PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT, Part 3. 

by U. S. Grant

CHAPTER XXVII. 

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURNTO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCEUPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT. 

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove myheadquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked, between the fall ofDonelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty underHalleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation ofthe town. I then obtained permission to leave the department, butGeneral Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urgedme so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain. Myapplication to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point withmy staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. There wasa detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles westto be stationed as a guard to the railroad. I went under cover of thisescort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to LaGrange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me. 

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There wereno troops stationed between these two points, except a small forceguarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange. General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had hisheadquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious countryhouse. The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, heinvited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him. I accepted theinvitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was athorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with arecital of the services he was rendering the cause. He was too old tobe in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but hismeans enabled him to be useful in other ways. In ordinary times thehomestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supplythe slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi. Nowhe raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have thatyear a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men whohad gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the"patriotism" of those better off. The crops around me looked fine, andI had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to begathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvestthem for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of therebellion instead of its support. I felt, however, the greatest respectfor the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughlybelieved in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible toconceive. 

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was verywarm, even for that latitude and season. With my staff and small escortI started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twentymiles of Memphis. At this point I saw a very comfortable-lookingwhite-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a littledistance from the road. I let my staff and escort ride ahead while Ihalted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. I was invited atonce to dismount and come in. I found my host very genial andcommunicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady ofthe house announced dinner and asked me to join them. The host, however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. 

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up fromthe southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis. A mile west ofthis junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shadeof forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet backfrom the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of theroad. I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of theafternoon, and then rode into Memphis. 

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was aMr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union. He had not pressed me to tarrylonger with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr. Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch asif something had hit him. Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel GeneralJackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. Hisneighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche inthat of the Union. The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknownto Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it andwould give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasantto him after the call of Dr. Smith. 

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guardingworkmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis. On the day Ientered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which hadbeen sent east for the troops so engaged. The drovers were not enlistedmen and he released them. A day or two after one of these drovers cameto my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, saidJackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that hewas six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad whenhe learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and hadridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with thatfrom La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passedthree-quarters of an hour before. He thought it would be useless topursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me withmy party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even armsin our hands with which to defend ourselves. 

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at notcapturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among thesoldiers the facts related were learned. A day or two later Mr. DeLoche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivilityin not insisting on my staying for dinner. He said that his wifeaccused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of hisneighbor, he had felt restless until I got away. I never met GeneralJackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at hisvery comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado. I remindedhim of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that hewas thankful now he had not captured me. I certainly was very thankfultoo. 

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long. The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel tome. Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where thecitizens were at home in any great numbers. Dover was within thefortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, everycitizen was gone. There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, andbut very few at Corinth. Memphis, however, was a populous city, andthere were many of the citizens remaining there who were not onlythoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thoughtthat even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if theycould only be induced to make an honest confession. It took hours of mytime every day to listen to complaints and requests. The latter weregenerally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaintswere not always, or even often, well founded. Two instances will markthe general character. First: the officer who commanded at Memphisimmediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troopshad ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to thesoldiers. Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. Second:at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a lawconfiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including thedebts of Southerners to Northern men. In consequence of this law, whenMemphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all theevidences he could obtain of such debts. 

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. Thegentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own highstanding as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian. He was a deacon in thechurch which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and bya Union chaplain filling the pulpit. He did not use the word "defile, "but he expressed the idea very clearly. He asked that the church berestored to the former congregation. I told him that no order had beenissued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. He said ofcourse the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differedso radically with them on questions of government. I told him thetroops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and thatthey would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimedfrom the pulpit. This closed the argument on the first point. 

Then came the second. The complainant said that he wanted the papersrestored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal underprotest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number oflarge business houses at the North; that "his government" hadconfiscated all debts due "alien enemies, " and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the"government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had beenpermitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officialsknowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollarreceived. He said that his "government, " when it came in possession ofall its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claimshe had surrendered to the provost-marshal. His impudence was so sublimethat I was rather amused than indignant. I told him, however, that ifhe would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate governmentwould ever molest him. He left, no doubt, as much amazed at myassurance as I was at the brazenness of his request. 

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic ordersappointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters inWashington. His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field ofduty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety andinterests of his previous command. I was next in rank, and hetelegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters atCorinth. I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had beenordered to a different field and did not know whether to move myheadquarters or not. I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staffwith me, and received word in reply: "This place will be yourheadquarters. You can judge for yourself. " I left Memphis for my newfield without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month. General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was veryuncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been calledto Corinth for. 

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief Iremained in command of the district of West Tennessee. Practically Ibecame a department commander, because no one was assigned to thatposition over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the25th of October. General Halleck while commanding the Department of theMississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooganorth. My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west ofthe Cumberland River. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, aspreviously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, withinstructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as headvanced. Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of theMobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus. Othertroops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to GrandJunction, and still others on the road west to Memphis. 

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120, 000 men which enteredCorinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was putentirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile tothe Union. One of the first things I had to do was to constructfortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could bespared to man them. The structures that had been built during themonths of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of theengineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in designbut suited to the command available to defend them. 

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with thesituation as rapidly as possible. The forces at Donelson, Clarksvilleand Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, Iregarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth, to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Bolivar. Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphisrailroad were abandoned. 

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five toforty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri. Thismovable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar orMemphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be toweaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force presentcould guard. The most anxious period of the war, to me, was during thetime the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired bythe fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was sufficiently reinforcedto take the offensive. The enemy also had cavalry operating in ourrear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back toColumbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all oursupplies. Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points ofthe command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus. Withthese points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus, thendown the river by boat. To reinforce Memphis would take three or fourdays, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would havetaken at least two days. Memphis therefore was practically isolatedfrom the balance of the command. But it was in Sherman's hands. Thentoo the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuableauxiliary. 

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there wasmuch fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but theseencounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to benow almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. Some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican warwhich attracted so much of the attention of the public when theyoccurred. About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to bereinforced from Jackson and Corinth. On the 27th there was skirmishingon the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learnedfrom Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Braggin person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by wayof Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to joinhim at Rome. Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, witha large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost. I proposed tothe general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informedthat, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troopsWAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell. 

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanoogaacross country, while his troops were transported over a longround-about road to the same destination, without need of guards exceptwhen in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troopsenjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. Buellwas marching through a hostile region and had to have his communicationsthoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. More men were requiredthe farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country. I, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purelyon the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force farinferior to my own. 

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon thecountry, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so faras practicable. I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lineswithout gloves, " to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes andfrom our lines. I do not recollect having arrested and confined acitizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. I am aware that agreat many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet, Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was myorder. I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who wassaid to be confined by my order. There were many citizens at home whodeserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity wasafforded to inflict an injury to the National cause. This class was notof the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that afew guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones shouldsuffer. 

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell. They were sent the same day by way of Decatur. On the 22d ColonelRodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment. 

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments offthe field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh. He was bynature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at hisaction when the battle was over. He came to me with tears in his eyesand begged to be allowed to have another trial. I felt great sympathyfor him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville andDonelson. He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubtbecause he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, hisconstitutional weakness overcame him. He inquired the number of men theenemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than hisown he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and havingsatisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrenderedand informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to dothe same. The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved uponDonelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meetthem and drove them away. 

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was thefact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible fromthe South and directed me to give every facility toward that end. Payin gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on therailroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would bereceived. This opened to the enemy not only the means of convertingcotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which theyso much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate andintelligent information in regard to our position and strength. It wasalso demoralizing to the troops. Citizens obtaining permits from thetreasury department had to be protected within our lines and givenfacilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not liketo be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of anenemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who sharednone of their dangers. 

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20thand 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to beabout 4, 000 strong. The enemy was driven away with a loss of more thanone hundred men. On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon wasattacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on thefield dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteenwounded. On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy instrong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with greatloss. Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of thebattlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. Our loss, asreported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. On the 2d ofSeptember I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell. Jacksonand Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements. On the4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also toLouisville, Kentucky. 

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march uponChattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent onedivision from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place. This gaveBuell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repairthe railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteendays at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by theNational forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. Theroad between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put inrepair by other troops, so that communication with the North would havebeen opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by theNational troops. If Buell had been permitted to move in the firstinstance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of theArmy of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrownfour divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair andguard it. 

Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September. I was atthe station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and foundGeneral P. H. Sheridan with them. I expressed surprise at seeing himand said that I had not expected him to go. He showed decideddisappointment at the prospect of being detained. I felt a littlenettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. 

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had servedeleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast whenthe war broke out. He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, andbefore the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, toget East. He went to Missouri. Halleck had known him as a verysuccessful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians onthe Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-westMissouri. There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward whileSheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with hisimmediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing theuse of public transportation for private purposes. He asked to berelieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged andhis request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April, 1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. During the advance onCorinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry. Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him tosuggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying hewould appoint a good man without reference to his State. Sheridan wasnamed; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reachedhe was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of theMississippi. He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July withtwo small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three timesas numerous as his own. By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness ofattack he completely routed the enemy. For this he was made abrigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army aboutCorinth. On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me. Hisdeparture was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished servicesin his new field. 

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and onthe night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up worksaround the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came fromthe front. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA. 

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of theMississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville. Therewere at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. This force constituted my left wing, ofwhich Rosecrans was in command. General Ord commanded the centre, fromBethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson toBolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River. General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of hisbrigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River bythe Memphis and Ohio railroad. This made the most convenientarrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces uponany threatened point. All the troops of the command were withintelegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman. Bybringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point therewas a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be hadwith that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangementall the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by railby the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troopsfrom Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place. 

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price, apparently upon Corinth. One division was brought from Memphis toBolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of theenemy. I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding theterritory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcingof Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Already the Army of Northern Virginia haddefeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland. In theCentre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marchingparallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River. 

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this timemy entire force numbered less than 50, 000 men, of all arms. Thisincluded everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction. If I tooshould be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing thebelligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line wasalready farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening ofthe war. It is true Nashville was never given up after its firstcapture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there wouldhave been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in WestTennessee had been compelled to fall back. To say at the end of thesecond year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East waspushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the Westbeyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would havebeen discouraging indeed. As it was, many loyal people despaired in thefall of 1862 of ever saving the Union. The administration at Washingtonwas much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But Ibelieve there was never a day when the President did not think that, insome way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. 

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroadeast of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in. By the 12th all werein except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin. Hehad been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yetbeen brought in to Corinth. 

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a townabout twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charlestonrailroad. Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place. Hemade no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troopsinto Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained tobe. The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief ofthe army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in Eastand Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their accountas for any danger threatening my command. I had not force enough atCorinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there wasdanger that before troops could be got from other points he might be faron his way across the Tennessee. To prevent this all spare forces atBolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentratedat Jackson for their transportation. Within twenty-four hours from thetransmission of the order the troops were at their destination, althoughthere had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward traingetting off the track and stopping all the others. This gave areinforcement of near 8, 000 men, General Ord in command. GeneralRosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force ofabout 9, 000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be leftbehind. It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' marchsouth of us, with a large force. It might have been part of his plan toattack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from thesouth. My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reachCorinth or go to his relief. 

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where hiscommand was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroadeastward. While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing allthe roads and streams in the surrounding country. He was alsopersonally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to himin my plans for the approach. We had cars enough to transport all ofGeneral Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point onthe road about seven miles west of Iuka. From there his troops were tomarch by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from thenorth-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position southof Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A small force was to hold theJacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main forcemoved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east. This planwas suggested by Rosecrans. 

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidableobstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all ofwhich, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. TheTennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidableobstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. Ord was on thenorth-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in thatdirection it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would havecarried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated itfrom all support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iukauntil we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. 

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail toBurnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part ofthe programme. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during theday and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the nextmorning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the tworoads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarterssimultaneously. Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detainany cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash intoCorinth until I could be notified. There was a telegraph wire along therailroad, so there would be no delay in communication. I detained carsand locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord'scommand at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead ofIuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7, 000 or8, 000 before he could have arrived. I remained at Burnsville with adetachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with mytwo wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon afterleaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove therebels back with considerable loss, including one general officerkilled. He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylightthe next morning. I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatchfrom Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear ofhis column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that hewould still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believethis possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles arenot in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. Itmight do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to makean assault. I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch andordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the soundof guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed to notify hisofficers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound eithertowards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained. 

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with thehead of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iukaleaves the road going east. He here turned north without sending anytroops to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacintoroad he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten anddriven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss wasconsiderable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmitsounds towards either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor any one in eithercommand heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. After theengagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. This wasbrought by a courier. There was no road between Burnsville and theposition then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for aman on horseback. The courier bearing the message was compelled to movewest nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville. This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battlethat had taken place during the afternoon. I at once notified Ord ofthe fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The nextmorning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with butlittle resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, withouthearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops comingfrom the south-west must be up by that time. Rosecrans, however, hadput no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage ofthis neglect and retreated by that road during the night. Word was soonbrought to me that our troops were in Iuka. I immediately rode intotown and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on withhim a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I lefthim and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had sohigh an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time. 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OFTHE TENNESSEE. 

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east toreinforce Buell. This threw the army at my command still more on thedefensive. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except atCorinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction. Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivarbecame our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad. Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions weresent out to watch the movements of the enemy. We were in a countrywhere nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us andfriendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and thenoften returned without it. 

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of GrandJunction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry andartillery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person tosuperintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might bemade upon. The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel thethreatened movement without a battle. Our cavalry followed the enemysouth of Davis' mills in Mississippi. 

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strikethe Mississippi River above Memphis. At the same time other pointswithin my command were so threatened that it was impossible toconcentrate a force to drive him away. There was at this juncture alarge Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within mycommand, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break upthe Mississippi Central railroad far to the south. This would not onlyhave called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of alarge rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raidson the enemy's line of supplies. Geographical lines between thecommands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they weretoo rigidly adhered to. 

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as hadapparently been his intention. He was simply covering a deeper design;one much more important to his cause. By the 1st of October it wasfully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force anddetermination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust hadjoined their strength for this purpose. There was some skirmishingoutside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebelsmassed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and theMobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinthand all possible reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must come by acircuitous route. 

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, whowas at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements pickedup along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut had beenordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dornwas coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in withthe advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening ofthe 3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, tocapture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. In that casethe enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and heldat bay all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could have takenthe offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times theirnumber and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinthto hold them. He came near success, some of his troops penetrating theNational lines at least once, but the works that were built afterHalleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until thetroops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel frontand rear. The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: alltheir charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. The loss onour side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's. McPhersoncame up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemyas was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support ofRosecrans just after the repulse. His approach, as well as that ofHurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. GeneralRosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I hadgiven specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue themoment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated theorder after the battle. In the first order he was notified that theforce of 4, 000 men which was going to his assistance would be in greatperil if the enemy was not pursued. 

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took commandof his troops. This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreatingcolumn just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten milesout from Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for theoperations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ordattacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in apanic. Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed offthe bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and met the mainforce. He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridgeand compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higherup the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement and the commanddevolved on Hurlbut. 

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and thentook the wrong road. Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with awagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. His march wastherefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards hissupplies. Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, withoutanything except what the men carried on their persons, would have beenworth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possiblybeen. Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route takenby the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a streamin front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leadingnorth and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched asfar as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far frombattle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any suchforce as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and hemight have been in great peril. 

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return. He kept onto Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. Ithereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to thegeneral-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back. Hadhe gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn hadat Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and theprobabilities are he would have lost his army. 

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1, 812wounded and 232 missing. The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported1, 423 dead and 2, 225 prisoners. We fought behind breastworks, whichaccounts in some degree for the disparity. Among the killed on our sidewas General Hackelman. General Oglesby was badly, it was for some timesupposed mortally, wounded. I received a congratulatory letter from thePresident, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. 

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though notso complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now thinkwas within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth. Sincethe war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow tothe enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at theNorth. The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safetyof the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receivingreinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movementagainst Vicksburg. 

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton's being in command at HollySprings and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama andTexas. The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with mycommand, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the armyin Middle Tennessee. I was delighted at the promotion of GeneralRosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that whenindependent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at thattime, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. As asubordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and haddetermined to relieve him from duty that very day. 

At the close of the operations just described my force, in roundnumbers, was 48, 500. Of these 4, 800 were in Kentucky and Illinois, 7, 000 in Memphis, 19, 200 from Mound City south, and 17, 500 at Corinth. General McClernand had been authorized from Washington to go north andorganize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi. These new levieswith other reinforcements now began to come in. 

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department of theTennessee. Reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative. This was a greatrelief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a largedistrict of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy readyto give information of our every move. I have described veryimperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place duringthis time. To describe all would take more space than I can allot tothe purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops whodistinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9)

CHAPTER XXX. 

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OFHOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS DOWN THEMISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE ANDFOOD. 

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first highground coming close to the river below Memphis. From there a railroadruns east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of theSouthern States. A railroad also starts from the opposite side of theriver, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louisiana. Vicksburg wasthe only channel, at the time of the events of which this chaptertreats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by theMississippi. So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigationof the river was prevented. Hence its importance. Points on the riverbetween Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but theirfall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. 

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November asindicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words:"I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisionsfrom Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee]to-morrow, and take command in person. If found practicable, I will goto Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad andtelegraph as I go. "

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad fromabout twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky;the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with theMobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to BearCreek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis. My entirecommand was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardlythat if kept on the defensive. By moving against the enemy and into hisunsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large forcefor field operations. My moving force at that time was about 30, 000men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at aboutthe same number. General McPherson commanded my left wing and GeneralC. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the rightwing. Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied HollySprings and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad. On the8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerableforce seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. Theroad from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as thetroops advanced. 

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that largebodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they alwayscovered and guarded in all forward movements. There was delay thereforein repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies tothe front. 

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions fromWashington, all the forage within reach was collected under thesupervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under thechief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to takethem; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as governmentstores. The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of thepossibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from thecountry itself. 

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "Freedman'sBureau" took its origin. Orders of the government prohibited theexpulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they camein voluntarily. Humanity forbade allowing them to starve. With such anarmy of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about GrandJunction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. There was no special authority for feeding them unless they wereemployed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but onlyable-bodied young men were suitable for such work. This labor wouldsupport but a very limited percentage of them. The plantations were alldeserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children aboveten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. To do thiswork with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under acompetent chief was necessary. On inquiring for such a man ChaplainEaton, now and for many years the very able United States Commissionerof Education, was suggested. He proved as efficient in that field as hehas since done in his present one. I gave him all the assistants andguards he called for. We together fixed the prices to be paid for thenegro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. Thecotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers toreceive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half centsper pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shippingthe cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. Citizensremaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of havingtheir crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. 

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining. The money was not paid tothem directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. Theygave me no trouble afterwards. 

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the MississippiRiver to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. A goodprice was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of governmentsteamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply withfuel). Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. Inthis way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they hadnever known before. 

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very muchdisturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to have aseparate and independent command within mine, to operate againstVicksburg by way of the Mississippi River. Two commanders on the samefield are always one too many, and in this case I did not think thegeneral selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fithim for so important a position. I feared for the safety of the troopsintrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. But on the 12th I received a dispatchfrom General Halleck saying that I had command of all the troops sent tomy department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased. The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs, and the enemy fell backsouth of the Tallahatchie. 

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, exceptthe few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction. This was along line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in anenemy's country. On the 15th of November, while I was still at HollySprings, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus. We were butforty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet wasfor me to take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the sameplace. At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I gavehim his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down theMississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman, who was alwaysprompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only fourregiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a smalldetachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their wayfrom the north to Memphis. About this time General Halleck orderedtroops from Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was notunder my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear. Theexpedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and wassuccessful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damagedone was very slight and was soon repaired. 

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroadbridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. Acrossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. I sentthe cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. Thiscaused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possiblyaccelerated by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn. The enemy wasfollowed as far south as Oxford by the main body of troops, and someseventeen miles farther by McPherson's command. Here the pursuit washalted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in orderto bring up supplies. The piles on which the railroad bridge rested hadbeen left standing. The work of constructing a roadway for the troopswas but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. 

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that anexpedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to havea competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th ofDecember back to Memphis to take charge. The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee. OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862. 

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. Onyour arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of theMississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in yourown army. As soon as possible move with them down the river to thevicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleetunder command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of thatplace in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, maydictate. 

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc. , necessary totake, will be left entirely with yourself. The Quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30, 000 men;should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will beauthorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may comeinto the port of Memphis. 

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with AdmiralPorter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. 

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you willembark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forceshere in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movementsof the enemy may make necessary. 

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, andwhatever cavalry may be there. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d ofDecember I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy southof the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg. On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helenatroops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them andthe Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thussecure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same day, the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the countrysouth of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25, 000 troops at Memphis bythe 20th for the Vicksburg expedition. I sent Sherman with twodivisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and askedwhether I should command the expedition down the river myself or sendSherman. I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishmentof the great object in view. I sent Sherman and so informed GeneralHalleck. 

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desireto get him in command of the forces separated from my directsupervision. I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was hissenior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War toexercise that particular command, --and independently. I doubtedMcClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that inforestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whoseauthority to command was above both him and me. 

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between usor between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my goingfurther south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was themain part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was thedefence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. Ihoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rearand into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held thebetter. 

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that ourmovements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held awayfrom Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expectedto abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha. With that point as asecondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoountil communications could be opened with the Mississippi wascontemplated. 

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, thatif the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates ofVicksburg. I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada onthe Yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a newbase of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada tofall back upon in case of failure. It should be remembered that at thetime I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operatein an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. A haltwas called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, tobring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. 

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide mycommand into four army corps, with General McClernand to command one ofthem and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operatedown the Mississippi. This interfered with my plans, but probablyresulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. McClernand wasat that time in Springfield, Illinois. The order was obeyed without anydelay. Dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. 

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondarybase of supplies, captured the garrison of 1, 500 men commanded byColonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all ourmunitions of war, food and forage. The capture was a disgraceful one tothe officer commanding but not to the troops under him. At the sametime Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, andColumbus, Kentucky, doing much damage to it. This cut me off from allcommunication with the north for more than a week, and it was more thantwo weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtainedin the regular way. This demonstrated the impossibility of maintainingso long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving inan enemy's country. I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaigninto the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange andGrand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road toMemphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to drawsupplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time. 

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalryat the front back to drive him from the country. He had start enough tomove north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack severalsmall garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. All these hefound warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn didnot succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at HollySprings, which was larger than all the others attacked by him puttogether. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made nopreparations to meet him. He did not even notify his command. 

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuatedIuka on the approach of the enemy. General Rosecrans denounced him forthe act and desired to have him tried and punished. I sustained thecolonel at the time because his command was a small one compared withthat of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had donewell to get away without falling into their hands. His leaving largestores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight andexcused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should, however, have destroyed them. This last surrender demonstrated to mymind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct. The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed eitherthe disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed toserve, or gross cowardice. 

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompaniedGeneral Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreatwas almost a panic. The roads were bad and it was difficult to move theartillery and trains. Why there should have been a panic I do not see. No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River. Had I knownthe demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that centralMississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been inpursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in myrear. 

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was todispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect andbring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen mileseast and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leavingtwo months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. Itshowed that we could have subsisted off the country for two monthsinstead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. Thistaught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaignwhen our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days'rations by the commissary. Our loss of supplies was great at HollySprings, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from thecountry and by the lesson taught. 

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of oursupplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in Oxford. They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, toask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops andwagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteenmiles on each side of the road. Countenances soon changed, and so didthe inquiry. The next was, "What are WE to do?" My response was thatwe had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resourceswhile visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enoughto destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected thatmen, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. Iadvised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist ineating up what we left. 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS. 

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off fromcommunication with a great part of my own command during this time--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand couldarrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand. Pembertongot back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there. The rebel positionswere on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth. Thewaters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leavingonly narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and thehigh bluffs. These were fortified and defended at all points. Therebel position was impregnable against any force that could be broughtagainst its front. Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. Hisefforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, werenecessarily unavailing. 

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity ofcommunicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraphto my rear on the 20th. He did not know but what I was in the rear ofthe enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for thetroops with me. I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him totake with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of theYazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cuttingloose from my base at Grenada. 

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. The troopswere drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, findingsupplies abundant and no enemy following. The road was not damagedsouth of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to causeany delay. As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and torepair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until thiswork was completed. 

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to GrandJunction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquartersto the latter place. During the campaign here described, the losses(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with theirHolly Springs capture, which they could not hold. 

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20, 000 men, taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12, 000 more at Helena, Arkansas. The troops on the west bank of the river had previously beenassigned to my command. McClernand having received the orders for hisassignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, andimmediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a partof his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th. Sherman, and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. Afterconsultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could renderservice to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawnfrom the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to theArkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up thatstream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. Sherman hadlearned of the existence of this force through a man who had beencaptured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and othersupplies intended for his command. The man had made his escape. McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says. No obstaclewas encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range ofthe fort. After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was madeby the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and intaking 5, 000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed todisapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having noespecial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result wasunderstood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand Confederatetroops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss ofproperty while navigating the Mississippi. 

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of thegarrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at themouth of the Arkansas River. From here I received messages from bothSherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command inperson, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability andfitness for so important and intricate an expedition. 

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It washere made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustfulof McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all theycould to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. Itwould have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances intosuch danger. By this time I had received authority to relieveMcClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the riverexpedition, or to assume command in person. I felt great embarrassmentabout McClernand. He was the senior major-general after myself withinthe department. It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assigna junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume thecommand myself. I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, togive him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the Decemberbefore; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he wasjunior to McClernand. Sherman's failure needs no apology. 

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, toYoung's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to makeall the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind mesecure. General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. TheMemphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Centralwas given up. Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, onthe river, left with a garrison. All the troops and guns from the postson the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. 

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed commandthe following day. General McClernand took exception in a mostcharacteristic way--for him. His correspondence with me on the subjectwas more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highlyinsubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of theservice. General McClernand was a politician of very considerableprominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secessionwar broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished allthe opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for savingthe Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union atall hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration ofwhere he stood in the contest before the country. He also gave up hisseat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he hadproclaimed. 

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began. Theproblem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of theriver from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg. TheMississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valleyof many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty upto two or more hundred feet above the river. On the west side thehighest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highestwater. Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. At places it runs tothe very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no suchhighlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburgis reached. 

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in highwater--many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making itimpossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical wayaccording to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehousescould be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line ofrailroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. Theelections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for theprosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and thelast dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greaterpart of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up ourranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movementas long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by manyof those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as adefeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and thepower to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to bedone but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY. This was in my mind fromthe moment I took command in person at Young's Point. 

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in theMississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took manymiles of river front. We had to occupy the levees and the groundimmediately behind. This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, underGeneral McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles aboveVicksburg. 

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg. The water was very high and the rains were incessant. There seemed nopossibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and itwould not do to lie idle all this time. The effect would bedemoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. Friends inthe North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in thesame section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation ofthe cause and those engaged in it. 

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for theboldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, bypress or by individuals, within their control. War at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or betweennations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. But, once enteredinto, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within theirranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section ornation. 

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to theriver's edge, below that on which Memphis stands. The bluff, or highland, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continuesin a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs alongthe Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below. The Yazoo River leavesthe high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into theMississippi nine miles above Vicksburg. Vicksburg is built on this highland where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill. Haines' Bluff, eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified. The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton wasalso intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pitsconnecting them. 

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly directionto a point just above the city, when it again turns and runssouth-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before theywere in range of the upper batteries. Since then the river has made acut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up withbayous, and much overflowed. A front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem thenbecame, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippiwithout an apparent retreat. Then commenced a series of experiments toconsume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops andof the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence thatany of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. NeverthelessI was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. 

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut aditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across fromYoung's Point to the river below. The distance across was a little overa mile. It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it wouldcut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy fromboth ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the risewithout doing any execution in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln hadnavigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well itstendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. He setmuch store accordingly by this canal. General McClernand had been, therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work ofwidening and deepening this canal. After my arrival the work wasdiligently pushed with about 4, 000 men--as many as could be used toadvantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke adam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water outuntil the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th of March. 

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable forsteamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. It runs in adirection almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the oppositeside, or east bank, of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered whatwe were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughoutits length. This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. Had the canal beencompleted it might have proven of some use in running transportsthrough, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet haveto run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. 

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, tryingto find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of theriver, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding thebatteries. 

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I orderedGeneral McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cutthe levee at that point. If successful in opening a channel fornavigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi Riverthrough the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and fourhundred miles below Vicksburg by the river. 

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about amile from the present channel. It is six miles long and has its outletthrough Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and RedRivers. The last three are navigable streams at all seasons. BayousBaxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered withdense forests overhanging the channel. They were also filled withfallen timber, the accumulation of years. The land along theMississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest nextto the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form theboundary of the valley through which it winds. Bayou Baxter, as itreaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in acypress swamp before it reaches the Macon. There was about two feet ofwater in this swamp at the time. To get through it, even with vesselsof the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavytimber wide enough to make a passage way. As the trees would have to becut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of greatmagnitude. 

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained withhim several days. The work had not progressed so far as to admit thewater from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded indrawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. With this we were able to explore thelake and bayou as far as cleared. I saw then that there was scarcely achance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troopsthrough an enemy's country. The distance from Lake Providence to thepoint where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippiagain, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. Thedistance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through whichthis new route would carry us. The enemy held Port Hudson, below wherethe Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg. The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigablestreams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstructour passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. I let thework go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a betterprospect of success. This work was abandoned after the canal proved afailure. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, toexamine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible. Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi Riverinto Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Passto Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins theYallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and formsthe Yazoo River. These were formerly navigated by steamers trading withthe rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi hadbuilt a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving theonly entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of themouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below. 

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut. The river being highthe rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short timethe entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled andmuch of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the MississippiRiver but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with hisbrigade of about 4, 500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwaterby felling trees into them. Much of the timber in this region being ofgreater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, theirremoval was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboatsunder the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting afortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha uniteand the Yazoo begins. The bends of the rivers are such at this point asto almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of theriver. This island was fortified and manned. It was named FortPemberton after the commander at Vicksburg. No land approach wasaccessible. The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towardsan assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece ofground which was discovered above water. The gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March. Both efforts werefailures and were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled and we lost sixmen killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less. 

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that arise of two feet would drive the enemy out. In hope of enlisting theelements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directlyopposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut. It did notaccomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back. On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quinby was thesenior of Ross, and assumed command. He was not satisfied withreturning to his former position without seeing for himself whetheranything could be accomplished. Accordingly Fort Pemberton wasrevisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this timewithout an attack. Quinby, with his command, returned with but littledelay. In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, notknowing that Quinby had been able to join him. Reinforcements were ofno use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain onboard of their transports. Relief had to come from another quarter. SoI determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton. 

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and itsmouth. It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavygrowth of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to within one mile ofthe Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point. Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek, Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River, and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by thewinding of the river. All these waterways are of about the same natureso far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; thisaffords free navigation. 

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14thof March, and reported it navigable. On the next day he started withfive gunboats and four mortar-boats. I went with him for some distance. The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did alsothe short turns in so narrow a stream. The gunboats, however, ploughedtheir way through without other damage than to their appearance. Thetransports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The roadwas somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. In the evening Ireturned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went inperson on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps. They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, wherethey debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where theyre-embarked on the transports. The river steamers, with their tallsmokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded thatthe gunboats got far ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a fewhundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free fromthe obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when heencountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed byobstructions in his front. He could do nothing with gunboats againstsharpshooters. The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4, 000men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. 

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out BlackBayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. On thenight of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had beenattacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. Sherman at oncereturned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met asteamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. Theytried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. It was night when they landed, and intensely dark. There was but anarrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrushor cane. The troops lighted their way through this with candles carriedin their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an openplantation. Here the troops rested until morning. They made twenty-onemiles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time torescue the fleet. Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up thegunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. Morewelcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on thisoccasion. The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvouson the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to getin rear of Vicksburg. 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THETROOPS. 

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March. Theeffort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connectingbayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. 

At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enterthe Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above GrandGulf. The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from thesebayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at thesepoints, is carried through these same channels to the river below. Incase of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find itsoutlet through the same channels. The dredges and laborers from thecanal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, Idetermined to open these other channels, if possible. If successful theeffort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for ourtransports. There was a good road back of the levees, along thesebayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over wheneverthe water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching abase heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. 

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about thisroute, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the otherundertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have beenaccomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had gotall over the country. 

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, furtherthan the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber fora distance of several miles from their source. It was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recedeand the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water. One smallsteamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no furtheruse could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this itwas no more successful than the other experiments with which the winterwas whiled away. All these failures would have been very discouragingif I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not. From the firstthe most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be usedbelow Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteriesdefending that city. 

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged aboutVicksburg. The river was higher than its natural banks from December, 1862, to the following April. The war had suspended peaceful pursuitsin the South, further than the production of army supplies, and inconsequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and thewhole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dryground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out amongthe men. Measles and small-pox also attacked them. The hospitalarrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that theloss of life was much less than might have been expected. Visitors tothe camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers cameback to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. Because I wouldnot divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored formy removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simpleremoval, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took nosteps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as Iunderstood it, to the best of my ability. Every one has hissuperstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibilityevery one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assignedby competent authority, without application or the use of influence tochange his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very greatinterest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that asthe main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of ever having anylarge command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had thevanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well inthe command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to mystaff officers, all of whom were civilians without any militaryeducation whatever, I said that I would give anything if I werecommanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and Ibelieved I could do some good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggestedthat I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentionedthis superstition. 

In time of war the President, being by the ConstitutionCommander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for theselection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making hisselections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended with mydoing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place, or obtained itthrough personal or political influence, my belief is that I would havefeared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probablyhave awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtainingimportant commands by application or political influence are apt to keepa written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which areshown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for theirfailures. 

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincolnand General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. I had nevermet Mr. Lincoln, but his support was constant. 

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsulabehind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; thetroops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bendpreparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious anddiscouraging labors with success. 

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to apoint below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to thepossible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resortedto for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not beundertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicatethis plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary tomake preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porterwas the first one to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navywas absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) ofsuch an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than hehad to command me. It was necessary to have part of his fleet belowVicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries werealso essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for thesesteamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen milesof batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that hehad better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to runthe batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better thansoldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because Iadmitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from theenemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east sideof the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from theenemy by the dense forests that intervened. Even spies could not getnear him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guardsdiscovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up theriver near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards thefleet. On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not muchlarger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as aflag of truce in case of discovery. The boat, crew and passengers werebrought ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be JacobThompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration ofPresident Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an hour ormore I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return toVicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in mymind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag. 

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for theirhazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. The great essential was toprotect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the firesunder the boilers from view. This he accomplished by loading thesteamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to thedeck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of theboilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain wouldbe wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity bythe muddy roads over which we expected to march. 

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls andbarges to be used as ferries when we got below. By the 16th of AprilPorter was ready to start on his perilous trip. The advance, flagshipBenton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed atintervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, thePrice, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh andCarondelet--all of these being naval vessels. Next came the transports--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loadedwith coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers whenbelow the batteries. The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soonafter the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fireacross the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, andthen by batteries all along the line. The gunboats ran up close underthe bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probablywithout much effect. They were under fire for more than two hours andevery vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to thegunboats. The transports did not fare so well. The Henry Clay wasdisabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in thecotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned herto the water's edge. The burning mass, however, floated down toCarthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. 

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready tolight up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firinghouses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side. The sight was magnificent, but terrible. I witnessed it from the deckof a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as lowdown as it was prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learnedthat no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. During the running of the batteries men were stationed in theholds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes thatmight be made in the hulls. All damage was afterwards soon repairedunder the direction of Admiral Porter. 

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudsonwith the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from belowVicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboatIndianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below. She metColonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producingthe greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi fromVicksburg (*10) to the Red River. 

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, andthen started up the Mississippi. The Confederates soon raised the Queenof the West, (*11) and repaired her. With this vessel and the ram Webb, which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two othersteamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered withbarges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speedagainst the rapid current of the Mississippi. The Confederate fleetovertook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the24th of February. The Indianola was superior to all the others inarmament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an hour and ahalf, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram andother vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinkingcondition. The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. Officers and crew then surrendered. 

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th ofMarch, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that hemight capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could getthere; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. Somemiles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in severalplaces, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats werecollected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spotfrom such material as could be collected, to transport the troops acrossthe overflowed interval. By the 6th of April McClernand had reached NewCarthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried throughthe woods by these boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we weredoing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The waterwas falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to useboats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. McClernand hadalready found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasseoccurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below NewCarthage. This increased the march from Milliken's Bend fromtwenty-seven to nearly forty miles. Four bridges had to be built acrossbayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about twothousand feet of bridging in all. The river falling made the current inthese bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building andpermanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankeesoldier" was equal to any emergency. The bridges were soon built ofsuch material as could be found near by, and so substantial were theythat not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army withartillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun(a thirty-two pounder). This, if my memory serves me correctly, brokethrough the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across thepeninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, underthe supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps. 

I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20thissued the following final order for the movement of troops:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA, April 20, 1863. 

Special Orders, No. 110. * * * * * ** VIII. The following orders are published for the information andguidance of the "Army in the Field, " in its present movement to obtain afoothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburgcan be approached by practicable roads. 

First. --The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernandcommanding, will constitute the right wing. 

Second. --The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Shermancommanding, will constitute the left wing. 

Third. --The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPhersoncommanding, will constitute the centre. 

Fourth. --The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left. 

Fifth. --Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity mayrequire. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division willremain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. 

Sixth. --Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities canbe afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. 

Seventh. --In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to eachcompany for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for eachregimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commandershaving the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but notto exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O. , seriesof 1862. 

Eighth. --All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediatecharge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, willconstitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorizedcamp equipage of the army. 

Ninth. --As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeentharmy corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed inlike manner by the Fifteenth army corps. 

Tenth. --Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corpscommanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage. 

Eleventh. --General hospitals will be established by the medical directorbetween Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and disabled soldierswill be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge of hospitals willreport convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. Each corpscommander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remainbehind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge intosquads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to commandthem, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. The force soorganized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport toMilliken's Bend. They will furnish all the guards and details requiredfor general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about thecamps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. 

Twelfth. --The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthagewill be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supplyof rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previousorders. 

Thirteenth. --Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all thebeef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; butwanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for militarypurposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses withoutproper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. Allsuch irregularities must be summarily punished. 

Fourteenth. --Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to thecommand of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line fromhere to New Carthage. His particular attention is called to GeneralOrders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of dateMarch 20, 1863. 

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. 

McClernand was already below on the Mississippi. Two of McPherson'sdivisions were put upon the march immediately. The third had not yetarrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend andwas to follow on arrival. 

Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his divisions were at Duckportand Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to returnfrom Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebelbattery that had been annoying our transports. 

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagontrain over the single narrow and almost impassable road betweenMilliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation. Accordingly six more steamerswere protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded withsupplies. They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. Onthe night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five gettingthrough more or less disabled while one was sunk. About half the bargesgot through with their needed freight. 

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with riversteamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing toaccompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called forfrom the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigatingthe western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-handsenough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels wewere moving through this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were fromLogan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part ofIllinois and from Missouri. All but two of the steamers were commandedby volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. In thisinstance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers couldbe found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet everycall for aid whether mechanical or professional. Colonel W. S. Oliverwas master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG. 

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'plantation. Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whetherthere was high land on the east shore of the river where we might landabove Grand Gulf. There was none practicable. Accordingly the troopswere set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down theriver and nearly opposite Grand Gulf. The loss of two steamers and sixbarges reduced our transportation so that only 10, 000 men could be movedby water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in theirmachinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those lessseverely injured. All the troops, therefore, except what could betransported in one trip, had to march. The road lay west of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be crossed. They were rapidlybridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson'swas following closely. I had determined to make the attempt to effect alanding on the east side of the river as soon as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all thetroops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. About10, 000 men were so embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence theguns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debarkin the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy andcarry the works by storm. The following order was issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA. , April 27, 1863. 

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C. 

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it asthere is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery and everyarticle authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and holdthem in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment'swarning. 

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, sendto a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special ordersof this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division. 

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence allthe batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below thepromontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best theground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. Thefirst object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintainthemselves until such time as preparations can be made and troopscollected for a forward movement. 

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicatedto you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may bebelow the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. 

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, outof range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past GrandGulf and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signalwill be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to startwith this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, butnot the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to bebrought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches tobelow Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that thetransports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, thatthe transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that thetransports can run by with the troops on board. 

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left torun the blockade. 

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations intheir haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

At 8 o'clock A. M. , 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strengthpresent, eight gunboats. For nearly five and a half hours the attackwas kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. All this timeMcClernand's 10, 000 men were huddled together on the transports in thestream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. I occupied a tug fromwhich I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within rangeof the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was notcalculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were beingassailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeingtheir efforts were entirely unavailing. The enemy ceased firing as soonas we withdrew. I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard hisship. The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-sixwounded. A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's sideand exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. Thesight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded theship was sickening. 

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot ofit. It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. Itherefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet thatnight, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would bewanted below. 

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towardsGrand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three milesabove and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about thesame distance below. The land was so low and wet that it would not havebeen practicable to march an army across but for a levee. I had hadthis explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain ifthere was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was foundthat the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. 

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in theplan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. I hadintended to make this request, but he anticipated me. At dusk, whenconcealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landedhis command on the west bank. The navy and transports ran the batteriessuccessfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover ofnight, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our wholefleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly movingdown the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, withNational troops. 

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected thatwe would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find alanding; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that agood landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson sometwelve miles in the interior. The information was found correct, andour landing was effected without opposition. 

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the morningof the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps upthe Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff. 

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburgas I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of theriver. The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our realdesign. Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter hadleft above Vicksburg. 

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attackthe enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff. This move was made without a single casualty in either branch of theservice. On the first of May Sherman received orders from me (sent fromHard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the frontof Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as hecould. 

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now thatall our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemymight fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament andattempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with aportion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of hiscommand. The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of thetransports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as aguard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved thereand put in position. 

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on the morning of 30thof April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps werespeedily landed. 

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalledsince. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defendersdemoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy'scountry, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between meand my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side ofthe river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships andexposures from the month of December previous to this time that had beenmade and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. 

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and twobrigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPhersoncommanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence thecampaign with. These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade ofLogan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps. On the 7thof May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total force was then about thirty-three thousandmen. 

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force ofnearly sixty thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg andis connected with it by a railroad. My first problem was to captureGrand Gulf to use as a base. 

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that point ishigher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and agood road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect the garrisonfrom Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, ourreaching this solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi justabove Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at thetime, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, thenearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more thandoubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back ofBruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Ourtransportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the riverat one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and onedivision of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and earlyevening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs werereached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping toreach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre beforethe enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of anenemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting point ofroads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson. 

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibsonat Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during the night, butnothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy hadtaken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen. Hishope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring couldreach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render muchassistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corpsfollowed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13thcorps could be got out of the way. 

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, theroads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass fromone ridge to another. Where there are no clearings the sides of thehills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and withundergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. 

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibsondivides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or twoat the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. Thismade it necessary for McClernand to divide his force. It was not onlydivided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character abovedescribed. One flank could not reinforce the other except by marchingback to the junction of the roads. McClernand put the divisions ofHovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus onthe left. I was on the field by ten A. M. , and inspected both flanks inperson. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at leastnot repulsing our advance. On the left, however, Osterhaus was notfaring so well. He had been repulsed with some loss. As soon as theroad could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, whowas close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan'sdivision. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade(General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and to moveto the left and flank the enemy out of his position. This movementcarried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, whenSmith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directedto renew his front attack. It was successful and unattended by heavyloss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their leftfollowed before sunset. While the movement to our left was going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests forreinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. Ihad been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging allthe men he had. We followed up our victory until night overtook usabout two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac forthe night. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND. 

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enoughto see the road. We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to findthat the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at thebridge, which he had burned. The troops were set to work at once toconstruct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre. At thistime the water was high and the current rapid. What might be called araft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from woodenbuildings, stables, fences, etc. , which sufficed for carrying the wholearmy over safely. Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, plannedand superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the waterand working as hard as any one engaged. Officers and men generallyjoined in this work. When it was finished the army crossed and marchedeight miles beyond to the North Fork that day. One brigade of Logan'sdivision was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebelbattery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to preventour repairing the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sentup the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair thebridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were building abridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced byCrocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippiat Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days'rations. McPherson still had one division west of the MississippiRiver, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below untilSherman's command should relieve it. 

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who hadjoined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, andhoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall intoour hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guidedby the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill--called the Battleof Port Gibson--found his way to where I was. He had no horse to rideat the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal. He, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me onthe Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. He was inthe same situation as Fred so far as transportation and messarrangements were concerned. The first time I call to mind seeingeither of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormoushorses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles andbridles. 

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectlyequipped. 

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused noanxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. He looked outfor himself and was in every battle of the campaign. His age, then notquite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain arecollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. 

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagontrain. The train still west of the Mississippi was carried around withproper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Timesseventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after thebattle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with thistrain. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburgwhich I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further thanstirrups. I had no other for nearly a week. 

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions couldbe taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried onthe person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draftanimals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should becollected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a trainwas collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it couldbe found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes ofcartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules withplough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc. ; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything thatcould be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either foruse or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped forthe time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a positionwas secured when the time could be spared to observe them. 

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of thecomplete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid throughcentral Mississippi. He had started from La Grange April 17th withthree regiments of about 1, 700 men. On the 21st he had detached ColonelHatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus andMacon and then return to La Grange. Hatch had a sharp fight with theenemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it atOkalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26. Griersoncontinued his movement with about 1, 000 men, breaking the Vicksburg andMeridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving atBaton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson hadattracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement againstVicksburg. 

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork wasrepaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy froma commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evidentthat the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg. Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson'sferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay ourprogress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across andseveral miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction of theroad going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond andJackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the lefttowards Grand Gulf. I went with him a short distance from thisjunction. McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since thebattle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's rightflank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to holdHankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as toguard the line back down the bayou. I did not want to take the chancesof having an enemy lurking in our rear. 

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes intothe one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, Ilearned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place ontheir way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition ofhis troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort ofabout twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already arrived with hisfleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. 

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage sincethe 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers andget a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to thegeneral-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to betelegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding aboveVicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About twelveo'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson'sferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard fromBanks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be atPort Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15, 000 men. Up tothis time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base ofsupplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him inthe reduction of Port Hudson. 

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from theone intended. To wait for his co-operation would have detained me atleast a month. The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousandmen after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all highpoints close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy wouldhave strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men thanBanks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independentlyof Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear ofVicksburg and invest or capture the city. 

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities atWashington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would leadhim to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave anychance of success. The time it would take to communicate withWashington and get a reply would be so great that I could not beinterfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan waspracticable. Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of suppliesother than what were afforded by the country while marching through fourStates of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mineat this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of theimpossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, andthen act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure aslife. " To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility ofsupplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will beimpossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect isto get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and makethe country furnish the balance. " We started from Bruinsburg with anaverage of about two days' rations, and received no more from our ownsupplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. A delaywould give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. 

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as theywere on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give themthree days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry and foragewere found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses wasalso secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not beobtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn forthe owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we werestopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, atall plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by thetroops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined togo without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo aboveVicksburg. 

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I orderedreconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view ofleading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black andattack the city at once. 

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command thatnight and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up fromGrand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. Orders were givenfor a forward movement the next day. Sherman was directed to order upBlair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bendto Hard Times with two brigades. 

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundredwagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. 

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to sendfour regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair'sdivision, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division inaddition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regimentswere to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be nodelay. 

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of theBig Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via RockySprings, Utica and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both atRocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry. McPherson remainedthere during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Shermanmarched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry. The 9th, McPherson movedto a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Shermanremained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Shermanto Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th, McClernandwas at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advancedfrom Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman atFourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle. 

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburgcould have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is notprobable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a closebesiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him tohold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to theBig Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. Itwas my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, andapproach from that direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that hadcrossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jacksoncommenced. 

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roadsgenerally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallelto the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand'scorps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all thecrossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel withthe railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand andSherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman, extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance inreconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find themost practicable routes from one command to another so they couldsupport each other in case of an attack. In making this move Iestimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteenthousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson. Itwould not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops atone place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight himin detail. This was done with success, but I found afterwards that Ihad entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength. 

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroadand about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond eighteenmiles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre onFourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within twomiles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated aconsiderable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. McClernand's left was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to thistime, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries hadbeen guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. 

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteriesunder General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about twoP. M. Logan was in advance with one of his brigades. He deployed andmoved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to becleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. Theorder was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position forassault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carryingthe enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not toappear against our front again until we met at Jackson. 

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing--nearly or quite all from Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. 

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commandersas could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much highercommand. Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when hevolunteered. His weak condition never put him on the sick report whenthere was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. He died not long after the close of the rebellion. 

CHAPTER XXXV. 

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundownmy position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the wholecolumn towards Jackson and capture that place without delay. 

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18, 000 men; infact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50, 000. A force was alsocollecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroadscommunicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of menand stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiegeVicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I thereforedetermined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any forcein that direction and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving againstJackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to havenone--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole forceeastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I movedquickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me inthe rear. 

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements onthe 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylightto move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of mydetermination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He wasordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's toRaymond. One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black. 

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, askingreinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of hisfleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position anddeclining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements as long asthe enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time andmaterial. 

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13thfrom Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederatetroops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reinforcements from thesouth and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy arebringing forces from Tullahoma. "

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of eachother, as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnoissanceswere constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaintthemselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in casea union became necessary. 

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th andimmediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advancereached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out ofthe town. McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward'sstation, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position forthe night in good order. On the night of the 13th, McPherson wasordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away. Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct roadfrom Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on anddoes not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossedthe line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman'sline, and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siegeguns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs. McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With onedivision at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, atJackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond MississippiSprings was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymondcould take either road. He still had two other divisions farther backnow that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If thislast command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already oneday's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three differentroads leading to the latter city. But the most important considerationin my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should comeout to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by Johnston to make this very move. 

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through anunprotected country. 

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night andarranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour. It rained in torrentsduring the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, wherethe land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. But the troops never murmured. By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson'scorps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets andspeedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of theintrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that hadbeen driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been reinforced; during thenight by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his forceamounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. 

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from thetown, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south andsouth-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind theirbreastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad. Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to anassault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployedCrocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on theright. By eleven A. M. Both were ready to attack. Crocker moved hisdivision forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops atonce encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole divisioncharged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this mainline. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside ofhis main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command untilwithin range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when hehalted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine thenext move. It was now about noon. 

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery whichenfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springsroad--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had topass. By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemyflanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought ourwhole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuouson the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of thecity to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted bya force sufficient to hold us back. Appearances did not justify anassault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to theright, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River. This force, Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, andsoon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. Tuttle'smovement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order aretreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he wasgetting away. Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lineswithout resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confrontingSherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. I rodeimmediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman. About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving hisfront, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that theycould not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital ofMississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. 

Our loss in this engagement was: McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. The enemy lost 845killed, wounded and captured. Seventeen guns fell into our hands, andthe enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a largeamount of commissary stores. 

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4thdivision. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, theonly commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. 

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupiedthe night before. 

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directedthe dispositions to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain inJackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, andmanufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work mosteffectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which hadnot ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankeetroops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of eitherthe manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked onfor a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of thelooms, with "C. S. A. " woven in each bolt. There was an immense amountof cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thoughtthey had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leaveand take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cottonand factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while Iwas President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it wasprivate. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that hisproperty had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use itwith Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. Ideclined. 

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch toPemberton at Edward's station: "I have lately arrived, and learn thatMajor-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. Itis important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. Ifpracticable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachmentwould be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assembleshould be brought. Time is all-important. " This dispatch was sent intriplicate, by different messengers. One of the messengers happened tobe a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before byHurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was agood deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning tothose who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and theexpelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston'sdispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me. 

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptlyin the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston couldreach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I alsoinformed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the followingorder: "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us andcross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow themto do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make alldispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road fromwherever they may be on the receipt of this order. "

And to Blair I wrote: "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Blackand pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. Wemust beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all thetrains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so asto divide your troops and train. "

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, thenight of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatchesannouncing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to therest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may beable to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himselffrom the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him. "

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character ofthe country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near therailroad. McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the roadMcPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus)was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other nearChampion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road withOsterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detainedby it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn witha different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and movedpromptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine inthe morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. 

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were aboutthree miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymondwith Blair in his rear. 

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just inHovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with two divisions, was inJackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and militaryfactories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I orderedMcClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioninghim to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he feltvery certain of success. 

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders ofhis superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make theattempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he haddecided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequentlydetermined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and mybase. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a weekbefore. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward'sstation, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to crossso much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a goodbridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching untilmidnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition ofhis order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent adispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might beexpected. 

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employedon the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. Theyreported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, andthat it was still marching east. They reported him to have eightyregiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-fivethousand men. 

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order tocomplete his work; but getting the above information I sent him ordersto move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with anammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commanderto march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Withinan hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to movewith all speed to Edward's station. McClernand was directed to embraceBlair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part ofthe 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join itscorps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced aboutand were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on ourextreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the wayof the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward'sstation, over which to march his troops. Hovey's division of his corpshad the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions bythe southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middleroad. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front tofeel for the enemy. 

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounterthe enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on themiddle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, foundthe enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. About thesame time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagonroad from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to joinHovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I wasstill back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, andexpressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on the roadand proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were infront of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishingamounted almost to a battle. 

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distanceto march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him wordby a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders wererepeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand'sadvance. 

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one ofthe highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground inrange. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is aravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making itdifficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridgeoccupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turnswesterly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south atthis point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradualand is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when wewere there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. 

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some threemiles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From thislatter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a halfmiles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. Itwas along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps, and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on theroad from Bolton direct to Edward's station. The middle road comes intothe northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west anddescends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several milessouth and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward'sstation. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formedparallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. 

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contestedbattle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold hisposition and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up histroops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the rightof Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey withone brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther westto make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roadswould admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling onme for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteriesto be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and theydid good execution. 

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him overopen fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. Hedid make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through thebelt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the mostheavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by ourright around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near theroad leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of theonly road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by twobrigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hoursbefore, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with twodivisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, wereconfronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur'sdivision of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at GrandGulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. NeitherLogan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just atthis juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for morereinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to moveMcPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncoveredthe rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by theenemy. 

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade fromLogan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up withtwo other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last oneabout the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fledprecipitately. This was between three and four o'clock. I rodeforward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the northroad, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishersadvanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's twodivisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were notin the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders toOsterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, Iexplained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far asthe Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark. 

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost roseto the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and ofMcPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other partof my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebeladvanced pickets as early as half-past seven. Their positions wereadmirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand, with twodivisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noonand in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fullycompetent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the woodseparating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but hedid not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a smallforce of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravineobstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road mystaff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back orbeen cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged tohis corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the bruntof the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pullout from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand hadto advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediatesuperior. 

We had in this battle about 15, 000 men absolutely engaged. Thisexcludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command exceptHovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1, 844 wounded and 187 missing. Hoveyalone lost 1, 200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of hisdivision. 

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known theground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could haveescaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over three thousandkilled and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and inpursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. Histroops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before thegeneral retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned totheir homes. Logan alone captured 1, 300 prisoners and eleven guns. Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1, 200. 

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill theircartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuitwas continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The nightof the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to sixmiles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about threemiles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops hadfought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned bythe enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces ofartillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and keptin advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped andtook possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back amile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouacon the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house whichhad been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with woundedand dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. 

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by thethousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after thebattle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to doas much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OFVICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton mighthave made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned toJohnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have beenhis proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had hebeen in Pemberton's place. In fact it would have been in conformitywith Johnston's orders to Pemberton. 

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16thand reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear guarddid not get in until two A. M. The 17th, but renewed their march bydaylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leavehis own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he wasinformed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march earlynext day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on theBig Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected tofind the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoontrain as early as possible. 

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where Ihoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corpsused to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening acrossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I wouldendeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. 

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuitat half-past three A. M. On the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus, McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemywas found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six milesfrom that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached atan early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washedclose up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimesoverflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. Abayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. Whenthe river is full water runs through it, converting the point of landinto an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy hadfelled into the ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water init. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of thisbayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwingdirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height westof the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip ofuncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr'sdivision was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extremeright and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus'division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entirefront. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready tocome in wherever he could be of assistance. 

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, datedthe 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks tobe forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and toco-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to returnwith our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer thatthe order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if heknew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought toobey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when Iheard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in thatdirection, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon theenemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of thecharge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; Ithink not even to this day. 

The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemyfled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him andleaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Manytried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some weredrowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1, 751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probablylost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for thesuccessful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but littledoubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to preventhis occupying his defences around Vicksburg. 

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had tobe built. It was but little after nine o'clock A. M. When the capturetook place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given forthe construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of byLieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPhersonhimself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligentvolunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cuttingonly on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their topsinterlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed fromtheir stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support theroadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and whereverfound, for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18thall three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. 

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair withthe pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched onthe west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the followingmorning. 

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troopsand as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to securea base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's lineof march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemythe December before when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxiouswith myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column andwell up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached worksalong the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, orelse the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their wayto Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thickand fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure oflooking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before onthe ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positiveassurance of success. This, however, he said was the end of one of thegreatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it atonce. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling whatmight happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this wasa complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman'slanguage; but the substance only. My reason for mentioning thisincident will appear further on. 

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson andVicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived atnight near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand movedby the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned tothe left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry toVicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my threecorps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limitednumber of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and covered thehigh ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as histroops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupiedground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the groundto his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping acontinuous line. 

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we weregetting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized byhis defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed hewould not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at twoo'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advancedpositions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fireof the enemy. 

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in makingroads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most ofthe army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rationsissued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, butbegan to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around tothe left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said inrather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack. " In amoment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since thearrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them witheverything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. Bythe night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated. 

I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, onlyfifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one Ihad with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of hiscoming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat myanticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not preventthe capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would savesending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, andwould set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. Butthe first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carrythe works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in thetrenches if they had not been allowed to try. 

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at teno'clock A. M. On the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery inposition. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that allmight open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to thevery parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported thathe had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wantedreinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could seeas well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see thesuccess he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeatedI could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as adiversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served toincrease our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon asit was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and beenobliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thusended the last assault upon Vicksburg. 

CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy, " as itwere, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convincedofficers and men that this was best, and they went to work on thedefences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold ourposition the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions ofwar to what they had on hand. These could not last always. 

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18thof May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty daysafter the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault hadbeen made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) hadbeen fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State hadfallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything usefulfor military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about onehundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; butfive days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousandprisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had beenkilled or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieceshad fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, fromVicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that hadcrossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-threethousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time totake part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field afterthe battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on theroads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in theirown country, where no rear guards were necessary. The country isadmirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensivecampaign. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to saythe least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson seven or eightthousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleventhousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black, four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left ofthose encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a forcesmaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this timewas:

 KILLED WOUNDED MISSING

 Port Gibson. .. .. 131 719 25 South Fork Bayou Pierre. .. .. . . 1 . . Skirmishes, May 3 . .. .. 1 9 . . Fourteen Mile Creek. .. .. 6 24 . . Raymond. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 66 339 39 Jackson. .. .. 42 251 7 Champion's Hill. .. .. 410 1, 844 187 Big Black. .. .. 39 237 3 Bridgeport. .. .. . . 1 . . Total. .. .. 695 3, 425 259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Nothalf of them were disabled for any length of time. 

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siegebegan. Sherman occupied the right starting from the river aboveVicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) andMcClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman'sdivision arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of theline. 

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had beencompleted from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear ofthe army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to beencamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troopshad been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up tothis time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentiss andHurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receivingreinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would makethe most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk oflosing ground elsewhere. 

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluffto Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was aboutseven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, inour rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second lineof defence facing the other way. I had not troops enough under mycommand to man these. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possibledispatch. 

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence. On the north it isabout two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest pointand very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown upwith cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with adense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and wasin cultivation. But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and smallstreams. The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge fromthe river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to theJackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in asouthwesterly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the descriptiongiven lay in front of these defences. As there is a succession ofgullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line wasnecessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs withintrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would havelengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight tothe head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generallyopen in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in thisouter work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. 

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy ashis was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated byour wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had butfour engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line Idirected that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where theyhad necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition totheir other duties assist in the work. 

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. Thechief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was goodfor unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rationswhile working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, andas we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I lethim off. The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twentypounds, and is not tall. 

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were noneat the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with abattery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the fieldartillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to dowas to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commandingpositions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of theenemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits andcovered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. Theenemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry waskept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and readyto fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. 

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more thanthe ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enoughapart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in theirdefence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting overour men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do notremember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one ofthese shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound wasterrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Theiruse is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without anycorresponding advantage to those using them. 

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, becausewe had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used itfreely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the menbehind. 

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had infront of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of thetoughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelvepound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered ascochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into thetrenches of the enemy. 

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done bythe pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who werepaid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advancedposition was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy thebatteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were two hundred andtwenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery ofheavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. We were nowas strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they wereagainst us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receivingconstant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a largerforce than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill. 

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburgreached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came togratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed throughthe terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associationscame to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often thosecoming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of thesoldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without breadduring the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good. 

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most ofthe State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was ofmost interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken andmost wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore tookthem to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting outto look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about whichthe North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knotaround Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, inthe most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first lookeddown from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; Iopposed it. I wrote him a letter about it. " But for this speech it isnot likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. Hisuntiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him toa full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not havedone more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out aforce of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven infor the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by ourtroops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and theroads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-fivemiles and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. Irequested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floatingnondescript force which had been assigned to his command and whichproved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcementscould be sent. 

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforcehim with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I could not complywith his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no dangerof an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no armyorganizing in his rear to raise the siege. 

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, GeneralKimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-eastof Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, onBlair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place withinstructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroythe roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. 

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops acrossthe Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3, 000 menfrom Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of thegunboats they were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over withinstructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had nofurther trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the firstimportant engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning ofthe siege, but they behaved well. 

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, underGeneral Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, andGeneral C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at thatpoint. 

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of theMissouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cutoff the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton andJohnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left whileHerron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point thewater recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through thisopening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to getmessengers under cover of night. 

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside'scorps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff. These lattertroops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken ofsent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrivednone too soon. 

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposedacross the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the BigBlack, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of thelatter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jacksonroad to Baldwin's ferry and below. 

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and theirimmediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. 

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18thfrom General McPherson, saying that their respective commands hadcomplained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published byGeneral McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to theother troops engaged in the campaign. This order had been sent Northand published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. Theorder had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outsideof McClernand's command until brought in this way. I at once wrote toMcClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps andordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his orderin the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THEMINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAGOF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTINGTHE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston hadcrossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, toraise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence betweenJohnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburghad by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately orderedSherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the BigBlack River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to holdthemselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines' Bluff had beenstrongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points fromthere to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had beenconstructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was notalready done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. 

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were alsolooking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantiallyprotected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and northwe were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidentlytook in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making anassault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sideswithout accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have takenthe offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any riskof losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced atthe opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston. 

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward ourposition nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At threepoints on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was runup to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it underminedand the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed inreaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebelwork stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of theenemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also our protection. Thesoldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across thisbarrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiersfor the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw overhand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returnedthem. 

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequentlywhen it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroyit. On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine wasexploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered toopen with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill offand make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient toenable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy havingfailed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where mostof the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in thecountermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that werethere were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground atwork when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He wasnot much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high hehad gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile, " was hisreply. General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored manto his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. 

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by tworegiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they hadbeen placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effortto expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. Fromhere, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. Thecompliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. Theenemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided thecontestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had tobe thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. Duringthe night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater againstthe missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base oftheir parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing theirgrenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses ofwhich they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into ourranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine wasconsequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroyingan entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of itsoccupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt tocharge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. Theenemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in thefirst. We lost none in the second. 

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our positionnearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined toexplode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number atdifferent points and assault immediately after. We were up now at threedifferent points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapetof the enemy divided us. 

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informedme that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in orderto relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make noformidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close toeach other--where there was space enough between the lines to postpickets--that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I wasinformed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, bycrossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he hademployed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had beencanvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" tocut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, becausetheir commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, andhad only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would befinished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also saidthat houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to buildthese boats with. Afterwards this story was verified: on entering thecity we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. 

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attemptabortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, sothat the river might be more closely watched; material was collected onthe west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river ifthe attempt was made; and batteries were established along the leveecrossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been madethe garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners onthe Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the westbank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, norcould he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. TheMississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We hadnearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence toopposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to drawsupplies over for any considerable force. 

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at anumber of places. At ten points we could move under cover to withinfrom five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to makeall preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches wereordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also tobe widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank, andbags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, toenable the troops to cross the ditches. 

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and theBig Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of themonth an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him tocut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reachedhim. 

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed thefollowing letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, itwill become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see noprospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperableobstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested toinform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of yourtroops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatiguesnecessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. "

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practicallydid the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuatewould fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnstonsuggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of thegarrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be aconfession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton touse his name in making such an arrangement. 

On the 3d about ten o'clock A. M. White flags appeared on a portion ofthe rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased atonce. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing awhite flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, andColonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the followingletter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view toarranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, ifagreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a likenumber to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you mayfind convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusionof blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feelingmyself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, byMajor-General John S. Bowen. "

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where thesewhite flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of thecommand. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hardfighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to thegibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all theirsuffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at lastat an end and the Union sure to be saved. 

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I hadbeen a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorablybefore the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that Ishould meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that, ifPemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps atthree o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written replyto Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice forseveral hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulationthrough commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion ofblood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time youmay choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now inVicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I canassure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrangethe terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than thoseindicated above. "

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbalmessage, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter ofthe morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, andseveral officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting wason a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near bystood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. Itwas but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limbhad disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. Since then the sametree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as"The True Cross. "

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of theMexican War. I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an oldacquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army ifit surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to hisletter. Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference mightas well end, " and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well. "General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should beconsummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking, showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals shouldhave a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be madebinding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly hada conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance awaytowards the enemy's lines were in conversation. After a while Bowensuggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out withthe honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. Thiswas promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended, Iagreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clockthat night. 

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence withPemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part ofboth army and navy. It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that theyshould not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. 

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and divisioncommanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half thearmy was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston. Iinformed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply andthe substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear anysuggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my ownhands. This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held. Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sentthe following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit thefollowing proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, publicstores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in onedivision as a guard, and take possession at eight A. M. To-morrow. Assoon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers andmen, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers takingwith them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalryofficers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all theirclothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, anyamount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the storesyou now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparingthem. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers andsoldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for theselatter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorizedto sign the roll of prisoners. "

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by eitherarmy were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken'slanding below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to beexchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was aConfederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free toperform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon anunconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand mento transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on theMississippi. Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported byrail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--allat very great expense. At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give inexchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whosehomes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the warand would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of themhad voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested tobe sent north where they could get employment until the war was over andthey could go to their homes. 

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication ofthis date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honorand spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I haveto submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, willperfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock A. M. To-morrow, Ipropose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrenderthe city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colorsand arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. After which youwill take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personalproperty, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected. "

This was received after midnight. My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3dJuly. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. Itwill be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signedby himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, willnecessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations withregard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While Ido not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannotconsent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. Theproperty which officers will be allowed to take with them will be asstated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will beallowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers onehorse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to marchto the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at teno'clock A. M. , and then return to the inside and there remain asprisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms bynine o'clock A. M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shallact accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should bedisplayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not havebeen notified, from firing upon your men. "

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms. 

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring betweenthe soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were closetogether. All rebels were known as "Johnnies, " all Union troops as"Yanks. " Often "Johnny" would call: "Well, Yank, when are you cominginto town?" The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4thof July there. " Sometimes it would be: "We always treat our prisonerswith kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you asprisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves. " The garrison, fromthe commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on thefourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successfulwhen made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. 

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy ofthe rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the bestreceipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit. " The paperat this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side ofwall paper. The last number was issued on the fourth and announced thatwe had "caught our rabbit. "

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the thirdwith a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knewwould be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place onthe great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration ofAmerican Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did hedefeated his aim in the latter particular. 

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of theirworks and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in goodorder. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was thefirst to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his divisionwas soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no soonerinside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men hadhad full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. Theenemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself sawour men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemythey had so recently been engaged in starving out. It was accepted withavidity and with thanks. 

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day forsurrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day Ishould obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knewthey would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of Julyinto the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify theirnational vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted fromthem at any other time. "

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day hedid for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letterasking terms was received about 10 o'clock A. M. , July 3d. It then couldhardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect asurrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose ofraising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as hecould. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one wasexpected on the fourth. In our interview he told me he had rationsenough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. It wasthis statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was todraw rations for his men from his own supplies. 

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or ninethousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made anattack upon Helena, Arkansas. He was totally defeated by GeneralPrentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundredsoldiers. Holmes reported his loss at 1, 636, of which 173 were killed;but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses. The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40missing. This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy toraise the siege of Vicksburg. 

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Shermanand directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could. Steele andOrd were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman assoon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified. 

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchangecongratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time Ifound that many of the citizens had been living under ground. Theridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. Where roads andstreets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as wellas if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made byrunning passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deepcuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families bycarving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases wouldbe cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carvedout of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In someinstances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, witha door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these werecarpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these theoccupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which weredropped into the city night and dav without intermission. 

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did notmove into the town until the sixth. On the afternoon of the fourth Isent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point wherethe telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is theirparole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us atthis moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, andleaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, witha large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from theState. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9tharmy corps to Burnside. "

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted agreat load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet andthe loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy wassealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be doneafterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALEwas with the supporters of the Union ever after. 

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall andsending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all thetroops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemynow had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copiesof this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon acopy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command ofPort Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of theNational forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender ofVicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that ifthis was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banksgave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and GeneralGardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudsonwith nearly 6, 000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5, 000 small-arms and other storesfell into the hands of the Union forces: from that day to the close ofthe rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the National troops. 

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could beparoled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy foreach, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officersof the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for eachsoldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by thesoldier signing and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refusedto sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisonersto being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. 

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign theirparoles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men whohad signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes assoon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton hearing this, againappealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act asguards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp ofinstruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. Thisrequest was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hopedthat they would do. I told him, however, that I would see that theymarched beyond our lines in good order. By the eleventh, just one weekafter the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederategarrison marched out. Many deserted, and fewer of them were everreturned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case hadthe surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the JamesRiver to be paroled. 

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards wereestablished along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to theriver below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old campsbehind the intrenchments. No restraint was put upon them, except bytheir own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men, and fromour supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had beenfighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they hadso long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their lateantagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would givepain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in thebreasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of theirlate antagonists. 

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They will beauthorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there toEdward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands tobe orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensiveremarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they havepassed. "

CHAPTER XXXIX. 

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPONMOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO. 

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnancestores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave newspirit to the loyal people of the North. New hopes for the finalsuccess of the cause of the Union were inspired. The victory gained atGettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. Now theMississippi River was entirely in the possession of the National troops;for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once. The army ofnorthern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back toabout the same ground it occupied in 1861. The Army of the Tennesseeunited with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate Statescompletely. 

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall ofVicksburg was in these words:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actualdelivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of thecartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men willimmediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the caseelsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you willdetain them until further orders. "

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the handsof Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. 

At Vicksburg 31, 600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannonabout 60, 000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. The small-armsof the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time ourtroops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lockmuskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early inthe war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimedat--and a few new and improved arms. These were of many differentcalibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunitionduring an engagement. The enemy had generally new arms which had runthe blockade and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender Iauthorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferiormuskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace themwith the latter. A large number of arms turned in to the OrdnanceDepartment as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by theUnion army in the capture of Vicksburg. 

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. Neitherhave I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with anarmy unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole ofofficers and men. A military education was acquired which no otherschool could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough forthem to command properly at the beginning, would have made goodregimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders wereequal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have beenequal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended thecampaign fitted to command independent armies. 

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in thecampaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against himin 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive andgenerous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficultto command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to commandone army officered intelligently and with subordination. It affords methe greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment inrespect to his character. There was no man braver than he, nor wasthere any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with moreunquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as apolitician. 

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfullymade with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been madeat all, in the way it was, with any number of men without suchassistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms ofthe service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, eitherof the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptlycomplied with. 

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resortedto; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have madeits execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory wasnecessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite withBanks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that baseand Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces againstVicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries andfighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that hecould not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteenthousand men. The time was worth more than the reinforcements; Itherefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. 

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapidmovements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day aftera new commander had arrived, and only a few days before largereinforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made; thegarrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, anddriven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. Itlooks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaignwhile the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree. 

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three thingsthat required immediate attention. The first was to send a force todrive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State. The second was tosend reinforcements to Banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to completethe triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth tothe free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes. The thirdwas to inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the goodnews, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence inthe ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. 

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for thesurrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended fromHaines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jacksonroad over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold hiscommand in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State assoon as Vicksburg surrendered. Steele and Ord were directed to be inreadiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, andSherman was advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly, crossing theBig Black at three different points with as many columns, allconcentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson. 

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as itoccurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson. On the 8th of JulySherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up tothe defences of the city and shelling the town. The siege was kept upuntil the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy hadevacuated during the night. The weather was very hot, the roads dustyand the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had somuch the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division, Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson. 

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than onethousand men, killed, wounded and missing. The Confederate loss wasprobably less, except in captured. More than this number fell into ourhands as prisoners. 

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick whohad to be left behind. A large amount of rations was issued to thefamilies that remained in Jackson. Medicine and food were also sent toRaymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as Ithought it only fair that we should return to these people some of thearticles we had taken while marching through the country. I wrote toSherman: "Impress upon the men the importance of going through the Statein an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutelynecessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try tocreate as favorable an impression as possible upon the people. "Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all thepeople, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whoseresources had been taken for the supply of our army. Very largequantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. 

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the sameposition they had occupied before--from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff. Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regularConfederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, Ifelt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do morebefore the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and whileimportant points might be captured without bloodshed. I suggested tothe General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, startingfrom Lake Pontchartrain. Halleck preferred another course. Thepossession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed topossess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of theMississippi. I am well aware that the President was very anxious tohave a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreigngovernments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in thewar, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to theConfederate States. This, however, could have been easily done withoutwasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending agarrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande. 

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so that Iwas obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive asI had been a year before in west Tennessee. It would have been an easything to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there. Having thatas a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interiorto operate against General Bragg's army. This would necessarily havecompelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. If hehad not done this the troops from Mobile could have inflictedinestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army andLee's were yet receiving their supplies. I was so much impressed withthis idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, askingonly the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops ator near Mobile. I also asked for a leave of absence to visit NewOrleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should beapproved. Both requests were refused. So far as my experience withGeneral Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favorthan to grant one. But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simplyin line of duty, though out of my department. 

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of anarmy, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as hadbeen the case the year before after the fall of Corinth when the armywas sent where it would do the least good. By orders, I sent to Banks aforce of 4, 000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky and, whentransportation had been collected, started a division of 5, 000 men toSchofield in Missouri where Price was raiding the State. I alsodetached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that placepermanently. This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time whenRansom arrived there. The enemy happened to have a large number, about5, 000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed theEastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which hadprobably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on theway to Lee's and other armies in the East. 

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily andunpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands andsmall detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and indestroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. Theguerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, andtherefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. 

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton'sarmy and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also. The mendetermined not to fight again while the war lasted. Those who livedbeyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes. Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for theirsupport till the war was over. Besides all this there was quite a peacefeeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part ofMississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. It is not probable thatPemberton got off with over 4, 000 of his army to the camp where heproposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. 

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13thcorps, General Ord commanding, to Banks. Besides this I received ordersto co-operate with the latter general in movements west of theMississippi. Having received this order I went to New Orleans to conferwith Banks about the proposed movement. All these movements came tonaught. 

During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short distance aboveCarrollton. The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on myreturn to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in thestreet, fell, probably on me. I was rendered insensible, and when Iregained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with severaldoctors attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along thebody up to the arm-pit. The pain was almost beyond endurance. I lay atthe hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself inbed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and wascarried to it on a litter. I was then taken to Vicksburg, where Iremained unable to move for some time afterwards. 

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be madein my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. No orderswere issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except uponconsultation with and approval of Sherman. 

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Hallecktelegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence toTuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga. On the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go toRosecrans. This was received on the 27th. I was still confined to mybed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once orderedSherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could beprovided. The division of McPherson's corps, which had got off and wason the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to Hurlbut at Memphis. Hurlbut was directed to forward thesetwo divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also tosend any other troops that might be returning there. Halleck suggestedthat some good man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphisto take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, asbeing, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. Hewas directed to take with him another division of his corps. This leftone back, but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still theequivalent. 

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga hadbeen fought and Rosecrans forced back into Chattanooga. Theadministration as well as the General-in-chief was nearly frantic at thesituation of affairs there. Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the WarDepartment, was sent to Rosecrans' headquarters. I do not know what hisinstructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived thereat a later period. 

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon asable to move and take general direction of the troops moving from thewest. I received the following dispatch dated October 3d: "It is thewish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able hewill come to Cairo and report by telegraph. " I was still very lame, butstarted without delay. Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported bytelegraph: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to reportfrom Cairo was received at 11. 30 on the 10th. Left the same day withstaff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo. "

END OF VOLUME I.