THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

BY ROBERT LANSING

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

CONTENTS

 I. REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

 II. MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

 III. GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

 IV. SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED

 V. THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER

 VI. THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN

 VII. SELF-DETERMINATION

 VIII. THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919

 IX. A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT

 X. THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT

 XI. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

 XII. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

 XIII. THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES

 XIV. DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED

 XV. THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE

 XVI. LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME

 XVII. SECRET DIPLOMACY

XVIII. THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT

 XIX. THE BULLITT AFFAIR

 CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

 I. THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919

 II. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLAN OF LORD ROBERT CECIL

 III. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

 IV. THE FOURTEEN POINTS

 V. PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11, 1918

 VI. THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG

INDEX

ILLUSTRATIONS

THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AT PARISPhotograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A. 

FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S COMMISSION AS A COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARYTO NEGOTIATE PEACE

THE RUE ROYALE ON THE ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON DECEMBER 14, 1918Photograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A. 

THE AMERICAN PEACE DELEGATION AND STAFFPhotograph by Signal Corps, U. S. A. 

A MEETING AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY AFTER PRESIDENT WILSON'SDEPARTURE FROM PARIS

FACSIMILE OF MR. LANSING'S "FULL POWERS" TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY OFASSISTANCE TO FRANCE

THE DAILY CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSIONPhotograph by Isabey, Paris

CHRONOLOGY

The Declaration of the Fourteen Points January 18, 1918

Declaration of Four Additional Bases of Peace February 11, 1918

Departure of Colonel House for Paris to represent the President on Supreme War Council October 17, 1918

Signature of Armistice, 5 A. M. ; effective, 11 A. M. November 11, 1918

Departure of President and American Commission for France December 4, 1918

Arrival of President and American Commission in Paris December 14, 1918

Meeting of Supreme War Council January 12, 1919

First Plenary Session of Peace Conference January 25, 1919

Plenary Session at which Report on the League of Nations was Submitted February 14, 1919

Departure of President from Paris for United States February 14, 1919

President lands at Boston February 24, 1919

Departure of President from New York for France March 5, 1919

President arrives in Paris March 14, 1919

Organization of Council of Four About March 24, 1919

President's public statement in regard to Fiume April 23, 1919

Adoption of Commission's Report on League of Nations by the Conference April 28, 1919

The Shantung Settlement April 30, 1919

Delivery of the Peace Treaty to the German Plenipotentiaries May 7, 1919

Signing of Treaty of Versailles June 28, 1919

Signing of Treaty of Assistance with France June 28, 1919

Departure of President for the United States June 28, 1919

Departure of Mr. Lansing from Paris for United States July 12, 1919

Hearing of Mr. Lansing before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations August 6, 1919

Conference of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with the President at the White House August 19, 1919

Hearing of Mr. Bullitt before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations September 12, 1919

Return of President to Washington from tour of West September 28, 1919

Resignation of Mr. Lansing as Secretary of State February 13, 1920

CHAPTER I

REASONS FOR WRITING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

"While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly eversince, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions withregard to which I had to instruct you only with increasingreluctance. .. . 

". .. I must say that it would relieve me of embarrassment, Mr. Secretary, the embarrassment of feeling your reluctance and divergenceof judgment, if you would give your present office up and afford me anopportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go alongwith mine. "

These words are taken from the letter which President Wilson wrote to meon February 11, 1920. On the following day I tendered my resignation asSecretary of State by a letter, in which I said:

 "Ever since January, 1919, I have been conscious of the fact that you no longer were disposed to welcome my advice in matters pertaining to the negotiations in Paris, to our foreign service, or to international affairs in general. Holding these views I would, if I had consulted my personal inclination alone, have resigned as Secretary of State and as a Commissioner to Negotiate Peace. I felt, however, that such a step might have been misinterpreted both at home and abroad, and that it was my duty to cause you no embarrassment in carrying forward the great task in which you were then engaged. "

The President was right in his impression that, "while we were still inParis, " I had accepted his guidance and direction with reluctance. Itwas as correct as my statement that, as early as January, 1919, I wasconscious that he was no longer disposed to welcome my advice in matterspertaining to the peace negotiations at Paris. 

There have been obvious reasons of propriety for my silence until now asto the divergence of judgment, the differences of opinion and theconsequent breach in the relations between President Wilson and myself. They have been the subject of speculation and inference which have leftuncertain the true record. The time has come when a frank account of ourdifferences can be given publicity without a charge being made ofdisloyalty to the Administration in power. 

The President, in his letter of February 11, 1920, from which thequotation is made, indicated my unwillingness to follow him in thecourse which he adopted at Paris, but he does not specifically point outthe particular subjects as to which we were not in accord. It isunsatisfactory, if not criticizable, to leave the American people indoubt as to a disagreement between two of their official representativesupon a matter of so grave importance to the country as the negotiationof the Treaty of Versailles. They are entitled to know the truth inorder that they may pass judgment upon the merits of the differenceswhich existed. I am not willing that the present uncertainty as to thefacts should continue. Possibly some may think that I have remainedsilent too long. If I have, it has been only from a sense of obligationto an Administration of which I was so long a member. It has not beenthrough lack of desire to lay the record before the public. 

The statements which will be made in the succeeding pages will not beentirely approved by some of my readers. In the circumstances it is fartoo much to expect to escape criticism. The review of facts and thecomments upon them may be characterized in certain quarters as disloyalto a superior and as violative of the seal of silence which isconsidered generally to apply to the intercourse and communicationsbetween the President and his official advisers. Under normal conditionssuch a characterization would not be unjustified. But the present caseis different from the usual one in which a disagreement arises between aPresident and a high official of his Administration. 

Mr. Wilson made our differences at Paris one of the chief grounds forstating that he would be pleased to take advantage of my expressedwillingness to resign. The manifest imputation was that I had advisedhim wrongly and that, after he had decided to adopt a course contrary tomy advice, I had continued to oppose his views and had with reluctanceobeyed his instructions. Certainly no American official is in honorbound to remain silent under such an imputation which approaches acharge of faithlessness and of a secret, if not open, avoidance of duty. He has, in my judgment, the right to present the case to the Americanpeople in order that they may decide whether the imputation wasjustified by the facts, and whether his conduct was or was not in thecircumstances in accord with the best traditions of the public serviceof the United States. 

A review of this sort becomes necessarily a personal narrative, which, because of its intimate nature, is embarrassing to the writer, since hemust record his own acts, words, desires, and purposes, his own views asto a course of action, and his own doubts, fears, and speculations as tothe future. If there were another method of treatment which would retainthe authoritative character of a personal statement, it would be asatisfaction to adopt it. But I know of none. The true story can only betold from the intimate and personal point of view. As I intend to tellthe true story I offer no further apology for its personal character. 

Before beginning a recital of the relations existing between PresidentWilson and myself during the Paris Conference, I wish to state, and toemphasize the statement, that I was never for a moment unmindful thatthe Constitution of the United States confides to the President theabsolute right of conducting the foreign relations of the Republic, andthat it is the duty of a Commissioner to follow the President'sinstructions in the negotiation of a treaty. Many Americans, some ofwhom are national legislators and solicitous about the Constitution, seem to have ignored or to have forgotten this delegation of exclusiveauthority, with the result that they have condemned the President inintemperate language for exercising this executive right. As to thewisdom of the way in which Mr. Wilson exercised it in directing thenegotiations at Paris individual opinions may differ, but as to thelegality of his conduct there ought to be but one mind. From first tolast he acted entirely within his constitutional powers as President ofthe United States. 

The duties of a diplomatic representative commissioned by the Presidentand given full powers to negotiate a treaty are, in addition to theformal carrying out of his instructions, twofold, namely, to advise thePresident during the negotiation of his views as to the wise course tobe adopted, and to prevent the President, in so far as possible, fromtaking any step in the proceedings which may impair the rights of hiscountry or may be injurious to its interests. These duties, in myopinion, are equally imperative whether the President directs thenegotiations through written instructions issuing from the White Houseor conducts them in person. For an American plenipotentiary to remainsilent, and by his silence to give the impression that he approves acourse of action which he in fact believes to be wrong in principle orcontrary to good policy, constitutes a failure to perform his full dutyto the President and to the country. It is his duty to speak and tospeak frankly and plainly. 

With this conception of the obligations of a Commissioner to NegotiatePeace, obligations which were the more compelling in my case because ofmy official position as Secretary of State, I felt it incumbent upon meto offer advice to the President whenever it seemed necessary to me toconsider the adoption of a line of action in regard to the negotiations, and particularly so when the indications were that the Presidentpurposed to reach a decision which seemed to me unwise or impolitic. Though from the first I felt that my suggestions were received withcoldness and my criticisms with disfavor, because they did not conformto the President's wishes and intentions, I persevered in my efforts toinduce him to abandon in some cases or to modify in others a coursewhich would in my judgment be a violation of principle or a mistake inpolicy. It seemed to me that duty demanded this, and that, whatever theconsequences might be, I ought not to give tacit assent to that which Ibelieved wrong or even injudicious. 

The principal subjects, concerning which President Wilson and I were inmarked disagreement, were the following: His presence in Paris duringthe peace negotiations and especially his presence there as a delegateto the Peace Conference; the fundamental principles of the constitutionand functions of a League of Nations as proposed or advocated by him;the form of the organic act, known as the "Covenant, " its elaboratecharacter and its inclusion in the treaty restoring a state of peace;the treaty of defensive alliance with France; the necessity for adefinite programme which the American Commissioners could follow incarrying on the negotiations; the employment of private interviews andconfidential agreements in reaching settlements, a practice which gavecolor to the charge of "secret diplomacy"; and, lastly, the admission ofthe Japanese claims to possession of German treaty rights at Kiao-Chauand in the Province of Shantung. 

Of these seven subjects of difference the most important were thoserelating to the League of Nations and the Covenant, though our oppositeviews as to Shantung were more generally known and more frequently thesubject of public comment. While chief consideration will be given tothe differences regarding the League and the Covenant, the record wouldbe incomplete if the other subjects were omitted. In fact nearly all ofthese matters of difference are more or less interwoven and have acollateral, if not a direct, bearing upon one another. They allcontributed in affecting the attitude of President Wilson toward theadvice that I felt it my duty to volunteer, an attitude which wasincreasingly impatient of unsolicited criticism and suggestion and whichresulted at last in the correspondence of February, 1920, that endedwith the acceptance of my resignation as Secretary of State. 

The review of these subjects will be, so far as it is possible, treatedin chronological order, because, as the matters of difference increasedin number, they gave emphasis to the divergence of judgment whichexisted between the President and myself. The effect was cumulative, andtended not only to widen the breach, but to make less and less possiblea restoration of our former relations. It was my personal desire tosupport the President's views concerning the negotiations at Paris, but, when in order to do so it became necessary to deny a settled convictionand to suppress a conception of the true principle or the wise policy tobe followed, I could not do it and feel that to give support under suchconditions accorded with true loyalty to the President of theUnited States. 

It was in this spirit that my advice was given and my suggestions weremade, though in doing so I believed it justifiable to conform as far asit was possible to the expressed views of Mr. Wilson, or to what seemedto be his views, concerning less important matters and to concentrate onthose which seemed vital. I went in fact as far as I could in adoptinghis views in the hope that my advice would be less unpalatable andwould, as a consequence, receive more sympathetic consideration. Believing that I understood the President's temperament, success in anattempt to change his views seemed to lie in moderation and in partialapproval of his purpose rather than in bluntly arguing that it waswholly wrong and should be abandoned. This method of approach, whichseemed the expedient one at the time, weakened, in some instances atleast, the criticisms and objections which I made. It is very possiblethat even in this diluted form my views were credited with wrong motivesby the President so that he suspected my purpose. It is to be hoped thatthis was the true explanation of Mr. Wilson's attitude of mind, for thealternative forces a conclusion as to the cause for his resentfulreception of honest differences of opinion, which no one, who admireshis many sterling qualities and great attainments, willwillingly accept. 

Whatever the cause of the President's attitude toward the opinions whichI expressed on the subjects concerning which our views were atvariance--and I prefer to assume that the cause was a misapprehension ofmy reasons for giving them--the result was that he was disposed to givethem little weight. The impression made was that he was irritated byopposition to his views, however moderately urged, and that he did notlike to have his judgment questioned even in a friendly way. It is, ofcourse, possible that this is not a true estimate of the President'sfeelings. It may do him an injustice. But his manner of meetingcriticism and his disposition to ignore opposition can hardly beinterpreted in any other way. 

There is the alternative possibility that Mr. Wilson was convinced that, after he had given a subject mature consideration and reached adecision, his judgment was right or at least better than that of anyadviser. A conviction of this nature, if it existed, would naturallyhave caused him to feel impatient with any one who attempted tocontrovert his decisions and would tend to make him believe thatimproper motives induced the opposition or criticism. This alternative, which is based of necessity on a presumption as to the temperament ofMr. Wilson that an unprejudiced and cautious student of personalitywould hesitate to adopt, I mention only because there were many whobelieved it to be the correct explanation of his attitude. In view of myintimate relations with the President prior to the Paris Conference Ifeel that in justice to him I should say that he did not, except on rareoccasions, resent criticism of a proposed course of action, and, whilehe seemed in a measure changed after departing from the United States inDecember, 1918, I do not think that the change was sufficient to justifythe presumption of self-assurance which it would be necessary to adoptif the alternative possibility is considered to furnish the betterexplanation. 

It is, however, natural, considering what occurred at Paris, to searchout the reason or reasons for the President's evident unwillingness tolisten to advice when he did not solicit it, and for his failure to takeall the American Commissioners into his confidence. But to attempt todissect the mentality and to analyze the intellectual processes ofWoodrow Wilson is not my purpose. It would only invite discussion andcontroversy as to the truth of the premises and the accuracy of thedeductions reached. The facts will be presented and to an extent theimpressions made upon me at the time will be reviewed, but impressionsof that character which are not the result of comparison with subsequentevents and of mature deliberation are not always justified. They maylater prove to be partially or wholly wrong. They have the value, nevertheless, of explaining in many cases why I did or did not docertain things, and of disclosing the state of mind that in a measuredetermined my conduct which without this recital of contemporaneousimpressions might mystify one familiar with what afterwards took place. The notes, letters, and memoranda which are quoted in the succeedingpages, as well as the opinions and beliefs held at the time (of which, in accordance with a practice of years, I kept a record supplementing mydaily journal of events), should be weighed and measured by thesituation which existed when they were written and not alone in thelight of the complete review of the proceedings. In forming an opinionas to my differences with the President it should be the reader'sendeavor to place himself in my position at the time and not judge themsolely by the results of the negotiations at Paris. It comes to this:Was I justified then? Am I justified now? If those questions areanswered impartially and without prejudice, there is nothing furtherthat I would ask of the reader. 

CHAPTER II

MR. WILSON'S PRESENCE AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Early in October, 1918, it required no prophetic vision to perceive thatthe World War would come to an end in the near future. Austria-Hungary, acting with the full approval of the German Government, had madeovertures for peace, and Bulgaria, recognizing the futility of furtherstruggle, had signed an armistice which amounted to an unconditionalsurrender. These events were soon followed by the collapse of Turkishresistance and by the German proposals which resulted in the armisticewhich went into effect on November 11, 1918. 

In view of the importance of the conditions of the armistice withGermany and their relation to the terms of peace to be later negotiated, the President considered it essential to have an American member addedto the Supreme War Council, which then consisted of M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando, the premiers of the three AlliedPowers. He selected Colonel Edward M. House for this important post andnamed him a Special Commissioner to represent him personally. ColonelHouse with a corps of secretaries and assistants sailed from New York onOctober 17, _en route_ for Paris where the Supreme War Council wasin session. 

Three days before his departure the Colonel was in Washington and we hadtwo long conferences with the President regarding the correspondencewith Germany and with the Allies relating to a cessation of hostilities, during which we discussed the position which the United States shouldtake as to the terms of the armistice and the bases of peace whichshould be incorporated in the document. 

It was after one of these conferences that Colonel House informed methat the President had decided to name him (the Colonel) and me as twoof the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference, and that thePresident was considering attending the Conference and in persondirecting the negotiations. This latter intention of Mr. Wilsonsurprised and disturbed me, and I expressed the hope that thePresident's mind was not made up, as I believed that if he gave moreconsideration to the project he would abandon it, since it was manifestthat his influence over the negotiations would be much greater if heremained in Washington and issued instructions to his representatives inthe Conference. Colonel House did not say that he agreed with myjudgment in this matter, though he did not openly disagree with it. However, I drew the conclusion, though without actual knowledge, that heapproved of the President's purpose, and, possibly, had encouraged himto become an actual participant in the preliminary conferences. 

The President's idea of attending the Peace Conference was not a newone. Though I cannot recollect the source of my information, I know thatin December, 1916, when it will be remembered Mr. Wilson was endeavoringto induce the belligerents to state their objects in the war and toenter into a conference looking toward peace, he had an idea that hemight, as a friend of both parties, preside over such a conference andexert his personal influence to bring the belligerents into agreement. Aservice of this sort undoubtedly appealed to the President'shumanitarian instinct and to his earnest desire to end the devastatingwar, while the novelty of the position in which he would be placed wouldnot have been displeasing to one who in his public career seemed to findsatisfaction in departing from the established paths marked out bycustom and usage. 

When, however, the attempt at mediation failed and when six weeks later, on February 1, 1917, the German Government renewed indiscriminatesubmarine warfare resulting in the severance of diplomatic relationsbetween the United States and Germany, President Wilson continued tocherish the hope that he might yet assume the role of mediator. He evenwent so far as to prepare a draft of the bases of peace, which hepurposed to submit to the belligerents if they could be induced to meetin conference. I cannot conceive how he could have expected to bringthis about in view of the elation of the Allies at the dismissal ofCount von Bernstorff and the seeming certainty that the United Stateswould declare war against Germany if the latter persisted in herruthless sinking of American merchant vessels. But I know, in spite ofthe logic of the situation, that he expected or at least hoped tosucceed in his mediatory programme and made ready to play his part inthe negotiation of a peace. 

From the time that Congress declared that a state of war existed betweenthe United States and the Imperial German Government up to the autumn of1918, when the Central Alliance made overtures to end the war, thePresident made no attempt so far as I am aware to enter upon peacenegotiations with the enemy nations. In fact he showed a disposition toreject all peace proposals. He appears to have reached the conclusionthat the defeat of Germany and her allies was essential before permanentpeace could be restored. At all events, he took no steps to bring thebelligerents together until a military decision had been practicallyreached. He did, however, on January 8, 1918, lay down his famous"Fourteen Points, " which he supplemented with certain declarations in"subsequent addresses, " thus proclaiming his ideas as to the properbases of peace when the time should come to negotiate. 

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the final triumph of the armies of theAllied and Associated Powers, the President, in the spring of 1917, directed the organization, under the Department of State, of a body ofexperts to collect data and prepare monographs, charts, and maps, covering all historical, territorial, economic, and legal subjects whichwould probably arise in the negotiation of a treaty of peace. ThisCommission of Inquiry, as it was called, had its offices in New York andwas under Colonel House so far as the selection of its members wasconcerned. The nominal head of the Commission was Dr. Mezes, Presidentof the College of the City of New York and a brother-in-law of ColonelHouse, though the actual and efficient executive head was Dr. IsaiahBowman, Director of the American Geographical Society. The plans oforganization, the outline of work, and the proposed expenditures for themaintenance of the Commission were submitted to me as Secretary ofState. I examined them and, after several conferences with Dr. Mezes, approved them and recommended to the President that he allot the fundsnecessary to carry out the programme. 

In addition to the subjects which were dealt with by this excellentcorps of students and experts, whose work was of the highest order, thecreation of some sort of an international association to prevent wars inthe future received special attention from the President as it did fromAmericans of prominence not connected with the Government. It causedconsiderable discussion in the press and many schemes were proposed andpamphlets written on the subject. To organize such an association becamea generally recognized object to be attained in the negotiation of thepeace which would end the World War; and there can be no doubt that thePresident believed more and more in the vital necessity of forming aneffective organization of the nations to preserve peace in the futureand make another great war impossible. 

The idea of being present and taking an active part in formulating theterms of peace had, in my opinion, never been abandoned by PresidentWilson, although it had remained dormant while the result of theconflict was uncertain. When, however, in early October, 1918, therecould no longer be any doubt that the end of the war was approaching, the President appears to have revived the idea and to have decided, ifpossible, to carry out the purpose which he had so long cherished. Heseemed to have failed to appreciate, or, if he did appreciate, to haveignored the fact that the conditions were wholly different in October, 1918, from what they were in December, 1916. 

In December, 1916, the United States was a neutral nation, and thePresident, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, which was real and notassumed, was seeking to bring the warring powers together in conferencelooking toward the negotiation of "a peace without victory. " In theevent that he was able to persuade them to meet, his presence at theconference as a pacificator and probably as the presiding officer wouldnot improbably have been in the interests of peace, because, as theexecutive head of the greatest of the neutral nations of the world andas the impartial friend of both parties, his personal influence wouldpresumably have been very great in preventing a rupture in thenegotiations and in inducing the parties to act in a spirit ofconciliation and compromise. 

In October, 1918, however, the United States was a belligerent. Itsnational interests were involved; its armies were in conflict with theGermans on the soil of France; its naval vessels were patrolling theAtlantic; and the American people, bitterly hostile, were demandingvengeance on the Governments and peoples of the Central Powers, particularly those of Germany. President Wilson, it is true, hadendeavored with a measure of success to maintain the position of anunbiased arbiter in the discussions leading up to the armistice ofNovember 11, and Germany undoubtedly looked to him as the one hope ofchecking the spirit of revenge which animated the Allied Powers in viewof all that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans. It isprobable too that the Allies recognized that Mr. Wilson was entitled tobe satisfied as to the terms of peace since American man power andAmerican resources had turned the scale against Germany and made victorya certainty. The President, in fact, dominated the situation. If heremained in Washington and carried on the negotiations through hisCommissioners, he would in all probability retain his superior place andbe able to dictate such terms of peace as he considered just. But, if hedid as he purposed doing and attended the Peace Conference, he wouldlose the unique position which he held and would have to submit to thecombined will of his foreign colleagues becoming a prey to intrigue andto the impulses arising from their hatred for the vanquished nations. 

A practical view of the situation so clearly pointed to the unwisdom ofthe President's personal participation in the peace negotiations that avery probable explanation for his determination to be present at theConference is the assumption that the idea had become so firmly embeddedin his mind that nothing could dislodge it or divert him from hispurpose. How far the spectacular feature of a President crossing theocean to control in person the making of peace appealed to him I do notknow. It may have been the deciding factor. It may have had no effect atall. How far the belief that a just peace could only be secured by theexercise of his personal influence over the delegates I cannot say. Howfar he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name asplenipotentiaries is wholly speculative. Whatever plausible reason maybe given, the true reason will probably never be known. 

Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of thePresident's plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter hadgone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be agrave mistake for the President to take part in person in thenegotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser inforeign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, tostate plainly to him my views. It was with hesitation that I did thisbecause the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would beto make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris. There wasthe danger that my motive in opposing the President's attending theConference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of actingfrom self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief. When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived forcompleting the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that Iought not to remain silent. 

The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, Imade the following note:

 "I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House in relation to the Peace Conference. I told him frankly that I thought the plan for him to attend was unwise and would be a mistake. I said that I felt embarrassed in speaking to him about it because it would leave me at the head of the delegation, and I hoped that he understood that I spoke only out of a sense of duty. I pointed out that he held at present a dominant position in the world, which I was afraid he would lose if he went into conference with the foreign statesmen; that he could practically dictate the terms of peace if he held aloof; that he would be criticized severely in this country for leaving at a time when Congress particularly needed his guidance; and that he would be greatly embarrassed in directing domestic affairs from overseas. "

I also recorded as significant that the President listened to my remarkswithout comment and turned the conversation into other channels. 

For a week after this interview I heard nothing from the President onthe subject, though the fact that no steps were taken to prepare writteninstructions for the American Commissioners convinced me that heintended to follow his original intention. My fears were confirmed. Onthe evening of Monday, November 18, the President came to my residenceand told me that he had finally decided to go to the Peace Conferenceand that he had given out to the press an announcement to that effect. In view of the publicity given to his decision it would have been futileto have attempted to dissuade him from his purpose. He knew my opinionand that it was contrary to his. 

After the President departed I made a note of the interview, in whichamong other things I wrote:

 "I am convinced that he is making one of the greatest mistakes of his career and will imperil his reputation. I may be in error and hope that I am, but I prophesy trouble in Paris and worse than trouble here. I believe the President's place is here in America. "

Whether the decision of Mr. Wilson was wise and whether my prophecy wasunfulfilled, I leave to the judgment of others. His visit to Europe andits consequences are facts of history. It should be understood that theincident is not referred to here to justify my views or to prove thatthe President was wrong in what he did. The reference is made solelybecause it shows that at the very outset there was a decided divergenceof judgment between us in regard to the peace negotiations. 

While this difference of opinion apparently in no way affected ourcordial relations, I cannot but feel, in reviewing this period of ourintercourse, that my open opposition to his attending the Conference wasconsidered by the President to be an unwarranted meddling with hispersonal affairs and was none of my business. It was, I believe, thebeginning of his loss of confidence in my judgment and advice, whichbecame increasingly marked during the Paris negotiations. At the time, however, I did not realize that my honest opinion affected the Presidentin the way which I now believe that it did. It had always been mypractice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candor and todisagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision inregard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs. There was a generalbelief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick toresent any opposition however well founded. I had not found him soduring the years we had been associated. Except in a few instances helistened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavored tovalue them correctly. If, however, the matter related even remotely tohis personal conduct he seemed unwilling to debate the question. Myconclusion is that he considered his going to the Peace Conference washis affair solely and that he viewed my objections as a direct criticismof him personally for thinking of going. He may, too, have felt that myopposition arose from a selfish desire to become the head of theAmerican Commission. From that time forward any suggestion or advicevolunteered by me was seemingly viewed with suspicion. It was, however, long after this incident that I began to feel that the President wasimputing to me improper motives and crediting me with disloyalty to himpersonally, an attitude which was as unwarranted as it was unjust. 

The President having determined to go to Paris, it seemed almost uselessto urge him not to become a delegate in view of the fact that he hadnamed but four Commissioners, although it had been arranged that theGreat Powers should each have five delegates in the Conference. Thisclearly indicated that the President was at least considering sitting asthe fifth member of the American group. At the same time it seemed that, if he did not take his place in the Conference as a delegate, he mightretain in a measure his superior place of influence even though he wasin Paris. Four days after the Commission landed at Brest I had a longconference with Colonel House on matters pertaining to the approachingnegotiations, during which he informed me that there was a determinedeffort being made by the European statesmen to induce the President tosit at the peace table and that he was afraid that the President wasdisposed to accede to their wishes. This information indicated that, while the President had come to Paris prepared to act as a delegate, hehad, after discussing the subject with the Colonel and possibly withothers, become doubtful as to the wisdom of doing so, but that throughthe pressure of his foreign colleagues he was turning again to thefavorable view of personal participation which he had held before heleft the United States. 

In my conversation with Colonel House I told him my reasons for opposingthe President's taking an active part in the Conference and explained tohim the embarrassment that I felt in advising the President to adopt acourse which would make me the head of the American Commission. I amsure that the Colonel fully agreed with me that it was impolitic for Mr. Wilson to become a delegate, but whether he actively opposed the plan Ido not know, although I believe that he did. It was some days before thePresident announced that he would become the head of the AmericanCommission. I believe that he did this with grave doubts in his own mindas to the wisdom of his decision, and I do not think that any newarguments were advanced during those days which materially affectedhis judgment. 

This delay in reaching a final determination as to a course of actionwas characteristic of Mr. Wilson. There is in his mentality a strangemixture of positiveness and indecision which is almost paradoxical. Itis a peculiarity which it is hard to analyze and which has often been anembarrassment in the conduct of public affairs. Suddenness rather thanpromptness has always marked his decisions. Procrastination inannouncing a policy or a programme makes coöperation difficult and notinfrequently defeats the desired purpose. To put off a decision to thelast moment is a trait of Mr. Wilson's character which has caused muchanxiety to those who, dealing with matters of vital importance, realizedthat delay was perilous if not disastrous. 

Of the consequences of the President's acting as one of his ownrepresentatives to negotiate peace it is not my purpose to speak. Theevents of the six months succeeding his decision to exercise in personhis constitutional right to conduct the foreign relations of the UnitedStates are in a general way matters of common knowledge and furnishsufficient data for the formulation of individual opinions without theaid of argument or discussion. The important fact in connection with thegeneral topic being considered is the difference of opinion between thePresident and myself as to the wisdom of his assuming the role of adelegate. While I did not discuss the matter with him except at thefirst when I opposed his attending the Peace Conference, I have littledoubt that Colonel House, if he urged the President to decline to sit asa delegate, which I think may be presumed, or if he discussed it at all, mentioned to him my opinion that such a step would be unwise. In anyevent Mr. Wilson knew my views and that they were at variance with thedecision which he reached. 

CHAPTER III

GENERAL PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

It appears, from a general review of the situation prior and subsequentto the assembling of the delegates to the Peace Conference, thatPresident Wilson's decision to go to Paris and to engage in person inthe negotiations was strongly influenced by his belief that it was theonly sure way of providing in the treaty of peace for the organizationof a League of Nations. While his presence in Paris was probablyaffected to an extent by other considerations, as I have pointed out, itis to be presumed that he was anxious to participate directly in thedrafting of the plan of organization of the League and to exert hispersonal influence on the delegates in favor of its acceptance bypublicly addressing the Conference. This he could hardly have donewithout becoming a delegate. It would seem, therefore, that the purposeof creating a League of Nations and obtaining the incorporation of aplan of organization in the treaty to be negotiated had much to do withthe President's presence at the peace table. 

From the time that the United States entered the war in April, 1917, Mr. Wilson held firmly to the idea that the salvation of the world fromimperialism would not be lasting unless provision was made in the peacetreaty for an international agency strong enough to prevent a futureattack upon the rights and liberties of the nations which were at sogreat a cost holding in check the German armies and preventing them fromcarrying out their evil designs of conquest. The object sought by theUnited States in the war would not, in the views of many, be achievedunless the world was organized to resist future aggression. Theessential thing, as the President saw it, in order to "make the worldsafe for democracy" was to give permanency to the peace which would benegotiated at the conclusion of the war. A union of the nations for thepurpose of preventing wars of aggression and conquest seemed to him themost practical, if not the only, way of accomplishing this supremeobject, and he urged it with earnestness and eloquence in his publicaddresses relating to the bases of peace. 

There was much to be said in favor of the President's point of view. Unquestionably the American people as a whole supported him in thebelief that there ought to be some international agreement, association, or concord which would lessen the possibility of future wars. Aninternational organization to remove in a measure the immediate causesof war, to provide means for the peaceable settlement of disputesbetween nations, and to draw the governments into closer friendshipappealed to the general desire of the peoples of America and Europe. Thefour years and more of horror and agony through which mankind had passedmust be made impossible of repetition, and there seemed no other waythan to form an international union devoted to the maintenance of peaceby composing, as far as possible, controversies which might ripeninto war. 

For many years prior to 1914 an organization devoted to the preventionof international wars had been discussed by those who gave thought towarfare of the nations and who realized in a measure the precariousstate of international peace. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907had been negotiated with that object, and it was only because of theimproper aspirations and hidden designs of certain powers, which wererepresented at those great historic conferences, that the measuresadopted were not more expressive of the common desire of mankind andmore effective in securing the object sought. The Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, the Ginn, now the World, Peace Foundation, and theAmerican Peace Society, and later the Society for the JudicialSettlement of International Disputes, the League to Enforce Peace, andmany other organizations in America and in Europe were actively engagedin considering ways and means to prevent war, to strengthen the bonds ofinternational good-will, and to insure the more general application ofthe principles of justice to disputes between nations. 

The outbreak of the war and the dreadful waste and suffering whichfollowed impelled the societies and associations then organized toredoubled effort and induced the formation of new organizations. Peopleeverywhere began to realize that their objects were real and not merelysentimental or academic, that they were seeking practical means toremove the conditions which had made the Great War possible. Publicopinion became more and more pronounced as the subject was more widelydiscussed in the journals and periodicals of the day and at publicmeetings, the divergence of views being chiefly in regard to the meansto be employed by the proposed organization and not as to the creationof the organization, the necessity for which appeared to begenerally conceded. 

With popular sentiment overwhelmingly in favor of some sort of worldunion which would to an extent insure the nations against anothertragedy like the one which in November, 1918, had left the belligerentswasted and exhausted and the whole world a prey to social and industrialunrest, there was beyond question a demand that out of the greatinternational assembly at Paris there should come some common agencydevoted to the prevention of war. To ignore this all-prevalent sentimentwould have been to misrepresent the peoples of the civilized world andwould have aroused almost universal condemnation and protest. ThePresident was, therefore, entirely right in giving prominence to theidea of an international union against war and in insisting that thePeace Conference should make provision for the establishment of anorganization of the world with the prevention of future wars as itscentral thought and purpose. 

The great bulk of the American people, at the time that the Presidentleft the United States to attend the Peace Conference, undoubtedlybelieved that some sort of organization of this nature was necessary, and I am convinced that the same popular belief prevailed in all othercivilized countries. It is possible that this assertion may seem tooemphatic to some who have opposed the plan for a League of Nations, which appears in the first articles of the Treaty of Versailles, but, ifthese opponents of the plan will go back to the time of which I amwriting, and avoid the impressions made upon them by subsequent events, they will find, I believe, that even their own views have materiallychanged since December, 1918. It is true that concrete plans had thenbeen suggested, but so far as the public knew the President had notadopted any of them or formulated one of his own. He had not thendisclosed the provisions of his "Covenant. "

The mass of the people were only concerned with the general idea. Therewas no well-defined opposition to that idea. At least it was not vocal. Even the defeat of the Democratic Party in the Congressional electionsof November, 1918, could not be interpreted to be a repudiation of theformation of a world organization. That election, by which both Housesof Congress became Republican, was a popular rebuke to Mr. Wilson forthe partisanship shown in his letter of October addressed to theAmerican people, in which he practically asserted that it wasunpatriotic to support the Republican candidates. The indignation andresentment aroused by that injudicious and unwarranted attack upon theloyalty of his political opponents lost to the Democratic Party theSenate and largely reduced its membership in the House ofRepresentatives if it did not in fact deprive the party of control ofthat body. The result, however, did not mean that the President's ideasas to the terms of peace were repudiated, but that his practicalassertion, that refusal to accept his policies was unpatriotic, wasrepudiated by the American people. 

It is very apparent to one, who without prejudice reviews the state ofpublic sentiment in December, 1918, that the trouble, which laterdeveloped as to a League of Nations, did not lie in the necessity ofconvincing the peoples of the world, their governments, and theirdelegates to the Paris Conference that it was desirable to organize theworld to prevent future wars, but in deciding upon the form andfunctions of the organization to be created. As to these details, whichof course affected the character, the powers, and the duties of theorganization, there had been for years a wide divergence of opinion. Some advocated the use of international force to prevent a nation fromwarring against another. Some favored coercion by means of generalostracism and non-intercourse. Some believed that the application oflegal justice through the medium of international tribunals andcommissions was the only practical method of settling disputes whichmight become causes of war. And some emphasized the importance of amutual agreement to postpone actual hostilities until there could be aninvestigation as to the merits of a controversy. There were thus twogeneral classes of powers proposed which were in the one case politicaland in the other juridical. The cleavage of opinion was along theselines, although it possibly was not recognized by the general public. Itwas not only shown in the proposed powers, but also in the proposed formof the organization, the one centering on a politico-diplomatic body, and the other on an international judiciary. Naturally the details ofany plan proposed would become the subject of discussion and theadvisability of adopting the provisions would arouse controversy anddispute. Thus unanimity in approving a world organization did not meanthat opinions might not differ radically in working out the fundamentalprinciples of its form and functions, to say nothing of the detailedplan based on these principles. 

In May, 1916, President Wilson accepted an invitation to address thefirst annual meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, which was to beheld in Washington. After preparing his address he went over it anderased all reference to the use of physical force in preventing wars. Imention this as indicative of the state of uncertainty in which he wasin the spring of 1916 as to the functions and powers of theinternational organization to maintain peace which he then advocated. ByJanuary, 1917, he had become convinced that the use of force was thepractical method of checking aggressions. This conversion was probablydue to the fact that he had in his own mind worked out, as one of theessential bases of peace, to which he was then giving much thought, amutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence, which had been the chief article of a proposed Pan-American Treatyprepared early in 1915 and to which he referred in his address beforethe League to Enforce Peace. He appears to have reached the conclusionthat a guaranty of this sort would be of little value unless supportedby the threatened, and, if necessary, the actual, employment of force. The President was entirely logical in this attitude. A guaranty againstphysical aggression would be practically worthless if it did not rest onan agreement to protect with physical force. An undertaking to protectcarried with it the idea of using effectual measures to insureprotection. They were inseparable; and the President, having adopted anaffirmative guaranty against aggression as a cardinal provision--perhapsI should say _the_ cardinal provision--of the anticipated peace treaty, could not avoid becoming the advocate of the use of force in making goodthe guaranty. 

During the year 1918 the general idea of the formation of aninternational organization to prevent war was increasingly discussed inthe press of the United States and Europe and engaged the thought of theGovernments of the Powers at war with the German Empire. On January 8 ofthat year President Wilson in an address to Congress proclaimed his"Fourteen Points, " the adoption of which he considered necessary to ajust and stable peace. The last of these "Points" explicitly states thebasis of the proposed international organization and the fundamentalreason for its formation. It is as follows:

 "XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. "

This declaration may be considered in view of subsequent developments tobe a sufficiently clear announcement of the President's theory as to theplan of organization which ought to be adopted, but at the time theexact character of the "mutual guarantees" was not disclosed and arousedlittle comment. I do not believe that Congress, much less the public atlarge, understood the purpose that the President had in mind. Undoubtedly, too, a sense of loyalty to the Chief Executive, while thewar was in progress, and the desire to avoid giving comfort of any sortto the enemy, prevented a critical discussion of the announced bases ofpeace, some of which were at the time academic, premature, and liable tomodification if conditions changed. 

In March Lord Phillimore and his colleagues made their preliminaryreport to the British Government on "a League of Nations" and this wasfollowed in July by their final report, copies of which reached thePresident soon after they were made. The time had arrived for puttinginto concrete form the general ideas that the President held, andColonel House, whom some believed to be the real author of Mr. Wilson'sconception of a world union, prepared, I am informed, the draft of ascheme of organization. This draft was either sent or handed to thePresident and discussed with him. To what extent it was amended orrevised by Mr. Wilson I do not know, but in a modified form it becamethe typewritten draft of the Covenant which he took with him to Paris, where it underwent several changes. In it was the guaranty of 1915, 1916, 1917, and 1918, which, from the form in which it appeared, logically required the use of force to give it effect. 

Previous to the departure of the American Commission for Paris, onDecember 4, 1918, the President did not consult me as to his plan for aLeague of Nations. He did not show me a copy of the plan or even mentionthat one had been put into writing. I think that there were two reasonsfor his not doing so, although I was the official adviser whom he shouldnaturally consult on such matters. 

The first reason, I believe, was due to the following facts. In ourconversations prior to 1918 I had uniformly opposed the idea of theemployment of international force to compel a nation to respect therights of other nations and had repeatedly urged judicial settlement asthe practical way of composing international controversies, though I didnot favor the use of force to compel such settlement. 

To show my opposition to an international agreement providing for theuse of force and to show that President Wilson knew of this oppositionand the reasons for it, I quote a letter which I wrote to him in May, 1916, that is, two years and a half before the end of the war:

 "_May 25, 1916_

 "My DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 "I had hoped to see you to-morrow at Cabinet meeting, but to-day the Doctor refused to allow me to leave the house this week. I intended when I saw you to say something about the purposes of the League to Enforce Peace, which is to meet here, and at the banquet of which I understand you are to speak on Saturday night. I would have preferred to talk the matter over with you, but as that is impossible I have taken the liberty to write you this letter, although in doing so I am violating the directions of the Doctor. 

 "While I have not had time or opportunity to study carefully the objects of the proposed League to Enforce Peace, I understand the fundamental ideas are these, which are to be embodied in a general treaty of the nations: _First_, an agreement to submit all differences which fail of diplomatic adjustment to arbitration or a board of conciliation; and, _second_, in case a government fails to comply with this provision, an agreement that the other parties will unite in compelling it to do so by an exercise of force. 

 "With the first agreement I am in accord to an extent, but I cannot see how it is practicable to apply it in case of a continuing invasion of fundamental national or individual rights unless some authoritative international body has the power to impose and enforce an order in the nature of an injunction, which will prevent the aggressor from further action until arbitration has settled the rights of the parties. How this can be done in a practical way I have not attempted to work out, but the problem is not easy, especially the part which relates to the enforcement of the order. 

 "It is, however, the second agreement in regard to the imposition of international arbitration by force, which seems to me the most difficult, especially when viewed from the standpoint of its effects on our national sovereignty and national interests. It is needless to go into the manifest questions arising when the _modus operandi_ of the agreement is considered. Such questions as: Who may demand international intervention? What body will decide whether the demand should be complied with? How will the international forces be constituted? Who will take charge of the military and naval operations? Who will pay the expenses of the war (for war it will be)?

 "Perplexing as these questions appear to me, I am more concerned with the direct effect on this country. I do not believe that it is wise to limit our independence of action, a sovereign right, to the will of other powers beyond this hemisphere. In any representative international body clothed with authority to require of the nations to employ their armies and navies to coerce one of their number, we would be in the minority. I do not believe that we should put ourselves in the position of being compelled to send our armed forces to Europe or Asia or, in the alternative, of repudiating our treaty obligation. Neither our sovereignty nor our interests would accord with such a proposition, and I am convinced that popular opinion as well as the Senate would reject a treaty framed along such lines. 

 "It is possible that the difficulty might be obviated by the establishment of geographical zones, and leaving to the groups of nations thus formed the enforcement of the peaceful settlement of disputes. But if that is done why should all the world participate? We have adopted a much modified form of this idea in the proposed Pan-American Treaty by the 'guaranty' article. But I would not like to see its stipulations extended to the European powers so that they, with our full agreement, would have the right to cross the ocean and stop quarrels between two American Republics. Such authority would be a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine and a greater menace to the Pan-American Doctrine. 

 "It appears to me that, if the first idea of the League can be worked out in a practical way and an international body constituted to determine when steps should be taken to enforce compliance, the use of force might be avoided by outlawing the offending nation. No nation to-day can live unto itself. The industrial and commercial activities of the world are too closely interwoven for a nation isolated from the other nations to thrive and prosper. A tremendous economic pressure could be imposed on the outlawed nation by all other nations denying it intercourse of every nature, even communication, in a word make that nation a pariah, and so to remain until it was willing to perform its obligations. 

 "I am not at all sure that this means is entirely feasible. I see many difficulties which would have to be met under certain conditions. But I do think that it is more practical in operation and less objectionable from the standpoint of national rights and interests than the one proposed by the League. It does not appear to me that the use of physical force is in any way practical or advisable. 

 "I presume that you are far more familiar than I am with the details of the plans of the League and that it may be presumptuous on my part to write you as I have. I nevertheless felt it my duty to frankly give you my views on the subject and I have done so. 

 "Faithfully yours

 "ROBERT LANSING

 "THE PRESIDENT

 "_The White House_"

The President, thus early advised of my unqualified opposition to anyplan which was similar in principle to the one advocated by the Leagueto Enforce Peace, naturally concluded that I would look with disfavor onan international guaranty which by implication, if not by declaration, compelled the use of force to give it effect. Doubtless he felt that Iwould not be disposed to aid in perfecting a plan which had as itscentral idea a guaranty of that nature. Disliking opposition to a planor policy which he had originated or made his own by adoption, hepreferred to consult those who without debate accepted his judgment andwere in sympathy with his ideas. Undoubtedly the President by refrainingfrom asking my advice spared himself from listening to arguments againstthe guaranty and the use of force which struck at the very root of hisplan, for I should, if I had been asked, have stated my views withentire frankness. 

The other reason for not consulting me, as I now realize, but did not atthe time, was that I belonged to the legal profession. It is a fact, which Mr. Wilson has taken no trouble to conceal, that he does not valuethe advice of lawyers except on strictly legal questions, and that heconsiders their objections and criticisms on other subjects to be toooften based on mere technicalities and their judgments to be warped byan undue regard for precedent. This prejudice against the legalprofession in general was exhibited on more than one occasion during oursojourn at Paris. Looking back over my years of intercourse with thePresident I can now see that he chafed under the restraints imposed byusage and even by enacted laws if they interfered with his acting in away which seemed to him right or justified by conditions. I do not saythat he was lawless. He was not that, but he conformed grudgingly andwith manifest displeasure to legal limitations. It was a thankless taskto question a proposed course of action on the ground of illegality, because he appeared to be irritated by such an obstacle to his will andto transfer his irritation against the law to the one who raised it asan objection. I think that he was especially resentful toward any onewho volunteered criticism based on a legal provision, precept, orprecedent, apparently assuming that the critic opposed his purpose onthe merits and in order to defeat it interposed needless legalobjections. It is unnecessary to comment on the prejudice which such anattitude of mind made evident. 

After the President's exceptionally strong address at the MetropolitanOpera House in New York on September 27, 1918, I realized the greatimportance which he gave to the creation of a League of Nations and inview of this I devoted time and study to the subject, giving particularattention to the British and French suggestions, both of whichemphasized judicial settlement. Knowing that the President had been inconsultation with Colonel House on the various phases of the peace to benegotiated as well as on the terms of the armistice, I asked the latterwhat he knew about the former's scheme for a League of Nations. 

The Colonel discreetly avoided disclosing the details of the plan, butfrom our conversation I gained an idea of the general principles of theproposed organization and the way in which the President intended toapply them. 

After the Colonel and his party had sailed for France and in expectationof being consulted on the subject by President Wilson, I put my thoughtson the League of Nations into writing. In a note, which is dated October27, 1918, appears the following:

 "From the little I know of the President's plan I am sure that it is impracticable. There is in it too much altruistic cooperation. No account is taken of national selfishness and the mutual suspicions which control international relations. It may be noble thinking, but it is not true thinking. 

 "What I fear is that a lot of dreamers and theorists will be selected to work out an organization instead of men whose experience and common sense will tell them not to attempt anything which will not work. The scheme ought to be simple and practical. If the federation, or whatever it may be called, is given too much power or if its machinery is complex, my belief is that it will be unable to function or else will be defied. I can see lots of trouble ahead unless impractical enthusiasts and fanatics are suppressed. This is a time when sober thought, caution, and common sense should control. "

On November 22, 1918, after I had been formally designated as a PeaceCommissioner, I made another note for the purpose of crystallizing myown thought on the subject of a League of Nations. Although PresidentWilson had not then consulted me in any way regarding his plan oforganization, I felt sure that he would, and I wished to be prepared togive him my opinion concerning the fundamentals of the plan which mightbe proposed on behalf of the United States. I saw, or thought that Isaw, a disposition to adopt physical might as the basis of theorganization, because the guaranty, which the President had announced inPoint XIV and evidently purposed to advocate, seemed to require the useof force in the event that it became necessary to make it good. 

From the note of November 22 I quote the following:

 "The legal principle [of the equality of nations], whatever its basis in fact, must be preserved, otherwise force rather than law, the power to act rather than the right to act, becomes the fundamental principle of organization, just as it has been in all previous Congresses and Concerts of the European Powers. 

 "It appears to me that a positive guaranty of territorial integrity and political independence by the nations would have to rest upon an open recognition of dominant coercive power in the articles of agreement, the power being commercial and economic as well as physical. The wisdom of entering into such a guaranty is questionable and should be carefully considered before being adopted. 

 "In order to avoid the recognition of force as a basis and the question of dominant force with the unavoidable classification of nations into 'big' and 'little, ' 'strong' and 'weak, ' the desired result of a guaranty might be attained by entering into a mutual undertaking _not_ to impair the territorial integrity or to violate the political sovereignty of any state. The breach of this undertaking would be a breach of the treaty and would sever the relations of the offending nation with all other signatories. "

I have given these two extracts from my notes in order to show the viewsthat I held, at the time the American Commission was about to departfrom the United States, in regard to the character of the guaranty whichthe President intended to make the central feature of the League ofNations. In the carrying out of his scheme and in creating anorganization to give effect to the guaranty I believed that I saw as anunavoidable consequence an exaltation of force and an overlordship ofthe strong nations. Under such conditions it would be impossible topreserve within the organization the equality of nations, a precept ofinternational law which was the universally recognized basis ofintercourse between nations in time of peace. This I considered mostunwise and a return to the old order, from which every one hoped thatthe victory over the Central Empires had freed the world. 

The views expressed in the notes quoted formed the basis for mysubsequent course of action as an American Commissioner at Paris inrelation to the League of Nations. Convinced from previous experiencethat to oppose every form of guaranty by the nations assembled at Pariswould be futile in view of the President's apparent determination tocompel the adoption of that principle, I endeavored to find a form ofguaranty that would be less objectionable than the one which thePresident had in mind. The commitment of the United States to anyguaranty seemed to me at least questionable, though to prevent it seemedimpossible in the circumstances. It did not seem politic to try topersuade the President to abandon the idea altogether. I was certainthat that could not be done. If he could be induced to modify his planso as to avoid a direct undertaking to protect other nations fromaggression, the result would be all that could be expected. I wasguided, therefore, chiefly by expediency rather than by principle inpresenting my views to the President and in openly approving the idea ofa guaranty. 

The only opportunity that I had to learn more of the President's planfor a League before arriving in Paris was an hour's interview with himon the U. S. S. George Washington some days after we sailed from New York. He showed me nothing in writing, but explained in a general way hisviews as to the form, purpose, and powers of a League. From thisconversation I gathered that my fears as to the proposed organizationwere justified and that it was to be based on the principle ofdiplomatic adjustment rather than that of judicial settlement and thatpolitical expediency tinctured with morality was to be the standard ofdetermination of an international controversy rather than strictlegal justice. 

In view of the President's apparent fixity of purpose it seemed unwiseto criticize the plan until I could deliver to him a substitute inwriting for the mutual guaranty which he evidently considered to be thechief feature of the plan. I did not attempt to debate the subject withhim believing it better to submit my ideas in concrete form, as I hadlearned from experience that Mr. Wilson preferred to have matters forhis decision presented in writing rather than by word of mouth. 

CHAPTER IV

SUBSTITUTE ARTICLES PROPOSED

The President, Mr. Henry White, and I arrived in Paris on Saturday, December 14, 1918, where Colonel House and General Bliss awaited us. Thedays following our arrival were given over to public functions in honorof the President and to official exchanges of calls and interviews withthe delegates of other countries who were gathering for the PeaceConference. On the 23d, when the pressure of formal and socialengagements had in a measure lessened, I decided to present to thePresident my views as to the mutual guaranty which he intended topropose, fearing that, if there were further delay, he would becomeabsolutely committed to the affirmative form. I, therefore, on that daysent him the following letter, which was marked "Secret and Urgent":

 "_Hotel de Crillon December 23, 1918_

 "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 "The plan of guaranty proposed for the League of Nations, which has been the subject of discussion, will find considerable objection from other Governments because, even when the principle is agreed to, there will be a wide divergence of views as to the terms of the obligation. This difference of opinion will be seized upon by those, who are openly or secretly opposed to the League, to create controversy and discord. 

 "In addition to this there will be opposition in Congress to assuming obligations to take affirmative action along either military or economic lines. On constitutional grounds, on its effect on the Monroe Doctrine, on jealousy as to Congressional powers, etc. , there will be severe criticism which will materially weaken our position with other nations, and may, in view of senatorial hostility, defeat a treaty as to the League of Nations or at least render it impotent. 

 "With these thoughts in mind and with an opposition known to exist among certain European statesmen and already manifest in Washington, I take the liberty of laying before you a tentative draft of articles of guaranty which I do not believe can be successfully opposed either at home or abroad. "

I would interrupt the reader at this point to suggest that it might bewell to peruse the enclosures, which will be found in the succeedingpages, in order to have a better understanding of the comments whichfollow. To continue:

 "I do not see how any nation can refuse to subscribe to them. I do not see how any question of constitutionality can be raised, as they are based essentially on powers which are confided to the Executive. They in no way raise a question as to the Monroe Doctrine. At the same time I believe that the result would be as efficacious as if there was an undertaking to take positive action against an offending nation, which is the present cause of controversy. 

 "I am so earnestly in favor of the guaranty, which is the heart of the League of Nations, that I have endeavored to find a way to accomplish this and to remove the objections raised which seem to me to-day to jeopardize the whole plan. 

 "I shall be glad, if you desire it, to confer with you in regard to the enclosed paper or to receive your opinion as to the suggestions made. In any event it is my hope that you will give the paper consideration. 

 "Faithfully yours

 "ROBERT LANSING

 "THE PRESIDENT

 "28 _Rue de Monceau_"

It should be borne in mind in reading this letter that I had reached theconclusion that modification rather than abandonment of the guaranty wasall that I could hope to accomplish, and that, as a matter ofexpediency, it seemed wise to indicate a sympathetic attitude toward theidea. For that reason I expressed myself as favorable to the guarantyand termed it "the heart of the League of Nations, " a phrase which thePresident by his subsequent use of it considered to be a propercharacterization. 

The memoranda contained in the paper enclosed in the letter were asfollows:

_The Constitutional Power to provide Coercion in a Treaty_

 "_December_ 20, 1918

 "In the institution of a League of Nations we must bear in mind the limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States upon the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government in defining their respective powers. 

 "The Constitution confers upon Congress the right to declare war. This right, I do not believe, can be delegated and it certainly cannot be taken away by treaty. The question arises, therefore, as to how far a provision in an agreement as to a League of Nations, which imposes on the United States the obligation to employ its military or naval forces in enforcing the terms of the agreement, would be constitutional. 

 "It would seem that the utilization of forces, whether independently or in conjunction with other nations, would in fact by being an act of war create a state of war, which constitutionally can only be done by a declaration of Congress. To contract by treaty to create a state of war upon certain contingencies arising would be equally tainted with unconstitutionality and would be null and inoperative. 

 "I do not think, therefore, that, even if it were advisable, any treaty can provide for the independent or joint use of the military or naval forces of the United States to compel compliance with a treaty or to make good a guaranty made in a treaty. 

 "The other method of international coercion is non-intercourse, especially commercial non-intercourse. Would a treaty provision to employ this method be constitutional?

 "As to this my mind is less clear. The Constitution in delegating powers to Congress includes the regulation of commerce. Does non-intercourse fall within the idea of regulation? Could an embargo be imposed without an act of Congress? My impression is that it could not be done without legislation and that a treaty provision agreeing in a certain event to impose an embargo against another nation would be void. 

 "Even if Congress was willing to delegate to the Executive for a certain purpose its powers as to making war and regulating commerce, I do not think that it could constitutionally do so. It is only in the event of war that powers conferred by the Constitution on Congress can be delegated and then only for war purposes. As a state of war would not exist at the time action was required, I do not believe that it could be done, and any provision contracting to take measures of this nature would be contrary to the Constitution and as a consequence void. 

 "But, assuming that Congress possessed the power of delegation, I am convinced that it would not only refuse to do so, but would resent such a suggestion because of the fact that both Houses have been and are extremely jealous of their rights and authority. 

 "Viewed from the standpoints of legality and expediency it would seem necessary to find some other method than coercion in enforcing an international guaranty, or else to find some substitute for a guaranty which would be valueless without affirmative action to support it. 

 "I believe that such a substitute can be found. "

The foregoing memorandum was intended as an introduction to the negativeguaranty or "self-denying covenant" which I desired to lay before thePresident as a substitute for the one upon which he intended to buildthe League of Nations. The memorandum was suggestive merely, but in viewof the necessity for a speedy decision there was no time to prepare anexhaustive legal opinion. Furthermore, I felt that the President, whosehours were at that time crowded with numerous personal conferences andpublic functions, would find little opportunity to peruse a long andclosely reasoned argument on the subject. 

The most important portion of the document was that entitled "_SuggestedDraft of Articles for Discussion_. December 20, 1918. " It readsas follows:

 "The parties to this convention, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and preventing future wars between one another, hereby constitute themselves into a League of Nations and solemnly undertake jointly and severally to fulfill the obligations imposed upon them in the following articles:

 "A

 "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political independence of any other power signatory or adherent to this convention except when authorized so to do by a decree of the arbitral tribunal hereinafter referred to or by a three-fourths vote of the International Council of the League of Nations created by this convention. 

 "B

 "In the event that any power signatory or adherent hereto shall fail to observe the covenant and guaranty set forth in the preceding article, such breach of covenant and guaranty shall _ipso facto_ operate as an abrogation of this convention in so far as it applies to the offending power and furthermore as an abrogation of all treaties, conventions, and agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the offending power and all other powers signatory and adherent to this convention. 

 "C

 "A breach of the covenant and guaranty declared in Article A shall constitute an act unfriendly to all other powers signatory and adherent hereto, and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, consular, and official relations with the offending power, and shall, through the International Council, hereinafter provided for, exchange views as to the measures necessary to restore the power, whose sovereignty has been invaded, to the rights and liberties which it possessed prior to such invasion and to prevent further violation thereof. 

 "D

 "Any interference with a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft proceeding over the high seas, which interference is not affirmatively sanctioned by the law of nations shall be, for the purposes of this convention, considered an impairment of political independence. "

In considering the foregoing series of articles constituting a guarantyagainst one's own acts, instead of a guaranty against the acts ofanother, it must be remembered that, at the time of their preparation, Ihad not seen a draft of the President's proposed guaranty, though fromconversations with Colonel House and from my study of Point XIV of "TheFourteen Points, " I knew that it was affirmative rather than negative inform and would require positive action to be effective in the event thatthe menace of superior force was insufficient to preventaggressive acts. 

As far as I am able to judge from subsequently acquired knowledge, President Wilson at the time he received my letter of December 23 had atypewritten draft of the document which after certain amendments helater laid before the American Commissioners and which he had printedwith a few verbal changes under the title of "The Covenant. " In order tounderstand the two forms of guaranty which he had for considerationafter he received my letter, I quote the article relating to it, whichappears in the first printed draft of the Covenant. 

 III

 "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reasons of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the people concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary. "

It seems needless to comment upon the involved language and theuncertainty of meaning of this article wherein it provided for"territorial readjustments" of which there appeared to be two classes, one dependent on "self-determination, " the other on the judgment of theBody of Delegates of the League. In view of the possible reasons whichmight be advanced for changes in territory and allegiance, justificationfor an appeal to the guarantors was by no means certain. If this articlehad been before me when the letter of December 23 was written, I mighthave gone much further in opposition to the President's plan forstabilizing peace in the world on the ground that a guaranty soconditioned would cause rather than prevent international discord. 

Though without knowledge of the exact terms of the President's proposedguaranty, I did not feel for the reason stated that I could delay longerin submitting my views to the President. There was not time to work outa complete and well-digested plan for a League, but I had prepared inthe rough several articles for discussion which related to theorganization, and which might be incorporated in the organic agreementwhich I then assumed would be a separate document from the treatyrestoring peace. While unwilling to lay these articles before thePresident until they were more carefully drafted, I enclosed in myletter the following as indicative of the character of the organizationwhich it seemed to me would form a simple and practical agency common toall nations:

 "_Suggestions as to an International Council For Discussion_

 "_December_ 21, 1918

 "An International Council of the League of Nations is hereby constituted, which shall be the channel for communication between the members of the League, and the agent for common action. 

 "The International Council shall consist of the diplomatic representative of each party signatory or adherent to this convention at ----. 

 "Meetings of the International Council shall be held at ----, or in the event that the subject to be considered involves the interests of ---- or its nationals, then at such other place outside the territory of a power whose interests are involved as the Supervisory Committee of the Council shall designate. 

 "The officer charged with the conduct of the foreign affairs of the power where a meeting is held shall be the presiding officer thereof. 

 "At the first meeting of the International Council a Supervisory Committee shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members present, which shall consist of five members and shall remain in office for two years or until their successors are elected. 

 "The Supervisory Committee shall name a Secretariat which shall have charge of the archives of the Council and receive all communications addressed to the Council or Committee and send all communications issued by the Council or Committee. 

 "The Supervisory Committee may draft such rules of procedure as it deems necessary for conducting business coming before the Council or before the Committee. 

 "The Supervisory Committee may call a meeting of the Council at its discretion and must call a meeting at the request of any member of the Council provided the request contains a written statement of the subject to be discussed. 

 "The archives of the Council shall be open at any time to any member of the Council, who may make and retain copies thereof. 

 "All expenses of the Supervisory Committee and Secretariat shall be borne equally by all powers signatory or adherent to this convention. "

As indicated by the caption, this document was intended merely "fordiscussion" of the principal features of the organization. It should benoted that the basic principle is the equality of nations. No specialprivileges are granted to the major powers in the conduct of theorganization. The rights and obligations of one member of the League areno more and no less than those of every other member. It is based oninternational democracy and denies international aristocracy. 

Equality in the exercise of sovereign rights in times of peace, anequality which is imposed by the very nature of sovereignty, seemed tome fundamental to a world organization affecting in any way a nation'sindependence of action or its exercise of supreme authority over itsexternal or domestic affairs. In my judgment any departure from thatprinciple would be a serious error fraught with danger to the generalpeace of the world and to the recognized law of nations, since it couldmean nothing less than the primacy of the Great Powers and theacknowledgment that because they possessed the physical might they had aright to control the affairs of the world in times of peace as well asin times of war. For the United States to admit that such primacy oughtto be formed would be bad enough, but to suggest it indirectly byproposing an international organization based on that idea would befar worse. 

On January 22, 1917, the President in an address to the Senate had madethe following declaration:

 "The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations or small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. "

In view of this sound declaration of principle it seemed hardly possiblethat the President, after careful consideration of the consequences ofhis plan of a guaranty requiring force to make it practical, would notperceive the fundamental error of creating a primacy of theGreat Powers. 

It was in order to prevent, if possible, the United States from becomingsponsor for an undemocratic principle that I determined to lay mypartial plan of organization before the President at the earliest momentthat I believed it would receive consideration. 

To my letter of December 23 with its enclosed memoranda I never receiveda reply or even an acknowledgment. It is true that the day following itsdelivery the President went to Chaumont to spend Christmas at theheadquarters of General Pershing and that almost immediately thereafterhe visited London and two or three days after his return to Paris he setout for Rome. It is possible that Mr. Wilson in the midst of thesecrowded days had no time to digest or even to read my letter and itsenclosed memoranda. It is possible that he was unable or unwilling toform an opinion as to their merits without time for meditation. I do notwish to be unjustly critical or to blame the President for a neglectwhich was the result of circumstance rather than of intention. 

At the time I assumed that his failure to mention my letter in any waywas because his visits to royalty exacted from him so much of his timethat there was no opportunity to give the matter consideration. Whilesome doubt was thrown on this assumption by the fact that the Presidentheld an hour's conference with the American Commissioners on January 1, just before departing for Italy, during which he discussed the favorableattitude of Mr. Lloyd George toward his (the President's) ideas as to aLeague of Nations, but never made any reference to my proposedsubstitute for the guaranty, I was still disposed to believe that therewas a reasonable explanation for his silence and that upon his returnfrom Rome he would discuss it. 

Having this expectation I continued the preparation of tentativeprovisions to be included in the charter of a League of Nations in theevent one was negotiated, and which would in any event constitute aguide for the preparation of declarations to be included in the Treatyof Peace in case the negotiation as to a League was postponed untilafter peace had been restored. As has been said, it was my hope thatthere would be a separate convention organizing the League, but I wasnot as sanguine of this as many who believed this course wouldbe followed. 

It later developed that the President never had any other purpose thanto include the detailed plan of organization in the peace treaty, whether the treaty was preliminary or definitive. When he departed forItaly he had not declared this purpose to the Commissioners, but fromsome source, which I failed to note at the time and cannot nowrecollect, I gained the impression that he intended to pursue thispolicy, for on December 29 I wrote in my book of notes:

 "It is evident that the President is determined to incorporate in the peace treaty an elaborate scheme for the League of Nations which will excite all sorts of opposition at home and abroad and invite much discussion. 

 "The articles relating to the League ought to be few and brief. They will not be. They will be many and long. If we wait till they are accepted, it will be four or five months before peace is signed, and I fear to say how much longer it will take to have it ratified. 

 "It is perhaps foolish to prophesy, but I will take the chance. Two months from now we will still be haggling over the League of Nations and an exasperated world will be cursing us for not having made peace. I hope that I am a false prophet, but I fear my prophecy will come true. We are riding a hobby, and riding to a fall. "

By the time the President returned from his triumphal journey to Rome Ihad completed the articles upon which I had been working; at least theywere in form for discussion. At a conference at the Hôtel Crillonbetween President Wilson and the American Commissioners on January 7, Ihanded to him the draft articles saying that they were supplemental tomy letter of December 23. He took them without comment and withoutmaking any reference to my unanswered letter. 

The first two articles of the "International Agreement, " as I termed thedocument, were identical in language with the memoranda dealing with amutual covenant and with an international council which I had enclosedin my letter of December 23. It is needless, therefore, to repeatthem here. 

Article III of the so-called "Agreement" was entitled "PeacefulSettlements of International Disputes, " and read as follows:

 "_Clause_ 1

 "In the event that there is a controversy between two or more members of the League of Nations which fails of settlement through diplomatic channels, one of the following means of settlement shall be employed:

 "1. The parties to the controversy shall constitute a joint commission to investigate and report jointly or severally to their Governments the facts and make recommendations as to settlement. After such report a further effort shall be made to reach a diplomatic settlement of the controversy. 

 "2. The parties shall by agreement arrange for the submission of the controversy to arbitration mutually agreed upon, or to the Arbitral Tribunal hereinafter referred to. 

 "3. Any party may, unless the second means of settlement is mutually adopted, submit the controversy to the Supervisory Committee of the International Council; and the Committee shall forthwith (a) name and direct a special commission to investigate and report upon the subject; (b) name and direct a commission to mediate between the parties to the controversy; or (c) direct the parties to submit the controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal for judicial settlement, it being understood that the direction to arbitrate may be made at any time in the event that investigation and mediation fail to result in a settlement of the controversy. 

 "_Clause 2_

 "No party to a controversy shall assume any authority or perform any acts based upon disputed rights without authorization of the Supervisory Committee, such authorization being limited in all cases to the pendency of the controversy and its final settlement and being in no way prejudicial to the rights of the parties. An authorization thus granted by the Supervisory Committee may be modified or superseded by mutual agreement of the parties, by order of an arbitrator or arbitrators selected by the parties, or by order of the Arbitral Tribunal if the controversy is submitted to it. 

 "_Clause 3_

 "The foregoing clause shall not apply to cases in which the constituted authorities of a power are unable or fail to give protection to the lives and property of nationals of another power. In the event that it becomes necessary for a power to use its military or naval forces to safeguard the lives or property of its nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of another power, the facts and reasons for such action shall be forthwith reported to the Supervisory Committee, which shall determine the course of action to be adopted in order to protect the rights of all parties, and shall notify the same to the governments involved which shall comply with such notification. In the event that a government fails to comply therewith it shall be deemed to have violated the covenant and guaranty hereinbefore set forth. "

The other articles follow:

 "ARTICLE IV

 "_Revision of Arbitral Tribunal and Codification of International Law_

 "_Clause 1_

 "The International Council, within one year after its organization, shall notify to the powers signatory and adherent to this convention and shall invite all other powers to send delegates to an international conference at such place and time as the Council may determine and not later than six months after issuance of such notification and invitation. 

 "_Clause 2_

 "The International Conference shall consider the revision of the constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal and provisions for the amicable settlement of international disputes established by the I Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907, and shall formulate codes embodying the principles of international law applicable in time of peace and the rules of warfare on land and sea and in the air. The revision and codification when completed shall be embodied in a treaty or treaties. 

 "_Clause 3_

 "The International Council shall prepare and submit with the notification and invitation above provided a preliminary programme of the International Conference, which shall be subject to modification or amendment by the Conference. 

 "_Clause 4_

 "Until the treaty of revision of the constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal becomes operative, the provisions of the I Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907 shall continue in force, and all references herein to the 'Arbitral Tribunal' shall be understood to be the Tribunal constituted under the I Treaty, but upon the treaty of revision coming into force the references shall be construed as applying to the Arbitral Tribunal therein constituted. 

 "ARTICLE V

 "_Publication of Treaties and Agreements_

 "_Clause 1_

 "Each power, signatory or adherent to this convention, severally agrees with all other parties hereto that it will not exchange the ratification of any treaty or convention hereinafter entered into by it with any other power until thirty days after the full text of such treaty or convention has been published in the public press of the parties thereto and a copy has been filed with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. 

 "_Clause 2_

 "No international agreement, to which a power signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, shall become operative or be put in force until published and filed as aforesaid. 

 "_Clause 3_

 "All treaties, conventions and agreements, to which a power, signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, and which are in force or to come into force and which have not been heretofore published, shall within six months after the signature of this convention be published and filed as aforesaid or abrogated or denounced. 

 "ARTICLE VI

 "_Equality of Commercial Privileges_

 "The powers, signatory and adherent to this convention agree jointly and severally not to discriminate against or in favor of any power in the matter of commerce or trade or of industrial privileges; and they further agree that all treaties, conventions and agreements now in force or to come into force or hereinafter negotiated shall be considered as subject to the 'most favored nation' doctrine, whether they contain or do not contain a clause to that effect. It is specifically declared that it is the purpose of this article not to limit any power in imposing upon commerce and trade such restrictions and burdens as it may deem proper but to make such impositions apply equally and impartially to all other powers, their nationals and ships. 

 "This article shall not apply, however, to any case, in which a power has committed an unfriendly act against the members of the League of Nations as defined in Article I and in which commercial and trade relations are denied or restricted by agreements between the members as a measure of restoration or protection of the rights of a power injured by such unfriendly act. "

These proposed articles, which were intended for discussion beforedrafting the provisions constituting a League of Nations and which didnot purport to be a completed document, are given in full because thereseems no simpler method of showing the differences between the Presidentand me as to the form, functions, and authority of an internationalorganization. They should be compared with the draft of the "Covenant"which the President had when these proposed articles were handed to him;the text of the President's draft appears in the Appendix (page 281). Comparison will disclose the irreconcilable differences between thetwo projects. 

Of these differences the most vital was in the character of theinternational guaranty of territorial and political sovereignty. Thatdifference has already been discussed. The second in importance was thepractical repudiation by the President of the doctrine of the equalityof nations, which, as has been shown, was an unavoidable consequence ofan affirmative guaranty which he had declared to be absolutely essentialto an effective world union. The repudiation, though by indirection, wasnone the less evident in the recognition in the President's plan of theprimacy of the Great Powers through giving to them a permanent majorityon the "Executive Council" which body substantially controlled theactivities of the League. A third marked difference was in Mr. Wilson'sexaltation of the executive power of the League and the subordination ofthe administration of legal justice to that power, and in my advocacy ofan independent international judiciary, whose decisions would be finaland whose place in the organization of the nations would be superior, since I considered a judicial tribunal the most practical agency forremoving causes of war. 

The difference as to international courts and the importance of appliedlegal justice requires further consideration in order to understand thedivergence of views which existed as to the fundamental idea oforganization of the League. 

President Wilson in his Covenant, as at first submitted to the AmericanCommissioners, made no provision for the establishment of a World Courtof Justice, and no reference of any sort was made to The Hague Tribunalof Arbitration. It is not, in my opinion, a misstatement to say that thePresident intentionally omitted judicial means of composinginternational disputes preferring to leave settlements of that sort toarrangement between the parties or else to the Body of Delegates or theExecutive Council, both of which bodies being essentially diplomatic orpolitical in their composition would lack the judicial point of view, since their members would presumably be influenced by their respectivenational interests and by political considerations rather than by adesire and purpose to do impartial justice by applying legal principles. 

It is true that in Article V of the first draft of the Covenant(Appendix) there is an agreement to submit to arbitrationcertain classes of controversies and a method of selecting arbitratorsis provided--a method, by the way, which the actual experience of acentury has shown to be the least satisfactory in administering legaljustice, since it almost inevitably leads to a compromise which impairsthe just rights of one of the parties. But, to my mind, a provision, farmore objectionable than the antiquated and unsatisfactory method ofarbitration provided, was that which made an arbitral award reviewableon appeal to the Body of Delegates of the League, which could set asidethe award even if the arbitrators had rendered a unanimous decision andcompel a rehearing before other arbitrators. International arbitrationas a method of applying the principles of justice to disputes betweennations would, in the first instance at least, have become a farce ifthis provision had been adopted. As an award based on compromise isseldom, if ever, satisfactory to both parties, the right of appeal wouldin substantially every case have been invoked and the award would havebeen reviewed by the Body of Delegates, who would practically render afinal decision since the new arbitrators would presumably adopt it. Theeffect of this provision as to appeals was, therefore, to supplantjudicial settlements by political compromises and diplomaticadjustments, in which the national interests of the judges, many of whomwould be untrained in juridical procedure, would be decided, if notdeciding, factors. Manifestly the expediency of the moment would be farmore potent in the decisions reached than the principles and precepts ofinternational law. 

I shall not express here my opinion as to the reasons which I believeimpelled the President to insert in the Covenant these extraordinaryprovisions which deprived arbitral courts of that independence of theexecutive authority which has been in modern times considered essentialto the impartial administration of justice. But, when one considers howjealously and effectively the Constitution of the United States and theconstitutions of the various States of the Union guard the judiciaryfrom executive and legislative interference, the proposal in thePresident's plan for a League of Nations to abandon that great principlein the settlement of international disputes of a justiciable naturecauses speculation as to Mr. Wilson's real opinion of the Americanpolitical system which emphasizes the separation and independence of thethree coordinate branches of government. 

That a provision found its way into the draft of the Covenant, which thePresident, on February 3, 1919, laid before the Commission on the Leagueof Nations, declaring for the creation by the League of a permanentcourt of international justice, was not due, I feel sure, to anyspontaneous thought on the part of President Wilson. 

My own views as to the relative value of the settlement of aninternational controversy, which is by its nature justiciable, by a bodyof diplomats and of the settlement by a body of trained jurists werefully set forth in an address which I delivered before the American BarAssociation at its annual meeting at Boston on September 5, 1919. 

An extract from that address will show the radical difference betweenthe President's views and mine. 

 "While abstract justice cannot [under present conditions] be depended upon as a firm basis on which to constitute an international concord for the preservation of peace and good relations between nations, legal justice offers a common ground where the nations can meet to settle their controversies. No nation can refuse in the face of the opinion of the world to declare its unwillingness to recognize the legal rights of other nations or to submit to the judgment of an impartial tribunal a dispute involving the determination of such rights. The moment, however, that we go beyond the clearly defined field of legal justice we enter the field of diplomacy where national interests and ambitions are to-day the controlling factors of national action. Concession and compromise are the chief agents of diplomatic settlement instead of the impartial application of legal justice which is essential to a judicial settlement. Furthermore, the two modes of settlement differ in that a judicial settlement rests upon the precept that all nations, whether great or small, are equal, but in the sphere of diplomacy the inequality of nations is not only recognized, but unquestionably influences the adjustment of international differences. Any change in the relative power of nations, a change which is continually taking place, makes more or less temporary diplomatic settlements, but in no way affects a judicial settlement. 

 "However, then, international society may be organized for the future and whatever machinery may be set up to minimize the possibilities of war, I believe that the agency which may be counted upon to function with certainty is that which develops and applies legal justice. "

Every other agency, regardless of its form, will be found, whenanalyzed, to be diplomatic in character and subject to those impulsesand purposes which generally affect diplomatic negotiations. With a fullappreciation of the advantage to be gained for the world at largethrough the common consideration of a vexatious international questionby a body representing all nations, we ought not to lose sight of thefact that such consideration and the action resulting from it areessentially diplomatic in nature. It is, in brief, the transference of adispute in a particular case from the capitals of the disputants to theplace where the delegates of the nations assemble to deliberate togetheron matters which affect their common interests. It does not--and this weshould understand--remove the question from the processes of diplomacyor prevent the influences which enter into diplomacy from affecting itsconsideration. Nor does it to an appreciable extent change the actualinequality which exists among nations in the matter of power andinfluence. 

 "On the other hand, justice applied through the agency of an impartial tribunal clothed with an international jurisdiction eliminates the diplomatic methods of compromise and concession and recognizes that before the law all nations are equal and equally entitled to the exercise of their rights as sovereign and independent states. In a word, international democracy exists in the sphere of legal justice and, up to the present time, in no other relation between nations. 

 "Let us, then, with as little delay as possible establish an international tribunal or tribunals of justice with The Hague Court as a foundation; let us provide an easier, a cheaper, and better procedure than now exists; and let us draft a simple and concise body of legal principles to be applied to the questions to be adjudicated. When that has been accomplished--and it ought not to be a difficult task if the delegates of the Governments charged with it are chosen for their experience and learning in the field of jurisprudence--we shall, in my judgment, have done more to prevent international wars through removing their causes than can be done by any other means that has been devised or suggested. "

The views, which I thus publicly expressed at Boston in September, 1919, while the President was upon his tour of the country in favor of theCovenant of the League of Nations, were the same as those that I held atParis in December, 1918, before I had seen the President's first draftof a Covenant, as the following will indicate. 

On December 17, 1918, three days after arriving in Paris, I had, as hasbeen stated, a long conference with Colonel House on the PeaceConference and the subjects to come before it. I urged him in the courseof our conversation "to persuade the President to make the nucleus ofhis proposed League of Nations an international court pointing out thatit was the simplest and best way of organizing the world for peace, andthat, if in addition the general principles of international law werecodified and the right of inquiry confided to the court, everythingpractical would have been done to prevent wars in the future" (quotedfrom a memorandum of the conversation made at the time). I also urgedupon the Colonel that The Hague Tribunal be made the basis of thejudicial organization, but that it be expanded and improved to meet thenew conditions. I shall have something further to say on this subject. 

Reverting now to the draft of articles which I had in form on January 5, 1919, it must be borne in mind that I then had no reason to think thatthe President would omit from his plan an independent judicial agencyfor the administration of legal justice, although I did realize that hegave first place to the mutual guaranty and intended to build a Leagueon that as a nucleus. It did not seem probable that an American, astudent of the political institutions of the United States and familiarwith their operation, would fail to incorporate in any scheme for worldorganization a judicial system which would be free from the control andeven from the influence of the political and diplomatic branch of theorganization. The benefit, if not the necessity, of such a division ofauthority seemed so patent that the omission of a provision to thateffect in the original draft of the Covenant condemned it to one whobelieved in the principles of government which found expression inAmerican institutions. Fortunately the defect was in a measure curedbefore the Commission on the League of Nations formally met to discussthe subject, though not before the Covenant had been laid before theAmerican Commissioners. 

The articles of a proposed convention for the creation of aninternational organization were not intended, as I have said, to form acomplete convention. They were suggestive only of the principal featuresof a plan which could, if the President desired, arouse discussion as tothe right theory and the fundamental principles of the internationalorganization which there seemed little doubt would be declared by theParis Conference. 

Among the suggested articles there was none covering the subject ofdisarmament, because the problem was highly technical requiring theconsideration of military and naval experts. Nor was there any referenceto the mandatory system because there had not been, to my knowledge, anymention of it at that time in connection with the President's plan, though General Smuts had given it prominence in his proposed scheme. 

During the preparation of these suggestive articles I made a briefmemorandum on the features, which seemed to me salient, of anyinternational agreement to prevent wars in the future, and which in myopinion ought to be in mind when drafting such an agreement. The firstthree paragraphs of the memorandum follow:

 "There are three doctrines which should be incorporated in the Treaty of Peace if wars are to be avoided and equal justice is to prevail in international affairs. 

 "These three doctrines may be popularly termed 'Hands Off, ' the 'Open Door, ' and 'Publicity. '

 "The first pertains to national possessions and national rights; the second to international commerce and economic conditions; and the third, to international agreements. "

An examination of the articles which I prepared shows that thesedoctrines are developed in them, although at the time I was uncertainwhether they ought to appear in the convention creating the League or inthe Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which I believed, in common with theprevailing belief, would be negotiated. My impression was that theyshould appear in the Peace Treaty and possibly be repeated in the LeagueTreaty, if the two were kept distinct. 

CHAPTER V

THE AFFIRMATIVE GUARANTY AND BALANCE OF POWER

While I was engaged in the preparation of these articles for discussion, which were based primarily on the equality of nations and avoided amutual guaranty or other undertaking necessitating a departure from thatprinciple, M. Clemenceau delivered an important address in the Chamberof Deputies at its session on December 30, 1918. In this address theFrench Premier declared himself in favor of maintaining the doctrine of"the balance of power" and of supporting it by a concert of the GreatPowers. During his remarks he made the following significant assertion, "This system of alliances, which I do not renounce, will be my guidingthought at the Conference, if your confidence sends me to it, so thatthere will be no separation in peace of the four powers which havebattled side by side. "

M. Clemenceau's words caused a decided sensation among the delegatesalready in Paris and excited much comment in the press. The publicinterest was intensified by the fact that President Wilson had but a dayor two before, in an address at Manchester, England, denounced thedoctrine of "the balance of power" as belonging to the old internationalorder which had been repudiated because it had produced the conditionsthat resulted in the Great War. 

A week after the delivery of M. Clemenceau's address I discussed hisdeclarations at some length with Colonel House, and he agreed with methat the doctrine was entirely contrary to the public opinion of theworld and that every effort should be made to prevent its revival and toend the "system of alliances" which M. Clemenceau desired to continue. 

During this conversation I pointed out that the form of affirmativeguaranty, which the President then had in mind, would unavoidably imposethe burden of enforcing it upon the Great Powers, and that they, havingthat responsibility, would demand the right to decide at what time andin what manner the guaranty should be enforced. This seemed to me to beonly a different application of the principle expressed in the doctrineof "the balance of power" and to amount to a practical continuance ofthe alliances formed for prosecution of the war. I said that, in myjudgment, if the President's guaranty was made the central idea of theLeague of Nations, it would play directly into the hands of M. Clemenceau because it could mean nothing other than the primacy of thegreat military and naval powers; that I could not understand how thePresident was able to harmonize his plan of a positive guaranty with hisutterances at Manchester; and that, if he clung to his plan, he wouldhave to accept the Clemenceau doctrine, which would to all intentstransform the Conference into a second Congress of Vienna and result ina reversion to the old undesirable order, and its continuance in theLeague of Nations. 

It was my hope that Colonel House, to whom I had shown the letter andmemoranda which I had sent to the President, would be so impressed withthe inconsistency of favoring the affirmative guaranty and of opposingthe doctrine of "the balance of power, " that he would exert hisinfluence with the President to persuade him to find a substitute forthe guaranty which Mr. Wilson then favored. It seemed politic toapproach the President in this way in view of the fact that he had neveracknowledged my letter or manifested any inclination to discuss thesubject with me. 

This hope was increased when the Colonel came to me on the evening ofthe same day that we had the conversation related above and told me thathe was "entirely converted" to my plan for a negative guaranty and forthe organization of a League. 

At this second interview Colonel House gave me a typewritten copy of thePresident's plan and asked me to examine it and to suggest a way toamend it so that it would harmonize with my views. This was the firsttime that I had seen the President's complete plan for a League. Myprevious knowledge had been gained orally and was general and more orless vague in character except as to the guaranty of which I had anaccurate idea through the President's "Bases of Peace" of 1917, andPoint XIV of his address of January 8, 1918. At the time that thetypewritten plan was handed to me another copy had already been given tothe printer of the Commission. It was evident, therefore, that thePresident was satisfied with the document. It contained the theory andfundamental principles which he advocated for world organization. 

CHAPTER VI

THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN

I immediately began an examination and analysis of the President's planfor a League, having in mind Colonel House's suggestion that I considera way to modify it so that it would harmonize with my views. The more Istudied the document, the less I liked it. A cursory reading of theplan, which is printed in the Appendix (page 281), will disclose thelooseness of the language and the doubtful interpretation of many of theprovisions. It showed an inexpertness in drafting and a fault inexpression which were chargeable to lack of appreciation of the need ofexactness or else to haste in preparation. This fault in the paper, which was very apparent, could, however, be cured and was by no means afatal defect. As a matter of fact, the faults of expression were to acertain extent removed by subsequent revisions, though some of thevagueness and ambiguity of the first draft persisted and appeared in thefinal text of the Covenant. 

The more serious defects of the plan were in the principles on which itwas based and in their application under the provisions of the articlesproposed. The contemplated use of force in making good the guaranty ofsovereign rights and the establishment of a primacy of the Great Powerswere provided for in language which was sufficiently explicit to admitof no denial. In my opinion these provisions were entirely out ofharmony with American ideals, policies, and traditions. Furthermore, theclauses in regard to arbitration and appeals from arbitral awards, towhich reference has been made, the lack of any provision for theestablishment of a permanent international judiciary, and theintroduction of the mandatory system were strong reasons to reject thePresident's plan. 

It should be borne in mind that, at the time that this document wasplaced in my hands, the plan of General Smuts for a League of Nationshad, as I have said, been printed in the press and in pamphlet form andhad been given wide publicity. In the Smuts plan, which gave first placeto the system of mandates, appeared the declaration that the League ofNations was to acquire the mandated territories as "the heir of theEmpires. " This clever and attractive phrase caught the fancy of thePresident, as was evident from his frequent repetition and approval ofit in discussing mandates under the League. Just as General Smuts hadadopted the President's "self-determination, " Mr. Wilson seized upon theSmuts idea with avidity and incorporated it in his plan. Itunquestionably had a decided influence upon his conception of the rightway to dispose of the colonial possessions of Germany and of the properrelation of the newly created European states to the League of Nations. As an example of the way in which President Wilson understood andapplied General Smuts's phrase to the new states, I quote the followingfrom the "Supplementary Agreements" forming part of the first printeddraft of the President's Covenant, but which I believe were added to thetypewritten draft after the President had examined the plan of the SouthAfrican statesman:

 "As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations _inter se_ of all new independent states arising or created out of the Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance of settled order and the general peace. "

There is a natural temptation to a student of international agreementsto analyze critically the composition and language of this provision, but to do so would in no way advance the consideration of the subjectunder discussion and would probably be interpreted as a criticism of thePresident's skill in accurately expressing his thoughts, a criticismwhich it is not my purpose to make. 

Mr. Wilson's draft also contained a system of mandates over territoriesin a form which was, to say the least, rudimentary if not inadequate. Bythe proposed system the League of Nations, as "the residuary trustee, "was to take sovereignty over "the peoples and territories" of thedefeated Empires and to issue a mandate to some power or powers toexercise such sovereignty. A "residuary trustee" was a novelty ininternational relations sufficient to arouse conjecture as to itsmeaning, but giving to the League the character of an independent statewith the capacity of possessing sovereignty and the power to exercisesovereign rights through a designated agent was even more extraordinary. This departure from the long accepted idea of the essentials ofstatehood seemed to me an inexpedient and to a degree a dangerousadventure. The only plausible excuse for the proposal seemed to be alack of knowledge as to the nature of sovereignty and as to theattributes inherent in the very conception of a state. The character ofa mandate, a mandatory, and the authority issuing the mandate presentedmany legal perplexities which certainly required very careful studybefore the experiment was tried. Until the system was fully worked outand the problems of practical operation were solved, it seemed to meunwise to suggest it and still more unwise to adopt it. While thegeneral idea of mandates issuing from the proposed internationalorganization was presumably acceptable to the President from the first, his support was doubtless confirmed by the fact that it followed thegroove which had been made in his mind by the Smuts phrase "the heir ofthe Empires. "

In any event it seemed to me the course of wise statesmanship topostpone the advocacy of mandates, based on the assumption that theLeague of Nations could become the possessor of sovereignty, until thepractical application of the theory could be thoroughly considered fromthe standpoint of international law as well as from the standpoint ofpolicy. The experiment was too revolutionary to be tried withouthesitation and without consideration of the effect on establishedprinciples and usage. At an appropriate place this subject will be morefully discussed. 

As to the organization and functions of the League of Nations planned byMr. Wilson there was little that appealed to one who was opposed to theemployment of force in compelling the observance of internationalobligations and to the establishment of an international oligarchy ofthe Great Powers to direct and control world affairs. The basicprinciple of the plan was that the strong should, as a matter of rightrecognized by treaty, possess a dominant voice in internationalcouncils. Obviously the principle of the equality of nations was ignoredor abandoned. In the face of the repeated declarations of the Governmentof the United States in favor of the equality of independent states asto their rights in times of peace, this appeared to be a reversal ofpolicy which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain in asatisfactory way. Personally I could not subscribe to this principlewhich was so destructive of the American theory of the proper relationsbetween nations. 

It was manifest, when I read the President's plan, that there was nopossible way to harmonize my ideas with it. They were fundamentallydifferent. There was no common basis on which to build. To attempt tobring the two theories into accord would have been futile. I, therefore, told Colonel House that it was useless to try to bring into accord thetwo plans, since they were founded on contradictory principles and thatthe only course of procedure open to me was to present my views to thePresident in written form, hoping that he would give them consideration, although fearing that his mind was made up, since he had ordered hisplan to be printed. 

In the afternoon of the same day (January 7), on which I informed theColonel of the impossibility of harmonizing and uniting the two plans, President Wilson held a conference with the American Commissionersduring which he declared that he considered the affirmative guarantyabsolutely necessary to the preservation of future peace and the onlyeffective means of preventing war. Before this declaration could bediscussed M. Clemenceau was announced and the conference came to an end. While the President did not refer in any way to the "self-denyingcovenant" which I had proposed as a substitute, it seemed to me that heintended it to be understood that the substitute was rejected, and thathe had made the declaration with that end in view. This was the nearestapproach to an answer to my letter of December 23 that I ever received. Indirect as it was the implication was obvious. 

Although the settled purpose of the President to insist on his form ofmutual guaranty was discouraging and his declaration seemed to beintended to close debate on the subject, I felt that no effort should bespared to persuade him to change his views or at least to leave open anavenue for further consideration. Impelled by this motive I gave to thePresident the articles which I had drafted and asked him if he would begood enough to read them and consider the principles on which they werebased. The President with his usual courtesy of manner smilinglyreceived them. Whether or not he ever read them I cannot statepositively because he never mentioned them to me or, to my knowledge, toany one else. I believe, however, that he did read them and realizedthat they were wholly opposed to the theory which he had evolved, because from that time forward he seemed to assume that I was hostile tohis plan for a League of Nations. I drew this conclusion from the factthat he neither asked my advice as to any provision of the Covenant nordiscussed the subject with me personally. In many little ways he showedthat he preferred to have me direct my activities as a Commissioner intoother channels and to keep away from the subject of a League. Theconviction that my counsel was unwelcome to Mr. Wilson was, of course, not formed at the time that he received the articles drafted by me. Itonly developed after some time had elapsed, during which incidents tookplace that aroused a suspicion which finally became a conviction. Possibly I was over-sensitive as to the President's treatment of mycommunications to him. Possibly he considered my advice of no value, and, therefore, unworthy of discussion. But, in view of his letter ofFebruary 11, 1920, it must be admitted that he recognized that I wasreluctant in accepting certain of his views at Paris, a recognitionwhich arose from my declared opposition to them. Except in the case ofthe Shantung settlement, there was none concerning which our judgmentswere so at variance as they were concerning the League of Nations. Icannot believe, therefore, that I was wrong in my conclusion as tohis attitude. 

On the two days succeeding the one when I handed the President my draftof articles I had long conferences with Lord Robert Cecil and ColonelHouse. Previous to these conferences, or at least previous to the secondone, I examined Lord Robert's plan for a League. His plan was based onthe proposition that the Supreme War Council, consisting of the Heads ofStates and the Secretaries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the FiveGreat Powers, should be perpetuated as a permanent international bodywhich should meet once a year and discuss subjects of common interest. That is, he proposed the formation of a Quintuple Alliance which wouldconstitute itself primate over all nations and the arbiter in worldaffairs, a scheme of organization very similar to the one proposed byGeneral Smuts. 

Lord Robert made no attempt to disguise the purpose of his plan. It wasintended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control ofinternational relations and the direction in large measure of theforeign policies of all nations. It was based on the power to compelobedience, on the right of the powerful to rule. Its chief merit was itshonest declaration of purpose, however wrong that purpose might appearto those who denied that the possession of superior might conferredspecial rights upon the possessor. It seemed to provide for a rebirth ofthe Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb ofdemocracy. It could only be interpreted as a rejection of the principleof the equality of nations. Its adoption would mean that the destiny ofthe world would be in the hands of a powerful international oligarchypossessed of dictatorial powers. 

There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, althoughhe was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order. Anexamination of his plan (Appendix) shows it to be a substantial revivalof the old and discredited ideas of a century ago. There could be nodoubt that a plan of this sort, materialistic and selfish as it was, would win the approval and cordial support of M. Clemenceau, since itfitted in with his public advocacy of the doctrine of "the balance ofpower. " Presumably the Italian delegates would not be opposed to ascheme which gave Italy so influential a voice in international affairs, while the Japanese, not averse to this recognition of their nationalpower and importance, would unquestionably favor an alliance of thisnature. I think that it is fair to assume that all of the Five GreatPowers would have readily accepted the Cecil plan--all except theUnited States. 

This plan, however, did not meet with the approval of President Wilson, and his open opposition to it became an obstacle which prevented itsconsideration in the form in which it was proposed. It is a matter ofspeculation what reasons appealed to the President and caused him tooppose the plan, although the principle of primacy found application ina different and less radical form in his own plan of organization. Possibly he felt that the British statesman's proposal too franklydeclared the coalition and oligarchy of the Five Powers, and that thereshould be at least the appearance of cooperation on the part of thelesser nations. Of course, in view of the perpetual majority of the FivePowers on the Executive Council, as provided in the President's plan, the primacy of the Five was weakened little if at all by the minoritymembership of the small nations. The rule of unanimity gave to eachnation a veto power, but no one believed that one of the lesser statesrepresented on the Council would dare to exercise it if the Great Powerswere unanimous in support of a proposition. In theory unanimity was ajust and satisfactory rule; in practice it would amount to nothing. ThePresident may also have considered the council proposed by Lord Robertto be inexpedient in view of the political organization of the UnitedStates. The American Government had no actual premier except thePresident, and it seemed out of the question for him to attend an annualmeeting of the proposed council. It would result in the Presidentsending a personal representative who would unavoidably be in asubordinate position when sitting with the European premiers. I thinkthis latter reason was a very valid one, but that the first one, whichseemed to appeal especially to the President, had little real merit. 

In addition to his objection to the Cecil plan of administration, another was doubtless of even greater weight to Mr. Wilson and that wasthe entire omission in the Cecil proposal of the mutual guaranty ofpolitical independence and territorial integrity. The method ofpreventing wars which was proposed by Lord Robert was for the nations toenter into a covenant to submit disputes to international investigationand to obtain a report before engaging in hostilities and also acovenant not to make war on a disputant nation which accepted a reportwhich had been unanimously adopted. He further proposed that the membersof the League should undertake to regard themselves as _ipso facto_ atwar with a member violating these covenants and "to take, jointly andseverally, appropriate military, economic, and other measures againstthe recalcitrant State, " thus following closely the idea of the Leagueto Enforce Peace. 

Manifestly this last provision in the Cecil plan was open to the sameconstitutional objections as those which could be raised against thePresident's mutual guaranty. My impression is that Mr. Wilson'sopposition to the provision was not based on the ground that it was incontravention of the Constitution of the United States, but rather onthe ground that it did not go far enough in stabilizing the terms ofpeace which were to be negotiated. The President was seeking permanencyby insuring, through the threat or pressure of international force, acondition of changelessness in boundaries and sovereign rights, subject, nevertheless, to territorial changes based either on the principle of"self-determination" or on a three-fourths vote of the Body ofDelegates. He, nevertheless, discussed the subject with Lord RobertCecil prior to laying his draft of a Covenant before the AmericanCommissioners, as is evident by comparing it with the Cecil plan, forcertain phrases are almost identical in language in the two documents. 

CHAPTER VII

SELF-DETERMINATION

The mutual guaranty which was advocated by President Wilson appears asArticle III of his original draft of a Covenant. It reads as follows:

 "ARTICLE III

 "The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary. "

In the revised draft, which he laid before the Commissionon the League of Nations at its first session Article IIIbecame Article 7. It is as follows:

 "ARTICLE 7

 "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League. "

The guaranty was finally incorporated in the Treaty of Peace as Article10. It reads:

 "ARTICLE 10

 "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. "

In the revision of the original draft the modifying clause providing forfuture territorial readjustments was omitted. It does not appear inArticle 7 of the draft which was presented to the Commission on theLeague of Nations and which formed the basis of its deliberations. Inaddition to this modification the words "unite in guaranteeing" inArticle III became "undertake to respect and preserve" in Article 7. These changes are only important in that they indicate a disposition torevise the article to meet the wishes, and to remove to an extent theobjections, of some of the foreign delegates who had prepared plans fora League or at least had definite ideas as to the purposes and functionsof an international organization. 

It was generally believed that the elimination of the modifying clausefrom the President's original form of guaranty was chiefly due to theopposition of the statesmen who represented the British Empire incontradistinction to those who represented the self-governing BritishDominions. It was also believed that this opposition was caused by anunwillingness on their part to recognize or to apply as a right theprinciple of "self-determination" in arranging possible future changesof sovereignty over territories. 

I do not know the arguments which were used to induce the President toabandon this phrase and to strike it from his article of guaranty. Ipersonally doubt whether the objection to the words "self-determination"was urged upon him. Whatever reasons were advanced by his foreigncolleagues, they were successful in freeing the Covenant from thephrase. It is to be regretted that the influence, which was sufficientto induce the President to eliminate from his proposed guaranty theclause containing a formal acceptance of the principle of"self-determination, " was not exerted or else was not potent enough toobtain from him an open disavowal of the principle as a right standardfor the determination of sovereign authority. Without such a disavowalthe phrase remained as one of the general bases upon which a just peaceshould be negotiated. It remained a precept of the international creedwhich Mr. Wilson proclaimed while the war was still in progress, for hehad declared, in an address delivered on February 11, 1918, before ajoint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, that"self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principleof action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. "

"Self-determination" is as right in theory as the more famous phrase"the consent of the governed, " which has for three centuries beenrepeatedly declared to be sound by political philosophers and has beengenerally accepted as just by civilized peoples, but which has been forthree centuries commonly ignored by statesmen because the right couldnot be practically applied without imperiling national safety, alwaysthe paramount consideration in international and national affairs. Thetwo phrases mean substantially the same thing and have to an extent beenused interchangeably by those who advocate the principle as a standardof right. "Self-determination" was not a new thought. It was arestatement of the old one. 

Under the present political organization of the world, based as it is onthe idea of nationality, the new phrase is as unsusceptible of universalapplication as the old one was found to be. Fixity of nationalboundaries and of national allegiance, and political stability woulddisappear if this principle was uniformly applied. Impelled by newsocial conditions, by economic interests, by racial prejudices, and bythe various forces which affect society, change and uncertainty wouldresult from an attempt to follow the principle in every case to which itis possible to apply it. 

Among my notes I find one of December 20, 1918--that is, one week afterthe American Commission landed in France--in which I recorded mythoughts concerning certain phrases or epigrams of the President, whichhe had declared to be bases of peace, and which I considered to containthe seeds of future trouble. In regard to the asserted right of"self-determination" I wrote:

 "When the President talks of 'self-determination' what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability. "

Ten days later (December 30) the frequent repetition of the phrase inthe press and by members of certain groups and unofficial delegations, who were in Paris seeking to obtain hearings before the Conference, caused me to write the following:

 "The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of 'self-determination, ' the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in many lands. 

 "What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? How can it be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically committed?

 "The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!"

Since the foregoing notes were written the impracticability of theuniversal or even of the general application of the principle has beenfully demonstrated. Mr. Wilson resurrected "the consent of the governed"regardless of the fact that history denied its value as a practicalguide in modern political relations. He proclaimed it in the phrase"self-determination, " declaring it to be an "imperative principle ofaction. " He made it one of the bases of peace. And yet, in thenegotiations at Paris and in the formulation of the foreign policy ofthe United States, he has by his acts denied the existence of the rightother than as the expression of a moral precept, as something to bedesired, but generally unattainable in the lives of nations. In theactual conduct of affairs, in the practical and concrete relationsbetween individuals and governments, it doubtless exercises and shouldexercise a measure of influence, but it is not a controlling influence. 

In the Treaty of Versailles with Germany the readjustment of the Germanboundaries, by which the sovereignty over millions of persons of Germanblood was transferred to the new states of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and the practical cession to the Empire of Japan of the port ofKiao-Chau and control over the economic life of the Province of Shantungare striking examples of the abandonment of the principle. 

In the Treaty of Saint-Germain the Austrian Tyrol was ceded to theKingdom of Italy against the known will of substantially the entirepopulation of that region. 

In both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain Austriawas denied the right to form a political union with Germany, and when anarticle of the German Constitution of August, 1919, contemplating a"reunion" of "German Austria" with the German Empire was objected to bythe Supreme Council, then in session at Paris, as in contradiction ofthe terms of the Treaty with Germany, a protocol was signed on September22, 1919, by plenipotentiaries of Germany and the five Principal Alliedand Associated Powers, declaring the article in the Constitution nulland void. There could hardly be a more open repudiation of the allegedright of "self-determination" than this refusal to permit Austria tounite with Germany however unanimous the wish of the Austrian people forsuch union. 

But Mr. Wilson even further discredited the phrase by adopting a policytoward Russia which ignored the principle. The peoples of Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan have by blood, language, and racial traits elements of difference which give to each ofthem in more or less degree the character of a distinct nationality. These peoples all possess aspirations to become independent states, andyet, throughout the negotiations at Paris and since that time, theGovernment of the United States has repeatedly refused to recognize theright of the inhabitants of these territories to determine forthemselves the sovereignty under which they shall live. It has, on thecontrary, declared in favor of a "Great Russia" comprising the vastterritory of the old Empire except the province which belonged to thedismembered Kingdom of Poland and the lands included within the presentboundaries of the Republic of Finland. 

I do not mention the policy of President Wilson as to an undividedRussia by way of criticism because I believe the policy was and hascontinued to be the right one. The reference to it is made for thesole purpose of pointing out another example of Mr. Wilson's frequentdeparture without explanation from his declared standard for thedetermination of political authority and allegiance. I thinkthat it must be conceded that he has by his acts proved that"self-determination" _is_ "a mere phrase" which ought to be discardedas misleading because it cannot be practically applied. 

It may be pointed out as a matter of special interest to the student ofAmerican history that, if the right of "self-determination" were soundin principle and uniformly applicable in establishing politicalallegiance and territorial sovereignty, the endeavor of the SouthernStates to secede from the American Union in 1861 would have been whollyjustifiable; and, conversely, the Northern States, in forciblypreventing secession and compelling the inhabitants of the Statescomposing the Confederacy to remain under the authority of the FederalGovernment, would have perpetrated a great and indefensible wrongagainst the people of the South by depriving them of a right to whichthey were by nature entitled. This is the logic of the application ofthe principle of "self-determination" to the political rights at issuein the American Civil War. 

I do not believe that there are many Americans of the present generationwho would support the proposition that the South was inherently rightand the North was inherently wrong in that great conflict. There were, at the time when the sections were arrayed in arms against each other, and there may still be, differences of opinion as to the _legal_ rightof secession under the Constitution of the United States, but theinherent right of a people of a State to throw off at will theirallegiance to the Federal Union and resume complete sovereignty over theterritory of the State was never urged as a conclusive argument. It wasthe legal right and not the natural right which was emphasized asjustifying those who took up arms in order to disrupt the Union. But ifan American citizen denies that the principle of "self-determination"can be rightfully applied to the affairs of his own country, how can heconsistently maintain that it is a right inseparable from a trueconception of political liberty and therefore universally applicable, just in principle, and wise from the practical point of view?

Of course, those who subscribe to "self-determination" and advocate itas a great truth fundamental to every political society organized toprotect and promote civil liberty, do not claim it for races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of thecapacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations. As topeoples or communities, however, who do possess the intelligence to makea rational choice of political allegiance, no exception is made, so faras words go, to the undeviating application of the principle. It is theaffirmation of an unqualified right. It is one of those declarations ofprinciple which sounds true, which in the abstract may be true, andwhich appeals strongly to man's innate sense of moral right and to hisconception of natural justice, but which, when the attempt is made toapply it in every case, becomes a source of political instability anddomestic disorder and not infrequently a cause of rebellion. 

In the settlement of territorial rights and of the sovereignty to beexercised over particular regions there are several factors whichrequire consideration. International boundaries may be drawn alongethnic, economic, geographic, historic, or strategic lines. One or allof these elements may influence the decision, but whatever argument maybe urged in favor of any one of these factors, the chief object in thedetermination of the sovereignty to be exercised within a certainterritory is national safety. National safety is as dominant in the lifeof a nation as self-preservation is in the life of an individual. It iseven more so, as nations do not respond to the impulse ofself-sacrifice. With national safety as the primary object to beattained in territorial settlements, the factors of the problem assumegenerally, though not always, the following order of importance: thestrategic, to which is closely allied the geographic and historic; theeconomic, affecting the commercial and industrial life of a nation; andlastly the ethnic, including in the terms such conditions asconsanguinity, common language, and similar social and religiousinstitutions. 

The national safety and the economic welfare of the United States wereat stake in the War of Secession, although the attempt to secederesulted from institutional rather than ethnic causes. The same was truewhen in the Papineau Rebellion of 1837 the French inhabitants of theProvince of Lower Canada attempted for ethnic reasons to free themselvesfrom British sovereignty. Had the right of "self-determination" in thelatter case been recognized as "imperative" by Great Britain, thenational life and economic growth of Canada would have been strangledbecause the lines of communication and the commercial routes to theAtlantic seaboard would have been across an alien state. The future ofCanada, with its vast undeveloped resources, its very life as a Britishcolony, depended upon denying the right of "self-determination. " It wasdenied and the French inhabitants of Quebec were forced against theirwill to accept British sovereignty. 

Experience has already demonstrated the unwisdom of having givencurrency to the phrase "self-determination. " As the expression of anactual right, the application of which is universal and invariable, thephrase has been repudiated or at least violated by many of the terms ofthe treaties which brought to an end the World War. Since the time thatthe principle was proclaimed, it has been the excuse for turbulentpolitical elements in various lands to resist established governmentalauthority; it has induced the use of force in an endeavor to wrest thesovereignty over a territory or over a community from those who havelong possessed and justly exercised it. It has formed the basis forterritorial claims by avaricious nations. And it has introduced intodomestic as well as international affairs a new spirit of disorder. Itis an evil thing to permit the principle of "self-determination" tocontinue to have the apparent sanction of the nations when it has beenin fact thoroughly discredited and will always be cast aside whenever itcomes in conflict with national safety, with historic political rights, or with national economic interests affecting the prosperity ofa nation. 

This discussion of the right of "self-determination, " which was one ofthe bases of peace which President Wilson declared in the winter of1918, and which was included in the modifying clause of his guaranty asoriginally drafted, is introduced for the purpose of showing thereluctance which I felt in accepting his guidance in the adoption of aprinciple so menacing to peace and so impossible of practicalapplication. As a matter of fact I never discussed the subject with Mr. Wilson as I purposed doing, because a situation arose on January 10, 1919, which discouraged me from volunteering to him advice on matterswhich did not directly pertain to legal questions and to theinternational administration of legal justice. 

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 10, 1919

It is with extreme reluctance, as the reader will understand, that Imake any reference to the conference which the President held with theAmerican Commissioners at the Hotel Crillon on January 10, because ofthe personal nature of what occurred. It would be far more agreeable toomit an account of this unpleasant episode. But without referring to itI cannot satisfactorily explain the sudden decision I then reached totake no further part in the preparation or revision of the text of theCovenant of the League of Nations. Without explanation my subsequentconduct would be, and not without reason, open to the charge of neglectof duty and possibly of disloyalty. I do not feel called upon to restunder that suspicion, or to remain silent when a brief statement of whatoccurred at that conference will disclose the reason for the cessationof my efforts to effect changes in the plan of world organization whichthe President had prepared. In the circumstances there can be noimpropriety in disclosing the truth as to the cause for a course ofaction when the course of action itself must be set forth to completethe record and to explain an ignorance of the subsequent negotiationsregarding the League of Nations, an ignorance which has been the subjectof public comment. Certainly no one who participated in the conferencecan object to the truth being known unless for personal reasons heprefers that a false impression should go forth. After carefulconsideration I can see no public reason for withholding the facts. Atthis meeting, to which I refer, the President took up the provisions ofhis original draft of a Covenant, which was at the time in typewrittenform, and indicated the features which he considered fundamental to theproper organization of a League of Nations. I pointed out certainprovisions which appeared to me objectionable in principle or at leastof doubtful policy. Mr. Wilson, however, clearly indicated--at least soI interpreted his words and manner--that he was not disposed to receivethese criticisms in good part and was unwilling to discuss them. He alsosaid with great candor and emphasis that he did not intend to havelawyers drafting the treaty of peace. Although this declaration wascalled forth by the statement that the legal advisers of the AmericanCommission had been, at my request, preparing an outline of a treaty, a"skeleton treaty" in fact, the President's sweeping disapproval ofmembers of the legal profession participating in the treaty-makingseemed to be, and I believe was, intended to be notice to me that mycounsel was unwelcome. Being the only lawyer on the delegation Inaturally took this remark to myself, and I know that other AmericanCommissioners held the same view of its purpose. If my belief wasunjustified, I can only regret that I did not persevere in my criticismsand suggestions, but I could not do so believing as I then did that alawyer's advice on any question not wholly legal in nature wasunacceptable to the President, a belief which, up to the present time, Ihave had no reason to change. 

It should be understood that this account of the conference of January10 is given by way of explanation of my conduct subsequent to it and notin any spirit of complaint or condemnation of Mr. Wilson's attitude. Hehad a right to his own opinion of the worth of a lawyer's advice and aright to act in accordance with that opinion. If there was any injusticedone, it was in his asking a lawyer to become a Peace Commissioner, thereby giving the impression that he desired his counsel and advice asto the negotiations in general, when in fact he did not. But, disregarding the personal element, I consider that he was justified inhis course, as the entire constitutional responsibility for thenegotiation of a treaty was on his shoulders and he was, in theperformance of his duty, entitled to seek advice from those only inwhose judgment he had confidence. 

In spite of this frank avowal of prejudice by the President there was nooutward change in the personal and official relations between him andmyself. The breach, however, regardless of appearances, was too wide andtoo deep to be healed. While subsequent events bridged it temporarily, it remained until my association with President Wilson came to an end inFebruary, 1920. I never forgot his words and always felt that in hismind my opinions, even when he sought them, were tainted with legalism. 

CHAPTER IX

A RESOLUTION INSTEAD OF THE COVENANT

As it seemed advisable, in view of the incident of January 10, to havenothing to do with the drafting of the Covenant unless the entire theorywas changed, the fact that there prevailed at that time a general beliefthat a preliminary treaty of peace would be negotiated in the nearfuture invited an effort to delay the consideration of a complete anddetailed charter of the League of Nations until the definitive treaty ora separate treaty dealing with the League alone was considered. As delaywould furnish time to study and discuss the subject and prevent hastyacceptance of an undesirable or defective plan, it seemed to me that theadvisable course to take was to limit reference to the organization inthe preliminary treaty to general principles. 

The method that I had in mind in carrying out this policy was to securethe adoption, by the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace, of aresolution embodying a series of declarations as to the creation, thenature, and the purposes of a League of Nations, which declarationscould be included in the preliminary treaty of peace accompanied by anarticle providing for the negotiation of a detailed plan based on thesedeclarations at the time of the negotiation of the definitive treaty orelse by an article providing for the summoning of a world congress, inwhich all nations, neutrals as well as belligerents, would berepresented and have a voice in the drafting of a conventionestablishing a League of Nations in accordance with the generalprinciples declared in the preliminary treaty. Personally I preferred aseparate treaty, but doubted the possibility of obtaining the assent ofthe Conference to that plan because some of the delegates showed afeeling of resentment toward certain neutral nations on account of theirattitude during the war, while the inclusion of the four powers whichhad formed the Central Alliance seemed almost out of the question. 

In addition to the advantage to be gained by postponing thedetermination of the details of the organization until the theory, theform, the purposes and the powers of the proposed League could bethoroughly considered, it would make possible the speedy restoration ofa state of peace. There can be no doubt that peace at the earliestpossible moment was the supreme need of the world. The political andsocial chaos in the Central Empires, due to the overthrow of theirstrong autocratic governments and the prevailing want, suffering, anddespair, in which the war had left their peoples, offered a fertilefield for the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism to take root andthrive. A proletarian revolution seemed imminent. The Spartacists inGermany, the Radical Socialists in Austria, and the Communists inHungary were the best organized and most vigorous of the politicalgroups in those countries and were conducting an active and seeminglysuccessful propaganda among the starving and hopeless masses, while theRussian duumvirs, Lenine and Trotsky, were with funds and emissariesaiding these movements against established authority and social order. Eastern Europe seemed to be a volcano on the very point of eruption. Unless something was speedily done to check the peril, it threatened tospread to other countries and even to engulf the very foundations ofmodern civilization. 

A restoration of commercial relations and of normal industrialconditions through the medium of a treaty of peace appeared to offer theonly practical means of resisting these movements and of saving Europefrom the horrors of a proletarian despotism which had brought theRussian people to so low a state. This was the common judgment of thosewho at that time watched with increasing impatience the slow progress ofthe negotiations at Paris and with apprehension the political turmoil inthe defeated and distracted empires of Central Europe. 

An immediate restoration of peace was, as I then saw it, of vitalimportance to the world as it was the universal demand of all mankind. To delay it for the purpose of completing the organization of a Leagueof Nations or for any other purpose than the formulation of termsessential to peace seemed to me to be taking a risk as to the futurewholly unwarranted by the relative importance of the subjects. There isno question, in the light of subsequent events, that the peoples of theCentral Empires possessed a greater power of resistance to thetemptations of lawlessness and disorder than was presumed in the winterof 1918-19. And yet it was a critical time. Anything might havehappened. It would have taken very little to turn the scale. Whatoccurred later cannot excuse the delay in making peace. It was not wisestatesmanship and foresight that saved the world from a greatcatastrophe but the fortunate circumstance that a people habituated toobedience were not led astray by the enemies of the existing order. 

Of the importance of negotiating a peace without waiting to complete adetailed plan for a League of Nations I was firmly convinced in thoseearly days at Paris, and I know that the President's judgment as to thiswas contrary to mine. He considered--at least his course can only be sointerpreted--that the organization of a League in all its details wasthe principal task to be accomplished by the Conference, a task that hefelt must be completed before other matters were settled. The conclusionis that the necessity of an immediate peace seemed to him subordinate tothe necessity of erecting an international agency to preserve the peacewhen it was restored. In fact one may infer that the President wasdisposed to employ the general longing for peace as a means of exertingpressure on the delegates in Paris and on their Governments to accepthis plan for a League. It is generally believed that objections tocertain provisions of the Covenant were not advanced or, if advanced, were not urged because the discussion of objections would mean delay innegotiating the peace. 

Mr. Wilson gave most of his time and thought prior to his departure forthe United States in February, 1919, to the revision of the plan oforganization which he had prepared and to the conversion of the moreinfluential members of the Conference to its support. While otherquestions vital to a preliminary peace treaty were brought up in theCouncil of Ten, he showed a disposition to keep them open and to avoidtheir settlement until the Covenant had been reported to the Conference. In this I could not conscientiously follow him. I felt that the policywas wholly wrong since it delayed the peace. 

Though recognizing the President's views as to the relative importanceof organizing a League and of restoring peace without delay, andsuspecting that he purposed to use the impatience and fear of thedelegates to break down objections to his plan of organization, I stillhoped that the critical state of affairs in Europe might induce him toadopt another course. With that hope I began the preparation of aresolution to be laid before the Conference, which, if adopted, wouldappear in the preliminary treaty in the form of declarations which wouldconstitute the bases of a future negotiation regarding a Leagueof Nations. 

At a conference on January 20 between the President and the AmericanCommissioners, all being present except Colonel House, I asked thePresident if he did not think that, in view of the shortness of timebefore he would be compelled to return to Washington on account of theapproaching adjournment of Congress, it would be well to prepare aresolution of this sort and to have it adopted in order that it mightclear the way for the determination of other matters which should beincluded in a preliminary treaty. From the point of view of policy Iadvanced the argument that a series of declarations would draw the fireof the opponents and critics of the League and would give opportunityfor an expression of American public opinion which would make possiblethe final drafting of the charter of a League in a way to win theapproval of the great mass of the American people and in all probabilityinsure approval of the Covenant by the Senate of the United States. 

In reviewing what took place at this conference I realize now, as I didnot then, that it was impolitic for me to have presented an argumentbased on the assumption that changes in the President's plan might benecessary, as he might interpret my words to be another effort to revisethe theory of his plan. At the time, however, I was so entirelyconvinced of the expediency of this course, from the President's ownpoint of view as well as from the point of view of those who gave firstplace to restoring peace, that I believed he would see the advantage tobe gained and would adopt the course suggested. I found that I wasmistaken. Mr. Wilson without discussing the subject said that he did notthink that a resolution of that sort was either necessary or advisable. 

While this definite rejection of the proposal seemed to close the doorto further effort in that direction, I decided to make another attemptbefore abandoning the plan. The next afternoon (January 21) at a meetingof the Council of Ten, the discussion developed in a way that gave me anexcuse to present the proposal informally to the Council. The advantagesto be gained by adopting the suggested action apparently appealed to themembers, and their general approval of it impressed the President, forhe asked me in an undertone if I had prepared the resolution. I repliedthat I had been working upon it, but had ceased when he said to me theday before that he did not think it necessary or advisable, adding thatI would complete the draft if he wished me to do so. He said that hewould be obliged to me if I would prepare one. 

Encouraged by the support received in the Council and by the seemingwillingness of the President to give the proposal consideration, Iproceeded at once to draft a resolution. 

The task was not an easy one because it would have been useless toinsert in the document any declaration which seemed to be contradictoryof the President's theory of an affirmative guaranty or which was notsufficiently broad to be interpreted in other terms in the event thatAmerican public opinion was decidedly opposed to his theory, as I feltthat it would be. It was also desirable, from my point of view, that theresolution should contain a declaration in favor of the equality ofnations or one which would prevent the establishment of an oligarchy ofthe Great Powers, and another declaration which would give proper placeto the administration of legal justice in international disputes. 

The handicaps and difficulties under which I labored are manifest, andthe resolution as drafted indicates them in that it does not express asclearly and unequivocally as it would otherwise do the principles whichformed the bases of the articles which I handed to the President onJanuary 7 and which have already been quoted _in extenso_. 

The text of the resolution, which was completed on the 22d, reads asfollows:

 "_Resolved_ that the Conference makes the following declaration:

 "That the preservation of international peace is the standing policy of civilization and to that end a league of nations should be organized to prevent international wars;

 "That it is a fundamental principle of peace that all nations are equally entitled to the undisturbed possession of their respective territories, to the full exercise of their respective sovereignties, and to the use of the high seas as the common property of all peoples; and

 "That it is the duty of all nations to engage by mutual covenants--

 "(1) To safeguard from invasion the sovereign rights of one another;

 "(2) To submit to arbitration all justiciable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic arrangement;

 "(3) To submit to investigation by the league of nations all non-justiciable disputes which fail of settlement by diplomatic arrangement; and

 "(4) To abide by the award of an arbitral tribunal and to respect a report of the league of nations after investigation;

 "That the nations should agree upon--

 "(1) A plan for general reduction of armaments on land and sea;

 "(2) A plan for the restriction of enforced military service and the governmental regulation and control of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war;

 "(3) Full publicity of all treaties and international agreements;

 "(4) The equal application to all other nations of commercial and trade regulations and restrictions imposed by any nation; and

 "(5) The proper regulation and control of new states pending complete independence and sovereignty. "

This draft of a resolution was discussed with the other AmericanCommissioners, and after some changes of a more or less minor characterwhich it seemed advisable to make because of the appointment of aCommission on the League of Nations at a plenary session of theConference on January 25, of which Commission President Wilson andColonel House were the American members, I sent the draft to thePresident on the 31st, four days before the Commission held its firstmeeting in Colonel House's office at the Hotel Crillon. 

As the Sixty-Fifth Congress would come to an end on March 4, and as theinterpretation which had been placed on certain provisions of theFederal Constitution required the presence of the Chief Executive inWashington during the last days of a session in order that he might passupon legislation enacted in the days immediately preceding adjournment, Mr. Wilson had determined that he could not remain in Paris afterFebruary 14. At the time that I sent him the proposed resolution thereremained, therefore, but two weeks for the Commission on the League ofNations to organize, to deliberate, and to submit its report to theConference, provided its report was made prior to the President'sdeparture for the United States. It did not seem to me conceivable thatthe work of the Commission could be properly completed in so short atime if the President's Covenant became the basis of its deliberations. This opinion was shared by many others who appreciated the difficultiesand intricacies of the subject and who felt that a hasty and undigestedreport would be unwise and endanger the whole plan of a worldorganization. 

In view of this situation, which seemed to be a strong argument fordelay in drafting the plan of international organization, I wrote aletter to the President, at the time I sent him the proposed resolution, saying that in my opinion no plan could be prepared with sufficient careto warrant its submission to the Conference on the Preliminaries ofPeace before he left Paris and that unless a plan was reported he wouldbe in the position of returning empty-handed to the United States. Iurged him in the circumstances to secure the adoption of a resolution bythe delegates similar in nature, if not in language, to the draft whichwas enclosed, thereby avoiding a state of affairs which would be verydisheartening to the advocates of a League of Nations and cause generaldiscontent among all peoples who impatiently expected evidence that therestoration of peace was not far distant. 

It would be presumptuous on my part to speculate on the President'sfeelings when he received and read my letter and the proposedresolution. It was never answered or acknowledged, and he did not actupon the suggestion or discuss acting upon it, to my knowledge, with anyof his colleagues. On the contrary, he summoned the Commission on theLeague of Nations to meet on February 3, eleven days before the datefixed for his departure for the United States, and laid before that bodyhis revised draft of a Covenant which formed the groundwork for theCommission's report presented to the Conference on February 14. 

The question naturally arises--Why did the President ask me to completeand send to him the resolution embodying a series of declarations if hedid not intend to make it a subject of consideration and discussion? Itis a pertinent question, but the true answer remains with Mr. Wilsonhimself. Possibly he concluded that the only way to obtain his plan fora League was to insist upon its practical acceptance before peace wasnegotiated, and that, unless he took advantage of the universal demandfor peace by making the acceptance of the Covenant a conditionprecedent, he would be unable to obtain its adoption. While I believethis is a correct supposition, it is not responsive to the question asto the reason why he wished me to deliver to him a draft resolution. Infact it suggests another question--What, from the President's point ofview, was to be gained by having the resolution in his hands?

I think the answer is not difficult to find when one remembers that Mr. Wilson had disapproved a resolution of that sort and that the Council ofTen had seemed disposed to approve it. There was no surer way to preventme from bringing the subject again before the Council than by having theproposed resolution before him for action. Having submitted it to him Iwas bound, on account of our official relationship, to await hisdecision before taking any further steps. In a word, his request for adraft practically closed my mouth and tied my hands. If he sought tocheck my activities with the members of the Council in favor of theproposed course of action, he could have taken no more effectual waythan the one which he did take. It was undoubtedly an effective means of"pigeonholing" a resolution, the further discussion of which mightinterfere with his plan to force through a report upon the Covenantbefore the middle of February. 

This opinion as to the motive which impelled the President to pursue thecourse that he did in regard to a resolution was not the one held by meat the time. It was formed only after subsequent events threw new lighton the subject. The delay perplexed me at the time, but the reason forit was not evident. I continued to hope, even after the Commission onthe League of Nations had assembled and had begun its deliberations, that the policy of a resolution would be adopted. But, as the days wentby and the President made no mention of the proposal, I realized that hedid not intend to discuss it, and the conviction was forced upon me thathe had never intended to have it discussed. It was a disappointingresult and one which impressed me with the belief that Mr. Wilson wasprejudiced against any suggestion that I might make, if it in any waydiffered with his own ideas even though it found favor with others. 

CHAPTER X

THE GUARANTY IN THE REVISED COVENANT

During the three weeks preceding the meeting of the Commission on theLeague the work of revising the President's original draft of theCovenant had been in progress, the President and Colonel House holdingfrequent interviews with the more influential delegates, particularlythe British and French statesmen who had been charged with the duty ofstudying the subject. While I cannot speak from personal knowledge, Ilearned that the suggested changes in terms and language were put intoform by members of the Colonel's office staff. In addition tomodifications which were made to meet the wishes of the foreignstatesmen, especially the British, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, theson-in-law and secretary of Colonel House, and Mr. David Hunter Miller, Auchincloss's law partner and one of the accredited legal advisers ofthe American Commission, prepared an elaborate memorandum on thePresident's draft of a Covenant which contained comments and alsosuggested changes in the text. On account of the intimate relationsexisting between Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss and Colonel House itseems reasonable to assume that their comments and suggestions wereapproved by, if they did not to an extent originate with, the Colonel. The memorandum was first made public by Mr. William C. Bullitt duringhis hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations inSeptember, 1919 (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pages 1177_et seq. _). 

The most important amendment to the Covenant suggested by these adviserswas, in my judgment, the one relating to Article III of the draft, whichbecame Article 10 in the Treaty. After a long criticism of thePresident's proposed guaranty, in which it is declared that "such anagreement would destroy the Monroe Doctrine, " and that "any guaranty ofindependence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of theindependence or integrity of the guaranteed State is attempted andpersisted in, " the memorandum proposed that the following besubstituted:

 "Each Contracting Power severally covenants and guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political independence of any other Contracting Power. "

This proposed substitute should be compared with the language of the"self-denying covenant" that I sent to the President on December 23, 1918, the pertinent portion of which is repeated here for the purpose ofsuch comparison:

 "Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political sovereignty of any other power signatory or adherent to this convention, . .. "

The practical adoption of the language of my proposed substitute in thememorandum furnishes conclusive proof that Colonel House was "entirelyconverted" to my form of a guaranty as he had frankly assured me that hewas on the evening of January 6. I am convinced also that Mr. HenryWhite and General Bliss held the same views on the subject. It isobvious that President Wilson was the only one of the Americanrepresentatives at Paris who favored the affirmative guaranty, but, ashe possessed the constitutional authority to determine independently thepolicy of the United States, his form of a guaranty was written into therevised draft of a Covenant submitted to the Commission on the League ofNations and with comparatively little change was finally adopted in theTreaty of Peace with Germany. 

The memorandum prepared by Messrs. Miller and Auchincloss was apparentlyin the President's hands before the revised draft was completed, forcertain changes in the original draft were in accord with thesuggestions made in their memorandum. His failure to modify the guarantymay be considered another rejection of the "self-denying covenant" and afinal decision to insist on the affirmative form of guaranty in spite ofthe unanimous opposition of his American colleagues. 

In view of what later occurred a very definite conclusion may be reachedconcerning the President's rejection of the proposed substitute for hisguaranty. Article 10 was from the first the storm center of oppositionto the report of the Commission on the League of Nations and the chiefcause for refusal of consent to the ratification of the Treaty ofVersailles by the Senate of the United States. The vulnerable nature ofthe provision, which had been so plainly pointed out to the Presidentbefore the Covenant was submitted to the Commission, invited attack. Ifhe had listened to the advice of his colleagues, in fact if he hadlistened to any American who expressed an opinion on the subject, theTreaty would probably have obtained the speedy approval of the Senate. There would have been opposition from those inimical to the UnitedStates entering any international organization, but it would have beeninsufficient to prevent ratification of the Treaty. 

As it was, the President's unalterable determination to have his form ofguaranty in the Covenant, in which he was successful, and his firmrefusal to modify it in any substantial way resulted in strengtheningthe opponents to the League to such an extent that they were able toprevent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two thirds ofthe Senators. 

The sincerity of Mr. Wilson's belief in the absolute necessity of theguaranty, which he proposed, to the preservation of international peacecannot be doubted. While his advisers were practically unanimous in theopinion that policy, as well as principle, demanded a change in theguaranty, he clung tenaciously to the affirmative form. The result wasthat which was feared and predicted by his colleagues. The President, and the President alone, must bear the responsibility for the result. 

CHAPTER XI

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

On the day that the Commission on the League of Nations held its firstmeeting and before I had reason to suspect that Mr. Wilson intended toignore the letter which I had sent him with the suggested resolutionenclosed, I determined to appeal to him in behalf of internationalarbitration. I decided to do this on the assumption that, even if theplan for a resolution was approved, the Commission would continue itssessions in preparation for the subsequent negotiation of an agreementof some sort providing for world organization. The provision as toarbitration in the President's original draft of a Covenant was so wrongfrom my point of view and showed such a lack of knowledge of thepractical side of the subject that I was impelled to make an effort toinduce him to change the provision. Except for the fact that the matterwas wholly legal in character and invited an opinion based on technicalknowledge, I would have remained silent in accordance with my feelingthat it would be inadvisable for me to have anything to do with draftingthe Covenant. I felt, however, that the constitution and procedure ofinternational courts were subjects which did not affect the generaltheory of organization and concerning which my views might influence thePresident and be of aid to him in the formulation of the judicialfeature of any plan adopted. 

With this object in view I wrote to him the following letter:

 "_Hôtel Crillon, Paris

 "February_ 3, 1919

 "My Dear Mr. President:

 "I am deeply interested, as you know, in the constitution and procedure of international courts of arbitration, and having participated in five proceedings of this sort I feel that I can speak with a measure of authority. 

 "In the first place let me say that a tribunal, on which representatives of the litigants sit as judges, has not proved satisfactory even though the majority of the tribunal are nationals of other countries. However well prepared from experience on the bench to render strict justice, the litigants' arbitrators act in fact as advocates. As a consequence the neutral arbitrators are decidedly hampered in giving full and free expression to their views, and there is not that frank exchange of opinion which should characterize the conference of judges. It has generally resulted in a compromise, in which the nation in the wrong gains a measure of benefit and the nation in the right is deprived of a part of the remedy to which it is entitled. In fact an arbitration award is more of a political and diplomatic arrangement than it is a judicial determination. I believe that this undesirable result can be in large measure avoided by eliminating arbitrators of the litigant nations. It is only in the case of monetary claims that these observations do not apply. 

 "Another difficulty has been the method of procedure before international tribunals. This does not apply to monetary claims, but to disputes arising out of boundaries, interpretation of treaties, national rights, etc. The present method of an exchange of cases and of counter-cases is more diplomatic than judicial, since it does not put the parties in the relation of complainant and defendant. This relation can in every case be established, if not by mutual agreement, then by some agency of the League of Nations charged with that duty. Until this reform of procedure takes place there will be no definition of issues, and arbitration will continue to be the long and elaborate proceeding it has been in the past. 

 "There is another practical obstacle to international arbitration as now conducted which ought to be considered, and that is the cost. This obstacle does not affect wealthy nations, but it does prevent small and poor nations from resorting to it as a means of settling disputes. Just how this can be remedied I am not prepared to say, although possibly the international support of all arbitral tribunals might be provided. At any rate, I feel that something should be done to relieve the great expense which now prevents many of the smaller nations from resorting to arbitration. 

 "I would suggest, therefore, that the Peace Treaty contain a provision directing the League of Nations to hold a conference or to summon a conference to take up this whole matter and draft an international treaty dealing with the constitution of arbitral tribunals and radically revising the procedure. 

 "On account of the difficulties of the subject, which do not appear on the surface, but which experience has shown to be very real, I feel that it would be impracticable to provide in the Peace Treaty too definitely the method of constituting arbitral tribunals. It will require considerable thought and discussion to make arbitration available to the poor as well as the rich, to make an award a judicial settlement rather than a diplomatic compromise, and to supersede the cumbersome and prolonged procedure with its duplication of documents and maps by a simple method which will settle the issues and materially shorten the proceedings which now unavoidably drag along for months, if not for years. 

 "Faithfully yours

 "ROBERT LANSING

 "THE PRESIDENT

 "28 _Rue de Monceau_"

At the time that I sent this letter to Mr. Wilson I had not seen therevised draft of the Covenant which he laid before the Commission on theLeague of Nations. The probability is that, if I had seen it, the letterwould not have been written, for in the revision of the original draftthe objectionable Article V, relating to arbitration and appeals fromarbitral awards, was omitted. In place of it there were substituted twoarticles, 11 and 12, the first being an agreement to arbitrate undercertain conditions and the other providing that "the Executive Councilwill formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, and this Court will be competent to hear anddetermine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable forsubmission to it for arbitration. "

Unadvised as to this change, which promised a careful consideration ofthe method of applying legal principles of justice to internationaldisputes, I did not feel that I could let pass without challenge theunsatisfactory provisions of the President's original draft. Knowing thecontempt which Mr. Wilson felt for The Hague Tribunal and his generalsuspicion of the justice of decisions which it might render, it seemedto me inexpedient to suggest that it should form the basis of a newlyconstituted judiciary, a suggestion which I should have made had I beendealing with any one other than President Wilson. In view of theintensity of the President's prejudices and of the uselessness ofattempting to remove them, my letter was intended to induce him topostpone a determination of the subject until the problems which itpresented could be thoroughly studied and a judicial system developed byan international body of representatives more expert in juridicalmatters than the Commission on the League of Nations, the Americanmembers of which were incompetent by training, knowledge, and practicalexperience to consider the subject. 

No acknowledgment, either written or oral, was ever made of my letter ofFebruary 3. Possibly President Wilson considered it unnecessary to do soin view of the provision in his revised Covenant postponing discussionof the subject. At the time, however, I naturally assumed that myvoluntary advice was unwelcome to him. His silence as to mycommunications, which seemed to be intended to discourage a continuanceof them, gave the impression that he considered an uninvited opinion onany subject connected with the League of Nations an unwarrantedinterference with a phase of the negotiations which he looked upon ashis own special province, and that comment or suggestion, which did notconform wholly to his views, was interpreted into opposition andpossibly into criticism of him personally. 

This judgment of the President's mental attitude, which was formed atthe time, may have been too harsh. It is possible that the shortness oftime in which to complete the drafting of the report of the Commissionon the League of Nations, upon which he had set his heart, caused him tobe impatient of any criticism or suggestion which tended to interrupthis work or that of the Commission. It may have been that pressure fortime prevented him from answering letters of the character of the one ofFebruary 3. Whatever the real reason was, the fact remains that theletter went unnoticed and the impression was made that it was futile toattempt to divert the President from the single purpose which he had inmind. His fidelity to his own convictions and his unswervingdetermination to attain what he sought are characteristics of Mr. Wilsonwhich are sources of weakness as well as of strength. Through themsuccess has generally crowned his efforts, success which in someinstances has been more disastrous than failure would have been. 

By what means the change of Article V of the original draft of theCovenant took place, I cannot say. In the memorandum of Messrs. Millerand Auchincloss no suggestion of a Court of International Justiceappears, which seems to indicate that the provision in the revised draftdid not originate with them or with Colonel House. In fact on more thanone occasion I had mentioned arbitration to the Colonel and found hisviews on the subject extremely vague, though I concluded that he hadalmost as poor an opinion of The Hague Tribunal as did the President. The probability is that the change was suggested to Mr. Wilson by one ofthe foreign statesmen in a personal interview during January and thatupon sounding others he found that they were practically unanimous infavor of a Permanent Court of Justice. As a matter of policy it seemedwise to forestall amendment by providing for its future establishment. If this is the true explanation, Article 12 was not of American origin, though it appears in the President's revised draft. 

To be entirely frank in stating my views in regard to Mr. Wilson'sattitude toward international arbitration and its importance in a planof world organization, I have always been and still am skeptical of thesincerity of the apparent willingness of the President to accept thechange which was inserted in his revised draft. It is difficult to avoidthe belief that Article V of the original draft indicated his trueopinion of the application of legal principles to controversies betweennations. That article, by depriving an arbitral award of finality andconferring the power of review on a political body with authority toorder a rehearing, shows that the President believed that more completejustice would be rendered if the precepts and rules of international lawwere in a measure subordinated to political expediency and if the judgeswere not permitted to view the questions solely from the standpoint oflegal justice. There is nothing that occurred, to my knowledge, betweenthe printing of the original draft of the Covenant and the printing ofthe revised draft, which indicated a change of opinion by the President. It may be that this is a misinterpretation of Mr. Wilson's attitude, andthat the change toward international arbitration was due to convictionrather than to expediency; but my belief is that expediency was thesole cause. 

CHAPTER XII

REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Commission on the League of Nations, over which President Wilsonpresided, held ten meetings between February 3 and February 14, on whichlatter day it submitted a report at a plenary session of the Conferenceon the Preliminaries of Peace. The report was presented by the Presidentin an address of exceptional excellence which made a deep impression onhis hearers. His dignity of manner, his earnestness, and his logicalpresentation of the subject, clothed as it was in well-chosen phrases, unquestionably won the admiration of all, even of those who could notreconcile their personal views with the Covenant, as reported by theCommission. It was a masterly effort, an example of literary rather thanemotional oratory, peculiarly fitting to the occasion and to the temperand intellectual character of the audience. 

Considering the brief time given to its discussion in the Commission andthe necessary haste required to complete the document before thePresident's departure, the Covenant as reported to the Conference was acreditable piece of work. Many of the more glaring errors of expressionand some of the especially objectionable features of the President'srevised draft were eliminated. There were others which persisted, butthe improvement was so marked that the gross defects in word and phraselargely disappeared. If one accepted the President's theory oforganization, there was little to criticize in the report, except acertain inexactness of expression which indicated a lack of technicalknowledge on the part of those who put the Covenant into final form. Butthese crudities and ambiguities of language would, it was fair topresume, disappear if the articles passed through the hands ofdrafting experts. 

Fundamentally, however, the Covenant as reported was as wrong as thePresident's original draft, since it contained the affirmative guarantyof political independence and territorial integrity, the primacy of theFive Great Powers on the Executive Council, and the perplexing andseemingly unsound system of mandates. In this I could not willinglyfollow President Wilson, but I felt that I had done all that I couldproperly do in opposition to his theory. The responsibility of decisionrested with him and he had made his decision. There was nothing moreto be said. 

On the evening of the day of the plenary session, at which the report ofthe League of Nations was submitted, the President left Paris for Brestwhere the George Washington was waiting to convey him to the UnitedStates. He carried with him the report of the Commission, whosedeliberations and decisions he had so manifestly dominated. He wentprepared to meet his political antagonists and the enemies of theLeague, confidently believing that he could win a popular support thatwould silence the opposition which had been increasingly manifest in theHalls of Congress and in some of the Republican newspapers whichdeclined to follow Mr. Taft, Mr. Wickersham, Mr. Straus, and otherinfluential Republican members of the League to Enforce Peace. 

During the ten days preceding February 14, when the Commission on theLeague of Nations held daily sessions, the President had no conferenceswith the American Commissioners except, of course, with Colonel House, his American colleague on the Commission on the League. On the morningof the 14th, however, he called a meeting of the Commissioners anddelivered to them the printed report which was to be presented thatafternoon to the plenary session. As the meetings of the Commission onthe League of Nations had been secret, the American Commissioners, otherthan Colonel House, were almost entirely ignorant of the proceedings andof the progress being made. Colonel House's office staff knew far moreabout it than did Mr. White, General Bliss, or I. When the Presidentdelivered the report to the Commissioners they were, therefore, in noposition to express an opinion concerning it. The only remarks wereexpressions of congratulation that he had been able to complete the workbefore his departure. They were merely complimentary. As to the meritsof the document nothing was or could be said by the three Commissioners, since no opportunity had been given them to study it, and without acritical examination any comment concerning its provisions would havebeen worthless. I felt and I presume that my two colleagues, who had notbeen consulted as to the work of the Commission on the League, felt, that it was, in any event, too late to offer suggestions or makecriticisms. The report was in print; it was that afternoon to be laidbefore the Conference; in twelve hours the President would be on his wayto the United States. Clearly it would have been useless to find faultwith the report, especially if the objections related to the fundamentalideas of the organization which it was intended to create. The Presidenthaving in the report declared the American policy, his commissionedrepresentatives were bound to acquiesce in his decision whatever theirpersonal views were. Acquiescence or resignation was the choice, andresignation would have undoubtedly caused an unfortunate, if not acritical, situation. In the circumstances acquiescence seemed the onlypractical and proper course. 

The fact that in ten meetings and in a week and a half a Commissioncomposed of fifteen members, ten of whom represented the Five GreatPowers and five of whom represented the lesser powers (to which werelater added four others), completed the drafting of a detailed plan of aLeague of Nations, is sufficient in itself to raise doubts as to thethoroughness with which the work was done and as to the care with whichthe various plans and numerous provisions proposed were studied, compared, and discussed. It gives the impression that many clauses wereaccepted under the pressing necessity of ending the Commission's laborswithin a fixed time. The document itself bears evidence of the hastewith which it was prepared, and is almost conclusive proof in itselfthat it was adopted through personal influence rather than because ofbelief in the wisdom of all its provisions. 

The Covenant of the League of Nations was intended to be the greatestinternational compact that had ever been written. It was to be the_Maxima Charta_ of mankind securing to the nations their rights andliberties and uniting them for the preservation of universal peace. Toharmonize the conflicting views of the members of the Commission--and itwas well known that they were conflicting--and to produce in eleven daysa world charter, which would contain the elements of greatness or evenof perpetuity, was on the face of it an undertaking impossible ofaccomplishment. The document which was produced sufficiently establishesthe truth of this assertion. 

It required a dominant personality on the Commission to force through adetailed plan of a League in so short a time. President Wilson was sucha personality. By adopting the scheme of an oligarchy of the GreatPowers he silenced the dangerous opposition of the French and Britishmembers of the Commission who willingly passed over minor defects in theplan provided this Concert of Powers, this Quintuple Alliance, wasincorporated in the Covenant. And for the same reason it may be assumedthe Japanese and Italians found the President's plan acceptable. Mr. Wilson won a great personal triumph, but he did so by surrendering thefundamental principle of the equality of nations. In his eagerness to"make the world safe for democracy" he abandoned international democracyand became the advocate of international autocracy. 

It is not my purpose to analyze the provisions of the Covenant which wassubmitted to the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on February14, 1919. My objections to it have been sufficiently discussed in thepreceding pages. It would be superfluous to repeat them. The innumerablepublished articles and the endless debates on the Covenant have broughtout its good features as well as its defects. Unfortunately for theopponents and defenders of the document alike some of the objectionsurged have been flagrantly unjustifiable and based on false premises andmisstatements of fact and of law, which seem to show political motivesand not infrequently personal animosity toward Mr. Wilson. Theexaggerated statements and unfair arguments of some of the Senators, larded, as they often were, with caustic sarcasm and vindictivepersonalities, did much to prevent an honest and useful discussion ofthe merits and demerits of the Covenant. 

The effect upon President Wilson of this campaign against himpersonally--and it seems to me that it would have had the same effectupon any man of spirit--was to arouse his indignation. Possibly a lessstubborn man would not have assumed so uncompromising an attitude as hedid or have permitted his ire to find expression in threats, but itcannot be denied that there was provocation for the resentment which heexhibited. The President has been blamed for not having sought moreconstantly to placate the opponents of the Covenant and to meet them ona common ground of compromise, especially during his visit to the UnitedStates in February, 1919. From the point of view of policy there isjustice in blaming him, but, when one considers the personal animusshown and the insolent tone assumed by some of his critics, his conductwas very human; not wise, but human. Mr. Wilson had never shown a spiritof conciliation in dealing with those who opposed him. Even in the caseof a purely political question he appeared to consider opposition to bea personal affront and he was disposed to retaliate in a personal way. In a measure this explains the personal enmity of many of his politicalfoes. I think that it is not unjust to say that President Wilson wasstronger in his hatreds than in his friendships. He seemed to lack theability to forgive one who had in any way offended him or opposed him. 

Believing that much of the criticism of the Covenant was in realitycriticism of him as its author, a belief that was in a measurejustified, the President made it a personal matter. He threatened, in apublic address delivered in the New York Opera House on the eve of hisdeparture for France, to force the Republican majority to accept theCovenant by interweaving the League of Nations into the terms of peaceto such an extent that they could not be separated, so that, if theyrejected the League, they would be responsible for defeating the Treatyand preventing a restoration of peace. With the general demand for peacethis seemed no empty threat, although the propriety of making it may bequestioned. It had, however, exactly the opposite effect from that whichthe President intended. Its utterance proved to be as unwise as it wasineffective. The opposition Senators resented the idea of being coerced. They became more than ever determined to defeat a President whom theycharged with attempting to disregard and nullify the right of the Senateto exercise independently its constitutional share in the treaty-makingpower. Thus at the very outset of the struggle between the President andthe Senate a feeling of hostility was engendered which continued withincreasing bitterness on both sides and prevented any compromise orconcession in regard to the Covenant as it finally appeared in theTreaty of Versailles. 

When President Wilson returned to Paris after the adjournment of theSixty-Fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, he left behind him opponents whowere stronger and more confident than they were when he landed ten daysbefore. While his appeal to public opinion in favor of the League ofNations had been to an extent successful, there was a general feelingthat the Covenant as then drafted required amendment so that thesovereign rights and the traditional policies of the United Statesshould be safeguarded. Until the document was amended it seemed that theopposition had the better of the argument with the people. Furthermore, when the new Congress met, the Republicans would have a majority in theSenate which was of special importance in the matter of the Treaty whichwould contain the Covenant, because it would, when sent to the Senate, be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations to report on itsratification and a majority of that Committee, under a Republicanorganization, would presumably be hostile to the plan for a Leagueadvocated by the President. The Committee could hinder and possiblyprevent the acceptance of the Covenant, while it would have theopportunity to place the opposition's case in a favorable light beforethe American people and to attack the President's conduct of thenegotiations at Paris. 

I believe that the President realized the loss of strategic positionwhich he had sustained by the Democratic defeat at the polls inNovember, 1918, but was persuaded that, by making certain alterations inthe Covenant suggested by Republicans favorable to the formation of aLeague, and especially those advocating a League to Enforce Peace, hewould be able to win sufficient support in the Senate and from thepeople to deprive his antagonists of the advantage which they had gainedby the elections. This he sought to do on his return to Paris about themiddle of March. If the same spirit of compromise had been shown whilehe was in America it would doubtless have gone far to weaken hostilityto the Covenant. Unfortunately for his purpose he assumed a contraryattitude, and in consequence the sentiment against the League wascrystallized and less responsive to the concessions which the Presidentappeared willing to make when the Commission on the League of Nationsresumed its sittings, especially as the obnoxious Article 10remained intact. 

In the formulation of the amendments to the Covenant, which wereincorporated in it after the President's return from the United Statesand before its final adoption by the Conference, I had no part and Ihave no reason to think that Mr. White or General Bliss shared in thework. As these amendments or modifications did not affect the theory oforganization or the fundamental principles of the League, they in no waychanged my views or lessened the differences between the President'sjudgment and mine. Our differences were as to the bases and not as tothe details of the Covenant. Since there was no disposition to changethe former we were no nearer an agreement than we were in January. 

The President's visit to the United States had been disappointing to thefriends of a League in that he had failed to rally to the support of theCovenant an overwhelming popular sentiment in its favor which theopposition in the Senate could not resist. The natural reaction was thatthe peoples of Europe and their statesmen lost a measure of theirenthusiasm and faith in the project. Except in the case of a fewidealists, there was a growing disposition to view it from the purelypractical point of view and to speculate on its efficacy as aninstrument to interpret and carry out the international will. Among theleaders of political thought in the principal Allied countries, thereports of the President's reception in the United States weresufficiently conflicting to arouse doubt as to whether the Americanpeople were actually behind him in his plan for a League, and this doubtwas not diminished by his proposed changes in the Covenant, whichindicated that he was not in full control of the situation at home. 

Two weeks after the President had resumed his duties as a negotiator andhad begun the work of revising the Covenant, I made a memorandum of myviews as to the situation that then existed. The memorandum isas follows:

 "_March_ 25, 1919

 "With the increasing military preparations and operations throughout Eastern Europe and the evident purpose of all these quarreling nations to ignore any idea of disarmament and to rely upon force to obtain and retain territory and rights, the League of Nations is being discussed with something like contempt by the cynical, hard-headed statesmen of those countries which are being put on a war-footing. They are cautious and courteous out of regard for the President. I doubt if the truth reaches him, but it comes to me from various sources. 

 "These men say that in theory the idea is all right and is an ideal to work toward, but that under present conditions it is not practical in preventing war. They ask, what nation is going to rely on the guaranty in the Covenant if a jealous or hostile neighbor maintains a large army. They want to know whether it would be wise or not to disarm under such conditions. Of course the answers are obvious. But, if the guaranty is not sufficient, or accepted as sufficient, protection, what becomes of the central purpose of the League and the chief reason for creating it?

 "I believe that the President and Colonel House see this, though they do not admit it, and that to save the League from being cast into the discard they will attempt to make of it a sort of international agency to do certain things which would normally be done by independent international commissions. Such a course would save the League from being still-born and would so interweave it with the terms of peace that to eliminate it would be to open up some difficult questions. 

 "Of course the League of Nations as originally planned had one supreme object and that was to prevent future wars. That was substantially all that it purposed to do. Since then new functions have been gradually added until the chief argument for the League's existence has been almost lost to sight. The League has been made a convenient 'catch-all' for all sorts of international actions. At first this was undoubtedly done to give the League something to do, and now it is being done to save it from extinction or from being ignored. 

 "I am not denying that a common international agent may be a good thing. In fact the plan has decided merit. But the organization of the League does not seem to me suitable to perform efficiently and properly these new functions. 

 "However, giving this character to the League may save it from being merely an agreeable dream. As the repository of international controversies requiring long and careful consideration it may live and be useful. 

 "My impression is that the principal sponsors for the League are searching through the numerous disputes which are clogging the wheels of the Conference, seizing upon every one which can possibly be referred, and heaping them on the League of Nations to give it standing as a useful and necessary adjunct to the Treaty. 

 "At least that is an interesting view of what is taking place and opens a wide field for speculation as to the future of the League and the verdict which history will render as to its origin, its nature, and its real value. "

I quote this memorandum because it gives my thoughts at the timeconcerning the process of weaving the League into the terms of peace asthe President had threatened to do. I thought then that it had a doublepurpose, to give a practical reason for the existence of the League andto make certain the ratification of the Covenant by the Senate. No facthas since developed which has induced me to change my opinion. 

In consequence of the functions which were added to the League, thecharacter of the League itself underwent a change. Instead of an agencycreated solely for the prevention of international wars, it wasconverted into an agency to carry out the terms of peace. Its idealisticconception was subordinated to the materialistic purpose of confirmingto the victorious nations the rewards of victory. It is true that duringthe long struggle between the President and the Senate on the questionof ratification there was in the debates a general return to theoriginal purpose of the League by both the proponents and opponents ofthe Covenant, but that fact in no way affects the truth of the assertionthat, in order to save the League of Nations, its character was changedby extending its powers and duties as a common agent of the nationswhich had triumphed over the Central Alliance. 

The day before the Treaty of Peace was delivered to the Germanplenipotentiaries (May 6) its terms induced me to write a note entitled"The Greatest Loss Caused by the War, " referring to the loss of idealismto the world. In that note I wrote of the League of Nations as follows:

 "Even the measure of idealism, with which the League of Nations was at the first impregnated, has, under the influence and intrigue of ambitious statesmen of the Old World, been supplanted by an open recognition that force and selfishness are primary elements in international co-operation. The League has succumbed to this reversion to a cynical materialism. It is no longer a creature of idealism. Its very source and reason have been dried up and have almost disappeared. The danger is that it will become a bulwark of the old order, a check upon all efforts to bring man again under the influence which he has lost. "

The President, in the addresses which he afterward made in advocacy ofthe Covenant and of ratification of the Treaty, indicated clearly thewide divergence of opinion between us as to the character of the Leagueprovided for in the Treaty. I do not remember that the subject wasdirectly discussed by us, but I certainly took no pains to hide mymisgivings as to the place it would have in the international relationsof the future. However, as Mr. Wilson knew that I disapproved of thetheory and basic principles of the organization, especially therecognition of the oligarchy of the Five Powers, he could not butrealize that I considered that idealism had given place to politicalexpediency in order to secure for the Covenant the support of thepowerful nations represented at the Conference. This was my belief as toour relations when the Treaty of Peace containing the Covenant was laidbefore the Germans at the Hôtel des Reservoirs in Versailles. 

CHAPTER XIII

THE SYSTEM OF MANDATES

In the foregoing review of the opposite views held by the President andby me in regard to the plan for a League of Nations and specifically inregard to the Covenant as originally drawn and as revised, mention wasmade of the proposed mandatory system as one of the subjects concerningwhich we were not in agreement. My objections to the system wereadvanced chiefly on the ground of the legal difficulties which itpresented because it seemed probable that the President would give moreweight to my opinion on that ground than on one which concerned thepolicy of adopting the system. Viewed from the latter standpoint itappeared to me most unwise for the President to propose a plan, in whichthe United States would be expected to participate and which, if it didparticipate, would involve it in the political quarrels of the OldWorld. To do so would manifestly require a departure from thetraditional American policy of keeping aloof from the politicaljealousies and broils of Europe. Without denying that present conditionshave, of necessity, modified the old policy of isolation and withoutminimizing the influence of that fact on the conduct of American foreignaffairs, it did not seem essential for the United States to become theguardian of any of the peoples of the Near East, who were aspiring tobecome independent nationalities, a guardianship which the Presidentheld to be a duty that the United States was bound to perform as itsshare of the burden imposed by the international coöperation which heconsidered vital to the new world order. 

The question of mandates issuing from the League of Nations wasdiscussed at length by the Council of Ten in connection with thedisposition and future control of the German colonies and incidentallyas to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The discussions werechiefly along the lines of practicability, of policy, and of moralobligation. The President's strong support of the mandatory system andhis equally strong objection to the idea of _condominium_ showed thathis mind was made up in favor of the issuance of mandates by the League. Since it would have been highly improper for me to oppose openly apolicy which the President had declared under his constitutionalauthority, there was no proper opportunity to present the legaldifficulties of the system to the Council. 

However, the seriousness of these difficulties and the possible troublesand controversies which might be anticipated from attempting to put thesystem into operation induced me, after one of the sessions of theCouncil of Ten, to state briefly to the President some of the seriousobjections to League mandates from the standpoint of international lawand the philosophy of government. President Wilson listened with hisusual attentiveness to what I had to say, though the objectionsevidently did not appeal to him, as he characterized them as "meretechnicalities" which could be cured or disregarded. Impressed myselfwith the importance of these "technicalities" and their direct bearingon the policy of adopting the mandatory system, I later, on February 2, 1919, embodied them in a memorandum. At the time I hoped and believedthat the negotiation of the completed Covenant might be postponed andthat there would be another opportunity to raise the question. Thememorandum, prepared with this end in view, is as follows:

 "The system of 'mandatories under the League of Nations, ' when applied to territories which were formerly colonies of Germany, the system which has been practically adopted and will be written into the plan for the League, raises some interesting and difficult questions:

 "The one, which is the most prominent since it enters into nearly all of the international problems presented, is--Where does the sovereignty over these territories reside?

 "Sovereignty is inherent in the very conception of government. It cannot be destroyed, though it may be absorbed by another sovereignty either by compulsion or cession. When the Germans were ousted from their colonies, the sovereignty passed to the power or powers which took possession. The location of the sovereignty up to the present is clear, but with the introduction of the League of Nations as an international primate superior to the conquerors some rather perplexing questions will have to be answered. 

 "Do those who have seized the sovereignty transfer it or does Germany transfer it to the League of Nations? If so, how?

 "Does the League assume possession of the sovereignty on its renunciation by Germany? If so, how?

 "Does the League merely direct the disposition of the sovereignty without taking possession of it?

 "Assuming that the latter question is answered in the affirmative, then after such disposition of the right to exercise sovereignty, which will presumably be a limited right, where does the actual sovereignty reside?

 "The appointment of a mandatory to exercise sovereign rights over territory is to create an agent for the real sovereign. But who is the real sovereign?

 "Is the League of Nations the sovereign, or is it a common agent of the nations composing the League, to whom is confided solely the duty of naming the mandatory and issuing the mandate?

 "If the League is the sovereign, can it avoid responsibility for the misconduct of the mandatory, its agent?

 "If it is not the League, who is responsible for the mandatory's conduct?

 "Assuming that the mandatory in faithfully performing the provisions of the mandate unavoidably works an injustice upon another party, can or ought the mandatory to be held responsible? If not, how can the injured party obtain redress? Manifestly the answer is, 'From the sovereign, ' but who is the sovereign?

 "In the Treaty of Peace Germany will be called upon to renounce sovereignty over her colonial possessions. To whom will the sovereignty pass?

 "If the reply is, 'The League of Nations, ' the question is: Does the League possess the attributes of an independent state so that it can function as an owner of territory? If so, what is it? A world state?

 "If the League does not constitute a world state, then the sovereignty would have to pass to some national state. What national state? What would be the relation of the national state to the League?

 "If the League is to receive title to the sovereignty, what officers of the League are empowered to receive it and to transfer its exercise to a mandatory?

 "What form of acceptance should be adopted?

 "Would every nation which is a member of the League have to give its representatives full powers to accept the title?

 "Assuming that certain members decline to issue such powers or to accept title as to one or more of the territories, what relation would those members have to the mandatory named?"

There is no attempt in the memorandum to analyze or classify the queriesraised, and, as I review them in the light of the terms of the Treaty ofVersailles, I do not think that some of them can be asked with anyhelpful purpose. On the other hand, many of the questions, I believe thelarge majority, were as pertinent after the Treaty was completed as theywere when the memorandum was made. 

As Colonel House was the other member of the Commission on the League ofNations and would have to consider the practicability and expediency ofincluding the mandatory system in the Covenant, I read the memorandum tohim stating that I had orally presented most of the questions to thePresident who characterized them as "legal technicalities" and for thatreason unimportant. I said to the Colonel that I differed with thePresident, as I hoped he did, not only as to the importance ofconsidering the difficulties raised by the questions before the systemof mandates was adopted, but also as to the importance of viewing fromevery standpoint the wisdom of the system and the difficulties thatmight arise in its practical operation. I stated that, in my opinion, asimpler and better plan was to transfer the sovereignty over territoryto a particular nation by a treaty of cession under such terms as seemedwise and, in the case of some of the newly erected states, to have themexecute treaties accepting protectorates by Powers mutually acceptableto those states and to the League of Nations. 

Colonel House, though he listened attentively to the memorandum and tomy suggestions, did not seem convinced of the importance of thequestions or of the advantages of adopting any other plan than that ofthe proposed mandatory system. To abandon the system meant to abandonone of the ideas of international supervision, which the Presidentespecially cherished and strongly advocated. It meant also to surrenderone of the proposed functions of the League as an agent in carrying outthe peace settlements under the Treaty, functions which would form thebasis of an argument in favor of the organization of the League andfurnish a practical reason for its existence. Of course the presumedarguments against the abandonment of mandates may not have beenconsidered, but at the time I believed that they were potent withColonel House and with the President. The subsequent advocacy of thesystem by these two influential members of the Commission on the Leagueof Nations, which resulted in its adoption, in no way lessened my beliefas to the reasons for their support. 

The mandatory system, a product of the creative mind of General Smuts, was a novelty in international relations which appealed strongly tothose who preferred to adopt unusual and untried methods rather than toaccept those which had been tested by experience and found practical ofoperation. The self-satisfaction of inventing something new or ofevolving a new theory is inherent with not a few men. They aredetermined to try out their ideas and are impatient of opposition whichseeks to prevent the experiment. In fact opposition seems sometimes toenhance the virtue of a novelty in the minds of those who propose oradvocate its adoption. Many reformers suffer from this form of vanity. 

In the case of the system of mandates its adoption by the Conference andthe conferring on the League of Nations the power to issue mandatesseemed at least to the more conservative thinkers at Paris a verydoubtful venture. It appeared to possess no peculiar advantages over theold method of transferring and exercising sovereign control either inproviding added protection to the inhabitants of territory subject to amandate or greater certainty of international equality in the matter ofcommerce and trade, the two principal arguments urged in favor of theproposed system. 

If the advocates of the system intended to avoid through its operationthe appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was asubterfuge which deceived no one. It seemed obvious from the very firstthat the Powers, which under the old practice would have obtainedsovereignty over certain conquered territories, would not be deniedmandates over those territories. The League of Nations might reserve inthe mandate a right of supervision of administration and even ofrevocation of authority, but that right would be nominal and of little, if any, real value provided the mandatory was one of the Great Powers asit undoubtedly would be. The almost irresistible conclusion is that theprotagonists of the theory saw in it a means of clothing the League ofNations with an apparent usefulness which justified the League by makingit the guardian of uncivilized and semi-civilized peoples and theinternational agent to watch over and prevent any deviation from theprinciple of equality in the commercial and industrial development ofthe mandated territories. 

It may appear surprising that the Great Powers so readily gave theirsupport to the new method of obtaining an apparently limited controlover the conquered territories, and did not seek to obtain completesovereignty over them. It is not necessary to look far for a sufficientand very practical reason. If the colonial possessions of Germany had, under the old practice, been divided among the victorious Powers andbeen ceded to them directly in full sovereignty, Germany might justlyhave asked that the value of such territorial cessions be applied on anywar indemnities to which the Powers were entitled. On the other hand, the League of Nations in the distribution of mandates would presumablydo so in the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and themandates would be accepted by the Powers as a duty and not to obtain newpossessions. Thus under the mandatory system Germany lost herterritorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debtto the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessionswithout the loss of any of their claims for indemnity. In actualoperation the apparent altruism of the mandatory system worked in favorof the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted themandates. And the same may be said of the dismemberment of Turkey. Itshould not be a matter of surprise, therefore, that the President foundlittle opposition to the adoption of his theory, or, to be moreaccurate, of the Smuts theory, on the part of the European statesmen. 

There was one case, however, in which the issuance of a mandate appearedto have a definite and practical value and to be superior to a directtransfer of complete sovereignty or of the conditional sovereigntyresulting from the establishment of a protectorate. The case was that ofa territory with or without a national government, which, not beingself-supporting and not sufficiently strong to protect its borders fromaggressive neighbors, or its people sufficiently enlightened to governthemselves properly, would be a constant source of expense instead ofprofit to the Power, which as its protector and tutor became itsoverlord. Under such conditions there was more probability of persuadinga nation inspired by humanitarian and altruistic motives to assume theburden for the common good under the mandatory system than under the oldmethod of cession or of protectorate. As to nations, however, whichplaced national interests first and made selfishness the standard ofinternational policy it was to be assumed that an appeal under eithersystem would be ineffective. 

The truth of this was very apparent at Paris. In the tentativedistribution of mandates among the Powers, which took place on thestrong presumption that the mandatory system would be adopted, theprincipal European Powers appeared to be willing and even eager tobecome mandatories over territories possessing natural resources whichcould be profitably developed and showed an unwillingness to acceptmandates for territories which, barren of mineral or agriculturalwealth, would be continuing liabilities rather than assets. This is notstated by way of criticism, but only in explanation of what took place. 

From the beginning to the end of the discussions on mandates and theirdistribution among the Powers it was repeatedly declared that the UnitedStates ought to participate in the general plan for the upbuilding ofthe new states which under mandatories would finally become independentnationalities, but it was never, to my knowledge, proposed, except bythe inhabitants of the region in question, that the United States shouldaccept a mandate for Syria or the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea. Thoseregions were rich in natural resources and their economic future under astable government was bright. Expenditures in their behalf and thedirection of their public affairs would bring ample returns to themandatory nations. On the other hand, there was a sustainedpropaganda--for it amounted to that--in favor of the United Statesassuming mandates over Armenia and the municipal district ofConstantinople, both of which, if limited by the boundaries which it wasthen purposed to draw, would be a constant financial burden to the Poweraccepting the mandate, and, in the case of Armenia, would require thatPower to furnish a military force estimated at not less than 50, 000 mento prevent the aggression of warlike neighbors and to preserve domesticorder and peace. 

It is not too severe to say of those who engaged in this propaganda thatthe purpose was to take advantage of the unselfishness of the Americanpeople and of the altruism and idealism of President Wilson in order toimpose on the United States the burdensome mandates and to divide thosewhich covered desirable territories among the European Powers. I do notthink that the President realized at the time that an actual propagandawas going on, and I doubt very much whether he would have believed it ifhe had been told. Deeply impressed with the idea that it was the moralduty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate andespecially to guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule untilthey were capable of self-government and self-protection, the Presidentapparently looked upon the appeals made to him as genuine expressions ofhumanitarianism and as manifestations of the opinion of mankindconcerning the part that the United States ought to take in thereconstruction of the world. His high-mindedness and loftiness ofthought blinded him to the sordidness of purpose which appears to haveinduced the general acquiescence in his desired system of mandates, andthe same qualities of mind caused him to listen sympathetically toproposals, the acceptance of which would give actual proof of theunselfishness of the United States. 

Reading the situation thus and convinced of the objections against themandatory system from the point of view of international law, of policyand of American interests, I opposed the inclusion of the system in theplan for a League of Nations. In view of the attitude which Mr. Wilsonhad taken toward my advice regarding policies I confined the objectionswhich I presented to him, as I have stated, to those based on legaldifficulties. The objections on the ground of policy were made toColonel House in the hope that through him they might reach thePresident and open his eyes to the true state of affairs. Whether theyever did reach him I do not know. Nothing in his subsequent course ofaction indicated that they did. 

But, if they did, he evidently considered them as invalid as he did theobjections arising from legal difficulties. The system of mandates waswritten into the Treaty and a year after the Treaty was signed PresidentWilson asked the Congress for authority to accept for the United Statesa mandate over Armenia. This the Congress refused. It is needless tomake further comment. 

CHAPTER XIV

DIFFERENCES AS TO THE LEAGUE RECAPITULATED

The differences between the President's views and mine in regard to thecharacter of the League of Nations and to the provisions of the Covenantrelating to the organization and functions of the League wereirreconcilable, and we were equally in disagreement as to the duties ofthe League in carrying out certain provisions of the Treaty of Peace asthe common agent of the signatory Powers. As a commissionedrepresentative of the President of the United States acting under hisinstructions I had no alternative but to accept his decisions and tofollow his directions, since surrender of my commission as PeaceCommissioner seemed to me at the time to be practically out of thequestion. I followed his directions, however, with extreme reluctancebecause I felt that Mr. Wilson's policies were fundamentally wrong andwould unavoidably result in loss of prestige to the United States and tohim as its Chief Magistrate. It seemed to me that he had endangered, ifhe had not destroyed, his preeminent position in world affairs in orderto obtain the acceptance of his plan for a League of Nations, a planwhich in theory and in detail was so defective that it would bedifficult to defend it successfully from critical attack. 

The objections to the terms of the Covenant, which I had raised at theoutset, were based on principle and also on policy, as has been shown inthe preceding pages; and on the same grounds I had opposed their hastyadoption and their inclusion in the Peace Treaty to be negotiated atParis by the Conference. These objections and the arguments advanced intheir support did not apparently have any effect on President Wilson, for they failed to change his views or to modify the plan which he, withGeneral Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil, had worked out for an internationalorganization. They did not swerve him one jot from his avowed purpose tomake the creation of the League of Nations the principal feature of thenegotiations and the provisions of the Covenant the most prominentarticles in the Treaties of Peace with the Central Powers. 

Instead of accomplishing their designed purpose, my efforts to inducethe President to change his policy resulted only in my losing hisconfidence in my judgment and in arousing in his mind, if I do notmisinterpret his conduct, doubts of my loyalty to him personally. It wascharacteristic of Mr. Wilson that his firm conviction as to thesoundness of his conclusions regarding the character of the League ofNations and his fixity of purpose in seeking to compel its adoption bythe Peace Conference were so intense as to brook no opposition, especially from one whom he expected to accept his judgment withoutquestion and to give support in thought and word to any plan or policywhich he advocated. In view of this mental attitude of the President itis not difficult to understand his opinion of my course of action atParis. The breach in our confidential relations was unavoidable in viewof my conviction of the duty of an official adviser and his belief thatobjections ought not to be urged as to a matter concerning which he hadexpressed his opinion. To give implied assent to policies and intentionswhich seemed to me wrong or unwise would have been violative of a publictrust, though doubtless by remaining silent I might have won favor andapproval from the President and retained his confidence. 

In summarizing briefly the subjects of disagreement between thePresident and myself concerning the League of Nations I will follow theorder of importance rather than the order in which they arose. Whilethey also divide into two classes, those based on principle and thosebased on policy, it does not seem advisable to treat them by classes inthe summary. 

The most serious defect in the President's Covenant was, in my opinion, one of principle. It was the practical denial of the equality of nationsin the regulation of international affairs in times of peace through therecognition in the Executive Council of the League of the right ofprimacy of the Five Great Powers. This was an abandonment of afundamental principle of international law and comity and wasdestructive of the very conception of national sovereignty both as aterm of political philosophy and as a term of constitutional law. Thedenial of the equal independence and the free exercise of sovereignrights of all states in the conduct of their foreign affairs, and theestablishment of this group of primates, amounted to a recognition ofthe doctrine that the powerful are, in law as well as in fact, entitledto be the overlords of the weak. If adopted, it legalized the mastery ofmight, which in international relations, when peace prevailed, had beenuniversally condemned as illegal and its assertion as reprehensible. 

It was this doctrine, that the possessors of superior physical powerwere as a matter of right the supervisors, if not the dictators, ofthose lacking the physical power to resist their commands, which was thevital element of ancient imperialism and of modern Prussianism. Beliefin it as a true theory of world polity justified the Great War in theeyes of the German people even when they doubted the plea of theirGovernment that their national safety was in peril. The victors, although they had fought the war with the announced purpose of provingthe falsity of this pernicious doctrine and of emancipating theoppressed nationalities subject to the Central Powers, revived thedoctrine with little hesitation during the negotiations at Paris andwrote it into the Covenant of the League of Nations by contriving anorganization which would give practical control over the destinies ofthe world to an oligarchy of the Five Great Powers. It was an assumptionof the right of supremacy based on the fact that the united strength ofthese Powers could compel obedience. It was a full endorsement of thetheory of "the balance of power" in spite of the recognized evils ofthat doctrine in its practical application. Beneath the banner of thedemocracies of the world was the same sinister idea which had foundexpression in the Congress of Vienna with its purpose of protecting themonarchical institutions of a century ago. It proclaimed in fact thatmankind must look to might rather than right, to force rather than law, in the regulation of international affairs for the future. 

This defect in the theory, on which the League of Nations was to beorganized, was emphasized and given permanency by the adoption of amutual guaranty of territorial integrity and political independenceagainst external aggression. Since the burden of enforcing the guarantywould unavoidably fall upon the more powerful nations, they couldreasonably demand the control over affairs which might develop into asituation requiring a resort to the guaranty. In fact during a plenarysession of the Peace Conference held on May 31, 1919, President Wilsonstated as a broad principle that responsibility for protecting andmaintaining a settlement under one of the Peace Treaties carried with itthe right to determine what that settlement should be. The applicationto the case of responsible guarantors is obvious and was apparently inmind when the Covenant was being evolved. The same principle was appliedthroughout the negotiations at Paris. 

The mutual guaranty from its affirmative nature compelled in fact, though not in form, the establishment of a ruling group, a coalition ofthe Great Powers, and denied, though not in terms, the equality ofnations. The oligarchy was the logical result of entering into theguaranty or the guaranty was the logical result of the creation of theoligarchy through the perpetuation of the basic idea of the Supreme WarCouncil. No distinction was made as to a state of war and a state ofpeace. Strongly opposed to the abandonment of the principle of theequality of nations in times of peace I naturally opposed theaffirmative guaranty and endeavored to persuade the President to acceptas a substitute for it a self-denying or negative covenant whichamounted to a promise of "hands-off" and in no way required theformation of an international oligarchy to make it effective. 

In addition to the foregoing objection I opposed the guaranty on theground that it was politically inexpedient to attempt to bind the UnitedStates by a treaty provision which by its terms would certainly inviteattack as to its constitutionality. Without entering into the strengthof the legal argument, and without denying that there are two sides tothe question, the fact that it was open to debate whether thetreaty-making power under the Constitution could or could not obligatethe Government of the United States to make war under certain conditionswas in my judgment a practical reason for avoiding the issue. If thepower existed to so bind the United States by treaty on the theory thatthe Federal Government could not be restricted in its right to makeinternational agreements, then the guaranty would be attacked as anunwise and needless departure from the traditional policies of theRepublic. If the power did not exist, then the violation of theConstitution would be an effective argument against such an undertaking. Whatever the conclusion might be, therefore, as to the legality of theguaranty or as to whether the obligation was legal or moral in nature, it did not seem possible for it to escape criticism and vigorous attackin America. 

It seemed to me that the President's guaranty was so vulnerable fromevery angle that to insist upon it would endanger the acceptance of anytreaty negotiated if the Covenant was, in accordance with thePresident's plan, made an integral part of it. Then, too, oppositionwould, in my opinion, develop on the ground that the guaranty wouldpermit European Powers to participate, if they could not actindependently, in the forcible settlement of international quarrels inthe Western Hemisphere whenever there was an actual invasion ofterritory or violation of sovereignty, while conversely the UnitedStates would be morally, if not legally, bound to take part in coercivemeasures in composing European differences under similar conditions. Itcould be urged with much force that the Monroe Doctrine in the one caseand the Washington policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" in theother would be so affected that they would both have to be substantiallyabandoned or else rewritten. If the American people were convinced thatthis would be the consequence of accepting the affirmative guaranty, itmeant its rejection. In any event it was bound to produce an acrimoniouscontroversy. From the point of view of policy alone it seemed unwise toinclude the guaranty in the Covenant, and believing that an objection onthat ground would appeal to the President more strongly than one basedon principle, I emphasized that objection, though in my own mind theother was the more vital and more compelling. 

The points of difference relating to the League of Nations between thePresident's views and mine, other than the recognition of the primacy ofthe Great Powers, the affirmative guaranty and the resulting denial infact of the equality of nations in times of peace, were the provisionsin the President's original draft of the Covenant relating tointernational arbitrations, the subordination of the judicial power tothe political power, and the proposed system of mandates. Havingdiscussed with sufficient detail the reasons which caused me to opposethese provisions, and having stated the efforts made to induce PresidentWilson to abandon or modify them, repetition would be superfluous. It isalso needless, in view of the full narrative of events contained inthese pages, to state that I failed entirely in my endeavor to divertthe President from his determination to have these provisions insertedin the Covenant, except in the case of international arbitrations, andeven in that case I do not believe that my advice had anything to dowith his abandonment of his ideas as to the method of selectingarbitrators and the right of appeal from arbitral awards. Those changesand the substitution of an article providing for the future creation ofa Permanent Court of International Justice, were, in my opinion, as Ihave said, a concession to the European statesmen and due to theirinsistence. 

President Wilson knew that I disagreed with him as to the relativeimportance of restoring a state of peace at the earliest date possibleand of securing the adoption of a plan for the creation of a League ofNations. He was clearly convinced that the drafting and acceptance ofthe Covenant was superior to every other task imposed on the Conference, that it must be done before any other settlement was reached and that itought to have precedence in the negotiations. His course of action wasconclusive evidence of this conviction. 

On the other hand, I favored the speedy negotiation of a short andsimple preliminary treaty, in which, so far as the League of Nations wasconcerned, there would be a series of declarations and an agreement fora future international conference called for the purpose of drafting aconvention in harmony with the declarations in the preliminary treaty. By adopting this course a state of peace would have been restored in theearly months of 1919, official intercourse and commercial relationswould have been resumed, the more complex and difficult problems ofsettlement would have been postponed to the negotiation of thedefinitive Treaty of Peace, and there would have been time to studyexhaustively the purposes, powers, and practical operations of a Leaguebefore the organic agreement was put into final form. Postponement wouldalso have given opportunity to the nations, which had continued neutralthroughout the war, to participate in the formation of the plan for aLeague on an equal footing with the nations which had been belligerents. In the establishment of a world organization universality ofinternational representation in reaching an agreement seemed to meadvisable, if not essential, provided the nations represented weredemocracies and not autocracies. 

It was to be presumed also that at a conference entirely independent ofthe peace negotiations and free from the influences affecting the termsof peace, there would be more general and more frank discussionsregarding the various phases of the subject than was possible at aconference ruled by the Five Great Powers and dominated in itsdecisions, if not in its opinions, by the statesmen of those Powers. 

To perfect such a document, as the Covenant of the League of Nations wasintended to be, required expert knowledge, practical experience ininternational relations, and an exchange of ideas untrammeled byimmediate questions of policy or by the prejudices resulting from thewar and from national hatreds and jealousies. It was not a work forpoliticians, novices, or inexperienced theorists, but for trainedstatesmen and jurists, who were conversant with the fundamentalprinciples of international law, with the usages of nations in theirintercourse with one another, and with the successes and failures ofprevious experiments in international association. The President wasright in his conception as to the greatness of the task to beaccomplished, but he was wrong, radically wrong, in believing that itcould be properly done at the Paris Conference under the conditionswhich there prevailed and in the time given for consideration ofthe subject. 

To believe for a moment that a world constitution--for so its advocateslooked upon the Covenant--could be drafted perfectly or even wisely ineleven days, however much thought individuals may have previously givento the subject, seems on the face of it to show an utter lack ofappreciation of the problems to be solved or else an abnormal confidencein the talents and wisdom of those charged with the duty. If onecompares the learned and comprehensive debates that took place in theconvention which drafted the Constitution of the United States, and themonths that were spent in the critical examination word by word of theproposed articles, with the ten meetings of the Commission on the Leagueof Nations prior to its report of February 14 and with the few hoursgiven to debating the substance and language of the Covenant, theinferior character of the document produced by the Commission ought notto be a matter of wonder. It was a foregone conclusion that it would befound defective. Some of these defects were subsequently corrected, butthe theory and basic principles, which were the chief defects in theplan, were preserved with no substantial change. 

But the fact, which has been repeatedly asserted in the preceding pagesand which cannot be too strongly emphasized by repetition, is that themost potent and most compelling reason for postponing the considerationof a detailed plan for an international organization was that such aconsideration at the outset of the negotiations at Paris obstructed anddelayed the discussion and settlement of the general terms necessary tothe immediate restoration of a state of peace. Those who recall thepolitical and social conditions in Europe during the winter of 1918-19, to which reference has already been made, will comprehend theapprehension caused by anything which interrupted the negotiation of thepeace. No one dared to prophesy what might happen if the state ofpolitical uncertainty and industrial stagnation, which existed under thearmistices, continued. 

The time given to the formulation of the Covenant of the League ofNations and the determination that it should have first place in thenegotiations caused such a delay in the proceedings and prevented aspeedy restoration of peace. Denial of this is useless. It is toomanifest to require proof or argument to support it. It is equally true, I regret to say, that President Wilson was chiefly responsible for this. If he had not insisted that a complete and detailed plan for the Leagueshould be part of the treaty negotiated at Paris, and if he had not alsoinsisted that the Covenant be taken up and settled in terms before othermatters were considered, a preliminary treaty of peace would in allprobability have been signed, ratified, and in effect duringApril, 1919. 

Whatever evils resulted from the failure of the Paris Conference tonegotiate promptly a preliminary treaty--and it must be admitted theywere not a few--must be credited to those who caused the delay. Thepersonal interviews and secret conclaves before the Commission on theLeague of Nations met occupied a month and a half. Practically anotherhalf month was consumed in sessions of the Commission. The monthfollowing was spent by President Wilson on his visit to the UnitedStates explaining the reported Covenant and listening to criticisms. While much was done during his absence toward the settlement of numerousquestions, final decision in every case awaited his return to Paris. After his arrival the Commission on the League renewed its sittings toconsider amendments to its report, and it required over a month to putit in final form for adoption; but during this latter period much timewas given to the actual terms of peace, which on account of the delaycaused in attempting to perfect the Covenant had taken the form of adefinitive rather than a preliminary treaty. 

It is conservative to say that between two and three months were spentin the drafting of a document which in the end was rejected by theSenate of the United States and was responsible for the non-ratificationof the Treaty of Versailles. In view of the warnings that PresidentWilson had received as to the probable result of insisting on the planof a League which he had prepared and his failure to heed the warnings, his persistency in pressing for acceptance of the Covenant beforeanything else was done makes the resulting delay in the peace lessexcusable. 

Two weeks after the President returned from the United States in Marchthe common opinion was that the drafting of the Covenant had delayed therestoration of peace, an opinion which was endorsed in the press of manycountries. The belief became so general and aroused so much popularcondemnation that Mr. Wilson considered it necessary to make a publicdenial, in which he expressed surprise at the published views anddeclared that the negotiations in regard to the League of Nations had inno way delayed the peace. Concerning the denial and the subject withwhich it dealt, I made on March 28 the following memorandum:

 "The President has issued a public statement, which appears in this morning's papers, in which he refers to the 'surprising impression' that the discussions concerning the League of Nations have delayed the making of peace and he flatly denies that the impression is justified. 

 "I doubt if this statement will remove the general impression which amounts almost to a conviction. Every one knows that the President's thoughts and a great deal of his time prior to his departure for the United States were given to the formulation of the plan for a League and that he insisted that the 'Covenant' should be drafted and reported before the other features of the peace were considered. The _real_ difficulties of the present situation, which had to be settled before the treaty could be drafted, were postponed until his return here on March 13th. 

 "In fact the real bases of peace have only just begun to receive the attention which they deserve. 

 "If such questions as the Rhine Provinces, Poland, reparations, and economic arrangements had been taken up by the President and Premiers in January, and if they had sat day and night, as they are now sitting _in camera, _ until each was settled, the peace treaty would, I believe, be to-day on the Conference's table, if not actually signed. 

 "Of course the insistence that the plan of the League be first pushed to a draft before all else prevented the settlement of the other questions. Why attempt to refute what is manifestly true? I regret that the President made the statement because I do not think that it carries conviction. I fear that it will invite controversy and denial, and that it puts the President on the defensive. "

The views expressed in this memorandum were those held, I believe, bythe great majority of persons who participated in the Peace Conferenceor were in intimate touch with its proceedings. Mr. Wilson's publisheddenial may have converted some to the belief that the drafting of theCovenant was in no way responsible for the delay of the peace, but thenumber of converts must have been very few, as it meant utter ignoranceof or indifference to the circumstances which conclusively proved theincorrectness of the statement. 

The effect of this attempt of President Wilson to check the growingpopular antipathy to the League as an obstacle to the speedy restorationof peace was to cause speculation as to whether he really appreciatedthe situation. If he did not, it was affirmed that he was ignorant ofpublic opinion or else was lacking in mental acuteness. If he didappreciate the state of affairs, it was said that his statement wasuttered with the sole purpose of deceiving the people. In either case hefell in public estimation. It shows the unwisdom of having issuedthe denial. 

CHAPTER XV

THE PROPOSED TREATY WITH FRANCE

There is one subject, connected with the consideration of the mutualguaranty which, as finally reported by the Commission on the League ofNations, appears as Article 10 of the Covenant, that should be brieflyreviewed, as it directly bears upon the value placed upon the guarantyby the French statesmen who accepted it. I refer to the treatiesnegotiated by France with the United States and Great Britainrespectively. These treaties provided that, in the event of France beingagain attacked by Germany without provocation, the two Powers severallyagreed to come to the aid of the French Republic in repelling theinvasion. The joint nature of the undertaking was in a provision in eachtreaty that a similar treaty would be signed by the other Power, otherwise the agreement failed. The undertakings stated in practicallyidentical terms in the two treaties constituted, in fact, a tripledefensive alliance for the preservation of the integrity of Frenchterritory and French independence. It had the same object as theguaranty in the Covenant, though it went even further in the assuranceof affirmative action, and was, therefore, open to the same objectionson the grounds of constitutionality and policy as Article 10. 

In a note, dated March 20, stating my "Impressions as to the PresentSituation, " I discussed the endeavors being made by the President toovercome opposition and to remove obstacles to the acceptance of hisplan for a League of Nations by means of compromises and concessions. Inthe note appears the following:

 "An instance of the lengths to which these compromises and makeshifts are going, occurred this morning when Colonel House sent to Mr. White, General Bliss, and me for our opinion the following proposal: That the United States, Great Britain, and France enter into a formal alliance to resist any aggressive action by Germany against France or Belgium, and to employ their military, financial, and economic resources for this purpose in addition to exerting their moral influence to prevent such aggression. 

 "We three agreed that, if that agreement was made, the chief reason for a League of Nations, as now planned, disappeared. So far as France and Belgium were concerned the alliance was all they needed for their future safety. They might or might not accept the League. Of course they would if the alliance depended upon their acceptance. They would do most anything to get such an alliance. 

 "The proposal was doubtless made to remove two provisions on which the French are most insistent: _First_, an international military staff to be prepared to use force against Germany if there were signs of military activity; _second_, the creation of an independent Rhenish Republic to act as a 'buffer' state. Of course the triple alliance would make these measures needless. 

 "What impressed me most was that to gain French support for the League the proposer of the alliance was willing to destroy the chief feature of the League. It seemed to me that here was utter blindness as to the consequences of such action. There appears to have been no thought given as to the way other nations, like Poland, Bohemia, and the Southern Slavs, would view the formation of an alliance to protect France and Belgium alone. Manifestly it would increase rather than decrease their danger from Germany since she would have to look eastward and southward for expansion. Of course they would not accept as sufficient the guaranty in the Covenant when France and Belgium declined to do it. 

 "How would such a proposal be received in the United States with its traditional policy of avoiding 'entangling alliances'? Of course, when one considers it, the proposal is preposterous and would be laughed at and rejected. "

This was the impression made upon me at the time that this triplealliance against Germany was first proposed. I later came to look uponit more seriously and to recognize the fact that there were some validreasons in favor of the proposal. The subject was not further discussedby the Commissioners for several weeks, but it is clear from whatfollowed that M. Clemenceau, who naturally favored the idea, continuedto press the President to agree to the plan. What arguments wereemployed to persuade him I cannot say, but, knowing the shrewdness ofthe French Premier in taking advantage of a situation, my belief is thathe threatened to withdraw or at least gave the impression that he wouldwithdraw his support of the League of Nations or else would insist on aprovision in the Covenant creating a general staff and an internationalmilitary force and on a provision in the treaty establishing a RhenishRepublic or else ceding to France all territory west of the Rhine. Toavoid the adoption of either of these provisions, which would haveendangered the approval of his plan for world organization, thePresident submitted to the French demand. At least I assume that was thereason, for he promised to enter into the treaty of assistance which M. Clemenceau insisted should be signed. 

It is of course possible that he was influenced in his decision by thebelief that the knowledge that such an agreement existed would besufficient to deter Germany from even planning another invasion ofFrance, but my opinion is that the desire to win French support for theCovenant was the chief reason for the promise that he gave. It should beremembered that at the time both the Italians and Japanese werethreatening to make trouble unless their territorial ambitions weresatisfied. With these two Powers disaffected and showing a dispositionto refuse to accept membership in the proposed League of Nations theopposition of France to the Covenant would have been fatal. It wouldhave been the end of the President's dream of a world organized tomaintain peace by an international guaranty of national boundaries andsovereignties. Whether France would in the end have insisted on theadditional guaranty of protection I doubt, but it is evident that Mr. Wilson believed that she would and decided to prevent a disaster to hisplan by acceding to the wishes of his French colleague. 

Some time in April prior to the acceptance of the Treaty of Peace by thePremiers of the Allied Powers, the President and Mr. Lloyd George agreedwith M. Clemenceau to negotiate the treaties of protective alliancewhich the French demanded. The President advised me of his decision onthe day before the Treaty was delivered to the German plenipotentiariesstating in substance that his promise to enter into the alliance formeda part of the settlements as fully as if written into the Treaty. I toldhim that personally I considered an agreement to negotiate the treaty ofassistance a mistake, as it discredited Article 10 of the Covenant, which he considered all-important, and as it would, I was convinced, bethe cause of serious opposition in the United States. He replied that heconsidered it necessary to adopt this policy in the circumstances, andthat, at any rate, having passed his word with M. Clemenceau, who wasaccepting the Treaty because of his promise, it was too late toreconsider the matter and useless to discuss it. 

Subsequently the President instructed me to have a treaty drafted inaccordance with a memorandum which he sent me. This was done by Dr. James Brown Scott and the draft was approved and prepared for signature. On the morning of June 28, the same day on which the Treaty ofVersailles was signed, the protective treaty with France was signed atthe President's residence in the Place des Etats Unis by M. Clemenceauand M. Pichon for the French Republic and by President Wilson and myselffor the United States, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour signing at thesame time a similar treaty for Great Britain. Though disagreeing withthe policy of the President in regard to this special treaty it wouldhave been futile for me to have refused to accept the full powers issuedto me on June 27 or to have declined to follow the directions to act asa plenipotentiary in signing the document. Such a course would not haveprevented Mr. Wilson from entering into the defensive alliance withFrance and Great Britain and might have actually delayed the peace. Feeling strongly the supreme necessity of ending the existing state ofwar as soon as possible I did not consider that I would be justified inrefusing to act as the formal agent of the President or in disobeyinghis instructions as such agent. In view of the long delay inratification of the Treaty of the Peace, I have since doubted whether Iacted wisely. But at the time I was convinced that the right course wasthe one which I followed. 

In spite of the fact that my judgment was contrary to the President's asto the wisdom of negotiating this treaty because I considered the policyof doing so bad from the standpoint of national interests and ofdoubtful expediency in view of the almost certain rejection of it by theUnited States Senate and of its probable effect on any plan for generaldisarmament, I was not entirely satisfied because I could not disregardthe fact that an argument could be made in its favor which was notwithout force. 

The United States entered the war to check the progress of theautocratic imperialism of Germany. That purpose became generallyrecognized before the victory was won. In making peace it was deemed, therefore, a matter of first importance to make impossible a revival ofthe aggressive spirit and ambitious designs of Germany. The prevailingbitterness against France because of the territorial cessions and thereparations demanded by the victor would naturally cause the Germanpeople to seek future opportunity to be revenged. With a populationalmost, if not quite, double that of the French Republic, Germany wouldbe a constant menace to the nation which had suffered so terribly in thepast by reason of the imperialistic spirit prevalent in the GermanEmpire. The fear of that menace strongly influenced the French policiesduring the negotiations at Paris. In fact it was hard to avoid thefeeling that this fear dominated the conduct of the French delegates andthe attitude of their Government. They demanded much, and recognizingthe probable effect of their demands on the German people sought toobtain special protection in case their vanquished enemy attempted inthe future to dispossess them by force of the land which he had beencompelled to surrender or attempted to make them restore theindemnity paid. 

Whether France could have avoided the danger of German attack in thefuture by lessening her demands, however just they might be, is neitherhere nor there. It makes little practical difference how that questionis answered. The important fact is that the settlements in favor ofFrance under the Treaty were of a nature which made the continuance ofpeace between the two nations doubtful if Germany possessed the abilityto regain her military strength and if nothing was done to prevent herfrom using it. In these circumstances a special protective treaty seemeda practical way to check the conversion of the revengeful spirit of theGermans into another war of invasion. 

However valid this argument in favor of the two treaties of assistance, and though my personal sympathy for France inclined me to satisfy herwishes, my judgment, as an American Commissioner, was that Americaninterests and the traditional policies of the United States were againstthis alliance. Possibly the President recognized the force of theargument in favor of the treaty and valued it so highly that heconsidered it decisive. Knowing, however, his general attitude towardFrench demands and his confidence in the effectiveness of the guarantyin the Covenant, I believe that the controlling reason for promising thealliance and negotiating the treaty was his conviction that it wasnecessary to make this concession to the French in order to secure theirsupport for the Covenant and to check the disposition in certainquarters to make the League of Nations essentially a military coalitionunder a general international staff organized and controlled bythe French. 

There were those who favored the mutual guaranty in the Covenant, butwho strongly opposed the separate treaty with France. Their objectionwas that, in view of the general guaranty, the treaty of assistance wassuperfluous, or, if it were considered necessary, then it discreditedthe Covenant's guaranty. The argument was logical and difficult tocontrovert. It was the one taken by delegates of the smaller nations whorelied on the general guaranty to protect their countries from futureaggressions on the part of their powerful neighbors. If the guaranty ofthe Covenant was sufficient protection for them, they declared that itought to be sufficient for France. If France doubted its sufficiency, how could they be content with it?

Since my own judgment was against any form of guaranty imposing upon theUnited States either a legal or a moral obligation to employ coercivemeasures under certain conditions arising in international affairs, Icould not conscientiously support the idea of the French treaty. Thisfurther departure from America's historic policy caused me to acceptPresident Wilson's "guidance and direction . .. With increasingreluctance, " as he aptly expressed it in his letter of February 11, 1920. We did not agree, we could not agree, since our points of viewwere so much at variance. 

Yet, in spite of the divergence of our views as to the negotiationswhich constantly increased and became more and more pronounced duringthe six months at Paris, our personal relations continued unchanged; atleast there was no outward evidence of the actual breach which existed. As there never had been the personal intimacy between the President andmyself, such as existed in the case of Colonel House and a few others ofhis advisers, and as our intercourse had always been more or less formalin character, it was easier to continue the official relations that hadpreviously prevailed. I presume that Mr. Wilson felt, as I did, that itwould create an embarrassing situation in the negotiations if there wasan open rupture between us or if my commission was withdrawn orsurrendered and I returned to the United States before the Treaty ofPeace was signed. The effect, too, upon the situation in the Senatewould be to strengthen the opposition to the President's purposes andfurnish his personal, as well as his political, enemies with new groundsfor attacking him. 

I think, however, that our reasons for avoiding a public break in ourofficial relations were different. The President undoubtedly believedthat such an event would jeopardize the acceptance of the Covenant bythe United States Senate in view of the hostility to it which hadalready developed and which was supplemented by the bitter animosity tohim personally which was undisguised. On my part, the chief reason forleaving the situation undisturbed was that I was fully convinced that mywithdrawal from the American Commission would seriously delay therestoration of peace, possibly in the signature of the Treaty at Parisand certainly in its ratification at Washington. Considering that thetime had passed to make an attempt to change Mr. Wilson's views on anyfundamental principle, and believing it a duty to place no obstacle inthe way of the signature and ratification of the Treaty of Peace withGermany, I felt that there was no course for me as a representative ofthe United States other than to obey the President's orders howeverstrong my personal inclination might be to refuse to follow a line ofaction which seemed to me wrong in principle and unwise in policy. 

In view of the subsequent contest between the President and theopposition Senators over the Treaty of Versailles, resulting in itsnon-ratification and the consequent delay in the restoration of a stateof peace between the United States and Germany, my failure at Paris todecline to follow the President may be open to criticism, if not tocensure. But it can hardly be considered just to pass judgment on myconduct by what occurred after the signature of the Treaty unless whatwould occur was a foregone conclusion, and at that time it was not evensuggested that the Treaty would fail of ratification. The decision hadto be made under the conditions and expectations which then prevailed. Unquestionably there was on June 28, 1919, a common belief that thePresident would compose his differences with a sufficient number of theRepublican Senators to obtain the necessary consent of two thirds of theSenate to the ratification of the Treaty, and that the delay insenatorial action would be brief. I personally believed that that wouldbe the result, although Mr. Wilson's experience in Washington inFebruary and the rigid attitude, which he then assumed, might have beena warning as to the future. Seeing the situation as I did, no man wouldhave been willing to imperil immediate ratification by resigning asCommissioner on the ground that he was opposed to the President'spolicies. A return to peace was at stake, and peace was the supreme needof the world, the universal appeal of all peoples. I could notconscientiously assume the responsibility of placing any obstacle in theway of a return to peace at the earliest possible moment. It would havebeen to do the very thing which I condemned in the President when heprevented an early signing of the peace by insisting on the acceptanceof the Covenant of the League of Nations as a condition precedent. Whatever the consequence of my action would have been, whether itresulted in delay or in defeat of ratification, I should have feltguilty of having prevented an immediate peace which from the firstseemed to me vitally important to all nations. Personal feelings andeven personal beliefs were insufficient to excuse such action. 

CHAPTER XVI

LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME

Having reviewed the radical differences between the President and myselfin regard to the League of Nations and the inclusion of the Covenant inthe Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is necessary to revert to the earlydays of the negotiations at Paris in order to explain the divergence ofour views as to the necessity of a definite programme for the AmericanCommission to direct it in its work and to guide its members in theirintercourse with the delegates of other countries. 

If the President had a programme, other than the general principles andthe few territorial settlements included in his Fourteen Points, and thegeneralities contained in his "subsequent addresses, " he did not show acopy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of itscontents. The natural conclusion was that he had never worked out indetail the application of his announced principles or put into concreteform the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in theterms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation ofthe policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorialsettlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were inlarge measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they weredelivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, orapplication to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequateinstructions to Commissioners who were authorized "to negotiate peace. "

An examination of the familiar Fourteen Points uttered by the Presidentin his address of January 8, 1918, will indicate the character of thedeclarations, which may be, by reason of their thought and expression, termed "Wilsonian" (Appendix IV, p. 314). The first five Points areannouncements of principle which should govern the peace negotiations. The succeeding eight Points refer to territorial adjustments, but makeno attempt to define actual boundaries, so essential in conductingnegotiations regarding territory. The Fourteenth Point relates to theformation of "a general association of the nations for the purpose ofaffording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorialintegrity to great and small nations alike. "

It is hardly worth while to say that the Fourteen Points and the fourprinciples declared in the address of February 11, 1918 (Appendix V), donot constitute a sufficient programme for negotiators. Manifestly theyare too indefinite in specific application. They were never intended forthat purpose when they were proclaimed. They might have formed a generalbasis for the preparation of instructions for peace commissioners, butthey omitted too many of the essentials to be considered actualinstructions, while the lack of definite terms to-be included in atreaty further deprived them of that character. Such important andpractical subjects as reparations, financial arrangements, the use andcontrol of waterways, and other questions of a like nature, are not evenmentioned. As a general statement of the bases of peace the FourteenPoints and subsequent declarations probably served a useful purpose, though some critics would deny it, but as a working programme for thenegotiation of a treaty they were inadequate, if not wholly useless. 

Believing in the autumn of 1918 that the end of the war was approachingand assuming that the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conferencewould have to be furnished with detailed written instructions as to theterms of the treaty to be signed, I prepared on September 21, 1918, amemorandum of my views as to the territorial settlements which wouldform, not instructions, but a guide in the drafting of instructions forthe American Commissioners. At the time I had no intimation that thePresident purposed to be present in person at the peace table and hadnot even thought of such a possibility. The memorandum, which follows, was written with the sole purpose of being ready to draft definiteinstructions which could be submitted to the President when the timecame to prepare for the negotiation of the peace. The memorandumfollows:

 "The present Russian situation, which is unspeakably horrible and which seems beyond present hope of betterment, presents new problems to be solved at the peace table. 

 "The Pan-Germans now have in shattered and impotent Russia the opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their 'Mittel-Europa' project. German domination over Southern Russia would offer as advantageous, if not a more advantageous, route to the Persian Gulf than through the turbulent Balkans and unreliable Turkey. If both routes, north and south of the Black Sea, could be controlled, the Pan-Germans would have gained more than they dreamed of obtaining. I believe, however, that Bulgaria fears the Germans and will be disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent of making a separate peace with the Allies. Nevertheless, if the Germans could obtain the route north of the Black Sea, they would with reason consider the war a successful venture because it would give them the opportunity to rebuild the imperial power and to carry out the Prussian ambition of world-mastery. 

 "The treaty of peace must not leave Germany in possession directly or indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient. There must be territorial barriers erected to prevent that Empire from ever being able by political or economic penetration to become dominant in those regions. 

 "With this in view I would state the essentials for a stable peace as follows, though I do so in the most tentative way because conditions may change materially. These 'essentials' relate to territory and waters, and do not deal with military protection. 

 "_First. _ The complete abrogation or denouncement of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian territory or commerce; and also the same action as to the Treaty of Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or Germany's allies. 

 "_Second. _ The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation. 

 "_Third_. Finland raises a different question and it should be carefully considered whether it should not be an independent state. 

 "_Fourth_. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in possession of the port of Danzig. 

 "_Fifth_. An independent state, either single or federal composed of Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia) and possessing an international right of way by land or water to a free port. 

 "_Sixth_. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in which the Ruthenians predominate. 

 "_Seventh_. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should ultimately be given sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the central mouth of the Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to the boundary there is doubt. )

 "_Eighth_. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate, namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a single or a federal state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be later settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and Italy. My present view is that there should be a good Jugo-Slav port. 

 "_Ninth_. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights of free navigation of the Danube. 

 "_Tenth_. Restoration to Italy of all the Italian provinces of Austria. Italy's territory to extend along the northern Adriatic shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the eastern side of the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy. (This last is doubtful. )

 "_Eleventh. _ Reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title of the Archduchy of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outlet to the sea would be like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea and the Baltic. 

 "_Twelfth_. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow in general those established after the First Balkan War, though Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of the Aegean coast and obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding Constantinople, to be subsequently decided upon. 

 "_Thirteenth_. Albania to be under Italian or Serbian sovereignty or incorporated in the Jugo-Slav Confederation. 

 "_Fourteenth. _ Greece to obtain more of the Aegean littoral at the expense of Bulgaria, the Greek-inhabited islands adjacent to Asia Minor and possibly certain ports and adjoining territory in Asia Minor. 

 "_Fifteenth. _ The Ottoman Empire to be reduced to Anatolia and have no possessions in Europe. (This requires consideration. )

 "_Sixteenth_. Constantinople to be erected into an international protectorate surrounded by a land zone to allow for expansion of population. The form of government to be determined upon by an international commission or by one Government acting as the mandatory of the Powers. The commission or mandatory to have the regulation and control of the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as international waterways. 

 "_Seventeenth. _ Armenia and Syria to be erected into protectorates of such Government or Governments as seems expedient from a domestic as well as an international point of view; the guaranty being that both countries will be given self-government as soon as possible and that an 'Open-Door' policy as to commerce and industrial development will be rigidly observed. 

 "_Eighteenth. _ Palestine to be an autonomous state under a general international protectorate or under the protectorate of a Power designated to act as the mandatory of the Powers. 

 "_Nineteenth. _ Arabia to receive careful consideration as to the full or partial sovereignty of the state or states established. 

 "_Twentieth_. Great Britain to have the sovereignty of Egypt, or a full protectorate over it. 

 "_Twenty-first. _ Persia to be freed from all treaties establishing spheres of influence. Rigid application of the 'Open-Door' policy in regard to commercial and industrial development. 

 "_Twenty-second. _ All Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France without conditions. 

 "_Twenty-third. _ Belgium to be restored to full sovereignty. 

 "_Twenty-fourth. _ A consideration of the union of Luxemburg to Belgium. (This is open to question. )

 "_Twenty-fifth. _ The Kiel Canal to be internationalized and an international zone twenty miles from the Canal on either side to be erected which should be, with the Canal, under the control and regulation of Denmark as the mandatory of the Powers. (This last is doubtful. )

 "_Twenty-sixth. _ All land north of the Kiel Canal Zone to be ceded to Denmark. 

 "_Twenty-seventh. _ The fortifications of the Kiel Canal and of Heligoland to be dismantled. Heligoland to be ceded to Denmark. 

 "_Twenty-eighth. _ The sovereignty of the archipelago of Spitzbergen to be granted to Norway. 

 "_Twenty-ninth. _ The disposition of the colonial possessions formerly belonging to Germany to be determined by an international commission having in mind the interests of the inhabitants and the possibility of employing these colonies as a means of indemnification for wrongs done. The 'Open-Door' policy should be guaranteed. 

 "While the foregoing definitive statement as to territory contains my views at the present time (September 21, 1918), I feel that no proposition should be considered unalterable, as further study and conditions which have not been disclosed may materially change some of them. 

 "Three things must constantly be kept in mind, the natural stability of race, language, and nationality, the necessity of every nation having an outlet to the sea so that it may maintain its own merchant marine, and the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a military power. "

Later I realized that another factor should be given as important aplace in the terms of peace as any of the three, namely, the economicinterdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit totheir inhabitants by close political affiliation. This factor in theterritorial settlements made more and more impression upon me as it wasdisclosed by a detailed study of the numerous problems which the PeaceConference had to solve. 

I made other memoranda on various subjects relating to the general peacefor the purpose of crystallizing my ideas, so that I could lay them inconcrete form before the President when the time came to draftinstructions for the American plenipotentiaries charged with thenegotiation of the Treaty of Peace. When the President reached thedecision to attend the Conference and to direct in person thenegotiations, it became evident that, in place of the instructionscustomarily issued to negotiators, a more practical and proper form ofdefining the objects to be sought by the United States would be anoutline of a treaty setting forth in detail the features of the peace, or else a memorandum containing definite declarations of policy inregard to the numerous problems presented. Unless there was someframework of this sort on which to build, it would manifestly be veryembarrassing for the American Commissioners in their intercourse withtheir foreign colleagues, as they would be unable to discussauthoritatively or even informally the questions at issue or expressopinions upon them without the danger of unwittingly opposing thePresident's wishes or of contradicting the views which might beexpressed by some other of their associates on the American Commission. A definite plan seemed essential if the Americans were to take any partin the personal exchanges of views which are so usual during theprogress of negotiations. 

Prior to the departure of the American delegation from the United Statesand for two weeks after their arrival in Paris, it was expected that thePresident would submit to the Commissioners for their guidance a_projet_ of a treaty or a very complete programme as to policies. Nothing, however, was done, and in the conferences which took placebetween the President and his American associates he confined hisremarks almost exclusively to the League of Nations and to his plan forits organization. It was evident--at least that was the naturalinference--that President Wilson was without a programme of any sort oreven of a list of subjects suitable as an outline for the preparation ofa programme. How he purposed to conduct the negotiations no one seemedto know. It was all very uncertain and unsatisfactory. 

In the circumstances, which seemed to be due to the President's failureto appreciate the necessity for a definite programme, I felt thatsomething ought to be done, as the probable result would be that theterms of the Treaty, other than the provisions regarding a League ofNations, would be drafted by foreign delegates and not by the President. 

Impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs and desirous ofremedying it if possible, I asked Dr. James Brown Scott and Mr. DavidHunter Miller, the legal advisers of the American Commission, to preparea skeleton treaty covering the subjects to be dealt with in thenegotiations which could be used in working out a complete programme. After several conferences with these advisers concerning the subjects tobe included and their arrangement in the Treaty, the work wassufficiently advanced to lay before the Commissioners. Copies were, therefore, furnished to them with the request that they give thedocument consideration in order that they might make criticisms andsuggest changes. I had not sent a copy to the President, intending toawait the views of my colleagues before doing so, but during theconference of January 10, to which I have been compelled reluctantly torefer in discussing the Covenant of the League of Nations, I mentionedthe fact that our legal advisers had been for some time at work on a"skeleton treaty" and had made a tentative draft. The President at onceshowed his displeasure and resented the action taken, evidentlyconsidering the request that a draft be prepared to be a usurpation ofhis authority to direct the activities of the Commission. It was thisincident which called forth his remark, to which reference was made inChapter VIII, that he did not propose to have lawyers draftingthe Treaty. 

In view of Mr. Wilson's attitude it was useless for Dr. Scott and Mr. Miller to proceed with their outline of a treaty or for theCommissioners to give consideration to the tentative draft already made. It was a disagreeable situation. If the President had had anything, however crude and imperfect it might have been, to submit in place ofthe Scott-Miller draft, it would have been a different matter andremoved to an extent the grounds for complaint at his attitude. But heoffered nothing at all as a substitute. It is fair to assume that he hadno programme prepared and was unwilling to have any one else make atentative one for his consideration. It left the American Commissionwithout a chart marking out the course which they were to pursue in thenegotiations and apparently without a pilot who knew the channel. 

Six days after the enforced abandonment of the plan to prepare askeleton treaty as a foundation for a definite and detailed programme, Imade the following note which expresses my views on the situation atthat time:

 "_January_ 16, 1919

 "No plan of work has been prepared. Unless something is done we will be here for many weeks, possibly for months. After the President's remarks the other day about a draft-treaty no one except the President would think of preparing a plan. He must do it himself, and he is not doing it. He has not even given us a list of subjects to be considered and of course has made no division of our labors. 

 "If the President does not take up this matter of organization and systematically apportion the subjects between us, we may possibly have no peace before June. This would be preposterous because with proper order and division of questions we ought to have a treaty signed by April first. 

 "I feel as if we, the Commissioners, were like a lot of skilled workmen who are ordered to build a house. We have the materials and tools, but there are no plans and specifications and no master-workman in charge of the construction. We putter around in an aimless sort of way and get nowhere. 

 "With all his natural capacity the President seems to lack the faculty of employing team-work and of adopting a system to utilize the brains of other men. It is a decided defect in an executive. He would not make a good head of a governmental department. The result is, so far as our Commission is concerned, a state of confusion and uncertainty with a definite loss and delay through effort being undirected. "

On several occasions I spoke to the President about a programme for thework of the Commission and its corps of experts, but he seemedindisposed to consider the subject and gave the impression that heintended to call on the experts for his own information which would beall that was necessary. I knew that Colonel House, through Dr. Mezes, the head of the organization, was directing the preparation of certaindata, but whether he was doing so under the President's directions I didnot know, though I presumed such was the case. Whatever data werefurnished did not, however, pass through the hands of the otherCommissioners who met every morning in my office to exchange informationand discuss matters pertaining to the negotiations and to direct theroutine work of the Commission. 

It is difficult, even with the entire record of the proceedings at Parisbefore one, to find a satisfactory explanation for the President'sobjection to having a definite programme other than the generaldeclarations contained in the Fourteen Points and his "subsequentaddresses. " It may be that he was unwilling to bind himself to a fixedprogramme, since it would restrict him, to an extent, in his freedom ofaction and prevent him from assuming any position which seemed to himexpedient at the time when a question arose during the negotiations. Itmay be that he did not wish to commit himself in any way to the contentsof a treaty until the Covenant of the League of Nations had beenaccepted. It may be that he preferred not to let the AmericanCommissioners know his views, as they would then be in a position totake an active part in the informal discussions which he apparentlywished to handle alone. None of these explanations is at allsatisfactory, and yet any one of them may be the true one. 

Whatever was the chief reason for the President's failure to furnish aworking plan to the American Commissioners, he knowingly adopted thepolicy and clung to it with the tenacity of purpose which has been oneof the qualities of mind that account for his great successes and forhis great failures. I use the adverb "knowingly" because it had beenmade clear to him that, in the judgment of others, the Commissionersought to have the guidance furnished by a draft-treaty or by a definitestatement of policies no matter how tentative or subject to change thedraft or statement might be. 

On the day that the President left Paris to return to the United States(February 14, 1919) I asked him if he had any instructions for theCommissioners during his absence concerning the settlements which shouldbe included in the preliminary treaty of peace, as it was understoodthat the Council of Ten would continue its sessions for theconsideration of the subjects requiring investigation and decision. ThePresident replied that he had no instructions, that the decisions couldwait until he returned, though the hearings could proceed and reportscould be made during his absence. Astonished as I was at this wish todelay these matters, I suggested to him the subjects which I thoughtought to go into the Treaty. He answered that he did not care to discussthem at that time, which, as he was about to depart from Paris, meantthat everything must rest until he had returned from his visit toWashington. 

Since I was the head of the American Commission when the President wasabsent and became the spokesman for the United States on the Council ofTen, this refusal to disclose his views even in a general way placed mein a very awkward position. Without instructions and without knowledgeof the President's wishes or purposes the conduct of the negotiationswas difficult and progress toward actual settlements practicallyimpossible. As a matter of fact the Council did accomplish a greatamount of work, while the President was away, in the collection of dataand preparing questions for final settlement. But so far as decidingquestions was concerned, which ought to have been the principal duty ofthe Council of Ten, it simply "marked time, " as I had no power to decideor even to express an authoritative opinion on any subject. It showedvery clearly that the President intended to do everything himself and toallow no one to act for him unless it was upon some highly technicalmatter. All actual decisions in regard to the terms of peace whichinvolved policy were thus forced to await his time and pleasure. 

Even after Mr. Wilson returned to Paris and resumed his place as head ofthe American delegation he was apparently without a programme. On March20, six days after his return, I made a note that "the President, so faras I can judge, has yet no definite programme, " and that I was unable to"find that he has talked over a plan of a treaty even with ColonelHouse. " It is needless to quote the thoughts, which I recorded at thetime, in regard to the method in which the President was handling agreat international negotiation, a method as unusual as it was unwise. Ireferred to Colonel House's lack of information concerning thePresident's purposes because he was then and had been from the beginningon more intimate terms with the President than any other American. If hedid not know the President's mind, it was safe to assume that noone knew it. 

I had, as has been stated, expressed to Mr. Wilson my views as to whatthe procedure should be and had obtained no action. With theresponsibility resting on him for the conduct and success of thenegotiations and with his constitutional authority to exercise his ownjudgment in regard to every matter pertaining to the treaty, there wasnothing further to be done in relieving the situation of the AmericanCommissioners from embarrassment or in inducing the President to adopt abetter course than the haphazard one that he was pursuing. 

It is apparent that we differed radically as to the necessity for aclearly defined programme and equally so as to the advantages to begained by having a draft-treaty made or a full statement preparedembodying the provisions to be sought by the United States in thenegotiations. I did not attempt to hide my disapproval of the vaguenessand uncertainty of the President's method, and there is no doubt in myown mind that Mr. Wilson was fully cognizant of my opinion. How far thislack of system in the work of the Commission and the failure to providea plan for a treaty affected the results written into the Treaty ofVersailles is speculative, but my belief is that they impaired in manyparticulars the character of the settlements by frequent abandonment ofprinciple for the sake of expediency. 

The want of a programme or even of an unwritten plan as to thenegotiations was further evidenced by the fact that the President, certainly as late as March 19, had not made up his mind whether thetreaty which was being negotiated should be preliminary or final. He hadup to that time the peculiar idea that a preliminary treaty was in thenature of a _modus vivendi_ which could be entered into independently bythe Executive and which would restore peace without going through theformalities of senatorial consent to ratification. 

The purpose of Mr. Wilson, so far as one could judge, was to include ina preliminary treaty of the sort that he intended to negotiate, theentire Covenant of the League of Nations and other principalsettlements, binding the signatories to repeat these provisions in thefinal and definitive treaty when that was later negotiated. By thismethod peace would be at once restored, the United States and othernations associated with it in the war would be obligated to renewdiplomatic and consular relations with Germany, and commercialintercourse would follow as a matter of course. All this was to be donewithout going through the American constitutional process of obtainingthe advice and consent of the Senate to the Covenant and to theprincipal settlements. The intent seemed to be to respond to the populardemand for an immediate peace and at the same time to checkmate theopponents of the Covenant in the Senate by having the League of Nationsorganized and functioning before the definitive treaty was laid beforethat body. 

When the President advanced this extraordinary theory of the nature of apreliminary treaty during a conversation, of which I made a fullmemorandum, I told him that it was entirely wrong, that by whatever namethe document was called, whether it was "armistice, " "agreement, ""protocol, " or "_modus_, " it would be a treaty and would have to be sentby him to the Senate for its approval. I said, "If we change the_status_ from war to peace, it has to be by a ratified treaty. There isno other way save by a joint resolution of Congress. " At this statementthe President was evidently much perturbed. He did not accept it asconclusive, for he asked me to obtain the opinion of others on thesubject. He was evidently loath to abandon the plan that he hadpresumably worked out as a means of preventing the Senate from rejectingor modifying the Covenant before it came into actual operation. It seemsalmost needless to say that all the legal experts, among them Thomas W. Gregory, the retiring Attorney-General of the United States, who chancedto be in Paris at the time, agreed with my opinion, and upon being soinformed the President abandoned his purpose. 

It is probable that the conviction, which was forced upon Mr. Wilson, that he could not independently of the Senate put into operation apreliminary treaty, determined him to abandon that type of treaty and toproceed with the negotiation of a definitive one. At least I had byMarch 30 reached the conclusion that there would be no preliminarytreaty as is disclosed by the following memorandum written on that day:

 "I am sure now that there will be no preliminary treaty of peace, but that the treaty will be complete and definitive. This is a serious mistake. Time should be given for passions to cool. The operations of a preliminary treaty should be tested and studied. It would hasten a restoration of peace. Certainly this is the wise course as to territorial settlements and the financial and economic burdens to be imposed upon Germany. The same comment applies to the organization of a League of Nations. Unfortunately the President insists on a full-blown Covenant and not a declaration of principles. This has much to do with preventing a preliminary treaty, since he wishes to make the League an agent for enforcement of definite terms. 

 "When the President departed for the United States in February, I assumed and I am certain that he had in mind that there would be a preliminary treaty. With that in view I drafted at the time a memorandum setting forth what the preliminary treaty of peace should contain. Here are the subjects I then set down:

 "1. Restoration of Peace and official relations. 

 "2. Restoration of commercial and financial relations subject to conditions. 

 "3. Renunciation by Germany of all territory and territorial rights outside of Europe. 

 "4. Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be fixed in the Definitive Treaty. 

 "5. Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms and munitions. 

 "6. Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany with time limits for payment and delivery. 

 "7. German property and territory to be held as security by the Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified. 

 "8. Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations. 

 "The President's obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to everything else. An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the adoption of the Covenant. The whole world wants peace. The President wants his League. I think that the world will have to wait. "

The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to thePresident's attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the UnitedStates and which he said he did not care to discuss. 

The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are thosethat I have continued to hold. The President was anxious to have theTreaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed ratherthan general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations. Withthat view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and thearticles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion andunquestionably delay the peace. To restore the peaceful intercoursebetween the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce, and to give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resumetheir normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task tobe accomplished. It was in my judgment superior to every other object ofthe Paris negotiations. Compared with it the creation of a League ofNations was insignificant and could well be postponed. President Wilsonthought otherwise. We were very far apart in this matter as he wellknew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions withreluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern. 

As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source fromwhich the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to theconduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to theconference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and towhich I have referred in connection with the subject of internationalarbitration. During that conference I said to the Colonel "that Ithought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiatedwithout delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations, boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being. The Colonelreplied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League, as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was doneat once. I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposedto anything which delayed the peace. " This quotation is from mymemorandum made at the time of our conversation. I think that the samereason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced thecourse of the President. My impression at the time was that the Colonelfavored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it thefull plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to beimpracticable. 

There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programmeprepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been apreliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed thenegotiations as to a League. Possibly the President realized that thisdanger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason wasunwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty bedrawn. At least it may have added another reason for his proceedingwithout advising the Commissioners of his purposes. 

As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took placeat Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the leastfrom an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems tome to have been the most potent influence in determining his method ofwork during the Peace Conference. He seemed to think that, having markedout a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would showintellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose. Even when there couldbe no doubt that in view of changed conditions it was wise to change apolicy, which he had openly adopted or approved, he clung to it withpeculiar tenacity refusing or merely failing to modify it. Mr. Wilson'smind once made up seemed to become inflexible. It appeared to growimpervious to arguments and even to facts. It lacked the elasticity andreceptivity which have always been characteristic of sound judgment andright thinking. He might break, but he would not bend. This rigidity ofmind accounts in large measure for the deplorable, and, as it seemed tome, needless, conflict between the President and the Senate over theTreaty of Versailles. It accounts for other incidents in his careerwhich have materially weakened his influence and cast doubts on hiswisdom. It also accounts, in my opinion, for the President's failure toprepare or to adopt a programme at Paris or to commit himself to a draftof a treaty as a basis for the negotiations, which failure, I amconvinced, not only prevented the signature of a short preliminarytreaty of peace, but lost Mr. Wilson the leadership in the proceedings, as the statesmen of the other Great Powers outlined the Treatynegotiated and suggested the majority of the articles which were writteninto it. It would have made a vast difference if the President had knowndefinitely what he sought, but he apparently did not. He dealt ingeneralities leaving, but not committing, to others their definition andapplication. He was always in the position of being able to repudiatethe interpretation which others might place upon his declarations ofprinciple. 

CHAPTER XVII

SECRET DIPLOMACY

Another matter, concerning which the President and I disagreed, was thesecrecy with which the negotiations were carried on between him and theprincipal European statesmen, incidental to which was the willingness, if not the desire, to prevent the proceedings and decisions frombecoming known even to the delegates of the smaller nations which wererepresented at the Peace Conference. 

Confidential personal interviews were to a certain extent unavoidableand necessary, but to conduct the entire negotiation through a smallgroup sitting behind closed doors and to shroud their proceedings withmystery and uncertainty made a very unfortunate impression on those whowere not members of the secret councils. 

At the first there was no Council of the Heads of States (the so-calledCouncil of Four); in fact it was not recognized as an organized bodyuntil the latter part of March, 1919. Prior to that time the directingbody of the Conference was the self-constituted Council of Ten composedof the President and the British, French, and Italian Premiers withtheir Secretaries or Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and two Japanesedelegates of ambassadorial rank. This Council had a membership identicalwith that of the Supreme War Council, which controlled the armistices, their enforcement, and other military matters. It assumed authority overthe negotiations and proceedings of the Conference, though it was neverauthorized so to do by the body of delegates. The Council of Four, whenlater formed, was equally without a mandate from the Conference. Theyassumed the authority and exercised it as a matter of right. 

From the time of his arrival in Paris President Wilson held almost dailyconversations with the leading foreign statesmen. It would be of littlevalue to speculate on what took place at these interviews, since thePresident seldom told the American Commission of the meetings ordisclosed to them, unless possibly to Colonel House, the subjects whichwere discussed. My conviction is, from the little information which thePresident volunteered, that these consultations were--certainly atfirst--devoted to inducing the European leaders to give their support tohis plan for a League of Nations, and that, as other matters relating tothe terms of peace were in a measure involved because of their possiblerelation to the functions of the League, they too became more and moresubjects of discussion. 

The introduction of this personal and clandestine method of negotiationwas probably due to the President's belief that he could in this wayexercise more effectively his personal influence in favor of theacceptance of a League. It is not unlikely that this belief was in ameasure justified. In Colonel House he found one to aid him in thiscourse of procedure, as the Colonel's intimate association with theprincipal statesmen of the Allied Powers during previous visits toEurope as the President's personal envoy was an asset which he couldutilize as an intermediary between the President and those with whom hewished to confer. Mr. Wilson relied upon Colonel House for his knowledgeof the views and temperaments of the men with whom he had to deal. Itwas not strange that he should adopt a method which the Colonel hadfound successful in the past and that he should seek the latter's aidand advice in connection with the secret conferences which usually tookplace at the residence of the President. 

Mr. Wilson pursued this method of handling the subjects of negotiationthe more readily because he was by nature and by inclination secretive. He had always shown a preference for a private interview with anindividual. In his conduct of the executive affairs of the Government atWashington he avoided as far as possible general conferences. He talkeda good deal about "taking common counsel, " but showed no disposition toput it into practice. He followed the same course in the matter offoreign affairs. At Paris this characteristic, which had often been thesubject of remark in Washington, was more pronounced, or at least morenoticeable. He was not disposed to discuss matters with the AmericanCommission as a whole or even to announce to them his decisions unlesssomething arose which compelled him to do so. He easily fell into thepractice of seeing men separately and of keeping secret the knowledgeacquired as well as the effect of this knowledge on his views andpurposes. To him this was the normal and most satisfactory method ofdoing business. 

From the time that the President arrived in Paris up to the time thatthe Commission on the League of Nations made its report--that is, fromDecember 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919--the negotiations regarding theLeague were conducted with great secrecy. Colonel House, the President'scollaborator in drafting the Covenant, if he was not, as many believed, the real author, was the only American with whom Mr. Wilson freelyconferred and to whom he confided the progress that he was making in hisinterviews with the foreign statesmen, at many of which interviews theColonel was present. It is true that the President held an occasionalconference with all the American Commissioners, but these conferenceswere casual and perfunctory in nature and were very evidently not forthe purpose of obtaining the opinions and counsel of the Commissioners. There was none of the frankness that should have existed between theChief Executive and his chosen agents and advisers. The impression madewas that he summoned the conferences to satisfy the _amour propre_ ofthe Commissioners rather than out of any personal wish to do so. 

The consequence was that the American Commissioners, other than ColonelHouse, were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminarynegotiations and were left to gather such information as they were ablefrom the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that theAmericans possessed the full confidence of the President, spoke withmuch freedom. As Mr. Wilson never held a conference with the AmericanCommission from the first meeting of the Commission on the League ofNations until its report was printed, his American colleagues did notknow, except indirectly, of the questions at issue or of the progressthat was being made. The fact is that, as the Commission on the Leaguemet in Colonel House's office at the Hôtel Crillon, his office forceknew far more about the proceedings than did the three AmericanCommissioners who were not present. As the House organization made noeffort to hide the fact that they had inside information, therepresentatives of the press as a consequence frequented the office ofthe Colonel in search of the latest news concerning the Commission onthe League of Nations. 

But, in addition to the embarrassment caused the American Commissionersand the unenviable position in which they were placed by the secrecywith which the President surrounded his intercourse with the foreignstatesmen and the proceedings of the Commission on the League ofNations, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the delegates tothe Conference and the public at large to lose in a large measure theirconfidence in the actuality of his devotion to "open diplomacy, " whichhe had so unconditionally proclaimed in the first of his FourteenPoints. If the policy of secrecy had ceased with the discussionspreliminary to the organization of the Conference, or even with thosepreceding the meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations, criticism and complaint would doubtless have ceased, but as thenegotiations progressed the secrecy of the conferences of the leadersincreased rather than decreased, culminating at last in the organizationof the Council of Four, the most powerful and most seclusive of thecouncils which directed the proceedings at Paris. Behind closed doorsthese four individuals, who controlled the policies of the UnitedStates, Great Britain, France, and Italy, passed final judgment on themass of articles which entered into the Treaties of Peace, but kepttheir decisions secret except from the committee which was draftingthe articles. 

The organization of the Council of Four and the mystery which envelopedits deliberations emphasized as nothing else could have done thesecretiveness with which adjustments were being made and compromiseswere being effected. It directed attention also to the fact that theFour Great Powers had taken supreme control of settling the terms ofpeace, that they were primates among the assembled nations and that theyintended to have their authority acknowledged. This extraordinarysecrecy and arrogation of power by the Council of Four excitedastonishment and complaint throughout the body of delegates to theConference, and caused widespread criticism in the press and among thepeople of many countries. 

A week after the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of theHeads of States, the official title of the Council of Four, and theCouncil of Foreign Ministers, the official title of the Council of Five(popularly nick-named "The Big Four" and "The Little Five"), I made thefollowing note on the subject of secret negotiations:

 "After the experience of the last three months [January-March, 1919] I am convinced that the method of personal interviews and private conclaves is a failure. It has given every opportunity for intrigue, plotting, bargaining, and combining. The President, as I now see it, should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary Conference. He would then have had the confidence and support of all the smaller nations because they would have looked up to him as their champion and guide. They would have followed him. 

 "The result of the present method has been to destroy their faith and arouse their resentment. They look upon the President as in favor of a world ruled by Five Great Powers, an international despotism of the strong, in which the little nations are merely rubber-stamps. 

 "The President has undoubtedly found himself in a most difficult position. He has put himself on a level with politicians experienced in intrigue, whom he will find a pretty difficult lot. He will sink in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here. A grievous blunder has been made. "

The views, which I expressed in this note in regard to the unwisdom ofthe President's course, were not new at the time that I wrote them. Overtwo months before I had watched the practice of secret negotiation withapprehension as to what the effect would be upon the President'sinfluence and standing with the delegates to the Conference. I thenbelieved that he was taking a dangerous course which he would in the endregret. So strong was this conviction that during a meeting, which thePresident held with the American Commissioners on the evening of January29, I told him bluntly--perhaps too bluntly from the point of view ofpolicy--that I considered the secret interviews which he was holdingwith the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, wereunwise, that he was far more successful in accomplishment and lessliable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Councilof Ten, and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would bemuch less subject to public criticism. I supported these views with thestatement that the general secrecy, which was being practiced, wasmaking a very bad impression everywhere, and for that reason, if for noother, I was opposed to it. The silence with which the Presidentreceived my remarks appeared to me significant of his attitude towardthis advice, and his subsequent continuance of secret methods withoutchange, unless it was to increase the secrecy, proved that our judgmentswere not in accord on the subject. The only result of myrepresentations, it would seem, was to cause Mr. Wilson to realize thatI was not in sympathy with his way of conducting the negotiations. Inthe circumstances I think now that it was a blunder on my part to havestated my views so frankly. 

Two days after I wrote the note, which is quoted (April 2, 1919), I madeanother note more general in character, but in which appears thefollowing:

 "Everywhere there are developing bitterness and resentment against a secretiveness which is interpreted to mean failure. The patience of the people is worn threadbare. Their temper has grown ragged. They are sick of whispering diplomats. 

 "Muttered confidences, secret intrigues, and the tactics of the 'gum-shoer' are discredited. The world wants none of them these days. It despises and loathes them. What the world asks are honest declarations openly proclaimed. The statesman who seeks to gain his end by tortuous and underground ways is foolish or badly advised. The public man who is sly and secretive rather than frank and bold, whose methods are devious rather than obvious, pursues a dangerous path which leads neither to glory nor to success. 

 "Secret diplomacy, the bane of the past, is a menace from which man believed himself to be rid. He who resurrects it invites condemnation. The whole world will rejoice when the day of the whisperer is over. "

This note, read at the present time, sounds extravagant in thought andintemperate in expression. It was written under the influence ofemotions which had been deeply stirred by the conditions then existing. Time usually softens one's judgments and the passage of events makesless vivid one's impressions. The perspective, however, grows clearerand the proportions more accurate when the observer stands at adistance. While the language of the note might well be changed and madeless florid, the thought needs little modification. The public criticismwas widespread and outspoken, and from the expressions used it was veryevident that there prevailed a general popular disapproval of the waythe negotiations were being conducted. The Council of Four won thepress-name of "The Olympians, " and much was said of "the thick cloud ofmystery" which hid them from the anxious multitudes, and of the secrecywhich veiled their deliberations. The newspapers and the correspondentsat Paris openly complained and the delegates to the Conference in a moreguarded way showed their bitterness at the overlordship assumed by theleading statesmen of the Great Powers and the secretive methods whichthey employed. It was, as may be gathered from the note quoted, adistressing and depressing time. 

As concrete examples of the evils of secret negotiations the "FiumeAffair" and the "Shantung Settlement" are the best known because of thestorm of criticism and protest which they caused. As the ShantungSettlement was one of the chief matters of difference between thePresident and myself, it will be treated later. The case of Fiume isdifferent. As to the merits of the question I was very much in accordwith the President, but to the bungling way in which it was handled Iwas strongly opposed believing that secret interviews, at which falsehopes were encouraged, were at the bottom of all the trouble which laterdeveloped. But for this secrecy I firmly believe that there would havebeen no "Fiume Affair. "

The discussion of the Italian claims to territory along the northernboundary of the Kingdom and about the head of the Adriatic Sea began assoon as the American Commission was installed at Paris, about the middleof December, 1918. The endeavor of the Italian emissaries was to inducethe Americans, particularly the President, to recognize the boundarylaid down in the Pact of London. That agreement, which Italy hadrequired Great Britain and France to accept in April, 1915, before sheconsented to declare war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, committedthe Entente Powers to the recognition of Italy's right to certainterritorial acquisitions at the expense of Austria-Hungary in the eventof the defeat of the Central Empires. By the boundary line agreed uponin the Pact, Italy would obtain certain important islands and ports onthe Dalmatian coast in addition to the Austrian Tyrol and the Italianprovinces of the Dual Monarchy at the head of the Adriatic. 

When this agreement was signed, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary wasnot in contemplation, or at least, if it was considered, the possibilityof its accomplishment seemed very remote. It was assumed that theDalmatian territory to be acquired under the treaty to be negotiated inaccordance with the terms of the Pact would, with the return of theItalian provinces, give to Italy naval control over the Adriatic Sea andsecure the harborless eastern coast of the Italian peninsula againstfuture hostile attack by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The boundary laiddown in the agreement was essentially strategic and based primarily onconsiderations of Italian national safety. As long as the Empire existedas a Great Power the boundary of the Pact of London, so far as itrelated to the Adriatic littoral and islands, was not unreasonable orthe territorial demands excessive. 

But the close of active warfare in the autumn of 1918, when thearmistice went into effect, found conditions wholly different from thoseupon which these territorial demands had been predicated. TheAustro-Hungarian Empire had fallen to pieces beyond the hope of becomingagain one of the Great Powers. The various nationalities, which had longbeen restless and unhappy under the rule of the Hapsburgs, threw off theimperial yoke, proclaimed their independence, and sought the recognitionand protection of the Allies. The Poles of the Empire joined theirbrethren of the Polish provinces of Russia and Prussia in theresurrection of their ancient nation; Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakiaunited in forming the new state of Czecho-Slovakia; the southern Slavsof Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia announced theirunion with their kindred of the Kingdom of Serbia; and Hungary declaredthe severance of her political union with Austria. In a word the DualEmpire ceased to exist. It was no longer a menace to the national safetyof Italy. This was the state of affairs when the delegates to the PeaceConference began to assemble at Paris. 

The Italian statesmen realized that these new conditions might raiseserious questions as to certain territorial cessions which would come toItaly under the terms of the Pact of London, because their strategicnecessity had disappeared with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Whilethey had every reason to assume that Great Britain and France would liveup to their agreement, it was hardly to be expected that under thechanged conditions and in the circumstances attending the negotiationand signature of the Pact, the British and French statesmen would bedisposed to protest against modifications of the proposed boundary ifthe United States and other nations, not parties to the agreement, should insist upon changes as a matter of justice to the new state ofthe Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It apparently was considered expedient, by the Italian representatives, in view of the situation which haddeveloped, to increase rather than to reduce their claims along theDalmatian coast in order that they might have something which could besurrendered in a compromise without giving up the boundaries laid downin the Pact of London. 

It is probable, too, that these additional claims were advanced by Italyin order to offset in a measure the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, whothrough the Serbian delegates at Paris were making territorial demandswhich the Italians declared to be extravagant and which, if granted, would materially reduce the proposed cessions to Italy under the Pact ofLondon. Furthermore, the Italian Government appeared to be by no meanspleased with the idea of a Jugo-Slav state so strong that it mightbecome a commercial, if not a naval, rival of Italy in the Adriatic. TheItalian delegates in private interviews showed great bitterness towardthe Slavs, who, they declared, had, as Austrian subjects, waged waragainst Italy and taken part in the cruel and wanton acts attendant uponthe invasion of the northern Italian provinces. They asserted that itwas unjust to permit these people, by merely changing their allegianceafter defeat, to escape punishment for the outrages which they hadcommitted against Italians and actually to profit by being vanquished. This antipathy to the Slavs of the former Empire was in a measuretransferred to the Serbs, who were naturally sympathetic with theirkinsmen and who were also ambitious to build up a strong Slav state witha large territory and with commercial facilities on the Adriatic coastwhich would be ample to meet the trade needs of the interior. 

While there may have been a certain fear for the national safety ofItaly in having as a neighbor a Slav state with a large and virilepopulation, extensive resources, and opportunity to become a naval powerin the Mediterranean, the real cause of apprehension seemed to be thatthe new nation would become a commercial rival of Italy in the Adriaticand prevent her from securing the exclusive control of the trade whichher people coveted and which the complete victory over Austria-Hungaryappeared to assure to them. 

The two principal ports having extensive facilities for shipping andrail-transportation to and from the Danubian provinces of the DualEmpire were Trieste and Fiume. The other Dalmatian ports were small andwithout possibilities of extensive development, while the precipitousmountain barrier between the coast and the interior which rose almostfrom the water-line rendered railway construction from an engineeringstandpoint impracticable if not impossible. It was apparent that, ifItaly could obtain both the port of Trieste and the port of Fiume, thetwo available outlets for foreign trade to the territories lying northand east of the Adriatic Sea, she would have a substantial monopoly ofthe sea-borne commerce of the Dalmatian coast and its hinterland. It wasequally apparent that Italian possession of the two ports would placethe new Slav state at a great disadvantage commercially, as theprincipal volume of its exports and imports would have to pass through aport in the hands of a trade rival which could, in case of controversyor in order to check competition, be closed to Slav ships and goods onthis or that pretext, even if the new state found it practicable tomaintain a merchant marine under an agreement granting it the use ofthe port. 

In view of the new conditions which had thus arisen through thedissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the union of the SouthernSlavs, the Italian delegates at Paris began a vigorous campaign toobtain sovereignty, or at least administrative control, over Fiume andthe adjacent coasts and islands, it having been generally conceded thatTrieste should be ceded to Italy. The Italian demand for Fiume hadbecome real instead of artificial. This campaign was conducted by meansof personal interviews with the representatives of the principal Powers, and particularly with those of the United States because it wasapparently felt that the chief opposition to the demand would come fromthat quarter, since the President was known to favor the generalproposition that every nation should have free access to the sea and, ifpossible, a seaport under its own sovereignty. 

The Italian delegates were undoubtedly encouraged by some Americans tobelieve that, while the President had not actually declared in favor ofItalian control of Fiume, he was sympathetic to the idea and wouldultimately assent to it just as he had in the case of the cession toItaly of the Tyrol with its Austrian population. Convinced by theseassurances of success the Italian leaders began a nationwide propagandaat home for the purpose of arousing a strong public sentiment for theacquisition of the port. This propaganda was begun, it would seem, fortwo reasons, first, the political advantage to be gained when it wasannounced that Signor Orlando and his colleagues at Paris had succeededin having their demand recognized, and, second, the possibility ofinfluencing the President to a speedy decision by exhibiting theintensity and unity of the Italian national spirit in demanding theannexation of the little city, the major part of the population of whichwas asserted to be of Italian blood. 

The idea, which was industriously circulated throughout Italy, thatFiume was an Italian city, aroused the feelings of the people more thanany political or economic argument could have done. The fact that thesuburbs, which were really as much a part of the municipality as thearea within the city proper, were inhabited largely by Jugo-Slavs wasignored, ridiculed, or denied. That the Jugo-Slavs undoubtedly exceededin numbers the Italians in the community when it was treated as a wholemade no difference to the propagandists who asserted that Fiume wasItalian. They clamored for its annexation on the ground of"self-determination, " though refusing to accept that principle asapplicable to the inhabitants of the Austrian Tyrol and failing to raiseany question in regard to it in the case of the port of Danzig. TheItalian orators and press were not disturbed by the inconsistency oftheir positions, and the Italian statesmen at Paris, when theirattention was called to it, replied that the cases were not the same, anassertion which it would have been difficult to establish with facts orsupport with convincing arguments. 

While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy, additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, weregiven to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson wasalmost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim toFiume. It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that thesestatesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that theinfluence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilsonas they had been led to believe. It was an unpleasant awakening. Theywere placed in a difficult position. Too late to calm the inflamedtemper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had noalternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since thefailure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to theOrlando Ministry. 

Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connectedwith the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go sofar as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Questionwas first settled to their satisfaction. In a memorandum dated March 29, I wrote: "This will cause a dangerous crisis, " and in commenting on theprobable future of the subject I stated:

 "My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to abandon their extravagant claim. I am sure that he will not be able to do it. On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather than weaken Italian determination. He ought to tell them _now_ that he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy. It would cause anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much longer. I shall tell the President my opinion at the first opportunity. [I did this a few days later. ]

 "The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an explosion before the matter is settled. It is a good thing that the President visited Italy when he did and when blessings rather than curses greeted him. Secret diplomacy is reaping a new harvest of execrations and condemnations. Will the practice ever cease?"

During the first three weeks of April the efforts to shake thedetermination of the President to support the Jugo-Slav claims to Fiumeand the adjacent territory were redoubled, but without avail. Every formof compromise as to boundary and port privileges, which did not depriveItaly of the sovereignty, was proposed, but found to be unacceptable. The Italians, held by the pressure of the aroused national spirit, andthe President, firm in the conviction that the Italian claim to the portwas unjust, remained obdurate. Attempts were made by both sides to reachsome common ground for an agreement, but none was found. As the timeapproached to submit the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries, whowere expected to arrive at Paris on April 26, the Italian delegates letit be known that they would absent themselves from the meeting at whichthe document was to be presented unless a satisfactory understanding inregard to Fiume was obtained before the meeting. I doubt whether thisthreat was with the approval and upon the advice of the American friendsof the Italians who had been industrious in attempting to persuade thePresident to accept a compromise. An American familiar with Mr. Wilson'sdisposition would have realized that to try to coerce him in that mannerwould be folly, as in all probability it would have just the contraryeffect to the one desired. 

The Italian delegates did not apparently read the President's temperaright. They made a mistake. Their threat of withdrawal from theConference resulted far differently from their expectation and hope. When Mr. Wilson learned of the Italian threat he met it with a publicannouncement of his position in regard to the controversy, which wasintended as an appeal to the people of Italy to abandon the claim toFiume and to reject their Government's policy of insisting on an unjustsettlement. This declaration was given to the press late in theafternoon of April 23, and a French newspaper containing it was handed, it was said, to Signor Orlando at the President's residence where theCouncil of Four were assembled. He immediately withdrew, issued acounter-statement, and the following day left Paris for Rome more onaccount of his indignation at the course taken by the President thanbecause of the threat which he had made. Baron Sonnino also departedthe next day. 

It is not my purpose to pursue further the course of events followingthe crisis which was precipitated by the President's published statementand the resulting departure of the principal Italian delegates. Theeffect on the Italian people is common knowledge. A tempest of popularfury against the President swept over Italy from end to end. From beingthe most revered of all men by the Italians, he became the mostdetested. As no words of praise and admiration were too extravagant tobe spoken of him when he visited Rome in January, so no words of insultor execration were too gross to characterize him after his publicannouncement regarding the Adriatic Question. There was never a morecomplete reversal of public sentiment toward an individual. 

The reason for reciting the facts of the Fiume dispute, which was one ofthe most unpleasant incidents that took place at Paris during thenegotiations, is to bring out clearly the consequences of secretdiplomacy. A discussion of the reasons, or of the probable reasons, forthe return of the Italian statesmen to Paris before the Treaty washanded to the Germans would add nothing to the subject underconsideration, while the same may be said of the subsequent occupationof Fiume by Italian nationalists under the fanatical D'Annunzio, withoutauthority of their Government, but with the enthusiastic approval of theItalian people. 

Five days after the Italian Premier and his Minister of Foreign Affairshad departed from Paris I had a long interview with a well-known Italiandiplomat, who was an intimate friend of both Signor Orlando and BaronSonnino and who had been very active in the secret negotiationsregarding the Italian boundaries which had been taking place at Parissince the middle of December. This diplomat was extremely bitter aboutthe whole affair and took no pains to hide his views as to the causes ofthe critical situation which existed. In the memorandum of ourconversation, which I wrote immediately after he left my office, appearsthe following:

 "He exclaimed: 'One tells you one thing and that is not true; then another tells you another thing and that too is not true. What is one to believe? What can one do? It is hopeless. So many secret meetings with different persons are simply awful'--He threw up his hands--'Now we have the result. It is terrible!'

 "I laughed and said, 'I conclude that you do not like secret diplomacy. '

 "'I do not; I do not, ' he fervently exclaimed. 'All our trouble comes from these secret meetings of four men [referring to the Big Four], who keep no records and who tell different stories of what takes place. Secrecy is to blame. We have been unable to rely on any one. To have to run around and see this man and that man is not the way to do. Most all sympathize with you when alone and then they desert you when they get with others. This is the cause of much bitterness and distrust. _Secret diplomacy is an utter failure. _ It is too hard to endure. Some men know only how to whisper. They are not to be trusted. I do not like it. '

 "'Well, ' I said, 'you cannot charge me with that way of doing business. '

 "'I cannot, ' he replied, 'you tell me the truth. I may not like it, but at least you do not hold out false hopes. '"

The foregoing conversation no doubt expressed the real sentiments of themembers of the Italian delegation at that time. Disgust withconfidential personal interviews and with relying upon personalinfluence rather than upon the merits of their case was the naturalreaction following the failure to win by these means the President'sapproval of Italy's demands. 

The Italian policy in relation to Flume was wrecked on the rock ofPresident Wilson's firm determination that the Jugo-Slavs should have aseaport on the Adriatic sufficient for their needs and that Italy shouldnot control the approaches to that port. With the wreck of the Fiumepolicy went in time the Orlando Government which had failed to make goodthe promises which they had given to their people. Too late theyrealized that secret diplomacy had failed, and that they had made amistake in relying upon it. It is no wonder that the two leaders of theItalian delegation on returning to Paris and resuming their duties inthe Conference refrained from attempting to arrange clandestinely thesettlement of the Adriatic Question. The "go-betweens, " on whom they hadpreviously relied, were no longer employed. Secret diplomacy wasanathema. They had paid a heavy price for the lesson, which theyhad learned. 

When one reviews the negotiations at Paris from December, 1918, to June, 1919, the secretiveness which characterized them is very evident. Everybody seemed to talk in whispers and never to say anything worthwhile except in confidence. The open sessions of the Conference werearranged beforehand. They were formal and perfunctory. The agreementsand bargains were made behind closed doors. This secrecy began with theexchange of views concerning the League of Nations, following which camethe creation of the Council of Ten, whose meetings were intended to besecret. Then came the secret sessions of the Commission on the Leagueand the numerous informal interviews of the President with one or moreof the Premiers of the Allied Powers, the facts concerning which werenot divulged to the American Commissioners. Later, on Mr. Wilson'sreturn from the United States, dissatisfaction with and complaint of thepublicity given to some of the proceedings of the Council of Ten inducedthe formation of the Council of Four with the result that the secrecy ofthe negotiations was practically unbroken. If to this brief summary ofthe increasing secretiveness of the proceedings of the controllingbodies of the Peace Conference are added the intrigues and personalbargainings which were constantly going on, the "log-rolling"--to use aterm familiar to American politics--which was practiced, the record isone which invites no praise and will find many who condemn it. In viewof the frequent and emphatic declarations in favor of "open diplomacy"and the popular interpretation placed upon the phrase "Open covenantsopenly arrived at, " the effect of the secretive methods employed by theleading negotiators at Paris was to destroy public confidence in thesincerity of these statesmen and to subject them to the charge ofpursuing a policy which they had themselves condemned and repudiated. Naturally President Wilson, who had been especially earnest in hisdenunciation of secret negotiations, suffered more than his foreigncolleagues, whose real support of "open diplomacy" had always beendoubted, though all of them in a measure fell in public estimation as aconsequence of the way in which the negotiations were conducted. 

The criticism and condemnation, expressed with varying degrees ofintensity, resulted from the disappointed hopes of the peoples of theworld, who had looked forward confidently to the Peace Conference atParis as the first great and decisive change to a new diplomacy whichwould cast aside the cloak of mystery that had been in the past therecognized livery of diplomatic negotiations. The record of the Parisproceedings in this particular is a sorry one. It is the record of theabandonment of principle, of the failure to follow preceptsunconditionally proclaimed, of the repudiation by act, if not by word, of a new and better type of international intercourse. 

It is not my purpose or desire to fix the blame for this perpetuation ofold and discredited practices on any one individual. To do so would beunjust, since more than one preferred the old way and should share theresponsibility for its continuance. But, as the secrecy became more andmore impenetrable and as the President gave silent acquiescence or atleast failed to show displeasure with the practice, I realized that inthis matter, as in others, our judgments were at variance and our viewsirreconcilable. As my opposition to the method of conducting theproceedings was evident, I cannot but assume that this decideddifference was one that materially affected the relations between Mr. Wilson and myself and that he looked upon me as an unfavorable critic ofhis course in permitting to go unprotested the secrecy whichcharacterized the negotiations. 

The attention of the delegates to the Peace Conference who representedthe smaller nations was early directed to their being denied knowledgeof the terms of the Treaty which were being formulated by the principalmembers of the delegations of the Five Great Powers. There is no doubtthat at the first their mental attitude was one of confidence that thepolicy of secrecy would not be continued beyond the informal meetingspreliminary to and necessary for arranging the organization andprocedure of the Conference; but, as the days lengthened into weeks andthe weeks into months, and as the information concerning the actualnegotiations, which reached them, became more and more meager, theycould no longer close their eyes to the fact that their national rightsand aspirations were to be recognized or denied by the leaders of theGreat Powers without the consent and even without the full knowledge ofthe delegates of the nations vitally interested. 

Except in the case of a few of these delegates, who had been able toestablish intimate personal relations with some of the "Big Four, " thesecretiveness of the discussions and decisions regarding the Treatysettlements aroused amazement and indignation. It was evident that itwas to be a "dictated peace" and not a "negotiated peace, " a peacedictated by the Great Powers not only to the enemy, but also to theirfellow belligerents. Some of the delegates spoke openly in criticism ofthe furtive methods that were being employed, but the majority heldtheir peace. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the body ofdelegates were practically unanimous in disapproving the secrecy of theproceedings, and this disapproval was to be found even among thedelegations of the Great Powers. It was accepted by the lesser nationsbecause it seemed impolitic and useless to oppose the united will of thecontrolling oligarchy. It was natural that the delegates of the lessinfluential states should feel that their countries would suffer in theterms of peace if they openly denounced the treatment accorded them asviolative of the dignity of representatives of independentsovereignties. In any event no formal protest was entered against theirbeing deprived of a knowledge to which they were entitled, a deprivationwhich placed them and their countries in a subordinate, and, to anextent, a humiliating, position. 

The climax of this policy of secrecy toward the body of delegates cameon the eve of the delivery of the Treaty of Peace to the Germanrepresentatives who were awaiting that event at Versailles. By adecision of the Council of the Heads of States, reached three weeksbefore the time, only a digest or summary of the Treaty was laid beforethe plenary session of the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace onthe day preceding the delivery of the full text of the Treaty to theGermans. The delegates of the smaller belligerent nations were notpermitted to examine the actual text of the document before it was seenby their defeated adversaries. Nations, which had fought valiantly andsuffered agonies during the war, were treated with no more considerationthan their enemies so far as knowledge of the exact terms of peace wereconcerned. The arguments, which could be urged on the ground of thepractical necessity of a small group dealing with the questions anddetermining the settlements, seem insufficient to justify theapplication of the rule of secrecy to the delegates who sat in theConference on the Preliminaries of Peace. It is not too severe to saythat it outraged the equal rights of independent and sovereign statesand under less critical conditions would have been resented as an insultby the plenipotentiaries of the lesser nations. Even within thedelegations of the Great Powers there were indignant murmurings againstthis indefensible and unheard-of treatment of allies. No man, whose mindwas not warped by prejudice or dominated by political expediency, couldgive it his approval or become its apologist. Secrecy, and intrigueswhich were only possible through secrecy, stained nearly all thenegotiations at Paris, but in this final act of withholding knowledge ofthe actual text of the Treaty from the delegates of most of the nationsrepresented in the Conference the spirit of secretiveness seems tohave gone mad. 

The psychological effects of secrecy on those who are kept in ignoranceare not difficult to analyze. They follow normal processes and may bethus stated: Secrecy breeds suspicion; suspicion, doubt; doubt, distrust; and distrust produces lack of frankness, which is closely akinto secrecy. The result is a vicious circle, of which deceit and intrigueare the very essence. Secrecy and its natural consequences have given todiplomacy a popular reputation for trickery, for double-dealing, and ina more or less degree for unscrupulous and dishonest methods ofobtaining desired ends, a reputation that has found expression in theironic definition of a diplomat as "an honest man sent to lie abroad forthe good of his country. "

The time had arrived when the bad name which diplomacy had so long bornecould and should have been removed. "Open covenants openly arrived at"appealed to the popular feeling of antipathy toward secret diplomacy, ofwhich the Great War was generally believed to be the product. The ParisConference appeared to offer an inviting opportunity to turn the pageand to begin a new and better chapter in the annals of internationalintercourse. To do this required a fixed purpose to abandon the oldmethods, to insist on openness and candor, to refuse to be drawn intowhispered agreements. The choice between the old and the new ways had tobe definite and final. It had to be made at the very beginning of thenegotiations. It was made. Secrecy was adopted. Thus diplomacy, in spiteof the announced intention to reform its practices, has retained theevil taint which makes it out of harmony with the spirit of good faithand of open dealing which is characteristic of the best thought of thepresent epoch. There is little to show that diplomacy has been raised toa higher plane or has won a better reputation in the world at large thanit possessed before the nations assembled at Paris to make peace. Thisfailure to lift the necessary agency of international relations out ofthe rut worn deep by centuries of practice is one of the deplorableconsequences of the peace negotiations. So much might have been done;nothing was done. 

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT

The Shantung Settlement was not so evidently chargeable to secretnegotiations as the crisis over the disposition of Fiume, but thedecision was finally reached through that method. The controversybetween Japan and China as to which country should become the possessorof the former German property and rights in the Shantung Peninsula wasnot decided until almost the last moment before the Treaty with Germanywas completed. Under pressure of the necessity of making the documentready for delivery to the German delegates, President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George, composing the Council of the Heads ofStates in the absence of Signor Orlando in Rome, issued an orderdirecting the Drafting Committee of the Conference to prepare articlesfor the Treaty embodying the decision that the Council had made. Thisdecision, which was favorable to the Japanese claims, was the result ofa confidential arrangement with the Japanese delegates by which, in theevent of their claims being granted, they withdrew their threat todecline to sign the Treaty of Peace, agreed not to insist on a proposedamendment to the Covenant declaring for racial equality, and orallypromised to restore to China in the near future certain rights ofsovereignty over the territory, which promise failed of confirmation inwriting or by formal public declaration. 

It is fair to presume that, if the conflicting claims of Japan and Chinato the alleged rights of Germany in Chinese territory had been settledupon the merits through the medium of an impartial commission named bythe Conference, the Treaty provisions relating to the disposition ofthose rights would have been very different from those which "The Three"ordered to be drafted. Before a commission of the Conference nopersuasive reasons for conceding the Japanese claims could have beenurged on the basis of an agreement on the part of Japan to adhere to theLeague of Nations or to abandon the attempt to have included in theCovenant a declaration of equality between races. It was only throughsecret interviews and secret agreements that the threat of the Japanesedelegates could be successfully made. An adjustment on such a basis hadnothing to do with the justice of the case or with the legal rights andprinciples involved. The threat was intended to coerce the arbiters ofthe treaty terms by menacing the success of the plan to establish aLeague of Nations--to use an ugly word, it was a species of "blackmail"not unknown to international relations in the past. It was made possiblebecause the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and theconversations concerning Shantung were secret. 

It was a calamity for the Republic of China and unfortunate for thepresumed justice written into the Treaty that President Wilson wasconvinced that the Japanese delegates would decline to accept theCovenant of the League of Nations if the claims of Japan to the Germanrights were denied. It was equally unfortunate that the President feltthat without Japan's adherence to the Covenant the formation of theLeague would be endangered if not actually prevented. And it wasespecially unfortunate that the President considered the formation ofthe League in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant to besuperior to every other consideration and that to accomplish this objectalmost any sacrifice would be justifiable. It is my impression that thedeparture of Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino from Paris and theuncertainty of their return to give formal assent to the Treaty withGermany, an uncertainty which existed at the time of the decision of theShantung Question, had much to do with the anxiety of the President asto Japan's attitude. He doubtless felt that to have two of the FiveGreat Powers decline at the last moment to accept the Treaty containingthe Covenant would jeopardize the plan for a League and would greatlyencourage his opponents in the United States. His line of reasoning waslogical, but in my judgment was based on the false premise that theJapanese would carry out their threat to refuse to accept the Treaty andenter the League of Nations unless they obtained a cession of the Germanrights. I did not believe at the time, and I do not believe now, thatJapan would have made good her threat. The superior internationalposition, which she held as one of the Five Great Powers in theConference, and which she would hold in the League of Nations as one ofthe Principal Powers in the constitution of the Executive Council, wouldnever have been abandoned by the Tokio Government. The Japanesedelegates would not have run the risk of losing this position byadopting the course pursued by the Italians. 

The cases were different. No matter what action was taken by Italy shewould have continued to be a Great Power in any organization of theworld based on a classification of the nations. If she did not enter theLeague under the German Treaty, she certainly would later and wouldundoubtedly hold an influential position in the organization whether herdelegates signed the Covenant or accepted it in another treaty or byadherence. It was not so with Japan. There were reasons to believe that, if she failed to become one of the Principal Powers at the outset, another opportunity might never be given her to obtain so high a placein the concert of the nations. The seats that her delegates had in theCouncil of Ten had caused criticism and dissatisfaction in certainquarters, and the elimination of a Japanese from the Council of theHeads of States showed that the Japanese position as an equal of theother Great Powers was by no means secure. These indications of Japan'splace in the international oligarchy must have been evident to herplenipotentiaries at Paris, who in all probability reported thesituation to Tokio. From the point of view of policy the execution ofthe threat of withdrawal presented dangers to Japan's prestige which thediplomats who represented her would never have incurred if they were ascautious and shrewd as they appeared to be. The President did not holdthis opinion. We differed radically in our judgment as to the sincerityof the Japanese threat. He showed that he believed it would be carriedout. I believed that it would not be. 

It has not come to my knowledge what the attitude of the British andFrench statesmen was concerning the disposition of the Shantung rights, although I have read the views of certain authors on the subject, but Ido know that the actual decision lay with the President. If he haddeclined to recognize the Japanese claims, they would never have beengranted nor would the grant have been written into the Treaty. Everything goes to show that he realized this responsibility and thatthe cession to Japan was not made through error or misconception of therights of the parties, but was done deliberately and with a fullappreciation that China was being denied that which in othercircumstances would have been awarded to her. If it had not been forreasons wholly independent and outside of the question in dispute, thePresident would not have decided as he did. 

It is not my purpose to enter into the details of the origin of theGerman lease of Kiao-Chau (the port of Tsingtau) and of the economicconcessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany. Suffice itto say that, taking advantage of a situation caused by the murder ofsome missionary priests in the province, the German Government in 1898forced the Chinese Government to make treaties granting for the periodof ninety-nine years the lease and concessions, by which the sovereignauthority over this "Holy Land" of China was to all intents ceded toGermany, which at once improved the harbor, fortified the leased area, and began railway construction and the exploitation of the ShantungPeninsula. 

The outbreak of the World War found Germany in possession of the leasedarea and in substantial control of the territory under the concession. On August 15, 1914, the Japanese Government presented an _ultimatum_ tothe German Government, in which the latter was required "to deliver on adate not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory ofKiao-Chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. "

On the German failure to comply with these demands the JapaneseGovernment landed troops and, in company with a small Britishcontingent, took possession of the leased port and occupied theterritory traversed by the German railway, even to the extent ofestablishing a civil government in addition to garrisoning the line withJapanese troops. Apparently the actual occupation of this Chineseterritory induced a change in the policy of the Imperial Government atTokio, for in December, 1914, Baron Kato, the Minister of ForeignAffairs, declared that the restoration of Tsingtau to China "is to besettled in the future" and that the Japanese Government had made nopromises to do so. 

This statement, which seemed in contradiction of the _ultimatum_ toGermany, was made in the Japanese Diet. It was followed up in January, 1915, by the famous "Twenty-one Demands" made upon the Government atPeking. It is needless to go into these demands further than to quotethe first to which China was to subscribe. 

 "The Chinese Government agrees that when the Japanese Government hereafter approaches the German Government for the transfer of all rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other manner, China shall give her full assent thereto. "

The important point to be noted in this demand is that Japan did notconsider that the occupation of Kiao-Chau and the seizure of the Germanconcessions transferred title to her, but looked forward to a futuretransfer by treaty. 

The "Twenty-one Demands" were urged with persistency by the JapaneseGovernment and finally took the form of an _ultimatum_ as to all butGroup V of the "Demands. " The Peking Government was in no political ormilitary condition to resist, and, in order to avoid an open rupturewith their aggressive neighbor, entered into a treaty granting theJapanese demands. 

China, following the action which the United States had taken onFebruary 3, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, and five months later declared war against her announcing at the sametime that the treaties, conventions, and agreements between the twocountries were by the declaration abrogated. As to whether a state ofwar does in fact abrogate a treaty of the character of the Sino-GermanTreaty of 1898 some question may be raised under the accepted rules ofinternational law, on the ground that it was a cession of sovereignrights and constituted an international servitude in favor of Germanyover the territory affected by it. But in this particular case theindefensible duress employed by the German Government to compel China toenter into the treaty introduces another factor into the problem andexcepts it from any general rule that treaties of that nature are merelysuspended and not abrogated by war between the parties. It would seem asif no valid argument could be made in favor of suspension because theeffect of the rule would be to revive and perpetuate an inequitable andunjustifiable act. Morally and legally the Chinese Government was rightin denouncing the treaty and agreements with Germany and in treating theterritorial rights acquired by coercion as extinguished. 

It would appear, therefore, that, as the Japanese Government recognizedthat the rights in the Province of Shantung had not passed to Japan bythe forcible occupation of Kiao-Chau and the German concessions, thoserights ceased to exist when China declared war against Germany, and thatChina was, therefore, entitled to resume full sovereignty over the areawhere such rights previously existed. 

It is true that subsequently, on September 24, 1918, the Chinese andJapanese Governments by exchange of notes at Tokio entered intoagreements affecting the Japanese occupation of the Kiao-Chau TsinanRailway and the adjoining territory, but the governmental situation atPeking was too precarious to refuse any demands made by the JapaneseGovernment. In fact the action of the Japanese Government was verysimilar to that of the German Government in 1898. An examination ofthese notes discloses the fact that the Japanese were in possession ofthe denounced German rights, but nothing in the notes indicates thatthey were there as a matter of legal right, or that the ChineseGovernment conceded their right of occupation. 

This was the state of affairs when the Peace Conference assembled atParis. Germany had by force compelled China in 1898 to cede to hercertain rights in the Province of Shantung. Japan had seized theserights by force in 1914 and had by threats forced China in 1915 to agreeto accept her disposition of them when they were legally transferred bytreaty at the end of the war. China in 1917 had, on entering the waragainst Germany, denounced all treaties and agreements with Germany, sothat the ceded rights no longer existed and could not legally betransferred by Germany to Japan by the Treaty of Peace, since the titlewas in China. In fact any transfer or disposition of the rights inShantung formerly belonging to Germany was a transfer or disposition ofrights belonging wholly to China and would deprive that country of aportion of its full sovereignty over the territory affected. 

While this view of the extinguishment of the German rights in Shantungwas manifestly the just one and its adoption would make for thepreservation of permanent peace in the Far East, the Governments of theAllied Powers had, early in 1917, and prior to the severance ofdiplomatic relations between China and Germany, acceded to the requestof Japan to support, "on the occasion of the Peace Conference, " herclaims in regard to these rights which then existed. The representativesof Great Britain, France, and Italy at Paris were thus restricted, or atleast embarrassed, by the promises which their Governments had made at atime when they were in no position to refuse Japan's request. They mighthave stood on the legal ground that the Treaty of 1898 having beenabrogated by China no German rights in Shantung were in being at thetime of the Peace Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to takethat position. Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which theycould not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; orpossibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt ofJapanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of theJapanese Government in regard to China. There can be little doubt thatpolitical, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude ofthe European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question. 

President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previouscommitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of theJapanese Government. The subject had been frequently considered duringthe early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergenceof views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to theresumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the leaseand the concessions to Germany. These views were further strengthened bythe presentation of the question before the Council of Ten. On January27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinesedelegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo spokeon behalf of China. In a note on the meeting I recorded that "he simplyoverwhelmed the Japanese with his argument. " I believe that that opinionwas common to all those who heard the two presentations. In fact it madesuch an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegatescalled upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect bydeclaring that the United States, since it had not promised to supportJapan's contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directlyto China. He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard tothe matter. It was an indirect threat of what would happen to thefriendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claimwas denied. 

The sessions of the Commission on the League of Nations and the absenceof President Wilson from Paris interrupted further consideration of theShantung Question until the latter part of March, when the Council ofFour came into being. As the subject had been fully debated in Januarybefore the Council of Ten, final decision lay with the Council of Four. What discussions took place in the latter council I do not know onaccount of the secrecy which was observed as to their deliberations. ButI presume that the President stood firmly for the Chinese rights, as thematter remained undecided until the latter part of April. 

On the 21st of April Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda called upon me inregard to the question, and I frankly told them that they ought to provethe justice of the Japanese claim, that they had not done it and that Idoubted their ability to do so. I found, too, that the President hadproposed that the Five Powers act as trustees of the former Germanrights in Shantung, but that the Japanese delegates had declared thatthey could not consent to the proposition, which was in the nature of acompromise intended to bridge over the existing situation that, onaccount of the near approach of the completion of the Treaty, wasbecoming more and more acute. 

On April 26 the President, at a conference with the AmericanCommissioners, showed deep concern over the existing state of thecontroversy, and asked me to see the Japanese delegates again andendeavor to dissuade them from insisting on their demands and to inducethem to consider the international trusteeship proposed. The evening ofthe same day the two Japanese came by request to my office and conferredwith Professor E. T. Williams, the Commission's principal adviser on FarEastern affairs, and with me. After an hour's conversation ViscountChinda made it very clear that Japan intended to insist on her "pound offlesh. " It was apparent both to Mr. Williams and to me that nothingcould be done to obtain even a compromise, though it was on the facefavorable to Japan, since it recognized the existence of the Germanrights, which China claimed were annulled. 

On April 28 I gave a full report of the interview to Mr. White andGeneral Bliss at our regular morning meeting. Later in the morning thePresident telephoned me and I informed him of the fixed determination ofthe Japanese to insist upon their claims. What occurred between the timeof my conversation with the President and the plenary session of theConference on the Preliminaries of Peace in the afternoon, at which theCovenant of the League of Nations was adopted, I do not actually know, but the presumption is that the Japanese were promised a satisfactorysettlement in regard to Shantung, since they announced that they wouldnot press an amendment on "racial equality" at the session, an amendmentupon which they had indicated they intended to insist. 

After the meeting of the Conference I made the following memorandum ofthe situation:

 "At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference this afternoon Baron Makino spoke of his proposed amendment to the Covenant declaring 'racial equality, ' but said he would not press it. 

 "I concluded from what the President said to me that he was disposed to accede to Japan's claims in regard to Kiao-Chau and Shantung. He also showed me a letter from ---- to Makino saying he was sorry their claims had not been finally settled before the Session. 

 "From all this I am forced to the conclusion that a bargain has been struck by which the Japanese agree to sign the Covenant in exchange for admission of their claims. If so, it is an iniquitous agreement. 

 "Apparently the President is going to do this to avoid Japan's declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret arrangements which have riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are wrecking a just peace. 

 "In my opinion it would be better to let Japan stay out of the League than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for 'a mess of pottage'--and a mess it is. I fear that it is too late to do anything to save the situation. "

Mr. White, General Bliss, and I, at our meeting that morning before theplenary session, and later when we conferred as to what had taken placeat the session, were unanimous in our opinions that China's rightsshould be sustained even if Japan withdrew from the Peace Conference. Wewere all indignant at the idea of submitting to the Japanese demands andagreed that the President should be told of our attitude, because wewere unwilling to have it appear that we in any way approved of accedingto Japan's claims or even of compromising them. 

General Bliss volunteered to write the President a letter on thesubject, a course which Mr. White and I heartily endorsed. 

The next morning the General read the following letter to us and withour entire approval sent it to Mr. Wilson:

 "_Hôtel de Crillon, Paris_

 "_April 29, 1919_

 "MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

 "Last Saturday morning you told the American Delegation that you desired suggestions, although not at that moment, in regard to the pending matter of certain conflicting claims between Japan and China centering about the alleged German rights. My principal interest in the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter this morning with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject. 

 "Since your conference with us last Saturday, I have asked myself three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me, personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies. 

 "_First. _ Japan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose Japan had not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans at Tsing-Tsau; suppose that the armistice of November 11th had found her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a clause in the Treaty of Peace. Would it occur to any one that, as a matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to Japan rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right has Japan acquired by her conquest of Shantung assisted by the British? If Great Britain and Japan secured no moral right to sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right has Japan acquired to the suzerainty (which she would undoubtedly eventually have) over 30, 000, 000 Chinese in the sacred province of Shantung?

 "_Second. _ Japan must base her claims either on the Convention with China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her moral right under either of these points. 

 "_a)_ If the United States has not before this recognized the validity of the rights claimed by Japan under her Convention with China, what has happened since the Armistice that would justify us in recognizing their validity now?

 "_b)_ If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the east coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no such territory. What then was left for Japan to acquire by conquest? Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot be acquired by conquest. 

 "_Third. _ Suppose Germany says to us, 'We will cede our lease and all rights under it, but we will cede them back to China. ' Will we recognize the justice of Japan's claims to such an extent that we will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights to Japan rather than to China?

 "Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these rights to Japan, even though we know that this is so wrong that we would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral justification would we have in making Germany do this?

 "_Fourth. _ Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not, under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a treaty with Japan by which we compel one of our Allies (China) to cede against her will these things to Japan? Would not this action be really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a party to on the Dalmatian Coast? Because, in the latter case, the territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power. 

 "It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what the Japanese mean when they say that they will return Kiao-chow to China. They _do not_ offer to return the railway, the mines or the port, i. E. , Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50 Kilometer Zone was not included. That was a _limitation_ put upon the movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty and administration. 

 "Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence, since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up. 

 "The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15 to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2) To have a Japanese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated by her, i. E. , she can take just as much as she likes of the territory around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory, but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory as are of no value. 

 "The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to the port. Why take two years to go through this operation?

 "If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated. 

 "If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy. 

 "If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan. 

 "We shall be sowing dragons' teeth. 

 "It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice and freedom. 

 "Sincerely yours

 "THE PRESIDENT

 "T. H. BLISS"

I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the Japanesedelegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amountedto nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and withoutsubstantial value. 

The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April30), by which he was fully advised of the attitude of General Bliss, Mr. White, and myself in regard to the Japanese claims, the Council of Fourreached its final decision of the matter, in which necessarily Mr. Wilson acquiesced. I learned of this decision the same evening. Thememorandum which I made the next morning in regard to the matter isas follows:

 "China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The President has conceded to Japan all that, if not more than, she ever hoped to obtain. This is the information contained in a memorandum handed by Ray Stannard Baker under the President's direction to the Chinese delegation last evening, a copy of which reached me through Mr. ---- [of the Chinese delegation]. 

 "Mr. ---- also said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been able to do more for China but that he had been compelled to accede to Japan's demand 'in order _to save the League of Nations. _'

 "The memorandum was most depressing. Though I had anticipated something of the sort three days ago [see note of April 28 previously quoted], I had unconsciously cherished a hope that the President would stand to his guns and champion China's cause. He has failed to do so. It is true that China is given the shell called 'sovereignty, ' but the economic control, the kernel, is turned over to Japan. 

 "However logical may appear the argument that China's political integrity is preserved and will be maintained under the guaranty of the League of Nations, the fact is that Japan will rule over millions of Chinese. Furthermore it is still a matter of conjecture how valuable the guaranty of the League will prove to be. It has, of course, never been tried, and Japan's representation on the Council will possibly thwart any international action in regard to China. 

 "Frankly my policy would have been to say to the Japanese, 'If you do not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you in the League of Nations. ' If the Japanese had taken offense and gone, I would have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a government with such imperial designs. But she would not have gone. She would have submitted. She has attained a high place in world councils. Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau. The whole affair assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat's-paw. 

 "I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to subordinate every other consideration. The result was that China was offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of Japan. When you get down to facts the threats were nothing but 'bluff. '

 "I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is bound to lose. I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics. There seems to be none. "

It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to thedecision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons forthe President's agreement to support the Japanese claims, that weradically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318). I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of theChinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument infavor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more stronglyto me than it did to Mr. Wilson. Our chief differences were, first, thatit was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of theLeague of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that theJapanese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation ofthe League; and, third, that Japan would have withdrawn if her claimshad been denied. As to these differences our opposite views remainedunchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed. 

When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations onAugust 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the Japanesesignatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenanteven though Shantung had not been delivered over to Japan, and that theonly reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow thedecision of the President of the United States. 

About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at theWhite House with the same Committee. In answer to questions regardingthe Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement thathis judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment thesignatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung toJapan, and that he had been notified that the Japanese delegates hadbeen instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the Germanrights in Shantung to Japan was included. 

Presumably the opinion which Mr. Wilson held in the summer of 1919 hecontinues to hold, and for my part my views and feelings remain the samenow as they were then, with possibly the difference that the indignationand shame that I felt at the time in being in any way a participant inrobbing China of her just rights have increased rather than lessened. 

So intense was the bitterness among the American Commissioners over theflagrant wrong being perpetrated that, when the decision of the Councilof Four was known, some of them considered whether or not they ought toresign or give notice that they would not sign the Treaty if thearticles concerning Shantung appeared. The presence at Versailles of theGerman plenipotentiaries, the uncertainty of the return of the Italiandelegates then in Rome, and the murmurs of dissatisfaction among thedelegates of the lesser nations made the international situationprecarious. To have added to the serious conditions and to have possiblyprecipitated a crisis by openly rebelling against the President was toassume a responsibility which no Commissioner was willing to take. Withthe greatest reluctance the American Commissioners submitted to thedecision of the Council of Four; and, when the Chinese delegates refusedto sign the Treaty after they had been denied the right to sign it withreservations to the Shantung articles, the American Commissioners, whohad so strongly opposed the settlement, silently approved their conductas the only patriotic and statesmanlike course to take. So far as Chinawas concerned the Shantung Question remained open, and the ChineseGovernment very properly refused, after the Treaty of Versailles wassigned, to enter into any negotiations with Japan looking toward itssettlement upon the basis of the treaty provisions. 

There was one exception to the President's usual practice which isespecially noticeable in connection with the Shantung controversy, andthat was the greater participation which he permitted the members of theAmerican Commission in negotiating with both the Japanese and theChinese. It is true he did not disclose his intentions to theCommissioners, but he did express a wish for their advice and hedirected me to confer with the Japanese and obtain their views. Just whyhe adopted this course, for him unusual, I do not know unless he feltthat so far as the equity of China's claim was concerned we were all inagreement, and if there was to be a departure from strict justice hedesired to have his colleagues suggest a way to do so. It is possible, too, that he felt the question was in large measure a legal one, anddecided that the illegality of transferring the German rights to Japancould be more successfully presented to the Japanese delegates by alawyer. In any event, in this particular case he adopted a course morein accord with established custom and practice than he did in any otherof the many perplexing and difficult problems which he was called uponto solve during the Paris negotiations, excepting of course the subjectssubmitted to commissions of the Conference. As has been shown, Mr. Wilson did not follow the advice of the three Commissioners given him inGeneral Bliss's letter, but that does not detract from thenoteworthiness of the fact that in the case of Shantung he sought advicefrom his Commissioners. 

This ends the account of the Shantung Settlement and the negotiationswhich led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound tofollow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached. Publicopinion in the United States was almost unanimous in condemning it andin denouncing those responsible for so evident a departure from legaljustice and the principles of international morality. No plea ofexpediency or of necessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubtedright. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to anation weak because of political discord and an insufficient militaryestablishment, in order to win favor with a nation strong because of itsmilitary power and national unity, had much to do with increasing thehostility to the Treaty and preventing its acceptance by the Senate ofthe United States. The whole affair furnishes another example of theresults of secret diplomacy, for the arguments which prevailed with thePresident were those to which he listened when he sat in secret councilwith M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. 

CHAPTER XIX

THE BULLITT AFFAIR

The foregoing chapters have related to subjects which were known toPresident Wilson to be matters of difference between us while we weretogether in Paris and which are presumably referred to in his letter ofFebruary 11, 1920, extracts from which are quoted in the openingchapter. The narration might be concluded with our difference of opinionas to the Shantung Settlement, but in view of subsequent informationwhich the President received I am convinced that he felt that myobjections to his decisions in regard to the terms of the peace withGermany extended further than he knew at the time, and that he resentedthe fact that my mind did not go along with his as to these decisions. This undoubtedly added to the reasons for his letter and possiblyinfluenced him to write as he did in February, 1920, even more than ourknown divergence of judgment during the negotiations. 

I do not feel, therefore, that the story is complete without at least abrief reference to my views concerning the Treaty of Versailles at thetime of its delivery to the German delegates, which were imperfectlydisclosed in a statement made by William C. Bullitt on September 12, 1919, at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations. As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsibleposition with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeatinga conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I makeno comment. 

The portion of the statement, which I have no doubt deeply incensed thePresident because it was published while he was in the West making hisappeals to the people in behalf of the Treaty and especially of theLeague of Nations, is as follows:

 "Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the League of Nations. He said: 'I consider that the League of Nations at present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker peoples. '

 "We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. Mr. Lansing said: 'I believe that if the Senate could only understand what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they will ever understand what it lets them in for. '" (Senate Doc. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276. )

It does not seem an unwarranted conjecture that the President believedthat this statement, which was asserted by Mr. Bullitt to be from amemorandum made at the time, indicated that I had been unfaithful tohim. He may even have concluded that I had been working against theLeague of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection ofthe Covenant by the Senate. If he did believe this, I cannot feel thatit was other than natural in the circumstances, especially if I did notat once publicly deny the truth of the Bullitt statement. That I couldnot do because there was sufficient truth in it to compel me to showhow, by slight variations and by omissions in the conversation, my wordswere misunderstood or misinterpreted. 

In view of the fact that I found it impossible to make an absolutedenial, I telegraphed the President stating the facts and offering tomake them public if he considered it wise to do so. The important partof the telegram, which was dated September 16, 1919, is as follows:

 "On May 17th Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons, with which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most every one did, but that was probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to have peace as soon as possible. "

It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of thisconversation without reference to the other side and by an omission hereand there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr. Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting thecontext, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was, and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signedand ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration ofpeace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which mightdelay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, was to be deplored. 

Having submitted to the President the question of making a publicexplanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure atleast correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do sountil I received the President's approval. That was never received. Thetelegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State, was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence wasthat the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the onlyone that up to the present time has been published. 

The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President's silence is thathe considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even toweaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had takenplace, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I wasopposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am notdisposed to blame the President for holding this opinion consideringwhat had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, suchas I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I wouldstill be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty, provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. WhileMr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, therewas sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem oflittle value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial, his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not beundone. I am inclined to think that he was right. 

My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr. Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which isas follows:

 "The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a complete document. 

 "The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and of depression. The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance. 

 "The League of Nations created by the Treaty is relied upon to preserve the artificial structure which has been erected by compromise of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and to prevent the germination of the seeds of war which are sown in so many articles and which under normal conditions would soon bear fruit. The League might as well attempt to prevent the growth of plant life in a tropical jungle. Wars will come sooner or later. 

 "It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an instrument of the mighty to check the normal growth of national power and national aspirations among those who have been rendered impotent by defeat. Examine the Treaty and you will find peoples delivered against their wills into the hands of those whom they hate, while their economic resources are torn from them and given to others. Resentment and bitterness, if not desperation, are bound to be the consequences of such provisions. It may be years before these oppressed peoples are able to throw off the yoke, but as sure as day follows night the time will come when they will make the effort. 

 "This war was fought by the United States to destroy forever the conditions which produced it. Those conditions have not been destroyed. They have been supplanted by other conditions equally productive of hatred, jealousy, and suspicion. In place of the Triple Alliance and the Entente has arisen the Quintuple Alliance which is to rule the world. The victors in this war intend to impose their combined will upon the vanquished and to subordinate all interests to their own. 

 "It is true that to please the aroused public opinion of mankind and to respond to the idealism of the moralist they have surrounded the new alliance with a halo and called it 'The League of Nations, ' but whatever it may be called or however it may be disguised it is an alliance of the Five Great Military Powers. 

 "It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the power to compel obedience by the exercise of the united strength of 'The Five' is the fundamental principle of the League. Justice is secondary. Might is primary. 

 "The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed and intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which may offer a restraint, will be broken or render the organization powerless. It is called upon to stamp as just what is unjust. 

 "We have a treaty of peace, but it will not bring permanent peace because it is founded on the shifting sands of self-interest. "

In the views thus expressed I was not alone. A few days after they werewritten I was in London where I discussed the Treaty with several of theleading British statesmen. I noted their opinions thus: "The consensuswas that the Treaty was unwise and unworkable, that it was conceived inintrigue and fashioned in cupidity, and that it would produce ratherthan prevent wars. " One of these leaders of political thought in GreatBritain said that "the only apparent purpose of the League of Nationsseems to be to perpetuate the series of unjust provisions which werebeing imposed. "

The day following my return from London, which was on May 17, I receivedMr. Bullitt's letter of resignation and also letters from five of ourprincipal experts protesting against the terms of peace and stating thatthey considered them to be an abandonment of the principles for whichAmericans had fought. One of the officials, whose relations with thePresident were of a most intimate nature, said that he was in a quandaryabout resigning; that he did not think that the conditions in the Treatywould make for peace because they were too oppressive; that theobnoxious things in the Treaty were due to secret diplomacy; and thatthe President should have stuck rigidly to his principles, which he hadnot. This official was evidently deeply incensed, but in the end he didnot resign, nor did the five experts who sent letters, because they weretold that it would seriously cripple the American Commission in thepreparation of the Austrian Treaty if they did not continue to serve. Another and more prominent adviser of the President felt very bitterlyover the terms of peace. In speaking of his disapproval of them he toldme that he had found the same feeling among the British in Paris, whowere disposed to blame the President since "they had counted upon him tostand firmly by his principles and face down the intriguers. "

It is needless to cite other instances indicating the general state ofmind among the Americans and British at Paris to show the views thatwere being exchanged and the frank comments that were being made at thetime of my interview with Mr. Bullitt. In truth I said less to him incriticism of the Treaty than I did to some others, but they have seenfit to respect the confidential nature of our conversations. 

It is not pertinent to the present subject to recite the events betweenthe delivery of the Treaty to the Germans on May 7 and its signature onJune 28. In spite of the dissatisfaction, which even went so far thatsome of the delegates of the Great Powers threatened to decline to signthe Treaty unless certain of its terms were modified, the supremenecessity of restoring peace as soon as possible overcame all obstacles. It was the appreciation of this supreme necessity which caused manyAmericans to urge consent to ratification when the Treaty was laidbefore the Senate. 

My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signedit and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convincedafter conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that hewould not consent to any effective reservations, the politic courseseemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. Itappeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all theworld longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appearedabsolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster resulting frompolitical and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations ifnot civilization itself. Even if the Treaty was bad in certainprovisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent, its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity. At least thatwas my conviction in the summer and autumn of 1919, and I am not yetsatisfied that it was erroneous. My views after January, 1920, are notpertinent to the subject under consideration. The consequences of thefailure to ratify promptly the Treaty of Versailles are still uncertain. They may be more serious or they may be less serious than they appearedin 1919. Time alone will disclose the truth and fix the responsibilityfor what occurred after the Treaty of Versailles was laid before theSenate of the United States. 

CONCLUSION

The narration of my relations to the peace negotiations as one of theAmerican Commissioners to the Paris Conference, which has been confinedwithin the limits laid down in the opening chapter of this volume, concludes with the recital of the views which I held concerning theterms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and which were brought to theattention of Mr. Wilson through the press reports of William C. Bullitt's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations onSeptember 12, 1919. 

The endeavor has been to present, as fully as possible in thecircumstances, a review of my association with President Wilson inconnection with the negotiations at Paris setting forth our differencesof opinion and divergence of judgment upon the subjects coming beforethe Peace Conference, the conduct of the proceedings, and the terms ofpeace imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. 

It is evident from this review that, from a time prior to Mr. Wilson'sdeparture from the United States on December 4, 1918, to attend thePeace Conference up to the delivery of the text of the Treaty to theGerman plenipotentiaries on May 7, 1919, there were many subjects ofdisagreement between the President and myself; that he was disposed toreject or ignore the advice and suggestions which I volunteered; andthat in consequence of my convictions I followed his guidance and obeyedhis instructions unwillingly. 

While there were other matters of friction between us they were of apersonal nature and of minor importance. Though they may havecontributed to the formality of our relations they played no real partin the increasing difficulty of the situation. The matters narratedwere, in my opinion, the principal causes for the letters written byPresident Wilson in February, 1920; at least they seem sufficient toexplain the origin of the correspondence, while the causes specificallystated by him--my calling together of the heads of the executivedepartments for consultation during his illness and my attempts toanticipate his judgment--are insufficient. 

The reasons given in the President's letter of February 11, theessential portions of which have been quoted, for stating that myresignation as Secretary of State would be acceptable to him, are theembarrassment caused him by my "reluctance and divergence of judgment"and the implication that my mind did not "willingly go along" with his. As neither of these reasons applies to the calling of Cabinet meetingsor to the anticipation of his judgment in regard to foreign affairs, theunavoidable conclusion is that these grounds of complaint were not thereal causes leading up to the severance of our official association. 

The real causes--which are the only ones worthy of consideration--are tobe found in the record of the relations between President Wilson andmyself in connection with the peace negotiations. Upon that record mustrest the justification or the refutation of Mr. Wilson's implied chargethat I was not entirely loyal to him as President and that I failed toperform my full duty to my country as Secretary of State and as aCommissioner to Negotiate Peace by opposing the way in which heexercised his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs ofthe United States. 

THE END

APPENDIX I

THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919

PREAMBLE

In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by theprescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, bythe firm establishment of the understandings of international law as theactual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance ofjustice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in thedealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory tothis covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt thisconstitution of the League of Nations. 

ARTICLE I

The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreementshall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegateswhich shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contractingPowers accredited to H. And the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. Themeetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat ofgovernment of H. And the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. Shall be thepresiding officer of the Body. 

Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meettemporarily at the seat of government of B. Or of S. , in which case theAmbassador or Minister to H. Of the country in which the meeting is heldshall be the presiding officer _pro tempore_. 

It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers to assist itsrepresentative in the Body of Delegates by any method of conference, counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to substitute uponoccasion a special representative for its regular diplomaticrepresentative accredited to H. 

ARTICLE II

The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall havepower to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquireinto and report upon any matters that lie within the field oftheir action. 

It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative ofany member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deembest, any matter lying within the jurisdiction of the League of Nationsas defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace ofthe world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in theexercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenantshall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, whichshall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shallconsist of the representatives of the Great Powers together withrepresentatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of whichshall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next afterthe Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minorStates (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itselfestablish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawnfrom these panels as will be but one less than the representatives ofthe Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shalloperate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed. 

All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates uponthe recommendation of the Executive Council, except those adopted inexecution of any direct powers herein granted to the Body of Delegatesthemselves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the severalgovernments of the League. 

The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staffand may appoint joint committees chosen from the Body of Delegates orconsisting of specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for thestudy and systematic consideration of the international questions withwhich the Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead tointernational complications or disputes. It shall also take thenecessary steps to establish and maintain proper liaison both with theforeign offices of the signatory powers and with any governments oragencies which may be acting as mandatories of the League of Nations inany part of the world. 

ARTICLE III

The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other politicalindependence and territorial integrity; but it is understood betweenthem that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the futurebecome necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions andaspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant tothe principle of self-determination, and also such territorialreadjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegatesbe demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoplesconcerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and thatterritorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. TheContracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that thepeace of the world is superior in importance to every question ofpolitical jurisdiction or boundary. 

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishmentand maintenance of peace will require the reduction of nationalarmaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and theenforcement by common action of international obligations; and theDelegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such areduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be bindingwhen, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatoryto this Covenant. 

As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the Powerssubscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes apart hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms ofcompulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces ofdefence and of international action shall consist of militia orvolunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall be fixed, afterexpert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction ofarmaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph. 

The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration andaction of the several governments what direct military equipment andarmament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forceslaid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, whenadopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body ofDelegates. 

The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements ofwar shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for privateprofit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to allnational armaments and military or naval programmes. 

ARTICLE V

The Contracting Powers jointly and severally agree that, should disputesor difficulties arise between or among them which cannot besatisfactorily settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes ofdiplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previouslysubmitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration orto inquiry by the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates or untilthere has been an award by the arbitrators or a decision by theExecutive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armedforce as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with theaward of the arbitrators or the decision of the Executive Council. 

The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and agree that wheneverany dispute or difficulty shall arise between or among them with regardto any questions of the law of nations, with regard to theinterpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any allegeddamage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor, if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by theordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter toarbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decisionthat may be rendered. 

In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referredto three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of theparties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and thethird by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties tothe dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the severalparties, and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number othersof their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the numberwhich will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thusadded in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by thecontending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contendingparties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, theadditional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body ofDelegates. 

On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitratorsmay be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in casethe decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote oftwo-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators wasnot unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding andconclusive. 

When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, thedispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretoforeprovided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted asarbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of thearbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally bindingand conclusive without right of appeal. 

If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter indispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to theExecutive Council to take the matter under consideration for suchmediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in thecircumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the reference andgive notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessaryarrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and consideration. Itshall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall makesuch recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on themerits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lastingsettlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal ofthe Executive Council any and all information that may be in theirpossession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of thecontroversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its powerby way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peacefulsettlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed tothe disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict. Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shallbe the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publishtheir several conclusions or recommendations; and such publicationsshall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of thedisputants. 

ARTICLE VI

Should any contracting Power break or disregard its covenants underARTICLE V, it shall thereby _ipso facto_ commit an act of war with allthe members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to acomplete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of alltrade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse betweentheir subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and theprevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, orpersonal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking Stateand the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League ofNations or not. 

It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Bodyof Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military ornaval force the members of the League of Nations shall severallycontribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smallermembers of the League be excused from making any contribution to thearmed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State. 

The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, besubject to perpetual disarmament and to the regulations with regard to apeace establishment provided for new States under the terms ofSUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE IV. 

ARTICLE VII

If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostilestep short of war, against another Power before submitting the disputeinvolved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council asherein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take anyhostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has beendecided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as hereinprovided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only tocease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite inblockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce orintercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may benecessary to accomplish that object. 

ARTICLE VIII

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of theContracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to theLeague of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and thosePowers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemedwise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. 

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of eachof the nations signatory or adherent to this Covenant to draw theattention of the Body of Delegates to any circumstances anywhere whichthreaten to disturb international peace or the good understandingbetween nations upon which peace depends. 

The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war isrumored or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power shallinform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest ofpeace is advisable. 

The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such otheroccasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine. 

ARTICLE IX

In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powersand a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involvedhereby binds itself to endeavour to obtain the submission of the disputeto judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will notagree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, theContracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body ofDelegates. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the Leagueof Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become _adhoc_ a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or toarbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that theprovisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission ofdisputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respectsapplicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as ifit were a party to this Covenant. 

In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept theinvitation of the Delegates to become _ad hoc_ a party, it shall be theduty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry intothe circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommendsuch joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and mosteffectual in the circumstances disclosed. 

ARTICLE X

If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against theContracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before adecision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, reportand recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, orcontrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereuponcease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall alsounite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to allcommerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointlyany force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. TheContracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of theContracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combiningtheir armed forces in its behalf. 

ARTICLE XI

In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, anyContracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of theDelegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League ofNations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute. 

If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree tosubmit its interests and causes of action wholly to the control anddecision of the League of Nations, that state shall _ad hoc_ be deemed aContracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall, through the ExecutiveCouncil, of their own motion take such action and make suchrecommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities andresult in the settlement of the dispute. 

ARTICLE XII

Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based uponthe principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body ofDelegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard thegranting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security ofthe World, they may act favourably on the application, and theirfavourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying inall respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shallrequire the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates. 

ARTICLE XIII

The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant andConvention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations _inter se_which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage thatthey will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with theterms hereof. 

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted tothe League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with theterms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to takeimmediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. 

_SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS_

I

In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged toAustria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerlyunder the dominion of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall beregarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimatedisposal or of continued administration in accordance with certainfundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion andcontrol shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the partof any Power. 

These principles are, that there shall in no case be any annexation ofany of these territories by any State either within the League oroutside of it, and that in the future government of these peoples andterritories the rule of self-determination, or the consent of thegoverned to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonablyapplied, and all policies of administration or economic development bebased primarily upon the well-considered interests of the peoplethemselves. 

II

Any authority, control, or administration which may be necessary inrespect of these peoples or territories other than their ownself-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusivefunction of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and exercisedor undertaken by or on behalf of it. 

It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, control, or administration of any such people or territory to somesingle State or organized agency which it may designate and appoint asits agent or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or feasiblethe agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved bythe autonomous people or territory. 

III

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised bythe mandatary State or agency shall in each case be explicitly definedby the League in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to theLeague complete power of supervision and of intimate control, and whichshall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmentalunit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction ofany breach of the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for thesubstitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary. 

The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be bound and requiredto maintain the policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for allthe signatories to this Covenant, in respect of the use and developmentof the economic resources of such people or territory. 

The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form or maintain anymilitary or naval force in excess of definite standards laid down by theLeague itself for the purposes of internal police. 

IV

No new State arising or created from the old Empires of Austria-Hungary, or Turkey shall be recognized by the League or admitted into itsmembership except on condition that its military and naval forces andarmaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respectof it from time to time. 

As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations_inter se_ of all new independent States arising or created out of theEmpires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating andcomposing differences between them with a view to the maintenance ofsettled order and the general peace. 

V

The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant agree that they willthemselves seek to establish and maintain fair hours and humaneconditions of labour for all those within their several jurisdictionswho are engaged in manual labour and that they will exert theirinfluence in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policyand like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercialrelations extend. 

VI

The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves asa condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomousStates, to accord to all racial or national minorities within theirseveral jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both inlaw and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority oftheir people. 

APPENDIX II

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(_Plan of Lord Robert Cecil_[1])

I

ORGANIZATION

The general treaty setting up the league of nations will explicitlyprovide for regular conferences between the responsible representativesof the contracting powers. 

These conferences would review the general conditions of internationalrelations and would naturally pay special attention to any difficultywhich might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would alsoreceive and as occasion demanded discuss reports as to the work of anyinternational administrative or investigating bodies working underthe League. 

These conferences would constitute the pivot of the league. They wouldbe meetings of statesmen responsible to their own sovereign parliaments, and any decisions taken would therefore, as in the case of the variousallied conferences during the war, have to be unanimous. 

The following form of organization is suggested:

I. _The conference_. Annual meeting of prime ministers and foreignsecretaries of British Empire, United States, France, Italy, Japan, andany other States recognized by them as great powers. Quadrennial meetingof representatives of all States included in the league. There shouldalso be provision for the summoning of special conferences on the demandof any one of the great powers or, if there were danger of an outbreakof war, of any member of the league. (The composition of the league willbe determined at the peace conference. Definitely untrustworthy andhostile States, e. G. , Russia, should the Bolshevist government remain inpower, should be excluded. Otherwise it is desirable not to be too rigidin scrutinizing qualifications, since the small powers will in any casenot exercise any considerable influence. )

2. For the conduct of its work the interstate conference will require apermanent secretariat. The general secretary should be appointed by thegreat powers, if possible choosing a national of some other country. 

3. _International bodies_. The secretariat would be the responsiblechannel of communication between the interstate conference and allinternational bodies functioning under treaties guaranteed by theleague. These would fall into three classes:

_(a)_ Judicial; i. E. , the existing Hague organization with any additionsor modifications made by the league. 

_(b)_ International administrative bodies. Such as the suggested transitcommission. To these would be added bodies already formed under existingtreaties (which are very numerous and deal with very importantinterests, e. G. , postal union, international labor office, etc. ). 

_(c)_ International commissions of enquiry: e. G. , commission on industrialconditions (labor legislation), African commission, armamentscommission. 

4. In addition to the above arrangements guaranteed by or arising out ofthe general treaty, there would probably be a periodical congress ofdelegates of the parliaments of the States belonging to the league, as adevelopment out of the existing Interparliamentary Union. A regularstaple of discussion for this body would be afforded by the reports ofthe interstate conference and of the different international bodies. Thecongress would thus cover the ground that is at present occupied by theperiodical Hague Conference and also the ground claimed by the SocialistInternational. 

For the efficient conduct of all these activities it is essential thatthere should be a permanent central meeting-place, where the officialsand officers of the league would enjoy the privileges ofextra-territoriality. Geneva is suggested as the most suitable place. 

II

PREVENTION OF WAR

The covenants for the prevention of war which would be embodied in thegeneral treaty would be as follows:

(1) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to waruntil they had submitted the questions at issue to an internationalconference or an arbitral court, and until the conference or court hadissued a report or handed down an award. 

(2) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to warwith any member of the league complying with the award of a court orwith the report of a conference. For the purpose of this clause, thereport of the conference must be unanimous, excluding the litigants. 

(3) The members of the league would undertake to regard themselves, as_ipso facto_, at war with any one of them acting contrary to the abovecovenants, and to take, jointly and severally, appropriate military, economic and other measure against the recalcitrant State. 

(4) The members of the league would bind themselves to take similaraction, in the sense of the above clause, against any State not being amember of the league which is involved in a dispute with a member ofthe league. 

(This is a stronger provision than that proposed in the PhillimoreReport. )

The above covenants mark an advance upon the practice of internationalrelations previous to the war in two respects: (i) In insuring anecessary period of delay before war can break out (except between twoStates which are neither of them members of the league); (2) In securingpublic discussion and probably a public report upon matters in dispute. 

It should be observed that even in cases where the conference report isnot unanimous, and therefore in no sense binding, a majority report maybe issued and that this would be likely to carry weight with the publicopinion of the States in the league. 

APPENDIX III

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

ARTICLE I

The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of theSignatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also suchof those other States named in the Annex as shall accede withoutreservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by aDeclaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of thecoming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to allother Members of the League. 

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in theAnnex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to bytwo thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effectiveguarantees of its sincere intention to observe its internationalobligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed bythe League in regard to its military, naval and air forces andarmaments. 

Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intentionso to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its internationalobligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have beenfulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. 

ARTICLE 2

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected throughthe instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanentSecretariat. 

ARTICLE 3

The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of theLeague. 

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time asoccasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place asmay be decided upon. 

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphereof action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. 

At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have onevote, and may have not more than three Representatives. 

ARTICLE 4

The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied andAssociated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Membersof the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by theAssembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment ofthe Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected bythe Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greeceshall be members of the Council. 

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may nameadditional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always bemembers of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase thenumber of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly forrepresentation on the Council. 

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and atleast once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place asmay be decided upon. 

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphereof action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. 

Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invitedto send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of theCouncil during the consideration of matters specially affecting theinterests of that Member of the League. 

At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on theCouncil shall have one vote, and may have not more than oneRepresentative. 

ARTICLE 5

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by theterms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly orof the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of theLeague represented at the meeting. 

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particularmatters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may bedecided by a majority of the Members of the League represented atthe meeting. 

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Councilshall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. 

ARTICLE 6

The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of theLeague. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and suchsecretaries and staff as may be required. 

The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex;thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council withthe approval of the majority of the Assembly. 

The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by theSecretary General with the approval of the Council. 

The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of theAssembly and of the Council. 

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of theLeague in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of theInternational Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. 

ARTICLE 7

The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. 

The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall beestablished elsewhere. 

All positions under or in connection with the League, including theSecretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. 

Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the Leaguewhen engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomaticprivileges and immunities. 

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officialsor by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. 

ARTICLE 8

The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peacerequires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest pointconsistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action ofinternational obligations. 

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation andcircumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reductionfor the consideration and action of the several Governments. 

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at leastevery ten years. 

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without theconcurrence of the Council. 

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by privateenterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to graveobjections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant uponsuch manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to thenecessities of those Members of the League which are not able tomanufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary fortheir safety. 

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frankinformation as to the scale of their armaments, their military, navaland air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as areadaptable to warlike purposes. 

ARTICLE 9

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on theexecution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, navaland air questions generally. 

ARTICLE 10

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as againstexternal aggression the territorial integrity and existing politicalindependence of all Members of the League. In case of any suchaggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression theCouncil shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall befulfilled. 

ARTICLE 11

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of theMembers of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern tothe whole League, and the League shall take any action that may bedeemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case anysuch emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the requestof any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. 

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of theLeague to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council anycircumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatensto disturb international peace or the good understanding between nationsupon which peace depends. 

ARTICLE 12

The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between themany dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the mattereither to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in nocase to resort to war until three months after the award by thearbitrators or the report by the Council. 

In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall bemade within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall bemade within six months after the submission of the dispute. 

ARTICLE 13

The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arisebetween them which they recognize to be suitable for submission toarbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration. 

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question ofinternational law, as to the existence of any fact which if establishedwould constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to theextent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, aredeclared to be among those which are generally suitable for submissionto arbitration. 

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration towhich the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the partiesto the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. 

The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full goodfaith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort towar against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In theevent of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shallpropose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. 

ARTICLE 14

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League foradoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court ofInternational Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear anddetermine any dispute of an international character which the partiesthereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion uponany dispute or question referred to it by the Council or bythe Assembly. 

ARTICLE 15

If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likelyto lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration inaccordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that theywill submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute mayeffect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the disputeto the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for afull investigation and consideration thereof. 

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to theSecretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their casewith all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwithdirect the publication thereof. 

The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, andif such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public givingsuch facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms ofsettlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. 

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or bya majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statementof the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemedjust and proper in regard thereto. 

Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public astatement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusionsregarding the same. 

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the membersthereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties tothe dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go towar with any party to the dispute which complies with therecommendations of the report. 

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to bythe members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more ofthe parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve tothemselves the right to take such action as they shall considernecessary for the maintenance of right and justice. 

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and isfound by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by internationallaw is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, theCouncil shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to itssettlement. 

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to theAssembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of eitherparty to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteendays after the submission of the dispute to the Council. 

In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Articleand of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shallapply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a reportmade by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of thoseMembers of the League represented on the Council and of a majority ofthe other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of theRepresentatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same forceas a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof otherthan the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. 

ARTICLE 16

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of itscovenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemedto have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of alltrade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse betweentheir nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, andthe prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercoursebetween the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationalsof any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. 

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to theseveral Governments concerned what effective military, naval or airforce the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armedforces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. 

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutuallysupport one another in the financial and economic measures which aretaken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss andinconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they willmutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed atone of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they willtake the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory tothe forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating toprotect the covenants of the League. 

Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the Leaguemay be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of theCouncil concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members ofthe League represented thereon. 

ARTICLE 17

In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a Statewhich is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members ofthe League, the State or States not Members of the League shall beinvited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for thepurposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deemjust. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemednecessary by the Council. 

Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institutean inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend suchaction as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations ofmembership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shallresort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. 

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept theobligations of membership in the League for the purposes of suchdispute, the Council may take such measures and make suchrecommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in thesettlement of the dispute. 

ARTICLE 18

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by anyMember of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariatand shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty orinternational engagement shall be binding until so registered. 

ARTICLE 19

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Membersof the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and theconsideration of international conditions whose continuance mightendanger the peace of the world. 

ARTICLE 20

The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is acceptedas abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which areinconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that theywill not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with theterms thereof. 

In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of theLeague, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms ofthis Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediatesteps to procure its release from such obligations. 

ARTICLE 21

Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity ofinternational engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regionalunderstandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenanceof peace. 

ARTICLE 22

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late warhave ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerlygoverned them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to standby themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, thereshould be applied the principle that the well-being and development ofsuch peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities forthe performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. 

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that thetutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who byreason of their resources, their experience or their geographicalposition can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing toaccept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them asMandatories on behalf of the League. 

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of thedevelopment of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire havereached a stage of development where their existence as independentnations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering ofadministrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time asthey are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be aprincipal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. 

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stagethat the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of theterritory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscienceand religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order andmorals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the armstraffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishmentof fortifications or military and naval bases and of military trainingof the natives for other than police purposes and the defense ofterritory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade andcommerce of other Members of the League. 

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of theSouth Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of theirpopulation, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres ofcivilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of theMandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under thelaws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject tothe safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenouspopulation. 

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council anannual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. 

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised bythe Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of theLeague, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. 

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine theannual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on allmatters relating to the observance of the mandates. 

ARTICLE 23

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of internationalconventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members ofthe League:

_(a)_ will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditionsof labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries andin all countries to which their commercial and industrial relationsextend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessaryinternational organisations;

_(b)_ undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants ofterritories under their control;

_(c)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision over theexecution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women andchildren, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

_(d)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision of the tradein arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of thistraffic is necessary in the common interest;

_(e)_ will make provision to secure and maintain freedom ofcommunications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerceof all Members of the League. In this connection, the specialnecessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shallbe borne in mind;

_(f)_ will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concernfor the prevention and control of disease. 

ARTICLE 24

There shall be placed under the direction of the League allinternational bureaux already established by general treaties if theparties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and allcommissions for the regulation of matters of international interesthereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. 

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by generalconventions but which are not placed under the control of internationalbureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject tothe consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect anddistribute all relevant information and shall render any otherassistance which may be necessary or desirable. 

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat theexpenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the directionof the League. 

ARTICLE 25

The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote theestablishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national RedCross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, theprevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughoutthe world. 

ARTICLE 26

Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by theMembers of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by amajority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose theAssembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League whichsignifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be aMember of the League. 

APPENDIX IV

THE FOURTEEN POINTS[2]

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and thatprogram, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shallbe no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacyshall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorialwaters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed inwhole or in part by international action for the enforcement ofinternational covenants. 

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and theestablishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nationsconsenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will bereduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of allcolonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that indetermining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of thepopulations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claimsof the government whose title is to be determined. 

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of allquestions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freestcooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her anunhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independentdetermination of her own political development and national policy andassure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations underinstitutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistancealso of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. Thetreatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to comewill be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of herneeds as distinguished from their own interests, and of theirintelligent and unselfish sympathy. 

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated andrestored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoysin common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve asthis will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the lawswhich they have themselves set and determined for the government oftheir relations with one another. Without this healing act the wholestructure and validity of international law is forever impaired. 

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portionsrestored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matterof Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world fornearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once morebe made secure in the interest of all. 

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected alongclearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wishto see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freestopportunity of autonomous development. 

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupiedterritories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea;and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determinedby friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegianceand nationality; and international guarantees of the political andeconomic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkanstates should be entered into. 

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should beassured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are nowunder Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life andan absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and theDardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the shipsand commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should includethe territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, whichshould be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whosepolitical and economic independence and territorial integrity should beguaranteed by international covenant. 

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specificcovenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of politicalindependence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 

APPENDIX V

PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11, 1918

The principles to be applied are these:

_First_, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon theessential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments asare most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

_Second_, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about fromsovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in agame, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance ofpower; but that

_Third_, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be madein the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, andnot as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongstrival states; and

_Fourth_, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accordedthe utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducingnew or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would belikely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently ofthe world. 

APPENDIX VI

THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG

ARTICLE 156

Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title andprivileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue ofthe Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of allother arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. 

All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branchlines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for theexploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, togetherwith all rights and privileges attaching thereto. 

The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and fromTsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and propertiesattaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear ofall charges and encumbrances. 

ARTICLE 157

The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in theterritory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany mightclaim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of theexpenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection withthis territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of allcharges and encumbrances. 

ARTICLE 158

Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the cominginto force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relatingto the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial orother, of the territory of Kiaochow. 

Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of alltreaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title orprivileges referred to in the two preceding Articles. 

[Footnote 1: Reprinted from Senate Doc. No. 106, 66th Congress, 1stSession, p. 1163. ]

[Footnote 2: From the address of President Wilson delivered at a JointSession of Congress on January 8, 1918. ]

INDEX

Abrogation of treaties contrary to the League, in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty, Affirmative guaranty of territory and independence, plan; Wilson adopts, in Fourteen Points; Lansing's opposition; constitutional and political arguments against; Lansing's "self-denying covenant" as substitute; in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty; as continuing balance of power; Wilson adheres to; not in Cecil plan; in Lansing's resolution of principles; other substitute; as reason for rejection of Treaty by Senate; retained in reported Covenant; and dominance of Great Powers. _See also_ Equality of nations; League; Self-denying covenant. 

Albania, disposition. 

Alliances. _See_ French alliance. 

Alsace-Lorraine, to be restored to France. 

Amendment of League, provision for. 

American Bar Association, Lansing's address. 

American Commission, members; ignored in League negotiations; conference of January 10; ignorant of preliminary negotiations; question of resignation over Shantung settlement; shares in Shantung negotiations. _See also_ Bliss; House; Lansing; White; Wilson. 

American Peace Society. 

American programme, lack of definite, as subject of disagreement; Fourteen Points announced; not worked out; insufficiency of Fourteen Points; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; effect of President's attendance at Conference; embarrassment to delegates of lack; _projet_ of treaty prepared for Lansing; President resents it; no system or team-work in American Commission; reason for President's attitude; no instructions during President's absence; results of lack; and Preliminary Treaty; influence of lack on Wilson's leadership; text of Fourteen Points. 

Annunzio, Gabriele d', at Fiume. 

Arabia, disposition. _See also_ Near East. 

Arbitral Tribunal, in Lansing's plan. 

Arbitration, as form of peace promotion; in Lansing's plan; in Wilson's original draft; in Cecil plan; in Treaty. _See also_ Diplomatic adjustment; Judicial settlement. 

Armenia, mandate for; protectorate. _See also_ Near East. 

Armistice, American conference on. 

Article X. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. 

Assembly (Body of Delegates), in Wilson's original draft; analogous body in Cecil plan; in Treaty. 

Auchincloss, Gordon, and drafting of League. 

Austria, Archduchy and union with Germany, outlet to sea. 

Austria-Hungary, dissolution; Fourteen Points on subject people. 

Azerbaidjan, Wilson and. 

Baker, Ray Stannard, and Shantung. 

Balance of power, Clemenceau advocates; Wilson denounces; and Cecil plan; League and. _See also_ Affirmative guaranty; Equality of nations. 

Balfour, Arthur, signs French alliance. 

Balkans, Fourteen Points on. _See also_ states by names. 

Belgium, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, full sovereignty, Bessarabia disposition, Bliss, Tasker H. American delegate, opposes affirmative guaranty, and Covenant as reported, and proposed French alliance, and Shantung, letter to President, _See also_ American Commission; American programme. 

Body of Delegates. _See_ Assembly. 

Boers, and self-determination, Bohemia, disposition, Bolshevism, peace as check to spread, Bosnia, disposition, Boundaries, principles in drawing, Bowman, Isaiah, Commission of Inquiry

Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to be abrogated, Bucharest Treaty, to be abrogated, Buffer state on the Rhine, Bulgaria, boundaries, Bullitt, William C. , on revision of Covenant, testimony on Lansing interview, Lansing's telegram to President on testimony, no reply received, and Wilson's western speeches, Canada, Papineau Rebellion and self-determination, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Cecil, Lord Robert, plan for League, Wilson opposes it, text of plan, Central Powers, Wilson and need of defeat, hope in Wilson's attitude, peace or Bolshevism, _See also_ Mandates, and states by name. 

China. _See_ Shantung. 

Chinda, Viscount, and Shantung, Civil War, and self-determination, Clemenceau, Georges, Supreme War Council, advocates balance of power, and Cecil plan, and Franco-American alliance, _See also_ Council of Four. 

Codification of international law, in Lansing's plan, Colonies, disposition of, in Lansing's plan, Fourteen Points on, _See also_ Mandates. 

Commerce. _See_ Non-intercourse; Open Door. 

Commission of Inquiry, work, Commission on the League of Nations, appointed, and Wilson's return to United States, meets, Wilson's draft as groundwork, meetings and report, Wilson's address, character of report and work, secrecy, Wilson's domination, Constantinople, disposition, Constitutional objections, to affirmative guaranty, and to Cecil plan, Council of Foreign Ministers, established, nickname, Council of Four, self-constituted, secrecy, "Olympians, " gives only digest of Treaty to other delegates, Shantung bargain, _See also_ Secret diplomacy. 

Council of Ten, and Lansing's substitute resolution on League, during Wilson's absence, self-constituted organization, and Supreme War Council, divided, and secrecy, Council of the Heads of States. _See_ Council of Four. 

Council (Executive Council) of the League, in Wilson's original draft, analogous body in Cecil plan, in Treaty, Covenant. _See_ League of Nations. 

Croatia, disposition, Czecho-Slovakia, erection, Dalmatia, in Pact of London, Danzig, for Poland, Dardanelles, Fourteen Points on, Declaration of war, affirmative guaranty and power over, Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Heligoland, Diplomacy. _See_ Secret diplomacy. 

Diplomatic adjustment, as basis of Covenant, exalted, Lansing on judicial settlement and, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, _See also_ Judicial settlement. 

Disarmament, not touched in Lansing's plan; in Lansing's resolution of principles; in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty. 

Dobrudja, disposition. 

East Indians, and self-determination. 

Economic influence on boundary lines. 

Economic interdependence, importance in peace negotiations. 

Economic pressure. _See_ Non-intercourse. 

Egypt, and self-determination; disposition. 

Election of 1918, as rebuke to Wilson. 

Entangling alliances. _See_ Isolation. 

Equality of nations, sacrifice in Wilson's draft of League; in Lansing's form for League; ignored in Cecil plan; primacy of Great Powers retained in reported Covenant; violation by Treaty; and secret diplomacy at Conference. 

Esthonia, Wilson and; autonomy. 

Ethnic influence on boundary lines. _See also_ Racial minorities; Self-determination. 

Finland, question of independence. 

Fiume affair, Lansing's attitude; Pact of London in light of dissolution of Austria-Hungary; resulting increase in Italian claims as basis for compromise; attitude of Italy toward Jugo-Slavia; commercial importance of Fiume to Jugo-Slavia; campaign of Italian delegates for Fiume; Italian public sentiment; character of population, self-determination question; efforts to get Wilson's approval; threat to retire from Conference; Wilson's statement against Italian claim; withdrawal of delegation; Italian resentment against Wilson; as lesson on secret diplomacy; delegation returns; and Shantung. 

Fourteen Points, announced; affirmative guaranty in; insufficient as programme; text. 

France, Alsace-Lorraine; restoration. _See also_ Clemenceau; French alliance; Great Powers. 

Freedom of the seas, in Fourteen Points. 

French alliance, as subject of disagreement; provisions of treaty; relation to League; and removal of certain French demands from Treaty of Peace; and French adherence to League; Lansing's opposition; drafted, signed; Lansing and signing; arguments for. 

Geographic influence on boundary lines. 

Georgia, Wilson and. 

Germany, buffer state on the Rhine; and Russian route to the East; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; military impotence. _See also_ Central Powers; French alliance; Mandates. 

Ginn Peace Foundation. 

Great Britain, and clause on self-determination; Egypt. _See also_ French alliance; Great Powers; Lloyd George. 

Great Powers, and mandates. _See also_ Balance of power; Council of Four; Equality of nations. 

Greece, territory. 

Gregory, Thomas W. , and Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea. 

Guaranty. _See_ Affirmative; Self-denying. 

Hague Conventions, and international peace. 

Hague Tribunal, and Lansing's plan; Wilson's contempt; recognition in Cecil plan. 

Hands Off, as basis of Lansing's plan. 

Health, promotion in Treaty. 

Heligoland, dismantlement, disposition. 

Herzegovina, disposition. 

Historic influence on boundary lines. 

Hostilities. _See_ Prevention of war. 

House, Edward M. , joins Supreme War Council; conference on armistice terms; selection as peace negotiator and President as delegate, Commission of Inquiry, and drafting of League, and international court, and "self-denying covenant, " and balance of power, of Commission on the League of Nations, and mandates, and data, ignorant of Wilson's programme, and Preliminary Treaty with detailed Covenant, and private consultations, _See also_ American Commission. 

Hungary, separation from Austria. 

Immoral traffic, prevention in Treaty, Immunities of League representatives, Indemnities, and mandates, India, German routes to, International commissions, in Cecil plan, in Treaty, International court. _See_ Judicial settlement. 

International enforcement. _See_ Affirmative guaranty. 

International military force, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, International military staff, proposal, Interparliamentary Congress, in Cecil plan, Inviolability of League property, Irish, and self-determination, Isolation, policy, and affirmative guaranty, and mandates, and French alliance, Italy, and Cecil plan, territory, _See also_ Fiume; Great Powers. 

Japan, and Cecil plan, in Council of Ten, _See also_ Great Powers; Shantung. 

Judicial settlement of international disputes, Lansing's plan, subordinated in Wilson's draft, Lansing on diplomatic adjustment and, Lansing urges as nucleus of League, in Lansing's resolution of principles, Lansing's appeal for, in Covenant, arbitrators of litigant nations, difficulties in procedure, cost, elimination from Covenant of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected, Lansing's appeal ignored, in Cecil plan, _See also_ Arbitration; Diplomatic adjustment. 

Jugo-Slavia, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, port, erected, _See also_ Fiume. 

Kato, Baron, and Shantung, Kiao-Chau. _See_ Shantung. 

Kiel Canal, internationalization, Koo, V. K. Wellington, argument on Shantung, Labor article, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, Lansing, Robert, resignation asked and given, divergence of judgment from President, reasons for retaining office, reasons for narrative, imputation of faithlessness, personal narrative, subjects of disagreement, attitude toward duty as negotiator, policy as to advice to President, President's attitude towards opinions, method of treatment of subject, conference on armistice terms, selected as a negotiator, opposition to President being a delegate, President's attitude toward this opposition, and Commission of Inquiry, arrival in Paris, and balance of power, and paramount need of speedy peace, opposition to mandates, opposition to French alliance treaty, signs it, personal relations with President, memorandum on American programme (1918), has _projet_ of treaty prepared, Wilson resents it, on lack of organization in American Commission, and lack of programme, and American Commission during President's absence, on Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea, opposition to secret diplomacy, effect on Wilson, and Fiume, and Shantung, Bullitt affair, views on Treaty when presented to Germans, and ratification of Treaty _See also_ American Commission; League; Wilson. 

Latvia Wilson and autonomy

League of Nations principles as subject of disagreement as object of peace negotiations as reason for President's participation in Conference Wilson's belief in necessity American support of idea, earlier plans and associations divergence of opinion on form political and juridical forms of organization Wilson's belief in international force and affirmative guaranty affirmative guaranty in Fourteen Points Phillimore's report preparation of Wilson's original draft, House as author Lansing not consulted, reason Lansing's opposition to affirmative guaranty Lansing and non-intercourse peace plan draft impracticable and equality of nations Lansing's "self-denying covenant" Lansing accepts guaranty as matter of expediency diplomatic adjustment as basis of Wilson's draft guaranty in first draft, later draft, and Treaty Lansing's substitute, his communications not acknowledged, incorporation of detailed Covenant in Treaty irreconcilable differences between Wilson's and Lansing's plans Lansing on diplomatic adjustment versus judicial settlement Lansing urges international court as nucleus three doctrines of Lansing's plan Lansing's first view of Wilson's draft his opinion of its form of its principles Wilson considers affirmative guaranty essential, effect on Treaty American Commission ignored on matters concerning Cecil plan Wilson's opposition to it question of self-determination Lansing's proposed resolution of principles in Treaty and later detailing detailed Covenant or speedy peace Wilson utilizes desire for peace to force acceptance of League Lansing proposes resolution to Wilson and to Council of Ten drafted resolution of principles Commission on the League of Nations appointed, American members resolution and Wilson's return to United States Wilson's draft before Commission Wilson pigeonholes resolution revision of Wilson's draft Lansing's appeal for international court it is ignored elimination of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected report of Commission, Wilson's address character of report and work of Commission, main principles unaltered Wilson and American opposition (Feb. ) American Commission and report amendments to placate American opinion reaction in Europe due to American opposition change in character and addition of functions to preserve it summary of Lansing's objections and French alliance in a preliminary treaty as a _modus vivendi_ as subject of Wilson's private consultations secrecy in negotiations and Shantung bargain Bullitt's report of Lansing's attitude and carrying out of the Treaty as merely a name for the Quintuple Alliance text of Wilson's original draft of Cecil plan in Treaty _See also_ Mandates. 

League to Enforce Peace Wilson's address

Lithuania Wilson and autonomy

Lloyd George, David, Supreme War Council, 14 and French alliance _See also_ Council of Four. 

Log-rolling at Conference

London, Pact of

Makino, Baron and Shantung

Mandates, in Smuts plan, Wilson adopts it Lansing's criticism retained in reported Covenant political difficulties Wilson's attitude legal difficulties usefulness questioned as means of justifying the League and indemnities altruistic, to be share of United States in Wilson's original draft in Treaty. 

Meeting-place of League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty. 

Membership in League in Wilson's original draft in Treaty withdrawal. 

Mezes, Sidney E. , Commission of Inquiry and data. 

Miller, David Hunter and drafting of Covenant and _projet_ of a treaty. 

_Modus vivendi_, Wilson and a preliminary treaty as

Monroe Doctrine and affirmative covenant preservation in Treaty

Montenegro in Jugo-Slavia Fourteen Points on

Moravia, disposition

Munitions regulation of manufacture and trade in Wilson's original draft in Treaty

National safety, dominance of principle

Near East United States and mandates Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements mandates in Wilson's original draft mandates in Treaty Fourteen points on

Negative guaranty. _See_ Self-denying covenant. 

Non-intercourse as form of peace promotion constitutionality in Wilson's original draft in Treaty

Norway, Spitzbergen

Open Door in Lansing's plan in Near East in former German colonies principle in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty in Fourteen Points

Outlet to the sea for each nation

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele

Palestine autonomy _See also_ Near East. 

Pan-America, proposed mutual guaranty treaty

Papineau Rebellion, and self-determination

Peace, Treaty of inclusion of detailed Covenant as subject of disagreement expected preliminary treaty speedy restoration of peace versus detailed Covenant Wilson employs desire for, to force acceptance of League, resulting delay, delay, delay on League causes definitive rather than preliminary treaty subjects for a preliminary treaty influence of lack of American programme Wilson's decision for a definitive treaty Lansing's views of finished treaty British opinion protests of experts and officials of American Commission Lansing and ratification _See also_ League. 

Persia, disposition

Phillimore, Lord, report on League of Nations

Poland and Anglo-Franco-American alliance independence Danzig

Postponement of hostilities as form of peace promotion in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty

President as delegate as subject of disagreement Lansing's opposition origin of Wilson's intention influence of belligerency on plan influence of presence on domination of situation personal reasons for attending decision to go to Paris decision to be a delegate attitude of House League as reason for decision

Prevention of war in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty _Sec also_ Arbitration; League. 

Publication of treaties in Lansing's plan in Treaty

Publicity as basis of Lansing's plan _See also_ Secret diplomacy. 

Quintuple Alliance, League of Nations as name for

Racial equality issue in Shantung bargain

Racial minorities protection, in Wilson's original draft

Ratification of Treaty Lansing's attitude

Red Cross promotion in Treaty

Rhenish Republic as buffer state

Roumania Bucharest Treaty to be abrogated territory Fourteen Points on

Russia Wilson's policy and route for Germany to the East Lansing's notes on territorial settlement Fourteen Points on

Ruthenians and Ukraine

Schleswig-Holstein disposition

Scott, James Brown drafts French alliance treaty and _projet_ of a treaty

Secret diplomacy as subject of disagreement in negotiation of League as evil at Conference Lansing's opposition, its effect on Wilson Wilson's consultations and Wilson's "open diplomacy" in Council of Four public resentment Fiume affair as lesson on perfunctory open plenary sessions of Conference Council of Ten effect on Wilson's prestige responsibility effect on delegates of smaller nations climax, text of Treaty withheld from delegates psychological effect great opportunity for reform missed and Shantung Fourteen Points on _See also_ Publicity

Secretariat of the League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty

"Self-denying covenant" for guaranty of territory and independence Lansing's advocacy House and Wilson rejects suggested by others to Wilson

Self-determination in Wilson's draft of Covenant why omitted from treaty in theory and in practice Wilson abandons violation in the treaties and Civil War and Fiume colonial, in Fourteen Points Wilson's statement (Feb. 1918)

Senate of United States and affirmative guaranty opposition and Wilson's threat plan to check opposition by a _modus vivendi_

Separation of powers Wilson's attitude

Serbia Jugo-Slavia territory Fourteen Points on

Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes _See_ Jugoslavia

Shantung Settlement as subject of disagreement and secret diplomacy bargain injustice, blackmail influence of Japanese bluff not to agree to the League German control Japanese occupation moral effect Chinese agreement to Japanese demands, resulting legal and moral status status after China's declaration of war on Germany attitude of Allied delegates attitude of American Commission, letter to Wilson argument before Council of Ten Japanese threat to American Commission before Council of Four value of Japanese promises questioned and Fiume question of resignation of American Commission over China refuses to sign Treaty Wilson permits American Commission to share in negotiations American public opinion text of Treaty articles on

Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia

Slavonia disposition

Slovakia disposition

Small nations _See_ Equality. 

Smuts, General and disarmament plan for mandates

Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes

Sonnino, Baron Sidney _See_ Fiume

Sovereignty question in system of mandates

Spitzbergen disposition

Strategic influence on boundary lines

Straus, Oscar S. Favors League as reported

Supreme War Council, American members added, 14; and Cecil plan; and Council of Ten. 

Syria, protectorate. _See also_ Near East. 

Taft, William H. , supports League as reported. 

Transylvania, disposition, Treaty of Peace. _See_ Peace. 

Treaty-making power, President's responsibility, duties of negotiators, and affirmative guaranty, Trieste, disposition; importance, Turkey, dismemberment and mandates, _See also_ Near East. 

Ukraine, Wilson and; autonomy, and Ruthenians. 

Unanimity, requirement in League. 

Violation of the League, action concerning, in Wilson's original draft, in Cecil plan; in Treaty, War. _See_ Arbitration; League of Nations; Prevention. 

White, Henry, arrival in Paris; opposes affirmative guaranty; and Covenant as reported and later amendments; and proposed French alliance; and Shantung question. _See also_ American programme; American Commission. 

Wickersham, George W. , supports League as reported. 

Williams, E. T. , and Shantung question, Wilson, Woodrow, responsibility for foreign relations; duties of negotiators to, and opposition, presumption of self-assurance, conference on armistice terms; disregard of precedent; and need of defeat of enemy; and Commission of Inquiry; open-mindedness; and advice on personal conduct; positiveness and indecision; and election of 1918; prejudice against legal attitude; prefers written advice, arrives in Paris, reception abroad, on equality of nations, and separation of powers, denounces balance of power, and self-determination, conference of Jan. 10, contempt for Hague Tribunal, fidelity to convictions, return to United States, return to Paris, and mandates, and French alliance, and open rupture with Lansing, and team-work, decides for a definitive treaty only, rigidity of mind, secretive nature, and Fiume, Italian resentment and Shantung, and Bullitt affair, Treaty as abandonment of his principles, Fourteen Points, principles of peace (Feb. 1918), _See also_ American programme; Commission on the League; Council of Four; Lansing; League; Peace; President as delegate; Secret diplomacy. 

Withdrawal from League, provision in Treaty, through failure to approve amendments. 

World Peace Foundation, Zionism, and self-determination, Zone system in mutual guaranty plan,