CHAPTER XVI. 

AT CHATTANOOGA--THE ENEMY FORTIFIES LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND MISSIONARYRIDGE--REORGANIZING THE ARMY--REMOVAL OF GENERAL ROSECRANS--PUNISHMENT OF DESERTERS--GRANT AT CHATTANOOGA--THE FIGHT ON LOOKOUTMOUNTAIN--A BRAVE COLOR-BEARER--BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. 

By 9 o'clock on the morning of September 22 my command took up aposition within the heavy line of intrenchments at Chattanooga, thegreater part of which defenses had been thrown up since the armycommenced arriving there the day before. The enemy, having nowsomewhat recovered from the shock of the recent battle, followedcarefully, and soon invested us close into our lines with a parallelsystem of rifle-pits. He also began at once to erect permanent linesof earthworks on Missionary Ridge and to establish himself stronglyon Lookout Mountain. He then sent Wheeler's cavalry north of theTennessee, and, aided greatly by the configuration of the ground, held us in a state of partial siege, which serious rains mightconvert into a complete investment. The occupation of LookoutMountain broke our direct communication with Bridgeport--oursub-depot--and forced us to bring supplies by way of the SequatchieValley and Waldron's Ridge of the Cumberland Mountains, over a roadmost difficult even in the summer season, but now liable to berendered impassable by autumn rains. The distance to Bridgeport bythis circuitous route was sixty miles, and the numerous passes, coves, and small valleys through which the road ran offered temptingopportunities, for the destruction of trains, and the enemy was notslow to take advantage of them. Indeed, the situation was notpromising, and General Rosecrans himself, in communicating with thePresident the day succeeding the battle of Chickamauga, expresseddoubts of his ability to hold the gateway of the CumberlandMountains. 

The position taken up by my troops inside the lines of Chattanoogawas near the old iron-works, under the shadow of Lookout Mountain. Here we were exposed to a continual fire from the enemy's batteriesfor many days, but as the men were well covered by secure thoughsimple intrenchments, but little damage was done. My ownheadquarters were established on the grounds of Mr. WilliamCrutchfield, a resident of the place, whose devotion to the Unioncause knew no bounds, and who rendered me--and, in fact, at one timeor another, nearly every general officer in the Army of theCumberland--invaluable service in the way of information about theConfederate army. My headquarters camp frequently received shotsfrom the point of Lookout Mountain also, but fortunately nocasualties resulted from this plunging fire, though, I am free toconfess, at first our nerves were often upset by the whirring oftwenty-pounder shells dropped inconsiderately into our camp atuntimely hours of the night. 

In a few days rain began to fall, and the mountain roads by which oursupplies came were fast growing impracticable. Each succeeding trainof wagons took longer to make the trip from Bridgeport, and the draftmules were dying by the hundreds. The artillery horses would soon gotoo, and there was every prospect that later the troops would starveunless something could be done. Luckily for my division, a companyof the Second Kentucky Cavalry had attached itself to myheadquarters, and, though there without authority, had been leftundisturbed in view of a coming reorganization of the army incidentalto the removal of McCook and Crittenden from the command of theirrespective corps, a measure that had been determined upon immediatelyafter the battle of Chickamauga. Desiring to remain with me, CaptainLowell H. Thickstun, commanding this company, was ready for any dutyI might find, for him, so I ordered him into the Sequatchie Valleyfor the purpose of collecting supplies for my troops, and sent myscout, Card along to guide him to the best locations. The companyhid itself away in a deep cove in the upper end of the valley, and bykeeping very quiet and paying for everything it took from the people, in a few days was enabled to send me large quantities of corn for myanimals and food for the officers and men, which greatly supplementedthe scanty supplies we were getting from the sub-depot at Bridgeport. In this way I carried men and animals through our beleaguerment inpretty fair condition, and of the turkeys, chickens, ducks, and eggssent in for the messes of my officers we often had enough to divideliberally among those at different headquarters. Wheeler's cavalrynever discovered my detached company, yet the chances of its capturewere not small, sometimes giving much uneasiness; still, I concludedit was better to run all risks than to let the horses die ofstarvation in Chattanooga. Later, after the battle of MissionaryRidge, when I started to Knoxville, the company joined me inexcellent shape, bringing with it an abundance of food, including asmall herd of beef cattle. 

The whole time my line remained near the iron-mills the shelling fromLookout was kept up, the screeching shots inquisitively asking intheir well-known way, "Where are you? Where are you?" but it isstrange to see how readily, soldiers can become accustomed to thesound of dangerous missiles under circumstances of familiarity, andthis case was no exception to the rule. Few casualties occurred, andsoon contempt took the place of nervousness, and as we could notreply in kind on account of the elevation required for our guns, themen responded by jeers and imprecations whenever a shell fell intotheir camp. 

Meantime, orders having been issued for the organization of the army, additional troops were attached to my command, and it became theSecond Division of the Fourth Army Corps, to which Major-GeneralGordon Granger was assigned as commander. This necessitated a changeof position of the division, and I moved to ground behind our works, with my right resting on Fort Negley and my left extending well overtoward Fort Wood, my front being parallel to Missionary Ridge. Mydivision was now composed of twenty-five regiments, classified intobrigades and demi-brigades, the former commanded by Brigadier-GeneralG. D. Wagner, Colonel C. G. Harker, and Colonel F. T. Sherman; thelatter, by Colonels Laiboldt, Miller, Wood, Walworth, and Opdyke. The demi-brigade was an awkward invention of Granger's; but at thistime it was necessitated--perhaps by the depleted condition of ourregiments, which compelled the massing of a great number ofregimental organizations into a division to give it weight and force. 

On October 16, 1863, General Grant had been assigned to the commandof the "Military Division of the Mississippi, " a geographical areawhich embraced the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and theTennessee, thus effecting a consolidation of divided commands whichmight have been introduced most profitably at an earlier date. Thesame order that assigned General Grant relieved General Rosecrans, and placed General Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland. At the time of the reception of the order, Rosecrans was busy withpreparations for a movement to open the direct road to Bridgeport--having received in the interval, since we came back to Chattanooga, considerable reinforcement by the arrival in his department of theEleventh and Twelfth corps, under General Hooker, from the Army ofthe Potomac. With this force Rosecrans had already strengthenedcertain important points on the railroad between Nashville andStevenson, and given orders to Hooker to concentrate at Bridgeportsuch portions of his command as were available, and to hold them inreadiness to advance toward Chattanooga. 

On the 19th of October, after turning the command over to Thomas, General Rosecrans quietly slipped away from the army. He submitteduncomplainingly to his removal, and modestly left us without fuss ordemonstration; ever maintaining, though, that the battle ofChickamauga was in effect a victory, as it had ensured us, he said, the retention of Chattanooga. When his departure became knowndeep and almost universal regret was expressed, for he wasenthusiastically esteemed and loved by the Army of the Cumberland, from the day he assumed command of it until he left it, notwithstanding the censure poured upon him after the battle ofChickamauga. 

The new position to which my division had been moved, in consequenceof the reorganization, required little additional labor to strengthenit, and the routine of fatigue duty and drills was continued asbefore, its monotony occasionally broken by the excitement of anexpected attack, or by amusements of various kinds that werecalculated to keep the men in good spirits. Toward this result muchwas contributed by Mr. James E. Murdock, the actor, who came downfrom the North to recover the body of his son, killed at Chickamauga, and was quartered with me for the greater part of the time he wasobliged to await the successful conclusion of his sad mission. Hespent days, and even weeks, going about through the division givingrecitations before the camp-fires, and in improvised chapels, whichthe men had constructed from refuse lumber and canvas. Suiting hisselections to the occasion, he never failed to excite intenseinterest in the breasts of all present, and when circumstancesfinally separated him from us, all felt that a debt of gratitude wasdue him that could never be paid. The pleasure he gave, and theconfident feeling that was now arising from expected reinforcements, was darkened, however, by one sad incident. Three men of my divisionhad deserted their colors at the beginning of the siege and madetheir way north. They were soon arrested, and were brought back tostand trial for the worst offense that can be committed by a soldier, convicted of the crime, and ordered to be shot. To make the exampleeffective I paraded the whole division for the execution, and on the13th of November, in the presence of their former comrades, theculprits were sent, in accordance with the terms of their sentence, to render their account to the Almighty. It was the saddestspectacle I ever witnessed, but there could be no evasion, nomitigation of the full letter of the law; its timely enforcement wasbut justice to the brave spirits who had yet to fight the rebellionto the end. 

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on October 23, and began at onceto carry out the plans that had been formed for opening the shorteror river road to Bridgeport. This object was successfullyaccomplished by the moving of Hooker's command to Rankin's andBrown's ferries in concert with a force from the Army of theCumberland which was directed on the same points, so by the 27th ofOctober direct communication with our depots was established. Thefour weeks which followed this cheering result were busy with thework of refitting and preparing for offensive operations as soon asGeneral Sherman should reach us with his troops from West Tennessee. During this period of activity the enemy committed the serious faultof detaching Longstreet's corps--sending it to aid in the siege ofKnoxville in East Tennessee--an error which has no justificationwhatever, unless it be based on the presumption that it wasabsolutely necessary that Longstreet should ultimately rejoin Lee'sarmy in Virginia by way of Knoxville and Lynchburg, with a chance ofpicking up Burnside en route. Thus depleted, Bragg still heldMissionary Ridge in strong force, but that part of his line whichextended across the intervening valley to the northerly point of. Lookout Mountain was much attenuated. 

By the 18th of November General Grant had issued instructionscovering his intended operations. They contemplated that Sherman'scolumn, which was arriving by the north bank of the Tennessee, shouldcross the river on a pontoon bridge just below the mouth ofChickamauga Creek and carry the northern extremity of MissionaryRidge as far as the railroad tunnel; that the Army of the Cumberland--the centre--should co-operate with Sherman; and that Hooker with amixed command should continue to hold Lookout Valley and operate onour extreme right as circumstances might warrant. Sherman crossed onthe 24th to perform his alloted part of the programme, but in themeantime Grant becoming impressed with the idea that Bragg wasendeavoring to get away, ordered Thomas to make a strongdemonstration in his front, to determine the truth or falsity of theinformation that had been received. This task fell to the FourthCorps, and at 12 o'clock on the 23d I was notified that Wood'sdivision would make a reconnoissance to an elevated point in itsfront called Orchard Knob, and that I was to support it with mydivision and prevent Wood's right flank from being turned by anadvance of the enemy on Moore's road or from the direction ofRossville. For this duty I marched my division out of the worksabout 2 p. M. , and took up a position on Bushy Knob. Shortly after wereached this point Wood's division passed my left flank on itsreconnoissance, and my command, moving in support of it, drove in theenemy's picket-line. Wood's took possession of Orchard Knob easily, and mine was halted on a low ridge to the right of the Knob, where Iwas directed by General Thomas to cover my front by a strong line ofrifle-pits, and to put in position two batteries of the Fourthregular artillery that had joined me from the Eleventh Corps. Afterdark Wood began to feel uneasy about his right flank, for a gapexisted between it and my left, so I moved in closer to him, takingup a line where I remained inactive till the 25th, but suffering someinconvenience from the enemy's shells. 

On the 24th General Sherman made an attack for the purpose ofcarrying the north end of Missionary Ridge. His success was notcomplete, although at the time it was reported throughout the army tobe so. It had the effect of disconcerting Bragg, however, and causedhim to strengthen his right by withdrawing troops from his left, which circumstance led Hooker to advance on the northerly face ofLookout Mountain. At first, with good glasses, we could plainly seeHooker's troops driving the Confederates up the face of the mountain. All were soon lost to view in the dense timber, but emerged again onthe open ground, across which the Confederates retreated at a livelypace, followed by the pursuing line, which was led by a color-bearer, who, far in advance, was bravely waving on his comrades. Thegallantry of this man elicited much enthusiasm among us all, but ashe was a considerable distance ahead of his comrades I expected tosee his rashness punished at any moment by death or capture. Hefinally got quite near the retreating Confederates, when suddenlythey made a dash at him, but he was fully alive to such a move, andran back, apparently uninjured, to his friends. About this time asmall squad of men reached the top of Lookout and planted the Starsand Stripes on its very crest. Just then a cloud settled down on themountain, and a heavy bank of fog obscured its whole face. 

After the view was lost the sharp rattle of musketry continued sometime, but practically the fight had been already won by Hooker's men, the enemy only holding on with a rear-guard to assure his retreatacross Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge. Later we heard veryheavy cannonading, and fearing that Hooker was in trouble I sent astaff-officer to find out whether he needed assistance, which Ithought could be given by a demonstration toward Rossville. Theofficer soon returned with the report that Hooker was all right, thatthe cannonading was only a part of a little rear-guard fight, twosections of artillery making all the noise, the reverberations frompoint to point in the adjacent mountains echoing and reechoing tillit seemed that at least fifty guns were engaged. 

On the morning of the 25th of November Bragg's entire army washolding only the line of Missionary Ridge, and our troops, being nowpractically connected from Sherman to Hooker, confronted it with theArmy of the Cumberland in the centre--bowed out along the front ofWood's division and mine. Early in the day Sherman, with greatdetermination and persistence, made an attempt to carry the highground near the tunnel, first gaining and then losing advantage, buthis attack was not crowned with the success anticipated. MeanwhileHooker and Palmer were swinging across Chattanooga Valley, using meas a pivot for the purpose of crossing Missionary Ridge in theneighborhood of Rossville. In the early part of the day I had drivenin the Confederate pickets in my front, so as to prolong my line ofbattle on that of Wood, the necessity of continuing to refuse myright having been obviated by the capture of Lookout Mountain and theadvance of Palmer. 

About 2 o'clock orders came to carry the line at the foot of theridge, attacking at a signal of six guns. I had few changes or newdispositions to make. Wagner's brigade, which was next to Wood'sdivision, was formed in double lines, and Harker's brigade took thesame formation on Wagner's right. Colonel F. T. Sherman's brigadecame on Harker's right, formed in a column of attack, with a front ofthree regiments, he having nine. My whole front was covered with aheavy line of skirmishers. These dispositions made, my right resteda little distance south of Moore's road, my left joined Wood overtoward Orchard Knob, while my centre was opposite Thurman's house--the headquarters of General Bragg--on Missionary Ridge. A smallstream of water ran parallel to my front, as far as which the groundwas covered by a thin patch of timber, and beyond the edge of thetimber was an open plain to the foot of Missionary Ridge, varying inwidth from four to nine hundred yards. At the foot of the ridge wasthe enemy's first line of rifle-pits; at a point midway up its face, another line, incomplete; and on the crest was a third line, in whichBragg had massed his artillery. 

The enemy saw we were making dispositions for an attack, and in plainview of my whole division he prepared himself for resistance, marching regiments from his left flank with flying colors; andfilling up the spaces not already occupied in his intrenchments. Seeing the enemy thus strengthening himself, it was plain that wewould have to act quickly if we expected to accomplish much, and Ialready began to doubt the feasibility of our remaining in the firstline of rifle-pits when we should have carried them. I discussed theorder with Wagner, Harker, and Sherman, and they were similarlyimpressed, so while anxiously awaiting the signal I sent CaptainRansom of my staff to Granger, who was at Fort Wood, to ascertain ifwe were to carry the first line or the ridge beyond. Shortly afterRansom started the signal guns were fired, and I told my brigadecommanders to go for the ridge. 

Placing myself in front of Harker's brigade, between the line ofbattle and the skirmishers, accompanied by only an orderly so as notto attract the enemy's fire, we moved out. Under a terrible storm ofshot and shell the line pressed forward steadily through the timber, and as it emerged on the plain took the double-quick and with fixedbayonets rushed at the enemy's first line. Not a shot was fired fromour line of battle, and as it gained on my skirmishers they meltedinto and became one with it, and all three of my brigades went overthe rifle-pits simultaneously. They then lay down on the face of theridge, for a breathing-spell and for protection' from the terriblefire, of canister and musketry pouring over us from the guns on thecrest. At the rifle-pits there had been little use for the bayonet, for most of the Confederate troops, disconcerted by the sudden rush, lay close in the ditch and surrendered, though some few fled up theslope to the next line. The prisoners were directed to move out toour rear, and as their intrenchments had now come under fire from thecrest, they went with alacrity, and without guard or escort, towardChattanooga. 

After a short pause to get breath the ascent of the ridge began, andI rode, into the ditch of the intrenchments to drive out a fewskulkers who were hiding there. Just at this time I was joined byCaptain Ransom, who, having returned from Granger, told me that wewere to carry only the line at the base, and that in coming back, when he struck the left of the division, knowing this interpretationof the order, he in his capacity as an aide-de-camp had directedWagner, who was up on the face of the ridge, to return, and that inconsequence Wagner was recalling his men to the base. I could notbear to order the recall of troops now so gallantly climbing the hillstep by step, and believing we could take it, I immediately rode toWagner's brigade and directed it to resume the attack. In themeantime Harker's and F. T. Sherman's troops were approaching thepartial line of works midway of the ridge, and as I returned to thecentre of their rear, they were being led by many stands ofregimental colors. There seemed to be a rivalry as to which colorshould be farthest to the front; first one would go forward a fewfeet, then another would come up to it, the color-bearers vying withone another as to who should be foremost, until finally everystandard was planted on the intermediate works. The enemy's firefrom the crest during the ascent was terrific in the noise made, butas it was plunging, it over-shot and had little effect on those abovethe second line of pits, but was very uncomfortable for those below, so I deemed it advisable to seek another place, and Wagner's brigadehaving reassembled and again pressed up the ridge, I rode up the faceto join my troops. 

As soon as the men saw me, they surged forward and went over theworks on the crest. The parapet of the intrenchment was too high formy horse to jump, so, riding a short distance to the left, I enteredthrough a low place in the line. A few Confederates were foundinside, but they turned the butts of their muskets toward me in tokenof surrender, for our men were now passing beyond them on both theirflanks. 

The right and right centre of my division gained the summit first, they being partially sheltered by a depression in the face of theridge, the Confederates in their immediate front fleeing down thesouthern face. When I crossed the rifle-pits on the top theConfederates were still holding fast at Bragg's headquarters, and abattery located there opened fire along the crest; making things mostuncomfortably hot. Seeing the danger to which I was exposed, for Iwas mounted, Colonel Joseph Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri, ran upand begged me to dismount. I accepted his excellent advice, and itprobably saved my life; but poor Conrad was punished for hissolicitude by being seriously wounded in the thigh at the moment hewas thus contributing to my safety. 

Wildly cheering, the men advanced along the ridge toward Bragg'sheadquarters, and soon drove the Confederates from this lastposition, capturing a number of prisoners, among them Breckenridge'sand Bates's adjutant-generals, and the battery that had made suchstout resistance on the crest-two guns which were named "LadyBreckenridge" and "Lady Buckner" General Bragg himself having barelytime to escape before his headquarters were taken. 

My whole division had now reached the summit, and Wagner and Harker--the latter slightly wounded--joined me as I was standing in thebattery just secured. The enemy was rapidly retiring, and thoughmany of his troops, with disorganized wagon-trains and several piecesof artillery, could be distinctly seen in much confusion about half amile distant in the valley below, yet he was covering them with apretty well organized line that continued to give us a desultoryfire. Seeing this, I at once directed Wagner and Harker to take upthe pursuit along Moore's road, which led to Chickamauga Station--Bragg's depot of supply--and as they progressed, I pushed Sherman'sbrigade along the road behind them. Wagner and Harker soon overtookthe rearguard, and a slight skirmish caused it to break, permittingnine guns and a large number of wagons which were endeavoring to getaway in the stampede to fall into our hands. 

About a mile and a half beyond Missionary Ridge, Moore's road passedover a second ridge or high range of hills, and here the enemy haddetermined to make a stand for that purpose, posting eight pieces ofartillery with such supporting force as he could rally. He wasimmediately attacked by Harker and Wagner, but the position wasstrong, the ridge being rugged and difficult of ascent, and after thefirst onset our men recoiled. A staff-officer from Colonel Wood'sdemi-brigade informing me at this juncture that that command was tooweak to carry the position in its front, I ordered the FifteenthIndiana and the Twenty-Sixth Ohio to advance to Wood's aid, and thenhastening to the front I found his men clinging to the face of theridge, contending stubbornly with the rear-guard of the enemy. Directing Harker to put Opdyke's demi-brigade in on the right, Iinformed Wagner that it was necessary to flank the enemy by carryingthe high bluff on our left where the ridge terminated, that I haddesignated the Twenty-Sixth Ohio and Fifteenth Indiana for the work, and that I wished him to join them. 

It was now dusk, but the two regiments engaged in the flankingmovement pushed on to gain the bluff. Just as they reached the crestof the ridge the moon rose from behind, enlarged by the refraction ofthe atmosphere, and as the attacking column passed along the summitit crossed the moon's disk and disclosed to us below a mostinteresting panorama, every figure nearly being thrown out in fullrelief. The enemy, now outflanked on left and right, abandoned hisground, leaving us two pieces of artillery and a number of wagons. After this ridge was captured I found that no other troops than minewere pursuing the enemy, so I called a halt lest I might become toomuch isolated. Having previously studied the topography of thecountry thoroughly, I knew that if I pressed on my line of marchwould carry me back to Chickamauga station, where we would be in rearof the Confederates that had been fighting General Sherman, and thatthere was a possibility of capturing them by such action; but I didnot feel warranted in marching there alone, so I rode back toMissionary Ridge to ask for more troops, and upon arriving there Ifound Granger in command, General Thomas having gone back toChattanooga. 

Granger was at Braggy's late headquarters in bed. I informed him ofmy situation and implored him to follow me up with the Army of theCumberland, but he declined, saying that he thought we had done wellenough. I still insisting, he told me finally to push on to thecrossing of Chickamauga Creek, and if I, encountered the enemy hewould order troops to my support. I returned to my division about12 o'clock at night, got it under way, and reached the crossing, about half a mile from the station, at 2 o'clock on the morning ofthe 26th, and there found the bridge destroyed, but that the creekwas fordable. I did not encounter the enemy in any force, but fearedto go farther without assistance. This I thought I might bring up bypracticing a little deception, so I caused two regiments to simulatean engagement by opening fire, hoping that this would alarm Grangerand oblige him to respond with troops, but my scheme failed. GeneralGranger afterward told me that he had heard the volleys, butsuspected their purpose, knowing that they were not occasioned by afight, since they were too regular in their delivery. 

I was much disappointed that my pursuit had not been supported, for Ifelt that great results were in store for us should the enemy bevigorously followed. Had the troops under Granger's command beenpushed out with mine when Missionary Ridge was gained, we could havereached Chickamauga Station by 12 o'clock the night of the 25th; orhad they been sent even later, when I called for them, we could havegot there by daylight and worked incalculable danger to theConfederates, for the force that had confronted Sherman did not passChickamauga Station in their retreat till after daylight on themorning of the 26th. 

My course in following so close was dictated by a thorough knowledgeof the topography of the country and a familiarity with its roads, bypaths, and farm-houses, gained with the assistance of Mr. Crutchfield; and sure my column was heading in the right direction, though night had fallen I thought that an active pursuit would almostcertainly complete the destruction of Bragg's army. When GeneralGrant came by my bivouac at the crossing of Chickamauga Creek on the26th, he realized what might have been accomplished had thesuccessful assault on Missionary Ridge been supplemented by vigorousefforts on the part of some high officers, who were more interestedin gleaning that portion of the battle-field over which my commandhad passed than in destroying a panic-stricken enemy. 

Although it cannot be said that the result of the two days'operations was reached by the methods which General Grant hadindicated in his instructions preceding the battle, yet the generaloutcome was unquestionably due to his genius, for the manoeuvring ofSherman's and Hooker's commands created the opportunity for Thomas'scorps of the Army of the Cumberland to carry the ridge at the centre. In directing Sherman to attack the north end of the ridge, Grantdisconcerted Bragg--who was thus made to fear the loss of his depotof supplies at Chickamauga Station--and compelled him to resiststoutly; and stout resistance to Sherman meant the withdrawal of theConfederates from Lookout Mountain. While this attack was in processof execution advantage was taken of it by Hooker in a well-plannedand well-fought battle, but to my mind an unnecessary one, for ourpossession of Lookout was the inevitable result that must follow fromSherman's threatening attitude. The assault on Missionary Ridge byGranger's and Palmer's corps was not premeditated by Grant, hedirecting only the line at its base to be carried, but when this fellinto our hands the situation demanded our getting the one at the topalso. 

I took into the action an effective force of 6, 000, and lost 123officers and 1, 181 men killed and wounded. These casualties speaklouder than words of the character of the fight, and plainly tellwhere the enemy struggled most stubbornly for these figures compriseone-third the casualties of the entire body of Union troops--Sherman's and all included. My division captured 1, 762 prisonersand, in all, seventeen pieces of artillery. Six of these guns Iturned over with caissons complete; eleven were hauled off the fieldand appropriated by an officer of high rank--General Hazen. I haveno disposition to renew the controversy which grew out of thismatter. At the time the occurrence took place I made the charge in aplain official report, which was accepted as correct by the corps andarmy commanders, from General Granger up to General Grant. GeneralHazen took no notice of this report then, though well aware of itsexistence. Nearly a quarter of a century later, however, heendeavored to justify his retention of the guns by trying to showthat his brigade was the first to reach the crest of MissionaryRidge, and that he was therefore entitled to them. This claim ofbeing the first to mount the ridge is made by other brigades thanHazen's, with equal if not greater force, so the absurdity of hisdeduction is apparent:

NOTE: In a book published by General Hazen in 1885, he endeavored toshow, by a number of letters from subordinate officers of hiscommand, written at his solicitation from fifteen to twenty yearsafter the occurrence, that his brigade was the first to mountMissionary Ridge, and that it was entitled to possess these guns. The doubtful character of testimony dimmed by the lapse of many yearshas long been conceded, and I am content to let the controversy standthe test of history, based on the conclusions of General Grant, as hedrew them from official reports made when the circumstances werefresh in the minds of all. 

General Grant says: "To Sheridan's prompt movement, the Army of theCumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture ofprisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his promptpursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. "

General Thomas says: "We captured all their cannon and ammunitionbefore they could be removed or destroyed. After halting a fewmoments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scatteredin the assault of the hill, General Sheridan pushed forward inpursuit, and drove those in his front who had escaped capture acrossChickamauga Creek. "

REPORT OF COLONEL FRANCIS T. SHERMAN, COMMANDING FIRST BRIGADE:"When within ten yards of the crest, our men seemed to be thrownforward as if by some powerful engine, and the old flag was plantedfirmly and surely on the last line of works of the enemy, followed bythe men, taking one battery of artillery. "

REPORT OF COLONEL MICHAEL GOODING, TWENTY-SECOND INDIANA:.... "I pushed men up to the second line of works as fast as possible;on and on, clear to the top, and over the ridge they went, to thehollow beyond, killing and wounding numbers of the enemy as weadvanced, and leaving the rebel battery in our rear. We capturedgreat numbers of prisoners, and sent them to the rear without guards, as we deemed the pursuit of the enemy of greater importance.... "I cannot give too much praise to Captain Powers, Company "H, "Lieutenant Smith, Company "K, " Lieutenant Gooding, Company "A, " andSecond Lieutenant Moser, Company "G, " for their assistance, and forthe gallant manner in which they encouraged their men up the side ofthe mountain, and charging the enemy's works right up to the muzzlesof their guns. "

REPORT OF COLONEL JASON MARSH, SEVENTY-FOURTH ILLINOIS:.... "The first on the enemy's works, and almost simultaneously, wereLieutenant Clement, Company "A, " Captain Stegner, Company "I, "Captain Bacon, Company "G, " and Captain Leffingwell, with some oftheir men. The enemy was still in considerable force behind theirworks; but, for some unaccountable reason, they either fled orsurrendered instantly upon the first few of our men reaching them--not even trying to defend their battery, which was immediatelycaptured by Captain Stegner. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PORTER C. OLSON, THIRTY-SIXTH ILLINOIS:.... "In connection with other regiments of this brigade, we assistedin capturing several pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, and agreat quantity of small-arms. "

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHN Q. LANE:.... "At the house known as Bragg's headquarters, the enemy weredriven from three guns, which fell into our hands. "

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. D. WAGNER, SECOND BRIGADE:.... "I ordered the command to storm the ridge, bringing up theFifteenth Indiana and Ninety-seventh Ohio, which had not yet beenengaged, although suffering from the enemy's artillery. The resultis a matter of history, as we gained the ridge, capturing artillery, prisoners, and small-arms; to what amount, however, I do not know, aswe pushed on after the enemy as soon as I had re-formed the command..... Captain Tinney, with his usual gallantry, dashed up the line withthe first troops, and with the aid of an orderly (George Dusenbury, Fifteenth Indiana), turned the loaded gun of the enemy on hisretreating ranks. "

REPORT OF CAPTAIN BENJAMIN F. HEGLER, FIFTEENTH INDIANA:.... "Our captures amounted to prisoners not counted, representingmany different regiments; several pieces of artillery, and somewagons. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ELIAS NEFF, FORTIETH INDIANA:.... "As the regiment reached the top of the ridge and swept for. Ward, the right passed through, without stopping to take possession, the battery at General Bragg's headquarters that had fired sovenomously during the whole contest. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. MOORE, FIFTY-EIGHTH INDIANA:.... "In passing to the front from Missionary Ridge, we saw severalpieces of artillery which had been abandoned by the enemy, though Idid not leave any one in charge of them. "

REPORT OF MAJOR C, M. HAMMOND, ONE HUNDREDTH ILLINOIS:.... "I immediately organized my regiment, and while so doingdiscovered a number of pieces of artillery in a ravine on my left. Isent Lieutenant Stewart, of Company A, to see if these guns which theenemy had abandoned could not be turned upon them. He returned andreported them to be four ten-pound Parrotts and two brass Napoleons;also that it would require a number of men to place them in position. I ordered him to report the same to General Wagner, and askpermission, but before receiving a reply was ordered by you to moveforward my regiment on the left of the Fifty-Eighth IndianaVolunteers. "

REPORT OF COLONEL CHARLES G. HARKER, THIRD BRIGADE:.... "My right and Colonel Sherman's left interlocked, so to speak, aswe approached the summit, and it was near this point that I saw thefirst part of my line gain the crest. This was done by a few bravemen of my own and Colonel Sherman's command driving the enemy fromhis intrenchments. The gap thus opened, our men rushed rapidly in, and the enemy, loth to give up their position, still remained, firingat my command toward the left, and the battery in front of the houseknown as General Bragg's headquarters was still firing at the troops, and was captured by our men while the gunners were still at theirposts........ "We captured and sent to division and corps headquarters 503prisoners and a large number of small-arms. In regard to the numberof pieces of artillery, it will probably be difficult to reconcilethe reports of my regimental commanders with the reports of otherregiments and brigades who fought so nobly with my own command, andwho alike are entitled to share the honors and glories of the day. More anxious to follow the enemy than to appropriate trophies alreadysecured, we pushed to the front, while the place we occupied onascending the hill was soon occupied by other troops, who, I havelearned, claim the artillery as having fallen into their own hands. It must therefore remain with the division and corps commanders, whoknew the relative position of each brigade and division, to accord toeach the trophies to which they are due..... "From my personal observation I can claim a battery of six gunscaptured by a portion of my brigade. "

REPORT OF COLONEL EMERSON OPDYKE, FIRST DEMI-BRIGADE:.... "My command captured Bragg's headquarters, house, and the sixguns which were near there; one of these I ordered turned upon theenemy, which was done with effect. "

REPORT OF COLONEL H. C. DUNLAP, THIRD KENTUCKY:.... "The point at which the centre of my regiment reached the crestwas at the stable to the left of the house said to be Bragg'sheadquarters, and immediately in front of the road which leads downthe southern slope of the ridge. One piece of the abandoned battery, was to the left of this point, the remainder to the right, near by. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. A. BULLITT, SIXTY-FIFTH OHIO:.... "The position in which my regiment found itself was immediatelyin front of a battery, which belched forth a stream of canister uponus with terrible rapidity. In addition to this, the enemy, wheneverdriven from other points, rallied around this battery, and defendedit with desperation. It cost a struggle to take it; but we finallysucceeded, and the colors of the Sixty-fifth Ohio were the firstplanted upon the yet smoking guns. Captain Smith, of my regiment, was placed in charge of the captured battery, which consisted of 5guns, 3 caissons, and 17 horses. "

REPORT OF CAPTAIN E. P. BATES, ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH OHIO:.... "Perceiving that the ridge across which my regiment extended wascommanded to the very crest by a battery in front, also by those toright and left, I directed the men to pass up the gorges on eitherside. About forty men, with Captain Parks and Lieutenant Stinger, passed to the left, the balance to the right, and boldly charged on, till, foremost with those of other regiments, they stood on thestrongest point of the enemy's works, masters alike of his guns andposition.... Captain Parks reports his skirmish-line to have chargedupon and captured one gun, that otherwise would have been hauledoff. "

REPORT OF COLONEL ALLEN BUCKNER, SEVENTY-NINTH ILLINOIS:.... "The right of the regiment rested on the left of the road, whereit crossed the rebel fortification, leading up the hill towardBragg's headquarters. We took a right oblique direction through apeach orchard until arriving at the woods and logs on the side of theridge, when I ordered the men to commence firing, which they did withgood effect, and continued it all the way up until the heights weregained. At this point the left of the regiment was near the right ofthe house, and I claim that my officers and men captured two largebrass pieces, literally punching the cannoniers from their guns. Privates John Fregan and Jasper Patterson, from Company "A, " rusheddown the hill, captured one caisson, with a cannonier and six horses, and brought them back. "

REPORT OF COLONEL J. R. MILES, TWENTY-SEVENTH ILLINOIS:.... "The regiment, without faltering, finally, at about 4. 30 P. M. , gained the enemy's works in conjunction with a party of theThirty-sixth Illinois, who were immediately on our right. Theregiment, or a portion of it, proceeded to the left, down the ridge, for nearly or quite a quarter of a mile capturing three or four piecesof cannon, driving the gunners from them. "

CHAPTER XVII. 

ORDERED TO RETURN TO CHATTANOOGA--MARCH TO KNOXVILLE--COLLECTINGSUBSISTENCE STORES--A CLEVER STRATAGEM--A BRIDGE OF WAGONS--LOOKINGOUT FOR THE PERSONAL COMFORT OF THE SOLDIERS-A LEAVE OF ABSENCE--ORDERED TO WASHINGTON--PARTING WITH SHERIDAN'S DIVISION. 

The day after the battle of Missionary Ridge I was ordered in theevening to return to Chattanooga, and from the limited supply ofstores to be had there outfit my command to march to the relief ofKnoxville, where General Burnside was still holding out against thebesieging forces of General Longstreet. When we left Murfreesboro'in the preceding June, the men's knapsacks and extra clothing, aswell as all our camp equipage, had been left behind, and thesearticles had not yet reached us, so we were poorly prepared for awinter campaign in the mountains of East Tennessee. There was butlittle clothing to be obtained in Chattanooga, and my commandreceived only a few overcoats and a small supply of India-rubberponchos. We could get no shoes, although we stood in great need ofthem, for the extra pair with which each man had started out fromMurfreesboro' was now much the worse for wear. The necessity forsuccoring Knoxville was urgent, however, so we speedily refitted asthoroughly as was possible with the limited means at hand. Mydivision teams were in very fair condition in consequence of theforage we had procured in the Sequatchie Valley, so I left the trainbehind to bring up clothing when any should arrive in Chattanooga. 

Under these circumstances, on the 29th of November the Fourth Corps(Granger's) took up the line of march for Knoxville, my men carryingin their haversacks four days' rations, depending for a furthersupply of food on a small steamboat loaded with subsistence stores, which was to proceed up the Tennessee River and keep abreast of thecolumn. 

Not far from Philadelphia, Tennessee, the columns of GeneralSherman's army, which had kept a greater distance from the river thanGranger's corps, so as to be able to subsist on the country, came intoward our right and the whole relieving force was directed onMarysville, about fifteen miles southwest of Knoxville. We got toMarysville December 5, and learned the same day that Longstreet hadshortly before attempted to take Knoxville by a desperate assault, but signally failing, had raised the siege and retired toward Bean'sStation on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and Bristol road, leading toVirginia. From Marysville General Sherman's troops returned toChattanooga, while Granger's corps continued on toward Knoxville, totake part in the pursuit of Longstreet. 

Burnside's army was deficient in subsistence, though not to theextent that we had supposed before leaving Chattanooga. It had eatenout the country in the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, however;therefore my division did not cross the Holstein River, but wasrequired, in order to maintain itself, to proceed to the region ofthe French Broad River. To this end I moved to Sevierville, andmaking this village my headquarters, the division was spread out overthe French Broad country, between Big Pigeon and Little Pigeonrivers, where we soon had all the mills in operation, grinding outplenty of flour and meal. The whole region was rich in provenderof all kinds, and as the people with rare exceptions wereenthusiastically loyal, we in a little while got more than enoughfood for ourselves, and by means of flatboats began sending thesurplus down the river to the troops at Knoxville. 

The intense loyalty of this part of Tennessee exceeded that of anyother section I was in during the war. The people could not do toomuch to aid the Union cause, and brought us an abundance ofeverything needful. The women were especially loyal, and as many oftheir sons and husbands, who had been compelled to "refugee" onaccount of their loyal sentiments, returned with us, numbers of thewomen went into ecstasies of joy when this part of the Union armyappeared among them. So long as we remained in the French Broadregion, we lived on the fat of the land, but unluckily our stay wasto be of short duration, for Longstreet's activity kept thedepartment commander in a state of constant alarm. 

Soon after getting the mills well running, and when the shipment oftheir surplus product down the river by flatboats had begun, I wasordered to move to Knoxville, on account of demonstrations byLongstreet from the direction of Blain's crossroads. On arriving atKnoxville, an inspection of my command, showed that the shoes of manyof the men were entirely worn out, the poor fellows having beenobliged to protect their feet with a sort of moccasin, made fromtheir blankets or from such other material as they could procure. About six hundred of the command were in this condition, plainly notsuitably shod to withstand the frequent storms of sleet and snow. These men I left in Knoxville to await the arrival of my train, whichI now learned was en route from Chattanooga with shoes, overcoats, and other clothing, and with the rest of the division proceeded toStrawberry Plains, which we reached the latter part of December. 

Mid-winter was now upon us, and the weather in this mountain regionof East Tennessee was very cold, snow often falling to the depth ofseveral inches. The thin and scanty clothing of the men affordedlittle protection, and while in bivouac their only shelter was theponchos with which they had been provided before leaving Chattanooga;there was not a tent in the command. Hence great suffering resulted, which I anxiously hoped would be relieved shortly by the arrival ofmy train with supplies. In the course of time the wagons reachedKnoxville, but my troops derived little comfort from this fact, forthe train was stopped by General Foster, who had succeeded Burnsidein command of the department, its contents distributed pro rata tothe different organizations of the entire army, and I received but asmall share. This was very disappointing, not to say exasperating, but I could not complain of unfairness, for every command in the armywas suffering to the same extent as mine, and yet it did seem that alittle forethought and exertion on the part of some of the othersuperior officers, whose transportation was in tolerable condition, might have ameliorated the situation considerably. I sent the trainback at once for more clothing, and on its return, just beforereaching Knoxville, the quartermaster in charge, Captain PhilipSmith, filled the open spaces in the wagons between the bows and loadwith fodder and hay, and by this clever stratagem passed it throughthe town safe and undisturbed as a forage train. On Smith's arrivalwe lost no time in issuing the clothing, and when it had passed intothe hands of the individual soldiers the danger of its appropriationfor general distribution, like the preceding invoice, was veryremote. 

General Foster had decided by this time to move his troops toDandridge for the twofold purpose of threatening the enemy's left andof getting into a locality where we could again gather subsistencefrom the French Broad region. Accordingly we began an advance on the15th of January, the cavalry having preceded us some time before. The Twenty-third Corps and Wood's division of the Fourth Corpscrossed the Holstein River by a bridge that had been constructed atStrawberry Plains. My division being higher up the stream, fordedit, the water very deep and bitter cold, being filled with slushyice. Marching by way of New Market, I reached Dandridge on the 17th, and here on my arrival met General Sturgis, then commanding ourcavalry. He was on the eve of setting out to, "whip the enemy'scavalry, " as he said, and wanted me to go along and see him do it. Ideclined, however, for being now the senior officer present, Foster, Parke, and Granger having remained at Knoxville and StrawberryPlains, their absence left me in command, and it was necessary that Ishould make disposition of the infantry when it arrived. As therewere indications of a considerable force of the enemy on theRussellville road I decided to place the troops in line of battle, soas to be prepared for any emergency that might arise in the absenceof the senior officers, and I deemed it prudent to supervisepersonally the encamping of the men. This disposition necessarilyrequired that some of the organizations should occupy verydisagreeable ground, but I soon got all satisfactorily posted withthe exception of General Willich, who expressed some discontent atbeing placed beyond the shelter of the timber, but accepted thesituation cheerfully when its obvious necessity was pointed out tohim. 

Feeling that all was secure, I returned to my headquarters in thevillage with the idea that we were safely established in ease ofattack, and that the men would now have a good rest if leftundisturbed; and plenty to eat, but hardly had I reached my own campwhen a staff-officer came post-haste from Sturgis with theinformation that he was being driven back to my lines, despite theconfident invitation to me (in the morning) to go out and witness thewhipping which was to be given to the enemy's cavalry. Riding to thefront, I readily perceived that the information was correct, and Ihad to send a brigade of infantry out to help Sturgis, thus relievinghim from a rather serious predicament. Indeed, the enemy was presentin pretty strong force, both cavalry and infantry, and from hisvicious attack on Sturgis it looked very much as though he intendedto bring on a general engagement. 

Under such circumstances I deemed it advisable that the responsiblecommanders of the army should be present, and so informed them. Mycommunication brought Parke and Granger to the front without delay, but Foster could not come, since the hardships of the winter hadreopened an old wound received during the Mexican War, and brought onmuch suffering. By the time Parke and Granger arrived, however, theenemy, who it turned out was only making a strong demonstration tolearn the object of our movement on Dandridge, seemed satisfied withthe results of his reconnoissance, and began falling back towardBull's Gap. Meanwhile Parke and Granger concluded that Dandridge wasan untenable point, and hence decided to withdraw a part of the armyto Strawberry Plains; and the question of supplies again coming up, it was determined to send the Fourth Corps to the south side of theFrench Broad to obtain subsistence, provided we could bridge theriver so that men could get across the deep and icy stream withoutsuffering. 

I agreed to undertake the construction of a bridge on condition thateach division should send to the ford twenty-five wagons with whichto make it. This being acceded to, Harker's brigade began the worknext morning at a favorable point a few miles down the river. As myquota of wagons arrived, they were drawn into the stream one afteranother by the wheel team, six men in each wagon, and as theysuccessively reached the other side of the channel the mules wereunhitched, the pole of each wagon run under the hind axle of the onejust in front, and the tailboards used so as to span the slight spacebetween them. The plan worked well as long as the material lasted, but no other wagons than my twenty-five coming on the ground, thework stopped when the bridge was only half constructed. Informed ofthe delay and its cause, in sheer desperation I finished the bridgeby taking from my own division all the wagons needed to make up thedeficiency. 

It was late in the afternoon when the work was finished, and I beganputting over one of my brigades; but in the midst of its crossingword came that Longstreet's army was moving to attack us, whichcaused an abandonment of the foraging project, and orders quicklyfollowed to retire to Strawberry Plains, the retrograde movement tobegin forthwith. I sent to headquarters information of the plight Iwas in--baggage and supplies on the bank and wagons in the stream--begged to know what was to become of them if we were to hurry off ata moment's notice, and suggested that the movement be delayed until Icould recover my transportation. Receiving in reply no assurancesthat I should be relieved from my dilemma--and, in fact, nothingsatisfactory--I determined to take upon myself the responsibility ofremaining on the ground long enough to get my wagons out of the river;so I sent out a heavy force to watch for the enemy, and with theremainder of the command went to work to break up the bridge. Beforedaylight next morning I had recovered everything without interferenceby Longstreet, who, it was afterward ascertained, was preparing tomove east toward Lynchburg instead of marching to attack us; the smalldemonstration against Dandridge, being made simply to deceive us as tohis ultimate object. I marched to Strawberry Plains unmolested, andby taking the route over Bay's Mountain, a shorter one than thatfollowed by the main body of our troops, reached the point ofrendezvous as soon as the most of the army, for the road it followedwas not only longer, but badly cut up by trains that had recentlypassed over it. 

Shortly after getting into camp, the beef contractor came in andreported that a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had captured myherd of beef cattle. This caused me much chagrin at first, but thecommissary of my division soon put in an appearance, and assured methat the loss would not be very disastrous to us nor of much benefitto the enemy, since the cattle were so poor and weak that they couldnot be driven off. A reconnoissance in force verified theCommissary's statement. From its inability to travel, the herd, after all efforts to carry it off had proved ineffectual, had beenabandoned by its captors. 

After the troops from Chattanooga arrived in the vicinity ofKnoxville and General Sherman had returned to Chattanooga, theoperations in East Tennessee constituted a series of blunders, lasting through the entire winter; a state of affairs doubtless due, in the main, to the fact that the command of the troops was sofrequently changed. Constant shifting of responsibility from one toanother ensued from the date that General Sherman, after assuringhimself that Knoxville was safe, devolved the command on Burnside. It had already been intimated to Burnside that he was to be relieved, and in consequence he was inactive and apathetic, confining hisoperations to an aimless expedition whose advance extended only asfar as Blain's crossroads, whence it was soon withdrawn. MeanwhileGeneral Foster had superseded Burnside, but physical disabilitiesrendered him incapable of remaining in the field, and then the chiefauthority devolved on Parke. By this time the transmission of powerseemed almost a disease; at any rate it was catching, so, while wewere en route to Dandridge, Parke transferred the command to Granger. The latter next unloaded it on me, and there is no telling what thefinal outcome would have been had I not entered a protest against afurther continuance of the practice, which remonstrance broughtGranger to the front at Dandridge. 

While the events just narrated were taking place, General Grant hadmade a visit to Knoxville--about the last of December--and arrangedto open the railroad between there and Chattanooga, with a view tosupplying the troops in East Tennessee by rail in the future, insteadof through Cumberland Gap by a tedious line of wagon-trains. Inpursuance of his plan the railroad had already been opened to Loudon, but here much delay occurred on account of the long time it took torebuild the bridge over the Tennessee. Therefore supplies were stillvery scarce, and as our animals were now dying in numbers fromstarvation, and the men were still on short allowance, it becamenecessary that some of the troops east of Knoxville should get nearerto their depot, and also be in a position to take part in the comingGeorgia campaign, or render assistance to General Thomas, shouldGeneral Johnston (who had succeeded in command of the Confederatearmy) make any demonstration against Chattanooga. Hence my divisionwas ordered to take station at Loudon, Tennessee, and I must confessthat we took the road for that point with few regrets, for a generaldisgust prevailed regarding our useless marches during the winter. 

At this time my faithful scout Card and his younger brother left me, with the determination, as I have heretofore related, to avenge theirbrother's death. No persuasion could induce Card to remain longer, for knowing that my division's next operation would be towardAtlanta, and being ignorant of the country below Dalton, herecognized and insisted that his services would then becomepractically valueless. 

At Loudon, where we arrived January 27, supplies were more plentiful, and as our tents and extra clothing reached us there in a few days, every one grew contented and happy. Here a number of my regiments, whose terms of service were about to expire, went through the processof "veteranizing, " and, notwithstanding the trials and hardships ofthe preceding nine months, they re-enlisted almost to a man. 

When everything was set in motion toward recuperating and refittingmy troops, I availed myself of the opportunity during a lull thatthen existed to take a short leave of absence--a privilege I had notindulged in since entering the service in 1853. This leave I spentin the North with much benefit to my physical condition, for I wasmuch run down by fatiguing service, and not a little troubled byintense pain which I at times still suffered from my experience inthe unfortunate hand-car incident on the Cumberland Mountains theprevious July. I returned from leave the latter part of March, rejoining my division with the expectation that the campaign in thatsection would begin as early as April. 

On the 12th of March, 1864, General Grant was assigned to the commandof the armies of the United States, as general-in-chief. He wasalready in Washington, whither he had gone to receive his commissionas lieutenant-general. Shortly after his arrival there, he commencedto rearrange the different commands in the army to suit the planswhich he intended to enter upon in the spring, and out of this grew achange in my career. Many jealousies and much ill-feeling, theoutgrowth of former campaigns, existed among officers of high gradein the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1864, and several generalofficers were to be sent elsewhere in consequence. Among these, General Alfred Pleasonton was to be relieved from the command of thecavalry, General Grant having expressed to the Presidentdissatisfaction that so little had hitherto been accomplished by thatarm of the service, and I was selected as chief of the cavalry corpsof the Army of the Potomac, receiving on the night of the 23d ofMarch from General Thomas at Chattanooga the following telegram:

"MARCH 23, 1864. "MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Chattanooga

"Lieutenant-General Grant directs that Major-General Sheridanimmediately repair to Washington and report to the Adjutant-Generalof the Army. 

" H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

I was not informed of the purpose for which I was to proceed toWashington, but I conjectured that it meant a severing of myrelations with the Second Division, Fourth Army Corps. I at once setabout obeying the order, and as but little preparation was necessary, I started for Chattanooga the next day, without taking any formalleave of the troops I had so long commanded. I could not do it; thebond existing between them and me had grown to such depth ofattachment that I feared to trust my emotions in any formal partingfrom a body of soldiers who, from our mutual devotion, had longbefore lost their official designation, and by general consent withinand without the command were called "Sheridan's Division. " When Itook the train at the station the whole command was collected on thehill-sides around to see me off. They had assembled spontaneously, officers and men, and as the cars moved out for Chattanooga theywaved me farewell with demonstrations of affection. 

A parting from such friends was indeed to be regretted. They hadnever given me any trouble, nor done anything that could bring aughtbut honor to themselves. I had confidence in them, and I believethey had in me. They were ever steady, whether in victory or inmisfortune, and as I tried always to be with them, to put them intothe hottest fire if good could be gained, or save them fromunnecessary loss, as occasion required, they amply repaid all my careand anxiety, courageously and readily meeting all demands in everyemergency that arose. 

In Kentucky, nearly two years before, my lot had been cast with abouthalf of the twenty-five regiments of infantry that I was justleaving, the rest joining me after Chickamauga. It was practically anew arm of the service to me, for although I was an infantry officer, yet the only large command which up to that time I had controlled wascomposed of cavalry, and most of my experience had been gained inthis arm of the service. I had to study hard to be able to masterall the needs of such a force, to feed and clothe it and guard allits interests. When undertaking these responsibilities I felt thatif I met them faithfully, recompense would surely come through thehearty response that soldiers always make to conscientious exertionon the part of their superiors, and not only that more could begained in that way than from the use of any species of influence, butthat the reward would be quicker. Therefore I always tried to lookafter their comfort personally; selected their camps, and providedabundantly for their subsistence, and the road they opened for meshows that my work was not in vain. I regretted deeply to have toleave such soldiers, and felt that they were sorry I was going, andeven now I could not, if I would, retain other than the warmestsentiments of esteem and the tenderest affection for the officers andmen of "Sheridan's Division, " Army of the Cumberland. 

On reaching Chattanooga I learned from General Thomas the purpose forwhich I had been ordered to Washington. I was to be assigned to thecommand of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Theinformation staggered me at first, for I knew well the greatresponsibilities of such a position; moreover, I was but slightlyacquainted with military operations in Virginia, and then, too, thehigher officers of the Army of the Potomac were little known to me, so at the moment I felt loth to undergo the trials of the newposition. Indeed, I knew not a soul in Washington except GeneralGrant and General Halleck, and them but slightly, and no one inGeneral Meade's army, from the commanding general down, except a fewofficers in the lower grades, hardly any of whom I had seen sincegraduating at the Military Academy. 

Thus it is not much to be wondered at that General Thomas'scommunication momentarily upset me. But there was no help for it, soafter reflecting on the matter a little I concluded to make the bestof the situation. As in Virginia I should be operating in a fieldwith which I was wholly unfamiliar, and among so many who werestrangers, it seemed to me that it would be advisable to have, as achief staff-officer, one who had had service in the East, if anavailable man could be found. In weighing all these considerationsin my mind, I fixed upon Captain James W. Forsyth, of the EighteenthInfantry, then in the regular brigade at Chattanooga--a dear friendof mine, who had served in the Army of the Potomac, in the Peninsulaand Antietam campaigns. He at once expressed a desire to accept aposition on my staff, and having obtained by the next day thenecessary authority, he and I started for Washington, accompanied byLieutenant T. W. C. Moore, one of my aides, leaving behind LieutenantM. V. Sheridan, my other aide, to forward our horses as soon as theyshould be sent down to Chattanooga from Loudon, after which he was tojoin me. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

AT WASHINGTON--MEETING SECRETARY STANTON--INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENTLINCOLN--MADE COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THEPOTOMAC--ITS OFFICERS--GENERAL MEADE's METHOD OF USING CAVALRY--OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN--SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. --A DIFFERENCE WITHGENERAL MEADE--PREPARING TO FIGHT STUART'S CAVALRY. 

Accompanied by Captain Forsyth and Lieutenant Moore, I arrived inWashington on the morning of April, 4, 1864, and stopped at Willard'sHotel, where, staying temporarily, were many officers of the Army ofthe Potomac en route to their commands from leave at the North. Among all these, however, I was an entire stranger, and I cannot nowrecall that I met a single individual whom I had ever before known. 

With very little delay after reaching my hotel I made my way toGeneral Halleck's headquarters and reported to that officer, havinglearned in the meantime that General Grant was absent from the city. General Halleck talked to me for a few minutes, outlining briefly thenature and duties of my new command, and the general militarysituation in Virginia. When he had finished all he had to say aboutthese matters, he took me to the office of the Secretary of War, topresent me to Mr. Stanton. During the ceremony of introduction, Icould feel that Mr. Stanton was eying me closely and searchingly, endeavoring to form some estimate of one about whom he knewabsolutely nothing, and whose career probably had never been calledto his attention until General Grant decided to order me East, aftermy name had been suggested by General Halleck in an interview the twogenerals had with Mr. Lincoln. I was rather young in appearance--looking even under than over thirty-three years--but five feet fiveinches in height, and thin almost to emaciation, weighing only onehundred and fifteen pounds. If I had ever possessed anyself-assertion in manner or speech, it certainly vanished in thepresence of the imperious Secretary, whose name at the time was thesynonym of all that was cold and formal. I never learned what Mr. Stanton's first impressions of me were, and his guarded and rathercalculating manner gave at this time no intimation that they wereeither favorable or unfavorable, but his frequent commendation inafter years indicated that I gained his goodwill before the close ofthe war, if not when I first came to his notice; and a more intimateassociation convinced me that the cold and cruel characteristicspopularly ascribed to him were more mythical than real. 

When the interview with the Secretary was over, I proceeded withGeneral Halleck to the White House to pay my respects to thePresident. Mr. Lincoln received me very cordially, offering both hishands, and saying that he hoped I would fulfill the expectations ofGeneral Grant in the new command I was about to undertake, addingthat thus far the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had not done allit might have done, and wound up our short conversation by quotingthat stale interrogation so prevalent during the early years of thewar, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" His manner did not impressme, however, that in asking the question he had meant anything beyonda jest, and I parted from the President convinced that he did notbelieve all that the query implied. 

After taking leave I separated from General Halleck, and on returningto my hotel found there an order from the War Department assigning meto the command of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac. The nextmorning, April 5, as I took the cars for the headquarters of the Armyof the Potomac, General Grant, who had returned to Washington theprevious night from a visit to his family, came aboard the train onhis way to Culpeper Court House, and on the journey down I learnedamong other things that he had wisely determined to continuepersonally in the field, associating himself with General Meade'sarmy; where he could supervise its movements directly, and at thesame time escape the annoyances which, should he remain inWashington, would surely arise from solicitude for the safety of theCapital while the campaign was in progress. When we reached BrandyStation, I left the train and reported to General Meade, who told methat the headquarters of the Cavalry Corps were some distance backfrom the Station, and indicated the general locations of thedifferent divisions of the corps, also giving me, in the short time Iremained with him, much information regarding their composition. 

I reached the Cavalry Corps headquarters on the evening of April 5, 1864, and the next morning issued orders assuming command. GeneralPleasonton had but recently been relieved, and many of hisstaff-officers were still on duty at the headquarters awaiting thearrival of the permanent commander. I resolved to retain the most ofthese officers on my staff, and although they were all unknown to mewhen I decided on this course, yet I never had reason to regret it, nor to question the selections made by my predecessor. 

The corps consisted of three cavalry divisions and twelve batteriesof horse artillery. Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert was incommand of the First Division, which was composed of three brigades;Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg, of the Second, consisting of twobrigades; and Brigadier-General J. H. Wilson was afterward assignedto command the Third, also comprising two brigades: Captain Robinson, a veteran soldier of the Mexican war, was chief of artillery, and assuch had a general supervision of that arm, though the batteries, either as units or in sections, were assigned to the differentdivisions in campaign. 

Each one of my division commanders was a soldier by profession. Torbert graduated from the Military Academy in 1855, and wascommissioned in the infantry, in which arm he saw much service on thefrontier, in Florida, and on the Utah expedition. At the beginningof hostilities in April, 1861, he was made a colonel of New Jerseyvolunteers, and from that position was promoted in the fall of 1862to be a brigadier-general, thereafter commanding a brigade ofinfantry in the Army of the Potomac till, in the redistribution ofgenerals, after Grant came to the East, he was assigned to the FirstCavalry Division. 

Gregg graduated in 1855 also, and was appointed to the FirstDragoons, with which regiment, up to the breaking out of the war, hesaw frontier service extending from Fort Union, New Mexico, throughto the Pacific coast, and up into Oregon and Washington Territories, where I knew him slightly. In the fall of 1861 he became colonel ofthe Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and a year later was made abrigadier-general. He then succeeded to the command of a division ofcavalry, and continued in that position till the close of hisservice, at times temporarily commanding the Cavalry Corps. He wasthe only division commander I had whose experience had been almostexclusively derived from the cavalry arm. 

Wilson graduated in 1860 in the Topographical Engineers, and wasfirst assigned to duty in Oregon, where he remained till July, 1861. In the fall of that year his active service in the war began, and herose from one position to another, in the East and West, till, whileon General Grant's staff, he was made a brigadier-general in the fallof 1863 in reward for services performed during the Vicksburgcampaign and for engineer duty at Chattanooga preceding the battle ofMissionary Ridge. At my request he was selected to command the ThirdDivision. General Grant thought highly of him, and, expecting muchfrom his active mental and physical ability, readily assented toassign him in place of General Kilpatrick. The only other generalofficers in the corps were Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt, Brigadier-General George A. Custer, and Brigadier-General Henry E. Davies, each commanding a brigade. 

In a few days after my arrival at Brandy Station I reviewed my newcommand, which consisted of about twelve thousand officers and men, with the same number of horses in passable trim. Many of the generalofficers of the army were present at the review, among them GeneralsMeade, Hancock, and Sedgwick. Sedgwick being an old dragoon, came torenew his former associations with mounted troops, and to encourageme, as he jestingly said, because of the traditional prejudices thecavalrymen were supposed to hold against being commanded by aninfantry officer. The corps presented a fine appearance at thereview, and so far as the health and equipment of the men wereconcerned the showing was good and satisfactory; but the horses werethin and very much worn down by excessive and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty, for the cavalry picket-line almostcompletely encircled the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, on a continuous line, of nearly sixty miles, with hardly a mounted Confederate confronting it at any point. Fromthe very beginning of the war the enemy had shown more wisdomrespecting his cavalry than we. Instead of wasting its strength by apolicy of disintegration he, at an early day, had organized hismounted force into compact masses, and plainly made it a favorite;and, as usual, he was now husbanding the strength of his horses bykeeping them to the rear, so that in the spring he could bring themout in good condition for the impending campaign. 

Before and at the review I took in this situation, and determined toremedy it if possible; so in due time I sought an interview withGeneral Meade and informed him that, as the effectiveness of mycommand rested mainly on the strength of its horses, I thought theduty it was then performing was both burdensome and wasteful. I alsogave him my idea as to what the cavalry should do, the main purportof which was that it ought to be kept concentrated to fight theenemy's cavalry. Heretofore, the commander of the Cavalry Corps hadbeen, virtually, but an adjunct at army headquarters--a sort of chiefof cavalry--and my proposition seemed to stagger General Meade not alittle. I knew that it would be difficult to overcome the recognizedcustom of using the cavalry for the protection of trains and theestablishment of cordons around the infantry corps, and so farsubordinating its operations to the movements of the main army thatin name only was it a corps at all, but still I thought it my duty totry. 

At first General Meade would hardly listen to my proposition, for hewas filled with the prejudices that, from the beginning of the war, had pervaded the army regarding the importance and usefulness ofcavalry, General Scott then predicting that the contest would besettled by artillery, and thereafter refusing the services ofregiment after regiment of mounted troops. General Meade deemedcavalry fit for little more than guard and picket duty, and wanted toknow what would protect the transportation trains and artilleryreserve, cover the front of moving infantry columns, and secure hisflanks from intrusion, if my policy were pursued. I told him that ifhe would let me use the cavalry as I contemplated, he need havelittle solicitude in these respects, for, with a mass of ten thousandmounted men, it was my belief that I could make it so lively for theenemy's cavalry that, so far as attacks from it were concerned, theflanks and rear of the Army of the Potomac would require little or nodefense, and claimed, further, that moving columns of infantry shouldtake care of their own fronts. I also told him that it was my objectto defeat the enemy's cavalry in a general combat, if possible, andby such a result establish a feeling of confidence in my own troopsthat would enable us after awhile to march where we pleased, for thepurpose of breaking General Lee's communications and destroying theresources from which his army was supplied. 

The idea as here outlined was contrary to Meade's convictions, forthough at different times since he commanded the Army of the Potomacconsiderable bodies of the cavalry had been massed for some specialoccasion, yet he had never agreed to the plan as a permanency, andcould not be bent to it now. He gave little encouragement, therefore, to what I proposed, yet the conversation was immediatelybeneficial in one way, for when I laid before him the true conditionof the cavalry, he promptly relieved it from much of the arduous andharassing picket service it was performing, thus giving me about twoweeks in which to nurse the horses before the campaign opened. 

The interview also disclosed the fact that the cavalry commandershould be, according to General Meade's views, at his headquarterspractically as one of his staff, through whom he would give detaileddirections as, in his judgment, occasion required. Meade's ideas andmine being so widely divergent, disagreements arose between us laterduring the battles of the Wilderness, which lack of concord ended insome concessions on his part after the movement toward SpottsylvaniaCourt House began, and although I doubt that his convictions wereever wholly changed, yet from that date on, in the organization ofthe Army of the Potomac, the cavalry corps became more of a compactbody, with the same privileges and responsibilities that attached tothe other corps--conditions that never actually existed before. 

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac moved against Lee, who wasoccupying a defensive position on the south bank of the Rapidan. After detailing the various detachments which I was obliged to supplyfor escorts and other mounted duty, I crossed the river with aneffective force of about 10, 000 troopers. In the interval succeedingmy assignment to the command of the cavalry, I had taken the pains tostudy carefully the topography of the country in eastern Virginia, and felt convinced that, under the policy Meade intended I shouldfollow, there would be little opportunity for mounted troops toacquit themselves well in a region so thickly wooded, and traversedby so many almost parallel streams; but conscious that he would becompelled sooner or later either to change his mind or partially giveway to the pressure of events, I entered on the campaign with theloyal determination to aid zealously in all its plans. 

General Lee's army was located in its winter quarters behindintrenchments that lay along the Rapidan for a distance of abouttwenty miles; extending from Barnett's to Morton's ford. The fordsbelow Morton's were watched by a few small detachments of Confederatecavalry, the main body of which, however, was encamped belowHamilton's crossing, where it could draw supplies from the richcountry along the Rappahannock. Only a few brigades of Lee'sinfantry guarded the works along the river, the bulk of it being sosituated that it could be thrown to either flank toward which theUnion troops approached. 

General Grant adopted the plan of moving by his left flank, with thepurpose of compelling Lee to come out from behind his intrenchmentsalong Mine Run and fight on equal terms. Grant knew well thecharacter of country through which he would have to pass, but he wasconfident that the difficulties of operation in the thickly woodedregion of the Wilderness would be counterbalanced by the facilitywith which his position would enable him to secure a new base; and bythe fact that as he would thus cover Washington, there would belittle or no necessity for the authorities there to detach from hisforce at some inopportune moment for the protection of that city. 

In the move forward two divisions of my cavalry took the advance, Gregg crossing the Rapidan at Ely's ford and Wilson at Germania ford. Torbert's division remained in the rear to cover the trains andreserve artillery, holding from Rapidan Station to Culpeper, andthence through Stevensburg to the Rappahannock River. Gregg crossedthe Rapidan before daylight, in advance of the Second Corps, and whenthe latter reached Ely's ford, he pushed on to Chancellorsville;Wilson preceded the Fifth Corps to Germania ford, and when it reachedthe river he made the crossing and moved rapidly by WildernessTavern, as far as Parker's Store, from which point he sent a heavyreconnoissance toward Mine Run, the rest of his division bivouackingin a strong position. I myself proceeded to Chancellorsville andfixed my headquarters at that place, whereon the 5th I was joined byTorbert's division. 

Meanwhile, General Meade had crossed the Rapidan and established hisheadquarters not far from Germania ford. From that point he was indirect communication with Wilson, whose original instructions from mecarried him only as far as Parker's Store, but it being found, duringthe night of the 4th, that the enemy was apparently unacquainted withthe occurrences of the day, Meade directed Wilson to advance in thedirection of Craig's Meeting House; leaving one regiment to holdParker's Store. Wilson with the second brigade encountered Rosser'sbrigade of cavalry just beyond the Meeting House, and drove it backrapidly a distance of about two miles, holding it there till noon, while his first brigade was halted on the north side of Robinson'sRun near the junction of the Catharpen and Parker's Store roads. 

Up to this time Wilson had heard nothing of the approach of the FifthCorps, and the situation becoming threatening, he withdrew the secondbrigade to the position occupied by the first, but scarcely had hedone so when he learned that at an early hour in the forenoon theenemy's infantry had appeared in his rear at Parker's Store and cutoff his communication with General Meade. Surprised at this, hedetermined to withdraw to Todd's Tavern, but before his resolutioncould be put into execution the Confederates attacked him with aheavy force, and at the same time began pushing troops down theCatharpen road. Wilson was now in a perplexing situation, sandwichedbetween the Confederates who had cut him off in the rear at Parker'sstore and those occupying the Catharpen road, but he extricated hiscommand by passing it around the latter force, and reached Todd'sTavern by crossing the Po River at Corbin's bridge. General Meadediscovering that the enemy had interposed at Parker's store betweenWilson and the Fifth Corps, sent me word to go to Wilson's relief, and this was the first intimation I received that Wilson had beenpushed out so far, but, surmising that he would retire in thedirection of Todd's Tavern I immediately despatched Gregg's divisionthere to his relief. Just beyond Todd's Tavern Gregg met Wilson, whowas now being followed by the enemy's cavalry. The pursuing forcewas soon checked, and then driven back to Shady Grove Church, whileWilson's troops fell in behind Gregg's line, somewhat the worse fortheir morning's adventure. 

When the Army of the Potomac commenced crossing the Rapidan on the4th, General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, began concentrating his command on the right of Lee's infantry, bringing it from Hamilton's crossing and other points where it hadbeen wintering. Stuart's force at this date was a little more thaneight thousand men, organized in two divisions, commanded by GeneralsWade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Hampton's division was composed ofthree brigades, commanded by Generals Cordon, Young, and Rosser;Fitzhugh Lee's division comprised three brigades also, Generals W. H. F. Lee, Lomax, and Wickham commanding them. 

Information of this concentration, and of the additional fact thatthe enemy's cavalry about Hamilton's crossing was all being drawn in, reached me on the 5th, which obviated all necessity for my moving onthat point as I intended at the onset of the campaign. Theresponsibility for the safety of our trains and of the left flank ofthe army still continued, however, so I made such dispositions of mytroops as to secure these objects by holding the line of the Brockroad beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's Tavern andPiney Branch Church. On the 6th, through some false information, General Meade became alarmed about his left flank, and sent me thefollowing note:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "May 6, 1864. --1 o'clock P. M. "MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Commanding Cavalry Corps

"Your despatch of 11. 45 a. M. , received. General Hancock has beenheavily pressed, and his left turned. The major-general commandingthinks that you had better draw in your cavalry, so as to secure theprotection of the trains. The order requiring an escort for thewagons to-night has been rescinded. 

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

On the morning of the 6th Custer's and Devin's brigades had beenseverely engaged at the Furnaces before I received the above note. They had been most successful in repulsing the enemy's attacks, however, and I felt that the line taken up could be held; but thedespatch from General Humphreys was alarming, so I drew all thecavalry close in toward Chancellorsville. It was found later thatHancock's left had not been turned, and the points thus abandoned hadto be regained at a heavy cost in killed and wounded, to both thecavalry and the infantry. 

On the 7th of May, under directions from headquarters, Army of thePotomac, the trains were put in motion to go into park at PineyBranch Church, in anticipation of the movement that was about to bemade for the possession of Spottsylvania Court House. I feltconfident that the order to move the trains there had been givenwithout a full understanding of the situation, for Piney BranchChurch was now held by the enemy, a condition which had resulted fromthe order withdrawing the cavalry on account of the supposed disasterto Hancock's left the day before; but I thought the best way toremedy matters was to hold the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich'still the ground on which it was intended to park them should beregained. 

This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, a spirited fight for thepossession of the crossroads at that point, participated in by theenemy's cavalry and Gregg's division, and two brigades of Torbert'sdivision, the latter commanded by Merritt, as Torbert became very illon the 6th, and had to be sent to the rear. To gain the objectivepoint--the crossroads--I directed Gregg to assail the enemy on theCatharpen road with Irvin Gregg's brigade and drive him over Corbin'sbridge, while Merritt attacked him with the Reserve brigade on theSpottsylvania road in conjunction with Davies's brigade of Gregg'sdivision, which was to be put in on the Piney Branch Church road, andunite with Merritt's left. Davies's and Irvin Gregg's brigades on myright and left flanks met with some resistance, yet not enough todeter them from, executing their orders. In front of Merritt theenemy held on more stubbornly, however, and there ensued anexceedingly severe and, at times, fluctuating fight. Finally theConfederates gave way, and we pursued them almost to SpottsylvaniaCourt House; but deeming it prudent to recall the pursuers aboutdark, I encamped Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in the open fieldsto the east of Todd's Tavern. 

During the preceding three days the infantry corps of the army hadbeen engaged in the various conflicts known as the battles of theWilderness. The success of the Union troops in those battles had notbeen all that was desired, and General Grant now felt that it wasnecessary to throw himself on Lee's communications if possible, whilepreserving his own intact by prolonging the movement to the left. Therefore, on the evening of the 7th he determined to shift his wholearmy toward Spottsylvania Court House, and initiated the movement bya night march of the infantry to Todd's Tavern. In view of what wascontemplated, I gave orders to Gregg and Merritt to move at daylighton the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of gaining possession ofSnell's bridge over the Po River, the former by the crossing atCorbin's bridge and the latter by the Block House. I also directedWilson, who was at Alsop's house, to take possession of Spottsylvaniaas early as possible on the morning of the 8th, and then move intoposition at Snell's bridge conjointly with the other two divisions. Wilson's orders remained as I had issued them, so he movedaccordingly and got possession of Spottsylvania, driving the enemy'scavalry a mile beyond, as will be seen by the following despatch sentme at 9 A. M. Of the 8th:

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 8, 1864 9 A. M. " LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FORSYTH, CHIEF-OF-STAFF, C. C. 

"Have run the enemy's cavalry a mile from Spottsylvania Court House;have charged them, and drove them through the village; am fightingnow with a considerable force, supposed to be Lee's division. Everything all right. 

"J. H. WILSON, "Brigadier-General Commanding. 

During the night of the 7th General Meade arrived at Todd's Tavernand modified the orders I had given Gregg and Merritt, directingGregg simply to hold Corbin's bridge, and Merritt to move out infront of the infantry column marching on the Spottsylvania road. Merritt proceeded to obey, but in advancing, our cavalry and infantrybecame intermingled in the darkness, and much confusion and delay wasthe consequence. I had not been duly advised of these changes inGregg's and Merritt's orders, and for a time I had fears for thesafety of Wilson, but, while he was preparing to move on to form hisjunction with Gregg and Merritt at Snell's bridge, the advance ofAnderson (who was now commanding Longstreet's corps) appeared on thescene and drove him from Spottsylvania. 

Had Gregg and Merritt been permitted to proceed as they wereoriginally instructed, it is doubtful whether the battles fought atSpottsylvania would have occurred, for these two divisions would haveencountered the enemy at the Pa River, and so delayed his march as toenable our infantry to reach Spottsylvania first, and thus force Leeto take up a line behind the Po. I had directed Wilson to move fromthe left by "the Gate" through Spottsylvania to Snell's bridge, whileGregg and Merritt were to advance to the same point by Shady Groveand the Block House. There was nothing to prevent at least a partialsuccess of these operations; that is to say, the concentration of thethree divisions in front of Snell's bridge, even if we could notactually have gained it. But both that important point and thebridge on the Block House road were utterly ignored, and Lee'sapproach to Spottsylvania left entirely unobstructed, while threedivisions of cavalry remained practically ineffective by reason ofdisjointed and irregular instructions. 

On the morning of the 8th, when I found that such orders had beengiven, I made some strong remonstrances against the course that hadbeen pursued, but it was then too late to carry out the combinationsI had projected the night before, so I proceeded to join Merritt onthe Spottsylvania road. On reaching Merritt I found General Warrenmaking complaint that the cavalry were obstructing his infantrycolumn, so I drew Merritt off the road, and the leading division ofthe Fifth Corps pushed up to the front. It got into line about 11o'clock, and advanced to take the village, but it did not go very farbefore it struck Anderson's corps, and was hurled back with heavyloss. This ended all endeavor to take Spottsylvania that day. 

A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reachedhis headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the betterof his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, layingblame here and there for the blunders that had been committed. Hewas particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things, that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying theSpottsylvania road. I replied that if this were true, he himself hadordered it there without my knowledge. I also told him that he hadbroken up my combinations, exposed Wilson's division to disaster, andkept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and further, repelled his insinuationsby saying that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring ofthe cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficientand useless before long. Meade was very much irritated, and I wasnone the less so. One word brought on another, until, finally, Itold him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me, but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions withoutconsulting or even notifying me, he could henceforth command theCavalry Corps himself--that I would not give it another order. 

The acrimonious interview ended with this remark, and after I lefthim he went to General Grant's headquarters and repeated theconversation to him, mentioning that I had said that I could whipStuart. At this General Grant remarked: "Did he say so? Then let himgo out and do it. " This intimation was immediately acted upon byGeneral Meade, and a little later the following order came to me:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC"May 8th, 1864 1 P. M. 

"GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Commanding Cavalry Corps. 

"The major-general commanding directs you to immediately concentrateyour available mounted force, and with your ammunition trains andsuch supply trains as are filled (exclusive of ambulances) proceedagainst the enemy's cavalry, and when your supplies are exhausted, proceed via New Market and Green Bay to Haxall's Landing on the JamesRiver, there communicating with General Butler, procuring suppliesand return to this army. Your dismounted men will be left with thetrain here. 

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-staff. "

As soon as the above order was received I issued instructions for theconcentration of the three divisions of cavalry at Aldrich's toprepare for the contemplated expedition. Three days' rations for themen were distributed, and half rations of grain for one day weredoled out for the horses. I sent for Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson andcommunicated the order to them, saying at the same time, "We aregoing out to fight Stuart's cavalry in consequence of a suggestionfrom me; we will give him a fair, square fight; we are strong, and Iknow we can beat him, and in view of my recent representations toGeneral Meade I shall expect nothing but success. " I also indicatedto my division commanders the line of march I should take--moving inone column around the right flank of Lee's army to get in its rear--and stated at the same time that it was my intention to fight Stuartwherever he presented himself, and if possible go through to Haxall'sLanding; but that if Stuart should successfully interpose between usand that point we would swing back to the Army of the Potomac bypassing around the enemy's left flank by way of Gordonsville. Atfirst the proposition seemed to surprise the division commanderssomewhat, for hitherto even the boldest, mounted expeditions had beenconfined to a hurried ride through the enemy's country, withoutpurpose of fighting more than enough to escape in case ofmolestation, and here and there to destroy a bridge. Our move wouldbe a challenge to Stuart for a cavalry duel behind Lee's lines, inhis own country, but the advantages which it was reasonable toanticipate from the plan being quickly perceived, each divisioncommander entered into its support unhesitatingly, and at once setabout preparing for the march next day. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE EXPEDITION STARTS--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--OPENING OF THE FIGHT ATYELLOW TAVERN--GENERAL CUSTER'S BRILLIANT CHARGE--DEATH OF GENERALSTUART--REMOVING TORPEDOES--EXCITEMENT IN RICHMOND--A NIGHT MARCH--ENTERPRISING NEWSBOYS--THE EFFECTS OF STUART'S DEFEAT AND DEATH--END OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION--ITS GREAT SUCCESS AND BENEFICIALRESULTS. 

The expedition which resulted in the battle of Yellow Tavern and thedeath of General Stuart started from the vicinity of Aldrich's towardFredericksburg early on the morning of May 9, 1864, marching on theplank-road, Merritt's division leading. When the column reachedTabernacle Church it headed almost due east to the telegraph road, and thence down that highway to Thornburg, and from that pointthrough Childsburg to Anderson's crossing of the North Anna River, itbeing my desire to put my command south of that stream if possible, where it could procure forage before it should be compelled to fight. The corps moved at a walk, three divisions on the same road, making acolumn nearly thirteen miles in length, and marched around the rightflank of the enemy unsuspected until my rear guard had passedMassaponax Church. Although the column was very long, I preferred tomove it all on one road rather than to attempt combinations forcarrying the divisions to any given point by different routes. Unless the separate commands in an expedition of this nature are veryprompt in movement, and each fully equal to overcoming at once anyobstacle it may meet, combinations rarely work out as expected;besides, an engagement was at all times imminent, hence it wasspecially necessary to keep the whole force well together. 

As soon as the Ny, Po, and Ta rivers were crossed, each of whichstreams would have afforded an excellent defensive line to the enemy, all anxiety as to our passing around Lee's army was removed, and ourability to cross the North Anna placed beyond doubt. MeanwhileGeneral Stuart had discovered what we were about, and he set hiscavalry in motion, sending General Fitzhugh Lee to follow and attackmy rear on the Childsburg road, Stuart himself marching by way ofDavenport's bridge, on the North Anna, toward Beaver Dam Station, near which place his whole command was directed to unite the nextday. 

My column having passed the Ta River, Stuart attacked its rear withconsiderable vigor, in the hope that he could delay my whole forcelong enough to permit him to get at least a part of his command in myfront; but this scheme was frustrated by Davies's brigade, which Idirected to fight as a rear-guard, holding on at one position andthen at another along the line of march just enough to deter theenemy from a too rapid advance. Davies performed this responsibleand trying duty with tact and good judgment, following the maincolumn steadily as it progressed to the south, and never oncepermitting Fitzhugh Lee's advance to encroach far enough to compel ahalt of my main body. About dark Merritt's division crossed theNorth Anna at Anderson's ford, while Gregg and Wilson encamped on thenorth side, having engaged the enemy, who still hung on my rear up toa late hour at night. 

After Merritt's division passed the river, Custer's brigade proceededon to Beaver Dam Station to cut the Virginia Central railroad. Before reaching the station he met a small force of the enemy, butthis he speedily drove off, recapturing from it about four hundredUnion prisoners, who had been taken recently in the Wilderness andwere being conducted to Richmond. Custer also destroyed the station, two locomotives, three trains of cars, ninety wagons, from eight toten miles of railroad and telegraph lines, some two hundred thousandpounds of bacon and other supplies, amounting in all to about amillion and a half of rations, and nearly all they medical stores ofGeneral Lee's army, which had been moved from Orange Court Houseeither because Lee wished to have them directly in his rear orbecause he contemplated falling back to the North Anna. 

On the morning of the 10th Gregg and Wilson, while crossing the NorthAnna, were again attacked, but were covered by the division on thesouth side of the stream; the passage was effected without much loss, notwithstanding the approach of Stuart on the south bank from thedirection of Davenport's bridge. The possession of Beaver Dam gaveus an important point, as it opened a way toward Richmond by theNegro-foot road. It also enabled us to obtain forage for ourwell-nigh famished animals, and to prepare for fighting the enemy, who, I felt sure, would endeavor to interpose between my column andRichmond. 

Stuart had hardly united his troops near Beaver Dam when he realizedthat concentrating there was a mistake, so he began makingdispositions for remedying his error, and while we leisurely took theNegro-foot toad toward Richmond, he changed his tactics and hauledoff from my rear, urging his horses to the death in order to get inbetween Richmond and my column. This he effected about 10 o'clock onthe morning of the 11th, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, six milesfrom the city, on the Brook turnpike. His change of tactics left mymarch on the 10th practically unmolested, and we quietly encampedthat night on the south bank of the South Anna, near Ground SquirrelBridge. Here we procured an abundance of forage, and as the distancetraveled that day had been only fifteen to eighteen miles, men andhorses were able to obtain a good rest during the night. 

At 2 o'clock in the morning, May 11, Davies's brigade of Gregg'sdivision marched for Ashland to cut the Fredericksburg railroad. Arriving there before the head of the enemy's column, which had topass through this same place to reach Yellow Tavern, Davies drove outa small force occupying the town, burnt a train of cars and alocomotive, destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoinedthe main column at Allen's Station on the Fredericksburg and Richmondrailroad. From Allen's Station the whole command moved on YellowTavern, Merritt in the lead, Wilson following, and Gregg in the rear. 

The appearance of Davies's brigade at Ashland in the morning had hadthe effect of further mystifying the enemy as to my intentions; andwhile he held it incumbent to place himself between me and Richmond, yet he was still so uncertain of my movements that he committed thesame fault that he did the first day, when he divided his force andsent a part to follow me on the Childsburg road. He now divided hiscommand again, sending a portion to hang upon my rear, while heproceeded with the rest to Yellow Tavern. This separation not onlymaterially weakened the force which might have been thrown across myline of march, but it also enabled me to attack with almost my entirecorps, while occupying the pursuers with a small rearguard. 

By forced marches General Stuart succeeded in reaching Yellow Tavernahead of me on May 11; and the presence of, his troops, on theAshland and Richmond road becoming known to Merritt as he wasapproaching the Brook turnpike, this general pressed forward at onceto the attack. Pushing his division to the front, he soon gotpossession of the turnpike and drove the enemy back several hundredyards to the east of it. This success had the effect of throwing thehead of my column to the east of the pike, and I quickly brought upWilson and one of Gregg's brigades to take advantage of the situationby forming a line of battle on that side or the road. Meanwhile theenemy, desperate but still confident, poured in a heavy fire from hisline and from a battery which enfiladed the Brook road, and madeYellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place. Gibbs's and Devin'sbrigades, however, held fast there, while Custer, supported byChapman's brigade, attacked the enemy's left and battery in a mountedcharge. 

Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank and the rest of Wilson'sdivision sustaining him, was brilliantly executed. Beginning at awalk, he increased his gait to a trot, and then at full speed rushedat the enemy. At the same moment the dismounted troops along mywhole front moved forward, and as Custer went through the battery, capturing two of the guns with their cannoneers and breaking up theenemy's left, Gibbs and Devin drove his centre and right from thefield. Gregg meanwhile, with equal success, charged the force in hisrear-Gordon's brigadeand the engagement ended by giving us completecontrol of the road to Richmond. We captured a number of prisoners, and the casualties on both sides were quite severe, General Stuarthimself falling mortally wounded, and General James B. Gordon, one ofhis brigade commanders, being killed. 

After Custer's charge, the Confederate cavalry was badly broken up, the main portion of it being driven in a rout toward Ashland and asmall part in the direction of Richmond, which latter force finallyrejoined Fitzhugh Lee near Mechanicsville. A reconnoitring partybeing now sent up the Brook turnpike toward the city, dashed acrossthe South Fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from theenemy's exterior intrenchments and went within them. I followed thisparty, and after a little exploration found between the two lines ofworks a country road that led across to the pike which runs fromMechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around within theouter line of works by this country road across to the Mechanicsvillepike on the south side of the Chickahominy, and encamp the next nightat Fair Oaks; so I determined to make the movement after dark, beinginfluenced in this to some extent by reports received during theafternoon from colored people, to the effect that General B. F. Butler's army had reached a small stream on the south side of theJames, about four miles south of Richmond. If I could succeed ingetting through by this road, not only would I have a shorter line ofmarch to Haxall's landing, but there was also a possibility that Icould help Butler somewhat by joining him so near Richmond. Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, wecommenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 1lth, andmassed the command on the plateau south of the Meadow bridge neardaylight on the 12th. 

The enemy, anticipating that I would march by this route, had plantedtorpedoes along it, and many of these exploded as the column passedover them, killing several horses and wounding a few men, but beyondthis we met with no molestation. The torpedoes were loaded shellsplanted on each side of the road, and so connected by wires attachedto friction-tubes in the shells, that when a horse's hoof struck awire the shell was exploded by the jerk on the improvised lanyard. After the loss of several horses and the wounding of some of the menby these torpedoes, I gave directions to have them removed, ifpracticable, so about twenty-five of the prisoners were brought upand made to get down on their knees, feel for the wires in thedarkness, follow them up and unearth the shells. The prisonersreported the owner of one of the neighboring houses to be theprincipal person who had engaged in planting these shells, and Itherefore directed that some of them be carried and placed in thecellar of his house, arranged to explode if the enemy's column camethat way, while he and his family were brought off as prisoners andheld till after daylight. 

Meanwhile the most intense excitement prevailed in Richmond. TheConfederates, supposing that their capital was my objective point, were straining every effort to put it in a state of defense, and hadcollected between four and five thousand irregular troops, underGeneral Bragg, besides bringing up three brigades of infantry fromthe force confronting General Butler south of the James River, thealarm being intensified by the retreat, after the defeat at YellowTavern, of Stuart's cavalry, now under General Fitzhugh Lee, by wayof Ashland to Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy, for falling back in that direction, left me between them andRichmond. 

Our march during the night of the 11th was very tedious, on accountof the extreme darkness and frequent showers of rain; but at daylighton the 12th the head of my column, under Wilson, reached theMechanicsville pike. Here Wilson, encountering the enemy's works andbatteries manned by General Bragg's troops, endeavored to pass. Inthis he failed, and as soon as I was notified that it wasimpracticable to reach Fair Oaks by passing between the works and theChickahominy, Custer's brigade was directed to make the crossing tothe north side of the Chickahominy, at the Meadow bridge. Custermoved rapidly for the bridge, but found it destroyed, and that theenemy's cavalry was posted on the north side, in front ofMechanicsville. When this information came back, I ordered Merrittto take his whole division and repair the bridge, instructing himthat the crossing must be made at all hazards; for, in view of animpending attack by the enemy's infantry in Richmond, it wasnecessary that I should have the bridge as a means of egress in caseof serious disaster. 

All the time that Merritt was occupied in this important duty, theenemy gave great annoyance to the working party by sweeping thebridge with a section of artillery and a fire from the supportingtroops, so a small force was thrown across to drive them away. When Merritt had passed two regiments over, they attacked, butwere repulsed. The work on the, bridge continued, however, not-withstanding this discomfiture; and when it was finished, Merrittcrossed nearly all his division, dismounted, and again attacked theenemy, this time carrying the line, of temporary breastworks, builtwith logs and rails, and pursuing his broken troops toward Gaines'sMills. 

While Merritt was engaged in this affair, the Confederates advancedfrom behind their works at Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg. Wilson's troops were driven back in some confusion at first; butGregg, in anticipation of attack, had hidden a heavy line ofdismounted men in a bushy ravine on his front, and when the enemymarched upon it, with much display and under the eye of the Presidentof the Confederacy, this concealed line opened a destructive firewith repeating carbines; and at the same time the batteries ofhorse-artillery, under Captain Robinson, joining in the contest, belched forth shot and shell with fatal effect. The galling firecaused the enemy to falter, and while still wavering Wilson ralliedhis men, and turning some of them against the right flank of theConfederates, broke their line, and compelled them to withdraw forsecurity behind the heavy works thrown up for the defense of the cityin 1862. 

By destroying the Meadow bridge and impeding my column on theMechanicsville, pike, the enemy thought to corner us completely, forhe still maintained the force in Gregg's rear that had pressed it theday before; but the repulse of his infantry ended all his hopes ofdoing us any serious damage on the limited ground between thedefenses of Richmond and the Chickahominy. He felt certain that onaccount of the recent heavy rains we could not cross the Chickahominyexcept by the Meadow bridge, and it also seemed clear to him that wecould not pass between the river and his intrenchments; therefore hehoped to ruin us, or at least compel us to return by the same routewe had taken in coming, in which case we would run into Gordon'sbrigade, but the signal repulse of Bragg's infantry dispelled theseillusions. 

Even had it not been our good fortune to defeat him, we could havecrossed the Chickahominy if necessary at several points that werediscovered by scouting parties which, while the engagement was goingon, I had sent out to look up fords. This means of getting out fromthe circumscribed plateau I did not wish to use, however, unlessthere was no alternative, for I wished to demonstrate to the CavalryCorps the impossibility of the enemy's destroying or capturing solarge a body of mounted troops. 

The chances of seriously injuring, us were more favorable to theenemy this time than ever they were afterward, for with the troopsfrom Richmond, comprising three brigades of veterans and about fivethousand irregulars on my front and right flank, with Gordon'scavalry in the rear, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on my left flank, holding the Chickahominy and Meadow bridge, I was apparently hemmedin on every side, but relying on the celerity with which mountedtroops could be moved, I felt perfectly confident that the seeminglyperilous situation could be relieved under circumstances even worsethan those then surrounding us. Therefore, instead of endeavoring toget away without a fight, I concluded that there would be littledifficulty in withdrawing, even should I be beaten, and none whateverif I defeated the enemy. 

In accordance with this view I accepted battle; and the completerepulse of the enemy's infantry, which assailed us from hisintrenchments, and of Gordon's cavalry, which pressed Gregg on theBrook road, ended the contest in our favor. The rest of the day weremained on the battle-field undisturbed, and our time was spent incollecting the wounded, burying the dead, grazing the horses, andreading the Richmond journals, two small newsboys with commendableenterprise having come within our lines from the Confederate capitalto sell their papers. They were sharp youngsters, and having comewell supplied, they did a thrifty business. When their stock intrade was all disposed of they wished to return, but they were sointelligent and observant that I thought their mission involved otherpurposes than the mere sale of newspapers, so they were held till wecrossed the Chickahominy and then turned loose. 

After Merritt had crossed the Chickahominy and reachedMechanicsville, I sent him orders to push on to Gaines's Mills. Nearthe latter place he fell in with the enemy's cavalry again, andsending me word, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon I crossed theChickahominy with Wilson and Gregg, but when we overtook Merritt hehad already brushed the Confederates away, and my whole command wentinto camp between Walnut Grove and Gaines's Mills. 

The main purposes of the expedition had now been executed. They were"to break up General Lee's railroad communications, destroy suchdepots of supplies as could be found in his rear, and to defeatGeneral Stuart's cavalry. " Many miles of the Virginia Central and ofthe, Richmond and Fredericksburg railroads were broken up, andseveral of the bridges on each burnt. At Beaver Dam, Ashland, andother places, about two millions of rations had been captured anddestroyed. The most important of all, however, was the defeat ofStuart. Since the beginning of the war this general haddistinguished himself by his management of the Confederate mountedforce. Under him the cavalry of Lee's army had been nurtured, andhad acquired such prestige that it thought itself well-nighinvincible; indeed, in the early years of the war it had proved to beso. This was now dispelled by the successful march we had made inLee's rear; and the discomfiture of Stuart at Yellow Tavern hadinflicted a blow from which entire recovery was impossible. 

In its effect on the Confederate cause the defeat of Stuart was mostdisheartening, but his death was even a greater calamity, as isevidenced by the words of a Confederate writer (Cooke), who says:"Stuart could be ill spared at this critical moment, and General Leewas plunged into the deepest melancholy at the intelligence of hisdeath. When it reached him he retired from those around him, andremained for some time communing with his own heart and memory. Whenone of his staff entered and spoke of Stuart, General Lee said: 'Ican scarcely think of him without weeping. '"

From the camp near Gaines's Mills I resumed the march to Haxall'sLanding, the point on the James River contemplated in my instructionswhere I was to obtain supplies from General Butler. We got to theJames on the 14th with all our wounded and a large number ofprisoners, and camped between Haxall's and Shirley. The prisoners, as well as the captured guns, were turned over to General Butler'sprovost-marshal, and our wounded were quickly and kindly cared for byhis surgeons. Ample supplies, also, in the way of forage andrations, were furnished us by General Butler, and the work ofrefitting for our return to the Army of the Potomac was vigorouslypushed. By the 17th all was ready, and having learned by scoutingparties sent in the direction of Richmond and as far as Newmarketthat the enemy's cavalry was returning to Lee's army I started thatevening on my return march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones'sbridge, and bivouacking on the 19th near Baltimore crossroads. 

My uncertainty of what had happened to the Army of the Potomac in ourabsence, and as to where I should find it, made our getting back aproblem somewhat difficult of solution, particularly as I knew thatreinforcements for Lee had come up from the south to Richmond, andthat most likely some of these troops were being held at differentpoints on the route to intercept my column. Therefore I determinedto pass the Pamunkey River at the White House, and sent to FortMonroe for a pontoon-bridge on which to make the crossing. Whilewaiting for the pontoons I ordered Custer to proceed with his brigadeto Hanover Station, to destroy the railroad bridge over the SouthAnna, a little beyond that place; at the same time I sent Gregg andWilson to Cold Harbor, to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond asfar as Mechanicsville, so as to cover Custer's movements. Merritt, with the remaining brigades of his division, holding fast atBaltimore crossroads to await events. 

After Gregg and Custer had gone, it was discovered that the railroadbridge over the Pamunkey, near the White House, had been destroyedbut partially--the cross-ties and stringers being burned in placesonly--and that it was practicable to repair it sufficiently to carryus over. In view of this information General Merritt's two brigadeswere at once put on the duty of reconstructing the bridge. Bysending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man ofwhich would bring in a board or a plank, Merritt soon accumulatedenough lumber for the flooring, and in one day the bridge was madepracticable. On the 22d Gregg, Wilson, and Custer returned. Thelatter had gone on his expedition as far as Hanover Station, destroyed some commissary stores there, and burned two trestlebridges over Hanover Creek. This done, he deemed it prudent toretire to Hanovertown. The next morning he again marched to HanoverStation, and there ascertained that a strong force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was posted at theSouth Anna bridges. These troops had gone there from Richmond enroute to reinforce Lee. In the face of this impediment Custer'smission could not be executed fully, so he returned to Baltimorecrossroads. 

The whole command was drawn in by noon of the 22d, and that day itcrossed the Pamunkey by Merritt's reconstructed bridge, marching toAyletts, on the Mattapony River, the same night. Here I learned fromcitizens, and from prisoners taken during the day by scouting partiessent toward Hanover Court House, that Lee had been, forced from hisposition near Spottsylvania Court House and compelled to retire tothe line of the North Anna. I then determined to rejoin the Army ofthe Potomac at the earliest moment, which I did by making forChesterfield Station, where I reported to General Meade on the 24thof May. 

Our return to Chesterfield ended the first independent expedition theCavalry Corps had undertaken since coming under my command, and oursuccess was commended highly by Generals Grant and Meade, bothrealizing that our operations in the rear of Lee had disconcerted andalarmed that general so much as to aid materially in forcing hisretrograde march, and both acknowledged that, by drawing off theenemy's cavalry during the past fortnight, we had enabled them tomove the Army of the Potomac and its enormous trains withoutmolestation in the manoeuvres that had carried it to the North Anna. Then, too, great quantities of provisions and munitions of war hadbeen destroyed--stores that the enemy had accumulated at sub-depotsfrom strained resources and by difficult means; the railroads thatconnected Lee with Richmond broken, the most successful cavalryleader of the South killed, and in addition to all this there hadbeen inflicted on the Confederate mounted troops the most thoroughdefeat that had yet befallen them in Virginia. 

When the expedition set out the Confederate authorities in Richmondwere impressed, and indeed convinced, that my designs contemplatedthe capture of that city, and notwithstanding the loss they sustainedin the defeat and death of Stuart, and their repulse the succeedingday, they drew much comfort from the fact that I had not enteredtheir capital. Some Confederate writers have continued to hold thistheory and conviction since the war. In this view they were and arein error. When Stuart was defeated the main purpose of myinstructions had been carried out, and my thoughts then turned tojoining General Butler to get supplies. I believed that I could dothis by cutting across to the Mechanicsville pike and Fair Oaks onthe south side of the Chickahominy, but the failure of Wilson'scolumn to get possession of the outwork which commanded the pikenecessitated my crossing at Meadow bridge, and then moving byMechanicsville and Gaines's Mills instead of by the shorter route. Moreover, my information regarding General Butler's position wasincorrect, so that even had I been successful in getting to Fair Oaksby the direct road I should still have gained nothing thereby, for Ishould still have been obliged to continue down the James River toHaxall's. 

CHAPTER XX. 

GENERAL WILSON'S ADVANCE TOWARD HANOVER COURT HOUSE--CROSSING THEPAMUNKEY--ENGAGEMENT OF HAWE'S SHOP--FIGHT AT MATADEQUIN CREEK--CAPTURE OF COLD HARBOR--THE FIGHT TO RETAIN THE PLACE--MOVEMENTSOF GENERAL WILSON. 

When I rejoined the Army of the Potomac, near Chesterfield Station, the heavy battles around Spottsylvania had been fought, and thecomplicated manoeuvres by which the whole Union force was swungacross the North Anna were in process of execution. In conjunctionwith these manoeuvres Wilson's division was sent to the right flankof the army, where he made a reconnoissance south of the North Annaas far as Little River, crossing the former stream near JerichoMills. Wilson was to operate from day to day on that flank as itswung to the south, covering to New Castle ferry each advance of theinfantry and the fords left behind on the march. From the 26th tothe 30th these duties kept Wilson constantly occupied, and alsonecessitated a considerable dispersion of his force, but by the 31sthe was enabled to get all his division together again, and crossingto the south side of the Pamunkey at New Castle ferry, he advancedtoward Hanover Court House. Near Dr Pride's house he encountered adivision of the enemy's cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee, and droveit back across Mechamp's Creek, thus opening communication with theright of our infantry resting near Phillips's Mills. Just as thishad been done, a little before dark, Wilson received an order fromGeneral Meade directing him to push on toward Richmond until heencountered the Confederates in such strength that he could no longersuccessfully contend against them, and in compliance with this orderoccupied Hanover Court House that same day. Resuming his march atdaylight on June 1, he went ahead on the Ashland road while sendingChapman's brigade up the south bank of the South Anna to destroy thebridges on that stream. Chapman having succeeded in this work, Wilson re-united his whole command and endeavored to hold Ashland, but finding the Confederate cavalry and infantry there in strongforce, he was obliged to withdraw to Dr. Price's house. Here helearned that the army had gone to the left toward Cold Harbor, so onthe 2d of June he moved to Hawe's Shop. 

While Wilson was operating thus on the right, I had to cover withGregg's and Torbert's divisions the crossing of the army over thePamunkey River at and near Hanovertown. Torbert having recoveredfrom the illness which overtook him in the Wilderness, had nowreturned to duty. The march to turn the enemy's right began on the26th. Torbert and Gregg in advance, to secure the crossings of thePamunkey and demonstrate in such manner as to deceive the enemy asmuch as possible in the movement, the two cavalry divisions beingsupported by General D. A. Russell's division of the Sixth Corps. 

To attain this end in the presence of an ever-watchful foe who hadjust recently been reinforced in considerable numbers from Richmondand further south--almost enough to make up the losses he hadsustained in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania--required the mostvigorous and zealous work on the part of those to whom had beenallotted the task of carrying out the initial manoeuvres. Torbertstarted for Taylor's ford on the Pamunkey with directions todemonstrate heavily at that point till after dark, as if the crossingwas to be made there, and having thus impressed the enemy, he was toleave a small guard, withdraw quietly, and march to Hanovertown ford, where the real crossing was to be effected. Meanwhile Gregg marchedto Littlepage's crossing of the Pamunkey, with instructions to makefeints in the same manner as Torbert until after dark, when he was toretire discreetly, leaving a small force to keep up thedemonstration, and then march rapidly to Hanovertown crossing, takingwith him the pontoon-bridge. 

At the proper hour Russell took up the march and followed thecavalry. The troops were in motion all night, undergoing the usualdelays incident to night marches, and, early on the morning of the27th the crossing was made, Custer's brigade of Torbert's divisiondriving from the ford about one hundred of the enemy's cavalry, andcapturing between thirty and forty prisoners. The remainder ofTorbert's division followed this brigade and advanced to Hanovertown, where General Gordon's brigade of Confederate cavalry was met. Torbert attacked this force with Devin's brigade, while he sentCuster to Hawe's Shop, from which point a road leading to the rightwas taken that brought him in rear of the enemy's cavalry; when theConfederates discovered this manoeuvre, they retired in the directionof Hanover Court House. Pursuit continued as far as a little streamcalled Crump's Creek, and here Torbert was halted, Gregg moving up onhis line meanwhile, and Russell encamping near the crossing of theriver. This completed our task of gaining a foothold south of thePamunkey, and on the 28th the main army crossed unharassed and tookup a position behind my line, extending south from the river, withthe Sixth Corps on the right across the Hanover Court House road atCrump's Creek, the Second Corps on the left of the Sixth, and theFifth Corps about two miles in front of Hanovertown, its leftextending to the Tolopotomy. 

There was now much uncertainty in General Grant's mind as to theenemy's whereabouts, and there were received daily the mostconflicting statements as to the nature of Lee's movements. Itbecame necessary, therefore, to find out by an actual demonstrationwhat Lee was doing, and I was required to reconnoitre in thedirection of Mechanicsville. For this purpose I moved Gregg'sdivision out toward this town by way of Hawe's Shop, and when it hadgone about three-fourths of a mile beyond the Shop the enemy'scavalry was discovered dismounted and disposed behind a temporarybreastwork of rails and logs. 

This was the first occasion on which, since the battle of YellowTavern, the Confederate troopers had confronted us in large numbers, their mounted operations, like ours, having been dependent more orless on the conditions that grew out of the movements in which Lee'sinfantry had been engaged since the 14th of May. 

On that date General Lee had foreshadowed his intention of using hiscavalry in connection with the manoeuvres of his infantry by issuingan order himself, now that Stuart was dead, directing that the "threedivisions of cavalry serving with the army [Lee's] will constituteseparate commands, and will report directly to and receive ordersfrom the headquarters of the army. " The order indicates that sinceStuart's death the Confederate cavalry had been re-organized intothree divisions, that were commanded respectively by General WadeHampton, General Fitzhugh Lee, and General W. H. F. Lee, theadditional division organization undoubtedly growing out of the fact, that General M. C. Butler's brigade of about four thousand men hadjoined recently from South Carolina. 

When this force developed in Gregg's front, he attacked the momenthis troops could be dismounted; and the contest became one ofexceeding stubborness, for he found confronting him Hampton's andFitzhugh Lee's divisions, supported by what we then supposed to be abrigade of infantry, but which, it has since been ascertained, wasButler's brigade of mounted troops; part of them armed withlong-range rifles. The contest between the opposing forces was ofthe severest character and continued till late in the evening. Thevarying phases of the fight prompted me to reinforce Gregg as much aspossible, so I directed Custer's brigade to report to him, sending, meanwhile, for the other two brigades of Torbert, but these were notavailable at the time--on account of delays which occurred inrelieving them from the line at Crump's Creek--and did not get uptill the fight was over. As soon as Custer joined him, Greggvigorously assaulted the Confederate position along his whole front;and notwithstanding the long-range rifles of the South Carolinians, who were engaging in their first severe combat it appears, and foughtmost desperately, he penetrated their barricades at several points. 

The most determined and obstinate efforts for success were now madeon both sides, as the position at Hawe's Shop had become of verygreat importance on account of the designs of both Lee and Grant. Lee wished to hold this ground while he manoeuvred his army to theline of the Tolopotomy, where he could cover the roads to Richmond, while Grant, though first sending me out merely to discover by astrong reconnoissance the movements of the enemy, saw the value ofthe place to cover his new base at the White House, and also to giveus possession of a direct road to Cold Harbor. Hawe's Shop remainedin our possession finally, for late in the evening Custer's brigadewas dismounted and formed in close column in rear of Gregg, and whileit assaulted through an opening near the centre of his line, theother two brigades advanced and carried the temporary works. Theenemy's dead and many of his wounded fell into our hands; also aconsiderable number of prisoners, from whom we learned thatLongstreet's and Ewell's corps were but four miles to the rear. 

The battle was a decidedly severe one, the loss on each side beingheavy in proportion to the number of troops engaged. This fight tookplace almost immediately in front of our infantry, which, during thelatter part of the contest, was busily occupied in throwing upintrenchments. Late in the afternoon I reported to General Meade thepresence of the enemy's infantry, and likewise that Hampton's andFitzhugh Lee's divisions were in my front also, and asked, at thesame time; that some of our infantry, which was near at hand, be sentto my assistance. I could not convince Meade that anything but theenemy's horse was fighting us, however, and he declined to push outthe foot-troops, who were much wearied by night marches. It has beenascertained since that Meade's conclusions were correct in so far asthey related to the enemy's infantry; but the five cavalry brigadesfar outnumbered my three, and it is to be regretted that so much wasrisked in holding a point that commanded the roads to Cold Harbor andMeadow bridge, when there was at hand a preponderating number ofUnion troops which might have been put into action. However, Gregg'sdivision and Custer's brigade were equal to the situation, allunaided as they were till dark, when Torbert and Merritt came on theground. The contest not only gave us the crossroads, but alsoremoved our uncertainty regarding Lee's movements, clearlydemonstrating that his army was retiring by its right flank, so thatit might continue to interpose between Grant and the James River; aswell as cover the direct route to Richmond. 

General Lee reported this battle to his Government as a Confederatevictory, but his despatch was sent early in the day, long before thefight ended, and evidently he could not have known the final resultwhen he made the announcement, for the fight lasted until dark. After dark, our own and the Confederate dead having been buried, Iwithdrew, and moving to the rear of our infantry, marched all nightand till I reached the vicinity of Old Church, where I had beeninstructed to keep a vigilant watch on the enemy with Gregg's andTorbert's divisions. As soon as I had taken position at Old Churchmy pickets were pushed out in the direction of Cold Harbor, and thefact that the enemy was holding that point in some force was clearlyascertained. But our occupation of Cold Harbor was of the utmostimportance; indeed, it was absolutely necessary that we shouldpossess it, to secure our communications with the White House, aswell as to cover the extension of our line to the left toward theJames River. Roads from Bethesda Church, Old Church, and the WhiteHouse centred at Cold Harbor, and from there many roads diverged alsotoward different crossings of the Chickahominy, which wereindispensable to us. 

The enemy too realized the importance of the place, for as soon as hefound himself compelled to take up the line of the Tolopotomy hethrew a body of troops into Cold Harbor by forced marches, andfollowed it up by pushing a part of this force out on the Old Churchroad as far as Matadequin Creek, where he established a line ofbattle, arranging the front of it parallel to the road along thesouth bank of the Pamunkey; this for the purpose of endangering ourtrains as they moved back and forth between the army and the WhiteHouse. 

Meanwhile I had occupied Old Church and pushed pickets down towardCold Harbor. The outposts struck each other just north of MatadequinCreek, and a spirited fight immediately took place. At first ourpickets were sorely pressed, but Torbert, who was already preparingto make a reconnoissance, lost no time in reinforcing them on thenorth side of the creek with Devin's brigade. The fight then becamegeneral, both sides, dismounted, stubbornly contesting the ground. Of the Confederates, General Butler's South Carolinians bore thebrunt of the fight, and, strongly posted as they were on the southbank of the creek, held their ground with the same obstinacy they hadpreviously shown at Hawe's Shop. Finally, however, Torbert threwMerritt's and Custer's brigades into the action, and the enemyretired, we pursuing to within a mile and a half of Cold Harbor andcapturing a number of prisoners. Gregg's division took no part inthe actual fighting, but remained near Old Church observing the roadson Torberts flanks, one leading toward Bethesda Church on his right, the other to his left in the direction of the White House. Thislatter road Gregg was particularly instructed to keep open, so as tocommunicate with General W. F. Smith, who was then debarking hiscorps at the White House, and on the morning of the 3ist thisgeneral's advance was covered by a brigade which Gregg had sent himfor the purpose. 

Torbert having pursued toward Cold Harbor the troops he fought atMatadequin Creek, had taken up a position about a mile and a halffrom that place, on the Old Church road. The morning of the 31st Ivisited him to arrange for his further advance, intending thus toanticipate an expected attack from Fitzhugh Lee, who was beingreinforced by infantry. I met Torbert at Custer's headquarters, andfound that the two had already been talking over a scheme to captureCold Harbor, and when their plan was laid before me it appeared soplainly feasible that I fully endorsed it, at once giving directionsfor its immediate execution, and ordering Gregg to come forward toTorbert's support with such troops as he could spare from the dutywith which he had been charged. 

Torbert moved out promptly, Merritt's brigade first, followed byCuster's, on the direct road to Cold Harbor, while Devin's brigadewas detached, and marched by a left-hand road that would bring him inon the right and rear of the enemy's line, which was posted in frontof the crossroads. Devin was unable to carry his part of theprogramme farther than to reach the front of the Confederate right, and as Merritt came into position to the right of the Old Church roadTorbert was obliged to place a part of Custer's brigade on Merritt'sleft so as to connect with Devin. The whole division was now inline, confronted by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Clingman'sbrigade from Hoke's division of infantry; and from the Confederatebreastworks, hastily constructed out of logs, rails, and earth, aheavy fire was already being poured upon us that it seemed impossibleto withstand. None of Gregg's division had yet arrived, and sostubborn was the enemy's resistance that I began to doubt our abilityto carry the place before reinforcements came up, but just thenMerritt reported that he could turn the enemy's left, and beingdirected to execute his proposition, he carried it to a mostsuccessful issue with the First and Second regular cavalry. Just asthese two regiments passed around the enemy's left and attacked hisrear, the remainder of the division assailed him in front. Thismanoeuvre of Merritt's stampeded the Confederates, and the defensesfalling into our hands easily, we pushed ahead on the Bottom's bridgeroad three-fourths of a mile beyond Cold Harbor. 

Cold Harbor was now mine, but I was about nine miles away from ournearest infantry, and had been able to bring up only Davies's brigadeof cavalry, which arrived after the fight. My isolated positiontherefore made me a little uneasy. I felt convinced that the enemywould attempt to regain the place, for it was of as much importanceto him as to us, and the presence of his infantry disclosed that hefully appreciated this. My uneasiness increased as the day grewlate, for I had learned from prisoners that the balance of Hoke'sdivision was en route to Cold Harbor, and Kershaw near at hand, interposing between the Union left near Bethesda Church and myposition. In view of this state of affairs, I notified General Meadethat I had taken Cold Harbor, but could not with safety to my commandhold it, and forthwith gave directions to withdraw during the night. The last of my troops had scarcely pulled out, however, when Ireceived a despatch from Meade directing me to hold Cold Harbor atevery hazard. General Grant had expected that a severe battle wouldhave to be fought before we could obtain possession of the place; andits capture by our cavalry not being anticipated, no preparation hadbeen made for its permanent occupancy. No time was to be lost, therefore, if the advantages which possession of Cold Harbor gave uswere to be improved, so at the same hour that Meade ordered me tohold the place at all hazards the Sixth Corps was started on a forcedmarch, by Grant's directions, to aid in that object, and on arrivalto relieve my cavalry. 

The moment Meade's order was received, I directed a reoccupation ofCold Harbor, and although a large portion of Torbert's command wasalready well on its way back to the line we held on the morning ofthe 31st, this force speedily retraced its steps, and re-entered theplace before daylight; both our departure and return having beeneffected without the enemy being aware of our movements. We nowfound that the temporary breastworks of rails and logs which theConfederates had built were of incalculable benefit to us infurnishing material with which to establish a line of defense, theybeing made available by simply reversing them at some points, or atothers wholly reconstructing them to suit the circumstances of theground: The troops, without reserves, were then placed behind ourcover dismounted, boxes of ammunition distributed along the line, andthe order passed along that the place must be held. All this wasdone in the darkness, and while we were working away at our cover theenemy could be distinctly heard from our skirmish-line givingcommands and making preparations to attack. 

Just after daylight on the 1st of June the Confederate infantry underGeneral Kershaw endeavored to drive us out, advancing against myright from the Bethesda Church road. In his assault he was permittedto come close up to our works, and when within short range such afirewas opened on him from our horse-artillery and repeating carbinesthat he recoiled in confusion after the first onset; still, he seemeddetermined to get the place, and after reorganizing, again attacked;but the lesson of the first repulse was not without effect, and hisfeeble effort proved wholly fruitless. After his second failure wewere left undisturbed, and at 9 A. M. I sent the following despatch toarmy headquarters:

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "Cold Harbor, Va. , June 1, 1864--9 A. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS, "Chief-of-Staff. 

"GENERAL: In obedience to your instructions I am holding Cold Harbor. I have captured this morning more prisoners; they belong to threedifferent infantry brigades. The enemy assaulted the right of mylines this morning, but were handsomely repulsed. I have been veryapprehensive, but General Wright is now coming up. I built slightworks for my men; the enemy came up to them, and were driven back. General Wright has just arrived. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. "

About 10 o'clock in the morning the Sixth Corps relieved Torbert andDavies, having marched all night, and these two generals moving outtoward the Chickahominy covered the left of the infantry line tillHancock's corps took their place in the afternoon. By this timeGregg had joined me with his two brigades, and both Torbert and Greggwere now marched to Prospect Church, from which point I moved them toa position on the north side of the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge. Here the enemy's cavalry confronted us, occupying the south bank ofthe stream, with artillery in position at the fords prepared todispute our passage; but it was not intended that we should cross; soGregg and Torbert lay quiet in camp at Bottom's bridge and at OldChurch without noteworthy event until the 6th of June. 

As before related, Wilson's division struck the enemy's infantry aswell as W. H. F. Lee's cavalry near Ashland on the 1st of June, andalthough Chapman destroyed the bridges over the South Anna, which washis part of the programme, Wilson found it necessary to return toPrice's Store. From this point he continued to cover the right ofthe Army of the Potomac, on the 2d of June driving the rear-guard ofthe enemy from Hawe's Shop, the scene of the battle of May 28. Thesame day he crossed Tolopotomy Creek, and passed around the enemy'sleft flank so far that Lee thought his left was turned by a strongforce, and under cover of darkness withdrew from a menacing positionwhich he was holding in front of the Ninth Corps. This successfulmanoeuvre completed, Wilson returned to Hawe's Shop, and on the 4thwent into camp at New Castle ferry, in anticipation of certainoperations of the Cavalry Corps, which were to take place while theArmy of the Potomac was crossing to the south side of the James. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES--THE SECOND EXPEDITION--BATTLE OFTREVILLIAN STATION--DEFEAT OF GENERAL WADE HAMPTON--MALLORY'SCROSSROADS--SUFFERING OF THE WOUNDED--SECURING THE TRAINS--GENERALGREGG'S STUBBORN FIGHT. 

By the 6th of June General Grant again determined to continue themovement of the army by its left flank to the south bank of the JamesRiver, his unsuccessful attack on the enemy's works near Cold Harborhaving demonstrated that Lee's position north of the Chickahominycould not be carried by assault with results that would compensatefor the enormous loss of life which must follow; therefore a furtherattempt to fight a decisive battle north of Richmond was abandoned. In carrying the army to the James River the hazardous manoeuvreswould be hampered by many obstacles, such as the thick timber, underbrush, and troublesome swamps to be met in crossing theChickahominy. Besides, Lee held an interior line, from which all thedirect roads to Richmond could be covered with his infantry, leavinghis cavalry free to confront our advance on the south bank of theChickahominy as far down as Jones's bridge, and thence around toCharles City Court House. In view of these difficulties it becamenecessary to draw off the bulk of the enemy's cavalry while themovement to the James was in process of execution, and General Meadedetermined to do this by requiring me to proceed with two divisionsas far as Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridge over theRivanna River near that town, the railroad itself from the Rivanna toGordonsville, and, if practicable, from Gordonsville back towardHanover Junction also. 

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "June 5, 1864. 3. 30 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Commanding Cavalry Corps. 

"I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish thefollowing instructions for your guidance in the execution of the dutyreferred to in the order for movements and changes of positionto-night, a copy of which order accompanies this communication. 

"With two divisions of your corps you will move on the morning of the7th instant to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad bridge overthe Rivanna near that town; you will then thoroughly destroy therailroad from that point to Gordonsville, and from Gordonsvilletoward Hanover Junction, and to the latter point, if practicable. The chief engineer, Major Duane, will furnish you a canvaspontoon-train of eight boats. The chief quartermaster will supply youwith such tools, implements, and materials as you may require for thedestruction of the road. Upon the completion of this duty you willrejoin this army. 

"A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

After Meade's instructions reached me they were somewhat modified byGeneral Grant, who on the same evening had received information thatGeneral Hunter, commanding the troops in West Virginia, had reachedStaunton and engaged with advantage the Confederate commander, General Jones, near that place. General Grant informed me orallythat he had directed Hunter to advance as far as Charlottesville, that he expected me to unite with him there, and that the twocommands, after destroying the James River canal and the VirginiaCentral road, were to join the Army of the Potomac in the mannercontemplated in my instructions from General Meade; and that in viewof what was anticipated, it would be well to break up as much of therailroad as possible on my way westward. A copy of his letter toHunter comprised my written instructions. A junction with thisgeneral was not contemplated when the expedition was first conceived, but became an important though not the paramount object after thereception of the later information. The diversion of the enemy'scavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy was its main purpose, for in the presence of such a force as Lee's contracted lines wouldnow permit him to concentrate behind the Chickahominy, thedifficulties of crossing that stream would be largely increased if healso had at hand a strong body of horse, to gain the time necessaryfor him to oppose the movement at the different crossings with massesof his infantry. 

The order calling for two divisions for the expedition, I decided totake Gregg's and Torbert's, leaving Wilson's behind to continue withthe infantry in its march to the James and to receive instructionsdirectly from, the headquarters of the army. All my dismounted menhad been sent to the White House some days before, and they weredirected to report to Wilson as they could be provided with mounts. 

"COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 6, 1964. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER, Commanding Dept West Virginia. 

"General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning with instructions toproceed to Charlottesville, Va. , and to commence there thedestruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way asmuch as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of thecanal on James River is of great importance to us. According to theinstructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you willproceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great valueto us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day. But thatpoint is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting toget it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting into theroad or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to GeneralHalleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicatesthat your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If youhave so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. Thedirection I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in thevalley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east bythe most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch ofthe Virginia Central road. From there move eastward along the lineof the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you joinGeneral Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan andyourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomacby the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions. If anyportion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back inyour department, you are authorized to send it back. If on receiptof this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable toreach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there. If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville andLynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroythe canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

Owing to the hard service of the preceding month we had lost manyhorses, so the number of dismounted men was large; and my strengthhad also been much reduced by killed and wounded during the sameperiod of activity. The effective mounted force of my two divisionswas therefore much diminished, they mustering only about six thousandofficers and men when concentrated on June 6 at New Castle ferry. Here they were provided with three days' rations, intended to lastfive days, and with two days' grain for the horses. The rations andforty rounds of ammunition per man were to be carried on the personsof the troopers, the grain on the pommel of the saddle, and thereserve ammunition in wagons. One medical wagon and eight ambulanceswere also furnished, and one wagon was authorized for each divisionand brigade headquarters; enough canvas-covered boats for a smallpontoon-bridge were also provided. 

My instructions permitting latitude in the route I should take, Idecided to march along the north bank of the North Anna River, crossthat stream at Carpenter's ford, strike the Virginia Central railroadat Trevillian Station, destroy it toward Louisa Court House, marchpast Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, anddestroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded west. Thesuccess of the last part of this programme would of course depend onthe location of General Hunter when I should arrive in the regionwhere it would be practicable for us to communicate with each other. 

From my camp at New Castle ferry we crossed the Pamunkey, marchedbetween Aylett's and Dunkirk on the Mattapony River, and on the 8thof June encamped at Polecat Station. The next day we resumed themarch along the North Anna--our advance guard skirmishing with a fewmounted men of the enemy, who proved to be irregulars--and bivouackedon Northeast Creek, near Young's Mills. This day I learned from someof these irregulars whom we made prisoners that Breckenridge'sdivision of infantry, en route to the Shenandoah Valley by way ofGordonsville, was passing slowly up the railroad parallel to me, andthat the enemy's cavalry had left its position on the south side ofthe Chickahominy, and was marching on the old Richmond andGordonsville road toward Gordonsville, under command of General WadeHampton, the information being confirmed by a scouting party sent outto cut the telegraph wires along the railroad in the night. Breckenridge had been ordered back to the valley by General Lee assoon as he heard of Hunter's victory near Staunton, but now that myexpedition had been discovered, the movement of Breckenridge's troopson the railroad was being timed to correspond with the marches of mycommand till Hampton could get more nearly parallel with me. 

On the 10th we resumed the march, passing by Twyman's store, crossingthe North Anna at Carpenter's ford and encamping on the road leadingalong the south fork of the North Anna to Trevillian Station. Duringthe evening and night of the Loth the boldness of the enemy'sscouting parties, with which we had been coming into collision moreor less every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating thepresence of a large force, and evidencing that his shorter line ofmarch had enabled him to bring to my front a strong body of cavalry, although it started from Lee's army nearly two days later than I didfrom Grant's. The arrival of this body also permitted Breckenridgeto pass on to Gordonsville, and from there to interpose betweenGeneral Hunter and me at either Charlottesville or Waynesboro' ascircumstances might determine. 

On the night of the Loth General Hampton's division camped aboutthree miles northwest of Trevillian, at a place called Green SpringValley and Fitzhugh Lee's division not far from Louisa Court House, some six miles east of Trevillian. Learning that I was atCarpenter's ford, Hampton marched his division by way of TrevillianStation toward Clayton's store, on the road from Trevillian toCarpenter's ford, intending to attack me at Clayton's. FitzhughLee's division was to join Hampton at Clayton's store from LouisaCourt House; but on the morning of the 11th the two generals wereseparated by several miles. 

At daylight of the 11th my march, to Trevillian Station was resumedon the direct road to that point, and engaging the enemy's picketsand advanced parties soon after setting out, we began to drive themin. Torbert had the lead with Merritt's and Devin's brigades, and ashe pressed back the pickets he came upon the enemy posted behind aline of barricades in dense timber about three miles from Trevillian. Meanwhile Custer's brigade had been sent from where we bivouacked, bya wood road found on our left, to destroy Trevillian Station. Infollowing this road Custer got to the rear of Hampton's division, having passed between its right flank and Fitzhugh Lee's division, which was at the time marching on the road leading from Louisa CourtHouse to Clayton's store to unite with Hampton. 

Custer, the moment he found himself in Hampton's rear, charged theled horses, wagons, and caissons found there, getting hold of a vastnumber of each, and also of the station itself. The stampede andhavoc wrought by Custer in Hampton's rear compelled him to turnRosser's brigade in that direction, and while it attacked Custer onone side, Fitzhugh Lee's division, which had followed Custer towardTrevillian, attacked him on the other. There then ensued a desperatestruggle for the possession of the captured property, resultingfinally in its being retaken by the enemy. Indeed, the great numberof horses and vehicles could not be kept on the limited space withinCuster's line, which now formed almost a complete circle; and whilehe was endeavoring to remove them to a secure place they, togetherwith Custer's headquarters wagon and four of his caissons, fell intothe hands of their original owners. 

As soon as the firing told that Custer had struck the enemy's rear, Idirected Torbert to press the line in front of Merritt and Devin, aided by one brigade of Gregg's division on their left, Gregg's otherbrigade in the meantime attacking Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa CourtHouse road. The effect of this was to force Hampton back, and hisdivision was so hard pushed that a portion of it was driven pell-mellinto Custer's lines, leaving there about five hundred prisoners. Therest of Hampton's men did not rally till they got some distance westof Trevillian, while, in the meantime, Gregg had driven Fitzhugh Leetoward Louisa Court House so far that many miles now intervenedbetween the two Confederate divisions, precluding their union untilabout noon the next day, when Fitzhugh Lee effected the junctionafter a circuitous march in the night. The defeat of Hampton at thepoint where he had determined to resist my further advance, and hisretreat westward, gave me undisturbed possession of the station; andafter destroying the railroad to some extent toward Gordonsville, Iwent into camp. 

From prisoners taken during the day, I gathered that General Hunter, instead of coming toward Charlottesville, as I had reason to expect, both from the instructions given me and the directions sent him byGeneral Grant, was in the neighborhood of Lexington--apparentlymoving on Lynchburg--and that Breckenridge was at Gordonsville andCharlottesville. I also heard, from the same source, that Ewell'scorps was on its way to Lynchburg, but this intelligence provedafterward to be incorrect, for these troops, commanded by GeneralEarly, did not leave Richmond till two days later. 

There was no doubt as to the information about Hunter's generallocation, however. He was marching toward Lynchburg, away frominstead of toward me, thus making the junction of our commands beyondall reasonable probability. So in view of this, I made up my mind toabandon that part of the scheme, and to return by leisurely marches, which would keep Hampton's cavalry away from Lee while Grant wascrossing the James River. I was still further influenced to thiscourse by the burden which was thrown on me in the large number ofwounded--there being about five hundred cases of my own--and the fivehundred prisoners that I would probably be forced to abandon, shouldI proceed farther. Besides, the recent battle had reduced my supplyof ammunition to a very small amount--not more than enough for onemore respectable engagement; and as the chances were that I wouldhave to fight a great deal before I could reach Hunter, now that theenemy's cavalry and Breckenridge's infantry were between us, therisks of the undertaking seemed too great to warrant it. 

The morning of June 12 Gregg's division commenced destroying therailroad to Louisa Court House, and continued the work during theday, breaking it pretty effectually. While Gregg was thus occupied, I directed Torbert to make a reconnoissance up the Gordonsville road, to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna, to the Catharpen road, as I purposed following that route toSpottsylvania Court House on my return, and thence via Bowling Greenand Dunkirk to the White House. About a mile beyond Trevillian theGordonsville road fork--the left fork leading to Charlottesville--andabout a mile beyond the fork Hampton had taken up and stronglyintrenched a line across both roads, being reinforced by FitzhughLee, who, as before related, had joined him about noon by aroundabout march. Torbert soon hotly engaged this line, and by theimpetuosity of his first attack, gained some advantage; but theappearance of Fitzhugh Lee's troops on the right, and Hampton'sstrong resistance in front, rendered futile all efforts to carry theposition; and, although I brought up one of Gregg's brigades toTorbert's assistance, yet the by-road I coveted was still held by theenemy when night closed in. 

This engagement, like that off the day before around Trevillian, wasmostly fought dismounted by both sides, as had also been the earlierfights of the cavalry during the summer in the Wilderness, at Todd'sTavern, Hawe's Shop, and Matadequin Creek. Indeed, they could hardlyhave been fought otherwise than on foot, as there was little chancefor mounted fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, thearmament of both parties, and the practice of barricading making itimpracticable to use the sabre with anything like a large force; andso with the exception of Yellow Tavern the dismounted methodprevailed in almost every engagement. 

The losses at Mallory's Crossroads were very heavy on both sides. The character of the fighting, together with the day's results, demonstrated that it was impossible to make the passage of the NorthAnna at Mallory's ford without venturing another battle the next day. This would consume the little ammunition left, and though we mightgain the road, yet the possibility of having no ammunition whateverto get back with was too great a hazard, so I gave orders to withdrawduring the night of the 12th. We retired along the same road bywhich we had come, taking with us the prisoners, and all of ourwounded who could be moved. Those who could not be transported, someninety in number, and all the Confederate wounded in my hands, wereleft at Trevillian in hospitals, under charge of one of our surgeons, with plenty of medical and other stores. 

We recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford the followingmorning, and halting there, unsaddled and turned the horses out tograze, for they were nearly famished, having had neither food norwater during the preceding forty-eight hours. Late in the afternoonwe saddled up and proceeded to Twyman's Store, while GeneralHampton's main body moved down the south bank of the North Anna, withthe purpose of intervening between me and the Army of the Potomac, inthe hope of preventing my return to it; but his movements took nodefinite shape beyond watching me, however, till several days later, near St. Mary's Church, when I was crossing the peninsula to theJames River. 

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpenroad, upon which it was originally intended to move if we had beenable to cross at Mallory's ford, and this conducted me to Shady GroveChurch. The next day we passed over the battle-field ofSpottsylvania Court House. The marks of the recent conflicts aboutthere were visible on every hand, and in the neighboring houses werefound many Union and Confederate wounded, who had been too severelyhurt to be removed from the field-hospitals at the time of thebattles. Such of our wounded as were able to travel were broughtaway. 

On the 16th I marched from Edge Hill on the Ta River through BowlingGreen to Dr. Butler's, on the north side of the Mattapony. When Iarrived here I was unable to ascertain the position of the Army ofthe Potomac, and was uncertain whether or not the base at the WhiteHouse had been discontinued. I had heard nothing from the army fornine days except rumors through Southern sources, and under thesecircumstances did not like to venture between the Mattapony andPamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with some four hundred wounded, five hundred prisoners, and about two thousand negroes that hadjoined my column in the hope of obtaining their freedom. I thereforedetermined to push down the north bank of the Mattapony far enough toenable me to send these impediments directly to West Point, where Ianticipated finding some of our gunboats and transports, that couldcarry all to the North. Following this plan, we proceeded throughWalkerton to King and Queen Court House, and bivouacked in itsvicinity the night of the 18th. Next day I learned that the depot atthe White House had not yet been broken up entirely, and thatsupplies were in store for me there; so after sending the wounded, prisoners, and negroes to West Point under an escort of tworegiments, I turned back to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony, and crossed tothe south side at a place where the stream was narrow enough tobridge with my pontoon-boats. 

In returning from Trevillian, as the most of our wounded were hauledin old buggies, carts, and such other vehicles as could be madeavailable in the absence of a sufficient number of ambulances, thesuffering was intense, the heat of the season and dusty roads addingmuch to the discomfort. Each day we halted many times to dress thewounds of the injured and to refresh them as much as possible, butour means for mitigating their distress were limited. The fortitudeand cheerfulness of the poor fellows under such conditions wereremarkable, for no word of complaint was heard. The Confederateprisoners and colored people being on foot, our marches werenecessarily made short, and with frequent halts also, but they toosuffered considerably from the heat and dust, though at times theprisoners were relieved by being mounted on the horses of some of ourregiments, the owners meantime marching on foot. Where all thecolored people came from and what started them was inexplicable, butthey began joining us just before we reached Trevillian--men, women, and children with bundles of all sorts containing their few worldlygoods, and the number increased from day to day until they arrived atWest Point. Probably not one of the poor things had the remotestidea, when he set out, as to where he would finally land, but to aman they followed the Yankees in full faith that they would lead tofreedom, no matter what road they took. 

On the morning of the 20th, at an early hour, we resumed our march, and as the column proceeded sounds of artillery were heard in thedirection of the White House, which fact caused us to quicken thepace. We had not gone far when despatches from General Abercrombie, commanding some fragmentary organizations at the White House, notified me that the place was about to be attacked. I hadpreviously sent an advance party with orders to move swiftly towardthe cannonading and report to me by couriers the actual condition ofaffairs. From this party I soon learned that there was no occasionto push our jaded animals, since the crisis, if there had been one, was over and the enemy repulsed, so the increased gait was reduced toa leisurely march that took us late in the afternoon to the northbank of the Pamunkey, opposite Abercrombie's camp. When I got to theriver the enemy was holding the bluffs surrounding the White Housefarm, having made no effort to penetrate General Abercrombie's lineor do him other hurt than to throw a few shells among the teamstersthere congregated. 

Next day Gregg's division crossed the Pamunkey dismounted, andTorbert's crossed mounted. As soon as the troops were over, Gregg, supported by Merritt's brigade, moved out on the road to Tunstall'sStation to attack Hampton, posted an the west side of Black Creek, Custer's brigade meanwhile moving, mounted, on the road toCumberland, and Devin's in like manner on the one to Baltimorecrossroads. This offer of battle was not accepted, however, andHampton withdrew from my front, retiring behind the Chickahominy, where his communications with Lee would be more secure. 

While at the White House I received orders to break up that depotwholly, and also instructions to move the trains which the Army ofthe Potomac had left there across the peninsula to the pontoon-bridgeat Deep Bottom on the James River. These trains amounted to hundredsof wagons and other vehicles, and knowing full well the dangers whichwould attend the difficult problem of getting them over toPetersburg, I decided to start them with as little delay ascircumstances would permit, and the morning of the 22d sent Torbert'sdivision ahead to secure Jones's bridge on the Chickahominy, so thatthe wagons could be crossed at that point. The trains followedTorbert, while Gregg's division marched by a road parallel to the oneon which the wagons were moving, and on their right flank, as theyneeded to be covered and protected in that direction only. 

The enemy made no effort to attack us while we were moving the trainsthat day, and the wagons were all safely parked for the night on thesouth side of the Chickahominy, guarded by General Getty, who hadrelieved Abercrombie from command of the infantry fragments before westarted off from the White House. 

To secure the crossing at Jones's bridge, Torbert had pushed Devin'sbrigade out on the Long Bridge road, on the side of the Chickahominywhere, on the morning of the 23d, he was attacked by Chambliss'sbrigade of W. H. F. Lee's division. Devin was driven in some littledistance, but being reinforced by Getty with six companies of coloredtroops, he quickly turned the tables on Chambliss and re-establishedhis picket-posts. From this affair I learned that Chambliss's brigadewas the advance of the Confederate cavalry corps, while Hamptondiscovered from it that we were already in possession of the Jones'sbridge crossing of the Chickahominy; and as he was too late tochallenge our passage of the stream at this point he contentedhimself with taking up a position that night so as to cover the roadsleading from Long Bridge to Westover, with the purpose of preventingthe trains from following the river road to the pontoon-bridge atDeep Bottom. 

My instructions required me to cross the trains over the James Riveron this pontoon-bridge if practicable, and to reach it I should beobliged to march through Charles City Court House, and then byHarrison's Landing and Malvern Hill, the latter point being held bythe enemy. In fact, he held all the ground between Long Bridge onthe Chickahominy and the pontoon-bridge except the Tete de pont atthe crossing. Notwithstanding this I concluded to make the attempt, for all the delays of ferrying the command and trains would beavoided if we got through to the bridge; and with this object in viewI moved Torbert's division out on the Charles City road to conductthe wagons. Just beyond Charles City Court House Torbert encounteredLomax's brigade, which he drove across Herring Creek on the road toWestover Church; and reporting the affair to me, I surmised, from thepresence of this force in my front, that Hampton would endeavor topenetrate to the long column of wagons, so I ordered them to go intopark near Wilcox's landing, and instructed Gregg, whose division hadbeen marching in the morning along the road leading from Jones'sbridge to St. Mary's Church for the purpose of covering the exposedflank of the train, to hold fast near the church without fail tillall the transportation had passed Charles City Court House. 

Meanwhile, General Hampton, who had conjectured that I would try toget the train across the James by the pontoon-bridge at Deep Bottom, began concentrating all his troops except Lomax's brigade, which wasto confront the head of my column on the river road, in the vicinityof Nance's Shop. This was discovered by Gregg at an early hour, anddivining this purpose he had prepared to meet it by constructinghasty cover for his men before receiving my instructions. About 4o'clock in the afternoon Hampton got his force in hand, and withFitzhugh Lee's division assailed the whole front of Gregg's line, andhis left flank with Chambliss's and Geary's brigades. For two hourshe continued to attack, but made little impression on Gregg--gain atone point being counterbalanced by failure at another. Because ofthe evident strength of Hampton, Gregg had placed all his troops inline of battle from the first, and on discovery of the enemy'ssuperior numbers sent message after message to me concerning thesituation, but the messengers never arrived, being either killed orcaptured, and I remained in total ignorance till dark of the straithis division was in. 

Toward night it became clear to Gregg that he could maintain theunequal contest no longer, and he then decided to retreat, but notuntil convinced that the time won had enabled all the trains to passCharles City Court House in safety. When he had got all his ledhorses fairly on the way, and such of the wounded as could betransported, he retired by his right flank-in some confusion, it istrue, but stubbornly resisting to Hopewell Church, where Hamptonceased to press him. 

Gregg's losses were heavy, and he was forced to abandon his dead andmost seriously wounded, but the creditable stand made ensured thesafety of the train, the last wagon of which was now parked atWilcox's Landing. His steady, unflinching determination to gain timefor the wagons to get beyond the point of danger was characteristicof the man, and this was the third occasion on which he had exhibiteda high order of capacity and sound judgment since coming under mycommand. The firmness and coolness with which he always met theresponsibilities of a dangerous place were particularly strong pointsin Gregg's make-up, and he possessed so much professional thoughunpretentious ability, that it is to be regretted he felt obliged afew months later to quit the service before the close of the war. 

Gregg's fight fully satisfied me that we could not get the trains upto the pontoon-bridge, for of course Hampton would now throw all hiscavalry in my front, on the river road, where it could be backed upby Lee's infantry. Meanwhile, General Meade had become assured ofthe same thing, and as he was now growing anxious about the fate ofWilson's division--which, during my absence, had been sent out tobreak the enemy's communications south of Petersburg, by destroyingthe Southside and Danville railroads--he sent ferryboats to cross meover the James. During the night of the 24th, and next morning, theimmense train--which ought never to have been left for the cavalry toescort, after a fatiguing expedition of three weeks--was moved backthrough Charles City Court House to Douthard's landing, and thereferried over the river, followed by my troops in like manner. WhenGeneral Hampton discovered this, he moved to Drury's Bluff, andthere, on the morning of the 27th, crossed the James by theConfederate pontoon-bridge. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

GENERAL WILSON'S RAID--DESTROYING RAILROADS--HIS DISCOMFITURE--RESULTS OF HIS RAID--REMOUNTS--MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THEJAMES--DECEIVING LEE--MY ISOLATED POSITION--ESTIMATE OF HANCOCK--SUCCESS OF THE CAVALRY--THEIR CONSTANT DUTIES. 

While I was absent on the expedition to Trevillian, the movement ofthe Army of the Potomac across the James River was effected, andWilson, whom I had left behind for the purpose, was engaged in theduty of covering its front and rear. Late on the night of June 12he, with Chapman's brigade, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, in advance of the Fifth Corps, and by 7 o'clock next morning haddriven the enemy's pickets up to White Oak bridge, where he waitedfor our infantry. When that came up, he pushed on as far as Riddle'sShop, but late that evening the Confederate infantry forced him towithdraw to St. Mary's Church; for early in the morning General Leehad discovered the movement of our army, and promptly threw thiscolumn of infantry south of the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp, withthe design of covering Richmond. From St. Mary's Church Wilsonguarded all the roads toward White Oak Swamp and Riddle's Shop, McIntosh's brigade joining him on the 14th, by way of Long Bridge, asthe rear of the Army of the Potomac passed the Chickahominy. In theperformance of this duty Wilson did not have to fight any engagementof magnitude, for the bulk of the enemy's cavalry had followed me toTrevillian. During the 15th and 16th Wilson drew his troops intoward the James River, and next day crossed it on the pontoon-bridgeand camped on the Blackwater, near Mt. Sinai Church. Here heremained till the 22d of June--the same day I reached the White Housewith Gregg and Torbert--when, under orders from General Meade, he setout to cut the enemy's communications to the south and southwest ofPetersburg. 

His instructions implied that the breaking up of the Petersburg andLynchburg, and Richmond and Danville railroads at Burkeville was themost important part of his mission, and that when the work ofdestruction began, it should be continued till he was driven off bythe enemy. Wilson's force consisted of about 5, 500 men, General A. V. Kautz, with the cavalry of the Army of the James, having joinedhim for the expedition. In moving out Wilson crossed the Weldon roadnear Ream's Station, first destroying it effectually at that point. About fourteen miles west of Petersburg he struck the Southsiderailroad, and broke it up clear to Burkeville, a distance of thirtymiles. Having destroyed everything at Burkeville Junction, he movedalong the Danville road to Staunton River, completely wrecking aboutthirty miles of that line also. At Staunton River he found therailroad bridge strongly guarded, and seeing that he could not burnit, he began his return march that night, and reached Nottoway River, some thirty miles south of Petersburg, at noon of the next day--the28th. 

In this expedition Wilson was closely followed from the start byBarringer's brigade of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, but the operationswere not interfered with materially, his success being signal till hereached the vicinity of Stony Creek depot on his return. At thispoint General Hampton, with his own and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, gotbetween Wilson and the Army of the Potomac, there being behind themat Ream's Station, at the same time, two brigades of infantry underGeneral Mahone. A severe battle ensued, resulting in Wilson'sdefeat, with the loss of twelve guns and all his wagons. Inconsequence of this discomfiture he was obliged to fall back acrossthe Nottoway River with his own division, and rejoined the army byway of Peter's bridge on that stream, while Kautz's division, unableto unite with Wilson after the two commands had become separated inthe fight, made a circuit of the enemy's left, and reached the linesof our army in the night of the 28th. 

Neither the presence of Hampton's cavalry at Stony Creek depot, northe possession of Ream's Station by the Confederate infantry, seemsto have been anticipated by Wilson, for in the report of theexpedition he states:

"Foreseeing the probability of having to return northward, I wrote toGeneral Meade the evening before starting that I anticipated noserious difficulty in executing his orders; but unless GeneralSheridan was required to keep Hampton's cavalry engaged, and ourinfantry to prevent Lee from making detachments, we should probablyexperience great difficulty in rejoining the army. In reply to thisnote, General Humphreys, chief-of-staff, informed me it was intendedthe Army of the Potomac should cover the Weldon road the next day, the Southside road the day after, and that Hampton having followedSheridan toward Gordonsville, I need not fear any trouble from him. "

I doubt that General Meade's letter of instructions and Wilson's noteof the same evening, warrant what General Wilson here says. It istrue that the Weldon railroad near Ream's Station was not covered byour infantry, as General Humphreys informed him it would be, butWilson is in error when he intimates that he was assured that I wouldlook after Hampton. I do not think General Meade's instructions aresusceptible of this interpretation. I received no orders requiringme to detain Hampton. On the contrary, when I arrived at the WhiteHouse my instructions required me to break up the depot there, andthen bring the train across the Peninsula as soon as practicable, norwere these instructions ever modified. I began the duty imposed onme on the morning of the 23d, totally in the dark as to what wasexpected of Wilson, though it seems, from some correspondence betweenGenerals Grant and Meade, which I never saw till after the war, thatGrant thought Wilson could rely on Hampton's absence from his fieldof operations throughout the expedition. 

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "June 21, 1864. 9:20 A. M. 

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILSON, "Commanding Third Division Cavalry Corps. 

"The major-general commanding directs that you move your command at2 A. M. To-morrow, the 22d instant, in execution of the duty assignedyou of destroying certain railroads. Despatches received from theWhite House state that Hampton's cavalry was before that placeyesterday evening, and that General Sheridan had also reached there, hence it is desirable that you should march at the earliest moment. In passing Petersburg you will endeavor to avoid the observation ofthe enemy, and then move by the shortest routes to the intersectionof the Petersburg and Lynchburg, and the Richmond and Danvillerailroads, and destroy both these roads to the greatest extentpossible, continuing their destruction until driven from it by suchattacks of the enemy as you can no longer resist. The destruction ofthose roads to such an extent that they cannot be used by the enemyin connection with Richmond during the remainder of the campaign isan important part of the plan of campaign. The latest informationfrom Major-General Hunter represents him to be a few miles west ofLynchburg. He may endeavor to form a junction with this army; youwill communicate with him if practicable, and have delivered to himverbally the contents of the following copy of a communication fromLieutenant-General Grant to the major-general commanding this army. Lieutenant Brooks, who will accompany your expedition part of theway, should be informed where General Hunter will probably be found. 

"The success of your expedition will depend upon the secrecy withwhich it is commenced, and the celerity with which its movements areconducted; your command will, therefore, have with it the lightestsupplies and smallest number of wheels consistent with the thoroughexecution of the duty, the supplies of the section of country youwill operate in being taken into account. Upon the completion of thework assigned you, you will rejoin this army. 

"The chief quartermaster was directed yesterday to supply you withthe implements and material for the destruction of railroads obtainedfor General Sheridan. 

"[Signed] "A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES, Mount Sinai Church, June 21, 1864--6 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS, ""Chief-of-Staff. "The instructions of the major-general commanding, of this date, arereceived. I shall march in obedience thereto at 2 A. M. To-morrow. Before starting I would like to know if our infantry forces cover theWeldon road. 

"I propose striking the Southside road first at Sutherland Station, or some point in that vicinity, tearing up the track sufficiently todelay railroad communication ten or twelve hours. At this place Ishall detach a force to strike the Richmond and Danville road, by arapid march, at the nearest point, tearing up the track at everypracticable point between there and Burkeville. 

"From Sutherlands I shall move the main body of my command by theGreat road (breaking the railroad at every convenient point) directlyto Burkeville, which, if we succeed in capturing, will afford us theopportunity of prosecuting our work with great advantage. As soon asI have made dispositions for communicating with Hunter and done allthe damage possible, I shall move with all possible rapidity forDanville and Grenboro'. 

"Circumstances must, however, is a great degree control our movementsafter leaving Burkeville. 

"If Sheridan will look after Hampton, I apprehend no difficulty, andhope to be able to do the enemy great damage. The ammunition issuedto my command is very defective. The implements for destroying roadshave not yet arrived, but I learn from General Ingalls that they willcertainly be here early to-morrow. 

"[Signed] J. H. WILSON, "Brigadier-General Commanding. "

The moment I received orders from General Meade to go to the reliefof Wilson, I hastened with Torbert and Gregg by way of Prince GeorgeCourt House and Lee's Mills to Ream's Station. Here I found theSixth Corps, which Meade had pushed out on his left flank immediatelyon hearing of Wilson's mishap, but I was too late to render anymaterial assistance, Wilson having already disappeared, followed bythe enemy. However, I at once sent out parties to gatherinformation, and soon learned that Wilson had got safe across theNottoway at Peter's bridge and was making for the army by way ofBlunt's bridge, on the Blackwater. 

The benefits derived from this expedition, in the destruction of theSouthside and Danville railroads, were considered by General Grant asequivalent for the losses sustained in Wilson's defeat, for thewrecking of the railroads and cars was most complete, occasioning atthis, time serious embarrassment to the Confederate Government; but Idoubt if all this compensated for the artillery and prisoners thatfell into the hands of the enemy in the swamps of Hatcher's Run andRowanty Creek. Wilson's retreat from the perilous situation atReam's station was a most creditable performance--in the face of twobrigades of infantry and three divisions of cavalry--and in theconduct of the whole expedition the only criticism that can holdagainst him is that he placed too much reliance on meeting ourinfantry at Ream's station, seeing that uncontrollable circumstancesmight, and did, prevent its being there. He ought to have marched onthe 28th by Jarrett's Station to Peter's bridge, on the Nottoway, andBlunts bridge on the Blackwater, to the rear of the Army of thePotomac. 

When the safety of Wilson's command was assured, I was ordered backto Light House Point, where I had gone into camp after crossing theJames River to rest and recruit my command, now very much reduced innumbers by reason of casualties to both horses and men. It had beenmarching and fighting for fifty consecutive days, and the fatiguingservice had told so fearfully on my animals that the number ofdismounted men in the corps was very large. With the exception ofabout four hundred horses that I received at the White House, noanimals were furnished to supply the deficiencies which had arisenfrom the wearing marches of the past two months until I got to thiscamp at Light House Point; here my needs were so obvious that theycould no longer be neglected. 

I remained at Light House Point from the 2d to the 26th of July, recuperating the cavalry, the intensely warm weather necessitatingalmost an entire suspension of hostilities on the part of the Army ofthe Potomac. Meanwhile fifteen hundred horses were sent me here, andthese, with the four hundred already mentioned, were all that mytroops received while I held the personal command of the CavalryCorps, from April 6 to August 1, 1864. This was not near enough tomount the whole command, so I disposed the men who could not besupplied in a dismounted camp. 

By the 26th of July our strength was pretty well restored, and asGeneral Grant was now contemplating offensive operations for thepurpose of keeping Lee's army occupied around Richmond, and also ofcarrying Petersburg by assault if possible, I was directed to move tothe north side of the James River in conjunction with GeneralHancock's corps, and, if opportunity offered, to make a secondexpedition against the Virginia Central railroad, and again destroythe bridges on the North Anna, the Little and the South Anna rivers. 

I started out on the afternoon of the 26th and crossed the Appomattoxat Broadway landing. At Deep Bottom I was joined by Kautz's smalldivision from the Army of the James, and here massed the wholecommand, to allow Hancock's corps to take the lead, it crossing tothe north bank of the James River by the bridge below the mouth ofBailey's Creek. I moved late in the afternoon, so as not to comewithin the enemy's view before dark, and after night-fall Hancock'scorps passed me and began crossing the pontoon-bridge about 2 o'clockin the morning. 

By daylight Hancock was across, the cavalry following. Soon aportion of his corps attacked the enemy's works on the east side ofBailey's Creek, and, aided by the cavalry moving on its right, captured four pieces of artillery. This opened the way for Hancockto push out his whole corps, and as he advanced by a wheel, with hisleft as a pivot, the cavalry joined in the movement, pressing forwardon the New Market and Central or Charles City roads. 

We did not go far before we found the enemy's infantry posted acrossthese two roads behind a strong line of intrenchments on the westbank of Bailey's Creek. His videttes in front of Ruffin's house onthe New Market road were soon driven in on their main line, and thehigh ground before the house was immediately occupied by Torbert andGregg, supported by Kautz's division. By the time the cavalry linewas formed the Confederate General Kershaw, with his own division ofinfantry and those of Wilcox and Heath, advanced to attack us. Directing the most of his troops against the cavalry, which was stillmounted, Kershaw drove it back some distance over the high ground. When it reached the eastern face of the ridge, however, it wasquickly dismounted, and the men directed to lie down in line ofbattle about fifteen yards from the crest, and here the onset of theenemy was awaited. When Kershaw's men reached the crest such asevere fire was opened on them, and at such close quarters, that theycould not withstand it, and gave way in disorder. They were followedacross the plain by the cavalry, and lost about two hundred and fiftyprisoners and two battle-flags. The counter attack against theinfantry by Torbert and Gregg re-established our line and gave us thevictory of Darbytown, but it also demonstrated the fact that GeneralLee had anticipated the movement around his left flank bytransferring to the north side of the James a large portion of hisinfantry and W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry. 

This development rendered useless any further effort on Hancock'spart or mine to carry out the plan of the expedition, for GeneralGrant did not intend Hancock to assault the enemy's works unlessthere should be found in them but a very thin line of infantry whichcould be surprised. In such event, Hancock was to operate so thatthe cavalry might turn the Confederates on the Central or CharlesCity road, but the continually increasing force of the enemy showedthis to be impracticable. The long front presented by Hancock'scorps and the cavalry deceived General Lee, and he undoubtedlythought that nearly all of Grant's army had been moved to the northside of the James River; and to meet the danger he transferred themost of his own strength to the same side to confront his adversary, thinning the lines around Petersburg to reinforce those opposing uson the Central and New Market roads. This was what Grant hoped Leewould do in case the operations of Hancock and myself becameimpracticable, for Grant had an alternative plan for carryingPetersburg by assault in conjunction with the explosion of a minethat had been driven under the enemy's works from the front ofBurnside's corps. 

Now that there was no longer a chance for the cavalry to turn theenemy's left, our attention was directed to keeping up the deceptionof Lee, and on the afternoon of the 28th Hancock's corps withdrew toa line nearer the head of the bridge, the cavalry drawing back to aposition on his right. From now on, all sorts of devices andstratagems were practiced--anything that would tend to make theConfederates believe we were being reinforced, while Hancock waspreparing for a rapid return to Petersburg at the proper time. Inorder to delude the enemy still more after night-fall of the 28th Isent one of my divisions to the south side of the James, firstcovering the bridgeway with refuse hay to keep the tramp of the horsesfrom being heard. After daylight the next morning, I marched thisdivision back again on foot, in full view of the enemy, to create theimpression of a continuous movement large bodies of infantry to thenorth side, while the same time Kautz was made to skirmish with theenemy on our extreme right. These various artifices had the effectintended, for by the evening of the 29th Lee had transferred all hisinfantry to the north bank of the James, except three divisions, andall his cavalry save one. 

The morning of the 30th had been fixed upon to explode the mine andassault the enemy's works, so after dark on the evening of the 29thHancock hastily but quietly withdrew his corps to the south side totake part in the engagement which was to succeed the explosion, and Iwas directed to follow Hancock. This left me on the north side ofthe river confronting two-thirds of Lee's army in a perilousposition, where I could easily be driven into Curl's Neck and mywhole command annihilated. The situation, therefore, was not apleasant one to contemplate, but it could not be avoided. Luckilythe enemy did not see fit to attack, and my anxiety was greatlyrelieved by getting the whole command safely across the bridgeshortly after daylight, having drawn in the different brigadessuccessively from my right. By 10 o'clock on the morning of the 3othmy leading division was well over toward the left of our army infront of Petersburg, marching with the purpose to get around theenemy's right flank during the operations that were to succeed themine explosion, but when I reached General Meade's headquarters Ifound that lamentable failure had attended the assault made when theenemy's works were blown up in the morning. Blunder after blunderhad rendered the assault abortive, and all the opportunities openedby our expedition to the north side were irretrievably lost, soGeneral Meade at once arrested the movement of the cavalry. 

In the expedition to Deep Bottom I was under the command ofMajor-General Hancock, who, by seniority, was to control my corps aswell as his own until the way was opened for me to get out on theVirginia Central railroad. If this opportunity was gained, I was tocut loose and damage Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valleyin such manner as best suited the conditions, but my return was not tobe jeopardized nor long delayed. This necessitated that Hancock'sline should extend to Bottom's bridge on the Chickahominy. Theenemy's early discovery of the movement and his concentration oftroops on the north side prevented Hancock from accomplishing theprogramme laid out for him. Its impracticability was demonstratedearly on the 27th, and Hancock's soldierly instincts told him this themoment he unexpectedly discovered Kershaw blocking the New Market andCharles City roads. To Hancock the temptation to assault Kershaw'sposition was strong indeed, but if he carried it there would stillremain the dubious problem of holding the line necessary for my safereturn, so with rare judgment he desisted zealously turning to thealternative proposition--the assault on Petersburg--for moresignificant results. This was the only occasion during the war inwhich I was associated with Hancock in campaign. Up till then we hadseldom met, and that was the first opportunity I had to observe hisquick apprehension, his physical courage, and the soldierlypersonality which had long before established his high reputation. 

On the 1st of August, two days after the mine explosion, I was. Relieved from the personal command of the Cavalry Corps, and orderedto the Shenandoah Valley, where at a later date Torbert's andWilson's divisions joined me. Practically, after I went to thevalley, my command of the Cavalry Corps became supervisory merely. During the period of my immediate control of the corps, I tried tocarry into effect, as far as possible, the views I had advancedbefore and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign, i. E. , "thatour cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry theenemy's infantry"; for there was great danger of breaking the spiritof the corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy's compactmasses of foot-troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless therewas some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained, such a use of it would not be justified. Immediately succeeding thebattles of the Wilderness, opportunity offered to put this plan intoexecution to some extent, and from that time forward--from the battleof Yellow Tavern--our success was almost continuous, resultingfinally, before the close of the war, in the nearly totalannihilation of the enemy's cavalry. 

The constant activity of the corps from May 5 till August 1 gavelittle opportunity for the various division and brigade commanders torecord its work in detail; so there exists but meagre accounts of thenumerous skirmishes and graver conflicts in which, in addition to thefights mentioned in this narrative, it engaged. A detailed historyof its performances is not within the province of a work of thisnature; but in review, it can be said, without trespassing on thereader's time, that the Cavalry Corps led the advance of the Army ofthe Potomac into the Wilderness in the memorable campaign of 1864;that on the expedition by way of Richmond to Haxall's it marked outthe army's line of march to the North Anna; that it again led theadvance to the Tolopotomy, and also to Cold Harbor, holding thatimportant strategic point at great hazard; and that by the Trevillianexpedition it drew away the enemy's cavalry from the south side ofthe Chickahominy, and thereby assisted General Grant materially insuccessfully marching to the James River and Petersburg. Subsequently, Wilson made his march to Staunton bridge, destroyingrailroads and supplies of inestimable value, and though this wasneutralized by his disaster near Ream's Station, the temporaryset-back there to one division was soon redeemed by victory overthe Confederate infantry at the battle of Darbytown. 

In the campaign we were almost always on the march, night and day, often unable to care properly for our wounded, and obliged to buryour dead where they fell; and innumerable combats attest the part thecavalry played in Grant's march from the Rapidan to Petersburg. Innearly all of these our casualties were heavy, particularly so when, as was often the case, we had to engage the Confederate infantry; butthe enemy returned such a full equivalent in dead and wounded inevery instance, that finally his mounted power, which from thebeginning of the war had been nurtured with a wise appreciation ofits value, was utterly broken. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

GENERAL HUNTER'S SUCCESSFUL MARCH AND SUBSEQUENT RETREAT--GENERALJUBAL A. EARLY THREATENS WASHINGTON--CHAMBERSBURG, PA. , BURNED--SELECTED TO OPERATE AGAINST GENERAL EARLY--THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. 

When the attempt to take Petersburg in conjunction with the mineexplosion resulted in such a dismal failure, all the operationscontemplated in connection with that project came to a standstill, and there was every prospect that the intensely hot and sultryweather would prevent further activity in the Army of the Potomactill a more propitious season. Just now, however, the conditionsexisting in the Shenandoah Valley and along the upper Potomacdemanded the special attention of General Grant, for, notwithstandingthe successful march that Major-General David Hunter had made towardLynchburg early in the summer, what he had first gained wassubsequently lost by strategical mistakes, that culminated indisaster during the retreat he was obliged to make from the vicinityof Lynchburg to the Kanawha Valley. This route of march uncoveredthe lower portion of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and with theexception of a small force of Union troops under General Franz Sigelposted aft Martinsburg for the purpose of covering the Baltimore andOhio railroad, there was nothing at hand to defend the lower valley. 

The different bodies of Confederates which compelled Hunter's retreatwere under command of General Jubal A. Early, who had been sent toLynchburg with Ewell's corps after the defeat of the ConfederateGeneral W. C. Jones near Staunton on the 5th of June, to take commandof the Valley District. When Early had forced Hunter into theKanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could notagain be threatened from that direction, he united to his own corpsGeneral John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry ofGenerals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland. B. T. Johnson, and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and westernVirginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr. , and with the column thusformed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower ShenandoahValley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to movenorth at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Marylandand threaten Washington. Indeed, General Lee had foreshadowed such acourse when Early started toward Lynchburg for the purpose ofrelieving the pressure in front of Petersburg, but was in some doubtas to the practicability of the movement later, till persuaded to itby the representations of Early after that general had driven Hunterbeyond the mountains and found little or nothing opposing except thesmall force of Sigel, which he thought he could readily overcome bycelerity of movement. 

By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and onthe 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that placethe same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreatthrough the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early wasthus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, movingaround Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, hefound his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, whereRicketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that hadbeen collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederatestill the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capitalfrom Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line ofthe Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally towardBaltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marchedto the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrationswhich were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its mainpurpose in front of Petersburg. 

Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused someconcern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was lookedupon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisiveissue, the Administration was not much disturbed till theConfederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarmand consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of thecapital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing amongthe different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginarydangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who, with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushedout to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops inhand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement;and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by someUnion cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimoreand Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchestertoward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this placehe found that he was being followed by General Crook with thecombined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned toWashington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. Thisreduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume theoffensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded inadministering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreatto Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawalrestored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing thisstream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on toChambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes, leaving threethousand non-combatants without shelter or food. 

When Early fell back from the vicinity of Washington towardStrasburg, General Grant believed that he would rejoin Lee, but latermanoeuvres of the enemy indicated that Early had given up this idea, if he ever, entertained it, and intended to remain in the valley, since it would furnish Lee and himself with subsistence, and alsoafford renewed opportunities for threatening Washington. Indeed, thepossession of the Valley of the Shenandoah at this time was of vastimportance to Lee's army, and on every hand there were indicationsthat the Confederate Government wished to hold it at least untilafter the crops could be gathered in to their depots at Lynchburg andRichmond. Its retention, besides being of great advantage in thematter of supplies, would also be a menace to the North difficult forGeneral Grant to explain, and thereby add an element of considerablebenefit to the Confederate cause; so when Early's troops againappeared at Martinsburg it was necessary for General Grant toconfront them with a force strong enough to put an end to incursionsnorth of the Potomac, which hitherto had always led to Nationaldiscomfiture at some critical juncture, by turning our army ineastern Virginia from its chief purpose--the destruction of Lee andthe capture of the Confederate capital. 

This second irruption of Early, and his ruthless destruction ofChambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grantlooking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing amongthe Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time theauthorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. The President and Secretary Stanton seemed unwilling to adopt hissuggestions, and one measure which he deemed very important--theconsolidation into a single command of the four geographicaldistricts into which, to relieve political pressure no doubt, theterritory had been divided--met with serious opposition. DespiteGrant's representations, he could not prevail on the Administrationto approve this measure, but finally the manoeuvres of Early and theraid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant hadsomewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint acommander for the forces in the field that were to operate againstEarly. 

On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander, andin obedience to his telegraphic summons I repaired to hisheadquarters at City Point. In the interview that followed, hedetailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac, tellingme that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operateagainst Early, but that General Hunter, who was at the head of thegeographical department, would be continued in his position for thereason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct orconsolidate the different districts. After informing me that onedivision of the Cavalry Corps would be sent to my new command, hewent on to say that he wanted me to push the enemy as soon as thisdivision arrived, and if Early retired up the Shenandoah Valley I wasto pursue, but if he crossed the Potomac I was to put myself south ofhim and try to compass his destruction. The interview having ended, I returned to Hancock Station to prepare for my departure, and on theevening of August 1 I was relieved from immediate duty with the Armyof the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corpsorganization. 

I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next dayreceived instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grantat Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, inconsequence of a characteristic despatch from the Presidentindicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder, and helplessnessprevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant'spresence there was necessary. 

In company with the Secretary of War I called on the President beforeleaving Washington, and during a short conversation Mr. Lincolncandidly told me that Mr. Stanton had objected to my assignment toGeneral Hunter's command, because he thought me too young, and thathe himself had concurred with the Secretary; but now, since GeneralGrant had "ploughed round" the difficulties of the situation bypicking me out to command the "boys in the field, " he felt satisfiedwith what had been done, and "hoped for the best. " Mr. Stantonremained silent during these remarks, never once indicating whetherhe, too, had become reconciled to my selection or not; and although, after we left the White House, he conversed with me freely in regardto the campaign I was expected to make, seeking to impress on me thenecessity for success from the political as well as from the militarypoint of view, yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken anypart in disapproving the recommendation of the general-in-chief. 

August 6, I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy, and he thereturned over to me the following instructions, which he had previouslyprepared for General Hunter in the expectation that general wouldcontinue to command the department:

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, "Monocacy Bridge, Md. , Aug. 5, 1864. 

"GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in thevicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards andgarrisons for public property as may be necessary. 

"Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so doing time can besaved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has movednorth of the Potomac in large force, push north, following andattacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of thePotomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained thatthe enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push souththe main force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficientforce to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. Indetaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route fromWashington via Rockville may be taken into account. 

"There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of thebest of cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to joinyou by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probablystart to-morrow. 

"In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will haveto go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left toinvite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stockwanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people should be informedthat so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of theseraids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at allhazards. 

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do thisyou want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course bythe course he takes. 

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regularvouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the countrythrough which you march. 

"Very respectfully, "U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. "

"Major-General D. HUNTER, "Commanding Department of West Virginia. "

When I had read the letter addressed to Hunter, General Grant said Iwould be expected to report directly to him, as Hunter had asked thatday to be wholly relieved, not from any chagrin at my assignment tothe control of the active forces of his command, but because hethought that his fitness for the position he was filling wasdistrusted by General Halleck, and he had no wish to causeembarrassment by remaining where he could but remove me one degreefrom the headquarters of the army. The next day Hunter's unselfishrequest was complied with, and an order was issued by the President, consolidating the Middle Department, the Department of Washington, the Department of the Susquehanna, and the Department of WestVirginia. 

Under this order these four geographical districts constituted theMiddle Military Division, and I was temporarily assigned to commandit. Hunter's men had been bivouacking for some days past in thevicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick, but before GeneralGrant's instructions were written out, Hunter had conformed to themby directing the concentration at Halltown, about four miles in frontof Harper's Ferry, of all his force available for field service. Therefore the different bodies of troops, with the exception ofAverell's cavalry, which had followed McCausland toward Moorefieldafter the burning of Chambersburg, were all in motion toward Halltownon August 6. 

Affairs at Monocacy kept me but an hour or two, and these disposedof, I continued on to Harper's Ferry by the special train which hadbrought me from Washington, that point being intended as myheadquarters while making preparations to advance. The enemy wasoccupying Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown at the time;sending occasional raiding parties into Maryland as far asHagerstown. The concentration of my troops at Halltown being anindication to Early that we intended to renew the offensive, however, he immediately began counter preparations by drawing in all hisdetached columns from the north side of the Potomac, abandoning acontemplated raid into Maryland, which his success against Crook atKernstown had prompted him to project, and otherwise disposinghimself for defense. 

At Harper's Ferry I made my headquarters in the second story of asmall and very dilapidated hotel, and as soon as settled sent forLieutenant John R. Meigs, the chief engineer officer of the command, to study with him the maps of my geographical division. It alwayscame rather easy to me to learn the geography of a new section, andits important topographical features as well; therefore I found that, with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession, the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in mymind. Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream, andwith all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge, and wasparticularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the ShenandoahValley, even down to the farmhouses. He imparted with greatreadiness what he knew of this, clearly pointing out itsconfiguration and indicating the strongest points for Confederatedefense, at the same time illustrating scientifically and forciblythe peculiar disadvantages under which the Union army had hithertolabored. 

The section that received my closest attention has its northern limitalong the Potomac between McCoy's ferry at the eastern base of theNorth Mountain, and Harper's Ferry at the western base of the BlueRidge. The southern limit is south of Staunton, on the divide whichseparates the waters flowing into the Potomac from those that run tothe James. The western boundary is the eastern slope of theAlleghany Mountains, the eastern, the Blue Ridge; these two distinctmountain ranges trending about southwest inclose a stretch of quiteopen, undulating country varying in width from the northern to thesouthern extremity, and dotted at frequent intervals with patches ofheavy woods: At Martinsburg the valley is about sixty miles broad, and on an east and west line drawn through Winchester aboutforty-five, while at Strasburg it narrows down to about twenty-five. Just southeast of Strasburg, which is nearly midway between theeastern and western walls of the valley, rises an abrupt range ofmountains called Massanutten, consisting of several ridges whichextend southward between the North and South Forks of the ShenandoahRiver until, losing their identity, they merge into lower but brokenground between New Market and Harrisonburg. The Massanutten ranges, with their spurs and hills, divide the Shenandoah Valley into twovalleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray, whilethat next the North Mountain retains the name of Shenandoah. 

A broad macadamized road, leading south from Williamsport, Maryland, to Lexington, Virginia, was built at an early day to connect theinterior of the latter State with the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, andalong this road are situated the principal towns and villages of theShenandoah Valley, with lateral lines of communication extending tothe mountain ranges on the east and west. The roads running towardthe Blue Ridge are nearly all macadamized, and the principal oneslead to the railroad system of eastern Virginia through Snicker's, Ashby's Manassas, Chester, Thornton's Swift Run, Brown's andRock-fish gaps, tending to an ultimate centre at Richmond. These gapsare low and easy, offering little obstruction to the march of an armycoming from eastern Virginia, and thus the Union troops operating westof the Blue Ridge were always subjected to the perils of a flankattack; for the Confederates could readily be brought by rail toGordonsville and Charlottesville, from which points they could movewith such celerity through the Blue Ridge that, on more than oneoccasion, the Shenandoah Valley had been the theatre of Confederatesuccess, due greatly to the advantage of possessing these interiorlines. 

Nature had been very kind to the valley, making it rich andproductive to an exceptional degree, and though for three yearscontending armies had been marching up and down it, the fertile soilstill yielded ample subsistence for Early's men, with a large surplusfor the army of Lee. The ground had long been well cleared oftimber, and the rolling surface presented so few obstacles to themovement of armies that they could march over the country in anydirection almost as well as on the roads, the creeks and rivers beingeverywhere fordable, with little or no difficulty beyond that ofleveling the approaches. 

I had opposing me an army largely composed of troops that hadoperated in this region hitherto under "Stonewall" Jackson withmarked success, inflicting defeat on the Union forces almost everytime the two armies had come in contact. These men were now commandedby a veteran officer of the Confederacy-General Jubal A. Early--whosepast services had so signalized his ability that General Leespecially selected him to take charge of the Valley District, and, notwithstanding the misfortunes that befell him later, clung to himtill the end, of the war. The Confederate army at this date wasabout twenty thousand strong, and consisted of Early's own corps, with Generals Rodes, Ramseur, and Gordon commanding its divisions;the infantry of Breckenridge from southwestern Virginia; threebattalions of artillery; and the cavalry brigades of Vaughn, Johnson, McCausland, and Imboden. This cavalry was a short time afterwardorganized into a division under the command of General Lomax. 

After discovering that my troops were massing in front of Harper'sFerry, Early lost not a moment in concentrating his in the vicinityof Martinsburg, in positions from which he could continue to obstructthe Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and yet be enabled to retire up thevalley under conditions of safety when I should begin an offensivecampaign. 

When I took command of the Army of the Shenandoah its infantry forcecomprised the Sixth Corps, one division of the Nineteenth Corps, andtwo divisions from West Virginia. The Sixth Corps was commandedby Major-General Horatio G. Wright; its three divisions byBrigadier-Generals David A. Russell, Geo. W. Getty, and James B. Ricketts. The single division of the Nineteenth Corps had for itsimmediate chief Brigadier-General William Dwight, the corps beingcommanded by Brigadier-General Wm. H. Emory. The troops from WestVirginia were under Brigadier-General George Crook, with ColonelsJoseph Thoburn and Isaac H. Duval as division commanders, and thoughin all not more than one fair-sized division, they had beendesignated, on account of the department they belonged to, the Army ofWest Virginia. General Torbert's division, then arriving from theCavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, represented the mounted armof the service, and in the expectation that Averell would soon join mewith his troopers, I assigned General Torbert as chief of cavalry, andGeneral Wesley Merritt succeeded to the command of Torbert's division. 

General Wright, the commander of the Sixth Corps, was an officer ofhigh standing in the Corps of Engineers, and had seen much activeservice during the preceding three years. He commanded theDepartment of the Ohio throughout the very trying period of thesummer and fall of 1862, and while in that position he, with otherprominent officers, recommended my appointment as abrigadier-general. In 1863 he rendered valuable service at the battleof Gettysburg, following which he was assigned to the Sixth Corps, andcommanded it at the capture of the Confederate works at RappahannockStation and in the operations at Mine Run. He ranked me as amajor-general of volunteers by nearly a year in date of commission, but my assignment by the President to the command of the army in thevalley met with Wright's approbation, and, so far as I have everknown, he never questioned the propriety of the President's action. The Sixth Corps division commanders, Getty, Russell, and Ricketts, were all educated soldiers, whose records, beginning with the MexicanWar, had already been illustrated in the war of the rebellion bydistinguished service in the Army of the Potomac. 

General Emory was a veteran, having graduated at the Military Academyin 1831, the year I was born. In early life he had seen much servicein the Artillery, the Topographical Engineers, and the Cavalry, andin the war of the rebellion had exhibited the most soldierlycharacteristics at Port Hudson and on the Red River campaign. Atthis time he had but one division of the Nineteenth Corps present, which division was well commanded by General Dwight, a volunteerofficer who had risen to the grade of brigadier-general throughconstant hard work. Crook was a classmate of mine--at least, weentered the Military Academy the same year, though he graduated ayear ahead of me. We had known each other as boys before we enteredthe army, and later as men, and I placed implicit faith in hisexperience and qualifications as a general. 

The transfer of Torbert to the position of chief of cavalry leftMerritt, as I have already said, in command of the First CavalryDivision. He had been tried in the place before, and from the day hewas selected as one of a number of young men to be appointed generalofficers, with the object of giving life to the Cavalry Corps, hefilled the measure of expectation. Custer was one of these young mentoo, and though as yet commanding a brigade under Merritt, hisgallant fight at Trevillian Station, as well as a dozen others duringthe summer, indicated that he would be equal to the work that was tofall to him when in a few weeks he should succeed Wilson. But to goon down the scale of rank, describing the officers who commanded inthe Army of the Shenandoah, would carry me beyond all limit, so Irefrain from the digression with regret that I cannot pay to each hiswell-earned tribute. 

The force that I could take with me into the field at this timenumbered about 26, 000 men. Within the limits of the geographicaldivision there was a much greater number of troops than this. Baltimore, Washington, Harper's Ferry, Hagerstown, Frederick, Cumberland, and a score of other points; besides the strongdetachments that it took to keep the Baltimore and Ohio railroad openthrough the mountains of West Virginia, and escorts for my trains, absorbed so many men that the column which could be made availablefor field operations was small when compared with the showing onpaper. Indeed, it was much less than it ought to have been, but forme, in the face of the opposition made by different interestsinvolved, to detach troops from any of the points to which they hadbeen distributed before I took charge was next to impossible. 

In a few days after my arrival preparations were completed, and I wasready to make the first move for the possession of the ShenandoahValley. For the next five weeks the operations on my part consistedalmost wholly of offensive and defensive manoeuvring for certainadvantages, the enemy confining himself meanwhile to measuresintended to counteract my designs. Upon the advent of Torbert, Earlyimmediately grew suspicious, and fell back twelve miles south ofMartinsburg, to Bunker Hill and vicinity, where his right flank wouldbe less exposed, but from which position he could continue tomaintain the break in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and pushreconnoitring parties through Smithfield to Charlestown. Thesereconnoitring parties exhibited considerable boldness at times, butsince they had no purpose in view save to discover whether or not wewere moving, I did not contest any ground with them except about ouroutposts. Indeed, I desired that Early might remain at some pointwell to the north till I was fully prepared to throw my army on hisright and rear and force a battle, and hence I abstained fromdisturbing him by premature activity, for I thought that if I couldbeat him at Winchester, or north of it, there would be far greaterchances of weighty results. I therefore determined to bring mytroops, if it were at all possible to do so, into such a positionnear that town as to oblige Early to fight. The sequel proved, however, that he was accurately informed of all my movements. Toanticipate them, therefore, he began his retreat up the valley theday that I moved out from Halltown, and consequently was able toplace himself south of Winchester before I could get there. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

MOVING ON GENERAL EARLY--GENERAL GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS--DESTROYING THE RESOURCES OF THE VALLEY--REASON FOR THE DESTRUCTION--WITHDRAWAL TO HALLTOWN--ALARM IN THE NORTH OVER THE RETROGRADEMOVEMENT--RENEWING THE ADVANCE UP THE VALLEY--GENERAL ANDERSON'SATTEMPT TO RETURN TO PETERSBURG--STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES. 

For a clear understanding of the operations which preceded thevictories that resulted in almost annihilating General Early's armyin the Shenandoah Valley, it is necessary to describe in considerabledetail the events that took place prior to the 19th of September. Myarmy marched from Harper's Ferry on the 10th of August, 1864, GeneralTorbert with Merritt's division of cavalry moving in advance throughBerryville, going into position near White Post. The Sixth Corps, under General Wright, moved by way of Charlestown and Summit Point toClifton; General Emory, with Dwight's division of the NineteenthCorps, marched along the Berryville pike through Berryville to theleft of the position of the Sixth Corps at Clifton; General Crook'scommand, moving on the Kabletown road, passed through Kabletown tothe vicinity of Berryville, and went into position on the left ofDwight's division, while Colonel Lowell, with a detached force of twosmall regiments of cavalry, marched to Summit Point; so that on thenight of August 10 my infantry occupied a line stretching fromClifton to Berryville, with Merritt's cavalry at White Post andLowell's at Summit Point. The enemy, as stated before, moved at thesame time from Bunker Hill and vicinity, and stretched his line fromwhere the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequon Creek tothe point at which the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses thesame stream, thus occupying the west bank to cover Winchester. 

On the morning of the 11th the Sixth Corps was ordered to move acrossthe country toward the junction of the Berryville-Winchester pike andthe Opequon, and to take the crossing and hold it, Dwight's divisionbeing directed to move through Berryville on the White Post road fora mile, then file to the right by heads of regiments at deployingdistances, and carry the crossing of Opequon Creek at a ford aboutthree-fourths of a mile from the left of the Sixth Corps, while Crookwas instructed to move out on the White Post road, a mile and a halfbeyond Berryville, then head to the right and secure the ford about amile to the left of Dwight; Torbert's orders were to push Merritt'sdivision up the Millwood pike toward Winchester, attack any force hemight run against, and ascertain the movements of the Confederatearmy; and lastly, Lowell received instructions to close in fromSummit Point on the right of the Sixth Corps. 

My object in securing the fords was to further my march on Winchesterfrom the southeast, since, from all the information gathered duringthe 10th, I still thought Early could be brought to a stand at thatpoint; but in this I was mistaken, as Torbert's reconnoissanceproved, for on the morning of the 11th, when Merritt had driven theConfederate cavalry, then covering the Millwood pike west of theOpequon, off toward Kernstown, he found that their infantry andartillery were retreating south, up the Valley pike. 

As soon as this information was obtained Torbert moved quicklythrough the toll-gate on the Front Royal and Winchester road toNewtown, to strike the enemy's flank and harass him in his retreat, Lowell following up through Winchester, on the Valley pike; Crook wasturned to the left and ordered to Stony Point, while Emory andWright, marching to the left also, were directed to take post on thenight of the 11th between the Millwood and Front Royal roads, withinsupporting distance of Crook. Merritt meeting some of the enemy'scavalry at the tollgate, drove it in the direction of Newtown till itgot inside the line of Gordon's division of infantry, which had beenthrown out and posted behind barricades to cover the flank of themain force in its retreat. A portion of Merritt's cavalry attackedthis infantry and drove in its skirmish-line, and though not able todislodge Gordon, Merritt held the ground gained till night-fall, whenthe Confederate infantry moved off under cover of darkness to Hupp'sHill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek. 

The next morning Crook marched from Stony Point to Cedar Creek, Emoryfollowed with Dwight, and the cavalry moved to the same point by wayof Newtown and the Valley pike, the Sixth Corps following thecavalry. That night Crook was in position at Cedar Creek, on theleft of the Valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the SixthCorps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the flanks. In theafternoon a heavy skirmish-line had been thrown forward to theheights on the south side of Cedar Creek, and a brisk affair with theenemy's pickets took place, the Confederates occupying with theirmain force the heights north of Strasburg. On the morning of the13th my cavalry went out to reconnoitre toward Strasburg, on themiddle road, about two and a half miles west of the Valley pike, anddiscovered that Early's infantry was at Fisher's Hill, where he hadthrown up behind Tumbling Run earthworks extending clear across thenarrow valley between the Massanutten and North mountains. On theleft of these works he had Vaughan's, McCausland's, and Johnson'sbrigades of cavalry under General Lomax, who at this time relievedGeneral Ramseur from the command of the Confederate mounted forces. 

Within the past day or two I had received information that a columnof the enemy was moving up from Culpeper Court House and approachingFront Royal through Chester Gap, and although the intelligence wasunconfirmed, it caused me much solicitude; for there was strongprobability that such a movement would be made, and any considerableforce advancing through Front Royal toward Winchester could fall uponmy rear and destroy my communication with Harper's Ferry, or, movingalong the base of Massanutten Mountain, could attack my flank inconjunction with the force at Fisher's Hill without a possibility ofmy preventing it. 

Neither Wilson's cavalry nor Grower's infantry had yet joined me, andthe necessities, already explained, which obliged me to hold withstring garrisons Winchester and other points heretofore mentioned. Had so depleted my line of battle strength that I knew the enemywould outnumber me when Anderson's corps should arrive in the valley. I deemed it advisable, therefore, to act with extreme caution, so, with the exception of a cavalry reconnoissance on the 13th, Iremained on the defensive, quietly awaiting developments. In theevening of that day the enemy's skirmishers withdrew to Tumbling Run, his main force remaining inactive behind the intrenchments atFisher's Hill waiting for the arrival of Anderson. 

The rumors in regard to the force advancing from Culpeper keptincreasing every hour, so on the morning of the 14th I concluded tosend a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal to ascertain definitely whatwas up. At the same time I crossed the Sixth Corps to the south sideof Cedar Creek, and occupied the heights near Strasburg. That day Ireceived from the hands of Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant-General'sDepartment, the following despatch, to deliver which he had ridden ingreat haste from Washington through Snicker's Gap, escorted by aregiment of cavalry:

"CITY POINT, August 12, 1864--9 A. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK

"Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain two (2) divisions ofinfantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) piecesof artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He mustbe cautious, and act now on the defensive until movements here forcethem to detach to send this way. Early's force, with this increase, cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for GeneralSheridan to attack. Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade ofthe Nineteenth Corps. 

"I have ordered to Washington all the one-hundred-day men. Theirtime will soon be out, but for the present they will do to serve inthe defenses. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

The despatch explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morningof the 15th Merritt's two remaining brigades were sent to Front Royalto oppose Anderson, and the Sixth Corps withdrawn to the north sideof Cedar Creek, where it would be in a position enabling me either toconfront Anderson or to act defensively, as desired by General Grant. 

To meet the requirements of his instructions I examined the map ofthe valley for a defensive line--a position where a smaller number oftroops could hold a larger number--for this information led me tosuppose that Early's force would greatly exceed mine when Anderson'stwo divisions of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had joined him. I could see but one such position, and that was at Halltown, in frontof Harper's Ferry. Subsequent experience convinced me that there wasno other really defensive line in the Shenandoah Valley, for atalmost any other point the open country and its peculiar topographyinvites rather than forbids flanking operations. 

This retrograde movement would also enable me to strengthen mycommand by Grower's division of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson'scavalry, both of which divisions were marching from Washington by wayof Snicker's Gap. 

After fully considering the matter, I determined to move back toHalltown, carrying out, as I retired, my instructions to destroy allthe forage and subsistence the country afforded. So Emory wasordered to retire to Winchester on the night of the 15th, and Wrightand Crook to follow through Winchester to Clifton the next night. 

For the cavalry, in this move to the rear, I gave the followinginstructions:

".... In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you willhave to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be leftto invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, andstock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot beconsumed, destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should bedestroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people shouldbe informed that so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined tostop them at all hazards.... " [Grant's letter of instructions. ]

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, "Cedar Creek, Va. , August 16, 1864. 

"GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant-Generalcommanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give thenecessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of aline from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap. You will seizeall mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army. Loyalcitizens can bring in their claims against the Government for thisnecessary destruction. No houses will be burned, and officers incharge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the peoplethat the object is to make this valley untenable for the raidingparties of the rebel army. 

"Very respectfully, "P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. 

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. T. A. TORBERT, "Chief of Cavalry, Middle Military Division. "

During his visit to General Hunter at the Monocacy, General Grant hadnot only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large forcesufficient to defeat Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he hadfurthermore determined to make that sections by the destruction ofits supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the Confederates. This would cut off one of Lee's main-stays in the way of subsistence, and at the same time diminish the number of recruits and conscriptshe received; the valley district while under his control not onlysupplying Lee with an abundance of food, but also furnishing him manymen for his regular and irregular forces. Grant's instructions todestroy the valley began with the letter of August 5 to Hunter, whichwas turned over to me, and this was followed at intervals by morespecific directions, all showing the earnestness of his purpose. 

"CITY POINT, Va. , Aug. 16--3:30 P. M. , 1864. "MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Winchester, Va. :

"If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them throughLoudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms. Inthis way you will get many of Mosby's men. All male citizens underfifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, not as citizenprisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so the momentthe rebel army gets hold of them. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "CITY POINT, Aug. 21, 1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va. :

"In stripping Loudoun County of supplies, etc. , impress from allloyal persons so that they may receive pay for what is taken fromthem. I am informed by the Assistant Secretary of War that LoudounCounty has a large population of Quakers, who are all favorablydisposed to the Union. These people may be exempted from arrest. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES"CITY POINT, Va. , Aug. 26, 2:30 P. M. 1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Halltown, Va. :

"Telegraphed you that I had good reason for believing that Fitz Leehad been ordered back here. I now think it likely that all troopswill be ordered back from the valley except what they believe to bethe minimum number to detain you. My reason for supposing this isbased upon the fact that yielding up the Weldon road seems to be ablow to the enemy he cannot stand. I think I do not overstate theloss of the enemy in the last two weeks at 10, 000 killed and wounded. We have lost heavily, mostly in captured when the enemy gainedtemporary advantages. Watch closely, and if you find this theorycorrect, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it ispossible to follow to the Virginia Central road, follow that far. Doall the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock ofall descriptions and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. Ifthe war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley toremain a barren waste. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "CITY POINT, Va. , Sept. 4, --10 A. M. --1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va. :

"In cleaning out the arms-bearing community of Loudoun County and thesubsistence for armies, exercise your own judgment as to who shouldbe exempt from arrest, and as to who should receive pay for theirstock, grain, etc. It is our interest that that county should not becapable of subsisting a hostile army, and at the same time we want toinflict as little hardship upon Union men as possible. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

"CITY POINT, Va. , Nov. 9, 1864. "MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va. :

"Do you not think it advisable to notify all citizens living east ofthe Blue Ridge to move out north of the Potomac all their stock, grain, and provisions of every description? There is no doubt aboutthe necessity of clearing out that country so that it will notsupport Mosby's gang. And the question is whether it is not betterthat the people should save what they can. So long as the war laststhey must be prevented from raising another crop, both there and ashigh up the valley as we can control. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

He had rightly concluded that it was time to bring the war home to apeople engaged in raising crops from a prolific soil to feed thecountry's enemies, and devoting to the Confederacy its best youth. Iendorsed the programme in all its parts, for the stores of meat andgrain that the valley provided, and the men it furnished for Lee'sdepleted regiments, were the strongest auxiliaries he possessed inthe whole insurgent section. In war a territory like this is afactor of great importance, and whichever adversary controls itpermanently reaps all the advantages of its prosperity. Hence, as Ihave said, I endorsed Grant's programme, for I do not hold war tomean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, andmaterial interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which onecombatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is farworse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see butlittle of the horrors attending such a duel, and even growindifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselveswith encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, tofill up the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is anothermatter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to theirown doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss ofproperty weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, thanthe sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularlyconsidered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reductionto poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly thandoes the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man hasdemonstrated in more than one great conflict. 

In the afternoon of the 16th I started back to Winchester, whence Icould better supervise our regressive march. As I was passingthrough Newtown, I heard cannonading from the direction of FrontRoyal, and on reaching Winchester, Merritt's couriers brought me wordthat he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah byKershaw's division of Anderson's corps and two brigades of FitzhughLee's cavalry, but that the attack had been handsomely repulsed, witha capture of two battle-flags and three hundred prisoners. This wasan absolute confirmation of the despatch from Grant; and I was nowmore than satisfied with the wisdom of my withdrawal. 

At daylight of the 17th Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville, and the same morning Crook and Wright reached Winchester, havingstarted from Cedar Creek the day before. From Winchester, Crook andWright resumed their march toward Clifton, Wright, who had the rearguard, getting that day as far as the Berryville crossing of theOpequon, where he was ordered to remain, while Crook went ahead tillhe reached the vicinity of Berryville. On the afternoon of the 17thLowell with his two regiments of troopers came into Winchester, wherehe was joined by Wilson's mounted division, which had come by a rapidmarch from Snicker's ferry. In the mean time Merritt, after hishandsome engagement with Kershaw near Front Royal, had been orderedback to the neighborhood of White Post, so that my cavalry outpostsnow extended from this last point around to the west of Winchester. 

During all these operations the enemy had a signal-station on ThreeTop Mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, from which every movementmade by our troops could be plainly seen; therefore, early on themorning of the 17th he became aware of the fact that we were retiringdown the valley, and at once made after us, and about sundown droveTorbert out of Winchester, he having been left there-with Wilson andLowell, and the Jersey brigade of the Sixth Corps, to develop thecharacter of the enemy's pursuit. After a severe skirmish Wilson andLowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined itscorps at the crossing of the Opequon. This affair demonstrated thatEarly's whole army had followed us from Fisher's Hill, in concertwith Anderson and Fitzhugh Lee from Front Royal, and the two columnsjoined near Winchester the morning of the 18th. 

That day I moved the Sixth Corps by way of Clifton to Flowing Spring, two and a half miles west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; andEmory, with Dwight's and Grower's divisions (Grower's having joinedthat morning from Washington), to a position about the same distancesouth of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike. Following thesemovements, Merritt fell back to Berryville, covering the Berryvillepike crossing of the Opequon, and Wilson was stationed at SummitPoint, whence he held a line along the Opequon as far north as thebridge at Smithfield. Crook continued to hold on near Clifton untilthe next day, and was then moved into place on the left of Emory. 

This line was practically maintained till the 21st, when the enemy, throwing a heavy force across the Opequon by the bridge atSmithfield, drove in my cavalry pickets to Summit Point, and followedup with a rapid advance against the position of the Sixth Corps nearFlowing Spring. A sharp and obstinate skirmish with a heavypicket-line of the Sixth Corps grew out of this manoeuvre, andresulted very much in our favor, but the quick withdrawal of theConfederates left no opportunity for a general engagement. It seemsthat General Early thought I had taken position near Summit Point, andthat by moving rapidly around through Smithfield he could fall upon myrear in concert with an attack in front by Anderson, but the warmreception given him disclosed his error, for he soon discovered thatmy line lay in front of Charlestown instead of where he supposed. 

In the manoeuvre Merritt had been attacked in front of Berryville andWilson at Summit Point, the former by cavalry and the latter byAnderson's infantry. The exposed positions of Merritt and Wilsonnecessitated their withdrawal if I was to continue to act on thedefensive; so, after the army had moved back to Halltown thepreceding night, without loss or inconvenience, I called them in andposted them on the right of the infantry. 

My retrograde move from Strasburg to Halltown caused considerablealarm in the North, as the public was ignorant of the reasons for it;and in the excited state of mind then prevailing, it was generallyexpected that the reinforced Confederate army would again cross thePotomac, ravage Maryland and Pennsylvania, and possibly captureWashington. Mutterings of dissatisfaction reached me from manysources, and loud calls were made for my removal, but I feltconfident that my course would be justified when the true situationwas understood, for I knew that I was complying with my instructions. Therefore I paid small heed to the adverse criticisms pouring downfrom the North almost every day, being fully convinced that the bestcourse was to bide my time, and wait till I could get the enemy intoa position from which he could not escape without such seriousmisfortune as to have some bearing on the general result of the war. Indeed, at this time I was hoping that my adversary would renew theboldness he had exhibited the early part of the month, and strike forthe north side of the Potomac, and wrote to General Grant on the 20thof August that I had purposely left everything in that direction opento the enemy. 

On the 22d the Confederates moved to Charlestown and pushed well upto my position at Halltown. Here for the next three days theyskirmished with my videttes and infantry pickets, Emory and Cookreceiving the main attention; but finding that they could make noimpression, and judging it to be an auspicious time to intensify thescare in the North, on the 25th of August Early despatched FitzhughLee's cavalry to Williamsport, and moved all the rest of his army butAnderson's infantry and McCausland's cavalry to Kerneysville. Thissame day there was sharp picket firing along the whole front of myinfantry line, arising, as afterward ascertained, from a heavydemonstration by Anderson. During this firing I sent Torbert, withMerritt's and Wilson's divisions, to Kerrteysville, whence he was toproceed toward Leetown and learn what had become of Fitz. Lee. 

About a mile from Leetown Torbert met a small force of Confederatecavalry, and soon after encountering it, stumbled on Breckenridge'scorps of infantry on the march, apparently heading for Shepherdstown. The surprise was mutual, for Torbert expected to meet only theenemy's cavalry, while the Confederate infantry column wasanticipating an unobstructed march to the Potomac. Torbert attackedwith such vigor as at first to double up the head of Breckenridge'scorps and throw it into confusion, but when the Confederates realizedthat they were confronted only by cavalry, Early brought up the wholeof the four infantry divisions engaged in his manoeuvre, and in asharp attack pushed Torbert rapidly back. 

All the advantages which Torbert had gained by surprising the enemywere nullified by this counter-attack, and he was obliged to withdrawWilson's division toward my right, to the neighborhood of Duffield'sStation, Merritt drawing back to the same point by way of theShepherdstown ford. Custer's brigade becoming isolated after thefight while assisting the rear guard, was also obliged to retire, which it did to Shepherdstown and there halted, picketing the riverto Antietam ford. 

When Torbert reported to me the nature of his encounter, and that apart of Early's infantry was marching to the north, while FitzhughLee's cavalry had gone toward Martinsburg, I thought that theConfederate general meditated crossing his cavalry into Maryland, soI sent Wilson by way of Harper's Ferry to watch his movements fromBoonesboro', and at the same time directed Averell, who had reportedfrom West Virginia some days before, to take post at Williamsport andhold the crossing there until he was driven away. I also thought itpossible that Early might cross the Potomac with his whole army, butthe doubts of a movement like this outweighed the probabilitiesfavoring it. Nevertheless, to meet such a contingency I arranged tothrow my army on his rear should the occasion arise, and deeming myposition at Halltown the most advantageous in which to awaitdevelopments, my infantry was retained there. 

If General Early had ever intended to cross the Potomac, Torbert'sdiscovery of his manoeuvre put an end to his scheme of invasion, forhe well knew that and success he might derive from such a coursewould depend on his moving with celerity, and keeping me in ignoranceof his march till it should be well under way; so he settled all thepresent uncertainties by retiring with all his troops aboutKerneysville to his old position at Bunker Hill behind the Opequon, and on the night of the 26th silently withdrew Anderson andMcCausland from my front at Halltown to Stephenson's depot. 

By the 27th all of Early's infantry was in position at Brucetown andBunker Hill, his cavalry holding the outposts of Leetown andSmithfield, and on that day Merritt's division attacked the enemy'shorse at Leetown, and pressed it back through Smithfield to the westside of the Opequon. This reconnoissance determined definitely thatEarly had abandoned the projected movement into Maryland, if he everseriously contemplated it; and I marched my infantry out fromHalltown to the front of Charlestown, with the intention of occupyinga line between Clifton and Berryville the moment matters should soshape themselves that I could do so with advantage. The night of the28th Wilson joined me near Charlestown from his points of observationin Maryland, and the next day Averell crossed the Potomac atWilliamsport and advanced to Martinsburg. 

Merritt's possession of Smithfield bridge made Early somewhat uneasy, since it afforded opportunity for interposing a column between hisright and left flanks, so he concluded to retake the crossing, and, to this end, on the 29th advanced two divisions of infantry. Asevere fight followed, and Merritt was forced to retire, being driventhrough the village toward Charlestown with considerable loss. AsMerritt was nearing my infantry line, I ordered. Ricketts's divisionof the Sixth Corps to his relief, and this in a few minutes turnedthe tide, the Smithfield crossing of the Opequon being regained, andafterward held by Lowell's brigade, supported by Ricketts. The nextmorning I moved Torbert, with Wilson and Merritt, to Berryville, andsucceeding their occupation of that point there occurred along mywhole line a lull, which lasted until the 3d of September, beingundisturbed except by a combat near Bunker Hill between Averell'scavalry and a part of McCausland's, supported by Rodes's division ofinfantry, in which affair the Confederates were defeated with theloss of about fifty prisoners and considerable property in the shapeof wagons and beef-cattle. 

Meanwhile Torbert's movement to Berryville had alarmed Early, and asa counter move on the 2d of September he marched with the bulk of hisarmy to Summit Point, but while reconnoitring in that region on the3d he learned of the havoc that Averell was creating in his rear, andthis compelled him to recross to the west side of the Opequon andmass his troops in the vicinity of Stephenson's depot, whence hecould extend down to Bunker Hill, continue to threaten the Baltimoreand Ohio railroad, and at the same time cover Winchester. 

The same day I was moving my infantry to take up the Clifton-Berryvilleline, and that afternoon Wright went into position at Clifton, Crookoccupied Berryville, and Emory's corps came in between them, formingalmost a continuous line. Torbert had moved to White Post meanwhile, with directions to reconnoitre as far south as the Front Royal Pike. 

My infantry had just got fairly into this position about an hourbefore sunset, when along Crook's front a combat took place that atthe time caused me to believe it was Early's purpose to throw acolumn between Crook and Torbert, with the intention of isolating thelatter; but the fight really arose from the attempt of GeneralAnderson to return to Petersburg with Kershaw's division in responseto loud calls from General Lee. Anderson started south on the 3d ofSeptember, and possibly this explains Early's reconnoissance that dayto Summit Point as a covering movement, but his rapid withdrawal lefthim in ignorance of my advance, and Anderson marched on heedlesslytoward Berryville, expecting to cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby'sGap. At Berryville however, he blundered into Crook's lines aboutsunset, and a bitter little fight ensued, in which the Confederatesgot so much the worst of it that they withdrew toward Winchester. When General Early received word of this encounter he hurried toAnderson's assistance with three divisions, but soon perceiving whatwas hitherto unknown to him, that my whole army was on a new line, hedecided, after some slight skirmishing, that Anderson must remain atWinchester until a favorable opportunity offered for him to rejoinLee by another route. 

Succeeding the discomfiture of Anderson, some minor operations tookplace on the part of, Averell on the right and McIntosh's brigade ofWilson's division on the left, but from that time until the 19th ofSeptember no engagement of much importance occurred. The line fromClifton to Berryville was occupied by the Sixth Corps and Grower'sand Dwight's divisions of the Nineteenth, Crook being transferred toSummit Point, whence I could use him to protect my right flank and mycommunication with Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened theenemy's right flank and line of retreat up the valley. 

The difference of strength between the two armies at this date wasconsiderably in my favor, but the conditions attending my situationin a hostile region necessitated so much detached service to protecttrains, and to secure Maryland and Pennsylvania from raids, that myexcess in numbers was almost canceled by these incidental demandsthat could not be avoided, and although I knew that I was strong, yet, in consequence of the injunctions of General Grant, I deemed itnecessary to be very cautious; and the fact that the Presidentialelection was impending made me doubly so, the authorities atWashington having impressed upon me that the defeat of my army mightbe followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, itwas believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if, indeed, it did not lead to the complete abandonment of all coercivemeasures. Under circumstances such as these I could not afford torisk a disaster, to say nothing of the intense disinclination everysoldier has for such results; so, notwithstanding my superiorstrength, I determined to take all the time necessary to equip myselfwith the fullest information, and then seize an opportunity undersuch conditions that I could not well fail of success.