LESSER HIPPIAS by Plato (see Appendix I) Translated by Benjamin Jowett APPENDIX I. It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writingsof Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which isof much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues ofa century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of theAristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertaintyconcerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed tohim. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they aretaken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particularauthor, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to thegenuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works aremore likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneousdesignation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such asepistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion thanothers; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or thering of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can bedetected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement reallyoccurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; whilethere is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with length. A really great and originalwriter would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to theforger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, theGods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting tobalance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must notforget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several ofhis contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in thenext generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; andmistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature inthe third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, andwithout the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributedto a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name onceappended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed toblend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators wasnot so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and theDialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literaturewhich has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard thequestion of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lostliterature had been preserved to us. These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria ofgenuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotleattributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3)great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit ofthe Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot alwaysbe distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has variousdegrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioningPlato, under their own names, e. G. The Hippias, the Funeral Oration, thePhaedo, etc. , have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. Theymay have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although inthe case of really great works, e. G. The Phaedo, this is not credible;those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defectivein their external credentials. There may be also a possibility thatAristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholarsin the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a moreimportant work, e. G. The Laws, especially when we remember that he wasliving at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, duringthe last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in allhis numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributesany passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. Andlastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as theParmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2)length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spiritof his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for thegenuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two headsonly: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind ofevidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusionthat nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever beenascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion ofthem, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected bythe ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal andexternal evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But therestill remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm eitherthat they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or whollythe compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of somecontemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name ofPlato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired toimitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophywe should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiorityof execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considereddecisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice tohimself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly notPlato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in theformation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writingsare compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus withthe Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner duringa period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an ageof great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literarytransition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separatedfrom his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculationas that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, andwhich appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonicwritings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, theFirst Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Orationare cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in theRhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in hiscitation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in theextant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular byAristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a seconddialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of aGreater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, doesto a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a veryclever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to containanything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful studentof the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leadingthought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem. , and there isno similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in anundoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of thegenuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socraticspirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject andtreatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they willdetect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoningupon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice isignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the lastpoint we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether theauthor is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merelyfollowing the argument 'whither the wind blows. ' That no conclusionis arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlierdialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot withcertainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, moremay be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and isinteresting as supplying an example of the manner in which the oratorspraised 'the Athenians among the Athenians, ' falsifying persons anddates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, andwas, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, theproper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. Thesatirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance tothe earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested bya comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration ofPericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may havesuggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears tobe suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment toThrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theagesin the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to befounded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parodyappears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in theSymposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the FirstAlcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has thegreatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though notverified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variancewith the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socratesand Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to becompared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiadesdescribes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For thedisparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialoguethere seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lessonimparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubteddialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favouritethesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passedcurrent in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socratesand Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (forthe catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded astrustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either ofpoetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we haveexpress testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearingthe name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on thegenuineness of the extant dialogue. Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw anabsolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings ofPlato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There mayhave been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as thereare certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. Thetraditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may haveformed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of thesame mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused withthe writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definiteform, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues whichwe have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader maybe partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogetherspurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Norcan we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, andthe Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urgedagainst them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly)of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, canwe exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usuallyrejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may begenuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings requiremore careful study and more comparison of them with one another, andwith forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before wecan finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all asgenuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintainedand still more often implied in this and similar discussions; butshould say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nordisproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we areas confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, theTimaeus, and the Laws are genuine. On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass underthe name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancientsthemselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairlydoubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable changeand growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). Thattwentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgmentof Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting someinteresting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importanceto the general reader. LESSER HIPPIAS INTRODUCTION. The Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most stronglyexhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vainand boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including hisown clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also ofseal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, isof a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature thanthe two great Sophists (compare Protag. ), but of the same characterwith them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method ofSocrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, hegets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is withdifficulty induced to proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras, Callicles, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed). Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, citing passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intendedAchilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he iseasily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretendsto show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similarinconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achillesunintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is itbetter to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relyingon the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latterof the two alternatives. . . All this is quite conceived in the spirit ofPlato, who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the sideof truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, isalso in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculousthan 'rhetoric turned logic, ' and equally fallacious. There werereasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receivethe natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which theyread. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparentinconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false, ' remind usof the interpretation by Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and ofsimilar reasonings in the first book of the Republic. The discrepancieswhich Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as greatas those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homericpoems. . . At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntaryand involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in thesame labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others wouldmake upon him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should bein a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensibleof the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can nolonger go to the wise and be taught by them. It may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1)that the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than inthe other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is morepalpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turnsof thought and style are found in it which appear also in the otherdialogues:--whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of oragainst the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important questionwhich will have to be answered differently in different cases. For thata writer may repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; andPlato elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is fullof repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as alreadyremarked, are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogueis the work of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias withthe other dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippiassketches the programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates toattend and bring any friends with him who may be competent judges), aremore than suspicious:--they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannotsuppose to have been due to Plato himself. The Greater Hippias moreresembles the Euthydemus than any other dialogue; but is immeasurablyinferior to it. The Lesser Hippias seems to have more merit than theGreater, and to be more Platonic in spirit. The character of Hippias isthe same in both dialogues, but his vanity and boasting are even moreexaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His art of memory is speciallymentioned in both. He is an inferior type of the same species asHippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol. ). Some passages in which the LesserHippias may be advantageously compared with the undoubtedly genuinedialogues of Plato are the following:--Less. Hipp. : compare Republic(Socrates' cunning in argument): compare Laches (Socrates' feeling aboutarguments): compare Republic (Socrates not unthankful): compare Republic(Socrates dishonest in argument). The Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may bereasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1)of considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning withAristotle and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard ofPlato's other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaningparadox (perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat theSophists at their own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appearthe better cause'; or merely as a dialectical experiment)--are notsufficient reasons for doubting the genuineness of the work. PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias. EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent displaywhich Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us incommending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, becausewe are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairlyclaim to take part in a philosophical discussion. SOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaningof what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father, Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than theOdyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus;Odysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem andAchilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has noobjection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and whichof them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in thecourse of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer anddivers other poets. EUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anythingwhich you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you aquestion, will you answer him? HIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if Irefused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went upfrom my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Helleneswere assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any ofthe exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions whichany one had to ask. SOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at everyOlympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdomwhen you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would beso fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your mind. HIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I firstentered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was mysuperior in anything. (Compare Gorgias. ) SOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdombe to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say youof Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in whatparticular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibitingand there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I didnot like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present, and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. Butnow that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, sothat I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them? HIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you moreclearly than I could in public my views about these and also about otherheroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the menwho went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest. SOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I finda difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several timesover? Please to answer me kindly and gently. HIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, whoteach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer in a civil and agreeable manner. SOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what youmeant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravestof men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when yousaid that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that Icould not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then Ishall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily? HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward ofmankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in thepassage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say toOdysseus:-- 'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak outplainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will, I believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death whothinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall beaccomplished. ' Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men;he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily andfalse; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in theselines. SOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when yousay that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false? HIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he isrepresented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey. SOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man isnot the same as the false? HIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates. SOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias? HIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other? SOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer whathe meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show awillingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what youdeclare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him? HIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like. SOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to dothings, or that they have the power to do things? HIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and inparticular to deceive mankind. SOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, arethey not? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of theirsimplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sortof prudence? HIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly. SOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose? HIPPIAS: So they are--very. SOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know whatthey do? HIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they domischief to others. SOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are theywise? HIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive. SOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are younot saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wisein those things about which they are false? HIPPIAS: To be sure. SOCRATES: And the true differ from the false--the true and the false arethe very opposite of each other? HIPPIAS: That is my view. SOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false areto be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise? HIPPIAS: Assuredly. SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in sofar as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the powerof uttering their falsehoods if they like? HIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power. SOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have thepower to speak falsely? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and isignorant cannot be false? HIPPIAS: You are right. SOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at thetime when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which heis prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speakinggenerally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my namewhen you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator andarithmetician? HIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am. SOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, ifyou pleased? HIPPIAS: certainly I should. SOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men inthese matters? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in thesematters of calculation, are you not also the best? HIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best. SOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truthabout these matters, would you not? HIPPIAS: Yes, I should. SOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? Imust beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness andmagnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were toask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be thebest and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the powerof speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these samematters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly?Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in mattersof calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimesstumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he didnot know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a liewould always and consistently lie? HIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right. SOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not aboutnumber, or when he is making a calculation? HIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as aboutother things. SOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men whoare false about calculation and number? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who isfalse must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, that he who is unable to be false will not be false? HIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said. SOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able tospeak falsely about calculation? HIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said. SOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly aboutcalculation? HIPPIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and trulyabout calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation--thearithmetician? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation?Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is thetrue man. HIPPIAS: That is evident. SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also trueabout the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than thefalse; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, asyou were just now imagining. HIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly. SOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances? HIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed. SOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry? HIPPIAS: I am. SOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Isnot the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly aboutdiagrams; and he is--the geometrician? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it? HIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else. SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in thehighest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams thegood man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad isunable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted. HIPPIAS: True. SOCRATES: Once more--let us examine a third case; that of theastronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a stillgreater proficient than in the preceding--do you not? HIPPIAS: Yes, I am. SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy? HIPPIAS: True, Socrates. SOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falselyhe will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speakfalsely, for he has no knowledge. HIPPIAS: Clearly not. SOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false? HIPPIAS: It would seem so. SOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about allthe sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard youboasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you weresetting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you saidthat upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that youhad on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, whichwas of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings;and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, anda strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said alsothat you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloakand the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary anda proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving;moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds;and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts whichI was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm andharmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were agreat many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgottento mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I wassaying, only look to your own arts--and there are plenty of them--and tothose of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions whichyou and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or anydescription of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which thetrue and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you can, ofany. But you cannot. HIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates. SOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; butthen if I am right, remember what the consequence will be. HIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates. SOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtlessbecause you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on thepresent occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying:were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false andwily? HIPPIAS: I was. SOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out tobe false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and ifAchilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed toone another, but they are alike. HIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details insteadof grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I willdemonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthfulman too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of manyuntruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shallmake a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is thebetter man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company willknow which of us is the better speaker. SOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But Ihave a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attentionto him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Havinga desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse andput together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if thespeaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, ortrouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom Ideem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wiseman, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in order that I may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not helpremarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses inwhich Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that youmust be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, isnever found to tell a lie; but Achilles is found to be wily on your ownshowing. At any rate he speaks falsely; for first he utters these words, which you just now repeated, -- 'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing andsays another:'-- And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded byOdysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he, -- 'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, having loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; andthen you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a careto you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of theearth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertilePhthia. ' And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said, -- 'And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked shipsis far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amasswealth and riches for you. ' But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, hespoke after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions, he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw downthe ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home; so noblyregardless was he of the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked youthe question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes wasintended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both ofthem were the best, and that it would be difficult to decide which wasthe better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but ofvirtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they aremuch upon a par. HIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaksfalsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelledagainst his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. Butwhen Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false. SOCRATES: You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself. HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so? SOCRATES: Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely fromdesign, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart, in Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior toOdysseus in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear tosay anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood. HIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? SOCRATES: Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking toOdysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but toAjax he tells quite a different story? HIPPIAS: Where is that? SOCRATES: Where he says, -- 'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and aboutmy tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for thebattle, will nevertheless stay his hand. ' Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had beenthe pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would havecarried the art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailingliars in the most violent terms only the instant before) as to say toOdysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, andthat he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whomhe regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better ofhim by his own cunning and falsehood? HIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe thatAchilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus inthe innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falselyor truly, speaks always with a purpose. SOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better thanAchilles? HIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates. SOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to bebetter than the involuntary? HIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, andvoluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those whoerr and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to bemade for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort ofharm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severeon those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evilinvoluntarily. SOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinaciousI am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the onlygood point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrongin some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact thatwhen I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdomall the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. Forspeaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anythingwhich you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than todiffer from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is mysalvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am verygrateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my gratefulthanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretendthat the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, andproclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in whatyou are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is myown fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend tobe more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of whatyou are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better farthan those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of theopposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, acondition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to bein a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear tome better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mindis due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that ingeneral those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who dowrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, andnot refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if youcure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body ofdisease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a longoration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to followyou; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me agreat deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worseyourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, foryou incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will notanswer me, you must entreat him on my behalf. EUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require anyentreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answerno man. --Did you not say so, Hippias? HIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesomein an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias;Republic. ) SOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did, it would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you wouldargue), but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, asyou say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned. EUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also thatyou may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you. HIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever youlike. SOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as towhich are the better--those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And ifyou will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approachingthe subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are goodrunners? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And there are bad runners? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill isa bad runner? HIPPIAS: Very true. SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runswell? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, andslowness is an evil quality? HIPPIAS: To be sure. SOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowlyvoluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? HIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily. SOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing? HIPPIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action ina race? HIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly. SOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful actionvoluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? HIPPIAS: That is to be inferred. SOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in arace than he who does them voluntarily? HIPPIAS: Yes, in a race. SOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match--which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? HIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless. SOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, tofall, or to throw another? HIPPIAS: To fall. SOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does baseand dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does theminvoluntarily? HIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth. SOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise--is not hewho is better made able to do both that which is strong and that whichis weak--that which is fair and that which is foul?--so that whenhe does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does themvoluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily. HIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength. SOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who isbetter made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and posturesvoluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? HIPPIAS: True. SOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of thebodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? HIPPIAS: True. SOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you preferthe voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? HIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune. SOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils? HIPPIAS: Goods. SOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily orinvoluntarily lame? HIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame. SOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you mightvoluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarilyblink? HIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink. SOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily actsill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill? HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention. SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and ofall the senses--those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to bedesired as being good? HIPPIAS: I agree. SOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;--which are the bettersort of instruments to have to do with?--those with which a man actsill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have arudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily? HIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer illvoluntarily. SOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the fluteand all other things? HIPPIAS: Very true. SOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that youmay ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? HIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily. SOCRATES: That would be the better horse? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would beproduced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? HIPPIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer whovoluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? HIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses. SOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mindwhich errs voluntarily? HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow. SOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not themind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than theinvoluntary? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in allarts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily doeswhat is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worsethat which does so involuntarily? HIPPIAS: That is evident. SOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should wenot prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit theminvoluntarily? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the beststate possible? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and makemistakes voluntarily or involuntarily? HIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say thatthose who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wronginvoluntarily! SOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference. HIPPIAS: I do not think so. SOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer oncemore: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at all events, be one of these? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which hasthe greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greaterpower, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better. HIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved. SOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the justersoul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will notthe soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and thatwhich is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? HIPPIAS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdomalso better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? HIPPIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power andart--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? HIPPIAS: That seems to be true. SOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice isto do well? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, dowrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? HIPPIAS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad manis he who has the bad? HIPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad maninvoluntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? HIPPIAS: Which he certainly has. SOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgracefulthings, if there be such a man, will be the good man? HIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you. SOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to bethe conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow fromour argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being inperplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinaryman should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise menalso wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, thematter begins to be serious both to us and to you.