THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN

Volume I. , Part 2

CHAPTER IX. 

EXPEDITION TO BOONEVILLE--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--CONFEDERATESTRAGGLERS--SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION--A RECONNOISSANCE--THEIMPORTANCE OF BODILY SUSTENANCE--THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE--RECOMMENDED FOR APPOINTMENT AS A BRIGADIER-GENERAL. 

The expedition referred to by General Halleck in his partingconversation was composed of the Second Michigan and Second Iowaregiments of cavalry, formed into a brigade under command of ColonelWashington L. Elliott, of the Second Iowa. It was to start on thenight of the 27th of May at 12 o'clock, and proceed by a circuitousroute through Iuka, Miss. , to Booneville, a station on the Mobile andOhio Railroad, about twenty-two miles below Corinth, and accomplishall it could in the way of destroying the enemy's supplies andcutting his railroad communications. 

The weather in that climate was already warm, guides unobtainable, and both men and horses suffered much discomfort from the heat, andfatigue from the many delays growing out of the fact that we were inalmost total ignorance of the roads leading to the point that wedesired to reach. In order that we might go light we carried onlysugar, coffee, and salt, depending on the country for meat and bread. Both these articles were scarce, but I think we got all there was, for our advent was so unexpected by the people of the region throughwhich we passed that, supposing us to be Confederate cavalry, theyoften gave us all they had, the women and servants contributing mostfreely from their, reserve stores. 

Before reaching Booneville I had the advance, but just as we arrivedon the outskirts of the town the brigade was formed with the SecondIowa on my right, and the whole force moved forward, right in front, preceded by skirmishers. Here we encountered the enemy, but forcedhim back with little resistance. When we had gained possession ofthe station, Colonel Elliott directed me to take the left wing of myregiment, pass to the south, and destroy a bridge or culvert supposedto be at a little distance below the town on the Mobile and OhioRailroad. The right wing, or other half of the regiment, was to beheld in reserve for my support if necessary. I moved rapidly in thedesignated direction till I reached the railroad, and then rode downit for a mile and a half, but found neither bridge nor culvert. Ithen learned that there was no bridge of any importance except theone at Baldwin, nine miles farther down, but as I was aware, frominformation recently received, that it was defended by threeregiments and a battery, I concluded that I could best accomplish thepurpose for which I had been detached--crippling the road--by tearingup the track, bending the rails, and burning the cross-ties. Thiswas begun with alacrity at four different points, officers and menvieing with one another in the laborious work of destruction. We hadbut few tools, and as the difficulties to overcome were serious, ourprogress was slow, until some genius conceived the idea that thetrack, rails and ties, might be lifted from its bed bodily, turnedover, and subjected to a high heat; a convenient supply of dryfence-rails would furnish ample fuel to render the rails useless. In this way a good deal of the track was effectively broken up, andcommunication by rail from Corinth to the south entirely cut off. While we were still busy in wrecking the road, a dash was made at myright and rear by a squadron of Confederate cavalry. This washandsomely met by the reserve under Captain Archibald P. Campbell, ofthe Second Michigan, who, dismounting a portion of his command, received the enemy with such a volley from his Colt's repeatingrifles that the squadron broke and fled in all directions. We werenot molested further, and resumed our work, intending to extend thebreak toward Baldwin, but receiving orders from Elliott to return toBooneville immediately, the men were recalled, and we started torejoin the main command. 

In returning to Booneville, I found the railroad track above where Ihad struck it blocked by trains that we had thus cut off, and thewoods and fields around the town covered with several thousandConfederate soldiers. These were mostly convalescents anddisheartened stragglers belonging to General Beauregard's army, andfrom them we learned that Corinth was being evacuated. I spent somelittle time in an endeavor to get these demoralized men into an openfield, with a view to some future disposition of them; but in themidst of the undertaking I received another order from ColonelElliott to join him at once. The news of the evacuation had alsoreached Elliott, and had disclosed a phase of the situation sodifferent from that under which he had viewed it when we arrived atBooneville, that he had grown anxious to withdraw, lest we should besuddenly pounced upon by an overwhelming force from some one of thecolumns in retreat. Under such circumstances my prisoners wouldprove a decided embarrassment, so I abandoned further attempts to getthem together--not even paroling them, which I thought might havebeen done with but little risk. 

In the meantime the captured cars had been fired, and as theircomplete destruction was assured by explosions from those containingammunition, they needed no further attention, so I withdrew my menand hastened to join Elliott, taking along some Confederate officerswhom I had retained from among four or five hundred prisonerscaptured when making the original dash below the town. 

The losses in my regiment, and, in fact, those of the entire command, were insignificant. The results of the expedition were important;the railroad being broken so thoroughly as to cut off all rollingstock north of Booneville, and to place at the service of GeneralHalleck's army the cars and locomotives of which the retreatingConfederates were now so much in need. In addition, we burnedtwenty-six cars containing ten thousand stand of small arms, threepieces of artillery, a great quantity of clothing, a heavy supply ofammunition, and the personal baggage of General Leonidas Polk. Alarge number of prisoners, mostly sick and convalescent, also fellinto our hands; but as we could not carry them with us--such a hurrieddeparture was an immediate necessity, by reason of our criticalsituation--the process of paroling them was not completed, and theydoubtless passed back to active service in the Confederacy, properlyenough unrecognized as prisoners of war by their superiors. 

In returning, the column marched back by another indirect route toits old camp near Farmington, where we learned that the whole armyhad moved into and beyond Corinth, in pursuit of Beauregard, on the13th of May, the very day we had captured Booneville. Although wehad marched about one hundred and eighty miles in four days, we wererequired to take part, of course, in the pursuit of the Confederatearmy. So, resting but one night in our old camp, we were early inthe saddle again on the morning of the 2d of June. Marching souththrough Corinth, we passed on the 4th of June the scene of our lateraid, viewing with much satisfaction, as we took the road towardBlackland, the still smoldering embers of the burned trains. 

On the 4th of June I was ordered to proceed with my regiment alongthe Blackland road to determine the strength of the enemy in thatdirection, as it was thought possible we might capture, by aconcerted movement which General John Pope had suggested to GeneralHalleck, a portion of Beauregard's rear guard. Pushing theConfederate scouts rapidly in with a running fire for a mile or more, while we were approaching a little stream, I hoped to gobble the mainbody of the enemy's pickets. I therefore directed the sabrebattalion of the regiment, followed by that portion of it armed withrevolving rifles, to dash forward in column, cut off these videttesbefore they could cross the stream, and then gather them in. Thepickets fled hastily, however, and a pell-mell pursuit carried usover the stream at their heels by a little bridge, with no thought ofhalting till we gained a hill on the other side, and suddenly foundourselves almost in the camp of a strong body of artillery andinfantry. Captain Campbell being in advance, hurriedly dismountedhis battalion for a further forward movement on foot, but it wasreadily seen that the enemy was present in such heavy force as almostto ensure our destruction, and I gave orders for a hasty withdrawal. We withdrew without loss under cover of thick woods, aided much, however, by the consternation of the Confederates, who had hardlyrecovered from their surprise at our sudden appearance in their campbefore we had again placed the stream between them and us byrecrossing the bridge. The reconnoissance was a success in one way--that is, in finding out that the enemy was at the point supposed by, General Pope; but it also had a tendency to accelerate Beauregard'sretreat, for in a day or two his whole line fell back as far south asGuntown, thus rendering abortive the plans for bagging a largeportion of his army. 

General Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth and retreat southward wereaccomplished in the face of a largely superior force of Union troops, and he reached the point where he intended to halt for reorganizationwithout other loss than that sustained in the destruction of the carsand supplies at Booneville, and the capture of some stragglers anddeserters that fell into our hands while we were pressing his rearfrom General Pope's flank. The number of these was quite large, andindicated that the enemy was considerably demoralized. Under suchcircumstances, an energetic and skillfully directed pursuit might nothave made certain the enemy's destruction, but it would largely haveaided in disintegrating his forces, and I never could quiteunderstand why it was not ordered. The desultory affairs betweenrear and advance guards seemed as a general, thing to have noparticular purpose in view beyond finding out where the enemy was, and when he was found, since no supporting colums were at hand and noone in supreme control was present to give directions, ourskirmishing was of little avail and brought but small reward. 

A short time subsequent to these occurrences, Colonel Elliott wasmade a brigadier-general, and as General Pope appointed him hisChief-of-Staff, I, on the 11th of June, 1862, fell in command of thebrigade by seniority. For the rest of the month but little of momentoccurred, and we settled down into camp at Booneville on the 26th ofJune, in a position which my brigade had been ordered to take up sometwenty miles, in advance of the main army for the purpose of coveringits front. Although but a few days had elapsed from the date of myappointment as colonel of the Second Michigan to that of mysucceeding to the command of the brigade, I believe I can say withpropriety that I had firmly established myself in the confidence ofthe officers and men of the regiment, and won their regard bythoughtful care. I had striven unceasingly to have them well fed andwell clothed, had personally looked after the selection of theircamps, and had maintained such a discipline as to allay formerirritation. 

Men who march, scout, and fight, and suffer all the hardships thatfall to the lot of soldiers in the field, in order to do vigorouswork must have the best bodily sustenance, and every comfort that canbe provided. I knew from practical experience on the frontier thatmy efforts in this direction would not only be appreciated, butrequited by personal affection and gratitude; and, further, that suchexertions would bring the best results to me. Whenever my authoritywould permit I saved my command from needless sacrifices andunnecessary toil; therefore, when hard or daring work was to be doneI expected the heartiest response, and always got it. Soldiers areaverse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results, and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that oftentakes place on the field of battle. They want some tangibleindemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an offset the valueof which is manifest, it not only makes them content to shed theirblood, but also furnishes evidence of capacity in those who commandthem. My regiment had lost very few men since coming under mycommand, but it seemed, in the eyes of all who belonged to it, thatcasualties to the enemy and some slight successes for us had repaidevery sacrifice, and in consequence I had gained not only theirconfidence as soldiers, but also their esteem and love as men, and toa degree far beyond what I then realized. 

As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville, I beganto scout in every direction, to obtain a knowledge of the enemy'swhereabouts and learn the ground about me. My standing in drawing atthe Military Academy had never been so high as to warrant the beliefthat I could ever prove myself an expert, but a few practical lessonsin that line were impressed on me there, and I had retained enough toenable me to make rough maps that could be readily understood, andwhich would be suitable to replace the erroneous skeleton outlines ofnorthern Mississippi, with which at this time we were scantilyfurnished; so as soon as possible I compiled for the use of myselfand my regimental commanders an information map of the surroundingcountry. This map exhibited such details as country roads, streams, farmhouses, fields, woods, and swamps, and such other topographicalfeatures as would be useful. I must confess that my crude sketch didnot evidence much artistic merit, but it was an improvement on whatwe already possessed in the way of details to guide the command, andthis was what I most needed; for it was of the first importance thatin our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thoroughknowledge of the section in which we were operating, so as to beprepared to encounter an enemy already indicating recovery from thedisorganizing effects of his recent retreat. 

In the immediate vicinity of Booneville the country was covered withheavy forests, with here and there clearings or intervening fieldsthat had been devoted to the cultivation of cotton and corn. Theground was of a low character, typical of northeastern Mississippi, and abounded in small creeks that went almost totally dry even inshort periods of drought, but became flooded with muddy water underthe outpouring of rain peculiar to a semi-tropical climate. In sucha region there were many chances of our being surprised, especiallyby an enemy who knew the country well, and whose ranks were filledwith local guides; and great precautions as well as the fullestinformation were necessary to prevent disaster. I thereforeendeavored to familiarize all with our surroundings, but scarcely hadmatters begun to shape themselves as I desired when our annihilationwas attempted by a large force of Confederate cavalry. 

On the morning of July 1, 1862, a cavalry command of between five andsix thousand-men, under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers, advanced on two roads converging near Booneville. The head of theenemy's column on the Blackland and Booneville road came in contactwith my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville. Thesepickets, under Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of the SecondMichigan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every tree orother cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where theconverging roads joined. At this junction there was a strongposition in the protecting timber, and here Scranton made a firmstand, being reinforced presently by the few men he had out aspickets on the road to his left, a second company I had sent him fromcamp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now commanded byCaptain Campbell. This force was dismounted and formed in line, andsoon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers. Up tothis time Chalmers had shown only the heads of his columns, and wehad doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced himto deploy two regiments on the right and left of the road, it becameapparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to losein preparing to repel his attack. 

Full information of the situation was immediately sent me, and Idirected Campbell to hold fast, if possible, till I could supporthim, but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly, taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong thefighting. Before this I had stationed one battalion of the SecondIowa in Booneville, but Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding thatregiment, was now directed to leave one company for the protection ofour camp a little to the north of the station, and take the balanceof the Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville except two sabrecompanies, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell, to protecthis flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break hisdismounted line. 

While these preparations were being made, the Confederates attemptedto drive Campbell from his position by a direct attack through anopen field. In this they failed, however, for our men, reservingtheir fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards, thenopened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt's riflesthat it soon became too hot for him, and he was repulsed withconsiderable loss. Foiled in this move, Chalmers hesitated to attackagain in front, but began overlapping both flanks of Campbell's lineby force of numbers, compelling Campbell to retire toward a strongposition I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make ourmain resistance. As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he againcharged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as in the firstassault, although the encounter was for a short time so desperate asto have the character of a hand-to-hand conflict, several groups offriend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns. At thisjuncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowagave a breathing-spell to Campbell, and made the Confederates sochary of further direct attacks that he was enabled to retire; and atthe same time I found opportunity to make disposition of thereinforcement to the best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowaon the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its rightwith all the men available. 

In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in hisability to overcome us, and in a little while again began hisflanking movements, his right passing around my left flank somedistance, and approaching our camp and transportation, which I hadforbidden to be moved out to the rear. Fearing that he would envelopus and capture the camp and transportation, I determined to take theoffensive. Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had becomefamiliar with while making the map heretofore mentioned, I concludedthat the most effective plan would be to pass a small column aroundthe enemy's left, by way of this road, and strike his rear by amounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on hisfront. I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardousundertaking, but in the face of such odds as the enemy had thecondition of affairs was most critical, and could be relieved, onlyby a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selectedfour sabre companies, two from the Second Michigan and two from theSecond Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, incommand of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick anddesperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope. 

To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger tofollow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy'sadvancing forces, to a point where 'it joined the Blackland road, about three miles from Booneville, and directed him, upon reachingthe Blackland road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear ofthe enemy's line. Under no circumstances was he to deploy thebattalion, but charge in column right through whatever he came upon, and report to me in front of Booneville, if at all possible for himto get there. If he failed to break through the enemy's line, he wasto go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men were left, and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he hadtaken on his way out. To conduct him on this perilous service I sentalong a thin, sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom Ihad employed as a guide and scout a few days before, on account ofhis intimate knowledge of the roads, from the public thoroughfaresdown to the insignificant by-paths of the neighboring swamps. Withsuch guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desiredpoint without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost ormisled by taking any of the many by-roads which traversed the denseforests through which it would be obliged to pass. I also informedAlger that I should take the reserve and join the main line in frontof Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force, and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struckthe enemy's rear, in order that my attack might be simultaneous withhis. 

I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy, andwhen he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve, to put everything I had into the fight. This meant an inestimableadvantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safetydemanded the hazard. All along our attenuated line the fighting wasnow sharp, and the enemy's firing indicated such numerical strengththat fear of disaster to Alger increased my anxiety terribly as thetime set for his cheering arrived and no sound of it was heard. 

Relying, however, on the fact that Beene's knowledge of the roadswould prevent his being led astray, and confident of Alger'sdetermination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soonas the hour was up I ordered my whole line forward. Fortunately, just as this moment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain formy horses ran into Booneville from Corinth. I say fortunately, because it was well known throughout the command that in the morning, when I first discovered the large numbers of the enemy, I had calledfor assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements hadarrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry wasencamped, and inspirated by this belief, advanced with renewedconfidence and wild cheering. Meantime I had the engineer of thelocomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might alsolearn that a train had come; and from the fact that in a few momentshe began to give way before our small force, I thought that thisstrategem had some effect. Soon his men broke, and ran in the utmostdisorder over the country in every direction. I found later, however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on hisleft from the Second Iowa, in concert with the front attack of theSecond Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger, who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition, though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hearthe signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville. 

After Alger had reached and turned up the Blackland road, the firstthing he came across was the Confederate headquarters; the officersand orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance toa farm-house. Continuing on a gallop, he soon struck the rear of theenemy's line, but was unable to get through; nor did he get nearenough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distancehe was to travel in the time allotted, his attack and mine werealmost coincident, and the enemy, stampeded by the charges in frontand rear, fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to captureAlger's command, which might readily have been done. Alger'stroopers soon rejoined me at Booneville, minus many hats, havingreturned by their original route. They had sustained little lossexcept a few men wounded and a few temporarily missing. Among thesewas Alger himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of atree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was unable to flank. The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run overby the enemy in his flight; but they all turned up later, none theworse except for a few scratches and bruises. 

My effective strength in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger'scommand comprised ninety officers and men. Chalmers's force wascomposed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have beenunable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers, yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtainedfrom citizens along his line of march, it is safe to say that he hadin the action not less than five-thousand men. Our casualties werenot many--forty-one in all. His loss in killed and wounded wasconsiderable, his most severely wounded--forty men--falling into ourhands, having been left at farm-houses in the vicinity of thebattlefield. 

The victory in the face of such odds was most gratifying, and as itjustified my disinclination--in fact, refusal--to retire fromBooneville without fighting (for the purpose of saving mytransportation, as directed by superior authority when I applied inthe morning for reinforcements), it was to me particularly grateful. It was also very valuable in, view of the fact that it increased theconfidence between the officers and men of my brigade and me, andgave us for the balance of the month not only comparative rest, butentire immunity from the dangers of a renewed effort to gobble myisolated outpost. In addition to all this, commendation from myimmediate superiors was promptly tendered through oral and writtencongratulations; and their satisfaction at the result of the battletook definite form a few days later, in the following application formy promotion, when, by an expedition to Ripley, Miss. , most valuableinformation as to the enemy's location and plans was captured:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, "JULY 30, 1862. --3. 05 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, "Washington, D. C. 

"Brigadiers scarce; good ones scarce. Asboth goes on the month'sleave you gave him ten months since; Granger has temporary command. The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotionof Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold. His Ripley expeditionhas brought us captured letters of immense value, as well asprisoners, showing the rebel plans and dispositions, as you willlearn from District Commander. 

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General. "C. C. SULLIVAN, " ""G. GRANGER, " ""W. L. ELLIOTT, " ""A. ASBOTH, " " "

CHAPTER X. 

IN CAMP NEAR RIENZI--GENERAL GRANGER--A VALUABLE CAPTURE AT RIPLEY--RAIDING A CORNFIELD--REPULSING AN ATTACK--PRESENTED WITH THE BLACKHORSE "RIENZI"--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL. 

After the battle of Booneville, it was decided by General Rosecrans, on the advice of General Granger, that my position at Booneville wastoo much exposed, despite the fact that late on the evening of thefight my force had been increased by the addition of, a battery offour guns and two companies of infantry, and by the Third MichiganCavalry, commanded by Colonel John K. Mizner; so I was directed towithdraw from my post and go into camp near Rienzi, Mississippi, where I could equally well cover the roads in front of the army, andalso be near General Asboth's division of infantry, which occupied aline in rear of the town. This section of country, being higher andmore rolling than that in the neighborhood of Booneville, had manyadvantages in the way of better camping-grounds, better grazing andthe like, but I moved with reluctance, because I feared that myproximity to Asboth would diminish to a certain extent myindependence of command. 

General Asboth was a tall, spare, handsome man, with gray mustacheand a fierce look. He was an educated soldier, of unquestionedcourage, but the responsibilities of outpost duty bore rather heavilyon him, and he kept all hands in a state of constant worry inanticipation of imaginary attacks. His ideas of discipline were notvery rigid either, and as by this time there had been introduced intomy brigade some better methods than those obtaining when it firstfell to my command, I feared the effect should he, have any controlover it, or meddle with its internal affairs. However, there wasnothing to do but to move to the place designated, but GeneralGranger, who still commanded the cavalry division to which thebrigade belonged, so arranged matters with General Rosecrans, who hadsucceeded to the command of the Army of the Mississippi, that myindependence was to be undisturbed, except in case of a generalattack by the enemy. 

We went into camp near Rienzi, July 22, sending back to the generalfield-hospital at Tuscumbia Springs all our sick--a considerablenumber--stricken down by the malarial influences around Booneville. In a few days the fine grazing and abundance of grain for ourexhausted horses brought about their recuperation; and the many largeopen fields in the vicinity gave opportunity for drills and parades, which were much needed. I turned my attention to those disciplinarymeasures which, on account of active work in the field, had beennecessarily neglected since the brigade had arrived at PittsburgLanding, in April; and besides, we had been busy in collectinginformation by scouting parties and otherwise, in prosecution of thepurpose for which we were covering the main army. 

I kept up an almost daily correspondence with General Granger, concerning the, information obtained by scouts and reconnoitringparties, and he came often to Rienzi to see me in relation to thisand other matters. Previously I had not had much personalassociation with Granger. While I was at Halleck's headquarters wemet on one or two occasions, and the day I joined the Second Michiganat Farmington I saw him for a few moments, but, with such slightexception, our intercourse had been almost exclusively official. Hehad suggested my name, I was told, to Governor Blair, when theGovernor was in search of an officer of the regular army to appointto the colonelcy of the Second Michigan Cavalry, but hisrecommendation must have been mainly based on the favorable opinionshe had heard expressed by General Halleck and by some of the officersof his staff, rather than from any personal knowledge of my capacity. Of course I was very grateful for this, but some of hischaracteristics did not impress me favorably, and I sometimes wishedthe distance between our camps greater. His most serious failing wasan uncontrollable propensity to interfere with and direct the minormatters relating to the command, the details for which those underhim were alone responsible. Ill-judged meddling in this respectoften led to differences between us, only temporary it is true, butmost harassing to the subordinate, since I was compelled by thecircumstances of the situation not only invariably to yield my ownjudgment, but many a time had to play peacemaker--smoothing downruffled feelings, that I knew had been excited by Granger's freakyand spasmodic efforts to correct personally some trifling fault thatought to have been left to a regimental or company commander toremedy. Yet with all these small blemishes Granger had many goodqualities, and his big heart was so full of generous impulses andgood motives as to far outbalance his short-comings; andnot-withstanding the friction and occasional acerbity of our officialintercourse, we maintained friendly relations till his death. 

In pursuance of the fatal mistake made by dispersing Halleck's forcesafter the fall of Corinth, General Don Carlos Buell's Army of theOhio had been started some time before on its march eastward towardChattanooga; and as this movement would be followed of course by amanoeuvre on the part of the enemy, now at Tupelo under GeneralBraxton Bragg, either to meet Buell or frustrate his designs by somecounter-operation, I was expected to furnish, by scouting and allother means available, information as to what was going on within theConfederate lines. To do the work required, necessitated an increaseof my command, and the Seventh Kansas Cavalry was therefore added toit, and my picket-line extended so as to cover from Jacintosouthwesterly to a point midway between Rienzi and Booneville, andthen northwesterly to the Hatchie River. Skirmishes between outpostson this line were of frequent occurrence, with small results toeither side, but they were somewhat annoying, particularly in thedirection of Ripley, where the enemy maintained a considerableoutpost. Deciding to cripple if not capture this outpost, on theevening of July 27, I sent out an expedition under Colonel Hatch, which drove the enemy from the town of Ripley and took a fewprisoners, but the most valuable prize was in the shape of a packageof thirty-two private letters, the partial reading of which disclosedto me the positive transfer from Mississippi of most of Bragg's army, for the purpose of counteracting Buell's operations in northernAlabama and East Tennessee. This decisive evidence was of the utmostimportance, and without taking time to read all the letters, Iforwarded them to General Granger July 28, in a despatch whichstated: "I deem it necessary to send them at once; the enemy ismoving in large force on Chattanooga. " Other than this the resultsof the expedition were few; and the enemy, having fled from Ripleywith but slight resistance, accompanied by almost all theinhabitants, re-occupied the place next day after our people hadquitted it, and resumed in due time his annoying attacks on ouroutposts, both sides trying to achieve something whenever occasionoffered. 

The prevalence of a severe drought had resulted in drying up many ofthe streams within the enemy's lines, and, in consequence, he wasobliged to shift his camps often, and send his beef-cattle and mulesnear his outposts for water. My scouts kept me well posted in regardto the movements of both camps and herds; and a favorable opportunitypresenting itself, I sent an expedition on August 14 to gather insome animals located on Twenty-Mile Creek, a stream always suppliedwith water from a source of never-failing, springs. Our side metwith complete success in this instance, and when the expeditionreturned, we were all made happy by an abundance of fresh beef, andby some two hundred captured mules, that we thus added to our trainsat a time when draft animals were much needed. 

Rations for the men were now supplied in fair quantities, and theonly thing required to make us wholly contented was plenty of grainfor our animals. Because of the large number of troops then in WestTennessee and about Corinth, the indifferent railroad leading downfrom Columbus, Ky. , was taxed to its utmost capacity to transportsupplies. The quantity of grain received at Corinth from the northwas therefore limited, and before reaching the different outposts, bypassing through intermediate depots of supply, it had dwindled toinsignificance. I had hopes, however, that this condition of thingsmight be ameliorated before long by gathering a good supply of cornthat was ripening in the neighborhood, and would soon, I thought, besufficiently hard to feed to my animals. Not far from myheadquarters there was a particularly fine field, which, with thisend in view, I had carefully protected through the milky stage, tothe evident disappointment of both Asboth's men and mine. They borethe prohibition well while it affected only themselves, but the trialwas too great when it came to denying their horses; and men whosediscipline kept faith with my guards during the roasting-ear periodnow fell from grace. Their horses were growing thin, and few couldwithstand the mute appeals of their suffering pets; so at night thecorn, because of individual foraging, kept stealthily and steadilyvanishing, until the field was soon fringed with only earless stalks. The disappearance was noticed, and the guard increased, but still thequantity of corn continued to grow less, the more honest troopersbemoaning the loss, and questioning the honor of those to whosesafekeeping it had been entrusted. Finally, doubtless under theapprehension that through their irregularities the corn would alldisappear and find its way to the horses in accordance with thestealthy enterprise of their owners, a general raid was made on thefield in broad daylight, and though the guard drove off themarauders, I must admit that its efforts to keep them back were sounsuccessful that my hopes for an equal distribution of the crop werequickly blasted. One look at the field told that it had been sweptclean of its grain. Of course a great row occurred as to who was toblame, and many arrests and trials took place, but there had beensuch an interchanging of cap numbers and other insignia that it wasnext to impossible to identify the guilty, and so much criminationand acrimony grew out of the affair that it was deemed best to dropthe whole matter. 

On August 27 about half of the command was absent reconnoitring, Ihaving sent it south toward Tupelo, in the hope of obtaining somedefinite information regarding a movement to Holly Springs of theremainder of the Confederate army, under General Price, when aboutmid-day I was suddenly aroused by excited cries and sounds of firing, and I saw in a moment that the enemy was in my camp. He had come inon my right flank from the direction of the Hatchie River, pell-mellwith our picket-post stationed about three miles out on the Ripleyroad. The whole force of the enemy comprised about eight hundred, but only his advance entered with my pickets, whom he had charged andbadly stampeded, without, on their part, the pretense of a fight inbehalf of those whom it was their duty to protect until properdispositions for defense could be made. The day was excessively hot, one of those sultry debilitating days that had caused the suspendingof all military exercises; and as most of the men were lounging orsleeping in their tents, we were literally caught napping. The alarmspread instantly through the camp, and in a moment the command turnedout for action, somewhat in deshabille it is true, but none the lesseffective, for every man had grabbed his rifle and cartridge-box atthe first alarm. Aided by a few shots from Captain Henry Hescock'sbattery, we soon drove the intruders from our camp in about the samedisorder in which they had broken in on us. By this time ColonelHatch and Colonel Albert L. Lee had mounted two battalions each, andI moved them out at a lively pace in pursuit, followed by a sectionof the battery. No halt was called till we came upon the enemy'smain body, under Colonel Faulkner, drawn up in line of battle nearNewland's store. Opening on him with the two pieces of artillery, Ihurriedly formed line confronting him, and quickly and with butlittle resistance drove him in confusion from the field. The suddenturning of the tables dismayed Faulkner's men, and panic seizingthem, they threw away every loose article of arms or clothing ofwhich they could dismember themselves, and ran in the wildestdisorder in a mad effort to escape. As the chase went on the panicincreased, the clouds of dust from the road causing an interminglingof friend and foe. In a little while the affair grew most ludicrous, Faulkner's hatless and coatless men taking to the woods in suchdispersed order and so demoralized that a good many prisoners weresecured, and those of the enemy who escaped were hunted until dark. When the recall was sounded, our men came in loaded down with plunderin the shape of hats, haversacks, blankets, pistols, and shotguns, ina quantity which amply repaid for the surprise of the morning, butdid not excuse the delinquent commander of our picket-guard, who afew days later was brought to a realizing sense of his duty by acourt-martial. 

Shortly after this affair Captain Archibald P. Campbell, of theSecond Michigan Cavalry, presented me with the black horse calledRienzi, since made historical from having been ridden by me in manybattles, conspicuously in the ride from Winchester to Cedar Creek, which has been celebrated in the poem by T. Buchanan Read. Thishorse was of Morgan stock, and then about three years old. He wasjet black, excepting three white feet, sixteen hands high, andstrongly built, with great powers of endurance. He was so activethat he could cover with ease five miles an hour at his naturalwalking gait. The gelding had been ridden very seldom; in fact, Campbell had been unaccustomed to riding till the war broke out, and, I think, felt some disinclination to mount the fiery colt. Campbellhad an affection for him, however, that never waned, and would oftencome to my headquarters to see his favorite, the colt being cared forthere by the regimental farrier, an old man named John Ashley, whohad taken him in charge when leaving Michigan, and had been his groomever since. Seeing that I liked the horse--I had ridden him onseveral occasions--Campbell presented him to me on one of thesevisits, and from that time till the close of the war I rode himalmost continuously, in every campaign and battle in which I tookpart, without once finding him overcome by fatigue, though on manyoccasions his strength was severely tested by long marches and shortrations. I never observed in him any vicious habit; a nervousnessand restlessness and switch of the tail, when everything about himwas in repose, being the only indication that he might beuntrustworthy. No one but a novice could be deceived by this, however, for the intelligence evinced in every feature, and histhoroughbred appearance, were so striking that any person accustomedto horses could not misunderstand such a noble animal. But Campbellthought otherwise, at least when the horse was to a certain degreeyet untrained, and could not be pursuaded to ride him; indeed, formore than a year after he was given to me, Campbell still retainedsuspicions of his viciousness, though, along with this mistrust, anundiminished affection. Although he was several times wounded, thishorse escaped death in action; and living to a ripe old age, died in1878, attended to the last with all the care and surrounded withevery comfort due the faithful service he had rendered. 

In moving from Corinth east toward Chattanooga, General Buell's armywas much delayed by the requirement that he should repair the Memphisand Charleston railroad as he progressed. The work of repair obligedhim to march very slowly, and was of but little use when done, forguerrillas and other bands of Confederates destroyed the road againas soon as he had passed on. But worst of all, the time thusconsumed gave General Bragg the opportunity to reorganize andincrease his army to such an extent that he was able to contest thepossession of Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. Consequently, themovement of this army through Tennessee and Kentucky toward the OhioRiver--its objective points being Louisville and Cincinnati--was nowwell defined, and had already rendered abortive General Buell'sdesigns on Chattanooga and East Tennessee. Therefore extraordinaryefforts on the part of the Government became necessary, and theconcentration of National troops at Louisville and Cincinnati to meetthe contingency of Bragg's reaching those points was an obviousrequirement. These troops were drawn from all sections in the Westwhere it was thought they could be spared, and among others I wasordered to conduct thither--to Louisville or Cincinnati, assubsequent developments might demand--my regiment, Hescock's battery, the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, and the Thirty-sixth andForty-fourth Illinois regiments of infantry, known as the "Pea RidgeBrigade. " With this column I marched back to Corinth on the 6th ofSeptember, 1862, for the purpose of getting railroad transportationto Columbus, Kentucky. 

At Corinth I met General Grant, who by this time had beenreestablished in favor and command somewhat, General Halleck havingdeparted for Washington to assume command of the army asGeneral-in-Chief. Before and during the activity which followed hisreinstatement, General Grant had become familiar with my servicesthrough the transmission to Washington of information I had furnishedconcerning the enemy's movements, and by reading reports of my fightsand skirmishes in front, and he was loth to let me go. Indeed, heexpressed surprise at seeing me in Corinth, and said he had notexpected me to go; he also plainly showed that he was much hurt atthe inconsiderate way in which his command was being depleted. SinceI was of the opinion that the chief field of usefulness andopportunity was opening up in Kentucky, I did not wish him to retainme, which he might have done, and I impressed him with my conviction, somewhat emphatically, I fear. Our conversation ended with my wishgratified. I afterward learned that General Granger, whom GeneralGrant did not fancy, had suggested that I should take to Cincinnatithe main portion of Granger's command--the Pea Ridge Brigade--as wellas the Second Michigan Cavalry, of which I was still colonel. We started that night, going by rail over the Mobile and Ohio road toColumbus, Ky. , where we embarked on steamboats awaiting us. Theseboats were five in number, and making one of them my flag-ship, expecting that we might come upon certain batteries reported to belocated upon the Kentucky shore of the Ohio, I directed the rest tofollow my lead. Just before reaching Caseyville, the captain of atin-clad gunboat that was patrolling the river brought me theinformation that the enemy was in strong force at Caseyville, andexpressed a fear that my fleet could not pass his batteries. Accepting the information as correct, I concluded to capture theplace before trying to pass up the river. Pushing in to the bank aswe neared the town, I got the troops ashore and moved on Caseyville, in the expectation of a bloody fight, but was agreeably surprisedupon reaching the outskirts of the village by an outpouring of itsinhabitants--men, women, and children--carrying the Stars andStripes, and making the most loyal professions. Similardemonstrations of loyalty had been made to the panic-stricken captainof the gunboat when he passed down the river, but he did not stay toascertain their character, neither by landing nor by inquiry, for heassumed that on the Kentucky bank of the river there could be noloyalty. The result mortified the captain intensely; and deeming hisconvoy of little further use, he steamed toward Cairo in quest ofother imaginary batteries, while I re-embarked at Caseyville, andcontinued up the Ohio undisturbed. About three miles belowCincinnati I received instructions to halt, and next day I wasordered by Major-General H. G. Wright to take my troops back toLouisville, and there assume command of the Pea Ridge Brigade, composed of the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, Thirty-sixth andForty-fourth Illinois infantry, and of such other regiments as mightbe sent me in advance of the arrival of General Buell's army. When I reached Louisville I reported to Major-General William Nelson, who was sick, and who received me as he lay in bed. He asked me whyI did not wear the shoulder-straps of my rank. I answered that I wasthe colonel of the Second Michigan cavalry, and had on my appropriateshoulder-straps. He replied that I was a brigadier-general for theBooneville fight, July 1, and that I should wear the shoulder-strapsof that grade. I returned to my command and put it in camp; andas I had no reluctance to wearing the shoulder-straps of abrigadier-general, I was not long in procuring a pair, particularlyas I was fortified next day by receiving from Washington officialinformation of my appointment as a brigadier-general, to date fromJuly 1, 1862, the day of the battle of Booneville. 

CHAPTER XI. 

GOOD ADVICE FROM GENERAL NELSON--HIS TRAGIC DEATH--PUTTING LOUISVILLEIN A STATE OF DEFENSE--ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ELEVENTHDIVISION--CAPTURE OF CHAPLIN HEIGHTS--BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE--REPORTEDAMONG THE KILLED--A THRILLING INCIDENT--GENERAL BUELL RELIEVED BYGENERAL ROSECRANS. 

I reported to Major-General Nelson at the Galt House in Louisville, September 14, 1862, who greeted me in the bluff and hearty fashion ofa sailor--for he had been in the navy till the breaking out of thewar. The new responsibilities that were now to fall upon me byvirtue of increased rank caused in my mind an uneasiness which, Ithink, Nelson observed at the interview, and he allayed it by givingme much good advice, and most valuable information in regard toaffairs in Kentucky, telling me also that he intended I should retainin my command the Pea Ridge Brigade and Hescock's battery. Thislatter assurance relieved me greatly, for I feared the loss of thesetroops in the general redistribution which I knew must soon takeplace; and being familiar with their valuable service in Missouri, and having brought them up from Mississippi, I hoped they wouldcontinue with me. He directed me to take position just below thecity with the Pea Ridge Brigade, Hescock's battery, and the SecondMichigan Cavalry, informing me, at the same time, that some of thenew regiments, then arriving under a recent call of the President forvolunteers, would also be assigned to my command. Shortly after theinterview eight new regiments and an additional battery joined me, thus making good his promise of more troops. 

A few days later came Nelson's tragic end, shocking the wholecountry. Those of us in camp outside of the city were startled onthe morning of September 29 by the news that General Jefferson C. Davis, of the Union Army, had shot General Nelson at the Galt House, and the wildest rumors in regard to the occurrence came thick andfast; one to the effect that Nelson was dead, another having it thathe was living and had killed Davis, and still others reflecting onthe loyalty of both, it being supposed by the general public at firstthat the difficulty between the two men had grown out of somepolitical rather than official or personal differences. When thenews came, I rode into the city to the Galt House to learn theparticulars, reaching there about 10 o'clock in the forenoon. Here Ilearned that Nelson had been shot by Davis about two hours before, atthe foot of the main stairway leading from the corridor just beyondthe office to the second floor, and that Nelson was already dead. Itwas almost as difficult to get reliable particulars of the matter atthe hotel as it had been in my camp, but I gathered that the two menhad met first at an early hour near the counter of the hotel office, and that an altercation which had begun several days before inrelation to something official was renewed by Davis, who, attemptingto speak to Nelson in regard to the subject-matter of their previousdispute, was met by an insulting refusal to listen. It now appearsthat when Nelson made this offensive remark, Davis threw a smallpaper ball that he was nervously rolling between his fingers intoNelson's face, and that this insult was returned by Nelson slappingDavis (Killed by a Brother Soldier. --Gen. J. B. Fry. ) in the face. But at the time, exactly what had taken place just before theshooting was shrouded in mystery by a hundred conflicting stories, the principal and most credited of which was that Davis had demandedfrom Nelson an apology for language used in the original altercation, and that Nelson's refusal was accompanied by a slap in the face, atthe same moment denouncing Davis as a coward. However this may be, Nelson, after slapping Davis, moved toward the corridor, from which astairway led to the second floor, and just as he was about to ascend, Davis fired with a pistol that he had obtained from some one near byafter the blow had been struck. The ball entered Nelson's breastjust above the heart, but his great strength enabled him to ascendthe stairway notwithstanding the mortal character of the wound, andhe did not fall till he reached the corridor on the second floor. Hedied about half an hour later. The tragedy cast a deep gloom overall who knew the men, for they both had many warm personal friends;and affairs at Louisville had hardly recovered as yet from theconfused and discouraging condition which preceded the arrival ofGeneral Buell's army. General Buell reported the killing of Nelsonto the authorities at Washington, and recommended the trial of Davisby court-martial, but no proceedings were ever instituted against himin either a civil or military court, so to this day it has not beendetermined judicially who was the aggressor. Some months later Daviswas assigned to the command of a division in Buell's army after thatofficer had been relieved from its command. 

Two Confederate armies, under General Kirby Smith and General BraxtonBragg, had penetrated into Kentucky, the one under Smith by the wayof Cumberland Gap, the other and main army under Bragg by way of theSequatche Valley, Glasgow, and Mumfordsville. Glasgow was capturedby the enemy on the 17th of September, and as the expectation wasthat Buell would reach the place in time to save the town, its losscreated considerable alarm in the North, for fears were nowentertained that Bragg would strike Louisville and capture the citybefore Buell could arrive on the ground. It became necessarytherefore to put Louisville in a state of defense, and after thecordon of principal works had been indicated, my troops threw up inone night a heavy line of rifle-pits south of the city, from theBardstown pike to the river. The apprehended attack by Bragg nevercame, however, for in the race that was then going on between him andBuell on parallel roads, the Army of the Ohio outmarched theConfederates, its advance arriving at Louisville September 25. 

General Buell immediately set about reorganizing the whole force, andon September 29 issued an order designating the troops under mycommand as the Eleventh Division, Army of the Ohio, and assigningBrigadier-General J. T. Boyle to command the division, and me tocommand one of its brigades. To this I could not object, of course, for I was a brigadier-general of very recent date, and could hardlyexpect more than a brigade. I had learned, however, that at leastone officer to whom a high command had been given--a corps--had notyet been appointed a general officer by the President, and Iconsidered it somewhat unfair that I should be relegated to abrigade, while men who held no commissions at all were being madechiefs of corps and divisions; so I sought an interview with GeneralBuell's chief-of-staff, Colonel Fry, and, while not questioningBuell's good intentions nor his pure motives, insisted that my rightsin the matter should be recognized. That same evening I was assignedto the command of the Eleventh Division, and began preparing it atonce for a forward movement, which I knew must soon take place in theresumption of offensive operations by the Army of the Ohio. 

During the interval from September 25 till October 1 there was amongthe officers much criticism of General Buell's management of therecent campaign, which had resulted in his retirement to Louisville;and he was particularly censured by many for not offering battle toGeneral Bragg while the two armies were marching parallel to eachother, and so near that an engagement could have been brought on atany one of several points--notably so at Glasgow, Kentucky, if therehad been a desire to join issue. It was asserted, and by manyconceded, that General Buell had a sufficient force to risk a fight. He was much blamed for the loss of Mumfordsville also. The captureof this point, with its garrison, gave Bragg an advantage in the racetoward the Ohio River, which odds would most likely have ensured thefall of Louisville had they been used with the same energy and skillthat the Confederate commander displayed from Chattanooga to Glasgow;but something always diverted General Bragg at the supreme moment, and he failed to utilize the chances falling to him at this time, for, deflecting his march to the north toward Bardstown, he left opento Buell the direct road to Louisville by way of Elizabethtown. 

At Bardstown Bragg's army was halted while he endeavored to establisha Confederate government in Kentucky by arranging for theinstallation of a provisional governor at Lexington. Bragg had beenassured that the presence of a Confederate army in Kentucky would soencourage the secession element that the whole State could be forcedinto the rebellion and his army thereby largely increased; but he hadbeen considerably misled, for he now found that though much latentsympathy existed for his cause, yet as far as giving active aid wasconcerned, the enthusiasm exhibited by the secessionists of Kentuckyin the first year of the war was now replaced by apathy, or at bestby lukewarmness. So the time thus spent in political machinationswas wholly lost to Bragg; and so little reinforcement was added tohis army that it may be said that the recruits gained were not enoughto supply the deficiencies resulting from the recent toilsome marchesof the campaign. 

In the meanwhile Buell had arrived at Louisville, system had beensubstituted for the chaos which had previously obtained there, andorders were issued for an advance upon the enemy with the purpose ofattacking and the hope of destroying him within the limits of the"blue grass" region, and, failing in that, to drive him fromKentucky. The army moved October 1, 1862, and my division, now apart of the Third Corps, commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, marcheddirectly on Bardstown, where it was thought the enemy would make astand, but Bragg's troops retreated toward Perryville, only resistingsufficiently to enable the forces of General Kirby Smith to be drawnin closer--they having begun a concentration at Frankfort--so theycould be used in a combined attack on Louisville as soon as theConfederate commander's political projects were perfected. 

Much time was consumed by Buell's army in its march on Perryville, but we finally neared it on the evening of October 7. During theday, Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell's division of Gilbert'scorps was in the advance on the Springfield pike, but as the enemydeveloped that he was in strong force on the opposite side of a smallstream called Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, mydivision was brought up and passed to the front. It was verydifficult to obtain water in this section of Kentucky, as a droughthad prevailed for many weeks, and the troops were suffering so forwater that it became absolutely necessary that we should gainpossession of Doctor's Creek in order to relieve their distress. Consequently General Gilbert, during the night, directed me to pushbeyond Doctor's Creek early the next morning. At daylight on the 8thI moved out Colonel Dan McCook's brigade and Barnett's battery forthe purpose, but after we had crossed the creek with some slightskirmishing, I found that we could not hold the ground unless wecarried and occupied a range of hills, called Chaplin Heights, infront of Chaplin River. As this would project my command in thedirection of Perryville considerably beyond the troops that were oneither flank, I brought up Laiboldt's brigade and Hescock's batteryto strengthen Colonel McCook. Putting both brigades into line wequickly carried the Heights, much to the surprise of the enemy, Ithink, for he did not hold on to the valuable ground as strongly ashe should have done. This success not only ensured us a good supplyof water, but also, later in the day, had an important bearing in thebattle of Perryville. After taking the Heights, I brought up therest of my division and intrenched, without much difficulty, bythrowing up a strong line of rifle-pits, although the enemy'ssharpshooters annoyed us enough to make me order Laiboldt's brigadeto drive them in on the main body. This was successfully done in afew minutes, but in pushing them back to Chaplin River, we discoveredthe Confederates forming a line of battle on the opposite bank, withthe apparent purpose of an attack in force, so I withdrew the brigadeto our intrenchments on the crest and there awaited the assault. 

While this skirmishing was going on, General Gilbert--the corpscommander--whose headquarters were located on a hill about a miledistant to the rear, kept sending me messages by signal not to bringon an engagement. I replied to each message that I was not bringingon an engagement, but that the enemy evidently intended to do so, andthat I believed I should shortly be attacked. Soon after returningto the crest and getting snugly fixed in the rifle-pits, my attentionwas called to our left, the high ground we occupied affording me inthat direction an unobstructed view. I then saw General A. McD. McCook's corps--the First-advancing toward Chaplin River by theMackville road, apparently unconscious that the Confederates werepresent in force behind the stream. I tried by the use of signalflags to get information of the situation to these troops, but myefforts failed, and the leading regiments seemed to approach theriver indifferently prepared to meet the sudden attack that speedilyfollowed, delivered as it was from the chosen position of the enemy. The fury of the Confederate assault soon halted this advance force, and in a short time threw it into confusion, pushed it back aconsiderable distance, and ultimately inflicted upon it such loss ofmen and guns as to seriously cripple McCook's corps, and prevent forthe whole day further offensive movement on his part, though hestoutly resisted the enemy's assaults until 4 o'clock in theafternoon. 

Seeing McCook so fiercely attacked, in order to aid him I advancedHescock's battery, supported by six regiments, to a very goodposition in front of a belt of timber on my extreme left, where anenfilading fire could be opened on that portion of the enemyattacking the right of the First Corps, and also on his batteriesacross Chaplin River. But at this juncture he placed two batterieson my right and began to mass troops behind them, and GeneralGilbert, fearing that my intrenched position on the heights might becarried, directed me to withdraw Hescock and his supports and returnthem to the pits. My recall was opportune, for I had no sooner gotback to my original line than the Confederates attacked me furiously, advancing almost to my intrenchments, notwithstanding that a largepart of the ground over which they had to move was swept by a heavyfire of canister from both my batteries. Before they had quitereached us, however, our telling fire made them recoil, and as theyfell back, I directed an advance of my whole division, bringing up myreserve regiments to occupy the crest of the hills; Colonel WilliamP. Carlin's brigade of Mitchell's division meanwhile moving forwardon my right to cover that flank. This advance pressed the enemy toPerryville, but he retired in such good order that we gained nothingbut some favorable ground that enabled me to establish my batteriesin positions where they could again turn their attention to theConfederates in front of McCook, whose critical condition was shortlyafter relieved, however, by a united pressure of Gilbert's corpsagainst the flank of McCook's assailants, compelling them to retirebehind Chaplin River. 

The battle virtually ended about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, thoughmore or less desultory firing continued until dark. Considering theseverity of the engagement on McCook's front, and the reverses thathad befallen him, I question if, from that part of the line, muchcould have been done toward retrieving the blunders of the day, butit did seem to me that, had the commander of the army been able to bepresent on the field, he could have taken advantage of Bragg's finalrepulse, and there would have remained in our hands more than thebarren field. But no attempt was made to do anything more till nextmorning, and then we secured little except the enemy's killed andmost severely wounded. 

The operations of my division during the engagement pleased. GeneralGilbert very much, and he informed me that he would relax a rigidlyenforced order which General Buell had issued some days before, sufficiently to permit my trains to come to the front and supply myalmost starving troops with rations. The order in question was oneof those issued, doubtless with a good intent, to secure generallythe safety of our trains, but General Gilbert was not elastic, and onthe march he had construed the order so illiberally that it was nextto impossible to supply the men with food, and they were particularlyshort in this respect on the eve of the battle. I had thenendeavored to persuade him to modify his iron-clad interpretation ofthe order, but without effect, and the only wagons we could bring upfrom the general parks in rear were ambulances and those containingammunition. So to gain access to our trains was a great boon, and atthat moment a more welcome result than would have been a completevictory minus this concession. 

When the battle ceased General Gilbert asked me to join him atBuell's headquarters, which were a considerable distance to the rear, so after making some dispositions for the evening I proceeded thereas requested. I arrived just as Buell was about to sit down to hissupper, and noticing that he was lame, then learned that he had beenseverely injured by a recent fall from his horse. He kindly invitedme to join him at the table, an invitation which I accepted withalacrity, enjoying the meal with a relish known only to a very-hungryman, for I had eaten nothing since morning. Of course the events ofthe day were the chief topic of discussion--as they were during mystay at headquarters--but the conversation indicated that what hadoccurred was not fully realized, and I returned to my troopsimpressed with the belief that General Buell and his staff-officerswere unconscious of the magnitude of the battle that had just beenfought. 

It had been expected by Buell that he would fight the enemy on the9th of October, but the Confederates disposed of that proposition byattacking us on the 8th, thus disarranging a tactical conceptionwhich, with our superior numbers, would doubtless have provedsuccessful had it not been anticipated by an enterprising foe. During the battle on the 8th the Second Corps, under General ThomasL. Crittenden, accompanied by General George H. Thomas, lay idle thewhole day for want of orders, although it was near enough to thefield to take an active part in the fight; and, moreover, a largepart of Gilbert's corps was unengaged during the pressure on McCook. Had these troops been put in on the enemy's left at any time after heassaulted McCook, success would have been beyond question; but therewas no one on the ground authorized to take advantage of thesituation, and the battle of Perryville remains in history an exampleof lost opportunities. This was due in some measure probably toGeneral Buell's accident, but is mainly attributable to the fact thathe did not clearly apprehend Bragg's aim, which was to gain time towithdraw behind Dick's River all the troops he had in Kentucky, forthe Confederate general had no idea of risking the fate of his armyon one general battle at a place or on a day to be chosen by theUnion commander. 

Considering the number of troops actually engaged, the losses toBuell were severe, amounting to something over five thousand inkilled, wounded, and missing. Among the killed were two brigadecommanders of much promise--General James S. Jackson and GeneralWilliam R. Terrill. McCook's corps lost twelve guns, some of whichwere recovered next day. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded wenever learned, but it must have equalled ours; and about fourthousand prisoners, consisting principally of sick and wounded, fellinto our hands. In the first report of the battle sent North to thenewspapers I was reported among the killed; but I was pleased tonotice, when the papers reached us a few days later, that the errorhad been corrected before my obituary could be written. 

The enemy retired from our front the night of the 8th, falling backon Harrodsburg to form a junction with Kirby Smith, and by takingthis line of retreat opened to us the road to Danville and the chancefor a direct march against his depot of supplies at Bryantsville. Wedid not take advantage of this opening, however, and late in the day--on the 9th--my division marched in pursuit, in the direction ofHarrodsburg, which was the apex of a triangle having for its base aline from Perryville to Danville. The pursuit was slow, very slow, consuming the evening of the 9th and all of the 10th and 11th. Bycutting across the triangle spoken of above, just south of the apex, I struck the Harrodsburg-Danville road, near Cave Springs, joiningthere Gilbert's left division, which had preceded me and marchedthrough Harrodsburg. Here we again rested until the intention of theenemy could be divined, and we could learn on which side of Dick'sRiver he would give us battle. A reconnoissance sent toward theDickville crossing developed to a certainty that we should not haveanother engagement, however; for it disclosed the fact that Bragg'sarmy had disappeared toward Camp Dick Robinson, leaving only a smallrear-guard at Danville, which in turn quickly fled in the directionof Lancaster, after exchanging a few shots with Hescock's battery. 

While this parting salute of deadly projectiles was going on, alittle, daughter of Colonel William J. Landram, whose home was inDanville, came running out from his house and planted a smallnational flag on one of Hescock's guns. The patriotic act was sobrave and touching that it thrilled all who witnessed the scene; anduntil the close of the war, when peace separated the survivingofficers and men of the battery, that little flag was protected andcherished as a memento of the Perryville campaign. 

Pursuit of the enemy was not continued in force beyond Crab Orchard, but some portions of the army kept at Bragg's heels until he crossedthe Cumberland River, a part of his troops retiring to Tennessee byway of Cumberland Gap, but the major portion through Somerset. Asthe retreat of Bragg transferred the theatre of operations back toTennessee, orders were now issued for a concentration of Buell's armyat Bowling Green, with a view to marching it to Nashville, and mydivision moved to that point without noteworthy incident. I reachedBowling Green with a force much reduced by the losses sustained inthe battle of Perryville and by sickness. I had started fromLouisville on October 1 with twelve regiments of infantry--four oldand eight new ones--and two batteries, but many poor fellows, overcome by fatigue, and diseases induced by the heat, dust, anddrought of the season, had to be left at roadside hospitals. Thiswas particularly the case with the new regiments, the men of which, much depressed by homesickness, and not yet inured to campaigning, fell easy victims to the hardships of war. 

At Bowling Green General Buell was relieved, General W. S. Rosecranssucceeding him. The army as a whole did not manifest much regret atthe change of commanders, for the campaign from Louisville on waslooked upon generally as a lamentable failure, yet there were manywho still had the utmost confidence in General Buell, and theyrepelled with some asperity the reflections cast upon him by hiscritics. These admirers held him blameless throughout for theblunders of the campaign, but the greater number laid every error athis door, and even went to the absurdity of challenging his loyaltyin a mild way, but they particularly charged incompetency atPerryville, where McCook's corps was so badly crippled while nearly30, 000 Union troops were idle on the field, or within strikingdistance. With these it was no use to argue that Buell's accidentstood in the way of his activity, nor that he did not know that theaction had assumed the proportions of a battle. The physicaldisability was denied or contested, but even granting this, hisdetractors claimed that it did not excuse his ignorance of the truecondition of the fight, and finally worsted his champions by pointingout that Bragg's retreat by way of Harrodsburg beyond Dick's River sojeopardized the Confederate army, that had a skillful and energeticadvance of the Union troops been made, instead of wasting precioustime in slow and unnecessary tactical manoeuvres, the enemy couldhave been destroyed before he could quit the State of Kentucky. 

CHAPTER XII. 

MOVING TO BOWLING GREEN--JAMES CARD, THE SCOUT AND GUIDE--GENERALSILL--COLONEL SCHAEFER--COLONEL G. W. ROBERTS--MOVEMENT ONMURFREESBORO'--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER. 

My division had moved from Crab Orchard to Bowling Green by easymarches, reaching this place November 1. General Rosecrans assumedcommand of the department October 30, at Louisville, and joined thearmy November 2. There had been much pressure brought to bear onGeneral Buell to induce him to take measures looking to the occupancyof East Tennessee, and the clamor to this end from Washington stillcontinued; but now that Bragg was south of the Cumberland River, in aposition threatening Nashville, which was garrisoned by but a smallforce, it was apparent to every one at all conversant with thesituation that a battle would have to be fought somewhere in MiddleTennessee. So, notwithstanding the pressure from Washington, thearmy was soon put in motion for Nashville, and when we arrived theremy division went into camp north of the river, on a plateau justoutside the little town of Edgefield, until the movements of theenemy should be further developed. 

While in this camp, on the plantation of Mr. Hobson, there came to myheadquarters one morning an East Tennessean named James Card, whooffered to the Union cause his services in any capacity in which theymight be made useful. This offer, and the relation of his personalhistory, were given with such sincerity of speech and manner that ina short time I became convinced of his honesty of purpose. He was asmall, active, busy man, with a determined way about him, and hiscountenance indicated great intelligence. He gave minute informationthat was of inestimable value to me regarding East and MiddleTennessee and northern Georgia, for, with a view to the army's futuremovements, I was then making a study of the topography of thisregion, and posting myself as to Middle Tennessee, for all knew thiswould be the scene of active operations whenever the campaign wasresumed. This man, like most of the East Tennesseans whom I had met, was intensely loyal and patriotic, and the interview led in a fewdays to his employment as a scout and guide, and subsequently to theengaging in the same capacity of two of his brothers, who were goodmen; but not quite as active nor so intelligent as he was. Card hadbeen a colporter, having pedled books, especially religious tracts, over all Middle and East Tennessee and Georgia, assisted by hisbrothers at times, and was therefore thoroughly familiar with theseregions, their roads and inhabitants. He also preached to countrycongregations occasionally, when ministers were scarce, and I have nodoubt often performed the functions of family physician in themountain district. Thus his opportunities were great; and the loyalpeople in every section of the country being well known to him andhis brothers, the three began, at this time, a system of scouting andinvestigation which bore its first-fruits in specifically locatingthe different divisions of Bragg's army, with statements of theirstrength and condition, and all with so much accuracy that Ithereafter felt reasonably sure that I could at all times procuresuch knowledge of the enemy's operations as would well equip me forany contingency that might arise. 

By the middle of November the enemy, having assembled his forces inMiddle Tennessee, showed considerable boldness, and it becamenecessary to rearrange the Union lines; so my troops were moved tothe south side of the river, out on the Murfreesboro' pike, to MillCreek, distant from Nashville about seven miles. While we were incamp on Mill Creek the army was reorganized, and General Joshua W. Sill, at his own request, was assigned to my division, and tookcommand of Colonel Nicholas Greusel's brigade. My division became atthe same time the Third Division, Right Wing, Fourteenth Army Corps, its three brigades of four regiments each being respectivelycommanded by General Sill, Colonel Frederick Schaefer and Colonel DanMcCook; but a few days later Colonel George W. Roberts's brigade, from the garrison at Nashville, was substituted for McCook's. 

General Sill was a classmate of mine at the Military Academy, havinggraduated in 1853. On graduating he was appointed to the OrdnanceCorps, and served in that department at various arsenals and ordnancedepots throughout the country till early in 1861, when he resigned toaccept a professorship of mathematics and civil engineering at theBrooklyn Collegiate and Polytechnic Institute. At the breaking outof the war he immediately tendered his services to the Government, and soon rose to the colonelcy of the Thirty-Third Ohio Volunteers, and afterward to the rank of brigadier-general. I knew him well, andwas glad that he came to my division, though I was very loth torelieve Colonel Greusel, of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois, who hadalready indicated much military skill and bravery, and at the battleof Perryville had handled his men with the experience of a veteran. Sill's modesty and courage were exceeded only by a capacity that hadalready been demonstrated in many practical ways, and his untimelydeath, almost within a month of his joining me, abruptly closed acareer which, had it been prolonged a little more, not only wouldhave shed additional lustre on his name, but would have been ofmarked benefit to his country. 

Colonel Schaefer, of the Second Missouri Infantry, had been absent onsick-leave during the Kentucky campaign, but about this date hereturned to duty, and by seniority fell in command of the secondbrigade. He was of German birth, having come from Baden, where, prior to 1848, he had been a non-commissioned officer in the serviceof his State. He took part as an insurgent in the so-calledrevolution which occurred at Baden in that year, and, compelled toemigrate on the suppression of the insurrection, made his way to thiscountry and settled in St. Louis. Here the breaking out of the warfound him, and through the personal interest which General Sigel tookin him he was commissioned a colonel of volunteers. He had had apretty fair education, a taste for the military profession, and wasof tall and slender build, all of which gave him a student-likeappearance. He was extremely excitable and nervous when anticipatinga crisis, but always calmed down to cool deliberation when thecritical moment came. With such a man I could not be less than wellsatisfied, although the officer whom he replaced--Colonel Laiboldt--had performed efficient service and shown much capacity in therecent campaign. 

Colonel G. W. Roberts, of the Forty-Second Illinois Infantry, alsocame to me in the reorganization. He was an ideal soldier both inmind and body. He was young, tall, handsome, brave, and dashing, andpossessed a balance-wheel of such good judgment that in his sphere ofaction no occasion could arise from which he would not reap the bestresults. But he too was destined to lay, down his life within a fewdays, and on the same fatal field. His brigade had been performinggarrison duty in Nashville during the siege of that city whileBuell's army was in Kentucky, but disliking the prospect ofinactivity pending the operations opening before us, Roberts hadrequested and obtained a transfer to the army in the field. Hisbrigade relieved Colonel Dan McCook's, the latter reluctantly joiningthe garrison at Nashville, every one in it disappointed and disgustedthat the circumstances existing at this time should necessitate theirrelegation to the harassing and tantalizing duty of protecting ourdepots and line of supply. 

I was fortunate in having such brigade commanders, and no lessfavored in the regimental and battery commanders. They all were notonly patriots, but soldiers, and knowing that discipline must be oneof the most potent factors in bringing to a successful termination, the mighty contest in which our nation was struggling for existence, they studied and practiced its methods ceaselessly, inspiring withthe same spirit that pervaded themselves the loyal hearts of theirsubordinate officers and men. All worked unremittingly in the campat Mill Creek in preparing for the storm, which now plainly indicatedits speedy coming. Drills, parades, scouts, foraging expeditions, picket and guard duty, made up the course in this school ofinstruction, supplemented by frequent changes in the locations of thedifferent brigades, so that the division could have opportunity tolearn to break camp quickly and to move out promptly on the march. Foraging expeditions were particularly beneficial in this respect, and when sent out, though absent sometimes for days, the men wentwithout tents or knapsacks, equipped with only one blanket and theirarms, ammunition, and rations, to teach them to shift for themselveswith slender means in the event of necessity. The number ofregimental and headquarters wagons was cut down to the lowestpossible figure, and everything made compact by turning into thesupply and ammunition trains of the division all surplustransportation, and restricting the personal baggage of officers tothe fewest effects possible. 

My own staff also was somewhat reorganized and increased at MillCreek, and though it had been perfectly satisfactory before, yet, onaccount of the changes of troops that had occurred in the command, Ifound it necessary to replace valuable officers in some instances, and secure additional ones in others. The gathering of informationabout the enemy was also industriously pursued, and Card and hisbrothers were used constantly on expeditions within the Confederatelines, frequently visiting Murfreesboro', Sparta, Tullahoma, Shelbyville, and other points. What they learned was reported toarmy headquarters, often orally through me or personally communicatedby Card himself, but much was forwarded in official letters, beginning with November 24, when I transmitted accurate informationof the concentration of Bragg's main force at Tullahoma. Indeed, Card kept me so well posted as to every movement of the enemy, notonly with reference to the troops in my immediate front, but alsothroughout his whole army, that General Rosecrans placed the mostunreserved reliance on all his statements, and many times used themto check and correct the reports brought in by his own scouts. 

Slight skirmishes took place frequently during this period, and nowand then heavy demonstrations were made in the neighborhood ofNolensville by reconnoitring parties from both armies, but none ofthese ever grew into a battle. These affairs sprung from the desireof each side to feel his antagonist, and had little result beyondemphasizing the fact that behind each line of pickets lay a massedand powerful army busily preparing for the inevitable conflict andeager for its opening. So it wore on till the evening of December25, 1862; then came the order to move forward. 

General Rosecrans, in the reorganization of the army, had assignedMajor-General A. McD. McCook to command the right wing, Major-GeneralGeorge H. Thomas the centre, and Major-General T. L. Crittenden theleft wing. McCook's wing was made up of three divisions, commandedin order of rank by Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis;Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, and Brigadier-General P. H. Sheridan. Although the corps nomenclature established by General Buell wasdropped, the grand divisions into which he had organized the army atLouisville were maintained, and, in fact, the conditions establishedthen remained practically unaltered, with the exception of theinterchange of some brigades, the transfer of a few general officersfrom one wing or division to another, and the substitution of GeneralThomas for Gilbert as a corps commander. The army was thus compactand cohesive, undisturbed by discord and unembarrassed by jealousiesof any moment; and it may be said that under a commander who, webelieved, had the energy and skill necessary to direct us to success, a national confidence in our invincibility made us all keen for atest of strength with the Confederates. We had not long to wait. 

Early on the morning of December 26, 1862, in a heavy rain, the armymarched, the movement being directed on Murfreesboro', where theenemy had made some preparation to go into winter-quarters, and tohold which town it was hoped he would accept battle. General Thomasmoved by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, General Crittenden by theMurfreesboro' pike, through Lavergne, and General McCook by theNolensville pike--Davis's division in advance. As McCook's commandneared Nolensville, I received a message from Davis informing me thatthe Confederates were in considerable force, posted on a range ofhills in his front, and requesting me to support him in an attack hewas about to make. When the head of my column arrived at NolensvilleI began massing my troops on the right of the road, and by the timethis formation was nearly completed Davis advanced, but not meetingwith sufficient resistance to demand active assistance from me, hewith his own command carried the hills, capturing one piece ofartillery. This position of the Confederates was a strong one, defending Knob's Gap, through which the Nolensville and Triune pikepassed. On the 27th Johnson's division, followed by mine, advancedto Triune, and engaged in a severe skirmish near that place, but mytroops were not called into action, the stand made by the enemy beingonly for the purpose of gaining time to draw in his outlying troops, which done, he retired toward Murfreesboro'. I remained inactive atTriune during the 28th, but early on the 29th moved out by the BoleJack road to the support of, Davis in his advance to Stewart's Creek, and encamped at Wilkinson's crossroads, from which point toMurfreesboro', distant about six miles, there was a good turnpike. The enemy had sullenly resisted the progress of Crittenden and McCookthroughout the preceding three days, and as it was thought probablethat he might offer battle at Stewart's Creek, Thomas, in pursuanceof his original instructions looking to just such a contingency, hadnow fallen into the centre by way of the Nolensville crossroads. 

On the morning of the 3oth I had the advance of McCook's corps on theWilkinson pike, Roberts's brigade leading. At first only slightskirmishing took place, but when we came within about three miles ofMurfreesboro' the resistance of the enemy's pickets grew serious, anda little further on so strong that I had to put in two regiments topush them back. I succeeded in driving them about half a mile, whenI was directed by McCook to form line of battle and place myartillery in position so that I could act in concert with Davis'sdivision, which he wished to post on my right in the general line hedesired to take up. In obedience to these directions I deployed onthe right of, and oblique to the Wilkinson pike, with a front of fourregiments, a second line of four regiments within short supportingdistance, and a reserve of one brigade in column of regiments to therear of my centre. All this time the enemy kept up a heavy artilleryand musketry fire on my skirmishers, he occupying, with hissharpshooters, beyond some open fields, a heavy belt of timber to myfront and right, where it was intended the left of Davis shouldfinally rest. To gain this point Davis was ordered to swing hisdivision into it in conjunction with a wheeling movement of my rightbrigade, until our continuous line should face nearly due east. Thiswould give us possession of the timber referred to, and not only ridus of the annoying fire from the skirmishers screened by it, but alsoplace us close in to what was now developing as Bragg's line ofbattle. The movement was begun about half-past 2, and wassuccessfully executed, after a stubborn resistance. In thispreliminary affair the enemy had put in one battery of artillery, which was silenced in a little while, however, by Bush's andHescock's guns. By sundown I had taken up my prescribed position, facing almost east, my left (Roberts's brigade) resting on theWilkinson pike, the right (Sill's brigade) in the timber we had justgained, and the reserve brigade (Schaefer's) to the rear of mycentre, on some rising ground in the edge of a strip of woods behindHoughtaling's and Hescock's batteries. Davis's division was placedin position on my right, his troops thrown somewhat to the rear, sothat his line formed nearly a right angle with mine, while Johnson'sdivision formed in a very exposed position on the right of Davis, prolonging the general line just across the Franklin pike. 

The centre, under Thomas, had already formed to my left, the right ofNegley's division joining my left in a cedar thicket near theWilkinson pike, while Crittenden's corps was posted on the left ofThomas, his left resting on Stone River, at a point about two milesand a half from Murfreesboro'. 

The precision that had characterized every manoeuvre of the pastthree days, and the exactness with which each corps and division fellinto its allotted place on the evening of the 30th, indicated that atthe outset of the campaign a well-digested plan of operations hadbeen prepared for us; and although the scheme of the expected battlewas not known to subordinates of my grade, yet all the movements upto this time had been so successfully and accurately made as to givemuch promise for the morrow, and when night fell there was generalanticipation of the best results to the Union army. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

ASSAULT ON OUR RIGHT FLANK--OCCUPYING A NEW POSITION--THE ENEMYCHECKED--TERRIBLE LOSS OF OFFICERS--AMMUNITION GIVES OUT--RECONSTRUCTING THE LINE--COLLECTING THE WOUNDED AND BURYINGTHE DEAD--DEALING WITH COWARDS--RESULTS OF THE VICTORY. 

The enemy under Bragg lay between us and stone River in order ofbattle, his general line conforming to the course of that stream. Inmy immediate front he appeared to be established in strong force in adense cedar wood, just beyond an open valley, which varied from twohundred to four hundred yards in width, the cedars extending theentire length of the valley. From the events of the day and eveningof the 3oth, it was apparent that the two armies were in closeproximity, and orders received during the night revealed the factthat Rosecrans intended to attack by throwing his left on the enemy'sright, with the expectation of driving it in toward Murfreesboro', sothat the right of Crittenden's corps could attack Bragg's centre inreverse, while Thomas supported Crittenden by a simultaneous frontassault; and from the movements of the enemy at daylight nextmorning, it was plainly indicated that Bragg had planned to swing hisleft on our right by an exactly similar manoeuvre, get possession ofthe railroad and the Nashville pike, and if possible cut us off fromour base at Nashville. The conceptions in the minds of the twogenerals were almost identical; but Bragg took the initiative, beginning his movement about an hour earlier than the time set byRosecrans, which gained him an immense advantage in execution in theearlier stages of the action. 

During the evening, feeling keenly all the solicitude whichattends one in anticipation of a battle, I examined my position withgreat care, inspecting its whole length several times to remedy anydefects that might exist, and to let the men see that I was alive totheir interests and advantages. After dark, I went back to the rearof my reserve brigade, and establishing my headquarters behind thetrunk of a large fallen tree, which would shelter me somewhat fromthe cold December wind, lay down beside a small camp-fire to get somerest. 

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 31st General Sill came back to meto report that on his front a continuous movement of infantry andartillery had been going on all night within the Confederate lines, and that he was convinced that Bragg was massing on our right withthe purpose of making an attack from that direction early in themorning. After discussing for a few minutes the probabilities ofsuch a course on the part of the enemy, I thought McCook should bemade acquainted with what was going on, so Sill and I went back tosee him at his headquarters, not far from the Griscom House, where wefound him sleeping on some straw in the angle of a worm-fence. Iwaked him up and communicated the intelligence, and our consequentimpressions. He talked the matter over with us for some little time, but in view of the offensive-defensive part he was to play in thecoming battle, did not seem to think that there was a necessity forany further dispositions than had already been taken. He said thathe thought Johnson's division would be able to take care of theright, and seemed confident that the early assault which was to bemade from Rosecrans's left would anticipate and check the designswhich we presaged. We two then returned to my little camp-firebehind the log, and as we continued talking of what might be expectedfrom the indications on the right, and Sill becoming more anxious, Idirected two regiments from the reserve to report to him, that theymight be placed within very short supporting distance of his line. He then rejoined his brigade, better satisfied, but still adhering tothe belief he had expressed when first making his report. 

Long before dawn my division breakfasted, and was assembled underarms, the infantry in line, the cannoneers at their pieces, but whilewe were thus preparing, all the recent signs of activity in theenemy's camp were hushed, a death-like stillness prevailing in thecedars to our front. Shortly after daylight General Hardee openedthe engagement, just as Sill had predicted, by a fierce attack onJohnson's division, the extreme right of the Union line. Immediatesuccess attending this assault, Hardee extended the attack graduallyalong in front of Davis, hip movement taking the form of a wheel tothe right, the pivot being nearly opposite the left of my division. Johnson's division soon gave way, and two of Davis's brigades wereforced to fall back with it, though stubbornly resisting thedetermined and sweeping onset. 

In the meantime the enemy had also attacked me, advancing across anold cotton-field in Sill's front in heavy masses, which werefuriously opened upon by Bush's battery from Sill's line, and byHescock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire onthe field from a commanding position in rear of my centre. Theeffect of this fire on the advancing column was terrible, but itcontinued on till it reached the edge of the timber where Sill'sright lay, when my infantry opened at a range of not over fiftyyards. For a short time the Confederates withstood the fire, butthen wavered, broke, and fell back toward their original line. Asthey retired, Sill's brigade followed in a spirited charge, drivingthem back across the open ground and behind their intrenchments. Inthis charge the gallant Sill was killed; a rifle ball passing throughhis upper lip and penetrating the brain. Although this was a heavyloss, yet the enemy's discomfiture was such as to give us an hour'stime, and as Colonel Greusel, Thirty-sixth Illinois, succeeded toSill's command, I directed him, as he took charge, to recall thebrigade to its original position, for the turning-column on myextreme right was now assuming the most menacing attitude, and it wasurgently necessary to prepare for it. 

When that portion of the enemy driven back by Sill recovered from itsrepulse it again advanced to the attack, this time directing itsefforts chiefly upon my extreme right, and the front of Woodruff'sbrigade of Davis's division, which brigade still held on in its firstposition. In front of my centre the Confederates were again drivenback, but as the assault on Woodruff was in conjunction with anadvance of the column that had forced Johnson to retire, Woodruff wascompelled unfortunately to give way, and two regiments on the rightof my line went with him, till they rallied on the two reserveregiments which, in anticipation of the enemy's initiatory attack Ihad sent to Sill's rear before daylight. 

Both Johnson's and Davis's divisions were now practically gone fromour line, having retired with a loss of all formation, and they werebeing closely pursued by the enemy, whose columns were following thearc of a circle that would ultimately carry him in on my rear. Inconsequence of the fact that this state of things would soon subjectme to a fire in reverse, I hastily withdrew Sill's brigade and thereserve regiments supporting it, and ordered Roberts's brigade, whichat the close of the enemy's second repulse had changed front towardthe south and formed in column of regiments, to cover the withdrawalby a charge on the Confederates as they came into the timber where myright had originally rested. Roberts made the charge at the propertime, and was successful in checking the enemy's advance, thus givingus a breathing-spell, during which I was able to take up a newposition with Schaefer's and Sill's brigades on the commanding groundto the rear, where Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries had beenposted all the morning. 

The general course of this new position was at right angles with myoriginal line, and it took the shape of an obtuse angle, with mythree batteries at the apex. Davis, and Carlin of his division, endeavored to rally their men here on my right, but their effortswere practically unavailing, --though the calm and cool appearance ofCarlin, who at the time was smoking a stumpy pipe, had some effect, and was in strong contrast to the excited manner of Davis, who seemedoverpowered by the disaster that had befallen his command. But fewcould be rallied, however, as the men were badly demoralized, andmost of them fell back beyond the Wilkinson pike, where theyreorganized behind the troops of General Thomas. 

At this juncture the enemy's turning-column began advancing again inconcert with Cheatham's division, and as the extreme left of theConfederates was directed on Griscom's house, and their right on theBlanton house, my new position was in danger of envelopment. No hopeof stemming the tide at this point seemed probable, but to gain timeI retained my ground as long as possible, and until, under directionsfrom General McCook, I moved to the front from my left flank andattached myself to the right of Negley's division, which up to thishour had been left almost undisturbed by the enemy in the line it hadtaken up the night before. Under a heavy fire we succeeded in thismanoeuvre, Schaefer's brigade marching first, then the batteries, andRoberts's and Sill's brigades following. When my division arrived onthis new ground, I posted Roberts on Negley's right, with Hescock'sand Bush's guns, the brigade and guns occupying a low rocky ridge oflimestone, which faced them toward Murfreesboro', nearly south. Therest of my division was aligned facing west, along the edge of acedar thicket, the rear rank backed up on the right flank of Roberts, with Houghtaling's battery in the angle. This presented Sill's andSchaefer's brigades in an almost opposite direction to the line wehad so confidently taken up the night before, and covered Negley'srear. The enemy, in the meantime, had continued his wheelingmovement till he occupied the ground that my batteries and reservebrigade had held in the morning, and I had now so changed my positionthat the left brigade of my division approached his intrenchments infront of Stone River, while Sill's and Schaeffer's brigades, byfacing nearly west, confronted the successful troops that had smashedin our extreme right. 

I had hardly got straightened out in this last place when I wasattacked by Cheatham's'division, which, notwithstanding thestaggering blows it had previously received from Sill and Roberts, now again moved forward in conjunction with the wheeling movementunder the immediate command of Hardee. One of the most sanguinarycontests of the day now took place. In fulfillment of Bragg'soriginal design no doubt, Cheatham's division attacked on my left, while heavy masses under Hardee, covered by batteries posted on thehigh ground formerly occupied by my guns, assaulted my right, thewhole force advancing simultaneously. At the same time the enemyopened an artillery fire from his intrenchments in front ofMurfreesboro', and it seemed that he was present on every side. Myposition was strong, however, located in the edge of a dense cedarthicket and commanding a slight depression of open ground that lay inmy front. My men were in good spirits too, notwithstanding they hadbeen a good deal hustled around since daylight, with losses that hadtold considerably on their numbers. Only a short distance nowseparated the contending lines, and as the batteries on each sidewere not much more than two hundred yards apart when the enemy madehis assault, the artillery fire was fearful in its effect on theranks of both contestants, the enemy's heavy masses staggering underthe torrent of shell and canister from our batteries, while our lineswere thinned by his ricochetting projectiles, that rebounded againand again over the thinly covered limestone formation and sped on tothe rear of Negley. But all his efforts to dislodge or destroy uswere futile, and for the first time since daylight General Hardee wasseriously checked in the turning movement he had begun for thepurpose of getting possession of the Nashville pike, and thoughreinforced until two-fifths of Bragg's army was now at his command, yet he met with repulse after repulse, which created great gaps inhis lines and taught him that to overwhelm us was hopeless. 

As the enemy was recoiling from his first attack, I received amessage from Rosecrans telling me that he was making newdispositions, and directing me to hold on where I was until they werecompleted. From this I judged that the existing conditions of thebattle would probably require a sacrifice of my command, so Iinformed Roberts and Schaefer that we must be prepared to meet thedemand on us by withstanding the assault of the enemy, no matter whatthe outcome. Every energy was therefore bent to the simple holdingof our ground, and as ammunition was getting scarce, instructionswere given throughout the command to have it reserve its fire tillthe most effective moment. In a little while came a second and athird assault, and although they were as daring and furious as thefirst, yet in each case the Confederates were repulsed, driven backin confusion, but not without deadly loss to us, for the nobleRoberts was killed, and Colonel Harrington, of the Twenty-SeventhIllinois, who succeeded to his brigade, was mortally wounded a fewminutes later. I had now on the death-roll three brigade commanders, and the loss of subordinate officers and men was appalling, but theirsacrifice had accomplished the desired result; they had not fallen invain. Indeed, the bravery and tenacity of my division gave toRosecrans the time required to make new dispositions, and exactedfrom our foes the highest commendations. 

A lull followed the third fierce assault, and an investigation showedthat, with the exception of a few rounds in my brigade, ourammunition was entirely exhausted; and while it was apparent that theenemy was reluctant to renew the conflict in my front, yet I wassatisfied I could not hold on much longer without the danger ofultimate capture, so I prepared to withdraw as soon as the troops ofRousseau's division, which had been ordered to take up a line on myright, came into position. Schaefer's and Sill's brigades beingwithout a cartridge, I directed them to fix bayonets for a charge, and await any attempt of the enemy to embarrass my retreat, whileRoberts's brigade, offering such resistance as its small quantity ofammunition would permit, was pulled slowly in toward the Nashvillepike. Eighty of the horses of Houghtaling's battery having beenkilled, an attempt was made to bring his guns back by hand over therocky ground, but it could not be done, and we had to abandon them. Hescock also had lost most of his horses, but all his guns weresaved. Bush's battery lost two pieces, the tangled underbrush in thedense cedars proving an obstacle to getting them away which hisalmost superhuman exertions could not surmount. Thus far the bloodyduel had cost me heavily, one-third of my division being killed orwounded. I had already three brigade commanders killed; a littlelater I lost my fourth--Colonel Schaefer. 

The difficulties of withdrawing were very great, as the ground wasexceptionally rocky, and the growth of cedars almost impenetrable forwheeled carriages. Retiring sullenly under a heavy fire, while thegeneral line was reformed to my right and rear, my division was atlength drawn through the cedars and debouched into an open space nearthe Murfreesboro' pike, behind the right of Palmer's division. Tworegiments of Sill's brigade, however, on account of the conformationof the ground, were obliged to fall back from the point whereWoodruff's brigade of Davis's division had rallied after the disasterof the early morning. The division came out of the cedars withunbroken ranks, thinned by only its killed and wounded--but fewmissing. When we came into the open ground, McCook directedRoberts's brigade--now commanded by Colonel Luther P. Bradley--toproceed a short distance to the rear on the Nashville pike, to repelthe enemy's threatening attempt at our communications. Willingly andcheerfully the brigade again entered the fight under these newconditions, and although it was supplied with but three or fourcartridges to the man now, it charged gallantly and recaptured twopieces of artillery which the Union troops had had to abandon at thatpoint. 

Shortly after we debouched from the cedars I was directed byRosecrans to send some aid to the right of General Palmer's division;and two of Schaefer's regiments, having obtained ammunition, werepushed up on Palmer's right, accompanied by four of Hescock's guns;but the advance of the enemy here had already been checked by Palmer, and only a desultory contest ensued. Rosecrans, whom I now met inthe open ground west of the railroad, behind Palmer, directed that mycommand should relieve Wood's division, which was required to fallback and take up the new line that had been marked out while I washolding on in the cedars. His usually florid face had lost its ruddycolor, and his anxious eyes told that the disasters of the morningwere testing his powers to the very verge of endurance, but he seemedfully to comprehend what had befallen us. His firmly set lips and, the calmness with which his instructions were delivered inspiredconfidence in all around him; and expressing approbation of what mydivision had done, while deliberately directing it to a new point, herenewed in us all the hope of final victory, though it must beadmitted that at this phase of the battle the chances lay largelywith the enemy. 

Withdrawing the two regiments and Hescock's battery, that I hadposted on the right of Palmer, I moved as directed by Rosecrans intothe position to the east of the railroad, and formed immediately tothe right of Wood, who was now being attacked all along his front, but more particularly where his right rested near the railroad. Under a storm of shot and shell that came in torrents my troops tookup the new ground, advancing through a clump of open timber to Wood'sassistance. Forming in line in front of the timber we poured atelling fire into the enemy's ranks, which were then attacking acrosssome cleared fields; but when he discovered additional troopsconfronting him, he gave up the attempt to carry Wood's position. Itwas here that I lost Schaefer, who was killed instantly, making myfourth brigade commander dead that day. The enemy in front of Woodhaving been checked, our whole line east of the railroad executedundisturbed its retrograde movement to a position about three hundredyards to its rear. When I fell back to the edge of the clump oftimber, where when first coming on the ground I had formed to helpWood, I was ordered by Rosecrans to prepare to make a charge shouldthe enemy again assault us. In anticipation of this work I massed mytroops in close column. The expected attack never came, however, butthe shot and shell of a furious cannonade told with fatal effect uponmen and officers as they lay on their faces hugging the ground. Thetorments of this trying situation were almost unbearable, but it wasobvious to all that it was necessary to have at hand a compact bodyof troops to repel any assault the enemy might make pending thereconstruction of the extreme right of our line, and a silentdetermination to stay seemed to take hold of each individual soldier;nor was this grim silence interrupted throughout the cannonade, except in one instance, when one of the regiments broke out in alusty cheer as a startled rabbit in search of a new hiding-placesafely ran the whole length of the line on the backs of the men. 

While my troops were still lying here, General Rosecrans, with a partof his staff and a few orderlies, rode out on the rearranged line tosupervise its formation and encourage the men, and in prosecution ofthese objects moved around the front of my column of attack, withinrange of the batteries that were shelling us so viciously. As hepassed to the open ground on my left, I joined him. The enemy seeingthis mounted party, turned his guns upon it, and his accurate aim wassoon rewarded, for a solid shot carried away the head of ColonelGaresche, the chief-of-staff, and killed or wounded two or threeorderlies. Garesche's appalling death stunned us all, and amomentary expression of horror spread over Rosecrans's face; but atsuch a time the importance of self-control was vital, and he pursuedhis course with an appearance of indifference, which, however, thoseimmediately about him saw was assumed, for undoubtedly he felt mostdeeply the death of his friend and trusted staff-officer. 

No other attacks were made on us to the east of the railroad for therest of the afternoon, and just before dark I was directed towithdraw and take up a position along the west side of the Nashvillepike, on the extreme right of our new line, where Roberts's brigadeand the Seventy-third and Eighty-eighth Illinois had already beenplaced by McCook. The day had cost me much anxiety and sadness, andI was sorely disappointed at the general result, though I could notbe other than pleased at the part taken by my command. The loss ofmy brigade commanders--Sill, Roberts, Schaefer, and Harrington-and alarge number of regimental and battery officers, with so many oftheir men, struck deep into my heart: My thinned ranks told thewoeful tale of the fierce struggles, indescribable by words, throughwhich my division had passed since 7 o'clock in the morning; andthis, added to our hungry and exhausted condition, was naturallydisheartening. The men had been made veterans, however, by thefortunes and misfortunes of the day, and as they went into their newplaces still confident of final success, it was plain to see thatthey felt a self-confidence inspired by the part they had alreadyplayed. 

My headquarters were now established on the Nashville pike, aboutthree miles and a half from Murfreesboro'; my division being alignedto the west of the pike, bowed out and facing almost west, Cleburn'sdivision of the Confederates confronting it. Davis's division wasposted on my right, and Walker's brigade of Thomas's corps, which hadreported to me, took up a line that connected my left with Johnson'sdivision. 

Late in the evening General Rosecrans, accompanied by General McCook, and several other officers whose names I am now unable to recall, rode by my headquarters on their way to the rear to look for a newline of battle--on Overall's creek it was said--that would preserveour communications with Nashville and offer better facilities forresistance than the one we were now holding. Considerable time hadelapsed when they returned from this exploration and proceeded totheir respective commands, without intimating to me that anything hadbeen determined upon by the reconnoissance, but a little later it wasrumored through the different headquarters that while the party waslooking for a new position it discovered the enemy's troops movingtoward our right and rear, the head of his columns being conducted inthe darkness by the aid of torches, and that no alternative was leftus but to hold the lines we then occupied. The torches had been seenunquestionably, and possibly created some alarm at first in the mindsof the reconnoitring party, but it was soon ascertained that thelights came from a battalion of the Fourth regular cavalry that waspicketing our flank and happened to be starting its bivouac fires atthe moment. The fires and the supposed movements had no weight, therefore, in deciding the proposition to take up a line at Overall'screek, but General Rosecrans, fortunately for the army, decided toremain where he was. Doubtless reflections during his ride causedhim to realize that the enemy must be quite as much crippled ashimself. If it had been decided to fall back to Overall's creek, wecould have withdrawn without much difficulty very likely, but such aretrograde movement would have left to the enemy the entirebattle-field of Stone River and ultimately compelled our retreatto Nashville. 

In the night of December 3rd several slight demonstrations were madeon my front, but from the darkness neither party felt the effect ofthe other's fire, and when daylight came again the skirmishers andlines of battle were in about the same position they had taken up theevening before. Soon after daybreak it became evident that theconflict was to be renewed, and a little later the enemy resumed theoffensive by an attack along my left front, especially on Walker'sbrigade. His attempt was ineffectual, however, and so easilyrepulsed as to demonstrate that the desperate character of hisassaults the day before had nearly exhausted his strength. About 3o'clock in the afternoon he made another feeble charge on my front, but our fire from the barricades and rifle-pits soon demoralized hisadvancing lines, which fell back in some confusion, thus enabling usto pick up about a hundred prisoners. From this time till theevening of January 3 Bragg's left remained in our front, andcontinued to show itself at intervals by weak demonstrations, whichwe afterward ascertained were directly intended to cover thedesperate assault he made with Breckenridge on the left of Rosecrans, an assault that really had in view only a defensive purpose, forunless Bragg dislodged the troops which were now massing in front ofhis right he would be obliged to withdraw General Polk's corps behindStone River and finally abandon Murfreesboro'. The sequel provedthis to be the case; and the ill-judged assault led by Breckenridgeending in entire defeat, Bragg retired from Murfreesboro' the nightof January 3. 

General Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro' on the 4th and 5th, havinggained a costly victory, which was not decisive enough in itscharacter to greatly affect the general course of the war, though itsomewhat strengthened and increased our hold on Middle Tennessee. The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far--only behind DuckRiver to Shelbyville and Tullahoma--and but little endeavor was madeto follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even ifit had been the intention at the outset of the campaign. 

As soon as possible after the Confederate retreat I went over thebattle-field to collect such of my wounded as had not been carriedoff to the South and to bury my dead. In the cedars and on theground where I had been so fiercely assaulted when the battle opened, on the morning of the 31st, evidences of the bloody struggle appearedon every hand in the form of broken fire-arms, fragments ofaccoutrements, and splintered trees. The dead had nearly all beenleft unburied, but as there was likelihood of their mutilation byroving swine, the bodies had mostly been collected in piles atdifferent points and inclosed by rail fences. The sad duties ofinterment and of caring for the wounded were completed by the 5th, and on the 6th I moved my division three miles, south ofMurfreesboro' on the Shelbyville pike, going into camp on the banksof Stone River. Here the condition of my command was thoroughlylooked into, and an endeavor made to correct such defects as had beendisclosed by the recent battle. 

During the engagement there had been little straggling, and my listof missing was small and legitimate; still, it was known that a veryfew had shirked their duty, and an example was necessary. Among thissmall number were four officers who, it was charged, had abandonedtheir colors and regiments. When their guilt was clearlyestablished, and as soon as an opportunity occurred, I caused thewhole division to be formed in a hollow square, closed in mass, andhad the four officers marched to the centre, where, telling them thatI would not humiliate any officer or soldier by requiring him totouch their disgraced swords, I compelled them to deliver theirs upto my colored servant, who also cut from their coats every insigniaof rank. Then, after there had been read to the command an orderfrom army headquarters dismissing the four from the service, thescene was brought to a close by drumming the cowards out of camp. Itwas a mortifying spectacle, but from that day no officer in thatdivision ever abandoned his colors. 

My effective force in the battle of Stone River was 4, 154 officersand men. Of this number I lost 1, 633 killed, wounded, and missing, or nearly 40 per cent. In the remaining years of the war, thoughoften engaged in most severe contests, I never experienced in any ofmy commands so high a rate of casualties. The ratio of loss in thewhole of Rosecrans's army was also high, and Bragg's losses werealmost equally great. Rosecrans carried into the action about 42, 000officers and men. He lost 13, 230, or 31 per cent. Bragg's effectiveforce was 37, 800 officers and men; he lost 10, 306, or nearly 28 percent. 

Though our victory was dearly bought, yet the importance of gainingthe day at any price was very great, particularly when we considerwhat might have been the result had not the gallantry of the army andthe manoeuvring during the early disaster saved us from ultimatedefeat. We had started out from Nashville on an offensive campaign, probably with no intention of going beyond Murfreesboro', inmidwinter, but still with the expectation of delivering a crushingblow should the enemy accept our challenge to battle. He met us witha plan of attack almost the counterpart of our own. In the executionof his plan he had many advantages, not the least of which was hisintimate knowledge of the ground, and he came near destroying us. Had he done so, Nashville would probably have fallen; at all events, Kentucky would have been opened again to his incursions, and thetheatre of war very likely transferred once more to the Ohio River. As the case now stood, however, Nashville was firmly established as abase for future operations, Kentucky was safe from the possibility ofbeing again overrun, and Bragg, thrown on the defensive, wascompelled to give his thoughts to the protection of the interior ofthe Confederacy and the security of Chattanooga, rather than indulgein schemes of conquest north of the Cumberland River. While he stillheld on in Middle Tennessee his grasp was so much loosened that onlyslight effort would be necessary to push him back into Georgia, andthus give to the mountain region of East Tennessee an opportunity toprove its loyalty to the, Union. 

The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyedthe hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the droopingspirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists inMiddle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concernedthe result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned thebattle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remainentirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to pushforward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro';and notwithstanding the fact that on the afternoon of December 30McCook received information that the right of Johnson's division. Resting near the Franklin pike, extended only to about the centre ofthe Confederate army, it does not appear that attack from thatquarter was at all apprehended by the Union commanders. 

The natural line of retreat of the Confederates was not threatened bythe design of Rosecrans; and Bragg, without risk to hiscommunications, anticipated it by a counter-attack of like characterfrom his own left, and demolished his adversary's plan the moment wewere thrown on the defensive. Had Bragg followed up with the spiritwhich characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee onour right wing--and there seems no reason why he should not have doneso--the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, butit would have been depleted and demoralized to such a degree as tounfit it for offensive operations for a long time afterward. Bragg'sintrenchments in front of Stone River were very strong, and thereseems no reason why he should not have used his plain advantage asexplained, but instead he allowed us to gain time, intrench, andrecover a confidence that at first was badly shaken. Finally, to capthe climax of his errors, he directed Breckenridge to make theassault from his right flank on January 2, with small chance foranything but disaster, when the real purpose in view could have beenaccomplished without the necessity of any offensive manoeuvrewhatever. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL--THE SECRET EXPEDITION UNDER CARD THESCOUT--HIS CAPTURE BY GUERRILLAS--ESCAPE--A REVENGE PARTY--WOMENSOLDIERS--A FIGHT WITH SABRES--TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN--A FOOLISHADVENTURE. 

On the 6th of January, 1863, my division settled quietly down in itscamp south of Murfreesboro'. Its exhausted condition after theterrible experiences of the preceding week required attention. Itneeded recuperation, reinforcement, and reorganization, and I setabout these matters without delay, in anticipation of activeoperations early in the spring. No forward movement was made fornearly six months, however, and throughout this period drills, parades, reconnoissances, and foraging expeditions filled in the timeprofitably. In addition to these exercises the construction ofpermanent fortifications for the security of Murfreesboro' wasundertaken by General Rosecrans, and large details from my troopswere furnished daily for the work. Much attention was also given tocreating a more perfect system of guard and picket duty-a matter thathad hitherto been somewhat neglected in the army, as its constantactivity had permitted scant opportunity for the development of sucha system. It was at this time that I received my appointment as amajor-general of Volunteers. My promotion had been recommended byGeneral Rosecrans immediately after the battle of Stone River, butfor some reason it was delayed until April, and though a long timeelapsed between the promise and the performance, my gratification wasextreme. 

My scout, Card, was exceedingly useful while encamped nearMurfreesboro, making several trips to East Tennessee within theenemy's lines to collect information as to the condition of the loyalpeople there, and to encourage them with the hope of earlyliberation. He also brought back from each trip very accuratestatements as to the strength and doings of the Confederate army, fixing almost with certainty its numbers and the locations of itsdifferent divisions, and enabling my engineer-officer--MajorMorhardt--to construct good maps of the country in our front. Onthese dangerous excursions Card was always accompanied by one of hisbrothers, the other remaining with me to be ready for duty if anyaccident occurred to those who had gone out, or in case I wanted tocommunicate with them. In this way we kept well posted, although theintelligence these men brought was almost always secured at the riskof their lives. 

Early in the spring, before the Tullahoma campaign began, I thoughtit would be practicable, by sending out a small secret expedition ofbut three or four men, to break the Nashville and Chattanoogarailroad between Chattanooga and the enemy's position at Tullahoma byburning the bridges in Crow Creek valley from its head to Stevenson, Alabama, and then the great bridge across the Tennessee River atBridgeport. Feeling confident that I could persuade Card toundertake the perilous duty, I broached the contemplated project tohim, and he at once jumped at the opportunity of thus distinguishinghimself, saying that with one of his brothers and three other loyalEast Tennesseeans, whose services he knew could be enlisted, he feltsure of carrying out the idea, so I gave him authority to choose hisown assistants. In a few days his men appeared at my headquarters, and when supplied with money in notes of the State Bank of Tennessee, current everywhere as gold in those days, the party, composed ofCard, the second brother, and the three East Tennesseeans, started ontheir precarious enterprise, their course being directed first towardthe Cumberland Mountains, intending to strike the Nashville andChattanooga railroad somewhere above Anderson's station. Theyexpected to get back in about fifteen days, but I looked for someknowledge of the progress of their adventure before the expiration ofthat period, hoping to hear through Confederate sources prisoners andthe like-of the destruction of the bridges. I waited in patience forsuch news, but none came, and as the time Card had allotted himselfpassed by, I watched anxiously for his return, for, as there wasscarcely a doubt that the expedition had proved a failure, the fateof the party became a matter of deep concern to Card's remainingbrother and to me. Finally this brother volunteered to go to hisfather's house in East Tennessee to get tidings of the party, and Iconsented, for the probabilities were that some of them had madetheir way to that point, or at least that some information hadreached there about them. As day after day went by, the time fixedfor this brother's return came round, yet he also remained out; butsome days after the lad was due Card himself turned up accompanied bythe brother he had taken with him, soon explained his delay ingetting back, and gave me the story of his adventures while absent. 

After leaving my camp, his party had followed various byways acrossthe Cumberland Mountains to Crow Creek Valley, as instructed; butwhen nearing the railroad above Anderson's Station, they werecaptured by some guerrillas prowling about that vicinity, and beingsuspected of disloyalty to the Confederacy, were carried toChattanooga and imprisoned as Yankee spies. Their prospects now weredecidedly discouraging, for death stared them in the face. Fortunately, however, some delays occurred relative to thedisposition that should be made of them, and they, meanwhile, effected their escape from their jailors by way of one of the prisonwindows, from which they managed to displace a bar, and by a skiff, in the darkness of night, crossed the Tennessee River a little belowChattanooga. From this point the party made their way back to mycamp, traveling only at night, hiding in the woods by day, and forfood depending on loyal citizens that Card had become acquainted withwhen preaching and peddling. 

Card's first inquiry after relating his story was for the youngestbrother, whom he had left with me. I told him what I had done, in myanxiety about himself, and that more than sufficient time had elapsedfor his brother's return. His reply was: "They have caught him. Thepoor fellow is dead. " His surmise proved correct; for news soon camethat the poor boy had been captured at his father's house, andhanged. The blow to Card was a severe one, and so hardened his heartagainst the guerrillas in the neighborhood of his father's home--forhe knew they were guilty of his brother's murder--that it was withdifficulty I could persuade him to continue in the employment of theGovernment, so determined was he to avenge his brother's death at thefirst opportunity. Finally, however, I succeeded in quieting thealmost uncontrollable rage that seemed to possess him, and heremained with me during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns; butwhen we reached Knoxville the next winter, he took his departure, informing me that he was going for the bushwhackers who had killedhis brother. A short time after he left me, I saw him at the head ofabout thirty well-armed East Tennesseeans--refugees. They weredetermined-looking men, seeking revenge for the wrongs and sufferingsthat had been put upon them in the last two years, and no doubtwreaked their vengeance right and left on all who had been in any wayinstrumental in persecuting them. 

The feeding of our army from the base at Louisville was attended witha great many difficulties, as the enemy's cavalry was constantlybreaking the railroad and intercepting our communications on theCumberland River at different points that were easily accessible tohis then superior force of troopers. The accumulation of reservestores was therefore not an easy task, and to get forage ahead a fewdays was well-nigh impossible, unless that brought from the North wassupplemented by what we could gather from the country. Corn wasabundant in the region to the south and southwest of Murfreesboro', so to make good our deficiences in this respect, I employed a brigadeabout once a week in the duty of collecting and bringing in forage, sending out sometimes as many as a hundred and fifty wagons to haulthe grain which my scouts had previously located. In nearly everyone of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and the wagonswere usually loaded while the skirmishers kept up a running fire, Often there would occur a respectable brush, with the loss on eachside of a number of killed and wounded. The officer in directcommand always reported to me personally whatever had happened duringthe time he was out--the result of his reconnoissance, so to speak, for that war the real nature of these excursions--and on one occasionthe colonel in command, Colonel Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri, informed me that he got through without much difficulty; in fact, that everything had gone all right and been eminently satisfactory, except that in returning he had been mortified greatly by the conductof the two females belonging to the detachment and division train atmy headquarters. These women, he said, had given much annoyance bygetting drunk, and to some extent demoralizing his men. To say thatI was astonished at his statement would be a mild way of putting it, and had I not known him to be a most upright man and of sound sense, I should have doubted not only his veracity, but his sanity. Inquiring who they were and for further details, I was informed thatthere certainly were in the command two females, that in somemysterious manner had attached themselves to the service as soldiers;that one, an East Tennessee woman, was a teamster in the divisionwagon-train and the other a private soldier in a cavalry companytemporarily attached to my headquarters for escort duty. While outon the foraging expedition these Amazons had secured a supply of"apple-jack" by some means, got very drunk, and on the return hadfallen into Stone River and been nearly drowned. After they had beenfished from, the water, in the process of resuscitation their sex wasdisclosed, though up to this time it appeared to be known only toeach other. The story was straight and the circumstance clear, so, convinced of Conrad's continued sanity, I directed theprovost-marshal to bring in arrest to my headquarters the twodisturbers of Conrad's peace of mind, After some little search theEast Tennessee woman was found in camp, somewhat the worse for theexperiences of the day before, but awaiting her fate content idlysmoking a cob-pipe. She was brought to me, and put in duress undercharge of the division surgeon until her companion could be secured. To the doctor she related that the year before she had "refugeed" fromEast Tennessee, and on arriving in Louisville assumed men's appareland sought and obtained employment as a teamster in thequartermaster's department. Her features were very large, and socoarse and masculine was her general appearance that she would readilyhave passed as a man, and in her case the deception was no doubteasily practiced. Next day the "she dragoon" was caught, and provedto be a rather prepossessing young woman, and though necessarilybronzed and hardened by exposure, I doubt if, even with these marks ofcampaigning, she could have deceived as readily as did her companion. How the two got acquainted, I never learned, and though they hadjoined the army independently of each other, yet an intimacy hadsprung up between them long before the mishaps of the foragingexpedition. They both were forwarded to army headquarters, and, whenprovided with clothing suited to their sex, sent back to Nashville, and thence beyond our lines to Louisville. 

On January 9, by an order from the War Department, the Army of theCumberland had been divided into three corps, designated theFourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first. This order did not alter thecomposition of the former grand divisions, nor change the commanders, but the new nomenclature was a decided improvement over the clumsydesignations Right Wing, Centre, and Left Wing, which were wellcalculated to lead to confusion sometimes. McCook's wing became theTwentieth Corps, and my division continued of the same organization, and held the same number as formerly-the Third Division, TwentiethCorps. My first brigade was now commanded by Brigadier-GeneralWilliam H. Lytle, the second by Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, and thethird by Colonel Luther P. Bradley. 

On the 4th of March I was directed to move in light marching ordertoward Franklin and join General Gordon Granger, to take part in someoperations which he was projecting against General Earl Van Dorn, then at Spring Hill. Knowing that my line of march would carry methrough a region where forage was plentiful, I took along a largetrain of empty wagons, which I determined to fill with corn and sendback to Murfreesboro', believing that I could successfully cover thetrain by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which had joined me for thepurpose of aiding in a reconnoissance toward Shelbyville. Inmarching the column I placed a regiment of infantry at its head, thenthe wagon-train, then a brigade of infantry--masking the cavalrybehind this brigade. The enemy, discovering that the train was withus, and thinking he could capture it, came boldly out with his, cavalry to attack. The head of his column came up to the crossroadsat Versailles, but holding him there, I passed the train and infantrybrigade beyond toward Eagleville, and when my cavalry had been thusunmasked, Minty, followed by the balance of my division, which wasstill behind, charged him with the sabre. Success was immediate andcomplete, and pursuit of the routed forces continued throughUnionville, until we fell upon and drove in the Confederate outpostsat Shelbyville. Here the enemy was taken by surprise evidently, which was most fortunate for us, otherwise the consequences mighthave been disastrous. Minty captured in the charge about fiftyprisoners and a few wagons and mules, and thus enabled me to load mytrain with corn, and send it back to Murfreesboro' unmolested. Inthis little fight the sabre was freely used by both sides, and I donot believe that during the whole war I again knew of so large apercentage of wounds by that arm in proportion to the numbersengaged. 

That night I encamped at Eagleville, and next day reported to Grangerat Franklin, arriving in the midst of much excitement prevailing onaccount of the loss of Coburn's brigade, which had been captured theday before a little distance south of that point, while marching toform a junction with a column that had been directed on Columbia fromMurfreesboro'. Shortly after Coburn's capture General Granger hadcome upon the scene, and the next day he advanced my division andMinty's troops directly on Spring Hill, with a view to making somereprisal; but Van Dorn had no intention of accommodating us, andretired from Spring Hill, offering but little resistance. Hecontinued to fall back, till finally he got behind Duck River, whereoperations against him ceased; for, in consequence of the incessantrains of the season, the streams had become almost impassable. Later, I returned by way of Franklin to my old camp at Murfreesboro', passing over on this march the ground on which the ConfederateGeneral Hood met with such disaster the following year in his attackon Stanley's corps. 

My command had all returned from the Franklin expedition toMurfreesboro' and gone into camp on the Salem pike by the latter partof March, from which time till June it took part in only the littleaffairs of outposts occurring every now and then on my own front. Inthe meanwhile General Rosecrans had been materially reinforced by thereturn of sick and wounded men; his army had become well disciplined, and was tolerably supplied; and he was repeatedly pressed by theauthorities at Washington to undertake offensive operations. 

During the spring and early summer Rosecrans resisted, with a greatdeal of spirit and on various grounds, these frequent urgings, andout of this grew up an acrimonious correspondence and strainedfeeling between him and General Halleck. Early in June, however, stores had been accumulated and other preparations made for a moveforward, Resecrans seeming to have decided that he could safely riskan advance, with the prospect of good results. Before finallydeciding, he called upon most of his corps and division commandersfor their opinions on certain propositions which he presented, andmost of them still opposed the projected movement, I among thenumber, reasoning that while General Grant was operating againstVicksburg, it was better to hold Bragg in Middle Tennessee than topush him so far back into Georgia that interior means ofcommunication would give the Confederate Government the opportunityof quickly joining a part of his force to that of General Johnson inMississippi. 

At this stage, and in fact prior to it, Rosecrans seemed to manifestspecial confidence in me, often discussing his plans with meindependent of the occasions on which he formally referred them formy views. I recollect that on two different occasions about thistime he unfolded his designs to me in this informal way, outlininggenerally how he expected ultimately to force Bragg south of theTennessee River, and going into the details of the contemplated moveon Tullahoma. His schemes, to my mind, were not only comprehensive, but exact, and showed conclusively, what no one doubted then, thatthey were original with him. I found in them very little tocriticise unfavorably, if we were to move at all, and Rosecranscertainly impressed me that he favored an advance at an early day, though many of his generals were against it until the operations onthe Mississippi River should culminate in something definite. Therewas much, fully apparent in the circumstances about his headquarters, leading to the conviction that Rosecrans originated the Tullahomacampaign, and the record of his prior performances collaterallysustains the visible evidence then existing. In my opinion, then, based on a clear recollection of various occurrences growing out ofour intimacy, he conceived the plan of the Tullahoma campaign and theone succeeding it; and is therefore entitled to every credit thatattended their execution, no matter what may be claimed for others. 

On the 23d of June Bragg was covering his position north of DuckRiver with a front extending from McMinnville, where his cavalryrested, through Wartrace and Shelbyville to Columbia, his depot beingat Tullahoma. Rosecrans, thinking that Bragg would offer strongresistance at Shelbyville--which was somewhat protected by a spurof low mountains or hills, offshoots of the Cumberland Mountains--decided to turn that place; consequently, he directed the massof the Union army on the enemy's right flank, about Manchester. 

On the 26th of June McCook's corps advanced toward Liberty Gap, mydivisions marching on the Shelbyville pike. I had proceeded but afew miles when I encountered the enemy's pickets, who fell back toChristiana, about nine miles from Murfreesboro'. Here I was assailedpretty wickedly by the enemy's sharpshooters and a section ofartillery, but as I was instructed to do nothing more than cover theroad from Eagleville, over which Brannan's division was to approachChristiana, I made little reply to this severe annoyance, wishing toconceal the strength of my force. As soon as the head of Brannan'scolumn arrived I marched across-country to the left, and encampedthat night at the little town of Millersburg, in the vicinity ofLiberty Gap. I was directed to move from Millersburg, on Hoover'sGap--a pass in the range of hills already referred to, through whichran the turnpike from Murfreesboro' to Manchester--but heavy rainshad made the country roads almost impassable, and the last of mydivision did not reach Hoover's Gap till the morning of June 27, after its abandonment by the enemy. Continuing on to Fairfield, thehead of my column met, south of that place, a small force ofConfederate infantry and cavalry, which after a slight skirmishLaiboldt's brigade drove back toward Wartrace. The next morning Iarrived at Manchester, where I remained quiet for the day. Early onthe 29th I marched by the Lynchburg road for Tullahoma, where theenemy was believed to be in force, and came into position about sixmiles from the town. 

By the 31st the whole army had been concentrated, in spite of manydifficulties, and though, on account of the heavy rains that hadfallen almost incessantly since we left Murfreesboro', its movementshad been slow and somewhat inaccurate, yet the precision with whichit took up a line of battle for an attack on Tullahoma showed thatforethought and study had been given to every detail. The enemy haddetermined to fall back from Tullahoma at the beginning of thecampaign, however, and as we advanced, his evacuation had so farprogressed that when, on July 1. We reached the earthworks thrown. Up early in the year for the defense of the place, he had almostwholly disappeared, carrying off all his stores and munitions of warexcept some little subsistence and eleven pieces of artillery. Astrong rearguard remained to cover the retreat, and on my front theusual encounters between advancing and retreating forces took place. Just before reaching the intrenchments on the Lynchburg road, I cameupon an open space that was covered by a network of fallen trees andunderbrush, which had been slashed all along in front of the enemy'searthworks. This made our progress very difficult, but I shortlybecame satisfied that there were only a few of the enemy within theworks, so moving a battalion of cavalry that had joined me the daybefore down the road as rapidly as the obstructions would permit, theConfederate pickets quickly departed, and we gained possession of thetown. Three siege guns, four caissons, a few stores, and a smallnumber of prisoners fell into my hands. 

That same evening orders were issued to the army to push on fromTullahoma in pursuit, for, as it was thought that we might not beable to cross Elk River on account of its swollen condition, we coulddo the enemy some damage by keeping close as possible at his heels. I marched on the Winchester road at 3 o'clock on the 2d of July andabout 8 o'clock reached Elk River ford. The stream was for the timetruly an impassable torrent, and all hope of crossing by theWinchester ford had to be abandoned. Deeming that further effortshould be made, however, under guidance of Card, I turned the head ofmy column in the direction of Alisona, marching up the river andnearly parallel with it till I came to Rock Creek. With a littledelay we got across Rock Creek, which was also much swollen, andfinding a short distance above its mouth a ford on Elk River thatCard said was practicable, I determined to attempt it: Some of theenemy's cavalry were guarding this ford, but after a sharp littleskirmish my battalion of cavalry crossed and took up a strongposition on the other bank. The stream was very high and the currentvery swift, the water, tumbling along over its rocky bed in animmense volume, but still it was fordable for infantry if means couldbe devised by which the men could keep their feet. A cable wasstretched across just below the ford as a lifeline for the weakerones, and then the men of the entire division having secured theirammunition by placing the cartridge-boxes on their shoulders, thecolumn pushed cheerfully into the rushing current. The men as theyentered the water joined each other in sets of four in a closeembrace, which enabled them to retain a foothold and successfullyresist the force of the flood. When they were across I turned thecolumn down the left bank of Elk River, and driving the enemy fromsome slight works near Estelle Springs, regained the Winchester road. 

By this time it was clear that Bragg intended to fall back behind theTennessee River, and our only chance of accomplishing anything ofimportance was to smash up his rear-guard before it crossed theCumberland Mountains, and in pursuance of this idea I was directed toattack such of his force as was holding on to Winchester. At 4o'clock on the morning of July 2 I moved on that town, and when wegot close to it directed my mounted troops to charge a small force ofConfederate cavalry that was picketing their front. The Confederatesresisted but little, and our men went with them in a disorderly chasethrough the village to Boiling Fork, a small stream about half a milebeyond. Here the fleeing pickets, rallying behind a stronger force, made a stand, and I was directed by McCook to delay till Iascertained if Davis's division, which was to support me, had madethe crossing of Elk River, and until I could open up communicationwith Brannan's division, which was to come in on my left at Decherd. As soon as I learned that Davis was across I pushed on, but the delayhad permitted the enemy to pull his rear-guard up on the mountain, and rendered nugatory all further efforts to hurt him materially, ouronly returns consisting in forcing him to relinquish a small amountof transportation and forage at the mouth of the pass just beyondCowan, a station on the line of the Nashville and Chattanoogarailroad. 

At Cowan, Colonel Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, reported tome with twelve hundred mounted men. Having heard during the nightthat the enemy had halted on the mountain near the University--aneducational establishment on the summit--I directed Watkins to make areconnoissance and find out the value of the information. He learnedthat Wharton's brigade of cavalry was halted at the University tocover a moderately large force of the enemy's infantry which had notyet got down the mountain on the other side, so I pushed Watkins outagain on the 5th, supporting him by a brigade of infantry, which Iaccompanied myself. We were too late, however, for when we arrivedat the top of the mountain Wharton had disappeared, and thoughWatkins pursued to Bridgeport, he was able to do nothing more, and onhis return reported that the last of the enemy had crossed theTennessee River and burned the railroad bridge. 

Nothing further could now be done, so I instructed Watkins to rejointhe division at Cowan, and being greatly fatigued by the hardcampaigning of the previous ten days, I concluded to go back to mycamp in a more comfortable way than on the back of my tired horse. In his retreat the enemy had not disturbed the railway track at all, and as we had captured a hand-car at Cowan, I thought I would have itbrought up to the station near the University to carry me down themountain to my camp, and, desiring company, I persuasively invitedColonel Frank T. Sherman to ride with me. I sent for the car by acourier, and for a long time patiently awaited its arrival, in fact, until all the returning troops had passed us, but still it did notcome. Thinking it somewhat risky to remain at the station withoutprotection, Sherman and myself started our horses to Cowan by ourorderlies, and set out on foot to meet the car, trudging along downthe track in momentary expectation of falling in with our privateconveyance. We had not gone very far before night overtook us, andwe then began to realize the dangers surrounding us, for there wewere alone and helpless, tramping on in the darkness over an unknownrailroad track in the enemy's country, liable on the one hand to gotumbling through some bridge or trestle, and on the other, topossible capture or death at the hands of the guerrillas theninfesting these mountains. Just after dark we came to a little cabinnear the track, where we made bold to ask for water, notwithstandingthe fact that to disclose ourselves to the inmates might lead tofatal consequences. The water was kindly given, but the owner andhis family were very much exercised lest some misfortune might befallus near their house, and be charged to them, so they encouraged us tomove on with a frankness inspired by fear of future trouble tothemselves. 

At every turn we eagerly hoped to meet the hand-car, but it nevercame, and we jolted on from tie to tie for eleven weary miles, reaching Cowan after midnight, exhausted and sore in every musclefrom frequent falls on the rough, unballasted road-bed. Inquiry. Developed that the car had been well manned, and started to us asordered, and nobody could account for its non-arrival. Furtherinvestigation next day showed, however, that when it reached the footof the mountain, where the railroad formed a junction, the improvisedcrew, in the belief no doubt that the University was on the main lineinstead of near the branch to Tracy City, followed the main stemuntil it carried them clear across the range down the Crow CreekValley, where the party was captured. 

I had reason to remember for many a day this foolish adventure, formy sore bones and bruised muscles, caused me physical suffering untilI left the Army of the Cumberland the next spring; but I had stillmore reason to feel for my captured men, and on this account I havenever ceased to regret that I so thoughtlessly undertook to rejoin mytroops by rail, instead of sticking to my faithful horse. 

CHAPTER XV. 

ORDERED TO OCCUPY BRIDGEPORT--A SPY--THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA--GENERAL THOMAS--TREATED TO COFFEE--RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 

The Tullahoma campaign was practically closed by the disappearance ofthe enemy from the country north of the Tennessee River. MiddleTennessee was once more in the possession of the National troops, andRosecrans though strongly urged from Washington to continue on, resisted the pressure until he could repair the Nashville andChattanooga railroad, which was of vital importance in supplying hisarmy from its secondary base at Nashville. As he desired to holdthis road to where it crossed the Tennessee, it was necessary to pusha force beyond the mountains, and after a few days of rest at Cowanmy division was ordered to take station at Stevenson, Alabama, thejunction of the Memphis and Charleston road with the Nashville andChattanooga, with instructions to occupy Bridgeport also. 

The enemy had meanwhile concentrated most of his forces atChattanooga for the twofold purpose of holding this gateway of theCumberland Mountains, and to assume a defensive attitude which wouldenable him to take advantage of such circumstances as might arise inthe development of the offensive campaign he knew we must make. Thepeculiar topography of the country was much to his advantage, andwhile we had a broad river and numerous spurs and ridges of theCumberland Mountains to cross at a long distance from our base, hewas backed up on his depots of supply, and connected by interiorlines of railway with the different armies of the Confederacy, sothat he could be speedily reinforced. 

Bridgeport was to be ultimately a sub-depot for storing subsistencesupplies, and one of the points at which our army would cross theTennessee, so I occupied it on July 29 with two brigades, retainingone at Stevenson, however, to protect that railway junction fromraids by way of Caperton's ferry. By the 29th of August aconsiderable quantity of supplies had been accumulated, and thenbegan a general movement of our troops for crossing the river. Asthere were not with the army enough pontoons to complete the twobridges required, I was expected to build one of them of trestles;and a battalion of the First Michigan Engineers under Colonel Inniswas sent me to help construct the bridge. Early on the 3ist I sentinto the neighboring woods about fifteen hundred men with axes andteams, and by nightfall they had delivered on the riverbank fifteenhundred logs suitable for a trestle bridge. Flooring had beenshipped to me in advance by rail, but the quantity was insufficient, and the lack had to be supplied by utilizing planking andweather-boarding taken from barns and houses in the surroundingcountry. The next day Innis's engineers, with the assistance of thedetail that had felled the timber, cut and half-notched the logs, andput the bridge across; spanning the main channel, which was swimmingdeep, with four or five pontoons that had been sent me for thispurpose. On the 2d and 3d of September my division crossed on thebridge in safety, though we were delayed somewhat because of itsgiving way once where the pontoons joined the trestles. We werefollowed by a few detachments from other commands, and by nearlyall the transportation of McCook's corps. 

After getting to the south side of the Tennessee River I was orderedto Valley Head, where McCook's corps was to concentrate. On the 4thof September I ascended Sand Mountain, but had got only half wayacross the plateau, on top, when night came, the march having been amost toilsome one. The next day we descended to the base, andencamped near Trenton. On the 10th I arrived at Valley Head, andclimbing Lookout Mountain, encamped on the plateau at Indian Falls. The following day I went down into Broomtown Valley to Alpine. The march of McCook's corps from Valley Head to Alpine was inpursuance of orders directing it to advance on Summerville, thepossession of which place would further threaten the enemy'scommunications, it being assumed that Bragg was in full retreatsouth, as he had abandoned Chattanooga on the 8th. This assumptionsoon proved erroneous, however, and as we, while in Broomtown Valley, could not communicate directly with Thomas's corps, the scatteredcondition of the army began to alarm us all, and McCook abandoned theadvance to Summerville, ordering back to the summit of LookoutMountain such of the corps trains as had got down into BroomtownValley. 

But before this I had grown uneasy in regard to the disjointedsituation of our army, and, to inform myself of what was going on, determined to send a spy into the enemy's lines. In passing ValleyHead on the 10th my scout Card, who had been on the lookout for someone capable to undertake the task, brought me a Union man with whomhe was acquainted, who lived on Sand Mountain, and had been muchpersecuted by guerrillas on account of his loyal sentiments. He knewthe country well, and as his loyalty was vouched for I asked him togo into the enemy's camp, which I believed to be near Lafayette, and, bring me such information as he could gather. He said such a journeywould be at the risk of his life, and that at best he could notexpect to remain in that section of country if he undertook it, butthat he would run all the chances if I would enable him to emigrateto the West at the end c f the "job, " which I could do by purchasingthe small "bunch" of stock he owned on the mountain. To this Ireadily assented, and he started on the delicate undertaking. Hepenetrated the enemy's lines with little difficulty, but whileprosecuting his search for information was suspected, and at oncearrested and placed under guard. From this critical situation heescaped; however, making his way through the enemy's picket-line inthe darkness by crawling on his belly and deceiving the sentinels byimitating the grunts of the half-wild, sand-colored hogs with whichthe country abounded. He succeeded in reaching Rosecrans'sheadquarters finally, and there gave the definite information thatBragg intended to fight, and that he expected to be reinforced byLongstreet. 

By this time it was clear that Bragg had abandoned Chattanooga withthe sole design of striking us in detail as we followed in pursuit;and to prevent his achieving this purpose orders came at 12 o'clock, midnight, for McCook to draw in toward Chattanooga. This could bedone only by recrossing Lookout Mountain, the enemy's army atLafayette now interposing between us and Thomas's corps. Theretrograde march began at once. I moved back over the mountain onthe 13th and 14th to Stevens's Mills, and on the 15th and 16threcrossed through Stevens's Gap, in the Lookout range, and encampedat its base in McLamore's cove. The march was made with all possiblecelerity, for the situation was critical and demanded every exertion. The ascent and descent of the mountains was extremely exhausting, thesteep grades often rendering it necessary to drag up and let down byhand both the transportation and artillery. But at last we were inconjunction with the main army, and my division breathed easier. 

On the 17th I remained in line of battle all day and night in frontof McLamore's cove, the enemy making slight demonstrations against mefrom the direction of Lafayette. The main body of the army havingbodily moved to the left meanwhile, I followed it on the 18th, encamping at Pond Spring. On the 19th I resumed the march to theleft and went into line of battle at Crawfish Springs to cover ourright and rear. Immediately after forming this line, I again becameisolated by the general movement to the left, and in consequence wasdirected to advance and hold the ford of Chickamauga Creek at Lee andGordon's Mills, thus coming into close communication with the balanceof our forces. I moved into this position rapidly, being compelled, though, first to drive back the enemy's cavalry skirmishers, who, having crossed to the west side of the creek, annoyed the right flankof my column a good deal while en route. 

Upon arrival at Lee and Gordon's Mills I found the ford overChickamauga Creek temporarily uncovered, through the hurried movementof Wood to the assistance of Davis's division. The enemy was alreadypresent in small force, with the evident intention of takingpermanent possession, but my troops at once actively engaged him andrecovered the ford with some slight losses. Scarcely had this beendone when I was directed to assist Crittenden. Leaving Lytle'sbrigade at the ford, I proceeded with Bradley's and Laiboldt's tohelp Crittenden, whose main line was formed to the east of theChattanooga and Lafayette road, its right trending toward a point onChickamauga Creek about a mile and a half north of Lee and Gordon'sMills. By the time I had joined Crittenden with my two brigades, Davis had been worsted in an attack Rosecrans had ordered him to makeon the left of that portion of the enemy's line which was locatedalong the west bank of the Chickamauga, the repulse being so severethat one of Davis's batteries had to be abandoned. Bradley's brigadearrived on the ground first and was hastily formed and thrown intothe fight, which up to this moment had been very doubtful, fortuneinclining first to one side, then to the other. Bradley's brigadewent in with steadiness, and charging across an open corn-field thatlay in front of the Lafayette road, recovered Davis's guns and forcedthe enemy to retire. Meanwhile Laiboldt's brigade had come on thescene, and forming it on Bradley's right, I found myself at the endof the contest holding the ground which was Davis's originalposition. It was an ugly fight and my loss was heavy, includingBradley wounded. The temporary success was cheering, and whenLytle's brigade joined me a little later I suggested to Crittendenthat we attack, but investigation showed that his troops, having beenengaged all day, were not in condition, so the suggestion could notbe carried out. 

The events of the day had indicated that Bragg's main object was toturn Rosecrans's left; it was therefore still deemed necessary thatthe army should continue its flank movement to the left, so orderscame to draw my troops in toward the widow Glenn's house. Bystrengthening the skirmish line and shifting my brigades insuccession from right to left until the point designated was reached, I was able to effect the withdrawal without much difficulty, callingin my skirmish line after the main force had retired. 

My command having settled down for the night in this new line I rodeto army headquarters, to learn if possible the expectations for themorrow and hear the result of the battle in General Thomas's front. Nearly all the superior officers of the army were at headquarters, and it struck me that much depression prevailed, notwithstanding thefact that the enemy's attempts during the day to turn our left flankand also envelop our right had been unsuccessful. It was nowpositively known, through prisoners and otherwise, that Bragg hadbeen reinforced to such an extent as to make him materially outnumberus, consequently there was much apprehension for the future. 

The necessity of protecting our left was most apparent, and the nextday the drifting in that direction was to be continued. Thismovement in the presence of the enemy, who at all points was activelyseeking an opportunity to penetrate our line and interpose a columnbetween its right and left, was most dangerous. But the necessityfor shifting the army to the left was obvious, hence only the methodby which it was undertaken is open to question. The move was made bythe flank in the face of an exultant foe superior in numbers, and wasa violation of a simple and fundamental military principle. Undersuch circumstances columns naturally stretch out into attenuatedlines, organizations become separated, and intervals occur, all ofwhich we experienced; and had the orders for the movement beenconstrued properly I doubt if it could have been executed withoutserious danger. Necessity knows no law, however, and when all thecircumstances of this battle are fully considered it is possible thatjustification may be found for the manoeuvres by which the army wasthus drifted to the left. We were in a bad strait unquestionably, and under such conditions possibly the exception had to be appliedrather than the rule. 

At daylight on the morning of the 20th a dense fog obscuredeverything; consequently both armies were passive so far as fightingwas concerned. Rosecrans took advantage of the inaction to rearrangehis right, and I was pulled back closer to the widow Glenn's house toa strong position, where I threw together some rails and logs asbarricades, but I was disconnected from the troops on my left by aconsiderable interval. Here I awaited the approach of the enemy, buthe did not disturb me, although about 9 o'clock in the forenoon hehad opened on our extreme left with musketry fire and a heavycannonade. Two hours later it was discovered by McCook that theinterval between the main army and me was widening, and he ordered meto send Laiboldt's brigade to occupy a portion of the front that hadbeen covered by Negley's division. Before getting this brigade intoplace, however, two small brigades of Davis's division occupied theground, and I directed Laiboldt to form in column of regiments on thecrest of a low ridge in rear of Carlin's brigade, so as to preventDavis's right flank from being turned. The enemy was now feelingDavis strongly, and I was about sending for Lytle's and Bradley'sbrigades when I received an order to move these rapidly to the, extreme left of the army to the assistance of General Thomas. I rodehastily back toward their position, but in the meanwhile, they hadbeen notified by direct orders from McCook, and were moving out at adouble-quick toward the Lafayette road. By this time the enemy hadassaulted Davis furiously in front and flank, and driven him from hisline, and as the confused mass came back, McCook ordered Laiboldt tocharge by deploying to the front. This he did through Davis's brokenranks, but failed to check the enemy's heavy lines, and finallyLaiboldt's brigade broke also and fell to the rear. My remainingtroops, headed by Lytle, were now passing along the rear of theground where this disaster took place--in column on the road--enroute to Thomas, and as the hundreds of fugitives rushed back, McCookdirected me to throw in Lytle's and Bradley's brigades. This washastily done, they being formed to the front under a terrible fire. Scarcely were they aligned when the same horde of Confederates thathad overwhelmed Davis and Laiboldt poured in upon them a deadly fireand shivered the two brigades to pieces. We succeeded in rallyingthem, however, and by a counter attack regained the ridge thatLaiboldt had been driven from, where we captured the colors of theTwenty-fourth Alabama. We could not hold the ridge, though, and mytroops were driven back with heavy loss, including General Lytlekilled, past the widow Glenn's house, and till I managed to establishthem in line of battle on a range of low hills behind the Dry Valleyroad. 

During these occurrences General Rosecrans passed down the roadbehind my line, and sent word that he wished to see me, but affairswere too critical to admit of my going to him at once, and he rode onto Chattanooga. It is to be regretted that he did not wait till Icould join him, for the delay would have permitted him to see thatmatters were not in quite such bad shape as he supposed; still, thereis no disguising the fact that at this juncture his army was badlycrippled. 

Shortly after my division had rallied on the low hills alreadydescribed, I discovered that the enemy, instead of attacking me infront, was wedging in between my division and the balance of thearmy; in short, endeavoring to cut me off from Chattanooga. Thisnecessitated another retrograde movement, which brought me back tothe southern face of Missionary Ridge, where I was joined by Carlin'sbrigade of Davis's division. Still thinking I could join GeneralThomas, I rode some distance to the left of my line to look for a wayout, but found that the enemy had intervened so far as to isolate meeffectually. I then determined to march directly to Rossville, andfrom there effect a junction with Thomas by the Lafayette road. Ireached Rossville about o'clock in the afternoon, bringing with meeight guns, forty-six caissons, and a long ammunition train, thelatter having been found in a state of confusion behind the widowGlenn's when I was being driven back behind the Dry Valley road. 

The head of my column passed through Rossville, appearing uponThomas's left about 6 o'clock in the evening, penetrated without anyopposition the right of the enemy's line, and captured several of hisfield-hospitals. As soon as I got on the field I informed Thomas ofthe presence of my command, and asked for orders. He replied thathis lines were disorganized, and that it would be futile to attack;that all I could do was to hold on, and aid in covering hiswithdrawal to Rossville. 

I accompanied him back to Rossville, and when we reached the skirt ofthe little hamlet General Thomas halted and we dismounted. Goinginto one of the angles of a worm fence near by I took a rail from thetop and put it through the lower rails at a proper height from theground to make a seat, and General Thomas and I sat down while, mytroops were moving by. The General appeared very much exhausted, seemed to forget what he had stopped for, and said little or nothingof the incidents of the day. This was the second occasion on which Ihad met him in the midst of misfortune, for during the fight in thecedars at Stone River, when our prospects were most disheartening, weheld a brief conversation respecting the line he was then taking upfor the purpose of helping me. At other times, in periods ofinactivity, I saw but little of him. He impressed me, now as he didin the cedars, his quiet, unobtrusive: demeanor communicating agloomy rather than a hopeful view of the situation. This apparentdepression was due no doubt to the severe trial through which he hadgone in the last forty-eight hours, which, strain had exhausted himvery much both physically and mentally. His success in maintaininghis ground was undoubtedly largely influenced by the fact thattwo-thirds of the National forces had been sent to his succor, but hisfirm purpose to save the army was the mainstay on which all reliedafter Rosecrans left the field. As the command was getting prettywell past, I rose to go in order to put my troops into camp. Thisaroused the General, when, remarking that he had a little flask ofbrandy in his saddle-holster, he added that he had just stopped forthe purpose of offering me a drink, as he knew I must be very tired. He requested one of his staff-officers to get the flask, and aftertaking a sip himself, passed it to me. Refreshed by the brandy, Imounted and rode off to supervise the encamping of my division, by nomeans an easy task considering the darkness, and the confusion thatexisted among the troops that had preceded us into Rossville. 

This done, I lay down at the foot of a tree, with my saddle for apillow, and saddle-blanket for a cover. Some soldiers near me havingbuilt a fire, were making coffee, and I guess I must have beenlooking on wistfully, for in a little while they brought me atin-cupful of the coffee and a small piece of hard bread, which Irelished keenly, it being the first food that had passed my lipssince the night before. I was very tired, very hungry, and muchdiscouraged by what had taken place since morning. I had beenobliged to fight my command under the most disadvantageouscircumstances, disconnected, without supports, without evenopportunity to form in line of battle, and at one time contendingagainst four divisions of the enemy. In this battle of Chickamauga, out of an effective strength Of 4, 000 bayonets, I had lost 1, 517officers and men, including two brigade commanders. This was notsatisfactory indeed, it was most depressing--and then there was muchconfusion prevailing around Rossville; and, this condition of thingsdoubtless increasing my gloomy reflections, it did not seem to methat the outlook for the next day was at all auspicious, unless theenemy was slow to improve his present advantage. Exhaustion soonquieted all forebodings, though, and I fell into a sound sleep, fromwhich I was not aroused till daylight. 

On the morning of the 21st the enemy failed to advance, and hisinaction gave us the opportunity for getting the broken anddisorganized army into shape. It took a large part of the day toaccomplish this, and the chances of complete victory would have beengreatly in Bragg's favor if he could have attacked us vigorously atthis time. But he had been badly hurt in the two days' conflict, andhis inactivity on the 21st showed that he too had to go through theprocess of reorganization. Indeed, his crippled condition began toshow itself the preceding evening, and I have always thought that, had General Thomas held on and attacked the Confederate right andrear from where I made the junction with him on the Lafayette road, the field of Chickamauga would have been relinquished to us; but itwas fated to be otherwise. 

Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden passed out of the battle when theywent back to Chattanooga, and their absence was discouraging to allaware of it. Doubtless this had much to do with Thomas's finalwithdrawal, thus leaving the field to the enemy, though at an immensecost in killed and wounded. The night of the 21st the army movedback from Rossville, and my division, as the rearguard of theTwentieth Corps, got within our lines at Chattanooga about 8 o'clockthe morning of the 22d. Our unmolested retirement from Rossvillelent additional force to the belief that the enemy had been badlyinjured, and further impressed me with the conviction that we mighthave held on. Indeed, the battle of Chickamauga was somewhat likethat of Stone River, victory resting with the side that had the gritto defer longest its relinquishment of the field. 

The manoeuvres by which Rosecrans had carried his army over theCumberland Mountains, crossed the Tennessee River, and possessedhimself of Chattanooga, merit the highest commendation up to theabandonment of this town by Bragg on the 8th of September; but I havealways fancied that that evacuation made Rosecrans over-confident, and led him to think that he could force Bragg south as far as Rome. After the Union army passed the river and Chattanooga fell into ourhands; we still kept pressing the enemy's communications, and theconfiguration of the country necessitated more or less isolation ofthe different corps. McCook's corps of three divisions had crossedtwo difficult ridges--Sand and Lookout mountains--to Alpine inBroomtown Valley with intentions against Summerville. Thomas's corpshad marched by the way of Stevens's Gap toward Lafayette, which heexpected to occupy. Crittenden had passed through Chattanooga, atfirst directing his march an Ringgold. Thus the corps of the armywere not in conjunction, and between McCook and Thomas thereintervened a positive and aggressive obstacle in the shape of Bragg'sarmy concentrating and awaiting reinforcement at Lafayette. Underthese circumstances Bragg could have taken the different corps indetail, and it is strange that he did not, even before receiving hisreinforcements, turn on McCook in Broomtown Valley and destroy him. 

Intelligence that Bragg would give battle began to come to us fromvarious sources as early as the 10th of September, and on the 11thMcCook found that he could not communicate with Thomas by the directroad through Broomtown Valley; but we did not begin closing in towardChattanooga till the 13th, and even then the Twentieth Corps hadbefore it the certainty of many delays that must necessarily resultfrom the circuitous and difficult mountain roads which we would beobliged to follow. Had the different corps, beginning with McCook's, been drawn in toward Chattanooga between the 8th and 12th ofSeptember, the objective point of the campaign would have remained inour hands without the battle of Chickamauga, but, as has been seen, this was not done. McCook was almost constantly on the march day andnight between the 13th and the 19th, ascending and descendingmountains, his men worried and wearied, so that when they appeared onthe battle-field, their fatigued condition operated greatly againsttheir efficiency. This delay in concentration was also the originalcause of the continuous shifting toward our left to the support ofThomas, by which manoeuvre Rosecrans endeavored to protect hiscommunications with Chattanooga, and out of which grew the intervalsthat offered such tempting opportunities to Bragg. In addition toall this, much transpired on the field of battle tending to bringabout disaster. There did not seem to be any well-defined plan ofaction in the fighting; and this led to much independence of judgmentin construing orders among some of the subordinate generals. It alsogave rise to much license in issuing orders: too many people weregiving important directions, affecting the whole army, withoutauthority from its head. In view, therefore, of all the errors thatwere committed from the time Chattanooga fell into our hands afterour first crossing the Tennessee, it was fortunate that the Uniondefeat was not more complete, that it left in the enemy's possessionnot much more than the barren results arising from the simple holdingof the ground on which the engagement was fought.