his allegiance to the United States, whichallegiance he only owed through his State, is such a confusion of ideasas does not belong to an ordinary comprehension of our Government. It istreason to the principle of community independence. It is to recur tothat doctrine of passive obedience which, in England, cost one monarchhis head and drove another into exile; a doctrine which, since theRevolution of 1688, has obtained nowhere where men speak the Englishtongue. Yet all this it is needful to admit, before we accept thisdoctrine of coercion, which is to send an army and a navy to do thatwhich there are no courts to perform; to execute the law without ajudicial decision, and without an officer to serve process. This, I say, would degrade us to the basest despotism under which man could live--thedespotism of a many-headed monster, without the sensibility or regardfulconsideration which might belong to an hereditary king. [207]

 * * * * *

There is a strange similarity in the position of affairs at the presentday to that which the colonies occupied. Lord North asserted the rightto collect the revenue, and insisted on collecting it by force. He senttroops to Boston Harbor and to Charlestown, and he quartered troops inthose towns. The result was, collision; and out of that collision camethe separation of the colonies from the mother-country. The same thingis being attempted to-day. Not the law, not the civil magistrate, buttroops, are relied upon now to execute the laws. To gather taxes in theSouthern ports, the army and navy must be sent to perform the functionsof magistrates. It is the old case over again. Senators of the North, you are reënacting the blunders which statesmen in Great Britaincommitted; but among you there are some who, like Chatham and Burke, though not of our section, yet are vindicating our rights. 

I have heard, with some surprise, for it seemed to me idle, therepetition of the assertion heretofore made, that the cause of theseparation was the election of Mr. Lincoln. It may be a source ofgratification to some gentlemen that their friend is elected; but noindividual had the power to produce the existing state of things. It wasthe purpose, the end, it was the declaration by himself and his friends, which constitute the necessity of providing new safeguards forourselves. The man was nothing, save as he was the representative ofopinions, of a policy, of purposes, of power, to inflict upon us thosewrongs to which freemen never tamely submit. 

Senators, I have spoken longer than I desired. I had supposed it waspossible, avoiding argument and not citing authority, to have made toyou a brief address. It was thought useless to argue a question whichnow belongs to the past. The time is near at hand when the places whichhave known us as colleagues laboring together can know us in thatrelation no more for ever. I have striven to avert the catastrophe whichnow impends over the country, unsuccessfully; and I regret it. For thefew days which I may remain, I am willing to labor in order that thatcatastrophe shall be as little as possible destructive to public peaceand prosperity. If you desire at this last moment to avert civil war, sobe it; it is better so. If you will but allow us to separate from youpeaceably, since we can not live peaceably together, to leave with therights we had before we were united, since we can not enjoy them in theUnion, then there are many relations which may still subsist between us, drawn from the associations of our struggles from the Revolutionary erato the present day, which may be beneficial to you as well as to us. 

If you will not have it thus--if in the pride of power, if in contemptof reason, and reliance upon force, you say we shall not go, but shallremain as subjects to you--then, gentlemen of the North, a war is to beinaugurated the like of which men have not seen. Sufficiently numerouson both sides, in close contact, with only imaginary lines of division, and with many means of approach, each sustained by productive sections, the people of which will give freely both of money and of store, theconflicts must be multiplied indefinitely, and masses of men, sacrificedto the demon of civil war, will furnish hecatombs, such as the recentcampaign in Italy did not offer. At the end of all this what will youhave effected? Destruction upon both sides; subjugation upon neither; atreaty of peace leaving both torn and bleeding; the wail of the widowand the cry of the orphan substituted for those peaceful notes ofdomestic happiness that now prevail throughout the land; and then youwill agree that each is to pursue his separate course as best he may. This is to be the end of war. Through a long series of years you maywaste your strength, distress your people, and yet at last must come tothe position which you might have had at first, had justice and reason, instead of selfishness and passion, folly and crime, dictated yourcourse. 

Is there wisdom, is there patriotism in the land? If so, easy must bethe solution of this question. If not, then Mississippi's gallant sonswill stand like a wall of fire around their State; and I go hence, notin hostility to you, but in love and allegiance to her, to take my placeamong her sons, be it for good or for evil. 

I shall probably never again attempt to utter here the language eitherof warning or of argument. I leave the case in your hands. If you solveit not before I go, you will have still to decide it. Toward youindividually, as well as to those whom you represent, I would that I hadthe power now to say there shall be peace between us for ever. I wouldthat I had the power now to say the intercourse and the commerce betweenthe States, if they can not live in one Union, shall still beuninterrupted; that all the social relations shall remain undisturbed;that the son in Mississippi shall visit freely his father in Maine, andthe reverse; and that each shall be welcomed when he goes to the other, not by himself alone, but also by his neighbors; and that all thatkindly intercourse which has subsisted between the different sections ofthe Union shall continue to exist. This is not only for the interest ofall, but it is my profoundest wish, my sincerest desire, that suchremnant of that which is passing away may grace the memory of a gloriousthough too brief existence. 

Day by day you have become more and more exasperated. False reports haveled you to suppose there was in our section hostility to you withmanifestations which did not exist. In one case, I well remember whenthe Senator from Vermont [Mr. Collamer] was serving with me on a specialcommittee, it was reported that a gentleman who had gone from acommercial house in New York had been inhumanly treated at Vicksburg, and this embarrassed a question which we then had pending. I wrote toVicksburg for information, and my friends could not learn that such aman had ever been there; but, if he had been there, no violencecertainly had been offered to him. Falsehood and suspicion have thus ledyou on step by step in the career of crimination, and perhaps hasinduced to some part of your aggression. Such evil effects we haveheretofore suffered, and the consequences now have their fatalculmination. On the verge of war, distrust and passion increase thedanger. To-day it is in the power of two bad men, at the opposite endsof the telegraphic line between Washington and Charleston, toprecipitate the State of South Carolina and the United States into aconflict of arms without other cause to have produced it. 

And still will you hesitate; still will you do nothing? Will you sitwith sublime indifference and allow events to shape themselves? Nolonger can you say the responsibility is upon the Executive. He hasthrown it upon you. He has notified you that he can do nothing; and youtherefore know he will do nothing. He has told you the responsibilitynow rests with Congress; and I close as I began, by invoking you to meetthat responsibility, bravely to act the patriot's part. If you will, theangel of peace may spread her wings, though it be over divided States;and the sons of the sires of the Revolution may still go on in friendlyintercourse with each other, ever renewing the memories of a commonorigin; the sections, by the diversity of their products and habits, acting and reacting beneficially, the commerce of each may swell theprosperity of both, and the happiness of all be still interwoventogether. Thus may it be; and thus it is in your power to make it. 

[Footnote 207: Here occurred a colloquy with another Senator, followedby some paragraphs not essential to the completeness of the subject. ]

APPENDIX I. 

Correspondence and extracts from correspondence relative to Fort Sumter, from the affair of the Star of the West, January 9, 1861, to thewithdrawal of the envoy of South Carolina from Washington, February 8, 1861. 

_Major Anderson to the Governor of South Carolina. 

To his Excellency the Governor of South Carolina. _

Sir: Two of your batteries fired this morning upon an unarmed vesselbearing the flag of my Government. As I have not been notified that warhas been declared by South Carolina against the Government of the UnitedStates, I can not but think that this hostile act was committed withoutyour sanction or authority. Under that hope, and that alone, did Irefrain from opening fire upon your batteries. 

I have the honor, therefore, respectfully to ask whether theabove-mentioned act--one I believe without a parallel in the history ofour country, or of any other civilized Government--was committed inobedience to your instructions, and to notify you, if it be notdisclaimed, that I must regard it as an act of war, and that I shallnot, after a reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit anyvessels to pass within range of the guns of my fort. 

In order to save as far as in my power the shedding of blood, I beg thatyou will have due notification of this my decision given to allconcerned. 

Hoping, however, that your answer may be such as will justify a furthercontinuance of forbearance on my part, I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ROBERT ANDERSON, _Major First Artillery U. S. A. , commanding_. 

Fort Sumter, South Carolina, _January 9, 1861_. 

_Extracts from reply of the Governor to Major Anderson_. 

State of South Carolina, Executive Office, Headquarters, Charleston, _January 9, 1861_. 

Sir: Your letter has been received. In it you make certain statementswhich very plainly show that you have not been fully informed by yourGovernment of the precise relations which now exist between it and theState of South Carolina. Official information has been communicated tothe Government of the United States that the political connectionheretofore existing between the State of South Carolina and the Stateswhich were known as the United States had ceased, and that the State ofSouth Carolina had resumed all the power it had delegated to the UnitedStates under the compact known as the Constitution of the United States. The right which the State of South Carolina possessed to change thepolitical relations it held with other States, under the Constitution ofthe United States, has been solemnly asserted by the people of thisState, in convention, and now does not admit of discussion. 

 * * * * *

The attempt to reënforce the troops now at Fort Sumter, or to retake andresume possession of the forts within the waters of this State, whichyou have abandoned, after spiking the guns placed there, and doingotherwise much damage, can not be regarded by the authorities of thisState as indicative of any other purpose than the coercion of the Stateby the armed force of the Government. To repel such an attempt is tooplainly its duty to allow it to be discussed. But, while defending itswaters, the authorities of the State have been careful so to conduct theaffairs of the State that no act, however necessary for its defense, should lead to a useless waste of life. Special agents, therefore, havebeen off the bar, to warn all approaching vessels, if armed, or unarmedand having troops to reënforce the forts on board, not to enter theharbor of Charleston; and special orders have been given to thecommanders of all the forts and batteries not to fire at such vesselsuntil a shot fired across their bows would warn them of the prohibitionof the State. 

Under these circumstances, the Star of the West, it is understood, thismorning attempted to enter this harbor, with troops on board; and, having been notified that she could not enter, was fired into. The actis perfectly justified by me. 

In regard to your threat in relation to vessels in the harbor, it isonly necessary to say, that you must judge of your responsibilities. Your position in this harbor has been tolerated by the authorities ofthe State. And, while the act of which you complain is in perfectconsistency with the rights and duties of the State, it is not perceivedhow far the conduct which you propose to adopt can find a parallel inthe history of any country, or be reconciled with any other purpose ofyour Government than that of imposing upon this State the condition of aconquered province. 

F. W. PICKENS. 

To Major Robert Anderson, _commanding Fort Sumter_. 

_Major Anderson to the Governor. _

Headquarters, Fort Sumter, South Carolina, _January 9, 1861_. 

To his Excellency F. W. PICKENS, _Governor of the State of South Carolina. _

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communicationof to-day, and to say that, under the circumstances, I have deemed itproper to refer the whole matter to my Government; and that I intenddeferring the course indicated in my note of this morning until thearrival from Washington of the instructions I may receive. I have thehonor also to express a hope that no obstructions will be placed in theway of, and that you will do me the favor to afford every facility to, the departure and return of the bearer, Lieutenant T. Talbot, U. S. Army, who has been directed to make the journey. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, ROBERT ANDERSON, _Major U. S. Army, commanding. _

_The Governor to the President of the United States. _

State of South Carolina, Executive Office, Headquarters, Charleston, _January 11, 1861_. 

Sir: At the time of the separation of the State of South Carolina fromthe United States, Fort Sumter was, and still is, in the possession oftroops of the United States, under the command of Major Anderson. Iregard that possession as not consistent with the dignity or safety ofthe State of South Carolina; and I have this day addressed to MajorAnderson a communication to obtain from him the possession of that fort, by the authorities of this State. The reply of Major Anderson informs methat he has no authority to do what I required, but he desires areference of the demand to the President of the United States. 

Under the circumstances now existing, and which need no comment by me, Ihave determined to send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, theAttorney-General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed himto demand the delivery of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, tothe constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina. 

The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which apersistence in your attempt to retain the possession of that fort willcause, and which will be unavailing to secure you that possession, butinduce a calamity most deeply to be deplored. 

If consequences so unhappy shall ensue, I will secure for this State, inthe demand which I now make, the satisfaction of having exhausted everyattempt to avoid it. 

In relation to the public property of the United States within FortSumter, the Hon. I. W. Hayne, who will hand you this communication, isauthorized to give you the pledge of the State that the valuation ofsuch property will be accounted for, by this State, upon the adjustmentof its relations with the United States, of which it was a part. 

F. W. PICKENS. 

_To the_ President _of the United States_. 

_Extracts from instructions of the State Department of South Carolina toHon. I. W. Hayne_. 

State of South Carolina, Executive Office, State Department, Charleston, _January 12, 1861_. 

Sir: The Governor has considered it proper, in view of the gravequestions which now affect the State of South Carolina and the UnitedStates, to make a demand upon the President of the United States for thedelivery to the State of South Carolina of Fort Sumter, now within theterritorial limits of this Sate and occupied by troops of the UnitedStates. 

 * * * * *

You are now instructed to proceed to Washington, and there, in the nameof the government of the State of South Carolina, inquire of thePresident of the United States whether it was by his order that troopsof the United States were sent into the harbor of Charleston toreënforce Fort Sumter; if he avows that order, you will then inquirewhether he asserts a right to introduce troops of the United Stateswithin the limits of this State, to occupy Fort Sumter; and you will, incase of his avowal, inform him that neither will be permitted, andeither will be regarded as his declaration of war against the State ofSouth Carolina. 

The Governor, to save life, and determined to omit no course ofproceeding usual among civilized nations, previous to that condition ofgeneral hostilities which belongs to war, and not knowing under whatorder, or by what authority, Fort Sumter is now held, demanded fromMajor Robert Anderson, now in command of that fort, its delivery to theState. That officer, in his reply, has referred the Governor to theGovernment of the United States at Washington. You will, therefore, demand from the President of the United States the withdrawal of thetroops of the United States from that fort, and its delivery to theState of South Carolina. 

You are instructed not to allow any question of property claimed by theUnited States to embarrass the assertion of the political right of theState of South Carolina to the possession of Fort Sumter. The possessionof that fort by the State is alone consistent with the dignity andsafety of the State of South Carolina; but such possession is notinconsistent with a right to compensation in money in anotherGovernment, if it has against the State of South Carolina any just claimconnected with that fort. But the possession of the fort can not, inregard to the State of South Carolina, be compensated by anyconsideration of any kind from the Government of the United States, whenthe possession of it by the Government is invasive of the dignity andaffects the safety of the State. That possession can not become now amatter of discussion or negotiation. You will, therefore, require fromthe President of the United States a positive and distinct answer toyour demand for the delivery of the fort. And you are further authorizedto give the pledge of the State to adjust all matters which may be, andare in their nature, susceptible of valuation in money, in the mannermost usual, and upon the principles of equity and justice alwaysrecognized by independent nations, for the ascertainment of theirrelative rights and obligations in such matters.... 

Respectfully, your obedient servant, A. G. MAGRATH. 

_To Hon. _ W. Hayne, _special envoy from the State of South Carolina tothe President of the United States_. 

_Letter of Senators of seceding States to Hon. I. W. Hayne_. 

Washington City, _January 15, 1861_. 

Hon. Isaac W. Hayne. 

Sir: We are apprised that you visit Washington, as an envoy from theState of South Carolina, bearing a communication from the Governor ofyour State to the President of the United States, in relation to FortSumter. Without knowing its contents, we venture to request you to deferits delivery to the President for a few days, or until you and he haveconsidered the suggestions which we beg leave to submit. 

We know that the possession of Fort Sumter by troops of the UnitedStates, coupled with the circumstances under which it was taken, is thechief, if not only, source of difficulty between the government of SouthCarolina and that of the United States. We would add that we, too, thinkit a just cause of irritation and of apprehension on the part of yourState. But we have also assurances, notwithstanding the circumstancesunder which Major Anderson left Fort Moultrie and entered Fort Sumterwith the forces under his command, that it was not taken, and is notheld, with any hostile or unfriendly purpose toward your State, butmerely as property of the United States, which the President deems ithis duty to protect and preserve. 

We will not discuss the question of right or duty on the part of eitherGovernment touching that property, or the late acts of either inrelation thereto; but we think that, without any compromise of right orbreach of duty on either side, an amicable adjustment of the matter ofdifferences may and should be adopted. We desire to see such anadjustment, and to prevent war or the shedding of blood. We representStates which have already seceded from the United States, or will havedone so before the 1st of February next, and which will meet your Statein convention on or before the 15th of that month. Our people feel thatthey have a common destiny with your people, and expect to form withthem, in that Convention, a new Confederation and ProvisionalGovernment. We must and will share your fortunes, suffering with you theevils of war if it can not be avoided; and enjoying with you theblessings of peace, if it can be preserved. We, therefore, think itespecially due from South Carolina to our States--to say nothing ofother slaveholding States--that she should, as far as she can, consistently with her honor, avoid initiating hostilities between herand the United States or any other power. We have the public declarationof the President that he has not the constitutional power or the will tomake war on South Carolina, and that the public peace shall not bedisturbed by any act of hostility toward your State. 

We, therefore, see no reason why there may not be a settlement ofexisting difficulties, if time be given for calm and deliberate counselwith those States which are equally involved with South Carolina. We, therefore, trust that an arrangement will be agreed on between you andthe President, at least till the 15th of February next; by which timeyour and our States may, in convention, devise a wise, just, andpeaceable solution of existing difficulties. 

In the mean time, we think your State should suffer Major Anderson toobtain necessary supplies of food, fuel, or water, and enjoy freecommunication, by post or special messenger, with the President; uponthe understanding that the President will not send him reënforcementsduring the same period. We propose to submit this proposition and youranswer to the President. 

If not clothed with power to make such arrangement, then we trust thatyou will submit our suggestions to the Governor of your State for hisinstructions. Until you have received and communicated his response tothe President, of course your State will not attack Fort Sumter, and thePresident will not offer to reënforce it. 

We most respectfully submit these propositions, in the earnest hope thatyou, or the proper authority of your State, may accede to them. 

We have the honor to be, with profound esteem, Your obedient servants, LOUIS T. WIGFALL, JOHN HEMPHILL, D. L. YULEE, S. R. MALLORY, JEFFERSON DAVIS, C. C. CLAY, Jr. , BENJAMIN FITZPATRICK, A. IVERSON, JOHN SLIDELL, J. P. BENJAMIN. 

_Letter of Hon. I. W. Hayne in reply to Senators from seceding States. _

Washington, _January, 1861_. 

Gentlemen: I have just received your communication, dated the 15thinstant. You represent, you say, States which have already seceded fromthe United States, or _will have_ done so before the 1st of Februarynext, and which will meet South Carolina in convention, on or beforethe 15th of that month; that your people feel they have a common destinywith our people, and expect to form with them in that Convention a newConfederacy and Provisional Government; that you must and _will_ shareour fortunes, suffering with us the evils of war, if it can not beavoided, and enjoying with us the blessings of peace, if it _can_ bepreserved. 

I feel, gentlemen, the force of this appeal, and, so far as my authorityextends, most cheerfully comply with your request. 

I am _not_ clothed with power to make the arrangements you suggest, butprovided you can get assurances, with which you are entirely satisfied, that _no_ reënforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that public peace shall _not_ be disturbed by any act of hostilitytoward South Carolina, I will refer your communication to theauthorities of South Carolina, and, withholding their communication, with which I am at present charged, will wait for their instructions. 

Major Anderson and his command, let me assure you, _do_ now obtain allnecessary supplies of food (including fresh meat and vegetables), and, Ibelieve, fuel and water; and _do_ now enjoy free communication, by postand special messengers, with the President, and will continue to do so, certainly, until the door of negotiation shall be closed. 

If your proposition is acceded to, you may assure the President that_no_ attack will be made on Fort Sumter until a response from theGovernor of South Carolina has been received by me, and communicated tohim. 

With great consideration and profound esteem, Your obedient servant, ISAAC W. HAYNE, _Envoy from the Governor and Council of South Carolina. _

_Letter of Senators of seceding States to the President. _

Senate-Chamber, _January 19, 1861_. 

Sir: We have been requested to present to you copies of a correspondencebetween certain Senators of the United States and Colonel Isaac W. Hayne, now in this city, in behalf of the government of South Carolina, and to ask that you will take into consideration the subject of saidcorrespondence. Very respectfully, your obedient servants, BENJAMIN FITZPATRICK, S. R. MALLORY, JOHN SLIDELL. To his Excellency James Buchanan, _President United States_. 

To the letter above, an evasive reply was returned on the 22d by theHon. Joseph Holt, Secretary of War _ad interim_, on behalf of thePresident, the material points of which are contained in the followingparagraph:

In regard to the proposition of Colonel Hayne, that "no reënforcementswill be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the public peacewill not be disturbed by any act of hostility toward South Carolina, " itis impossible for me to give you any such assurances. The President hasno authority to enter into such an agreement or understanding. As anexecutive officer, he is simply bound to protect the public property, sofar as this may be practicable; and it would be a manifest violation ofhis duty to place himself under engagements that he would not performthis duty either for an indefinite or limited period. At the presentmoment it is not deemed necessary to reënforce Major Anderson, becausehe makes no such request, and feels quite secure in his position. Shouldhis safety, however, require reënforcements, every effort will be madeto supply them. 

Mr. Holt concludes his letter by saying:

Major Anderson is not menacing Charleston; and I am convinced that thehappiest result which can be attained is, that both he and theauthorities of South Carolina shall remain on their present amicablefooting, neither party being bound by any obligations whatever, exceptthe high Christian and moral duty to keep the peace, and to avoid allcauses of mutual irritation. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. HOLT, _Secretary of War ad interim. _

_Letter of Senators of seceding States to Hon. I. W. Hayne. _

Hon. Isaac W. Hayne. Washington, _January 23, 1861_. 

Sir: In answer to your letter of the 17th inst. We have now to informyou that, after communicating with the President, we have received aletter signed by the Secretary of War, and addressed to Messrs. Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and Slidell, on the subject of our proposition, which letter we now inclose to you. Although its terms are not assatisfactory as we could have desired, in relation to the ulteriorpurposes of the Executive, we have no hesitation in expressing ourentire confidence that no reënforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter, nor will the public peace be disturbed within the period requisite forfull communication between yourself and your government; and we trust, therefore, that you will feel justified in applying for furtherinstructions before delivering to the President any message with whichyou may have been charged. 

We take this occasion to renew the expression of an earnest hope thatSouth Carolina will not deem it incompatible with her safety, dignity;or honor to refrain from initiating any hostilities against any powerwhatsoever, or from taking any steps tending to produce collision, untilour States, which are to share her fortunes, shall have an opportunityof joining their counsels with hers. 

We are, with great respect, your obedient servants, LOUIS T. WIGFALL, D. L. YULEE, J. P. BENJAMIN, A. IVERSON, JOHN HEMPHILL, JOHN SLIDELL, C. C. CLAY, Jr. 

P. S. --Some of the signatures to the former letter addressed to you arenot affixed to the foregoing communication, in consequence of thedeparture of several Senators, now on their way to their respectiveStates. 

_Letter of Hon. I. W. Hayne to Senators of seceding States. _

To the Honorable Louis T. Wigfall, D. L. Yulee, J. P. Benjamin, A. Iverson, John Hemphill, John Slidell, and C. C. Clay, Jr. 

Gentlemen: I have received your letter of the 23d inst. , inclosing acommunication dated the 22d inst. , addressed to Messrs. Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and Slidell, from the Secretary of War _ad interim_. Thiscommunication from the Secretary is far from being satisfactory to me. But, inasmuch as you state that "we (you) have no hesitation inexpressing an entire confidence that no reënforcement will be sent toFort Sumter, nor will the public peace be disturbed within the periodrequisite for full communication between yourself (myself) and your (my)Government, " in compliance with our previous understanding, I withholdthe communication with which I am at present charged, and refer thewhole matter to the authorities of South Carolina, and will await theirreply. 

Mr. Gourdin, of South Carolina, now in this city, will leave here by theevening's train, and will lay before the Governor of South Carolina andhis Council the whole correspondence between yourselves and myself, andbetween you and the Government of the United States, with acommunication from me, asking further instructions. 

I can not, in closing, but express my deep regret that the Presidentshould deem it necessary to keep a garrison of troops at Fort Sumter forthe protection of the "_property_" of the United States. South Carolinascorns the idea of appropriating to herself the _property_ of another, whether of a government or an individual, without accounting, to thelast dollar, for everything which, for the protection of her citizensand in vindication of her own honor and dignity, she may deem itnecessary to take into her own possession. As _property_, Fort Sumter isin far greater jeopardy occupied by a garrison of United States troopsthan it would be if delivered over to the State authorities, with thepledge that, in regard to that and all other property claimed by theUnited States within the jurisdiction of South Carolina, they wouldfully account, upon a fair adjustment. 

Upon the other point of the preservation of the peace, and the avoidanceof bloodshed--is it supposed that the occupation of a fort in the midstof a harbor, with guns bearing upon every position of it, by aGovernment no longer acknowledged, can be other than the occasion ofconstant irritation, excitement, and indignation? It creates a conditionof things which I fear is but little calculated to advance theobservance of the "high Christian and moral duty to keep the peace, andto avoid all causes of mutual irritation, " recommended by the Secretaryof War in his communication. 

In my judgment, to continue to hold Fort Sumter, by United Statestroops, is the worst possible means of protecting it as property, andthe worst possible means for effecting a peaceful solution of presentdifficulties. 

I beg leave, in conclusion, to say that it is in deference to theunanimous opinion expressed by the Senators present in Washington, "representing States which have already seceded from the United States, or will have done so before the 1st of February next, " that I complywith your suggestions. And I feel assured that suggestions from such aquarter will be considered with profound respect by the authorities ofSouth Carolina, and will have great weight in determining their action. 

With high consideration, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yourobedient servant, ISAAC W. HAYNE, _Envoy from the Governor and Council of South Carolina. _

_Mr. Hayne to the President of the United States_. 

Washington, _January_ 31, 1861. 

To his Excellency James Buchanan, _President_. 

Sir: I had the honor to hold a short interview with you on the 14thinst. , informal and unofficial. Having previously been informed that youdesired that whatever was official should be, on both sides, conductedby written communications, I did not at that time present mycredentials, but verbally informed you that I bore a letter from theGovernor of South Carolina in regard to the occupation of Fort Sumter, which I would deliver the next day under cover of a writtencommunication from myself. The next day, before such communication couldbe made, I was waited upon by a Senator from Alabama, who stated that hecame on the part of all the Senators then in Washington from the Stateswhich had already seceded from the United States, or would certainlyhave done so before the 1st day of February next. The Senator fromAlabama urged that he and they were interested in the subject of mymission in almost an equal degree with the authorities of SouthCarolina. He said that hostilities commenced between South Carolina andyour Government would necessarily involve the States represented bythemselves in civil strife, and, fearing that the action of SouthCarolina might complicate the relations of your Government to theseceded and seceding States, and thereby interfere with a peacefulsolution of existing difficulties, these Senators requested that I wouldwithhold my message to yourself until a consultation among themselvescould be had. To this I agreed, and the result of the consultation wasthe letter of these Senators addressed to me, dated 15th January, a copyof which is in your possession. To this letter I replied on the 17th, and a copy of that reply is likewise in your possession. Thiscorrespondence, as I am informed, was made the subject of acommunication from Senators Fitzpatrick, Mallory, and Slidell, addressedto you, and your attention called to the contents. These gentlemenreceived on the 22d day of January a reply to their application, conveyed in a letter addressed to them, dated the 22d, signed by theHon. J. Holt, Secretary of War _ad interim_. Of this letter you ofcourse have a copy. This letter from Mr. Holt was communicated to meunder the cover of a letter from all the Senators of the seceded andseceding States, who still remained in Washington; and of this letter, too, I am informed you have been furnished with a copy. 

This reply of yours through the Secretary of War _ad interim_ to theapplication made by the Senators, was entirely unsatisfactory to me. Itappeared to me to be not only a rejection in advance of the mainproposition made by these Senators, to wit, that "an arrangement shouldbe agreed on between the authorities of South Carolina and yourGovernment, at least until the 15th of February next, by which timeSouth Carolina and the States represented by the Senators might, inconvention, devise a wise, just, and peaceable solution of existingdifficulties"; "in the mean time, " they say, "we think" (that is, theseSenators) "that your State" (South Carolina) "should suffer MajorAnderson to obtain necessary supplies of food, fuel, or water, and enjoyfree communication, by post or special messenger, with the President, upon the understanding that the President will not send himreënforcements during the same period"; but, besides this rejection ofthe main proposition, there was in Mr. Holt's letter a distinct refusalto make any stipulation on the subject of reënforcement, even for theshort time that might be required to communicate with my government. 

This reply to the Senators was, as I have stated, altogetherunsatisfactory to me, and I felt sure that it would be so to theauthorities whom I represented. It was not, however, addressed to me, orto the authorities of South Carolina; and, as South Carolina hadaddressed nothing to your Government, and had asked nothing at yourhands, I looked not to Mr. Holt's letter but to the note addressed to meby the Senators of the seceded and seceding States. I had consented towithhold my message at _their_ instance, provided they could getassurances _satisfactory to them_ that no reënforcements would be sentto Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the peace should not bedisturbed by any act of hostility. The Senators expressed, in their noteto me of the 23d instant, their "entire confidence that noreënforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter, nor will the public peace bedisturbed within the period requisite for full communication between you(myself) and your (my) Government"; and renewed their request that Iwould withhold the communication with which I stood charged, and awaitfurther instructions. This I have done. The further instructions arrivedon the 30th instant and bear date the 26th. I now have the honor to maketo you my first communication as special envoy from the government ofSouth Carolina. You will find inclosed the original communication to thePresident of the United States from the Governor of South Carolina, withwhich I was charged in Charleston on the 12th day of January, instant, the day on which it bears date. I am now instructed by the Governor ofSouth Carolina to say that "his opinion as to the propriety of thedemand which is contained in this letter has not only been confirmed bythe circumstances which your (my) mission has developed, but is nowincreased to a conviction of its necessity. The safety of the Staterequires that the position of the President should be distinctlyunderstood. The safety of all seceding States requires it as much as thesafety of South Carolina. If it be so, that Fort Sumter is held as_property_, then as property, the rights, whatever they may be, of theUnited States can be ascertained, and for the satisfaction of theserights the pledge of the State of South Carolina you are" (I am)"authorized to give. If Fort Sumter is not held as property, it isheld, " say my instructions, "as a military post, and such a post withinthe limits of South Carolina can not be tolerated. "

You will perceive that it is upon the presumption that it is solely asproperty that you continue to hold Fort Sumter that I have been selectedfor the performance of the duty upon which I have entered. I do not comeas a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but as thelegal officer of the State, its Attorney-General, to claim for the Statethe exercise of its undoubted right of eminent domain, and to pledge theState to make good all injury to the rights of property which may arisefrom the exercise of the claim. 

South Carolina, as a separate, independent sovereignty, assumes theright to take into her possession everything within her limits essentialto maintain her honor or her safety, irrespective of the question ofproperty, subject only to the moral duty requiring that compensationshould be made to the owner. This right she can not permit to be drawninto discussion. As to compensation for any property, whether of anindividual or a Government, which she may deem it necessary for herhonor or safety to take into her possession, her past history givesample guarantee that it will be made, upon a fair accounting, to thelast dollar. The proposition now is, that her law officer should, underauthority of the Governor and his Council, distinctly pledge the faithof South Carolina to make such compensation in regard to Fort Sumter, and its appurtenances and contents, to the full extent of the moneyvalue of the property of the United States delivered over to theauthorities of South Carolina by your command. 

I will not suppose that a pledge like this can be consideredinsufficient security. Is not the money value of the property of theUnited States in this fort, situated where it can not be made availableto the United States for any one purpose for which it was originallyconstructed, worth more to the United States than the property itself?Why, then, _as property_, insist on holding it by an armed garrison? Yetsuch has been the ground upon which you have invariably placed youroccupancy of this fort by troops; beginning, prospectively, with yourannual message of the 4th December; again in your special message of the9th (8th) January, and still more emphatically in your message of the28th January. The same position is set forth in your reply to theSenators, through the Secretary of War _ad interim_. It is therevirtually conceded that Fort Sumter "is held merely as property of theUnited States, which you deem it your duty, to protect and preserve. "

Again, it is submitted that the continuance of an armed possessionactually jeopards the property you desire to protect. It is impossiblebut that such a possession, if continued long enough, must lead tocollision. No people, not completely abject and pusillanimous, couldsubmit, indefinitely, to the armed occupation of a fortress in the midstof the harbor of its principal city, and commanding the ingress andegress of every ship that enters the port, the daily ferry-boats thatply upon the waters moving but at the sufferance of aliens. An attackupon this fort would scarcely improve it as property, whatever theresult; and, if captured, it would no longer be the subject of account. 

To protect Fort Sumter, merely as property, it is submitted that anarmed occupancy is not only unnecessary, but that it is manifestly theworst possible means which can be resorted to for such an object. 

Your reply to the Senators, through Mr. Holt, declares it to be yoursole object "to act strictly on the defensive, and to authorize nomovement against South Carolina unless justified by a hostile movementon their part, " yet, in reply to the proposition of the Senators that noreënforcements should be sent to Fort Sumter, provided South Carolinaagrees that during the same period no attack should be made, you say:"It is impossible for me (your Secretary) to give you (the Senators) anysuch assurance, " that it "would be a manifest violation of his (your)duty to place himself (yourself) under engagements that he (you) wouldnot perform the duty either for an indefinite or a limited period. "

In your message of the 28th inst. , in expressing yourself in regard to asimilar proposition, you say: "However strong may be my desire to enterinto such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not possess the power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the war-making power, can exercisethe discretion of agreeing to abstain 'from any and all acts calculatedto produce a collision of arms' between this and other governments. Itwould, therefore, be a usurpation for the Executive to attempt torestrain their hands by an agreement in regard to matters over which hehas no constitutional control. If he were thus to act, they might passlaws which he should be bound to obey, though in conflict with hisagreement. " The proposition, it is suggested, was addressed to you underthe laws as they now are, and was not intended to refer to a newcondition of things arising under new legislation. It was addressed tothe Executive discretion, acting under existing laws. If Congressshould, under the war-making power, or in any other way, legislate in amanner to affect the peace of South Carolina, her interests or herrights, it would not be accomplished in secret. South Carolina wouldhave timely notice, and she would, I trust, endeavor to meet theemergency. 

It is added in the letter of Mr. Holt that "at the present moment it isnot deemed necessary to reënforce Major Anderson, because he makes nosuch request, and feels quite secure in his position. But, should hissafety require it, every effort will be made to supply reënforcements. "This would seem to ignore the other branch of the proposition made bythe Senators, viz. , that no attack was to be made on Fort Sumter duringthe period suggested, and that Major Anderson should enjoy thefacilities of communication, etc. 

I advert to this point, however, for the purpose of saying that to sendreënforcements to Fort Sumter could not serve as a means of _protecting_and _preserving_ property, for, as must be known to your Government, itwould inevitably lead to immediate hostilities, in which property on allsides would necessarily suffer. 

South Carolina has every disposition to preserve the public peace, andfeels, I am sure, in full force, those high "Christian and moral duties"referred to by your Secretary; and it is submitted that on her partthere is scarcely any consideration of mere property, apart from honorand safety, which could induce her to do aught to jeopard that peace, still less to inaugurate a protracted and bloody civil war. She restsher position on something higher than mere property. It is aconsideration of her own dignity as a sovereign, and the safety of herpeople, which prompts her to demand that this property should not longerbe used as a military post by a Government she no longer acknowledges. She feels this to be an imperative duty. It has, in fact, become anabsolute necessity of her condition. 

Repudiating, as you do, the idea of coercion, avowing peacefulintentions, and expressing a patriot's horror for civil war and bloodystrife among those who once were brethren, it is hoped that on furtherconsideration you will not, on a mere question of property, refuse thereasonable demand of South Carolina, which honor and necessity alikecompel her to vindicate. Should you disappoint this hope, theresponsibility for the result surely does not rest with her. If theevils of war are to be encountered, especially the calamities of civilwar, an elevated statesmanship would seem to require that it should beaccepted as the unavoidable alternative of something still moredisastrous, such as national dishonor or measures materially affectingthe safety or permanent interests of a people--that it should be achoice deliberately made, and entered upon as war, and of set purpose. But that war should be the incident or accident, attendant on a policyprofessedly peaceful, and not required to effect the object which isavowed as the only end intended, can only be excused when there has beenno warning given as to the consequences. 

I am further instructed to say that South Carolina can not, by hersilence, appear to acquiesce in the imputation that she was guilty of anact of unprovoked aggression in firing on the Star of the West. Thoughan unarmed vessel, she was filled with armed men entering her territoryagainst her will, with the purpose of reënforcing a garrison held, within her limits, against her protest. She forbears to recriminate bydiscussing the question of the propriety of attempting such areënforcement at all, as well as of the disguised and secret manner inwhich it was intended to be effected. And on this occasion she will saynothing as to the manner in which Fort Sumter was taken into thepossession of its present occupants. 

The interposition of the Senators who have addressed you was acircumstance unexpected by my government, and unsolicited certainly byme. The Governor, while he appreciates the high and generous motives bywhich they were prompted, and while he fully approves the delay which, in deference to them, has taken place in the presentation of thisdemand, feels that it can not longer be withheld. 

I conclude with an extract from the instructions just received by mefrom the government of South Carolina:

"The letter of the President, through Mr. Holt, may be received as thereply to the question you were instructed to ask, as to his assertion ofhis right to send reënforcements to Fort Sumter. You were instructed tosay to him, if he asserted that right, that the State of South Carolinaregarded such a right when asserted, or with an attempt at its exercise, as a declaration of war. 

"If the President intends it shall not be so understood, it is proper, to avoid any misconception hereafter, that he should be informed of themanner in which the Governor will feel bound to regard it. 

"If the President, when you have stated the reasons which prompt theGovernor in making the demand for the delivery of Sumter, shall refuseto deliver the fort upon the pledge you have been authorized to make, you will communicate that refusal without delay to the Governor. If thePresident shall not be prepared to give you an immediate answer, youwill communicate to him that his answer may be transmitted within areasonable time to the Governor at this place (Charleston, SouthCarolina). 

"The Governor does not consider it necessary that you (I) should remainlonger in Washington than is necessary to execute this, the closing dutyof your (my) mission, in the manner now indicated to you (me). As soonas the Governor shall receive from you information that you have closedyour mission, and the reply, whatever it may be, of the President, hewill consider the conduct which may be necessary on his part. "

Allow me to request that you would, as soon as possible, inform mewhether, under these instructions, I need await your answer inWashington; and, if not, I would be pleased to convey from you, to mygovernment, information as to the time when an answer may be expected inCharleston. 

With high consideration, I am, very respectfully, ISAAC W. HAYNE, _Special Envoy_. 

Some further correspondence ensued, but without the presentation of anynew feature necessary to a full understanding of the case. The resultwas to leave it as much unsettled in the end as it had been in thebeginning, and the efforts at negotiation were terminated by theretirement from Washington of Colonel Hayne on the 8th of February, 1861. 

APPENDIX K. 

THE CONSTITUTIONS. 

The Provisional Constitution of the Confederate States, adopted on the8th of February, 1861, is here presented, followed by the Constitutionof the United States, with all its amendments to the period of thesecession of the Southern States, and the permanent Constitution of theConfederate States (adopted on the 11th of March, 1861), in parallelcolumns. The variations from the Constitution of the United States, inthe permanent Constitution of the Confederate States, are indicated byitalics; the parts omitted by periods. 

Constitution for the Provisional Government of the Confederate States ofAmerica. 

We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States of SouthCarolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, invoking the favor of Almighty God, do hereby, in behalf of theseStates, ordain and establish this Constitution for the provisionalGovernment of the same: to continue one year from the inauguration ofthe President, or until a permanent Constitution or Confederationbetween the said States shall be put in operation, whichsoever shallfirst occur. 

ARTICLE I. 

Section 1. --All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested inthis Congress now assembled until otherwise ordained. 

Section 2. --When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the same shall be filled in such manner as the proper authorities of theState shall direct. 

Section 3. --1. The Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members; any number of deputies froma majority of the States being present, shall constitute a quorum to dobusiness; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may beauthorized to compel the attendance of absent members; upon allquestions before the Congress each State shall be entitled to one vote, and shall be represented by any one or more of its deputies who may bepresent. 

2. The Congress may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish itsmembers for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of twothirds, expel a member. 

3. The Congress shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from timeto time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgmentrequire secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members on any questionshall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, or at the instanceof any one State, be entered on the journal. 

Section 4. --The members of Congress shall receive a compensation fortheir services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasuryof the Confederacy. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, andbreach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendanceat the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from thesame; and for any speech or debate they shall not be questioned in anyother place. 

Section 5. --1. Every bill which shall have passed the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of theConfederacy; if he approve, he shall sign it; but, if not, he shallreturn it with his objections to the Congress, who shall enter theobjections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two thirds of the Congress shall agree topass the bill, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votesshall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the personsvoting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal. If anybill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundaysexcepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be alaw, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, bytheir adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be alaw. The President may veto any appropriation or appropriations, andapprove any other appropriation or appropriations, in the same bill. 

2. Every order, resolution, or vote intended to have the force andeffect of a law, shall be presented to the President, and, before thesame shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapprovedby him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Congress, according tothe rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. 

3. Until the inauguration of the President, all bills, orders, resolutions, and votes adopted by the Congress shall be of full forcewithout approval by him. 

Section 6. --1. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for the revenue necessary to pay the debtsand carry on the Government of the Confederacy; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the States of the Confederacy. 

2. To borrow money on the credit of the Confederacy. 

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the severalStates, and with the Indian tribes. 

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on thesubject of bankruptcies throughout the Confederacy. 

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, andfix the standard of weights and measures. 

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities andcurrent coin of the Confederacy. 

7. To establish post-offices and post-roads. 

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing forlimited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to theirrespective writings and discoveries. 

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. 

10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on thehigh-seas, and offenses against the law of nations. 

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rulesconcerning captures on land and water. 

12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to thatuse shall be for a longer term than two years. 

13. To provide and maintain a navy. 

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land andnaval forces. 

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of theConfederacy, suppress insurrections, and repel invasion. 

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, andfor governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of theConfederacy, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of theofficers, and the authority of training the militia according to thediscipline prescribed by Congress. 

17. To make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carryinginto execution the foregoing powers and all other powers expresslydelegated by this Constitution to this provisional Government. 

18. The Congress shall have power to admit other States. 

19. This Congress shall also exercise executive powers until thePresident is inaugurated. 

Section 7. --1. The importation of African negroes from any foreigncountry, other than the slaveholding States of the United States, ishereby forbidden; and Congress are required to pass such laws as shalleffectually prevent the same. 

2. The Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction ofslaves from any State not a member of this Confederacy. 

3. The privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be suspendedunless, when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety mayrequire it. 

4. No bill of attainder or _ex post facto_ law shall be passed. 

5. No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce orrevenue, to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shallvessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or payduties in another. 

6. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence ofappropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of thereceipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published fromtime to time. 

7. Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury unless it beasked and estimated for by the President or some one of the heads ofdepartments, except for the purpose of paying its own expenses andcontingencies. 

8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the Confederacy; and noperson holding any office of profit or trust under it shall, without theconsent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, ortitle of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign state. 

9. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion orprohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom ofspeech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably toassemble and to petition the Government for a redress of such grievancesas the delegated powers of this Government may warrant it to considerand redress. 

10. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a freestate, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not beinfringed. 

11. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any housewithout the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner tobe prescribed by law. 

12. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall notbe violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the placeto be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 

13. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwiseinfamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall anyperson be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be awitness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law; nor shall private property be taken forpublic use without just compensation. 

14. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to aspeedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and districtwherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall havebeen previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature andcause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him;to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and tohave the assistance of counsel for his defense. 

15. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceedtwenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and nofact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reëxamined in any court of theConfederacy than according to the rules of the common law. 

16. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 

17. The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not beconstrued to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 

18. The powers not delegated to the Confederacy by the Constitution, norprohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 

19. The judicial power of the Confederacy shall not be construed toextend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against oneof the States of the Confederacy, by citizens of another State, or bycitizens or subjects of any foreign state. 

Section 8. --1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, orconfederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emitbills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender inpayment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, _ex post facto_ law, orlaw impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title ofnobility. 

2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any impostsor duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessaryfor executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties andimposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the useof the Treasury of the Confederacy, and all such laws shall be subjectto the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without theconsent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, enter into any agreementor compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in warunless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit ofdelay. 

ARTICLE II. 

Section 1. --1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of theConfederate States of America. He, together with the Vice-President, shall hold his office for one year, or until this Provisional Governmentshall be superseded by a permanent Government, whichsoever shall firstoccur. 

2. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by ballot by theStates represented in this Congress, each State casting one vote, and amajority of the whole being requisite to elect. 

3. No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of one of theStates of this Confederacy at the time of the adoption of thisConstitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neithershall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attainedthe age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident of oneof the States of this Confederacy. 

4. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the saidoffice (which inability shall be determined by a vote of two thirds ofthe Congress), the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and theCongress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the President and Vice-President, declaring whatofficer shall then act as President; and such officer shall actaccordingly, until the disability be removed or a President shall beelected. 

5. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services duringthe period of the Provisional Government a compensation at the rate oftwenty-five thousand dollars per annum; and he shall not receive duringthat period any other emolument from this Confederacy, or any of theStates thereof. 

6. Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take thefollowing oath or affirmation:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute theoffice of President of the Confederate States of America, and will, tothe best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitutionthereof. 

Section 2. --1. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army andNavy of the Confederacy, and of the militia of the several States, whencalled into the actual service of the Confederacy; he may require theopinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executivedepartments, upon subjects relating to the duties of their respectiveoffices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons foroffenses against the Confederacy, except in cases of impeachment. 

2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of theCongress, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Congress concur;and he shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of theCongress, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, andconsuls, judges of the courts, and all other officers of the Confederacywhose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and whichshall be established by law. But the Congress may, by law, vest theappointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in thePresident alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 

3. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that mayhappen during the recess of the Congress, by granting commissions whichshall expire at the end of their next session. 

Section 3. --1. He shall from time to time give to the Congressinformation of the state of the Confederacy, and recommend to theirconsideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Congress at such timesas he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other publicministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed; andshall commission all the officers of the Confederacy. 

2. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of theConfederacy shall be removed from office on conviction by the Congressof treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors; a vote oftwo thirds shall be necessary for such conviction. 

ARTICLE III. 

Section 1. --1. The judicial power of the Confederacy shall be vested inone Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as are herein directed, or as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 

2. Each State shall constitute a district in which there shall be acourt called a District Court, which, until otherwise provided by theCongress, shall have the jurisdiction vested by the laws of the UnitedStates, as far as applicable, in both the District and Circuit Courts ofthe United States, for that State; the judge whereof shall be appointedby the President by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, andshall, until otherwise provided by the Congress, exercise the power andauthority vested by the laws of the United States in the judges of theDistrict and Circuit Courts of the United States for that State, andshall appoint the times and places at which the courts shall be held. Appeals may be taken directly from the District Courts to the SupremeCourt, under similar regulations to those which are provided in cases ofappeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, or under suchregulations as may be provided by the Congress. The commissions of allthe judges shall expire with this provisional Government. 

3. The Supreme Court shall be constituted of all the district judges, amajority of whom shall be a quorum, and shall sit at such times andplaces as the Congress shall appoint. 

4. The Congress shall have power to make laws for the transfer of anycauses which were pending in the courts of the United States to thecourts of the Confederacy, and for the execution of the orders, decrees, and judgments heretofore rendered by the said courts of the UnitedStates; and also all laws which may be requisite to protect the partiesto all such suits, orders, judgments, or decrees, their heirs, personalrepresentatives, or assignees. 

Section 2. --1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases of law andequity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United Statesand of this Confederacy, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under its authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other publicministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritimejurisdiction; to controversies to which the Confederacy shall be aparty; controversies between two or more States; between citizens ofdifferent States; between citizens of the same State claiming landsunder grants of different States. 

2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Courtshall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases beforementioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both asto law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as theCongress shall make. 

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be byjury, and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimesshall have been committed; but, when not committed within any State, thetrial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law havedirected. 

Section 3. --1. Treason against this Confederacy shall consist only inlevying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aidand comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on thetestimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession inopen court. 

2. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason;but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, orforfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. 

ARTICLE IV. 

Section 1. --1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to thepublic acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. Andthe Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which suchacts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect of suchproof. 

Section 2. --1. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to allprivileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. 

2. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, ondemand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, bedelivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of thecrime. 

3. A slave in one State escaping to another shall be delivered up, onclaim of the party to whom said slave may belong, by the Executiveauthority of the State in which such slave shall be found, and, in caseof any abduction or forcible rescue, full compensation, including thevalue of the slave and all costs and expenses, shall be made to theparty by the State in which such abduction or rescue shall take place. 

Section 3. --1. The Confederacy shall guarantee to every State in thisUnion a republican form of government, and shall protect each of themagainst invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of theExecutive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against domesticviolence. 

ARTICLE V. 

1. The Congress, by a vote of two thirds, may at any time alter or amendthis Constitution. 

ARTICLE VI. 

1. This Constitution, and the laws of the Confederacy which shall bemade in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall bemade, under the authority of the Confederacy, shall be the supreme lawof the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrarynotwithstanding. 

2. The Government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for thesettlement of all matters between the States forming it, and their otherlate confederates of the United States, in relation to the publicproperty and public debt at the time of their withdrawal from them;these States hereby declaring it to be their wish and earnest desire toadjust everything pertaining to the common property, common liability, and common obligations of that Union upon the principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith. 

3. Until otherwise provided by the Congress, the city of Montgomery, inthe State of Alabama, shall be the seat of government. 

4. The members of the Congress and all executive and judicial officersof the Confederacy shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support thisConstitution; but no religious test shall be required as a qualificationto any office or public trust under this Confederacy. 

[Transcriber's Note: Following are the constitutions of the UnitedStates of America, and of the Confederate States of America, listedessentially sentence by sentence, with the corresponding sentences fromeach constitution. This is the listing "in parallel columns" describedearlier. Each sentence is prefixed with either USA or CSA to indicatethe source. ]

[USA] Constitution of the United States of America. [208]

[CSA] Constitution of the Confederate States of America. 

[USA] We the People of the United States, in order to form a moreperfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, providefor the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure theBlessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain andestablish this Constitution for the United States of America. 

[CSA] We, the People of the _Confederate_ States, _each State acting inits sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanentFederal Government_, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and ourposterity--_invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God_--do ordainand establish this Constitution for the _Confederate_ States of America. 

[USA] ARTICLE I. 

[CSA] ARTICLE I. 

[USA] Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vestedin a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate andHouse of Representatives. 

[CSA] Section 1. All legislative powers herein _delegated_ shall bevested in a Congress of the _Confederate_ States, which shall consist ofa Senate and House of Representatives. 

[USA] Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed ofMembers chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisitefor Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. 

[CSA] Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed ofmembers chosen every second year by the people of the several States;and the electors in each State shall _be citizens of the ConfederateStates_, _and_ have the qualifications requisite for electors of themost numerous branch of the State Legislature; _but no person of foreignbirth, not a citizen of the Confederate States, shall be allowed to votefor any officer, civil or political, State or Federal_. 

[USA] No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained tothe Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of theUnited States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of thatState in which he shall be chosen. 

[CSA] No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attainedthe age of twenty-five years, and _be a citizen of the Confederate_States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that Statein which he shall be chosen. 

[USA] Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among theseveral States, which may be included within this Union, according totheir respective Numbers, [209] which shall be determined by adding tothe whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for aTerm of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of allother Persons. [210] The actual Enumeration shall be made within threeYears after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, andwithin every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shallby Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one forevery thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least oneRepresentative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State ofNew Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New Yorksix, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgiathree. 

[CSA] Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among theseveral States which may be included within this _Confederacy_, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined byadding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound toservice for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, threefifths of all _slaves_. The actual enumeration shall be made withinthree years after the first meeting of the Congress of the _Confederate_States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner asthey shall be by law direct. The number of Representatives shall notexceed one for every _fifty_ thousand, but each State shall have atleast one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, theState of _South Carolina_ shall be entitled to choose _six, the State ofGeorgia ten, the State of Alabama nine, the State of Florida two, theState of Mississippi seven, the State of Louisiana six, and the State ofTexas six_. 

[USA] When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, theExecutive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill suchVacancies. 

[CSA] When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, theExecutive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill suchvacancies. 

[USA] The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and otherofficers;[211] and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. 

[CSA] The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and otherofficers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment, _except that anyjudicial or other Federal officer, resident and acting solely within thelimits of any State, may be impeached by a vote of two thirds of bothbranches of the Legislature thereof_. 

[USA] Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed oftwo Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for sixYears; and each Senator shall have one Vote. 

[CSA] Section 3. The Senate of the _Confederate_ States shall becomposed of two Senators from each State, chosen for six years by theLegislature thereof, _at the regular session next immediately precedingthe commencement of the term of service_; and each Senator shall haveone vote. 

[USA] Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of thefirst Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into threeClasses. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacatedat the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at theExpiration of the fourth Year, and of the third class at the Expirationof the sixth Year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year;and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recessof the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may maketemporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, whichshall then fill such Vacancies. 

[CSA] Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence of thefirst election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into threeclasses. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacatedat the expiration of the second year; of the second class at theexpiration of the fourth year; and of the third class at the expirationof the sixth year; so that one third may be chosen every second year;and if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the recessof the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may maketemporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, whichshall then fill such vacancies. 

[USA] No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to theAge of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State forwhich he shall be chosen. 

[CSA] No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the ageof thirty years, and _be a citizen of the Confederate_ States; and whoshall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of _the_ State for which heshall be chosen. 

[USA] The Vice President of the United States shall be President of theSenate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. 

[CSA] The Vice-President of the _Confederate_ States shall be Presidentof the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided. 

[USA] The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a Presidentpro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shallexercise the Office of President of the United States. 

[CSA] The Senate shall choose their other officers; and also a President_pro tempore_ in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shallexercise the office of President of the _Confederate_ States. 

[USA] The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. Whensitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When thePresident of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shallpreside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence oftwo-thirds of the Members present. 

[CSA] The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. Whensitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When thePresident of the _Confederate_ States is tried, the Chief-Justice shallpreside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of the members present. 

[USA] Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than toremoval from Office, and Disqualification to hold and enjoy any Officeof Honour, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Partyconvicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. 

[CSA] Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than toremoval from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any officeof honor, trust, or profit, under the _Confederate_ States; but theparty convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject toindictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. 

[USA] Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections forSenators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by theLegislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time by Law make oralter such Regulations, except as to the places of chusing Senators. 

[CSA] Section 4. The times, place, and manner of holding elections forSenators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by theLegislature thereof, _subject to the provisions of this Constitution_;but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter suchregulations, except as to the _times and_ places of choosing Senators. 

[USA] The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and suchMeeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall byLaw appoint a different Day. 

[CSA] The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year; and suchmeeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall, bylaw, appoint a different day. 

[USA] Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returnsand Qualifications of its own Members and a Majority of each shallconstitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjournfrom day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance ofabsent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each Housemay provide. 

[CSA] Section 5. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of eachshall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number mayadjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendanceof absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each Housemay provide. 

[USA] Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish itsMembers for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence oftwo-thirds, expel a Member. 

[CSA] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish itsmembers for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirdsof the whole number, expel a member. 

[USA] Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from timeto time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgmentrequire Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House onany question shall, at the Desire of one-fifth of those Present, beentered on the Journal. 

[CSA] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from timeto time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgmentrequire secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either House, on any question, shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, beentered on the journal. 

[USA] Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without theConsent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any otherPlace than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. 

[CSA] Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without theconsent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any otherplace than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. 

[USA] Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive aCompensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid outof the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, exceptTreason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrestduring their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, andin going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate ineither House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. 

[CSA] Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive acompensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid outof the Treasury of the _Confederate_ States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged fromarrest during their attendance at the session of their respectiveHouses, and in going to and returning from the same; and, for any speechor debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any otherplace. 

[USA] No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which hewas elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of theUnited States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereofshall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding anyOffice under the United States, shall be a Member of either House duringhis Continuance in Office. 

[CSA] No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which hewas elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the_Confederate_ States, which shall have been created, or the emolumentswhereof shall have been increased during such time; and no personholding any office under the _Confederate_ States, shall be a member ofeither House during his continuance in office. _But Congress may, bylaw, grant to the principal officer in each of the executive departmentsa seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussingany measures appertaining to his department. _

[USA] Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in theHouse of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur withAmendments as on other Bills. 

[CSA] Section 7. All bills for raising _the_ revenue shall originate inthe House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur withamendments, as on other bills. 

[USA] Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representativesand the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to thePresident of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but ifnot he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which itshall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on theirJournal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsiderationtwo-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shalllikewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of Both Housesshall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Personsvoting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of eachHouse respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the Presidentwithin ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented tohim, the Same shall be a law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in whichCase it shall not be a Law. 

[CSA] Every bill which shall have passed _both Houses_, shall, before itbecomes a law, be presented to the President of the _Confederate_States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed toreconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that Houseshall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with theobjections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise bereconsidered, and, if approved by two thirds of that House, it shallbecome a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall bedetermined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for andagainst the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House, respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President withinten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unlessthe Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case itshall not be a law. _The President may approve any appropriation anddisapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case heshall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved;and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, tothe House in which the bill shall have originated; and the sameproceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved bythe President. _

[USA] Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of theSenate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on aquestion of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of theUnited States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approvedby him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds ofthe Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules andLimitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 

[CSA] Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of_both Houses_ may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the President of the _Confederate_ States; and, before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him; or, beingdisapproved, shall be repassed by two thirds of _both Houses_, accordingto the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a bill. 

[USA] Section 8. The Congress shall have Power

[CSA] Section 8. The Congress shall have power--

[USA] To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay theDebts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of theUnited States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniformthroughout the United States;

[CSA] To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, _forrevenue necessary_ to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, _and carry on the Government of the Confederate_ States; _but nobounties shall be granted from the Treasury; nor shall any duties ortaxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or fosterany branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall beuniform throughout the Confederate States_;

[USA] To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

[CSA] To borrow money on the credit of the _Confederate_ States;

[USA] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the severalStates, and with the Indian Tribes;

[CSA] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the severalStates, and with the Indian tribes; _but neither this, nor any otherclause contained in the Constitution, shall ever be construed todelegate the power to Congress to appropriate money for any internalimprovement intended to facilitate commerce; except for the purpose offurnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and other aid to navigation uponthe coasts, and the improvement of harbors and the removing ofobstructions in river navigation, in all which cases, such duties shallbe laid on the navigation facilitated thereby, as may be necessary topay the costs and expenses thereof_;

[USA] To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Lawson the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

[CSA] To establish uniform _laws_ of naturalization, and uniform laws onthe subject of bankruptcies, throughout the _Confederate_ States; _butno law of Congress shall discharge any debt contracted before thepassage of the same_;

[USA] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

[CSA] To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

[USA] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities andcurrent Coin of the United States;

[CSA] To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities andcurrent coin of the _Confederate_ States;

[USA] To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

[CSA] To establish post-offices and post _routes; but the expenses ofthe Post-Office Department, after the first day of March, in the year ofour Lord eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall be paid out of its ownrevenue_;

[USA] To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securingfor limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to theirrespective Writings and Discoveries;

[CSA] To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securingfor limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to theirrespective writings and discoveries;

[USA] To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

[CSA] To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

[USA] To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the highSeas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

[CSA] To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on thehigh-seas, and offenses against the law of nations;

[USA] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and makeRules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

[CSA] To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and makerules concerning captures on land and on water;

[USA] To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to thatUse shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

[CSA] To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to thatuse shall be for a longer term than two years;

[USA] To provide and maintain a Navy;

[CSA] To provide and maintain a navy;

[USA] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land andnaval Forces;

[CSA] To make rules for the government and regulation of the land andnaval forces;

[USA] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws ofthe Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

[CSA] To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws ofthe _Confederate_ States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

[USA] To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service ofthe United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointmentof the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according tothe Discipline prescribed by Congress;

[CSA] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service ofthe _Confederate_ States, reserving to the States, respectively, theappointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militiaaccording to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

[USA] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, oversuch District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession ofparticular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat ofthe Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority overall Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State inwhich the Same shall be, for the Erection for Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And

[CSA] To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, oversuch district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of_one or more_ States, and the acceptance Congress, become the seat ofthe Government of the _Confederate_ States, and to the exercise likeauthority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature ofthe Sate in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and

[USA] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carryinginto Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by thisConstitution in the Government of the United Sates, or in any Departmentor Officer thereof. 

[CSA] To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carryinginto execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by thisConstitution in the Government of the _Confederate_ States, or in anydepartment or officer thereof. 

[USA] Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any ofthe States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not beprohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundredand eight, but a Tax or Duty may be imposed on such Importation, and notexceeding ten dollars for each Person. 

[CSA] Section 9. The importation of _negroes of the African race, fromany foreign country other than the slave-holding States or Territoriesof the United States of America, is hereby forbidden; and Congress isrequired to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same. _

[CSA] _Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction ofslaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy. _

[USA] The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety mayrequire it. 

[CSA] The privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not besuspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the publicsafety may require it. 

[USA] No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 

[CSA] No bill of attainder, _ex post facto_ law, _or law denying orimpairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed_. 

[USA] No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless inProportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to betaken. 

[CSA] No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless inproportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to betaken. 

[USA] No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. 

[CSA] No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State_except by a vote of two thirds of both Houses_. 

[USA] No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce orRevenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shallVessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or payDuties in another. 

[CSA] No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce orrevenue to the ports of one State over those of another. 

[USA] No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence ofAppropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of theReceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published fromtime to time. 

[CSA] No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence ofappropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of thereceipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published fromtime to time. 

[CSA] _Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury, except bya vote of two thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless itbe asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments, andsubmitted to Congress by the President; or for the purpose of paying itsown expenses and contingencies; or for the payment of claims against theConfederate States, the justice of which shall have been judiciallydeclared by a tribunal for the investigation of claims against theGovernment, which it is hereby made the duty of Congress to establish. _

_All bills appropriating money shall specify, in Federal currency, theexact amount of each appropriation, and the purposes for which it ismade; and Congress shall grant no extra compensation to any publiccontractor, officer, agent, or servant, after such contract shall havebeen made or such service rendered_. 

[USA] No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And noPerson holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, withoutthe Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. 

[CSA] No title of nobility shall be granted by the _Confederate_ States;and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreignstate. 

[CSA] Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging thefreedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceablyto assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 

[CSA] A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a freestate, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not beinfringed. 

[CSA] No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any housewithout the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner tobe prescribed by law. 

[CSA] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shallnot be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the placeto be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 

[CSA] No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwiseinfamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall anyperson be subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb; nor be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witnessagainst himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, withoutdue process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public usewithout just compensation. 

[CSA] In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right toa speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State anddistrict wherein the crime shall have been committed, which districtshall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of thenature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnessesagainst him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in hisfavor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 

[CSA] In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shallexceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved;and no fact _so_ tried by a jury shall be otherwise reëxamined in anycourt of the _Confederacy_, than according to the rules of the commonlaw. 

[CSA] Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 

[CSA] _Every law, or resolution having the force of law, shall relate tobut one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. _

[USA] Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, orConfederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emitBills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender inPayment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Lawimpairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 

[CSA] Section 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, orconfederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; makeanything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass anybill of attainder, or _ex post facto_ law, or law impairing theobligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 

[USA] No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay anyImposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutelynecessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of allDuties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall befor the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Lawsshall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 

[CSA] No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay anyimposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutelynecessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of allduties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall befor the use of the Treasury of the _Confederate_ States; and all suchlaws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. 

[USA] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty ofTonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into anyAgreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, orengage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger aswill not admit of Delay. 

[CSA] No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty _on_tonnage, _except on sea-going vessels for the improvement of its riversand harbors navigated by the said vessels; but such duties shall notconflict with any treaties of the Confederate States with foreignnations. And any surplus revenue thus derived shall, after making suchimprovement, be paid into the common Treasury; nor shall any_ State keeptroops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement ofcompact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in warunless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit ofdelay. _But when any river divides or flows through two or more States, they may enter into compacts with each other to improve the navigationthereof. _

[USA] ARTICLE II. 

[USA] Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President ofthe United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Termof four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for thesame Term, be elected, as follows:

[CSA] ARTICLE II. 

[CSA] Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President ofthe _Confederate_ States of America. _He and the Vice-President shallhold their offices for_ the term of _six_ years; _but the Presidentshall not be reëligible. The President and the Vice-President shall_ beelected as follows:

[USA] Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislaturethereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number ofSenators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in theCongress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Officeof Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed anElector. 

[CSA] Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislaturethereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number ofSenators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in theCongress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an officeof trust or profit under the _Confederate_ States, shall be appointed anelector. 

[USA] [212]The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and voteby Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be anInhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a Listof all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; whichList they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of theGovernment of the United States, directed to the President of theSenate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senateand House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votesshall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votesshall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Numberof Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have suchMajority and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House ofRepresentatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them forPresident; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five higheston the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. Butin chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, theRepresentation from each State having one Vote; a Quorum for thisPurpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of theStates, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having thegreatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more have equal Votes, the Senateshall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President. 

[CSA] The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote byballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shallnot be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall namein their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinctballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall makedistinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all personsvoted for as Vice-President and of the number of votes for each, whichlist they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of theGovernment of the _Confederate_ States, directed to the President of theSenate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senateand House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votesshall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votesfor President shall be the President, if such number be a majority ofthe whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have suchmajority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceedingthree on the list of those voted for as President, the House ofRepresentatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. Butin choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, therepresentation from each State having one vote; a quorum for thispurpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of theStates, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a Presidentwhenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourthday of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act asPresident, as in the case of the death or other constitutionaldisability of the President. 

[CSA] The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the wholenumber of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, thenfrom the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose theVice-President. A quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds ofthe whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shallbe necessary to a choice. 

[CSA] But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office ofPresident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the_Confederate_ States. 

[USA] The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, andthe Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be thesame throughout the United States. 

[CSA] The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, andthe day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be thesame throughout the _Confederate_ States. 

[USA] No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of theUnited States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shallbe eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person beeligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age ofthirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the UnitedStates. 

[CSA] No person except a natural born citizen of the _Confederate_States, or a citizen thereof at the time of the adoption of thisConstitution, _or a citizen thereof born in the United States prior tothe 20th of December, 1860_, shall be eligible to the office ofPresident; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shallnot have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen yearsa resident within the _limits of the Confederate States, as they mayexist at the time of his election_. 

[USA] In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of hisDeath, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties ofthe said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and theCongress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring whatOfficer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall actaccordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall beelected. 

[CSA] In case of the removal of the President from office, or of hisdeath, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties ofthe said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and theCongress may, by law, provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President; and such officershall act accordingly, until the disability be removed or a Presidentshall be elected. 

[USA] The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, aCompensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during thePeriod for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receivewithin that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any ofthem. 

[CSA] The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services acompensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during theperiod for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receivewithin that period any other emolument from the _Confederate_ States, orany of them. 

[USA] Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take thefollowing Oath or Affirmation:

[CSA] Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take thefollowing oath or affirmation:

[USA] "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully executethe Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of myAbility, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the UnitedStates. "

[CSA] "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully executethe office of President of the _Confederate_ States _of America_, andwill to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend theConstitution _thereof_. "

[USA] Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Armyand Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may requirethe Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of theexecutive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of theirrespective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves andPardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases ofImpeachment. 

[CSA] Section 2. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armyand Navy of the _Confederate_ States, and of the militia of the severalStates, when called into the actual service of the _Confederate_ States;he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in eachof the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties oftheir respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves andpardons for offenses against the _Confederacy_, except in cases ofimpeachment. 

[USA] He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of theSenate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators presentconcur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent ofthe Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers andConsuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of theUnited States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vestthe Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in thePresident alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 

[CSA] He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of theSenate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators presentconcur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent ofthe Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, Judges of the Supreme Court and all other officers of the_Confederate_ States, whose appointments are not herein otherwiseprovided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congressmay by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they thinkproper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads ofdepartments. 

[CSA] _The principal officer in each of the executive departments, andall persons connected with the diplomatic service, may be removed fromoffice at the pleasure of the President. All other civil officers of theexecutive department may be removed at any time by the President, orother appointing power, when their services are unnecessary, or fordishonesty, incapacity, inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty;and, when so removed the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together with the reasons therefor. _

[USA] The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that mayhappen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions whichshall expire at the End of their next Session. 

[CSA] The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that mayhappen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions whichshall expire at the end of their next session. _But no person rejectedby the Senate shall be reappointed to the same office during theirensuing recess. _

[USA] Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the CongressInformation of the State of the Union, and recommend to theirConsideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either ofthem, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the timeof Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall thinkproper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; heshall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shallCommission all the officers of the United States. 

[CSA] Section 3. _The President_ shall from time to time give to theCongress information of the state of the _Confederacy_, and recommend totheir consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary andexpedient: he may on extraordinary occasions convene both Houses, oreither of them; and in case of disagreement between them, with respectto the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shallthink proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers;he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shallcommission all the officers of the _Confederate_ States. 

[USA] Section 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers ofthe United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, andConviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 

[CSA] Section 4. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officersof the _Confederate_ States, shall be removed from office on impeachmentfor and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes andmisdemeanors. 

[USA] ARTICLE III. 

[CSA] ARTICLE III. 

[USA] Section 1. The Judicial Power of the United States, shall bevested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congressmay from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of thesupreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during goodBehavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services, aCompensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance inOffice. 

[CSA] Section 1. The judicial power of the _Confederate_ States shall bevested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congressmay from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of theSupreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during goodbehavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services acompensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance inoffice. 

[USA] Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Lawand Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the UnitedStates, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under theirAuthority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministersand Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--toControversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--toControversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizensof another State;--between Citizens of different States, --betweenCitizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of differentStates, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreignStates, Citizens or Subjects. 

[CSA] Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases arisingunder this Constitution, the laws of the _Confederate_ States, andtreaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to allcases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to allcases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to whichthe _Confederate_ States shall be a party; to controversies between twoor more States; between a State and citizens of another State, _wherethe State is plaintiff_; between citizens claiming lands under grants ofdifferent States, and between a State or the citizens thereof, andforeign states, citizens, or subjects. _But no State shall be sued by acitizen or subject of any foreign state. _

[USA] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers andConsuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Courtshall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases beforementioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both asto Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as theCongress shall make. 

[CSA] In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Courtshall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases beforementioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both asto law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as theCongress shall make. 

[USA] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall beby Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimesshall have been committed; but when not committed with any State, theTrial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law havedirected. 

[CSA] The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall beby jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimesshall have been committed; but when not committed within any State thetrial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law havedirected. 

[USA] Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist onlyin levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, givingthem Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless onthe Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confessionin open Court. 

[CSA] Section 3. Treason against the _Confederate_ States shall consistonly in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treasonunless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or onconfession in open court. 

[USA] The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment ofTreason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, orForfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. 

[CSA] The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment oftreason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, orforfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. 

[USA] ARTICLE IV. 

[CSA] ARTICLE IV. 

[USA] Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State tothe public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which suchActs, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 

[CSA] Section 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State tothe public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in whichsuch acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effectthereof. 

[USA] Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to allPrivileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. 

[CSA] Section 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all theprivileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, _and shallhave the right of transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in saidslaves shall not be thereby impaired_. 

[USA] A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or otherCrime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shallon Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, bedelivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of theCrime. 

[CSA] A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime_against the laws of such State_, who shall flee from justice, and befound in another State, shall on demand of the Executive authority ofthe State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to theState having jurisdiction of the crime. 

[USA] No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Lawsthereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law orRegulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shallbe delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour maybe done. 

[CSA] _No slave or other_ person held to service or labor _in any Stateor Territory of the Confederate States_, under the laws thereof, escaping _or lawfully carried_ into another, shall, in consequence ofany law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor;but shall be delivered up on claim of the party _to whom such slavebelongs, or_ to whom such service or labor may be due. 

[USA] Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into thisUnion; but no new State shall be formed or erected within theJurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junctionof two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of theLegislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. 

[CSA] Section 3. _Other States may be admitted into this Confederacy bya vote of two thirds of the whole House of Representatives and twothirds of the Senate, the Senate voting by States_; but no new Stateshall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State;nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or partsof States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the Statesconcerned, as well as of the Congress. 

[USA] The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needfulRules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Propertybelonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shallbe so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or ofany particular State. 

[CSA] The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needfulrules and regulations _concerning_ the _property of the Confederate_States, _including the lands thereof_. 

[CSA] _The Confederate States may acquire new territory; and Congressshall have power to legislate and provide governments for theinhabitants of all territory belonging to the Confederate States, lyingwithout the limits of the several States; and may permit them, at suchtimes and in such manner as it may by law provide, to form States to beadmitted into the Confederacy. In all such territory, the institution, of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall berecognized and protected by Congress and by the territorial government;and the inhabitants of the several Confederate States and Territoriesshall have the right to take to such Territory any slaves lawfully heldby them in any of the States or Territories of the Confederate States. _

[USA] Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State inthis Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each ofthem against Invasion, and on Application of the Legislature, or of theExecutive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domesticViolence. 

[CSA] The _Confederate_ States shall guarantee to every State _that nowis, or hereafter may become, a member of this Confederacy_, a republicanform of government; and shall protect each of them against invasion; andon application of the Legislature (or of the Executive when theLegislature _is not in session_), against domestic violence. 

[USA] ARTICLE V. 

[CSA] ARTICLE V. 

[USA] The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem itnecessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on theApplication of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of thisConstitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of theseveral States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the oneor the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress:Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year onethousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the firstand fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and thatno State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffragein the Senate. 

[CSA] _Section 1. Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembledin their several conventions, the Congress shall summon a Convention ofall the States, to take into consideration such amendments to theConstitution as the said States shall concur in suggesting at the timewhen the said demand is made; and should any of the proposed amendmentsto the Constitution be agreed on by the said Convention--voting byStates--and the same be ratified by the Legislatures of two thirds ofthe several States, or by conventions in two-thirds thereof_--as the oneor the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the _generalConvention--they shall thenceforward form_ a _part of this Constitution. But_ no State shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal_representation_ in the Senate. 

[USA]ARTICLE VI. 

[CSA]ARTICLE VI. 

[USA] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before theAdoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the UnitedStates under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. 

[CSA] _The Government established by this Constitution is the successorof the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America, andall the laws passed by the latter shall continue in force until the sameshall be repealed or modified; and all the officers appointed by thesame shall remain in office until their successors are appointed andqualified, or the offices abolished. _

[CSA] All debts contracted and engagements entered into before theadoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the_Confederate_ States under this Constitution as under the _ProvisionalGovernment_. 

[USA] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shallbe made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall bemade, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Lawof the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anyThing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrarynotwithstanding. 

[CSA] This Constitution, and the laws of the _Confederate_ States madein pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made underthe authority of the _Confederate_ States, shall be the supreme lawof the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrarynotwithstanding. 

[USA] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Membersof the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicialOfficers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall bebound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but noreligious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Officeor public Trust under the United States. 

[CSA] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the membersof the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicialofficers, both of the _Confederate_ States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; butno religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to anyoffice or public trust under the _Confederate_ States. 

[CSA] The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall notbe construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people of _theseveral States_. 

[CSA] The powers not delegated to the _Confederate_ States by theConstitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to theStates, respectively, or to the people _thereof_. 

[USA] ARTICLE VII. 

[CSA] ARTICLE VII. 

[USA] The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall besufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the Statesso ratifying the Same. 

[CSA] The ratification of the Conventions of _five_ States shall besufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the Statesso ratifying the same. 

[CSA] _When five States shall have ratified this Constitution, in themanner before specified, the Congress under the Provisional Constitutionshall prescribe the time for holding the election of President andVice-President, and for the meeting of the electoral college, and forcounting the votes, and inaugurating the President. They shall alsoprescribe the time for holding the first election of members of Congressunder this Constitution, and the time for assembling the same. Until theassembling of such Congress, the Congress under the ProvisionalConstitution shall continue to exercise the legislative powers grantedthem; not extending beyond the time limited by the Constitution of theProvisional Government. _

_Articles in Addition to, and Amendment of, the Constitution of theUnited States of America. Proposed by Congress, and ratified by theLegislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth article of theoriginal Constitution. _

ARTICLE I. 

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, orprohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom ofspeech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably toassemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 

ARTICLE II. 

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a freeState, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not beinfringed. 

ARTICLE III. 

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, withoutthe consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to beprescribed by law. 

ARTICLE IV. 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not beviolated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the placeto be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 

ARTICLE V. 

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamouscrime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except incases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when inactual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person besubject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life orlimb; nor shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witnessagainst himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, withoutdue process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 

ARTICLE VI. 

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to aspeedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and districtwherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall havebeen previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature andcause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses againsthim; to have Compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favour, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 

ARTICLE VII. 

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceedtwenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and nofact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of theUnited States, than according to the rules of the common law. 

ARTICLE VIII. 

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, norcruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 

ARTICLE XII. [213]

The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballotfor President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be aninhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in theirballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots theperson voted for as Vice President, and they shall make distinct listsof all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for asVice President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists theyshall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of thegovernment of the United States, directed to the President of theSenate;--The President of the Senate shall, in presence of the Senateand House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votesshall then be counted;--The person having the greatest number of votesfor President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority ofthe whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have suchmajority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceedingthree on the list of those voted for as President, the House ofRepresentatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. Butin choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, therepresentation from each state having one vote; a quorum for thispurpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of thestates, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a Presidentwhenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourthday of March next following, then the Vice President shall act asPresident, as in the case of the death or other constitutionaldisability of the President. --The person having the greatest number ofvotes as Vice President, shall be the Vice President, if such number bea majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no personhave a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, theSenate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shallconsist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority ofthe whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no personconstitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligibleto that of Vice President of the United States. 

[Footnote 208: This is an exact copy of the original in punctuation, spelling, capitals, etc. ]

[Footnote 209: Under the census of 1860 one representative is allowedfor every 127, 381 persons. ]

[Footnote 210: "Other persons" refers to slaves. See Amendments, Art. XIV. , Sections 1 and 2. ]

[Footnote 211: The principal of these are the clerk, sergeant-at-arms, door-keeper, and postmaster. ]

[Footnote 212: Superseded by the twelfth amendment. ]

[Footnote 213: This article is substituted for Clause 3, Sec. I. , Art. II. , page 662, and annuls it. It was declared adopted in 1804. ]

APPENDIX L. 

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS, MR. SECRETARYSEWARD AND JUDGE CAMPBELL. 

_The Commissioners to Mr. Seward. _

Washington City, _March 12, 1861_. 

Hon. William H. Seward, _Secretary of State of the United States_. 

Sir: The undersigned have been duly accredited by the Government of theConfederate States of America as commissioners to the Government of theUnited States, and, in pursuance of their instructions, have now thehonor to acquaint you with that fact, and to make known, through you tothe President of the United States, the objects of their presence inthis capital. 

Seven states of the late Federal Union, having in the exercise of theinherent right of every free people to change or reform their politicalinstitutions, and through conventions of their people, withdrawn fromthe United States and reassumed the attributes of sovereign powerdelegated to it, have formed a government of their own. The ConfederateStates constitute an independent nation, _de facto_ and _de jure_, andpossess a government perfect in all its parts, and endowed with all themeans of self-support. 

With a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of thispolitical separation, upon such terms of amity and good-will as therespective interests, geographical contiguity, and future welfare of thetwo nations may render necessary, the undersigned are instructed to maketo the Government of the United States overtures for the opening ofnegotiations, assuring the Government of the United States, that thePresident, Congress, and people of the Confederate States earnestlydesire a peaceful solution of these great questions; that it is neithertheir interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded instrictest justice, nor do any act to injure their late confederates. 

The undersigned have now the honor, in obedience to the instructions oftheir Government, to request you to appoint as early a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President of the United States thecredentials which they bear and the objects of the mission with whichthey are charged. 

We are, very respectfully, your obedient servants, (Signed) JOHN FORSYTH. 

(Signed) MARTIN J. CRAWFORD. 

_Memorandum. _

Department of State, Washington, _March_ 15, 1861. 

Mr. John Forsyth, of the State of Alabama, and Mr. Martin J. Crawford, of the State of Georgia, on the 11th inst. , through the kind offices ofa distinguished Senator, submitted to the Secretary of State theirdesire for an unofficial interview. This request was, on the 12th inst. , upon exclusively public considerations, respectfully declined. 

On the 13th inst. , while the Secretary was preoccupied, Mr. A. D. Banks, of Virginia, called at this department, and was received by theAssistant Secretary, to whom he delivered a sealed communication, whichhe had been charged by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to present to theSecretary in person. 

In that communication Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford inform the Secretaryof State that they have been duly accredited by the Government of theConfederate States of America as commissioners to the Government of theUnited States, and they set forth the objects of their attendance atWashington. They observe that seven States of the American Union, in theexercise of a right inherent in every free people, have withdrawn, through conventions of their people, from the United States, reassumedthe attributes of sovereign power, and formed a government of their own, and that those Confederate States now constitute an independent nation, _de facto_ and _de jure_, and possess a government perfect in all itsparts, and fully endowed with all the means of self-support. 

Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, in their aforesaid communication, thereupon proceeded to inform the Secretary that, with a view to aspeedy adjustment of all questions growing out of the politicalseparation thus assumed, upon such terms of amity and good-will as therespective interests, geographical contiguity, and the future welfare ofthe supposed two nations might render necessary, they are instructed tomake to the Government of the United States overtures for the opening ofnegotiations, assuring this Government that the President, Congress, andthe people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peacefulsolution of these great questions, and that it is neither their interestnor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in the strictestjustice, nor do any act to injure their late confederates. 

After making these statements, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford close theircommunication, as they say, in obedience to the instructions of theirGovernment, by requesting the Secretary of State to appoint as early aday as possible, in order that they may present to the President of theUnited States the credentials which they bear and the objects of themission with which they are charged. 

The Secretary of State frankly confesses that he understands the eventswhich have recently occurred, and the condition of political affairswhich actually exists in the part of the Union to which his attentionhas thus been directed, very differently from the aspect in which theyare presented by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. He sees in them, not arightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation, with anestablished Government, but rather a perversion of a temporary andpartisan excitement to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiableand unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vestedin the Federal Government, and hitherto benignly exercised, as fromtheir very nature they always must so be exercised, for the maintenanceof the Union, the preservation of liberty, and the security, peace, welfare, happiness, and aggrandizement of the American people. TheSecretary of State, therefore, avows to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawfordthat he looks patiently, but confidently, for the cure of evils whichhave resulted from proceedings so unnecessary, so unwise, so unusual, and so unnatural, not to irregular negotiations, having in view new anduntried relations with agencies unknown to and acting in derogation ofthe Constitution and laws, but to regular and considerate action of thepeople of those States, in coöperation with their brethren in the otherStates, through the Congress of the United States, and suchextraordinary conventions, if there shall be need thereof, as theFederal Constitution contemplates and authorizes to be assembled. 

It is, however, the purpose of the Secretary of State, on this occasion, not to invite or engage in any discussion of these subjects, but simplyto set forth his reasons for declining to comply with the request ofMessrs. Forsyth and Crawford. 

On the 4th of March instant, the then newly elected President of theUnited States, in view of all the facts bearing on the present question, assumed the Executive Administration of the Government, firstdelivering, in accordance with an early, honored custom, an inauguraladdress to the people of the United States. The Secretary of Staterespectfully submits a copy of this address to Messrs. Forsyth andCrawford. 

A simple reference to it will be sufficient to satisfy these gentlementhat the Secretary of State, guided by the principles therein announced, is prevented altogether from admitting or assuming that the Statesreferred to by them have, in law or in fact, withdrawn from the FederalUnion, or that they could do so in the manner described by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, or in any other manner than with the consent andconcert of the people of the United States, to be given through aNational Convention, to be assembled in conformity with the provisionsof the Constitution of the United States. Of course, the Secretary ofState can not act upon the assumption, or in any way admit that theso-called Confederate States constitute a foreign power, with whomdiplomatic relations ought to be established. 

Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State, whose official dutiesare confined, subject to the direction of the President, to theconducting of the foreign relations of the country, and do not at allembrace domestic questions, or questions arising between the severalStates and the Federal Government, is unable to comply with the requestof Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, to appoint a day on which they maypresent the evidences of their authority and the objects of their visitto the President of the United States. On the contrary, he is obliged tostate to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford that he has no authority, nor ishe at liberty, to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or holdcorrespondence or other communication with them. 

Finally, the Secretary of State would observe that, although he hassupposed that he might safely and with propriety have adopted theseconclusions, without making any reference of the subject to theExecutive, yet, so strong has been his desire to practice entiredirectness, and to act in a spirit of perfect respect and candor towardMessrs. Forsyth and Crawford, and that portion of the people of theUnion in whose name they present themselves before him, that he hascheerfully submitted this paper to the President, who coincidesgenerally in the views it expresses, and sanctions the Secretary'sdecision declining official intercourse with Messrs. Forsyth andCrawford. 

_April 8, 1861. _

The foregoing memorandum was filed in this department on the 15th ofMarch last. A delivery of the same to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford wasdelayed, as was understood, with their consent. They have now, throughtheir secretary, communicated their desire for a definite disposition ofthe subject. The Secretary of State therefore directs that a dulyverified copy of the paper be now delivered. 

_The Commissioners in reply to Mr. Seward. _

Washington, _April 9, 1861. _

Hon. William H. Seward, _Secretary of State for the United States, Washington:_

The "memorandum" dated Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1861, with postscript under date of 8th instant, has been received through thehands of Mr. J. T. Pickett, secretary of this commission, who, by theinstructions of the undersigned, called for it on yesterday at thedepartment. 

In that memorandum you correctly state the purport of the official noteaddressed to you by the undersigned on the 12th ultimo. Withoutrepeating the contents of that note in full, it is enough to say herethat its object was to invite the Government of the United States to afriendly consideration of the relations between the United States andthe seven States lately the Federal Union, but now separated from it bythe sovereign will of their people, growing out of the pregnant andundeniable fact that those people have rejected the authority of theUnited States, and established a government of their own. Thoserelations had to be friendly or hostile. The people of the old and newGovernments, occupying contiguous territories, had to stand to eachother in the relation of good neighbors, each seeking their happinessand pursuing their national destinies in their own way, withoutinterference with the other; or they had to be rival and hostilenations. The Government of the Confederate States had no hesitation inelecting its choice in this alternative. Frankly and unreservedly, seeking the good of the people who had intrusted them with power, in thespirit of humanity, of the Christian civilization of the age, and ofthat Americanism which regards the true welfare and happiness of thepeople, the Government of the Confederate States, among its first acts, commissioned the undersigned to approach the Government of the UnitedStates with the olive-branch of peace, and to offer to adjust the greatquestions pending between them in the only way to be justified by theconsciences and common sense of good men who had nothing but the welfareof the people of the two confederacies at heart. 

Your Government has not chosen to meet the undersigned in theconciliatory and peaceful spirit in which they are commissioned. Persistently wedded to those fatal theories of construction of theFederal Constitution always rejected by the statesmen of the South, andadhered to by those of the Administration school, until they haveproduced their natural and often predicted result of the destruction ofthe Union, under which we might have continued to live happily andgloriously together, had the spirit of the ancestry who framed thecommon Constitution animated the hearts of all their sons, you now, witha persistence untaught and uncured by the ruin which has been wrought, refuse to recognize the great fact presented to you of a completed andsuccessful revolution; you close your eyes to the existence of theGovernment founded upon it, and ignore the high duties of moderation andhumanity which attach to you in dealing with this great fact. Had youmet these issues with the frankness and manliness with which theundersigned were instructed to present them to you and treat them, theundersigned had not now the melancholy duty to return home and telltheir Government and their countrymen that their earnest and ceaselessefforts in behalf of peace had been futile, and that the Government ofthe United States meant to subjugate them by force of arms. Whatever maybe the result, impartial history will record the innocence of theGovernment of the Confederate States, and place the responsibility ofthe blood and mourning that may ensue upon those who have denied thegreat fundamental doctrine of American liberty, that "governments derivetheir just powers from the consent of the governed, " and who have setnaval and land armaments in motion to subject the people of one portionof this land to the will of another portion. That that can never bedone, while a free-*man survives in the Confederate States to wield aweapon, the undersigned appeal to past history to prove. These militarydemonstrations against the people of the seceded States are certainlyfar from being in keeping and consistency with the theory of theSecretary of State, maintained in his memorandum, that these States arestill component parts of the late American Union, as the undersigned arenot aware of any constitutional power in the President of the UnitedStates to levy war, without the consent of Congress, upon a foreignpeople, much less upon any portion of the people of the United States. 

The undersigned, like the Secretary of State, have no purpose to "inviteor engage in discussion" of the subject on which their two Governmentsare so irreconcilably at variance. It is this variance that has brokenup the old Union, the disintegration of which has only begun. It isproper, however, to advise you that it were well to dismiss the hopesyou seem to entertain that, by any of the modes indicated, the people ofthe Confederate States will ever be brought to submit to the authorityof the Government of the United States. You are dealing with delusions, too, when you seek to separate our people from our Government, and tocharacterize the deliberate sovereign act of that people as a"perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement" If you cherish thesedreams, you will be awakened from them and find them as unreal andunsubstantial as others in which you have recently indulged. Theundersigned would omit the performance of an obvious duty, were they tofail to make known to the Government of the United States that thepeople of the Confederate States have declared their independence with afull knowledge of all the responsibilities of that act, and with as firma determination to maintain it by all the means with which nature hasendowed them as that which sustained their fathers when they threw offthe authority of the British Crown. 

The undersigned clearly understand that you have declined to appoint aday to enable them to lay the objects of the mission with which they arecharged before the President of the United States, because so to dowould be to recognize the independence and separate nationality of theConfederate States. This is the vein of thought that pervades thememorandum before us. The truth of history requires that it shoulddistinctly appear upon the record that the undersigned did not ask theGovernment of the United States to recognize the independence of theConfederate States. They only asked audience to adjust, in a spirit ofamity and peace, the new relations springing from a manifest andaccomplished revolution in the Government of the late Federal Union. Your refusal to entertain these overtures for a peaceful solution, theactive naval and military preparations of this Government, and a formalnotice to the commanding General of the Confederate forces in the harborof Charleston that the President intends to provision Fort Sumter byforcible means, if necessary, are viewed by the undersigned, and canonly be received by the world, as a declaration of war against theConfederate States; for the President of the United States knows thatFort Sumter can not be provisioned without the effusion of blood. Theundersigned, in behalf of their Government and people, accept the gageof battle thus thrown down to them; and, appealing to God and thejudgment of mankind for the righteousness of their cause, the people ofthe Confederate States will defend their liberties to the last, againstthis flagrant and open attempt at their subjugation to sectional power. 

This communication can not be properly closed without adverting to thedate of your memorandum. The official note of the undersigned, of the12th of March, was delivered to the Assistant Secretary of State on the13th of that month, the gentleman who delivered it informing him thatthe secretary of this commission would call at twelve o'clock, noon, onthe next day, for an answer. At the appointed hour Mr. Pickett did call, and was informed by the Assistant Secretary of State that theengagements of the Secretary of State had prevented him from giving thenote his attention. The Assistant Secretary of State then asked for theaddress of Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, the members of the commissionthen present in this city, took note of the address on a card, andengaged to send whatever reply might be made to their lodgings. Why thiswas not done, it is proper should be here explained. The memorandum isdated March 15th, and was not delivered until April 8th. Why was itwithheld during the intervening twenty-three days? In the postscript toyour memorandum you say it "was delayed, as was understood, with their(Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford's) consent. " This is true; but it is alsotrue that, on the 15th of March, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford wereassured by a person occupying a high official position in theGovernment, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, thatFort Sumter would be evacuated in a very few days, and that no measurechanging the existing _status_ prejudicially to the Confederate States, as respects Fort Pickens, was then contemplated, and these assuranceswere subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplatedchange as respects Pickens would be notified to us. On the 1st of Aprilwe were again informed that there might be an attempt to supply FortSumter with provisions, but that Governor Pickens should have previousnotice of this attempt. There was no suggestion of any reinforcement. The undersigned did not hesitate to believe that these assurancesexpressed the intentions of the Administration at the time, or at allevents of prominent members of that Administration. This delay wasassented to for the express purpose of attaining the great end of themission of the undersigned, to wit, a pacific solution of existingcomplications. The inference deducible from the date of your memorandum, that the undersigned had, of their own volition and without cause, consented to this long _hiatus_ in the grave duties with which they werecharged, is therefore not consistent with a just exposition of the factsof the case. The intervening twenty-three days were employed in activeunofficial efforts, the object of which was to smooth the path to apacific solution, the distinguished personage alluded to coöperatingwith the undersigned; and every step of that effort is recorded inwriting and now in the possession of the undersigned and of theirGovernment. It was only when all those anxious efforts for peace hadbeen exhausted, and it became clear that Mr. Lincoln had determined toappeal to the sword to reduce the people of the Confederate States tothe will of the section or party whose President he is, that theundersigned resumed the official negotiation temporarily suspended, andsent their secretary for a reply to their official note of March 12th. 

It is proper to add that, during these twenty-three days, two gentlemen, of official distinction as high as that of the personage hithertoalluded to, aided the undersigned as intermediaries in these unofficialnegotiations for peace. 

The undersigned, commissioners of the Confederate States of America, having thus made answer to all they deem material in the memorandumfiled in the department on the 15th of March last, have the honor to be

JOHN FORSYTH, MARTIN J. CRAWFORD, A. B. ROMAN. 

_Mr. Seward in reply to the Commissioners. _

Department Of State, Washington, _April 10, 1861. _

Messrs. Forsyth, Crawford, and Roman, having been apprised by amemorandum, which has been delivered to them, that the Secretary ofState is not at liberty to hold official intercourse with them, will, itis presumed, expect no notice from him of the new communication whichthey have addressed to him under date of the 9th inst. , beyond thesimple acknowledgment of the receipt thereof, which he hereby verycheerfully gives. 

_Judge Campbell to Mr. Seward. _

Washington City, _Saturday, April 18, 1861. _

Sir: On the 15th of March, ultimo, I left with Judge Crawford, one ofthe commissioners of the Confederate States, a note in writing, to theeffect following:

"I feel entire confidence that Fort Sumter will be evacuated in the nextten days. And this measure is felt as imposing great responsibility onthe Administration. 

"I feel entire confidence that no measure changing the existing _status_prejudicially to the Southern Confederate States is at presentcontemplated. 

"I feel an entire confidence that an immediate demand for an answer tothe communication of the commissioners will be productive of evil andnot of good. I do not believe that it ought, at this time, to bepressed. "

The substance of this statement I communicated to you the same eveningby letter. Five days elapsed, and I called with a telegram from GeneralBeauregard, to the effect that Sumter was not evacuated, but that MajorAnderson was at work making repairs. 

The next day, after conversing with you, I communicated to JudgeCrawford in writing that the failure to evacuate Sumter was not theresult of bad faith, but was attributable to causes consistent with theintention to fulfill the engagement, and that, as regarded Pickens, Ishould have notice of any design to alter the existing _status_ there. Mr. Justice Nelson was present at these conversations, three in number, and I submitted to him each of my written communications to JudgeCrawford, and informed Judge Crawford that they had his (Judge Nelson's)sanction. I gave you, on the 22d of March, a substantial copy of thestatement I had made on the 15th. 

The 30th of March arrived, and at that time a telegram came fromGovernor Pickens, inquiring concerning Colonel Lamon, whose visit toCharleston he supposed had a connection with the proposed evacuation ofFort Sumter. I left that with you, and was to have an answer thefollowing Monday (1st of April). On the 1st of April I received from youthe statement in writing, "I am satisfied the Government will notundertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor P. "The words "I am satisfied" were for me to use as expressive ofconfidence in the remainder of the declaration. 

The proposition, as originally prepared, was, "The President _maydesire_ to supply Sumter, but will not do so, " etc. , and your verbalexplanation was, that you did not believe any such attempt would bemade, and that there was no design to reënforce Sumter. 

There was a departure here from the pledges of the previous month, but, with the verbal explanation, I did not consider it a matter then tocomplain of. I simply stated to you that I had that assurancepreviously. 

On the 7th of April I addressed you a letter on the subject of the alarmthat the preparations by the Government had created, and asked you ifthe assurances I had given were well or ill-founded. In respect toSumter, your reply was, "Faith as to Sumter fully kept--wait and see. "In the morning's paper I read, "An authorized messenger from PresidentLincoln informed Governor Pickens and General Beauregard that provisionswill be sent to Fort Sumter--peaceably, or _otherwise by force_. " Thiswas the 8th of April, at Charleston, the day following your lastassurance, and is the last evidence of the full faith I was invited to_wait for_ and _see_. In the same paper I read that intercepteddispatches disclosed the fact that Mr. Fox, who had been allowed tovisit Major Anderson, on the pledge that his purpose was pacific, employed his opportunity to devise a plan for supplying the fort byforce, and that this plan had been adopted by the Washington Government, and was in process of execution. My recollection of the date of Mr. Fox's visit carries it to a day in March. I learn he is a nearconnection of a member of the Cabinet. My connection with thecommissioners and yourself was superinduced by a conversation withJustice Nelson. He informed me of your strong disposition in favor ofpeace, and that you were oppressed with a demand of the commissioners ofthe Confederate States for a reply to their first letter, and that youdesired to avoid it, if possible, at that time. 

I told him I might perhaps be of some service in arranging thedifficulty. I came to your office entirely at his request, and withoutthe knowledge of either of the commissioners. Your depression wasobvious to both Judge Nelson and myself. I was gratified at thecharacter of the counsels you were desirous of pursuing, and muchimpressed with your observation that a civil war might be prevented bythe success of my mediation. You read a letter of Mr. Weed, to show howirksome and responsible the withdrawal of troops from Sumter was. Aportion of my communication to Judge Crawford, on the 16th of March, wasfounded upon these remarks, and the pledge to evacuate Sumter is lessforcible than the words you employed. These words were, "Before thisletter reaches you [a proposed letter by me to President Davis], Sumterwill have been evacuated. " The commissioners who received thosecommunications conclude they have been abused and overreached. TheMontgomery Government hold the same opinion. The commissioners havesupposed that my communications were with you, and upon the [that]hypothesis were prepared to arraign you before the country, inconnection with the President. I placed a peremptory prohibition uponthis, as being contrary to the terms of my communications with them. Ipledged myself to them to communicate information, upon what Iconsidered as the best authority, and they were to confide in theability of myself, aided by Judge Nelson, to determine upon thecredibility of my informant. 

I think no candid man, who will read over what I have written, andconsiders for a moment what is going on at Sumter, but will agree thatthe equivocating conduct of the Administration, as measured andinterpreted in connection with these promises, is the proximate cause ofthe great calamity. 

I have a profound conviction that the telegrams of the 8th of April, ofGeneral Beauregard, and of the 10th of April, of General Walker, theSecretary of War, can be referred to nothing else than their belief thatthere has been systematic duplicity practiced on them through me. It isunder an impressive sense of the weight of this responsibility that Isubmit to you these things for your explanation. 

Very respectfully, (Signed) JOHN A. CAMPBELL, _Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, United States. _Hon. William H. Seward, _Secretary of State_. 

_Judge Campbell to Mr. Secretary Seward_. 

Washington, _April 20, 1861. _

Sir: I inclose you a letter, corresponding very nearly with one Iaddressed to you one week ago (April 13th), to which I have not had anyreply. The letter is simply one of inquiry in reference to factsconcerning which, I think, I am entitled to an explanation. I have notadopted any opinion in reference to them which may not be modified byexplanation; nor have I affirmed in that letter, nor do I in this, anyconclusion of my own unfavorable to your integrity in the wholetransaction. All that I have said and mean to say is, that anexplanation is due from you to myself. I will not say what I shall do incase this request is not complied with, but I am justified in sayingthat I shall feel at liberty to place these letters before any personwho is entitled to ask an explanation of myself. 

Very respectfully, JOHN A. CAMPBELL, _Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, United States_. Hon. William H. Seward, _Secretary of State_. 

No reply has been made to this letter, April 24, 1861. 

INDEX TO VOL. I. 

_Abolition of African servitude_; its first public agitation, 33; activity of the propagandists, 34; misuse of the sacred word liberty, 34. 

_Absurdity of the construction_, attempted to be put on expressions ofthe Constitution, 175; a brief analysis, 175. 

_Accede_, discussions on the word, 136; its former use, 137. 

Adams, James H, commissioner from South Carolina to Washington, 213. 

Adams, John, stumbled at the preamble of the Constitution, 121. 

Adams, John Quincy, his declaration of the rights of the people of theStates, 190, 191. 

_African servitude_, its aid to the Confederacy in the war, 303; confidence of the people in the Africans, 303. 

_Agreement_, between Generals Harney and Price, at St. Louis, Missouri, 416. 

_Agricultural products, Southern_, mainly for export, 302; a change of habits in the planters required, 302; our success largely due to African servitude, 303; condition of the Africans, 303; diminished every year during the war, 505. 

_Alabama_, withdraws from the Union, 220. 

_All powers not delegated_, etc. , what does it mean? 175. 

_Allegiance_, inconsistent ideas of, 182; paramount to the Government, a monstrous view, 182; the sovereign is the people, 182; obligation to support a Constitution derived from the allegiance due to the sovereign, 183; oath to support the Constitution based on the sovereignty of the States, 183; the oath of military and naval officers, 183; how false to attribute "treason" to the Southern States, 183; an oath to support the Constitution, 183. 

_Amendment_ of the Constitution, distinct from the delegation of power, 196. 

Anderson, Robert, commands forts in Charleston Harbor, 212; instructions from the War Department of the United States, 212; removes to Fort Sumter, 213; acquaintance and past associations with the author, 216; his protest against relieving Fort Sumter, 281; the letter of protest, 282; reply to the demand for evacuation, 286. 

_Annapolis, Maryland_, first meeting of the commissioners to revise Articles of Confederation held there, 87; how revision was effected, 88. 

_Anti-slavery and pro-slavery_, terms misleading the sympathies andopinions of the world, 6. 

_Armories_, the chief, where located, 480. 

_Armory at Harper's Ferry_, burned by order of the United States Government, 317; a breach of pledges, 317; machinery and materials largely saved, 317; removed to Richmond, 317; and Fayetteville, North Carolina, 317; Armorer Ball, his skill and fate, 318. 

_Arms and ammunition_, arrangements for the purchase of, 311; agent sent to Europe, 311; do. Sent North, 311; letter to Admiral Semmes, 311. 

_Army officers_ choose their future place of service in disintegration of the army, 306; act of Confederate Congress relative to, 307. 

_Arms_ within the limits of the Confederacy in 1861, 471; do. Powder, 472; do. Arsenals, 472; cannon-foundries, 472; the increased supply, 476. 

_Army, Confederate_, its organization, instruction, and equipment, the first object, 303; provisions of the first bill of Congress, 304; its modification for twelve months' men, 304; fifth section of the act, 304; system of organization, 305; acts of Congress providing for its organization, 305; act to establish army of Confederate States, 306; its provisions, 306; the army belongs to the States, and its officers return to the States on its disintegration, 306; provision securing rank to officers of the United States Army, 307; the constitutional view, 307; how observed, 307; Generals appointed, 308; efforts to increase the efficiency of, 384; desire to employ the available force, 384; organization of--early circumstances relating to it, 443; the largest army in 1861 that of the Potomac, 443; act of Congress relating to organization, 444; the right to preserve for volunteers the character of State troops surrendered by the States, 444; efforts to comply with the law, 444; obstruction to its execution, 444; correspondence, 444. 

_Arrest_, threats of, against Senators withdrawing from Congress, 226. 

_Arrest and imprisonment_ of police authorities of Baltimore, 334. 

_Arsenals_, contents of, in 1861, 471; do. In Richmond, 479. 

_Artillery_, extent of its manufacture, 473. 

_Assault on us_, The, made by the hostile descent of the fleet to relieve Fort Sumter, 292. 

_Assertions_, of Everett and Motley examined, 130. 

Baker, Edward, Colonel, killed at Ball's Bluff, 437. 

Ball, Armistead, master armorer at Harper's Ferry, 317; his gallant services, 317; his capacity and fidelity, 318. 

_Ball's Bluff_, defeat of the enemy at, 437; losses, 437. 

_Baltimore_, manly effort of her citizens to resist the progress of the armies of invasion, 299; occupied by United States troops, 333; the city disarmed, 334; arrest and imprisonment of police commissioners by General Banks, 334-'35; provost-marshal appointed, 334; search for and seizure of arms, 335; report of a committee of the Legislature on the arrests, 335. 

Banks, Major-General, unlawful proceeding of, in Baltimore, 334. 

_Bargain, A_, can not be broken on one side, says Webster, and still bind the other side, 167. 

Barnwell, Robert W. , commissioner from South Carolina to Washington, 213; offered the place of Secretary of State under Provisional Constitution, 241. 

Bartow, Colonel, killed at Manassas, 357. 

Beauregard, General P. G. T. , correspondence with the Confederate Government relative to Fort Sumter, 285, 286-287; demands its evacuation; commands army at Manassas, 340; orders troops from left to right at Manassas, 352; his promotion, 359; his statement of the defenses of Washington, 360; report of the battle of Manassas, 368; endorsement of the President, 369. 

Bee, General Bernard, wounded at Manassas, 357. 

Bell, John, nominated for the Presidency in 1860, 50; offers to withdraw, 52. 

_Belmont, Missouri_, occupied by Federal troops, 403; afterward garrisoned by Confederate troops, 403; Grant attempts to surprise the garrison, 403; the battle that ensued, 404. 

Benjamin, Judah P. , Attorney-General under Provisional Constitution, 242. 

"_Bible and Sharpe's rifles_, " declaration of a famous preacher, 29. 

"_Bloodletting, A little more_, " the letter recommending, 249. 

_Bond of Union, A_, necessary after the Declaration of Independence, 193; Articles of Confederation followed, 193; how amended, 193; difference in the new form of government from the old one, 194; the same principle for obtaining grants of power in both, 194; amendments made more easy, 195. 

_Border States_ promptly accede to the proposition of Virginia for a Congress to adjust controversies, 248; secession of the, 328. 

Bonham, General, marches to Virginia with his brigade on her secession, 300; commands brigade at Manassas, 353; proposal that he shall pursue the enemy, 353. 

_Bowling Green, Kentucky_, occupied by General Johnston, 406. 

Breckinridge, John C. , nominated for the Presidency in 1860, 50; willing to withdraw, 52; ex-Vice-President of United States, 399; his address to the citizens of Kentucky, 399. 

Brown, John, his raid into Virginia, 41; how viewed, 41; report of United States Senate committee, 41. 

Brown, Mayor of Baltimore, visits with citizens President Lincoln, 332; his report, 332. 

Buchanan, President, his views and action in 1860, 54; his objection to withdrawing the garrison from the forts in Charleston Harbor, 215; opposed to the coercion of States, 216; view of the cession of a site for a fort, 217; hope to avert a collision, 217; message to Congress, with letter of South Carolina commissioners, and his answer, 218; his alarm at the state of affairs, 265. 

Butler, Major-General B. F. , occupies Baltimore with troops, 333. 

Cabell, W. L. , statement of field transportation at Manassas, 383. 

_Cabinet_ of the President under the Provisional Constitution, 241. 

_Cabinet, Mr. Lincoln's_, a transaction in, 276. 

Calhoun, John C. , his death, 17; remarks of Mr. Webster, 17; anecdote, 17; extract from his speech, "How to save the Union, " 55. 

_California_, circumstances of its admission to the Union, 16. 

Campbell, J. A. P. , letter relative to the views of the Provisional President, 238. 

_Camp Jackson_ surrounded by General Lyon's force, 414; massacre at, 416. 

Campbell, Judge, his statement relative to the intercourse between our commissioners and the Federal State Department, 267, 268; his own views, 268, 269. 

_Capon Springs_, speech of Webster at, 167. 

Cass, Lewis, his "Nicholson letter, " 38; resigns as United States Secretary of State, 214; his reason, 214. 

_Causes_ which led the Southern States into the position they held at the close of 1860, recapitulation of, 77. 

_Cavils, verbal_, relative to the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation, 135, 136. 

_Centralism_, its fate in the Constitutional Convention, 161. 

_Centreville_, conflagration at, 467; retreat from, 468. 

_Change of government_, a question that the States had the power to decide, by virtue of the unalienable rights announced in the Declaration of Independence, 438. 

Chandler, Z. , his letter on a "little more bloodletting, " 249. 

_Charleston Harbor defenses_, a subject of anxiety in the secession of the State, 212; Representatives in Congress call on the President, 212; proposal to observe a peaceful military status, 212; secret preparations for reënforcement by United States Government, 212; instructions to the commander, 212; modified, 213; commissioners sent by the State to treat for the delivery of the forts, 213; change of military condition in the harbor, 213; how regarded, 213; interview of commissioners with President, 214; sharp correspondence, 214. 

Chesnut, James, letter on the election of Provisional President, 289. 

Clark, John B. , of Missouri, letter from President Davis, 427. 

_Clause second of Article VI_ of the Constitution, adduced by the friends of centralism, 149; how magnified and perverted, 150. 

Clay, C. C. , letter relative to certain misstatements relative to the author, 206-208. 

Clayton, Alexander M. , letter relative to the election of Provisional President, 237. 

_Coercion of a State_, views in 1850, 55; do. 1860, 55; declaration of the Convention that framed the Constitution, 56; other declarations, 56; the idea absolutely excluded, 101; the alternative of secession, if no such right exists, 177; the proposition before the Convention, 177; views of the delegates, 177; coercion military, treated with abhorrence, 179; the right to, repudiated, 252, 253; language of the New York press, 253; do. Of Northern speeches, 254; do. Of Thayer, 254; remarks of Governor Seymour, 255; do. Of Chancellor Walworth, 255; do. Of the Northern press, 256; words of Mr. Lincoln in his inaugural, 256; views of Southern people, 257. 

_Columbus, Kentucky_, occupation by Confederate forces, 402. 

_Commissioners_ to the United States appointed, 246; nature of, 246; how treated, 247; negotiations of Judges Nelson and Campbell, 267; statement of Judge Campbell, 268; his views, 268; declarations of Mr. Seward, 268; his assurances, 269; expectations of the commissioners and of the Confederate Government, 269; pledge given by Federal authorities, 270; telegram to General Beauregard, 270; his reply, 270; explanations of Mr. Seward, 270; plan to reënforce and supply Sumter, 271; proceedings for its execution by Secretary Fox, 271; facts presented to Mr. Seward, 273; the point of honor, 273; further declarations of Mr. Seward, 273; official notification from Washington to Governor Pickens and General Beauregard, 274; letter to President Buchanan, 264; their arrival, 264; incidents, 265; letter of Judge Crawford describing his reception, 265; arrival of Mr. Forsyth--their letter to Mr. Seward, 266; no answer received for twenty-seven days, 266; a paper filed in the State Department, 266; an oral answer, 266; state of affairs relative to Fort Sumter, 266, 267; their letters to General Beauregard, 277, 278; failure of their mission, 296. 

_Commissioners from South Carolina_ to President Buchanan relative to the delivery of the forts in Charleston Harbor, 213. 

_Community independence_, its origin and development, 116. 

_Compact, The original_, causes that blighted its fair prospects, 48; the Articles of Confederation a compact, 135; been denied of the Constitution, 135; denied by Webster, 135; cavils on the words of the Constitution compared with the Articles of Confederation, 136; the wood accede considered, 136; use of the words "compact, accede, Confederacy, " 137; compact used by Gerry, Morris, Madison, Washington, Martin, and others, 138; in the ratification of Massachusetts, 137; the Constitution shown to be one by its structure, 140; provisions, 140; representation in the Senate, etc. , 140. 

_Compromise measures of 1850_, their origin, 14; bear the impress of the sectional spirit, 14. 

_Compromise, Missouri_, how constituted, 13; votes on, 13. 

_Confederacies_, the first local formed in New England, 115. 

_Confederacy_, the growth of, 485; financial system of, 485; the state of the finances in 1862, 485. 

_Confederate Government_, its instructions to General Beauregard relative to Fort Sumter, 284; the correspondence, 285, 286; aid given to Missouri, 429. 

_Confederation, The old_, declares independence of each State, 86; its articles, 86; affairs, how managed, 87; the first idea of reorganization, 87; consequences, 87; term applied to the articles, 88; revision, how effected, 88; how could it be superseded without secession? 100. 

_Conference of the President and generals_, after the victory at Manassas, 352; order to pursue the enemy, 353; letter of the President respecting, 353; answer from General Beauregard, 354, 355; subjects considered, 356; second do. Of the President and generals, after the victory at Manassas, inquiry as to what more it was practicable to do, 360; fortifications said to exist at Washington, 360; subsequent reports, 360; at variance with the information then possessed, 360; why an advance was not contemplated to south bank of Potomac, 360; returns to Richmond to increase army, 361; charge of preventing the pursuit, 361. 

_Congress of the Confederation_, its distinction from the United States Congress, 26; language of its resolution for a revision of its articles, 88; its recommendation, 89; instructions to the commissioners to the Constitutional Convention by the several States, 89; early acts of, 243; laws of United States not inconsistent continued in force till altered, 243; financial officers continued in office, 243; early steps required to be taken for a settlement with United States, 244; act relative to free navigation of the Mississippi River, 245; coasting trade opened to foreign vessels, 245; resolutions after the victory at Manassas, 383. 

_Congress, Provisional_, of seceding States assembles at Montgomery, 220; resolution to remove the seat of government to Richmond, 339. 

_Congress of the Confederation and that of the United States_, difference between, 10, 11. 

_Congress, United States_, decision on first abolition petition, 5; prohibits importation of slaves, vote on the bill, 5; its action on the petition of Indiana Territory for the suspension of the ordinance prohibiting slavery, 8; report of the committee, 8; future action on resolutions, 10; has only delegated powers, 26; action in the Senate in 1860-'61, 68; action of its committee, 69; failures of adjustment in the House, 70. 

_Connecticut_, instructions to her delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 92; her ratification of the Federal Constitution, 107. 

"_Constitution, The_, a covenant with hell, " use of the expression, 56; signification of the word, 88; the seventh article, a provision for secession, 101; not established by the people in the aggregate, nor by the States in the aggregate, 101; delegates were chosen by the States as States, and voted as States, 102; object for which they were sent, 102; terms used then in the same sense as now, 102; a national Government distinctly rejected, 102; final words of the Constitution, 102; not adopted by the people in the aggregate, 114; the assertion a monstrous fiction, 114; as British colonies they did not constitute one people, 114; confused views of Judge Story, 115; exposition of them, 115; some facts, 115; local confederacies, 115; the form of the first, 115; its existence, 115; assertion of Edward Everett, 116; unsustainable, 116; his quotations, 117; letter of General Gage to Congress in 1774, 117; extract, 117; a citation from the Declaration of Independence, 118; a palpable misconception, 118; as united States Independence was achieved, 118; as united States they entered into a new compact, 119; in no single instance was the action by the people in the aggregate or as one body, 119; facts, 119, 120; by what authority was it ordained? 131; denied by Webster to be a compact, 135. 

_Constitution, Confederate_, the permanent of the Confederate States, prepared and ratified, 258; remarks of Mr. Stephens, 258; followed the model of the United States Constitution, 259; some of its distinctive features, 259, 260; term of the President's office, 259; removals from office, 259; admission of Cabinet officers to seats on floor of Congress, 259; protective duties prohibited, 260; two-thirds vote for appropriations, 260; impeachment by State Legislature, 260; the States make a compact for improvement of navigation, 260; amendments obligatory by convention, 260; provisions relative to slavery, 261; other provisions, 261; words of Mr. Lincoln, 262; words of "New York Herald, " 263. 

_Constitution, Provisional_, for the Confederacy, adopted, 229; officers elected, 230. 

_Constitutional Convention_, the original, rejected the doctrine of the coercion of a State, 56; conclusions drawn from the instructions of the States to their delegates, 93; assembling of the Convention, 94; the work takes a wider range than was contemplated, 94; diversity of opinion among the members, 95; Luther Martin's description of the three parties in the Convention, 95; the equality of the States, how adjusted, 96; plan of government of Edmund Randolph, 96; how the word "national" was treated, 97. 

_Constitutional questions_ involved in the position of the Southern States, recapitulation of, 77. 

_Constitutional Union party_ of 1860, its principles, 51. 

_Constitutional Union Convention_ in 1860, its nominations and resolutions, 60. 

_Convention_, the original idea of calling, 98; its powers merely advisory, 103; how its work was approved, 103. 

_Conventions, State_, representatives of sovereignty, 97. 

Cooper, Samuel, resigns in United States Army, 308; his rank, 308; appointment in the Confederate Army, 308. 

Count of Paris, his travesty of history, 200, 201; libels the memory of Major Anderson, 283. 

Coxe, Tench, words relative to separate sovereignties, 128. 

Crawford, Martin J. , appointed commissioner to United States, 246; commissioner to Washington arrives, 246; describes the incidents and his reception, 265; other proceedings, 266. 

Crittenden, J. C. , offers in the Senate a joint resolution proposing amendments to the Constitution, 60; how received, 60. 

Davis, Jefferson, reëlected to United States Senate in 1851, 18; subject of the compromise measures agitating Mississippi, 18; division of opinion, 18; the principles of the Declaration of Independence of more value than the Union, 18; his position and views, 19; invited to become candidate for Governor, 19; not accepted, 20; active canvass, 20; nominated again on the withdrawal of the former nominee, 20; resigns as United States Senator, 20; his position relative to the Union, 21; letter to W. J. Brown, 21; enters the Cabinet of President Pierce, 22; charge of the Pacific Railroad survey, 23; charge of the Capitol extension, 23; charge of changes in the model of arms, 23; increase of the army, 23; its officers, 24; clerkships, 24; anecdote of General Jesup, 24; again elected Senator from Mississippi, 25; no change in President Pierce's Cabinet during his term, 25; extract from a speech in the Senate on the relation of master and servant in a Territory, 30; remarks in the Senate on the "Nicholson letter" of General Cass, 37; offers a series of resolutions in United States Senate, 42; the resolutions, 42; discussion and vote in the Senate, 43; position of the mover shown in extract from his speech, 44-46; meets with the Congressional representatives and Governor of Mississippi in consultation, 57; his views, 57; summoned to Washington, 58; state of affairs there and his proceedings, 59; extract from a speech in December, 1860, in the Senate, showing his position, 61-68; position and feelings at the beginning of 1861, 205; previous life, 205; office of Senator, 206; in the Cabinet, 206; letter of C. C. Clay, relative to misstatements respecting, 206; conversation with President Buchanan relative to the forts in Charleston Harbor, 214; advises him to withdraw the garrison, 215; his objections, 215; presents rejoinder of South Carolina Commissioners to President Buchanan in the Senate, 218; his speech, 219; notified of the secession of Mississippi, 220; states the position of the State in his final address to the United States Senate 221-224; elected President of the Confederate States, 230; engaged at home, 230; disappointed, 230; better fitted for command in the field, 230; anecdote of W. L. Sharkey, 230; addresses on the way to Montgomery, 231; inaugural address, 232; letter to President Buchanan, 264; message to Congress on April 28th, 278, 279; writes to Governor Letcher to sustain Baltimore, 300; remained in the Senate after Mississippi called her convention, in order to obtain such measures as would prevent the final step, 302; when her ordinance was enacted the question was no longer open, and her Senator could only retire from the United States Senate, 302; letter of instructions to Captain Semmes, 311; message to Congress in April, 1861, 326; reply to the Maryland Commissioners, 333; answer to Johnston relative to the rank of the latter, 348; goes to the Manassas battle-field, 348; scenes witnessed and described, 348, 349; arrives at Beauregard's headquarters, 349; meets General Johnston, 350; appearance of the enemy, 350; the field on the left, 351; meets General Beauregard, 352; conference with the generals after Manassas battle, 352; subject of conference, 356; necessity of pursuit, 356; condition of the troops, 356; meets the wounded, 357; letter promoting General Beauregard, 359; charged with preventing the pursuit at Manassas, 361; letter to General Johnston on the subject, 362; answer of Johnston, 363; reference to another conference, 363; letter to General Beauregard relative to the plea of a want of transportation for not pursuing the enemy, 365; endorsement on the report of General Johnston, 366; remarks upon it, 366; letter to Beauregard relative to his report, 366; the objectionable point reviewed, 367; the part of the report and objections suppressed by Congress, 367; the report, 368; the endorsement of the President, 369; letter calling for information on the wants of the army, 384; reply to the letter of the Governor of Kentucky, 390; anxiety about affairs in Missouri, 426; letter to John B. Clark, 427; answer to the request of General J. E. Johnston for reënforcements, 442; letter to General G. W. Smith on the reorganization of the army, 445; letter to General Beauregard, 446; letter to General Beauregard, 447; letter to General J. E. Johnston, 448; letter to General J. E. Johnston on enemy's movements, 452; letter to General G. W. Smith on movements against the enemy, 453; letter to General J. E. Johnston on inspection of the line between Dumfries and Fredericksburg, 454; letter to General J. E. Johnston on Jackson's movement in the Valley, 457; letter to General J. E. Johnston on the order of the Secretary of War for the troops to retire to the Valley, 460; letter to General J. E. Johnston on the complaint of irregular action by the Secretary of War, 461; letter to General J. E. Johnston in answer to a letter stating that his position was considered unsafe, 462; letter to General J. E. Johnston on mobilizing his army, 463; letter to General J. E. Johnston in answer to a notice that the army was in retreat, 464; visit to General Johnston's headquarters, 465; reconnaissance, 466; extract from the inaugural address in 1862, 484; message on the employment of slaves in the army, 515. 

_Debt, Foreign_, at the close of the war, 496; attempts to discredit the Government abroad, 497; reference to Union bank-bonds, 497. 

_Delaware_, instructions to her delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 93; her words of ratification of the Federal Constitution, 104. 

_Delicate truth, A_, to be veiled, 101. 

_Democratic Convention of 1860_, disagreement, 50; adjournment of divisions, 50; nominations by the friends of popular sovereignty, 50; nominations by the Conservatives, 50. 

_Democratic party_, dissensions in, 36. 

D'Wolf, James, president of a slave-trading company, anecdote of, 84. 

_Disguise with Confederate Commissioners_ thrown off on the reduction of Sumter, 297. 

_Dissolution and secession_ from the first Union gave existence to the present Union, 171; the right to withdraw in either case results from the same principles, 171. 

_Dogma, A new_, created at the Chicago Convention in 1860, 49. 

Douglas, Stephen A. , on the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, 38; nominated for the Presidency in 1860, 50; unwilling to withdraw, 52; his resolution in the Senate recommending evacuation of the forts, 281; his remarks, 281. 

_Dred Scott case_; the question, 83; the salient points established, 84; remarks of the Chief-Justice, 84. 

Early, General Jubal, commands regiment at Manassas, 351; extracts relative to the first battle of Manassas written by him, 372; sketch of him, 372-378; remarks on the retreat from Centreville, 468; do. On the loss of supplies, 468. 

_Election, Presidential, of 1860_, votes and result, 53. 

Ellis, Governor, of North Carolina, reply to Mr. Lincoln's call for troops, 412; sketch of Governor Ellis, 413; letter to President Buchanan restoring Forts Johnson and Caswell, 413. 

Ellsworth, Oliver, views of, on the coercion of a State, 178. 

Elzy, General, commands brigade at Manassas, 351. 

_Endorsement of the President_, on the report of the victory at Manassas, by General Beauregard, 369. 

_Equality of the States_ a condition of the Union, 180, 181. 

_Equilibrium between the sections_ destroyed by the action of the General Government, 32. 

_Equipments for armies_, the supply of, 478; their manufacture, 478. 

Everett, Edward, nominated for the Vice-Presidency in 1860, 50; his assertions relative to the Constitution, 129; views on the sovereignty of the States, 148. 

Evans, General N. S. , his force near Leesburg, 437; fight at Ball's Bluff, 437. 

_Expedition, Naval_, to reënforce Fort Sumter, 274; the circumstances, 274; its arrival delayed by a storm, 274; dissensions in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, 274; impossible that he was ignorant of the communications of the Secretary, 275; yet the Secretary was not impeached, 275; a transaction in the Cabinet, 275; letter of Mr. Blair, 277; letters of the Commissioners, 277, 278; message of President Davis to Congress, 277; the relief squadron, 284; correspondence of Major Anderson, 288; arrival of the fleet off Charleston Harbor, 289; its failure to relieve the fort, 289; report of Captain McGowan, 291. 

_Fairfax Court-House_, The conference at, 445; circumstances, 449; questions considered at the conference, 449; a paper relating to the conference, 450; details respecting it, 450; position unfavorable for defense, 452; establishment of a battery near Acquia Creek, 452; possibilities in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 452; correspondence, 452; reference to, 464. 

"_Faith as to Sumter fully kept_"--the written answer of Secretary Seward, 273; official notification of reënforcement served on Governor Pickens on the same day, 274. 

_False representations_ made of us at the close of 1860, 77. 

_Federal Constitution_, how the term was freely used, 93. 

_Federal Government_, the tendency to pervert the functions delegated to it, and to use them with sectional discrimination against the minority, 32. 

_Federalist, The_, its use of the word "sovereign" as applied to the States, 144. 

"_Fighting in the Union_, " what was meant by it, 225. 

_Financial system of The Confederacy_ adopted from necessity, 485; its operation during eighteen months, 485; issue of notes and bonds, 486, 487; efforts to fund Treasury notes, 487; provisions of Congress relative to, 488; measure to reduce the currency, 489; a review of the financial legislation, 489; a war-tax, 490; internal taxation a partial failure, 490; compulsory reduction of the currency, 491; its success, 492; financial condition of the Government at its close, 492; amount of the public debt, 493; taxation, 493. 

"_Firing on the flag_, " the disingenuous rant of demagogues, 292. 

"_Flaunting lie, A_, " the compact of Union, 326. 

_Florida_ withdraws from the Union, 220. 

Floyd, General John B. , resigns as United States Secretary of War, 214; his reason, 214; advances to the support of General Wise, 433; his skirmishes with the enemy, 433; defeats them, 435; assailed by General Rosecrans, 433; Rosecrans falls back, 433. 

Foote, Samuel A. , states the true issue relative to the admission of Missouri to the Union, 12. 

_Foreign relations_, efforts at recognition, 469; seizure of our commissioners on board the Trent, 469; indignation in England, 469; their restoration, 469. 

Forsyth, John, appointed commissioner to United States, 246. 

_Forts and arsenals_, course of United States Government relative to, 281; resolution, 202; do. Taken possession of by the Southern States, 202; assertion made that the absence of troops was the result of collusion, 202; this absence was the ordinary condition of peace, 203; as defenseless now as in 1861, 203; some exceptions, 203; the situation long maintained at Pensacola Bay, 203; conditional cession to United States, 209; condition of the cession of Massachusetts, 209; do. Of New York, 209; do. Of South Carolina, 210; stipulations made by Virginia in ceding the ground for Fortress Monroe, 210; act of cession, 211. 

Fox, G. V. , his plan to reënforce and furnish supplies to Fort Sumter, 271; describes the details, 271. 

_Framework of the Government_, how constructed, 97. 

Franklin, Benjamin, his use of the word "sovereignties" as applied to the States, 144. 

_Freedom_ and _slavery_, terms misleading the opinions and sympathies of the world, 6. 

Fremont, General John C. , his confiscation proclamation in Missouri, 430. 

Frost, General D. M. , commands militia at Camp Jackson, 415; surrenders to Captain Lyon, 415; efforts for release, 415; his letter to General Harney, 415, 416. 

_Fugitives_, law for the rendition of, occasion of its passage, 16; tended to lead other States to believe they might evade their constitutional obligations, 16; action of the States which had passed personal liberty laws, 16; the rendition of, not the proper subject for the legislation of Congress, 81; how it was in early times, 82. 

Garnett, General Robert, killed at Rich Mountain, 338; biographical notice, 338. 

_General Government_, its claim of a right to judge of the extent of its own authority, 191. 

_Georgia_, efforts to prohibit importation of slaves, 4; instructions to her deputies to the Constitutional Convention, 91; her ratification of the Federal Constitution, 106; withdraws from the Union, 220. 

Gerry, Elbridge, objects to the provision for nine States to ratify, as a virtual dissolution of the Union, 100; his use of the word "compact, " 137. 

Gorgas, General, appointed chief of ordnance, 310; states the growth of his department, 481; statement relative to the charge against Secretary of War Floyd, 482. 

_Government, The United States_, exalted above the States which created it, 127; no such unit as United States ever mentioned, 127; instances, 127; words of Tench Coxe, 128; forgotten misconceptions revived by Daniel Webster, 128; his assertions in debate, 128; specimen of views of sectionists, 129; assertion of Edward Everett, 129; do. Of J. L. Motley, 129; most remarkable of these assertions, 130; Constitution mentions the States as States seventy times, 130; what authority ordained and established the Constitution, 131; statements of Everett and Motley, 131; question of Story and its answer, 132; views of Madison on the nature of the ratification, 133; legislation can not alter a fact, 134; its treatment of citizens of Kentucky, 398; not supreme, but subject to the Constitution and laws, 151; accepted of sites for forts on the conditions prescribed by the State, 211; confounded with the oath to support the Constitution, 151. 

_Government, Confederate_, seat of, removed to Richmond, 340; reasons for the removal, 340. 

_Governments_ only agents of the sovereign, 142; responsible to it, and subject to its control, 154. 

Grant, General, attempts to capture the garrison at Belmont, 403; his defeat, 404; became willing to exchange prisoners, 405. 

_Grants to the Federal Government_, not surrenders, says Hamilton, but delegations of power, 163. 

_Great Britain_, charge preferred against the Government of, in the Declaration of Independence, 82. 

Green, James S. , offers a resolution in the United States Senate relative to preserving peace between the States, 61. 

_Grievance_, the intolerable, 83. 

Hamilton, Alexander, his use of the word "sovereignty" as applied to the States, 144; on the supremacy of the Constitution, 150; on a confederated republic, 162; extract from "The Federalist, " 162; further views, 162; his views on the coercion of a State, 178; on the omission of a State to appoint Senators, 179. 

Harney, Major-General, removed from command in Missouri, 421. 

_Harper's Ferry_, burned and evacuated, 328; President Lincoln expresses his approbation, 328; destruction caused, 329; an important, position for military and political considerations, 340; its occupation needful for the removal of machinery, 341. 

Harris, Governor of Tennessee, reply to Mr. Lincoln's call for troops, 413. 

Harrison, William Henry, Governor of Indiana Territory, 8; letter to Congress with resolutions requesting the suspension of the ordinance prohibiting slavery, 9. 

_Hartford Convention_, proceedings relative to a dissolution of the Union, 74. 

Hayne, I. W. , Commissioner from South Carolina to Washington, 219. 

_Hemp, bales of_, used for a breastwork, 430. 

Henry, Patrick, asks what right had they to say, "We the people, " 121; his objection to "one people, " 174. 

Hicks, Governor of Maryland, his declarations, 331; his proclamation, 331. 

Hill, Colonel A. P. , orders the affair near Romney, 343; sketch of, 344. 

Hill, Colonel D. H. , afterward lieutenant-general, 342; report of the combat at Bethel Church, 342. 

_Honor of the United States Government_, how maintained relative to the forts in Charleston Harbor, 217; a point easy to concede, 217. 

_Hope of reconciliation_, the last expires, 250. 

_Hostile expedition_, the, made the reduction of Sumter necessary before it should be reënforced, 297. 

Howard, Charles, arrest and imprisonment by General Banks, 335. 

Huger, General, commands a force at Norfolk, 340. 

Hurlburt, a captive prisoner, 361; his career, 361. 

Huse, Major Caleb, sent to Europe for the purchase of munitions of war, 311; our agent in Europe, 482; his letter relative to the shipment of supplies, 482. 

_Immigration_, causes which combined for its direction to the Northern States, 32. 

_Inaction of the Army of the Potomac_, the President alleged to be responsible for it, 449; the question for consideration at the Fairfax conference, 449; a paper relative to the conference, 450; proceedings at the Conference, 451, 452; correspondence, 452, 453; application of General Jackson, 454; correspondence relative to, 455, 456; further correspondence, 457, etc. 

_Inaugural address_ of the author as President of the Confederate States, 232. 

_Incendiaries_, trained in scenes of Kansas strife, 31. 

_Independence_ of North Carolina and Rhode Island while not members of the Union, 112; relations between them and the United States, 112; letter from the Governor of Rhode Island, 112. 

_Indiana Territory_, petitions for the suspension of the Ordinance of 1787, prohibiting slavery, 8; action on the petitions, 8; subsequent action and resolutions, 9. 

_Insurrection, An_, was it? 325. 

_Introduction_, The, 1. 

_Irrepressible conflict_, how the declaration of, arose, 34. 

"_Is thy servant a dog?_" its use in the United States Senate, 34. 

_Invasions of States_, no right in the Federal government to, 411; words of the Constitution, 411; deemed a high crime, 411; response of Governors to President Lincoln's call for troops, 411. 

_Invention_ exhausted itself in the creation of imaginary "cabals, " "conspiracies, " and "intrigues, " 200; examples, 209. 

Jackson, General T. J. , skill and daring in checking the enemy's forces in June, 1861, 344; character, 454; letter proposing a movement into the Shenandoah Valley, 455; letter of the President, 457. 

Jackson, Governor of Missouri, reply to Mr. Lincoln's call for troops, 412; issues a call for fifty thousand volunteers, 421; words of the Governor, 421; his efforts to preserve the peace, 422; his declarations, 422; demands of the Federal officers, 422; his march, 459; its results, 459. 

_Jersey Plan, The_, States rights, and opposed to national, as proposed in the Federal Constitutional Convention, 105; arguments for it, 106. 

Johnston, General Albert Sidney, resigns in United States Army, 308; rank, 308; appointment in Confederate Army, 309; his early career, 405; resigns in United States army, 406; assigned to the command of the Confederate Department of the West, 406; destitution at Nashville, 406; his movements, 406; his military positions, 406; takes command at Bowling Green, 406; his force, 407; force of the enemy, 407; efforts to procure arms and men, 407; letter to the Governor of Alabama, 407; letter to the Governor of Georgia, 407; telegram to Richmond, 407; answer of the Secretary of War, 407; aid from the Governor and Legislature of Tennessee, 408; measures taken to concentrate and recruit his forces, 408; the result, 408; resolves on a levy _en masse_, 409; letters to the Governors of States, 409; reënforced from Virginia, 410. 

Johnson, Herschel V. , nominated for the Vice-Presidency in 1860, 50. 

Johnston, General Joseph E. , commands army near Harper's Ferry, 340; desires to retire, 341; official letter addressed to him, 341; apparent effort of the enemy to detain him in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 344; his junction with Beauregard becomes necessary, 344; extract from official letter, 345; urged to join General Beauregard, 345; correspondence lost, 346; telegram sent to, by General Cooper, 346; confidence reposed in him, 346; the meaning of an order, 347; the junction made with marked skill, 347; answer to telegram to join Beauregard, 347; his telegram asking his position relative to Beauregard, 348; answer, 348; his rank in the Confederate Army, 348; letter relative to obstacles to the pursuit of the enemy at Manassas, 363; his report, and the endorsement put on it by the President, 366; remonstrates against the movement of General Jackson in the valley, 454; letter, 456; reconnaissance, 465. 

Johnson, John M. , chairman of committee of Kentucky Senate on military occupation, 393; letter to General Polk, 393. 

Jordan, Colonel Thomas, letter respecting the pursuit of the enemy after battle at Manassas, 354; his order, 355. 

_Judiciary, The Federal_, views of Marshall on the power of, 166. 

_Justification, A_, efforts of President Lincoln to make out his, 322; words of his message, 322; his question, 322; its answer very plain, 322; his supposed answer, 322; nothing more erroneous than such views, 323; the beginning and end of all the powers of government are to be found in the instrument of delegation, 323; for what purpose must he call out the war power? 324; his blockade proclamation, 324; its scheme, 324; how based, 324; its assumption of an insurrection, 325; was it an insurrection? 325. 

Kane, Police Marshal, arrested and imprisoned at Baltimore, 334. 

_Kansas and Nebraska Bill_, some facts connected with it, 26; declaration of 1850, 26; its discussion, 27; proceedings relative to, 28; not inspired by President Pierce's Cabinet, 28; true intent and meaning of the act, 28; its terms, 29. 

_Kansas_ Territory, its organization, 26. 

Kenner, Duncan F. , letter on the election of Provisional President, 238. 

_Kentucky_, the principles announced by her, 385; resolutions, 385; her position in the conflict, 386; the question of neutrality, 386; how could it be maintained, 386; correspondence between Governor Magoffin and President Lincoln, 387; correspondence with President Davis, 389, 390; advance of General Polk, 391; the occasion of it, 390; correspondence between General Polk and the authorities of Kentucky, 392; resolutions of the Legislature relative to the occupation of points in the State by troops, 392; treatment of her citizens by United States Government, 398. 

King, Rufus, on the danger to the Union, 186. 

Lamon, Colonel, application to visit Fort Sumter, 272. 

Lane, Joseph, nominated for the Vice-Presidency in 1860, 50; Senator from Oregon, some remarks relative to affairs, 250. 

_Language of the Northern press_, on the right to coerce a State, 253-256; language of Northern speeches, on resistance to an attempt to coerce a State, 254. 

_Laurel Hill_, West Virginia, the conflict at, 338. 

Lay, Colonel, reminiscences of the battle of Manassas, 381, 382. 

Lee, Robert E. , resigns in the United States Army, 308; rank, 308; appointment in the Confederate Army, 309; appointed commander-in-chief of the military forces of Virginia, 328; commands the Army of Virginia, 340; remarks, 340; goes to western Virginia, 434; his movements, 434; the bad season, 434; decides to attack the encampment of the enemy, 434; the instructions, 435; refrains from the attack, 435; cause, 435; moves to the support of Wise and Floyd, 436; the enemy withdraws, 436; Lee returns to Richmond, 436; sent to South Carolina, 437. 

_Leesburg_, movement of the enemy to cross the Potomac near, 437. 

Letcher, Governor, reply to Mr. Lincoln's call for troops, 412. 

"_Let the Union slide_, " origin of the expression, 56. 

_Lexington, Missouri_, the battle at, 430; surrender of the enemy, 431. 

_Liberty_, misuse of the word by abolitionists, 34. 

Lincoln, President, his language relative to coercion, 256; approves the plan of Fox to reënforce Sumter, 272; issues his proclamation introducing the farce of combinations, 297; no power to declare war, 298; section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution, 298; no justification for the invasion of a State, 298; a palpable violation of the Constitution, 298; his effort to justify himself before the world for attacking us, 322; expresses his approbation at the burning of Harper's Ferry, 329; his explanation of his policy, 329; letter relative to the passage of troops through Baltimore, 332; reply to the letter of the Governor of Kentucky, 388; calls on the Governors of States for troops, 412; their answers, 412. 

_Louisiana Territory_, its purchase one ofthe earliest occasions for the manifestationof sectional jealousy, 12; withdrawsfrom the Union, 220. 

Loring, General, commands at Valley Mountain, Virginia, 434. 

Lyons, General, begins hostilities in Missouri, 415; announces the intention of the Administration to reduce Missouri to the exact condition of Maryland, 423; killed at Springfield, 429; disposal of his body, 430. 

Madison, James, asks on what principle the old Confederation can be superseded, 100; his answer, 100; says the parties to the Constitution are the people as composing thirteen sovereignties, 122; views on the nature of the ratification of the Constitution, 133; his use of the word "compact" as applied to the Constitution, 138; his use of the word "sovereignties" as applied to the States, 144; on the supremacy of the Constitution, 150; his interpretation of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, 164; his argument to show that the great principles of the Constitution are an expansion of the principles in the Articles of Confederation, 171; his view of "one people, " 174; on the coercion of a State, 177; on the danger to the perpetuity of the Union, 185. 

Magoffin, B. , Governor of Kentucky, 287; letter to President Lincoln, 287; letter to President Davis, 389; reply to Mr. Lincoln's call for troops, 412. 

Magruder, General, commands the force on the Peninsula, 340. 

Mallory, S. B. , Secretary of State under Provisional Constitution, 242; Secretary of Confederate Navy, 314; his experience, 314. 

_Manassas_, first battle at, 348; appearance of the field, 348; condition of our forces afterward, 356; evidences of the rout of the enemy, 356; cost of the victory, 356; dispersion of our troops after the battle, 357; reasons why it was an extraordinary victory, 358; nature of the field, 358; the line of the retreating foe followed, 359; articles abandoned, 359; the spoils gathered, 360; strength of the two armies, 371; amount of field transportation, 383; dissatisfaction that followed the victory, 442; unjust criticisms, 442; their effect on the Government, 442. 

_Manufacturing industry_, more extensive than ever, 505. 

Marshall, John, on the powers of the States, 165; on the power of the Federal judiciary, 166. 

Martin, Luther, his use of the word "compact" as applied to the Constitution, 138. 

_Maryland_, instructions to her delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 92; her ratification of the Federal Constitution, 108; refused to be bound by the Articles of Confederation, 126; first to be invaded, 330; warning to all the slaveholding States, 330; views of Governor Hicks, 330; a commissioner from Mississippi, 330; declarations of Governor Hicks, 331; Baltimore resists the passage of troops, 332; efforts of the police and Governor, 332; letter of President Lincoln, 332; visit of the Mayor of Baltimore, 332; his report, 332; Legislature appoints commissioners to the Confederate Government, 333; also to Washington, 333; reply of President Davis, 333; Baltimore occupied by United States troops, 333; the city disarmed, 334; authorities arrested and imprisoned, 334; arrest of members of the Legislature, 336; imprisonment, 336; Governor Hicks's final message, 336; her story sad to the last degree, 337; how relieved, 337; the Maryland line of the Revolution, 337; tender ministrations of her daughters to the wounded, 337. 

Mason, George, views on the coercion of a State, 177. 

Mason and Slidell, Messrs. , sent as Commissioners to Europe, 469; seized on their passage by Captain Wilkes, United States Navy, 469; their treatment and restoration, 470. 

_Massachusetts_, threats of a dissolution of the Union in 1844-'45, 76; instructions to her delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 92; tenacious of her State independence, 107; action on the ratification of the Federal Constitution, 107; her terms of ratification, 139; her use of the word "compact, " as applied to the Constitution, 139; use of the word "sovereign, " as applied to the State, 143; on the reserved powers of the States, 146; resolutions of her Legislature express perhaps too decided a doctrine of nullification, 190; terms of cession of land for forts and navy-yard to the United States, 209. 

McClellan, Major-General George B. , commands force in Western Virginia, 338; commands enemy's forces at Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, 338. 

McDowell, General, moves to attack General Beauregard, 344. 

_Medicines_, declared by the enemy contraband of war, 310; substitutes sought from the forest, 310. 

Memminger, C. G. , Secretary of the Treasury under the Provisional Constitution, 242. 

_Michigan_, action of her Senators relative to the Peace Congress, 248, 249; the "bloodletting" letter, 249. 

Miles, W. Porcher, letter on the election of Provisional President, 240. 

_Military organizations, quasi_, in the North in 1860, 55. 

_Military service_, laws relating to, 506; a constitutional question raised, 506; its discussion at length, 506. 

_Mississippi_, agitated by compromise measures of 1850, 18; diversity of views, 18; Governor calls special session of the Legislature after the Presidential election in 1860, 57; its Senators and Representatives in Congress convened for consultation, 57; views of the author, 57, 58; letter of O. R. Singleton on the consultation, 58; withdraws from the Union, 220; State Convention makes provision for a State army, 228; appoints the author major-general, and other officers, 228; State divided into districts, and troops apportioned, 228; destitution of arms showed the absence of expectation of war, 228. 

_Mississippi River_, misrepresentations relative to the free navigation of, 244; act of Congress relative to, 245. 

_Mississippi Union Bank_ bonds, the facts in relation to them, 497. 

_Missouri Compromise_, without Constitutional authority, 11. 

_Missouri_, controversy relative to the admission of, to the Union, 12; its origin, 12; history of the excitement occasioned, 12; its result, 12; true issue stated by Samuel A. Foote, 12; the compromise, how constituted, 13; votes on, 13; line obliterated in 1850, 14; its effect, 14, 15; resistance to its admission as a State, owing merely to political motives, 33; the issue of subjugation presented to her, 403; her condition similar to that of Kentucky, 414; hostilities instituted by Captain Lyon, 414; Camp Jackson surrounded, 414; its surrender, 415; imprisonment of General Frost, 415; efforts to restore order, 416; agreement between Generals Price and Harney, 416; signification of the agreement between Generals Harney and Price, 417; favorable prospect of peace in the State, 418; misrepresentations by a cabal, 418; an incident, 418; General Harney removed, 419; arms removed from the United States Arsenal to St. Louis, 419; houses of citizens searched for arms, 419; the excitement in the State, 420; General Jackson an object of special persecution, 420; activity of Lieutenant-Governor Reynolds, 420; position of the State in 1860, 420; interference of unauthorized parties, 420; the volunteers attacked at Booneville by General Lyon and United States troops, 424; a party of the enemy routed, 424; General Price moves to southwestern part of the State, 424; the patriot army of Missouri, 425; rout of the enemy at Carthage, 425; anxiety about affairs in Missouri, 426; General Price's efforts, 427, 428; complaints and embarrassments in, 427; correspondence with John B. Clark, 427; destitution of arms, 428; Missourians at Vicksburg, 428; aid from Confederate States, 429; battle at Springfield, 429; action of General Fremont, 430; conflict at Lexington, 430; asserts her right to exercise supreme control over her domestic affairs, 421; proceedings in, 421; attack of Kansas troops, 431; put to flight, 431; increase of the force of the enemy, 432; General Price retires, 432; evidence that the ordinance of secession was the expression of the popular will of Missouri, 432. 

_Misrepresentations_, inspired by a cabal in St. Louis, 418. 

Monroe, Judge, citizen of Kentucky, his treatment by the Government of the United States, 398. 

Moore, Surgeon L. P. , appointed Surgeon-general, 310. 

Morris, Gouverneur, his use of the word "compact, " 137; his remarkable propositions in the Convention, and their fate, 159, 160. 

Motley, John L. , his assertions relative to the Constitution, 129; his declaration relative to the words "sovereign" and "sovereignty, " 143; views on the second clause of the sixth article, 150. 

_Munitions of war_, preparations to provide them, 316; prompt measures to supply niter, saltpeter, charcoal, 316. 

Myers, Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. , appointed quartermaster-general, 310. 

"_National_, " how the word was treated in the Convention that framed the Constitution, 97. 

_Nationalism_, its fate in the Constitutional Convention, 161. 

_Naval officers, Southern_, view of their position, 313; returned all vessels to the North, 314. 

_Naval vessels_, instructions to Captain Semmes to seek for, 313; views relative to Southern naval officers, 313; officer sent to England, 314. 

Nelson, Judge, coöperates between the Commissioners and the Federal authorities, 267; his own views, 267. 

_Neutrality_, the position assumed by Kentucky, 386. 

_Neutrality of Kentucky_ not respected by United States Government, 397; historical statement, 398. 

_New Hampshire_, instructions to her deputies to the Constitutional Convention, 92; her ratification of the Federal Constitution, 108; use of the word "compact" as applied to the Constitution, 134; use of the word "sovereign" as applied to the State, 143; on the reserved powers of the States, 147. 

_New Jersey_, instructions to her delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 90; her ratification of the Federal Constitution, 106. 

_New States_, practice of the Government relative to the admission of, 38; the usual process of transition, 39; question of sovereignty, 39; Territorial Legislatures the agents of Congress, 40. 

_New York_, instructions to her delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 92; how the ratification was secured, 109; a declaration of principles, 110; her declaration on the reserved powers of the States, 147; conditions upon which the land for Brooklyn Navy Yard was ceded to the United States, 209; nine States to ratify, reason for the adoption of this number, 98; why referred to State Conventions, 99; a dissolution of the Union, 100; the right of, to form a government for themselves under the seventh article of the Constitution, 101; a refutation of the assertion that the Constitution was formed by the people in the aggregate, 101. 

_Niter and Mining Bureau_, organized, 477; its operation, 477. 

_North, The_, the cause of undue caution, 314. 

_North Carolina_, instructions to her commissioners to the Constitutional Convention, 90; her declaration on the reserved powers of the States, 147. 

_Northern States_, at the last moment, refuse to make any concessions, or offer any guarantees to check the current toward secession of the complaining States, 438; responsible for whatever of bloodshed, of devastation, or shock to republican government has resulted from the war, 439. 

Northrop, Colonel L. B. , placed at the head of the subsistence department, 303; his experience and capacity, 303; rank, 310; his efforts to provide for present and future supplies, 315; lack of transportation, 315. 

_Nullification_ and _secession_, distinction between, 184. 

_Oath_ required by the Constitution, some took it and made use of the powers and opportunities of the offices held under its sanctions to nullify its obligations, 81. 

_Object of the war_, our subjugation by the North, 321. 

_Obstacles_ to the formation of a more perfect Union, 31. 

"_On to Richmond_, " changed at Manassas to "off to Washington, " 351. 

_Order of pursuit_, after the victory at Manassas, details of, 353, 354; not sent, 355; another order sent, 355. 

_Ordinance of Virginia_ in 1787, its articles, 7; urged as a precedent in support of the claim of a power in Congress to determine the question of the admission of slaves into the Territories, 10; its validity examined, 10, 11. 

Orr, James L. , Commissioner from South Carolina to Washington, 213. _Pandora's box_, the opening of, 15. 

_Paradoxical theories_, relative to sovereignty in the United States, 142; no government is sovereign, 142. 

_Patriot army of_ Missouri, description of, 425. 

Patterson, William, arguments for the Jersey plan in the Constitutional Convention, 206. 

Patterson, Major-General, commands force at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 337; its object, 338. 

_Pause, A_, to consider the attitude of the parties to the contest, and the grounds on which they stand, 289. 

_Peace Congress_, it assembles, 248; States represented, 248; its officers and proceedings, 249; the plan proposed, 250; how treated by the majority, 250; the failure of, 296. 

Pegram, Colonel, second in command at Rich Mountain, 338. 

Pendleton, Captain W. N. , commands an effective battery at Manassas, 358. 

_Peninsula of Virginia_, features for defense, 300. 

_Pennsylvania_, instructions to her deputies to the Constitutional Convention, 90; words with which she ratified the Federal Constitution, 105. 

_People in the aggregate, The_, no instance of the action of the people as one body, 119; use of the word by Virginia, 125; its early use, 125; do. In the Declaration of Independence, 126; views of Story, 126; speak as the people of the States, 152. 

_People of the State_, the only sovereign political community before the adoption of the Federal Constitution, 154. 

_People of the United States_, understood to mean the people of the respective States, 174; views of Virginia, of Massachusetts, and others, 174. 

_People of the South_, their hope and wish that the disagreeable necessity of separation would be peaceably met, 438; every step of the Confederate Government directed to that end, 439. 

_Perpetuity of the Union_, danger to, foreshadowed, 185. 

Pickens, Governor, his dispatch relative to Colonel Lamon, 272. 

_Pickens, Fort_, its condition at the outbreak of the war, 203. 

Pickering, Timothy, letter in 1803-'4 on a separation of the Union, 71; his prediction, 79. 

Pierce, Franklin, President, his character, 25. 

_Plans of the enemy_, their development, 468. 

_Pledge_ given by Federal authorities to Confederate Commissioners and Government for the evacuation of Sumter and unchanged condition of Pickens, 269. 

_Plighted faith_, the last vestige of, disappeared, 274. 

_Point of honor_, the, raised by Secretary Seward, 273. 

_Political parties_, the changes occurring in, 35; their names and signification, 35. 

Polk, Major-General Leonidas, enters Kentucky and occupies Hickman and Columbus, 391; his dispatch to the President and the answer, 392; answer to Kentucky Committee, 394; letter to the Governor of Kentucky, 396; his proposition, 397; repulses the assailants at Belmont, 404; his report of the conflict, 405. 

_Popular sovereignty party_ of 1860, its principles, 51. 

_Powder_, our supply in 1861, 472; first efforts to obtain, 473; mills in existence, 472; progress of development, 474; amount of powder annually required, 474; how supplied, 474, 475; Government mills, 475. 

Powell, Senator, offers a resolution in the United States Senate relative to the state of affairs in 1860, 61; action on the resolution, 68. 

_Power, Political_, the balance of, the basis of sectional controversy, 11; its earlier manifestations, 11. 

_Power of amendment_, special examination of, 195; what is the Constitution? 195; the States have only intrusted to a common agent certain functions, 196; a power to amend the delegated grants, 196; the first ten amendments, 196; distinction between amendment and delegation of power, 196; smaller power required for amendment than for a grant, 196; apprehensions of the power of amendment, 197; restrictions placed on the exercise of the delegated powers, 197; effect on New England, 198. 

_Power of the Confederate Government_ over its own armies and the militia, 506; object of confederations, 506; the war powers granted, 507; two modes of raising armies in the Confederate States, 507; is the law necessary and proper? 508; Congress is the judge, under the grant of specific power, 508; what is meant by militia, 509; whole military strength divided into two classes, 510; powers of Congress, 510; objections answered, 511; the limitations enlarged, 512; result of the operations of these laws, 515; act for the employment of slaves, 515; message to Congress, 515; died of a theory, 518; act passed, 518; not time to put it in operation, 519. 

_Power to prohibit slavery_ in a Territory, argument for its possession by the United States Congress, 26. 

_Preamble to the Constitution_, its words, 121; the stronghold of the advocates of consolidation, 121; we, the People, interpreted as a nation, 121; words of John Adams, 121; do. Of Patrick Henry, 121; other words of Henry, 122; answer of Madison to Henry, 122; the people were those of the respective States, 123; proceeding in the Convention, 123; the original words reported, 124; vote on them unanimous, 124; reason of modification, 124; the word _people_--its signification, 125; examples from Scripture, 125; instances in the Declaration of Independence, 126; revolt of Maryland, 126; do. Of North Carolina and Rhode Island, 126. 

_Precipitation_, the calmness with which Southern measures were adopted refutes the charge of, 199. 

_Prediction_ of Timothy Pickering, 79. 

_Presidential election of 1800_, the basis of the contest, 189; the last contest on them, 189. 

_Pretension, Absurdity of_ the, by which a factitious sympathy was obtained in certain quarters for the war upon the South, on the ground that it was a war in behalf of freedom against slavery, 262; letter of Mr. Seward, 263. 

Price, General, agreement with General Harney, 416; address to the people of Missouri, 421, 422; his efforts in Missouri, 427, 428; his enthusiasm, 428; magnanimity at the battle of Springfield, 429. 

_Proclamation of President Lincoln_ on April 15, 1861, an official declaration of war, 319; his words, 319; power granted in the Constitution, how expressed, 320; delegated to Congress, 320; action of South Carolina, 320; the State designated as a combination, 320; not recognized as a State, 320; its effect, 321; reason of President Lincoln for designating the State as a combination, 321; no authority to enter a State on insurrection arising, 321; words of the Constitution, 321; his efforts to justify himself, 322; was it an insurrection? 325. 

_Prohibitory clauses_, relative to the States, 149. 

_Propositions_ clearly established relative to sovereignty, 157, 158. 

_Proposition of Major-General Polk_ to the Governor of Kentucky, 397. 

_Public opinion_, how drifted from the landmarks set up by the sages and patriots who formed the constitutional Union, 216. 

Quincy, Josiah, member of Congress from Massachusetts, declaration of a dissolution of the Union in 1811, 73. 

Quitman, John A. , nominated for Governor of Mississippi, 20; accepts and subsequently withdraws, 20. 

_Railroads_, insufficient in number, 315; poorly furnished, 315; dependent on Northern foundries, 315. 

Rains, General G. W. , his experience, 316; charged with the manufacture of powder, 316; undertakes the manufacture of powder, 475. 

Randolph, Edmund, plan of government offered in the Convention, 96; his views on the coercion of a State, 178. 

Reagan, J. H. , Postmaster-General under Provisional Constitution, 242. 

Rector, Governor of Arkansas, reply to Mr. Lincoln's call for troops, 412. 

_Relay House_, occupied by United States troops, 333. 

_Remedy, The_, invoked by Mr. Calhoun 189. 

_Representatives of the South_, their proceedings at Washington. 

_Republic, An American_, never transfers or surrenders its sovereignty, 154. 

_Republican (so-called) Convention_ of 1860, a purely sectional body, 49; its selection of candidates, 49; declaration of Mr. Lincoln, 49. 

_Republican party_, its growth, 36; its principle, 36; votes, 36; of 1860, its principles, 51. 

_Republicans_, demand made on them in the United States Senate for a declaration of their policy, 69; no answer, 69. 

_Resolutions_, relating to Territories offered by Senator Davis, 42; discussion and vote upon them, 43; position of the Senator, 44; adopted by Southern Senators, 204; their significance, 204; further efforts would be unavailing, 205. 

_Resolutions of_ 1798-'99, the corner-stone of the political edifice of Mr. Jefferson, 385. 

_Reserved powers of the States_, views of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, 146, 147; declaration of New York, 147; do. Of South Carolina, 147; do. Of North Carolina, 147; do. Of Rhode Island, 148; no objection made to the principle, 148. 

_Resumption of powers, etc. _, some objections considered, 180; as to new States, 180; every State equal, 180; States formed of purchased territory, 181; allegiance to the Federal Government said to be paramount, 182; examined, 182; the sovereign is the people, 182; the right asserted in the ratifications of Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, 173; effort to construe these as declaring the right of one people, 174. 

_Revolutionary measures in the extreme_, acts of the United States Government in Missouri, 420. 

Reynolds, Lieutenant-Governor, ably seconds the efforts of Governor Jackson in Missouri, 423. 

_Rhode Island_, the Constitution rejected by a vote of the people, 111; subsequently ratified, 111; terms of ratification, 111; letter of her Governor to President Washington relative to her position as not a member of the new Union, 113; her declaration on the reserved powers of the States, 148. 

_Rich Mountain_, West Virginia, the contest at, 338. 

_Richmond_, a campaign against, planned by the enemy, 466. 

_Right, the_, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, 386; determination of the States to exercise it, 386; to attack Fort Sumter, South Carolina a State, 290; ground on which the fort stood ceded in trust to the United States for her defense, 290; no other had an interest in the maintenance of the fort except for aggression against her, 290; remarks of Senator Douglas, 290. 

_Rights of the States_, assertions of, in various quarters, 190; resolutions of Massachusetts Legislature, 190; declaration on the purchase of Louisiana, 190; on the admission of the State, 190; on the annexation of Texas, 190. 

_Right of the Federal troops to enter a State_, 411; words of the Constitution, 411; how could they be sent to overrule the will of the people? 411. 

Roman, A. B. , appointed Commissioner to United States, 246. 

_Romney_, the affair near, in June, 1861, 343. 

"_Rope of sand_, " the expression examined, 176. 

Scott, Major-General, advises the evacuation of the forts, 282. 

_Seat of sovereignty_, never disturbed heretofore in this country, 154. 

_Secession_, the tendency of the Southern movement to, 60; repeated instances of the assertion of this right in the prior history of the country, 71; several instances, 71; letters, 71; provision made for, 100; the right of, to be veiled, 101; a question easily determined, 168; the compact between the States was in the nature of a partnership, 168; law of partnerships, 168; formation of the Confederation, 169; do. Of the "more perfect Union, " 169; an amended Union not a consolidation, 169; the very powers of the Federal Government and prohibitions to the States, relied upon by the advocates of centralism as incompatible with State sovereignty, were in force under the old Confederation, 170; arguments of Madison to show that the great principles of the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation are the same, 170; extract, 171; why was it not expressly renounced if it was intended to surrender it? 172; it would have been extraordinary to put in the Constitution a provision for the dissolution of the Union, 172; in treaties there is a provision for perpetuity, but the right to dissolve the compact is not less clearly understood, 172; the movements which culminated in, began before the session of Congress of December, 1860, 201; action of the author, 201, 202. 

_Secession and coercion_, views on, that had been held in all parts of the country, 252. 

_Secessionists per se_, number so small as not to be felt in any popular decision, 301; only alternative to a surrender of equality in the union, 301. 

_Sectional controversy_, the basis of, 11; no question of the right or wrong of slavery involved in the earlier, 13. 

_Sectional hostility_, not the consequence of any difference on the abstract question of slavery, 79; the offspring of sectional rivalry and political ambition, 79. 

_Sectional rivalry_, its efforts to prevent free emigration, 29. 

_Self-defense_, preparations for, 326; declarations of the message to Congress, 326; the state of affairs, 326, 327; acts for military purposes passed, 327; our object and desire distinctly declared, 327; the patriotic devotion of every portion of the country, 328; secession of the border States, 328. 

Semmes, Captain, afterward Admiral, 311; sent North to purchase arms, ammunition, etc. , etc. , 311; letter of instructions, 311. 

_Senators, Southern_, efforts to dissuade from aggressive movements, 204; how exerted, 204. 

_Separation_ made familiar to the people by agitation, 227. 

_Settlement with the United States_, views relative to, 245. 

Seward, W. H. , letter to Mr. Dayton on the views and purposes of the United States Government, 262; proceedings as Secretary of State relative to our Commissioners, 267; his declarations, 268; assurances given, 269; his representations and misrepresentations to the Commissioners, 273, 425; further statements, 277. 

Seymour, Horatio. Remarks relative to coercion, 255. 

Sharkey, William L. , anecdote of, 230. 

_Sharp correspondence_ between the Commissioners from South Carolina and President Buchanan, 214 (see Appendix). 

Sherman, Roger, his use of the word "sovereign" as applied to the States, 144. 

Singleton, O. R. , letter on conference of Senators and Representatives in Congress from Mississippi with the Governor, 58. 

_Slaves_, importation forbidden by Southern States, 4. 

_Slave-trade_, interference with, by Congress forbidden in the Constitution, 4; importation forbidden by Southern States, 4; its final abolition, 5. 

_Slavery_, a right understanding of questions growing out of, 3; existed at the adoption of the Federal Constitution, 3; occasion of diversities, 3; cause of its abolition, 4; first petitions for abolition of, 5; question of maintenance of, belongs exclusively to the States, 6; how raised by zealots in the North, 6; the extension of, a term misleading the opinions of the world, 6; did not imply the addition of a single slave to the number existing, 7; signified distribution or dispersion, 7; no question of the right or wrong of, involved in the earlier sectional controversies, 13; historical sketch of its existence among us, 78; far from being the cause of the conflict, 73; only an incident, 80; a matter entirely subject to the control of the States, 80; its existence and validity distinctly recognized by the Constitution, 80. 

_Slaves_, message on the employment of, in the army, 515; act passed, 519. 

Smith, General E. K. , wounded at Manassas, 351. 

_South Carolina_ repeals law to prohibit importation of slaves, 4; instructions to her representatives to the Constitutional Convention, 91; adopts an ordinance of secession, 70; her representatives in Congress withdraw, 70; action of other States, 71; her ratification of the Federal Constitution, 108; her declaration on the reserved powers of the States, 147; conditions of her cession of sites for ports in Charleston Harbor to United States, 210; any delay by her to secede could not have changed the result, 300; nature of her act of secession, 320. 

_South, The_, growth of overweening confidence in, 314. 

_Southern manifestations_, cause of, after the Presidential election of 1860, 53; their deliberate action, 54. 

_Southern_ people, in advance of their leaders throughout, 199; their grounds to hope there would be no war, 257; their conservative temper, 258; the prevailing sentiment, a cordial attachment to the Union, 301. 

_Southern States_, only alternative to seek security out of the Union, 85; what course remained for them to adopt, 192; over sovereigns there is no common judge, 192; their defenseless condition in 1861, 228; their calamities a result of their credulous reliance on the power of the Constitution, 228; satisfied with a Federal Government such as their fathers had formed, 439; against the violations of the Constitution they remonstrated, argued, and finally appealed to the undelegated power of the States, 439; years of fruitless effort to secure from their Northern associates a faithful observance of the compact, 439; a peaceful separation preferred to a continuance in a hostile Union, 439; pleas for peace met deceptive answers, 440. 

_Sovereignty resides alone in the States, 26; assertion of Story, 141; increased the unnecessary confusion of ideas, 141; definition of Burlamaqui, 141; sovereignty seated in the people, 141; they can exercise it only through the State, 141; the States were sovereign under the articles of Confederation, 142; never been divested of it, 142; paradoxical theories in the United States, 142; if the people have transferred their sovereignty, to whom was it made? 143; declaration of Motley, 143; refutation by articles of Confederation, 143; action of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 143; declarations of Madison, Hamilton, and others, 143, 144; views of others, 145; reservations in the tenth amendment, 146; its meaning, 146; views of the States on signification of it, 147, 148. 

_Sovereign will_, two modes of expressing known to the people of this country, 153; an effort to make it clear beyond the possibility of misconception, 153; propositions clearly established, 157, 158. 

_Special friends of the Union_, claim arrogated by the abolitionists, 34. 

_Springfield, Missouri_, the battle at, 429. 

_Squatter sovereignty_, responsibilities of the authors of, 31; its origin, 36; when fully developed, 38; the theory in its application to Territories, 40. 

_Star of the West, _ attempts to reënforce Fort Sumter, 217; the result, 218. 

_Statements_, unfounded, relative to the election of Provisional President, 236. 

_State_, a suit against, views of Hamilton, 162. 

_State seceding, A_, assumes control of all her defenses intrusted to the United States, 211. 

_States, The_, their separate independence acknowledged by Great Britain, 47; to whom could they have surrendered their sovereignty, 156; represented in the Peace Congress, 248; as States, mentioned in the Constitution seventy times, 130; ratification by, alone gave validity to the Constitution, 132; have never been divested of sovereignty, 142. 

_States Rights party_ of 1860, its principles, 51. 

Stephens, Alexander H. , elected Vice-President of the Confederate States, 230; remarks on the permanent Constitution, 258. 

St. John, General, appointed commissary-general of subsistence, 318; his report, 318. 

Story, Judge Joseph, a question asked by him, 132; its answer, 132. 

Stuart, General J. E. B. , activity and vigilance in Virginia, 344. 

_Subjugation_; the measures of the United States Government in Missouri designed for the subjugation of the State, 423. 

_Sumter, Fort_, correspondence relative to occupancy of, between Colonel I. W. Hayne and President Buchanan, 219; state of affairs relative to, after the inauguration of President Lincoln, 267; pledges given relative to, 269; proceedings of G. V. Fox relative to reënforcing and furnishing supplies to, 271; official notification from Washington, 274; correspondence relative to bombardment of, 285, 286; do. Relative to evacuation of, 288; the right to claim it as public property is untenable, apart from a claim of coercive control over the State, 290; the right of the Federal Government to coerce a State to submission, 291; no hope of peaceful settlement existed, 291; repeated attempts at negotiation, 291; met by evasion, prevarication, and perfidy, 291; the right to demand that there should be no hostile grip pending a settlement, 291; the forbearance of the Confederate Government unexampled, 292; he who makes the assault is not necessarily the one who strikes the first blow, 292; the attempt to represent us as the aggressors unfounded, 292; "firing on the flag, " 292; idea of the commander of the Pawnee, 292; remark of Greeley, 293; the conflict, 293; nobody injured, 293; extract from Mr. Lincoln's message, 294; reply, 294; a word from him would have relieved the hungry, 294; suppose the Confederate authorities had consent to supplies for the garrison, 294; what would have been the next step, 294; what reliance could be placed on his assurances, 294; fire upon, opened by General Beauregard, 293; the conflict, 293; final surrender, 293; an incident of ex-Senator Wigfall, 293; terms of surrender, 293; bombardment in anticipation of the fleet, 296. 

_Supremacy of the Constitution_, considerations conducing to a clearer understanding of, 150; declared to be in the Constitution and laws, not in the Government of the United States, 151. 

_Supremacy, State_, the controlling idea in the Confederate army bill, 304; arms and munitions within the several States were considered as belonging to them, 305; the forces could only be drawn from the several States by their consent, 305; the system of organization, 305; provision for the discharge of the forces, 305; the act to provide for the public defense, 305; the law for the establishment and organization of the army of the Confederate States, 306; wish and object of the Government were peace, 306; provisions of the act, 306. 

Taney, Chief-Justice, remark in the Dred Scott case, 84. 

_Tariff laws_, enacted for protection against foreign competition, 32; a burden on the Southern States, 32; a most prolific source of sectional strife, 498; its early history, 498; policy of the British Government with the colonies, 499; a difficulty in the Constitutional Convention, 499; progress after the formation of the Union, 500; all laws based on the principle of duties for revenue, 500; the first time a tariff law had protection for its object, it for the first time produced discontent, 501; geographical differences between North and South, 501; legislation for the benefit of Northern manufactures a Northern policy, 501; the controversy quadrennially renewed, 502; motion of Mr. Drayton, of South Carolina, 502; progress of parties, 503; position of Southern representatives, 503; other causes, 503; general effect on the character of our institutions, 504. 

_Texas_, her division, how effected, 16; compared with California, 16. 

_Taxation_, the system of measures for, 493; objects of taxation, 494; direct taxes, 494; obstacle to the levy of these taxes, 495. 

Thayer, James S. , speech of, in New York, on the attempt to coerce a State, 254. 

_Thirteen, Senate Committee_ of, consequences of their failure to come to an agreement, 199. 

_Thoroughfare Gap_, meat-packing establishment at, 462. 

Toombs, Robert, Secretary of State under Provisional Constitution, 242. 

Townsend, Colonel Frederick, commands Third Regiment of the enemy's force at Bethel Church, 342; his account of the combat at Bethel Church, 342. 

_Travesty of history_, statements of a foreign writer, 201; their absurdity shown, 201. 

_Trent, The steamer_, seizure of our Commissioners on board, 470; their treatment and restoration, 470. 

_Tribune, The New York_, declaration relative to the coercion of States, 56; its declarations relative to coercion, 252. 

_Troops, Southern_, rush to Virginia, 300; also sent by Confederate Government, 300. 

_Troops_ of the two armies, exemplification of the difference before either was trained to war, 342, 343. 

_Union, The_, no moral or sentimental considerations involved in the controversies that ruptured the Union, 6. 

_Union, Dissolution of the_, first threats or warnings of, from New England, 12; ground of opposition stated, 12; Colonel Timothy Pickering in 1803, 71; do. In 1804, 72; its peaceful character, 72; declaration of Josiah Quincy in Congress in 1811, 73; action of the House, 74; the celebrated Hartford Convention, 74; its proceedings, 74; published report, 74; their declaration, 75; threats of Massachusetts in 1844, 76. 

_Union_, the, how to be saved, views of President Buchanan, 54; declaration of Senator Calhoun, 55. 

_Union, A perpetual_, provided for in the last article of the Confederation, 98; a serious difficulty, 98; danger of failure, 98. 

_Union_, A, necessarily involves the idea of competent States, 128; was not formed to destroy the States, but to secure the blessings of liberty, 176; a voluntary junction of free and independent States, 439. 

_Union of the armies of Johnston and Beauregard_, decided at Richmond, 347; order sent to Johnston, 347. 

_United States Supreme Court_, decision of, flouted, denounced, and disregarded, 85. 

_Usurpation_, tendency to, in the Federal Government, 176; last effort to stay the tide of, 247; set on foot by Virginia, 247; an effort for adjustment, 247; the Peace Congress, 248. 

Vattel, his views on the sovereignty of a state, 145. 

Vaughn, Colonel, report of the affair near Romney, in June, 1861, 343; a notice of Vaughn, 344. 

_Virginia_, made efforts to prohibit the importation of slaves, 4; first to prohibit, 5; her cession of territory in 1784, 7; Ordinance of 1787, 7; the occasion of her cession of territory north of the Ohio River, 47; instructions to her Commissioners to the Constitutional Convention, 90; long debates in her Convention, 108; the speakers, 108; her terms of ratification, 109; her cession of sites for forts to United States, 210; act of cession, 211; proposes a convention to adjust existing controversies, 247; appoints commissioners, 247; her ordinance subject to the ratification of the people, 299; forms a convention with the Confederate States, 299; prompt to reclaim the grants she had made on the appearance of President Lincoln's proclamation, 298; passes an ordinance of secession, 299; liable to be invaded from north, east, and west, 300; the forces assembled in, 340; divided into three armies, 340; their positions, 340; junction possible between first and second, 340; her history a long course of sacrifices for the benefit of her sister States, 440; her efforts to check dissolution, 440; her mediations rejected in the Peace Congress, 440; required to furnish troops for subjugation, or reclaim her grants to the Federal Government, 440; one course left consistent with her stainless reputation, 440; the forces of the enemy around her, 440; Richmond threatened, 441. 

_Volunteers_, sufficient secured during the first year, 505; laws relating to the military service, 506. 

Walker, L. P. , Secretary of War under Provisional Constitution, 242. 

Walworth, Chancellor, remarks on the coercion of the Southern States, 255. 

_War of the Revolution_, its causes were grievances inflicted on the Northern colonies, 148; the South had no material cause of complaint, 48. 

_War, the late bloody_, the theory on which it was waged, 160; proposition in the Convention to incorporate it in the Constitution, 160; not seconded, 160. 

_War between the Slates_, who was responsible for? 440; the probability of, discussed by the people, 227; opinion that it would be long and bloody, 230. 

_War-cry, the_, employed to train the Northern mind, 29; its success, 30. 

_Washington_, the great effort of invasion to be from that point, 337; accumulation of troops, 337. 

Washington, George, his use of the word "compact" as applied to the Constitution, 138; repeatedly refers to the proposed Union as a confederacy, 164; extracts from his letters, 164. 

Washington, John A. , killed on a reconnaissance, 436. 

Webster, Daniel, remark of, at the death of Mr. Calhoun, 17; first to revive refuted misconceptions, 128; a remark of his, 134; denies the Constitution to be a compact, 135; on the word "accede, " 136; his concessions, 137; denied what Massachusetts and New Hampshire affirmed, 139; on the sovereignty of the Government, 151; his inconsistent ideas, 152; his views in 1819, 166; his speech at Capon Springs, 167; on the omission of a State to appoint Senators, 179. 

Welles, Gideon, statement of proceedings in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, 276. 

Wise, General Henry A. , sent to western Virginia, 433; his success, 433.