SEXTUS EMPIRICUSANDGREEK SCEPTICISM

_A Thesis accepted for the Degree of Doctor of__Philosophy in the University of Bern__Switzerland, November_ 1897

by

MARY MILLS PATRICK

PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE, CONSTANTINOPLETURKEY

_This Thesis is accompanied by a Translation from the Greek__of the First Book of the "Pyrrhonic Sketches_"_by Sextus Empiricus_

CAMBRIDGE

DEIGHTON BELL & CO. 

LONDON GEORGE BELL & SONS

1899

CAMBRIDGE

PRINTED BY JONATHAN PALMER

ALEXANDRA STREET

PREFACE

The following treatise on Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticismhas been prepared to supply a need much felt in the Englishlanguage by students of Greek philosophy. For while otherschools of Greek philosophy have been exhaustively andcritically discussed by English scholars, there are few sourcesof information available to the student who wishes to makehimself familiar with the teachings of Pyrrhonism. The aim hasbeen, accordingly, to give a concise presentation of Pyrrhonismin relation to its historical development and the Scepticism ofthe Academy, with critical references to the French and Germanworks existing on the subject. The time and manner of theconnection of Sextus Empiricus with the Pyrrhonean School hasalso been discussed. 

As the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_, or Pyrrhonic Sketches bySextus Empiricus, contains the substance of the teachings ofPyrrhonism, it has been hoped that a translation of it intoEnglish might prove a useful contribution to the literature onPyrrhonism, and this translation has been added to the criticalpart of the work. 

In making this translation, and in the general study of theworks of Sextus, the Greek text of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1842, has been used, with frequent consultation of the text ofJ. A. Fabricius, 1718, which was taken directly from the existingmanuscripts of the works of Sextus. The divisions into chapters, with the headings of the chapters in the translation, is thesame as Fabricius gives from the manuscripts, although not usedby Bekker, and the numbers of the paragraphs are the same asthose given by both Fabricius and Bekker. References to DiogenesLaertius and other ancient works have been carefully verified. 

The principal modern authors consulted are the following:

Ritter, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, II. Auf. , Hamburg, 1836-38. 

Zeller, _Philosophie der Griechen_, III. Auf. , Leipzig, 1879-89. 

Lewes, _History of Philosophy_, Vol. I. , London, 1866. 

Ueberweg, _History of Philosophy_, IV. Ed. , translated by Morris, 1871. 

Brochard, _Les Sceptiques Grecs_, Paris, 1877. 

Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism Primitive_, No. 5, Ribot's _Revue Phil. _, Paris, 1885. 

Saisset, _Le Scepticism Aenésidème-Pascal-Kant_, Paris, 1867. 

Chaignet, _Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs_, Paris, 1887-90. 

Haas, _Leben des Sextus Empiricus_, Burghausen, 1882. 

Natorp, _Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems bei den Alten_, Berlin, 1884. 

Hirzel, _Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften_, Leipzig, 1877-83. 

Pappenheim, _Erläuterung zu des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneischen Grundzügen_, Heidelberg, 1882. 

Pappenheim, _Die Tropen der Greichischen Skeptiker_, Berlin, 1885. 

Pappenheim, _Lebensverhältnisse des Sextus Empiricus_, Berlin, 1887. 

Pappenheim, _Der angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos_, Berlin, 1887. 

Pappenheim, _Der Sitz der Schule der Griechischen Skeptiker, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, I. 1, S. 47, 1887. 

Maccoll, _The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus_, London, 1869. 

My grateful acknowledgments are due to Dr. Ludwig Stein, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bern, for valuableassistance in relation to the plan of the work and advice inregard to the best authorities to be consulted. Thanks are alsodue to Dr. Louisos Iliou, of Robert College, Constantinople, forkind suggestions concerning the translation. 

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. 

THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS . .. 1

Introductory paragraph. --The name of Sextus Empiricus. His profession. --The time when he lived. --The place ofhis birth. --The seat of the Sceptical School while Sextuswas at its head. --The character of the writings of SextusEmpiricus. 

CHAPTER II. 

THE POSITION AND AIM OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM . .. 23

The subject-matter of the Hypotyposes. --The origin ofPyrrhonism. --The nomenclature of Pyrrhonism. --Itscriterion. --Its aim. --[Greek: epochê] and [Greek: ataraxia]. --Thestandpoint of Pyrrhonism. 

CHAPTER III. 

THE SCEPTICAL TROPES . .. 31

Origin of the name. --The ten Tropes of [Greek: epochê]. --TheFirst Trope. --The Second Trope. --The Third Trope. --The FourthTrope. --The Fifth Trope. --The Sixth Trope. --The SeventhTrope. --The Eighth Trope. --The Ninth Trope. --The TenthTrope. --The five Tropes of Agrippa. --The two Tropes. --The Tropesof Aenesidemus against Aetiology. 

CHAPTER IV. 

AENESIDEMUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS . .. 63

Statement of the problem. --The theory of Pappenheim. --The theoryof Brochard. --Zeller's theory. --The theory of Ritter andSaisset. --The theory of Hirzel and Natorp. --Critical examinationof the subject. 

CHAPTER V. 

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PYRRHONISM . .. 81

Pyrrhonism and Pyrrho. --Pyrrhonism and the Academy. Strength andweakness of Pyrrhonism. 

 * * * * *

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PYRRHONIC SKETCHES BY SEXTUSEMPIRICUS, TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK . .. 101

CHAPTER I. 

_The Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus. _

Interest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiricus in recenttimes, especially, one may say, since the date of Herbart. Thereis much in the writings of Sextus that finds a parallel in themethods of modern philosophy. There is a common starting-pointin the study of the power and limitations of human thought. There is a common desire to investigate the phenomena ofsense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to the loweranimals, and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge. 

While, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form apossible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophicalthought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism asa whole lacked the essential element of all philosophicalprogress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding andestablishing the truth in the subjects investigated. 

Before beginning a critical study of the writings of SextusEmpiricus, and the light which they throw on the development ofGreek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhatfamiliar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. Weshall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint fromwhich he regarded philosophical questions. 

Let us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life, including his profession, the time when he lived, the place ofhis birth, the country in which he taught, and the general aimand character of his works. Here, however, we encounter greatdifficulties, for although we possess most of the writings ofSextus well preserved, the evidence which they provide on thepoints mentioned is very slight. He does not give usbiographical details in regard to himself, nor does he refer tohis contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge ofthem. His name even furnishes us with a problem impossible ofsolution. He is called [Greek: Sextos ho empeirikos] by DiogenesLaertius[1]: [Greek: Hêrodotou de diêkouse Sextos ho empeirikoshou kai ta deka tôn skeptikôn kai alla kallista' Sextou dediêkouse Satorninos ho Kythênas, empeirikos kai autos]. Althoughin this passage Diogenes speaks of Sextus the second timewithout the surname, we cannot understand the meaning otherwisethan that Diogenes considered Sextus a physician of theEmpirical School. Other evidence also is not wanting that Sextusbore this surname. Fabricius, in his edition of the works ofSextus, quotes from the _Tabella de Sectis Medicorum_ ofLambecius the statement that Sextus was called Empiricus becauseof his position in medicine. [2]

Pseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the directors of theEmpirical School, and calls him [Greek: Sextos hoempeirikos]. [3] His name is often found in the manuscriptswritten with the surname, as for example at the end of _LogicII_. [4] In other places it is found written without the surname, as Fabricius testifies, where Sextus is mentioned as a Scepticin connection with Pyrrho. 

 [1] Diog. Laert. IX. 12, 116. 

 [2] Fabricius _Testimonia_, p. 2. 

 [3] Pseudo-Galen _Isag. _ 4; Fabricius _Testimonia_, p. 2. 

 [4] Bekker _Math. _ VIII. 481. 

The Sceptical School was long closely connected with theEmpirical School of medicine, and the later Pyrrhoneans, whenthey were physicians, as was often the case, belonged for themost part to this school. Menedotus of Nicomedia is the firstSceptic, however, who is formally spoken of as an Empiricalphysician, [1] and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was alsoan Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and Theodas isdifficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass agree that it was about150 A. D. [2] After the time of these two physicians, who werealso each in turn at the head of the Sceptical School, [3] thereseems to have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism andEmpiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to believe thatthis alliance existed until the time of Sextus. 

 [1] Diog. IX. 12, 115. 

 [2] Brochard _Op. Cit. Livre_ IV. P. 311. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 12, 116. 

The difficulty in regard to the name arises from Sextus' owntestimony. In the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ he takesstrong ground against the identity of Pyrrhonism and Empiricismin medicine. Although he introduces his objections with theadmission that "some say that they are the same, " in recognitionof the close union that had existed between them, he goes on tosay that "Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself, nor would itsuit the Sceptic to take that sect upon himself", [1] for thereason that Empiricism maintains dogmatically the impossibilityof knowledge, but he would prefer to belong to the MethodicalSchool, which was the only medical school worthy of the Sceptic. "For this alone of all the medical sects, does not proceedrashly it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and does notpresume to say whether they are comprehensible or not, but it isguided by phenomena. [2] It will thus be seen that the MethodicalSchool of medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticismwhich is closer than that of the other medical sects. "[3]

 [1] _Hyp_. I. 236. 

 [2] _Hyp_. I. 237. 

 [3] _Hyp_. I. 241. 

We know from the testimony of Sextus himself that he was aphysician. In one case he uses the first person for himself as aphysician, [1] and in another he speaks of Asclepius as "thefounder of our science, "[2] and all his illustrations show abreadth and variety of medical knowledge that only a physiciancould possess. He published a medical work which he refers toonce as [Greek: iatrika hupomnêmata], [3] and again as [Greek:empeirika hupomnêmata][4] These passages probably refer to thesame work, [5] which, unfortunately for the solution of thedifficult question that we have in hand, is lost, and nothing isknown of its contents. 

In apparent contradiction to his statement in _Hypotyposes_ I. , that Scepticism and Empiricism are opposed to each other, inthat Empiricism denies the possibility of knowledge, andScepticism makes no dogmatic statements of any kind, Sextusclasses the Sceptics and Empiricists together in anotherinstance, as regarding knowledge as impossible[6] [Greek: all oimen phasin auta mê katalambanesthai, hôster hoi apo têsempeirias iatroi kai hoi apo tês skepseôs phiolosophoi]. Inanother case, on the contrary, he contrasts the Sceptics sharplywith the Empiricists in regard to the [Greek: apodeixeis]. [7][Greek: hoi de empeirikoi anairousin, hoi de skeptikoi en epochêtautên ephylaxan]. 

 [1] _Hyp_. Ii. 238. 

 [2] _Adv. Math_. A. 260. 

 [3] _Adv. Math_. Vii. 202. 

 [4] _Adv. Math_. A. 61. 

 [5] Zeller _Op. Cit. _. Iii. 43. 

 [6] _Adv. Math. _ viii. 191. 

 [7] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 328. 

Pappenheim thinks that Sextus belonged to the Methodical School, both from his strong expression in favor of that school in_Hyp_. I. 236, as above, and also because many of hismedical opinions, as found in his works, agree with theteachings of the Methodical School, more nearly than with thoseof the Empiricists. Pappenheim also claims that we find noinconsistency with this view in the passage given where Sextusclasses the Sceptics with the Empiricists, but considers thatstatement an instance of carelessness in expressing himself, onthe part of Sextus. [1]

 [1] _Lebensverhältnisse des Sex. Em. _ 36. 

The position of Pappenheim is assailable for the reason that indealing with any problem regarding an author on the basis ofinternal evidence, we have no right to consider one of hisstatements worthy of weight, and another one unworthy, on thesupposition that he expressed himself carelessly in the secondinstance. Rather must we attempt to find his true standpoint byfairly meeting all the difficulties offered in apparentlyconflicting passages. This has been attempted by Zeller, Brochard, Natorp and others, with the general result that allthings considered they think without doubt that Sextus belongedto the Empirical School. [1] His other references are too strongto allow his fidelity to it to be doubted. He is called one ofthe leaders of Empiricism by Pseudo-Galen, and his only medicalwork bore the title [Greek: empeirika hupomnêmata. ] The opinionof the writers above referred to is that the passage which wehave quoted from the _Hypotyposes_ does not necessarily meanthat Sextus was not an Empiricist, but as he was more of aSceptic than a physician, he gave preference to those doctrinesthat were most consistent with Scepticism, and accordinglyclaimed that it was not absolutely necessary that a Scepticphysician should be an Empiricist. Natorp considers that thedifferent standpoint from which Sextus judges the Empirical andMethodical Schools in his different works is accounted for onthe supposition that he was an Empiricist, but disagreed withthat school on the one point only. [2] Natorp points out thatSextus does not speak more favourably of the medical stand ofthe Methodical School, but only compares the way in which bothschools regarded the question of the possibility of knowledge, and thinks that Sextus could have been an Empiricist as aphysician notwithstanding his condemnation of the attitude ofthe Empirical School in relation to the theory of knowledge. This difference between the two schools was a small one, and ona subtle and unimportant point; in fact, a difference inphilosophical theory, and not in medical practice. 

 [1] Brochard _Op. Cit. Livre_ IV. 317; Zeller _Op. Cit_. III. 15; Natorp _Op. Cit. _ p. 155. 

 [2] Natorp _Op. Cit_. 157. 

While we would agree with the authors above referred to, thatSextus very probably recognized the bond between the EmpiricalSchool of medicine and Pyrrhonism, yet to make his possibleconnection with that school the explanation of his name, giveshim more prominence as a physician than is consistent with whatwe know of his career. The long continued union of Empiricismand Scepticism would naturally support the view that Sextus was, at least during the earlier part of his life, a physician ofthat school, and yet it may be that he was not named Empiricusfor that reason. There is one instance in ancient writings whereEmpiricus is known as a simple proper name. [1] It may have beena proper name in Sextus' case, or there are many other ways inwhich it could have originated, as those who have studied theorigin of names will readily grant, perhaps indeed, from thetitle of the above-named work, [Greek: empeirika hupomnêmata. ]The chief argument for this view of the case is that there wereother leaders of the Sceptical School, for whom we can claim fargreater influence as Empiricists than for Sextus, and for whomthe surname Empiricus would have been more appropriate, if itwas given in consequence of prominence in the Empirical School. Sextus is known to the world as a Sceptic, and not as aphysician. He was classed in later times with Pyrrho, and hisphilosophical works survived, while his medical writings didnot, but are chiefly known from his own mention of them. Moreover, the passage which we have quoted from the_Hypotyposes_ is too strong to allow us easily to believe thatSextus remained all his life a member of the Empirical School. He could hardly have said, "Nor would it suit the Sceptic totake that sect upon himself, " if he at the same time belonged toit. His other references to the Empirical School, of a morefavorable character, can be easily explained on the ground ofthe long continued connection which had existed between the twoschools. It is quite possible to suppose that Sextus was anEmpiricist a part of his life, and afterwards found theMethodical School more to his liking, and such a change wouldnot in any way have affected his stand as a physician. 

 [1] Pappenheim _Leb. Ver. Sex. Em_. 6. 

In regard to the exact time when Sextus Empiricus lived, we gainvery little knowledge from internal evidence, and outsidesources of information are equally uncertain. Diogenes Laertiusmust have been a generation younger than Sextus, as he mentionsthe disciple of Sextus, Saturninus, as an Empiricalphysician. [1] The time of Diogenes is usually estimated as thefirst half of the third century A. D. , [2] therefore Sextus cannotbe brought forward later than the beginning of the century. Sextus, however, directs his writings entirely against theDogmatics, by whom he distinctly states that he means theStoics, [3] and the influence of the Stoics began to decline inthe beginning of the third century A. D. A fact often used as ahelp in fixing the date of Sextus is his mention of Basilidesthe Stoic, [4] [Greek: alla kai oi stôikoi, ôs oi peri tonBasileidên]. This Basilides was supposed to be identical withone of the teachers of Marcus Aurelius. [5] This is accepted byZeller in the second edition of his _History of Philosophy_, butnot in the third for the reason that Sextus, in all the workfrom which this reference is taken, _i. E. Math_. VII. -XI. , mentions no one besides Aenesidemus, who lived later than themiddle of the last century B. C. [6] The Basilides referred to bySextus may be one mentioned in a list of twenty Stoics, in afragment of Diogenes Laertius, recently published in Berlin byVal Rose. [7] Too much importance has, however, been given to therelation of the mention of Basilides the Stoic to the questionof the date of Sextus. Even if the Basilides referred to bySextus is granted to have been the teacher of Marcus Aurelius, it only serves to show that Sextus lived either at the same timewith Marcus Aurelius or after him, which is a conclusion that wemust in any case reach for other reasons. 

 [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. 

 [2] Ueberweg _Hist. Of Phil. _ p. 21. 

 [3] Hyp. I. 65. 

 [4] _Adv. Math_. VII. 258. 

 [5] Fabricius _Vita Sexti. _

 [6] Zeller _Op. Cit_. III. 8. 

 [7] Brochard _Op. Cit_. IV. 315. 

The fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in regard tothe date of Sextus is that Claudius Galen in his works mentionsseveral Sceptics who were also physicians of the EmpiricalSchool, [1] and often speaks of Herodotus, supposed to beidentical with the teacher of Sextus given by DiogenesLaertius, [2] but makes no reference whatever to Sextus. AsGalen's time passes the limit of the second century A. D. , wemust either infer that Sextus was not the well-known physicianthat he was stated to be by Pseudo-Galen, and consequently notknown to Galen, or that Galen wrote before Sextus becameprominent as a Sceptic. This silence on the part of Galen inregard to Sextus increases the doubt, caused by Sextus' owncriticism of the Empirical School of medicine, as to his havingbeen an Empiricist. The question is made more complicated, as itis difficult to fix the identity of the Herodotus so oftenreferred to by Galen. [3] As Galen died about 200 A. D. At the ageof seventy, [4] we should fix the date of Sextus early in thethird century, and that of Diogenes perhaps a little later thanthe middle, were it not that early in the third century theStoics began to decline in influence, and could hardly haveexcited the warmth of animosity displayed by Sextus. We mustthen suppose that Sextus wrote at the very latter part of thesecond century, and either that Galen did not know him, or thatGalen's books were published before Sextus became prominenteither as a physician or as a Sceptic. The fact that he may havebeen better known as the latter than as the former does notsufficiently account for Galen's silence, as other Sceptics arementioned by him of less importance than Sextus, and the latter, even if not as great a physician as Pseudo-Galen asserts, wascertainly both a Sceptic and a physician, and must have belongedto one of the two medical schools so thoroughly discussed byGalen--either the Empirical or the Methodical. Therefore, ifSextus were a contemporary of Galen, he was so far removed fromthe circle of Galen's acquaintances as to have made noimpression upon him, either as a Sceptic or a physician, asupposition that is very improbable. We must then fix the dateof Sextus late in the second century, and conclude that theclimax of his public career was reached after Galen had finishedthose of his writings which are still extant. 

 [1] Zeller, III. 7. 

 [2] Diog. XI. 12, 116. 

 [3] Pappenheim _Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em. _ 30. 

 [4] Zeller _Grundriss der Ges. Der Phil. _ p. 260. 

Sextus has a Latin name, but he was a Greek; we know this fromhis own statement. [1] We also know that he must have been aGreek from the beauty and facility of his style, and from hisacquaintance with Greek dialects. The place of his birth canonly, however, be conjectured, from arguments indirectly derivedfrom his writings. His constant references throughout his worksto the minute customs of different nations ought to give us aclue to the solution of this question, but strange to say theydo not give us a decided one. Of these references a largenumber, however, relate to the customs of Libya, showing aminute knowledge in regard to the political and religiouscustoms of this land that he displays in regard to no othercountry except Egypt. [2] Fabricius thinks Libya was not hisbirth place because of a reference which he makes to it in the_Hypotyposes_--[Greek: Thrakôn de kai Gaitoulôn (Libyôn deethnos touto)]. [3] This conclusion is, however, entirelyunfounded, as the explanation of Sextus simply shows that thepeople whom he was then addressing were not familiar with thenations of Libya. Suidas speaks of two men called Sextus, onefrom Chæronea and one from Libya, both of whom he callsSceptics, and to one of whom he attributes Sextus' books. Allauthorities agree in asserting that great confusion exists inthe works of Suidas; and Fabricius, Zeller, and Pappenheim placeno weight upon this testimony of Suidas. [4] Haas, however, contends[5] that it is unreasonable to suppose that thisconfusion could go as far as to attribute the writings of SextusEmpiricus to Sextus of Chæronea, and also make the latter aSceptic, and he considers it far more reasonable to accept thetestimony of Suidas, as it coincides so well with the internalevidence of Sextus' writings in regard to his native land. It isnevertheless evident, from his familiarity with the customs, language, and laws of Athens, Alexandria and Rome, that he musthave resided at some time in each of these cities. 

 [1] _Adv. Math. _ A. 246; _Hyp. _ I. 152; _Hyp. _ III. 211, 214. 

 [2] Haas _Op. Cit. _ p. 10. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ III. 213. 

 [4] Pappenheim _Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em. _ 5, 22; Zeller _Op. Cit. _ III. 39; Fabricius _Vita de Sextus_. 

 [5] Haas _Op. Cit_. P. 6. 

Of all the problems connected with the historical details of thelife of Sextus, the one that is the most difficult of solution, and also the most important for our present purpose of making acritical study of his teaching, is to fix the seat of theSceptical School during the time that he was in charge of it. The _Hypotyposes_ are lectures delivered in public in thatperiod of his life. Where then were they delivered? We know thatthe Sceptical School must have had a long continued existence asa definite philosophical movement, although some have contendedotherwise. The fact of its existence as an organized directionof thought, is demonstrated by its formulated teachings, and thelist given by Diogenes Laertius of its principal leaders, [1] andby references from the writings of Sextus. In the first book of_Hypotyposes_ he refers to Scepticism as a distinct system ofphilosophy, [Greek: kai taen diakrisin taes skepseos apo tonparakeimenon autae philosophion]. [2] He speaks also of the olderSceptics, [3] and the later Sceptics. [4]

Pyrrho, the founder of the school, taught in Elis, his nativevillage; but even as early as the time of Timon, his immediatefollower, his teachings were somewhat known in Alexandria, whereTimon for a while resided. [5] The immediate disciples of Timon, as given by Diogenes, were not men known in Greece or mentionedin Greek writings. Then we have the well-known testimony ofAristocles the Peripatetic in regard to Aenesidemus, that hetaught Pyrrhonism in Alexandria[6]--[Greek: echthes kai proaenen Alexandreia tae kat' Aigypton Ainaesidaemos tis anazopyreinaerxato ton huthlon touton]. 

 [1] Diog. XI. 12, 115, 116. 

 [2] _Hyp_. I. 5. 

 [3] _Hyp_. I. 36. 

 [4] _Hyp_. I. 164. 

 [5] Chaignet _Op. Cit. _ 45. 

 [6] Aristocles of Euseb. _Praep. Ev. _ XIV. E. 446. 

This was after the dogmatic tendency of the Academy underAntiochus and his followers had driven Pyrrhonism from thepartial union with the Academy, which it had experienced afterthe breaking up of the school under the immediate successors ofTimon. Aenesidemus taught about the time of our era inAlexandria, and established the school there anew; and hisfollowers are spoken of in a way that presupposes theircontinuing in the same place. There is every reason to thinkthat the connection of Sextus with Alexandria was an intimateone, not only because Alexandria had been for so long a time theseat of Pyrrhonism, but also from internal evidence from hiswritings and their subsequent historical influence; and yet the_Hypotyposes_ could not have been delivered in Alexandria, as heoften refers to that place in comparison with the place where hewas then speaking. He says, furthermore, that he teaches in thesame place where his master taught. [1] [Greek: Blepon te hotientha ho huphaegaetaes ho emos dielegeto, entautha ego nundialegomai]. Therefore the school must have been removed fromAlexandria, in or before the time of the teacher of Sextus, tosome other centre. The _Hypotyposes_ are from beginning to end adirect attack on the Dogmatics; therefore Sextus must havetaught either in some city where the dogmatic philosophy wasstrong, or in some rival philosophical centre. The _Hypotyposes_show also that the writer had access to some large library. Alexandria, Rome and Athens are the three places the mostprobable for selection for such a purpose. For whatever reasonthe seat of the school was removed from Alexandria by the masterof Sextus, or by himself, from the place where it had so longbeen united with the Empirical School of medicine, Athens wouldseem the most suitable city for its recontinuance, in the landwhere Pyrrhonism first had its birth. Sextus, however, in oneinstance, in referring to things invisible because of theiroutward relations, says in illustration, "as the city of Athensis invisible to us at present. "[2] In other places also hecontrasts the Athenians with the people whom he is addressing, equally with the Alexandrians, thus putting Athens as well asAlexandria out of the question. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ III. 120. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ II. 98. 

Of the different writers on Sextus Empiricus, those who havetreated this part of the subject most critically are Haas andPappenheim. We will therefore consider, somewhat at length, theresults presented by these two authors. Haas thinks that the_Hypotyposes_ were delivered in Rome for the following reasons. Sextus' lectures must have been given in some centre ofphilosophical schools and of learning. He never opposes Romanrelations to those of the place where he is speaking, as he doesin regard to Athens and Alexandria. He uses the name "Romans"only three times, [1] once comparing them to the Rhodians, onceto the Persians, and once in general to other nations. [2] In thefirst two of these references, the expression "among the Romans"in the first part of the antithesis is followed by theexpression, "among us, " in the second part, which Haasunderstands to be synonymous. The third reference is in regardto a Roman law, and the use of the word 'Roman' does not at allshow that Sextus was not then in Rome. The character of the lawsreferred to by Sextus as [Greek: par' haemin] shows that theywere always Roman laws, and his definition of law[3] isespecially a definition of Roman law. This argument might, itwould seem, apply to any part of the Roman Empire, but Haasclaims that the whole relation of law to custom as treated of bySextus, and all his statements of customs forbidden at that timeby law, point to Rome as the place of his residence. Further, Haas considers the Herodotus mentioned by Galen[4] as aprominent physician in Rome, to have been the predecessor andmaster of Sextus, in whose place Sextus says that he isteaching. [5] Haas also thinks that Sextus' refutation of theidentity of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism evidently refers to aparagraph in Galen's _Subfiguratio Empirica_, [6] which would benatural if the _Hypotyposes_ were written shortly after Galen's_Sub. Em. _, and in the same place. Further, Hippolytus, whowrote in or near Rome very soon after the time of Sextus, apparently used the _Hypotyposes_, which would be more naturalif he wrote in the same place. According to Haas, every thing ininternal evidence, and outward testimony, points to Rome ashaving been the city where Sextus occupied his position as thehead of the Sceptical School. 

 [1] Haas _Op. Cit. _ p. 15. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 149, 152; III. 211. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 146. 

 [4] Galen _de puls. _ IV. 11; Bd. VIII. 751. 

 [5] _Hyp_. III. 120. 

 [6] Galen _Sub. Em. _ 123 B-126 D. (Basileae, 1542). 

Coming now to the position of Pappenheim on this subject, wefind that he takes very decided ground against the seat of theSceptical School having been in Rome, even for a short time, inhis latest publication regarding it. [1] This opinion is theresult of late study on the part of Pappenheim, for in his workon the _Lebensverhältnisse des Sextus Empiricus_ Berlin 1875, hesays, "Dass Herodotus in Rom lebte sagt Galen. Vermuthlich auchSextus. " His reasons given in the later article for notconnecting the Sceptical School at all with Rome are as follows. He finds no proof of the influence of Scepticism in Rome, asCicero remarks that Pyrrhonism is extinct, [2] and he also givesweight to the well-known sarcastic saying of Seneca, _Quis estqui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis!_[3] While Haas claims thatSextus would naturally seek one of the centres of dogmatism, inorder most effectively to combat it, Pappenheim, on thecontrary, contends that it would have been foolishness on thepart of Sextus to think of starting the Sceptical School inRome, where Stoicism was the favored philosophy of the RomanEmperors; and when either for the possible reason of strifebetween the Empirical and Methodical Schools, or for some othercause, the Pyrrhonean School was removed from Alexandria, Pappenheim claims that all testimony points to the conclusionthat it was founded in some city of the East. The name of Sextusis never known in Roman literature, but in the East, on thecontrary, literature speaks for centuries of Sextus and Pyrrho. The _Hypotyposes_, especially, were well-known in the East, andreferences to Sextus are found there in philosophical andreligious dogmatic writings. The Emperor Julian makes use of theworks of Sextus, and he is frequently quoted by the ChurchFathers of the Eastern Church. [4] Pappenheim accordinglyconcludes that the seat of Pyrrhonism after the school wasremoved from Alexandria, was in some unknown city of the East. 

 [1] Pappenheim _Sitz der Skeptischen Schule. Archiv für Geschichte der Phil. _ 1888. 

 [2] Cicero _De Orat. _ III. 17, 62. 

 [3] Seneca _nat. Qu. _ VII. 32. 2. 

 [4] Fabricius _de Sexto Empirico Testimonia_. 

In estimating the weight of these arguments, we must accept withPappenheim the close connection of Pyrrhonism with Alexandria, and the subsequent influence which it exerted upon theliterature of the East. All historical relations tend to fix thepermanent seat of Pyrrhonism, after its separation from theAcademy, in Alexandria. There is nothing to point to its removalfrom Alexandria before the time of Menodotus, who is the teacherof Herodotus, [1] and for many reasons to be considered the realteacher of Sextus. It was Menodotus who perfected the Empiricaldoctrines, and who brought about an official union betweenScepticism and Empiricism, and who gave Pyrrhonism in greatmeasure, the _éclat_ that it enjoyed in Alexandria, and whoappears to have been the most powerful influence in the school, from the time of Aenesidemus to that of Sextus. Furthermore, Sextus' familiarity with Alexandrian customs bears the imprintof original knowledge, and he cannot, as Zeller implies, beaccepted as simply quoting. One could hardly agree withZeller, [2] that the familiarity shown by Sextus with the customsof both Alexandria and Rome in the _Hypotyposes_ does notnecessarily show that he ever lived in either of those places, because a large part of his works are compilations from otherbooks; but on the contrary, the careful reader of Sextus' worksmust find in all of them much evidence of personal knowledge ofAlexandria, Athens and Rome. 

 [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. 

 [2] Zeller _Op. Cit. _ III. P. 39. 

A part of Sextus' books also may have been written inAlexandria. [Greek: Pros phusikous] could have been written inAlexandria. [1] If these were also lectures, then Sextus taughtin Alexandria as well as elsewhere. The history of Easternliterature for the centuries immediately following the time ofSextus, showing as it does in so many instances the influence ofPyrrhonism, and a knowledge of the _Hypotyposes_, furnishes uswith an incontestable proof that the school could not have beenfor a long time removed from the East, and the absence of suchknowledge in Roman literature is also a strong argument againstits long continuance in that city. It would seem, however, fromall the data at command, that during the years that theSceptical School was removed from Alexandria, its head quarterswere in Rome, and that the Pyrrhonean _Hypotyposes_ weredelivered in Rome. Let us briefly consider the arguments infavour of such a hypothesis. Scepticism was not unknown in Rome. Pappenheim quotes the remark of Cicero that Pyrrhonism was longsince dead, and the sarcasm of Seneca, _Quis est qui tradatpraecepta Pyrrhonis?_ as an argument against the knowledge ofPyrrhonism in Rome. We must remember, however, that in Cicero'stime Aenesidemus had not yet separated himself from the Academy;or if we consider the Lucius Tubero to whom Aenesidemusdedicated his works, as the same Lucius Tubero who was thefriend of Cicero in his youth, and accordingly fix the date ofAenesidemus about 50 B. C. , [2] even then Aenesidemus' work inAlexandria was too late to have necessarily been known toCicero, whose remark must have been referred to the old schoolof Scepticism. Should we grant, however, that the statements ofCicero and Seneca prove that in their time Pyrrhonism wasextinct in Rome, they certainly do not show that after theirdeath it could not have again revived, for the _Hypotyposes_were delivered more than a century after the death of Seneca. There are very few writers in Aenesidemus' own time who showedany influence of his teachings. [3] This influence was feltlater, as Pyrrhonism became better known. That Pyrrhonismreceived some attention in Rome before the time of Sextus isnevertheless demonstrated by the teachings of Favorinus there. Although Favorinus was known as an Academician, the title of hisprincipal work was [Greek: tous philosophoumenous autô tônlogôn, hôn aristoi hoi Purrhôneioi]. [4] Suidas calls Favorinus agreat author and learned in all science and philosophy, [5] andFavorinus made Rome the centre of his teaching and writing. Hisdate is fixed by Zeller at 80-150 A. D. , therefore Pyrrhonism wasknown in Rome shortly before the time of Sextus. 

 [1] Pappenheim _Sitz der Skeptischen Schule; Archiv für Geschichte der Phil. _, 1888; _Adv. Math. _ X. 15, 95. 

 [2] Zeller _Op. Cit. _ III. 10. 

 [3] Zeller _Op. Cit. _ p. 63. 

 [4] Zeller _Op. Cit. _ p. 67. 

 [5] Brochard _Op. Cit. _ 329. 

The whole tone of the _Hypotyposes_, with the constantreferences to the Stoics as living present opponents, shows thatthese lectures must have been delivered in one of the centres ofStoicism. As Alexandria and Athens are out of the question, alltestimony points to Rome as having been the seat of thePyrrhonean School, for at least a part of the time that Sextuswas at its head. We would then accept the teacher of Sextus, inwhose place he says he taught, as the Herodotus so oftenreferred to by Galen[1] who lived in Rome. Sextus' frequentreferences to Asclepiades, whom he mentions ten different timesby name in his works, [2] speak in favour of Rome in the matterunder discussion, as Asclepiades made that city one of thecentres of medical culture. On the other hand, the fact thatthere is no trace of the _Hypotyposes_ in later Romanliterature, with the one exception of the works of Hippolytus, as opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of them shown in theEast for centuries, is incontestable historical proof that theSceptical School could not long have had its seat at Rome. Fromthe two passages given above from Sextus' work against physics, he must either have written that book in Alexandria, it wouldseem, or have quoted those passages from some other work. May wenot then conclude, that Sextus was at the head of the school inRome for a short time, where it may have been removedtemporarily, on account of the difficulty with the Empiricists, implied in _Hyp_. I. 236-241, or in order to be better able toattack the Stoics, but that he also taught in Alexandria, wherethe real home of the school was certainly found? There itprobably came to an end about fifty years after the time ofSextus, and from that centre the Sceptical works of Sextus hadtheir wide-spread influence in the East. 

 [1] Galen VIII. 751. 

 [2] Bekker _Index_. 

The books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the best andfullest presentation of ancient Scepticism which has beenpreserved to modern times, and give Sextus the position of oneof the greatest men of the Sceptical School. His works which arestill extant are the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ in three volumes, and the two works comprising eleven books which have been unitedin later times under the title of [Greek: pros mathêmatikous], one of which is directed against the sciences in general, andthe other against the dogmatic philosophers. The six bookscomposing the first of these are written respectively againstgrammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians, astronomers and musicians. The five books of the latter consistof two against the logicians, two against physics, and oneagainst systems of morals. If the last short work of the firstbook directed against the arithmeticians is combined with theone preceding against the geometricians, as it well could be, the two works together would be divided into ten differentparts; there is evidence to show that in ancient times such adivision was made. [1] There were two other works of Sextus whichare now lost, the medical work before referred to, and a bookentitled [Greek: peri psuchês]. The character of the extantworks of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed eitheragainst science or against the dogmatics, and they all presentthe negative side of Pyrrhonism. The vast array of argumentscomprising the subject-matter, often repeated in the same anddifferent forms, are evidently taken largely from the Scepticalworks which Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summingup of all the wisdom of the Sceptical School. The style of thesebooks is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of Plutarch andThucydides, and although Sextus does not claim originality, butpresents in all cases the arguments of the Sceptic, yet theillustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented, often bear the marks of his own thought, and are characterizedhere and there by a wealth of humor that has not beensufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of all theauthors who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is the only one whoseems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side. 

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the generalposition and aim of Pyrrhonism. 

[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. 

CHAPTER II. 

_The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism_. 

The first volume of the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ gives the mostcomplete statement found in any of the works of Sextus Empiricusof the teachings of Pyrrhonism and its relation to other schoolsof philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presentedis a work of the same name by Aenesidemus, [1] either directlyused by Sextus, or through the writings of those who followedAenesidemus. The comprehensive title [Greek: Purrhôneioihupotupôseis] was very probably used in general to designatecourses of lectures given by the leaders of the ScepticalSchool. 

In the opening chapters of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus undertakesto define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism. [2] In introducinghis subject he treats briefly of the differences betweenphilosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; thosewhich claim that they have found the truth, like the schools ofAristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny thepossibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; andthose that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. Theaccusation against the Academicians, that they denied thepossibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics werevery fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later, simply remarking here, that to affirm the "incomprehensibilityof the unknown, " was a form of expression that the Pyrrhoniststhemselves were sometimes betrayed into, notwithstanding theircareful avoidance of dogmatic statements. [3]

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 78. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 3, 4. 

 [3] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 191. 

After defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic, the Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that hedoes not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but thathe intends simply to present the Sceptical argumentshistorically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes histreatment of the subject as general rather than critical, including a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its principles, its manner of reasoning, its criterion and aim, and a presentation of the Tropes, or aspects of doubt, and theSceptical formulae and the distinction between Scepticism andthe related schools of philosophy. [1]

The result of all the gradual changes which the development ofthought had brought about in the outward relations of theSceptical School, was to increase the earnestness of the claimof the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the greatfounder of the movement. In discussing the names given to theSceptics, Sextus gives precedence very decidedly to the title"Pyrrhonean, " because Pyrrho appears the best representative ofScepticism, and more prominent than all who before him occupiedthemselves with it. [2]

It was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancienttimes, whether Pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophicalsect or not. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled[Greek: peri haireseôn], written shortly before our era, doesnot include Pyrrhonism among the other sects. [3] Diogeneshimself, after some hesitation remarking that many do notconsider it a sect, finally decides to call it so. [4]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 5, 6. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 7. 

 [3] Diog. _Pro. _ 19. 

 [4] Diog. _Pro. _ 20. 

Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an [Greek:agogê], or a movement, rather than a [Greek: hairesis], sayingthat Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a systematicarrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has no dogmas. If, however, a sect may mean simply the following of a certainsystem of reasoning according to what appears to be true, thenScepticism is a sect. [1] From a quotation given later on bySextus from Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term[Greek: agogê]. [2] Sextus gives also the other titles, so wellknown as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, [Greek:zêtêtikê], [Greek: ephektikê], and [Greek: aporêtikê]. [3] The[Greek: dunamis][4] of Scepticism is to oppose the things ofsense and intellect in every possible way to each other, andthrough the equal weight of things opposed, or [Greek:isostheneia], to reach first the state of suspension ofjudgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or "repose and tranquillityof soul. "[5] The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope ofataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mindinduced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regardto the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest talentbegan the Sceptical system by placing in opposition to everyargument an equal one, thus leading to a philosophical systemwithout a dogma, for the Sceptic claims that he has no dogma. [6]The Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, butonly to say what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, such as "Nothing more, "[7] or "I decide nothing, "[8] or "All isfalse, " include themselves with other things. The onlystatements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his ownsensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 15, 17. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 210. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 8. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 10. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 12. 

 [7] _Hyp. _ I. 14. 

 [8] _Hyp. _ I. 14. 

Sextus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena byrefuting it. [1] The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, becausethey are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions. "We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, meaning by this name the idea of it. "[2] Phenomena are the onlythings which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his lifeby them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus distinctlyaffirms that sensations are the phenomena, [3] and that they liein susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that theyconstitute the appearances of objects. [4] We see from this thatSextus makes the only reality to consist in subjectiveexperience, but he does not follow this to its logicalconclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind. He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknownoutside, about which the Sceptic can make no assertions. Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic ordershis daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and theyaffect life in four different ways. They constitute the guidanceof nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to thetraditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of thearts important. [5] According to the tradition of laws andcustoms, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itselfan abstract good. The Sceptic of Sextus' time also inculcatedthe teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case withprofessing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were. Sextus says, "We are not without energy in the arts which weundertake. "[6] This was a positive tendency which no philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoidinconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy fromhis theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, andhis life was governed by phenomena. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 19. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 19. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 22; Diog. IX. 11, 105. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 22. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 23. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 24. 

The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertainto opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes. [1]In other words, we find here the same natural desire of thehuman being to rise above and beyond the limitations which painand passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and underother names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychologicalequilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight ofdifferent arguments that are opposed to each other, and theconsequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct. [2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in thefirst instance, apparently accidental, for while the Scepticwithheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed. [3]After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire todiscriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true fromthe false[4] during the time of [Greek: epochê], or suspensionof judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadowfollows the body. [5]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 25. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 26. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 26. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 107. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 29. 

The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, doesnot entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He isnot wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, andso on. [1] He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than thedogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one fromthe feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that theyare by nature an evil. [2] To the Sceptic nothing is in itselfeither an evil or a good, and so he thinks that "he escapes fromdifficulties easier. "[3] For instance, he who considers riches agood in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and inpossession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying "No more, " is untroubled inwhatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is nomore an evil than the possession of them is a good. [4] For hewho considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is not present with him, hethinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, andfollows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that asudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers agood. [5] The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid norseek anything eagerly. [6]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 30. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 30. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 30; Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

 [4] _Adv. Math. _ XI. 146-160. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 27. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 28. 

Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam ona horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attemptsto do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threwthe sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colorsfrom the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture itproduced a representation of the foam. [1] Thus the Sceptics werenever able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomalybetween the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came tothem of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it. 

The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, consists inplacing arguments in opposition to each other, both in regard tophenomena, and to things of the intellect. By placing thephenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal, the intellectual tothe intellectual, and the phenomenal to the intellectual, and_vice versa_, the present to the present, past, and future, onewill find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. Itis not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, andconsequently a state of [Greek: epochê] may always bemaintained. [2] Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion, and must be preceded by the intellectual process describedabove, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or anysubtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique formof moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itselfhappiness. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 28, 29. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 32-35. 

It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to assertnothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not toaffirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, andconsequently to have the attitude of still seeking. Thestandpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from theteachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of thesoul, [1] or the ego, and denied absolute existencealtogether. [2] The introductory statements of Diogenes regardingPyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint. [3]

There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot provethat the phenomena represent objects, or find out what therelation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion totell us which one is true of all the different representationsof the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation thatarise through the many phases of relativity of the conditionswhich control the character of the phenomena. 

Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, andabsolute reality can never be known. 

 [1] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 55; _Hyp. _ II. 32. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ XI. 140. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

CHAPTER III. 

_The Sceptical Tropes_. 

The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism constituteshistorically and philosophically the most important part of thewritings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sumtotal of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were heldin high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, butalso by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In thefirst book of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus gives two classes ofTropes, those of [Greek: epochê] and the eight Tropes ofAenesidemus against Aetiology. 

The Tropes of [Greek: epochê] are arranged in groups of ten, five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School towhich they belong; the first of these groups is historically themost important, or the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epochê], as theseare far more closely connected with the general development ofScepticism, than the later ones. By the name [Greek: tropos] orTrope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form ofargument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common inGreek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time ofAristotle. [1] The Stoics, however, used the word with adifferent meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics. [2]Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word_modus_[3] and [Greek: tropos] also is often usedinterchangeably with the word [Greek: logos] by Sextus, DiogenesLaertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with [Greek:topos], [4] and [Greek: typos] is found in the oldest edition ofSextus. [5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, ormanner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at thecondition of doubt, in consequence of the equality ofprobabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes ofdoubt. [6] All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time ofAenesidemus give the Tropes the principal place in theirtreatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two thirds of thefirst book of the _Hypotyposes_ in stating and discussing them;and about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism isdevoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these twoauthors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attackon Scepticism. [7] Favorinus wrote a book entitled _PyrrhoneanTropes_, and Plutarch one called _The Ten ([Greek: topoi]) Topesof Pyrrho_. [8] Both of these latter works are lost. 

 [1] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen_, p. 35. 

 [2] Diog I. 76; _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 227. 

 [3] Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 36. 

 [5] Fabricius on _Hyp. _ I. 36; Cap. XIV. G. 

 [6] Diog. IX. 11, 79-108. 

 [7] Aristocles _Euseb. Praep. Ev. _ X. 14, 18. 

 [8] Fabricius on _Hyp. _ I. 36. 

All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus the work ofsystematizing and presenting to the world the ten Tropes of[Greek: epochê]. He was the first to conceive the project ofopposing an organized philosophical system of Pyrrhonism to thedogmatism of his contemporaries. [1] Moreover, the fact thatDiogenes introduces the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does notnecessarily imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, forDiogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of amovement with those of the founders themselves; he gives theseTropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' work entitled _PyrrhoneanHypotyposes_, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving atleast a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directlyor through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correctionof the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, which would make him quote theTropes from a book by Theodosius, [2] author of a commentary onthe works of Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for theTropes an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to whomAristocles also attributes them. [3] They are not mentioned inDiogenes' life of Timon, the immediate disciple of Pyrrho. Cicero has no knowledge of them, and does not refer to them inhis discussion of Scepticism. 

 [1] Compare Saisset _Op. Cit. _ p. 78. 

 [2] Brochard _Op. Cit. _ 254, Note 4. 

 [3] Aristocles _Eus. Praep. Ev. _ XIV. 18. 8. 

Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these Tropes, but many things tend to show that they resulted, in reality, from the gradual classification of the results of the teachingsof Pyrrho, in the subsequent development of thought from his owntime to that of Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropeswere not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closelyconnected with the thought of earlier times. The decidedlyempirical character of the Tropes proves this connection, forthe eight Tropes of Aetiology, which were original withAenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing amore decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found inthe Tropes of [Greek: epochê]. Many of the illustrations givenof the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity thanthat of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancienttimes, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposingprinciples of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. Theterminology, however, with very few exceptions, points to alater period than that of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number ofexpressions in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of theTropes, which could not date back farther than the time ofAenesidemus. [1] One of the most striking features of the wholepresentation of the Tropes, especially as given by Sextus, istheir mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of oneperson, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lackingvery decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mindwould have shown. 

 [1] Zeller _Op. Cit. _ p. 25. 

At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, noother force was as strong in giving life to the school as thesystematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of [Greek:epochê]. The reason of this is evident. It was not that theideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, but because a definite statement of belief is always a far morepowerful influence than principles which are vaguely understoodand accepted. There is always, however, the danger to theSceptic, in making a statement even of the principles ofScepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatictendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even withAenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escapethe accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even instating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know fromDiogenes. [1] To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirmthings to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear tohim, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said. [2]

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 102. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 4, 24. 

Sextus tells us that "Certain Tropes, ten in number, forproducing the state of [Greek: epochê] have been handed downfrom the older Sceptics. "[1] He refers to them in another workas the "Tropes of Aenesidemus. "[2] There is no evidence that thesubstance of these Tropes was changed after the time ofAenesidemus, although many of the illustrations given by Sextusmust have been of a later date, added during the two centuriesthat elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. Ingiving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a systematicmethodical classification, and closes his list of them, in theiroriginal concise form, with the remark, "We make this orderourselves. "[3] The order is given differently by Diogenes, andalso by Favorinus. [4] The Trope which Sextus gives as the tenthis the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is theeighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh byDiogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by Sextus. Diogenessays that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls theeighth, and Sextus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statementdoes not correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextusgives, proving that Diogenes took some other text than that ofSextus as his authority. [5] The difference in the order of theTropes shows, also, that the order was not considered a matterof great importance. There is a marked contrast in the spirit ofthe two presentations of the Tropes given by Sextus andDiogenes. The former gives them not only as an orator, but asone who feels that he is defending his own cause, and the schoolof which he is the leader, against mortal enemies, whileDiogenes relates them as an historian. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 36. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 345. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 38. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 87. 

 [5] Diog. IX. 11, 87. 

Pappenheim tries to prove[1] that Aenesidemus originally gaveonly nine Tropes in his _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_, as Aristoclesmentions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case, however, the fact would surely have been mentioned either byDiogenes or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes ofAenesidemus. 

The Tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is sorelative and changeable, that certain knowledge cannot be basedupon them, and as we have shown, there is no other criterion ofknowledge for the Sceptic than phenomena. [2] All of the Tropes, except the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, andrelate to the difference of the results obtained through thesenses under different circumstances. They may be divided intotwo classes, _i. E. _, those based upon differences of ourphysical organism, and those based upon external differences. Tothe first class belong the first, second, third and fourth; tothe second class, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and alsothe ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is appliedobjectively both by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment ofthe Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, butprincipally to show the relation of outward objects to eachother. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance, and it has also a higher subjective value than the others; ittakes its arguments from an entirely different sphere ofthought, and deals with metaphysical and religiouscontradictions in opinion, and with the question of good andevil. That this Trope is one of the oldest, we know from itsdistinct mention in connection with the foundation theories ofPyrrho, by Diogenes. [3] In treating of the subjective reasonsfor doubt as to the character of external reality, the Scepticswere very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, however, which they never quite reached. 

 [1] Pappenheim, _Die Tropen der Griechen_, p. 23. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 22. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

There is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed with theillustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible to separatethe original parts from the material that was the commonproperty of the Sceptical School. Many of these illustrationsshow, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific andmedical teachings of the time. Before entering upon hisexposition of the Tropes, Sextus gives them in the short conciseform in which they must first have existed[1]--

 (i) Based upon the variety of animals. 

 (ii) Based upon the differences between men. 

 (iii) Based upon differences in the constitution of the sense organs. 

 (iv) Based upon circumstances. 

 (v) Based upon position, distance and place. 

 (vi) Based upon mixtures. 

 (vii) Based upon the quantities and constitutions of objects. 

(viii) Relation. 

 (ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences. 

 (x) Based upon systems, customs and laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 36-38. 

Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding thearrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his classification ofthem a regular gradation, from the arguments based upondifferences in animals to those in man, first considering thelatter in relation to the physical constitution, and then tocircumstances outside of us, and finally the treatment ofmetaphysical and moral differences. 

_The First Trope_. [1] That the same mental representations arenot found in different animals, may be inferred from theirdifferences in constitution resulting from their differentorigins, and from the variety in their organs of sense. Sextustakes up the five senses in order, giving illustrations to provethe relative results of the mental representations in all ofthem, as for example the subjectivity of color[2] and sound. [3]All knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and notabsolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine theimpossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Lockeregards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in thisstatement. [4] The form and shape of objects as they appear to usmay be changed by pressure on the eyeball. Furthermore, thecharacter of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on theirshape, as the images in concave mirrors are very different fromthose in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes ofanimals are of different shapes, and supplied with differentfluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grasshoppers must bevery different. [5]

 [1] _Hyp. _. I. 40-61. 

 [2] _Hyp. _. I. 44-46. 

 [3] _Hyp. _. I. 50. 

 [4] _Hyp. _. I. 47. 

 [5] _Hyp. _. I. 49. 

In discussing the mental representations of animals of differentgrades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very good comprehensionof the philogenetic development of the organs of sense, anddraws the final conclusion that external objects are regardeddifferently by animals, according to their difference inconstitution. [1] These differences in the ideas which differentanimals have of the same objects are demonstrated by theirdifferent tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal toothers. [2] The practical illustrations given of this result showa familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastesand habits of many animals, [3] but were probably few of themoriginal with Sextus, unless perhaps in their application; thatthis train of reasoning was the common property of the ScepticSchool, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins hisexposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that ofSextus. [4] His illustrations are, however, few and meagrecompared with those of Sextus, and the scientific facts used byboth of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquitygiven in a similar way. [5] The logical result of the reasoningused to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot compare theideas of the animals with each other, nor with our own; nor canwe prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of theanimals. [6] As therefore an examination of ideas is impossible, any decided opinion about their trustworthiness is alsoimpossible, and this Trope leads to the suspension of judgmentregarding external objects, or to [Greek: epochê. ][7]

 [1] _Hyp. _. I. 54. 

 [2] _Hyp. _. I. 55. 

 [3] _Hyp. _. I. 55-59. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 79-80. 

 [5] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundzüge Par_. 41. 

 [6] _Hyp_. I. 59. 

 [7] _Hyp_. I. 61. 

After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a long chapterto prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to thisin Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was afavourite line of argument with the Sceptics. [1] Sextus, however, says that his course of reasoning is different fromthat of most of the Sceptics on the subject, [2] as they usuallyapplied their arguments to all animals, while he selected onlyone, namely the dog. [3] This chapter is full of sarcasticattacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion tothe Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which hasbeen before referred to. [4]

Sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in someapparently less original chapters, and with a wealth of specialillustrations, that the dog is superior to man in acuteness ofperception, [5] that he has the power of choice, and possesses anart, that of hunting, [6] and, also, is not deprived ofvirtue, [7] as the true nature of virtue is to show justice toall, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kindto him, and keeping off those who do evil. [8] The reasoningpower of this animal is proved by the story taken fromChrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads infollowing a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two of theroads, he takes the third road without scenting it as a resultof a quick process of thought, which proves that he shares inthe famous dialectic of Chrysippus, [9] the five forms of [Greek:_anapodeiktoi logoi_, ] of which the dog chooses the fifth. Either _A_ or _B_ or _C_, not _A_ or _B, _ therefore _C_. 

 [1] _Hyp_. I. 238. 

 [2] Compare Brochard _Op. Cit. _ 256. 

 [3] _Hyp_. I. 62-63. 

 [4] _Hyp_. I. 65. 

 [5] _Hyp_. I. 64. 

 [6] _Hyp_. I. 66. 

 [7] _Hyp_. I. 67. 

 [8] _Hyp_. I. 67. 

 [9] _Hyp_. I. 69; _Hyp_. II. 166; Diog. VII. 1, 79. 

The dog and other irrational animals may also possess spokenlanguage, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is thefact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make. [1] Wehave an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, whoafter enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honouredthemselves with the name of this animal, "[2] thus making asarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes. [3]

 [1] _Hyp_. I. 74. 

 [2] _Hyp_. I. 72. 

 [3] Diog. VI. 1, 13. 

_The Second Trope_. Passing on to the second Trope, Sextus aimsto prove that even if we leave the differences of the mentalimages of animals out of the discussion, there is not asufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings toallow us to base any assertions upon them in regard to thecharacter of external objects. [1] He had previously announcedthat he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual"in any way whatever, "[2] so he begins here by referring to thetwo parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and thebody, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men insense-perception and in opinion. [3] Most of the illustrationsgiven of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; ofthe more general of these I will note the only two which arealso given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope, [4] viz. , Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, who shivered in the sun, andAndron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he travelledthrough the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some havereasoned from the presence of the first of these illustrationsin the exposition of the Tropes, that a part of this material atleast goes back to the time of Pyrrho, as Pyrrho from hisintimacy with Alexander, when he accompanied him to India, hadabundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of hisservant Demophon. [5] The illustration of Andron the Argive istaken from Aristotle, according to Diogenes. [6]

 [1] _Hyp_. I. 79. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 8. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 80. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 80-81. 

 [5] Compare _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, Revue phil. _, Paris 1885, No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521. 

 [6] Diog. IX. 11, 81. 

Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another example ofthe sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he refers to the [Greek:physiognômonikê sophia][1] as the authority for believing thatthe body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, sothe souls also probably differ. The differences of mind amongmen is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the generalstatement that they choose different professions; while Sextuselaborates this point, speaking of the great differences inopposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice andavoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men. [2] Thepoets well understand this marked difference in human desires, as Homer says, "One man enjoys this, another enjoys that. "

Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar, [3]

 "One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses, Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold, Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea. "

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 85. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 87-89. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 86. 

_The Third Trope_. The third Trope limits the argument to thesense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or toone whom the Dogmatics consider wise, [1] and states that as theideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in away that does not admit of their being compared with each other, they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature ofobjects. [2] "Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems topresent itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrantbrown and sweet. " The apple was evidently the ordinary examplegiven for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a muchmore condensed form, and not with equal understanding of theresults to be deduced from it. [3] The consequence of theincompatibility of the mental representations produced throughthe several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance ofeither of the three following propositions: (i) That only thosequalities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That morethan these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do notexist. [4] Accordingly, any experience which can give rise tosuch different views regarding outward objects, cannot be reliedupon as a testimony concerning them. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 90. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 94. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11 81. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 99. 

The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected withthe different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds usof the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in his _Theoryof Vision_. 

Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual number ofsenses, would form altogether different ideas of the externalworld than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas ofobjects depend on our mental images, a greater number of senseorgans would give us still different ideas of outwardreality. [1] The strong argument of the Stoics against suchreasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmonybetween nature and the soul, so that when a representation isproduced in us of a real object, a [Greek: katalêptikêphantasia], [2] by this representation the soul grasps a realexistence. There is a [Greek: logos] in us which is of the samekind, [Greek: syngenos], or in relation to all nature. Thisargument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of thesoul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used inall ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that weapprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kantby his opponents, who thought in this way to refute histeachings. [3] The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theoryof nature that included the soul and the external world in oneharmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the thirdTrope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later inhis work against logic. [4] He simply states here thatphilosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, andfurthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of thediscord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion can be reached by those who arethemselves an element of the uncertainty. [5]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 96-97. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 93. 

 [3] Ueberweg _Op. Cit. _ 195. 

 [4] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 354. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 98-99. 

_The Fourth Trope_. This Trope limits the argument to eachseparate sense, and the effect is considered of the condition ofbody and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the severalsense-organs. [1] The physical states which modifysense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. Allof these conditions of the body entirely change the character ofthe mental images, producing different judgments of the color, taste, and temperature of objects, and of the character ofsounds. A man who is asleep is in a different world from oneawake, the existence of both worlds being relative to thecondition of waking and sleeping. [2]

The subjective states which Sextus mentions here as modifyingthe character of the mental representations are hating orloving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and sanity orinsanity. [3] No man is ever twice in exactly the same conditionof body or mind, and never able to review the differences of hisideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only aresubject to careful inspection. [4] Furthermore, no one is freefrom the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that hecan be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can beestablished that can be shown to be true, but on the contrary, whatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterionand the proof will be thrown into the _circulus in probando_, for the truth of each rests on the other. [5]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 100. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 104. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 100. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 112. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 117. 

Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this Trope, butin a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of thistrain of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormalconditions are also natural. In referring at first to theopposing states of body and mind, which so change the characterof sense-perception, Sextus classifies them according to thepopular usage as [Greek: kata physin] and [Greek: para physin]. This distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, andwas especially developed by the Stoics[1] in a broader sensethan referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics, however, considered only normal conditions as being according tonature. Sextus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal statesare also conditions according to nature, [2] and just as thosewho are in health are in a state that is natural to those whoare in health, so also those not in health are in a state thatis natural to those not in health, and in some respectsaccording to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are notabsolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really existsfor those who are asleep as the things that exist in wakingexist, although they do not exist in sleep. [3] One mentalrepresentation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which isalso in a state of relation to existing physical and mentalconditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedlyin his exposition of this Trope. "The insane are not in acondition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we alsosee the sun as if it were stationary. "[4] Furthermore, indifferent periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond ofballs and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, and the aged still others. [5] The wisdom contained in this Tropein reference to the relative value of the things most soughtafter is not original with Sextus, but is found in the moreearnest ethical teachings of older writers. Sextus does not, however, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, butonly uses it as an argument for [Greek: epochê]. 

 [1] Diog. VII. 1, 86. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 103. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 104. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 82. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 106. 

_The Fifth Trope_. This Trope leaves the discussion of thedependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, and takes upthe influence of the environment upon them. It makes thedifference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, andplace of objects, thus taking apparently their real existencefor granted. Things change their form and shape according to thedistance from which they are observed, and the position in whichthey stand. [1]

The same light or tone alters decidedly in differentsurroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle atwhich the picture is suspended. [2] With Diogenes this Trope isthe seventh, [3] and his exposition of it is similar, but asusual, shorter. Both Sextus and Diogenes give theillustration[4] of the neck of the dove differing in color indifferent degrees of inclination, an illustration used byProtagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by thesenses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light sunny and purple. "[5] Since, then, allphenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certaindistance, and according to a certain position, each of whichrelations makes a great difference with the mental images, weshall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving ofthe opinion. [6]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 118. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 120. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 85. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 120; Diog. IX. 11, 86. 

 [5] _Schol. Zu Arist. _ 60, 18, ed. Brandis; Pappen. _Er. Pyrr. Grundzüge_, p. 54. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 121. 

_The Sixth Trope_. This Trope leads to [Greek: epochê] regardingthe nature of objects, because no object can ever be presentedto the organs of sense directly, but must always be perceivedthrough some medium, or in some mixture. [1] This mixture may bean outward one, connected with the temperature, or the rarity ofthe air, or the water[2] surrounding an object, or it may be amixture resulting from the different humors of thesense-organs. [3] A man with the jaundice, for example, seescolors differently from one who is in health. The illustrationof the jaundice is a favorite one with the Sceptics. Diogenesuses it several times in his presentation of Scepticism, and itoccurs in Sextus' writings in all, as an illustration, in eightdifferent places. [4] The condition of the organ of the [Greek:hêgemonikon], or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures. Pappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea of _a priori_, only on a materialistic foundation. [5] A careful considerationof the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought is morein harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than withthe philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, [Greek: isôs de kaiautê (hê dianoia) epimixian tina idian poieitai pros ta hypo tônaisthêseôn anangellomena], [6] stood alone, without furtherexplanation, it might well refer to _a priori_ laws of thought, but the explanation which follows beginning with "because" makesthat impossible. [7] "Because in each of the places where theDogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, we see presentcertain humors, which are the cause of mixtures. " Sextus doesnot advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty inthe body, which is, according to the Stoics, the principal partof the soul, where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate, [8]but simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, whichclaim on the one hand that it is in the brain, and on the otherthat it is in the heart. [9] This subject he deals with morefully in his work against logic. [10] As, however, he bases hisargument, in discussing possible intellectual mixtures inillustration of the sixth Trope, entirely on the condition ofthe organ of the intellect, it is evident that his theory of thesoul was a materialistic one. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 124. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 125. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 126. 

 [4] See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus. 

 [5] Papp. _Er. Pyr. Gr. _ p. 55. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 128. 

 [7] _Hyp. _ I. 128. 

 [8] Diog. VII. 1, 159. 

 [9] _Hyp. _ I. 128. 

 [10] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 313. 

_The Seventh Trope_. This Trope, based upon the quantities andcompositions of objects, is illustrated by examples of differentkinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the differenteffects according to the quantity taken, as the harmfulness andthe usefulness of most things depend on their quantity. Thingsact differently upon the senses if applied in small or largequantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains ofsand have a different color and touch from the same taken in theform of a solid. [1] The result is that ideas vary according tothe composition of the object, and this Trope also brings toconfusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us toreserve our opinion in regard to them. [2] This Trope isillustrated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity. [3]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 129-131. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 134. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 86. 

_The Eighth Trope_. The Trope based upon relation contains, asSextus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine, [1] forthe general statement of the relativity of knowledge includesthe other statements made. The prominence which Sextus gave thisTrope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expecthere new illustrations and added[2] arguments for [Greek:epochê]. We find, however, neither of these, but simply astatement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These twokinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have beenused to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or atthe end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate tothe eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to therelation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that isnot found elsewhere where as an argument for [Greek: epochê]. [3]This Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens hisreasoning in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does notdirectly make, _i. E. _, that everything is in relation to theunderstanding. [4]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 39. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 135-140. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 135-140. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 88. 

_The Ninth Trope_. This is based upon the frequency and rarityof events, and refers to some of the phenomena of nature, suchas the rising of the sun, and the sea, as no longer a source ofastonishment, while a comet or an earthquake are wonders tothose not accustomed to them. [1] The value of objects alsodepends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold. [2]Furthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and at anothernot so, according to the frequency and rarity of theoccurrence. [3] Therefore this Trope also leads to [Greek:epochê]. Diogenes gives only two illustrations to this Trope, that of the sun and the earthquake. [4]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 141-142. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 143. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 144. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 87. 

_The Tenth Trope_. We have already remarked on the difference inthe character of the tenth Trope, dealing as it does, not withthe ideas of objects, like the other nine Tropes, but withphilosophical and religious opinions, and questions of right andwrong. It was the well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit tothe laws and customs of the land where they were found, and toconform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies;this they did without either affirming or denying the truth ofthe principles upon which these teachings were based, [1] andalso without any passion or strong feeling in regard to them, [2]as nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil. The tenthTrope accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs, laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that they arealso changeable and relative, and not of absolute worth. Thefoundation-thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his introduction[3] to the lifeof Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes. [4] As it is apparentlyone of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much usedin discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wideethical significance, and must also have held an important placein the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophicaldiscussions. The definition[5] in the beginning of Sextus'exposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken fromAristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs anddogmatic opinions, [6] and the definition which Diogenes gives oflaw in his life of Plato[7] is similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps fromChrysippus. [8] The argument is based upon the differences indevelopment of thought, as affecting the standpoint of judgmentin philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which wefind in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in thevariety in religious belief, and in the laws and customs ofdifferent countries. Therefore the decisions reached in theworld of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding theabsolute value of any standards, with those obtained throughsense-perception, and the universal conflict of opinionregarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us alsoaccording to this Trope to the reserving of the opinion. [9] ThisTrope is the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directlyafter the first four which relate more especially to humandevelopment, [10] while Sextus uses it as the final one, perhapsthinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of mandeserves the last place, or is the summation of the otherarguments. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 24. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ III. 235. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 83. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 145-147. 

 [6] Fabricius, Cap. IV. H. 

 [7] Diog. III. 86. 

 [8] Pappenheim _Gr. Pyrr. Grundzüge_, p. 50. 

 [9] _Hyp. _ I. 163. 

 [10] Diog. IX. 11, 83. 

Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the olderSceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he attributes tothe "later Sceptics. "[1] Sextus nowhere mentions the author ofthese Tropes. Diogenes, however, attributes them to Agrippa, aman of whom we know nothing except his mention of him. He wasevidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a scholar ofinfluence in the Sceptical School, who must have himself haddisciples, as Diogenes says, [Greek: hoi peri Agrippan][2] addto these tropes other five tropes, using the plural verb. Another Sceptic, also mentioned by Diogenes, and a man unknownfrom other sources, named some of his books after Agrippa. [3]Agrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders ofthe Sceptical School, but[4] his influence in the development ofthe thought of the School must have been great, as thetransition from the ten Tropes of the "older Sceptics" to thefive attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows theentrance into the school of a logical power before unknown init. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written from an entirely different standpoint. The tenTropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of thefoundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are ratherrules of thought leading to logical proof, and are dialectic intheir character. We find this distinction illustrated by thedifferent way in which the Trope of relativity is treated in thetwo groups. In the first it points to an objective relativity, but with Agrippa to a general subjective logical principle. Theoriginality of the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in theirsubstance matter, but in their formulation and use in theSceptical School. These methods of proof were, of course, notnew, but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by theSceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon, [5] while the[Greek: pros ti] goes back at least to Protagoras. The fiveTropes are as follows. 

 (i) The one based upon discord. (ii) The _regressus in infinitum_. (iii) Relation. (iv) The hypothetical. (v) The _circulus in probando_. 

Two of these are taken from the old list, the first and thethird, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are intended tosupplement the ten Tropes, and to show the audacity of theDogmatics in a variety of ways. [6] The order of these Tropes isthe same with Diogenes as with Sextus, but the definitions ofthem differ sufficiently to show that the two authors took theirmaterial from different sources. According to the first oneeverything in question is either sensible or intellectual, andin attempting to judge it either in life, practically, or "amongphilosophers, " a position is developed from which it isimpossible to reach a conclusion. [7] According to the second, every proof requires another proof, and so on to infinity, andthere is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning. [8]According to the third, all perceptions are relative, as theobject is colored by the condition of the judge, and theinfluence of other things around it. [9] According to the fourth, it is impossible to escape from the _regressus in infinitum_ bymaking a hypothesis the starting point, as the Dogmatics attemptto do. [10] And the fifth, or the _circulus in probando_, ariseswhen that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by thething to be proved. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 164. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 88. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 106. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 12, 115-116. 

 [5] Compare Natorp. _Op. Cit. _ p. 302. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 177. 

 [7] _Hyp. _ I. 165. 

 [8] _Hyp. _ I. 166. 

 [9] _Hyp. _ I. 167. 

 [10] _Hyp. _ I. 168. 

Sextus claims that all things can be included in these Tropes, whether sensible or intellectual. [1] For whether, as some say, only the things of sense are true, or as others claim, onlythose of the understanding, or as still others contend, somethings both of sense and understanding are true, a discord mustarise that is impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judgedby the sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of theintellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the result ofall reasoning must be either hypothetical, or fall into the_regressus in infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_. [2] Thereference above to some who say that only the things of senseare true, is to Epicurus and Protagoras; to some that only thethings of thought are true, to Democritus and Plato; and tothose that claimed some of both to be true, to the Stoics andthe Peripatetics. [3] The three new Tropes added by Agrippa havenothing to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon thepossibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of logic, in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely, with the exception of the tenth, to material objects. Sextusclaims that these five Tropes also lead to the suspension ofjudgment, [4] but their logical result is rather the dogmaticdenial of all possibility of knowledge, showing as Hirzel haswell demonstrated, far more the influence of the New Academythan the spirit of the Sceptical School. [5] It was thestandpoint of the older Sceptics, that although the search forthe truth had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers, and Sextus claims to be faithful to this old aim of thePyrrhonists. He calls himself a seeker, [6] and in reproachingthe New Academy for affirming that knowledge is impossible, Sextus says, "Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal asregards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. "[7] The tenTropes claim to establish doubt only in regard to a knowledge ofthe truth, but the five Tropes of Agrippa aim to logically provethe impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that Sextusdoes not see this decided contrast in the attitude of the twosets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of those of Agrippa, and makes more frequent use of the fifth of these, [Greek: hodiallêlos], in his subsequent reasoning than of any otherargument. [8]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 169. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 170-171. 

 [3] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 185-186; VIII. 56; VII. 369. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 177. 

 [5] Hirzel _Op. Cit. _ p. 131. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 3, 7. 

 [7] _Hyp. _ I. 227. 

 [8] See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works. 

We find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after the time ofAenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic teaching that--so faras the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the NewAcademy can be unravelled, and the separation of Pyrrhonism canbe understood, at the time that the Academy passed over intoeclecticism--was one of the causes of that separation. 

It is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great progress in thedevelopment of thought. They furnish an organisation of theSchool far superior to what went before, placing the reasoningon the firm basis of the laws of logic, and simplifying theamount of material to be used. In a certain sense Saisset iscorrect in saying that Agrippa contributed more than any otherin completing the organisation of Scepticism, [1] but it is notcorrect when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism withwhich the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony. It was throughthe very progress shown in the production of these Tropes thatthe school finally lost the strength of its position. 

Not content with having reduced the number of the Tropes fromten to five, others tried to limit the number still further totwo. [2] Sextus gives us no hint of the authorship of the twoTropes. Ritter attributes them to Menodotus and his followers, and Zeller agrees with that opinion, [3] while Saisset thinksthat Agrippa was also the author of these, [4] which is a strangetheory to propound, as some of the material of the five isrepeated in the two, and the same man could certainly not appearas an advocate of five, and at the same time of two Tropes. 

 [1] Saisset _Op. Cit. _ p. 237. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 178. 

 [3] Zeller III. 38; Ritter IV. 277. 

 [4] Saisset _Op. Cit. _ p. 231. 

The two Tropes are founded on the principle that anything mustbe known through itself or through something else. It cannot beknown through itself, because of the discord existing betweenall things of the senses and intellect, nor can it be knownthrough something else, as then either the _regressus ininfinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow. [1] DiogenesLaertius does not refer to these two Tropes. 

In regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of judgment, Sextus has well remarked in his introduction to them, that theyare included in the eighth, or that of relation. [2]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 178-179. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 39. 

_The Tropes of Aetiology_. The eight Tropes against causalitybelong chronologically before the five Tropes of Agrippa, in thehistory of the development of sceptical thought. They have amuch closer connection with the spirit of Scepticism than theTropes of Agrippa, including, as they do, the fundamentalthought of Pyrrhonism, _i. E. _, that the phenomena do not revealthe unknown. 

The Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they denied thatthe phenomena are signs capable of being interpreted, or ofrevealing the reality of causes. It is impossible by a researchof the signs to find out the unknown, or the explanation ofthings, as the Stoics and Epicureans claim. The theory ofAenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropesagainst aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows:[1]"There are no visible signs of the unknown, and those whobelieve in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion. "This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fullerexplanation of it given later on by Sextus. [2] If phenomena arenot signs of the unknown there is no causality, and a refutationof causality is a proof of the impossibility of science, as allscience is the science of causes, the power of studying causesfrom effects, or as Sextus calls them, phenomena. 

It is very noticeable to any one who reads the refutation ofcausality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus, [3] that there isno reference to the strongest argument of modern Scepticism, since the time of Hume, against causality, namely that theorigin of the idea of causality cannot be so accounted for as tojustify our relying upon it as a form of cognition. [4]

 [1] _Myriob. _ 170 B. 12. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 207. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 180-186. 

 [4] Ueberweg _Op. Cit. _ p. 217. 

The eight Tropes are directed against the possibility ofknowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested against in allhis Tropes, the ten as well as the eight. [1] They are writtenfrom a materialistic standpoint. These Tropes are given withillustrations by Fabricius as follows:

I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen, it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard tophenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance ofthe planets by a musical proportion. 

II. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given forthe same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explainthe inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source, while there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or theaction of the sun. 

III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causespresented do not show any order, as for example, the motion ofthe stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does nottake into account the order that reigns among them. 

IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same wayas phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as theappearance of images in a dark room. 

V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agreewith their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but notwith common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atomslike Epicurus, by homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter andform like Aristotle. 

VI. Theories are accepted which agree with individualhypotheses, and others equally probable are passed by, asAristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection ofvapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory ofthe universe. 

VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not onlywith individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admitlike Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which wasincompatible with the necessity which he advocated. 

VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equallyinscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by theattraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some. [2]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 98. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z. 

Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but hegives a _resumé_ of the general arguments of the Scepticsagainst aetiology, [1] which has less in common with the eightTropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subjectby Sextus later, [2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly toshow [Greek: mêden einai aition]. Although the Tropes ofAenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is soprominent with Sextus, between the signs [Greek: hypomnêstika]and [Greek: endeiktika], [3] especially as Diogenes sums up hisargument on the subject with the general assertion, [Greek:Sêmeion ouk einai], [4] and proceeds to introduce the logicalconsequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of theTropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the _Hypotyposes_, by Sextus:--"A cause in harmony with all the sects ofphilosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhapsnot possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogetherdisagree. "[5]

It is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh ofthese Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that causality has only asubjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was anargument against its real existence, and the same argument isused by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition ofthought. [6]

Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false andsophistical, [7] but as Maccoll has well said, they areremarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and aredirected against the false method of observing facts through thelight of preconceived opinion. [8] They have, however, a strongercritical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency ofthe thought of Aenesidemus. 

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ III. 24-28. 

 [3] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 151. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 96. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 185. 

 [6] Compare Maccoll _Op. Cit. _ p. 77. 

 [7] Chaignet _Op. Cit. _ 507. 

 [8] Maccoll _Op. Cit. _ p. 88. 

CHAPTER IV. 

_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus. _

A paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which hasgiven rise to much speculation and many different theories, isthe comparison which Sextus makes of Scepticism with thephilosophy of Heraclitus. [1] In this paragraph the statement ismade that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri tonAinêsidêmon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophyof Heraclitus, because the doctrine that contradictorypredicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads theway to the one that contradictory predicates are in realityapplicable to the same thing. [2] [Greek: hoi peri tonAinêsidêmon elegon hodon einai tên skeptikên agôgên epi tênHêrakleiteion philosophian, dioti proêgeitai tou tanantia perito auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As theSceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to beapplicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans come from this tothe more positive doctrine that they are in reality so. [3]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 210. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 210. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 210. 

This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have affirmedbetween Scepticism and the philosophy of Heraclitus is earnestlycombated by Sextus, who declares that the fact thatcontradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the samething is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but a fact which presentsitself to all men, and not to the Sceptics only. No one forinstance, whether he be a Sceptic or not, would dare to say thathoney does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter tothose who have the jaundice, so that Heraclitus begins from apreconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps tothe other schools of philosophy as well. [1] As the statementconcerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regardto the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, thenScepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Heraclitusthan to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all usecommon subject matter. "But we are afraid that the ScepticalSchool not only does not help towards the knowledge of thephilosophy of Heraclitus, but even hinders that result. Sincethe Sceptic accuses Heraclitus of having rashly dogmatised, presenting on the one hand the doctrine of 'conflagration' andon the other that 'contradictory predicates are in realityapplicable to the same thing. '"[2] "It is absurd, then, to saythat this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which itconflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the ScepticalSchool is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. "[3]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 211. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 212. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 212. 

This is not the only place in the writings of Sextus whichstates that Aenesidemus at some time of his life was an advocateof the doctrines of Heraclitus. In no instance, however, whereSextus refers to this remarkable fact, does he offer anyexplanation of it, or express any bitterness againstAenesidemus, whom he always speaks of with respect as a leaderof the Sceptical School. We are thus furnished with one of themost difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem ofreconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus of theteachings of Heraclitus with his position in the ScepticalSchool. 

A comparison with each other of the references made by Sextusand other writers to the teachings of Aenesidemus, and aconsideration of the result, gives us two pictures ofAenesidemus which conflict most decidedly with each other. Wehave on the one hand, the man who was the first to givePyrrhonism a position as an influential school, and the first tocollect and present to the world the results of precedingSceptical thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of[Greek: epochê], and perhaps in part their author, and theauthor of the eight Tropes against aetiology. [1] He develops hisScepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor theintellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality. [2] Hedenied the possibility of studying phenomena as signs of theunknown. [3] He denied all possibility of truth, and the realityof motion, origin and decay. There was according to his teachingno pleasure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good. Hedenied the possibility of finding out the nature of things, orof proving the existence of the gods, and finally he declaredthat no ethical aim is possible. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 180. 

 [2] Photius 170, B. 12. 

 [3] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 40. 

The picture on the other hand, presented to us by Sextus andTertullian, is that of a man with a system of beliefs anddogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy of Heraclitus. Instrange contradiction to his assertion of the impossibility ofall knowledge, he advocates a theory that the original substanceis air, [1] which is most certainly a dogma, although indeed adeviation from the teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sextusseemed unconscious, as he says, [Greek: to te on kata tonHêrakleiton aêr estin, hôs physin ho Ainêsidêmos]. Aenesidemusdogmatised also regarding number and time and unity of theoriginal world-stuff. [2] He seems to have dogmatised furtherabout motion, [3] and about the soul. [4]

If Sextus' language is taken according to its apparent meaning, we find ourselves here in the presence of a system of beliefswhich would be naturally held by a follower of theStoic-Heraclitan physics, [5] and absolutely inexplicable fromthe standpoint of a man who advocated so radical a Scepticism asAenesidemus. Sextus in the passage that we first quoted, [6]expresses great indignation against the idea that Scepticismcould form the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, but he doesnot express surprise or indignation against Aenesidemuspersonally, or offer any explanation of the apparentcontradiction; and while his writings abound in references tohim as a respected leader of the Sceptical School, he sometimesseems to include him with the Dogmatics, mentioning him with the[Greek: dogmatikôn philosophôn]. [7] In fact, the task ofpresenting any consistent history of the development of thoughtthrough which Aenesidemus passed is such a puzzling one, thatBrochard brilliantly remarks that possibly the best attitude totake towards it would be to follow the advice of Aenesidemushimself, and suspend one's judgment altogether regarding it. Isit possible to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker asAenesidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions?

 [1] _Adv. Math. _ X. 233. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ IX. 337; X. 216. 

 [3] _Adv. Math. _ X. 38. 

 [4] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 349. 

 [5] Compare Zeller _Op. Cit. _ III. P. 33. 

 [6] _Hyp. _ I. 210-212. 

 [7] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 8; X. 215. 

The conjecture that he was first a Heraclitan Stoic, and later aSceptic, which might be possible, does not offer any explanationof Sextus' statement, that he regarded Scepticism as a path tothe philosophy of Heraclitus. Nor would it be logical to thinkthat after establishing the Sceptical School in renewedinfluence and power, he reverted to the Heraclitan theories asthey were modified by the Stoics. These same theories were thecause of his separation from the Academy, for his chiefaccusation against the Academy was that it was adopting thedogmatism of the Stoics. [1] The matter is complicated by thefact that Tertullian also attributes to Aenesidemusanthropological and physical teachings that agree with theStoical Heraclitan doctrines. It is not strange that in view ofthese contradictory assertions in regard to the same man, somehave suggested the possibility that they referred to twodifferent men of the same name, a supposition, however, that noone has been able to authoritatively vindicate. 

Let us consider briefly some of the explanations which have beenattempted of the apparent heresy of Aenesidemus towards theSceptical School. We will begin with the most ingenious, that ofPappenheim. [2]

Pappenheim claims that Sextus was not referring to Aenesidemushimself in these statements which he joins with his name. In themost important of these, the one quoted from the_Hypotyposes_, [3] which represents Aenesidemus as claiming thatScepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, theexpression used is [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainêsidêmon], and inmany of the other places where Sextus refers to the dogmaticstatements of Aenesidemus, the expression is either [Greek: hoiperi ton Ainêsidêmon], or [Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath'Hêrakleiton], while when Sextus quotes Aenesidemus to sustainScepticism, he uses his name alone. 

 [1] Compare Zeller _Op. Cit. _ III. P. 16. 

 [2] _Die angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos_, Berlin 1889. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 210-212. 

Pappenheim thinks that Sextus' conflict was not with the deadAenesidemus, who had lived two centuries before him, but withhis own contemporaries. He also seeks to prove that Sextus couldnot have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemusfrom any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by theancients, nor by later writers, was any book spoken of whichcould well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Diogenesmentions any such book. 

Pappenheim also makes much of the argument that Sextus in noinstance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part ofAenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his allegedteachings, but in referring to him personally he always speaksof him with great respect. 

Pappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic of Sextus wasagainst contemporaries, those who accepted the philosophy ofHeraclitus in consequence of, or in some connection with, theteachings of Aenesidemus. He entirely ignores the fact thatthere is no trace of any such school or sect in history, callingthemselves followers of "Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus, "but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed inAlexandria at the time of Sextus, where so many different sectswere found. Sextus use Aenesidemus' name in four differentways:--alone, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidêmon], [Greek:Ainêsidêmos kath' Hêrakleiton], and in one instance [Greek: hoiperi ton Ainêsidêmon kath' Hêrakleiton]. [1]

 [1] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 8. 

Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporariesagainst whom Sextus directed his arguments had written a bookentitled [Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath' Hêrakleiton], to prove theharmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus, and that it was fromthis book that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which heintroduced with that formula. He claims, further, that thepassage quoted from _Hypotyposes I. _ even, is directedagainst contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs ofthe harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus on the connectionof the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with theSceptics: "Contrary predicates appear to apply to the samething, " with the apparent deduction from this, that "Contrarypredicates in reality apply to the same thing. " Sextus wishes, according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries thatthey had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus does not reportAenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrinesof Heraclitus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, norconsequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, thesedogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, butrefer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Scepticswhile they accepted the teachings of Heraclitus. Sextusnaturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preservePyrrhonism pure. 

Brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part ofAenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question. [1]He starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which weshall consider later, that Aenesidemus had passed through onechange of opinion already when he severed his connection withthe New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such achange has already made us familiar with, he adds a third. Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted differentbeliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claimsthat such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus islogical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seemfrom the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, butrather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachingsof Heraclitus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to theextent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. TheSceptic says, "Contradictory predicates are apparentlyapplicable to the same thing, " and Aenesidemus accepts theHeraclitan result--"Contradictory predicates are in realityapplicable to the same thing. " From Sextus' report, Aenesidemuswould seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in sayingthat Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. Hedoes not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds itincomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance ofcontradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he wouldnaturally ask, "Whence come these contradictory appearances?"After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore hedoubts. The system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and heaccepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in thesoul because they are an expression of reality. 

 [1] Brochard _Op. Cit. _ 272. 

As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he doesnot find that the statement of Heraclitus disproves this, butrather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existenceof science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it. Brochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemusshould have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoraswas so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion, Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed toAenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictorypredicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of thefoundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him aSceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves hisrank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School. 

Coming now to the opinion of Zeller, [1] we find that headvocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of Sextus. The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simplefact that Sextus had not understood Aenesidemus; and asTertullian and Sextus agree in this misconception of the viewsof Aenesidemus, they must have been misled by consulting acommon author in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused whatAenesidemus said of Heraclitus with his own opinion. Zellermaintains that the expression so often repeated bySextus--[Greek: Ainêsidêmos kath' Hêrakleiton]--shows that someone of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Heraclitus'doctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as manyauthorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justifyhis quotations from Heraclitus, he had possibly given a shortabstract of Heraclitus' teachings; and the misconceptionadvocated by Zeller and found both in Tertullian and Sextus, refers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted fromAenesidemus, and is a misconception due to some earlier author, who had given a false impression of the meaning of Aenesidemusin quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about Heraclitus. That is tosay, Heraclitus was classed by Aenesidemus only among those whoprepared the way for Scepticism, just as Diogenes[2] mentionsmany philosophers in that way; and that Soranus[3] and Sextusboth had the same misunderstanding can only be explained by amistake on the part of the authority whom they consulted. 

 [1] Zeller _Op. Cit. _ III, pp. 31-35; _Grundriss der Geschichte der Griechischen Phil. _ p. 263. 

 [2] Diog. Laert. IX. 11, 71-74. 

 [3] Tertullian. 

This explanation, however, makes Sextus a very stupid man. Aenesidemus' books were well known, and Sextus would mostcertainly take the trouble to read them. His reputation as anhistorian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenescalls his books [Greek: ta deka tôn skeptikôn kai allakallista]. [1] Furthermore, that Sextus used Aenesidemus' ownbooks we know from the direct quotation from them in regard toPlato, [2] which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus[3] andhis own. 

 [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 222. 

 [3] Following the Greek of Bekker. 

Sextus' references to Aenesidemus in connection with Heraclitusare very numerous, and it is absurd to suppose that he wouldhave trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authorityon such a subject. Even were it possible that Sextus did notrefer directly to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do notadmit, even then, there had been many writers in the ScepticalSchool since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly couldnot all have misrepresented him. We must remember that Sextuswas at the head of the School, and had access to all of itsliterature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and ifhe had indeed made it, his contemporaries must surely havediscovered it before Diogenes characterised his books as [Greek:kallista]. Whatever may be said against the accuracy of Sextusas a general historian of philosophy, especially in regard tothe older schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorancerespecting the school of which he was at that time the head. 

The opinion of Ritter on this subject is that Aenesidemus musthave been a Dogmatic. [1] Saisset contends[2] that Aenesidemusreally passed from the philosophy of Heraclitus to that ofPyrrho, and made the statement that Scepticism is the path tothe philosophy of Heraclitus to defend his change of view, although in his case the change had been just the opposite tothe one he defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history ofphilosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticismalways follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples, Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, whowas a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss theabsurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked wouldinvolve an _a priori_ construction of history. There is noapparent reason for Saisset's conjecture in regard toAenesidemus, for it is exactly the opposite of what Sextus hasreported. Strange to say, Saisset himself remarks in anotherplace that we owe religious respect to any text, and that itshould be the first law of criticism to render this. [3] Suchrespect to the text of Sextus, as he himself advocates, putsSaisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of thequestion. 

 [1] Ritter, _Op. Cit. _ p. 280. Book IV. 

 [2] Saisset, _Op. Cit. _ p. 206. 

 [3] Saisset _Op. Cit. _ p. 206. 

Hirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in thetwo views presented of the theories of Aenesidemus, nor do theythink that Sextus has misrepresented them. They rather maintain, that in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicatesregarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease to be aSceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates areapplicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are onlyapplicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. TheHeraclitism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, ashe understood the statement, that "Contradictory predicates arein reality applicable to the same thing, " only in the phenomenalsense. [1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicatesare in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the samefor all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered thosephenomena true that are the same for all. [2] As Protagoras, thedisciple of Heraclitus, declared the relative character ofsensations, that things exist only for us, and that their naturedepends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictorypredicates in reality apply to the same thing. 

 [1] Natorp _Op. Cit. _ 115, 122. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 8; Hirzel _Op. Cit. _ p. 95. 

This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to dowith the word [Greek: huparchein], in the statement thatcontradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing;while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus declares commonphenomena to be true ones, we have the word [Greek: alêthê], sothat this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a verystrange use of the word [Greek: huparchein]. 

All of these different views of the possible solution of thisperplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of menwho have given much thought to this and other closely Belatedsubjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one ofthem, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are veryvaluable in helping to construct a theory on the subject thatshall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present aconsistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus. 

First, in regard to the Greek expression [Greek: hoi peri] inconnection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases somuch of his argument. All Greek scholars would agree that theexpression does not apply usually only to the disciples of anyteacher, but [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainêsidêmon], for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literallytranslated, "Aenesidemus and his followers. " It is noticeable, however, in the writings of Sextus that he uses the expression[Greek: hoi peri] often for the name of the founder of a schoolalone, as Pappenheim himself admits. [1] We find examples of thisin the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as[Greek: hoi peri ton Platôna kai Dêmokriton][2] and [Greek: hoiperi ton Arkesilaon], [3] and accordingly we have no right toinfer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has anexceptional significance. It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or itmay signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers. 

 [1] Pappenheim _Op. Cit. _ p. 21. 

 [2] _Adv. Math. _ VIII. 6. 

 [3] _Adv. Math. _ VII. 150. 

In reply to Zeller's position, that Sextus and Tertullian havemisunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote from some common author whomisrepresents him, we would admit that such a misunderstandingmight be possible where Sextus gives long explanations ofHeraclitus' teachings, beginning with quoting Aenesidemus, andcontinuing in such a way that it is not always possible todistinguish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; butsuch a misunderstanding certainly cannot be asserted in regardto the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism asthe path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for the reasonspreviously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whosesolution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical, _i. E. _, that Aenesidemus had necessarily already passed throughtwo phases of philosophical belief. It is possible to admit agradual evolution of thought in Aenesidemus without supposing ineither case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the Academyis an argument against, rather than in favor of a change on hispart, and was caused by the well-known change in the attitude ofthe Academy. 

Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were takendirectly from the Academy, belonging to those doctrinesadvocated in the Academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendencyintroduced by Antiochus. In fact, Sextus himself claims a closerelation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism. [1]Aenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy, and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in Pyrrhonism, and cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge aSceptic of Sextus' time. 

It seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries whichelapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus, thestandpoint of judgment in the Sceptical School had greatlychanged. An example illustrating this change we find in acomparison of the presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes withthat of Sextus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably oneof the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, andDemocritus, Sceptics, and also Plato, [2] while Sextus, in regardto all of these men, opposes the idea that they wereSceptics. [3] Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic, and evenHomer, [4] and quotes sceptical sayings from the Seven WiseMen;[5] he includes in the list of Sceptics, Archilochus, Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippocrates, [6] and, furthermore, says that Theodosius, probably one of the younger Sceptics, objected to the name 'Pyrrhonean' on the ground that Pyrrho wasnot the first Sceptic. [7]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 232. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 17-72. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 213-214; I. 223-225. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 71. 

 [5] Diog. IX. 11, 71. 

 [6] Diog. IX. 11, 71-73. 

 [7] Diog. IX. 11. 70. 

We have given the testimony from many sources to the effect thatbefore the time of Sextus the Empirical School of Medicine wasconsidered identical with Scepticism, although not so by Sextushimself. From all of these things we may infer a narrowing ofthe limits of Pyrrhonism in the time of Sextus. 

Let us accept with Brochard the development of thought seen inAenesidemus from the beginning to the end of his career, withoutagreeing with him that Aenesidemus ever consciously changed hisbasis. He was a Sceptic in the Academy. He left the Academy onthat account, and he remained a Sceptic to the end, in so far asa man can be a Sceptic, and take the positive stand thatAenesidemus did. 

Two things might account for his apparent dogmatism--

 (i) The eclectic spirit of his time. 

(ii) The psychological effect upon himself of this careful systemisation of the Sceptical teachings. 

Let us consider the first of these causes. Aenesidemus, althoughnot the first of the later Sceptics, was apparently the first toseparate himself from the Academy. He was the founder of a newmovement, the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taughtby Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic teachingsof the Stoics which were so greatly affecting the Scepticism ofthe New Academy. It was the spirit of his time to seek tosustain all philosophical teaching by the authority of as manyas possible of the older philosophers, and he could hardlyescape the tendency which his training in the Academy hadunconsciously given him. Therefore we find him trying to provethat the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It isnot necessary either to explain the matter, as both Hirzel andNatorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by claiming that the truthof contradictory predicates which Aenesidemus accepted fromHeraclitus referred only to phenomena. The history of philosophygives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absoluteScepticism, and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example ofmany of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must existin connection with all thought. In the case of Aenesidemus, whoevidently gave the best efforts of his life to establish theSceptical School, the dogmatism was probably unconscious. Thathe remained to the end a Sceptic is shown by the fact that hewas known as such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change ofbasis referred to in regard to him, and Sextus, in refuting themistakes which he attributes to Aenesidemus, does it, as itwere, to point out something of which Aenesidemus had beenunconscious. 

Let us consider here the second cause of Aenesidemus' Dogmatism, the psychological effect upon himself of formulating Scepticalbeliefs. The work that he did for the Sceptical School was apositive one. It occupied years of his life, and stamped itselfupon his mental development. In formulating Scepticism, and inadvocating it against the many enemies of the School, and amidstall the excitement of the disruption from the Academy, and ofestablishing a new School, it was inevitable that his mindshould take a dogmatic tendency. He remained a Sceptic as he hadalways been, but must have grown dogmatic in his attitudetowards the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt someof the teachings of Heraclitus, unconscious of theirinconsistency. 

Where should we find a modern writer who is consistent in allhis statements? Could we read the works of Aenesidemus, we mightbetter understand the connection between the apparentlycontradictory ideas in his teaching, but the inconsistencies instatement would probably remain. It is necessary to remember theposition of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the Academy and infounding a new school, the full significance of which he couldnot foresee. There must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneerwork, and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts, anda compiler like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies whichthe two centuries since the time of Aenesidemus had made plain. Aenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absoluteSceptical consistency. He was nevertheless the greatest thinkerthe Sceptical School had known since the age of Pyrrho, itsfounder. In claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and thephilosophy of Heraclitus, he recognised also the pre-Socratictendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Socrates was allpowerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus comprehended the factthat the true spirit of Pyrrhonism was of earlier origin thanthe Academic Scepsis. 

CHAPTER V. 

_Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism_. 

The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho was theauthor bore his name for five centuries after his death. It hadan acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency, if indeednot a sect, for a great part of that time. Yet, when wecarefully analyse the relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to usby Sextus, to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as theycan be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for which Pyrrhowas not responsible. 

The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit of Empiricaldoubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certaindirections rather than others, are due to Pyrrho. The methods ofthe school, however, were very foreign to anything found in thelife or teachings of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. Hewas also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived hisphilosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in thePyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents him asdesiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions ofhis time--

 [Greek: ô geron ô Purrhôn, pôs ê pothen ekdusin heures latreiês doxôn te kenophrosunês te sophistôn;]

and again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life--

 [Greek: touto moi, ô Purrhôn, himeiretai êtor akousai pôs pot' anêr et' ageis panta meth' hêsuchiês mounos d'anthrôpoisi theou tropon hêgemoneueis . .. .. Phêista meth' hêsuchiês aiei aphrontistôs kai akinêtôs kata tauta mê prosech' indalmois hêdulogou sophiês. ][1]

Pyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace, and hisdislike of the Sophists[2] may well have made him try to avoiddialectic; while, on the contrary, in the Pyrrhonean School oflater times discussion was one of the principal methods ofcontest, at least after the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems tohave been originally a theory of life, like the philosophy ofSocrates, to whom Pyrrho is often compared, [3] and Pyrrho, likeSocrates, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of Pyrrho isgained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes, and fromthe Academic traditions given by Cicero. Diogenes gives usdetails of his life which he attributes to Antigonus ofCarystius, who lived about the time of Pyrrho. [4] Pyrrho was adisciple and admirer of Democritus, [5] some of whose teachingsbore a lasting influence over the subsequent development ofPyrrhonism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, wherehe remained as a member of his suite for some time, and thephilosophical ideas of India were not without influence on histeachings. Oriental philosophy was not unknown in Greece longbefore the time of Pyrrho, but his personal contact with theMagi and the Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressedupon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by hisprevious study and natural disposition. In his indifference toworldly goods we find a strong trace of the Buddhistic teachingregarding the vanity of human life. He showed also a similarhopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding asatisfactory philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidentlyreturned from India with the conviction that truth was not to beattained. [6]

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of Timon by Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive_, p. 525. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 69. 

 [3] Lewes _Op. Cit. _ p. 460. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 62. 

 [5] Diog. IX. 11, 67. 

 [6] Compare Maccoll _Op. Cit. _

After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return to Greece, helived quietly with his sister at Elis, and Diogenes says that hewas consistent in his life, asserting and denying nothing, butin everything withholding his opinion, as nothing in itself isgood or shameful, just or unjust. [1] He was not a victim offalse pride, but sold animals in the market place, and, ifnecessary, washed the utensils himself. [2] He lived in equalityof spirit, and practised his teachings with serenity. If onewent out while he was talking he paid no attention, but wentcalmly on with his remarks. [3] He liked to live alone, and totravel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked about in avessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his imperturbability, but pointed to a swine calmly eating on board, and said that thewise man should have as much calmness of soul as that. Heendured difficult surgical operations with indifference, [4] andwhen his friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fallinto a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to help him, for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus afterwards praisedhim. There are two instances given by Diogenes when he lostcontrol of himself; once in getting angry with his sister, andonce in trying to save himself when chased by a dog. Whenaccused of inconsistency, he said it was difficult to entirelygive up one's humanity. [5] He was greatly venerated by thepeople among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and on hisaccount exempted all philosophers from taxation, [6] and afterhis death erected a statue to his memory. These facts testify tohis moral character, and also to fulfil the functions of highpriest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary. 

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61, 62. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 66. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 63. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 67. 

 [5] Diog. IX. 11, 66. 

 [6] Diog. IX. 11, 64. 

According to Diogenes, "We cannot know, " said Pyrrho, "whatthings are in themselves, either by sensation or by judgment, and, as we cannot distinguish the true from the false, thereforewe should live impassively, and without an opinion. " The term[Greek: epochê], so characteristic of Pyrrhonism, goes back, according to Diogenes, to the time of Pyrrho. [1] Nothing is, initself, one thing more than another, but all experience isrelated to phenomena, and no knowledge is possible through thesenses. [2] Pyrrho's aim was [Greek: ataraxia] and his lifefurnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference, forwhich the expression [Greek: apatheia] is better suited than thelater one, [Greek: ataraxia]. The description of his life withhis sister confirms this, where the term [Greek: adiaphoria] isused to describe his conduct. [3] He founded his Scepticism onthe equivalence of opposing arguments. [4]

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 61-62. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11. 66. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11. 106. 

The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely different fromthat of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly with it. [1] Ciceroknows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not as a Sceptic. Bothauthors attribute to Pyrrho the doctrine of indifference andapathy, but, according to Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, honesty, and the _summum bonum_, while Diogenes plainly tells usthat he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all thingsnothing as true. "[2] Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrhoneandoubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea of Pyrrho, theinfluence of the Academy, perhaps even of Antiochus himself, [3]which probably colored the representations given of Pyrrho; but, on the other hand, there is much in Diogenes' account ofPyrrho's life and teachings, and in the writings of Timon, whichshows us the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying thepossibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive forindifference in the relations of life, than the foundationthought of a philosophical system. His teaching has a decidedethical side, showing in that respect the strong influence ofDemocritus over him, who, like Pyrrho, made happiness to consistin a state of feeling. [4] The one motive of all of Pyrrho'steaching is a positive one, the desire for happiness. 

 [1] _De orat. _ III, 62. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

 [3] Compare Natorp _Op. Cit. _ p. 71. 

 [4] Zeller _Grundriss der Griechischen Phil. _ p. 70. 

The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1]Man desires to be happy. To realise his desire he must considerthree things:

 (i) What is the nature of things?

 (ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to them?

(iii) What is the result to him of this relation?

The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to them must beone of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, orbelief, --that is, an entirely negative relation. The result isthat state of having no opinion, called [Greek: epochê], whichis followed in turn by [Greek: ataraxia]. 

 [1] Aristocles _ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev. _ XIV. 18. 

[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in theterms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that ofthe great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system topresent the truth. Yet the importance of these questions showsthe originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is furthershown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being foundtalking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, thathe was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek:chrêstos]), [2] thus showing an entirely different spirit fromanything found in Sextus' books. The explanation of his life andteachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such anattitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, andcannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated. One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it wasnecessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold hisdoctrines. [3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advanceany formulae of Scepticism, [4] but they must have been veryelementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace offormulated Tropes in Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable thathe indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, andpossibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the largenumber of sceptical formulae, or [Greek: phônai], the threewhich seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the[Greek: antilogia], the [Greek: ouden horizô], and the [Greek:ou mallon]. [5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is theauthority for saying that in regard to everything there are twoopposing arguments. [6] The saying "to determine nothing" isquoted from Timon's _Python_ by Diogenes, [7] and the other twomentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles. [8] We havealso in the [Greek: ou mallon] a direct connection withDemocritus, although the difference in the meaning which heattributed to it is shown by Sextus. [9] So while the expressionis the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must havebeen different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all ofthese three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that eventhen they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, thatsimply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised, [10]for the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the oldaccount of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include alsothemselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itselftogether with other harmful objects. [11]

 [1] Compare Maccoll _Op. Cit. _ p. 21. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 11, 64. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61. 

 [5] _Hyp. _ I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51; _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H. 

 [6] _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H. 

 [7] _Hyp. _ I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76. 

 [8] _Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev. _ XIV. 18. 

 [9] _Hyp. _ I. 213. 

 [10] Diog. IX. 11, 68-76. 

 [11] Diog. IX. 11, 76; _Hyp. _ I. 206. 

In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two. WithPyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to hispositive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was theend to be attained. We would attribute, however, the empiricaltendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrhoas its originator. He was an empirical philosopher, and theresult of his influence in this respect, as seen in thesubsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrastto the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis. The empiricismof the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact thatso many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character ofthe ten Tropes of [Greek: epochê]. We may safely affirm thatthe foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, andthe originality which gave the school its power. The elaboratedarguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong tolater times. 

Coming now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, theconnection between the two is difficult to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus. Scepticismin the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical withPyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of theAcademy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout theevolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and inAcademic Scepticism, the different results which followed thedifference in origin of the two movements, and these differencesfollowed according to general laws of development of thought. Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed toreturn to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing thelectures, [1] which were the method of teaching in the laterschools of philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as beingmore decidedly a Socratic method. Although, according to Sextus, he was the one leader of the Academy whose Scepticism mostnearly approached that of Pyrrhonism, [2] yet underneath hiswhole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly inopposition to the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socratesand Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lostits influence over the Academy, but was like a hidden germ, destined to reappear after Scepticism had passed away. Itfinally led the Academy back to Dogmatism, and prepared the wayfor the Eclecticism with which it disappeared from history. 

 [1] Compare Maccoll _Op. Cit. _ p. 36. 

 [2] _Hyp_. I. 232. 

The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic Scepticism werefor a time contemporaneous. The immediate follower of Pyrrho, Timon, called by Sextus the "prophet of Pyrrho, "[1] was acontemporary of Arcesilaus. That he did not consider theScepticism of the Academy identical with Pyrrhonism is provedfrom the fact that he did not himself join the Academy, but was, on the contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilausas a Dogmatic is evident from his writings. [2] One day, onseeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he cried out, "Whatare you doing here among us who are free?"[3] After the death ofTimon, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative till the timeof Ptolemy of Cyrene, [4] and Greek Scepticism was represented bythe Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence over Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, is evident[5]; but there wasalso never a time when the Academy entirely broke away from allthe teachings of Plato, even in their deepest doubt. [6] It istrue that Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, some of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only thosethat bore a dogmatic character, while those that presented amore decided Socratic mode of questioning without reaching anydecided result, men regarded as authority for Scepticism. 

 [1] _Adv. Math. _ I. 53. 

 [2] Diog. IV. 6, 33, 34. 

 [3] Diog. IX. 12, 114. 

 [4] Diog. IX. 12, 115. 

 [5] Diog. IV. 6, 33. 

 [6] Diog. IV. 6, 32. 

Sextus does not deny that Arcesilaus was almost a Pyrrhonean, but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was only apparent, and notreal, and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to theteachings of Plato. [1] As Ariston said of him, [2] "Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle. " Sextus alsocharacterises the method of Arcesilaus as dialectic, [3] and weknow from Cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return tothe dialectic of Socrates. 

It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of theposition that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes upthe entire development of Academic thought from the time ofPlato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument toScepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the twoschools were the same, is stated by him, [4] and the word 'some'probably refers to members of both schools at different periodsof their history. Sextus recognises three Academies, although heremarks that some make even a further division, calling that ofPhilo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and hisfollowers, the fifth. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 234. 

 [2] Diog. IV. 6, 33. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 234. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 220. 

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Platoas a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, wefind both from Sextus and Diogenes. [1] As Lewes justly remarks, one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works ofPlato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sumtotal of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato'steachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, andas Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him. [3] Sextushimself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings canhave nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts thedesirability of the virtuous life, and the existence ofProvidence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them asprobable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterisesthe sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics, [4]which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirmsthat Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknownthings to others in trustworthiness. The ethical differenceunderlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextuswas very quick to see, and although it is very probable that thepart of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference betweenthe Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from theintroduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly givesthese statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemnsthe Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, orif this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probablethat what is called good exists than the contrary. [5]

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72. 

 [2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp. _ I. 222. 

 [3] _Hyp. _ I. 222. 

 [4] _Hyp. _ I. 223. 

 [5] _Hyp_. I. 226. 

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted thestandpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regardstrustworthiness and untrustworthiness, [1] for the Academiciansdeclared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, andthey make a difference even in those ideas that they callprobable. 

Sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds ofdifference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is thedoctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regardto the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others. [2]The second is the different way in which the two schools followtheir teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving orstrong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child followshis teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy andassent, as Carneades and Clitomachus affirm. [3] The thirddifference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what isprobable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but liveaccording to laws, customs, and natural feelingsundogmatically. [4]

The difference between the later teaching of the Academy andPyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats of it briefly, as notrequiring discussion, [5] as Philo taught that the nature offacts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa tothe Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison whichwe have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with whichScepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, theexact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of thetwo contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician whohad most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of thefundamental incompatibility between the two schools. 

 [1] _Hyp_. I. 227. 

 [2] _Hyp_. I. 229. 

 [3] _Hyp_. I. 230. 

 [4] _Hyp_. I. 231. 

 [5] _Hyp_. I. 235. 

During all the chequered history of the Academy the dormantidealism was there, underlying the outward development. Althoughduring the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference wasso slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yetthe different foundations on which the two schools stood wasalways recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ ofidealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on theother, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result inthe final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true, especially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of [Greek:epochê]. [1] Both placed great weight on [Greek: isostheneia], orthe equal value of opposing arguments. [2] The foundation of the[Greek: epochê] was, however, different in the two cases. Arcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's wasempirical. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 232. 

 [2] Diog. IX. 73; _Hyp. _ II. 130; III. 65. 

The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of theouter world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannotdistinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge isimpossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist inideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequentlythe existence of all truth, [Greek: mêden einai tê alêtheia epipantôn]. [1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth waspossibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never beknown to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still beingseekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory togive knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that suchknowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgmentregarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to themethod. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth, therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically toprove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relationof the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties ofScepticism are explained by their difference in origin. InPyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the AcademicScepsis such an element was found throughout all its history inthe theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stressupon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2] isutterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teachesthat, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters ofknowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and hisactions by the probable. [3]

 [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61. 

 [2] _Hyp. _ I. 229. 

 [3] Compare Maccoll _Op. Cit. _ 39. 

After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy, Pyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, andit flourished for over two centuries after our era, and thenalso disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophicalschool. 

Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism aspresented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly notethe characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, andthe causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that everyphilosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Scepticremains always in the beginning. This remark may well be appliedto Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamentalphilosophical truths which might have formed the beginning ofgreat philosophical progress, but which were never developed toany positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some ofthem well fitted to prepare the way to idealism. The great ideaof the relativity of _Vorstellungen_ is made very prominent bythe ten Tropes of [Greek: epochê]. Aenesidemus, in his eightTropes against aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine ofcausality when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to himfinal, [Greek: epei ouk estai aition. ] He could not divine thatalthough the result which he presented was logical, it only ledto a higher truth. It was reserved for the greatest of modernphilosophers to reveal to the world that causality is acondition, and a necessary condition, of thought. WhenAenesidemus proved by his seventh Trope that causality issubjective, he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine; yet thisconclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy, although Aenesidemus could not himself see it in all itsbearings. The great difference between Aenesidemus and Kant isthe difference between the materialist and the believer insubjective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of the_Ding an sich_, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end of allhis philosophy; to Kant, however, the beginning. 

Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstanding its points of fatalweakness, marked service to the world in science, philosophy, ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific thought byemphasising empirical methods of investigation, and bycriticising all results founded without sufficient data uponfalse hypotheses. If, instead of denying the possibility of allscience because of the want of a criterion of the truth ofphenomena, the Pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of ascience of phenomena, they might have led the world inscientific progress. [1] Their service to philosophy lay in thestimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmaticbeliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought together all the mostprominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to testtheir weakness and expose their contradictions, and this veryprocess of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truthwhich they contained. 

Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church Fathers withcorrupting religious belief, and yet the greatest service whichPyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethicallines. This service did not, naturally, consist in destroyingbelief in absolute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but inpreparing the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism onall truth led men to investigate ethical and religiousteachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and to put inpractical use the right of reason and free discussion. 

Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience andrational criticism, [2] and the absolute right of scientificthought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none of the benefits oftheir own system. They remained, as it were, always on thethreshold of possible progress. With the keys to greatdiscoveries in their hands, the doors of philosophical andscientific advancement were for ever closed to them by thelimitations of their own system. The inherent weakness ofPyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in itsnegative character. I think that we may safely say thatPyrrhonism was the most consistent system of Scepticism everoffered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly thatcomplete Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man maygive up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are ideasthat are popularly accepted, he will be called a Sceptic, as wasthe case with Hume. He must, however, replace these ideas byothers equally positive, and then he is no longer a Sceptic, buta Dogmatic, for he believes in something. 

 [1] Compare Lewes _Op. Cit. _ p. 463. 

 [2] Compare Chaignet _Op. Cit. _ p. 460. 

We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absoluteScepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised whatconsistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almostevery page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not aparagraph of his books in which he does not, after all, dogmatise on some subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary tothe fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involvessome affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and thereforesome of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, andothers advocated [Greek: aphasia][1] as one of the doctrines oftheir system. 

 [1] _Hyp. _ I. 192. 

The very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. [Greek:Ataraxia] was only another name for happiness, and in oneinstance, even, is given as [Greek: hêdonê], and thus, in spiteof themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness. Pyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, andthought that he had found it in [Greek: ataraxia], the peace ofmind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms. The difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, andEpicureans was more apparent than real. To them all philosophywas a path to lead to happiness. The method of Pyrrhonism was, however, negative. Its strength consisted in its attacks onDogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for itspositive side could not be recognised according to its owndoctrines. Therefore there was no real development inPyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed. 

We find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, nogrowth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement inmethods. Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim, as that would form, as we have shown, a psychologicalcontradiction. The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, butpassivity can never lead to progress. Much of the polemical workof Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress byproviding a vast store of scientific data, but progress was tothe Pyrrhonists impossible. They sounded their own scientificdeath-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, andputting an end to all theories. 

The life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in theattempt to find the hidden truth. To the Sceptic there was notruth, and there could be no progress. As progress is a law inthe evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophycould never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism inreligion can be a lasting influence. Both of them are onlyoutgrowths. As the foundation principles of Scepticism wereopposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that couldnever originate anything. Pyrrho taught from the beginning thatthe Sceptic must live according to law and custom; not, however, because one law or custom is better than another in itself, butsimply for the sake of peace. This basis of action was itself adeath-blow to all reform in social or political life. It was aselfish, negative way of seeking what was, after all, a positivething, the [Greek: ataraxia] that the Sceptic desired. Life withthe Pyrrhonist was phenomenal, and not phenomenal simply inregard to the outer world, but also subjectively, and noabsolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personalexistence was possible. 

The cause of the downfall of Pyrrhonism lay in the fact that ithad nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it haddestroyed. It made no appeal to human sympathies, and ignoredall the highest motives to human action. The especialmaterialistic standpoint from which Pyrrhonism judged all thatpertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal, and allpossibility of absolute truth. It was an expression of thephilosophic decadence of the age when it flourished, andalthough it possessed some philosophic worth, yet it bore initself the causes of its decay. 

PYRRHONIC SKETCHES

BY

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. 

BOOK I. 

CHAPTER I. 

_The Principal Differences between Philosophers. _

It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will 1either find it as they continue the search, will deny that itcan be found and confess it to be out of reach, or will go onseeking it. Some have said, accordingly, in regard to the thingssought in philosophy, that they have found the truth, while 2others have declared it impossible to find, and still otherscontinue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it arethose who are especially called Dogmatics, as for example, theSchools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others. Those who have declared it impossible to find are Clitomachus, 3Carneades, with their respective followers, and otherAcademicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. Itappears therefore, reasonable to conclude that the three 4principal kinds of philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the other Schools, but as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline ofit, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will besaid do we speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, butwe shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us. 

CHAPTER II. 

_Ways of Treating Scepticism. _

One way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called 5general, and the other special. The general method is that bywhich we set forth the character of Scepticism, declaring whatits idea is, what its principles are, its mode of reasoning, itscriterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt, [Greek: hoi tropoi tês epochês], and the way in which we shouldunderstand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction betweenScepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. The specialmethod, on the contrary, is that by which we 6 speak against 6each part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Scepticismat first in the general way, beginning our delineation with thenomenclature of the Sceptical School. 

CHAPTER III. 

_The Nomenclature of Scepticism. _

The Sceptical School is also called the "Seeking School, " from 7its spirit of research and examination; the "Suspending School, "from the condition of mind in which one is left after thesearch, in regard to the things that he has examined; and the"Doubting School, " either because, as some say, the Scepticsdoubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because theynever know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called thePyrrhonean School, because Pyrrho appears to us the bestrepresentative of Scepticism, and is more prominent than all whobefore him occupied themselves with it. 

CHAPTER IV. 

_What is Scepticism?_

The [Greek: dynamis] of the Sceptical School is to place the 8phenomenal in opposition to the intellectual "in any waywhatever, " and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons andthings ([Greek: isostheneia tôn logôn]) opposed to each other, to reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, [Greek:epochê] and afterwards that of imperturbability, [Greek:ataraxia]. We do not use the word [Greek: dynamis] in any 9unusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. Bythe phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place theintellectual in opposition to it. The phrase "in any waywhatever, " may refer to the word [Greek: dynamis] in order thatwe may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or itmay refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual inopposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in avariety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and theintellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say"in any way whatever, " in order that all methods of oppositionmay be included. Or "in any way whatever" may refer to thephenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask howdoes the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived, but that we may understand these things in a simple sense. By"reasons opposed to each other, " we do not by any means 10understand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply thatthey offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality inregard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of thereasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one shouldnot excel another in trustworthiness. [Greek: epochê] is aholding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neitherdeny nor affirm anything. [Greek: ataraxia] is repose andtranquillity of soul. We shall explain how [Greek: ataraxia]accompanies [Greek: epochê] when we speak of the aim. 

CHAPTER V. 

_The Sceptic. _

What is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from 11the idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonean, namely, who identifies himself with this system. 

CHAPTER VI. 

_The Origin of Scepticism. _

Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining 12[Greek: ataraxia]; for men of the greatest talent were perplexedby the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what tobelieve, began to question what things are true, and what false, hoping to attain [Greek: ataraxia] as a result of the decision. The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especiallythis, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach theposition where we have no dogmas. 

CHAPTER VII. 

_Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?_

We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say 13this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certainthings rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent tofeelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as forexample, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinkshe is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma theacceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown thingsinvestigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothingthat is unknown. Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when 14he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that areunknown, such as "Nothing more, " or "I decide nothing, " or anyof the others about which we shall speak later. For the one whodogmatises regards the thing about which he is said todogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not howeverregard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for heassumes that the saying "All is false, " includes itself withother things as false, and likewise the saying "Nothing istrue"; in the same way "Nothing more, " states that together withother things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itselftherefore, as well as other things. We say the same also inregard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who 15dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which hedogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayingsin such a way that they are understood to be themselvesincluded, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in sayingthese things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae isthat he says what appears to him, and communicates his ownfeelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything inregard to external objects. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

_Is Scepticism a Sect?_

We respond in a similar way if we are asked whether 16Scepticism is a sect or not. If the word sect is defined asmeaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are inconformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogmameans an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply thatwe have no sect. If, however, one means by sect, a school 17which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena, and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently liverightly, not understanding "rightly" as referring to virtueonly, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be ableto suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect. Forwe follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based uponphenomena, and which shows us how to live according to thehabits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our ownfeelings. 

CHAPTER IX. 

_Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?_

We reply similarly also to the question whether the Sceptic 18should study natural science. For we do not study naturalscience in order to express ourselves with confidence regardingany of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order tobe able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and alsofor the sake of [Greek: ataraxia]. In the same way we study thelogical and ethical part of so-called philosophy. 

CHAPTER X. 

_Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?_

Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to 19be in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we donot deny the sensations which we think we have, and which leadus to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena. When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appearsto be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question, not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted ofthe phenomenon, and that is different from doubting thephenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey issweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through 20sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason ofits essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but ofthat which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however, argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with theintention of denying their existence, but to show the rashnessof the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that itwell nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, howshould we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown, so as not to rashly follow it?

CHAPTER XI. 

_The Criterion of Scepticism. _

It is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from 21what we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. Theword criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as aproof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shallspeak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers toaction, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, indoing some things and refraining from doing others, and it isabout this that we shall now speak. We say, consequently, thatthe criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and incalling it so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted, 22as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling. Hence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so, but one questions if it is as it appears. Therefore, as wecannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of dailylife, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in anunprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the 23daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes itis directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by thenecessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of lawsand of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. It isdirected by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are 24capable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of thefeelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; bythe traditions of laws and customs, for according to them weconsider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by theteaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts weundertake. We say all these things, however, without expressinga decided opinion. 

CHAPTER XII. 

_What is the aim of Scepticism?_

It follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of the 25Sceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all thingsare done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in otherwords, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say, then, that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek: ataraxia] in thosethings which pertain to the opinion, and moderation in thethings that life imposes. For as soon as he began to 26philosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas, and tounderstand which are true and which are false, in order toattain [Greek: ataraxia]. He met, however, with contradictionsof equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withheld hisopinion; and while his judgment was in suspension [Greek:ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, in regard to matters ofopinion. For he who is of the opinion that anything is either 27good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when he does notpossess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he istortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursuesthose that he thinks to be good. Having acquired them, however, he falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyondreason and without measure from fear of a change, and he doeseverything in his power to retain the things that seem to himgood. But he who is undecided, on the contrary, regarding 28things that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoidsanything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of [Greek:ataraxia]. For that which is related of Apelles the painterhappened to the Sceptic. It is said that as he was once paintinga horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in thepicture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it upand threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped thecolors from the painting. As soon, however, as it touched thepicture it produced a good copy of the foam. The Scepticslikewise hoped to gain [Greek: ataraxia] by forming judgments 29in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things ofthought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspendedtheir judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension[Greek: ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, as the shadowfollows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Scepticwholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that areinevitable. We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, and that he suffers in such ways. But in these things even theignorant are beset in two ways, from the feelings themselves, 30and not less also from the fact that they think these conditionsare bad by nature. The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, ashe rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature. Therefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek:ataraxia] in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling inthose things that are inevitable. Some notable Sceptics haveadded also suspension of judgment in investigation. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

_The General Method of Scepticism. _

Since we have said that [Greek: ataraxia] follows the suspension 31of judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us toexplain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking ingeneral it takes place through placing things in opposition toeach other. We either place phenomena in opposition tophenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to theintellectual, or reciprocally. For example, we place 32phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this towerappears round from a distance but square near by; theintellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the onewho from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning toprove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact thatadversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil, and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is noprovidence. The intellectual is placed in opposition to 33phenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow iswhite, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water isblack, snow must also be black. Likewise we sometimes place thepresent in opposition to the present, similarly to theabove-mentioned cases, and sometimes also the present inopposition to the past or the future. As for example, whensomeone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we sayto him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belong 34was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with ithad not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, so in the same way it is possible that its refutation alsoexists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it isnot at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that nowseems to be strong. " In order to make it clearer to us what 35we mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Tropes([Greek: tropoi]), through which the suspension of judgment isproduced, without asserting anything about their meaning ortheir number, because they may be unsound, or there may be morethan I shall enumerate. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

_The Ten Tropes. _

Certain Tropes were commonly handed down by the older Sceptics, 36by means of which [Greek: epochê] seems to take place. They are ten in number, and are called synonymously [Greek:logoi] and [Greek: tropoi]. They are these: The first is basedupon the differences in animals; the second upon the differencesin men; the third upon the difference in the constitution of theorgans of sense; the fourth upon circumstances; the fifth uponposition, distance, and place; the sixth upon mixtures; theseventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects; theeighth upon relation; the ninth upon frequency or rarity of 37occurences; the tenth upon systems, customs, laws, mythicalbeliefs, and dogmatic opinions. We make this order ourselves. 38These Tropes come under three general heads: the standpointof the judge, the standpoint of the thing judged, and thestandpoint of both together. Under the standpoint of the judgecome the first four, for the judge is either an animal, or aman, or a sense, and exists under certain circumstances. Underthe standpoint of that which is judged, come the seventh and thetenth. Under the one composed of both together, come the fifthand the sixth, the eighth and the ninth. Again, these threedivisions are included under the Trope of relation, because 39that is the most general one; it includes the three specialdivisions, and these in turn include the ten. We say thesethings in regard to their probable number, and we proceed in thefollowing chapter to speak of their meaning. 

THE FIRST TROPE. 

The first Trope, we said, is the one based upon the 40differences in animals, and according to this Trope, differentanimals do not get the same ideas of the same objects throughthe senses. This we conclude from the different origin of theanimals, and also from the difference in the constitution oftheir bodies. In regard to the difference in origin, someanimals originate without mixture of the sexes, while othersoriginate through sexual intercourse. Of those which 41originate without intercourse of the sexes, some come from fire, as the little animals which appear in the chimneys, others fromstagnant water, as musquitoes, others from fermented wine, asthe stinging ants, others from the earth, others from the mud, like the frogs, others from slime, as the worms, others fromdonkeys, as the beetles, others from cabbage, as caterpillars, others from fruit, as the gall insect from the wild figs, othersfrom putrified animals, as bees from bulls, and wasps fromhorses. Again, of those originating from intercourse of the 42sexes, some come from animals of the same kind, as in mostcases, and others from those of different kinds, as mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, as men, others from eggs, as birds, and others are born a lump of flesh, as bears. It is probable therefore, that the inequalities and 43differences in origin cause great antipathies in the animals, and the result is incompatibility, discord, and conflict betweenthe sensations of the different animals. Again, the differencesin the principal parts of the body, especially in those 44fitted by nature to judge and to perceive, may cause thegreatest differences in their ideas of objects, according to thedifferences in the animals themselves. As for example, those whohave the jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white, and those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red. Accordingly, as some animals have yellow eyes, and othersblood-shot ones, and still others whitish ones, and others eyesof other colors, it is probable, I think, that they have adifferent perception of colors. Furthermore, when we looksteadily at the sun for a long time, and then look down at a 45book, the letters seem to us gold colored, and dance around. Nowsome animals have by nature a lustre in their eyes, and theseemit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night, andwe may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear thesame to them as to us. Jugglers by lightly rubbing the wick 46of the lamp with metal rust, or with the dark yellow fluid ofthe sepia, make those who are present appear now copper-coloredand now black, according to the amount of the mixture used; ifthis be so it is much more reasonable to suppose that because ofthe mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals, theirideas of objects would be different. Furthermore, when we 47press the eye on the side, the figures, forms and sizes ofthings seen appear elongated and narrow. It is thereforeprobable that such animals as have the pupil oblique and long, as goats, cats, and similar animals, have ideas different fromthose of the animals which have a round pupil. Mirrors accordingto their different construction, sometimes show the external 48object smaller than reality, as concave ones, and sometimes longand narrow, as the convex ones do; others show the head of theone looking into it down, and the feet up. As some of thevessels around the eye fall entirely outside the eye, on 49account of their protuberance, while others are more sunken, andstill others are placed in an even surface, it is probable thatfor this reason also the ideas vary, and dogs, fishes, lions, men, and grasshoppers do not see the same things, either of thesame size, or of similar form, but according to the impressionon the organ of sight of each animal respectively. The samething is true in regard to the other senses; for how can it 50be said that shell-fish, birds of prey, animals covered withspines, those with feathers and those with scales would beaffected in the same way by the sense of touch? and how can thesense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have thenarrowest auditory passages, and in those that are furnishedwith the widest, or in those with hairy ears and those withsmooth ones? For we, even, hear differently when we partiallystop up the ears, from what we do when we use them naturally. The sense of smell also varies according to differences in 51animals, since even our sense of smell is affected when we havetaken cold and the phlegm is too abundant, and also when partsaround our head are flooded with too much blood, for we thenavoid odors that seem agreeable to others, and feel as if wewere injured by them. Since also some of the animals are moistby nature and full of secretions, and others are very full ofblood, and still others have either yellow or black bileprevalent and abundant, it is reasonable because of this tothink that odorous things appear different to each one of them. And it is the same in regard to things of taste, as some 52animals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist. Wetoo, when we have a dry tongue in fever, think that whatever wetake is gritty, bad tasting, or bitter; and this we experiencebecause of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to bein us. Since, then, different animals have different organs fortaste, and a greater or less amount of the various humors, itcan well be that they form different ideas of the same objectsas regards their taste. For just as the same food on being 53absorbed becomes in some places veins, in other places arteries, and in other places bones, nerves, or other tissues, showingdifferent power according to the difference of the partsreceiving it; just as the same water absorbed by the treesbecomes in some places bark, in other places branches, and inother places fruit, perhaps a fig or a pomegranate, or somethingelse; just as the breath of the musician, one and the same 54when blown into the flute, becomes sometimes a high tone andsometimes a low one, and the same pressure of the hand upon thelyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone, soit is natural to suppose that external objects are regardeddifferently according to the different constitution of theanimals which perceive them. We may see this more clearly in 55the things that are sought for and avoided by animals. Forexample, myrrh appears very agreeable to men and intolerable tobeetles and bees. Oil also, which is useful to men, destroyswasps and bees if sprinkled on them; and sea-water, while it isunpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it, is mostagreeable and sweet to fishes. Swine also prefer to wash in vilefilth rather than in pure clean water. Furthermore, some 56animals eat grass and some eat herbs; some live in the woods, others eat seeds; some are carnivorous, and others lactivorous;some enjoy putrified food, and others fresh food; some raw foodand others that which is prepared by cooking; and in generalthat which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal toothers, and should be avoided by them. Thus hemlock makes the 57quail fat, and henbane the hogs, and these, as it is known, enjoy eating lizards; deer also eat poisonous animals, andswallows, the cantharidae. Moreover, ants and flying ants, whenswallowed by men, cause discomfort and colic; but the bear, onthe contrary, whatever sickness he may have, becomes stronger bydevouring them. The viper is benumbed if one twig of the oak 58touches it, as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree. Theelephant flees before the ram, and the lion before the cock, andseals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded, and thetiger from the sound of the drum. Many other examples could begiven, but that we may not seem to dwell longer than isnecessary on this subject, we conclude by saying that since thesame things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others, andthe pleasure and displeasure depend on the ideas, it must bethat different animals have different ideas of objects. Andsince the same things appear different according to the 59difference in the animals, it will be possible for us to say howthe external object appears to us, but as to how it is inreality we shall suspend our judgment. For we cannot ourselvesjudge between our own ideas and those of other animals, beingourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more inneed of being judged than being ourselves able to judge. Andfurthermore, we cannot give the preference to our own mental 60representations over those of other animals, either withoutevidence or with evidence, for besides the fact that perhapsthere is no evidence, as we shall show, the evidence so calledwill be either manifest to us or not. If it is not manifest tous, then we cannot accept it with conviction; if it is manifestto us, since the question is in regard to what is manifest toanimals, and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us whoare animals, then it is to be questioned if it is true as it ismanifest to us. It is absurd, however, to try to base the 61questionable on the questionable, because the same thing is tobe believed and not to be believed, which is certainlyimpossible. The evidence is to be believed in so far as it willfurnish a proof, and disbelieved in so far as it is itself to beproved. We shall therefore have no evidence according to whichwe can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-calledirrational animals. Since therefore ideas differ according tothe difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them, it is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to externalobjects. 

_Have the So-called Irrational Animals Reason_?

We continue the comparison of the so-called irrational animals 62with man, although it is needless to do so, for in truth we donot refuse to hold up to ridicule the conceited and braggingDogmatics, after having given the practical arguments. Now most 63of our number were accustomed to compare all the irrationalanimals together with man, but because the Dogmatics playingupon words say that the comparison is unequal, we carry ourridicule farther, although it is most superfluous to do so, andfix the discussion on one animal, as the dog, if it suits you, which seems to be the most contemptible animal; for we shalleven then find that animals, about which we are speaking, arenot inferior to us in respect to the trustworthiness of theirperceptions. Now the Dogmatics grant that this animal is 64superior to us in sense perception, for he perceives betterthrough smell than we, as by this sense he tracks wild animalsthat he cannot see, and he sees them quicker with his eyes thanwe do, and he perceives them more acutely by hearing. Let usalso consider reasoning, which is of two kinds, reasoning in 65thought and in speech. Let us look first to that of thought. This kind of reasoning, judging from the teachings of thoseDogmatics who are now our greatest opponents, those of the Stoa, seems to fluctuate between the following things: the choice ofthe familiar, and avoidance of the alien; the knowledge of thearts that lead to this choice; and the comprehension of thosevirtues that belong to the individual nature, as regards thefeelings. The dog then, upon whom it was decided to fix theargument as an example, makes a choice of things suitable to 66him, and avoids those that are harmful, for he hunts for food, but draws back when the whip is lifted up; he possesses also anart by which he procures the things that are suitable for him, the art of hunting. He is not also without virtue; since the 67true nature of justice is to give to every one according to hismerit, as the dog wags his tail to those who belong to thefamily, and to those who behave well to him, guards them, andkeeps off strangers and evil doers, he is surely not withoutjustice. Now if he has this virtue, since the virtues follow 68each other in turn, he has the other virtues also, which thewise men say, most men do not possess. We see the dog also bravein warding off attacks, and sagacious, as Homer testified whenhe represented Odysseus as unrecognised by all in his house, andrecognised only by Argos, because the dog was not deceived bythe physical change in the man, and had not lost the [Greek:phantasia katalêptikê] which he proved that he had kept betterthan the men had. But according to Chrysippus even, who most 69attacked the irrational animals, the dog takes a part in thedialectic about which so much is said. At any rate, the manabove referred to said that the dog follows the fifth of theseveral non-apodictic syllogisms, for when he comes to a meetingof three roads, after seeking the scent in the two roads, through which his prey has not passed, he presses forwardquickly in the third without scenting it. For the dog reasons inthis way, potentially said the man of olden time; the animalpassed through this, or this, or this; it was neither throughthis nor this, therefore it was through this. The dog alsounderstands his own sufferings and mitigates them. As soon as 70a sharp stick is thrust into him, he sets out to remove it, byrubbing his foot on the ground, as also with his teeth; and ifever he has a wound anywhere, for the reason that uncleansedwounds are difficult to cure, and those that are cleansed areeasily cured, he gently wipes off the collected matter; and 71he observes the Hippocratic advice exceedingly well, for sincequiet is a relief for the foot, if he has ever a wound in thefoot, he lifts it up, and keeps it undisturbed as much aspossible. When he is troubled by disturbing humours, he eatsgrass, with which he vomits up that which was unfitting, andrecovers. Since therefore it has been shown that the animal 72that we fixed the argument upon for the sake of an example, chooses that which is suitable for him, and avoids what isharmful, and that he has an art by which he provides what issuitable, and that he comprehends his own sufferings andmitigates them, and that he is not without virtue, things inwhich perfection of reasoning in thought consists, so accordingto this it would seem that the dog has reached perfection. It isfor this reason, it appears to me, that some philosophers havehonoured themselves with the name of this animal. In regard toreasoning in speech, it is not necessary at present to bring 73the matter in question. For some of the Dogmatics, even, haveput this aside, as opposing the acquisition of virtue, for whichreason they practiced silence when studying. Besides, let it besupposed that a man is dumb, no one would say that he isconsequently irrational. However, aside from this, we see afterall, that animals, about which we are speaking, do produce humansounds, as the jay and some others. Aside from this also, evenif we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational 74irrational animals, it is not at all unlikely that theyconverse, and that we do not understand their conversation. Forwhen we hear the language of foreigners, we do not understandbut it all seems like one sound to us. Furthermore, we hear dogsgiving out one kind of sound when they are resisting someone, 75and another sound when they howl, and another when they arebeaten, and a different kind when they wag their tails, andgenerally speaking, if one examines into this, he will find agreat difference in the sounds of this and other animals underdifferent circumstances; so that in all likelihood, it may besaid that the so-called irrational animals partake also inspoken language. If then, they are not inferior to men in the 76accuracy of their perceptions, nor in reasoning in thought, norin reasoning by speech, as it is superfluous to say, then theyare not more untrustworthy than we are, it seems to me, inregard to their ideas. Perhaps it would be possible to provethis, should we direct the argument to each of the irrational 77animals in turn. As for example, who would not say that thebirds are distinguished for shrewdness, and make use ofarticulate speech? for they not only know the present but thefuture, and this they augur to those that are able to understandit, audibly as well as in other ways. I have made thiscomparison superfluously, as I pointed out above, as I think 78I had sufficiently shown before, that we cannot consider our ownideas superior to those of the irrational animals. In short, ifthe irrational animals are not more untrustworthy than we inregard to the judgment of their ideas, and the ideas aredifferent according to the difference in the animals, I shall beable to say how each object appears to me, but in regard to whatit is by nature I shall be obliged to suspend my judgment. 

THE SECOND TROPE. 

Such is the first Trope of [Greek: epochê]. The second, we said 79above, is based upon the differences in men. For even if oneassent to the hypothesis that men are more trustworthy than theirrational animals, we shall find that doubt arises as soon aswe consider our own differences. For since man is said to becomposed of two things, soul and body, we differ from each otherin respect to both of these things; for example, as regards thebody, we differ both in form and personal peculiarities. For the 80body of a Scythian differs from the body of an Indian inform, the difference resulting, it is said, from the differentcontrol of the humors. According to different control of thehumors, differences in ideas arise also, as we represented underthe first Trope. For this reason there is certainly a greatdifference among men in the choice and avoidance of externalthings. The Indians delight in different things from our ownpeople, and the enjoyment of different things is a sign thatdifferent ideas are received of the external objects. We differ 81in personal peculiarities, as some digest beef better thanthe little fish from rocky places, and some are affected withpurging by the weak wine of Lesbos. There was, they say, an oldwoman in Attica who could drink thirty drachmas of hemlockwithout danger, and Lysis took four drachmas of opium unhurt, and Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, shivered when he was 82in the sun or in a hot bath, and felt warm in the shade;Athenagoras also, from Argos, did not suffer harm if stung byscorpions and venomous spiders; the so-called Psylli were notinjured when bitten by snakes or by the aspis, and theTentyrites among the Egyptians are not harmed by the crocodilesaround them; those also of the Ethiopians who live on the 83Hydaspes river, opposite Meroe, eat scorpions and serpents, andsimilar things without danger; Rufinus in Chalcis could drinkhellebore without vomiting or purging, and he enjoyed anddigested it as something to which he was accustomed; Chrysermos, the Herophilian, ran the risk of stomach-ache if he ever took 84pepper, and Soterichus, the surgeon, was seized by purging if heperceived the odor of roasting shad; Andron, the Argive, was sofree from thirst that he could travel even through the waterlessLibya without looking for a drink; Tiberius, the emperor, saw inthe dark, and Aristotle tells the story of a certain Thracian, who thought that he saw the figure of a man always going beforehim as a guide. While therefore such a difference exists in men 85in regard to the body, and we must be satisfied withreferring to a few only of the many examples given by theDogmatics, it is probable that men also differ from each otherin respect to the soul itself, for the body is a kind of type ofthe soul, as the physiognomical craft also shows. The bestexample of the numerous and infinite differences of opinionamong men is the contradiction in the sayings of the Dogmatics, not only about other things, but about what it is well to seekand to avoid. The poets have also fittingly spoken about 86this, for Pindar said--

 "One delights in getting honors and crowns through storm-footed horses, Another in passing life in rooms rich in gold, Another still, safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea. "

And the poet says--

 "One man enjoys this, another enjoys that. "

The tragedies also abound in such expressions, for instance, it is said--

 "If to all, the same were good and wise, Quarrels and disputes among men would not have been. "

And again--

 "It is awful indeed, that the same thing some mortals should please, And by others be hated. "

Since therefore the choice and the avoidance of things, 87depends on the pleasure and displeasure which they give, and thepleasure and displeasure have their seat in perception andideas, when some choose the things that others avoid, it islogical for us to conclude that they are not acted uponsimilarly by the same things, for otherwise they would havechosen or avoided alike. Now if the same things act upondifferent men differently, on account of the difference in themen, for this cause also suspension of the judgment mayreasonably be introduced, and we may perhaps say how each objectappears to us, and what its individual differences are, but weshall not be able to declare what it is as to the nature of itsessence. For we must either believe all men or some men; but 88to believe all is to undertake an impossibility, and to acceptthings that are in opposition to each other. If we believe someonly, let someone tell us with whom to agree, for the Platonistwould say with Plato, the Epicurean with Epicurus, and otherswould advise in a corresponding manner; and so as they disagree, with no one to decide, they bring us round again to thesuspension of judgment. Furthermore, he who tells us to agree 89with the majority proposes something childish, as no one couldgo to all men and find out what pleases the majority, for it ispossible that in some nations which we do not know the thingswhich to us are rare are common to the majority, and thosethings which happen commonly to us are rare. As for example, itmight happen that the majority should not suffer when bitten byvenomous spiders, or that they should seldom feel pain, or haveother personal peculiarities similar to those spoken of above. It is necessary therefore to suspend the judgment on account ofthe differences in men. 

THE THIRD TROPE. 

While, however, the Dogmatics are conceited enough to think 90that they should be preferred to other men in the judgement ofthings, we know that their claim is absurd, for they themselvesform a part of the disagreement; and if they give themselvespreference in this way in the judgment of phenomena, they begthe question before they begin the judgment, as they trust thejudgment to themselves. Nevertheless, in order that we should 91reach the result of the suspension of judgment by limitingthe argument to one man, one who for example they deem to bewise, let us take up the third Trope. This is the one that isbased upon differences in perception. That the perceptions 92differ from each other is evident. For example, paintings seemto have hollows and prominences to the sense of sight, but notto the sense of touch, and honey to the tongue of some peopleappears pleasant, but unpleasant to the eyes; therefore it isimpossible to say whether it is really pleasant or unpleasant. In regard to myrrh it is the same, for it delights the sense ofsmell, but disgusts the sense of taste. Also in regard to 93euphorbium, since it is harmful to the eyes and harmless toall the rest of the body, we are not able to say whether it isreally harmless to bodies or not, as far as its own nature isconcerned. Rain-water, too, is useful to the eyes, but it makesthe trachea and the lungs rough, just as oil does, although itsoothes the skin; and the sea-torpedo placed on the extremitiesmakes them numb, but is harmless when placed on the rest of thebody. Wherefore we cannot say what each of these things is bynature. It is possible only to say how it appears each time. We 94could cite more examples than these, but in order not tospend too long in laying out the plan of this book we shallsimply say the following: Each of the phenomena perceived by usseems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. Now it is not known whether it has inreality only those qualities which appear to us, or if it hasonly one quality, but appears different on account of thedifferent constitution of the sense organs, or if it has morequalities than appear to us, but some of them do not affect us. That it has only one quality might be concluded from what we 95have said about the food distributed in bodies, and the waterdistributed in trees, and the breath in the flute and syrinx, and in similar instruments; for it is possible that the applealso has only one quality, but appears different on account ofthe difference in the sense organs by which it is perceived. On 96the other hand, that the apple has more qualities than thosethat appear to us, can be argued in this way: Let us imaginesomeone born with the sense of touch, of smell, and of taste, but neither hearing nor seeing. He will then assume that neitheranything visible nor anything audible exists at all, but onlythe three kinds of qualities which he can apprehend. It is 97possible then that as we have only the five senses, we apprehendonly those qualities of the apple which we are able to grasp, but it may be supposed that other qualities exist which wouldaffect other sense organs if we possessed them; as it is, we donot feel the sensations which would be felt through them. But 98nature, one will say, has brought the senses into harmonywith the objects to be perceived. What kind of nature? Among theDogmatics a great difference of opinion reigns about the realexistence of nature anyway; for he who decides whether there isa nature or not, if he is an uneducated man, would be accordingto them untrustworthy; if he is a philosopher, he is a part ofthe disagreement, and is himself to be judged, but is not ajudge. In short, if it is possible that only those qualities 99exist in the apple which we seem to perceive, or that more thanthese are there, or that not even those which we perceive exist, it will be unknown to us what kind of a thing the apple is. Thesame argument holds for other objects of perception. If, however, the senses do not comprehend the external world, theintellect cannot comprehend it either, so that for this reasonalso it will appear that the suspension of judgment follows inregard to external objects. 

THE FOURTH TROPE. 

In order to attain to [Greek: epochê] by fixing the argument on 100each separate sense, or even by putting aside the sensesaltogether, we take up the fourth Trope of [Greek: epochê]. Thisis the one based upon circumstances, and by circumstances wemean conditions. This Trope comes under consideration, we maysay, with regard to conditions that are according to nature, orcontrary to nature; such as waking or sleeping, the age of life, moving or keeping still, hating or loving, need or satiety, drunkenness or sobriety, predispositions, being courageous orafraid, sorrowing or rejoicing. For example, things appear 101different as they are according to nature, or contrary to it; asfor instance, the insane and those inspired by a god, think thatthey hear gods, while we do not; in like manner they often saythat they perceive the odor of storax or frankincense, or thelike, and many other things which we do not perceive. Water, also, that seems lukewarm to us, if poured over places that areinflamed, will feel hot, and a garment that appearsorange-coloured to those that have blood-shot eyes, would notlook so to me, and the same honey appears sweet to me, butbitter to those who have the jaundice. If one should say 102that those who are not in a natural state have unusual ideas ofobjects, because of the intermingling of certain humors, thenone must also say, that it may be that objects which are reallywhat they seem to be to those who are in an unnatural condition, appear different to those who are in health, for even those whoare in health have humors that are mixed with each other. For to 103give to one kind of fluid a power to change objects, and notto another kind, is a fiction of the mind; for just as those whoare in health are in a condition that is natural to those whoare in health, and contrary to the nature of those who are notin health, so also those who are not in health, are in acondition contrary to the nature of those in health, but naturalto those not in health, and we must therefore believe that theyalso are in some respect in a natural condition. Furthermore, 104in sleep or in waking, the ideas are different, because wedo not see things in the same way when we are awake as we do insleep; neither do we see them in the same way in sleep as we dowhen awake, so that the existence or non-existence of thesethings is not absolute, but relative, that is in relation to asleeping or waking condition. It is therefore probable that wesee those things in sleep which in a waking condition do notexist, but they are not altogether non-existent, for they existin sleep, just as those things which exist when we are awake, exist, although they do not exist in sleep. Furthermore, things 105present themselves differently according to the age of life, for the same air seems cold to the aged, but temperate to thosein their prime, and the same color appears dim to those who areold, and bright to those in their prime, and likewise the sametone seems faint to the former, and audible to the latter. People in different ages are also differently disposed 106towards things to be chosen or avoided; children, for example, are very fond of balls and hoops, while those in their primeprefer other things, and the old still others, from which itfollows that the ideas in regard to the same objects differ indifferent periods of life. Furthermore, things appear different 107in a condition of motion and rest, since that which we see atrest when we are still, seems to move when we are sailingby it. There are also differences which depend on liking or 108disliking, as some detest swine flesh exceedingly, but otherseat it with pleasure. As Menander said--

 "O how his face appears Since he became such a man! What a creature! Doing no injustice would make us also beautiful. "

Many also that love ugly women consider them very beautifulFurthermore, there are differences which depend on hunger or 109satiety, as the same food seems agreeable to those who arehungry, and disagreeable to those who are satisfied. There arealso differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety, as thatwhich we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly tous when we are drunk. Again, there are differences depending 110on predispositions, as the same wine appears sourish to thosewho have previously eaten dates or dried figs, but agreeable tothose who have taken nuts or chickpeas; the vestibule of thebath warms those who enter from without, but cools those who goout, if they rest in it. Furthermore, there are differences 111depending on being afraid or courageous, as the same thingseems fearful and terrible to the coward, but in no wise so tohim who is brave. There are differences, also, depending onbeing sad or joyful, as the same things are unpleasant to thesad, but pleasant to the joyful. Since therefore the 112anomalies depending on conditions are so great, and since menare in different conditions at different times, it is perhapseasy to say how each object appears to each man, but not so ofwhat kind it is, because the anomaly is not of a kind to bejudged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either insome one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutelyno condition whatever; but to say that he is in no condition atall, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor inillness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not ofany age, and also that he is free from the other conditions, iswholly absurd. But if he judges the ideas while he is in any 113condition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction, and, besides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because heis confused by the condition in which he finds himself. Therefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas ofthose who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who isin health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well;for we believe more in the things that are present, andaffecting us at present, than in the things not present. In 114another way, the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to bejudged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and onecondition to another, does this either without a criterion and aproof, or with a criterion and a proof; but he can do thisneither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, norwith them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly by acriterion, and he will say that this criterion is either true orfalse. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on 115the contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that thecriterion is true either without proof or with proof. If withoutproof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true withproof, it is certainly necessary that the proof be true, or hewill be untrustworthy. Now will he say that the proof which hehas accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true, having judged it, or without having judged it? If he says so 116without judging it, he will be untrustworthy; if he has judgedit, it is evident that he will say that he has judged accordingto some criterion, and we must seek a proof for this criterion, and for that proof a criterion. For the proof always needs acriterion to establish it, and the criterion needs a proof thatit may be shown to be true; and a proof can neither be soundwithout a pre-existing criterion that is true, nor a criteriontrue without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy. And so both the criterion and the proof are thrown into the 117_circulus in probando_, by which it is found that they are bothof them untrustworthy, for as each looks for proof from theother, each is as untrustworthy as the other. Since then onecannot prefer one idea to another, either without a proof and acriterion or with them, the ideas that differ according todifferent conditions cannot be judged, so that the suspension ofjudgment in regard to the nature of external objects followsthrough this Trope also. 

THE FIFTH TROPE. 

The fifth Trope is that based upon position, distance, and 118place, for, according to each of these, the same things appeardifferent, as for example, the same arcade seen from either endappears curtailed, but from the middle it looks symmetrical onevery side; and the same ship appears small and motionless fromafar, and large and in motion near by, and the same towerappears round from a distance, but square near by. So much fordistance. Now in reference to place, we say that the light 119of the lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark; andthe same rudder appears broken in the sea, but straight out ofit; and the egg in the bird is soft, but in the air hard; andthe lyngurion is a fluid in the lynx, but is hard in the air;and the coral is soft in the sea, but hard in the air; and atone of voice appears different produced by a syrinx, and by aflute, and different simply in the air. Also in reference to 120position, the same picture leaned back appears smooth, andleaned forward a little seems to have hollows and protuberances, and the necks of doves appear different in color according tothe difference in inclination. Since then all phenomena are 121seen in relation to place, distance, and position, each of whichrelation makes a great difference with the idea, as we havementioned, we shall be obliged by this Trope also to come to thesuspension of judgment. For he who wishes to give preference tocertain ones of these ideas will attempt the impossible. For if 122he simply makes the decision without proof he will beuntrustworthy. If, however, he wishes to make use of a proof, should he say that the proof is false, he contradicts himself, but if he declares the proof to be true, proof of its proof willbe demanded of him, and another proof for that, which proof alsomust be true, and so on to the _regressus in infinitum_. It isimpossible, however, to present proofs _in infinitum_, so 123that one will not be able to prove that one idea is to bepreferred to another. Since then one cannot either without proofor with proof judge the ideas in question, the suspension ofjudgment results, and how each thing appears according to thisor that position, or this or that distance, or this or thatplace, we perhaps are able to say, but what it really is it isimpossible to declare, for the reasons which we have mentioned. 

THE SIXTH TROPE. 

The sixth Trope is the one based upon mixtures, according to 124which we conclude that since no object presents itself alone, but always together with something else, it is perhaps possibleto say of what nature the mixture is, of the thing itself, andof that with which it is seen, but of what sort the externalobject really is we shall not be able to say. Now it is evident, I think, that nothing from without is known to us by itself, butalways with something else, and that because of this fact itappears different. The color of our skin, for example, is 125different seen in warm air from what it is in cold, and wecould not say what our color really is, only what it is whenviewed under each of these conditions. The same sound appearsdifferent in rare air from what it is in dense, and aromas aremore overpowering in the warm bath and in the sun than they arein the cold air, and a body surrounded by water is light, but byair heavy. Leaving aside, however, outer mixtures, our eyes 126have inside of them coatings and humors. Since then visiblethings are not seen without these, they will not be accuratelycomprehended, for it is the mixture that we perceive, and forthis reason those who have the jaundice see everything yellow, and those with bloodshot eyes bloody. Since the same soundappears different in broad open places from what it does innarrow and winding ones, and different in pure air and inimpure, it is probable that we do not perceive the tonesunmixed; for the ears have narrow winding passages filled withvaporous secretions, which it is said gather from places aroundthe head. Since also there are substances present in the 127nostrils and in the seat of the sense of taste, we perceive thethings smelled and the things tasted in connection with them, and not unmixed. So that because of mixture the senses do notperceive accurately what the external objects are. The intellect 128even does not do this, chiefly because its guides, thesenses, make mistakes, and perhaps it itself adds a certainspecial mixture to those messages communicated by the senses;for in each place where the Dogmatics think that the rulingfaculty is situated, we see that certain humors are present, whether one would locate it in the region of the brain, in theregion of the heart, or somewhere else. Since thereforeaccording to this Trope also, we see that we cannot say anythingregarding the nature of external objects, we are obliged tosuspend our judgment. 

THE SEVENTH TROPE. 

The seventh Trope is the one which, as we said, is based 129upon the quantity and constitution of objects, constitutioncommonly meaning composition. And it is evident that we areobliged to suspend our judgment according to this Trope also inregard to the nature of things. As for example, filings from thehorn of the goat appear white when they are seen separately andwithout being put together; put together, however, in the formof a horn, they look black. And the parts of silver, the filingsthat is, by themselves appear black, but as a whole appearwhite; and parts of the Taenarus stone look white when ground, but in the whole stone appear yellow; grains of sand 130scattered apart from each other appear to be rough, but puttogether in a heap, they produce a soft feeling; hellebore takenfine and downy, causes choking, but it no longer does so whentaken coarse; wine also taken moderately strengthens us, but 131when taken in excess relaxes the body; food similarly, has adifferent effect according to the quantity, at least, it oftendisturbs the body when too much is taken, causing dyspepsia anddischarge. We shall be able here also to say of what kind 132the cutting from the horn is, and what many cuttings puttogether are, of what kind a filing of silver is, and what manyof them put together are, of what kind the tiny Taenarus stone, and what one composed of many small ones is, and in regard tothe grains of sand, and the hellebore, and the wine, and thefood, what they are in relation, but no longer the nature of thething by itself, because of the anomaly in the ideas which wehave of things, according to the way in which they are puttogether. In general it appears that useful things become 133harmful when an intemperate use is made of them, and things thatseem harmful when taken in excess, are not injurious in a smallquantity. What we see in the effect of medicines witnessesespecially to this fact, as an exact mixture of simple remediesmakes a compound which is helpful, but sometimes when a verysmall inclination of the balance is overlooked, the medicine isnot only not helpful, but very harmful, and often poisonous. So 134the argument based upon the quantity and constitution ofobjects, puts in confusion the existence of external objects. Therefore this Trope naturally leads us to suspend our judgment, as we are not able to declare exactly the nature of externalobjects. 

THE EIGHTH TROPE. 

The eighth Trope is the one based upon relation, from which 135we conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things areabsolutely, in their nature, since every thing is in relation tosomething else. And we must bear in mind that we use the word_is_ incorrectly, in place of _appears_, meaning to say, everything _appears_ to be in relation. This is said, however, withtwo meanings: first, that every thing is in relation to the onewho judges, for the external object, _i. E. _ the thing judged, appears to be in relation to the judge; the other way is thatevery thing is in relation to the things considered togetherwith it, as the relation of the right hand to the left. But we 136came to the conclusion above, that every thing is in relationto something, as for example, to the one judging; each thingappears in relation to this or that animal, and this or thatman, and this or that sense, and in certain circumstances;as regards things considered together, also, each thing appearsin relation to this or that mixture, and this or that Trope, andthis or that composition, quantity and place. And in another wayit is possible to conclude that every thing is in relation 137to something, as follows: does the being in difference differfrom the being in relation, or not? If it does not differ, thenit is the same as relation; if it does differ, since every thingwhich differs is in some relation, for it is said to be inrelation to that from which it differs, those things which arein a difference are in a relation to something. Now according 138to the Dogmatics, some beings belong to the highest genera, others to the lowest species, and others to both generaand species at the same time; all of these are in relation tosomething, therefore every thing is in relation to something. Furthermore, among things, some things are manifest, and othersare hidden, as the Dogmatics themselves say, and the things thatmake themselves known to us are the phenomena, and the thingsthat are made known to us by the phenomena are the hiddenthings, for according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are theoutward appearance of the unknown; then that which makes known, and that which is made known, are in relation to something;every thing, therefore, is in relation to something. In 139addition to this, some things are similar to each other, andothers are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal. Now these things are in relation to something, therefore everything is in relation to something, and whoever says that everything is not in relation to something, himself establishes thefact that every thing is in relation to something, for even insaying that every thing is not in relation to something, he 140proves it in reference to us, and not in general, by hisobjections to us. In short, as we have shown that every thing isin relation to something, it is then evident that we shall notbe able to say exactly what each object is by nature, but whatit appears to be like in relation to something else. It followsfrom this, that we must suspend our judgment regarding thenature of things. 

THE NINTH TROPE. 

In regard to the Trope based on the frequency and rarity of 141events, which we call the ninth of the series, we give thefollowing explanation: The sun is certainly a much moreastonishing thing than a comet, but because we see the suncontinually and the comet rarely we are so much astonished atthe comet that it even seems an omen, while we are not at allastonished at the sun. If, however, we should imagine the sunappearing at rare intervals, and at rare intervals setting, inthe first instance suddenly lighting up all things, and in thesecond casting everything into shade, we should see greatastonishment at the sight. An earthquake, too, does not trouble 142those who experience it for the first time in the same manneras those who have become accustomed to it. How great theastonishment of a man who beholds the sea for the first time!And the beauty of the human body, seen suddenly for the firsttime, moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it. Thatwhich is rare seems valuable, while things that are familiar 143and easily obtained seem by no means so. If, for example, weshould imagine water as rare, of how much greater value would itseem than all other valuable things! or if we imagine gold assimply thrown about on the ground in large quantities likestones, to whom do we think it would be valuable, or by whomwould it be hoarded, as it is now? Since then the same thingsaccording to the frequency or rarity that they are met with seemto be now valuable and now not so, we conclude that it may bethat we shall be able to say what kind of a thing each of 144them appears to be according to the frequency or rarity withwhich it occurs, but we are not able to say what each externalobject is absolutely. Therefore, according to this Trope also, we suspend our judgment regarding these things. 

THE TENTH TROPE. 

The tenth Trope is the one principally connected with 145morals, relating to schools, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. Now a school is a choice of a manner oflife, or of something held by one or many, as for example theschool of Diogenes or the Laconians. A law is a written 146contract among citizens, the transgressor of which is punished. A custom or habit, for there is no difference, is a commonacceptance of a certain thing by many, the deviator from whichis in no wise punished. For example, it is a law not to commitadultery, and it is a custom with us [Greek: to mê dêmosiagynaiki mignusthai]. A mythical belief is a tradition 147regarding things which never took place, but were invented, asamong others, the tales about Cronus, for many are led tobelieve them. A dogmatic opinion is the acceptance of somethingthat seems to be established by a course of reasoning, or bysome proof, as for example, that atoms are elements of things, and that they are either homogeneous, or infinitesimal, or ofsome other description. Now we place each of these thingssometimes in opposition to itself, and sometimes in oppositionto each one of the others. For example, we place a custom in 148opposition to a custom thus: some of the Ethiopians tattoonew-born children, but we do not, and the Persians think it isseemly to have a garment of many colors and reaching to thefeet, but we think it not so. The Indians [Greek: tais gynaixidêomosia mignyntai] but most of the other nations consider it ashame. We place a law in opposition to a law in this way: 149among the Romans he who renounces his paternal inheritance doesnot pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians he pays themin any case; and among the Tauri in Scythia it was a law tooffer strangers in sacrifice to Artemis, but with us it isforbidden to kill a man near a temple. We place a school in 150opposition to a school when we oppose the school of Diogenes tothat of Aristippus, or that of the Laconians to that of theItalians. We place a mythical belief in opposition to a mythicalbelief, as by some traditions Jupiter is said to be the fatherof men and gods, and by others Oceanus, as we say--

 "Oceanus father of the gods, and Tethys the mother. "

We place dogmatic opinions in opposition to each other, when 151we say that some declare that there is only one element, butothers that they are infinite in number, and some that the soulis mortal, others that it is immortal; and some say that ouraffairs are directed by the providence of the gods, but othersthat there is no providence. We place custom in opposition 152to other things, as for example to a law, when we say that amongthe Persians it is the custom to practice [Greek: arrenomixiai], but among the Romans it is forbidden by law to do it; by usadultery is forbidden, but among the Massagetae indifference inthis respect is allowed by custom, as Eudoxos of Cnidus relatesin the first part of his book of travels; among us it isforbidden [Greek: mêtrasi mignusthai], but among the Persians itis the custom by preference to marry so; the Egyptians marrysisters also, which among us is forbidden by law. Further, 153we place a custom in opposition to a school, when we say thatmost men [Greek: anachôrountes mignuôntai tais heautôn gunaixin, ho de Kratês tê Hipparchia dêmosia], and Diogenes went aroundwith one shoulder bare, but we go around with our customaryclothes. We place a custom in opposition to a mythical 154belief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, while with us it is the custom to take care of our children; andamong us it is the custom to venerate the gods as good, and notliable to evil, but they are described by the poets as beingwounded, and also as being jealous of each other. We place acustom in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that 155it is a custom with us to seek good things from the gods, butthat Epicurus says that the divine pays no heed to us;Aristippus also held it to be a matter of indifference to wear awoman's robe, but we consider it shameful. We place a school inopposition to a law, as according to the law it is not allowed 156to beat a free and noble born man, but the wrestlers andboxers strike each other according to the teaching of theirmanner of life, and although murder is forbidden, the gladiatorskill each other for the same reason. We place a mythical 157belief in opposition to a school when we say that, although themyths say of Hercules that in company with Omphale--

 "He carded wool, and bore servitude, "

and did things that not even an ordinary good man would havedone, yet Hercules' theory of life was noble. We place a 158mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when wesay that athletes seeking after glory as a good, enter for itssake upon a laborious profession, but many philosophers, on theother hand, teach that glory is worthless. We place law inopposition to mythical belief when we say the poets 159represent the gods as working adultery and sin, but among us thelaw forbids those things. We place law in opposition to dogmaticopinion when we say that the followers of Chrysippus hold 160that it is a matter of indifference to marry one's mother orsister, but the law forbids these things. We place a mythicalbelief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that 161the poets represent Jupiter as descending and holdingintercourse with mortal women, but the Dogmatics think this wasimpossible; also that the poet says that Jupiter, on account 162of his sorrow for Sarpedon, rained drops of blood upon theearth, but it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divine isexempt from suffering; and they deny the myth of thehorse-centaurs, giving us the horse-centaur as an example ofnon-existence. Now we could give many other examples of each 163of the antitheses mentioned above, but for a brief argument, these are sufficient. Since, however, such anomaly of things isshown by this Trope also, we shall not be able to say whatobjects are by nature, but only what each thing appears to belike, according to this or that school, or this or that law, orthis or that custom, or according to each of the otherconditions. Therefore, by this Trope also, we must suspend ourjudgment in regard to the nature of external objects. Thus wearrive at [Greek: epochê] through the ten Tropes. 

CHAPTER XV. 

_The Five Tropes. _

The later Sceptics, however, teach the following five Tropes 164of [Greek: epochê]: first, the one based upon contradiction;second, the _regressus in infinitum_; third, relation; fourth, the hypothetical; fifth, the _circulus in probando_. The one 165based upon contradiction is the one from which we find, that inreference to the thing put before us for investigation, aposition has been developed which is impossible to be judged, either practically, or theoretically, and therefore, as we arenot able to either accept or reject anything, we end insuspending the judgment. The one based upon the _regressus 166in infinitum_ is that in which we say that the proof broughtforward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, andthat one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not havinganything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension ofjudgment follows. The one based upon relation, as we have 167said before, is that one in which the object appears of thiskind or that kind, as related to the judge and to the thingsregarded together with it, but we suspend our judgment as towhat it is in reality. The one based upon hypothesis is 168illustrated by the Dogmatics, when in the _regressus ininfinitum_ they begin from something that they do not found onreason, but which they simply take for granted without proof. The Trope, _circulus in probando_, arises when the thing 169which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustainedby the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the onefor the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard toboth. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to referevery thing under investigation to one or another of theseTropes, as follows: the thing before us is either sensible orintellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to whatit is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense 170are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, andothers say that some things of sense, and some of thought, aretrue. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion canbe judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then wehave the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, becauseit is impossible to express opinion in regard to things aboutwhich a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. Ifit can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? For 171example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first tothis--Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectualstandards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since weare in doubt about the sensible, that will also need somethingelse to sustain it; and if that proof is also somethingsensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it, and so on _in infinitum_. If, on the contrary, the sensible mustbe judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement 172in regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing willrequire also judgment and proof. Now, how is it to be proved?If by something intellectual, it will likewise be throwninto _infinitum_; if by something sensible, as the intellectualhas been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensiblehas been taken for that of the intellectual, the _circulus inprobando_ is introduced. If, however, in order to escape 173from this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to takesomething for granted which has not been proved, in order toprove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, whichprovides no way of escape. For if the one who makes thehypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case beno less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis. Ifthe one who makes the assumption assumes something true, hemakes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as anestablished fact; if it is false, the foundation of thereasoning is unsound. If a hypothesis is any help towards a 174trustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be assumed, and not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establishthe thing under discussion. If it is absurd to assume the thingquestioned, it is also absurd to assume that upon which itrests. That all things belonging to the senses are also in 175relation to something else is evident, because they are inrelation to those who perceive them. It is clear then, thatwhatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easilyreferred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similarconclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should besaid that there is a difference of opinion regarding them whichcannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend thejudgment concerning it. In case the difference of opinion 176can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, wefall into the _regressus in infinitum_, and if through anythingsensible into the _circulus in probando_; for, as the sensibleis again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judgedby the sensible on account of the _regressus in infinitum_, itwill have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual hasneed of the sensible. But he who accepts anything which ishypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also 177in relation, because the form in which they are expresseddepends on the mind of the thinker, and, if they were in realityexactly as they are described, there would not have been anydifference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectualalso is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it isnecessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard toevery thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropestaught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throwout the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity ofthe Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well asby those. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

_The Two Tropes. _

Two other Tropes of [Greek: epochê] are also taught. For as it 178appears that everything that is comprehended is eithercomprehended through itself or through something else, it isthought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things. And that nothing can be understood through itself is evident, itis said, from the disagreement which exists altogether among thephysicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things. Imean, of course, a disagreement which cannot be judged, as weare not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion injudging it, for everything that we would take has a part in thedisagreement, and is untrustworthy. Nor is it conceded thatanything can be comprehended through something else; for if 179a thing is comprehended through something, that must always inturn be comprehended through something else, and the _regressusin infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow. If, on thecontrary, a thing is comprehended through something that onewishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself, this is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehendedthrough itself, according to what we have said. We do not knowhow that which contradicts itself can be comprehended, eitherthrough itself or through something else, as no criterion of thetruth or of comprehension appears, and signs without proof wouldbe rejected, as we shall see in the next book. So much willsuffice for the present about suspension of judgment. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

_What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?_

In the same manner as we teach the Tropes of [Greek: epochê], 180some set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics, by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they areespecially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by whichhe thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless. The first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character 181of aetiology in general, which does not give incontestabletestimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseenthings. The second Trope states that although abundant resourcesexist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question, some Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. The third Trope 182states that the Dogmatics assign causes which do not showany order for things which have taken place in an orderlymanner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, acceptingphenomena as they take place, think that they also understandhow unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen thingshave taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhapsin some other way peculiar to themselves. The fifth Trope states 183that they all, so to speak, assign causes according to theirown hypotheses about the elements, but not according to anycommonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they oftenexplain things investigated according to their own hypotheses, but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. Theseventh states that they often give reasons for things that 184not only conflict with phenomena, but also with their ownhypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seemsmanifest, and that which is to be investigated, are oftenequally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one aboutthe other, although both are equally inscrutable. It is notimpossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics 185should fail in their theories of causality from othercombinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above. Perhaps also the five Tropes of [Greek: epochê] are sufficientto refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will proposeone which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, with Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not. Perhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be inharmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogetherdisagree with each other. If it is not in harmony with them, thereason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed 186it; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon, or something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will bethrown into the _regressus in infinitum_; if he uses one causeto account for another one, into the _circulus in probando_; butif he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that heproposes holds good so far as regards the things that have beensaid, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint;or if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked byus. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of theDogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

_The Sceptical Formulae. _

When we use any one of these Tropes, or the Tropes of 187[Greek: epochê], we employ with them certain formulae which showthe Sceptical method and our own feeling, as for instance, thesayings, "No more, " "One must determine nothing, " and certainothers. It is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place. Let us begin with "No more. "

CHAPTER XIX. 

_The Formula "No more. "_

We sometimes express this as I have given it, and sometimes 188thus, "Nothing more. " For we do not accept the "No more, " assome understand it, for the examination of the special, and"Nothing more" for that of the general, but we use "No more" and"Nothing more" without any difference, and we shall at presenttreat of them as one and the same expression. Now this formulais defective, for as when we say a double one we really mean adouble garment, and when we say a broad one we really mean abroad road; so when we say "No more" we mean really no more thanthis, or in every way the same. But some of the Sceptics use 189instead of the interrogation "No?" the interrogation "What, thisrather than this?" using the word "what" in the sense of "whatis the reason, " so that the formula means, "What is the reasonfor this rather than for this?" It is a customary thing, however, to use an interrogation instead of a statement, as "Whoof the mortals does not know the wife of Jupiter?" and also touse a statement instead of an interrogation, as "I seek whereDion dwells, " and "I ask why one should admire a poet. " The word"what" is also used instead of "what for" by Menander--"(For)what did I remain behind?" The formula "Not more this than this"expresses our own condition of mind, and signifies that 190because of the equality of the things that are opposed to eachother we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul. Wemean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable, by things placed in opposition to each other we mean simplythings which conflict with each other, and by a state ofequilibrium we mean a state in which we do not assent to onething more than to another. Even if the formula "Nothing 191more" seems to express assent or denial, we do not use it so, but we use it loosely, and not with accuracy, either instead ofan interrogation or instead of saying, "I do not know to whichof these I would assent, and to which I would not. " What liesbefore us is to express what appears to us, but we areindifferent to the words by which we express it. This must beunderstood, however, that we use the formula "Nothing more"without affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure andtrue, but we present it as it appears to us. 

CHAPTER XX. 

_Aphasia. _

We explain Aphasia as follows: The word [Greek: phasis] is used 192in two ways, having a general and a special signification. According to the general signification, it expresses affirmationor negation, as "It is day" or "It is not day"; according to thespecial signification, it expresses an affirmation only, andnegations are not called [Greek: phaseis]. Now Aphasia is theopposite of [Greek: phasis] in its general signification, which, as we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It followsthat Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we saythat we neither affirm nor deny anything. It is evident fromthis that we do not understand by Aphasia something that 193inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean thatwe now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by itin regard to the things that are under investigation. It isnecessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or denyany of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard tothe unknown, for we yield assent only to those things whichaffect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

_"Perhaps, " and "It is possible, " and "It may be. "_

The formulae "Perhaps, " and "Perhaps not, " and "It is 194possible, " and "It is not possible, " and "It may be, " and "Itmay not be, " we use instead of "Perhaps it is, " and "Perhaps itis not, " and "It is possible that it is, " and "It is possiblethat it is not, " and "It may be that it is, " and "It may be thatit is not. " That is, we use the formula "It is not possible" forthe sake of brevity, instead of saying "It is not possible tobe, " and "It may not be" instead of "It may not be that it is, "and "Perhaps not" instead of "Perhaps it is not. " Again, we donot here dispute about words, neither do we question if the 195formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely, as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulaeexpress Aphasia. For certainly the formula "Perhaps it is"really includes that which seems to contradict it, _i. E. _ theformula "Perhaps it is not, " because it does not affirm in inregard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also inregard to the others. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

[Greek: epochê] _or the Suspension of Judgment. _

When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot 196say which of those things presented should be believed, andwhich should not be believed, showing that things appear equalto me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Nowwe do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appearsto us in regard to them at the time when they present themselvesto us. [Greek: epochê] means the holding back of the opinion, soas neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equalityof the things in question. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

_The Formula "I determine Nothing. "_

In regard to the formula "I determine nothing, " we say the 197following: By "determine" we mean, not simply to speak, but togive assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing. For it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the formula "I determine nothing, " for this formula isnot a dogmatic opinion, that is an assent to something unknown, but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When, for example, the Sceptic says, "I determine nothing, " he meansthis: "According to my present feeling I can assert or denynothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation, "and in saying this he expresses what appears to him in referenceto the things under discussion. He does not express himselfpositively, but he states what he feels. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

_The Formula "Every thing is Undetermined. "_

The expression "Indetermination" furthermore shows a state 198of mind in which we neither deny nor affirm positively anythingregarding things that are investigated in a dogmatic way, thatis the things that are unknown. When then the Sceptic says"Every thing is undetermined, " he uses "is undetermined, " in thesense of "it appears undetermined to him. " The words "everything" do not mean all existences, but those that he hasexamined of the unknown things that are investigated by theDogmatists. By "undetermined, " he means that there is nopreference in the things that are placed in opposition to eachother, or that they simply conflict with each other in respectto trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. And as the one who 199says "I am walking" really means "It is I that am walking, " sohe who says "Every thing is undetermined" means at the sametime, according to our teachings, "as far as I am concerned, " or"as it appears to me, " as if he were saying "As far as I haveexamined the things that are under investigation in a dogmaticmanner, it appears to me that no one of them excels the onewhich conflicts with it in trustworthiness oruntrustworthiness. "

CHAPTER XXV. 

_The Formula "Every thing is Incomprehensible. "_

We treat the formula "Every thing is incomprehensible" in 200the same way. For "every thing" we interpret in the same way asabove, and we supply the words "to me" so that what we say isthis: "As far as I have inspected the unknown things which aredogmatically examined, it appears to me that every thing isincomprehensible. " This is not, however, to affirm that thethings which are examined by the Dogmatists are of such a natureas to be necessarily incomprehensible, but one expresses his ownfeeling in saying "I see that I have not thus far comprehendedany of those things because of the equilibrium of the thingsthat are placed in opposition to each other. " Whence it seems tome that every thing that has been brought forward to dispute ourformulae has fallen wide of the mark. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

_The Formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do notunderstand. "_

The formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not understand" 201show a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof forthe present from asserting or denying anything in regard to theunknown things under investigation, as is evident from what wesaid before about the other formulae. 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

_The Formula "To place an equal Statement in oppositionto every Statement. "_

Furthermore, when we say "Every statement may have an equal 202statement placed in opposition to it, " by "every, " we mean allthe statements that we have examined; we do not use the word"statement" simply, but for a statement which seeks to provesomething dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not atall one that shows a process of reasoning from premises andconclusions, but something which is put together in any sort ofway. We use the word "equal" in reference to trustworthiness oruntrustworthiness. "Is placed in opposition" we use instead ofthe common expression "to conflict with, " and we supply "as itappears to me. " When therefore one says, "It seems to me 203that every statement which I have examined, which provessomething dogmatically, may have another statement placed inopposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, andwhich is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, "this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of humanfeeling as it appears to the one who feels it. Some Sceptics 204express the formula as follows: "Every statement should have anequal one placed in opposition to it, " demanding itauthoritatively thus: "Let us place in opposition to everystatement that proves something dogmatically another conflictingstatement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, andis equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. "Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitiveshould be used instead of the imperative, that is, "to oppose"instead of "let us oppose. " This formula is recommended to the 205Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by the Dogmatists andgive up his investigations, and rashly fail of the [Greek:ataraxia] which is thought to accompany [Greek: epochê] inregard to everything, as we have explained above. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

_General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics. _

We have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for 206an outline, especially since what we have said about thosementioned applies also to others that we have omitted. In regardto all the Sceptical formulae, it must be understood in advancethat we do not affirm them to be absolutely true, because we saythat they can even refute themselves, since they are themselvesincluded in those things to which they refer, just as catharticmedicines not only purge the body of humors, but carry offthemselves with the humors. We say then that we use these 207formulae, not as literally making known the things for whichthey are used, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately. Itis not fitting for the Sceptic to dispute about words, especially as it contributes to our purpose to say that theseformulae have no absolute meaning; their meaning is a relativeone, that is, relative to the Sceptics. Besides, it is to be 208remembered that we do not say them about all things in general, but about the unknown, and things that are dogmaticallyinvestigated, and that we say what appears to us, and that we donot express ourselves decidedly about the nature of externalobjects. By this means I think that every sophism broughtagainst the Sceptical formulae can be overturned. We have now 209shown the character of Scepticism by examining its idea, itsparts, its criterion and aim, and also the Tropes of [Greek:epochê], and by treating of the Sceptical formulae. We think ittherefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinctionbetween Scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophyin order to more clearly understand the Sceptical School. Wewill begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus. 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

_In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophyof Heraclitus?_

Now that this school differs from ours is evident, for 210Heraclitus expresses himself about many unknown thingsdogmatically, which we do not, as has been said. Aenesidemus andhis followers said that the Sceptical School is the way to thephilosophy of Heraclitus. They gave as a reason for this thatthe statement that contradictory predicates appear to beapplicable to the same thing, leads the way to the statementthat contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to thesame thing; and as the Sceptics say that contradictorypredicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, theHeraclitans proceed from this to the doctrine that suchpredicates are in reality applicable. We reply to this that thestatement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicableto the same thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but is a factthat presents itself not only to the Sceptics, but to otherphilosophers, and to all men. No one, for instance, would 211venture to say that honey does not taste sweet to those inhealth, and bitter to those who have the jaundice, so that theHeraclitans start from a preconception common to all men, as dowe also, and perhaps the other schools of philosophy likewise. If, however, they had attributed the origin of the statementthat contradictory predicates are present in the same thing toany of the Sceptical teachings, as, for example, to the formula"Every thing is incomprehensible, " or "I determine nothing, " orany of the other similar ones, it may be that which they saywould follow; but since they start from that which is a commonexperience, not only to us, but to other philosophers, and inlife, why should one say that our school is a path to thephilosophy of Heraclitus more than any of the other schools ofphilosophy, or than life itself, as we all make use of the samesubject matter? On the other hand, the Sceptical School may not 212only fail to help towards the knowledge of the philosophy ofHeraclitus, but may even hinder it! For the Sceptic attacks allthe dogmas of Heraclitus as having been rashly given, andopposes on the one hand the doctrine of conflagration, and onthe other, the doctrine that contradictory predicates in realityapply to the same thing, and in regard to every dogma ofHeraclitus he scorns his dogmatic rashness, and then, in themanner that I have before referred to, adduces the formulae "Ido not understand" and "I determine nothing, " which conflictwith the Heraclitan doctrines. It is absurd to say that thisconflicting school is a path to the very sect with which itconflicts. It is then absurd to say that the Sceptical School isa path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. 

CHAPTER XXX. 

_In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophyof Democritus?_

The philosophy of Democritus is also said to have community 213with Scepticism, because it seems to use the same matter that wedo. For, from the fact that honey seems sweet to some and bitterto others, Democritus reasons, it is said, that honey is neithersweet nor bitter, and therefore he accords with the formula "Nomore, " which is a formula of the Sceptics. But the Sceptics andthe Democritans use the formula "No more" differently from eachother, for they emphasise the negation in the expression, butwe, the not knowing whether both of the phenomena exist orneither one, and so we differ in this respect. The distinction, however, becomes most evident when Democritus says that 214atoms and empty space are real, for by real he means existing inreality. Now, although he begins with the anomaly in phenomena, yet, since he says that atoms and empty space really exist, itis superfluous, I think, even to say that he differs from us. 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

_In what does Scepticism differ from the Cyrenaic Philosophy?_

Some say that the Cyrenaic School is the same as the 215Sceptical, because that school also claims to comprehend onlyconditions of mind. It differs, however, from it, because, whilethe former makes pleasure and the gentle motion of the flesh itsaim, we make [Greek: ataraxia] ours, and this is opposed to theaim of their school. For whether pleasure is present or not, confusion awaits him who maintains that pleasure is an aim, as Ihave shown in what I said about the aim. And then, in addition, we suspend our judgment as far as the reasoning with regard toexternal objects is concerned, but the Cyrenaics pronounce thenature of these inscrutable. 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

_In what does Scepticism differ from the Philosophy ofProtagoras?_

Protagoras makes man the measure of all things, of things 216that are that they are, and things that are not that they arenot, meaning by measure, criterion, and by things, events, thatis to say really, man is the criterion for all events, of thingsthat are that they are, and of things that are not that they arenot. And for that reason he accepts only the phenomena thatappear to each man, and thus he introduces relation. Therefore 217he seems to have community with the Pyrrhoneans. He differs, however, from them, and we shall see the difference after wehave somewhat explained how things seemed to Protagoras. Hesays, for example, that matter is fluid, and as it flows, additions are constantly made in the place of that which iscarried away; the perceptions also are arranged anew andchanged, according to the age and according to other conditionsof the body. He says also, that the reasons of all phenomena 218are present in matter, so that matter can be all that it appearsto be to all men as far as its power is concerned. Men, however, apprehend differently at different times, according to thedifferent conditions that they are in; for he that is in anatural condition will apprehend those qualities in matter thatcan appear to those who are in a natural condition, while on 219the contrary, those who are in an unnatural condition willapprehend those qualities that can appear to the abnormal. Furthermore, the same reasoning would hold true in regard todifferences in age, to sleeping and waking, and each of theother different conditions. Therefore man becomes the criterionof things that are, for all things that appear to men exist formen, and those things that do not appear to any one among men donot exist. We see that he dogmatises in saying that matter isfluid, and also in saying that the reasons for all phenomenahave their foundation in matter, while these things are unknown, and to us are things regarding which we suspend our judgment. 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

_In what does Scepticism differ from the AcademicPhilosophy?_

Some say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as 220Scepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat ofthat also. There have been, as the most say, threeAcademies--the most ancient one, that of Plato and hisfollowers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and hisfollowers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third andnew Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and theirfollowers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides, and their followers; and some count even a fifth, that ofAntiochus and his followers. Beginning then from the oldAcademy, let us consider the difference between the schools ofphilosophy mentioned. Now some have said that Plato was a 221Dogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he wasin some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic. For inthe fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as eithermaking sport of someone or contending against the Sophists, Plato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but heis dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either throughSocrates or Timaeus or any such person. In regard to those 222who say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things anda Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, tospeak now, for they themselves grant that he is different fromus. The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not wetreat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state brieflythat according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for theseespecially defended this position) Plato dogmatises when heexpresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existenceof Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is moreto be chosen than the one of vice. If he assents to these thingsas true, he dogmatises; or even if he accepts them as moreprobable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character, since he gives a preference to one thing above another intrustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is tous is evident from what we have said before. Even if when he 223performs mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses somethings sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic. For hewho dogmatises about one thing, or, in short, gives preferenceto one mental image over another in trustworthiness oruntrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is aDogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said ofXenophanes. For after having praised Xenophanes in many 224things, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, hemade him mourn and say--

 "Would that I also might gain that mind profound, Able to look both ways. In a treacherous path have I been decoyed, And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed. For wherever I turned my view All things were resolved into unity; all things, alway From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same. "

Timon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free fromvanity, when he said--

 "Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of Homeric deceit, Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal, Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect. "

In saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant thathe was in some things free from vanity. He called him a mockerof the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit inHomer. Xenophanes also dogmatised, contrary to the assumptions 225of other men, that all things are one, and that God is growntogether with all things, that He is spherical, insensible, unchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference ofXenophanes from us is easily proved. In short, from what hasbeen said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubtabout some things, so long as he has expressed himself incertain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, oras preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, hecannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic. Those of the New Academy, although they say that all things are incomprehensible, 226differ from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all thingsare incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard tothis, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may becomprehended), but they differ evidently still further from usin their judgment of good and evil. For the Academicians saythat there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it, but more with the conviction that that which they call goodexists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to theevil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with theconviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in anunprejudiced way in order not to be inactive. Moreover, we saythat our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness 227and untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while theysay that some are probable and others improbable. They make adifference also between the improbable ones, for they believethat some of them are only probable, others probable andundisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested. Asfor example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat darkroom, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it, and thinks that it is a serpent; but it appears to be a rope 228to him who has looked carefully around, and found out that itdoes not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on, according to an idea which is probable and undisputed. Thetested idea is like this: It is said that Hercules led Alcestisafter she was dead back again from Hades and showed her toAdmetus, and he received an idea that was probable andundisputed regarding Alcestis. As, however, he knew that she wasdead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief. Now those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which 229is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one. To bothof these, however, they prefer that which is probable, undisputed, and tested. If, however, both those of the Academyand the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there isan evident difference between the two schools of philosophy evenin this; for "to believe" is used in a different sense, 230meaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to acceptwithout strong inclination and approval, as the child is said tobelieve the teacher; on the other hand, "to believe" is used tosignify assenting to something with choice, and, as it were, with the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigalfollows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life. Therefore, since Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that theyare strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, andwe simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ 231from them, I think, in this way. We differ from the New Academylikewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who saythat they govern themselves according to that School availthemselves of the idea of the probable in life, we liveaccording to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, inan unprejudiced way. We could say more regarding the distinctionbetween the two schools if we did not aim at brevity. Nevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and 232chief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much incommon with the Pyrrhonean teachings, so that his school andours are almost one. For neither does one find that he expressedan opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nordoes he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthinessor untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding allthings, and the aim of his philosophy is [Greek: epochê], whichis accompanied by [Greek: ataraxia], and this agrees with whatwe have said. But he calls the particular instances of 233[Greek: epochê] _bona_, and the particular instances of assent_mala_. The difference is that we say these things according towhat appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them asif speaking of realities, that is, he says that [Greek: epochê]is in itself good, and assent an evil. If we are to believe alsothe things that are said about him, he appeared at first 234sight to be a Pyrrhonean, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for heused to test his companions by the method of doubt to seewhether they were gifted enough to take in Plato's dogmas, sothat he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time hecommunicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companionswho were gifted. Hence Ariston also said about him--

 "Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle, "

because he availed himself of the dialectic of Diodorus, but was 235wholly a Platonist. Now Philo and his followers say that asfar as the Stoic criterion is concerned, that is to say the[Greek: phantasia katalêptikê], things are incomprehensible, butas far as the nature of things is concerned, they arecomprehensible. Antiochus, however, transferred the Stoa to theAcademy, so that it was even said of him that he taught theStoic philosophy in the Academy, because he tried to show thatthe Stoic doctrines are found in Plato. The difference, therefore, between the Sceptical School and the Fourth and FifthAcademy is evident. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

_Is Empiricism in Medicine the same as Scepticism?_

Some say that the medical sect called Empiricism is the same 236as Scepticism. Yet the fact must be recognised, that even ifEmpiricism does maintain the impossibility of knowledge, it isneither Scepticism itself, nor would it suit the Sceptic to takethat sect upon himself. He could rather, it seems to me, belongto the so-called Methodic School. For this alone, of all themedical sects, does not seem to proceed rashly in regard to 237unknown things, and does not presume to say whether they arecomprehensible or not, but is guided by phenomena, and receivesfrom them the same help which they seem to give to the Scepticalsystem. For we have said in what has gone before, that theevery-day life which the Sceptic lives is of four parts, depending on the guidance of nature, on the necessity of thefeelings, on the traditions of laws and customs, and on theteaching of the arts. Now as by necessity of the feelings 238the Sceptic is led by thirst to drink, and by hunger to food, and to supply similar needs in the same way, so also thephysician of the Methodic School is led by the feelings to findsuitable remedies; in constipation he produces a relaxation, asone takes refuge in the sun from the shrinking on account ofintense cold; he is led by a flux to the stopping of it, asthose in a hot bath who are dripping from a profuse perspirationand are relaxed, hasten to check it by going into the cold air. Moreover, it is evident that the Methodic physician forces thosethings which are of a foreign nature to adapt themselves totheir own nature, as even the dog tries to get a sharp stick outthat is thrust into him. In order, however, that I should 239not overstep the outline character of this work by discussingdetails, I think that all the things that the Methodics havethus said can be classified as referring to the necessity of thefeelings that are natural or those that are unnatural. Besidesthis, it is common to both schools to have no dogmas, and to usewords loosely. For as the Sceptic uses the formula "I 240determine nothing, " and "I understand nothing, " as we saidabove, so the Methodic also uses the expressions "Community, "and "To go through, " and other similar ones without over muchcare. In a similar way he uses the word "Indication"undogmatically, meaning that the symptoms of the patient eithernatural or unnatural, indicate the remedies that would besuitable, as we said in speaking of thirst, hunger, and otherthings. It will thus be seen that the Methodic School of 241medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism which iscloser than that of the other medical sects, speakingcomparatively if not absolutely from these and similar tokens. Having said so much in reference to the schools that seem toclosely resemble Scepticism, we conclude the generalconsideration of Scepticism and the First Book of the Sketches.