PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

Volume I. 

by U. S. Grant

PREFACE. 

"Man proposes and God disposes. " There are but few important events inthe affairs of men brought about by their own choice. 

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I haddetermined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. Atthe age of nearly sixty-two I received an injury from a fall, whichconfined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect mygeneral health. This made study a pleasant pastime. Shortly after, therascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement ofa failure. This was followed soon after by universal depression of allsecurities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part ofthe income still retained, and for which I am indebted to the kindly actof friends. At this juncture the editor of the Century Magazine askedme to write a few articles for him. I consented for the money it gaveme; for at that moment I was living upon borrowed money. The work Ifound congenial, and I determined to continue it. The event is animportant one for me, for good or evil; I hope for the former. 

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon the taskwith the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether onthe National or Confederate side, other than the unavoidable injusticeof not making mention often where special mention is due. There must bemany errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too largeto be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all theofficers and men engaged. There were thousands of instances, during therebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds ofheroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. Thetroops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports oftheir individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. 

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written beforeI had reason to suppose I was in a critical condition of health. LaterI was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible forme to attend to anything for weeks. I have, however, somewhat regainedmy strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as aperson should devote to such work. I would have more hope of satisfyingthe expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more time. I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement offact given. The comments are my own, and show how I saw the matterstreated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. 

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking nofavor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. 

U. S. GRANT. 

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885. 

CONTENTS

VOLUME I. 

CHAPTER I. ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD. 

CHAPTER II. WEST POINT--GRADUATION. 

CHAPTER III. ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY. 

CHAPTER IV. CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO--SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION. 

CHAPTER V. TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND-LIEUTENANT--ARMY OFOCCUPATION. 

CHAPTER VI. ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE. 

CHAPTER VII. THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OFRESACA DE LA PALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ONCAMARGO. 

CHAPTER VIII. ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OFMONTEREY--SURRENDER OF THE CITY. 

CHAPTER IX. POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ. 

CHAPTER X. MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTTAND TAYLOR. 

CHAPTER XI. ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULTAT CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OFTHE MONTEZUMAS. 

CHAPTER XII. PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OFMEXICO--THE ARMY--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

CHAPTER XIII. TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTALQUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO. 

CHAPTER XIV. RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST--CROSSING THE ISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO. 

CHAPTER XV. SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THEPACIFIC COAST--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA. 

CHAPTER XVI. RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMINGCRISIS. 

CHAPTER XVII. OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING--MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICESTENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT. 

CHAPTER XVIII. APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THEREGIMENT--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS ATFLORIDA, MO. --GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO. 

CHAPTER XIX. COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO. --JEFFERSON CITY--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH--HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO. 

CHAPTER XX. GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLEOF BELMONT--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE. 

CHAPTER XXI. GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OFCAIRO--MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. 

CHAPTER XXII. INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACKOF THE ENEMY--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT. 

CHAPTER XXIII. PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIEDTERRITORY--ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATERETREAT--RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERALSMITH. 

CHAPTER XXIV. THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THECONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERALSHERMAN--CONDITION OF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THESECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 

CHAPTER XXV. STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THECONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ON SHILOH. 

CHAPTER XXVI. HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPONCORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED. 

CHAPTER XXVII. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTEDCOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDEROF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF AMICHIGAN REGIMENT. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLEOF IUKA. 

CHAPTER XXIX. VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THEDEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE. 

CHAPTER XXX. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'SMOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD. 

CHAPTER XXXI. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL MCCLERNAND INCOMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONSAT YAZOO PASS. 

CHAPTER XXXII. THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THENORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS. 

CHAPTER XXXIII. ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OFGRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND. 

CHAPTER XXXV. MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTINGTHE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 

CHAPTER XXXVI. BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 

CHAPTER XXXVII. SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES'S BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THEASSAULT--THE FLAG OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FORSURRENDER--ACCEPTING THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXXIX. RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSEDMOVEMENT UPON MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO. 

Volume one begins:

CHAPTER I. 

ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD. 

My family is American, and has been for generations, in all itsbranches, direct and collateral. 

Mathew Grant, the founder of the branch in America, of which I am adescendant, reached Dorchester, Massachusetts, in May, 1630. In 1635 hemoved to what is now Windsor, Connecticut, and was the surveyor for thatcolony for more than forty years. He was also, for many years of thetime, town clerk. He was a married man when he arrived at Dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. His eldest son, Samuel, took lands on the east side of the Connecticut River, opposite Windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. 

I am of the eighth generation from Mathew Grant, and seventh fromSamuel. Mathew Grant's first wife died a few years after theirsettlement in Windsor, and he soon after married the widow Rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and hisfirst wife, on the ship Mary and John, from Dorchester, England, in1630. Mrs. Rockwell had several children by her first marriage, andothers by her second. By intermarriage, two or three generations later, I am descended from both the wives of Mathew Grant. 

In the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, Noah Grant, andhis younger brother, Solomon, held commissions in the English army, in1756, in the war against the French and Indians. Both were killed thatyear. 

My grandfather, also named Noah, was then but nine years old. At thebreaking out of the war of the Revolution, after the battles of Concordand Lexington, he went with a Connecticut company to join theContinental army, and was present at the battle of Bunker Hill. Heserved until the fall of Yorktown, or through the entire Revolutionarywar. He must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as Ibelieve most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married inConnecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at theclose. Soon after this he emigrated to Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and settled near the town of Greensburg in that county. He took with him the younger of his two children, Peter Grant. Theelder, Solomon, remained with his relatives in Connecticut until oldenough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the British West Indies. 

Not long after his settlement in Pennsylvania, my grandfather, CaptainNoah Grant, married a Miss Kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, thistime to Ohio, and settled where the town of Deerfield now stands. Hehad now five children, including Peter, a son by his first marriage. Myfather, Jesse R. Grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the secondmarriage. 

Peter Grant went early to Maysville, Kentucky, where he was veryprosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned atthe mouth of the Kanawha River, Virginia, in 1825, being at the time oneof the wealthy men of the West. 

My grandmother Grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. This brokeup the family. Captain Noah Grant was not thrifty in the way of "layingup stores on earth, " and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son Peter, inMaysville. The rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood ofDeerfield, my father in the family of judge Tod, the father of the lateGovernor Tod, of Ohio. His industry and independence of character weresuch, that I imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of hismaintenance. 

There must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the Tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge Tod and his wife, withall the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead ofbenefactors. I have often heard him speak of Mrs. Tod as the mostadmirable woman he had ever known. He remained with the Tod family onlya few years, until old enough to learn a trade. He went first, Ibelieve, with his half-brother, Peter Grant, who, though not a tannerhimself, owned a tannery in Maysville, Kentucky. Here he learned histrade, and in a few years returned to Deerfield and worked for, andlived in the family of a Mr. Brown, the father of John Brown--"whosebody lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on. " Ihave often heard my father speak of John Brown, particularly since theevents at Harper's Ferry. Brown was a boy when they lived in the samehouse, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of greatpurity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanaticand extremist in whatever he advocated. It was certainly the act of aninsane man to attempt the invasion of the South, and the overthrow ofslavery, with less than twenty men. 

My father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery atRavenna, the county seat of Portage County. In a few years he removedfrom Ravenna, and set up the same business at Point Pleasant, ClermontCounty, Ohio. 

During the minority of my father, the West afforded but poor facilitiesfor the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and themajority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertionsfor whatever learning they obtained. I have often heard him say thathis time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of aneducation, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably whileliving with judge Tod. But his thirst for education was intense. Helearned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death inhis eightieth year. Books were scarce in the Western Reserve during hisyouth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood wherehe lived. This scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everythinghe read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything init. The habit continued through life. Even after reading the dailypapers--which he never neglected--he could give all the importantinformation they contained. He made himself an excellent Englishscholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constantcontributor to Western newspapers, and was also, from that time until hewas fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the West at that time. He always took an activepart in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, Ibelieve, that he was the first Mayor of Georgetown. He supportedJackson for the Presidency; but he was a Whig, a great admirer of HenryClay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office afterJackson. 

My mother's family lived in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, for severalgenerations. I have little information about her ancestors. Her familytook no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when Iwas sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. On the otherside, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in hisresearches, he found that there was an entailed estate in Windsor, Connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, Lawson Grant--still living--was the heir. He was so much interested in the subjectthat he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832or 1833, when I was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to Windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the ownersfor a consideration--three thousand dollars, I think. I remember thecircumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return thathe found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothingbeyond their homes. From these he refused to receive any recompense. 

My mother's father, John Simpson, moved from Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, to Clermont County, Ohio, about the year 1819, taking withhim his four children, three daughters and one son. My mother, HannahSimpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty yearsof age. Her oldest sister was at that time married, and had severalchildren. She still lives in Clermont County at this writing, October5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. Until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when theDemocratic party lost control in 1860. Her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled inKentucky before the war. He was the only one of the children whoentered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. 

Her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still livingin Clermont County, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is asactive in mind as ever. He was a supporter of the Government during thewar, and remains a firm believer, that national success by theDemocratic party means irretrievable ruin. 

In June, 1821, my father, Jesse R. Grant, married Hannah Simpson. I wasborn on the 27th of April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio. In the fall of 1823 we moved to Georgetown, the county seat ofBrown, the adjoining county east. This place remained my home, until atthe age of seventeen, in 1839, I went to West Point. 

The schools, at the time of which I write, were very indifferent. Therewere no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. They were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who wasoften a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they impartedall they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the A B C's up to the young lady of eighteenand the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the threeR's, "Reading, 'Riting, 'Rithmetic. " I never saw an algebra, or othermathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in Georgetown, until afterI was appointed to West Point. I then bought a work on algebra inCincinnati; but having no teacher it was Greek to me. 

My life in Georgetown was uneventful. From the age of five or six untilseventeen, I attended the subscription schools of the village, exceptduring the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. The former period was spent inMaysville, Kentucky, attending the school of Richardson and Rand; thelatter in Ripley, Ohio, at a private school. I was not studious inhabit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for theoutlay for board and tuition. At all events both winters were spent ingoing over the same old arithmetic which I knew every word of before, and repeating: "A noun is the name of a thing, " which I had also heardmy Georgetown teachers repeat, until I had come to believe it--but Icast no reflections upon my old teacher, Richardson. He turned outbright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuousplaces in the service of their States. Two of my contemporaries there--who, I believe, never attended any other institution of learning--haveheld seats in Congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; theseare Wadsworth and Brewster. 

My father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortablecircumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and thecommunity in which he lived. Mindful of his own lack of facilities foracquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for theeducation of his children. Consequently, as stated before, I nevermissed a quarter from school from the time I was old enough to attendtill the time of leaving home. This did not exempt me from labor. Inmy early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where myyouth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. It wasonly the very poor who were exempt. While my father carried on themanufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned andtilled considerable land. I detested the trade, preferring almost anyother labor; but I was fond of agriculture, and of all employment inwhich horses were used. We had, among other lands, fifty acres offorest within a mile of the village. In the fall of the year chopperswere employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. When I wasseven or eight years of age, I began hauling all the wood used in thehouse and shops. I could not load it on the wagons, of course, at thattime, but I could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one atthe house unload. When about eleven years old, I was strong enough tohold a plough. From that age until seventeen I did all the work donewith horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn andpotatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood forstoves, etc. , while still attending school. For this I was compensatedby the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by myparents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going tothe creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting mygrandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on theice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on theground. 

While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also Maysville, Kentucky, often, and onceLouisville. The journey to Louisville was a big one for a boy of thatday. I had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to Chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing toToledo, Ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, toFlat Rock, Kentucky, about seventy miles away. On this latter occasionI was fifteen years of age. While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr. Payne, whom I was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours inGeorgetown, I saw a very fine saddle horse, which I rather coveted, andproposed to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two I wasdriving. Payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brotherabout it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that I wasallowed to do as I pleased with the horses. I was seventy miles fromhome, with a carriage to take back, and Mr. Payne said he did not knowthat his horse had ever had a collar on. I asked to have him hitched toa farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. It was soonevident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed noviciousness, and I expressed a confidence that I could manage him. Atrade was at once struck, I receiving ten dollars difference. 

The next day Mr. Payne, of Georgetown, and I started on our return. Wegot along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dogthat frightened the horses and made them run. The new animal kicked atevery jump he made. I got the horses stopped, however, before anydamage was done, and without running into anything. After giving them alittle rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. That instant thenew horse kicked, and started to run once more. The road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the secondrunaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feetdeep on the opposite side of the pike. I got the horses stopped on thevery brink of the precipice. My new horse was terribly frightened andtrembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as mycompanion, Mr. Payne, who deserted me after this last experience, andtook passage on a freight wagon for Maysville. Every time I attemptedto start, my new horse would commence to kick. I was in quite a dilemmafor a time. Once in Maysville I could borrow a horse from an uncle wholived there; but I was more than a day's travel from that point. Finally I took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universaluse then--and with this blindfolded my horse. In this way I reachedMaysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of myfriend. Here I borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day weproceeded on our journey. 

About half my school-days in Georgetown were spent at the school of JohnD. White, a North Carolinian, and the father of Chilton White whorepresented the district in Congress for one term during the rebellion. Mr. White was always a Democrat in politics, and Chilton followed hisfather. He had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mineat their father's school--who did not go the same way. The secondbrother died before the rebellion began; he was a Whig, and afterwards aRepublican. His oldest brother was a Republican and brave soldierduring the rebellion. Chilton is reported as having told of an earlierhorse-trade of mine. As he told the story, there was a Mr. Ralstonliving within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which I verymuch wanted. My father had offered twenty dollars for it, but Ralstonwanted twenty-five. I was so anxious to have the colt, that after theowner left, I begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. My father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted I was to offertwenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give thetwenty-five. I at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. When Igot to Mr. Ralston's house, I said to him: "Papa says I may offer youtwenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, I am to offertwenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give youtwenty-five. " It would not require a Connecticut man to guess the pricefinally agreed upon. This story is nearly true. I certainly showedvery plainly that I had come for the colt and meant to have him. Icould not have been over eight years old at the time. This transactioncaused me great heart-burning. The story got out among the boys of thevillage, and it was a long time before I heard the last of it. Boysenjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that daydid, and in later life I have found that all adults are not free fromthe peculiarity. I kept the horse until he was four years old, when hewent blind, and I sold him for twenty dollars. When I went to Maysvilleto school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, I recognized my colt as oneof the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. 

I have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of thewhole. I did not like to work; but I did as much of it, while young, asgrown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at thesame time. I had as many privileges as any boy in the village, andprobably more than most of them. I have no recollection of ever havingbeen punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. But at schoolthe case was different. The rod was freely used there, and I was notexempt from its influence. I can see John D. White--the school teacher--now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. It was not alwaysthe same one, either. Switches were brought in bundles, from a beechwood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they wereintended. Often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. Inever had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attendingthe school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. Mr. White was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community inwhich he lived. He only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. 

CHAPTER II. 

WEST POINT--GRADUATION. 

In the winter of 1838-9 I was attending school at Ripley, only ten milesdistant from Georgetown, but spent the Christmas holidays at home. During this vacation my father received a letter from the HonorableThomas Morris, then United States Senator from Ohio. When he read it hesaid to me, "Ulysses, I believe you are going to receive theappointment. " "What appointment?" I inquired. "To West Point; I haveapplied for it. " "But I won't go, " I said. He said he thought I would, AND I THOUGHT SO TOO, IF HE DID. I really had no objection to going toWest Point, except that I had a very exalted idea of the acquirementsnecessary to get through. I did not believe I possessed them, and couldnot bear the idea of failing. There had been four boys from ourvillage, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from WestPoint, and never a failure of any one appointed from Georgetown, exceptin the case of the one whose place I was to take. He was the son of Dr. Bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. Young Bailey had beenappointed in 1837. Finding before the January examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, andremained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. Before the next examination he was dismissed. Dr. Bailey was a proudand sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that heforbade his return home. There were no telegraphs in those days todisseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the Alleghanies, and butfew east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into otherpeople's private affairs. Consequently it did not become generallyknown that there was a vacancy at West Point from our district until Iwas appointed. I presume Mrs. Bailey confided to my mother the factthat Bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden hisson's return home. 

The Honorable Thomas L. Hamer, one of the ablest men Ohio ever produced, was our member of Congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. He and my father had been members of the same debating society (wherethey were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personalfriends from their early manhood up to a few years before. In politicsthey differed. Hamer was a life-long Democrat, while my father was aWhig. They had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over someact of President Jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, Ithink--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. I knowboth of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been gladat any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make theadvance. Under these circumstances my father would not write to Hamerfor the appointment, but he wrote to Thomas Morris, United StatesSenator from Ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at West Pointfrom our district, and that he would be glad if I could be appointed tofill it. This letter, I presume, was turned over to Mr. Hamer, and, asthere was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. This healedthe breach between the two, never after reopened. 

Besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to WestPoint--that "he thought I would go"--there was another very stronginducement. I had always a great desire to travel. I was already thebest travelled boy in Georgetown, except the sons of one man, JohnWalker, who had emigrated to Texas with his family, and immigrated backas soon as he could get the means to do so. In his short stay in Texashe acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one wouldform going there now. 

I had been east to Wheeling, Virginia, and north to the Western Reserve, in Ohio, west to Louisville, and south to Bourbon County, Kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole countrywithin fifty miles of home. Going to West Point would give me theopportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, Philadelphia and New York. This was enough. When these places werevisited I would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroadcollision, or any other accident happen, by which I might have receiveda temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, toenter the Academy. Nothing of the kind occurred, and I had to face themusic. 

Georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. It is, andhas been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. There wasprobably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity couldhave been afforded, it would not have voted for Jefferson Davis forPresident of the United States, over Mr. Lincoln, or any otherrepresentative of his party; unless it was immediately after some ofJohn Morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through Ohio, spent a fewhours in the village. The rebels helped themselves to whatever theycould find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many orderedmeals to be prepared for them by the families. This was no doubt a farpleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render alike service for Union soldiers. The line between the Rebel and Unionelement in Georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in thechurches. There were churches in that part of Ohio where treason waspreached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to thegovernment, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far moreessential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the Bible. There were men in Georgetown who filled all the requirements formembership in these churches. 

Yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old andyoung, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for theorganization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearingarms--furnished the Union army four general officers and one colonel, West Point graduates, and nine generals and field officers ofVolunteers, that I can think of. Of the graduates from West Point, allhad citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, exceptpossibly General A. V. Kautz, who had remained in the army from hisgraduation. Two of the colonels also entered the service from otherlocalities. The other seven, General McGroierty, Colonels White, Fyffe, Loudon and Marshall, Majors King and Bailey, were all residents ofGeorgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive atthe close, returned there. Major Bailey was the cadet who had precededme at West Point. He was killed in West Virginia, in his firstengagement. As far as I know, every boy who has entered West Point fromthat village since my time has been graduated. 

I took passage on a steamer at Ripley, Ohio, for Pittsburg, about themiddle of May, 1839. Western boats at that day did not make regulartrips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length oftime, for passengers or freight. I have myself been detained two orthree days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. Onthis occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three daysPittsburg was reached. From Pittsburg I chose passage by the canal toHarrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. This gave abetter opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of Western Pennsylvania, and I had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. At thattime the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with thecomfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be morepleasant, when time was not an object. From Harrisburg to Philadelphiathere was a railroad, the first I had ever seen, except the one on whichI had just crossed the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, and over whichcanal boats were transported. In travelling by the road fromHarrisburg, I thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. We travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, andmade the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles anhour. This seemed like annihilating space. I stopped five days inPhiladelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited Girard College (which was then in course of construction), andgot reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. My sojourn in New York was shorter, but long enough to enable me to seethe city very well. I reported at West Point on the 30th or 31st ofMay, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. 

A military life had no charms for me, and I had not the faintest idea ofstaying in the army even if I should be graduated, which I did notexpect. The encampment which preceded the commencement of academicstudies was very wearisome and uninteresting. When the 28th of Augustcame--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--I felt asthough I had been at West Point always, and that if I staid tograduation, I would have to remain always. I did not take hold of mystudies with avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson thesecond time during my entire cadetship. I could not sit in my roomdoing nothing. There is a fine library connected with the Academy fromwhich cadets can get books to read in their quarters. I devoted moretime to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. Much ofthe time, I am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of atrashy sort. I read all of Bulwer's then published, Cooper's, Marryat's, Scott's, Washington Irving's works, Lever's, and many othersthat I do not now remember. Mathematics was very easy to me, so thatwhen January came, I passed the examination, taking a good standing inthat branch. In French, the only other study at that time in the firstyear's course, my standing was very low. In fact, if the class had beenturned the other end foremost I should have been near head. I neversucceeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any onestudy, during the four years. I came near it in French, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. 

Early in the session of the Congress which met in December, 1839, a billwas discussed abolishing the Military Academy. I saw in this anhonorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with muchinterest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for I wasselfish enough to favor the bill. It never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, I would have been sorry to haveseen it succeed. My idea then was to get through the course, secure adetail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at theAcademy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in somerespectable college; but circumstances always did shape my coursedifferent from my plans. 

At the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extendingfrom the close of the June examination to the 28th of August. This Ienjoyed beyond any other period of my life. My father had sold out hisbusiness in Georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which myday-dreams carried me back as my future home, if I should ever be ableto retire on a competency. He had moved to Bethel, only twelve milesaway, in the adjoining county of Clermont, and had bought a young horsethat had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddleduring my furlough. Most of my time was spent among my oldschool-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at West Point. 

Persons acquainted with the Academy know that the corps of cadets isdivided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. These companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent andcommandant selecting the officers for their military bearing andqualifications. The adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelvelieutenants are taken from the first, or Senior class; the sergeantsfrom the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, orSophomore class. I had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when Ireturned from furlough I found myself the last but one--about mystanding in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. The promotion wastoo much for me. That year my standing in the class--as shown by thenumber of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among thesergeants, and I was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. 

During my first year's encampment General Scott visited West Point, andreviewed the cadets. With his commanding figure, his quite colossalsize and showy uniform, I thought him the finest specimen of manhood myeyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. I could never resemblehim in appearance, but I believe I did have a presentiment for a momentthat some day I should occupy his place on review--although I had nointention then of remaining in the army. My experience in a horse-tradeten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in mymind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimatechum. The next summer Martin Van Buren, then President of the UnitedStates, visited West Point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impressme with the awe which Scott had inspired. In fact I regarded GeneralScott and Captain C. F. Smith, the Commandant of Cadets, as the two menmost to be envied in the nation. I retained a high regard for both upto the day of their death. 

The last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but theystill seemed about five times as long as Ohio years, to me. At last allthe examinations were passed, and the members of the class were calledupon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. I wasanxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, butthere was only one regiment of dragoons in the Army at that time, andattached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were atleast four brevet second lieutenants. I recorded therefore my firstchoice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. Again therewas a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for theclass were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of September. Again I went to Ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; andagain I found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besidesa horse and buggy that I could drive--but I was not in a physicalcondition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. Forsix months before graduation I had had a desperate cough ("Tyler's grip"it was called), and I was very much reduced, weighing but one hundredand seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though I had grown sixinches in stature in the mean time. There was consumption in myfather's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, whichmade my symptoms more alarming. The brother and sister next youngerthan myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and Iseemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. 

Having made alternate choice of two different arms of service withdifferent uniforms, I could not get a uniform suit until notified of myassignment. I left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not tomake the uniform until I notified him whether it was to be for infantryor dragoons. Notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then ittook at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor andtwo more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. This was a timeof great suspense. I was impatient to get on my uniform and see how itlooked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. 

The conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances thathappened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distastefor military uniform that I never recovered from. Soon after thearrival of the suit I donned it, and put off for Cincinnati onhorseback. While I was riding along a street of that city, imaginingthat every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when Ifirst saw General Scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirtyand ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's whatsuspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tubfor weeks, turned to me and cried: "Soldier! will you work? No, sir--ee; I'll sell my shirt first!!" The horse trade and its direconsequences were recalled to mind. 

The other circumstance occurred at home. Opposite our house in Bethelstood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, The stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. Onmy return I found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the colorof my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed downthe outside seams in imitation of mine. The joke was a huge one in themind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but I did notappreciate it so highly. 

During the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent invisiting friends in Georgetown and Cincinnati, and occasionally othertowns in that part of the State. 

CHAPTER III. 

ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY. 

On the 30th of September I reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, with the 4th United States infantry. It was the largest militarypost in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companiesof infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. Colonel Steven Kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commandedthe post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, butwithout vexatious rules or regulations. Every drill and roll-call hadto be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoythemselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, withoutmaking written application to state where they were going for how long, etc. , so that they were back for their next duty. It did seem to me, inmy early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they cameto command posts, made it a study to think what orders they couldpublish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. Inoticed, however, a few years later, when the Mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed ofdisabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. They were right; butthey did not always give their disease the right name. 

At West Point I had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he wasroom-mate also--F. T. Dent, whose family resided some five miles west ofJefferson Barracks. Two of his unmarried brothers were living at homeat that time, and as I had taken with me from Ohio, my horse, saddle andbridle, I soon found my way out to White Haven, the name of the Dentestate. As I found the family congenial my visits became frequent. There were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a schoolmiss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. There was still anolder daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years atboarding-school in St. Louis, but who, though through school, had notyet returned home. She was spending the winter in the city withconnections, the family of Colonel John O'Fallon, well known in St. Louis. In February she returned to her country home. After that I donot know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did becomemore enjoyable. We would often take walks, or go on horseback to visitthe neighbors, until I became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. Sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of theyounger sisters. If the 4th infantry had remained at Jefferson Barracksit is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued forsome years without my finding out that there was anything serious thematter with me; but in the following May a circumstance occurred whichdeveloped my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. 

The annexation of Texas was at this time the subject of violentdiscussion in Congress, in the press, and by individuals. Theadministration of President Tyler, then in power, was making the moststrenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the greatand absorbing question of the day. During these discussions the greaterpart of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, whichhad been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "DismountedRifles"--was stationed at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, some twenty-five mileseast of the Texas line, to observe the frontier. About the 1st of Maythe 3d infantry was ordered from Jefferson Barracks to Louisiana, to gointo camp in the neighborhood of Fort Jessup, and there await furtherorders. The troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way downthe Mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. About the time they started I obtained a leave of absence for twentydays to go to Ohio to visit my parents. I was obliged to go to St. Louis to take a steamer for Louisville or Cincinnati, or the firststeamer going up the Ohio River to any point. Before I left St. Louisorders were received at Jefferson Barracks for the 4th infantry tofollow the 3d. A messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; butbefore he could reach me I was off, totally ignorant of these events. Aday or two after my arrival at Bethel I received a letter from aclassmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of thecircumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter postmarked St. Louis or Jefferson Barracks, until the expiration of myleave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them alongfor me. His advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent tome. I now discovered that I was exceedingly anxious to get back toJefferson Barracks, and I understood the reason without explanation fromany one. My leave of absence required me to report for duty, atJefferson Barracks, at the end of twenty days. I knew my regiment hadgone up the Red River, but I was not disposed to break the letter of myleave; besides, if I had proceeded to Louisiana direct, I could not havereached there until after the expiration of my leave. Accordingly, atthe end of the twenty days, I reported for duty to Lieutenant Ewell, commanding at Jefferson Barracks, handing him at the same time my leaveof absence. After noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves ofabsence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will reportfor duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order tojoin my regiment in Louisiana. I then asked for a few days' leavebefore starting, which he readily granted. This was the same Ewell whoacquired considerable reputation as a Confederate general during therebellion. He was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the oldarmy, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars--both in my estimation unholy. 

I immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking nobaggage with me, of course. There is an insignificant creek--theGravois--between Jefferson Barracks and the place to which I was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to itsmouth. There is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to runa coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. On thisoccasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, Ifound the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. I looked atit a moment to consider what to do. One of my superstitions had alwaysbeen when I started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turnback, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. I havefrequently started to go to places where I had never been and to which Idid not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, andif I got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, Iwould go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, takethat, and come in by the other side. So I struck into the stream, andin an instant the horse was swimming and I being carried down by thecurrent. I headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. Iwent on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my--future--brother-in-law. We were not of the same size, but the clothesanswered every purpose until I got more of my own. 

Before I returned I mustered up courage to make known, in the mostawkward manner imaginable, the discovery I had made on learning that the4th infantry had been ordered away from Jefferson Barracks. The younglady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had neverlooked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable toher, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account forwhen the regiment left. Before separating it was definitely understoodthat at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let theremoval of a regiment trouble us. This was in May, 1844. It was the22d of August, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. My dutieskept me on the frontier of Louisiana with the Army of Observation duringthe pendency of Annexation; and afterwards I was absent through the warwith Mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by theannexation itself. During that time there was a constant correspondencebetween Miss Dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of fouryears and three months. In May, 1845, I procured a leave for twentydays, visited St. Louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for theunion, which had not been asked for before. 

As already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. Accordingly, soon after I was settled at Jefferson Barracks, I wrote a letter toProfessor Church--Professor of Mathematics at West Point--requesting himto ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to bemade. Assistant professors at West Point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particularbranch of study they are assigned to teach. The answer from ProfessorChurch was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt I should have beendetailed a year or two later but for the Mexican War coming on. Accordingly I laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued ingarrison, with regularity, if not persistency. I reviewed my West Pointcourse of mathematics during the seven months at Jefferson Barracks, andread many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. Tohelp my memory I kept a book in which I would write up, from time totime, my recollections of all I had read since last posting it. Whenthe regiment was ordered away, I being absent at the time, my effectswere packed up by Lieutenant Haslett, of the 4th infantry, and takenalong. I never saw my journal after, nor did I ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. Often since afear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall intothe hands of some malicious person who would publish it. I know itsappearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthfulhorse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. 

The 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at FortJessup, about midway between the Red River and the Sabine. Our ordersrequired us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await furtherinstructions. Those authorized to do so selected a place in the pinewoods, between the old town of Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, about threemiles from each, and on high ground back from the river. The place wasgiven the name of Camp Salubrity, and proved entitled to it. The campwas on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, infront and rear. The springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in thatregion in great multitudes and of great voracity. In the valley theyswarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. Theregiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. 

There was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4thregiments of infantry to the western border of Louisiana was occasionedin any way by the prospective annexation of Texas, but it was generallyunderstood that such was the case. Ostensibly we were intended toprevent filibustering into Texas, but really as a menace to Mexico incase she appeared to contemplate war. Generally the officers of thearmy were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; butnot so all of them. For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the mostunjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. It was aninstance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additionalterritory. Texas was originally a state belonging to the republic ofMexico. It extended from the Sabine River on the east to the Rio Grandeon the west, and from the Gulf of Mexico on the south and east to theterritory of the United States and New Mexico--another Mexican state atthat time--on the north and west. An empire in territory, it had but avery sparse population, until settled by Americans who had receivedauthority from Mexico to colonize. These colonists paid very littleattention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into thestate almost from the start, though the constitution of Mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. Soon they set up anindependent government of their own, and war existed, between Texas andMexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities verynearly ceased upon the capture of Santa Anna, the Mexican President. Before long, however, the same people--who with permission of Mexico hadcolonized Texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then secededas soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and theState to the United States, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. Theoccupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of themovement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territoryout of which slave states might be formed for the American Union. 

Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in whichthe subsequent war was forced upon Mexico cannot. The fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay anyclaim to, as part of the new acquisition. Texas, as an independentState, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between theNueces River and the Rio Grande. Mexico had never recognized theindependence of Texas, and maintained that, even if independent, theState had no claim south of the Nueces. I am aware that a treaty, madeby the Texans with Santa Anna while he was under duress, ceded all theterritory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande--, but he was a prisonerof war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. He knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the Texans, if theyshould ever capture him. The Texans, if they had taken his life, wouldhave only followed the example set by Santa Anna himself a few yearsbefore, when he executed the entire garrison of the Alamo and thevillagers of Goliad. 

In taking military possession of Texas after annexation, the army ofoccupation, under General Taylor, was directed to occupy the disputedterritory. The army did not stop at the Nueces and offer to negotiatefor a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparentlyin order to force Mexico to initiate war. It is to the credit of theAmerican nation, however, that after conquering Mexico, and whilepractically holding the country in our possession, so that we could haveretained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a roundsum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or waslikely to be, to Mexico. To us it was an empire and of incalculablevalue; but it might have been obtained by other means. The Southernrebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war. Nations, likeindividuals, are punished for their transgressions. We got ourpunishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. 

The 4th infantry went into camp at Salubrity in the month of May, 1844, with instructions, as I have said, to await further orders. At first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. As the summer heat increasedthese were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. The summerwas whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visitingthose stationed at, and near, Fort Jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the Red River, and the citizens of Natchitochesand Grand Ecore. There was much pleasant intercourse between theinhabitants and the officers of the army. I retain very agreeablerecollections of my stay at Camp Salubrity, and of the acquaintancesmade there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers livingwho were there at the time. I can call to mind only two officers of the4th infantry, besides myself, who were at Camp Salubrity with theregiment, who are now alive. 

With a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusualnumber of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, myhopes of being ordered to West Point as instructor vanished. At thetime of which I now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary'sand adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of thearmy, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until theirregimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. Generallylieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staffcorps. If they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrivedat a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they wouldretain. In the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers wereon duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from theregiment. Under these circumstances I gave up everything like a specialcourse of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, andnot very much for that, until the war was over. I kept a horse androde, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirelyrecovered from the cough which I had carried from West Point, and fromall indications of consumption. I have often thought that my life wassaved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by anadministrative act, and a war, both of which I disapproved. 

As summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, thetents e were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and"further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy thehardship. Men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and ina very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well asofficers. The outlay by the government in accomplishing this wasnothing, or nearly nothing. The winter was spent more agreeably thanthe summer had been. There were occasional parties given by theplanters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the Red River werecalled. The climate was delightful. 

Near the close of the short session of Congress of 1844-5, the bill forthe annexation of Texas to the United States was passed. It reachedPresident Tyler on the 1st of March, 1845, and promptly received hisapproval. When the news reached us we began to look again for "furtherorders. " They did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of May followingI asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purposeof visiting--St. Louis. The object of this visit has been beforestated. 

Early in July the long expected orders were received, but they only tookthe regiment to New Orleans Barracks. We reached there before themiddle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. The yellow fever was raging in New Orleans during the time we remainedthere, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuouswell-observed Sunday. I recollect but one occasion when this observanceseemed to be broken by the inhabitants. One morning about daylight Ihappened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, I looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. I observed acouple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it wasnothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinionwith rifles, at twenty paces. " I do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settledsatisfactorily, and "honorably, " in the estimation of the partiesengaged. I do not believe I ever would have the courage to fight aduel. If any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing tokill him, I would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons withwhich it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separatingus, when I executed him. If I should do another such a wrong as tojustify him in killing me, I would make any reasonable atonement withinmy power, if convinced of the wrong done. I place my opposition toduelling on higher grounds than here stated. No doubt a majority of theduels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of thoseengaged to decline. 

At Camp Salubrity, and when we went to New Orleans Barracks, the 4thinfantry was commanded by Colonel Vose, then an old gentleman who hadnot commanded on drill for a number of years. He was not a man todiscover infirmity in the presence of danger. It now appeared that warwas imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. Accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took commandof the regiment at a battalion drill. Only two or three evolutions hadbeen gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go tohis own quarters, dropped dead. He had not been complaining of illhealth, but no doubt died of heart disease. He was a most estimableman, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. 

CHAPTER IV. 

CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO--SUPPLYINGTRANSPORTATION. 

Early in September the regiment left New Orleans for Corpus Christi, nowin Texas. Ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was madein sailing vessels. At that time there was not more than three feet ofwater in the channel at the outlet of Corpus Christi Bay; thedebarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at anisland in the channel called Shell Island, the ships anchoring somemiles out from shore. This made the work slow, and as the army was onlysupplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effectthe landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrisonequipage, etc. There happened to be pleasant weather while this wasgoing on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamerwere on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerabledistance apart. The men and baggage were let down to a point higherthan the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got intothe trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would bedrawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. 

After I had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at ShellIsland, quite six miles from the ship, I had occasion for some reason orother to return on board. While on the Suviah--I think that was thename of our vessel--I heard a tremendous racket at the other end of theship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes, "etc. In a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as hewas, and crying, that his men had mutinied. It was necessary to sustainthe captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailorscharged with mutiny were in irons. I rather felt for a time a wish thatI had not gone aboard just then. As the men charged with mutinysubmitted to being placed in irons without resistance, I always doubtedif they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. 

By the time I was ready to leave the ship again I thought I had learnedenough of the working of the double and single pulley, by whichpassengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamerbelow, and determined to let myself down without assistance. Withoutsaying anything of my intentions to any one, I mounted the railing, andtaking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, I put onefoot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as I did sosome one called out "hold on. " It was too late. I tried to "hold on"with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down sorapidly that my hold broke, and I plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me Inever would stop. When I came to the surface again, being a fairswimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, I swam around until abucket was let down for me, and I was drawn up without a scratch orinjury. I do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized withme in the least when they found me uninjured. I rather enjoyed the jokemyself. The captain of the Suviah died of his disease a few months later, and I believe before the mutineers were tried. I hope they got clear, because, as before stated, I always thought the mutiny was all in thebrain of a very weak and sick man. 

After reaching shore, or Shell Island, the labor of getting to CorpusChristi was slow and tedious. There was, if my memory serves me, butone small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantryarrived. Others were procured later. The distance from Shell Island toCorpus Christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. The channel to thebay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be draggedover the bottom when loaded. Not more than one trip a day could beeffected. Later this was remedied, by deepening the channel andincreasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. 

Corpus Christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed bythe entrance of the Nueces River into tide-water, and is on the westbank of that bay. At the time of its first occupancy by United Statestroops there was a small Mexican hamlet there, containing probably lessthan one hundred souls. There was, in addition, a small American tradingpost, at which goods were sold to Mexican smugglers. All goods were putup in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable forloading on pack mules. Two of these packages made a load for anordinary Mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. The bulk of thetrade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. TheMexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer inexchange except silver. The trade in tobacco was enormous, consideringthe population to be supplied. Almost every Mexican above the age often years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. Nearly everyMexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in thehands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. The cigarettes weremade by the smokers as they used them. 

Up to the time of which I write, and for years afterwards--I think untilthe administration of President Juarez--the cultivation, manufacture andsale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk ofthe revenue collected from internal sources. The price was enormouslyhigh, and made successful smuggling very profitable. The difficulty ofobtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. I know from my own experience that when I was atWest Point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, andthe mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority ofthe cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. Ifailed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but themajority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. 

Under Spanish rule Mexico was prohibited from producing anything thatthe mother-country could supply. This rule excluded the cultivation ofthe grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climatewere well adapted. The country was governed for "revenue only;" andtobacco, which cannot be raised in Spain, but is indigenous to Mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object ofgovernment. The native population had been in the habit of using "theweed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. Bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread morerapidly and universally than good ones, and the Spanish colonistsadopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. Spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in theseplaces farmed out the privilege at a very high price. The tobacco whenraised could only be sold to the government, and the price to theconsumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and thecapacity of the people to pay. 

All laws for the government of the country were enacted in Spain, andthe officers for their execution were appointed by the Crown, and sentout to the New El Dorado. The Mexicans had been brought up ignorant ofhow to legislate or how to rule. When they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world thatthey should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. The onlychange was, that Mexico became her own executor of the laws and therecipient of the revenues. The tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenueunder the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, ofthe obnoxious imposts to be repealed. Now, the citizens are allowed tocultivate any crops the soil will yield. Tobacco is cheap, and everyquality can be produced. Its use is by no means so general as when Ifirst visited the country. 

Gradually the "Army of Occupation" assembled at Corpus Christi. When itwas all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment ofdragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry--the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting asinfantry--not more than three thousand men in all. General ZacharyTaylor commanded the whole. There were troops enough in one body toestablish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers forall they were capable of in case of battle. The rank and file werecomposed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for sevendollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to theaverage volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, andalso to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the Union. The men engaged in the Mexican war were brave, and the officers of theregular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. A more efficient army for its number and armament, I do not believe everfought a battle than the one commanded by General Taylor in his firsttwo engagements on Mexican--or Texan soil. 

The presence of United States troops on the edge of the disputedterritory furthest from the Mexican settlements, was not sufficient toprovoke hostilities. We were sent to provoke a fight, but it wasessential that Mexico should commence it. It was very doubtful whetherCongress would declare war; but if Mexico should attack our troops, theExecutive could announce, "Whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc. , "and prosecute the contest with vigor. Once initiated there were but fewpublic men who would have the courage to oppose it. Experience provesthat the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, nomatter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life orhistory. Better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine, " than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. Thehistory of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared withthat of the Northern man who aided him by conspiring against hisgovernment while protected by it. The most favorable posthumous historythe stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. 

Mexico showing no willingness to come to the Nueces to drive theinvaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" toapproach to within a convenient distance to be struck. Accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the Rio Grande, to apoint near Matamoras. It was desirable to occupy a position near thelargest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutelyinvading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. 

The distance from Corpus Christi to Matamoras is about one hundred andfifty miles. The country does not abound in fresh water, and the lengthof the marches had to be regulated by the distance between watersupplies. Besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filledduring the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, whotravelled constantly between Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande, and someby the buffalo. There was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between Corpus Christiand Matamoras. It was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon trainsufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain forthe artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, wherethey had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. Thearmy was but indifferently supplied with transportation. Wagons andharness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horsescould not so readily be brought. The American traders and Mexicansmugglers came to the relief. Contracts were made for mules at fromeight to eleven dollars each. The smugglers furnished the animals, andtook their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. I doubtwhether the Mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars perhead for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paidanything but their own time in procuring them. Such is trade; such iswar. The government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulatedprice. 

Between the Rio Grande and the Nueces there was at that time a largeband of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band ofbuffalo roaming further north was before its rapid exterminationcommenced. The Mexicans used to capture these in large numbers andbring them into the American settlements and sell them. A picked animalcould be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken atwholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. Some ofthese were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. The horses were generally very strong, formed much like the Normanhorse, and with very heavy manes and tails. A number of officerssupplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as usefulservice as the northern animal in fact they were much better whengrazing was the only means of supplying forage. 

There was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in thenecessary preparations for a move. In the meantime the army was engagedin all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. Twice, that I remember, small trains were sent from Corpus Christi, withcavalry escorts, to San Antonio and Austin, with paymasters and funds topay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. GeneralTaylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. Iaccompanied one of them in December, 1845. The distance from CorpusChristi to San Antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. Now that roads exist it is probably less. From San Antonio to Austin wecomputed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latterplace back to Corpus Christi at over two hundred miles. I know thedistance now from San Antonio to Austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. 

There was not at the time an individual living between Corpus Christiand San Antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering Mexican settlements along the SanAntonio River. The people in at least one of these hamlets livedunderground for protection against the Indians. The country abounded ingame, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys alongthe streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. On the Nueces, about twenty-five miles up from Corpus Christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called San Patricio, but the inhabitants had allbeen massacred by the Indians, or driven away. 

San Antonio was about equally divided in population between Americansand Mexicans. From there to Austin there was not a single residenceexcept at New Braunfels, on the Guadalupe River. At that point was asettlement of Germans who had only that year come into the State. Atall events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers wouldhastily construct for temporary occupation. From Austin to CorpusChristi there was only a small settlement at Bastrop, with a few farmsalong the Colorado River; but after leaving that, there were nosettlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at theold town of Goliad. Some of the houses were still standing. Goliad hadbeen quite a village for the period and region, but some years beforethere had been a Mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had beenkilled or driven away. This, with the massacre of the prisoners in theAlamo, San Antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men inall, furnished the strongest justification the Texans had for carryingon the war with so much cruelty. In fact, from that time until theMexican war, the hostilities between Texans and Mexicans was so greatthat neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be insuperior numbers or possessed of superior arms. The man we found livingthere seemed like an old friend; he had come from near Fort Jessup, Louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2ddragoons had known him and his family. He had emigrated in advance ofhis family to build up a home for them. 

CHAPTER V. 

TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND LIEUTENANT--ARMY OF OCCUPATION. 

When our party left Corpus Christi it was quite large, including thecavalry escort, Paymaster, Major Dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, exceptLieutenant Benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of Mexico--Lieutenant, now General, Augur, and myself, concluded to spend theirallotted time at San Antonio and return from there. We were all to beback at Corpus Christi by the end of the month. The paymaster wasdetained in Austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would haveexceeded our leave. We concluded, therefore, to start back at once withthe animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for theirfood, it was a good six days' journey. We had to sleep on the prairieevery night, except at Goliad, and possibly one night on the Colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, andprepared ourselves. The journey was hazardous on account of Indians, and there were white men in Texas whom I would not have cared to meet ina secluded place. Lieutenant Augur was taken seriously sick before wereached Goliad and at a distance from any habitation. To add to thecomplication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured fromthe band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity athis capture--gave out. It was absolutely necessary to get for ward toGoliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. By dint of patienceand exceedingly slow movements, Goliad was at last reached, and ashelter and bed secured for our patient. We remained over a day, hopingthat Augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. He didnot, however, and knowing that Major Dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with ourLouisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant untilthus relieved, and went on. 

I had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone insearch of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. On this tripthere was no minute of time while travelling between San Patricio andthe settlements on the San Antonio River, from San Antonio to Austin, and again from the Colorado River back to San Patricio, when deer orantelope could not be seen in great numbers. Each officer carried ashot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go outand soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entirecamp. I, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun;except, being detained over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I concluded togo down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it thepecan--and bring back a few turkeys. We had scarcely reached the edgeof the timber when I heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in aninstant I saw two or three turkeys flying away. These were soonfollowed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirtyhad left from just over my head. All this time I stood watching theturkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and neveronce thought of levelling it at the birds. When I had time to reflectupon the matter, I came to the conclusion that as a sportsman I was afailure, and went back to the house. Benjamin remained out, and got asmany turkeys as he wanted to carry back. 

After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and I started to make theremainder of the journey alone. We reached Corpus Christi just in timeto avoid "absence without leave. " We met no one not even an Indian--during the remainder of our journey, except at San Patricio. A newsettlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, inducedpossibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while theproximity of troops gave protection against the Indians. On the eveningof the first day out from Goliad we heard the most unearthly howling ofwolves, directly in our front. The prairie grass was tall and we couldnot see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. To myear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour ourparty, horses and all, at a single meal. The part of Ohio that I hailedfrom was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long beforeI left. Benjamin was from Indiana, still less populated, where the wolfyet roamed over the prairies. He understood the nature of the animaland the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited numberof them. He kept on towards the noise, unmoved. I followed in histrail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. I have no doubt that if Benjamin had proposed returning to Goliad, Iwould not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that itwas very hard-hearted in us to leave Augur sick there in the firstplace; but Benjamin did not propose turning back. When he did speak itwas to ask: "Grant, how many wolves do you think there are in thatpack?" Knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought I wouldover-estimate the number, I determined to show my acquaintance with theanimal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, andanswered: "Oh, about twenty, " very indifferently. He smiled and rodeon. In a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. Therewere just TWO of them. Seated upon their haunches, with their mouthsclose together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for thepast ten minutes. I have often thought of this incident since when Ihave heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had desertedtheir associates. There are always more of them before they arecounted. 

A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on this trip, I had beenpromoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to fullsecond-lieutenant, 7th infantry. Frank Gardner, (*1) of the 7th, waspromoted to the 4th in the same orders. We immediately made applicationto be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. On myreturn, I found that our application had been approved at Washington. While in the 7th infantry I was in the company of Captain Holmes, afterwards a Lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. I never came incontact with him in the war of the Rebellion, nor did he render any veryconspicuous service in his high rank. My transfer carried me to thecompany of Captain McCall, who resigned from the army after the Mexicanwar and settled in Philadelphia. He was prompt, however, to volunteerwhen the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-generalin the Union army. I was not fortunate enough to meet him after heresigned. In the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier andgentleman. Our relations were always most pleasant. 

The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance progressed as rapidlyin the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had beenthere. The principal business consisted in securing mules, and gettingthem broken to harness. The process was slow but amusing. The animalssold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. Usually anumber would be brought in by a company of Mexicans, partners in thedelivery. The mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. The Mexicans, --who were allexperienced in throwing the lasso, --would go into the corral onhorseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. Soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter thecorral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter withbranding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. A lasso was thenthrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to thelength of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. Whilehe was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown byanother Mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. This would bringthe mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsterswhile the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "U. S. "Ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tightenaround the throat if pulled. With a man on each side holding theseropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed torise. With more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picketrope outside and fastened there. The delivery of that mule was thencomplete. This process was gone through with every mule and wild horsewith the army of occupation. 

The method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. It isa well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specificpurposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as arule, subdued to the same uses. At that time in Northern Mexico themule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used exceptfor the saddle or pack. At all events the Corpus Christi mule resistedthe new use to which he was being put. The treatment he was subjectedto in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. 

The soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our largecities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it isnot probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competentteamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed thatmany had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever toharness. Numbers together can accomplish what twice their number actingindividually could not perform. Five mules were allotted to each wagon. A teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly thesame color and general appearance for his team. With a full corps ofassistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mulestogether. In two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. Two ropes would be put about theneck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked iftoo unruly. They were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched tothe wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. Two men remainedon either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and oneman retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. All being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. Thefirst motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backsbowed, hind feet extended to the rear. After repeating this movement afew times the leaders would start to run. This would bring thebreeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemedto regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resistby taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. In time allwere broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, butthere never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a Mexicanmule get entirely loose. Their drivers were all teamsters by the timethey got through. 

I recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under thesaddle, not only for some time at Corpus Christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite Matamoras, then to Camargo, wherehe got loose from his fastenings during the night. He did not run awayat first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming upsometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamsterhe always got out of the way. At last, growing tired of the constanteffort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. Nothing short of aMexican with his lasso could have caught him. Regulations would nothave warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lassoto catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule, " ona certificate that he had run away without any fault of thequartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase ofanother to take his place. I am a competent witness, for I wasregimental quartermaster at the time. 

While at Corpus Christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kepthorses. The animals cost but little in the first instance, and whenpicketed they would get their living without any cost. I had three notlong before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all atone time. A colored boy who gave them all the attention they got--besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate andfellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars permonth, was riding one to water and leading the other two. The ledhorses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. They never wereheard of afterwards. Shortly after that some one told Captain Bliss, General Taylor's Adjutant-General, of my misfortune. "Yes; I heardGrant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day, " hereplied. That was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when I gotthem and cost nearly twenty dollars. I never suspected the colored boyof malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had notescaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then inprospect. 

CHAPTER VI. 

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE. 

At last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for theadvance to begin on the 8th of March. General Taylor had an army of notmore than three thousand men. One battery, the siege guns and all theconvalescent troops were sent on by water to Brazos Santiago, at themouth of the Rio Grande. A guard was left back at Corpus Christi tolook after public property and to take care of those who were too sickto be removed. The remainder of the army, probably not more than twentyfive hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalryindependent. Colonel Twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and abattery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. He was followed by thethree infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. Thus the rear brigade did not move from Corpus Christi until the 11th ofMarch. In view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day overnarrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in ourlate war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousandmen should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day'smarch. 

General Taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, I doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as theaggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than hisinstructions from Washington demanded. His orders to the troopsenjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons andthe payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use ofthe army. 

All officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ridethem on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. As already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth ofhorses" but a short time before I determined not to get another, but tomake the journey on foot. My company commander, Captain McCall, had twogood American horses, of considerably more value in that country, wherenative horses were cheap, than they were in the States. He used onehimself and wanted the other for his servant. He was quite anxious toknow whether I did not intend to get me another horse before the marchbegan. I told him No; I belonged to a foot regiment. I did notunderstand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we wereabout to start, he said: "There, Grant, is a horse for you. " I foundthat he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long marchwhile his lieutenant went a-foot. He had found a mustang, a three-yearold colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of thecolored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. It wasprobably the only horse at Corpus Christi that could have been purchasedjust then for any reasonable price. Five dollars, sixty-six andtwo-thirds per cent. Advance, induced the owner to part with themustang. I was sorry to take him, because I really felt that, belongingto a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. But I saw theCaptain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for thetrip. The day we started was the first time the horse had ever beenunder saddle. I had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us asto which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. At no time during the day could I choose exactly the part of the columnI would march with; but after that, I had as tractable a horse as anywith the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. He neverate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pickwithin the length of his picket rope. 

A few days out from Corpus Christi, the immense herd of wild horses thatranged at that time between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was seendirectly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. It was the very band from which the horse I was riding had been capturedbut a few weeks before. The column was halted for a rest, and a numberof officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the rightto see the extent of the herd. The country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth'scurvature. As far as the eye could reach to our right, the herdextended. To the left, it extended equally. There was no estimating thenumber of animals in it; I have no idea that they could all have beencorralled in the State of Rhode Island, or Delaware, at one time. Ifthey had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage wouldhave given out the first day. People who saw the Southern herd ofbuffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of theTexas band of wild horses in 1846. 

At the point where the army struck the Little Colorado River, the streamwas quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. The water wasbrackish and the banks were fringed with timber. Here the whole armyconcentrated before attempting to cross. The army was not accompanied bya pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed inbridge building. To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the armywas here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. Buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the"assembly, " and other military calls. Like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient todevour General Taylor and his army. There were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the"invader. " A few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam thestream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. I do not remember that asingle shot was fired. 

The troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepestpart. Teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of thewagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side ofthe leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules inrear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. The bankdown to the water was steep on both sides. A rope long enough to crossthe river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, andmen behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mulesinto the water. This latter rope also served the purpose of bringingthe end of the forward one back, to be used over again. The water wasdeep enough for a short distance to swim the little Mexican mules whichthe army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled throughso fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was leftthem to show their obstinacy. In this manner the artillery andtransportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the Colorado River. 

About the middle of the month of March the advance of the army reachedthe Rio Grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, oppositethe city of Matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at thelower end of the town. There was not at that time a single habitationfrom Corpus Christi until the Rio Grande was reached. 

The work of fortifying was commenced at once. The fort was laid out bythe engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under thesupervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining generaldirections. The Mexicans now became so incensed at our near approachthat some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafefor small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. Theycaptured two companies of dragoons, commanded by Captains Thornton andHardee. The latter figured as a general in the late war, on theConfederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by botharmies. Lieutenant Theodric Porter, of the 4th infantry, was killedwhile out with a small detachment; and Major Cross, the assistantquartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. 

There was no base of supplies nearer than Point Isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the Rio Grande and twenty-five miles away. Theenemy, if the Mexicans could be called such at this time when no war hadbeen declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe tosend a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. I have already said that General Taylor's whole command on the RioGrande numbered less than three thousand men. He had, however, a fewmore troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago. The supplies broughtfrom Corpus Christi in wagons were running short. Work was thereforepushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number oftroops to hold the fort. All the men who could be employed, were keptat work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. With all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew soshort that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. Bythe latter part of April the work was in a partially defensiblecondition, and the 7th infantry, Major Jacob Brown commanding, wasmarched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. All thesupplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of thearmy to Point Isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march wascommenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being takenwith the army. Early on the second day after starting the force reachedits destination, without opposition from the Mexicans. There was somedelay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the openroadstead. 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OF RESACA DE LAPALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ON CAMARGO. 

While General Taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the littlegarrison up the river was besieged. As we lay in our tents upon thesea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio Grande could bedistinctly heard. 

The war had begun. 

There were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, andinformation from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. WhatGeneral Taylor's feelings were during this suspense I do not know; butfor myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gunbefore, I felt sorry that I had enlisted. A great many men, when theysmell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. When they say sothemselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they areas anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approachdanger they become more subdued. This rule is not universal, for I haveknown a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was noenemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. But the number of such men is small. 

On the 7th of May the wagons were all loaded and General Taylor startedon his return, with his army reinforced at Point Isabel, but still lessthan three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the Rio Grande. The road from Point Isabel to Matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the RioGrande is reached. This river, like the Mississippi, flows through arich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards allpoints of the compass at times within a few miles. Formerly the riverran by Resaca de la Palma, some four or five miles east of the presentchannel. The old bed of the river at Resaca had become filled atplaces, leaving a succession of little lakes. The timber that hadformerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, wasstill standing. This timber was struck six or eight miles out from thebesieged garrison, at a point known as Palo Alto--"Tall trees" or"woods. "

Early in the forenoon of the 8th of May as Palo Alto was approached, anarmy, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up inline of battle just in front of the timber. Their bayonets andspearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. The force was composedlargely of cavalry armed with lances. Where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stockwas pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as adarning-needle. General Taylor halted his army before the head of columncame in range of the artillery of the Mexicans. He then formed a lineof battle, facing the enemy. His artillery, two batteries and twoeighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position atintervals along the line. A battalion was thrown to the rear, commandedby Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, of the artillery, as reserves. Thesepreparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each companyto stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, tofill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respectivecompanies. When the men were all back in their places in line, thecommand to advance was given. As I looked down that long line of aboutthree thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, I thought what a fearful responsibility General Taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. The Mexicansimmediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then withinfantry. At first their shots did not reach us, and the advance wascontinued. As we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going throughthe ranks. They hurt no one, however, during this advance, because theywould strike the ground long before they reached our line, andricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see themand open ranks and let them pass. When we got to a point where theartillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battleopened on both sides. 

The infantry under General Taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, andpaper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. At thedistance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day withoutyour finding it out. The artillery was generally six-pounder brass gunsthrowing only solid shot; but General Taylor had with him three or fourtwelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-poundersbefore spoken of, that had a long range. This made a powerful armament. The Mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry wasconcerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. We had greatlythe advantage in this arm. 

The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and openedfire. The infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching theeffect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to stepout of their way. It could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and thehowitzers did a great deal of execution. On our side there was littleor no loss while we occupied this position. During the battle MajorRinggold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortallywounded, and Lieutenant Luther, also of the artillery, was struck. During the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it becameevident that the Mexicans were falling back. We again advanced, andoccupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by theenemy at the beginning. In this last move there was a brisk fire uponour troops, and some execution was done. One cannon-ball passed throughour ranks, not far from me. It took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the splintersfrom the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knockeddown two or three others, including one officer, Lieutenant Wallen, --hurting them more or less. Our casualties for the day were nine killedand forty-seven wounded. 

At the break of day on the 9th, the army under Taylor was ready to renewthe battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left ourfront during the night. The chaparral before us was impenetrable exceptwhere there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spotsof small dimensions. A body of men penetrating it might easily beambushed. It was better to have a few men caught in this way than thewhole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river shouldbe relieved. To get to them the chaparral had to be passed. Thus Iassume General Taylor reasoned. He halted the army not far in advanceof the ground occupied by the Mexicans the day before, and selectedCaptain C. F. Smith, of the artillery, and Captain McCall, of mycompany, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find wherethe enemy had gone. This left me in command of the company, an honorand responsibility I thought very great. 

Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way of their advance untilthey came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at Resaca. The Mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the oppositebank. This position they had strengthened a little by throwing up deadtrees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover theapproaches and open places. Smith and McCall deployed on each side ofthe road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. Word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at oncecommenced. As we came up we were deployed in like manner. I was withthe right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever apenetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot thatwould carry me towards the enemy. At last I got pretty close up withoutknowing it. The balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cuttingthe limbs of the chaparral right and left. We could not see the enemy, so I ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to beenforced. We kept our position until it became evident that the enemywere not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground toadvance upon. 

By this time some progress had been made on our left. A section ofartillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had beentaken. The Mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many ofthem had, no doubt, left early. I at last found a clear spaceseparating two ponds. There seemed to be a few men in front and Icharged upon them with my company. 

There was no resistance, and we captured a Mexican colonel, who had beenwounded, and a few men. Just as I was sending them to the rear with aguard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing backone of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where Iwas. The ground had been charged over before. My exploit was equal tothat of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one ofthe enemy. When asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied:"Some one had done that before. " This left no doubt in my mind but thatthe battle of Resaca de la Palma would have been won, just as it was, ifI had not been there. There was no further resistance. The evening ofthe 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the Fort, and thegarrison was relieved. The siege had lasted a number of days, but thecasualties were few in number. Major Jacob Brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort wasnamed. Since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on theground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. 

The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma seemed to us engaged, aspretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of theirmagnitude until they were fought over in the North by the Press and thereports came back to us. At the same time, or about the same time, welearned that war existed between the United States and Mexico, by theacts of the latter country. On learning this fact General Taylortransferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, andMatamoras was occupied. We then became the "Army of Invasion. "

Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops in his command; butnow that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one yearcommenced arriving. The army remained at Matamoras until sufficientlyreinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. General Taylor wasnot an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, butwas inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. He felthis responsibility as going no further. If he had thought that he wassent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he wouldprobably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them todetermine what should be done. If the judgment was against him he wouldhave gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand withoutparading his grievance before the public. No soldier could face eitherdanger or responsibility more calmly than he. These are qualities morerarely found than genius or physical courage. 

General Taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform orretinue. In dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything inthe field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but hewas known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. I cancall to mind only one instance when I saw him in uniform, and one otherwhen I heard of his wearing it, On both occasions he was unfortunate. The first was at Corpus Christi. He had concluded to review his armybefore starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. ColonelTwiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given thecommand of the review. Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, afar different soldier from Taylor in the use of the uniform, was next toTwiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rankwhen the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had tocommand. Worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggsuntil the question was settled by the highest authority. This broke upthe review, and the question was referred to Washington for finaldecision. 

General Taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. He was assigned to duty, however, bythe President, with the rank which his brevet gave him. Worth was notso assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under thearmy regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. The question was submitted to Washington, and no response was receiveduntil after the army had reached the Rio Grande. It was decided againstGeneral Worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. This kepthim out of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Either theresignation was not accepted, or General Worth withdrew it before actionhad been taken. At all events he returned to the army in time tocommand his division in the battle of Monterey, and served with it tothe end of the war. 

The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have donned hisuniform, was in order to receive a visit from the Flag Officer of thenaval squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande. While the army was onthat river the Flag Officer sent word that he would call on the Generalto pay his respects on a certain day. General Taylor, knowing thatnaval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on alloccasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive hisguest in the same style. His uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. The Flag Officer, knowing GeneralTaylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that itwould be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian'sdress, left off his uniform for this occasion. The meeting was said tohave been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principallyapologetic. 

The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at Matamoras, while we werewaiting for volunteers. It is probable that all the most importantpeople of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before wegot there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparentlyexisted. It was the policy of the Commanding General to allow nopillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual usewithout satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was affordedthan the people had ever known before. 

Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras was an Ohio regiment, ofwhich Thomas L. Hamer, the Member of Congress who had given me myappointment to West Point, was major. He told me then that he couldhave had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed abrigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. Ihave said before that Hamer was one of the ablest men Ohio everproduced. At that time he was in the prime of life, being less thanfifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising longlife. But he was taken sick before Monterey, and died within a fewdays. I have always believed that had his life been spared, he wouldhave been President of the United States during the term filled byPresident Pierce. Had Hamer filled that office his partiality for mewas such, there is but little doubt I should have been appointed to oneof the staff corps of the army--the Pay Department probably--and wouldtherefore now be preparing to retire. Neither of these speculations isunreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men controltheir own destiny. 

Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of August the movementcommenced from Matamoras to Camargo, the head of navigation on the RioGrande. The line of the Rio Grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade Mexico from the North. In that casethe most natural route to take was the one which General Taylorselected. It entered a pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains, at Monterey, through which the main road runs to the City of Mexico. Monterey itselfwas a good point to hold, even if the line of the Rio Grande covered allthe territory we desired to occupy at that time. It is built on a plaintwo thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and thesituation healthy. 

On the 19th of August the army started for Monterey, leaving a smallgarrison at Matamoras. The troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged, were moved up the river toCamargo on steamers. As there were but two or three of these, the boatshad to make a number of trips before the last of the troops wereup. Those who marched did so by the south side of the river. Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigadecommander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. One day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in themonth of August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly forNorthern men. The order of marching was changed and night marches weresubstituted with the best results. 

When Camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the Mexicanhamlet. I was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to theregiment. The teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transportall supplies from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande over the levelprairies of Texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of thereinforced army in a mountainous country. To obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with Mexicans to pack and drive them. I hadcharge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the packtrain to supplement them. There were not men enough in the army tomanage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned how. Asit was the difficulty was great enough. The troops would take up theirmarch at an early hour each day. After they had started, the tents andcooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could belashed to the backs of the mules. Sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles andmess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. Ittook several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the timewe were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standingso long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would start torun, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; otherswould lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get onthe top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part oftheir loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a saplingwhile they would take the other. I am not aware of ever having used aprofane expletive in my life; but I would have the charity to excusethose who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of Mexicanpack mules at the time. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY--SURRENDEROF THE CITY. 

The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September. The armywas divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day'smarch. The advance reached Cerralvo in four days and halted for theremainder of the troops to come up. By the 13th the rear-guard hadarrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed asbefore, a day separating the divisions. The forward division haltedagain at Marin, twenty-four miles from Monterey. Both this place andCerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seenrunning and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when thepeople returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which musthave given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos--"the Yankees. " FromMarin the movement was in mass. On the 19th General Taylor, with isarmy, was encamped at Walnut Springs, within three miles of Monterey. 

The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and isbacked by a range of hills of moderate elevation. To the north, betweenthe city and Walnut Springs, stretches an extensive plain. On thisplain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood astrong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of"Black Fort. " Its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the fullextent of their range. There were two detached spurs of hills ormountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were alsofortified. On one of these stood the Bishop's Palace. The road toSaltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire ofthe guns from these heights. The lower or eastern end was defended bytwo or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. To the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of thatthe range of foot-hills. The plaza in the centre of the city was thecitadel, properly speaking. All the streets leading from it were sweptby artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. Thehouse-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications bythe use of sand-bags for parapets. Such were the defences of Montereyin September, 1847. General Ampudia, with a force of certainly tenthousand men, was in command. 

General Taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, inthree divisions, under Generals Butler, Twiggs and Worth. The troopswent into camp at Walnut Springs, while the engineer officers, underMajor Mansfield--a General in the late war--commenced theirreconnoissance. Major Mansfield found that it would be practicable toget troops around, out of range of the Black Fort and the works on thedetached hills to the north-west of the city, to the Saltillo road. With this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off fromreceiving further supplies, if not from all communication with theinterior. General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, wasgiven the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo road, and ofcarrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. Hestarted on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. The divisionsunder Generals Butler and Twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east andnorth sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of themovement under General Worth. Worth's was regarded as the main attack onMonterey, and all other operations were in support of it. His marchthis day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavilyabout the Bishop's Palace and the other outside fortifications on theirleft. General Worth reached a defensible position just out of range ofthe enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouackedfor the night. The engineer officers with him--Captain Sanders andLieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the commander of the victoriousNational army at the battle of Gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to theSaltillo road under cover of night. 

During the night of the 20th General Taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon Black Fort. A naturaldepression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in itfrom the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established onthe crest nearest the enemy. The 4th infantry, then consisting of butsix reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists whilethey were intrenching themselves and their guns. I was regimentalquartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of campand the public property at Walnut Springs. It was supposed that theregiment would return to its camp in the morning. 

The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the workperformed without attracting the attention of the enemy. At daylightthe next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, whatseemed to me at that day, great fury. My curiosity got the better of myjudgment, and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what wasgoing on. I had been there but a short time when an order to charge wasgiven, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where I had beenordered to stay--I charged with the regiment As soon as the troops wereout of the depression they came under the fire of Black Fort. As theyadvanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. About one-third of the men engaged inthe charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. Weretreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward andperpendicular to the direct road running into the city from WalnutSprings. I was, I believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in thecharge who was on horseback. When we got to a lace of safety theregiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. Theadjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in robusthealth, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in thecharge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish thathe could be mounted also. I offered him my horse and he accepted theoffer. A few minutes later I saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. I ran to him, took his horse and was back withthe regiment in a few minutes. In a short time we were off again; andthe next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect ofbeing in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lowerbatteries. The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was killed, and Iwas designated to act in his place. 

This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. We belonged to thebrigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, and he had receivedorders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if hecould without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion infavor of Worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intendedshould be decisive. By a movement by the left flank Garland could haveled his men beyond the range of the fire from Black Fort and advancedtowards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire ascould be expected. There was no undue loss of life in reaching thelower end of Monterey, except that sustained by Garland's command. 

Meanwhile Quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, hadreached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of thehouses without much loss. Colonel Garland's brigade also arrived at thesuburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reachedhouse-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering theapproaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedilycaptured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. Anentrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the housesprotected our troops so long as they were inactive. On the west GeneralWorth had reached the Saltillo road after some fighting but withoutheavy loss. He turned from his new position and captured the forts onboth heights in that quarter. This gave him possession of the upper orwest end of Monterey. Troops from both Twiggs's and Butler's divisionswere in possession of the east end of the town, but the Black Fort tothe north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in thepossession of the enemy. Our camps at Walnut Springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. A regiment of Kentuckyvolunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against Black Fort. Practically Monterey was invested. 

There was nothing done on the 22d by the United States troops; but theenemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Black Fort and the batteriesstill in their possession at the east end of the city. During the nightthey evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we heldundisputed possession of the east end of Monterey. 

Twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well coveredfrom the fire of the enemy. But the streets leading to the plaza--allSpanish or Spanish-American towns have near their centres a squarecalled a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. Thehouses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about theplaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protectedfrom our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. All advances into the citywere thus attended with much danger. While moving along streets whichdid not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, andfrom the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these avolley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariablyencountered. The 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advancenearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. The loss of the 3dinfantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. There wereonly five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officerspresent, and five of these officers were killed. When within a squareof the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to ahalt. Placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, themen would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboringhouses. The exposure of a single head would bring a volley from oursoldiers. 

We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that ourammunition was growing low. I volunteered to go back (*2) to the pointwe had started from, report our position to General Twiggs, and ask forammunition to be forwarded. We were at this time occupying ground offfrom the street, in rear of the houses. My ride back was an exposedone. Before starting I adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthestfrom the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of thesaddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I started at fullrun. It was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, butthese I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I was past andunder cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. I gotout safely without a scratch. 

At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking in front of a house, andstopped to inquire what he was doing there. Finding that the house wasfull of wounded American officers and soldiers, I dismounted and wentin. I found there Captain Williams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded inthe head, probably fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly woundedhis bowels protruding from his wound. There were quite a number ofsoldiers also. Promising them to report their situation, I left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon withthe troops at the east end. Before ammunition could be collected, thetwo regiments I had been with were seen returning, running the samegauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but withcomparatively little loss. The movement was countermanded and thetroops were withdrawn. The poor wounded officers and men I had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. 

While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a smalldivision of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the oppositeend of the city. He resorted to a better expedient for getting to theplaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. Instead of moving by theopen streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways fromone to another. Without much loss of life, he got so near the plazaduring the night that before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. This stoppedall further hostilities. The terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses andpersonal property with them. 

My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of Montereymarching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling wasexperienced by most of our army who witnessed it. Many of the prisonerswere cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable littlehalf-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry theirriders out of town. The men looked in but little better condition. Ithought how little interest the men before me had in the results of thewar, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about. "

After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp life wasled until midwinter. As had been the case on the Rio Grande, the peoplewho remained at their homes fraternized with the "Yankees" in thepleasantest manner. In fact, under the humane policy of our commander, I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did notregret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. Propertyand person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for allthe products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. The educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they werein the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very smallpercentage of the whole population. 

CHAPTER IX. 

POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE ANDCAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ. 

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration conductingit desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott was at thehead of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professionalcapacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almostindisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk, orMarcy, his Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig and the administrationwas democratic. General Scott was also known to have politicalaspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civilpositions as military victories. It would not do therefore to give himcommand of the "army of conquest. " The plans submitted by Scott for acampaign in Mexico were disapproved by the administration, and hereplied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May, 1846. Fourdays later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico. General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to takethe field. Colonel Zachary Taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--wastherefore left in command. He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed toentertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall ofMonterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig papersat home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for thePresidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growingpopularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where allhis battles had been victories: the design would have been tootransparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico inchief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan:that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country. It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him toslaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet itwas hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to securethe prize. 

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. Itwas engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successfulissue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capableofficers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the manselected for his lack of political ambition had himself become aprominent candidate for the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy hischances promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss ofconquest and without permitting another general of the same politicalparty to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the administration ofMr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak morecorrectly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgracehimself. 

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande, Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was in command ofall the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regulartroops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold theline then in possession of the invading army. Indeed Scott did not deemit important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorizedTaylor to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protestedagainst the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement uponBuena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chiefin regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande. 

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required tocapture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, twohundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he askedand seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but hissincere good wishes. The promises were all broken. Only about half thetroops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material waswithheld and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the Presidentundertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H. Benton as lieutenant-general. This being refused by Congress, thePresident asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior ofthe same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to the rank ofmajor-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Congressfailed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained incommand: but every general appointed to serve under him was politicallyopposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. 

General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth ofthe Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up theriver to Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to meet him. Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico, for the purpose ofestablishing a post there. He had started on this march before he wasaware of General Scott being in the country. Under these circumstancesScott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawnfrom Taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to holdwith his subordinate. 

General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had notbeen in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a foregoneconclusion. He was nominated and elected in 1848. I believe that hesincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peaceafforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling thehighest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the UnitedStates. 

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in thedivision of General David Twiggs, in Taylor's command; but under the neworders my regiment was transferred to the division of General WilliamWorth, in which I served to the close of the war. The troops withdrawnfrom Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkationfor their destination. I found General Worth a different man from any Ihad before served directly under. He was nervous, impatient andrestless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confrontedhim. There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it wasknown that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the pointof our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved hisdivision with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he beengoing to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length of themarches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supplyof water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long andsometimes short. General Worth on one occasion at least, after havingmade the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops werein camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made themarch that night which had been intended for the next day. Somecommanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of themwithout fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days withoutaccomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class. Heenjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thusattached his officers and men to him. 

The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of themouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival oftransports to carry it to its new field of operations. The transportswere all sailing vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many ofthe troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation atthe mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of VeraCruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. Thetransports used were built for carrying freight and possessed butlimited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to thediscomfort of all. 

The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of AntonLizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, andthere awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunitionand supplies of all kinds from the North. With the fleet there was alittle steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind I hadever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one thenwith the army. At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what therewere were sidewheelers. This little vessel, going through the fleet sofast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. I recollect that Lieutenant SidneySmith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on thedeck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "Why, thething looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances. "

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelvethousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a population of sevenor eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possiblenatural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commencethe perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. 

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels could not get anywherenear shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters orsurf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North. The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. Themen were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came toshallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, andtherefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans were very kindto us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing exceptan occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation oneshot took off the head of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reachedanywhere near the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops werelanded and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south ofthe city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. 

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walledcity. The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to thewater again on the north. There were fortifications at intervals alongthe line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island halfa mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosedfortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls wouldprove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the invadingarmy had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front ofthe line where the troops lay. These batteries were intrenched and theapproaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been made at anytime by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have beenquickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy'smain line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or todrive our troops away. 

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th ofMarch, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wallsurrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who was Governor ofboth the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence withGeneral Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott'sarmy. About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces ofartillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell intothe hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side duringthe siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. 

CHAPTER X. 

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT ANDTAYLOR. 

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He hadbeen promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimedthat he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a verysmall army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into anenemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, oflargely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line ofmarch that could be selected led through mountain passes easilydefended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruzto the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa andPerote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on thegreat plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range ofmountains is passed. 

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon aspossible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usuallyvisits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons notacclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, wasarriving very slowly. It was absolutely necessary to have enough tosupply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and abovethe fevers of the coast. At that point the country is fertile, and anarmy of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for anindefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisonsfor the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than tenthousand strong. This force was composed of three divisions, underGenerals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping thevomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be gottogether to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th ofApril, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soonby Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up the rearwith his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carrysix days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and campand garrison equipage. It was the 13th of April before this divisionleft Vera Cruz. 

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fiftymiles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio, about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reachedPlan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two werethen secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexicanforces. At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcementsand without molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott hadremained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to takepersonal supervision. He at once commenced his preparations for thecapture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it. 

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve tofifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point asthe easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to havebeen built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defendedat every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountainwalls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flankmovement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of thecommanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out tofind, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might bereached without a front attack. These reconnoissances were made underthe supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B. McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers whoattained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflictfor the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnoissance wascompleted, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank ofthe enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. This was accomplishedwithout the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground wherehe supposed it impossible. On the same day General Scott issued hisorder for the attack on the 18th. 

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle ofthe Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before anengagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards tookplace. Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been openedover chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men couldbarely climb them. Animals could not. These had been opened undercover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. Theengineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troopsfollowed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the menengaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the gunsdown, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground ontop, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the courseof the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up theopposite slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached their assignedposition in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hastyretreat, and those occupying them surrendered. On the left GeneralPillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held apart of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am notpretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of theportion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at otherpoints in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as herenarrated. 

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; somethree thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount ofordnance and ordnance stores. The prisoners were paroled, the artilleryparked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of BuenaVista was probably very important to the success of General Scott atCerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the greatplains reaching to the City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had toprotect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was theone he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that hewould have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United Statestroops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion furthersouth. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to BuenaVista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scottin the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor wasdisastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marchedhis army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand milesby the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well beforeScott got there. If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troopswould no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Hadthe battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had timeto move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army notdemoralized nor depleted by defeat. 

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was ina beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of thecoast. Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between thereand the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. Itwas important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway betweenthe sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves themountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortifyin our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure thisresult. The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far fromwhere the road debouches from the mountains. There is a low, strongfort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote. This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with itsarmament. 

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of VeraCruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their lineback to Vera Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the menwhose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fallinto the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the termfor which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined todischarge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their timewould have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season ofthe vomito. This reduced Scott's force in the field to about fivethousand men. 

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on toPuebla. The roads were wide and the country open except through onepass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which theroad runs. Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into twobodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of specialnote, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day'smarch east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or threethousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. Abattery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent againstthem and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of May we entered the cityof Puebla. 

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, whenGeneral Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, hisrestlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I wasattached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. On one occasionGeneral Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with threedays' cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one commandto another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an armyvastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene thelatter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna andhis myriads. There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hoveringaround to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodiesof troops, if they ventured too far out. These always withdrew on theapproach of any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrivalof General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train ofwagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. We had lessthan a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. We procuredfull loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easilyhave furnished as much more. 

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress forthe raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill wasbefore the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to beattached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February beforeit became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to bemade; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the wholetransported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott receivedreinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. His moving column, noteven now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commandedby Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman. There was also a cavalrycorps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and3d dragoons. The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs'sdivision in front. The remaining three divisions followed, with aninterval of a day between. The marches were short, to makeconcentration easier in case of attack. 

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conductingarmies in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked. General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely forcomfort. He moved about the field in which he was operating to seethrough his own eyes the situation. Often he would be without staffofficers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribedorder in which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horseside-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars. He always woreall the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected hislines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders inadvance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might beexpected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms tosalute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dressuniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc. , that could be spared--followed, also in uniformand in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great care andevidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. 

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrastedquite as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott wasprecise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud ofhis rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the thirdperson, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking aboutwithout the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be nomistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in thefewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to theconstruction of high-sounding sentences. But with their oppositecharacteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant toserve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more throughthe eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans weredeliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw forhimself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to howthey would read in history. 

CHAPTER XI. 

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT ATCHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMINGOF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THEMONTEZUMAS. 

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico wasover Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highestpoint, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass throughthis mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and theadvanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla. The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed byanother mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on thenorth and south. Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City ofMexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left andTexcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico. Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which thedirect road to the city runs. Xochimilco is also to the left of theroad, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected withLake Chalco by a narrow channel. There is a high rocky mound, called ElPenon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat grounddividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at itsbase and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. 

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points nearthe eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnoissances were made up to withingun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the southside of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the southand south-west. A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th ofAugust troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven milesdue south from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpamand the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village ofChurubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these points, except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, wherevolcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to SanAntonio. This made the approach to the city from the south verydifficult. 

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--wassent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. AugustinTlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. The groundon which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surfaceof the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, exceptto the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. Tothe south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--overwhich cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would makebut poor progress if confronted by an enemy. From the position occupiedby Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against thedefences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by theenemy's artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles west andsouth, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to theright flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and thecity. Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding ofthe front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. 

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam, Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advancedintrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by anartificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purposethan defense. General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring theworks about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to gettroops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the forceoccupying that place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and themountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy'sdefences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those naturalbulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. 

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which theofficers of the engineer corps won special distinction. In fact, inboth cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easierfor the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on anordinary field. The very strength of each of these positions was, bythe skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaultingparties while securing their positions for final attack. All the troopswith General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of thedivision of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade ofGarland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle ofContreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of theirchief, to reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on themorning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of theadvance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and largequantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded byGeneral Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the finalassault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. 

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progressmade at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rearof the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the way back to the citycould see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they didnot enjoy the sight. We moved out at once, and found them gone from ourimmediate front. Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved westover the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the northsufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causewayleading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approachedChurubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont atthat place and brought on an engagement. About an hour after, Garlandwas ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in timeto take part in the engagement. San Antonio was found evacuated, theevacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeingthe stars and stripes waving over Contreras. 

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on theirway to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallelto the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco. It was expected by thecommanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently farto flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turningeast to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in thevalley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the battle-field about thisjuncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turnthe right of the enemy. This Shields did, but not without hard fightingand heavy loss. The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our handsprisoners, artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway heldby the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. Irecollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood theirground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande. 

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in thesevarious engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as Ilook upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. As before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and ledthe different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that thechief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with allthe precision he could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to thepoints from which the attack was to commence. After that point isreached the enemy often induces a change of orders not beforecontemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quitethree to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession ofdefeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been enteredwithout much further bloodshed. In fact, Captain Philip Kearney--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadronof cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt haveentered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt. 

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, ashort time before the advance upon the capital commenced. He hadconsequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to thebattle of Contreras. By an unfortunate fall of his horse on theafternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. The next day, when hisbrigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was orderedagainst the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points ofthe road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attemptedto accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, andfainted. This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjustcriticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency. Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for thePresidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. I was not asupporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I didany other of the volunteer generals. 

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr. Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States tonegotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and eitherhe or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty wouldbe more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of thecapital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of aninvader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The armytook up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were at once entered into withSanta Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediatecommander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. A trucewas signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen itsposition, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of thearmistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his armyfrom the city in the meantime. 

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously betweenMr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, untilthe 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum. Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico andCalifornia ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to beafterwards determined. I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretionwhatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in theinterest of an institution, and the probabilities are that privateinstructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which newStates might be carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged atthe terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, withoutgiving notice of the termination of the armistice. The terms of thetruce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the cityto bring out supplies for the army. The first train entering the citywas very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized forby the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with theirescorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and thecitizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and negotiationscontinued. As soon as the news reached General Scott of the secondviolation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote avigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. 

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, avillage some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extendingfrom the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molinodel Rey. The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and severalhundred feet in length. At the period of which I speak General Scottsupposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the castingof guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable to theMexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building isflat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered thetop quite a formidable defence for infantry. Chapultepec is a moundspringing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundredfeet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the westernpart of the city. It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky andprecipitous sides. 

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting onstrong stone arches. One of these aqueducts draws its supply of waterfrom a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey, andruns north close to the west base of Chapultepec; thence along thecentre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into thecity by the Garita San Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and roadboth run east to the city. The second aqueduct starts from the eastbase of Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east tothe city. This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broadroad-way, thus leaving a space on each side. The arches supporting theaqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to thoseengaged defensively. At points on the San Cosme road parapets werethrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery ineach. At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right anglesfrom north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied byone gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the SanCosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back toChapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made ofsandbags. The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme and Belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. Such were the defences of the City of Mexico in September, 1847, on theroutes over which General Scott entered. 

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to GeneralWorth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, forsome reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief. Scott evidentlytook this coldness somewhat to heart. He did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan andexecute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or interferencefrom any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold andindifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. 

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of September. Thenight of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions forthe morrow. These orders contemplated a movement up to within strikingdistance of the Mills before daylight. The engineers had reconnoitredthe ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the informationnecessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. 

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged atMolino were all at the places designated. The ground in front of theMills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit ofChapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a chargewas made, and soon all was over. Worth's troops entered the Mills byevery door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec. Hadthis victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicanswould have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so near together thatthe place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. Thedefenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangeringtheir own men. This was not done, and five days later more valuablelives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in ourpossession on the 8th. I do not criticise the failure to captureChapultepec at this time. The result that followed the first assaultcould not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpectedadvantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and giventhe necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kepton without orders. It is always, however, in order to follow aretreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. The loss on ourside at Molino del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged. It wasespecially so among commissioned officers. 

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills. In passingthrough to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec, I happened tonotice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, onlya few feet from many of our men. Not seeing any stairway or ladderreaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had acart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing theshafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart couldnot back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within threeor four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me bysome other way. There were still quite a number of Mexicans on theroof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, whohad not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied thebuilding. They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentionedwas walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all byhimself. I halted the sentinel, received the swords from thecommissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of thesoldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them againstthe edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. 

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with theexception of an appropriate guard over the captured position andproperty, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya. Theengagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded werenumerous for the number of troops engaged. 

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could playupon the fortifications of Chapultepec. The bombardment commenced earlyon the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement duringthis day than that of the artillery. General Scott assigned the captureof Chapultepec to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to hisjudgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They werecommanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The assault wassuccessful, but bloody. 

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey andChapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. When theassaults upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west ofthem sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road abovementioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearertogether, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on theaqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec. In likemanner, the troops designated to act against Belen could have kept eastof Chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out ofrange of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both havebeen necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for theywould have been turned. 

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who stoodwell with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the columnacting against Belen. General Worth commanded the column against SanCosme. When Chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the twoaqueduct roads. I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most thattook place on that route. When opposition was encountered our troopssheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting theaqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no seriousobstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were onintersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueductturns at a right angle. I have described the defences of this positionbefore. There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, thatI can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position wasreached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the MarineCorps. I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. Our progress was stopped for the time by the singlepiece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupyingthe house-tops back from it. 

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying thesouth-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were movingupon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for aconsiderable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite ayard about the house. I watched my opportunity and skipped across theroad and behind the south wall. Proceeding cautiously to the westcorner of the enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. Ithen returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. All that wereclose to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched ouropportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wallbeyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of thearches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path andthe house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above theparapets they would fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicablewithout loss. 

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again tocarry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they wereordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosmeroad was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving thegun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. When wereached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I sawsome United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the company ofCaptain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. Iexplained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was aboutto do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on andhe would follow. As soon as we got on the road leading to the city thetroops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on thehouse-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such closepursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a secondline across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small aforce. It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. 

Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. Laterin the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of theroad, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground backof the garita San Cosme. I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with amountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. The road being inpossession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reachthe church. This took us over several ditches breast deep in water andgrown up with water plants. These ditches, however, were not over eightor ten feet in width. The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried bythe men to its destination. When I knocked for admission a priest cameto the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. With thelittle Spanish then at my command, I explained to him that he might saveproperty by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself frombecoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to goin whether he consented or not. He began to see his duty in the samelight that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if itgave him special pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfryand put together. We were not more than two or three hundred yards fromSan Cosme. The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy andcreated great confusion. Why they did not send out a small party andcapture us, I do not know. We had no infantry or other defences besidesour one gun. 

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was somarked that General Worth saw it from his position. (*3) He was sopleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton--laterLieutenant-General commanding the defences of Vicksburg--to bring me tohim. He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in thechurch steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, andordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer tobe placed along with the one already rendering so much service. I couldnot tell the General that there was not room enough in the steeple foranother gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statementas a contradiction from a second lieutenant. I took the captain withme, but did not use his gun. 

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under GeneralWorth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line confronting the generalline of the enemy across to Belen. The troops that I was with were inthe houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engagedduring the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to anothertowards the town. During the night Santa Anna, with his army--exceptthe deserters--left the city. He liberated all the convicts confined inthe town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injurybefore daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott to ask--if notdemand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizensand the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipalaffairs. General Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, butgave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would beprotected so long as they behaved themselves properly. 

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position atBelen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After the interview aboverelated between General Scott and the city council, orders were issuedfor the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. The troops underWorth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city. Quitman was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of thePalace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has itssessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are alllocated, the President resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. This is the building generally designated as the"Halls of the Montezumas. "

CHAPTER XII. 

PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO--THE ARMY--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the releasedconvicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. The streetswere deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of thedead, " except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. In this firing the lieutenant-colonel ofmy regiment, Garland, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. He died a few days after, andby his death I was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant. (*4) I hadgone into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant, andI entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and ina regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever hadpresent at any one engagement. My regiment lost four commissionedofficers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the Mexicanwar. The Mexicans were not so discriminating. They sometimes pickedoff my juniors. 

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. Iwonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he was not; at allevents he was not hurt. He took quarters at first in the "Halls of theMontezumas, " and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for thegovernment of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts ofliberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respectof all who study them. Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City ofMexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. The people beganto make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to thevillages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the southand south-west. 

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner inwhich it was brought about, I have no means of knowing. His orders totroops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regardfor the perpetuation of his own fame. On the other hand, GeneralTaylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administrationaccountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himselffurther than for the faithful performance of his duties. Both generalsdeserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in thegrateful memory of this people to the latest generation. 

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached afterpassing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Pueblaand Mexico. The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. Thispass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the Cityof Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have beensuccessfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. But bymoving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. The road from Perote tothe City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies inour West. Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have beendetached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west withthe rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered beforereaching the City of Mexico. It is true this road would have broughttroops in by Guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountainabout two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name--and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which wasfortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could havepassed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to thenorth-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on thesouth. 

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City ofMexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my laterexperience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seenplainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confidentcritics are generally those who know the least about the mattercriticised. I know just enough about the Mexican war to approveheartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have beenpassed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to itshould have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuationinsured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemyin intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexicocould have been approached without any danger of opposition, except inthe open field. 

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invadeda populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into theinterior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed tohim; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always onthe defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, andconquered the government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it istrue, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. 

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott andGeneral Taylor. The former divided his force of 10, 500 men into fourcolumns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital ofthe nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large ashis own stood ready to resist his coming. The road was broad and thecountry open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylorpursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. He moved even insmaller bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibilityof these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. Isupposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passedover a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessarytrains. Later I found the fallacy of this belief. The rebellion, whichfollowed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have beensuppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the sametime than was the custom under Scott and Taylor. 

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superiornumbers. There were two reasons for this. Both General Scott andGeneral Taylor had such armies as are not often got together. At thebattles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a smallarmy, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the bestof drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but inthe camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. The rank andfile were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war;but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out allthere was in them. A better army, man for man, probably never faced anenemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest twoengagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were ofbetter material, but without drill or discipline at the start. Theywere associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educatedofficers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidencethey would not have felt otherwise. They became soldiers themselvesalmost at once. All these conditions we would enjoy again in case ofwar. 

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. The privatesoldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants whenwanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, andseldom paid. He was turned adrift when no longer wanted. The officersof the lower grades were but little superior to the men. With all thisI have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as I have everseen made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army larger than thatof the United States. They have a military school modelled after WestPoint. Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. TheMexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. 

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we wouldimitate in part, but with more regard to truth. They celebrate theanniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very greatvictories. The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. Atthese two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, itwas at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicanssuffered. The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well asany troops ever did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of experienceamong the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their themewhen telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sumof money they forced us to pay in the end. With us, now twenty yearsafter the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers--who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that theUnion forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashedaround from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the Eastfrom Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out fromsheer exhaustion. There is no difference in the amount of romance inthe two stories. 

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, northose of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer;but I would like to see truthful history written. Such history will dofull credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of theAmerican citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. The justice of the cause which in the endprevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizenof the land, in time. For the present, and so long as there are livingwitnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who willnot be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. As time passes, people, even of the South, will begin to wonder how itwas possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justifiedinstitutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. 

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government ofMexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country fora long time might be necessary. General Scott at once began thepreparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. He contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of theoccupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon thepeople. His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, andcollect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. Fromthe beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either forthe use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. Thispolicy was to be pursued. There were not troops enough in the valley ofMexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized armyof the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the RioGrande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of Vera Cruz. Military possession was taken of Cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca, nearly as far west, and of Pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles tothe north-east. Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already inour possession. 

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of SantaAnna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United Statescommissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. Atemporary government, however, was soon established at Queretaro, andTrist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. Before terms werefinally agreed upon he was ordered back to Washington, but General Scottprevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearlyreached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded inmaking such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. Thetreaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by thegovernment at Washington. It is that known as the "Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, " and secured to the United States the Rio Grande as theboundary of Texas, and the whole territory then included in New Mexicoand Upper California, for the sum of $15, 000, 000. 

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of GeneralsPillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott became very marked. Scott claimed that they had demanded of the President his removal. I donot know whether this is so or not, but I do know of their unconcealedhostility to their chief. At last he placed them in arrest, andpreferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. Thisact brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. He hadasserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him;that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that thePresident himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavorto procure the appointment of Benton: and the administration now gaveopen evidence of its enmity. About the middle of February orders cameconvening a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brigadier-GeneralTowson, the paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing andColonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and theaccuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from Washington, relieving Scott of the command of the army in the field and assigningMajor-General William O. Butler of Kentucky to the place. This orderalso released Pillow, Worth and Duncan from arrest. 

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was agreeableto every one concerned, so far as I remember to have heard expressionson the subject. There were many who regarded the treatment of GeneralScott as harsh and unjust. It is quite possible that the vanity of theGeneral had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausiblepretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it hadwanted to do from the start. The court tried the accuser quite as muchas the accused. It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meetin Frederick, Maryland. General Scott left the country, and never afterhad more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. Hecertainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline inhigh places. 

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, madethem both candidates for the Presidency. General Taylor was nominatedin 1848, and was elected. Four years later General Scott received thenomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died withhis defeat. (*5)

CHAPTER XIII. 

TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TOPOPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO. 

The treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by thecommissioners of each side early in February, 1848. It took aconsiderable time for it to reach Washington, receive the approval ofthe administration, and be finally ratified by the Senate. It wasnaturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, andofficers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing theremust be delay they contented themselves as best they could. EverySunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would paytheir fifty cents. I attended one of them--just one--not wishing toleave the country without having witnessed the national sport. Thesight to me was sickening. I could not see how human beings could enjoythe sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do onthese occasions. 

At these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. The audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition isgiven, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. When all is ready abull is turned into the ring. Three or four men come in, mounted on themerest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that theycould not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of fallingdown. The men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as aneedle. Other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags andexplosives about the size of a musket cartridge. To each of theseexplosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose ofattaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. Beforethe animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached tohim. The pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles isexasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence theanimal becomes frantic. As he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. He turns towards his last tormentor whena man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and isallowed to take it on his horns. The flag drops and covers the eyes ofthe animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him andthe torment is renewed. When the animal is worked into anuncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores--literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve oreighteen inches long, and sharp. The trick is to dodge an attack fromthe animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. If these efforts failthe bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knifeblade into the spinal column just back of the horns. He is then draggedout by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the sameperformance is renewed. 

On the occasion when I was present one of the bulls was not turned asideby the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc. , etc. , but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of ahorse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. The horsewas killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. The bull was thenlassoed and killed in the manner above described. Men came in andcarried the dead man off in a litter. When the slaughtered bull andhorse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. Conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out ona litter but a few minutes before. He was only dead so far as thatperformance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not foregothe chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren whomight not be so fortunate. There was a feeling of disgust manifested bythe audience to find that he had come to life again. I confess that Ifelt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. I did not stayfor the conclusion of the performance; but while I did stay, there wasnot a bull killed in the prescribed way. 

Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal District--embracing aterritory around the City of Mexico, somewhat larger than the Districtof Columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. During one of my recent visits to Mexico, bull fights were got up in myhonor at Puebla and at Pachuca. I was not notified in advance so as tobe able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases Icivilly declined to attend. 

Another amusement of the people of Mexico of that day, and one whichnearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest andlayman, was Monte playing. Regular feast weeks were held every year atwhat was then known as St. Augustin Tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. There were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. In manyof the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of themmaking six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in greatquantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could notbet more than a few pennies at a time. In other booths silver formedthe bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changedif there should be a run of luck against the bank. In some there was nocoin except gold. Here the rich were said to bet away their entireestates in a single day. All this is stopped now. 

For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. Myregiment was stationed in Tacubaya. I was regimental quartermaster andcommissary. General Scott had been unable to get clothing for thetroops from the North. The men were becoming--well, they neededclothing. Material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, andpeople employed to make it up into "Yankee uniforms. " A quartermasterin the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothingwas so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. A regimentwas glad to get a dozen suits at a time. I had to look after thismatter for the 4th infantry. Then our regimental fund had run down andsome of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for anumber of months. 

The regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from thegovernment, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. There wasauthority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. Somany could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the variousgrades, and the remainder the pay of privates. This would not secure aband leader, nor good players on certain instruments. In garrison thereare various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to giveextra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. Thebest device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiersinstead of flour. The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day ofeither flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make onehundred and forty pounds of bread. This saving was purchased by thecommissary for the benefit of the fund. In the emergency the 4thinfantry was laboring under, I rented a bakery in the city, hiredbakers--Mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and I also gota contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a largeamount of hard bread. In two months I made more money for the fund thanmy pay amounted to during the entire war. While stationed at Monterey Ihad relieved the post fund in the same way. There, however, was noprofit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. 

In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visitPopocatapetl, the highest volcano in America, and to take an escort. Iwent with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuouspositions before the country. Of those who "went south, " and attainedhigh rank, there was Lieutenant Richard Anderson, who commanded a corpsat Spottsylvania; Captain Sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt; CaptainGeorge Crittenden, a rebel general; S. B. Buckner, who surrendered FortDonelson; and Mansfield Lovell, who commanded at New Orleans before thatcity fell into the hands of the National troops. Of those who remainedon our side there were Captain Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone andLieutenant Z. B. Tower. There were quite a number of other officers, whose names I cannot recollect. 

At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Popocatapetl, where wepurposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack muleswith forage for our horses. High up on the mountain there was adeserted house of one room, called the Vaqueria, which had been occupiedyears before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. Thepasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were stillsome cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had nowbecome wild. It was possible to go on horseback as far as the Vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. Sometimes it was verynarrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to aroaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on theother side. At one of these places one of our mules loaded with twosacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to thebottom. The descent was steep but not perpendicular. The mule rolledover and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of coursethe poor animal was dashed to pieces. What was our surprise, not longafter we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and ownercoming up the ascent. The load had protected the animal from seriousinjury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to thepath leading up to the hut where we were to stay. 

The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant I ever knew. It was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. A little higher up therain ceased and snow began. The wind blew with great velocity. Thelog-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on theother it was hardly better then a sieve. There was little or no sleepthat night. As soon as it was light the next morning, we started tomake the ascent to the summit. The wind continued to blow with violenceand the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. The clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear spacebetween them. The wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sidesin such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. We labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not bereached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded toreturn. The descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we gotbelow the snow line. At the cabin we mounted our horses, and by nightwere at Ozumba. 

The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove usto bed early. Our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with ablanket under us. Soon all were asleep; but long before morning firstone and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciatingpain in the eyes. Not one escaped it. By morning the eyes of half theparty were so swollen that they were entirely closed. The otherssuffered pain equally. The feeling was about what might be expectedfrom the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. We remained inquarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. Thisrelieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. Theswelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had theireyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those whocould see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. We moved back to the village of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stoppedagain for the night. The next morning all were entirely well and freefrom pain. The weather was clear and Popocatapetl stood out in all itsbeauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us toreturn. About half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, andconcluded to do so. The remainder--I was with the remainder--concludedthat we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountainclimbing, and that we would visit the great caves of Mexico, some ninetymiles from where we then were, on the road to Acapulco. 

The party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded inreaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor theyencountered in their first attempt. Three of them--Anderson, Stone andBuckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at thetime. I made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about itsince, but it seems to me that I can see the whole of it as vividly asif it were but yesterday. I have been back at Ameca Ameca, and thevillage beyond, twice in the last five years. The scene had not changedmaterially from my recollection of it. 

The party which I was with moved south down the valley to the town ofCuantla, some forty miles from Ameca Ameca. The latter stands on theplain at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eightthousand feet above tide water. The slope down is gradual as thetraveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going toCuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change inthe climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. In themorning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits arethose common to the United States, we halted in the evening in atropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and thesugar-cane were flourishing. We had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. 

Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an armistice had beenagreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respectivearmies were not to go during its continuance. Our party knew nothingabout these limits. As we approached Cuantla bugles sounded theassembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of thetown towards us. Our party halted, and I tied a white pockethandkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded onto the town. Captains Sibley and Porter followed a few hundred yardsbehind. I was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could bedispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorizedthat I should be conducted to him. I had been with the general but afew minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. TheMexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for usto be there. However, as we had no special authority from our owncommanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for thenight, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to Cuernavacathe next morning. 

Cuernavaca is a town west of Guantla. The country through which wepassed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productionsand rich in scenery. At one point, about half-way between the twoplaces, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there isa very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearlyall full-blooded Indians. Very few of them even spoke Spanish. Thehouses were built of stone and generally only one story high. Thestreets were narrow, and had probably been paved before Cortez visitedthe country. They had not been graded, but the paving had been done onthe natural surface. We had with us one vehicle, a cart, which wasprobably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through thattown. 

On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; andit was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. We ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed noparticular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advancedcivilization. The next day we went into Cuernavaca. 

After a day's rest at Cuernavaca our party set out again on the journeyto the great caves of Mexico. We had proceeded but a few miles when wewere stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of theexisting armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. Upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekersdesirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country whichwe expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda nearby, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of thatdepartment could be communicated with and his decision obtained as towhether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. The guardpromised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. Atnight there was no response from the commanding general, but the captainof the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. Again in themorning there was no reply. The second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messengerto the department commander. We determined therefore to go on unlessstopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. 

After a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to theone at Cuantia occurred. The commanding officer sent a guide to conductour party around the village and to put us upon our road again. Thiswas the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffeeplantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. It must have been a Saturday night; the peons had been paid off, andspent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. Their coin was principally copper, and I do not believe there was a manamong them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. Theywere as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. Irecollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off hisshirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of acard. Monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near thewindow of the room occupied by the officers of our party. 

The next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. We explored to a distance ofabout three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambersof great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. Stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. Some of theformer were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor;some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but theformation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence thesestalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. Thestalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled withwater. The water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--oftenthe drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineralmatter. Evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. Thisin time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons inweight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. Irecollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of suchhuge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either sideof it. Some of our party became satisfied with their explorationsbefore we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed totake explorers, and started back without guides. Coming to the largecolumn spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commencedretracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without beingaware of the fact. When the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw thetorches of an approaching party. We could not conceive who these couldbe, for all of us had come in together, and there were none butourselves at the entrance when we started in. Very soon we found it wasour friends. It took them some time to conceive how they had got wherethey were. They were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth ofthe cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST--CROSSING THEISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO. 

My experience in the Mexican war was of great advantage to meafterwards. Besides the many practical lessons it taught, the warbrought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as tomake them personally acquainted. It also brought them in contact withvolunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. Then, in my particular case, I had been at West Point at about the righttime to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at thebreaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. Graduating in 1843, I was at the military academy from one to four yearswith all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. These classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards becamegenerals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holdinghigh commands. All the older officers, who became conspicuous in therebellion, I had also served with and known in Mexico: Lee, J. E. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes, Hebert and a number of others on theConfederate side; McCall, Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others on theNational side. The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service tome in the war of the rebellion--I mean what I learned of the charactersof those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say thatall movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference tothe characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by thisknowledge. The natural disposition of most people is to clothe acommander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhumanabilities. A large part of the National army, for instance, and most ofthe press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities, but I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it wasjust as well that I felt this. 

The treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of Mexicoby United States troops was ordered. Early in June the troops in theCity of Mexico began to move out. Many of them, including the brigadeto which I belonged, were assembled at Jalapa, above the vomito, toawait the arrival of transports at Vera Cruz: but with all thisprecaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in aJuly sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged withgreat virulence in Vera Cruz, not two miles away. I can call to mindonly one person, an officer, who died of the disease. My regiment wassent to Pascagoula, Mississippi, to spend the summer. As soon as it wassettled in camp I obtained a leave of absence for four months andproceeded to St. Louis. On the 22d of August, 1848, I was married toMiss Julia Dent, the lady of whom I have before spoken. We visited myparents and relations in Ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded tomy post at Sackett's Harbor, New York. In April following I was orderedto Detroit, Michigan, where two years were spent with but few importantincidents. 

The present constitution of the State of Michigan was ratified duringthis time. By the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of theUnited States residing within the State at the time of the ratificationbecame citizens of Michigan also. During my stay in Detroit there was anelection for city officers. Mr. Zachariah Chandler was the candidate ofthe Whigs for the office of Mayor, and was elected, although the citywas then reckoned democratic. All the officers stationed there at thetime who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. I did notoffer mine, however, as I did not wish to consider myself a citizen ofMichigan. This was Mr. Chandler's first entry into politics, a careerhe followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoyingthe friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. 

In the spring of 1851 the garrison at Detroit was transferred toSackett's Harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantrywas ordered to the Pacific Coast. It was decided that Mrs. Grant shouldvisit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her ownfamily at their St. Louis home until an opportunity offered of sendingfor her. In the month of April the regiment was assembled at Governor'sIsland, New York Harbor, and on the 5th of July eight companies sailedfor Aspinwall. We numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. Passage was securedfor us on the old steamer Ohio, commanded at the time by CaptainSchenck, of the navy. It had not been determined, until a day or twobefore starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the Ohio;consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. Theaddition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer mostuncomfortably, especially for the tropics in July. 

In eight days Aspinwall was reached. At that time the streets of thetown were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passedfrom place to place on raised foot-walks. July is at the height of thewet season, on the Isthmus. At intervals the rain would pour down instreams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer'ssun. These alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous inthe afternoons. I wondered how any person could live many months inAspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. 

In the summer of 1852 the Panama railroad was completed only to thepoint where it now crosses the Chagres River. From there passengerswere carried by boats to Gorgona, at which place they took mules forPanama, some twenty-five miles further. Those who travelled over theIsthmus in those days will remember that boats on the Chagres River werepropelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. Theseboats carried thirty to forty passengers each. The crews consisted ofsix men to a boat, armed with long poles. There were planks wide enoughfor a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boatfrom end to end. The men would start from the bow, place one end oftheir poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against theother end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. In thisway from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against thecurrent of the river. 

I, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property andhad also to look after the transportation. A contract had been enteredinto with the steamship company in New York for the transportation ofthe regiment to California, including the Isthmus transit. A certainamount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to befurnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. Theregiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the publicproperty--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers withfamilies, took boats, propelled as above described, for Gorgona. Fromthis place they marched to Panama, and were soon comfortably on thesteamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. I, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all thetents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to Cruces, a town a fewmiles higher up the Chagres River than Gorgona. There I found animpecunious American who had taken the contract to furnishtransportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred poundsfor the freight and so much for each saddle animal. But when we reachedCruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. The contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in themorning. In the morning he said that they were on the way from someimaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. This wenton until I saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the pricehe had promised to furnish them for. The unusual number of passengersthat had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight topack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. Some of thepassengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ridetwenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars inthat market at other times. Meanwhile the cholera had broken out, andmen were dying every hour. To diminish the food for the disease, Ipermitted the company detailed with me to proceed to Panama. Thecaptain and the doctors accompanied the men, and I was left alone withthe sick and the soldiers who had families. The regiment at Panama wasalso affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations forthe well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with thedisease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. There were also hospitaltents on shore on the island of Flamingo, which stands in the bay. 

I was about a week at Cruces before transportation began to come in. About one-third of the people with me died, either at Cruces or on theway to Panama. There was no agent of the transportation company atCruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuringtransportation at a price which would secure it. I therefore myselfdismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at morethan double the original price. Thus we finally reached Panama. Thesteamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and theregiment was detained still longer. Altogether, on the Isthmus and onthe Pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. About one-seventh of thosewho left New York harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of July, nowlie buried on the Isthmus of Panama or on Flamingo island in Panama Bay. 

One amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor inPanama Bay. In the regiment there was a Lieutenant Slaughter who wasvery liable to sea-sickness. It almost made him sick to see the wave ofa table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. Soon after hisgraduation, Slaughter was ordered to California and took passage by asailing vessel going around Cape Horn. The vessel was seven monthsmaking the voyage, and Slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place ofdestination. On landing in California he found orders which had come bythe Isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he shouldhave been ordered to the northern lakes. He started back by the Isthmusroute and was sick all the way. But when he arrived at the East he wasagain ordered to California, this time definitely, and at this date wasmaking his third trip. He was as sick as ever, and had been so for morethan a month while lying at anchor in the bay. I remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin betweenhis hands, and looking the picture of despair. At last he broke out, "Iwish I had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy;if I had done so, I should not have had to go to sea so much. " PoorSlaughter! it was his last sea voyage. He was killed by Indians inOregon. 

By the last of August the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safeto start. The disease did not break out again on the way to California, and we reached San Francisco early in September. 

CHAPTER XV. 

SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA. 

San Francisco at that day was a lively place. Gold, or placer diggingas it was called, was at its height. Steamers plied daily between SanFrancisco and both Stockton and Sacramento. Passengers and gold from thesouthern mines came by the Stockton boat; from the northern mines bySacramento. In the evening when these boats arrived, Long Wharf--therewas but one wharf in San Francisco in 1852--was alive with peoplecrowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" andto "have a time. " Of these some were runners for hotels, boardinghouses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecuniousadventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on thealert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in thehope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. Many were young menof good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. Their parentshad been able to support them during their minority, and to give themgood educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. From 1849 to 1853there was a rush of people to the Pacific coast, of the class described. All thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in thegold fields on the Pacific. Some realized more than their most sanguineexpectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many ofwhom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. Many of the real scenes in early California life exceed in strangenessand interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. 

Those early days in California brought out character. It was a long wayoff then, and the journey was expensive. The fortunate could go by CapeHorn or by the Isthmus of Panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed theplains with their ox-teams. This took an entire summer. They were verylucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. All othermeans were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the Missouri River. Theimmigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, farfrom friends. Time pressed, for the little means that could be realizedfrom the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a manlong at California prices. Many became discouraged. Others would takeoff their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. Thesesucceeded as a rule. There were many young men who had studiedprofessions before they went to California, and who had never done aday's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once andwent to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. Somesupplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, ormortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggagewagons, until they could do better. More became discouraged early andspent their time looking up people who would "treat, " or lounging aboutrestaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. They were welcomed at these places because they often brought in minerswho proved good customers. 

My regiment spent a few weeks at Benicia barracks, and then was orderedto Fort Vancouver, on the Columbia River, then in Oregon Territory. During the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of theColumbia River being taken from Oregon to make Washington Territory. 

Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the Pacific coast from1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible forofficers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been thatauthority was given them to purchase from the commissary such suppliesas he kept, at New Orleans wholesale prices. A cook could not be hiredfor the pay of a captain. The cook could do better. At Benicia, in1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and otherarticles in proportion. In 1853 at Vancouver vegetables were a littlelower. I with three other officers concluded that we would raise a cropfor ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. Ibought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and werevery poor. They recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team tobreak up the ground with. I performed all the labor of breaking up theground while the other officers planted the potatoes. Our crop wasenormous. Luckily for us the Columbia River rose to a great height fromthe melting of the snow in the mountains in June, and overflowed andkilled most of our crop. This saved digging it up, for everybody on thePacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same timethat agriculture would be profitable. In 1853 more than three-quartersof the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to bethrown away. The only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. 

While I was stationed on the Pacific coast we were free from Indianwars. There were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinityof Portland in Oregon, and of Fort Vancouver in Washington Territory. They had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but noneof the virtues, except in individual cases. The Hudson's Bay Companyhad held the North-west with their trading posts for many years beforethe United States was represented on the Pacific coast. They stillretained posts along the Columbia River and one at Fort Vancouver, whenI was there. Their treatment of the Indians had brought out the betterqualities of the savages. Farming had been undertaken by the company tosupply the Indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattleand horses; and they had now taught the Indians to do the labor of thefarm and herd. They always compensated them for their labor, and alwaysgave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. 

Before the advent of the American, the medium of exchange between theIndian and the white man was pelts. Afterward it was silver coin. Ifan Indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, notan infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it forAmerican half dollars. These he could count. He would then commence hispurchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. He wouldnot trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. At thatday fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, werecommon on the Pacific coast. They were called slugs. 

The Indians, along the lower Columbia as far as the Cascades and on thelower Willamette, died off very fast during the year I spent in thatsection; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they hadacquired also their diseases. The measles and the small-pox were bothamazingly fatal. In their wild state, before the appearance of thewhite man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to werethose produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuitof game, and over-eating. Instinct more than reason had taught them aremedy for these ills. It was the steam bath. Something like abake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. Bushes werestuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two orthree feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. The topsof the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in thatposition; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until everyopening was filled. Just inside the open end of the oven the floor wasscooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two ofwater. These ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a bigspring, or pool of water. When a patient required a bath, a fire wasbuilt near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. The cavity at thefront was then filled with water. When the stones were sufficientlyheated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would bethrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until thepatient could stand it no longer. He was then withdrawn from his steambath and doused into the cold stream near by. This treatment may haveanswered with the early ailments of the Indians. With the measles orsmall-pox it would kill every time. 

During my year on the Columbia River, the small-pox exterminated onesmall remnant of a band of Indians entirely, and reduced othersmaterially. I do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the Hudson Bay Company took the matter in hand andestablished a hospital. Nearly every case he treated recovered. Inever, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. Thedecimation among the Indians I knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a Hudson's Bay building not a stone'sthrow from my own quarters. 

The death of Colonel Bliss, of the Adjutant General's department, whichoccurred July 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company thenstationed at Humboldt Bay, California. The notice reached me inSeptember of the same year, and I very soon started to join my newcommand. There was no way of reaching Humboldt at that time except totake passage on a San Francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. Redwood, a species of cedar, which on the Pacific coast takes the placefilled by white pine in the East, then abounded on the banks of HumboldtBay. There were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumberfor the San Francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it tomarket, furnished the only means of communication between Humboldt andthe balance of the world. 

I was obliged to remain in San Francisco for several days before I founda vessel. This gave me a good opportunity of comparing the SanFrancisco of 1852 with that of 1853. As before stated, there had beenbut one wharf in front of the city in 1852--Long Wharf. In 1853 thetown had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharfwhen I first saw it. Streets and houses had been built out on pileswhere the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay atanchor or tied to the wharf. There was no filling under the streets orhouses. San Francisco presented the same general appearance as the yearbefore; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuousfor their number and publicity. They were on the first floor, withdoors wide open. At all hours of the day and night in walking thestreets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, bythe sight of players at faro. Often broken places were found in thestreet, large enough to let a man down into the water below. I have butlittle doubt that many of the people who went to the Pacific coast inthe early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard fromsince, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, foundwatery graves beneath the houses or streets built over San FranciscoBay. 

Besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale incity lots. These were sold "On Change, " much as stocks are now sold onWall Street. Cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker;but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. He was charged at therate of two or three per cent. A month on the difference, besidescommissions. The sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible tofoot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--avara being a Spanish yard. These were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to manythousands of dollars. The brokers did a fine business, and so did manysuch purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the finalcrash came. As the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnishedmaterial for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and stillfurther out. The temporary houses, first built over the water in theharbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. The main business partof the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largestclass lay at anchor in the early days. I was in San Francisco again in1854. Gambling houses had disappeared from public view. The city hadbecome staid and orderly. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMING CRISIS. 

My family, all this while, was at the East. It consisted now of a wifeand two children. I saw no chance of supporting them on the Pacificcoast out of my pay as an army officer. I concluded, therefore, toresign, and in March applied for a leave of absence until the end of theJuly following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end ofthat time. I left the Pacific coast very much attached to it, and withthe full expectation of making it my future home. That expectation andthat hope remained uppermost in my mind until the Lieutenant-Generalcybill was introduced into Congress in the winter of 1863-4. The passageof that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming acitizen of the further West. 

In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a sonwhom I had never seen, born while I was on the Isthmus of Panama. I wasnow to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for oursupport. My wife had a farm near St. Louis, to which we went, but I hadno means to stock it. A house had to be built also. I worked veryhard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished theobject in a moderate way. If nothing else could be done I would load acord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. I managed tokeep along very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague. I had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in Ohio. It lasted now over a year, and, while it did notkeep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work Iwas able to perform. In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops andfarming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. 

In the winter I established a partnership with Harry Boggs, a cousin ofMrs. Grant, in the real estate agency business. I spent that winter atSt. Louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. Our business might have become prosperous if I had been able to wait forit to grow. As it was, there was no more than one person could attendto, and not enough to support two families. While a citizen of St. Louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, I was a candidatefor the office of county engineer, an office of respectability andemolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. Theincumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of fivemembers. My opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was acitizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. I now withdrew from theco-partnership with Boggs, and, in May, 1860, removed to Galena, Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. 

While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote ata Presidential election occurred. I had been in the army from beforeattaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although I was a Whig by education and a great admirer of Mr. Clay. Butthe Whig party had ceased to exist before I had an opportunity ofexercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the Know-Nothing party hadtaken its place, but was on the wane; and the Republican party was in achaotic state and had not yet received a name. It had no existence inthe Slave States except at points on the borders next to Free States. In St. Louis City and County, what afterwards became the Republicanparty was known as the Free-Soil Democracy, led by the Honorable FrankP. Blair. Most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the armywith Whig proclivities. They had been on the same side, and, on thedeath of their party, many had become Know-Nothings, or members of theAmerican party. There was a lodge near my new home, and I was invited tojoin it. I accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meetingjust one week later, and never went to another afterwards. 

I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of theAmerican party; for I still think native-born citizens of the UnitedStates should have as much protection, as many privileges in theirnative country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. But allsecret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, nomatter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which firstbring them together. No political party can or ought to exist when oneof its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to theright to worship God "according to the dictate of one's own conscience, "or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. Nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the Statelaws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted andsuppressed at whatever cost. 

Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, menwho carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from thosefor a justice of the peace up to the Presidency of the United States. They were noisy but not numerous. But the great majority of people atthe North, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. They did not hold the States where slavery existed responsible for it;and believed that protection should be given to the right of property inslaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of theinstitution. Opposition to slavery was not a creed of either politicalparty. In some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to theDemocratic party, and in others to the Whigs. But with the inaugurationof the Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of Texas, "theinevitable conflict" commenced. 

As the time for the Presidential election of 1856--the first at which Ihad the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to runhigh. The Republican party was regarded in the South and the borderStates not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoringthe compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to theowners. The most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to theminds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. Many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe thatemancipation meant social equality. Treason to the Government wasopenly advocated and was not rebuked. It was evident to my mind thatthe election of a Republican President in 1856 meant the secession ofall the Slave States, and rebellion. Under these circumstances Ipreferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent orpostpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end ofwhich no man could foretell. With a Democrat elected by the unanimousvote of the Slave States, there could be no pretext for secession forfour years. I very much hoped that the passions of the people wouldsubside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if itwas not, I believed the country would be better prepared to receive theshock and to resist it. I therefore voted for James Buchanan forPresident. Four years later the Republican party was successful inelecting its candidate to the Presidency. The civilized world haslearned the consequence. Four millions of human beings held as chattelshave been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schoolsof the country have been opened to their children. The nation stilllives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with theblacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. 

While living in Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting myselfand family on a stipulated salary. In reality my position wasdifferent. My father had never lived in Galena himself, but hadestablished my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself incharge of the business, assisted by the youngest. When I went there itwas my father's intention to give up all connection with the businesshimself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who hadreally built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it wasnot thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. Helived until September, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious diseasewhich always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growingbetter up to the close of life. A more honorable man never transactedbusiness. In September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment whichrequired all my attention elsewhere. 

During the eleven months that I lived in Galena prior to the first callfor volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my business, and hadmade but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged inthe same line with myself. When the election took place in November, 1860, I had not been a resident of Illinois long enough to gaincitizenship and could not, therefore, vote. I was really glad of thisat the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for StephenA. Douglas, who had no possible chance of election. The contest wasreally between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lincoln; between minority ruleand rule by the majority. I wanted, as between these candidates, to seeMr. Lincoln elected. Excitement ran high during the canvass, andtorch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quietstreets of Galena many nights during the campaign. I did not paradewith either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes"--Republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. It wasevident, from the time of the Chicago nomination to the close of thecanvass, that the election of the Republican candidate would be thesignal for some of the Southern States to secede. I still had hopesthat the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of aPresidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slaveryextension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cooldown; for the Southerners to think well before they took the awful leapwhich they had so vehemently threatened. But I was mistaken. 

The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people ofthe North-west, and I presume the same order of people throughout theentire North, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. Itwas very much discussed whether the South would carry out its threat tosecede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of whichshould be, protection to the "Divine" institution of slavery. For therewere people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as thereare now people who believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by theMost High. We forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbidtheir practice. It was generally believed that there would be a flurry;that some of the extreme Southern States would go so far as to passordinances of secession. But the common impression was that this stepwas so plainly suicidal for the South, that the movement would notspread over much of the territory and would not last long. 

Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. Eachcolony considered itself a separate government; that the confederationwas for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention ofstrife and war among themselves. If there had been a desire on the partof any single State to withdraw from the compact at any time while thenumber of States was limited to the original thirteen, I do not supposethere would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much thedetermination might have been regretted. The problem changed on theratification of the Constitution by all the colonies; it changed stillmore when amendments were added; and if the right of any one State towithdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of theConstitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new States, atleast so far as the new States themselves were concerned. It was neverpossessed at all by Florida or the States west of the Mississippi, allof which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. Texas andthe territory brought into the Union in consequence of annexation, werepurchased with both blood and treasure; and Texas, with a domain greaterthan that of any European state except Russia, was permitted to retainas state property all the public lands within its borders. It wouldhave been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for thisState to withdraw from the Union after all that had been spent and doneto introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, Texas mustnecessarily have gone with the South, both on account of herinstitutions and her geographical position. Secession was illogical aswell as impracticable; it was revolution. 

Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. When people areoppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy torelieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, eitherby withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting agovernment more acceptable. But any people or part of a people whoresort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and everyclaim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. Victory, orthe conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. 

In the case of the war between the States it would have been the exacttruth if the South had said, --"We do not want to live with you Northernpeople any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious toyou, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may atsome time in the future be endangered. So long as you permitted us tocontrol the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the Northto enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape ofour property, we were willing to live with you. You have beensubmissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did notintend to continue so, and we will remain in the Union no longer. "Instead of this the seceding States cried lustily, --"Let us alone; youhave no constitutional power to interfere with us. " Newspapers andpeople at the North reiterated the cry. Individuals might ignore theconstitution; but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but mustenforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the constructionput upon it by the Southerners themselves. The fact is the constitutiondid not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to1865. Its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. Ifthey had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctionedthe right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that there shouldbe war between brothers. 

The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very bestpossible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also oftheir descendants to the latest days. It is preposterous to supposethat the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rulesof government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseencontingencies. At the time of the framing of our constitution the onlyphysical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do hislabor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. Rudemachinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propelships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but theapplication of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. Theinstantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means ofelectricity would probably at that day have been attributed towitchcraft or a league with the Devil. Immaterial circumstances hadchanged as greatly as material ones. We could not and ought not to berigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so differentfor emergencies so utterly unanticipated. The fathers themselves wouldhave been the first to declare that their prerogatives were notirrevocable. They would surely have resisted secession could they havelived to see the shape it assumed. 

I travelled through the Northwest considerably during the winter of1860-1. We had customers in all the little towns in south-westWisconsin, south-east Minnesota and north-east Iowa. These generallyknew I had been a captain in the regular army and had served through theMexican war. Consequently wherever I stopped at night, some of thepeople would come to the public-house where I was, and sit till a latehour discussing the probabilities of the future. My own views at thattime were like those officially expressed by Mr. Seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days. " I continued to entertainthese views until after the battle of Shiloh. I believe now that therewould have been no more battles at the West after the capture of FortDonelson if all the troops in that region had been under a singlecommander who would have followed up that victory. 

There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment ofthe South would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, ifthere had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased bythreats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much asthat of any other. But there was no calm discussion of the question. Demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that theydid not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairsof state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly againstthe North; against its aggressions upon the South; its interference withSouthern rights, etc. , etc. They denounced the Northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one Southern man was equal tofive Northern men in battle; that if the South would stand up for itsrights the North would back down. Mr. Jefferson Davis said in a speech, delivered at La Grange, Mississippi, before the secession of that State, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of Mason andDixon's line if there should be a war. The young men who would have thefighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both inregard to the aggressiveness of the North and its cowardice. They, too, cried out for a separation from such people. The great bulk of thelegal voters of the South were men who owned no slaves; their homes weregenerally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educatingtheir children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were verylimited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the North; they tooneeded emancipation. Under the old regime they were looked down upon bythose who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, aspoor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast itaccording to direction. 

I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individualtestimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballotwas as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; butin the face of any such contradiction I reassert the statement. Theshot-gun was not resorted to. Masked men did not ride over the countryat night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a classexisted in every State with a sort of divine right to control publicaffairs. If they could not get this control by one means they must byanother. The end justified the means. The coercion, if mild, wascomplete. 

There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States, bothstrong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to theinstitution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all otherinstitutions in state or nation. The slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. Had politics ever divided the slave-holdersand the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged toyield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. I do notknow that the Southern people were to blame for this condition ofaffairs. There was a time when slavery was not profitable, and thediscussion of the merits of the institution was confined almostexclusively to the territory where it existed. The States of Virginiaand Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one Statedefeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. Butwhen the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceasedwhere it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. The cotton-gin probably had muchto do with the justification of slavery. 

The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-dayas one of great excitement. South Carolina promptly seceded after theresult of the Presidential election was known. Other Southern Statesproposed to follow. In some of them the Union sentiment was so strongthat it had to be suppressed by force. Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky andMissouri, all Slave States, failed to pass ordinances of secession; butthey were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-calledConfederate States. The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of Missouri, in 1861, Jackson and Reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion andtook refuge with the enemy. The governor soon died, and thelieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governorof the State; was recognized as such by the Confederate Government, andcontinued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. The Southclaimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to coerce intotheir confederation such States as they wanted, that is, all the Stateswhere slavery existed. They did not seem to think this courseinconsistent. The fact is, the Southern slave-owners believed that, insome way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent ofnobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes ofthose who did not hold such property. They convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particularinstitution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators butthemselves. 

Meanwhile the Administration of President Buchanan looked helplessly onand proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere;that the Nation had no power to save its own life. Mr. Buchanan had inhis cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mildterm--in the cause of secession as Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman. One of them, Floyd, the Secretary of War, scattered the army so thatmuch of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, anddistributed the cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughoutthe South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. The navy wasscattered in like manner. The President did not prevent his cabinetpreparing for war upon their government, either by destroying itsresources or storing them in the South until a de facto government wasestablished with Jefferson Davis as its President, and Montgomery, Alabama, as the Capital. The secessionists had then to leave thecabinet. In their own estimation they were aliens in the country whichhad given them birth. Loyal men were put into their places. Treason inthe executive branch of the government was estopped. But the harm hadalready been done. The stable door was locked after the horse had beenstolen. 

During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners were sodefiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression ofa sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who couldstand up and proclaim his loyalty to the Union. On the other hand menat the North--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no powerto coerce the South into submission to the laws of the land; that if theNorth undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have tomarch over the dead bodies of the speakers. A portion of the press ofthe North was constantly proclaiming similar views. When the timearrived for the President-elect to go to the capital of the Nation to besworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as aPresident-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. Instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of hisconstituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stopon the way and to be smuggled into the capital. He disappeared frompublic view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrivalwas announced at the capital. There is little doubt that he would havebeen assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout hisjourney. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING--MUSTERINGOFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICES TENDERED TO THEGOVERNMENT. 

The 4th of March, 1861, came, and Abraham Lincoln was sworn to maintainthe Union against all its enemies. The secession of one State afteranother followed, until eleven had gone out. On the 11th of April FortSumter, a National fort in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, wasfired upon by the Southerners and a few days after was captured. TheConfederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarredthemselves of all right to claim protection under the Constitution ofthe United States. We did not admit the fact that they were aliens, butall the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect bettertreatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon anindependent nation. Upon the firing on Sumter President Lincoln issuedhis first call for troops and soon after a proclamation conveningCongress in extra session. The call was for 75, 000 volunteers forninety days' service. If the shot fired at Fort Sumter "was heardaround the world, " the call of the President for 75, 000 men was heardthroughout the Northern States. There was not a state in the North of amillion of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire numberfaster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had beennecessary. 

As soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached Galena, posterswere stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-housein the evening. Business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for atime there were no party distinctions; all were Union men, determined toavenge the insult to the national flag. In the evening the court-housewas packed. Although a comparative stranger I was called upon topreside; the sole reason, possibly, was that I had been in the army andhad seen service. With much embarrassment and some prompting I made outto announce the object of the meeting. Speeches were in order, but itis doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other thanpatriotic ones. There was probably no one in the house, however, whofelt like making any other. The two principal speeches were by B. B. Howard, the post-master and a Breckinridge Democrat at the Novemberelection the fall before, and John A. Rawlins, an elector on the Douglasticket. E. B. Washburne, with whom I was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, Iunderstood afterwards, a little surprise that Galena could not furnish apresiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. Hecame forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to thepatriotism of the meeting. 

After the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form acompany. The quota of Illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and itwas supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted fromGalena. The company was raised and the officers and non-commissionedofficers elected before the meeting adjourned. I declined the captaincybefore the balloting, but announced that I would aid the company inevery way I could and would be found in the service in some position ifthere should be a war. I never went into our leather store after thatmeeting, to put up a package or do other business. 

The ladies of Galena were quite as patriotic as the men. They could notenlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company tothe field uniformed. They came to me to get a description of the UnitedStates uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material;procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. In a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at theState capital for assignment. The men all turned out the morning aftertheir enlistment, and I took charge, divided them into squads andsuperintended their drill. When they were ready to go to Springfield Iwent with them and remained there until they were assigned to aregiment. 

There were so many more volunteers than had been called for that thequestion whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, RichardYates. The legislature was in session at the time, however, and came tohis relief. A law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept theservices of ten additional regiments, one from each congressionaldistrict, for one month, to be paid by the State, but pledged to go intothe service of the United States if there should be a further callduring their term. Even with this relief the governor was still verymuch embarrassed. Before the war was over he was like the Presidentwhen he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something hecould give to all who wanted it. "

In time the Galena company was mustered into the United States service, forming a part of the 11th Illinois volunteer infantry. My duties, Ithought, had ended at Springfield, and I was prepared to start home bythe evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. Up to that time I do notthink I had been introduced to Governor Yates, or had ever spoken tohim. I knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the samehotel and I often saw him at table. The evening I was to quit thecapital I left the supper room before the governor and was standing atthe front door when he came out. He spoke to me, calling me by my oldarmy title "Captain, " and said he understood that I was about leavingthe city. I answered that I was. He said he would be glad if I wouldremain over-night and call at the Executive office the next morning. I complied with his request, and was asked to go into theAdjutant-General's office and render such assistance as I could, thegovernor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. I accepted the proposition. 

My old army experience I found indeed of very great service. I was noclerk, nor had I any capacity to become one. The only place I everfound in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a sidecoat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful thanmyself. But I had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in thefield. The army forms were familiar to me and I could direct how theyshould be made out. There was a clerk in the office of theAdjutant-General who supplied my deficiencies. The ease with which theState of Illinois settled its accounts with the government at the closeof the war is evidence of the efficiency of Mr. Loomis as an accountanton a large scale. He remained in the office until that time. 

As I have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept theservices of ten additional regiments. I had charge of mustering theseregiments into the State service. They were assembled at the mostconvenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. I detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered threein the southern part of the State myself. One of these was to assembleat Belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of St. Louis. When I gotthere I found that only one or two companies had arrived. There was noprobability of the regiment coming together under five days. This gaveme a few idle days which I concluded to spend in St. Louis. 

There was a considerable force of State militia at Camp Jackson, on theoutskirts of St. Louis, at the time. There is but little doubt that itwas the design of Governor Claiborn Jackson to have these troops readyto seize the United States arsenal and the city of St. Louis. Why theydid not do so I do not know. There was but a small garrison, twocompanies I think, under Captain N. Lyon at the arsenal, and but for thetimely services of the Hon. F. P. Blair, I have little doubt that St. Louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with allits arms and ammunition. 

Blair was a leader among the Union men of St. Louis in 1861. There wasno State government in Missouri at the time that would sanction theraising of troops or commissioned officers to protect United Statesproperty, but Blair had probably procured some form of authority fromthe President to raise troops in Missouri and to muster them into theservice of the United States. At all events, he did raise a regimentand took command himself as Colonel. With this force he reported toCaptain Lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. It waswhispered that Lyon thus reinforced intended to break up Camp Jacksonand capture the militia. I went down to the arsenal in the morning tosee the troops start out. I had known Lyon for two years at West Pointand in the old army afterwards. Blair I knew very well by sight. I hadheard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but Ihad never spoken to him. As the troops marched out of the enclosurearound the arsenal, Blair was on his horse outside forming them intoline preparatory to their march. I introduced myself to him and had afew moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. This was my first personal acquaintance with the Honorable--afterwardsMajor-General F. P. Blair. Camp Jackson surrendered without a fight andthe garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. 

Up to this time the enemies of the government in St. Louis had been boldand defiant, while Union men were quiet but determined. The enemies hadtheir head-quarters in a central and public position on Pine Street, near Fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. The Unionmen had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, I did not know where, and I doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the governmentby placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. As soon asthe news of the capture of Camp Jackson reached the city the conditionof affairs was changed. Union men became rampant, aggressive, and, ifyou will, intolerant. They proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and wereimpatient at anything like disrespect for the Union. The secessionistsbecame quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. They had beenplaying the bully. The Union men ordered the rebel flag taken down fromthe building on Pine Street. The command was given in tones ofauthority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in St. Louis. 

I witnessed the scene. I had heard of the surrender of the camp andthat the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. I had seen the troopsstart out in the morning and had wished them success. I now determinedto go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. Istepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and Pine streets, and sawa crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, whowere there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. There were squadsof other people at intervals down the street. They too were quiet butfilled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insultto, what they called, "their" flag. Before the car I was in hadstarted, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day--stepped in. He was in a great state of excitement and used adjectivesfreely to express his contempt for the Union and for those who had justperpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. There wasonly one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young manentered. He evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he gotaway from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pulldown a flag they adored. He turned to me saying: "Things have come toa ---- pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. Where I came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the Union wehang him to a limb of the first tree we come to. " I replied that "afterall we were not so intolerant in St. Louis as we might be; I had notseen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty ofthem who ought to be, however. " The young man subsided. He was socrestfallen that I believe if I had ordered him to leave the car hewould have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "More Yankeeoppression. "

By nightfall the late defenders of Camp Jackson were all within thewalls of the St. Louis arsenal, prisoners of war. The next day I leftSt. Louis for Mattoon, Illinois, where I was to muster in the regimentfrom that congressional district. This was the 21st Illinois infantry, the regiment of which I subsequently became colonel. I mustered oneregiment afterwards, when my services for the State were about closed. 

Brigadier-General John Pope was stationed at Springfield, as UnitedStates mustering officer, all the time I was in the State service. Hewas a native of Illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominentmen in the State. I was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. While I was on duty at Springfield the senators, representatives inCongress, ax-governors and the State legislators were nearly all at theState capital. The only acquaintance I made among them was with thegovernor, whom I was serving, and, by chance, with Senator S. A. Douglas. The only members of Congress I knew were Washburne and PhilipFoulk. With the former, though he represented my district and we werecitizens of the same town, I only became acquainted at the meeting whenthe first company of Galena volunteers was raised. Foulk I had known inSt. Louis when I was a citizen of that city. I had been three years atWest Point with Pope and had served with him a short time during theMexican war, under General Taylor. I saw a good deal of him during myservice with the State. On one occasion he said to me that I ought togo into the United States service. I told him I intended to do so ifthere was a war. He spoke of his acquaintance with the public men ofthe State, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position andthat he would do all he could for me. I declined to receive endorsementfor permission to fight for my country. 

Going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with GeneralPope, I wrote from Galena the following letter to the Adjutant-Generalof the Army. 

GALENA, ILLINOIS, May 24, 1861. 

COL. L. THOMAS Adjt. Gen. U. S. A. , Washington, D. C. 

SIR:--Having served for fifteen years in the regular army, includingfour years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of every one who hasbeen educated at the Government expense to offer their services for thesupport of that Government, I have the honor, very respectfully, totender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as maybe offered. I would say, in view of my present age and length ofservice, I feel myself competent to command a regiment, if thePresident, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. 

Since the first call of the President I have been serving on the staffof the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I could in theorganization of our State militia, and am still engaged in thatcapacity. A letter addressed to me at Springfield, Illinois, will reachme. 

I am very respectfully, Your obt. Svt. , U. S. GRANT. 

This letter failed to elicit an answer from the Adjutant-General of theArmy. I presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could nothave been submitted to higher authority. Subsequent to the war GeneralBadeau having heard of this letter applied to the War Department for acopy of it. The letter could not be found and no one recollected everhaving seen it. I took no copy when it was written. Long after theapplication of General Badeau, General Townsend, who had becomeAdjutant-General of the Army, while packing up papers preparatory to theremoval of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. It had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. 

I felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of aregiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether I would be equal to theposition. But I had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered infrom the State of Illinois, and some from Indiana, and felt that if theycould command a regiment properly, and with credit, I could also. 

Having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regimentsauthorized by the State legislature, I asked and obtained of thegovernor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in Covington, Kentucky, immediately opposite Cincinnati. General McClellan had beenmade a major-general and had his headquarters at Cincinnati. In realityI wanted to see him. I had known him slightly at West Point, where weserved one year together, and in the Mexican war. I was in hopes thatwhen he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. I called ontwo successive days at his office but failed to see him on eitheroccasion, and returned to Springfield. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THE REGIMENT--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT FLORIDA, MO. --GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO. 

While I was absent from the State capital on this occasion thePresident's second call for troops was issued. This time it was for300, 000 men, for three years or the war. This brought into the UnitedStates service all the regiments then in the State service. These hadelected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted withtheir organizations as they were, except in two instances. A Chicagoregiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to thecolonelcy. When it came to taking the field the regiment asked to haveanother appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen madelieutenant-colonel. The 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me atMattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of theirselection in any position. While I was still absent Governor Yatesappointed me colonel of this latter regiment. A few days after I was incharge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near Springfield. 

My regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good socialposition as any in their section of the State. It embraced the sons offarmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers andministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positionsthemselves. There were also men in it who could be led astray; and thecolonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fullycapable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. It wassaid that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from theirposts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. When there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have someone else to lead them. I found it very hard work for a few days tobring all the men into anything like subordination; but the greatmajority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regulararmy punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. 

The ten regiments which had volunteered in the State service for thirtydays, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into theNational service if called upon within that time. When they volunteeredthe government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. Men werecalled now for three years or the war. They felt that this change ofperiod released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. When I wasappointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the State service. About the time they were to be mustered into the United States service, such of them as would go, two members of Congress from the State, McClernand and Logan, appeared at the capital and I was introduced tothem. I had never seen either of them before, but I had read a greatdeal about them, and particularly about Logan, in the newspapers. Bothwere democratic members of Congress, and Logan had been elected from thesouthern district of the State, where he had a majority of eighteenthousand over his Republican competitor. His district had been settledoriginally by people from the Southern States, and at the breaking outof secession they sympathized with the South. At the first outbreak ofwar some of them joined the Southern army; many others were preparing todo so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the Union, andmade it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which Nationaltroops had to pass in southern Illinois, as it was in Kentucky or any ofthe border slave states. Logan's popularity in this district wasunbounded. He knew almost enough of the people in it by their Christiannames, to form an ordinary congressional district. As he went inpolitics, so his district was sure to go. The Republican papers hadbeen demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questionswhich at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. Some werevery bitter in their denunciations of his silence. Logan was not a manto be coerced into an utterance by threats. He did, however, come outin a speech before the adjournment of the special session of Congresswhich was convened by the President soon after his inauguration, andannounced his undying loyalty and devotion to the Union. But I had nothappened to see that speech, so that when I first met Logan myimpressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. McClernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for themaintenance of the Union and had been praised accordingly by theRepublican papers. The gentlemen who presented these two members ofCongress asked me if I would have any objections to their addressing myregiment. I hesitated a little before answering. It was but a few daysbefore the time set for mustering into the United States service such ofthe men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. I hadsome doubt as to the effect a speech from Logan might have; but as hewas with McClernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions ofthe day were well known, I gave my consent. McClernand spoke first; andLogan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for forceand eloquence. It breathed a loyalty and devotion to the Union whichinspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered toremain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to beararms against it. They entered the United States service almost to aman. 

General Logan went to his part of the State and gave his attention toraising troops. The very men who at first made it necessary to guardthe roads in southern Illinois became the defenders of the Union. Loganentered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose tothe rank of major-general. His district, which had promised at first togive much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it fortroops, without resorting to the draft. There was no call made whenthere were not more volunteers than were asked for. That congressionaldistrict stands credited at the War Department to-day with furnishingmore men for the army than it was called on to supply. 

I remained in Springfield with my regiment until the 3d of July, when Iwas ordered to Quincy, Illinois. By that time the regiment was in agood state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in thecompany drill. There was direct railroad communication betweenSpringfield and Quincy, but I thought it would be good preparation forthe troops to march there. We had no transportation for our camp andgarrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3dof July we started. There was no hurry, but fair marches were madeevery day until the Illinois River was crossed. There I was overtakenby a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had beenchanged to Ironton, Missouri, and ordering me to halt where I was andawait the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the IllinoisRiver to take the regiment to St. Louis. The boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. Weremained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an Illinois regiment wassurrounded by rebels at a point on the Hannibal and St. Joe Railroadsome miles west of Palmyra, in Missouri, and I was ordered to proceedwith all dispatch to their relief. We took the cars and reached Quincyin a few hours. 

When I left Galena for the last time to take command of the 21stregiment I took with me my oldest son, Frederick D. Grant, then a lad ofeleven years of age. On receiving the order to take rail for Quincy Iwrote to Mrs. Grant, to relieve what I supposed would be her greatanxiety for one so young going into danger, that I would send Fred homefrom Quincy by river. I received a prompt letter in reply decidedlydisapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowedto accompany me. It came too late. Fred was already on his way up theMississippi bound for Dubuque, Iowa, from which place there was arailroad to Galena. 

My sensations as we approached what I supposed might be "a field ofbattle" were anything but agreeable. I had been in all the engagementsin Mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not incommand. If some one else had been colonel and I had beenlieutenant-colonel I do not think I would have felt any trepidation. Before we were prepared to cross the Mississippi River at Quincy myanxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment camestraggling into town. I am inclined to think both sides got frightenedand ran away. 

I took my regiment to Palmyra and remained there for a few days, untilrelieved by the 19th Illinois infantry. From Palmyra I proceeded toSalt River, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by theenemy. Colonel John M. Palmer at that time commanded the 13th Illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuildingthis bridge. Palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments aslong as we remained together. The bridge was finished in about twoweeks, and I received orders to move against Colonel Thomas Harris, whowas said to be encamped at the little town of Florida, some twenty-fivemiles south of where we then were. 

At the time of which I now write we had no transportation and thecountry about Salt River was sparsely settled, so that it took some daysto collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrisonequipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week'ssupply of provision and some ammunition. While preparations for themove were going on I felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the roadand found every house deserted I was anything but easy. In thetwenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossedours. As soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horsescould carry them. I kept my men in the ranks and forbade their enteringany of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. We halted atnight on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being nearwater. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerableheight, possibly more than a hundred feet. As we approached the brow ofthe hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, andpossibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept gettinghigher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. Iwould have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I hadnot the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view Ihalted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before wasstill there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred tome at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been ofhim. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but itwas one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of thewar, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though Ialways felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as muchreason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable. 

Inquiries at the village of Florida divulged the fact that ColonelHarris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation wasbeing collected took time by the forelock and left Florida before I hadstarted from Salt River. He had increased the distance between us byforty miles. The next day I started back to my old camp at Salt Riverbridge. The citizens living on the line of our march had returned totheir houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet usnow. They had evidently been led to believe that the National troopscarried death and devastation with them wherever they went. 

In a short time after our return to Salt River bridge I was ordered withmy regiment to the town of Mexico. General Pope was then commanding thedistrict embracing all of the State of Missouri between the Mississippiand Missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of Mexico. Iwas assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops inthe immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and asection of artillery. There was one regiment encamped by the side ofmine. I assumed command of the whole and the first night sent thecommander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. Not wishingto be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign forhis regiment for the night. When he was informed that the countersignsent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it wasdifficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarrantedinterference of one colonel over another. No doubt he attributed it forthe time to the presumption of a graduate of West Point over a volunteerpure and simple. But the question was soon settled and we had nofurther trouble. 

My arrival in Mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regimentsin which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had beenin the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helpingthemselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. They carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man theyfound take the oath of allegiance to the government. I at oncepublished orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private housesunless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating privateproperty to their own or to government uses. The people were no longermolested or made afraid. I received the most marked courtesy from thecitizens of Mexico as long as I remained there. 

Up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of thesoldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received sometraining on the march from Springfield to the Illinois River. There wasnow a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. While Iwas at West Point the tactics used in the army had been Scott's and themusket the flint lock. I had never looked at a copy of tactics from thetime of my graduation. My standing in that branch of studies had beennear the foot of the class. In the Mexican war in the summer of 1846, Ihad been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had notbeen at a battalion drill since. The arms had been changed since thenand Hardee's tactics had been adopted. I got a copy of tactics andstudied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first dayto the commands I had thus learned. By pursuing this course from day today I thought I would soon get through the volume. 

We were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scatteringsuburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when I got my regiment inline and rode to the front I soon saw that if I attempted to follow thelesson I had studied I would have to clear away some of the houses andgarden fences to make room. I perceived at once, however, that Hardee'stactics--a mere translation from the French with Hardee's name attached--was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age appliedto Scott's system. The commands were abbreviated and the movementexpedited. Under the old tactics almost every change in the order ofmarch was preceded by a "halt, " then came the change, and then the"forward march. " With the new tactics all these changes could be madewhile in motion. I found no trouble in giving commands that would takemy regiment where I wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. I do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered thatI had never studied the tactics that I used. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO. --JEFFERSON CITY--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH--HEADQUARTERS ATCAIRO. 

I had not been in Mexico many weeks when, reading a St. Louis paper, I found the President had asked the Illinois delegation in Congressto recommend some citizens of the State for the position ofbrigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as firston a list of seven. I was very much surprised because, as I have said, my acquaintance with the Congressmen was very limited and I did not knowof anything I had done to inspire such confidence. The papers of thenext day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to theSenate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. 

When appointed brigadier-general I at once thought it proper that one ofmy aides should come from the regiment I had been commanding, and soselected Lieutenant C. B. Lagow. While living in St. Louis, I had had adesk in the law office of McClellan, Moody and Hillyer. Difference inviews between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, andgeneral hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. Hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. I asked him to accept a place on my staff. I also wanted to take oneman from my new home, Galena. The canvass in the Presidential campaignthe fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of John A. Rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the State. Hewas also a candidate for elector on the Douglas ticket. When Sumter wasfired upon and the integrity of the Union threatened, there was no manmore ready to serve his country than he. I wrote at once asking him toaccept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank ofcaptain, on my staff. He was about entering the service as major of anew regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the State; buthe threw this up and accepted my offer. 

Neither Hillyer nor Lagow proved to have any particular taste or specialqualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resignedduring the Vicksburg campaign; the latter I relieved after the battle ofChattanooga. Rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose tothe rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the General of theArmy--an office created for him--before the war closed. He was an ableman, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically toa request which he thought should not be granted that the person he wasaddressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressingthe matter. General Rawlins was a very useful officer in other waysthan this. I became very much attached to him. 

Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to Ironton, Missouri, tocommand a district in that part of the State, and took the 21stIllinois, my old regiment, with me. Several other regiments wereordered to the same destination about the same time. Ironton is on theIron Mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of St. Louis, andsituated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. When Ireached there, about the 8th of August, Colonel B. Gratz Brown--afterwards Governor of Missouri and in 1872 Vice-Presidential candidate--was in command. Some of his troops were ninety days' men and theirtime had expired some time before. The men had no clothing but whatthey had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it wouldhardly stay on. General Hardee--the author of the tactics I did notstudy--was at Greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it wassaid, with five thousand Confederate troops. Under these circumstancesColonel Brown's command was very much demoralized. A squadron ofcavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. Brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever hasbeen since. I relieved him and sent all his men home within a day ortwo, to be mustered out of service. 

Within ten days after reading Ironton I was prepared to take theoffensive against the enemy at Greenville. I sent a column east out ofthe valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and westand come into the Greenville road ten miles south of Ironton. Anothercolumn marched on the direct road and went into camp at the pointdesignated for the two columns to meet. I was to ride out the nextmorning and take personal command of the movement. My experienceagainst Harris, in northern Missouri, had inspired me with confidence. But when the evening train came in, it brought General B. M. Prentisswith orders to take command of the district. His orders did not relieveme, but I knew that by law I was senior, and at that time even thePresident did not have the authority to assign a junior to command asenior of the same grade. I therefore gave General Prentiss thesituation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, andstarted for St. Louis the same day. The movement against the rebels atGreenville went no further. 

From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City, the capital of theState, to take command. General Sterling Price, of the Confederatearmy, was thought to be threatening the capital, Lexington, Chillicotheand other comparatively large towns in the central part of Missouri. Ifound a good many troops in Jefferson City, but in the greatestconfusion, and no one person knew where they all were. ColonelMulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated asyet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. I found that volunteers had obtained permission from the departmentcommander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; somebattalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according tothe number of men they brought into the service. There were recruitingstations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over thedoors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for whichrecruits at that station would be received. The law required allvolunteers to serve for three years or the war. But in Jefferson Cityin August, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and ondifferent conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for ayear, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, otherswere not to be sent out of the State. The recruits were principally menfrom regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound forthree years if the war lasted that long. 

The city was filled with Union fugitives who had been driven by guerillabands to take refuge with the National troops. They were in adeplorable condition and must have starved but for the support thegovernment gave them. They had generally made their escape with a teamor two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. Alittle bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown intothe wagon. All else of their worldly goods were abandoned andappropriated by their former neighbors; for the Union man in Missouriwho staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately underthe protection of the National troops, was at perpetual war with hisneighbors. I stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troopsabout the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. Orderwas soon restored. 

I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when I was directed fromdepartment headquarters to fit out an expedition to Lexington, Booneville and Chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in thosecities all the funds they had and send them to St. Louis. The westernarmy had not yet been supplied with transportation. It became necessarytherefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers withthe rebellion or to hire those of Union men. This afforded anopportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within ourlines as had teams suitable for our purposes. They accepted the servicewith alacrity. As fast as troops could be got off they were moved westsome twenty miles or more. In seven or eight days from my assumingcommand at Jefferson City, I had all the troops, except a smallgarrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself thenext day. 

But my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, Isaw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be Colonel JeffersonC. Davis. I had never met him before, but he introduced himself byhanding me an order for him to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve meof the command. The orders directed that I should report at departmentheadquarters at St. Louis without delay, to receive important specialinstructions. It was about an hour before the only regular train of theday would start. I therefore turned over to Colonel Davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry outthe department instructions already described. I had at that time butone staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed byan adjutant-general. In an hour after being relieved from the command Iwas on my way to St. Louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) tofollow the next day with our horses and baggage. 

The "important special instructions" which I received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well asall southern Illinois. At first I was to take personal command of acombined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of ColonelJeff. Thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who wasdisputing with us the possession of south-east Missouri. Troops hadbeen ordered to move from Ironton to Cape Girardeau, sixty or seventymiles to the south-east, on the Mississippi River; while the forces atCape Girardeau had been ordered to move to Jacksonville, ten miles outtowards Ironton; and troops at Cairo and Bird's Point, at the junctionof the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readinessto go down the Mississippi to Belmont, eighteen miles below, to be movedwest from there when an officer should come to command them. I was theofficer who had been selected for this purpose. Cairo was to become myheadquarters when the expedition terminated. 

In pursuance of my orders I established my temporary headquarters atCape Girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer atJackson, to inform me of the approach of General Prentiss from Ironton. Hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rationsto Jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. NeitherGeneral Prentiss nor Colonel Marsh, who commanded at Jackson, knew theirdestination. I drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until I should hear of the junction of ourtroops at Jackson. Two or three days after my arrival at CapeGirardeau, word came that General Prentiss was approaching that place(Jackson). I started at once to meet him there and to give him hisorders. As I turned the first corner of a street after starting, I sawa column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. I turnedand rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of thecolumn. I found there General Prentiss himself, with a large escort. He had halted his troops at Jackson for the night, and had come onhimself to Cape Girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow himin the morning. I gave the General his orders--which stopped him atJackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under anotherbrigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. He had been a brigadier, in command at Cairo, while I was musteringofficer at Springfield without any rank. But we were nominated at thesame time for the United States service, and both our commissions boredate May 17th, 1861. By virtue of my former army rank I was, by law, the senior. General Prentiss failed to get orders to his troops toremain at Jackson, and the next morning early they were reported asapproaching Cape Girardeau. I then ordered the General veryperemptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to Jackson. He obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them toJackson, and went to St. Louis and reported himself. This broke up theexpedition. But little harm was done, as Jeff. Thompson moved light andhad no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. He was as much athome in Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would keep out of the way ofa superior force. Prentiss was sent to another part of the State. 

General Prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that hewould not have committed later in the war. When I came to know himbetter, I regretted it much. In consequence of this occurrence he wasoff duty in the field when the principal campaign at the West was goingon, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could beobtained. He would have been next to myself in rank in the district ofsouth-east Missouri, by virtue of his services in the Mexican war. Hewas a brave and very earnest soldier. No man in the service was moresincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; nonemore ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. 

On the 4th of September I removed my headquarters to Cairo and foundColonel Richard Oglesby in command of the post. We had never met, atleast not to my knowledge. After my promotion I had ordered mybrigadier-general's uniform from New York, but it had not yet arrived, so that I was in citizen's dress. The Colonel had his office full ofpeople, mostly from the neighboring States of Missouri and Kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. He evidently did not catch my namewhen I was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the tablewhere he was seated and writing the order assuming command of thedistrict of south-east Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to commandthe post at Bird's Point, and handing it to him, he put on an expressionof surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some oneidentify me. But he surrendered the office without question. 

The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man came to me who said hewas a scout of General Fremont. He reported that he had just come fromColumbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles below on the Kentuckyside, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, toseize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee. There was no time fordelay; I reported by telegraph to the department commander theinformation I had received, and added that I was taking steps to get offthat night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that importantpoint. There was a large number of steamers lying at Cairo and a goodmany boatmen were staying in the town. It was the work of only a fewhours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. Troopswere also designated to go aboard. The distance from Cairo to Paducahis about forty-five miles. I did not wish to get there before daylightof the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchorout in the stream until the time to start. Not having received ananswer to my first dispatch, I again telegraphed to departmentheadquarters that I should start for Paducah that night unless Ireceived further orders. Hearing nothing, we started before midnightand arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy byprobably not over six or eight hours. It proved very fortunate that theexpedition against Jeff. Thompson had been broken up. Had it not been, the enemy would have seized Paducah and fortified it, to our very greatannoyance. 

When the National troops entered the town the citizens were taken bysurprise. I never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces ofthe people. Men, women and children came out of their doors lookingpale and frightened at the presence of the invader. They were expectingrebel troops that day. In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbuswere at that time within ten or fifteen miles of Paducah on their way tooccupy the place. I had but two regiments and one battery with me, butthe enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus. I stationed mytroops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, leftgunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on myreturn to Cairo. Before leaving, however, I addressed a short printedproclamation to the citizens of Paducah assuring them of our peacefulintentions, that we had come among them to protect them against theenemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue theirusual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. This was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have muchpreferred the presence of the other army. I reinforced Paducah rapidlyfrom the troops at Cape Girardeau; and a day or two later General C. F. Smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at Cairo and was assignedto the command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee. In a shorttime it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupySmithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland. 

The State government of Kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the North and theSouth, and the governor really seemed to think the State had a perfectright to maintain a neutral position. The rebels already occupied twotowns in the State, Columbus and Hickman, on the Mississippi; and at thevery moment the National troops were entering Paducah from the Ohiofront, General Lloyd Tilghman--a Confederate--with his staff and a smalldetachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as Ihave already said, nearly four thousand Confederate troops were onKentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. But, in theestimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this didnot justify the National authorities in invading the soil of Kentucky. I informed the legislature of the State of what I was doing, and myaction was approved by the majority of that body. On my return to CairoI found authority from department headquarters for me to take Paducah"if I felt strong enough, " but very soon after I was reprimanded fromthe same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warnedagainst a repetition of the offence. 

Soon after I took command at Cairo, General Fremont entered intoarrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at Camp Jacksonin the month of May. I received orders to pass them through my lines toColumbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. Quite anumber of these prisoners I had been personally acquainted with beforethe war. Such of them as I had so known were received at myheadquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was notdisturbed by their presence. On one occasion when several were presentin my office my intention to visit Cape Girardeau the next day, toinspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. Something transpiredwhich postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government waspassing a point some twenty or more miles above Cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. Amajor, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, cameat once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for mydelivery. It was hard to persuade him that I was not there. Thisofficer was Major Barrett, of St. Louis. I had been acquainted with hisfamily before the war. 

CHAPTER XX. 

GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE OF BELMONT--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE. 

From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November nothingimportant occurred with the troops under my command. I was reinforcedfrom time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatoryfor the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I hadnot fewer than 20, 000 men, most of them under good drill and ready tomeet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in anengagement. They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almostin hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fightagainst. I asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move againstColumbus. It could have been taken soon after the occupation ofPaducah; but before November it was so strongly fortified that it wouldhave required a large force and a long siege to capture it. 

In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in personand moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling Price, who wasthen in the State of Missouri with a considerable command. About thefirst of November I was directed from department headquarters to make ademonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view ofdetaining the rebels at Columbus within their lines. Before my troopscould be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there weresome 3, 000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west, or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force againstthem. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient tocompete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word camefrom the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large forcefrom Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the WhiteRiver, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed toprevent this movement if possible. I accordingly sent a regiment fromBird's Point under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforceOglesby, with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance belowColumbus, on the Missouri side. At the same time I directed General C. F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah directlyagainst Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town toawait further orders from me. Then I gathered up all the troops atCairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down theriver on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. My force consisted of a little over 3, 000 men and embraced fiveregiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. Wedropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus, debarked a few men on the Kentucky side and established pickets toconnect with the troops from Paducah. 

I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nordid I intend anything of the kind when I started out from Cairo; butafter we started I saw that the officers and men were elated at theprospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they hadvolunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. I did not seehow I could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to Cairo without an effort to do something. Columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison muchmore numerous than the force I had with me. It would not do, therefore, to attack that point. About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, Ilearned that the enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the westbank to be dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby. I knew there was asmall camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus, and I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouriside, capture Belmont, break up the camp and return. Accordingly, thepickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight theboats moved out from shore. In an hour we were debarking on the westbank of the Mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at Columbus. 

The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is low andin places marshy and cut up with sloughs. The soil is rich and thetimber large and heavy. There were some small clearings between Belmontand the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered withthe native forests. We landed in front of a cornfield. When thedebarkation commenced, I took a regiment down the river to post it as aguard against surprise. At that time I had no staff officer who couldbe trusted with that duty. In the woods, at a short distance below theclearing, I found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high waterbecame a slough or bayou. I placed the men in the hollow, gave themtheir instructions and ordered them to remain there until they wereproperly relieved. These troops, with the gunboats, were to protect ourtransports. 

Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. From Columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transportsloaded with troops. But the force from Paducah was threatening themfrom the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if Columbuswas our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. Theydoubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assaulton Columbus before their divided command could be united. 

About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marchingby the flank. After moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, I halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth oftimber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force asskirmishers. By this time the enemy discovered that we were moving uponBelmont and sent out troops to meet us. Soon after we had started inline, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. Thiscontinued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemybeing forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early inthis engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got another from oneof my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river wasreached. 

The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for thefirst time. Veterans could not have behaved better than they did up tothe moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they becamedemoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. Theenemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear groundon which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the riverbank, which protected him from our shots and from view. Thisprecipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the National forces topick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the onlyartificial defence the enemy had. The moment the camp was reached ourmen laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick uptrophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than theprivates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and atevery halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and theachievements of the command. 

All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, laycrouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrenderif summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, theyworked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and ourtransports. I saw at the same time two steamers coming from theColumbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--withsoldiers from boiler-deck to roof. Some of my men were engaged infiring from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out ofrange, cheering at every shot. I tried to get them to turn their gunsupon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. My efforts were invain. At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights ofColumbus. They had abstained from firing before, probably because theywere afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, untilthe camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of theirfriends. About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank wereseen in line up the river between us and our transports. The alarm"surrounded" was given. The guns of the enemy and the report of beingsurrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. At firstsome of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to beplaced in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do butsurrender. But when I announced that we had cut our way in and couldcut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers andsoldiers. They formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. Again the Confederates sought shelter under the river banks. We couldnot stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seencrossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer ourtransports than we were. It would be prudent to get them behind us; butwe were not again molested on our way to the boats. 

From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to thehouses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. I now set the troopsto bringing their wounded to the boats. After this had gone on for somelittle time I rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visitthe guard I had stationed over the approach to our transports. I knewthe enemy had crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers andmight be expected to attack us as we were embarking. This guard wouldbe encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, wouldbe able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. My surprise wasgreat to find there was not a single man in the trench. Riding back tothe boat I found the officer who had commanded the guard and learnedthat he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. At firstI ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some timeto get the men together and march them back to their position, Icountermanded the order. Then fearing that the enemy we had seencrossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out inthe field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether theenemy was passing. The field was grown up with corn so tall and thickas to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directlyalong the rows. Even in that direction, owing to the overhanging bladesof corn, the view was not extensive. I had not gone more than a fewhundred yards when I saw a body of troops marching past me not fiftyyards away. I looked at them for a moment and then turned my horsetowards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when I thoughtmyself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse couldcarry me. When at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundredyards to the point where the nearest transport lay. 

The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of adense forest. Before I got back the enemy had entered this forest andhad opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with the exception ofdetails that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now eitheraboard the transports or very near them. Those who were not aboard soongot there, and the boats pushed off. I was the only man of the Nationalarmy between the rebels and our transports. The captain of a boat thathad just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered theengineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. My horse seemed to take in the situation. There was no path down thebank and every one acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that itsbanks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from theperpendicular. My horse put his fore feet over the bank withouthesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid downthe bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, overa single gang plank. I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. 

The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so that thebanks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks ofthe steamers. The rebels were some distance back from the river, sothat their fire was high and did us but little harm. Our smoke-stackwas riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on theboats, two of whom were soldiers. When I first went on deck I enteredthe captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on asofa. I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on thedeck to observe what was going on. I had scarcely left when a musketball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through itand lodged in the foot. 

When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned itwith vigor. They were well out in the stream and some distance down, sothat they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clearthe banks of the river. Their position very nearly enfiladed the lineof the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. The executionwas very great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learnedmore positively. We were very soon out of range and went peacefully onour way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory andthat he had contributed his share to it. 

Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 ofour wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. The loss of theenemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about 2, 500 men, exclusive of the guard left with thetransports. The enemy had about 7, 000; but this includes the troopsbrought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence ofBelmont. 

The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fullyaccomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops fromColumbus. His losses were very heavy for that period of the war. Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, totake them home for medical treatment or burial. I learned later, when Ihad moved further south, that Belmont had caused more mourning thanalmost any other battle up to that time. The National troops acquired aconfidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through thewar. 

The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk'scommand, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and alsocommenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When our men wentto bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conductedbelow the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. Some of theofficers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request wasrefused with the statement that we had no dead there. 

While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had known bothat West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in the cornfield neartheir troops when they passed; that I had been on horseback and had worna soldier's overcoat at the time. This officer was on General Polk'sstaff. He said both he and the general had seen me and that Polk hadsaid to his men, "There is a Yankee; you may try your marksmanship onhim if you wish, " but nobody fired at me. 

Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly unnecessarybattle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from thebeginning. If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probablyhave been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. Then Ishould have been culpable indeed. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF CAIRO--MOVEMENTON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. 

While at Cairo I had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebelofficers of the Columbus garrison. They seemed to be very fond ofcoming up on steamers under flags of truce. On two or three occasions Iwent down in like manner. When one of their boats was seen coming upcarrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery atFort Holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come nofarther. I would then take a steamer and, with my staff andoccasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. Therewere several officers among them whom I had known before, both at WestPoint and in Mexico. Seeing these officers who had been educated for theprofession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a farmore efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the Southpossessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion. They hadfrom thirty to forty per cent. Of the educated soldiers of the Nation. They had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers hadto find employment with the troops from their own States. In this waywhat there was of military education and training was distributedthroughout their whole army. The whole loaf was leavened. 

The North had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but thebulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally withtheir old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. Inthe Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the "regularbrigade, " in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngestsecond lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. So, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in numberto each, were men educated for their profession. Some of these wentinto battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirelywithout military training. This state of affairs gave me an idea whichI expressed while at Cairo; that the government ought to disband theregular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify thedisbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the warlasted except as volunteers. The register should be kept up, but thenames of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at theclose, should be stricken from it. 

On the 9th of November, two days after the battle of Belmont, Major-General H. W. Halleck superseded General Fremont in command of theDepartment of the Missouri. The limits of his command took in Arkansasand west Kentucky east to the Cumberland River. From the battle ofBelmont until early in February, 1862, the troops under my command didlittle except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be beforethem. 

The enemy at this time occupied a line running from the MississippiRiver at Columbus to Bowling Green and Mill Springs, Kentucky. Each ofthese positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on theTennessee and Cumberland rivers near the Tennessee state line. Theworks on the Tennessee were called Fort Heiman and Fort Henry, and thaton the Cumberland was Fort Donelson. At these points the two riversapproached within eleven miles of each other. The lines of rifle pitsat each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so thatthe garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. These positionswere of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondinglyimportant for us to possess ourselves of. With Fort Henry in our handswe had a navigable stream open to us up to Muscle Shoals, in Alabama. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee at Eastport, Mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to theshoals. This road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to beof use to them for through traffic the moment Fort Henry became ours. Fort Donelson was the gate to Nashville--a place of great military andpolitical importance--and to a rich country extending far east inKentucky. These two points in our possession the enemy wouldnecessarily be thrown back to the Memphis and Charleston road, or to theboundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would belost to them for through communication. 

The designation of my command had been changed after Halleck's arrival, from the District of South-east Missouri to the District of Cairo, andthe small district commanded by General C. F. Smith, embracing themouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had been added to myjurisdiction. Early in January, 1862, I was directed by GeneralMcClellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance infavor of Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, who commanded theDepartment of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville, and who wasconfronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate force atBowling Green. It was supposed that Buell was about to make some moveagainst the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent thesending of troops from Columbus, Fort Henry or Donelson to Buckner. Iat once ordered General Smith to send a force up the west bank of theTennessee to threaten forts Heiman and Henry; McClernand at the sametime with a force of 6, 000 men was sent out into west Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River withanother. I went with McClernand's command. The weather was very bad;snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, wereintolerable. We were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. The object of theexpedition was accomplished. The enemy did not send reinforcements toBowling Green, and General George H. Thomas fought and won the battle ofMill Springs before we returned. 

As a result of this expedition General Smith reported that he thought itpracticable to capture Fort Heiman. This fort stood on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite side of the river, andits possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure thecapture of Fort Henry. This report of Smith's confirmed views I hadpreviously held, that the true line of operations for us was up theTennessee and Cumberland rivers. With us there, the enemy would becompelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the State ofKentucky. On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for thisexpedition, I had asked permission of the general commanding thedepartment to go to see him at St. Louis. My object was to lay thisplan of campaign before him. Now that my views had been confirmed by soable a general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on whatI deemed important military business. The leave was granted, but notgraciously. I had known General Halleck but very slightly in the oldarmy, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican war. I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated theobject of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I hadnot uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan waspreposterous. I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen. 

Flag-officer Foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in theneighborhood of Cairo and, though in another branch of the service, wassubject to the command of General Halleck. He and I consulted freelyupon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to thefeasibility of the campaign up the Tennessee. Notwithstanding therebuff I had received from my immediate chief, I therefore, on the 28thof January, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, Icould take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee. " This time I wasbacked by Flag-officer Foote, who sent a similar dispatch. On the 29thI wrote fully in support of the proposition. On the 1st of February Ireceived full instructions from department headquarters to move uponFort Henry. On the 2d the expedition started. 

In February, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up atCairo for want of employment, the Mississippi River being closed againstnavigation below that point. There were also many men in the town whoseoccupation had been following the river in various capacities, fromcaptain down to deck hand But there were not enough of either boats ormen to move at one time the 17, 000 men I proposed to take with me up theTennessee. I loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent General McClernand in command. I followed with one of thelater boats and found McClernand had stopped, very properly, nine milesbelow Fort Henry. Seven gunboats under Flag-officer Foote hadaccompanied the advance. The transports we had with us had to return toPaducah to bring up a division from there, with General C. F. Smith incommand. 

Before sending the boats back I wanted to get the troops as near to theenemy as I could without coming within range of their guns. There was astream emptying into the Tennessee on the east side, apparently at aboutlong range distance below the fort. On account of the narrow water-shedseparating the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the streammust be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, inFebruary, it was a torrent. It would facilitate the investment of FortHenry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. Totest whether this could be done I boarded the gunboat Essex andrequested Captain Wm. Porter commanding it, to approach the fort to drawits fire. After we had gone some distance past the mouth of the streamwe drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. Inconsequence I had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to theupper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gunthat sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. One shot passedvery near where Captain Porter and I were standing, struck the deck nearthe stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into theriver. We immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked belowthe mouth of the creek. 

When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to Paducahto hasten up the balance of the troops. I got back on the 5th with theadvance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carrythem. At ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was notyet up. Being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible beforethe enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at11 A. M. On the 6th. I felt sure that all the troops would be up by thattime. 

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the waterbattery a direct fire down the stream. The camp outside the fort wasintrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road toDonelson and Dover. The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2, 800, with strong reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out. Therewere seventeen heavy guns in the fort. The river was very high, thebanks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep inwater. Below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yardsback from the bank on the east side. On the west bank Fort Heiman stoodon high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry. The distance fromFort Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles. The two positions were soimportant to the enemy, AS HE SAW HIS INTEREST, that it was natural tosuppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from whichthey could be got. Prompt action on our part was imperative. 

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack thefort at close quarters. General Smith was to land a brigade of hisdivision on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rearof Heiman. 

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. General Smithfound Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. Thegunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, butthe troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for want ofroads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what wouldin dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. This delay madeno difference in the result. On our first appearance Tilghman had senthis entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left toman the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover andDonelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; andbefore any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson. He stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solelyto give his troops time to make their escape. 

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as thearmament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked uptwo guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, thatthe pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. 

All the gunboats engaged were hit many times. The damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, wasslight, except to the Essex. A shell penetrated the boiler of thatvessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteenof whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. Onseveral occasions during the war such details were made when thecomplement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty beforethem. After the fall of Fort Henry Captain Phelps, commanding theiron-clad Carondelet, at my request ascended the Tennessee River andthoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK OF THE ENEMY--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT. 

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry andthat on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson. But the rain continued tofall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagontrains. Then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed withoutthe gunboats. At least it would have been leaving behind a valuablepart of our available force. 

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff andthe cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to withinabout a mile of the outer line of works at Donelson. I had knownGeneral Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter howsmall, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he wasgiven to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff at the time. Iknew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged thathe would yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected, noopposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning thetopography of the country on the way and around Fort Donelson, foundthat there were two roads available for marching; one leading to thevillage of Dover, the other to Donelson. 

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from Dover. Thefort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. Onthe east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it faced Hickman'screek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because ofthe back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, orrather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland. This also was filled withback-water from the river. The fort stood on high ground, some of it asmuch as a hundred feet above the Cumberland. Strong protection to theheavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting awayplaces for them in the bluff. To the west there was a line of riflepits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. Thisline ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one placecrossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and thefort. The ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was verybroken and generally wooded. The trees outside of the rifle-pits hadbeen cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so thattheir tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. The limbs had beentrimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greaterpart of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and extending abouthalf the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south andopening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort. The entireside of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis. 

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to getreinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo. General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large division underGeneral Nelson, from Buell's army, was also dispatched. Orders went outfrom the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that werebeing recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies, andto consolidate companies into regiments. General Halleck did notapprove or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson. He said nothingwhatever to me on the subject. He informed Buell on the 7th that Iwould march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on the 10th hedirected me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the landside, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. Ireceived this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson. 

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew theimportance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce itrapidly. I felt that 15, 000 men on the 8th would be more effective than50, 000 a month later. I asked Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to orderhis gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River andnot to wait for those gone to Eastport and Florence; but the others gotback in time and we started on the 12th. I had moved McClernand out afew miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. 

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me ontransports. It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commandedby Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska. As the gunboats were going around toDonelson by the Tennessee, Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayerto turn about and go under their convoy. 

I started from Fort Henry with 15, 000 men, including eight batteries andpart of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction todetain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. Thatafternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make theinvestment as complete as possible. General Smith had been directed toleave a portion of his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman. He left General Lew. Wallace with 2, 500 men. With the remainder of hisdivision he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek. McClernandwas on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west fromDover. His right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening intothe Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not intrenched, butthe nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protectedfrom the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. Ourline was generally along the crest of ridges. The artillery wasprotected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not serving theguns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little backfrom the crest. The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. Itwas midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing andfreezing alternately. It would not do to allow camp-fires except fardown the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allowmany of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march overfrom Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets andovercoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. 

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer onthe 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15, 000 men, withoutintrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21, 000, without conflictfurther than what was brought on by ourselves. Only one gunboat hadarrived. There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by themovement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there wasno actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in frontof McClernand's command. That general had undertaken to capture abattery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders orauthority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The battery wasin the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole armypresent. Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss onour side was great for the number of men engaged. In this assaultColonel William Morrison fell badly wounded. Up to this time thesurgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the housesnear our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals wereovercrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons thesuffering was not so great as it might have been. The hospitalarrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible tomake them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack oftents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally ofbut one or two rooms. 

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I hadrequested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on hisexpedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as farup towards Donelson as possible. He started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamerAlps. Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, alittle after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a pointwithin gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the waterbatteries at long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival theday before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requestinghim at the same time to attack again that day so that I might takeadvantage of any diversion. The attack was made and many shots fellwithin the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. Theinvestment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troopsengaged would admit of. 

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with theiron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboatsTyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade. On the morning of the14th Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had ordered over from FortHenry, also arrived about the same time. Up to this time he had beencommanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith. These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, andGeneral Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composedof the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrivedthe same day. This new division was assigned to the centre, giving thetwo flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a strongerline. 

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, whilethe gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters andsilence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run thebatteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover. I hadordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to theriver above Dover in case they should be needed there. That positionattained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--anda very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled tosurrender. 

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, andadvanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. After comingin range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but aconstant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bearupon the fort. I occupied a position on shore from which I could seethe advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance ofthe water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and Isoon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visiblydisabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed forthe day. The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides havingbeen hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through nearthe waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. Thetiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, droppedhelplessly back. Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that theyscarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. 

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but theywere jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the riverentirely out of the control of the men on board. Of course I onlywitnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at thetime over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that theenemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on thenight of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting FortDonelson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather hadturned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep upfires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, manyhad thrown away their overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest ofour gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility ofrendering any present assistance. I retired this night not knowing butthat I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for themen or build huts under the cover of the hills. 

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messengerfrom Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see meon the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before somuch that he could not come himself to me. I at once made mypreparations for starting. I directed my adjutant-general to notifyeach of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to donothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen fordays and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads betweenthe troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads hadbecome cut up so as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of thenight of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. This made travel onhorseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as theroads would allow. 

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in thestream. A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon onboard with the flag-officer. He explained to me in short the conditionin which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, andsuggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City withhis disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could havethe necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. I saw the absolutenecessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but Ishould be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. But theenemy relieved me from this necessity. 

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no ideathat there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it onmyself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us thanthey had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12thto the 14th we had but 15, 000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now wehad been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division oftroops under General L. Wallace and 2, 500 men brought over from FortHenry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, hadtaken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of mystaff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safetyof the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines infull force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which wasin full retreat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fasttime, but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had beenmade on the National right. I was some four or five miles north of ourleft. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point wherethe disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith andWallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held bySmith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part init. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the supportof McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within hislines. 

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had comeout in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand'sdivision had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in theircartridge-boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition near bylying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was notall of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who hadbeen educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantlysupplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men foundthemselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops whoseemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled, butmost of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of rangeof the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayerpushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops thatwere without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within hisintrenchments and was there when I got on the field. 

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. Noofficer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had theirmuskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicateda determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as theprovisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badlydemoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted toforce his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first nowwill be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he getsahead of me. " I determined to make the assault at once on our left. Itwas clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with hisentire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made onthe left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as wepassed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemyis trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so. " This actedlike a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. Werode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to himand directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his wholedivision, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a verythin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly shorttime, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while theywere working their way through the abatis intervening between them andthe enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night ofthe 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within thelines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederatesmust surrender or be captured the next day. 

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the nightof the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man oftalent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, didnot possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made himafraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain theConstitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all itsenemies. He had betrayed that trust. As Secretary of War he wasreported through the northern press to have scattered the little armythe country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail whensecession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he hadremoved arms from northern to southern arsenals. He continued in theCabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacymade out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid tofall into the hands of National troops. He would no doubt have beentried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had hebeen captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, andprided himself much on his services in the Mexican war. He telegraphedto General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebelrifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that theSouthern troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded thedispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were readingit Floyd and Pillow were fugitives. 

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it wouldbe impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was third inrank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to haveregarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding thedepartment, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters atNashville. Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelsonlost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at thesacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already inNashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It thendevolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Doverand before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigadeformerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3, 000. Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on thesteamers. During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and someother troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passingbetween our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over theback-water in the little creek just south of Dover. 

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter fromGeneral Buckner:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862. 

SIR:--In consideration of all the circumstances governing the presentsituation of affairs at this station, I propose to the CommandingOfficer of the Federal forces the appointment of Commissioners to agreeupon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, andin that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A. 

To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Com'ding U. S. Forces, Near FortDonelson. 

To this I responded as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862. 

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army. 

SIR:--Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment ofCommissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. Noterms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen. 

To this I received the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE, February 16, 1862. 

To Brig. Gen'l U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army. 

SIR:--The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to anunexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under yourcommand, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of theConfederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrousterms which you propose. 

I am, sir, Your very ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A. 

General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the aboveletters, sent word to his different commanders on the line ofrifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to thesurrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify National troopsin their front so that all fighting might be prevented. White flagswere stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over thefort. As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received I mounted myhorse and rode to Dover. General Wallace, I found, had preceded me anhour or more. I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of GeneralBuckner. 

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards servedwith him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. In thecourse of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me thatif he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easilyas I did. I told him that if he had been in command I should not havetried in the way I did: I had invested their lines with a smaller forcethan they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigadefull 5, 000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon theircommander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. Hereplied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all thesick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry;that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men withthem; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during thepreceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but hesaid I would not find fewer than 12, 000, nor more than 15, 000. 

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury hisdead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. I gavedirections that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. Ihave no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but itfamiliarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passingto and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobservedand went on. The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thoughtthey had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out ofthe army. Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that theywere tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and Ibade them go. 

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be givenwith entire accuracy. The largest number admitted by any writer on theSouthern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He gives the number at17, 000. But this must be an underestimate. The commissary general ofprisoners reported having issued rations to 14, 623 Fort Donelsonprisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point. General Pillow reportedthe killed and wounded at 2, 000; but he had less opportunity of knowingthe actual numbers than the officers of McClernand's division, for mostof the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of thatdivision, and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrenderand when Pillow was a fugitive. It is known that Floyd and Pillowescaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than3, 000 men. Forrest escaped with about 1, 000 and others were leavingsingly and in squads all night. It is probable that the Confederateforce at Donelson, on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21, 000 in roundnumbers. 

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27, 000 men to confront theConfederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. 

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at themouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and supplies tome. At that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority oflaw to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. But everyboat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note ofencouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for anyassistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service atthe front I might send for him and he would waive rank. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPONNASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THECOMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL SMITH. 

The news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great delight all over theNorth. At the South, particularly in Richmond, the effect wascorrespondingly depressing. I was promptly promoted to the grade ofMajor-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by the Senate. All three ofmy division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonelswho commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteerservice. My chief, who was in St. Louis, telegraphed hiscongratulations to General Hunter in Kansas for the services he hadrendered in securing the fall of Fort Donelson by sending reinforcementsso rapidly. To Washington he telegraphed that the victory was due toGeneral C. F. Smith; "promote him, " he said, "and the whole country willapplaud. " On the 19th there was published at St. Louis a formal orderthanking Flag-officer Foote and myself, and the forces under ourcommand, for the victories on the Tennessee and the Cumberland. Ireceived no other recognition whatever from General Halleck. ButGeneral Cullum, his chief of staff, who was at Cairo, wrote me a warmcongratulatory letter on his own behalf. I approved of General Smith'spromotion highly, as I did all the promotions that were made. 

My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of FortDonelson the way was opened to the National forces all over theSouth-west without much resistance. If one general who would have takenthe responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of theAlleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis andVicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going onrapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at allthese centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy thatmight be found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition ofrebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so thatreinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could havebeen obtained to carry them to their destination. On the other handthere were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still attheir homes in the South-western States, who had not gone into theConfederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire togo. If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of themnever would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was giventhe enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twiceafterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the OhioRiver. 

I promptly informed the department commander of our success at FortDonelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and Nashville; andthat unless I received orders to the contrary I should take Clarksvilleon the 21st and Nashville about the 1st of March. Both these places areon the Cumberland River above Fort Donelson. As I heard nothing fromheadquarters on the subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksvilleat the time designated and found the place evacuated. The capture offorts Henry and Donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken fromColumbus to Bowling Green, and it was known that he was falling backfrom the eastern point of this line and that Buell was following, or atleast advancing. I should have sent troops to Nashville at the time Isent to Clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there weremany prisoners to be forwarded north. 

None of the reinforcements from Buell's army arrived until the 24th ofFebruary. Then General Nelson came up, with orders to report to me withtwo brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo. I knew General Buellwas advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scoutsthat the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all thesupplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the bestprovisioned posts in the South. I had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelsonto proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson. I sent agunboat also as a convoy. The Cumberland River was very high at thetime; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all rivercraft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. Nashvilleis on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching fromthe east. I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's division would beuseful in ferrying the balance of Buell's forces across. I orderedNelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to returnbelow the city and await orders. Buell, however, had already arrived inperson at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell's division of hiscommand reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possessionof the city. 

After Nelson had gone and before I had learned of Buell's arrival, Isent word to department headquarters that I should go to Nashvillemyself on the 28th if I received no orders to the contrary. Hearingnothing, I went as I had informed my superior officer I would do. Onarriving at Clarksville I saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the samethat had taken Nelson's division--and troops going aboard. I landed andcalled on the commanding officer, General C. F. Smith. As soon as hesaw me he showed an order he had just received from Buell in thesewords:

NASHVILLE, February 25, 1862. 

GENERAL C. F. SMITH, Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville. 

GENERAL:--The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to myintentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold thisside at every hazard. If the enemy should assume the offensive, and Iam assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is hisintention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only15, 000 men. I have to request you, therefore, to come forward with allthe available force under your command. So important do I consider theoccasion that I think it necessary to give this communication all theforce of orders, and I send four boats, the Diana, Woodford, John Rain, and Autocrat, to bring you up. In five or six days my force willprobably be sufficient to relieve you. 

Very respectfully, your ob't srv't, D. C. BUELL, Brigadier-GeneralComd'g. 

P. S. --The steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. 

General Smith said this order was nonsense. But I told him it wasbetter to obey it. The General replied, "of course I must obey, " andsaid his men were embarking as fast as they could. I went on up toNashville and inspected the position taken by Nelson's troops. I didnot see Buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that I hadbeen in Nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. On myreturn to the boat we met. His troops were still east of the river, andthe steamers that had carried Nelson's division up were mostly atClarksville to bring Smith's division. I said to General Buell myinformation was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. General Buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelvemiles away. I said: "Quite probably; Nashville contained valuablestores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probablytrying to carry away all he can. The fighting is doubtless with therear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting awaywith. " Buell spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of anattack from the enemy. I said, in the absence of positive information, I believed my information was correct. He responded that he "knew. ""Well, " I said, "I do not know; but as I came by Clarksville GeneralSmith's troops were embarking to join you. "

Smith's troops were returned the same day. The enemy were trying to getaway from Nashville and not to return to it. 

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all theConfederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the exceptionof those in the extreme south. On the National side the forcesconfronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separatedepartments. Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supremecommand over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon onepoint, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, dividedinto independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious actionexcept by orders from Washington. 

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston's troops east of the Mississippioccupied a line extending from Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs, on his right. As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the TennesseeRiver, the west bank of the Cumberland and Bowling Green, all werestrongly fortified. Mill Springs was intrenched. The National troopsoccupied no territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisonsalong its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront thatat Bowling Green. Johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferiorto that of the National troops; but this was compensated for by theadvantage of being sole commander of all the Confederate forces at theWest, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care ofhis rear without any detail of soldiers. But when General George H. Thomas moved upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts Henry andHeiman fell into the hands of the National forces, with their armamentsand about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten theConfederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreatfrom Bowling Green on Nashville. He reached this latter place on the14th of February, while Donelson was still besieged. Buell followedwith a portion of the Army of the Ohio, but he had to march and did notreach the east bank of the Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24thof the month, and then with only one division of his army. 

The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed ordisabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against anyNational troops that could have been brought against it within ten daysafter the arrival of the force from Bowling Green. Johnston seemed tolie quietly at Nashville to await the result at Fort Donelson, on whichhe had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in theStates of Kentucky and Tennessee. It is true, the two generals seniorin rank at Fort Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, evenclaiming great Confederate victories up to the night of the 16th whenthey must have been preparing for their individual escape. Johnston madea fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to Floyd, who hemust have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. Pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. If these officers hadbeen forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then heshould have left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to Donelson himself. If he hadbeen captured the result could not have been worse than it was. 

Johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of National troops. He wrote to Richmond on the 8th of February, "I think the gunboats ofthe enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity ofemploying their land force in cooperation. " After the fall of thatplace he abandoned Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to saveeither, and fell back into northern Mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. 

From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly unfortunate in notreceiving dispatches from General Halleck. The order of the 10th ofFebruary directing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly tothe land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for thatpurpose, reached me after Donelson was invested. I received nothingdirect which indicated that the department commander knew we were inpossession of Donelson. I was reporting regularly to the chief ofstaff, who had been sent to Cairo, soon after the troops left there, toreceive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to theSt. Louis headquarters. Cairo was at the southern end of the telegraphwire. Another line was started at once from Cairo to Paducah andSmithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively. My dispatches were all sent to Cairo by boat, but many of thoseaddressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancingwire and he failed to forward them. This operator afterwards proved tobe a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went southtaking his dispatches with him. A telegram from General McClellan to meof February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report infull the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d ofMarch. 

On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my commandback to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at Donelson. FromFort Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport, Mississippi, and Paris, Tennessee. We started from Donelson on the 4th, and the sameday I was back on the Tennessee River. On March 4th I also received thefollowing dispatch from General Halleck:

MAJ. -GEN. U. S. GRANT, Fort Henry:

You will place Maj. -Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, andremain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to reportstrength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

I was surprised. This was the first intimation I had received thatGeneral Halleck had called for information as to the strength of mycommand. On the 6th he wrote to me again. "Your going to Nashvillewithout authority, and when your presence with your troops was of theutmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return. " This wasthe first I knew of his objecting to my going to Nashville. That placewas not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expresslydeclared in orders, were "not defined. " Nashville is west of theCumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me for dutyto occupy the place. I turned over the command as directed and thenreplied to General Halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved fromfurther duty under him. 

Later I learned that General Halleck had been calling lustily for moretroops, promising that he would do something important if he could onlybe sufficiently reinforced. McClellan asked him what force he then had. Halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my commandwas concerned, but I received none of his dispatches. At last Halleckreported to Washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give thestrength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that I had goneto Nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at BullRun had been by defeat. General McClellan, on this information, orderedthat I should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should bemade into any charges against me. He even authorized my arrest. Thusin less than two weeks after the victory at Donelson, the two leadinggenerals in the army were in correspondence as to what dispositionshould be made of me, and in less than three weeks I was virtually inarrest and without a command. 

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Hallecksent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated thataccounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him toinvestigate and report the facts. He forwarded also a copy of adetailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me;but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had createdall the trouble. On the contrary, he wrote to me, "Instead of relievingyou, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assumeimmediate command, and lead it to new victories. " In consequence I feltvery grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had setme right with the government. I never knew the truth until GeneralBadeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of mycampaigns. 

General Halleck unquestionably deemed General C. F. Smith a much fitterofficer for the command of all the forces in the military district thanI was, and, to render him available for such command, desired hispromotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. It is probable that the general opinion was that Smith's long servicesin the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper personfor such command. Indeed I was rather inclined to this opinion myselfat that time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith as he haddone under me. But this did not justify the dispatches which GeneralHalleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them fromme when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. 

On receipt of the order restoring me to command I proceeded to Savannahon the Tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. General Smithwas delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of thetreatment I had received. He was on a sick bed at the time, from whichhe never came away alive. His death was a severe loss to our westernarmy. His personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment andprofessional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidenceof those he commanded as well as of those over him. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE CONFEDERATE ATTACKAT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL SHERMAN--CONDITIONOF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 

When I reassumed command on the 17th of March I found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, whileone division was at Crump's landing on the west bank about four mileshigher up, and the remainder at Pittsburg landing, five miles aboveCrump's. The enemy was in force at Corinth, the junction of the twomost important railroads in the Mississippi valley--one connectingMemphis and the Mississippi River with the East, and the other leadingsouth to all the cotton states. Still another railroad connects Corinthwith Jackson, in west Tennessee. If we obtained possession of Corinththe enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies orsupplies until that running east from Vicksburg was reached. It was thegreat strategic position at the West between the Tennessee and theMississippi rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg. 

I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion for Pittsburglanding, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at Corinth and collectingan army there under Johnston. It was my expectation to march againstthat army as soon as Buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me withthe Army of the Ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river wasthe place to start from. Pittsburg is only about twenty miles fromCorinth, and Hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mileor two nearer. I had not been in command long before I selected Hamburgas the place to put the Army of the Ohio when it arrived. The roadsfrom Pittsburg and Hamburg to Corinth converge some eight miles out. This disposition of the troops would have given additional roads tomarch over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance ofeach other. 

Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had joined the Army of theTennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made anexpedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood ofEastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroadeast of Corinth. The rains had been so heavy for some time before thatthe low-lands had become impassable swamps. Sherman debarked his troopsand started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but theriver was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributariesthreatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, andthe expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. The gunshad to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. 

On the 17th of March the army on the Tennessee River consisted of fivedivisions, commanded respectively by Generals C. F. Smith, McClernand, L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman. General W. H. L. Wallace wastemporarily in command of Smith's division, General Smith, as I havesaid, being confined to his bed. Reinforcements were arriving daily andas they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into adivision, and the command given to General Prentiss, who had beenordered to report to me. General Buell was on his way from Nashvillewith 40, 000 veterans. On the 19th of March he was at Columbia, Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg. When all reinforcementsshould have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching onCorinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though thissubject was taken into consideration. McPherson, my only militaryengineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, butreported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampmentas it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, wasyet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to beeasily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would bein the hands of the enemy. The fact is, I regarded the campaign we wereengaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy wouldleave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he wouldbe attacked where he was if he remained. This view, however, did notprevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keepadvised of all movements of the enemy. 

Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, andoccasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. On the 1stof April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing thatan advance of some kind was contemplated. On the 2d Johnston leftCorinth in force to attack my army. On the 4th his cavalry dashed downand captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed somefive miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road. Colonel Bucklandsent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with anentire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking theremainder of a brigade. The pursuit was kept up for some three milesbeyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and afternightfall Sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what hadoccurred. 

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. My apprehension wasmuch greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was forPittsburg. I had no apprehension that the enemy could really captureeither place. But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapiddash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of whichwere kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could bereinforced. Lew. Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen thathe was not removed. 

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned toSavannah in the evening. I was intending to remove my headquarters toPittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah. I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwiseshould have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. The skirmishingin our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of Aprilthat I did not leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I feltthere would be no further danger before the morning. 

On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland's advance, I was very muchinjured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while I was trying toget to the front where firing had been heard. The night was one ofimpenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing wasvisible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes oflightning. Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far, however, when Imet General W. H. L. Wallace and Colonel (afterwards General) McPhersoncoming from the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so faras the enemy was concerned. On the way back to the boat my horse's feetslipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. Theextreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the fewpreceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protractedlameness. As it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that myboot had to be cut off. For two or three days after I was unable towalk except with crutches. 

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived atSavannah and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to bein a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's landing orPittsburg as occasion required. I had learned that General Buellhimself would be at Savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on hisarrival. Affairs at Pittsburg landing had been such for several daysthat I did not want to be away during the day. I determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus savetime. He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised meof the fact and I was not aware of it until some time after. While Iwas at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction ofPittsburg landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buellinforming him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah. Onthe way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat to run in close toCrump's landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew. Wallace. I found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and Idirected him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders hemight receive. He replied that his troops were already under arms andprepared to move. 

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's landingmight not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, abouteight A. M. , I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable, andthat nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports andstores, was needed at Crump's. Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on mystaff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace tomarch immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river. CaptainBaxter made a memorandum of this order. About one P. M. , not hearingfrom Wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, I sent two moreof my staff, Colonel McPherson and Captain Rowley, to bring him up withhis division. They reported finding him marching towards Purdy, Bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by severalmiles than when he started. The road from his first position toPittsburg landing was direct and near the river. Between the two pointsa bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at whichWallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at thetwo places to support each other in case of need. Wallace did notarrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. General Wallacehas since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter wassimply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which hemarched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy whereit crosses Owl Creek on the right of Sherman; but this is not where Ihad ordered him nor where I wanted him to go. 

I never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary furtherthan to direct him to come to Pittsburg landing, without specifying bywhat route. His was one of three veteran divisions that had been inbattle, and its absence was severely felt. Later in the war GeneralWallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th ofApril, 1862. I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did hewould be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thusperform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of hiscommand, as well as to the benefit of his country. 

Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing was a log meeting-housecalled Shiloh. It stood on the ridge which divides the waters of Snakeand Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Tennessee just north ofPittsburg landing, and the latter south. This point was the key to ourposition and was held by Sherman. His division was at that time whollyraw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but I thought thisdeficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. McClernand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged atforts Henry and Donelson and were therefore veterans so far as westerntroops had become such at that stage of the war. Next to McClernandcame Prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart withone brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. The division ofGeneral C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General Smithwas still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hearing of our guns. Hisservices would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his healthpermitted his presence. The command of his division devolved uponBrigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer; aveteran too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war and had beenwith his command at Henry and Donelson. Wallace was mortally wounded inthe first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thusnecessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of hisdivision was much weakened. 

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek on theleft to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearlysouth and possibly a little west. The water in all these streams wasvery high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. The enemywas compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did withgreat vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but sufferingmuch heavier on his own. 

The Confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses ontheir own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. Theground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timberedwith scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troopson both sides. There was also considerable underbrush. A number ofattempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Shermanwas posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. But thefront attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success ofthese attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer Pittsburg landing. When the firing ceased at night the National line was all of a mile inrear of the position it had occupied in the morning. 

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded byGeneral Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left hisflanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2, 200 ofhis officers and men. General Badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th asabout the time this capture took place. He may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. General Prentisshimself gave the hour as half-past five. I was with him, as I was witheach of the division commanders that day, several times, and myrecollection is that the last time I was with him was about half-pastfour, when his division was standing up firmly and the General was ascool as if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four orlater, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured intheir camps is without any foundation whatever. If it had been true, ascurrently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, therewould not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousandskilled and wounded on the Confederate side. 

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture ofPrentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day fromSnake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or theTennessee on the left above Pittsburg. 

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing andgenerally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at allpoints at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash againstNorthern pluck and endurance. Three of the five divisions engaged onSunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received theirarms on the way from their States to the field. Many of them hadarrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load theirmuskets according to the manual. Their officers were equally ignorantof their duties. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing thatmany of the regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases, as I nowremember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearingthe whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these cases the colonels wereconstitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so theofficers and men led out of danger by them. Better troops never wentupon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwardsproved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle ofbullets and shell at Shiloh. 

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing fromone part of the field to another, giving directions to divisioncommanders. In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed itimportant to stay long with Sherman. Although his troops were thenunder fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presencewith them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled themto render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best ofveterans. McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting wasin front of these two divisions. McClernand told me on that day, the6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that daywould have been a sad one for the troops engaged at Shiloh. And hownear we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in thehand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making aslight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition tothis he had several horses shot during the day. 

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used infront; I therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--ofwhom there were many. When there would be enough of them to make ashow, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sentto reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regardto their companies, regiments or brigades. 

On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and metGeneral Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but atthat time there probably were as many as four or five thousandstragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most ofwhom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, beforethey would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protectthemselves. This meeting between General Buell and myself was on thedispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah. It wasbrief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the menlying under cover of the river bank. I saw him berating them and tryingto shame them into joining their regiments. He even threatened themwith shells from the gunboats near by. But it was all to no effect. Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of thosewho saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have no doubt thatthis sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreatwould be a good thing just then. If he had come in by the front insteadof through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and feltdifferently. Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he wouldhave witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. The distantrear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which tojudge correctly what is going on in front. Later in the war, whileoccupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, Ilearned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed muchfrom that within our own. Some of the country people estimated thestragglers from Johnston's army as high as 20, 000. Of course this wasan exaggeration. 

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: along the top ofthe bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing, Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more piecesof artillery facing south or up the river. This line of artillery wason the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into theTennessee. Hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of thisartillery, extending west and possibly a little north. McClernand camenext in the general line, looking more to the west. His division wascomplete in its organization and ready for any duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other two, wascomplete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any serviceit might be called upon to render. All three divisions were, as amatter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers fromthe terrible battle of the day. The division of W. H. L. Wallace, asmuch from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigadecommanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost itsorganization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. Prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members havingbeen killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant servicesbefore its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to thedefence of Shiloh. 

The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake Creek, a shortdistance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for thepurpose of connecting Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing. Shermanhad posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlookedboth the bridge over which Wallace was expected and the creek above thatpoint. In this last position Sherman was frequently attacked beforenight, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advancein order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came up after dark. 

There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. TheTennessee River was very high and there was water to a considerabledepth in the ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort toturn our flank, but was repelled. The gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided thearmy and effectually checked their further progress. Before any ofBuell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing hadalmost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of theenemy to advance had absolutely ceased. There was some artillery firingfrom an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do notremember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. Ashis troops arrived in the dusk General Buell marched several of hisregiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired brisklyfor some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firingreceived an injury. The attack had spent its force. 

General Lew. Wallace, with 5, 000 effective men, arrived after firing hadceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came, Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came; but none--unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men whosaved Shiloh on that first day against large odds. Buell's loss on the6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36thIndiana infantry. The Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least7, 000 men. The presence of two or three regiments of Buell's army onthe west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect inpreventing the capture of Pittsburg landing. 

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next daywould bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that I visited each division commander in person before anyreinforcements had reached the field. I directed them to throw outheavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, andpush them forward until they found the enemy, following with theirentire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soonas found. To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh. Victory was assuredwhen Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. I wasglad, however, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them withdoing all there was for them to do. 

During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell'sarmy crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, formingthe left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came upthe river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bankearly on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person. My command was thusnearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. 

During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed tothe storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a fewhundred yards back from the river bank. My ankle was so much swollenfrom the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise wasso painful, that I could get no rest. 

The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep withoutthis additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing restive underthe storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house underthe bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded menwere being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputatedas the case might require, and everything being done to save life oralleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encounteringthe enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain. 

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the campsoccupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile backfrom the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before. It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell'scommand. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tentsduring the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were droppedupon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. 

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was asfollows: General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his left; thenMcClernand and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army, was on ourextreme left, next to the river. 

Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right, McCookfollowed and formed the extreme right of Buell's command. My oldcommand thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly underBuell constituted the left wing of the army. These relative positionswere retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven fromthe field. 

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. Thisday everything was favorable to the Union side. We had now become theattacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been theday before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last pointheld by him was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, onthe left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About three o'clock, beingnear that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhereelse, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, fromtroops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. Atthis point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable forcharging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to break andonly wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join theirfriends who had started earlier. After marching to within musket-rangeI stopped and let the troops pass. The command, CHARGE, was given, andwas executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemybroke. (*7)

CHAPTER XXV. 

STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ONSHILOH. 

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right toleft and back, to see for myself the progress made. In the early partof the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson and Major Hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. We weremoving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward theriver above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to ourright, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from theedge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells andballs whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. I do notthink it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did notstop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position wehalted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting asif ready to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struckhim forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirelythrough. In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given nosign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the metalscabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off;before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. There werethree of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one asword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no worse. 

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains forsome days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemycarrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, madethem still worse for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had notthe heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feeldisposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, topursue. Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only afew weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time past, a departmentcommander, while I commanded only a district. I did not meet Buell inperson until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; buthad I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at leastrequested him to follow. 

I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found thatthe enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, someammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening theirloads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out wefound their field hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must haveresulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners andprobably some guns. 

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, andbut few in the East equalled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw anopen field, in our possession on the second day, over which theConfederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered withdead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, inany direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching theground. On our side National and Confederate troops were mingledtogether in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the fieldnearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not beenploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, busheshad grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not oneof these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were allcut down. 

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience ofthe army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We werewithout intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more thanhalf the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drillas soldiers. The officers with them, except the division commanders andpossibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equallyinexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the menwho achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. 

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroyan army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavyloss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged andconvinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. 

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders tolet the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detailparties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury theConfederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers soburied. The latter part of these instructions was not carried out byall; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some ofthe parties sent out by McClernand. The heaviest loss sustained by theenemy was in front of these two divisions. 

The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have beenintrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and spade had been butlittle resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subjectunder consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, asalready stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besidesthis, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drillmore than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that hadbeen hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments ofincomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline wereworth more to our men than fortifications. 

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as muchprofessional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. Ihad been two years at West Point with him, and had served with himafterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more. Hewas not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimateacquaintances. He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidenceand respect of all who knew him. He was a strict disciplinarian, andperhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who"enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. Onesystem embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men ofsocial standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in anyother occupation. General Buell became an object of harsh criticismlater, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. No one who knewhim ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing couldbe more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war andthen betray the trust. When I came into command of the army in 1864, Irequested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty. 

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerablythrough the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had beenconducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every worddropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did notconfirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the waror the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurredfor me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjustcharges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the verycharge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty. This brought from GeneralBuell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York World some timebefore I received the letter itself. I could very well understand hisgrievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustainedby an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I repliedto him, but not through the press. I kept no copy of my letter, nor didI ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer. 

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces atthe beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon ofthe first day. This wound, as I understood afterwards, was notnecessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But he was a man who would notabandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger andconsequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted bythe loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon afterdied. The news was not long in reaching our side and I suppose wasquite an encouragement to the National soldiers. 

I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war and later as an officerin the regular army. He was a man of high character and ability. Hiscontemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to knowhim personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to provethe most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce. 

I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army toprove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon hismilitary ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches ofJohnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer'squalifications as a soldier. My judgment now is that he was vacillatingand undecided in his actions. 

All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were so discouraging to theauthorities in Richmond that Jefferson Davis wrote an unofficial letterto Johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, andsaying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. The letter was nota reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as thoughit had been one. General Johnston raised another army as rapidly as hecould, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth. He knew theNational troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. But he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of hisoperations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign whichwould restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish stillmore. We have the authority of his son and biographer for saying thathis plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh and crush them; then tocross the Tennessee and destroy the army of Buell, and push the waracross the Ohio River. The design was a bold one; but we have the sameauthority for saying that in the execution Johnston showed vacillationand indecision. He left Corinth on the 2d of April and was not ready toattack until the 6th. The distance his army had to march was less thantwenty miles. Beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to theattack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the Nationaltroops would attack the Confederates in their intrenchments; second, wewere in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. Johnston not only listened to the objection of Beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. Onthe evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of hisgenerals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. During this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the National troops opening fire on the enemy. Thisseemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battleof Shiloh. It also seems to me to settle the question as to whetherthere was a surprise. 

I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or hisability. But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by manyof his friends. He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. 

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to thecommand, which he retained to the close of the battle and during thesubsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but Ido not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under thecircumstances. Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won whenJohnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me wouldhave been annihilated or captured. IFS defeated the Confederates atShiloh. There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefullybeaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlesslyover the enemy and IF all of theirs had taken effect. Commandinggenerals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact thatwhen he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make acharge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there wasneither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unboundedconfidence on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, nohour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did notarrive at an earlier hour. 

The description of the battle of Shiloh given by Colonel Wm. PrestonJohnston is very graphic and well told. The reader will imagine that hecan see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of Unionsoldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towardsthe Tennessee River, which was a little more than two miles away at thebeginning of the onset. If the reader does not stop to inquire why, withsuch Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the National troops were not all killed, captured or driven into theriver, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. But I witnessed thefight from the National side from eight o'clock in the morning untilnight closed the contest. I see but little in the description that Ican recognize. The Confederate troops fought well and deservecommendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more thantheir just dues. 

The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of thefirst day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had beenvery heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on theNational side, with the difference that those of the enemy left thefield entirely and were not brought back to their respective commandsfor many days. On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell backfurther than the landing on the river, and many of these were in linefor duty on the second day. The admissions of the highest Confederateofficers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. The victory was not to either party until the battle was over. It wasthen a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohioboth participated. But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entirerebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and nightalone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson'sdivision. 

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skillclaimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing tocriticise except the claims put forward for it since. But theConfederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority ingeneralship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to theUnion troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The troopson both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreignfoe. It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little moredash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly lessenduring. 

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their menagainst ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at severalpoints at once. This they did with daring and energy, until at nightthe rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was tobe prepared to resist assaults wherever made. The object of theConfederates on the second day was to get away with as much of theirarmy and material as possible. Ours then was to drive them from ourfront, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of theirmen and material. We were successful in driving them back, but not sosuccessful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. Asit was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as muchartillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one greatcapture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemygained from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman lost seven pieces ofartillery, McClernand six, Prentiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries. On the 7th Sherman captured seven guns, McClernand three and the Army ofthe Ohio twenty. 

At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces on the morning ofthe 6th was 33, 000 men. Lew. Wallace brought 5, 000 more afternightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40, 955. According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this numberprobably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard ornurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry amusket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving payfrom the government is counted. Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a timeduring the 6th when we had more than 25, 000 men in line. On the 7thBuell brought 20, 000 more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's didnot reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firinghad ceased, but not in time to be of much service. 

Our loss in the two days' fight was 1, 754 killed, 8, 408 wounded and2, 885 missing. Of these, 2, 103 were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of 10, 699, of whom 1, 728 were killed, 8, 012 wounded and 957 missing. This estimate must be incorrect. Weburied, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of thedivisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and 4, 000was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. Beauregardreports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40, 000, and their totalloss during the two days at 10, 699; and at the same time declares thathe could put only 20, 000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. 

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed italways did both before and subsequently when I was in command. Thenature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it coulddo nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. Thecountry was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of thebattle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger fromfire from the gunboats as the foe. But about sundown, when the Nationaltroops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was nearthe river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which wasdelivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when firing hadentirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea ofdropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutesduring the night. This was done with effect, as is proved by theConfederate reports. 

Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapsesuddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of itsarmies. Donelson and Henry were such victories. An army of more than21, 000 men was captured or destroyed. Bowling Green, Columbus andHickman, Kentucky, fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville, Tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell intoour hands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths tothe head of navigation, were secured. But when Confederate armies werecollected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, fromMemphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumedthe offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had beenlost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except bycomplete conquest. Up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property ofthe citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to theirsentiments, whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regardedit as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found attheir homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support orsupply armies. Protection was still continued over such supplies aswere within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold;but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded asmuch contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction wasaccomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as thedestruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under thedirection of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermasteror commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northerndepots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when itcould not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone tothe support of secession and rebellion. 

This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening theend. 

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg landing, has been perhaps lessunderstood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistentlymisunderstood, than any other engagement between National andConfederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of thebattle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau and, in a speechbefore a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of theseappeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after publicopinion had been most erroneously formed. 

I myself made no report to General Halleck, further than was containedin a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that anengagement had been fought and announcing the result. A few daysafterwards General Halleck moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landingand assumed command of the troops in the field. Although next to him inrank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I wasignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territorywithin my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troopsengaged at Shiloh I was not permitted to see one of the reports ofGeneral Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they werepublished by the War Department long after the event. For this reason Inever made a full official report of this engagement. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED. 

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April andimmediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Popearrived with an army 30, 000 strong, fresh from the capture of IslandNumber Ten in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburglanding five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: theArmy of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Popecommanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided thecombined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. Major-General George H. Thomas, who had been in Buell's army, wastransferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee and givencommand of the right wing, composed of all of that army exceptMcClernand's and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was assigned tothe command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace'sdivisions. Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Popethe left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I was named second incommand of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of theright wing and reserve. 

Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to send intheir reports without delay to department headquarters. Those fromofficers of the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me; but from theArmy of the Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing throughmy hands. General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but I positively declined on the ground that he had received the reportsof a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their coming through me. He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, butexplained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving thecommand, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it toWashington. 

Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander foran advance on Corinth. Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, andexpeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if ourposition was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towardsCorinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were alsoconstructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by differentroutes could reinforce each other. All commanders were cautionedagainst bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that itwould be better to retreat than to fight. By the 30th of April allpreparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile and Ohiorailroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth as far asMonterey twelve miles from Pittsburg. Everywhere small bodies of theenemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force tofight battles. 

Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburglanding and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, butprobably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four milessouth of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, andat the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with theMobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile. From Pittsburgto Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevationthat makes high hills to pass over. In 1862 the greater part of thecountry was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passingthrough with ease. There are two small creeks running from north of thetown and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creekwhich empties into the Tuscumbia River. Corinth is on the ridge betweenthese streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. The creeksare insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widensout in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of anenemy. On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy wasstrongly intrenched. 

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, andconsequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. We ought tohave seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then itshould have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops atPittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival ofPope should not have been awaited. There was no time from the battle ofShiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not haveleft if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from theirdefeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact fromhaving been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that astand for the time would have been impossible. Beauregard madestrenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. Heappealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and receiveda few. A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the samequarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He hadnegroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooksand laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into theranks. The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, werenot willing to part with their negroes. It is only fair to state thatthey probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and forthe families left at home. 

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shilohwith 17, 000 men. Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted toadd to the strength at Corinth. With these reinforcements and the newregiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large forceon paper, but probably not much over 50, 000 effective men. We estimatedhis strength at 70, 000. Our own was, in round numbers, 120, 000. Thedefensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made50, 000 then enough to maintain their position against double that numberfor an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. 

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shilohupon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the close. The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of coursethe small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way foran advance. Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "notto bring on an engagement. " "It is better to retreat than to fight. "The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simplyobservers there were but few engagements that even threatened to becomebattles. All the engagements fought ought to have served to encouragethe enemy. Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; aline was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troopsto concentrate in case of attack. The National armies were thoroughlyintrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth. 

For myself I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent directto the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made fromone line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. My positionwas so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during thesiege to be relieved. 

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. Pope being on the extreme left did not see so muchof his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. On the 3dof May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, butthrew forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth. His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, butcarried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. There would thenhave been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to forma new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conformwith the general line. On the 8th of May he moved again, taking hiswhole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to therebel line. Again he was ordered back. By the 4th of May the centreand right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out. Their advance wasslow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. Theleft wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself closeto the enemy. The creek with the marsh before described, separated thetwo lines. Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained eitherline at this point. 

Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right ofthe right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and four from theworks in their front. The creek, which was a formidable obstacle foreither side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on ourright. Here the enemy occupied two positions. One of them, as much astwo miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation anddefended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. A heavy woodintervened between this work and the National forces. In rear to thesouth there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of thisclearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied byinfantry. Sherman's division carried these two positions with some lossto himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May, and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as completeas it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west of the Mobile andOhio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroadeast of Corinth. 

Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that Ithought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by therear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope wouldfind no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no seriousartificial one. The ground, or works, occupied by our left could beheld by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. Tothe right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. I wassilenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested anunmilitary movement. 

Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command wasthen on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had beenevacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinthwith his brigade. Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out ofCorinth constantly. Some of the men who had been engaged in variouscapacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, byputting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains weremoving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. They saidloaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones comingin. Subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and onthe 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared forbattle and announced in orders that there was every indication that ourleft was to be attacked that morning. Corinth had already beenevacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession withoutopposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. TheConfederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on thearrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees thatreinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or wounded man leftby the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had beenblown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels ofwagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. 

The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategicimportance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. Itwas nearly bloodless. It is a question whether the MORALE of theConfederate troops engaged at Corinth was not improved by the immunitywith which they were permitted to remove all public property and thenwithdraw themselves. On our side I know officers and men of the Army ofthe Tennessee--and I presume the same is true of those of the othercommands--were disappointed at the result. They could not see how themere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effectiverebel armies existed. They believed that a well-directed attack wouldat least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth. Formyself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a twodays' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements afterthe battle of Shiloh. 

General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinthon a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took thewhole National army to do it. All commanding points two or three milesto the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. It wasexpected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100, 000 men tofully man them. It was probably thought that a final battle of the warwould be fought at that point. These fortifications were never used. Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops, General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and GeneralBuell soon followed. Buell was the senior of the two generals andcommanded the entire column. The pursuit was kept up for some thirtymiles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war orprisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and werewilling captives. On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all backat Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of thesemovements. 

The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6thof June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces tookpossession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source tothat point. The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put ingood condition and held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson, Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held theTennessee River from its mouth to Eastport. New Orleans and Baton Rougehad fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now theConfederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication withRichmond to the single line of road running east from Vicksburg. Todispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the firstimportance. The possession of the Mississippi by us from Memphis toBaton Rouge was also a most important object. It would be equal to theamputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. 

After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80, 000 men, besidesenough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motionfor the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of therebellion. In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swellthe effective force. But the work of depletion commenced. Buell withthe Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphisand Charleston railroad. This he was ordered to repair as he advanced--only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops assoon as he was out of the way. If he had been sent directly toChattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisionsalong the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could havearrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the lossof life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Braggwould then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possessionof middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone Riverand Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside wouldnot have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himselfor escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought. These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinthfell into the possession of the National forces. The positive resultsmight have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or toany other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi. 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURNTO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCEUPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT. 

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove myheadquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked, between the fall ofDonelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty underHalleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation ofthe town. I then obtained permission to leave the department, butGeneral Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urgedme so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain. Myapplication to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point withmy staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. There wasa detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles westto be stationed as a guard to the railroad. I went under cover of thisescort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to LaGrange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me. 

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There wereno troops stationed between these two points, except a small forceguarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange. General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had hisheadquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious countryhouse. The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, heinvited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him. I accepted theinvitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was athorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with arecital of the services he was rendering the cause. He was too old tobe in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but hismeans enabled him to be useful in other ways. In ordinary times thehomestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supplythe slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi. Nowhe raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have thatyear a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men whohad gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the"patriotism" of those better off. The crops around me looked fine, andI had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to begathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvestthem for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of therebellion instead of its support. I felt, however, the greatest respectfor the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughlybelieved in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible toconceive. 

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was verywarm, even for that latitude and season. With my staff and small escortI started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twentymiles of Memphis. At this point I saw a very comfortable-lookingwhite-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a littledistance from the road. I let my staff and escort ride ahead while Ihalted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. I was invited atonce to dismount and come in. I found my host very genial andcommunicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady ofthe house announced dinner and asked me to join them. The host, however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. 

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up fromthe southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis. A mile west ofthis junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shadeof forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet backfrom the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of theroad. I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of theafternoon, and then rode into Memphis. 

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was aMr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union. He had not pressed me to tarrylonger with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr. Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch asif something had hit him. Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel GeneralJackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. Hisneighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche inthat of the Union. The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknownto Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it andwould give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasantto him after the call of Dr. Smith. 

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guardingworkmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis. On the day Ientered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which hadbeen sent east for the troops so engaged. The drovers were not enlistedmen and he released them. A day or two after one of these drovers cameto my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, saidJackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that hewas six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad whenhe learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and hadridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with thatfrom La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passedthree-quarters of an hour before. He thought it would be useless topursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me withmy party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even armsin our hands with which to defend ourselves. 

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at notcapturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among thesoldiers the facts related were learned. A day or two later Mr. DeLoche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivilityin not insisting on my staying for dinner. He said that his wifeaccused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of hisneighbor, he had felt restless until I got away. I never met GeneralJackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at hisvery comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado. I remindedhim of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that hewas thankful now he had not captured me. I certainly was very thankfultoo. 

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long. The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel tome. Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where thecitizens were at home in any great numbers. Dover was within thefortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, everycitizen was gone. There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, andbut very few at Corinth. Memphis, however, was a populous city, andthere were many of the citizens remaining there who were not onlythoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thoughtthat even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if theycould only be induced to make an honest confession. It took hours of mytime every day to listen to complaints and requests. The latter weregenerally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaintswere not always, or even often, well founded. Two instances will markthe general character. First: the officer who commanded at Memphisimmediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troopshad ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to thesoldiers. Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. Second:at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a lawconfiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including thedebts of Southerners to Northern men. In consequence of this law, whenMemphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all theevidences he could obtain of such debts. 

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. Thegentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own highstanding as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian. He was a deacon in thechurch which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and bya Union chaplain filling the pulpit. He did not use the word "defile, "but he expressed the idea very clearly. He asked that the church berestored to the former congregation. I told him that no order had beenissued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. He said ofcourse the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differedso radically with them on questions of government. I told him thetroops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and thatthey would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimedfrom the pulpit. This closed the argument on the first point. 

Then came the second. The complainant said that he wanted the papersrestored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal underprotest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number oflarge business houses at the North; that "his government" hadconfiscated all debts due "alien enemies, " and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the"government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had beenpermitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officialsknowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollarreceived. He said that his "government, " when it came in possession ofall its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claimshe had surrendered to the provost-marshal. His impudence was so sublimethat I was rather amused than indignant. I told him, however, that ifhe would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate governmentwould ever molest him. He left, no doubt, as much amazed at myassurance as I was at the brazenness of his request. 

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic ordersappointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters inWashington. His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field ofduty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety andinterests of his previous command. I was next in rank, and hetelegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters atCorinth. I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had beenordered to a different field and did not know whether to move myheadquarters or not. I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staffwith me, and received word in reply: "This place will be yourheadquarters. You can judge for yourself. " I left Memphis for my newfield without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month. General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was veryuncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been calledto Corinth for. 

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief Iremained in command of the district of West Tennessee. Practically Ibecame a department commander, because no one was assigned to thatposition over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the25th of October. General Halleck while commanding the Department of theMississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooganorth. My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west ofthe Cumberland River. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, aspreviously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, withinstructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as headvanced. Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of theMobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus. Othertroops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to GrandJunction, and still others on the road west to Memphis. 

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120, 000 men which enteredCorinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was putentirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile tothe Union. One of the first things I had to do was to constructfortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could bespared to man them. The structures that had been built during themonths of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of theengineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in designbut suited to the command available to defend them. 

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with thesituation as rapidly as possible. The forces at Donelson, Clarksvilleand Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, Iregarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth, to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Bolivar. Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphisrailroad were abandoned. 

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five toforty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri. Thismovable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar orMemphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be toweaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force presentcould guard. The most anxious period of the war, to me, was during thetime the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired bythe fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was sufficiently reinforcedto take the offensive. The enemy also had cavalry operating in ourrear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back toColumbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all oursupplies. Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points ofthe command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus. Withthese points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus, thendown the river by boat. To reinforce Memphis would take three or fourdays, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would havetaken at least two days. Memphis therefore was practically isolatedfrom the balance of the command. But it was in Sherman's hands. Thentoo the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuableauxiliary. 

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there wasmuch fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but theseencounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to benow almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. Some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican warwhich attracted so much of the attention of the public when theyoccurred. About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to bereinforced from Jackson and Corinth. On the 27th there was skirmishingon the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learnedfrom Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Braggin person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by wayof Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to joinhim at Rome. Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, witha large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost. I proposed tothe general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informedthat, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troopsWAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell. 

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanoogaacross country, while his troops were transported over a longround-about road to the same destination, without need of guards exceptwhen in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troopsenjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. Buellwas marching through a hostile region and had to have his communicationsthoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. More men were requiredthe farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country. I, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purelyon the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force farinferior to my own. 

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon thecountry, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so faras practicable. I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lineswithout gloves, " to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes andfrom our lines. I do not recollect having arrested and confined acitizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. I am aware that agreat many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet, Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was myorder. I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who wassaid to be confined by my order. There were many citizens at home whodeserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity wasafforded to inflict an injury to the National cause. This class was notof the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that afew guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones shouldsuffer. 

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell. They were sent the same day by way of Decatur. On the 22d ColonelRodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment. 

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments offthe field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh. He was bynature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at hisaction when the battle was over. He came to me with tears in his eyesand begged to be allowed to have another trial. I felt great sympathyfor him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville andDonelson. He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubtbecause he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, hisconstitutional weakness overcame him. He inquired the number of men theenemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than hisown he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and havingsatisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrenderedand informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to dothe same. The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved uponDonelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meetthem and drove them away. 

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was thefact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible fromthe South and directed me to give every facility toward that end. Payin gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on therailroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would bereceived. This opened to the enemy not only the means of convertingcotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which theyso much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate andintelligent information in regard to our position and strength. It wasalso demoralizing to the troops. Citizens obtaining permits from thetreasury department had to be protected within our lines and givenfacilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not liketo be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of anenemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who sharednone of their dangers. 

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20thand 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to beabout 4, 000 strong. The enemy was driven away with a loss of more thanone hundred men. On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon wasattacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on thefield dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteenwounded. On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy instrong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with greatloss. Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of thebattlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. Our loss, asreported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. On the 2d ofSeptember I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell. Jacksonand Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements. On the4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also toLouisville, Kentucky. 

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march uponChattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent onedivision from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place. This gaveBuell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repairthe railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteendays at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by theNational forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. Theroad between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put inrepair by other troops, so that communication with the North would havebeen opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by theNational troops. If Buell had been permitted to move in the firstinstance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of theArmy of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrownfour divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair andguard it. 

Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September. I was atthe station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and foundGeneral P. H. Sheridan with them. I expressed surprise at seeing himand said that I had not expected him to go. He showed decideddisappointment at the prospect of being detained. I felt a littlenettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. 

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had servedeleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast whenthe war broke out. He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, andbefore the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, toget East. He went to Missouri. Halleck had known him as a verysuccessful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians onthe Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-westMissouri. There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward whileSheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with hisimmediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing theuse of public transportation for private purposes. He asked to berelieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged andhis request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April, 1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. During the advance onCorinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry. Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him tosuggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying hewould appoint a good man without reference to his State. Sheridan wasnamed; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reachedhe was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of theMississippi. He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July withtwo small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three timesas numerous as his own. By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness ofattack he completely routed the enemy. For this he was made abrigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army aboutCorinth. On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me. Hisdeparture was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished servicesin his new field. 

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and onthe night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up worksaround the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came fromthe front. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA. 

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of theMississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville. Therewere at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. This force constituted my left wing, ofwhich Rosecrans was in command. General Ord commanded the centre, fromBethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson toBolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River. General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of hisbrigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River bythe Memphis and Ohio railroad. This made the most convenientarrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces uponany threatened point. All the troops of the command were withintelegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman. Bybringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point therewas a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be hadwith that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangementall the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by railby the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troopsfrom Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place. 

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price, apparently upon Corinth. One division was brought from Memphis toBolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of theenemy. I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding theterritory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcingof Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Already the Army of Northern Virginia haddefeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland. In theCentre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marchingparallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River. 

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this timemy entire force numbered less than 50, 000 men, of all arms. Thisincluded everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction. If I tooshould be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing thebelligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line wasalready farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening ofthe war. It is true Nashville was never given up after its firstcapture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there wouldhave been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in WestTennessee had been compelled to fall back. To say at the end of thesecond year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East waspushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the Westbeyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would havebeen discouraging indeed. As it was, many loyal people despaired in thefall of 1862 of ever saving the Union. The administration at Washingtonwas much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But Ibelieve there was never a day when the President did not think that, insome way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. 

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroadeast of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in. By the 12th all werein except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin. Hehad been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yetbeen brought in to Corinth. 

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a townabout twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charlestonrailroad. Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place. Hemade no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troopsinto Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained tobe. The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief ofthe army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in Eastand Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their accountas for any danger threatening my command. I had not force enough atCorinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there wasdanger that before troops could be got from other points he might be faron his way across the Tennessee. To prevent this all spare forces atBolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentratedat Jackson for their transportation. Within twenty-four hours from thetransmission of the order the troops were at their destination, althoughthere had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward traingetting off the track and stopping all the others. This gave areinforcement of near 8, 000 men, General Ord in command. GeneralRosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force ofabout 9, 000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be leftbehind. It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' marchsouth of us, with a large force. It might have been part of his plan toattack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from thesouth. My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reachCorinth or go to his relief. 

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where hiscommand was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroadeastward. While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing allthe roads and streams in the surrounding country. He was alsopersonally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to himin my plans for the approach. We had cars enough to transport all ofGeneral Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point onthe road about seven miles west of Iuka. From there his troops were tomarch by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from thenorth-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position southof Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A small force was to hold theJacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main forcemoved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east. This planwas suggested by Rosecrans. 

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidableobstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all ofwhich, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. TheTennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidableobstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. Ord was on thenorth-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in thatdirection it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would havecarried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated itfrom all support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iukauntil we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. 

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail toBurnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part ofthe programme. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during theday and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the nextmorning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the tworoads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarterssimultaneously. Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detainany cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash intoCorinth until I could be notified. There was a telegraph wire along therailroad, so there would be no delay in communication. I detained carsand locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord'scommand at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead ofIuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7, 000 or8, 000 before he could have arrived. I remained at Burnsville with adetachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with mytwo wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon afterleaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove therebels back with considerable loss, including one general officerkilled. He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylightthe next morning. I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatchfrom Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear ofhis column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that hewould still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believethis possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles arenot in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. Itmight do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to makean assault. I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch andordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the soundof guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed to notify hisofficers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound eithertowards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained. 

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with thehead of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iukaleaves the road going east. He here turned north without sending anytroops to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacintoroad he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten anddriven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss wasconsiderable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmitsounds towards either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor any one in eithercommand heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. After theengagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. This wasbrought by a courier. There was no road between Burnsville and theposition then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for aman on horseback. The courier bearing the message was compelled to movewest nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville. This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battlethat had taken place during the afternoon. I at once notified Ord ofthe fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The nextmorning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with butlittle resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, withouthearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops comingfrom the south-west must be up by that time. Rosecrans, however, hadput no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage ofthis neglect and retreated by that road during the night. Word was soonbrought to me that our troops were in Iuka. I immediately rode intotown and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on withhim a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I lefthim and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had sohigh an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time. 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OFTHE TENNESSEE. 

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east toreinforce Buell. This threw the army at my command still more on thedefensive. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except atCorinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction. Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivarbecame our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad. Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions weresent out to watch the movements of the enemy. We were in a countrywhere nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us andfriendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and thenoften returned without it. 

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of GrandJunction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry andartillery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person tosuperintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might bemade upon. The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel thethreatened movement without a battle. Our cavalry followed the enemysouth of Davis' mills in Mississippi. 

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strikethe Mississippi River above Memphis. At the same time other pointswithin my command were so threatened that it was impossible toconcentrate a force to drive him away. There was at this juncture alarge Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within mycommand, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break upthe Mississippi Central railroad far to the south. This would not onlyhave called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of alarge rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raidson the enemy's line of supplies. Geographical lines between thecommands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they weretoo rigidly adhered to. 

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as hadapparently been his intention. He was simply covering a deeper design;one much more important to his cause. By the 1st of October it wasfully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force anddetermination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust hadjoined their strength for this purpose. There was some skirmishingoutside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebelsmassed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and theMobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinthand all possible reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must come by acircuitous route. 

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, whowas at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements pickedup along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut had beenordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dornwas coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in withthe advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening ofthe 3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, tocapture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. In that casethe enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and heldat bay all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could have takenthe offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times theirnumber and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinthto hold them. He came near success, some of his troops penetrating theNational lines at least once, but the works that were built afterHalleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until thetroops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel frontand rear. The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: alltheir charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. The loss onour side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's. McPhersoncame up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemyas was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support ofRosecrans just after the repulse. His approach, as well as that ofHurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. GeneralRosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I hadgiven specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue themoment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated theorder after the battle. In the first order he was notified that theforce of 4, 000 men which was going to his assistance would be in greatperil if the enemy was not pursued. 

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took commandof his troops. This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreatingcolumn just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten milesout from Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for theoperations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ordattacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in apanic. Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed offthe bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and met the mainforce. He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridgeand compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higherup the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement and the commanddevolved on Hurlbut. 

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and thentook the wrong road. Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with awagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. His march wastherefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards hissupplies. Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, withoutanything except what the men carried on their persons, would have beenworth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possiblybeen. Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route takenby the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a streamin front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leadingnorth and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched asfar as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far frombattle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any suchforce as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and hemight have been in great peril. 

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return. He kept onto Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. Ithereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to thegeneral-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back. Hadhe gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn hadat Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and theprobabilities are he would have lost his army. 

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1, 812wounded and 232 missing. The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported1, 423 dead and 2, 225 prisoners. We fought behind breastworks, whichaccounts in some degree for the disparity. Among the killed on our sidewas General Hackelman. General Oglesby was badly, it was for some timesupposed mortally, wounded. I received a congratulatory letter from thePresident, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. 

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though notso complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now thinkwas within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth. Sincethe war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow tothe enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at theNorth. The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safetyof the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receivingreinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movementagainst Vicksburg. 

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton's being in command at HollySprings and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama andTexas. The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with mycommand, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the armyin Middle Tennessee. I was delighted at the promotion of GeneralRosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that whenindependent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at thattime, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. As asubordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and haddetermined to relieve him from duty that very day. 

At the close of the operations just described my force, in roundnumbers, was 48, 500. Of these 4, 800 were in Kentucky and Illinois, 7, 000 in Memphis, 19, 200 from Mound City south, and 17, 500 at Corinth. General McClernand had been authorized from Washington to go north andorganize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi. These new levieswith other reinforcements now began to come in. 

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department of theTennessee. Reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative. This was a greatrelief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a largedistrict of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy readyto give information of our every move. I have described veryimperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place duringthis time. To describe all would take more space than I can allot tothe purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops whodistinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9)

CHAPTER XXX. 

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OFHOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS DOWN THEMISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE ANDFOOD. 

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first highground coming close to the river below Memphis. From there a railroadruns east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of theSouthern States. A railroad also starts from the opposite side of theriver, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louisiana. Vicksburg wasthe only channel, at the time of the events of which this chaptertreats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by theMississippi. So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigationof the river was prevented. Hence its importance. Points on the riverbetween Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but theirfall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. 

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November asindicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words:"I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisionsfrom Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee]to-morrow, and take command in person. If found practicable, I will goto Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad andtelegraph as I go. "

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad fromabout twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky;the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with theMobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to BearCreek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis. My entirecommand was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardlythat if kept on the defensive. By moving against the enemy and into hisunsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large forcefor field operations. My moving force at that time was about 30, 000men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at aboutthe same number. General McPherson commanded my left wing and GeneralC. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the rightwing. Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied HollySprings and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad. On the8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerableforce seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. Theroad from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as thetroops advanced. 

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that largebodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they alwayscovered and guarded in all forward movements. There was delay thereforein repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies tothe front. 

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions fromWashington, all the forage within reach was collected under thesupervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under thechief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to takethem; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as governmentstores. The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of thepossibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from thecountry itself. 

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "Freedman'sBureau" took its origin. Orders of the government prohibited theexpulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they camein voluntarily. Humanity forbade allowing them to starve. With such anarmy of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about GrandJunction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. There was no special authority for feeding them unless they wereemployed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but onlyable-bodied young men were suitable for such work. This labor wouldsupport but a very limited percentage of them. The plantations were alldeserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children aboveten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. To do thiswork with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under acompetent chief was necessary. On inquiring for such a man ChaplainEaton, now and for many years the very able United States Commissionerof Education, was suggested. He proved as efficient in that field as hehas since done in his present one. I gave him all the assistants andguards he called for. We together fixed the prices to be paid for thenegro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. Thecotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers toreceive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half centsper pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shippingthe cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. Citizensremaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of havingtheir crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. 

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining. The money was not paid tothem directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. Theygave me no trouble afterwards. 

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the MississippiRiver to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. A goodprice was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of governmentsteamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply withfuel). Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. Inthis way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they hadnever known before. 

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very muchdisturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to have aseparate and independent command within mine, to operate againstVicksburg by way of the Mississippi River. Two commanders on the samefield are always one too many, and in this case I did not think thegeneral selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fithim for so important a position. I feared for the safety of the troopsintrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. But on the 12th I received a dispatchfrom General Halleck saying that I had command of all the troops sent tomy department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased. The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs, and the enemy fell backsouth of the Tallahatchie. 

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, exceptthe few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction. This was along line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in anenemy's country. On the 15th of November, while I was still at HollySprings, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus. We were butforty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet wasfor me to take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the sameplace. At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I gavehim his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down theMississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman, who was alwaysprompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only fourregiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a smalldetachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their wayfrom the north to Memphis. About this time General Halleck orderedtroops from Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was notunder my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear. Theexpedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and wassuccessful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damagedone was very slight and was soon repaired. 

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroadbridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. Acrossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. I sentthe cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. Thiscaused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possiblyaccelerated by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn. The enemy wasfollowed as far south as Oxford by the main body of troops, and someseventeen miles farther by McPherson's command. Here the pursuit washalted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in orderto bring up supplies. The piles on which the railroad bridge rested hadbeen left standing. The work of constructing a roadway for the troopswas but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. 

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that anexpedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to havea competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th ofDecember back to Memphis to take charge. The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee. OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862. 

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. Onyour arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of theMississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in yourown army. As soon as possible move with them down the river to thevicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleetunder command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of thatplace in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, maydictate. 

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc. , necessary totake, will be left entirely with yourself. The Quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30, 000 men;should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will beauthorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may comeinto the port of Memphis. 

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with AdmiralPorter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. 

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you willembark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forceshere in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movementsof the enemy may make necessary. 

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, andwhatever cavalry may be there. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d ofDecember I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy southof the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg. On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helenatroops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them andthe Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thussecure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same day, the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the countrysouth of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25, 000 troops at Memphis bythe 20th for the Vicksburg expedition. I sent Sherman with twodivisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and askedwhether I should command the expedition down the river myself or sendSherman. I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishmentof the great object in view. I sent Sherman and so informed GeneralHalleck. 

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desireto get him in command of the forces separated from my directsupervision. I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was hissenior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War toexercise that particular command, --and independently. I doubtedMcClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that inforestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whoseauthority to command was above both him and me. 

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between usor between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my goingfurther south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was themain part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was thedefence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. Ihoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rearand into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held thebetter. 

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that ourmovements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held awayfrom Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expectedto abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha. With that point as asecondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoountil communications could be opened with the Mississippi wascontemplated. 

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, thatif the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates ofVicksburg. I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada onthe Yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a newbase of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada tofall back upon in case of failure. It should be remembered that at thetime I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operatein an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. A haltwas called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, tobring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. 

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide mycommand into four army corps, with General McClernand to command one ofthem and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operatedown the Mississippi. This interfered with my plans, but probablyresulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. McClernand wasat that time in Springfield, Illinois. The order was obeyed without anydelay. Dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. 

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondarybase of supplies, captured the garrison of 1, 500 men commanded byColonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all ourmunitions of war, food and forage. The capture was a disgraceful one tothe officer commanding but not to the troops under him. At the sametime Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, andColumbus, Kentucky, doing much damage to it. This cut me off from allcommunication with the north for more than a week, and it was more thantwo weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtainedin the regular way. This demonstrated the impossibility of maintainingso long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving inan enemy's country. I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaigninto the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange andGrand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road toMemphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to drawsupplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time. 

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalryat the front back to drive him from the country. He had start enough tomove north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack severalsmall garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. All these hefound warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn didnot succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at HollySprings, which was larger than all the others attacked by him puttogether. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made nopreparations to meet him. He did not even notify his command. 

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuatedIuka on the approach of the enemy. General Rosecrans denounced him forthe act and desired to have him tried and punished. I sustained thecolonel at the time because his command was a small one compared withthat of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had donewell to get away without falling into their hands. His leaving largestores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight andexcused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should, however, have destroyed them. This last surrender demonstrated to mymind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct. The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed eitherthe disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed toserve, or gross cowardice. 

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompaniedGeneral Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreatwas almost a panic. The roads were bad and it was difficult to move theartillery and trains. Why there should have been a panic I do not see. No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River. Had I knownthe demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that centralMississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been inpursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in myrear. 

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was todispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect andbring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen mileseast and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leavingtwo months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. Itshowed that we could have subsisted off the country for two monthsinstead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. Thistaught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaignwhen our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days'rations by the commissary. Our loss of supplies was great at HollySprings, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from thecountry and by the lesson taught. 

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of oursupplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in Oxford. They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, toask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops andwagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteenmiles on each side of the road. Countenances soon changed, and so didthe inquiry. The next was, "What are WE to do?" My response was thatwe had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resourceswhile visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enoughto destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected thatmen, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. Iadvised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist ineating up what we left. 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS. 

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off fromcommunication with a great part of my own command during this time--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand couldarrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand. Pembertongot back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there. The rebel positionswere on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth. Thewaters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leavingonly narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and thehigh bluffs. These were fortified and defended at all points. Therebel position was impregnable against any force that could be broughtagainst its front. Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. Hisefforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, werenecessarily unavailing. 

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity ofcommunicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraphto my rear on the 20th. He did not know but what I was in the rear ofthe enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for thetroops with me. I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him totake with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of theYazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cuttingloose from my base at Grenada. 

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. The troopswere drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, findingsupplies abundant and no enemy following. The road was not damagedsouth of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to causeany delay. As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and torepair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until thiswork was completed. 

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to GrandJunction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquartersto the latter place. During the campaign here described, the losses(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with theirHolly Springs capture, which they could not hold. 

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20, 000 men, taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12, 000 more at Helena, Arkansas. The troops on the west bank of the river had previously beenassigned to my command. McClernand having received the orders for hisassignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, andimmediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a partof his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th. Sherman, and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. Afterconsultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could renderservice to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawnfrom the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to theArkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up thatstream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. Sherman hadlearned of the existence of this force through a man who had beencaptured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and othersupplies intended for his command. The man had made his escape. McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says. No obstaclewas encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range ofthe fort. After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was madeby the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and intaking 5, 000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed todisapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having noespecial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result wasunderstood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand Confederatetroops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss ofproperty while navigating the Mississippi. 

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of thegarrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at themouth of the Arkansas River. From here I received messages from bothSherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command inperson, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability andfitness for so important and intricate an expedition. 

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It washere made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustfulof McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all theycould to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. Itwould have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances intosuch danger. By this time I had received authority to relieveMcClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the riverexpedition, or to assume command in person. I felt great embarrassmentabout McClernand. He was the senior major-general after myself withinthe department. It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assigna junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume thecommand myself. I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, togive him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the Decemberbefore; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he wasjunior to McClernand. Sherman's failure needs no apology. 

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, toYoung's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to makeall the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind mesecure. General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. TheMemphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Centralwas given up. Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, onthe river, left with a garrison. All the troops and guns from the postson the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. 

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed commandthe following day. General McClernand took exception in a mostcharacteristic way--for him. His correspondence with me on the subjectwas more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highlyinsubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of theservice. General McClernand was a politician of very considerableprominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secessionwar broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished allthe opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for savingthe Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union atall hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration ofwhere he stood in the contest before the country. He also gave up hisseat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he hadproclaimed. 

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began. Theproblem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of theriver from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg. TheMississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valleyof many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty upto two or more hundred feet above the river. On the west side thehighest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highestwater. Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. At places it runs tothe very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no suchhighlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburgis reached. 

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in highwater--many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making itimpossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical wayaccording to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehousescould be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line ofrailroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. Theelections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for theprosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and thelast dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greaterpart of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up ourranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movementas long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by manyof those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as adefeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and thepower to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to bedone but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY. This was in my mind fromthe moment I took command in person at Young's Point. 

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in theMississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took manymiles of river front. We had to occupy the levees and the groundimmediately behind. This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, underGeneral McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles aboveVicksburg. 

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg. The water was very high and the rains were incessant. There seemed nopossibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and itwould not do to lie idle all this time. The effect would bedemoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. Friends inthe North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in thesame section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation ofthe cause and those engaged in it. 

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for theboldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, bypress or by individuals, within their control. War at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or betweennations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. But, once enteredinto, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within theirranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section ornation. 

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to theriver's edge, below that on which Memphis stands. The bluff, or highland, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continuesin a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs alongthe Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below. The Yazoo River leavesthe high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into theMississippi nine miles above Vicksburg. Vicksburg is built on this highland where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill. Haines' Bluff, eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified. The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton wasalso intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pitsconnecting them. 

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly directionto a point just above the city, when it again turns and runssouth-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before theywere in range of the upper batteries. Since then the river has made acut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up withbayous, and much overflowed. A front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem thenbecame, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippiwithout an apparent retreat. Then commenced a series of experiments toconsume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops andof the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence thatany of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. NeverthelessI was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. 

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut aditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across fromYoung's Point to the river below. The distance across was a little overa mile. It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it wouldcut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy fromboth ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the risewithout doing any execution in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln hadnavigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well itstendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. He setmuch store accordingly by this canal. General McClernand had been, therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work ofwidening and deepening this canal. After my arrival the work wasdiligently pushed with about 4, 000 men--as many as could be used toadvantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke adam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water outuntil the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th of March. 

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable forsteamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. It runs in adirection almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the oppositeside, or east bank, of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered whatwe were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughoutits length. This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. Had the canal beencompleted it might have proven of some use in running transportsthrough, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet haveto run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. 

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, tryingto find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of theriver, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding thebatteries. 

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I orderedGeneral McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cutthe levee at that point. If successful in opening a channel fornavigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi Riverthrough the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and fourhundred miles below Vicksburg by the river. 

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about amile from the present channel. It is six miles long and has its outletthrough Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and RedRivers. The last three are navigable streams at all seasons. BayousBaxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered withdense forests overhanging the channel. They were also filled withfallen timber, the accumulation of years. The land along theMississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest nextto the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form theboundary of the valley through which it winds. Bayou Baxter, as itreaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in acypress swamp before it reaches the Macon. There was about two feet ofwater in this swamp at the time. To get through it, even with vesselsof the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavytimber wide enough to make a passage way. As the trees would have to becut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of greatmagnitude. 

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained withhim several days. The work had not progressed so far as to admit thewater from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded indrawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. With this we were able to explore thelake and bayou as far as cleared. I saw then that there was scarcely achance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troopsthrough an enemy's country. The distance from Lake Providence to thepoint where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippiagain, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. Thedistance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through whichthis new route would carry us. The enemy held Port Hudson, below wherethe Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg. The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigablestreams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstructour passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. I let thework go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a betterprospect of success. This work was abandoned after the canal proved afailure. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, toexamine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible. Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi Riverinto Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Passto Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins theYallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and formsthe Yazoo River. These were formerly navigated by steamers trading withthe rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi hadbuilt a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving theonly entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of themouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below. 

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut. The river being highthe rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short timethe entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled andmuch of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the MississippiRiver but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with hisbrigade of about 4, 500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwaterby felling trees into them. Much of the timber in this region being ofgreater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, theirremoval was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboatsunder the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting afortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha uniteand the Yazoo begins. The bends of the rivers are such at this point asto almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of theriver. This island was fortified and manned. It was named FortPemberton after the commander at Vicksburg. No land approach wasaccessible. The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towardsan assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece ofground which was discovered above water. The gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March. Both efforts werefailures and were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled and we lost sixmen killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less. 

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that arise of two feet would drive the enemy out. In hope of enlisting theelements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directlyopposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut. It did notaccomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back. On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quinby was thesenior of Ross, and assumed command. He was not satisfied withreturning to his former position without seeing for himself whetheranything could be accomplished. Accordingly Fort Pemberton wasrevisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this timewithout an attack. Quinby, with his command, returned with but littledelay. In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, notknowing that Quinby had been able to join him. Reinforcements were ofno use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain onboard of their transports. Relief had to come from another quarter. SoI determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton. 

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and itsmouth. It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavygrowth of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to within one mile ofthe Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point. Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek, Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River, and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by thewinding of the river. All these waterways are of about the same natureso far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; thisaffords free navigation. 

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14thof March, and reported it navigable. On the next day he started withfive gunboats and four mortar-boats. I went with him for some distance. The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did alsothe short turns in so narrow a stream. The gunboats, however, ploughedtheir way through without other damage than to their appearance. Thetransports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The roadwas somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. In the evening Ireturned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went inperson on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps. They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, wherethey debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where theyre-embarked on the transports. The river steamers, with their tallsmokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded thatthe gunboats got far ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a fewhundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free fromthe obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when heencountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed byobstructions in his front. He could do nothing with gunboats againstsharpshooters. The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4, 000men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. 

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out BlackBayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. On thenight of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had beenattacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. Sherman at oncereturned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met asteamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. Theytried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. It was night when they landed, and intensely dark. There was but anarrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrushor cane. The troops lighted their way through this with candles carriedin their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an openplantation. Here the troops rested until morning. They made twenty-onemiles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time torescue the fleet. Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up thegunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. Morewelcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on thisoccasion. The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvouson the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to getin rear of Vicksburg. 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THETROOPS. 

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March. Theeffort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connectingbayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. 

At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enterthe Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above GrandGulf. The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from thesebayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at thesepoints, is carried through these same channels to the river below. Incase of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find itsoutlet through the same channels. The dredges and laborers from thecanal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, Idetermined to open these other channels, if possible. If successful theeffort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for ourtransports. There was a good road back of the levees, along thesebayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over wheneverthe water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching abase heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. 

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about thisroute, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the otherundertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have beenaccomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had gotall over the country. 

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, furtherthan the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber fora distance of several miles from their source. It was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recedeand the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water. One smallsteamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no furtheruse could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this itwas no more successful than the other experiments with which the winterwas whiled away. All these failures would have been very discouragingif I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not. From the firstthe most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be usedbelow Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteriesdefending that city. 

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged aboutVicksburg. The river was higher than its natural banks from December, 1862, to the following April. The war had suspended peaceful pursuitsin the South, further than the production of army supplies, and inconsequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and thewhole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dryground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out amongthe men. Measles and small-pox also attacked them. The hospitalarrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that theloss of life was much less than might have been expected. Visitors tothe camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers cameback to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. Because I wouldnot divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored formy removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simpleremoval, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took nosteps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as Iunderstood it, to the best of my ability. Every one has hissuperstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibilityevery one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assignedby competent authority, without application or the use of influence tochange his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very greatinterest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that asthe main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of ever having anylarge command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had thevanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well inthe command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to mystaff officers, all of whom were civilians without any militaryeducation whatever, I said that I would give anything if I werecommanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and Ibelieved I could do some good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggestedthat I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentionedthis superstition. 

In time of war the President, being by the ConstitutionCommander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for theselection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making hisselections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended with mydoing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place, or obtained itthrough personal or political influence, my belief is that I would havefeared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probablyhave awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtainingimportant commands by application or political influence are apt to keepa written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which areshown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for theirfailures. 

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincolnand General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. I had nevermet Mr. Lincoln, but his support was constant. 

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsulabehind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; thetroops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bendpreparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious anddiscouraging labors with success. 

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to apoint below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to thepossible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resortedto for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not beundertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicatethis plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary tomake preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porterwas the first one to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navywas absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) ofsuch an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than hehad to command me. It was necessary to have part of his fleet belowVicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries werealso essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for thesesteamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen milesof batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that hehad better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to runthe batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better thansoldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because Iadmitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from theenemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east sideof the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from theenemy by the dense forests that intervened. Even spies could not getnear him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guardsdiscovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up theriver near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards thefleet. On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not muchlarger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as aflag of truce in case of discovery. The boat, crew and passengers werebrought ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be JacobThompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration ofPresident Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an hour ormore I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return toVicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in mymind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag. 

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for theirhazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. The great essential was toprotect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the firesunder the boilers from view. This he accomplished by loading thesteamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to thedeck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of theboilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain wouldbe wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity bythe muddy roads over which we expected to march. 

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls andbarges to be used as ferries when we got below. By the 16th of AprilPorter was ready to start on his perilous trip. The advance, flagshipBenton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed atintervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, thePrice, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh andCarondelet--all of these being naval vessels. Next came the transports--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loadedwith coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers whenbelow the batteries. The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soonafter the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fireacross the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, andthen by batteries all along the line. The gunboats ran up close underthe bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probablywithout much effect. They were under fire for more than two hours andevery vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to thegunboats. The transports did not fare so well. The Henry Clay wasdisabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in thecotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned herto the water's edge. The burning mass, however, floated down toCarthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. 

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready tolight up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firinghouses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side. The sight was magnificent, but terrible. I witnessed it from the deckof a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as lowdown as it was prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learnedthat no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. During the running of the batteries men were stationed in theholds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes thatmight be made in the hulls. All damage was afterwards soon repairedunder the direction of Admiral Porter. 

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudsonwith the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from belowVicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboatIndianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below. She metColonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producingthe greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi fromVicksburg (*10) to the Red River. 

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, andthen started up the Mississippi. The Confederates soon raised the Queenof the West, (*11) and repaired her. With this vessel and the ram Webb, which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two othersteamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered withbarges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speedagainst the rapid current of the Mississippi. The Confederate fleetovertook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the24th of February. The Indianola was superior to all the others inarmament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an hour and ahalf, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram andother vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinkingcondition. The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. Officers and crew then surrendered. 

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th ofMarch, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that hemight capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could getthere; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. Somemiles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in severalplaces, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats werecollected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spotfrom such material as could be collected, to transport the troops acrossthe overflowed interval. By the 6th of April McClernand had reached NewCarthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried throughthe woods by these boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we weredoing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The waterwas falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to useboats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. McClernand hadalready found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasseoccurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below NewCarthage. This increased the march from Milliken's Bend fromtwenty-seven to nearly forty miles. Four bridges had to be built acrossbayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about twothousand feet of bridging in all. The river falling made the current inthese bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building andpermanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankeesoldier" was equal to any emergency. The bridges were soon built ofsuch material as could be found near by, and so substantial were theythat not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army withartillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun(a thirty-two pounder). This, if my memory serves me correctly, brokethrough the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across thepeninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, underthe supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps. 

I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20thissued the following final order for the movement of troops:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA, April 20, 1863. 

Special Orders, No. 110. * * * * * ** VIII. The following orders are published for the information andguidance of the "Army in the Field, " in its present movement to obtain afoothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburgcan be approached by practicable roads. 

First. --The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernandcommanding, will constitute the right wing. 

Second. --The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Shermancommanding, will constitute the left wing. 

Third. --The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPhersoncommanding, will constitute the centre. 

Fourth. --The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left. 

Fifth. --Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity mayrequire. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division willremain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. 

Sixth. --Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities canbe afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. 

Seventh. --In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to eachcompany for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for eachregimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commandershaving the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but notto exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O. , seriesof 1862. 

Eighth. --All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediatecharge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, willconstitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorizedcamp equipage of the army. 

Ninth. --As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeentharmy corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed inlike manner by the Fifteenth army corps. 

Tenth. --Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corpscommanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage. 

Eleventh. --General hospitals will be established by the medical directorbetween Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and disabled soldierswill be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge of hospitals willreport convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. Each corpscommander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remainbehind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge intosquads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to commandthem, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. The force soorganized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport toMilliken's Bend. They will furnish all the guards and details requiredfor general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about thecamps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. 

Twelfth. --The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthagewill be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supplyof rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previousorders. 

Thirteenth. --Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all thebeef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; butwanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for militarypurposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses withoutproper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. Allsuch irregularities must be summarily punished. 

Fourteenth. --Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to thecommand of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line fromhere to New Carthage. His particular attention is called to GeneralOrders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of dateMarch 20, 1863. 

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. 

McClernand was already below on the Mississippi. Two of McPherson'sdivisions were put upon the march immediately. The third had not yetarrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend andwas to follow on arrival. 

Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his divisions were at Duckportand Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to returnfrom Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebelbattery that had been annoying our transports. 

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagontrain over the single narrow and almost impassable road betweenMilliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation. Accordingly six more steamerswere protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded withsupplies. They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. Onthe night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five gettingthrough more or less disabled while one was sunk. About half the bargesgot through with their needed freight. 

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with riversteamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing toaccompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called forfrom the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigatingthe western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-handsenough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels wewere moving through this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were fromLogan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part ofIllinois and from Missouri. All but two of the steamers were commandedby volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. In thisinstance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers couldbe found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet everycall for aid whether mechanical or professional. Colonel W. S. Oliverwas master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG. 

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'plantation. Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whetherthere was high land on the east shore of the river where we might landabove Grand Gulf. There was none practicable. Accordingly the troopswere set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down theriver and nearly opposite Grand Gulf. The loss of two steamers and sixbarges reduced our transportation so that only 10, 000 men could be movedby water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in theirmachinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those lessseverely injured. All the troops, therefore, except what could betransported in one trip, had to march. The road lay west of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be crossed. They were rapidlybridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson'swas following closely. I had determined to make the attempt to effect alanding on the east side of the river as soon as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all thetroops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. About10, 000 men were so embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence theguns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debarkin the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy andcarry the works by storm. The following order was issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA. , April 27, 1863. 

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C. 

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it asthere is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery and everyarticle authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and holdthem in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment'swarning. 

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, sendto a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special ordersof this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division. 

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence allthe batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below thepromontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best theground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. Thefirst object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintainthemselves until such time as preparations can be made and troopscollected for a forward movement. 

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicatedto you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may bebelow the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. 

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, outof range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past GrandGulf and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signalwill be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to startwith this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, butnot the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to bebrought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches tobelow Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that thetransports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, thatthe transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that thetransports can run by with the troops on board. 

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left torun the blockade. 

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations intheir haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

At 8 o'clock A. M. , 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strengthpresent, eight gunboats. For nearly five and a half hours the attackwas kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. All this timeMcClernand's 10, 000 men were huddled together on the transports in thestream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. I occupied a tug fromwhich I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within rangeof the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was notcalculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were beingassailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeingtheir efforts were entirely unavailing. The enemy ceased firing as soonas we withdrew. I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard hisship. The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-sixwounded. A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's sideand exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. Thesight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded theship was sickening. 

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot ofit. It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. Itherefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet thatnight, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would bewanted below. 

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towardsGrand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three milesabove and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about thesame distance below. The land was so low and wet that it would not havebeen practicable to march an army across but for a levee. I had hadthis explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain ifthere was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was foundthat the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. 

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in theplan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. I hadintended to make this request, but he anticipated me. At dusk, whenconcealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landedhis command on the west bank. The navy and transports ran the batteriessuccessfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover ofnight, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our wholefleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly movingdown the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, withNational troops. 

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected thatwe would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find alanding; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that agood landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson sometwelve miles in the interior. The information was found correct, andour landing was effected without opposition. 

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the morningof the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps upthe Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff. 

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburgas I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of theriver. The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our realdesign. Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter hadleft above Vicksburg. 

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attackthe enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff. This move was made without a single casualty in either branch of theservice. On the first of May Sherman received orders from me (sent fromHard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the frontof Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as hecould. 

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now thatall our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemymight fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament andattempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with aportion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of hiscommand. The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of thetransports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as aguard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved thereand put in position. 

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on the morning of 30thof April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps werespeedily landed. 

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalledsince. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defendersdemoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy'scountry, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between meand my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side ofthe river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships andexposures from the month of December previous to this time that had beenmade and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. 

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and twobrigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPhersoncommanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence thecampaign with. These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade ofLogan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps. On the 7thof May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total force was then about thirty-three thousandmen. 

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force ofnearly sixty thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg andis connected with it by a railroad. My first problem was to captureGrand Gulf to use as a base. 

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that point ishigher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and agood road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect the garrisonfrom Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, ourreaching this solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi justabove Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at thetime, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, thenearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more thandoubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back ofBruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Ourtransportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the riverat one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and onedivision of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and earlyevening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs werereached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping toreach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre beforethe enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of anenemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting point ofroads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson. 

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibsonat Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during the night, butnothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy hadtaken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen. Hishope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring couldreach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render muchassistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corpsfollowed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13thcorps could be got out of the way. 

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, theroads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass fromone ridge to another. Where there are no clearings the sides of thehills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and withundergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. 

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibsondivides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or twoat the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. Thismade it necessary for McClernand to divide his force. It was not onlydivided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character abovedescribed. One flank could not reinforce the other except by marchingback to the junction of the roads. McClernand put the divisions ofHovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus onthe left. I was on the field by ten A. M. , and inspected both flanks inperson. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at leastnot repulsing our advance. On the left, however, Osterhaus was notfaring so well. He had been repulsed with some loss. As soon as theroad could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, whowas close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan'sdivision. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade(General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and to moveto the left and flank the enemy out of his position. This movementcarried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, whenSmith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directedto renew his front attack. It was successful and unattended by heavyloss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their leftfollowed before sunset. While the movement to our left was going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests forreinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. Ihad been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging allthe men he had. We followed up our victory until night overtook usabout two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac forthe night. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND. 

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enoughto see the road. We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to findthat the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at thebridge, which he had burned. The troops were set to work at once toconstruct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre. At thistime the water was high and the current rapid. What might be called araft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from woodenbuildings, stables, fences, etc. , which sufficed for carrying the wholearmy over safely. Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, plannedand superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the waterand working as hard as any one engaged. Officers and men generallyjoined in this work. When it was finished the army crossed and marchedeight miles beyond to the North Fork that day. One brigade of Logan'sdivision was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebelbattery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to preventour repairing the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sentup the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair thebridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were building abridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced byCrocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippiat Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days'rations. McPherson still had one division west of the MississippiRiver, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below untilSherman's command should relieve it. 

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who hadjoined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, andhoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall intoour hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guidedby the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill--called the Battleof Port Gibson--found his way to where I was. He had no horse to rideat the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal. He, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me onthe Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. He was inthe same situation as Fred so far as transportation and messarrangements were concerned. The first time I call to mind seeingeither of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormoushorses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles andbridles. 

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectlyequipped. 

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused noanxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. He looked outfor himself and was in every battle of the campaign. His age, then notquite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain arecollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. 

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagontrain. The train still west of the Mississippi was carried around withproper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Timesseventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after thebattle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with thistrain. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburgwhich I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further thanstirrups. I had no other for nearly a week. 

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions couldbe taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried onthe person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draftanimals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should becollected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a trainwas collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it couldbe found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes ofcartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules withplough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc. ; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything thatcould be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either foruse or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped forthe time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a positionwas secured when the time could be spared to observe them. 

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of thecomplete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid throughcentral Mississippi. He had started from La Grange April 17th withthree regiments of about 1, 700 men. On the 21st he had detached ColonelHatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus andMacon and then return to La Grange. Hatch had a sharp fight with theenemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it atOkalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26. Griersoncontinued his movement with about 1, 000 men, breaking the Vicksburg andMeridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving atBaton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson hadattracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement againstVicksburg. 

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork wasrepaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy froma commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evidentthat the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg. Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson'sferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay ourprogress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across andseveral miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction of theroad going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond andJackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the lefttowards Grand Gulf. I went with him a short distance from thisjunction. McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since thebattle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's rightflank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to holdHankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as toguard the line back down the bayou. I did not want to take the chancesof having an enemy lurking in our rear. 

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes intothe one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, Ilearned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place ontheir way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition ofhis troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort ofabout twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already arrived with hisfleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. 

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage sincethe 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers andget a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to thegeneral-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to betelegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding aboveVicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About twelveo'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson'sferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard fromBanks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be atPort Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15, 000 men. Up tothis time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base ofsupplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him inthe reduction of Port Hudson. 

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from theone intended. To wait for his co-operation would have detained me atleast a month. The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousandmen after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all highpoints close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy wouldhave strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men thanBanks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independentlyof Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear ofVicksburg and invest or capture the city. 

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities atWashington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would leadhim to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave anychance of success. The time it would take to communicate withWashington and get a reply would be so great that I could not beinterfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan waspracticable. Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of suppliesother than what were afforded by the country while marching through fourStates of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mineat this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of theimpossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, andthen act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure aslife. " To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility ofsupplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will beimpossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect isto get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and makethe country furnish the balance. " We started from Bruinsburg with anaverage of about two days' rations, and received no more from our ownsupplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. A delaywould give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. 

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as theywere on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give themthree days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry and foragewere found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses wasalso secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not beobtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn forthe owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we werestopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, atall plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by thetroops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined togo without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo aboveVicksburg. 

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I orderedreconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view ofleading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black andattack the city at once. 

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command thatnight and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up fromGrand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. Orders were givenfor a forward movement the next day. Sherman was directed to order upBlair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bendto Hard Times with two brigades. 

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundredwagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. 

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to sendfour regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair'sdivision, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division inaddition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regimentswere to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be nodelay. 

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of theBig Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via RockySprings, Utica and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both atRocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry. McPherson remainedthere during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Shermanmarched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry. The 9th, McPherson movedto a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Shermanremained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Shermanto Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th, McClernandwas at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advancedfrom Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman atFourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle. 

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburgcould have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is notprobable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a closebesiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him tohold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to theBig Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. Itwas my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, andapproach from that direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that hadcrossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jacksoncommenced. 

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roadsgenerally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallelto the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand'scorps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all thecrossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel withthe railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand andSherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman, extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance inreconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find themost practicable routes from one command to another so they couldsupport each other in case of an attack. In making this move Iestimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteenthousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson. Itwould not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops atone place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight himin detail. This was done with success, but I found afterwards that Ihad entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength. 

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroadand about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond eighteenmiles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre onFourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within twomiles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated aconsiderable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. McClernand's left was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to thistime, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries hadbeen guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. 

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteriesunder General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about twoP. M. Logan was in advance with one of his brigades. He deployed andmoved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to becleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. Theorder was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position forassault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carryingthe enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not toappear against our front again until we met at Jackson. 

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing--nearly or quite all from Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. 

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commandersas could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much highercommand. Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when hevolunteered. His weak condition never put him on the sick report whenthere was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. He died not long after the close of the rebellion. 

CHAPTER XXXV. 

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundownmy position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the wholecolumn towards Jackson and capture that place without delay. 

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18, 000 men; infact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50, 000. A force was alsocollecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroadscommunicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of menand stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiegeVicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I thereforedetermined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any forcein that direction and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving againstJackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to havenone--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole forceeastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I movedquickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me inthe rear. 

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements onthe 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylightto move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of mydetermination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He wasordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's toRaymond. One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black. 

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, askingreinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of hisfleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position anddeclining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements as long asthe enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time andmaterial. 

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13thfrom Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederatetroops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reinforcements from thesouth and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy arebringing forces from Tullahoma. "

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of eachother, as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnoissanceswere constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaintthemselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in casea union became necessary. 

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th andimmediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advancereached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out ofthe town. McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward'sstation, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position forthe night in good order. On the night of the 13th, McPherson wasordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away. Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct roadfrom Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on anddoes not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossedthe line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman'sline, and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siegeguns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs. McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With onedivision at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, atJackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond MississippiSprings was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymondcould take either road. He still had two other divisions farther backnow that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If thislast command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already oneday's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three differentroads leading to the latter city. But the most important considerationin my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should comeout to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by Johnston to make this very move. 

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through anunprotected country. 

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night andarranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour. It rained in torrentsduring the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, wherethe land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. But the troops never murmured. By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson'scorps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets andspeedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of theintrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that hadbeen driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been reinforced; during thenight by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his forceamounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. 

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from thetown, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south andsouth-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind theirbreastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad. Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to anassault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployedCrocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on theright. By eleven A. M. Both were ready to attack. Crocker moved hisdivision forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops atonce encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole divisioncharged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this mainline. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside ofhis main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command untilwithin range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when hehalted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine thenext move. It was now about noon. 

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery whichenfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springsroad--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had topass. By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemyflanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought ourwhole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuouson the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of thecity to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted bya force sufficient to hold us back. Appearances did not justify anassault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to theright, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River. This force, Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, andsoon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. Tuttle'smovement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order aretreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he wasgetting away. Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lineswithout resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confrontingSherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. I rodeimmediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman. About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving hisfront, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that theycould not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital ofMississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. 

Our loss in this engagement was: McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. The enemy lost 845killed, wounded and captured. Seventeen guns fell into our hands, andthe enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a largeamount of commissary stores. 

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4thdivision. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, theonly commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. 

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupiedthe night before. 

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directedthe dispositions to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain inJackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, andmanufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work mosteffectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which hadnot ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankeetroops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of eitherthe manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked onfor a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of thelooms, with "C. S. A. " woven in each bolt. There was an immense amountof cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thoughtthey had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leaveand take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cottonand factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while Iwas President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it wasprivate. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that hisproperty had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use itwith Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. Ideclined. 

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch toPemberton at Edward's station: "I have lately arrived, and learn thatMajor-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. Itis important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. Ifpracticable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachmentwould be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assembleshould be brought. Time is all-important. " This dispatch was sent intriplicate, by different messengers. One of the messengers happened tobe a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before byHurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was agood deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning tothose who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and theexpelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston'sdispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me. 

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptlyin the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston couldreach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I alsoinformed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the followingorder: "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us andcross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow themto do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make alldispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road fromwherever they may be on the receipt of this order. "

And to Blair I wrote: "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Blackand pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. Wemust beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all thetrains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so asto divide your troops and train. "

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, thenight of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatchesannouncing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to therest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may beable to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himselffrom the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him. "

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character ofthe country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near therailroad. McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the roadMcPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus)was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other nearChampion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road withOsterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detainedby it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn witha different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and movedpromptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine inthe morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. 

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were aboutthree miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymondwith Blair in his rear. 

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just inHovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with two divisions, was inJackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and militaryfactories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I orderedMcClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioninghim to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he feltvery certain of success. 

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders ofhis superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make theattempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he haddecided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequentlydetermined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and mybase. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a weekbefore. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward'sstation, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to crossso much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a goodbridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching untilmidnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition ofhis order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent adispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might beexpected. 

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employedon the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. Theyreported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, andthat it was still marching east. They reported him to have eightyregiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-fivethousand men. 

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order tocomplete his work; but getting the above information I sent him ordersto move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with anammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commanderto march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Withinan hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to movewith all speed to Edward's station. McClernand was directed to embraceBlair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part ofthe 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join itscorps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced aboutand were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on ourextreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the wayof the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward'sstation, over which to march his troops. Hovey's division of his corpshad the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions bythe southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middleroad. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front tofeel for the enemy. 

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounterthe enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on themiddle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, foundthe enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. About thesame time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagonroad from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to joinHovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I wasstill back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, andexpressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on the roadand proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were infront of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishingamounted almost to a battle. 

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distanceto march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him wordby a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders wererepeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand'sadvance. 

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one ofthe highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground inrange. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is aravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making itdifficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridgeoccupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turnswesterly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south atthis point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradualand is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when wewere there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. 

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some threemiles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From thislatter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a halfmiles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. Itwas along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps, and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on theroad from Bolton direct to Edward's station. The middle road comes intothe northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west anddescends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several milessouth and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward'sstation. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formedparallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. 

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contestedbattle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold hisposition and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up histroops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the rightof Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey withone brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther westto make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roadswould admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling onme for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteriesto be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and theydid good execution. 

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him overopen fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. Hedid make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through thebelt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the mostheavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by ourright around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near theroad leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of theonly road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by twobrigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hoursbefore, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with twodivisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, wereconfronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur'sdivision of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at GrandGulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. NeitherLogan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just atthis juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for morereinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to moveMcPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncoveredthe rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by theenemy. 

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade fromLogan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up withtwo other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last oneabout the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fledprecipitately. This was between three and four o'clock. I rodeforward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the northroad, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishersadvanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's twodivisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were notin the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders toOsterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, Iexplained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far asthe Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark. 

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost roseto the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and ofMcPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other partof my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebeladvanced pickets as early as half-past seven. Their positions wereadmirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand, with twodivisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noonand in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fullycompetent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the woodseparating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but hedid not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a smallforce of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravineobstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road mystaff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back orbeen cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged tohis corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the bruntof the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pullout from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand hadto advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediatesuperior. 

We had in this battle about 15, 000 men absolutely engaged. Thisexcludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command exceptHovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1, 844 wounded and 187 missing. Hoveyalone lost 1, 200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of hisdivision. 

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known theground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could haveescaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over three thousandkilled and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and inpursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. Histroops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before thegeneral retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned totheir homes. Logan alone captured 1, 300 prisoners and eleven guns. Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1, 200. 

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill theircartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuitwas continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The nightof the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to sixmiles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about threemiles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops hadfought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned bythe enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces ofartillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and keptin advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped andtook possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back amile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouacon the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house whichhad been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with woundedand dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. 

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by thethousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after thebattle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to doas much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OFVICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton mighthave made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned toJohnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have beenhis proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had hebeen in Pemberton's place. In fact it would have been in conformitywith Johnston's orders to Pemberton. 

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16thand reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear guarddid not get in until two A. M. The 17th, but renewed their march bydaylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leavehis own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he wasinformed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march earlynext day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on theBig Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected tofind the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoontrain as early as possible. 

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where Ihoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corpsused to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening acrossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I wouldendeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. 

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuitat half-past three A. M. On the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus, McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemywas found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six milesfrom that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached atan early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washedclose up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimesoverflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. Abayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. Whenthe river is full water runs through it, converting the point of landinto an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy hadfelled into the ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water init. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of thisbayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwingdirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height westof the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip ofuncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr'sdivision was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extremeright and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus'division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entirefront. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready tocome in wherever he could be of assistance. 

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, datedthe 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks tobe forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and toco-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to returnwith our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer thatthe order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if heknew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought toobey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when Iheard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in thatdirection, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon theenemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of thecharge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; Ithink not even to this day. 

The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemyfled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him andleaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Manytried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some weredrowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1, 751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probablylost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for thesuccessful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but littledoubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to preventhis occupying his defences around Vicksburg. 

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had tobe built. It was but little after nine o'clock A. M. When the capturetook place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given forthe construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of byLieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPhersonhimself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligentvolunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cuttingonly on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their topsinterlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed fromtheir stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support theroadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and whereverfound, for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18thall three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. 

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair withthe pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched onthe west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the followingmorning. 

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troopsand as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to securea base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's lineof march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemythe December before when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxiouswith myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column andwell up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached worksalong the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, orelse the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their wayto Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thickand fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure oflooking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before onthe ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positiveassurance of success. This, however, he said was the end of one of thegreatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it atonce. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling whatmight happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this wasa complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman'slanguage; but the substance only. My reason for mentioning thisincident will appear further on. 

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson andVicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived atnight near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand movedby the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned tothe left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry toVicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my threecorps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limitednumber of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and covered thehigh ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as histroops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupiedground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the groundto his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping acontinuous line. 

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we weregetting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized byhis defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed hewould not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at twoo'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advancedpositions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fireof the enemy. 

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in makingroads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most ofthe army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rationsissued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, butbegan to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around tothe left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said inrather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack. " In amoment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since thearrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them witheverything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. Bythe night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated. 

I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, onlyfifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one Ihad with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of hiscoming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat myanticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not preventthe capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would savesending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, andwould set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. Butthe first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carrythe works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in thetrenches if they had not been allowed to try. 

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at teno'clock A. M. On the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery inposition. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that allmight open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to thevery parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported thathe had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wantedreinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could seeas well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see thesuccess he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeatedI could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as adiversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served toincrease our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon asit was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and beenobliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thusended the last assault upon Vicksburg. 

CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy, " as itwere, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convincedofficers and men that this was best, and they went to work on thedefences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold ourposition the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions ofwar to what they had on hand. These could not last always. 

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18thof May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty daysafter the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault hadbeen made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) hadbeen fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State hadfallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything usefulfor military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about onehundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; butfive days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousandprisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had beenkilled or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieceshad fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, fromVicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that hadcrossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-threethousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time totake part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field afterthe battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on theroads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in theirown country, where no rear guards were necessary. The country isadmirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensivecampaign. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to saythe least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson seven or eightthousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleventhousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black, four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left ofthose encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a forcesmaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this timewas:

 KILLED WOUNDED MISSING

 Port Gibson. .. .. 131 719 25 South Fork Bayou Pierre. .. .. . . 1 . . Skirmishes, May 3 . .. .. 1 9 . . Fourteen Mile Creek. .. .. 6 24 . . Raymond. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 66 339 39 Jackson. .. .. 42 251 7 Champion's Hill. .. .. 410 1, 844 187 Big Black. .. .. 39 237 3 Bridgeport. .. .. . . 1 . . Total. .. .. 695 3, 425 259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Nothalf of them were disabled for any length of time. 

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siegebegan. Sherman occupied the right starting from the river aboveVicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) andMcClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman'sdivision arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of theline. 

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had beencompleted from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear ofthe army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to beencamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troopshad been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up tothis time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentiss andHurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receivingreinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would makethe most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk oflosing ground elsewhere. 

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluffto Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was aboutseven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, inour rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second lineof defence facing the other way. I had not troops enough under mycommand to man these. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possibledispatch. 

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence. On the north it isabout two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest pointand very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown upwith cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with adense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and wasin cultivation. But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and smallstreams. The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge fromthe river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to theJackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in asouthwesterly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the descriptiongiven lay in front of these defences. As there is a succession ofgullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line wasnecessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs withintrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would havelengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight tothe head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generallyopen in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in thisouter work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. 

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy ashis was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated byour wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had butfour engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line Idirected that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where theyhad necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition totheir other duties assist in the work. 

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. Thechief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was goodfor unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rationswhile working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, andas we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I lethim off. The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twentypounds, and is not tall. 

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were noneat the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with abattery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the fieldartillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to dowas to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commandingpositions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of theenemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits andcovered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. Theenemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry waskept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and readyto fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. 

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more thanthe ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enoughapart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in theirdefence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting overour men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do notremember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one ofthese shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound wasterrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Theiruse is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without anycorresponding advantage to those using them. 

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, becausewe had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used itfreely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the menbehind. 

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had infront of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of thetoughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelvepound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered ascochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into thetrenches of the enemy. 

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done bythe pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who werepaid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advancedposition was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy thebatteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were two hundred andtwenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery ofheavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. We were nowas strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they wereagainst us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receivingconstant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a largerforce than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill. 

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburgreached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came togratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed throughthe terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associationscame to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often thosecoming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of thesoldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without breadduring the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good. 

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most ofthe State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was ofmost interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken andmost wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore tookthem to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting outto look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about whichthe North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knotaround Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, inthe most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first lookeddown from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; Iopposed it. I wrote him a letter about it. " But for this speech it isnot likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. Hisuntiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him toa full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not havedone more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out aforce of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven infor the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by ourtroops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and theroads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-fivemiles and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. Irequested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floatingnondescript force which had been assigned to his command and whichproved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcementscould be sent. 

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforcehim with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I could not complywith his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no dangerof an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no armyorganizing in his rear to raise the siege. 

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, GeneralKimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-eastof Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, onBlair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place withinstructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroythe roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. 

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops acrossthe Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3, 000 menfrom Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of thegunboats they were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over withinstructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had nofurther trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the firstimportant engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning ofthe siege, but they behaved well. 

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, underGeneral Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, andGeneral C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at thatpoint. 

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of theMissouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cutoff the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton andJohnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left whileHerron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point thewater recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through thisopening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to getmessengers under cover of night. 

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside'scorps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff. These lattertroops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken ofsent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrivednone too soon. 

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposedacross the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the BigBlack, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of thelatter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jacksonroad to Baldwin's ferry and below. 

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and theirimmediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. 

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18thfrom General McPherson, saying that their respective commands hadcomplained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published byGeneral McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to theother troops engaged in the campaign. This order had been sent Northand published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. Theorder had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outsideof McClernand's command until brought in this way. I at once wrote toMcClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps andordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his orderin the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THEMINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAGOF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTINGTHE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston hadcrossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, toraise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence betweenJohnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburghad by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately orderedSherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the BigBlack River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to holdthemselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines' Bluff had beenstrongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points fromthere to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had beenconstructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was notalready done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. 

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were alsolooking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantiallyprotected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and northwe were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidentlytook in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making anassault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sideswithout accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have takenthe offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any riskof losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced atthe opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston. 

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward ourposition nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At threepoints on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was runup to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it underminedand the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed inreaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebelwork stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of theenemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also our protection. Thesoldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across thisbarrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiersfor the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw overhand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returnedthem. 

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequentlywhen it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroyit. On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine wasexploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered toopen with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill offand make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient toenable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy havingfailed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where mostof the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in thecountermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that werethere were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground atwork when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He wasnot much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high hehad gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile, " was hisreply. General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored manto his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. 

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by tworegiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they hadbeen placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effortto expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. Fromhere, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. Thecompliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. Theenemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided thecontestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had tobe thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. Duringthe night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater againstthe missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base oftheir parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing theirgrenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses ofwhich they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into ourranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine wasconsequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroyingan entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of itsoccupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt tocharge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. Theenemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in thefirst. We lost none in the second. 

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our positionnearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined toexplode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number atdifferent points and assault immediately after. We were up now at threedifferent points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapetof the enemy divided us. 

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informedme that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in orderto relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make noformidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close toeach other--where there was space enough between the lines to postpickets--that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I wasinformed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, bycrossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he hademployed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had beencanvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" tocut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, becausetheir commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, andhad only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would befinished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also saidthat houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to buildthese boats with. Afterwards this story was verified: on entering thecity we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. 

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attemptabortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, sothat the river might be more closely watched; material was collected onthe west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river ifthe attempt was made; and batteries were established along the leveecrossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been madethe garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners onthe Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the westbank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, norcould he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. TheMississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We hadnearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence toopposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to drawsupplies over for any considerable force. 

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at anumber of places. At ten points we could move under cover to withinfrom five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to makeall preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches wereordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also tobe widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank, andbags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, toenable the troops to cross the ditches. 

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and theBig Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of themonth an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him tocut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reachedhim. 

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed thefollowing letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, itwill become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see noprospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperableobstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested toinform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of yourtroops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatiguesnecessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. "

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practicallydid the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuatewould fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnstonsuggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of thegarrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be aconfession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton touse his name in making such an arrangement. 

On the 3d about ten o'clock A. M. White flags appeared on a portion ofthe rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased atonce. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing awhite flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, andColonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the followingletter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view toarranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, ifagreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a likenumber to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you mayfind convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusionof blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feelingmyself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, byMajor-General John S. Bowen. "

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where thesewhite flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of thecommand. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hardfighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to thegibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all theirsuffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at lastat an end and the Union sure to be saved. 

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I hadbeen a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorablybefore the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that Ishould meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that, ifPemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps atthree o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written replyto Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice forseveral hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulationthrough commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion ofblood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time youmay choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now inVicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I canassure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrangethe terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than thoseindicated above. "

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbalmessage, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter ofthe morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, andseveral officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting wason a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near bystood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. Itwas but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limbhad disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. Since then the sametree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as"The True Cross. "

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of theMexican War. I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an oldacquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army ifit surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to hisletter. Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference mightas well end, " and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well. "General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should beconsummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking, showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals shouldhave a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be madebinding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly hada conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance awaytowards the enemy's lines were in conversation. After a while Bowensuggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out withthe honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. Thiswas promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended, Iagreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clockthat night. 

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence withPemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part ofboth army and navy. It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that theyshould not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. 

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and divisioncommanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half thearmy was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston. Iinformed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply andthe substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear anysuggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my ownhands. This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held. Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sentthe following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit thefollowing proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, publicstores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in onedivision as a guard, and take possession at eight A. M. To-morrow. Assoon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers andmen, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers takingwith them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalryofficers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all theirclothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, anyamount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the storesyou now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparingthem. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers andsoldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for theselatter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorizedto sign the roll of prisoners. "

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by eitherarmy were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken'slanding below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to beexchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was aConfederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free toperform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon anunconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand mento transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on theMississippi. Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported byrail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--allat very great expense. At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give inexchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whosehomes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the warand would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of themhad voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested tobe sent north where they could get employment until the war was over andthey could go to their homes. 

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication ofthis date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honorand spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I haveto submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, willperfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock A. M. To-morrow, Ipropose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrenderthe city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colorsand arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. After which youwill take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personalproperty, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected. "

This was received after midnight. My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3dJuly. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. Itwill be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signedby himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, willnecessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations withregard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While Ido not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannotconsent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. Theproperty which officers will be allowed to take with them will be asstated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will beallowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers onehorse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to marchto the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at teno'clock A. M. , and then return to the inside and there remain asprisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms bynine o'clock A. M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shallact accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should bedisplayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not havebeen notified, from firing upon your men. "

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms. 

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring betweenthe soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were closetogether. All rebels were known as "Johnnies, " all Union troops as"Yanks. " Often "Johnny" would call: "Well, Yank, when are you cominginto town?" The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4thof July there. " Sometimes it would be: "We always treat our prisonerswith kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you asprisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves. " The garrison, fromthe commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on thefourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successfulwhen made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. 

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy ofthe rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the bestreceipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit. " The paperat this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side ofwall paper. The last number was issued on the fourth and announced thatwe had "caught our rabbit. "

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the thirdwith a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knewwould be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place onthe great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration ofAmerican Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did hedefeated his aim in the latter particular. 

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of theirworks and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in goodorder. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was thefirst to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his divisionwas soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no soonerinside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men hadhad full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. Theenemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself sawour men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemythey had so recently been engaged in starving out. It was accepted withavidity and with thanks. 

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day forsurrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day Ishould obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knewthey would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of Julyinto the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify theirnational vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted fromthem at any other time. "

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day hedid for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letterasking terms was received about 10 o'clock A. M. , July 3d. It then couldhardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect asurrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose ofraising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as hecould. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one wasexpected on the fourth. In our interview he told me he had rationsenough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. It wasthis statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was todraw rations for his men from his own supplies. 

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or ninethousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made anattack upon Helena, Arkansas. He was totally defeated by GeneralPrentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundredsoldiers. Holmes reported his loss at 1, 636, of which 173 were killed;but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses. The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40missing. This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy toraise the siege of Vicksburg. 

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Shermanand directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could. Steele andOrd were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman assoon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified. 

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchangecongratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time Ifound that many of the citizens had been living under ground. Theridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. Where roads andstreets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as wellas if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made byrunning passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deepcuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families bycarving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases wouldbe cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carvedout of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In someinstances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, witha door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these werecarpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these theoccupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which weredropped into the city night and dav without intermission. 

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did notmove into the town until the sixth. On the afternoon of the fourth Isent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point wherethe telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is theirparole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us atthis moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, andleaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, witha large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from theState. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9tharmy corps to Burnside. "

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted agreat load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet andthe loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy wassealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be doneafterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALEwas with the supporters of the Union ever after. 

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall andsending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all thetroops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemynow had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copiesof this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon acopy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command ofPort Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of theNational forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender ofVicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that ifthis was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banksgave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and GeneralGardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudsonwith nearly 6, 000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5, 000 small-arms and other storesfell into the hands of the Union forces: from that day to the close ofthe rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the National troops. 

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could beparoled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy foreach, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officersof the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for eachsoldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by thesoldier signing and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refusedto sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisonersto being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. 

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign theirparoles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men whohad signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes assoon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton hearing this, againappealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act asguards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp ofinstruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. Thisrequest was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hopedthat they would do. I told him, however, that I would see that theymarched beyond our lines in good order. By the eleventh, just one weekafter the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederategarrison marched out. Many deserted, and fewer of them were everreturned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case hadthe surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the JamesRiver to be paroled. 

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards wereestablished along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to theriver below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old campsbehind the intrenchments. No restraint was put upon them, except bytheir own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men, and fromour supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had beenfighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they hadso long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their lateantagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would givepain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in thebreasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of theirlate antagonists. 

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They will beauthorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there toEdward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands tobe orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensiveremarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they havepassed. "

CHAPTER XXXIX. 

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPONMOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO. 

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnancestores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave newspirit to the loyal people of the North. New hopes for the finalsuccess of the cause of the Union were inspired. The victory gained atGettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. Now theMississippi River was entirely in the possession of the National troops;for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once. The army ofnorthern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back toabout the same ground it occupied in 1861. The Army of the Tennesseeunited with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate Statescompletely. 

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall ofVicksburg was in these words:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actualdelivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of thecartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men willimmediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the caseelsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you willdetain them until further orders. "

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the handsof Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. 

At Vicksburg 31, 600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannonabout 60, 000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. The small-armsof the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time ourtroops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lockmuskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early inthe war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimedat--and a few new and improved arms. These were of many differentcalibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunitionduring an engagement. The enemy had generally new arms which had runthe blockade and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender Iauthorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferiormuskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace themwith the latter. A large number of arms turned in to the OrdnanceDepartment as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by theUnion army in the capture of Vicksburg. 

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. Neitherhave I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with anarmy unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole ofofficers and men. A military education was acquired which no otherschool could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough forthem to command properly at the beginning, would have made goodregimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders wereequal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have beenequal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended thecampaign fitted to command independent armies. 

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in thecampaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against himin 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive andgenerous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficultto command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to commandone army officered intelligently and with subordination. It affords methe greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment inrespect to his character. There was no man braver than he, nor wasthere any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with moreunquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as apolitician. 

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfullymade with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been madeat all, in the way it was, with any number of men without suchassistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms ofthe service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, eitherof the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptlycomplied with. 

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resortedto; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have madeits execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory wasnecessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite withBanks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that baseand Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces againstVicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries andfighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that hecould not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteenthousand men. The time was worth more than the reinforcements; Itherefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. 

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapidmovements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day aftera new commander had arrived, and only a few days before largereinforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made; thegarrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, anddriven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. Itlooks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaignwhile the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree. 

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three thingsthat required immediate attention. The first was to send a force todrive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State. The second was tosend reinforcements to Banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to completethe triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth tothe free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes. The thirdwas to inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the goodnews, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence inthe ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. 

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for thesurrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended fromHaines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jacksonroad over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold hiscommand in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State assoon as Vicksburg surrendered. Steele and Ord were directed to be inreadiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, andSherman was advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly, crossing theBig Black at three different points with as many columns, allconcentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson. 

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as itoccurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson. On the 8th of JulySherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up tothe defences of the city and shelling the town. The siege was kept upuntil the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy hadevacuated during the night. The weather was very hot, the roads dustyand the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had somuch the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division, Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson. 

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than onethousand men, killed, wounded and missing. The Confederate loss wasprobably less, except in captured. More than this number fell into ourhands as prisoners. 

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick whohad to be left behind. A large amount of rations was issued to thefamilies that remained in Jackson. Medicine and food were also sent toRaymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as Ithought it only fair that we should return to these people some of thearticles we had taken while marching through the country. I wrote toSherman: "Impress upon the men the importance of going through the Statein an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutelynecessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try tocreate as favorable an impression as possible upon the people. "Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all thepeople, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whoseresources had been taken for the supply of our army. Very largequantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. 

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the sameposition they had occupied before--from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff. Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regularConfederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, Ifelt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do morebefore the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and whileimportant points might be captured without bloodshed. I suggested tothe General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, startingfrom Lake Pontchartrain. Halleck preferred another course. Thepossession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed topossess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of theMississippi. I am well aware that the President was very anxious tohave a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreigngovernments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in thewar, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to theConfederate States. This, however, could have been easily done withoutwasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending agarrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande. 

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so that Iwas obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive asI had been a year before in west Tennessee. It would have been an easything to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there. Having thatas a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interiorto operate against General Bragg's army. This would necessarily havecompelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. If hehad not done this the troops from Mobile could have inflictedinestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army andLee's were yet receiving their supplies. I was so much impressed withthis idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, askingonly the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops ator near Mobile. I also asked for a leave of absence to visit NewOrleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should beapproved. Both requests were refused. So far as my experience withGeneral Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favorthan to grant one. But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simplyin line of duty, though out of my department. 

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of anarmy, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as hadbeen the case the year before after the fall of Corinth when the armywas sent where it would do the least good. By orders, I sent to Banks aforce of 4, 000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky and, whentransportation had been collected, started a division of 5, 000 men toSchofield in Missouri where Price was raiding the State. I alsodetached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that placepermanently. This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time whenRansom arrived there. The enemy happened to have a large number, about5, 000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed theEastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which hadprobably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on theway to Lee's and other armies in the East. 

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily andunpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands andsmall detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and indestroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. Theguerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, andtherefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. 

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton'sarmy and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also. The mendetermined not to fight again while the war lasted. Those who livedbeyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes. Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for theirsupport till the war was over. Besides all this there was quite a peacefeeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part ofMississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. It is not probable thatPemberton got off with over 4, 000 of his army to the camp where heproposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. 

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13thcorps, General Ord commanding, to Banks. Besides this I received ordersto co-operate with the latter general in movements west of theMississippi. Having received this order I went to New Orleans to conferwith Banks about the proposed movement. All these movements came tonaught. 

During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short distance aboveCarrollton. The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on myreturn to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in thestreet, fell, probably on me. I was rendered insensible, and when Iregained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with severaldoctors attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along thebody up to the arm-pit. The pain was almost beyond endurance. I lay atthe hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself inbed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and wascarried to it on a litter. I was then taken to Vicksburg, where Iremained unable to move for some time afterwards. 

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be madein my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. No orderswere issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except uponconsultation with and approval of Sherman. 

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Hallecktelegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence toTuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga. On the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go toRosecrans. This was received on the 27th. I was still confined to mybed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once orderedSherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could beprovided. The division of McPherson's corps, which had got off and wason the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to Hurlbut at Memphis. Hurlbut was directed to forward thesetwo divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also tosend any other troops that might be returning there. Halleck suggestedthat some good man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphisto take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, asbeing, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. Hewas directed to take with him another division of his corps. This leftone back, but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still theequivalent. 

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga hadbeen fought and Rosecrans forced back into Chattanooga. Theadministration as well as the General-in-chief was nearly frantic at thesituation of affairs there. Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the WarDepartment, was sent to Rosecrans' headquarters. I do not know what hisinstructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived thereat a later period. 

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon asable to move and take general direction of the troops moving from thewest. I received the following dispatch dated October 3d: "It is thewish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able hewill come to Cairo and report by telegraph. " I was still very lame, butstarted without delay. Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported bytelegraph: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to reportfrom Cairo was received at 11. 30 on the 10th. Left the same day withstaff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo. "

END OF VOLUME I.