+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | Transcriber's Notes: | | | | In the original book, the unique headers on the odd numbered | | pages have been reproduced with [Page Heading: ] tags. | | | | A number of obvious typographical errors have been | | corrected in this text. For a complete list, please | | see the bottom of this document. | +--------------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * [Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN D. P. FRENCH, G. C. B. , G. C. V. O. , K. C. M. G. _From a portrait by his son, J. R. L. French. _] SIR JOHN FRENCHAN AUTHENTIC BIOGRAPHY BY CECIL CHISHOLM, M. A. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BYSIR EVELYN WOOD, V. C. AND A PORTRAIT BY J. R. L. FRENCH HERBERT JENKINS LIMITEDARUNDEL PLACE HAYMARKETLONDON S. W. MCMXV "This is the happy warrior--this is he That every man in arms should wish to be. " _Wordsworth. _ WYMAN & SONS LTD. , PRINTERS, READING AND LONDON. INTRODUCTION BY FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EVELYN WOOD, V. C. I regard John Denton French as the man who for the last twelve yearshas been the driving force of tactical instruction in the BritishArmy. He made use of all the best ideas of the Generals who precededhim in the Aldershot Command, and he was, I think, instrumental incausing the appointment of Horace Smith-Dorrien and Douglas Haig tosucceed in turn to that nursery of soldiers. How sound his judgment has proved to be may be discovered from thedispatches--carefully worded--in which he describes how Smith-Dorrienconducted the most successful retreat since that of Sir John Moore toCorunna, 1808-9, and how Douglas Haig carried his Army across theAisne river in the face of the enemy's fire opposition. From 1884-5, when as a Squadron Officer he showed marked determinationin the abortive expedition for the relief of Gordon, until 1899-1902in South Africa, he has been the foremost man to inculcate the"Cavalry Spirit, " and unlike many advocates of that spirit, he hasnever become a slave to the idea. He has been at pains to teach theCavalry soldier that when he can no longer fight to the best advantagein the saddle, he is to get off his horse and fight on foot. This is amarked feature of his military genius. He is intensely practical; and he is possessed of great moral andphysical courage which never fail to assert themselves in the face ofthe most difficult situations. They were conspicuously shown duringthe Boer War when, with an extraordinary determination, he formed uphis men on their tired and exhausted horses and advanced in extendedorder, galloping through the Boers in position, and reaching Kimberleyas the result of his heroic determination. When, in the earlier part of this War, things were not going well, Iwas asked to give my opinion of our chances of success. I said that Idid not think that our prospects were then bright, but although manymen had gone "Hands up" before John French, he would never put up hisown, whatever happened. EVELYN WOOD, F. -M. _November 10_, 1914. PREFACE In writing this biography of Field-Marshal Sir John French I have beendeeply indebted to many of his personal friends for helping me withfirst-hand impressions of our General in the Field. A number ofmilitary writers have been almost equally helpful. Among those to whomI owe sincere thanks for personal assistance are Lady French, Mr. J. R. L. French, Mrs. Despard, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, Field-MarshalSir Evelyn Wood, General Bewicke Copley, Colonel E. K. Aylener, ColonelKendal Coghill, Colonel Charles E. Warde, M. P. , the Editor of the_Army and Navy Gazette_, Mr. Percy J. King, the Editor of the_Regiment_, Mr. Frederick W. Carter, Mr. Leonard Crocombe and Mr. S. R. Littlewood, who put valuable material at my disposal. I shall be very grateful for any further biographical particulars, stories, or corrections for incorporation in subsequent editions: allcommunications should be addressed to me, care of my publishers. C. C. _The outside wrapper is reproduced from a drawing by E. Oakdale, by courtesy of Mr. Holbrook Jackson, Editor of "T. P. 's Weekly_. " CONTENTS PAGEINTRODUCTION iii PREFACE v CHAPTER IEARLY DAYS A Kentish Celt--A Rebellious Boy--Four Years in the Navy--With the 19th Hussars--"Captain X Trees"--A Studious Subaltern--Chafing at Home--The First Opportunity 1 CHAPTER IIWITH THE NILE EXPEDITION A Forlorn Hope--Scouting in the Desert--The Battle of Abu Klea--Metammeh--The Death of Gordon--A Dangerous Retreat--"Major French and His Thirteen Troopers" 10 CHAPTER IIIYEARS OF WAITING Second in Command--Maintaining the Barrow tradition--The Persistent Student--Service in India--Retires on Half-pay--Renewed Activities--Rehearsing for South Africa 23 CHAPTER IVELANDSLAAGTE AND RIETFONTEIN The Unknown Commander of Cavalry--Who is General French?--Advancing without Reinforcements--"This is your Show, French"--The White Flag--The Chess-Player--The Victor in Anecdote 32 CHAPTER VTHE TIDE TURNS White's Dash from Ladysmith--Nicholson's Nek--The Reverse at Lombard's Kop--A Cavalry Exploit--French's Dramatic Escape from Ladysmith 45 CHAPTER VITHE CAMPAIGN ROUND COLESBERG The Fog of War--A Perilous Situation--Damming "The Flowing Tide"--Shows His Genius as a Commander--A Campaign in Miniature--Hoisting Guns on Hilltops--The Fifty-mile Front--Saving the Situation 52 CHAPTER VIITHE DASH TO KIMBERLEY French's Pledge--The Task--The First Shell--"Hemmed in"--"We must break through"--The Lancers' Charge--In and Out of Kimberley--The Surrender of Cronje 67 CHAPTER VIIIROUNDING UP THE BOERS French in the Modder--At Bloemfontein--French and the Artist--An Ambush--Doing the Impossible Again--Short Shrift with Barberton Snipers---Some French Stories 82 CHAPTER IXWORK AT HOME AND RESIGNATION At Aldershot--Driving Training at High Pressure-- General French is "fairly well pleased"--Strenuous Manoeuvres--Chief of the Imperial General Staff--Ulster and Resignation 97 CHAPTER XHIS BELIEF IN CAVALRY The Lessons of the Boer War--Cavalry _v_. Mounted Infantry--A Plea for the Lance--The Cavalry Spirit--Shock Tactics still Useful 106 CHAPTER XITHE MODERN MARLBOROUGH Europe's Need--The Plight of France--A Delicate Situation--The Man of "Grip"--A Magnificent Retreat 116 CHAPTER XIIFRENCH, THE MAN A Typical Englishman--Fighting at School--Napoleon Worship--"A Great Reporter"--Halting Speeches and Polished Prose. A South African Coincidence--Mrs. Despard and the Newsboy--The Happy Warrior 121 Index 149 SIR JOHN FRENCH CHAPTER I EARLY DAYS A Kentish Celt--A Rebellious Boy--Four Years in the Navy--With the 19th Hussars--"Captain X Trees"--A Studious Subaltern--Chafing at Home--The First Opportunity. "If I don't end my days as a Field-Marshal it will not be for want oftrying, and--well, I'm jolly well going to do it. " In these words, uttered many years ago to a group of brother officers in the mess roomof the 19th Hussars, Sir John French quite unconsciously epitomisedhis own character in a way no biographer can hope to equal. Theconversation had turned upon luck, a word that curiously enough waslater to be so intimately associated with French's name. One man hadstoutly proclaimed that all promotion was a matter of luck, and Frenchhad claimed that only work and ability really counted in the end. Yet"French's luck" has become almost a service proverb--for those whohave not closely studied his career. Luck is frequently a word used toexplain our own failure and another man's success. Not that success and John French could ever have been strangers. Thereare some happy natures whose destiny is never in doubt, Providencehaving apparently planned it half a century ahead. Sir John French isa striking instance of this. Destiny never had any doubt about theman. He was born to be a fighter. On his father's side he comes of thefamous old Galway family of which Lord de Freyne, of French Park, Co. Roscommon, is now the head. By tradition the Frenches are a navalfamily, although there have been famous soldiers as well as famoussailors amongst its members. There was, for instance, the John Frenchwho fought in the army of King William, leading a troop of theEnniskillen Dragoons at Aughrim in 1689. Sir John French is himself the son of a sailor, Commander J. T. W. French, who on retiring from the Navy settled down on the beautifullittle Kentish estate of Ripplevale, near Walmer. Here John DentonPinkstone French was born on September 28, 1852, in the same year ashis future colleague, General Joffre. His mother, a Miss Eccles, wasthe daughter of a Scotch family resident near Glasgow. [Page Heading: PLAYING WITH SOLDIERS] Of the boy's home life at Ripplevale very little is known. He was thesixth child and the only son of the family. Both his parents dyingwhile he was quite young, he was brought up under the care of hissisters. But there is no reason to suppose that he was thereforespoilt; for one of these ladies shared in a remarkable degree thequalities of energy and determination which were to distinguish herbrother. Young French's earliest education was largely guided by thisgifted sister, who is now so well known in another field of warfare asMrs. Despard. It is extremely difficult to say what manner of boy the futureField-Marshal was. Only one fact emerges clearly. He was high-spiritedand full of mischief. Everything that he did was done with thegreatest enthusiasm, and already there were signs that he possessed anunusually strong will. Inevitably games quickly took possession of his imagination. Very soonthe war game had first place in his affections. He was perpetuallyplaying with soldiers--a fascinating hobby which intrigued the curiousmind of the rather silent child. French, in fact, was a very normaland healthy boy, with just a touch of thoughtfulness to mark him offfrom his fellows. He was not, however, to enjoy the freedom of home life for very long. At an early age he was sent to a preparatory school at Harrow, whichhe left for Eastman's Naval College at Portsmouth. After the necessary"cramming" he passed the entrance examination to the Navy at the ageof thirteen. In the following year (1866) he joined the _Britannia_ asa cadet. Four years of strenuous naval work followed. But like anotherField-Marshal-to-be, Sir Evelyn Wood, the boy was not apparentlyenamoured of the sea. As a result he decided to leave that branch ofthe service. That action is typical of the man. He is ruthless with himself as wellas with others. If the Navy were not to give scope for his ambition, then he must quit the Navy. Already, no doubt, his life-long hero, Napoleon, was kindling the young man's imagination. But the EnglishNavy of those days gave little encouragement to the Napoleonic pointof view. It was bound up with the sternest discipline and much redtape. If rumour speaks true young French was irritated by the almostdespotic powers then possessed by certain naval officers. So he boldlydecided at the age of eighteen to end one career and commence another. To enter the sister service he had to stoop to what is dubbed the"back-door, " in other words a commission in the militia. It seemsrather remarkable that one of our most brilliant officers should havehad this difficulty to face. Incidentally it is a curious sidelight onthe system of competitive examinations. But there are several facts toremember. Sir John French's genius developed slowly. One does notfigure him as ready, like Kitchener, at twenty-one, with a completemap of his career. In these days he was probably more interested inhunting than in soldiering. The man who is now proverbial for hisdevotion to the study of tactics was then very little of a book-worm. Indeed he seems to have shown no special intellectual or practicalabilities until much later in life. [Page Heading: THE "DUMPIES"] In 1874 he was gazetted to the 8th Hussars, being transferred threeweeks later to the 19th. At that time the 19th Hussars was scarcely acrack regiment. With two other regiments raised after the Indianmutiny it was nicknamed the "Dumpies, " owing to the standard of heightbeing lowered, and it had yet to earn the reputation which Barrow andFrench secured it. About John French the subaltern, as about JohnFrench the midshipman, history is silent. No fabulous legends haveaccumulated about him. Presumably the short, firmly-built youngofficer was regarded as normal and entirely _de rigeur_ in hissporting propensities. The subaltern of the 'eighties took himself much less seriously thanhis successor of today. The eternal drill and the occasionalmanoeuvres were conducted on well-worn and almost automaticprinciples. As a result, the younger officers found hunting and polodecidedly better sport. Few or none of them were military enthusiasts;and study did not enter largely into their programme. It entered intoFrench's--but only in stray hours, often snatched by early rising, before the day's work--or sport--began. Despite constant rumours to the contrary, there can be no questionthat French was a most spirited young officer and a thoroughsportsman. He at once earned for himself the sobriquet of "Capt. XTrees, " as a result of his being a "retired naval man. " To this dayamong the very few remaining brother officers of his youth, he isstill greeted as "Trees. " As might be expected, French showed no desire to pose as "the glass offashion or the mould of form. " He never attempted to cultivate thegraces of the _beau sabreur_. His short square figure did not lookwell on horseback and probably never will. But he was admitted to be acapable horseman and to have "good hands. " Although not keen on polohe was very fond of steeplechasing. Of his love for that sport thereis ample proof in the fact that he trained and rode his ownsteeplechasers. [Page Heading: A DIFFICULT TEAM] One of his best horses was a mare called "Mrs. Gamp, " which he lent onone occasion to a brother subaltern--now Colonel Charles E. Warde, M. P. For Mid-Kent. Riding with his own spurs on French's mare, ColonelWarde was one of three out of a field of four hundred to live througha Warde Union run which was responsible for the death of six huntersbefore the day was over. Young French also became a very good whip. Along with Colonel H. M. A. Warde--now the Chief Constable of Kent--he had a thrilling adventurein coach driving. When the regiment first started a coach it wasnecessary to bring it from Dublin to the Curragh. The two subalterns, neither of whom had ever driven four horses before, commandeered fourchargers belonging to brother officers. One of the animals was anotorious kicker. But they took them up to Dublin and drove the coachtwenty-eight miles down to the Curragh next day, arriving there aliveand with no broken harness! At that time French differed from his fellow officers probably ratherin degree than in temperament. Although a very keen sportsman he didnot put sport first. Colonel C. E. Warde, one of his closest friends, gives the following description of the man. "Although he neverattempted to go to the Staff College he was continually studyingmilitary works, and often, when his brother subalterns were at polo orother afternoon amusements, he would remain in his room reading VonSchmidt, Jomini, or other books on strategy. I recollect oncetravelling by rail with him in our subaltern days, when afterobserving the country for some time, he broke out: 'There is where Ishould put my artillery. ' 'There is where I should put my cavalry' andso on to the journey's end. " In spite of these evidences of a soldier's eye for country, there isnothing to show that French had developed any abnormal devotion forhis work. He was interested but not absorbed. In 1880 a captaincy andhis marriage probably did something to make him take his career moreseriously. His wife, Lady French, was a daughter of Mr. R. W. Selby-Lowndes, of Bletchley, Bucks. They have two sons and a daughter. A few months after his marriage he accepted an adjutancy in theNorthumberland Yeomanry. For four uneventful years he was stationed atNewcastle, where the work was monotonous and the opportunities almost_nil_. [Page Heading: THE WAITING GAME] Naturally the young man fretted very much at being left behind withthe Yeomanry when his regiment was ordered to embark for Egypt in1882. And he never rested until he was allowed to follow it out in1884. It was in many ways a new 19th which the young officer re-joinedin Egypt. The regiment hurried out in 1882 had at last come under acommander of real genius in Colonel Percy Barrow, C. B. , and in thatcommander French was to find his first real military inspiration. Itis difficult to judge what his future might have been but for this oneman and the Nile Expedition, which proved the turning point inFrench's career as it did in that of his regiment. Then, as ever, French was a man who had to wait for his opportunities. He was thirty-two years of age before he saw this, his first piece ofactive service. Where Kitchener found, or made, opportunities formilitary experience, French was content to wait the turn of events. Soit has been all through his life. He has never forestalled Destiny; hehas simply accepted its call. But when an opportunity presented itselfhe always seized it, and the Nile Expedition was no exception to therule. Major French, without Staff College training, without the usualdiplomas, was to prove himself once and for all a master tactician. CHAPTER II WITH THE NILE EXPEDITION A Forlorn Hope--Scouting in the Desert--The Battle of Abu Klea--Metammeh--The Death of Gordon--A Dangerous Retreat--"Major French and His Thirteen Troopers. " Sir John French's first experience of actual warfare was a bitter one. If ever the British Government bungled one of their militaryenterprises more thoroughly than another, it was the Nile Expeditionof 1884-5. What began as a forlorn hope ended in complete failure, andin three short months French experienced the miseries of retreat, offailure, and of work under an invertebrate War Office. To this day no one has ever justified the hidden processes of logic bywhich the Government responsible came to the conclusion that theSoudan must be evacuated. It is true that the Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, had won considerable successes against our forces since his appearancein 1881. But no army of any dimensions had ever been opposed to his"Divine powers. " Why Gordon should have been entrusted with theevacuation is not so doubtful. W. T. Stead and other journalisticpundits conceived him to be the man for the task, however much Egypt'sruler, Lord Cromer, might differ from their verdict. So to KhartoumGordon was sent with an all too small band of followers. Presumablythe authorities imagined that the man who had worked miracles in Chinawith neither men nor money would settle the Soudan on equallyeconomical terms. But the Mahdi's black braves were other mettle thanthe yellow men, as Gordon himself well knew from his past experiencein the Soudan. [Page Heading: THE SLEEPER WAKES] Reaching Khartoum on February 18, 1884, he quickly discovered howperilous the defeat of Baker Pasha at El-Teb had made his position. Heat once warned his superiors, but nothing was done. In April he foundKhartoum besieged, but even that did not startle the Home authoritiesfrom their lethargy. At length, however, the Government realised thatto allow their General to perish at the hands of the Dervishes mightbe to forfeit their prestige in Egypt. Lord Wolseley was accordinglyinstructed to relieve Khartoum at all costs. Those instructions were more easy to give than to obey. Wolseleydecided to send a flying column across the desert from Korti toMetammeh and thence to Khartoum; and a second up the Nile. With theluckless flying column went part of the 19th Hussars, underLieutenant-Colonel Barrow. Major French was second in command. On December 30, General Herbert Stewart's little force, with itsthousand odd men and two thousand camels, was on parade for inspectionnear Korti. At first there was some doubt as to how the camels wouldstand the attack of the Mahdi's wild warriors. "In order to test the steadiness of our camels as regarded noise andfiring, the 19th Hussars one day at brigade drill charged on theunprotected mass of camels, cheering and yelling. Everybody expectedto see them break their ropes and career wildly over the desert. Theonly result was that one solitary camel struggled to his feet, lookedround and knelt down again; the others never moved an eyelid. "That was satisfactory: and as firing into them with blank cartridgesand over them with ball had already been tried . .. With no visibleresult, the general opinion was that they would stand charging niggersor anything else in creation with equanimity. Sad to say we came tothe conclusion that it was want of brains _pur et simple_ that causedour steeds to behave thus docilely: any other animal with a vestige ofbrain would have been scared to death, but, as it was, no oneregretted their deficiency. "[1] [Page Heading: THE KITCHENER WAY] Before the corps set out from Korti, Sir Herbert Stewart sent for thechief men at Ambukol who knew the desert route. Showing them money heasked whether they would act as guides. This they refused to do. SaidStewart, "You will come anyway. If you like to ride to Metammeh tiedon your camels well and good; if you prefer not being lashed on, youwill get these nice presents. " They agreed to go! So they were sent toride ahead of the column, guarded by some of the 19th, who had ordersto shoot if they attempted to fly. But no such effort was made. The rest of the 19th had more arduous work to do. During the wholeweary march they were far ahead of the column scouting. "On coming to a plain with hills in the distance, you'd see variousspecks on the tops of the furthest hills, and with the help of yourglasses discover them to be the 19th. Sir Herbert (Stewart) wasimmensely pleased with them and pointed them out to me as being thevery acme of Light Cavalry. "[2] The column itself was almost half-a-mile in length, even when by nightit marched in close order. It was a strange sight to see the camels, with long necks outstretched, swaying across the desert towards thehorizon, both the men and their ostrich-like steeds enveloped in ahuge cloud of dust. A wind storm arose more than once, flingingblinding clouds of sand in the men's faces. On New Year's Eve, however, the soldiers shouted themselves hoarse with "Auld Lang Syne"as they plodded wearily along the moonlit desert. Very soon the cavalry had an opportunity to distinguish themselves. Onthe following day a halt was called "to allow the indefatigable 19thto find out the reason of a faint light burning far off on theplain. .. . They returned with several natives, a string of camels andseveral loads of dates. They had found . .. The natives bivouacked forthe night, surprised them, captured as much loot as possible andbolted the rest. "[3] After a fortnight's marching the column came in touch with the enemyat Abu Klea. At this time French's work was peculiarly dangerous. Hespent night after night in the desert in solitary watching and waitingfor the Dervishes. On January 16 the 19th Hussars were sent to reconnoitre. Theyreported that the Mahdi had mustered considerable force between theBritish camp and the wells. Stewart determined to fight his waythrough to the wells at any cost. Leaving a very small force to holdhis camp, he formed his main body into a square, in which form itadvanced. No sooner had the advance begun than the enemy opened aterrific fire. Yet the square pushed on, despite constant haltsnecessary to assure its formation remaining intact, as the guns werehauled over the rutty and uneven surface of the desert. Soon, however, the Dervishes rushed to the attack, and Stewart foundhimself outnumbered by four to one. The attack was delivered withappalling force. The Arabs' shouts as they rushed forward have beendescribed by an eye-witness as like the thunder of the sea. [Page Heading: THE BROKEN SQUARE] Their onslaught was so sudden that the square was broken, the heavycamel corps suffering specially severely. So did the naval brigadewhose solitary Gardner gun jammed at the critical moment. When LordCharles Beresford was attempting to clear it his assistants were allspeared and he himself was knocked senseless under the gun. Somehow orother, with much difficulty, he managed to get back to the square. During the afternoon, however, the Arabs' attack began to diminish inviolence. Here was the cavalry's opportunity. They charged the enemywith great impetuosity. Gradually the Dervishes were driven off by theaid of the artillery. But there were the wells still to capture, andthe detachment of the 19th Hussars was given that important mission. They were able to accomplish it without resistance. That night thethirsty force was able to drink water again--albeit yellow in colourand weird of taste. After a brief rest the advance on Metammeh was continued, with theHussars still in the van. On the following night there was a scene ofwild disorder. It was very dark and camels began to stumble and losetheir places in the long grass. The men were so weary that many went to sleep and even fell from theircamels, which wandered along unguided and strayed far from the column. The night was extraordinarily dark, and there was no moon to light theway for the exhausted column through the wild and pathless country, which would have been difficult to traverse even in broad daylight. Attimes it was discovered that the troops were going in a circle and therear guard found itself in front of the force. When at last open ground was reached the enemy were found to be instrength. Once again a fight was inevitable for the tired force. SoStewart had a zeriba of camel saddles, boxes, etc. , hastily flung upto protect his men. By this time the horses of the 19th Hussars wereso done up as to render them useless. French's regiment, therefore, was left with some artillery, under Colonel Barrow, in the zeriba, along with the war correspondents, who had tried in vain to make adash back to Abu Klea. [Page Heading: THE GUARDS AT ABU KLEA] The rest of the force once more formed into a square to meet theenemy's attack. It was like a tornado when it came. With a headlong rush eight hundred spearmen, led by emirs onmagnificent horses, hurled themselves upon the British square. Withouta tremor the troops awaited their onslaught, cheering loudly as theysaw the fluttering banners of the enemy approach. The brunt of theattack was on the left angle of the front face, where the Guards andMounted Infantry received the charge, at a distance of three hundredyards, with a fire so deadly that the front ranks of the yellingDervishes were mown down. The battle was over within a few moments. The enemy never got within thirty yards of the square, but with brokenranks and wild confusion the spearmen fled, leaving two hundred andfifty of their dead upon the field. This rapid victory was largely due to the garrison in the zeriba, whomade very effective use of their guns. The enemy left two hundred andfifty dead on the field. Yet not a single British soldier was eitherkilled or wounded in actually repelling the charge. Among thoseseriously wounded later in the day was General Stewart, who died ofhis wounds a few days later. Almost his last words to Colonel Barrowwere, "Take care of the 19th Hussars; they have done well. " But all this gallantry was vain. While the force was still nearMetammeh, news came of the fall of Khartoum. An officer who was withhim when the blow fell has recorded that he never saw French soprofoundly moved as he was on the receipt of these black tidings. WithKhartoum fallen the mission of the flying column was ended. Itsposition indeed had become extremely precarious. The problem beforethe authorities was now not how to relieve Khartoum, but how torelieve the Relieving Expedition. It cannot be said that they solved it very successfully. Buller wassent up to Gubat to take command. With him he brought only the RoyalIrish and West Kent Regiments to reinforce the column. And hisinstructions were to seize Metammeh and march on Berber! [Page Heading: HIS FIRST RETREAT] Once on the scene, however, Buller soon saw the hopelessness of thesituation. Considering that the fall of Khartoum had released a hostof the Mahdi's followers, the storming of Metammeh was now a doublydifficult enterprise; an attack on Berber would have been simplysuicidal. Buller accordingly determined on a retreat. On February 13 he evacuated Gubat. On March 1 his advance guard hadreached Korti. In this retreat the 19th Hussars again did splendidwork. For days on end the column was submitted to that unceasingpelting of bullets which Buller characterised in one of his laconicdispatches as "annoying. " But Barrow, the Hussars' chief, was a masterof the art of reconnoitring. Time and again he and his men were ableto deceive the enemy as to the direction of the column's march. It wasthen that French had his first experience in "masterly retreat. " How sorely the column was pressed may be shown from one incident. While he was preparing to evacuate Abu Klea, Buller receivedinformation to the effect that the enemy was advancing upon him with aforce of eight thousand men. He determined upon a desperate measure. He left standing the forts which he had intended to demolish andfilled up the larger wells. A desert well, to the Oriental, is almost sacred, and never even insavage warfare would such a course have been adopted. But Buller knewthat the absence of water was the only thing that could check the rushof the oncoming hordes, and this deed, terrible as it may have seemedto the Eastern mind, was his sole means of covering his retreat. Orders were therefore given to fill up all the principal wells withstones and rubbish. It was certainly an effectual measure, for theenemy would be delayed for many hours, perhaps days, before he couldrestore the wells and obtain sufficient water to enable him tocontinue in pursuit of the British force which was so hopelesslyoutnumbered. In the circumstances Buller could not be blamed forsaving British lives at the price of Oriental tradition. Sir Evelyn Wood was also sent with reinforcements from Korti tostrengthen the force at Gakdul Wells. There he met French for thefirst time. "I saw him, " Sir Evelyn relates, "when our people werecoming back across the desert after our failure, the whole forcedepressed by the death of Gordon. I came on him about a hundred milesfrom the river--the last man of the last section of the rear guard! Wewere followed by bands of Arabs. They came into our bivouac on thenight of which I am speaking, and the night following they carriedoff some of our slaughter cattle. "[4] [Page Heading: MENTIONED IN DISPATCHES] Major French was quickly able to distinguish himself in the retreat. For Buller was a believer in cavalry and used it wherever possible. Inhis dispatch on the retreat he paid French the following handsometribute: "I wish expressly to remark on the excellent work that has been doneby a small detachment of the 19th Hussars, both during our occupationof Abu Klea and during our retirement. Each man has done the work often; and it is not too much to say that the force owes much to MajorFrench and his thirteen troopers. " The flying column occupied just two months in its fruitlessexpedition. But no more trying experience was ever packed into soshort a time. On that march across the Bayuda desert history has onlyone verdict. It is that pronounced by Count von Moltke on the men whoaccomplished it:--"They were not soldiers but heroes. " None of the menearned the title more thoroughly than Major French and his troopers. "During the whole march from Korti, " says Colonel Biddulph, "theentire scouting duty had been taken by the 19th Hussars, so that eachday they covered far more ground than the rest of the force. "[5] Theenemy themselves came to respect the little force of cavalrymen. "Eventhe fierce Baggara horsemen appeared unwilling to cross swords withour Hussars, " wrote one who accompanied the column. Major French andhis regiment had firmly established their reputation. FOOTNOTES: [1] _With the Camel Corps up the Nile_, by Count Gleichen, bypermission of Messrs. Chapman and Hall. [2] _With the Camel Corps up the Nile_, by Count Gleichen, bypermission of Messrs. Chapman and Hall. [3] _With the Camel Corps up the Nile_, by Count Gleichen, bypermission of Messrs. Chapman and Hall. [4] For this and much other valuable information the writer isindebted to Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood. [5] _The Nineteenth and their Times_, by Col. J. Biddulph, bypermission of Mr. John Murray. CHAPTER III YEARS OF WAITING Second in Command--Maintaining the Barrow tradition--The Persistent Student--Service in India--Retires on Half-pay--Renewed Activities--Rehearsing for South Africa. After the success in the Soudan Major French had not long to wait forpromotion. A few days after General Buller's tribute he was appointedLieutenant-Colonel of his regiment. So that he came back to England assecond in command of the 19th Hussars. From this time onward he became entirely absorbed in his profession. It is true that he had always been interested in it; but there is noquestion that Barrow was the man who had shown him the fascination ofscientific generalship. While making the reputation of the 19th, Barrow had unhappily lost his own life. He died as the result ofre-opening an internal wound while tent-pegging in the following year. French determined to carry on his work, and at Norwich the trainingof the 19th Hussars rapidly became famous throughout the Army. One young officer, now General Bewicke Copley, [6] was attached to the19th from another regiment in order to study their methods. He tellshow he was greatly struck by the brilliant work which French wasdoing. His strict discipline and his terrific ideas of what trainingmeant, may have struck some of his young subalterns as scarcelyyielding them the ideal existence of the _beau sabreur_. Probably theywere right; but they were being licked into a state of amazingefficiency. In 1887 it fell to Sir Evelyn Wood's lot to inspect the regiment. Pointing to French, he asked his Colonel, "Of what value is that man?"The reply was, "He is for ever reading military books. " And he hasbeen reading them ever since! A couple of years later he attained the rank of Colonel, with commandof his regiment. Very soon Sir Evelyn was to discover the answer tohis question. For he was anxious at that time to introduce thesquadron system. French was the one commanding officer who carried itout. In spite of the very large amount of extra work it entailed, hewas willing to take any number of recruits and train them in the newmethod. That method was finally allowed to lapse, although it has beenadopted in another form for infantry regiments. It is typical ofFrench that he was willing to slave over the unpopular way of doingthings, while other men adhered to the traditional and officialmethods. [Page Heading: THE AUTHORITIES ASTONISHED] While French was still busy elaborating new theories and testing themat manoeuvres, his regiment was ordered to India. There he met one ofhis future colleagues in South Africa, Sir George White. He was alsofortunate in working with one of the most brilliant of all Britishcavalry trainers, Sir George Luck. The latter considered that the cavalry regiments in India requireddrastic reorganisation. French was ready to carry it out. To increasethe efficiency of the cavalry extensive manoeuvres were organised. French acted as Chief of the Staff to General Luck, and astonished theauthorities by the way in which "he conducted troops dispersed over awide area of ground, allotting to each section its appointed work andbringing the complete movement to a brilliant conclusion. " But the Government's recognition of his brilliant work was by no meansencouraging. In 1893 Colonel French was actually retired on half-pay!It is an admirable system which allows the middle-aged officer tomake way for youth in the British army; but the spectacle of a Frenchdespatched into civil obscurity at the ripe age of forty-one, has itstragic as well as its comic side. That it acutely depressed him weknow. For a time he was almost in despair as to his career. Actually, however, these two years "out of action" were probablyinvaluable to him--and to the army. For the first time he had theopportunity for unrestrained study; and much of that time was spent, no doubt, in thinking out the theories of cavalry action which wereyet to bring him fame and our arms success. Much of his most valuable work dates from this period of enforcedretirement. He was present, for instance, during the cavalrymanoeuvres of 1894 in Berkshire. He took part in the manoeuvres as abrigadier. His chief Staff Officer, by the way, was Major R. S. S. (nowLieut. -General Sir Robert) Baden-Powell, while the aide-de-camp to theDirector-General of manoeuvres was Captain (now Lieut. -General Sir)Douglas Haig. Here French formulated what was to be one of the axiomsof his future cavalry tactics. One of those present at headquartershas recorded his remarks. [Page Heading: THE FUNCTION OF CAVALRY] "There is, " said French, "no subject upon which more misconceptionexists, even among service men, than as regards the real rôle ofcavalry in warfare. My conception of the duties and functions of themounted arm is not to cut and to hack and to thrust at your enemywherever and however he may be found. The real business of cavalry isso to manoeuvre your enemy as to bring him within effective range ofthe corps artillery of your own side for which a position suitable forbattle would previously have been selected. "[7] It is difficult to conceive a more clear and concise statement of thefunction of cavalry. It differs widely from the rather grim utteranceof the late Sir Baker Russell, who stated that the duty of cavalry wasto look pretty during time of peace, and get killed in war. Happily Colonel French's theorising was not without its effect. TheBerkshire manoeuvres showed a number of flagrant shortcomings in ourcavalry. Several military men, ably seconded by _The Morning Post_, insisted on the reorganisation of that arm. After the customaryprotest, officialdom bowed to the storm. French's old chief, Sir George Luck, was brought back from India toinstitute reforms. The first thing that the new Inspector-General ofCavalry insisted upon was a revised Cavalry Drill Book. Who was towrite it? The answer was not easy. But eventually Colonel French wascalled in from his retirement and installed in the Horse Guards forthat purpose. The result was a masterpiece of lucid explanation and terse precision. The book evolved into something much more than a mere manual of drill. For it is also a treatise on cavalry tactics, a guide to modernstrategy, and a complete code of regulations for the organisation ofmounted troops. No sooner was the book issued than another problem arose. Who was tocarry out all these drastic alterations? Once again, recourse was hadto the half-pay Colonel in Kent! Who so fit to materialise reforms asthe man who had conceived them? So in 1895 Colonel French wasensconced in the War Office as Assistant Adjutant-General of Cavalry. There were great reforms instituted. British cavalry was placed on a brigade establishment at homestations. Which means that, for the first time, three regiments weregrouped into a brigade and placed under the command of a staffcolonel, who was entirely responsible for their training. In thesummer months the regiments were massed for combined training. In spite of the revolution he was accomplishing, it is doubtfulwhether French was at all happy at the War Office. He is essentially aman of action. Unlike Kitchener, he prefers execution to organisation, and he probably chafed horribly over the interminable disentangling ofknots which is efficient organisation. His one consolation was thesolution every night before he left his desk of a refreshing problemin tactics. [Page Heading: FROM STOOL TO SADDLE] There are endless stories of his pacing up and down that back room inPall Mall like a caged lion. Like Mr. Galsworthy's Ferrand he hates todo "round business on an office stool. " His temperament is entirelydynamic. Everything static and stay-at-home is utter boredom to him. Probably no soldier ever showed the qualities and the limitations ofthe man of action in more vivid contrast. His trials, however, were not of long duration. So soon as the brigadesystem had been fully organised he was given command of one of theunits which he had created--the Second Cavalry Brigade at Canterbury. Here he was able to achieve one of his most notable successes. Ithappened during the 1898 manoeuvres. As commander of a brigade, Frenchwas chosen to lead Buller's force in the mimic campaign. His opponentwas General Talbot, an older officer who worked on the stereo-typedmethods. The antiquity of his antagonist's ideas gave French hisopportunity. He made such a feature of reconnaissance that the expertsdeclared his tactics to be hopelessly rash. But by the mobility of hisforce he continually checked and out-manoeuvred his opponent--appearingin the most unexpected places in the most unaccountable ways. [Page Heading: THE CRITICS ROUTED] At the end of the manoeuvres the fighting centred round YarmburyCastle. All day French had been harassing General Talbot's forces. Atlast, by a rapid movement, his cavalry surprised several batteries ofthe enemy's horse artillery. He commanded them to dismount and madethe whole force his prisoners. When the umpires upheld his claim, theexperts aforesaid were given considerable food for thought. The general conclusion was that luck had contributed to his success, and that in actual warfare such recklessness might lead to disaster. Consequently, French's opponents were justified to some extent intheir insistence that the old methods were best. Indeed, his successonly strengthened prejudice in certain quarters. Happily, however, the original mind won the day. And in 1899, Frenchwas given command of the first cavalry brigade at Aldershot, with therank of Major-General. This is the highest post open to a cavalryofficer in his own sphere during the time of peace. Thus French'scritics were finally routed, and he was free at last to train Britishcavalry according to his own brilliant and original ideas. FOOTNOTES: [6] To General Bewicke Copley the writer is indebted for much kindassistance in writing this chapter. [7] Quoted in _M. A. P. _, March 3, 1900. CHAPTER IV ELANDSLAAGTE AND RIETFONTEIN The Unknown Commander of Cavalry--Who is General French?--Advancing without Reinforcements--"This is your Show, French"--The White Flag--The Chess-Player--The Victor in Anecdote. From the end of the South African War until the outbreak of theEuropean War the British nation had never taken its army seriously. Atbest it had shown very tepid interest in its work. Some brief Indianskirmishing might momentarily flash the names of a few regiments or astray general upon the public mind. But for the most part we werecontent to take the army very much for granted, forgetful of Mr. Dooley's sage pronouncement that "Standing armies are useful in timeof war. " Prior to the Boer War the public ignorance on the subject waseven more appalling. [Page Heading: A NEW STAR] At the opening of the South African campaign there was a good deal ofvague discussion as to who should have the cavalry command in Natal. But General French was not one of the officers prominently mentioned. Yet, he had already risen to a position analogous to that whichGeneral von Bernhardi then occupied in the German army. In any otherEuropean country his name would have been practically a householdword. Even to the English newspaper writer it was a paradox and aproblem. "Who is this General French?" people asked one another, when news ofhis first victories came to hand. Scarcely anyone was able to answerthe question. One finds curious corroboration of the prevailingignorance of French's career in a society journal of that date. InJanuary of 1900, a then most popular social medium was almostpathetically confessing its perturbation on the point. After giving adescription of General French, the writer goes on rather in wrath thanin apology--"Since I wrote the above paragraph, I have found a letterin an Irish paper, which declares that the French of whom I have justspoken is not the hero of Colesberg. The French of whom I have spokenis George Arthur (_sic_), while the Colesberg French is John DentonPinkstone French. Of John Denton Pinkstone French I have found nodetails in any of the ordinary books of reference. Probably somecorrespondent will supply me with the details. " There was a lapse orsix weeks before any further information was forthcoming. But there was one man who knew his French. General Sir Redvers Bullerhad found his worth on the Nile Expedition, in repeated autumnmanoeuvres at home, and in many a long discussion on military topics. His casting vote, therefore, made French Commander of Cavalry inNatal. Major Arthur Griffiths has supplied an admirable little sketch ofFrench's appearance at this time. "He is short and thick, and ofrather ungainly figure. Although he can stick on a horse as well asanyone, rides with a strong seat, and is indefatigable in the saddle, he is not at all a pretty horseman. His mind is more set onessentials, on effective leadership with all it means, rather thanwhat soldiers call 'Spit and polish': he is sound in judgment, clear-headed, patient, taking everything quietly, the rough with thesmooth; but he is always on the spot, willing to wait, and still moreready to act, when the opportunity comes, with tremendous effect. " That description is true in general, if not in detail. For patience iscertainly not one of French's personal, if it be one of his militaryvirtues. A close friend of his agreed to the word "tempestuous, " asmost nicely describing his temperament. Like every good soldier, infact, French has a temper, for which he is none the worse. If apt toflame out suddenly, it quickly burns itself out, leaving no touch ofresentment in the scorched. [Page Heading: RECALLED TO LADYSMITH] Ten days after the Boer ultimatum had been delivered to the Britishagent at Pretoria, French was in Ladysmith. He arrived there, to bepedantically accurate, on October 20, 1899, at 5 a. M. At 11 a. M. Hewas in the saddle, leading a column out to recapture the railwaystation at Elandslaagte, which, with a newly-arrived train of troops, the Boers had seized overnight. No sooner had his men begun to locatethe enemy, than French was recalled to Ladysmith. Reluctantly the menturned back to reinforce Sir George White's small garrison, for whathe feared might prove a night attack. Soon afterwards, however, newsof General Symons' victory at Talana came in to cheer the men aftertheir fruitless sortie. At once Sir George White saw his opportunity. It was the Boers, andnot the British, who now stood in peril of a sudden attack. There waslittle sleep for French's men that night. At 4 a. M. Next morning theywere again on the march for Elandslaagte. About eight o'clock on one of those perfect mist-steeped summermornings that presage a day of burning heat, French's force came insight of the Boer laagers. As the mist cleared the enemy could bespied in large numbers about the station and the colliery buildingsand over the yellow veldt. French ordered the Natal Battery to turnits little seven-pounder on the station. One of the first shots told;and the Boers came tumbling out of their shelter, leaving thetrainload of British soldiers, captured the previous night, free tojoin their comrades. Soon afterwards the station was in the hands ofthe British, as the result of a dashing cavalry charge. But the Boers were only temporarily dislodged. Their long range gunsvery soon shelled the station from the neighbouring kopjes with deadlyeffect. French was compelled to withdraw. The stupidity of the enemy, in leaving the telegraph wires uncut, enabled him immediately toacquaint Sir George White with the peril of his situation. White'sorders were emphatic: "The enemy must be beaten and driven off. Timeof great importance. " The necessary reinforcements were hurried to thespot. [Page Heading: IN HIS ELEMENT] French did not wait for their arrival before striking at the enemy. The Light Horse, under Colonel Scott Chisholme, quickly tookpossession of a low ridge near the railway station, which fronted themain line of the enemy's kopjes. While he held this ridge French hadthe satisfaction of seeing infantry, cavalry and artillery coming upthe railway line to his assistance. In the late afternoon his forcenumbered something like three thousand five hundred men, outnumberingthe enemy by more than two to one. Those who ask why so many men were required, do not understand theposition in which the British force found itself. The enemy wereentrenched on a series of high, boulder-strewn tablelands, whichoffered almost perfect cover. Between these tablelands and French'sforce lay a wide and partly scrubless stretch of veldt. Over thatterrible exposed slope his men must go, before they could come withinuseful range of the enemy. French was faced with a most perilous anddifficult enterprise. However, that is precisely what French likes. Herose to the situation with ready resource. It was not easy to locatethe exact position of the enemy ensconced amid these covering hills. So in the afternoon he ordered a simultaneous frontal and flankattack. Just which was front and which was flank it was for hislieutenants to discover. Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions to theinfantry were brief but decisive. "The enemy are there, " he said, "andI hope you will shift them out before sunset--in fact, I know youwill. " When the action had fairly commenced, Sir George White and his staffgalloped over from Ladysmith. French approached, saluted, and askedfor instructions. The chivalrous White's only reply was, "Go on, French; this is your show. " All the afternoon he stayed on the field, watching the progress of events, and approving French's dispositions. The battle proved to be, in many ways, one of the most spectacular inhistory. For as the infantry advanced, under a steady hail of shelland bullets, the sky began to darken. The Boer positions stoodsilhouetted by stray puffs of white smoke against a lowering cumulusof clouds. While the artillery on both sides shook the ground with aninferno of sound, the storm burst. The thunder of the heavens became aspasmodic chorus to the roar of the guns. One correspondent hasdescribed how he found himself mechanically humming the "Ride of theValkyries" that was being played on such a dread orchestra. Slippingand stumbling, cursing and cheering, the Devons crept forward acrossthe sodden grass. Many of the bravest, among them Chisholme, went downon that plain of death. Far beyond the level veldt there weresomething like 800 feet to climb in the face of Mauser and shrapnel. At length, however, the top of the ridge was reached. There stood thethree guns that had wrought such havoc, now silent among the corpsesof the frock-coated burghers who had served them. [Page Heading: THE WHITE FLAG TRICK] The Boers still kept up the fight, however, on the further side of theplateau. The cheering Gordons, the Manchesters and the Devons nowflung themselves at the remnant of the foe. Suddenly a white flag wasseen to flutter defeat from a kopje beyond the laager. On the instantthe soldiers paused at the surprising notes of the "Cease fire, "followed by the "Retire. " For a moment they wavered between disciplineand dismay. At that instant from a small kopje east of the nek came aviolent burst of firing as some fifty of the enemy made a last effortto regain their position. There was a momentary panic in the British lines. But a little buglershouted "Retire be damned, " and sounded the "Advance. " Gradually theinfantry recovered, and the Gordons and Devons, rushing on the enemy, took a fearful revenge for the dastardly trick. French had scored his first victory within a day of his arrival. Whatwonder if men called him "French the lucky?" From now onwards thattradition was to cling to his name. But a great deal more than luckwent to the winning of Elandslaagte. Had French not advanced his menthroughout in open formation, the day might never have been his. Ithas been said that he was our only general to master the Boer methods. He was certainly the first and the most able imitator of thosemethods. But he was prepared to meet them before he ever stepped onSouth African soil. For his whole theory of cavalry tactics is basedon the realisation that massive formations are now hopelessly out ofdate. [Page Heading: LUCK OR BRAINS] One of the newspaper correspondents[8] happened to run across Frenchtwice during the battle. He tells how at the end of the engagement hemet the General, who had come along the ridge in the fighting line ofthe Manchesters and Gordons, and offered him his congratulations onthe day. He adds: "Last time I had met him was when the artillery onboth sides were hard at it; he appeared then more like a man playing agame of chess than a game of war, and was not too busy to sympathisewith me on the badness of the light when he saw me trying to takesnap-shots of the Boer shells bursting amid the Imperial Light Horsenear us. " French's luck lay in his ability to see his opportunities and graspthem. But the soldier will never be convinced on that point, even ifFrench himself attempt his conversion. For him the British leader hasremained "The luckiest man in the army" ever since Elandslaagte. Yetin a letter to Lady French after the engagement he had written, "Inever thought I would come out alive. " As frequently happened in the South African campaign, success couldnot be followed up. Having cleared the railway line, French was unableto garrison his position, and returned next morning to Ladysmith. Acouple of days later he was again in action, and again he wassuccessful. It had become necessary to keep the way open for GeneralYule and his jaded forces now in retreat from Dundee. White determinedto sally out and distract the enemy. Once again the heavy share of thework fell on French and his cavalry. Marching out from the town towards Modder Spruit they found the enemyholding a range of hills about seven miles from Ladysmith. Flanked by the artillery, and supported from the rear by rifle fire, the infantry advanced to a convenient ridge from which the Boerposition might be shelled. There they were joined by the field andmountain batteries, whose well-directed fire played great havoc amongthe enemy. During the engagement one costly mistake was made. The Gloucesters onreaching the summit of the slope, attempted to descend on the otherside. Their advancing lines were ploughed down by a deadly fire. "Inthe first three minutes, " said an eye-witness, "Colonel Wilford, whowas commanding the regiment, had fallen shot through the head, and anumber of the men lay dead and dying about him. So fierce was theattack that no living thing could have remained upon the exposedslope, which boasted not even a shred of cover of any kind. " Slowlyand silently the Gloucesters retired. By two o'clock the infantry fire had ceased, and White had receivednews that Yule was nearing Ladysmith in safety. He therefore decidedto withdraw his troops. This was no easy matter, for the Boers, instead of relinquishing their position, had merely retired for ashort distance. The retreat, however, was safely carried out, thankslargely to the masterly fashion in which French's cavalry covered theretirement. From a military point of view the engagement would scarcely be calledimportant. But from a strategic point of view it was invaluable. Itcertainly saved General Yule's force, which the Boers would otherwisehave cut off on its way to Ladysmith. This would scarcely have beendifficult, for the column was in no condition to fight. That itcovered twenty-three miles without food, water, or rest beforenightfall in its exhausted condition was in itself remarkable. [Page Heading: THE ONLY GENERAL] This was the last successful engagement that the British forces wereto fight for many a day. But that was not French's fault. In the firstweek after his arrival he had scored two distinct successes and wonfor himself a reputation among the Boers. He was indeed the onlyBritish general for whom they at that time expressed the veryslightest respect. In a week his name became a by-word among them. Asoldier[9] has recorded how, when towns or railway stations werecaptured, our men would find allusions to French chalked on the wall. Thus: "We are not fighting the English--they don't count--we are onlyfighting the 'French. '" Quite early in the campaign this inscriptionwas found on the wall of a Boer farm house: "Why are we bound to win?Because although we have only 90, 000 burghers, that means 90, 000generals--but the English, though they have 200, 000 soldiers, haveonly one General--and he is French. " That was in the days beforeRoberts and Kitchener were on the scene. But the Boers were not alone in their appreciation of French. One ofthe authorities of the German General Staff wrote of him "His(French's) name was one of those most dreaded by the enemy, " and "heimpressed his personality on the troops. " Perhaps the best descriptionof the man ever penned, however, came from the brilliant Americanjournalist, Julian Ralph. "As to his personality, the phrase 'Thesquare little General' would serve to describe him in army circleswithout a mention of his name. "He is quiet, undemonstrative, easy, and gentle. When you are underhis command you don't notice him, you don't think about him--unlessyou are a soldier, and then you are glad you are there. "[10] FOOTNOTES: [8] The correspondent referred to is Mr. George Lynch. [9] "A. D. C. " _The Regiment_. [10] In the _Daily Mail_. CHAPTER V THE TIDE TURNS White's Dash from Ladysmith--Nicholson's Nek--The Reverse at Lombard's Kop--A Cavalry Exploit--French's Dramatic Escape from Ladysmith. So far the tide of battle had flowed fairly equally between the twoarmies. Thanks to French, White had won the two engagements which hehad to undertake in order to save Yule's column. In Ladysmith he hadnow an admirably proportioned force of 10, 000 men, quite adequate forthe town's defence. Across the Atlantic an Army Corps was hastening tohis succour. He had only to sit still and wait in Ladysmith, fortifying it with all the ingenuity that time would permit. Unfortunately he was not content to sit still and wait behind hisentrenchments. He determined not to be hemmed in without a struggle. Be it remembered that at that time the British commanders had notfully realised the numbers, the equipment and the intrepidity oftheir opponents. The traditional chastening of experience was stillwanting. As Napier has it, "In the beginning of each war England hasto seek in blood the knowledge necessary to ensure success; and, likethe fiend's progress towards Eden, her conquering course is throughchaos followed by death. " It was a very beautiful if a rather optimistic plan of attack thatWhite arranged for the morning of October 30. He divided his forcesinto three columns. During the night of the 29th Colonel Carleton, with the Irish Fusiliers and the Gloucesters, was to advance upon andseize a long ridge called Nicholson's Nek, some six miles north ofLadysmith. This would protect his left wing. On the right flank theinfantry were to advance under cover of French's cavalry and mountedinfantry, while the artillery was to advance in the centre. Provided that all went well the plan was of course superb. No soonerhad the main army won their action at Lombard's Cop than it wouldswing round to the right and wedge the Boers in between its artilleryand the force on Nicholson's Nek. But suppose anything happened toCarleton? Or suppose that the main action was lost? In either casedisaster would be inevitable. In the event, French was alone able tostick to his time table. Misfortune befell both Carleton on the left, and Grimwood on the right. [Page Heading: THE MULES BOLT] At 10. 0 p. M. Carleton was on the march; and two and a half hours laterGrimwood's brigade had set out eastward. By some mistake two of hisbattalions followed the artillery to the left instead of taking theinfantry route. Of that error Grimwood remained in ignorance until hereached his destination near the south eastern flank of Long Hilltowards dawn. Soon afterwards the Gordon Highlanders were amazed tofind an officer in their ranks from Carleton's column, jaded andspent. He reported that all the mules of his battery had bolted andhad not been recovered. The day had begun with a double disaster. Grimwood's force was not allat White's disposal; Carleton's was not to appear at all. Never had ageneral's plans gone more thoroughly agley. Of the unequal engagement which ensued little need be said here. Aludicrously insufficient force was attempting to encircle a larger andbetter equipped one. The result was not long in doubt. AlthoughWhite's forty-two guns pounded away bravely, they were no match forthe heavy artillery of the enemy. One huge Creusot gun had beendragged to the top of Pepworth Hill whence it threw a 96lb. Shell adistance of four miles. There were also several 40 lb. Howitzers whichhopelessly outranged the British guns. From a front over eight miles in extent there poured in a convergingartillery fire against which our guns could do nothing. Gradually theright flank was pushed back along with the centre; and the left flankwas now non-existent. During the afternoon the inevitable retirementtook place, under the Creusot's shells. Had not Captain HedworthLambton rapidly silenced the gun on Pepworth Hill with his navalbattery, opportunely arrived at the critical moment, the retreat mightwell have been a rout. As it was the tired force which wandered backto Ladysmith had left 300 men on the field. Irretrievable disaster had overtaken Carleton's column. Whilebreasting Nicholson's Nek in the darkness the men were surprised atthe sudden clattering by of a Boer picquet. The transport mules, panic-stricken, fled _en masse_, wrecking the column as they stampededdown the hillside, felling men as they went. It was a gunless, ammunitionless and weary column which the Boers surprised in the earlymorning. The end was the surrender of the force to the enemy. [Page Heading: A BRILLIANT SUCCESS] The British position was now serious. Nothing could prevent Sir GeorgeWhite and his forces from being cooped in either Colenso or Ladysmith. But it is typical of French that he found a last opportunity ofout-manoeuvring the Boers before leaving Ladysmith. In the battle ofLombard's Cop his cavalry had taken but a small part. Had some ofthem, however, been sent with Carlton's column to keep it in touchwith the base, the issue of its enterprise might possibly have beendifferent. A couple of days afterwards, on November 2, French found anopportunity to score. The Boers had moved round our lines and postedtheir guns in a very advantageous position. White therefore ordered abombardment by the naval guns to which the Boers replied. Whilst theywere so engaged French crept round behind Bester's Hill, where theBoer commander had a large camp. Before Joubert realised what themovement meant French was upon him. Field artillery, along with thenaval guns, supported his advance. While this double fire wasdistracting the Boers, French stormed their laager. The enemy fled, leaving their camp and all its equipments to French. This brilliantlittle success was practically a cavalry exploit, and it was typicalof much that was to follow. It now became obvious that Ladysmith was becoming completely invested. The Boer lines which had been three miles from the town were creepingnearer. Assuredly the belligerent town was no place for a cavalryofficer. [Page Heading: THE ESCAPE] French determined to leave Ladysmith. It would not be easy to breakthrough the lines of the net that was closing round the city. Whetheror no the railway was still open was uncertain. When French'saide-de-camp, Lieutenant Milbanke, now Sir John Milbanke, V. C. , askedthe station-master whether a special train could get through toPietermaritzburg, that worthy indignantly scorned the idea. With theBoers at Colenso it would certainly be madness--a fool's errand. Milbanke, however, used persuasions which resulted in an effort beingmade to run the gauntlet. That evening an engine and a few carriagesduly drew up at the station. Very soon French's staff was aboard. Asthe train was about to start a short and agile elderly officer mighthave been seen to dash across the platform into the last carriage, where he ensconced himself beneath a seat lest the train be stoppedand searched. Very soon bullets were rattling through the carriagewindows, and it was an excessively uncomfortable journey that theBritish General and his staff endured. But they were at last free tocarry out fresh services for their country. Five months were to passbefore another train crossed these metals. CHAPTER VI THE CAMPAIGN ROUND COLESBERG The Fog of War--A Perilous Situation--Damming "The Flowing Tide"--Shows His Genius as a Commander--A Campaign in Miniature--Hoisting Guns on Hilltops--The Fifty-mile Front--Saving the Situation. So far French had justified the tradition which called him lucky. Anycompetent and experienced general _might_, with luck, have won thebattle of Elandslaagte. That victory did not mark French out as acommander of genius. But what followed in the campaign round Colesbergdid. It is very much to be regretted that the circumstances of the caseforced this campaign to be fought amid an unusually dense variety of"the fog of war. " Owing to the difficulty and danger of the operationsand the extended front on which they were carried out, any newspapercorrespondent present could hope to chronicle only a sub-section ofthe action. The public, therefore, was without any complete record ofwhat happened. [11] To the man in the street the British general and hisforces seemed to spend three months in perpetual dodging in and aboutsome thirty square miles of kopjed veldt. [Page Heading: THE "INEFFICIENT" GENERAL] Yet French's column was the pivot on which the whole British planturned. This campaign in miniature gave French his chance finally todisprove the fallacies of the critics at home. Before his appointmentin October, he had actually been described by some of his opponents as"inefficient to command in the field. " This is the tragedy of many abrilliant cavalry leader--it is impossible for him to demonstrate hisability save in actual warfare. When French went down to Cape Town to consult with General Buller, hefound his Chief oppressed by serious misgivings. Sir George White andhis force were surrounded in Ladysmith; Mafeking and Kimberley wereboth invested by the enemy; and a great invasion was threatened alongthe whole northern boundary of Cape Colony. To deal with all thesedifficulties Buller had only one army corps. One column, under LordMethuen, was advancing to the relief of Kimberley; another, underGeneral Gatacre, was attempting to stem the Boer invasion of CapeColony; while a third, to be led by Buller himself, was massing atChieveley, prior to advancing to the relief of Ladysmith. French wasgiven command of a fourth column with which he was to harass the Boersaround Colesberg. A Boer commando under Schoeman had seized a passageon the Orange River at Norval's Pont on November 1. On the 14th theBoers entered Colesberg; and a proclamation was issued declaring thedistrict to be a Free State territory. [Page Heading: WORRYING TACTICS] From the first no striking victories were anticipated for French'slittle force. It was to act as a dam, rather than as a weapon ofdestruction. It was a rather flimsy dam at that. Buller'sinstructions, which at first spoke of a "flying column, " soon declinedto suggestions of "a policy of worry without risking men. " Inparticular it was to stop raids on the railway line which might impedeMethuen's advance on Kimberley. Collecting a part of his force at Cape Town, French left on November18. On the following night he reached De Aar, where Major-GeneralWauchope gave him another couple of companies of Mounted Infantry. Acting on Wauchope's advice, he determined to make Naauwpoort hisbase. Buller had suggested Hanover Road. But French on arrival foundthat Wauchope was right. The country round Naauwpoort proved to bemuch more level, was less closely laced with wire fences, and affordedbetter means of communication both by road and rail. No sooner had he arrived (on November 21) than he ordered areconnaissance to be made on the following morning. His cavalry camewithin eight miles of Colesberg, without seeing the enemy. AccordinglyFrench determined to attack the town, and asked for reinforcements ofcavalry for that purpose. On November 23, however, furtherreconnaissance supported by a trainload of infantry showed that thesituation had developed. It was found impossible to approach Arundel, as the kopjes north of Arundel station were occupied by the Boers. Reporting the state of affairs to headquarters, French said that, inhis opinion, the Boers should be pushed out of Colesberg immediately, as they were being reinforced daily, and were spreading disaffectionthroughout the Colony. But he was not in a position to do more thanworry the enemy for several days. However, his persistentnight-and-day fretting of Schoeman's forces achieved the desiredresult. His ubiquitous patrols seriously alarmed the Boer general asto the safety of his outposts at Arundel. A squadron of Lancersdiscovered one day that the kopjes round Arundel had been evacuated. After that a dash on the town followed. Here again the policy of nagand bluster had frightened the Boers out of their position. There wereonly a hundred men in it when the British force arrived; and they fledprecipitately at the mere sight of it. Next day, Colonel Porter struckeven farther north with his cavalry and mounted infantry, occupying akopje three miles north of the town. There followed a brief lapse in active hostilities. The Boers heavilyentrenched themselves on the neighbouring hills; and a prisoner takenby our men said that Schoeman had at least 3, 000 men, with some usefulguns, and was waiting for further reinforcements. French's position now became critical in more than one sense of theword. For in mid-December news of the triple British disaster camethrough to hearten Schoeman and his men. Cronje had inflicted acrushing defeat on Methuen at Magersfontein; Botha had crippled Bullerat Colenso; and Gatacre's force had met with a reverse at Stormberg. Elated by his colleagues' successes, Schoeman was spoiling for thefray. Could he once gain a victory over French, the whole of CapeColony would probably join the rebellion. Both east and west the Dutchpopulation were simply waiting a sign to rise. With the whole of South Africa in revolt, our position of "splendidisolation" in Europe might well have induced Continentalcomplications. The foreign Press, indeed, was almost unanimous in itsjubilations over this series of disasters. The German papers inparticular, filled their pages with the most atrocious insults andjibes. Such was the situation in "Black Week. " There was much ominoustalk on the Continent about "the flowing tide. " Only one obstacleprevented these dire prophecies from coming true. French and hislittle force possibly stayed the tide of a world conflict, throughchecking the rebel torrent between Naauwpoort and Colesberg. [Page Heading: A TIGHT CORNER] It is typical of his perfect _sang froid_, that in this excessivelytight corner, French found time to send a cheering Christmas greetingto friends at home. "We shall drink your health on Christmas Day, " hewired on behalf of himself and his staff, "and we hope you are well, and having as good a time as we are. " French's use of Arundel was masterly. For him to attack wasimpossible; about this time he was outnumbered by something like fiveto one. His one aim, therefore, was to keep the Boers from therailway line. The moment that his scouts discovered the Boers throwingout detachments to defend a kopje, French would have an elaborateattack, or a reconnaissance in force to drive the enemy in. At thistime scarcely a day passed without its "affair" of one sort oranother. If it was not a night attack, then it was a miniature siege, or a flanking movement--or a piece of bluff! His men were in thesaddle night and day. One of those present has related how hepractically lived on his horse for two months. Did Schoeman attempt to force a pitched battle, then French, by aseries of simultaneous flank and rear movements, would harass him outof the possibility of a general action. It is doubtful, indeed, whether during this lively period of his life the Boer commander everreally had time to meet either his fellow commanders or hislieutenants and discuss a concerted plan of action. No sooner was ageneral movement visible in the Boer camps, than French and his menswept out, or threatened to sweep out, on some dangerous design. Everymorning the General himself made a personal reconnaissance in theneighbourhood. [Page Heading: A BRILLIANT EXPLOIT] During his reconnaissance on December 31, French came to theconclusion that an offensive movement was at last possible. Colesberglies in a little plateau, ringed round by a quadrangle of kopjes, allof which were strongly held by the enemy. Just beyond this quadrangle, however, one or two kopjes projected from its western face. Frenchdetermined to seize one of these, from which he could push forwardalong the enemy's flank, jeopardising his line of retreat. As usual, the venture was brilliantly conceived and ably carried out. During the day a squadron of Hussars was sent forward to Maeder'sFarm, some five miles on the line of march. There the men bivouackedunder arms, and at midnight set out on a silent march to the west. Under the screen of darkness and perfect silence the advance wasspeedy. Even the regimental carts were dispensed with, lest thecreaking of their wheels might betray the advance. Not until thecolumn was near its objective, McCracken's Hill, did the Boers suspectits approach. An amazed shouting and some wild rifle-fire from theoutposts--and McCracken's Hill was in French's hands. The cavalry now wound round the hill towards the road. But theircommander, Colonel Fisher, found it impossible to take the hillscommanding the road. As generally happened, a complicated engagementensued. The Boers attempted to retake McCracken's Hill next morning, adding a counter-attack to the north-east and an enveloping movementon the right to the already complex situation. But French checkmatedevery move, although he finally thought it wise that Colonel Fishershould evacuate the hill he had so cleverly won. That night bothFrench and Schoeman were wiring for reinforcements in the hope ofclearing up the situation. [Page Heading: THE FATE OF THE SUFFOLKS] Some days afterwards came the only reverse which French ever receivedat the hands of the Boers. There has been endless argument as to whowas directly responsible for the disaster to the Suffolks. It seemsbest simply to record the fact that the order was given by French asthe result of pressure brought to bear on him by the enthusiasticcolonel of the Suffolks. The key to the Boer stronghold lay in thekopje of Grassy Hill. Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Watson had frequentlyreconnoitred the Boer position in company with General French. As aresult, he was confident that his battalion could rush the position. On January 5 he begged for permission to attempt the feat. On thefollowing day French authorised him to make the attack should he see afavourable opportunity, on condition that he first informed theGeneral of his plans and probable time of attack. This he failed todo, and that night, without further warning, Watson and his men creptnoiselessly out of camp, walking either in canvas shoes or instocking-soles in order to deaden the noise of their footsteps. The foremost ranks were scrambling breathlessly towards the summit, when a withering Boer fire fell upon their panting lines. It was clearthat they were not only discovered but expected. Watson ordered awithdrawal. But withdrawal from that stark boulder-strewn hill-sidewas almost an impossibility. The column fell into disorder, someadvancing and some retreating, under a fierce fire from the enemy. Watson himself gathered together the rear company and attempted, withreckless gallantry, to lead it to the summit. He was among the firstto fall, riddled with bullets, and although his officers perished withhim almost to a man, the men beat a hasty retreat, in face of theenemy's destructive fire. The affair accounted in all for elevenofficers and 150 men. No doubt the gallant Watson was largely toblame. But the facts seemed to show that the enemy were in some wayapprised of his intentions. Against such a chance as this, strategyand generalship are helpless. Certainly French would be the last manin the world to deny any responsibility, had he been to blame forthat one mishap in a memorable campaign. One fact was now clear beyond dispute. The enemy's right had beenstrongly reinforced and was too alert to allow of much hope ofsuccessful action against it. Nothing daunted, French thereforedirected his energies to the left. A few days later (January 11) heaccomplished the _tour de force_ of the campaign. In the plain to thewest of Colesberg there arose an isolated kopje, some six hundred feetin height, called Coles Kop. This hill, which rises almost sheer fromthe plain, taxes the wind of the unencumbered climber to the utmost. Being higher than the surrounding kopjes, it commands both Colesbergand the enemy's laager. The Boers had left it ungarrisoned, thinkingit useless either to themselves or to the enemy. They made a verygreat mistake. For the mere hint that a thing is impossible firesFrench to attempt it. [Page Heading: PREPARING A SURPRISE] One day Schoeman woke up to find shrapnel assailing him apparentlyfrom nowhere. It was coming from a 15-pounder which Major E. E. A. Butcher, R. F. A. , had coaxed up to the top of Coles Kop in three and ahalf hours by dint of much scientific haulage and more sinew. TheBoers themselves never equalled this extraordinary feat. To hoist the guns on to the hilltop was the least part of theundertaking. Guns without ammunition are useless. To get shells on tothe kopje without disaster was an infinitely more difficultundertaking. He solved it by installing a hill lift. The veldt is nota very promising engineering shop; but Butcher was not easily beaten. Using steel rails for standards and anything worthy the name forcable, he soon had the framework erected. To the uprights were fixedsnatchblocks over which he passed his carrying wires. On this mountainlift he was able to send weights up to 30 lbs. , thanks to an ingenioussystem of pulleys. Nor was the lift altogether rustic, for a drum andratchet made it double-acting, so that as one load went up another wasautomatically let down. It is only fair to say that the Boersthemselves were masters of the art of haulage. How they managed to gettheir guns to the top of kopjes remained for long a mystery to ourmen. Butcher, however, quickly taught his men to beat the enemy attheir own game, although nothing else quite so dramatic as the ColesKop incident is on record. During this proceeding French had been distracting the enemy by ademonstration to the south-east of Colesburg. Consequently the shellsfrom nowhere began to pour into their laager during breakfast(January 12) with devastating results. The laager was instantlyabandoned, and a second, two thousand yards farther off, suffered thesame fate. When Butcher had finally been able to get a second15-pounder up the hill, the Boers were compelled to shift every campthey possessed into sheltered positions. Most of these exploits show the resource and the daring which markFrench's tactics. But his caution is no less remarkable. One instanceof it will suffice. Shortly after the Coles Kop incident, it wasdiscovered that the Boers had left open a portion of the road fromColesberg, where it goes through a narrow pass known as Plessis Poort. Immediately French planned its capture. One detachment was sent tooccupy Bastard's Nek, another defile to the west of Plessis Poort. Covered by a cross-fire from the artillery, the infantry were to moveforward and seize the road. In order to divert the Boers' attentionfrom these matters, a demonstration was ordered along the wholeBritish line. Advancing carefully the infantry met with littleopposition, a fact which made French suspicious. As the silencecontinued he abruptly ordered the "Retire. " The moment that his menobeyed, a fierce fire broke out from the enemy, who were present inforce. French's caution was justified. [Page Heading: MASTERS OF TACTICS] During all this time the rival fronts had been gradually stretchingout, in the constant effort to parry outflanking movements, until theyreached the extraordinary length of fifty miles. Yet at the utmostneither general could throw more than ten thousand men into the field!During the last days of French's command, the fighting had become morea matter of outpost skirmishes than anything else. The Boer generals, who now included De Wet and Delarey, were entirely taken up with theeffort to out-manoeuvre the irrepressible French. It was here that French first mastered the new problem of modernwarfare--the extended front. The ability of the rival generalsgradually gave the campaign the resemblance of a Mukden or a Mons inminiature. That the British force was not entirely out-manoeuvred bysuch masters of tactics as Delarey and De Wet says something forFrench's extraordinary mastery of a new method of warfare in somethinglike six weeks' time. Herein lies French's peculiar genius. Although he knows all themethods of all the schoolmen, he is capable as one soldier expressedit, "of making his own tactics brand new on the spot. " To that factone may attribute his consistent superiority to the Boer. Where evenKitchener and Roberts doubted, French invariably did the right thing. During the following fortnight he had more brilliant opportunities ofdemonstrating his unique abilities. FOOTNOTES: [11] To those interested enough to pursue the subject further, Icommend _With French and his Cavalry in South Africa_, by C. S. Goldman. (Macmillan & Co. ) CHAPTER VII THE DASH TO KIMBERLEY French's Pledge--The Task--The First Shell--"Hemmed in"--"We must break through"--The Lancers' Charge--In and Out of Kimberley--The Surrender of Cronje. By the end of the year French had saved the situation in Cape Colony. Realizing this, Roberts summoned him to Cape Town on more importantbusiness. Into French's hands he placed the task which Methuen hadfailed to accomplish through adverse circumstances--the Relief ofKimberley. When Lord Roberts, with customary precision, had statedexactly what he wanted, he was surprised to receive a dramatic pledgefrom his General. "I promise faithfully, " said French, "to relieveKimberley at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 15th, if I am alive. " It may be asked why the case of Kimberley was considered so urgent byLord Roberts. There are those who have suggested that the presence ofthe millionaire, Cecil Rhodes, in the beleaguered city wasresponsible for the authorities' energy in the matter. The meresuggestion, however, refutes itself. For Rhodes was the one man whodid more than any other to have the defences of the city brought intoa state of some sort of efficiency. The fact is that there wasdiscontent among the civil population and a constant peril ofsurrender. For this the great hundred pound shells which hurtleddestruction across the town's streets from the neighbouring heightswere chiefly responsible. On the face of it, French's promise might then have been taken for apiece of reckless bravado. The camp on the Modder River in which hegathered his forces together was over a hundred miles from Kimberley. The commander-in-chief had promised him a full cavalry division ofeight thousand five hundred men. But on February 11, French had barelyfour thousand eight hundred men, with seven batteries of HorseArtillery at his disposal. Between his camp and the mining city layCronje with a mobile force as large as French's own. Add to this thatthe ground to be covered consisted largely of arid and well-lessveldt, affording neither food nor drink for man or beast. The time toowas the African summer, with all the difficulties of handling partlyraw English troops to be faced. The task before French and his menwas certainly such as might have appalled a less courageous leader. [Page Heading: DECEIVING CRONJE] Guile as well as daring had much to do with the success of theenterprise. The vast concentration camp, with its flapping seas ofcanvas, was in itself a huge blind. Through its bustle and publicityFrench meant Cronje to conclude that he was about to force the Pass ofMagersfontein, and thence to relieve Ladysmith. For this Cronjeprepared himself with customary care. Meantime, French proceeded, asever, to belie the very justifiable expectations he had aroused. The most obvious route for French would be over Koodoesberg's Drifttowards the west. Accordingly Macdonald's Highland Brigade spent astrenuous day in threatening the Drift and returned to camp. After a day's rest Macdonald's horses were again ready for the field. On Sunday morning therefore, February 11, the long column filedsilently out of camp. At 10 o'clock the main body had covered 22miles, reaching the farmhouse of Ramdam. By that time Cronje'soutposts had probably realised that the camp which French hadcarefully left standing at the Modder River was simply a city ofcanvas from which the inhabitants had departed. Next day the force was again on the march at 3. 0 a. M. It now took aneasterly course in order to force a crossing on the Riet River. Itsgoal was Waterval Drift. But so intense was the darkness that after anhour of difficult movement the General ordered a halt, until dawn, when he ordered the division to make the feint on Waterval. He was notcertain whether the Drift was held in force by the enemy or not. Butvery soon conviction came in a shell nicely aimed at the General inperson. It burst between French and his staff. "There are too many ofus riding together, " was his only comment, as he moved forward toreconnoitre the ground from the top of the nearest kopje. Very soon the Horse Artillery had the gun silenced, and the wholedivision swerved to the right just as the Boers drew off down streamto wait for the English crossing. Immediately the whole division wasmaking for De Kiel's Drift further up stream. The banks proved to besteep and difficult, but a ford was discovered. As the cavalry nearedthe bank a party of Boers saw the ruse, and a neck-to-neck race forthe Drift began. By a piece of daring horsemanship our cavalry gothome first, and the Boers arrived too late to dispute their passage. By mid-day the division was able to cross and bivouac on the rightbank, pending the arrival of the baggage train, left far behind. [Page Heading: DELAYED TRANSPORT] The Riet River is by no means a refreshing torrent; it winds its slowway in muddy melancholy to the cleanly water of the Vaal. But at leastit contained water in which both men and horses could forget the heatof the veldt. All day the weary cavalrymen waited for the supplies, which did not come until they were attempting to snatch a few hours ofsleep. The transport horses stumbled and strained their way up thebanks in the early hours of the morning. There was pleasant excitement in camp, however, when both Roberts andKitchener rode over to congratulate French on his progress, and wishedhim "good luck" for the rest of the journey. But the delay intransport was annoying to French. Neither the men nor their horsesreceived any supplies until the morning was well advanced. And the sunwas already scorching the veldt before the division was ready toadvance. That delay was to be paid for in sweat and suffering. On thatday alone over one hundred horses died or fell out from exhaustion. Their tired riders were forced to trudge across the veldt at what pacethey could, or to find ignominious relief in the ammunition carts. Shortly after mid-day, however, a welcome well of water was reached. Here, thought the parched and foot-sore men, was relief at last. Butonce again they were doomed to disappointment. It is one of French'scharacteristics that he practises an exquisitely perfect loyalty bothto the army and to his superiors. That well of sparkling water wasdestined for the infantry tramping on behind. Reluctantly the troopersturned aside on their tedious way. Not a drop of the water wastouched. By this time the men's sufferings from thirst and dust were intense. At two o'clock they neared Klip Drift, where they were fiercelyattacked by a large body of Boers. The guns of the first brigade, however, quickly put the enemy to flight, but the General thought itwell to make certain alterations in the order of his advance. Thesechanges were only accomplished with the greatest difficulty. So tiredwere the horses that even the General's gallopers, who werecontinually traversing the column's half-mile front, were often unableto spur their horses to anything better than a walk. Very quickly theenemy returned to the attack, pestering French on the right. Realisinghis peril, he changed his course suddenly and headed away from theKlip Kraal Drift. Naturally, the enemy rushed off to block his way. For an hour and a half the Drift appeared to be the division's urgentobjective. Then, without warning, he as suddenly turned about andswung back to Klip Drift. [Page Heading: THE BOERS FLEE] These manoeuvres had reduced the horses almost to the last stage ofexhaustion. Many of them fell dead by the way. But at last the riverwas reached. Still the actual crossing was not yet. Once again Frenchshowed his extraordinary mastery of finesse. He ordered preparation tobe made for the actual crossing at Klip Drift and Rondeval Drift. Having thrown Gordon to the left to effect one crossing and Broadwoodto the right to effect another, French advanced so rapidly that Cronjewas utterly nonplussed. Gordon opened a heavy shell fire whichcompletely disconcerted him, although only a very few of the gunscould come into action. Soon afterwards Gordon was crossing the riverin pursuit. The Boers fled, in spite of the natural strength of theirpositions and the utterly exhausted state of our men. But neitherGordon on the left, nor Broadwood on the right, was satisfied withmerely effecting a crossing. Both went in pursuit of the enemy towardsKimberley. The result was a complete rout. The Boers' camp, theirammunition, their wagons, fell entirely into our hands. The rout was not without spasmodic touches of humour, even for thesejaded men. "One of the Staff plunged into the river and caught somegeese, but someone else ate them; a pig ran the gauntlet through thecamp--amidst roars of laughter, even from the serious General--oflances, bayonets, knives, sticks, boots, water-bottles, anything tohand, and at length was caught by a lucky trooper, who shared hisfeast that night with his friends. A wagon of fresh fruit was taken, sufficient to make thirsty men's mouths water, but some thought thegrapes were sour. "[12] The next day was perforce spent in camp, resting the tired troops andawaiting the arrival of supplies. The baggage was not on the sceneuntil late in the afternoon, much to the discomfort of French's men. It was midnight before Lord Kitchener and his Staff were near thecamp. One of French's aides-de-camp, Captain J. Laycock, rode out insolitary peril, and although continually sniped at by the Boers, wasable to lead Lord Kitchener and his Staff safely into camp. All daythe Boers had been making the men's lives a burden through unexpectedsniping and feints. French is said to have admitted that had any oftheir attacks been driven home, his plans might have been seriouslydisconcerted. "Could the Boers learn to attack they would be a mostformidable foe, " was his verdict on the situation. [Page Heading: THE ROAD BLOCKED] At 9. 30 on February 15 the column set out on the last stage of theirjourney. French, with the idea of putting the enemy off the track, ledhis men towards Bloemfontein. His idea was eventually to dash straightfor Kimberley with his whole division, hemming the enemy's rear andflank in at Magersfontein, where Methuen's force could hold him infront. Scarcely had the advance begun, however, when a murderous firebroke out from the river on the south-west, followed almostinstantaneously by a cross fire from a line of kopjes on thenorth-west. The road to Bloemfontein was blocked; and the road toKimberley was exposed to a cross fire from the enemy's two positions. This was checkmate with a vengeance. It was thought that some twothousand Boers held the kopjes ahead of French. At once he ordered theguns into position and boldly replied to the enemy's fire. The columnwas now nearing a plain several miles in width, guarded on one side bya ridge running from north to south, and on the other by a hill. TheBoers held both hill and ridge in force. So that whatever the gunsmight do, the position was difficult--if not impossible. By allmilitary rules French was "hemmed in. " To a lesser man retreat wouldhave seemed inevitable, though disastrous. Once again it was French_v. _ The Impossible. A member of his staff relates how, sweeping thehorizon with his glass, while riderless horses from the guns gallopedpast, he muttered, squaring the pugnacious jaw, "They are over here tostop us from Bloemfontein and they are there to stop us fromKimberley--we have got to break through. " In an instant his decisionwas taken. He would attempt the impossible--a direct cavalry charge inthe teeth of the enemy's fire. [Page Heading: A TERRIFIC CHARGE] He immediately ordered Gordon to charge the right front. The membersof his Staff expected that the General would now take up a position ofsecurity in the rear of the column, before the grim work began. But hekept his place in the van with his Staff. His officers werepractically certain that not only the first, but several of theleading squadrons would be utterly wiped out. There appeared to benothing in heaven or earth which could prevent huge losses. Gordon ledhis men--the Ninth and Sixteenth Lancers--in superb style. Despite thepitiable condition of the horses, it was a charge worthy of theBritish Army. A strong fire poured in from the Boer trenches and fromthe kopjes above. But as the huge masses of armed men gained theinevitable momentum and pounded down upon the enemy in a cloud ofsword-lit dust, the Boers fled before these clattering hoofs. Throwingup their guns they begged for mercy. But nothing could stop theterrific impetus of the charge. Nearly one hundred and fifty Boersfell as the Lancers ploughed through their trenches. Behind theLancers the whole division now swept on in perfect order, led by theGreys. "So the whole division swung up the plain at the gallop. It wasa thrilling time never to be forgotten, " wrote Boyle. So wild was theBoer fire that our casualties only amounted to four men wounded andtwo horses wounded. The plain once cleared, a halt was made for the guns to come up, tohold the enemy on the left. When the Artillery had joined the mainforce, the advance was again begun. The plain once crossed, the smokestacks of Kimberley came into view. At sight of these dingy symbols ofthe commerce they had risked all to save, the men raised a tiredcheer. Kimberley was relieved--although the nervous operators to whomFrench attempted to heliograph the fact, persisted in pessimisticallybelieving that he was the enemy. By far the worst of the work was now over. Before French reachedKimberley, however, the Boers made a last effort to stay hisvictorious advance. But they were driven back with heavy loss. Onlythe frightful condition of his horses prevented French from turningrout into annihilation. But his worn-out animals were quite beyondpursuing even a beaten enemy. At length, Kimberley, seeing the huge sand cloud on the horizon, cameto the conclusion that it enveloped the horsemen, not of Cronje but ofFrench. About six o'clock in the evening an officer rode out of thebesieged city to meet the soldier who had saved it. At 7--just onehour after the moment of French's historic promise, the Generalentered Kimberley with his Staff. He dined that night at De Beer'sSanatorium. But there was no rest for the conquerors. At 3. 30 on the followingmorning the cavalry was harrying the Boers to the north-east. At 5o'clock they came upon a body of Boers on a well-fortified ridge, whowere covering the army's retreat. Unable to operate vigorously againstthem owing to the condition of his forces, French forced them to drawin their outposts. But it was impossible to do more. His horses werehalf dead. And in the terrific heat "the tongues of men and horsesbecome black from thirst. " Realising the hopelessness of thesituation, French returned to the town. [Page Heading: A MAGNIFICENT RESPONSE] Rest was not yet, however. Scarcely had he retired than news came thatCronje had decided to evacuate Magersfontein. No confirmationfollowed, however. The General, therefore, advised his Staff that atlast a night's rest was possible. A couple of hours later a telegramarrived from Lord Kitchener, announcing that Cronje, with ten thousandmen, was in full retreat from Magersfontein, with "all his wagons andequipment and four guns, along the north bank of the Modder Rivertowards Bloemfontein, that he had already fought a rearguard actionwith him, and if French with all available horses and guns could headhim and prevent his crossing the river, the infantry from Klip Driftwould press on and annihilate or take the whole force prisoners. " General French responded magnificently to the call of thisopportunity. Another man might have pleaded that his troops and horseswere utterly unfit for work, but with French the greater theobstacles, the stronger is his determination to win through! Of allhis five thousand men, only two thousand could be found whose horseswere fit to carry them in that wild dash to head off the BoerCommando. At 3 a. M. On February 17, French left Kimberley, and by a marvellouspiece of far-sighted calculation made straight for Koodoos Rand Drift, the very crossing which Cronje himself had chosen. His horses died onthe way, but French reached the river first and seized the Drift, almost under the enemy's eyes. Cronje was completely surprised. The previous evening, French had beenin pursuit of the Boers north of Kimberley; now he had suddenlyappeared 35 miles to the south, and was facing the enemy, determinedto cut off his retreat. Swiftly Cronje moved down the river and tookpossession of a long stretch between Gaardeberg Drift and WolveskraalDrift. It must have been an anxious night for General French, for had Cronjerealised how small was the force that thus held him at bay, and made adesperate effort to break through, there would have been little chanceof thwarting him. But Cronje lay still in the river bed, while theBritish forces closed swiftly in and the net was drawn closer roundhim. [Page Heading: CRONJE SURRENDERS] For ten long days the Boer General held out, while the Britishartillery poured shells into his laager. Meanwhile the Boers flockedin from every side to endeavour to rescue Cronje from his hopelessposition. French undertook to check them and hold them back, leavingthe main army to deal with the surrounded enemy. General French and his men were in continual action for the next fewdays. But the soldiers gloried in their work, for they were cheered bythe message from Queen Victoria in appreciation of their excellentwork, particularly in the relief of Kimberley, which had earned forthem "the gratitude of the whole nation. " At length, on February 27, Cronje surrendered, and four thousand menlaid down their arms. Thus closed the most brilliant exploit of theBritish Arms in South Africa--an exploit whose success can be largelytraced to the extraordinary mixture of dauntless courage, practicalacumen and remorseless persistence which mark the genius of Sir JohnFrench. FOOTNOTES: [12] _The Cavalry Rush to Kimberley. _ By Captain Cecil Boyle, _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1900. CHAPTER VIII ROUNDING UP THE BOERS French in the Modder--At Bloemfontein--French and the Artist--An Ambush--Doing the Impossible Again--Short Shrift with Barberton Snipers--Some French Stories. To have relieved Kimberley and partially effected the capture of theredoubtable Cronje in the course of a fortnight, was no meanaccomplishment. The average commander would have been content to resthis forces after such exertions. But French is never tired. The veryday that Cronje surrendered news came through that a rescue party wascoming to Cronje's assistance, and already held a hill on thesouth-east of the Modder. Although the river was in flood, as theresult of torrential rains, French forthwith led out two brigades withtheir batteries to make a reconnaissance. In forcing the stream bothFrench and his A. A. G. Very nearly lost their lives. Losing itsfoothold the General's horse took fright and fell, flinging him intothe raging torrent. As the animal strove to recover, it upset Colonel(now Sir Douglas) Haig, who was coming to the rescue, dashing riderand horse into an over-hanging willow tree. Both French and Haigluckily managed to get themselves free from their plunging animals andstruck out for the shore. Dripping but determined, they jumped on tofresh mounts, and advanced in two steamy haloes across the dustyveldt. Of course, not a solitary Boer was in sight for ten miles atleast! [Page Heading: AT POPLAR GROVE] It very quickly transpired, however, that the Boers were stronglyentrenched at Poplar Grove. At their head were French's mostredoubtable opponents in the Colesberg campaign--De Wet and Delarey. For once his old antagonists were able to get back at least a littleof their own. Their position extended across the river and wasprotected by a chain of hills, with kopjes between, not to mention thewired fences, ditches and other wiles in which they excelled. Lord Roberts determined that an attack must be delivered before theenemy had time to recover from the shock of Cronje's surrender. Frenchwas, therefore, ordered to circle round the Boer left flank, thuscutting off his retreat, while the infantry delivered a frontalattack. The result was a compliment to the terrible French and his cavalry. No sooner did the Boers realise that the horsemen were upon them, thanthey beat a hasty retreat. Before the cavalry were in position, theBoers and their wagons could be seen scurrying off for the river. Arm-chair critics at home have strongly criticised French for whatfollowed. They claim that what should have been a rout, ended in anorderly escape. But they forget several factors in the situation. While French's men were urging their spent horses forward to overtakethe enemy, it became obvious that De Wet had very cleverly covered hisretreat. First from a farmhouse in the rear, and, when it was taken, from a low kopje, a small body of men poured forth a hail of bullets. In manoeuvring to take the kopje, the tired cavalry allowed the astuteDe Wet and Delarey to escape with their guns intact. Kruger and Steynalso, who had come up to hearten their followers, got away. Maddening as it was to French to see his old enemy escape through hisfingers like this, the condition of his men and of his horses had tobe taken into account; they were dead beat. For once the manoeuvringof De Wet proved as successful as when it was practised by French atColesberg. Finally the event of the day is attributable to two ofFrench's best qualities--his caution and his extreme parsimony in thematter of human life. A more ruthless leader might possibly havecaptured the Boer guns. But it is extremely doubtful whether he wouldhave taken De Wet, Delarey or any other of the well-mounted Boerleaders. From Poplar Grove the enemy fell back on Driefontein. On March 10, French again drove them, although not without real difficulty, fromtheir stronghold. This accomplished, the army pushed on towardsBloemfontein, which surrendered on March 13. For six weeks the mainbody halted there to rest, but chiefly to obtain remounts for thecavalry. During that time, however, French's men were not idle. Theycontinually patrolled the surrounding country, keeping in constanttouch with the enemy and driving him back for many miles from thetown. [Page Heading: A PAINFUL SITTING] One unhappy afternoon the General spent in sitting for a painter inBloemfontein. It was probably the severest ordeal of the campaign forthat retiring soldier. "General French, " wrote the painter's youngestdaughter, "is quite the shyest man in the British army, and looks lesslike a cavalry officer than you could possibly imagine. He is a heavyman, always looks half-asleep--although who is there more wideawake?--has a very red complexion, grey moustache, thick-set figure, and the last personality in the world to help an artist as a sitter. He promised to sit for the painter, although most characteristicallyhe could not for the life of him think what he had done to be ofsufficient interest for anyone to want to sketch him. At last, after agreat deal of trouble, the painter got him to sit one morning justoutside the club at Bloemfontein. That sitting was the shortest andmost disjointed the painter has ever had. The General sat bolt uprightin a chair, reading his paper upside down through sheer nervousness, and, if he left that chair once, on one excuse or another, he left ita hundred times, coming back looking more thoroughly upset and nervouseach time, until at last he never came back at all. And the painter'sonly chance of sketching him was at the club during dinner!"[13] At last the main army was ready for work again, and on May 1 thetroops moved out of the fever-stricken town. French and his cavalrywere the last to leave, but they overtook Lord Roberts and the mainbody, and led the way to Kroonstad, once again the seat of the FreeState Government. Here by one of his famous turning movements, Frenchcleverly forced the enemy to surrender and give up the keys of thetown. Keeping ahead of Lord Roberts and his forces, he crossed theVaal River and was first at the gates of Johannesburg, which theBritish entered on May 31. [Page Heading: THE GUNS] After two days in the mining city, Lord Roberts' triumphant forcesmoved on their way to Pretoria. French's next task was to cut therailway communications to the north of Pretoria. In carrying this outhe made a wide detour to the west, where his cavalry found themselvesin a treacherous country of kopjes, scrub and menacing gorges, a typeof country most dangerous to mounted men. Anxiously he pushed forwardto reach open country before nightfall (of June 2). But the Boers werebefore him. A sudden hail of Mauser bullets and shells announced anambush. But French was undismayed. "Quietly, in complete mastery ofthe situation, General French gave his orders. 'Make room for theguns, ' passed down the line; and like a fire engine to the rescue, updashed a section of horse artillery and a pom-pom. "[14] Very quicklythe enemy was beaten off, in spite of the fatigue of a thirty-twomile march. No further resistance was met with as the men passedthrough the rich, orange-growing country round Pretoria. On June 4, French had completed his enveloping movement, and taken up hisposition to the north of the town. In the afternoon the cavalrymenlearnt, with no little chagrin, that Lord Roberts had already enteredPretoria. When the efforts to negotiate peace with Botha had failed, French wasinstructed by Lord Roberts to push the Boers east by a turningmovement on their flank, which he would follow by the usual frontalattack on foot. So energetic were the Boers in harassing Lord Roberts'force, that drastic action had become necessary. It proved to be oneof the most difficult enterprises that the cavalry had undertaken. As usually happened the Boers were securely ensconced on ridges, thechief of which was known as Diamond Hill, while our men were condemnedto work round from a level plain open to the enemy's fire. In ordernot to become a series of conspicuous targets, the cavalrymen wereforced to dismount and fight their way up to the ridges on foot. Fortwo days they fought gallantly against a steady fire, until theinfantry's attack on the enemy's other flank gave French his chanceto drive them out. For a third time the plight of his horses finallyforbade his taking full advantage of his success. The Boers weredriven back, but without being severely punished. The ubiquitous DeWet, need one add, showed a clean pair of heels. [Page Heading: A DARING VENTURE] In July, French was in command of the forces operating in EasternTransvaal. There followed a long and arduous march towards the eastwhich, after the capture of Middleburg, ended in the surrender ofBarberton. It was in the beginning of September that French turned hisattention to the enemy's forces collected round the latter town. Hecommenced his operations by circulating reports of an intended actionin the opposite direction. While the Boers prepared to meet this hewas able to reach Carolina with comparative ease. Here he remained forthree days in order to prepare for a flanking movement againstBarberton. As he must cut himself off entirely from sources of supply, such preparation was very necessary. French was about to attempt oneof the most daring achievements of his career. He was going to takemounted men over a miniature Alps. The Boers were prepared for hisattacking Barberton from every direction save one. They never supposedfor a moment that the British troops would attempt to force theNelshoogte Pass. For what did it mean? The scaling of precipitousheights, and the passage along narrow ledges of men, horses and guns. It would have been a difficult task for mountaineers, far less forheavily burdened cavalrymen. French, however, was determined to do the impossible "once more. " Hewould repeat the miracle of Coles Kop on a titanic scale. Accordingly, after a day's hard fighting, he rested his men for a night near theentrance to the pass. On the following morning, the enemy havingdisappeared, the advance was sounded. Up a narrow path, whose gradientwas frequently one in four, the men crawled, often on hands and knees, while their horses stumbled on behind. Frequently they were scalingtowering crags several hundred feet in height, from which there wassometimes a sheer fall of over a thousand feet. In teams of sixteenthe oxen panted, struggled and frequently perished in the attempt todrag the heavy guns up the fearful incline. Only a man of indomitablecourage would have attempted such a feat. But French lost not a singleman in the process. Perhaps the division's perfect belief in his luckdid something towards nerving the men for the ordeal. The top of the pass once reached, French determined to make a suddendescent on Barberton. Taking a leaf out of the Boers' book, he leftthe whole of his baggage behind to lighten the horses, and rushed hismen towards the town. On descending the other side of the pass thesoldiers had still to lead their horses, who were as often on theirhaunches as their feet. Barberton and the Boers saw the oncoming ofthe British force with blank amazement. It was the last thing in theworld they expected. The Boer Commando in possession, six hundredstrong, had just time to escape from one end of the town as Frenchentered it at the other. [Page Heading: A WAY WITH SNIPERS] Enraged at the surprise that had been sprung on them, the Boerscommenced sniping the town from various vantage points in thevicinity. But French knew how to treat the sniper. The followingnotice was immediately dashed off by the local printing press andposted all over the town. TO THE INHABITANTS OF BARBERTON. This is to give notice that if any Shooting into the Town or Sniping in its vicinity takes place, the Lieutenant-General Commanding will withdraw the Troops, and shell the Town without further notice. By order, D. HAIG, Lt. -Col. Chief Staff Officer to Lt. -General French. _September 15, 1900. _ The sniping stopped forthwith. One of the first things that French did was to go and personallyrescue his old enemy, Schoeman, from the local jail. That worthy, having surrendered, had come into bad odour with his fellowcountrymen. In consequence he had been incarcerated at Barberton. Foronce the unfortunate Schoeman was glad to see the face of his oldenemy again! French rested his forces in Barberton for three weeks, leaving thetown on October 3. The march back to Pretoria was, if anything, moretrying than the adventurous dash to Barberton had been. Apart from thetrying climb over the heights of the Kaapsche Hoop, and the eternalsniping of the Boers, the weather now brought new sufferings. The menwere exhausted by days of heat, and soaked by nights of torrentialrain. It was a thoroughly tired and jaded force which finally reachedPretoria on November 3. One incident of that trying march shows how ably French dealt withBoer bluff. The enemy had made prisoner a captain of the R. A. M. C, andsent a message that they would shoot him unless General French pledgedhis word that he would burn no Boer farms. French replied that unlessthe captured medical officer were brought into the British camp nextmorning, he would burn the town of Bethel to the ground; and, if hewere shot, ten Boer prisoners would be similarly put to death. Thedoctor was brought into camp next morning. [Page Heading: LORD ROBERTS' RETURN] In inspecting the cavalry on their return, Lord Roberts expressed hishigh appreciation of French's work and informed him that, whileretaining his cavalry command, he had been appointed to the command ofJohannesburg and district. At the end of the month Lord Roberts returned to England to takecommand of the Home Forces; and several months elapsed before Frenchwas able actively to take up that long rounding-up of the Boers whichKitchener was now planning in such elaborate detail. During the earlypart of 1901 he was able to clear the Boers out of the centraldistrict of Cape Colony. On June 8 he took supreme command of theoperations in that Colony, and by November he had confined the enemyto its north-eastern and south-western extremities. Not until Midsummer, 1902, was French able to return home. Before thathe had spent some time recruiting his health in Cape Town. Very eagerwere the loyal citizens to fête the most successful of all the BritishGenerals. But French would have no banqueting on his account. The war, he characteristically explained, was not yet ended, and so long as itwas in progress he was not inclined to accept any public hospitality. Anything like show or ostentation is foreign to French's whole nature. If there are few stories of his exploits in South Africa, there liesthe reason. He is far too modest a man to prepare _bons mots_ orpretty _jeux d'esprit_ for public consumption. Also he is by nature asilent man. His silence is not the detached, Olympian and ratherominous silence of Kitchener. It proceeds simply from a naturalmodesty and reticence, which reinforce his habitual tendency to "thinkthings over. " He is the type of man whom hostesses have to "draw out";he never talks either on himself, the army or any other subject. To"do his job" better than anybody else in the world could do it isenough for French; chatter about it he leaves to less busy people. His habitual taciturnity, curiously enough, is one of the traits whichendears him to the army. For French's silence has no trait ofchurlishness. It is the silence of a man utterly absorbed in the taskbefore him, the man whom Tommy Atkins admires. "If the British soldierlikes one thing in a General more than another, " wrote a soldier whoserved with French in South Africa, "it is the golden gift of silence, especially when joined to straight action, just to distinguish himfrom the old women of both sexes. Whenever French penned a dispatch, or an order, or a proclamation, he wasted no ink and strained no pennibs; but he never penned anything if there was a way of doing thething himself. "[15] [Page Heading: A SHIRT-SLEEVED GENERAL] In South Africa he earned the title of "the shirt-sleeved General, "--asoubriquet that conveys a subtle compliment from Tommy's point ofview. Actually French was often to be seen walking about in campduring his heavy marches in shirt-sleeves. One afternoon acorrespondent rode up to the lines, and seeing a soldier sitting on abundle of hay, smoking a dilapidated looking old briar pipe, askedwhere the General was. "The old man is somewhere about, " coollyreplied the soldier. "Well, just hold my horse while I go and searchfor him. " "Certainly, sir, " and the smoker rose obediently and tookthe bridle. "Can you tell me where the General is?" inquired thecorrespondent of a staff officer further down the line. "GeneralFrench? oh, he's somewhere about. Why, there he is, holding thathorse's head!" And the officer pointed directly to the smoker, stilltranquilly pulling at his pipe, and holding the horse! Needless to say"Uncle French" and his men hugely enjoyed the correspondent'sawakening. Such a man is bound to be the idol of the ranks. "What a good leaderGeneral French is, " wrote Driver Payne, of the Royal Horse Artillery, to a friend. "He seems so cool at excitable moments; he does not losehis head and rush his men into danger. In fact, he always looks beforehe leaps, and when he does leap, he makes us move--and the Boers too. "Perhaps French was best summed-up one day by a trooper whom, in a curtword, he had just sentenced to barracks for some offence. "The Generaldon't bark much, " he remarked, "but, crikey, don't he know how tobite!" FOOTNOTES: [13] _M. A. P. _, August 25, 1900. [14] _With General French and his Cavalry in South Africa. _ By C. S. Goldman. By permission of Messrs. Macmillan & Co. , Ltd. [15] _The Regiment_, September 5, 1914. CHAPTER IX WORK AT HOME AND RESIGNATION At Aldershot--Driving Training at High Pressure--General French is "fairly" well pleased--Strenuous Manoeuvres--Chief of the Imperial General Staff--Ulster and Resignation. With Lord Kitchener, General French had a wonderful welcome on hisreturn from South Africa. The former had certainly added a few leavesto his laurel wreath, but French brought back a complete new crown ofhis own. His return home in July was a triumphal progress. AtSouthampton, in replying to congratulations, he paid a fine tribute tohis men. French's hatred of ostentation in any form prevented him from allowingSociety to fête him to its heart's content. He was the most retiringof lions; and, like Kitchener, he allowed London to idolise him onlyat a distance. A knighthood was one reward of his services; and aftera brief rest he was back at Aldershot as Lieutenant-General incommand. For the first time French found himself in command of all arms of theservice in time of peace. After his arrival, instruction was driven athigh pressure. No sooner had he arrived than he turned out the wholeof his command--"just to see how they looked!" Such a thing hadscarcely ever happened before; and the order sent desolation to thehearts of some of the officers. For it meant that the whole force, every man, horse and gun had to turn out forthwith, in full marchingorder, and ready for action. After the first feverish digging out ofaccoutrements and tents, however, the men became hardened to thesesudden alarums and excursions. They became a part of the programme. The cavalry especially was trained to an extraordinary degree ofperfection. The most rigorous methods in use abroad were used andbettered. The result was the production of a body of men who, likeWellington's heroes of Torres Vedras, "were ready to go anywhere anddo anything. " [Page Heading: "FAIRLY" WELL PLEASED] In December, 1907, French was appointed Inspector-General of theForces. In this extremely exacting office, his qualities ofthoroughness and grip had splendid scope. A glance at his commentsdiscloses the high standard of excellence which he exacted from everybranch of the service. Only the other day timid folk were bewailinghis methods at manoeuvres. Four horses had succumbed to a gruellingday of fierce exertion. But French expressed himself as "wellpleased. " One does not remember his ever going farther up the giddyincline of the superlatives. Probably his exacting eye never yet metthe corps of his dream. He had a terrible word with which he was wontto emphasise the fact of disenchantment. How often did one read"General French expressed himself as 'fairly' well pleased with whathe saw"? A withering qualitative. French was determined to infuse thewhole army with his own professional love of efficiency. To that endhe phrased his judgments with extraordinary care. His remarks were asnicely aimed and as carefully timed as his cavalry charges. Nor didthey lack shattering force on occasion. After five years of "tuning up" the army, French took command of itsadministration. In 1912 he was appointed Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff, a body formed on the lines of the efficient German GeneralStaff. Of the nature and value of the reforms instituted under hisdirection it is too early yet to speak. Suffice it to say that in theEuropean War they have met the almost intolerable strain with signalsuccess. For once we presented to the Continent the unparalleledspectacle of a War Office "ready for action. " In particular Sir John French encouraged originality of thought amonghis officers by frankly seeking critical contributions for a newservice journal, and by putting various opportunities for individualenterprise in their way. In the midst of these invaluable if slightly uncongenialadministrative activities, Sir John French was brought to a tragicstandstill. A political intrigue cut across his soldier's life, andended its usefulness for the time being. At this early date it isextremely difficult to disentangle the rights and wrongs of the Goughincident. But there is no need to enter into the political aspect ofthe case here. Suffice it to deplore the sticky mess of party politicswhich threatened to gulf a great career. [Page Heading: THE ULSTER CRISIS] In the month of March the Government believed that they had seriousreason to expect disturbance in Ireland. Accordingly, General SirArthur Paget was summoned to the War Office to consult his militarychiefs. Apparently, General Paget was instructed--so far as can begathered in the absence of documentary evidence--to lay before hisofficers a certain choice of action. He accordingly called a meetingof his officers, whom he informed that "Active operations were to bebegun against Ulster; that he expected the country to be in a blaze bySaturday (March 21); and that he was instructed by the War Office toallow officers domiciled in Ulster to disappear, but as regards othersthat any who resigned would be dismissed. " The officers were given twohours to make their decision. Out of a total of 72 officers in theBrigade, 59 "would, respectfully, and under protest, " prefer to bedismissed, while five claimed exemption on the ground of beingdomiciled in Ulster. A few days later it was explained on behalf of the Government that nooperations were intended against Ulster, and that through "an honestmisunderstanding" General Paget had misinterpreted his instructions. Brigadier-General Gough was therefore asked to return to his command, finally obtaining a written undertaking, signed by the Secretary ofState for War, that the troops would not be used in Ulster. Inaddition to Colonel Seely's signature, that of the Chief of theImperial General Staff (Sir John French) and of the Adjutant-General(Sir J. S. Ewart) appeared on the memorandum. Now it transpired that two important paragraphs of the memorandum werewritten by Colonel Seely, but presumably they were not sanctioned bythe Cabinet. The paragraphs in question ran: "His Majesty's Governmentmust retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to maintain law and order, and to support the CivilPower in the ordinary execution of its duty. "But they had no intention whatever of taking advantage of this rightto crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the HomeRule Bill. " As they stand these two paragraphs are a trifle ambiguous. The factapparently occurred to General Gough. For he asked Sir John Frenchexplicitly whether they could be taken to mean that he could not becalled upon to order his brigade to take part in the coercion ofUlster to the Home Rule Bill. Sir John French wrote across the notethat this was his belief. On the strength of this General Goughreturned to his command. [Page Heading: A QUESTION OF HONOUR] When the facts of the case were known, the Government were severelycriticised by the Labour and the Nationalist parties. In replying tothese criticisms, on Wednesday, this pledge was declared to be "notoperative. " As the result, Colonel Seely, who had signed theassurance, threatened resignation. On Friday, March 26, it was knownthat both Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart had resigned theirpositions. Every effort was made to induce these distinguishedofficers to reconsider their decision, but without avail. To remain inoffice would mean repudiating their pledged word. To this course nopossible pressure could induce Sir John French to agree. He persistedin his resignation: and the Prime Minister solved a very dangeroussituation by himself taking up the office of Minister of War, whichColonel Seely had now resigned. So Sir John French went for a second time into retirement. Nothingless could be expected of one whose views on discipline are soextremely strict and whose ideals of loyalty are notoriously so high. To have remained in office would have been to impair the authority ofthe Imperial General Staff, quite apart from failing in loyalty to apledged word. For all these reasons Sir John French chose eclipserather than dishonour. Unquestionably he viewed the _impasse_ purely from the military pointof view. His dislike of anything like politics in the army is wellknown. Mr. Asquith's famous dictum on taking up the office ofSecretary for War is an echo of General French's invariable advice tohis officers--"You will hear no politics from me, and I expect tohear none from you. " What his attitude towards the officers at the Curragh was in the firstinstance, is a matter of mere surmise. It has been said that he wouldpersonally have dealt very sharply with those concerned. But suchstatements obviously lack authority. Sir John French is much toodiscreet an officer to babble his views abroad on such a point. All weknow is that at the time he strongly deprecated politics in the armyin several speeches of considerable force. A psychological problem inarmy feeling was closely bound up with the issue. It is enough toemphasise the fact that Sir John French is himself no politician anddid what he did because his honour demanded nothing less. [Page Heading: A HOLIDAY] For four months the most energetic man in the Army was able torusticate. Actually nothing ever fell out more happily than thisenforced holiday. His duties during the past few years had necessarilybeen extremely exhausting. He had rarely had time for the rest andrelaxation that make for physical and mental freshness. Now he gavehimself to the walking, the riding and the yachting he so keenlyenjoys, and so rarely indulges in. For the General has, at least, taken the love of the water from his otherwise tedious days in theNavy. He is an expert yachtsman and has explored a large part of theBritish coast at one time or another. Riding and hunting are, however, the only sports he now takes very seriously. He rides a great dealduring his busiest days at home, running down from London to the Manorat Waltham Cross for the purpose when occasion permits. Until the beginning of August, Sir John French was able to revel inhis new found freedom. When the call came, it found him feeling betterand fitter than he had done for years. Perhaps even political intrigueserves a purpose in the game of the War Gods. CHAPTER X HIS BELIEF IN CAVALRY The Lessons of the Boer War--Cavalry _v. _ Mounted Infantry--A Plea for the Lance--The Cavalry Spirit--Shock Tactics still Useful. It does not necessarily follow that because a man is a great cavalryleader, he therefore has ideas on the subject of cavalry. To thepopular mind cavalry suggests clouds of dust and a clatter of hoofs, the flashing of swords, followed by the crash and sound of anengagement. The man who would conduct this imagined spectaclesatisfactorily would therefore be dependent rather on the timelyuprush of the spirit than on the mechanical certainty of the mind. Hewould need to act by inspiration and impulse, rather than by coldthought. Quite obviously some other and less resplendent being wouldhave to time the rise of his curtain in the theatre of war. He wouldbe the last man whom one would figure, like Kipling's successfulGeneral, "worrying himself bald" over a map and compasses. [Page Heading: THEORY AND PRACTICE] But the popular version does less than justice to the modern cavalryleader in general and to French in particular. We have seen him as asubaltern poring over his books before his colleagues were out of bed. We have seen him varying the monotony of War Office administration bysolving problems in tactics. Indubitably he is a student: incidentallyhe is an innovator. This fact of mental duality raises him in a momentout of the ruck of mere cavalry experts--of both sorts. On the onehand he is not a competent machine working out other people's ideas inthe field of battle: on the other he is no blundering theorist whoseideas crumple into ineffectual dust under the stress of actualwarfare. He can carry out with the ardour of the soldier the schemeswhich he has formulated with the cold cunning of the strategist. It isdifficult indeed to say in which field of cavalry work he more greatlyexcels--that of theory or practice. We shall see later that hepossesses qualities altogether apart from those of the theoriser orthe man of action. Suffice it now to glance at the astonishinglycomplete theory of cavalry on which his marvellous execution isfounded. One reaches the bedrock of French's curiously sane conception of warwhen one asks him to define war. In dealing with those gentlemen whotell us that the Boer War was fought under such abnormal conditionsthat it is useless as a ground-work for conclusions as to future wars, he uttered a memorable retort. "All wars are abnormal, " he observed, "because there is no such thing as normal war. "[16] There we have oneof the axioms both of his theory and of his practice. There can be nofixed conditions, and so there can be no final theories as to theconduct of warfare. Theory is simply a means to an end. And thesuccessful general is he who most ably adapts the general body oftheory suitable for all cases to the particular campaign on which heis engaged. [Page Heading: A VEXED QUESTION] Broadly, however, French has very clearly defined what he considers tobe the use and the abuse of cavalry. After the Boer War, as is wellknown, opinion on the subject of the future of the mounted arm wasbitterly divided. There were those who saw in French's success ajustification for the cavalrymen of the old school, armed _cap à pie_. There were others who, like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, saw the end oftheir day approaching. The author of _The Great Boer War_ says of thecharge before Kimberley: "It appears to have been one of the very fewoccasions during the campaign when that obsolete and absurd weapon thesword was anything but a dead weight to its bearer. " And again: "Thewar has been a cruel one for the cavalry. .. . It is difficult to saythat cavalry, as cavalry, have justified their existence. In theopinion of many the tendency of the future will be to convert thewhole forces into mounted infantry. .. . A little training in takingcover, leggings instead of boots, and a rifle instead of a carbine, would give us a formidable force of 20, 000 men who could do all thatour cavalry does, and a great deal more besides. .. . The lesson both ofthe South African and of the American Civil War is that the lighthorseman who is trained to fight on foot is the type of thefuture. "[17] This is the opinion of a very competent civilian whodeeply studied the South African campaign. But it is the opinion of acivilian. On the other hand many experts, most of them military men, insist thatthe day of shock tactics is far from done. They instance the chargebefore Kimberley as a case in point. Obviously all the elements ofdisaster were there. Only a brilliant use of the traditional cavalryattack saved the situation--and Kimberley. Situations of that sortare bound to arise again. How is the mounted infantryman, lacking the_elan_ and spirit of the cavalryman, to meet the situation? [Page Heading: TOO MUCH CAUTION] French takes an attitude somewhat midway between these two extremes. He, of all men, has developed cavalry most successfully on what mightbe called mounted infantry lines. That is to say, he has taught hismen to fight on foot, to take cover at every opportunity, and tomaster the whole art of reconnaissance. But at the same time, heobjects to extremist[18] views as to the abolition of the cavalryspirit. "One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publiclycommented upon that campaign have said that what is termed the'Cavalry Spirit' is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. Theyhold that the cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding theend instead of the means. They consider that events in the Far Eastteach us that we must render our cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres'and to 'tournaments, ' in order to enable them to fit themselves totake part in modern fighting; that the times have come when themethods of warfare should be changed; and that the cavalry mustdetermine to defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely. "I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in EuropeanArmies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convincedthat the Cavalry Spirit is, and may be encouraged to the utmost, without in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismountedduties or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part ofleaders as will enable them to discern when and where to resort todismounted methods. "How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy'sCavalry is defeated and paralysed? I challenge any Cavalry officer, British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as suchagainst its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it isproficient in shock tactics. "Cavalry soldiers must, of course, learn to be expert rifle shots, butthe attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer byignoring the horse, the sword or the lance. On the contrary, the_elan_ and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvres imparts tolarge bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in theiremployment as mounted rifle-men when the field is laid open to theirenterprise in this rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry. That theCavalry on both sides in the recent war did not distinguishthemselves or their Arm, is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quiteapparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, theriding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hencewere only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry, which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on theRussian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have beentrained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers nowadvocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought ofnothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence theylamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a displayof the highest form of Cavalry spirit. " On the other hand Sir John French protests against the tendency to_ultra-caution_ in handling cavalry at manoeuvres. The cavalry chargeis always a risk. The risk taken by the Field-Marshal, for instance, when he ordered the famous charge which won him the way to Kimberley, would certainly have been regarded as fatal at official manoeuvres. Itis absurd, he insists, that the umpires should call on cavalry tosurrender the moment that they come face to face with an infantryfire. Such a moment may be the cavalry's great opportunity. [Page Heading: VIEWS ON CAVALRY] Many of the modern armies, he holds, are suffering from cavalrywithout confidence. And there is abundant evidence to justify thecharge. Bernhardi has pointed out that the phenomenal successes of theGerman cavalry in the war of 1870-1 were due not to its ownextraordinary valour, but to the absence of opposition on the part ofthe French. Von Moltke made a similar criticism (which Sir John Frenchapproves) on the Prussian cavalry after the war of 1866. "Our cavalryfailed, " he wrote, "perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed atmanoeuvres, where criticism and blame had been almost synonymous, andit therefore shirked independent bold action, and kept far in therear, and as much as possible out of sight. " French, in fact, is convinced that the "cavalry battle" is by no meansa thing of the past. Until the enemy's cavalry is overthrown, the workof the mounted infantryman cannot begin. So long as opposing countriestrain efficient cavalry, the clash of the rival horsemen is theinevitable preliminary of any campaign. At the same time his views on the specialisation of training are farfrom extreme. The cavalry spirit must be encouraged: but it must notbe permitted to overshadow that wider _camaraderie_ which is the Armyspirit. "It is not only possible but necessary, " he says, "to preachthe Army spirit, or, in other words, the close comradeship of all armsin battle, and at the same time to develop the highest qualities andthe special attributes of each branch. The particular spirit which weseek to encourage is different for each arm. Were we to seek to endowcavalry with the tenacity and stiffness of infantry, or to take fromthe mounted arm the mobility and the cult of the offensive which arethe breath of its life, we should ruin not only the cavalry, but theArmy besides. Those who scoff at the spirit, whether of cavalry, ofartillery, or of infantry, are people who have had no practicalexperience of the actual training of troops in peace, or of thepersonal leadership in war. Such men are blind guides indeed. "[19] For cavalry, then, Sir John French sees a brilliant future. "Theopinion which I hold and have often expressed is that the _true rôleof cavalry on the battlefield is to reconnoitre, to deceive and tosupport_. If the enemy's cavalry has been overthrown, the rôle ofreconnaissance will have been rendered easier. In the rôles ofdeception and support, such an immense and fruitful field ofusefulness and enterprise is laid open to a cavalry division which hasthought out and practised these rôles in its peace training, and isaccustomed to act in large bodies dismounted, that I cannot bringmyself to believe that any equivalent for such manifest advantages canbe found even in the most successful raid against the enemy'scommunications by mounted troops. "[20] [Page Heading: A HISTORIC PHRASE] How brilliantly Sir John French trained his men to accomplish thesemultiple activities, recent history has shown. We may note in passing, however, that mechanics have now divested the cavalry of one of theirchief functions. The aeroplane is now the eye of the army and thestrategical rôle of the cavalry is no more. The mounted arm willalmost certainly now be confined to screening operations and to shocktactics, after the opposing armies have come into touch with oneanother. History, therefore, has obviously justified Sir John Frenchin his championship of the cavalry spirit. Without it his horsemenwould have been no match for the German cavalry. Thanks to theirtraining, they "went through the Uhlans like brown paper" in GeneralSir Philip Chetwode's historic phrase. FOOTNOTES: [16] Sir John French's Preface to _Cavalry_ by General von Bernhardi. By permission of Messrs. Hugh Rees, Ltd. , and Messrs. Hodder &Stoughton. [17] _The Great Boer War_, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. By permission ofMessrs. Smith, Elder & Co. [18] Sir John French's Preface to _Cavalry in Future Wars_, by Generalvon Bernhardi. By permission of Mr. John Murray. [19] From Sir John French's Introduction to _Cavalry_, by General F. Von Bernhardi, by permission of Mr. Hugh Rees and Messrs. Hodder &Stoughton. [20] From Sir John French's Introduction to _Cavalry_, by General F. Von Bernhardi, by permission of Mr. Hugh Rees and Messrs. Hodder &Stoughton. CHAPTER XI THE MODERN MARLBOROUGH Europe's Need--The Plight of France--A Delicate Situation--The Man of "Grip"--A Magnificent Retreat. On August 4, Great Britain woke up to find herself engaged in one ofthe most terrific contests in history. Out of an assassination atSerajevo had sprung a European war. In demanding apologies for thedeath of its Archduke, Austria-Hungary, with the connivance ofGermany, refused to be conciliated with the most adequate apologiesoffered by Servia. The result was a protest from Russia, which woulddoubtless have allayed the situation, but for the aggressive attitudedictated to Vienna from Berlin. In the sequel Great Britain foundherself arrayed with Russia and France against the Austro-Germanicforces. The question arose as to who should lead the English expeditionaryforce so sorely needed to stem the tide of the German legions as itrolled over an outraged Belgium and an unprepared France. There wasnever any doubt as to whom the great task should be entrusted. SirJohn French was obviously the man for the task. [Page Heading: A CAPABLE STAFF] Fate pointed to him not only as the greatest active military leader inthis country, but as the one man possessing the peculiar qualitiescalled for in this campaign. There may be more brilliant intellects inthe army, but there is no other such leader of men. This campaign wasbound to be a long, a hazardous and a delicate enterprise. It calledfor a man of extraordinary grip and pertinacity of purpose. Thesequalities French possesses to a marked degree. He has also the powerof sensing ability in other men. In South Africa he was able tosurround himself with one of the ablest General Staffs in Europe. French's extraordinary rapidity of thought, his lightning decisions, and his masterly grip of the most complex situation, allied withlieutenants competent to undertake the most difficult operations whichhe may suggest, provides a combination probably unequalled in history. In another respect French is peculiarly suited to the onerous taskimposed upon him. His innate sense of loyalty makes him a colleague ofrare qualities. On the face of it the British commander's positioncalled for very great tact. It was delicate almost to a distressingdegree. Allied commanders have always to struggle with the teasingelement of friction. Sir John French eliminated that at the outset. Even more difficult was the problem of seniority. General Joffre, whois French's superior, is his inferior in rank, not being aField-Marshal. Here was a situation teeming with difficulties. Theslightest clumsiness on the British Commander's part would have causeda crisis. There were no crises, because French is a diplomatist aswell as a soldier. No sooner had the British army fairly landed on French soil than itwas faced with the worst trial of war--a prolonged and perilousretreat before overwhelming odds. But Sir John French knew all thatwas to be known of the scientific retreat. Had he not seen it thirtyyears ago on an Egyptian desert, and practised its every form time andagain on the African veldt? In four days the British force covered 60miles in orderly and aggressive retreat, without once giving way toconfusion or disorder. The men who had been with French in SouthAfrica, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and General Sir Douglas Haig, had the situation in hand from the first. The retreat was a triumphfor the British army, and particularly for the cavalry which Frenchhad trained. Nor was its route that desired by the German HeadquartersStaff. Through the vigour of his cavalry charges, French was able todictate his own line of retreat. He had held his position long enoughto save the French left wing; and he had retreated in order before aforce five times that of his own. [Page Heading: SPLENDID PRAISE] French's old South African commander, Lord Roberts, was particularlystruck by the retreat from Mons. He expressed his admiration in thefollowing remarkable letter to Lady French: _12 Sept. , 1914. _ MY DEAR LADY FRENCH, I write these few lines to tell you how much I admire your husband's Dispatch, and how proud I am of the splendid work done by the troops under his command. When the whole story of the war comes to be known, the masterly way in which the Retreat from Mons--under vastly superior numbers--was carried out, will be remembered as one of the finest military exploits ever achieved. .. . [21] I trust you will continue to get good news of Sir John, and that you are keeping well yourself. With kindest regards, in which Lady Roberts and my daughters join, Believe me, Yours sincerely, (_Signed_) ROBERTS, (F. -M. ). That was only the first chapter in the story of his new achievements. The authentic history of his latest successes remains to be written. The French, however, were not wrong in dubbing the BritishField-Marshal "the modern Marlborough. " For French belongs to the samedogged, cautious school as Marlborough and Wellington. His genius isone of those which include an infinite capacity for taking pains. Indeed his thoroughness is more than Teutonic. In this war, Frenchhas, so far, found no Napoleon to fight. It is, indeed, questionablewhether the Germans have a commander of his excellence on the field. But the preparations of the German Headquarters Staff may be admittedto be Napoleonic in their elaborate and far-seeing perfection. Yettime and again, as in the Napoleonic wars, they have gone down beforea British General who unites the dash of von Roon with the caution andthe prescience of Moltke. FOOTNOTES: [21] Published by courtesy of Lady French and Earl Roberts. CHAPTER XII FRENCH, THE MAN A Typical Englishman--Fighting at School--Napoleon Worship--"A Great Reporter"--Halting Speeches and Polished Prose. A South African Coincidence--Mrs. Despard and the Newsboy--The Happy Warrior. So far, this book has necessarily been chiefly a record of events. That was inevitable, for the man of action writes his story in deeds. Nor was there ever a great soldier who made less clamour in the worldof newspapers than General French. He has never adopted the studiedreticence of Kitchener nor yet the chill aloofness of certain of hiscolleagues. War correspondents are not anathema to him; neither doeshe shudder at the sight of the reporter's pencil. Yet, somehow, fewanecdotes cluster round his name. Perhaps that is because his modesty is not a pose, although it hasbecome almost a tradition. It is simply a natural trait in a modestand rather retiring disposition. French simply will not be talkedabout--and there is an end of the matter. If one were asked to describe the man, one might best answer that heis the Englishman to the _n_th. Degree. It is usual to find that theman of extraordinary merit is in some degree a contrast with and acriticism of the mere average mortal of his set. The dour urbanity ofKitchener, for instance, is Oriental rather than English, andcontrasts strangely with the choleric tradition of the army officer. So the infinite alertness and constant good humour of Roberts has aquality of Latin _esprit_ very foreign to the English temperament. Butthere are no such peculiarities about French. He is the very essenceof healthy normality. Yet, although of Celtic descent, he is essentially English. He has nothacked his way to fame in the manner of the Scot, nor has he leaptupon her pedestal with the boisterous humour of the Irishman. He hasgot there in the dogged but sporting English way, taking Fortune'sgifts when they came, but never pushing or scrambling for them whenthey were out of reach. One catches the spirit of the man in the schoolboy. When he first wentto school at Harrow, the boys, knowing that sisters had beenresponsible for his education, were prepared to take it out of him. But as French was ready to fight at the slightest provocation, andequally ready to swear eternal friendship when the fight was done, hequickly won his way through respect to popularity. [Page Heading: AN ADMIRER OF NAPOLEON] Despite this quality, the steadfast object of his admiration has beenone of the most abnormal and theatrical figures in history--Napoleon. It is, however, Napoleon the soldier and not the personality that hasattracted French, who, by the way, possesses a wonderful collection ofNapoleonic relics. He sees Napoleon as the greatest strategist theworld has known. As such the Corsican claims his unstinted admiration:but there his admiration stops. For French is altogether humane. Thereis nothing of the iron heel about either his methods or his manners. His extreme parsimony of life we have seen as the cause of the onlycriticism which has ever been levelled against him. By a strange coincidence, however, his worship of Napoleon has proveditself invaluable in an unexpected way. In following Napoleon'scampaigns out in detail, French had traversed every inch of Waterloo, and much of the Belgian battle-ground in the European war. There canbe little doubt that the success of some of his work has been due tohis detailed knowledge of the scene of operations. Inevitably, perhaps, French suggests Napoleon in certain subtle traitsof character rather than in personality. His rapidity of thought, forinstance, has probably rarely been equalled, since Napoleon set Europeby the ears. An officer under his command in South Africa, hasrecorded how, day after day, for weeks on end, French would answer themost intricate questions on policy and tactics over the telephone withscarcely a moment's delay. Such inhuman speed and accuracy of decisionlink French with the greatest commanders of history. There is just a suggestion of Napoleon too, in his habitual attitudes. He usually stands with legs wide apart and arms folded either acrosshis chest or clasped behind his back. But the perfect cheerfulness ofhis smile banishes any fear of Corsican churlishness of manner. It isvery certain that French is not feared by his staff: he is worshippedby them. The reason for that is not far to seek. Although his temperis irascible, it is not enduring. Often it will flash out in wrathfulwords, but the storm is quickly over. Men of this choleric temper arealways beloved, for good humour inevitably underlies the ebullitionsof so light a rage. They never nurse hatreds nor brood over trifles. Also they are healthily impervious to the wiles of flattery or thesnare of favouritism. There is nothing of the jealous and erraticgenius about French. To read his dispatches is to find praise lavishlygiven to subordinates but no mention of self. For he looks after hisassistants and leaves his own record to fate. He has, indeed, masteredthe art of being great enough to allow others to be great. Hence theexcellence which always marks his General Staff. [Page Heading: THE SOLDIERS' IDOL] Such qualities must inevitably endear a General to his officers, tothe men who have to bear the brunt of their Chief's personality. Butdo they appeal to the private? Both Napoleon and Wellingtonindubitably took immense pains to surround themselves with a shroud ofmystery. Under their dark mantles, the ranks must feel, lay buried thetalisman of success. We know that his officers found "the sight ofWellington's long nose on a frosty morning worth another ten thousandmen" to them. Sir John French has cultivated neither a nose, nor afrown, nor even a chin. How does he manage to be the idol of his men?it may be asked. Simply and solely by being himself. Without any ofthe meretricious arts of the personality-monger, he has impressed hispersonality on the troops in a most memorable way. This is largely dueto the impression of quiet confidence which he always gives. You feelyou are safe with French. Nothing, you know, will ever upset the coolsanity of his reasoning, the balanced decision of his judgments. Thisimpression of certainly is strengthened by the distinctly masterfulcarriage of the man. His short, stocky figure, like General Grant's, suggests that fatigue is unknown to him. This is indeed the case. Thestory has often been told of how the General and his staff oncedecided, after an exhausting day, to spend the night in a lonely farmin South Africa. The house only boasted one bed, which was of course, reserved for the General. But French insisted on a tired member of hisstaff occupying the solitary mattress, and wrapping himself up in arug, went contentedly to sleep on the floor. His mind is as tireless as his body. The operations round Colesbergcould only have been undertaken in their complicated entirety by aGeneral who did not know what mental fatigue meant. This physical andmental fitness French has most carefully studied to preserve. At onetime, several years ago, he feared a tendency to avoirdupois, andinstantly undertook a stern but successful bulk-reducing regimen. Apropos the regimen there is a story. Just before the present war, abulky package was one day delivered to him at his club. French openedit negligently, expecting to discover the inevitable knick-knack ofdoubtful utility. But this was not the usual gift. It was a package ofweight-reducing preparations. [Page Heading: AN INDEPENDENT THINKER] French's mind, however, is original as well as tireless. Just therelies the unique quality of his gifts. The art of war is necessarilyone of the most highly systematised and therefore the most hide-boundin the world. No man is more perilously in danger of having his mindswathed in red tape and numbed by discipline than the soldier. Inmodern times the tendency to employ masses has not lessened thetendency to stereotype habits of thought. The danger of the mechanicalsoldier is stressed by no one more forcibly than by General vonBernhardi. He holds that a self-reliant personality is as essential asa profound knowledge of generalship to the modern commander. Frenchpossesses both. Although profoundly versed in all the doctrines of theschoolmen, he is never afraid to jump over the traces where they wouldlead to a precipice. He has never been hampered, as so many soldiersare, by his studies. Knowledge he has always used as a means to anend, which is its proper vocation. To this independence of mind, as tonothing else, may be attributed his phenomenal success amid theabnormal conditions of Boer warfare. Where the books end, French'sactive mind begins to construct its own "way out" of the corner. The Boers were indeed the first to admit his superiority to the otherEnglish officers, if not to themselves. De Wet was once asked in theearly stages of the war how long he expected to avoid capture. Hereplied, with a smile, that it all depended on which General wasdispatched to run him down. When a certain name was mentioned, thereply was "Till eternity. " General B---- was next mentioned. "Abouttwo years, " was the verdict. "And General French?" "Two weeks, "admitted De Wet. French has, of course, never accepted social life in this country onits face value. The young officer who was studying when his friendswere at polo or tennis, was under no illusions as to the havoc whichan over-accentuation of the sporting and social side of life wasplaying with the officers' work. Nowadays, like Kitchener, he is benton producing the professional and weeding out the "drawing-room"soldier. No wonder that his favourite authors are those acutestcritics of English social life and English foibles, Dickens andThackeray. The former's "Bleak House" and the latter's "Book ofSnobs" are the two books he places first in his affections. [Page Heading: A GREAT REPORTER] He is himself a writer of parts. We are, ourselves, so close to theevent he describes, that we are perhaps unable to appreciate theliterary excellence of the despatches which French has sent us on theoperations in France. A Chicago paper hails him, however, as "a greatreporter. " "No one can read his reports, " the writer remarks, "withoutbeing struck with his weighty lucidity, his calm mastery of theimportant facts, the total absence of any attempt at 'effect, ' and theremarkably suggestive bits of pertinent description. " Undoubtedly, the Americans are right--provided that these dispatcheswere actually penned by the General himself. His speeches may be obvious and even trite; his letters may lack anyflavour of personality; but these dispatches are literature. Like hishero Napoleon, like Cæsar and Wellington, Sir John French has forged aliterary style for himself. There is nothing amateurish orjournalistic about his communications from the front. The dispatchfrom Mons, for instance, is a masterpiece of lucid and incisiveEnglish. It might well be printed in our school-histories, not merelyas a vivid historic document, but as a model of English prose. Not that Sir John French's style is an accident. Like most of theother successes of his career, it is the result of design. The man wholaboriously "crammed" tactics laboured equally hard over the art ofwriting. The many prefaces which he has written to famous books onstrategy and war bear traces of the most careful preparation. Apart from his dispatches, however, French has written some virile, telling English in his prefaces to several books on cavalry and onmilitary history. The most interesting is that which he wrote forCaptain Frederick von Herbert's _The Defence of Plevna_. He prefacesit with a dramatic little coincidence of war capitally told. "Duringthe last year of the South African War, while directing the operationsin Cape Colony, I found myself, late one afternoon in February, 1902, at the north end of the railway bridge over the Orange River atBethulie, strangely attracted by the appearance of a well-constructedand cleverly hidden covered field work, which formed an important partof the 'Bridge head. ' Being somewhat pressed for time I rode on anddirected my aide-de-camp to go down into the fort, look round it, andthen catch me up. He shortly overtook me with an urgent request toreturn and inspect it myself. I did so, and was very much struck, notonly with the construction of the work and its excellent siting, butalso with all the defence arrangements at that point of the river. Whilst I was in the fort the officer in charge arrived and reportedhimself. Expressing my strong approval of all I had seen, I remarkedthat it brought back to my mind a book I had read and re-read, andindeed studied with great care and assiduity--a book called _TheDefence of Plevna_, by a certain Lieutenant von Herbert, whom, to myregret, I had never met. 'I am von Herbert, and I wrote the book youspeak of, ' was the reply of the officer to whom I spoke. "[22] [Page Heading: OSMAN PASHA] Osman Pasha was a soldier after French's own heart. Indeed, histenacity was probably equal to that of his critic. Hence this finetribute: "The great soldier who defended Plevna refused to acknowledgesuch a word as defeat. When things were at their worst his outwarddemeanour was calmest and most confident. There was no hystericalshrieking for supports or reinforcements. These might have reachedhim, but through treacherous jealousy he was betrayed and left to hisown resources. In spite of this no thought of capitulation or retreatever entered the mind of Osman Pasha. .. . "[23] What a wonderful littlecameo of courage! One wonders whether the school-boy who sent French the followingletter on his return from South Africa knew the quality of hiswriting. "MY DEAR FRENCH, --You are a great British General. I want your autograph, but, whatever you do, don't let your secretary write it. " I have said that Sir John French is the average Englishman in anaccentuated degree. How then does he regard war? If the plain truth betold, we are not at heart a martial nation. We have made war when wehave been compelled to it by the threat of an Armada or the menace ofa Napoleon. But we have not cultivated war, at least since our wodedays, as a pastime and a profession. Nor is French that abnormalbeing, an Englishman governed by the blood lust. Mrs. Despard has saidthat in reality he regards war as a hideous outrage. He has nodelusions as to the glory of war. By no chance could he be rankedamong the romanticist of the battlefield. That, perhaps, is why henever is, never has been, ruthless or remorseless with the men whom hecommands. [Page Heading: FRENCH AND THE SUFFOLKS] If ever French had cause for anger, it was over the unlucky incidentof the Suffolks, the one failure unwarrantably attributed to his evervictorious arms. Yet he was the one officer who softened thebitterness of that reverse to the men. He met the regiment in theTransvaal just eight months after the disaster. His speech to thetroops, as reported in at least one paper, is well worthy ofpreservation. After referring to his pleasure in meeting them allagain, he said: "What you did at Colesberg is still fresh in myrecollection . .. But what I wish especially to recall is the sad eventof the night of January 5th and 6th, and to express my sympathy withyou on the loss of your gallant leader, Colonel Watson, who on thatnight showed splendid qualities as a noble and able officer. Now, ithas come to my knowledge that there has been spread about an idea thatthat event cast discredit of some sort upon this gallant regiment. Iwant you all to banish any such thought from your minds as utterlyuntrue. You took part . .. In a night operation of extreme difficultyon a pitch dark night, and did all in your power to make it a success. So do not let any false idea get into your minds. Think rather thatwhat took place brings honour to your regiment, and add this event tothe long list of honours it has won in the past. I want you all tobear in mind about such night operations, that they can never be acertain success, and because they sometimes fail it does not, therefore, bring discredit on those who attempted to carry them out. You must remember that, if we always waited for an opportunity ofcertain success, we should do nothing at all, and that in war, fighting a brave enemy, it is absolutely impossible to be always sureof success: all we can do is to try our very best to securesuccess--and that you did on the occasion I am speaking of. I thankyou for that and all the good work you have done since, and rememberabove all that no slur whatever attaches to your regiment for theresult of that occasion. " With these finely sympathetic words might be placed French's speech tohis troops before the battle of Elandslaagte. "Men, " he said, "you aregoing to oppose two thousand or three thousand Dutch. We want to keepup our honour as we did in the olden time--as soldiers and men, wewant to take that position before sunset. " [Page Heading: FRENCH AND HIS MEN] In that single phrase, "as soldiers and men, " one has the key toFrench's popularity with the ranks. He treats the men as human beingsand not as machines. In other words, he understands the Britishsoldier through and through. Mrs. Despard has told a touching littlestory of the affection which he inspires in his men. She was returninghome one evening when she was surprised by a question as she stoppedto buy the customary evening paper. "Are you Mrs. Despard, GeneralFrench's sister?" asked the ragged wretch. She admitted that claim todistinction. The man then told her, with much enthusiasm, how whenworking with a battery in a very hot corner during the South Africanwar, he had seen the General ride over to cheer them up. "Now, hidon't care 'oo that man is, and I don't care 'oo I am, I love thatman, " he said rather huskily. Mrs. Despard has told how she forgot herpaper that night in shaking the ex-soldier's hand. For this tact in dealing with his men, Sir John French has largely tothank the vein of acute sensibility which runs through his character. This sensibility can be traced in his mouth, which is remarkablyfinely chiselled. We have seen it in his childhood, when he shrankfrom some of the usual noisiness of boyhood. And Mrs. Despard hascrystallised it in a phrase. Feeling depressed on one occasion beforeaddressing a meeting on some reforms which she considered urgent, sheconfessed to her brother that she was spiritually afraid. "Why, " hereplied, "don't worry, I've never yet done anything worth doingwithout having to screw myself up to it. " French, very obviously, is aman for whom spiritual doubt may have its terrors. One cannot figurehim as harbouring the narrow if sincere religion of a Kitchener or aGordon. One might sum him up as the _beau-ideal_, not only of the cavalryspirit, but of the scientific soldier. He can lead a cavalry chargewith the dash of a Hotspur: and he can plan out a campaign with themasterly logic of a Marlborough. Unlike some of his contemporaries, hehas attained extraordinary mastery over the science of war withouthimself becoming a scientific machine. In many ways he bears, incharacter and temperament, a striking resemblance to his colleague inarms--General Joffre. Although Joffre is three inches taller thanFrench--he is five foot nine--he is otherwise very similar inappearance. There is the same short, powerful physique, the narrowneck surmounted by a massive head and heavy jaw, and the same broadforehead, with masterful eyes peeping from beneath bushy eyebrows. Neither of these men on whom hangs Europe's destiny is in the leastdegree strident or self-assertive. Indeed, both tend to be listenersrather than talkers. Both have the same trick of making instantaneousdecisions. Both scorn to be merely "smart" in outward appearance; bothare devoted to efficiency in detail; and, most suggestive of all, eachfinds himself eternally compared to General Grant! Probably thelatter's dogged personality forms the best possible common denominatorfor these two remarkable men. [Page Heading: AN OPPORTUNITY] It is said that when news of the war in South Africa reached French, momentarily obeying a natural impulse, he waved his hand and cried, "Hurrah for South Africa. " If anyone had any right to thank Heaven forthat particular campaign, it was certainly French. But he would have"hurrahed" any campaign that gave opportunity for his powers. Afterall, the soldier's stage is the battlefield. Without wars he iswithout an active rôle, and must spend his years drudging in therehearsal theatre of the Colonies. If he be so original and sothorough a soldier as French, his abilities will be at an even graverdiscount. For the rehearsal is not the play; and the best Generals, like the ablest actors, are notoriously weak at rehearsal, which doesnot pluck fully at their energies. Probably French would have hurrahedfor South Africa, however, had he had no special abilities at all. For nowhere is he happier than on the battlefield. If the grisly gameof war must be played, French plays it with all his heart. It is thegame which destiny put him on the stage to play; the game which he hasdevoted his life to mastering; and the only game in which he has everseriously interested himself. Luck invariably follows the man who is utterly absorbed in hisprofession, for the simply reason that, being always engrossed in hiswork, he is always alive to his opportunities. French's luck consistssolely in the fact that he happens to be a soldier. Men of Kitchener'sorganising genius may be many things; in nothing, not even in thearts, are they likely to seriously fail. But French is a soldier inthe sense quite other than Kitchener. He is a man made for theendurance of hardship and for the facing of hard practicaldifficulties in the field. It is as natural for him to conduct acampaign as it was for Pope to "lisp in numbers, for the numberscame. " He is the Happy Warrior in being. FINIS FOOTNOTES: [22] From Sir John French's Preface to _The Defence of Plevna_, byCapt. Frederick von Herbert, by permission of Messrs. Smith, Elder. [23] From Sir John French's Preface to _The Defence of Plevna_, byCapt. Frederick von Herbert, by permission of Messrs. Smith, Elder. APPENDIX THE MONS DESPATCH _To the Secretary of State for War_ _September 7, 1914. _ MY LORD, I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch. 1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination in this country well within the scheduled time. The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign. The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows:-- From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the 2nd Corps, and to the right of the 2nd Corps from Mons the 1st Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche. In the absence of my 3rd Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work. During August 22 and 23 these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage. 2. At 6 a. M. On August 23 I assembled the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the position, and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us. From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observation of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate. About 3 p. M. On Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened. The Commander of the 1st Corps had pushed his flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche. The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the Commander of the 2nd Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 p. M. , I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps, viz. , a reserve corps, the 4th Corps and the 9th Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the 2nd Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the 5th French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. 3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions. When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th. A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the 1st and 2nd Divisions, whilst the 1st Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the 2nd Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division on the right of the Corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons. The 2nd Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the 1st Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p. M. Towards midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left. I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavour to take the pressure off. About 7. 30 a. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct support to the 5th Division. During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the Brigade. The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the Line of Communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the 2nd Corps. With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so. At nightfall the position was occupied by the 2nd Corps to the west of Bavai, the 1st Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank. 4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position. I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object. The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops. The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5. 30 a. M. Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the 2nd Corps, covered the movement of the 2nd Corps. The remainder of the Cavalry Division, with the 19th Brigade, the whole under the command of General Allenby, covered the west flank. The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a Brigade of Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for service. I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered great help to the effective retirement of the 2nd and 1st Corps to the new position. Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to the information I received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight. Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganisation. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont. The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement. Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the 1st Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt De Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest. The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9. 30 p. M. A report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1, 000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the 1st Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise. By about 6 p. M. The 2nd Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and the line of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back. During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai. The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Army Corps. On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz. , the 26th. At daybreak on August 26 it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the 2nd Corps and the 4th Division. At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack. I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the 1st Corps being at the moment incapable of movement. The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way. There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them. The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents. At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3. 30 p. M. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation. Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit. I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation. The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit. On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai. General D'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British Forces. This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, August 23, and which really constituted a four days' battle. At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch. I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Forces have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration by rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German Army Corps. It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the direction of the troops by Divisional Brigade and Regimental Leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men. I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout. Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines. I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during this trying period. Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the Personal Staff. In such operations as I have described the work of the Quartermaster-General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major-General Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties with his characteristic energy, skill and determination; and it is largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the troops--inseparable from such operations--were not much greater. Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant-General, has also been confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations which arose. I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during the period under review; and, as I understand it is of importance that this despatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this list, separately, as soon as I can. I have the honour to be, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant, (Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field. INDEX Abu Klea, battle of, 17. Asquith, H. H. , 103. Baden-Powell, Lieut. -General Sir Robert, 26. Barrow, Col. Percy, 12, 18, 19, 23. Beresford, Lord Charles: Knocked senseless, 15. Bernhardi, General von, 33, 127. Bewicke Copley, General--Admiration of French, 24. Bloemfontein, 75, 85, 86. Botha, General, 56. Buller, Sir Redvers: Relief for the Expedition, 18. Desperate measure, A, 19. Checking the enemy's advance, 20. Tribute to French, 21. His knowledge of French's value, 34. Oppressed by misgivings, 53. Preparing to relieve Ladysmith, 54. Disaster at Colenso, 56. Butcher Major E. E. A. : Ingenious solution of a difficulty, 62, 63. Carleton, Colonel, 46, 47, 48, 49. Cavalry: Test against camels, 12. Distinguishing themselves, 14. Buller's belief in, 21. Enemy's respect for, 22. Cavalry regiments in India, 25. French's, Sir, J. , idea of the function of, 26. Opinion of the late Sir Robert Russell, 27. British cavalry reform, 28. Worrying the enemy at Colesberg, 55. Race for De Kiel's Drift, The, 70. Popular idea of cavalry, 106. Use and abuse of, 108. Lesson of the Boer War, 109. French's, Sir J. , confidence in, 114. Mounted arm in modern warfare, The, 115. Chisholme, Colonel Scott, 36, 38. Colenso, 50, 56. Colesberg, 33, 55, 59, 62, 64, 84, 127, 134. Cromer, Lord, 11. Cronje, General, 56, 68, 69, 73, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82. Curragh, The, 7, 104. Delarey, General, 65, 83, 84. Despard, Mrs. , 2, 136. De Wet, General, 65, 83, 84, 129. Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, 99. "Dumpies, " The, 5. Eccles, Miss, 2. Elandslaagte, 40, 41, 52, 135. Ewart, Sir J. S. , 101, 103. Fisher, Colonel, 59. French, General Sir John: Boyhood, 3. War game, The, 3. 8th Hussars, Gazetted to the, 5. Naval career, Early, 4. Sportsman, As a, 6, 7. Nickname, His, 6. Strategy, Interest in, 8. Marriage, 8. Egypt, Ordered to, 9. Scouting in the desert, 14, 15. Wood, Sir E. , First meeting with, 20. Mentioned in Dispatches, 21. Promotion, 23. Reorganisation of cavalry regiments in India, 25. An enforced retirement, 25. Function of cavalry, His idea of the, 26. Effect of his cavalry theory, 27. Appointment at the War Office, 28. Temperament, His, 29. Notable success, A, 30. Promotion to Major-General, 31. Public ignorance of his work, 33. Sketch by Major Arthur Griffiths, 34. Arrival at Ladysmith, 35. Result of a cavalry charge, 36. Difficult enterprise, A, 37. His opportunity, 38. His first victory, 39. Impression of him on the battlefield, An, 40. Secret of his ability, 41. Won a reputation among the Boers, 43. An American journalist's description, 44. Out-manoeuvring the Boers, 49. Leaving Ladysmith, 50. Confounding the critics, 53. Object at Colesberg, 54. Cavalry attack, A, 55. Cheering Christmas greeting, A, 57. Cavalry tactics, His, 58. Brilliant venture, A, 59. Disaster to the Suffolks, The, 60. His remarkable caution, 64. Problem--modern warfare, mastered, A, 65. Ability for doing the right thing, 66. Promise to relieve Kimberley, 67. Greatness of the undertaking, 68, 69. Congratulated by Lords Roberts and Kitchener, 71. Boers routed, 73. French _v. _ The Impossible, 76. Kimberley relieved, 78. Cutting off Cronje's retreat, 80. Escape of De Wet, 84. Narrow escape from death, 82. Sitting for his portrait, 86. Command of the forces in Eastern Transvaal, 89. Imitating the Boers, 91. Releasing Schoeman from jail, 92. Command of the operations in Cape Colony, 93. His modesty, 94. "Shirt-sleeved General, The, " 95. Artilleryman's tribute, An, 96. Return from South Africa, 97. Appointed Inspector-General of the forces, 98. His love of efficiency, 99. Appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 99. Gough incident, The, 100, 101. His resignation, 103. Student and an innovator, 107. Objection to extremist views, 110. His value in the present crisis, 118. Man as he is, The, 123. Worship of Napoleon, His, 124, 125. Secret of his popularity, 126. Literary ability, 130. How he regards war, 133. French, Lady, 8. French, Commander J. T. W. , 2. Freyne, Lord de, 2. Gatacre, General: Boer invasion of Cape Colony, 54. Reverse at Stormberg, 56. Gordon, General, 11. Griffiths, Major Arthur, 34. Grimwood, Colonel, 47. Gough, Brigadier-General, 101, 102. Haig, Lieut. -General Sir Douglas, 26, 83, 119. Hamilton, Sir Ian, 37. Hussars, 19th, 1, 5, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22. Joffre, General, 2, 119, 137. Joubert, General, 49. Khartoum: Besieged, 11. Effort to relieve, 12. Fall of, 18. Release of the Madhi's followers, 19. Kitchener, Lord, 5, 9, 29, 66, 71, 74. 79, 93, 97, 122, 139. Kimberley, 53, 54, 68, 75, 77, 78, 100, 101. Kruger, President, 84. Ladysmith, 35, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 69. Lambton, Captain Hedworth, 48. Laycock, Capt. J. , 74. Lombard's Cop, 49. Luck, Sir George: Opinion of cavalry regiments in India, 25. Instituting cavalry reforms at home, 27. Mahdi, The, 10, 11, 12, 15. Mafeking, 53. Magersfontein, 56, 75, 79. Methuen, Lord, 53, 67, 75. Milbanke, Sir John, 50. Modder River, 69. "Modern Marlborough, The, " 120. Moltke, Count von, 21. _Morning Post, The_, 27. Nile Expedition, 9. Paget, General, 101. Porter, Colonel, 56. Pretoria, 88, 92. Relieving Expedition, 18. Rhodes, Cecil, 67, 68. Roberts, Earl, 66, 67, 71, 83, 86, 87, 88, 93. Seely, Colonel, 101, 102. Selby-Lowndes, Richard William, 8. Schoeman, General, 56, 58, 92. Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 119. Stead, W. T. , 11. Stewart, General Sir Herbert: Testing the camels, 12. Compelling the guides, 13. Outnumbered by Dervishes, 15. Hasty protection, 17. Last words, His, 18. Steyn, President, 84. Stormberg, 56. Talbot, General, 29, 30. Warde, Colonel Charles E. , 7. Watson, Lieut. -Colonel A. J. , 60, 61, 134. Wauchope, Major-General, 54. White, Sir George: French's, Sir. J. Colleague in South Africa, 25. Peril at Ladysmith, His, 35. Orders to French, His, 36. Chivalrous reply, A, 38. Attempt to distract the enemy, 41. Difficult retreat, A, 42. Two successful engagements, 45. An optimistic plan, 46. Seriousness of British position, 49. Surrounded in Ladysmith, 53. Wilford, Colonel, 42. Wolseley, Lord: Khartoum, Orders to relieve, 11. Flying column, Dispatch of, 12. Wood, Sir Evelyn, 4. First meeting with French, 20. Discovery of French's value, 24. Yule, General: Retreat from Dundee, 41. His force saved, 42, 45. * * * * * Typographical errors corrected in text: Page 151: optimisitc replaced by optimistic Page 73: pursut replaced by pursuit * * * * *