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HISTORY OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENTFIFTH ARMY CORPS, AT SANTIAGO, With a Few Unvarnished Truths Concerning that Expedition. 

(Short Title: The Gatlings at Santiago)

BY JOHN H. PARKER, 1st Lieut. 13th Inf. 

(Late) Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago. 

DEDICATION. 

To the Enlisted Members of the Detachment, Who, by Their Devotion, Courage and Endurance, Made Its Success Possible, this Volume isDedicated as a Token of Esteem by the Author. 

CONTENTS

I. L'envoi. II. Inception Of The Scheme. III. The Ordnance Depot. IV. The Voyage And Disembarkation. V. The March. VI. The Battery In Camp Wheeler. VII. The Battle. VIII. Tactical Analysis Of The Battles At Santiago. IX. The Volunteers. X. The Sufferings Of The Fifth Army Corps. XI. Home Again. Appendix IAppendix IIAppendix IIIIndex

The photographic illustrations in this work are due to the courage andkindness of Mr. John N. Weigle, of Gettysburg, Pa. This young man wasfirst sergeant of the Gatling Gun Detachment, and took with him alarge supply of material. It was his delight to photograph everythingthat occurred, and his pleasure to furnish a set of photographs forthe use of the author. Mr. Weigle was recommended for a commission inthe Regular Army of the United States, for his extreme gallantry inaction, and is a magnificent type of the American youth. The thanks ofthe author are tendered to him for the photographic illustrations sogenerously supplied. 

ILLUSTRATIONS

Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th US Infantry, Late Commanding Gatling Guns at Santiago. (_Frontispiece_)Map--Santiago and Surrounding Area. Skirmish Drill at Tampa. Skirmish Drill at Tampa. Field Bakery. Awaiting Turn to Embark. Baiquiri. The "Hornet. "Waiting. Wrecked Locomotives and Machine Shops at Baiquiri. The Landing. Pack Train. Calvary Picket Line. San Juan Hill. Cuban Soldiers as They Were. Wagon Train. Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso. Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st. (Taken under fire by Sergeant Weigle). Fort Roosevelt. Sergeant Greene's Gun at Fort Roosevelt. Skirmish Line in Battle. Fort Roosevelt. A Fighting Cuban, and Where He Fought. Map--Siege Lines at Santiago. Gatling Camp and Bomb-Proofs at Fort Roosevelt. Tree Between Lines Showing Bullet Holes. This Tree Grew on Low Ground. Spanish Block-House. Spanish Fort of Three-Inch Guns. Tentage in Cuba. After the Rain. Native Industry. Charge on San Juan Hill. Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For the Front. Cuban Cart used by Gatling Gun Detachment, Priv. J. Shiffer Driving. Tiffany at his Gun in the Trench. Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun in Spanish Fort, Silenced by Gatlings July 1, '98. 2. Rear Sight of same Gun. 3. Fuse picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridge used by the Spanish Volunteers, the so-called "Explosive" Brass-covered Bullet. 5. Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish Spurs. Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered. Undergrowth in Cuba. Cuban Residence. "Reina Mercedes" Sunk by the "Iowa" near Mouth of Harbor of Santiago. 

PREFACE. 

On the morning of July 1st, the dismounted cavalry, including myregiment, stormed Kettle Hill, driving the Spaniards from theirtrenches. After taking the crest, I made the men under me turn andbegin volley-firing at the San Juan Blockhouse and intrenchmentsagainst which Hawkins' and Kent's Infantry were advancing. While thusfiring, there suddenly smote on our ears a peculiar drumming sound. One or two of the men cried out, "The Spanish machine guns!" but, after listening a moment, I leaped to my feet and called, "It's theGatlings, men! It's our Gatlings!" Immediately the troopers began tocheer lustily, for the sound was most inspiring. Whenever the drummingstopped, it was only to open again a little nearer the front. Ourartillery, using black powder, had not been able to stand within rangeof the Spanish rifles, but it was perfectly evident that the Gatlingswere troubled by no such consideration, for they were advancing allthe while. 

Soon the infantry took San Juan Hill, and, after one false start, wein turn rushed the next line of block-houses and intrenchments, andthen swung to the left and took the chain of hills immediatelyfronting Santiago. Here I found myself on the extreme front, incommand of the fragments of all six regiments of the cavalry division. I received orders to halt where I was, but to hold the hill at allhazards. The Spaniards were heavily reinforced and they opened atremendous fire upon us from their batteries and trenches. We laiddown just behind the gentle crest of the hill, firing as we got thechance, but, for the most part, taking the fire without responding. Asthe afternoon wore on, however, the Spaniards became bolder, and madean attack upon the position. They did not push it home, but they didadvance, their firing being redoubled. We at once ran forward to thecrest and opened on them, and, as we did so, the unmistakable drummingof the Gatlings opened abreast of us, to our right, and the mencheered again. As soon as the attack was definitely repulsed, Istrolled over to find out about the Gatlings, and there I found Lieut. Parker with two of his guns right on our left, abreast of our men, whoat that time were closer to the Spaniards than any others. 

From thence on, Parker's Gatlings were our inseparable companionsthroughout the siege. They were right up at the front. When we dug ourtrenches, he took off the wheels of his guns and put them in thetrenches. His men and ours slept in the same bomb-proofs and sharedwith one another whenever either side got a supply of beans or coffeeand sugar. At no hour of the day or night was Parker anywhere butwhere we wished him to be, in the event of an attack. If a troop of myregiment was sent off to guard some road or some break in the lines, we were almost certain to get Parker to send a Gatling along, and, whether the change was made by day or by night, the Gatling went. Sometimes we took the initiative and started to quell the fire of theSpanish trenches; sometimes they opened upon us; but, at whatever hourof the twenty-four the fighting began, the drumming of the Gatlingswas soon heard through the cracking of our own carbines. 

[Illustration: Map--Santiago and Surrounding Area. ]

I have had too little experience to make my judgment final; butcertainly, if I were to command either a regiment or a brigade, whether of cavalry or infantry, I would try to get a Gatlingbattery--under a good man--with me. I feel sure that the greatestpossible assistance would be rendered, under almost all circumstances, by such a Gatling battery, if well handled; for I believe that itcould be pushed fairly to the front of the firing-line. At any rate, this is the way that Lieut. Parker used his battery when he went intoaction at San Juan, and when he kept it in the trenches beside theRough Riders before Santiago. 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

CHAPTER I. 

L'ENVOI. 

The history of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, is to acertain extent the history of the Santiago campaign. The detachmentwas organized on the spur of the moment, to utilize material whichwould otherwise have been useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in allthe campaign. It participated in all the fighting of that campaign, except the fight at La Guasimas, and was disbanded upon the return ofthe Fifth Corps to Montauk. Whatever hardships were endured by theFifth Corps were shared by this detachment; whatever dangers werefaced by the Fifth Corps were faced by it also; where the hottestfighting occurred this detachment went in and stayed; and at thesurrender it was paraded, to use the words of General Shafter, "Uponthat portion of the line which it occupied so promptly and defended sowell. "

But this memoir is not intended as a history of that campaign nor ofthe Fifth Corps. The author has not the data available to cover solarge a field, nor the ability to do justice to the courage, fortitude, and endurance so heroically displayed by that gallant army. That story will be written by abler pens, and will be the wonder ofthe world when it is told. 

This story is that of an experiment. It is told to lay before thegeneral public, as well as the military critic, the work of a littledetachment of thirty-seven men, armed with an untried weapon, organized in the short space of four days preceding July 1, 1898, andwhich without proper equipment, adequate instruction, or previoustraining, in the face of discouragements and sneers, and in spite ofobstacles enough to make the mere retrospect sickening, still achievedfor itself a warm place in the hearts of all true soldiers, andcovered itself with glory upon the hardest fought battle-field of theHispano-American War. 

This story is to commemorate the gallantry of the enlisted men whohelped to make history and revolutionize tactics at Santiago. It willtell of the heroism of the plain American Regular, who, without hopeof preferment or possibility of reward, boldly undertook to confutethe erroneous theories of military compilers, who, without originalityor reason, have unblushingly cribbed the labored efforts of foreignofficers, and foisted these compilations of second-hand opinions uponthe American Army as military text-books of authority and weight. These literary soldiers declared, following the lead of their foreignguides, that "The value of machine guns on the battle-field isdoubtful, " and that "Their offensive value is probably very small. "They also agreed, with most touching unanimity, that "A direct assaultupon a fortified position, occupied by good, unshaken infantry, armedwith the modern rifle and plentifully supplied with ammunition is sureto fail, unless made by overwhelming numbers and prepared by strongand accurate fire by artillery. "

These servile imitators of foreign pen soldiers were destined to seeall their pet theories exploded by the grim old mountain puma fromCalifornia and his brave Fifth Corps. They were to learn, so far asthey are capable of learning, that the American Regular makes tacticsas he needs them; that the rules of war established by pen soldiers donot form the basis of actual operations in the field; that theoriesmust go to the wall before the stern logic of irrefutable facts; andthat deductions based on the drill-made automatons of European armiesare not applicable to an army composed of American Volunteer Regulars, led by our trained officers. 

We shall see that an army destitute of cavalry, and hence without"eyes"; not supported by artillery; in the most difficult country overwhich soldiers ever operated, and without maps or reconnaissance--intwenty days shut up and captured an army of twice its own effectivestrength, in a strongly fortified city, with better served and morenumerous artillery. 

We shall find that when the "sledge" was not at hand, Americaningenuity was able to use the "mallet" instead, making light machineguns perform all the function of artillery, and dispensing altogether, so far as any practical results were concerned, with that expensiveand much overrated arm; that the Regular private is capable of meetingall demands upon his intelligence, and that the American non. Com. Isthe superior of foreign officers. 

It is also hoped to place before the intelligent American public somecorrect ideas of the new arm which was tried thoroughly at Santiagofor the first time in the history of the world. The machine gun is thelatest practical product of American inventive genius applied to war. The first form of this weapon tried, the mitrailleuse, was not verysuccessful. It failed, not on account of faults of construction, orimperfect mechanism, but because its proper tactical employment hadnot been thought out by the French army. Since that time machine gunshave been greatly improved, but no one has succeeded in making theirgreat value appreciated by military authorities. The failures of theFrench brought the gun into disfavor, and created a prejudice againstits employment. 

The Artillery of the world, which poses in every country as anelite body of scientific fighters, and is often found on thebattle-field to be an aggregation of abstruse theorists, were jealousand contemptuous. They said, "See how easily the artillery knocked outmachine guns at Gravelotte. " The Cavalry of the world, famouseverywhere for an _esprit-du-corps_ which looks haughtily down onall other arms of the service, were too deeply absorbed in the meritsof saber vs. Revolver, and in the proper length of theirspectacular plumes, to give a second thought to this new, untried, andtherefore worthless weapon. The world's Infantry, resting upon theassumption that it is the backbone of all armies, and the only real, reliable fighting body under all conditions, left the consideration ofthese vague dreams of mechanical destructiveness to lunatics, cranks, and philanthropists. 

In our own country the Ordnance Department, which is the trial courtbefore which all military inventions must appear, scouted the idea ofusefulness of machine guns even after war was declared, and adhered tothe view that machine guns, in the very nature of things, could neverbe useful except in the defense of fortified positions; that theynever could be brought up on the battlefield, nor used if they werebrought up. This view was that of a prominent young officer of thatdepartment who wrote a report on the subject, and it seemed to expressthe views of the department. 

This view must have been that of our War Department, for it did noteven acknowledge the receipt of drawings and specifications for amachine gun carriage, offered freely to the Government as a gift bythe inventor six months before the war, together with the firstcorrect tactical outline of the proper use of machine guns ever filedin any War Office in the world. This invention was designed tofacilitate the use of the machine gun by making its advance with theskirmish line possible on the offensive, and was recommended by thewhole staff of the Infantry and Cavalry School as a meritoriousdevice, worthy of trial. The discussion filed with the inventionpointed out, for the first time, the correct tactical employment ofthe weapon, and staked the military reputation and ability of theauthor and inventor on the correctness of his views. 

From these facts it may be gathered that there was required a certaindegree of originality and energy to get together and organize amachine gun battery for the Santiago campaign. 

The project was conceived and executed. The service rendered by thisbattery has forever set at rest the question of the proper tacticaluse of the machine gun arm, both on the offensive and defensive. Thesethings are now beyond the realm of theory. They are a demonstratedproblem. The solution is universally acknowledged to be correct. 

This is the history of that detachment. 

CHAPTER II. 

INCEPTION. 

From the 26th of April until the 6th of June, Tampa and Port Tampawere the military centers of greatest interest in the United States. Troops were rushed into these places on special trains and camped onavailable sites, pending the organization of a proposed expeditionto--somewhere. Supplies of every description came pouring in on longtrains of express and freight cars; mounted officers and orderliesploughed their rushing way through great heaps and dunes ofever-shifting sand, leaving behind them stifling clouds ofscintillating particles, which filtered through every conceivablecrevice and made the effort to breathe a suffocating nightmare. Overall the tumultuous scene a torrid sun beat down from a cloudless sky, while its scorching rays, reflected from the fierce sand under foot, produced a heat so intolerable that even the tropical vegetationlooked withered and dying. In this climate officers and men, gatheredmostly from Northern posts, were to "acclimate" themselves for atropical campaign--somewhere. 

[Illustration: Skirmish Drill at Tampa. ]

They never encountered as deadly a heat, nor a more perniciousclimate, in Cuba nor in Porto Rico, than that of southern Florida. Itsfirst effect upon men just emerging from a bracing Northern winter wasakin to prostration. Then began to follow a decided tendency tolanguor; after this one was liable to sudden attacks of boweltroubles. The deadly malaria began to insidiously prepare the way fora hospital cot; the patient lost flesh, relish of food became areminiscence, and an hour's exertion in the sun was enough to put aman on his back for the rest of the day. Exposure to the direct actionof the sun's rays was frequently followed by nausea, a slight chill, and then a high fever. The doctors subsequently called this "thermalfever, " which is suspected to be a high-sounding name calculated tocover up a very dense ignorance of the nature of the disease, becauseno one ever obtained any relief from it from them. Recurrence of theexposure brought recurrence of the fever, and, if persisted in, finally produced a severe illness. 

One reason for this was that the troops continued to wear the winterclothing they had worn on their arrival. The promised "khaki" did notmaterialize. Some regiments drew the brown canvas fatigue uniform, butthe only use made of it was to put the white blanket-roll through thelegs of the trousers, thereby adding to the weight of the roll, without perceptible benefit to the soldier. 

Such a climate, under such surroundings, was not conducive to originalthought, prolonged exertion, or sustained study. Everybody felt "mean"and was eager for a change. Nobody wanted to listen to any newschemes. The highest ambition seemed to be to get out of it tosomewhere with just as little delay and exertion as possible. It wasat this juncture that the plan of organizing a Gatling gun battery wasconceived, and the attempt to obtain authority began. 

The Gatling gun is one of the two machine guns adopted in the landservice of the United States. Not to enter into a technicaldescription, but merely to convey a general idea of its working anduses, it may be described as follows:

The gun is a cluster of rifle barrels, without stocks, arranged arounda rod, and parallel to it. Each barrel has its own lock or bolt, andthe whole cluster can be made to revolve by turning a crank. The boltsare all covered in a brass case at the breech, and the machine isloaded by means of a vertical groove in which cartridges are placed, twenty at a time, and from which they fall into the receivers one at atime. As the cluster of barrels revolves each one is fired at thelowest point, and reloaded as it completes the revolution. The gun ismounted on a wye-shaped trunnion; the lower end of the wye passes downinto a socket in the axle. The gun is pointed by a lever just as onepoints a garden hose or sprinkler, with the advantage that the gun canbe clamped at any instant, and will then continue to sprinkle itsdrops of death over the same row of plants until the clamps arereleased. The axle is hollow and will hold about a thousandcartridges. It is horizontal, and on its ends are heavy Archibaldwheels. There is also a heavy hollow trail, in which tools andadditional ammunition can be stored. The limber resembles that used bythe Artillery, and is capable of carrying about 9600 rounds ofcartridges. The whole gun, thus mounted, can be drawn by two mules, and worked to good advantage by from six to eight men. It is built ofvarious calibers, and can fire from 300 to 900 shots per minute. Theguns used by the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, were builtby the Colt's Arms Co. , were the latest improved model, longten-barrel gun, and fired the Krag-Jorgenson ammunition used by theRegular Army. 

The attempt to obtain authority to organize a machine gun battery metwith many discouragements and repeated failures. No one seemed to havethought anything about the subject, and Tampa was not a good place norclimate in which to indulge in that form of exercise, apparently. Perhaps the climate was one reason why so little thinking was done, and everything went "at sixes and sevens. "

[Illustration: Skirmish Drill at Tampa. ]

The officer who had conceived the scheme was a young man, too. He wasonly a second lieutenant ("Second lieutenants are fit for nothingexcept to take reveille"), and had never, so far as his militarysuperiors knew, heard the whistle of a hostile bullet. He had made nobrilliant record at the Academy, had never distinguished himself inthe service, and was not anybody's "pet. " He was, apparently, a safeman to ignore or snub if occasion or bad temper made it desirable toignore or snub somebody, and, above all, had no political friends whowould be offended thereby. 

"Politics" cut quite a figure in Tampa in some respects. An officerwho was known to be a personal friend of Senator Somebody, or protegeof this or that great man, was regarded with considerable awe andreverence by the common herd. It was ludicrous to see the weightattached to the crumbs of wisdom that fell from the friends of thefriends of somebody. They shone only by a reflected light, it is true;but nobody there at Tampa had a lamp of his own, except the few whohad won renown in the Civil War, and reflected light was better thannone at all. A very young and green second lieutenant who was able toboast that he had declined to be a major in a certain State was atonce an oracle to other lieutenants--and to some who were notlieutenants. The policy which governed these appointments was not sowell understood at that date in the campaign as it is now. 

When the court of a reigning favorite was established at the Tampa BayHotel as a brigadier, and people began to get themselves a littlesettled into the idea that they knew who was in command, they weresuddenly disillusioned by the appointment of another and seniorbrigadier to the command. They settled down to get acquainted with thenew authority, and were just beginning to find out who was who, whenthe telegraph flashed the news that the deposed potentate had beenmade a major-general, and, of course, was now in command. The thingwas becoming interesting. Bets began to be made as to which would comein ahead under the wire. The other also became a major-general. Thencame a period of uncertainty, because the question of rank hinged uponsome obscure and musty record of forgotten service some thirty-fouryears before. From these facts will be apparent the difficulty underwhich a subordinate labored in trying to create anything. 

It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort to waste time withsubordinates. The projector of an enterprise had better go straight tothe one who has the necessary authority to order what is wanted; ifaccess to him can be had, and he can be brought to recognize themerits of the plan--that settles it; if not--that also settles it. Ineither case the matter becomes a settled thing, and one knows what todepend upon. 

But who was the man to see there at Tampa? Nobody knew. 

The first officer approached was the one in direct line ofsuperiority, Col. A. T. Smith, 13th Infantry. The idea was toascertain his views and try to obtain from him a favorable endorsementupon a written plan to be submitted through military channels to thecommanding general at Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly climate; forthe reply to a request for a few minutes' audience on the subject ofmachine guns was very gruff and curt: "I don't want to hear anythingabout it. I don't believe in it, and I don't feel like hearing it. Ifyou want to see me about this subject, come to me in office hours. "That settled it. Any effort to get a written plan through would haveto carry the weight of official disapproval from the start, and even a"shavey" knows that disapproval at the start is enough to kill a paperin the official routine. 

The next officers approached were Major William Auman and Capt. H. Cavanaugh, of the 13th Infantry, who were asked for advice. These twoofficers, both of whom rendered very distinguished services on thebattle-field, listened with interest and were convinced. Their advicewas: "Get your plan in tangible shape, typewritten, showing just whatyou propose; then go straight to the commanding general himself. If helistens to you, he will be the responsible party, and will have waivedthe informality; if he will not receive you, no harm is done. "

This advice was followed and the following plan prepared:

_Scheme for Organization of Division Galling Gun Detachment. _

"Material:

"Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 horses and 16 saddles; 6sets double harness, wheel, and 6 lead; 1 escort wagon, team anddriver; and 100, 000 rounds, . 30 cal. 

"Personnel:

"One first lieutenant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 clerk, 1 cook, and35 enlisted men selected for their intelligence, activity, and daring;volunteers, if possible to be obtained, as the service will behazardous. 

"Equipment:

"Officer: Revolver, saber, or machete, and field-glass. 

"Enlisted men: Revolver and knife. 

"Fifty rounds to be carried on person for revolver, and 50 in ordnancetrain. 

"Camp Equipage:

"Four conical wall-tents, 2 'A' wall-tents, and the ordinary cookingoutfit for a company of 41 men. 

"Organization:

"In the discretion of the detachment commander, subject to approval ofdivision commander; probably as follows, subject to modifications byexperience:

"Three detachments under a sergeant. A detachment to be composed of 1gunner and 7 men. The gunner should be a corporal. 

"Administration:

"The Division Gatling Gun Detachment to be subject only to the ordersof the division commander, or higher authority. Its members arecarried on 'd. S. ' in their respective organizations. Its commanderexercises over it the same authority as a company commander, and keepsthe same records. Returns, reports, and other business are transactedas in company, except that the detachment commander reports directlyto and receives orders directly from Division Headquarters. Thedetachment is not subject to ordinary guard or fatigue. When used aspart of a guard, whole detachments go with their pieces. 

"Instruction:

"The organization is purely experimental; hence the greatest possiblelatitude must be allowed the detachment commander, and he should beheld accountable for the results. He should not be subjected to theorders or interference of any subordinates, however able, who havemade no special study of the tactical use or instruction for machineguns, and who may not have faith in the experiment. It will be uselessto expect efficiency of the proposed organization unless this libertybe accorded its organizer. The field is a new one, not yet welldiscussed by even the text-writers. Organization and instruction mustbe largely experimental, subject to change as the result ofexperience; but no change from the plans of the organizer should bemade except for good and sufficient reasons. 

"Tactical Employment:

"This organization is expected to develop:

 "(a) The fire-action of good infantry. 

 "(b) The mobility of cavalry. 

"Its qualities, therefore, must be rapidity and accuracy, both of fireand movement. 

"Its employment on the defensive is obvious. On the offensive it isexpected to be useful with advance guards, rear guards, outposts, raids, and in battle. The last use, novel as it is, will be mostimportant of all. The flanks of the division can be secured by thisorganization, relieving reserves of this duty; it will give astiffening to the line of support, and at every opportune occasionwill be pushed into action on the firing line. The _moral effect_of its presence will be very great; it will be able to render valuableassistance by its fire (over the charging line) in many cases. Last, but very important, the occupation of a captured line by thisorganization at once will supply a powerful, concentrated, andcontrolled fire, either to repulse a counter-charge or to fire on adiscomfited, retiring enemy. Being a horsed organization, it canarrive at the critical point at the vital moment when, the defender'sfirst line having been thrust out, our line being disorganized, acounter-charge by the enemy would be most effective, or controlledfire by our own troops on him would be most useful. 

"It is urged that this last use of machine guns is one of the mostimportant functions, and one which has been overlooked by writers andtacticians. 

"There is one vital limitation upon the proposed organization; viz. , it must not be pitted against artillery. 

"It is urgently suggested that this organization can be perfected hereand now without difficulty, while it will be very difficult to perfectafter the forward movement has begun. Horses and harness can be easilyprocured at Tampa; there will be no difficulty if some energeticofficer be authorized to proceed with the work, and directed to attendto the details. 

"Believing earnestly in the utility of the proposed organization, which will convert useless impedimenta into a fourth arm, andrealizing the dangerous nature of the proposed service, I respectfullyoffer my services to carry these plans into effect. 

"John H. Parker, "2d Lieut. 13th Infty. "

With this plan well digested and with many a plausible argument in itsfavor all thought out, Col. Arthur McArthur, assistant adjutant-generalto Gen. Wade, who was at that moment in command, was approached. 

[Illustration: Field Bakery. ]

Col. McArthur was a very busy man. He was also a very business-likeman, and one of handsome appearance, easy access, and pleasantaddress. He sandwiched in a fifteen-minute interview between twopressing engagements, and manifested both interest and approval. Butnothing could be done at that time. "Come again a week from to-day, "said he, "and I will try to obtain you a hearing before one who can dowhat you wish by a single word. I believe in your scheme and will helpyou if I can. " The week rolled by and a change of commanding generalsoccurred. Gen. Wade was ordered away, taking McArthur with him, and noprogress had been made. It was discouraging. 

The next step in the plan was by lucky accident. Lieutenant (nowLieut. -Col. ) John T. Thompson, Ordnance Department, who was in chargeof the Ordnance Depot at Tampa, accidentally met the would-bemachine-gun man, and was promptly buttonholed over a dish of icecream. Thompson was himself a young man and a student. His departmentplaced an insuperable obstacle in the way of himself carrying out aplan which he, also, had conceived, and he was keen to see the idea, which he fully believed in, demonstrated on the battle-field. He had, moreover, as ordnance officer, just received an invoice of fifteenGatling guns, complete, of the latest model, and he had access to thecommanding general by virtue of being a member of his staff. By reasonof the terrible rush of overwork, he needed an assistant, and itseemed practicable to try to kill two birds with one stone. But all hesaid was, "I believe in the idea; I have long advocated it. It may bepossible for me to get you your opportunity, and it may not. If so, you will hear from the matter. "

The attempt to get the thing going had been apparently abandoned, when, utterly without notice, the regimental commander received ordersper letter, from Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, which resulted in thefollowing orders:

"Headquarters 13th Infantry, in the Field, "Tampa, Fla. , May 27, 1898. 

"Special Orders No. 22:

"Pursuant to instructions contained in letter from Headquarters 5thArmy Corps, May 26, 1898, 2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry. Sergeant Alois Weischaar, Company A, Sergeant William Eyder, Company G, Private Lewis Kastner, Company A. Private Joe Seman, Company B, Private Abram Greenberg, Company C. Private Joseph Hoft, Company D, Private O'Connor L. Jones, Company D, Private Louis Misiak, Company E, Private George C. Murray, Company F, Private John Bremer, Company G, Private Fred H. Chase, Company H, Private Martin Pyne, Company H, will report to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, ordnance officer, for duty inconnection with the Gatling Gun Battery. 

"These men will be fully equipped, with the exception of rifle, bayonet, scabbard, and blanket-bag, and will be rationed to includeMay 31, 1898. 

"By order of Colonel Smith. 

"M. McFarland, "1st Lieut. 13th Infty. , Adjutant. "

These men were selected by their company commanders. It is not knownwhether the selections were made with a view to special fitness ornot. They had no notice that the detail was to be anything but atransient character; in fact, one company commander actually detailedthe cook of his private mess, and was intensely disgusted when hefound that the detail was to be permanent or semi-permanent. The menwere sent fully armed and equipped; carrying rifles, knapsacks, etc. , and marched down to the Ordnance Depot for instructions. Theseinstructions were to return to camp, turn in their rifles, bayonets, cartridges, belts, and knapsacks, and return early the followingmorning equipped with blanket-roll complete, haversack, and canteen. Each man, after full explanation of the hazardous duty, was given achance to withdraw, but all volunteered to stay. 

The instructions were obeyed, and the Gatling Gun Detachment wasborn--a pigmy. 

[Illustration: Awaiting Turn to Embark. ]

CHAPTER III. 

THE ORDNANCE DEPOT. 

The Ordnance Depot at Tampa was located on Lafayette Street, at theend of the bridge over the river, next to the Tampa Bay Hotel. Theriver washed the sides of the building, which was occupied by theTampa Athletic Club, and had formerly been used as a club-house. Therewere two stories and a basement. The basement was nearly on a levelwith the river, the main floor on a level with the bridge, and therewas also a spacious upper floor. The main floor was used for storageof light articles of ordnance; the basement for heavy articles andammunition. Hundreds of thousands of rounds of rifle and revolver ballcartridges, thousands of rounds of Hotchkiss fixed ammunition, andmany hundreds of pounds of powder charges for field artillery andmortars were here stored. Miscellaneous assortments were daily comingin, generally without any mark on the box by which to learn what werethe contents. The name of the arsenal, if from an arsenal, was usuallystamped on the seal; generally there was no mark whatever to designatethe origin or contents of the many boxes which came from ordinaryposts. The invoices came from a week to ten days behind or in advanceof the arrival of the boxes, and there was not the slightest clue tobe gained from them. Consequently those who had to check up invoicesand prepare for issues were at their wits' end to keep thingsstraight. A requisition for so many articles would come in, dulyapproved; unless the boxes containing these articles happened to havebeen unpacked, it was uncertain whether they were on hand or not. Nowholesale merchant of any sense would ship out boxes of goods withoutsome indication of their contents; but that was exactly what was donefrom all over the country to the Ordnance Depot at Tampa. 

The upper floor consisted of one large room. A rope railing was placedaround it to preserve clear space around the desks. There were severalof these for the ordnance officer and the various clerks. A chiefclerk, an assistant clerk, a stenographer, and two ordnance sergeantslooked after the red tape. An overseer with four subordinates and agang of negro stevedores attended to loading and unloading boxes, storing them, counting out articles for issue or receipt, and suchother duties as they were called on to perform. There was an oldjanitor named McGee, a veteran of the Civil War, whose business it wasto look after the sweeping and keep the floors clean. 

Four guns in their original boxes were issued to the detachment on the27th of May. They were new, and apparently had never been assembled. On assembling them it was found that the parts had been constructedwith such "scientific" accuracy that the use of a mallet wasnecessary. The binder-box on the pointing lever was so tight that inattempting to depress the muzzle of the gun it was possible to liftthe trail off the ground before the binder-box would slide on thelever. The axis-pin had to be driven in and out with an axe, using ablock of wood, of course, to prevent battering. A truly pretty stateof affairs for a gun the value of which depends on the ease with whichit can be pointed in any direction. 

Inquiry after the war at the factory where the guns are made disclosedthe fact that these parts are rigidly tested by a gauge by theGovernment inspectors, and that looseness is regarded as a fataldefect. Even play of half a hundredth of an inch is enough to insurethe rejection of a piece. The very first thing done by the Gatling GunDetachment, upon assembling these guns, was to obtain a set ofarmorers' tools and to file away these parts by hand until the aim ofthe piece could be changed by the touch of a feather. The detachmentwas ordered to rely upon the friction clutches for steadiness of aim, when necessary, and not upon the tight fit of the parts. It wasordered that there must be no doubt whatever of easy, perfectly freemanipulation at any and all times, even if the pointing lever shouldbecome rusted. This precaution proved on July 1st to have been ofgreat value. 

[Illustration: Baiquiri. ]

The instruction of the detachment began immediately, and consisted, atfirst, of unpacking, mounting, dismounting, and repacking the guns. The four guns were mounted and a drill held each time in the loadingand firing of the piece. This system of instruction was continueduntil the detachment was ordered on board ship on the 6th of June. During this instruction members of the detachment were designated byname to fall out, and the remainder of the detachment required toexecute all the maneuvers of the piece as before. In fact, thisinstruction was carried to such a point that one man alone wasrequired to load, aim, and fire the gun at designated objects withoutany assistance. 

The detachment at once assumed the position of an independent command. It reported directly to Maj. -Gen. W. R. Shafter, commanding the 5thCorps, in everything so far as its duties with Gatling guns wereconcerned, was regarded as an independent command, kept its ownrecords in the same manner as a company, obtained cooking utensilsfrom the quartermaster and ran its own mess, and furnished its ownguard. This status, that of a separate command, continued until thedetachment was finally disbanded at Montauk. 

On the 27th of May the detachment commander was summoned to Gen. Wheeler's headquarters and there requested to explain to the generalin person his plans for organizing a Gatling gun detachment. Gen. Wheeler had just assumed command of all the Cavalry belonging to the5th Army Corps. His headquarters, instead of being in a suite of roomsin the palatial Tampa Bay Hotel, where all the other general officershad their headquarters, were located about half a mile from the hotelin a treeless pasture. The cavalry guidon floating from a lance-headwas the only indication of headquarters, and the half-dozen "A" tentsin an irregular line gave no sign that one of the most distinguishedgenerals in the world had here his headquarters in the field. 

The general was easily accessible. The first thing that impressed oneof him was his extraordinary quickness. His eye seemed to take ineverything within sight of him at a single glance, and to read one'sthoughts before the tongue could give expression to them. He graspedideas when they were only half uttered and immediately drew deductionsfrom mere statements of simple facts, the result of years of carefulstudy. These deductions, which Gen. Wheeler drew instantly, were inevery case correct, and showed a keener and more correct appreciationof the proper tactical employment of machine guns than was shown byany other officer of the 5th Corps. The result of the interview withthe general was that a scheme for the organization of a tactical unitto be composed of three Gatling guns and to be employed with thecavalry division, was drawn up on the spot, under Gen. Wheeler'spersonal direction, and was submitted by him to Gen. Shafter, with therequest that authority be granted for the organization of this commandfor the purpose indicated. 

In the application Gen. Wheeler stated that he believed that such abattery of machine guns, if properly handled, could go anywhere thatcavalry could go, could take the place of infantry supports, coulddash up and hold any ground or advantageous position that a body ofcavalry might seize, could be thrown out to one flank of the enemy andassist in his demoralization in preparation for the cavalry charge, and would be of particular service in case the enemy attempted to forminfantry squares, which were at that time supposed to be the main partof the Spanish tactics of battle. This application was disapproved. 

On the 30th of May, Gen. Lee sent for the detachment commander for aninterview on the subject of Gatling guns. Gen. Lee was at this timequartered at the Tampa Bay Hotel, and was engaged in the organizationof the 7th Army Corps. It was supposed that the 7th Corps was designedfor the Havana campaign, and it was believed that the attack uponHavana would begin at a very early date. The result of the interviewwith Gen. Lee was that he directed a scheme for the organization of atactical unit to be composed of 9 guns, 3 batteries of 3 guns each, tobe prepared for service with the 7th Army Corps. 

It was desired that this organization be a volunteer organization, andthe application was therefore made for authority from the President, under that law of Congress authorizing the employment of specialtroops. Col. Guild, well and favorably known from his connection withthe Massachusetts National Guard, was prepared to furnish a volunteerorganization already in existence, well drilled and already officered, composed of the flower of the youth of Massachusetts, very largely ofcollege graduates, who had already been communicated with on thesubject, and who were even at that time expecting momentarily atelegram calling them to this duty. Nothing resulted from this effort. 

Meantime the drill instruction of the little detachment continued. Itsmembers had acquired a considerable degree of proficiency in themechanical handling of their guns, and were beginning to appreciatethe destructive possibilities of their weapon. They were enjoying adegree of liberty which they had not found in their regimental camp, because when not on duty they were free to come and go at will, whenand where they pleased. The hours for instruction were designated inthe morning and in the cool of the afternoon, leaving the middle ofthe day and the evening for the men's own recreation. The result ofthis system of treatment was that _esprit-du-corps_ began to bedeveloped in the detachment. They began to feel that they were aspecial organization, expected to do special work, and that they werereceiving very special treatment. They began to be proud of beingmembers of the Gatling Gun Detachment, to take greater interest in thework, and when on the first of June they received their monthly paynot a single member of the detachment committed any excesses inconsequence of this unusual degree of freedom. No one was intoxicated. No one was absent without permission. 

The detachment had not been at the Ordnance Depot very long before anopportunity occurred for some of its members to exhibit thosequalities which made the success of the battery so conspicuous on thebattle-field afterward. The detachment commander had been detailed byverbal orders on the first of June in charge of the issues of ordnanceproperty to the Santiago expedition. This was in addition to hisduties with the Gatling guns. The work would commence about 6 o'clockin the morning, and from that time until dark there was a continualstream of wagons carrying away stores such as rifles, haversacks, meatration cans, tin cups, and all the articles needed by troops in thefield during a campaign. The ammunition which was issued to the troopsat this time was drawn at the same place. 

When wagons arrived to receive issues, stevedores were directed tocount out the different articles under the direction of an overseer, and these piles of articles were verified by the officer in charge ofthe issues. The stevedores then loaded them on the wagons which wereto haul them to the different camps. Receipts in duplicate were alwaystaken and invoices in duplicate were always given, in the name, ofcourse, of Lieut. John T. Thompson, who was responsible for thestores. 

On the 4th of June issues were being made of rifle-ball cartridges. These cartridges came packed in boxes of 1000 rounds each, and eachbox weighed 78 pounds. A great quantity of it was stored in thebasement, where there was also a considerable quantity of fixedHotchkiss ammunition, as well as several thousand rounds of powdercharges in boxes. The Hotchkiss ammunition, which comes withprojectile and powder both set in a brass case, is bad ammunition topack; for, no matter how carefully it is handled, there is almostalways some leakage of powder from the cartridge case, thus causing acertain amount of loose powder to sift into the box in which it ispacked. 

About half past 11 o'clock on this morning a negro stevedoreaccidentally dropped a box of rifle ammunition near a pile ofHotchkiss fixed, and the next instant the laborers saw smoke ascendingtoward the ceiling of the basement. They yelled "Fire! fire!" at thetop of their voices, and everybody in the basement at once made a rushfor the two doors. It was a panic. The danger was imminent. The smokecurled up to the ceiling and then curled down again, and the excited, panic-stricken faces of the negroes as they rushed through the doormade an awful picture of human terror. People on the outside of thebuilding began to shout "Fire!"

At this juncture McGee, the old janitor, who had just reached thedoor, cried out, "Lieutenant, there is a box in here on fire!"speaking to Lieut. Parker, who was verifying issues just outside thedoor. The lieutenant replied, "Let's throw it into the river, " anddashed toward the box through the door, pushing the excited negroes toeach side in order to assist McGee, who had instantly started for thebox. When Lieut. Parker reached the box, he found that McGee hadalready taken it up, and was staggering under its weight. He placedone arm around McGee's shoulder and with the other assisted him tosupport the box, from which the smoke was still ascending, and the tworushed for the door, throwing the whole momentum of their weight andspeed against the crowd of frightened negroes, who were falling overeach other in their panic-stricken efforts to escape. Priv. Greenberg, of the 13th Infantry, a member of the Gatling Gun Detachment, who wasthe sentinel on post at the time, saw the two men coming with the box, and with great presence of mind added his own weight with a rapid rushto the shock they had produced, thus enabling them to break their waythrough the dense throng at the door. It was only the work of aninstant to then throw the box in the river, where it sank in the waterand for a moment the blue smoke continued to bubble up from the box, which lay clearly visible on the bed of the river, the water beingonly about two feet deep at this point, which was, however, enough toentirely cover the box and thus extinguish the fire. At the outcry of"Fire!" Lieut. H. L. Kinnison, of the 25th Infantry, who was waitingoutside of the basement with a wagon, started in at the other door, and Serg. Weischaar, acting first sergeant of the Gatling GunDetachment, started for water. Just as the two men emerged from thedoor carrying the box, Lieut. Kinnison reached the spot where the firehad originated, and Serg. Weischaar appeared with two buckets ofwater. He and Lieut. Kinnison at once flooded the floor, seized awoolen cloth which happened to be near, and wetted down the boxes ofHotchkiss ammunition as a measure of precaution. 

[Illustration: The "Hornet. "]

McGee, the hero of this episode, is an old veteran of the Civil War, having served three years in the Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantryduring the war, and five years in the Regular Army after the war. Hehas never drawn a pension nor applied for one, although he suffersconsiderably from disease and wounds contracted and received duringthe war, and certainly should be rewarded by a grateful government forhis conspicuous heroism. The explosion of this magazine would havebrought the whole expedition to a standstill, besides inflictingtremendous destruction of property and frightful loss of life. 

The same day the Artillery of the army began to draw its material forthe campaign, and for a period of thirty-nine hours there was no restfor anybody connected with the issue of ordnance stores. It was atthis time that the lack of intelligent marking and packing of theboxes was keenly felt. The greatest difficulty was experienced inselecting, from the mass of stores in the depot, the stores that wererequired by the Artillery. It was especially difficult during the workby night, when the only light that could possibly be allowed was asingle lantern, on account of the danger of fire. 

At the close of this thirty-nine hours of arduous duty, the officer incommand of the Gatling Gun Detachment learned that orders had beenissued for the embarkation of the 5th Army Corps at Port Tampa, andthat no reference had been made to the Gatling Gun Detachment in theseorders. He at once sought Lieut. Thompson, who could offer no light onthe omission, but said, "I have orders to send at once to theCherokee 521, 000 rounds of rifle-ball cartridges and all therevolver ammunition on hand. This is the reserve ammunition of the 5thArmy Corps. I will send you in charge of this ammunition and you willsee it to its destination. You may take an escort or not, as youplease. The ammunition is to go on the 4 o'clock train and you mustmake all the arrangements in regard to it. Get box-cars, haul theammunition over there and put it in the cars, see that it goes on thattrain, and as soon as it arrives at Port Tampa, see that it isproperly put on board the Cherokee. "

In order to fully understand the situation of the Gatling GunDetachment at this juncture, the following correspondence on thesubject is necessary:

"Office of Ordnance Officer, "Lafayette Street, West of Bridge, "Tampa, Fla. , June 3, 1898. 

"The Assistant Adjutant-General, 5th Army Corps, Tampa, Florida:

"Sir, --Replying to your letter of June 1, 1898, in reference to GatlingGun Detachment, I have the honor to submit the following report:

Guns, men, and equipment required for a 4-gun detachment:

 Guns. Serg. Corp. Priv. Total required: 4 5 4 28 On hand: 4 2 0 10 Required: 3 4 18

The gun crews thus organized will give most effective service for thedetachment. 

Ammunition: Each limber carries 9, 840 rounds cal. . 30. Four limbers, 27, 360; necessary reserve, 32, 640; total, 60, 000. 

Tentage: Two conical wall-tents for enlisted men; one 'A' wall-tentfor officer. 

Camp equipage, in addition to that on hand in Gatling Gun Detachment:one buzzacot, small; four mess-pans, one dish-pan, one coffee-mill. 

Blanket-roll complete; revolver with 50 rounds per man; waist-beltsand entrenching-knives. 

"It is recommended that Priv. Butz, 'G' Co. , 13th Infantry, Corp. Robert S. Smith, 'C' Co. , 13th Infantry, and Serg. Weigle, 9thInfantry, be members of the detachment; and that detachment be takenfrom 9th Infantry, which has some well-instructed men. 

"It is further recommended that the detachment be fully horsed as soonas practicable, and that the whole be placed under the command ofLieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, as acting captain. 

"I recommend that I be authorized to issue the 4 Gatling guns andparts to him. 

"The details should carry the rations prescribed in General Orders5th, May 31, 1898, 5th Army Corps. Very respectfully, (Signed) "Jno. T. Thompson, "1st Lieut. , Ord. Dept, U. S. A. "

This letter, prepared by Lieut. Parker and signed by Lieut. Thompson, was endorsed as follows:

First Endorsement. 

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "Tampa, Fla. , June 5, 1898. 

"Respectfully returned to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, Ordnance Officer. 

"If Lieut. Parker, in charge of the detachment as at presentconstituted, can make the arrangements suggested within, he may takeaction; but, in view of the limited time remaining, it is thought thedetachment already organized will answer. 

"By command of Maj. -Gen. Shafter. 

"E. J. McClernand, "Assistant Adjutant-General. "

Second Endorsement. 

"Office of the Ordnance Officer, "Lafayette Street Bridge, "Tampa, Fla. , June 5, 1898. 

"Respectfully referred to Lieut. John H. Parker for his information. 

"Jno. T. Thompson, "1st Lieut. , Ordnance Dept, U. S. A. "

It will be seen from the first endorsement that a certain amount ofdiscretion was left to the detachment commander. He was authorized totake action if he could make the arrangements suggested within. Lieut. Thompson had authorized an escort for the reserve ammunition, if itwas considered necessary. The detachment commander resolved to takeaction by using his whole detachment as an escort, putting it on boardthe Cherokee, with the reserve ammunition, and accompanying it to itsdestination--in Cuba, trusting to the future to enable him to completethe detachment according to the first endorsement. 

It was now 11 o'clock in the forenoon. Between that time and 4 o'clockit was necessary to obtain two freight cars, have them placed upon thesiding at a convenient point, have more than twenty wagon-loads ofammunition, camp equipage, etc. , placed in these cars, have the fourguns with their limbers placed on board, and, more difficult than allthe rest, go through the necessary red tape at the quartermaster'soffice in order to get the two cars moved to Port Tampa. It was allaccomplished. 

The general freight agent was bluffed into believing that unless thetwo cars were instantly set where they were wanted his whole railroadwould be tied up. The quartermaster was hypnotized and droppedformality, putting all the clerks to work upon papers and making outthe necessary bill of lading, invoices, etc. , in time to catch the 4o'clock train. He also issued the necessary transportation for theofficer and men of the detachment from Tampa to Port Tampa, acceptingthe first endorsement above as sufficient orders for that purpose. 

One member of the detachment, Priv. Murray, had been very ill withwhat we afterward learned to call the Cuban fever, and, whileapparently convalescent, was entirely too weak to accompany thedetachment. He was a splendid fellow, and the tears rolled down hisemaciated face when he was told he must remain behind. He wasfurnished with a descriptive list and a letter was written to thechief surgeon of the Division Hospital, requesting him to send anambulance immediately for the sick man. One member of the detachmentcarried this letter to Tampa Heights, and so sharp was the work ofgetting away that this man had to board a moving train as it waspulling out to keep from getting left; but Priv. Murray was taken tothe hospital and cared for, and Priv. Bremer did not get left. 

The detachment reached Port Tampa about sundown, and Maj. Cushing, whohad charge of the loading of the transports, at once authorized thecars to be set alongside the Cherokee. The ammunition, guns, campequipage, men, and all were promptly put aboard. The training inpacking and unpacking the guns was the only thing which enabled thework to be done in the limited time allotted. Not so much as aten-penny nail belonging to the detachment was left behind. 

During the night the troops that were to occupy the Cherokee came onboard, and it was found the next morning that five or six tons ofregimental baggage had been piled on top of the guns, making itpractically impossible to disembark, even if such a movement should beordered. 

[Illustration: Wrecked Locomotives and Machine Shops at Baiquiri. ]

CHAPTER IV. 

THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION. 

It seemed that the work had been accomplished none too soon, for onthe morning of June 7th orders came to the Cherokee to leave the slipand proceed down the bay. There were on board at this time, beside thelittle Gatling Gun Detachment, the 17th Infantry, under command ofCol. Haskell, and a battalion of the 12th Infantry, under command ofCol. Comba, who was the senior officer on board. The ship wasfrightfully crowded. The berth deck and lower deck had been arrangedfor the accommodation of the men by nailing rows of two 2x4 scantlingsjust far enough apart to leave room for a man to lie down, andfastening three tiers of bunks to these scantlings. The men werepacked in these bunks like sardines in a box. The ventilation wasconspicuous by its absence, the heat below deck was frightful and themisery entailed by such accommodations was beyond description. But themen were very cheerful, and, being allowed the privilege of the upperdeck, very little in the way of complaint was heard. Everybody wasanxious to be off. The hope most frequently expressed was for a quickpassage and a sharp, swift campaign. It was easily foreseen by theofficers on board the ship that a long sojourn on shipboard under suchconditions would have a very bad effect on the men. 

The ship dropped down the bay to the quarantine station, startingabout noon, and there lay to, waiting, as was supposed, for theremainder of the fleet. Suddenly, about 8 p. M. , one of the torpedocruisers came tearing down the bay under full steam, and we heard themessage sounded through the megaphone: "Return to port. Three Spanishcruisers within three hours' sail of the offing. " It was a thrillingmoment. Officers and men were lounging, taking, as they supposed, their last view of the American shores, without a suspicion of presentdanger, when they were rapidly brought to a realizing sense that "waris hell, " by a notice that the enemy was upon them. Whether they werein danger or not, the danger was deadly real and imminent to them atthe time. 

The Cherokee had been anchored pretty well inside. She immediately gotup steam and went out to warn other vessels farther out in the offing, and then made safely for the harbor. Officers and men behaved withperfect coolness. It was hopeless to attempt to escape by concealment, so Col. Comba ordered out the band of the 17th Infantry and the goodship fled up the bay, in momentary expectation of a smashing shot fromthe enemy, to the strains of "There'll be a hot time. " What littleexcitement there was displayed itself in a feverish searching of thebay with field-glasses for signs of the enemy. The older officers, upon whom the responsibility was resting, sat upon the quarter-deck, smoking their pipes and discussing the situation. The captains quietlymoved about, assigning stations to their companies, in case of attack, with the view of trying the effect of the modern rifle upon thearmored sides of a Spanish man-of-war, and two of the younger officerstook advantage of the catchy air which the band was playing to dance atwo-step on the quarter-deck. So the evening wore away. The moon wentdown. The myriad little stars came out, twinkling in the deep bluesky, and at last both officers and men, tired of looking for an enemywho was never to appear, turned in for such sleep as they could get, leaving a small guard on deck to keep a lookout. When they awoke nextmorning, the ship was in the deepest part of the nearest slip, mooredfast by her guy-ropes to the dock. Thus ended the first engagementwith the enemy. 

From the 8th until the 13th, the Cherokee lay at anchor in the slip. She was relieved on the 10th of about 200 men, thus slightlylightening her overcrowded condition. In the meantime, thisovercrowded condition of the ship had led to some discussion as to whocould best be moved on board some other ship, with some prospect thatthe Gatling Gun Detachment might be disturbed. The situation was notat all satisfactory. With four guns, no mules, no harness, noauthority, and only twelve men, the Gatling Gun Detachment did notappear to be in a very fair way toward inflicting much damage upon theenemy. So on the 11th of June the detachment commander visited Gen. Shafter at his headquarters, determined to bring the matter to anissue, definitely, one way or the other. This was the first time hehad met the general, and, under the circumstances, the manner of hisreception appeared to be doubtful. 

Gen. Shafter is a big man. This is not noticed at first glance. He isabove the average height, but his corpulent figure does not indicatethat he is full five feet nine inches in height, because his girth isof like proportion. His hands are big; his arm is big; his head isbig. The occiput is especially full, and the width of head just overthe ears is noticeable. There is plenty of room for the organs ofcombativeness. One would think he is probably a lover of children;during this interview he patted the head of an inquisitive dog, whichevidently belonged somewhere on board the flag-ship, and which strayedinto the room. His eyes are big, very full and very keen. As you enterhe says curtly, "Take a seat. " He waits, looking down, for you tostate your business, then suddenly fixes you with a piercing glance, and goes to the heart of the subject by one incisive sentence, whichleaves no more to be said. This description is a general type ofseveral interviews with him. On this occasion the general inquiredconcerning the facts, looking keenly, searchingly, and meditatively atthe detachment commander. The machine gun man was "on trial. " Then thegeneral broke the silence by one short question, "What do you want?"and the reply was in kind, "Twenty men, general, with the privilege ofselecting them. " The general suggested the advisability of taking acomplete organization; to which was replied, "That at this late hourin the expedition it is imperative to have selected men in order toperform the required duty; that men taken at random, as would be thecase in a complete organization such as a company, would not be likelyto have the required characteristics. " The general tersely remarked, "You may have them. Make out your list, name any man in the corps thatyou want, and hand the list to me. I will send the men to you. " Thetrial was over, and the Machine Gun Detachment was a settled fact. 

Accordingly on the following day Special Orders No. 16 were issued, asfollows:

Extract. 

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "On Board S. S. Seguransa, "Tampa Bay, Fla. , June 11, 1898. 

"Special Orders, No. 16:

 * * * * *

"4. The following named enlisted men are detailed for duty with theGatling Gun Detachment, 5th Army Corps, and will report at once to 2dLieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, commanding the detachment forduty:

"9th Infantry: Sergeant Weigle. 

"12th Infantry: Privates Voelker, Company A; Anderson, Lauer, andTimberly, Company C; Prazak, Company E. 

"13th Infantry: Sergeant Green, Company H; Corporals Stiegerwald, Company A; Doyle, Smith, and Rose, Company C; Privates Corey andPower, Company A; Barts, Company E; and Schmadt, Company G. 

"17th Infantry: Privates Merryman and Schulze, Company A; McDonald, Company B; Elkins, Dellett, and McGoin, Company D; Click, Needle, Shiffer, and Sine, Company E. 

"Each of the soldiers will report equipped as follows: Blanket-rollcomplete, haversack and contents, canteen, waist-belt of leather, hunting-knife, and revolver, and they will be rationed with ten days'travel rations. Descriptive lists of these men will be sent to thecommanding officer of the detachment. 

 * * * * *

"By command of Maj. -Gen. Shafter. 

"Official. J. D. Miley, E. J. McClernand, "Aide. Asst. Adj. -Gen. "

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "On Board S. S. Seguransa, "Tampa Bay, June 11, 1898. 

"Special Orders, No. 16:

Extract. 

 * * * * *

"5. 2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, commanding the GatlingGun Detachment, 5th Army Corps, is authorized to make the usualrequisitions for supplies. 

 * * * * *

"By command of Maj. -Gen. Shafter. 

"Official. J. D. Miley, E. J. McClernand, "Aide. Asst. Adj. -Gen. "

The organization was thus perfected by a single stroke of thegeneral's pen on the 11th of June, theoretically; practically it wasthe 14th of June before the details from the 12th and 17th Infantryreported, and when they did, instead of being equipped as directed, they carried rifles with 100 rounds of ammunition. 

[Illustration: The Landing. ]

Serg. Weigle, of the 9th Infantry, who reported at the same time, carried a revolver. On the 14th a wigwag message was received from the13th Infantry, inquiring whether the detail was desired to report atonce or not, to which the reply was sent that it was desired to reportat the earliest possible moment. It did not report. 

The detachment was at once organized as well as possible for the tripon board the transport, and the guns brought up from the hold of theship and mounted in such a way that they would be ready for instantuse. It was not known but that the detachment might have toparticipate in a naval engagement, and the value of machine guns inthe navy has long been demonstrated. At any rate, it was determined tobe ready to give a warm reception to any torpedo vessel which mightattempt to attack the Cherokee. One object of getting the guns up wasto give instruction to the new men who reported on the 14th. Sergt. Weigle was well instructed in the use of Gatling guns, but none of theother members of the detachment had ever received any instruction, andhad been selected rather on the ground of their superior intelligenceand courage than on any special knowledge of machine guns. They weregiven a drill each day in loading and firing the piece, during thetime they remained on board the transport, when the weather permitted. 

The condition of the troops on board the transport was miserable. Thefollowing extract from a letter written at that time will convey someidea of the crowded, ill-ventilated condition of the vessel:

"We have now been on board the transport a week, and are getting intoa frame of mind suitable for desperate work. If you can imagine 1000men crowded into space needed for 500, and then kept there withoutroom to stand or move or sit for seven days, under a tropical sun, infoul holds utterly without ventilation (just imagine it!), enduredwithout a single murmur or complaint, not stoically, but patiently andintelligently, while every officer on board is kicking as hard and asoften as possible for the relief of his men, then you will have someidea of the situation. The men are very patient, but they know someonehas blundered. Talk about the heroism of the Light Brigade! It isnothing to the heroism that goes cheerfully and uncomplainingly intothe Black Hole of Calcutta (there is nothing else that will comparewith these transports), all because it is duty. When will the peopleappreciate the heroism of the Regular Army?"

This was the actual condition of affairs on board the Cherokeeup to the time of leaving port on the 14th of June, and it wasmodified only by the hoisting of wind-sails, after we got under way. These were not very efficient and there were only two of them, so verylittle relief was given to the overcrowded berth-deck. Most of the menspent their time on the upper deck, and one whole company wasquartered there. At night, after 8 o'clock, Col. Comba authorized themen to sleep on deck, and there was always a rush, when the ship'sbell struck the hour, for good places on the quarter-deck. The onlything that made the voyage endurable was the good weather whichprevailed. This prevented seasickness, to a certain extent. 

The squadron reached Santiago de Cuba, and after tacking about forseveral days, either for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, or ofwaiting a decision as to the landing-place, finally approachedBaiquiri, which had been selected for the landing. The troops on theCherokee began to land on the 23d of June, the battalion of the12th Infantry going first. This was followed by the 17th Infantry, andupon its departure the captain of the Cherokee put to sea. Thereason for this maneuver is not known. The orders issued by Gen. Shafter in regard to the landing were that the Gatling Gun Detachmentshould accompany Gen. Lawton's Division. This movement of theCherokee completely blocked the landing of the Gatling guns. Theship's captain was finally induced to put back into the bay and speakto the Seguransa, and Gen. Shafter directed that the detachment shouldbe taken off the next morning. 

An effort was made, therefore, to obtain the use of a lighter whichwas not at that time in use, but the Commissary Department refused toyield the boat, and it remained until 11 o'clock the next morning tiedup to the wharf with half a load of commissaries on board before itbecame available, and then was seized by the Quartermaster'sDepartment. An effort was then made to obtain the use of threepontoons, belonging to the Engineer Department, which had been drawnup to the shore and were of no use to anybody. The young engineerofficer in charge of these boats, a premature graduate of the class of'98, was "afraid the boats might get smashed in the surf, " and couldnot consent without seeing Col. Derby. Col. Derby could not be found. 

[Illustration: Pack Train. ]

A wigwag came from Gen. Shafter, asking whether the Gatling guns hadbeen landed. The reply, "No; may I use pontoons?" was answered atonce, "Use pontoons, and get off immediately. " On returning to shorewith a party to work the pontoons, the party was stopped in the act oflaunching the first boat by Gen. Sumner, and ordered to proceed to theCherokee, take her out into the offing, and order another to take herplace to unload. Protesting against this action, and informing Gen. Sumner of the urgent orders for the Gatling guns to disembark at once, that officer inquired the opinion of the prematurely graduatedengineer as to the practicability of using the pontoons, and thisexperienced young man again expressed the fear that the boats might beinjured in the surf. To the detachment commander's indignantexclamation, "What the h-- were these boats made for, if they are notto be used and smashed?" Gen. Sumner responded by a peremptory orderto warp the Cherokee out from the pier and send the other vessels in. The order was obeyed, and all the circumstances reported to Gen. Shafter the same evening, with the expression of the opinion that ifthe general wanted the Gatling guns landed, he would have to attend toit personally, because the Gatling gun commander did not havesufficient rank to accomplish it in the face of all these obstacles. Early on the morning of June 25th, therefore, Gen. Shafter sentperemptory orders to the lighter to lay alongside the Cherokee, takethe Gatling guns and detachment on board, and land them on the dock. The transfer began at 8 o'clock in the morning, Gen. Shafter comingout in person in his steam launch to see that his order was executed. By 11 o'clock the guns, carriages, 30, 000 rounds of ammunition, foursets of double harness, and the detachment were on board the lighter. This had been accomplished a mile outside in the offing, with thevessel rolling and pitching in the trough of the sea and on the crestof the gigantic rollers in so violent a manner that it was almostimpossible for men to stand on their feet, much less handle such heavymaterial as guns and ammunition. The lighter was warped to the pier at11 o'clock, and the general tied his steam launch alongside to seethat it was not disturbed until the debarkation was completed. At 1o'clock everything was ashore, and, in compliance with the general'sinstructions, the best mules in the corral were taken, and as theywere led away from the corral-gate, a fat, sleek, black streaked, long-eared specimen, which had been selected for a saddle-mule, set upa cheerful "Aw! hee haw! haw!" which produced a burst of laughter andcheering from the members of the detachment and the soldiers in thevicinity. It was a cheerful omen. These Missouri mules were capable ofpulling anything loose at both ends, and four experienced drivers hadbeen selected from the detachment who were capable of riding anythingthat walked on four feet, or driving anything from an Arab courser toa pair of Shetland ponies. 

Priv. J. Shiffer had been selected as corral boss of the detachment. The most picturesque figure, the most boyish member, and as brave asoldier as ever shouldered a musket; broad of shoulder, stout of limb, full of joke, as cheerful as a ray of sunlight, this man was theincarnation of courage and devotion. He loved a mule. He was proud ofthe job. With the instinct of a true teamster, he had snapped up thebest pair of mules in the whole corral and was out before thedetachment commander had selected a single mule. This team was asblack as Shiffer's shoes and as strong as a pair of elephants. Theywere worked harder than any other team in the 5th Army Corps, and whenthey were turned in to the quartermaster in August, they were as fat, as sleek, as strong, and as hardy as on the day they were taken fromthe corral in Baiquiri. The other three teamsters were like unto thefirst. They were all handy men. They were as capable of fighting oraiming a gun as of driving a team. Any one of the four could take ateam of mules up a mountain-side or down a vertical precipice inperfect safety. They could do the impossible with a team of mules, andthey had to do it before the detachment reached the firing-line. Thesuccess of the battery was to depend to a very large degree upon thecoolness, good judgment, and perfect bravery of these four teamsters. 

[Illustration: Calvary Picket Line. ]

It should be noted that the use of mules was an experiment. The"scientific" branch of service has always held that the proper animalto draw a field-piece is the horse. They expatiate with great delightupon the almost human intelligence and sagacity of that noble animal;upon his courage "when he snuffeth the battle afar, " and upon theundaunted spirit with which he rushes upon the enemy, and assists hismaster to work the destruction of his foes. The Artillery claims thatmules are entirely too stubborn, too cowardly, and too hard to managefor the purpose of their arm of the service. It was also an experimentto use two mules per gun. The Engineer Department had reported thatthe road to the front was impassable for wheeled vehicles, and eventhe general had apparently thought that four mules per gun would benecessary. The necessity of economizing mules, and the opinion of thedetachment commander that two mules per gun would be sufficient, hadled to the issue of that number. Those who despise the army mule forthe purposes of field artillery know very little of the capacity ofthis equine product of Missouri when properly handled. It wasdemonstrated that two mules can pull a Gatling gun with 10, 000 roundsof ammunition, loaded down with rations and forage, where eight horsesare required to draw a field-piece; and that mules are equally as easyto manage under fire as horses. 

The landing was completed and the detachment organized at 3 p. M. , having rations, forage, and ammunition complete. There was no tentage, except the shelter-halves which some of the men had brought with them. Capt. Henry Marcotte, retired, the correspondent of the Army and NavyJournal, requested permission to accompany the detachment, which wasgranted, and soon all were _en route_ for the front, entrusted withthe task of opening the way for wheeled transportation and ofdemonstrating the practicability of the road for army wagons and fieldartillery. 

For the first mile the road was excellent. It lay through one of themost fertile parts of the most fertile island in the world. A littlestream trickling along the side of the road furnished plenty of waterfor both men and animals. At the end of the mile the detachment founda steep hill to descend. The Ordnance Department, which designed andbuilt the carriage for the Gatling guns, had never foreseen thenecessity for a brake, and it was therefore necessary to cut downbushes from the roadside and fasten the rear wheels by placing a stoutpole between the spokes and over the trail of the piece. This lockedthe wheels, and the guns were thus enabled to slide down the steephill without danger of a runaway. From this point the road became anarrow defile. The rank jungle closed in upon the trail, the longbarbed leaves of the Spanish bayonet hung across and lacerated thelegs of the mules until the blood trickled down to the hoofs; theboughs of the trees hung down over it so that even the men on foot hadto stoop to pass under them, and the tortuous path winding in and outamid the dense tropical undergrowth made it impossible to see inplaces more than twenty-five or thirty yards ahead at a time. 

The advance guard, consisting of all the members of one gun crew, hadbeen organized at once upon starting, and this guard moved along theroad about two hundred and fifty yards in advance of the detachment, scouting every path vigilantly to the right and left, and keeping aconstant, careful lookout to the front. Their orders were, in case ofencountering the enemy, to scatter in the underbrush, open fire withmagazines, so as to produce the impression upon the enemy that therewas a large force, and then slowly fall back upon the battery. Theplan was, upon the first alarm, to bring the two leading guns intobattery upon the road, with the fourth gun ready to be opened toeither flank, while the gun crew of the third gun, which formed theadvance guard, were to act as infantry support to the battery. It washoped that the enemy would follow the advance guard as it retreated, and it was believed that the Gatling gun battery could take care oftwo or three regiments of Spaniards without help if necessary. 

This form for the march had been adopted as the result of maturereflection. The general had offered a cavalry escort of two troops, and Gen. Sumner had rather urged the use of an escort, but it wasdesired to demonstrate that a battery of machine guns, properly mannedand equipped, is capable of independent action, and does not need theassistance of either arm of the service. In fact, the Gatling gun menwould have been rather pleased than not to have had a brush with theenemy without the assistance of either infantry or cavalry. But it wasnot to be. 

The march was continued until darkness fell over the landscape, andthe battery arrived at a beautiful camping-place about one mile eastof Siboney, where a break in the water-pipe near the railroad trackgave an ample supply of excellent water, and a ruined plantation, nowovergrown with luxuriant sugar-cane, provided ample forage for themules. The two troops of cavalry, which had been offered and refusedas an escort, had reached this camping-place some time before, so thatthe wearied members of the detachment found pleasant camp-firesalready throwing their weird lights and shadows over the droopingbranches of the royal palm. 

Here, in the midst of the jungle, they pitched their first camp inCuba. The condition of the mules was duly looked to, their shoulderswashed down with strong salty water, their feet carefully examined, and the animals then tethered to graze their fill on the succulentsugar-cane, after having had a bountiful supply of oats. Meantime thecamp cooks had a kettle full of coffee simmering, and canned roastbeef warming over the fire, and after a hearty meal the tired menstretched themselves upon the ground, with no canopy except the starsand only one sentinel over the camp, and slept more soundly than theyhad on board the tossing Cherokee. 

CHAPTER V. 

THE MARCH. 

At early dawn the battery arose, and, after a quick breakfast, resumedthe march. Some half-mile farther on they passed a battery of lightartillery which had preceded them on the road by some nine hours, andwhich had camped at this point awaiting forage. At Siboney thedetachment stopped to look after the detail from the 13th Infantry, which had not yet reported. The detachment commander sought out theregimental adjutant, who referred him to the regimental commander, Col. Worth. This colonel was at first reluctant to allow the men togo, but, on being informed of the necessity for them, and afterinquiring about the orders on the subject, he directed the detail toreport immediately. All the members of this detail reported at once, except Corp. Rose, who had been left by his company commander on boardship. 

The road from Siboney to the front was not known. There was no one incamp who even knew its general direction. Application was thereforemade to Gen. Castillo, who was in command of a body of Cubans atSiboney, for a guide. After a great deal of gesticulation, muchexcited talk between the general and members of his staff, andnumerous messengers had been dispatched hither and thither upon thisimportant and very difficult business, a Cuban officer was sent withinstructions to furnish a guide who could conduct the detachment toGen. Wheeler's headquarters at the front. In the course of some twentyminutes, a dirty slouchy, swarthy, lousy-looking vagabond was pointedout as the desired guide, and was said to know every by-path and trailbetween Siboney and Santiago. He was told to go with the detachment toGen. Wheeler's headquarters and then return, and the detachmentcommander started for his command followed by his sable guide. Passingthrough a group of these brave Cuban heroes, he lost sight of hisredoubtable guide for an instant, and has never since found thatgentleman. 

It would be just as well to add a description of the patriotic Cubanas he was found by the Gatling Gun Detachment during their campaign inbehalf of Cuban independence, in the name of humanity; and thisdescription, it is thought, tallies with the experience of allofficers in the expedition. 

The valiant Cuban! He strikes you first by his color. It ranges fromchocolate yellow through all the shades to deepest black with kinkyhair; but you never by any chance see a white Cuban, except the fat, sleek, well-groomed, superbly mounted ones in "khaki, " who loaf aroundheadquarters with high-ranking shoulder-straps. These are all importedfrom the United States. They comprise the few wealthy ones of Spanishdescent, who are renegade to their own nativity, and are appealing tothe good people of the United States to establish them in their statusof master of peons without any overlord who can exact his tithes forthe privilege. 

[Illustration: San Juan Hill. ]

The next thing you notice is the furtive look of the thief. No one hasever yet had a chance to look one of these chocolate-colored Cubansstraight in the eye. They sneak along. Their gait has in it somethingof that of the Apache, the same soft moccasined tread, noiseless andalways stealthy. Your impressions as to their honesty can be instantlyconfirmed. Leave anything loose, from a heavy winter overcoat, whichno one could possibly use in Cuba, to--oh well, anything--and anyCuban in sight will take great pleasure in dispelling any falseimpressions that honesty is a native virtue. 

Next you notice that he is dirty. His wife does sometimes make a faintattempt at personal cleanliness; this is evident, because in onebright instance a white dress was seen on a native woman, that hadbeen washed sometime in her history. But as to his lordship, the proudmale citizen of Cuba libre, you would utterly and bitterly insult himby the intimation that a man of his dignity ought ever to bathe, puton clean clothes, or even wash his hands. He is not merely dirty, heis filthy. He is infested with things that crawl and creep, oftenvisibly, over his half-naked body, and he is so accustomed to it thathe does not even scratch. 

Next you observe the intense pride of this Cuban libre. It ismanifested the very first time you suggest anything like manuallabor--he is incapable of any other--even for such purposes as campsanitation, carrying rations, or for any other purpose. His manlychest swells with pride and he exclaims in accents of wounded dignity, "Yo soy soldado!" Still his pride does not by any chance get himknowingly under fire. At El Poso some of him did get under fire fromartillery, accidentally, and it took a strong provost guard to keephim there. If he ever got under fire again there was no officer on thefiring-line who knew it. 

He is a treacherous, lying cowardly, thieving, worthless, half-breedmongrel; born of a mongrel spawn of Europe, crossed upon the fetichesof darkest Africa and aboriginal America. He is no more capable ofself-government than the Hottentots that roam the wilds of Africa orthe Bushmen of Australia. He can not be trusted like the Indian, willnot work like a negro, and will not fight like a Spaniard; but he willlie like a Castilian with polished suavity, and he will stab you inthe dark or in the back with all the dexterity of a renegade graduateof Carlisle. 

Providence has reserved a fairer future for this noble country than tobe possessed by this horde of tatterdemalions. Under the impetus ofAmerican energy and capital, governed by a firm military hand witheven justice, it will blossom as the rose; and, in the course of threeor four generations, even the Cuban may be brought to appreciate thevirtues of cleanliness, temperance, industry, and honesty. 

Our good roads ended at Siboney, and from there on to Gen. Wheeler'sheadquarters was some of the worst road ever traveled. Part of it laythrough deep valleys, where the sun was visible scarcely more than anhour at noontime, and the wet, fetid soil was tramped into a muck ofmalarial slime under foot of the mules and men. The jungle becameranker, the Spanish bayonets longer and their barbs sharper in theselow bottom jangles. The larger undergrowth closed in more sharply onthe trail, and its boughs overhung so much in some places that itbecame necessary to cut them away with axes in order to pass. 

These guns were the first wheeled vehicles that had ever disturbed thesolitude of this portion of Cuba. The chocolate-colored natives ofCuba sneak; the white native of Cuba, when he travels at all, goes onhorseback. He very seldom travels in Cuba at all, because he is notoften there. Consequently the roads in Cuba, as a rule, are merelysmall paths sufficient for the native to walk along, and they carrythe machete in order to open a path if necessary. These low places inthe valleys were full of miasmatic odors, yellow fever, agues, and allthe ills that usually pertain to the West Indian climate. 

At other places the road ran along the tops of the foot-hills from oneto two hundred feet higher than the bottom of these valleys. Here thecountry was much more open. The path was usually wide enough for theguns to move with comparative ease. Sometimes one wagon could passanother easily. These parts of the road were usually more or lessstrewn with boulders. The road was rarely level and frequently theupland parts were washed out. Sometimes it was only the boulder-cladbottom of a ravine; again the water would have washed out the gully onone side so deep as to threaten overturning the guns. The portions ofthe road between the valleys and the top of these foot-hills were theworst places the detachment had to pass. These ascents and descentswere nearly always steep. While not at all difficult for the man uponhorseback or for the man on foot, they were frequently almost toosteep for draft, and they were always washed out. In places it wasnecessary to stop and fill up these washouts by shoveling earth andstone into the places before the detachment could pass. 

[Illustration: Cuban Soldiers as They Were. ]

On one of these occasions, while heaving rock to fill up a badwashout, Priv. Jones was stung by a scorpion. Jones did not know whathad bitten him, and described it as a little black thing about as longas his finger. Fortunately there was a small supply of whisky with thedetachment, and this remedy was applied to Jones internally. Somesoldier in the detachment suggested that a quid of tobacco externallywould be beneficial, so this also was done. It was not a dressingfavorable to an aseptic condition of the wound, perhaps, nor was thereanything in the quid of tobacco calculated to withdraw the poison orneutralize its effects, so the doctors may characterize this as a veryfoolish proceeding; but country people skilled in simples and herbremedies might tell some of these ultra scientific surgeons that theapplication of a quid of tobacco or of a leaf of tobacco to the stingof a wasp or the bite of a spider, or even the sting of a scorpion, isnearly always attended by beneficial results. In fact, when Jones wasstung there was a surgeon, a medical officer, who turned up evenbefore Jones was treated with the whisky cure, and, upon receivingJones' explanation that he had been heaving rock and had been bittenon the end of the finger by a little black thing, and after hearingthe remarks of the men that it was very probably a scorpion sting, this medical officer very sagely diagnosed the accident to thateffect, but was unable to prescribe any remedy because he had notbrought along his emergency case. This medical officer, with his twoattendant hospital satellites, had left both litter and emergency caseupon the transport. 

The ordinary line officer or soldier who is somewhat accustomed tocarrying weights and does not require a hospital drill to teach him tocarry a wounded comrade a few yards, looks with a certain degree ofenvy upon the possession of a hospital litter with its convenientstraps for weight-carrying, and would consider this a very convenientmeans for carrying a pack. This litter is designed to enable two men, hospital attendants or band men, to pick up a wounded soldier weighingsome 160 or 180 pounds and carry him from fifty yards to a mile ifnecessary, to a dressing-station or hospital shack. The medicalfield-case No. 1 weighs about sixty pounds filled, and field-case No. 2 weighs about forty pounds. These two cases contain all the medicinesnecessary to run a division hospital; the case of emergencyinstruments does not weigh above ten or twelve pounds, and would notbe a burden for a child to carry. It is therefore difficult for thesmall-minded officer of the line to see why the Medical Department wasunable to have these medicines up at the front. They had the samemeans of locomotion provided for the other soldiers, by Nature, andthey had, moreover, no particular necessity for all rushing to theextreme front. On the contrary, they had from the 23d of June, whenthe landing began, at Baiquiri, until the 1st of July, to accomplish adistance of less than twenty miles; and it would seem reasonable thatthey might have had their medicine-cases up where they were needed bythat time. 

These gentlemen pose as the most learned, expert, scientific, highlytrained body of medical men in the world. They are undoubtedly as welltrained, as highly educated, and as thoroughly proficient as themedical officers of any army in the world. A summons of an ordinarypractitioner would bring with him his saddle-bags of medicines; nophysician in the city would pretend to answer even an ambulance callwithout having a few simple remedies--in other words, an emergencycase; but it was an exception, and a very rare exception at that, tofind a medical officer who took the trouble to carry anything upon hisaristocratic back on that march to the front. 

A conversation overheard between two medical officers on board atransport just before landing may serve to partially explain the stateof affairs. Said surgeon No. 1 to surgeon No. 2, "We are going to landthis morning; are you going to carry your field-case?" To whichsurgeon No. 2 indignantly replied, "No, I'm not a pack-mule!" SurgeonNo. 1 again inquired, "Are you going to make your hospital men carryit?" To which surgeon No. 2 replied, "No; my men are not beasts ofburden. " Both of these medical officers went ashore; one of them hadhis field case carried; the other did not. Both of them were up at thefiring-line, both did good service in rendering first aid. Both ofthem worked heroically, both seemed deeply touched by the sufferingthey were compelled to witness, and both contracted the climaticfever. But in the absence of medicines the role of the surgeon can betaken by the private soldier who has been instructed in first aid tothe injured; for in the absence of medical cases and surgicalinstruments the first-aid packet is the only available source ofrelief, and these first-aid packets were carried by the privatesoldier, not by the Medical Department. 

[Illustration: Wagon Train. ]

A little less "theory, " a little less "science, " a little lesstendency to dwell on the "officer" part of the business, with a littlemore devotion to the duty of relieving suffering humanity--in short, alittle less insistence upon "rank, " would have vastly improved themedical service of the United States Army in the field at this time. 

These remarks do not apply to the heroes like Ebert, Thorpe, Brewer, Kennedy, Warren, and a few others, who fearlessly exposed their livesupon the very firing-line. These men are the very "salt of the earth. "The escape of even a "frazzle" of the 5th Corps was due to theirsuperhuman energy and exertions. They did much to redeem the good nameof their corps and to alleviate suffering. 

But Priv. Jones recovered from the sting of the scorpion. In fact, soldiers were heard to exclaim that they would be glad to find ascorpion when they saw the character of the remedy applied in Jones'case. 

The detachment left Siboney about 10 o'clock in the morning andtramped steadily along the road up hill and down until 12; then, uponfinding a convenient place, it halted for dinner. The mules wereunharnessed, coffee prepared, and, just as the detachment was about tobegin this noonday meal, two of the peripatetic newspaper fraternityjoined, _en route_ to the rear. The ubiquitous correspondent hadfor the first time discovered the Gatling Gun Detachment, and theythought it was Artillery. 

One of these gentlemen was a long, slim, frayed-out specimen ofhumanity, with a wearied and expressive droop of the shoulders; theother was a short, stout, florid, rotund individual, and his "too, toosolid flesh" was in the very visible act of melting. The newspapergentlemen were invited to participate in the noonday meal, and, withsome gentle urging, consented. It was only after the meal was overthat it was learned that this was the first square meal these men hadhad in over forty-eight hours. They had been with Gen. Wheeler at LaGuasimas, had rejoined Wheeler after reporting that fight, in hopes ofmaking another "scoop, " and were now on their way to Siboney, hopingto buy some provisions. Poor devils! They had worked for a "scoop" atLa Guasimas; they had gone up on the firing-line and had sent backauthentic accounts of that little skirmish; but they did not make the"scoop. " The "scoop" was made by newspaper men who had remained onboard the transports, and who took the excited account of a member ofthe command who had come back delirious with excitement, crazed withfear, trembling as though he had a congestive chill--who, in fact, hadcome back faster than he had gone to the front, and in his excitedcondition had told the story of an ambuscade; that Wheeler, Wood, andRoosevelt were all dead; that the enemy was as thick as the barbs onthe Spanish bayonet; and that he, only he, had escaped to tell thetale. This was the account of the battle that got back to thenewspapers in the form of a "scoop, " and it was nothing more nor lessthan the excited imagination of the only coward who at that time orever afterwards was a member of the famous Rough Riders. He wasconsequently returned to civil life prematurely. 

The newspaper correspondent in Cuba was of a distinguished type. Yourecognized him immediately. He was utterly fearless; he delighted ingetting up on the firing-line--that is, a few of him did. Among thesefew might be mentioned Marshall, and Davis, and Remington, andMarcotte, and King, and some half-dozen others; but there was anothertype of newspaper correspondent in Cuba, who hung around from twomiles and a half to three miles in rear of the firing-line, and neverby any possibility got closer to the enemy than that. The members ofthis guild of the newspaper fraternity were necessarily nearer thecable office than their more daring comrades; in fact, there were afew who were known to have been eight or nine miles nearer to thecable office during battles, and those correspondents were the oneswho made the great "scoop" in the New York papers, by which a regimentthat laid down and skulked in the woods, or ran wildly to the rear, was made to do all the fighting on the first day of July. This latterclass of journalists were a menace to the army, a disgrace to theirprofession, and a blot upon humanity. Even the Cubans were ashamed ofthem. 

The detachment resumed the march at half past 1, and encountered somevery difficult road, difficult because it needed repairs. The mostdifficult places were the ascents and descents of the hills, and innearly every case fifteen or twenty minutes' careful investigation wasable to discover a means of getting around the worst places in theroad. When it was not practicable to go around, J. Shiffer and histhree fellow-teamsters would take a twist of their hands in the manesof their long-eared chargers, and apparently lift them down, or up, asthe case might be, always landing on their feet and always safely. Itwas merely a question of good driving and will to go through. Theworst places were repaired by the detachment before these recklessattempts at precipice-scaling were made. At one place there was adetachment of the 24th Infantry engaged in an alleged effort to repairthe road. They did not seem to work with much vim. Chaplain Springer, having in the morning exhorted them to repentance and a better lifeand to doing good works unto their brethren, the enemy, was engaged atthis point in the afternoon, it being Sunday, in a practicaldemonstration of what he considered good works. In other words, thechaplain, whose religious enthusiasm no one doubts, was engaged inheaving rocks with his own hands to show these colored soldiers howthey ought to make good road, and he was doing "good works. "

It is but a just tribute to Chaplains Springer and Swift, of theRegulars, to say that they were conspicuous in the hour of danger atthe point of greatest peril. In the fearless discharge of their holyoffice, they faced all the dangers of battle; nor did they neglect thecare of the body while ministering to the spiritual needs of thesoldiers. Springer, for example, collected wood and made coffee forall on the firing-line, within 400 yards of the block-house at ElCaney; and Swift was equally conspicuous in relieving suffering, binding up wounds, and caring for the sick. There were probably othersequally as daring; but the author knows of the deeds of these men, anddesires to pay a tribute of respect to them. Chaplains of this stampare always listened to with respectful attention when they expresstheir views of the true course of life to obtain a blessed hereafter. They were in very sharp contrast to the long-visaged clericalgentlemen who were so much in evidence at Tampa, and who never gotwithin 500 miles of danger. 

The detachment safely passed all the bad places and obstacles in theroad, arriving at Gen. Wheeler's headquarters about half past 4o'clock, and reported. It was assigned a position between the advanceoutposts and directed to dispose of its guns in such a manner as tosweep the hills on which these outposts were placed. High hills to theright at a distance of about 2000 yards were supposed to be infestedby the enemy, and a blockhouse which stood out against the sky-linewas thought to contain a Spanish detachment. A high hill to the leftat a distance of about 1000 yards had not yet been explored, and itwas thought probable that some of the enemy was concealed on this hillalso. The detachment commander was directed to report, after postinghis battery, in which duty he was assisted by Col. Dorst, to Gen. Chaffee, who had charge of the outposts. The General inquired what thebattery consisted of, and upon being informed that "It consists offour Gatling guns, posted so as to command the neighboring hills, "remarked in a very contemptuous manner, "You can't command anything. "Gen. Chaffee subsequently had reason to revise his opinion, if not toregret the expression of it. 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER. 

At this point in the history of the detachment, it would be well togive some account of the reasoning which led to its formation and thepersonnel of the detachment. 

Since the days of '65 the armies of the civilized world have adopted arifle whose effective range is more than twice as great as that usedin the Civil War. Very able discussions have been made upon thetheoretical changes of the battle-field thus brought about, but noproper conclusion had been reached. It was acknowledged by alltext-book writers that the artillery arm of the service would findmuch greater difficulty in operating at short ranges, and thatassaults upon fortified positions would be much more difficult in thefuture. But only Gen. Williston, of the United States Artillery, hadever taken the advanced ground that in a machine gun arm would befound a valuable auxiliary as a result of these changed conditions. This theory of Gen. Williston's was published in the Journal of theMilitary Service Institute in the spring of '86, but never went, so far as Gen. Williston was concerned, beyond a mere theory; nor hadthe detachment commander ever heard of Gen. Williston's article untilafter the battle of Santiago. 

[Illustration: Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso. ]

A study of the science of tactics--not merely drill regulations, buttactics in the broader sense of maneuvering bodies of troops upon thebattle-field--had led Lieut. Parker to the conclusion that theartillery arm of the service had been moved back upon the battle-fieldto ranges not less than 1500 yards. This not because of lack ofcourage on the part of the Artillery, but as an inherent defect in anyarm of the service which depends upon draft to reach an effectiveposition. It was not believed that animals could live at a shorterrange in anything like open country. The problem of supporting aninfantry charge by some sort of fire immediately became the greattactical problem of the battle-field. Admitting that the assault of afortified position has become much more difficult than formerly, thenecessity of artillery support, or its equivalent in some kind offire, became correspondingly more important, while under theconditions it became doubly more difficult to bring up this support inthe form of artillery fire. 

The solution of this problem, then, was the principal difficulty ofthe modern battle-field; and yet, strange to say, the curtailedusefulness of artillery does not seem to have suggested itself toanybody else in the service previous to the first day of July. Thisproblem had been made the subject of special study by him for severalyears, and had led to the conclusion that some form of machine gunmust be adopted to take the place of artillery from 1500 yards down. This in turn led to the study of machine guns. The different forms inuse in the different armies of the world had been considered, and itwas found that there was none in any service properly mounted for theparticular use desired. All of them required the service of animals aspack-mules, or for draft, while the very conditions of the problemrequired a gun to be so mounted that the use of animals could bedispensed with. 

The Maxim gun has been reduced in weight to about 60 pounds, and isfurnished with a tripod weighing about the same; but this is tooheavy, and the supply of ammunition at once becomes a criticalquestion. The Colt's automatic rapid-fire gun has been reduced to 40pounds, with a tripod of equal weight, but here again the samedifficulty presents itself. The soldier is capable of carrying only alimited amount of weight; and with his already too heavy pack, histhree days' rations, together with the heat, fatigue and excitement ofbattle, it did not appear possible for any tripod-mounted gun to beeffectively used. 

The problem therefore resolved itself into the question of carriages:A carriage capable of carrying any form of machine gun usingsmall-caliber ammunition, capable of being moved anywhere by draft, capable of being dismantled and carried on a pack-mule, and, above, all, capable of being moved by hand; required also some device forgetting the requisite amount of ammunition up to the firing-line. Acarriage and ammunition cart was invented fulfilling all theseconditions and the invention was presented to the adjutant-general ofthe army for consideration, accompanied by a discussion of the propertactical use of the gun so mounted. This discussion, in part, was asfollows:

"It is claimed for this carriage that a machine gun mounted on it canbe carried with a firing-line of infantry on the offensive, overalmost any kind of ground, into the decisive zone of rifle fire and tothe lodgment in the enemy's line, if one is made. 

"On broken ground the piece can be moved forward by draft under coverof sheltering features of the terrain to a position so near the enemythat, under cover of its fire, an infantry line can effect a lodgment, after which the piece can be rushed forward by a sudden dash. 

"The machine gun, mounted on this carriage, is especially adapted forservice with the reserve of a battalion on the offensive, actingeither alone or in regiment. Its use will enable the commander toreduce the reserve, thereby increasing the strength of thefighting-line, and yet his flanks will be better protected thanformerly, while he will still have a more powerful reserve. If thefighting-line be driven back, the machine guns will establish a pointof resistance on which the line can rally, and from which it can notbe driven, unless the machine guns be annihilated by artillery fire. 

"In case of counter-charge by the enemy, the superior weight andintensity of its fire will shake the enemy and so demoralize him that, in all probability, a return counter-charge will result in hiscomplete discomfiture. 

[Illustration: Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st. (Taken under fireby Sergeant Weigle. )]

"Retiring troops as rear guards have in this weapon _par excellence_the weapon for a swift and sharp return with the power of rapidlywithdrawing. If the enemy can by any means be enticed within itsrange, he will certainly suffer great losses. If he cannot be broughtin range, his distance will be rather respectful. "

This discussion as presented was entirely and absolutely original withthe author and the result of his own unaided researches on thesubject. It will be seen in the account of the battle how accuratelythe conditions there laid down were fulfilled. 

But the carriage in use by the Gatling Gun Detachment was not the oneproposed to the War Department. That carriage has not, as yet, beenbuilt, nor has the War Department in any way recognized the inventionor even acknowledged the receipt of the communication and drawings. 

The problem, therefore, confronting the Gatling Gun Detachment was todemonstrate the above uses of the machine gun, taking the obsoleteartillery carriage drawn by mules, and endeavor to get the guns intoaction by draft. The personnel of the detachment alone accountsfor their success. They got the guns up on the firing-line, notbecause of any superiority of the carriage over that in use by theartillery, for there was none; not because of aid rendered by otherarms of the service, for they actually went into battle as far as 100yards in advance of the infantry skirmishers; but because the GatlingGun Detachment was there for the purpose of getting into the fight andwas determined to give the guns a trial. 

In the first place, all the members of the Gatling Gun Detachment weremembers of the Regular Army. All but three of them were natives of theUnited States, and those three were American citizens. Every man inthe detachment had been selected by the detachment commander, or hadvoluntarily undertaken to perform this duty, realizing and believingthat it was an extremely hazardous duty. Every member of thedetachment possessed a common-school education, and some of them werewell educated. All of them were men of exceptionally good characterand sober habits. The drivers were Privs. Shiffer, Correll, Merryman, and Chase. The description formerly given of Shiffer applies, withslight modifications, to all the four. The first sergeant, Weigle, anative of Gettysburg, a soldier of eight years' experience in theRegular Army, a man of fine natural ability and good educationalattainments, was worthy to command any company in the United StatesArmy. Thoroughly well instructed in the mechanism of Gatling guns, ofexceptionally cheerful and buoyant disposition, he was an ideal firstsergeant for any organization. Steigerwald, acting chief of gun No. 1, was of German birth, well educated. He had chosen the militaryprofession for the love of it; he was a man of wonderfully finephysique, a "dead sure" shot, and one who hardly understood themeaning of the word "fatigue. " He was ambitious, he was an ardentbeliever in the Gatling gun, and he was determined to win a commissionon the battle-field. 

Corporal Doyle was a magnificent type of the old-time Regular--one ofthe kind that composed the army before Proctorism tried to convert itinto a Sunday-school. In former days Doyle had been a drinking man;but the common opinion as expressed by his company officers even inthose days was, "I would rather have Doyle, drunk, than any othernon-commissioned officer, sober; because Doyle never gets too drunk toattend to duty. " Two years before this Doyle had quit drinking, andthe only drawback to this most excellent noncommissioned officer hadbeen removed. He was a thorough disciplinarian; one of the kind thattakes no back talk; one who is prone to using the butt end of a musketas a persuader, if necessary; and Doyle was thoroughly devoted to thedetachment commander. Corp. Smith was another of the same stamp. Corp. Smith loved poker. In fact, his _sobriquet_ was "Poker Smith. " Hewas one of the kind of poker-players who would "see" a $5 bet on apair of deuces, raise it to $25, and generally rake in the "pot. " Itwas Corp. Smith who thought in this Gatling gun deal he was holding apair of deuces, because he didn't take much stock in Gatling guns, buthe was a firm believer in his commanding officer and was prepared to"bluff" the Dons to the limit of the game. 

[Illustration: Fort Roosevelt. ]

Sergeants Ryder and Weischaar were splendid types of the AmericanRegular non-commissioned officer, alert, respectful, attentive toduty, resolute, unflinching, determined, magnificent soldiers. Serg. Green was a young man, only twenty-three, the idolized son of hisparents, in the army because he loved it; enthusiastic over his gun, and fully determined to "pot" every Spaniard in sight. Corp. Rose waslike unto him. They were eager for nothing so much as a chance to getinto action, and equally determined to stay there. The privates of thedetachment were like unto the noncommissioned officers. They hadvolunteered for this duty from a love of adventure, a desire to winrecognition, or from their personal attachment to the commandingofficer; and there was not a man who was not willing to follow himinto the "mouth of hell" if necessary. The gunners were expert shotswith the rifle. Numbers 1 and 2, who turned the crank and fed the gun, respectively, were selected for their dexterity and coolness; thedrivers, for their skill in handling mules; and each of the othermembers of the detachment was placed on that duty which he seemed bestfitted to perform. 

The roll of the detachment and its organization as it went into battleon the first day of July are subjoined:

Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps. 

Commanding Officer, John H. Parker, first lieutenant, 13th Infantry. Acting First Sergeant, Alois Weischaar, sergeant, Co. A, 13th Infantry. Acting Quartermaster Sergeant, William Eyder, Co. G, 13th Infantry. 

Gun No. 1:Acting Chief and Gunner, Charles C. Steigerwald, corporal, Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private Voelker, Co. A, 12th Infantry. No. 2, Private Elkins, Co. D, 17th Infantry. No. 3, Private Schmandt, Co. G, 13th Infantry. No. 4, Private Needles, Co. E, 17th Infantry. No. 5, Private Click, Co. E, 17th Infantry. No. 6, Private Jones, Co. D, 13th Infantry. Driver, Private Shiffer, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 

Gun No. 2:Chief, Sergeant William Ryder, Co. G, 13th Infantry. Gunner, Corporal Geo. N. Rose, Co. C, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private Seaman, Co. B, 13th Infantry. No. 2, Private Kastner, Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 3, Private Pyne, Co. H, 13th Infantry. No. 4, Private Schulze, Co. A, 17th Infantry. No. 5, Private Barts, Co. E, 13th Infantry. Driver, Private Correll, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 

Gun No. 3:Chief, Sergeant Newton A. Green, Co. H, 13th Infantry. Gunner, Corporal Matthew Doyle, Co. C, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private Anderson, Co. C, 12th Infantry. No. 2, Private Sine, Co. E, 17th Infantry. No. 3, Private Lauer, Co. C, 12th Infantry. No. 4, Private Dellett, Co. D, 17th Infantry. No. 5, Private Cory, Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 6, Private Greenberg, Co. G, 13th Infantry. Driver, Private Merryman, Co. A, 17th Infantry. 

Gun No. 4:Chief, Sergeant John N. Weigle, Co. L, 9th Infantry. Gunner, Corporal Robert S. Smith, Co. C, 13th Infantry. No. 1, Private McGoin, Co. D, 17th Infantry. No. 2, Private Misiak, Co. E, 13th Infantry. No. 3, Private Power, Co. A, 13th Infantry. No. 4, Private McDonald, Co. B, 17th Infantry. No. 5, Private Prazak, Co. E, 12th Infantry. Driver, Private Chase, Co. H, 13th Infantry. Cook, Private Hoft, Co. D, 13th Infantry. Assistant cook, Private Bremer, Co. G, 13th Infantry. Absent, sick, Private Murray, Co. F, 13th Infantry, at Tampa. 

Sergeant Weigle was subsequently appointed first sergeant of Co. L. , 9th Infantry, and of the Gatling Gun Detachment, vice Weischaar, relieved at his own request. 

Another element which contributed much to the success of thedetachment was the presence with it of Captain Marcotte. Thisexcellent officer had served with great distinction in the Civil War, having been promoted from a private in the ranks through all of thegrades up to a captaincy, for meritorious conduct in battle, andhaving failed of higher grades only because he was too badly shot topieces to continue with the Army. He joined the detachment on the 25thof June, and his valuable advice was always at the disposal not merelyof the commander, but of any member of the detachment who wished toconsult him. He had spent seventeen years in the Cuban climate and wasthoroughly familiar with all the conditions under which we werelaboring. He contributed not a little, by his presence, his example, and his precept, to the final success of the organization. When thebattery went under fire, Marcotte was with it. It was the first timemost of the members had passed through this ordeal, but who could run, or even feel nervous, with this gray-haired man skipping about frompoint to point and taking notes of the engagement as coolly as thoughhe were sitting in the shade of a tree sipping lime-juice cocktails, amile from danger. 

Such was the personnel of the detachment. It lay in Camp Wheeler, which was only about a mile and a half from El Poso, where the firstengagement occurred on the first of July, until that morning. Themules were daily harnessed up and drilled in maneuvering the pieces, and the members of the detachment experimentally posted in differentpositions in order to get the most effective service. 

On the 27th, Serg. Green was sent back to Siboney with orders to bringCorp. Rose or his body. He brought Corp. Rose, and the corporal wasvery glad to be brought. 

The mules were fed with oats and on the juicy sugar-cane. It is worthyof mention that no other organization at the front had oats. A feed ortwo of oats was given to Gen. Wheeler and Col. Dorst for their horses;it was the first time their horses had tasted oats since leaving thetransports, and was probably the last time until after the surrender. Furthermore, the Gatling Gun Detachment had "grub. " Of course, it was"short" on potatoes, onions, and vegetables generally; these luxurieswere not to be well known again until it returned to the UnitedStates; but it did have hardtack, bacon, canned roast beef, sugar, andcoffee, having drawn all the rations it could carry before leavingBaiquiri, and was the only organization which had as much astwenty-four hours' rations. Gen. Hawkins and his whole brigade wereliving from hand to mouth, one meal at a time. The same was true ofGen. Wheeler and the whole cavalry division, and they were dependingfor that one meal upon the pack-mule train. On the 30th of June acomplete set of muster- and pay-rolls, was prepared for thedetachment, and it was duly mustered in the usual form and manner. Itwas the only organization at the front of which a formal muster wasmade, and was the only one there which had muster- and pay-rolls. 

It rained on the 29th and 30th of June. Not such rains as the peopleof the United States are familiar with, but Cuban rains. It was likestanding under a barrel full of water and having the bottom knockedout. These rains caused the rifles and carbines of the army to rust, and some quickwitted captain bethought himself to beg oil from theGatling Gun Detachment. He got it. Another, and another, and stillanother begged for oil; then regiments began to beg for oil; andfinally application was made for oil for a whole brigade. This led tothe following correspondence:

"Camp Six Miles from Santiago, "29th June, 1898. 

"The Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division, Present:

"Sir, --I have the honor to inform you that I have learned that some ofthe rifles in this command are badly in need of oil, and that in somecompanies there is no oil to use on them. These facts I learnedthrough requests to me for oil. 

"I therefore report to you that my men found at Altares (the secondlanding-place) and reported to me four (4) barrels of lard oil andthree (3) barrels of cylinder oil, in an old oil-house near themachine shops. 

"If this be procured and issued, it will save the rifles and carbinesfrom rust. 

"Very respectfully, "John H. Parker, "Lt. Comdg. G. G. Detachment, 5th Corps. "

First Endorsement. 

"Headquarters Cavalry Division, "Camp 6 miles east of Santiago de Cuba, "June 29, 1898. 

"Respectfully referred to the adjutant-general, 6th Army Corps. 

"Jos. Wheeler, "Major-General U. S. Vols. , Comdg. "

Second Endorsement. 

"Headquarters 5th Corps, "June 29, 1898. 

"Return. Lt. Parker will send a man back tomorrow to obtain thenecessary oil. 

"By command of Gen. Shafter. 

"E. J. McClernand, "A. A. G. "

Third Endorsement. 

"Headquarters Cavalry Division, "June 29, 1898. 

"Return Lt. Parker. Attention invited to the foregoing endorsement. 

"J. H. Dorst, "Lieutenant-Colonel. "

Fourth Endorsement. 

"June 30, 1898. 

"The Quartermaster, Altares, Cuba:

"Please furnish to Sergeant Green of my detachment transportation fortwo (2) barrels of oil. He will show you an order from Gen. Shafter, and the matter is urgent. The soldiers must have this oil at once, astheir rifles are rusting badly. 

"John H. Parker, "Lt. Comdg. Gatling Gun Detach. "

[Illustration: Sergeant Greene's Gun at Fort Roosevelt. ]

The quartermaster furnished the transportation and two barrels of oilwere duly forwarded to the front and placed in charge of brigadequartermasters at different points, with orders to distribute out onequart to each company. This oil, perhaps, had some bearing upon thecondition of the rifles in the fight following. 

On the 27th of June, Captain Marcotte and the detachment commandermade a reconnaissance of a high hill to the left of Camp Wheeler, and, having gained the top, reconnoitered the city of Santiago and itssurrounding defenses with a powerful glass, and as a result reportedto Gen. Wheeler that the key of Santiago was the Morro mesa, apromontory or tableland overlooking the city on the east side at adistance of about a mile and a half and not at that time occupied bythe enemy, with the proposition that a detail of a half-dozen men fromthe detachment should make a rush and capture this plateau, and holdit until the guns could be brought up. The general could not authorizethe proposed undertaking, as it would have endangered the safety ofhis army, perhaps by leading to a premature engagement. By the time asufficient reconnaissance had been made and convinced everybody of thevalue of this plan, the mesa had been strongly occupied by the enemy. It is still believed that the occupation of this height waspracticable on the 27th of June, and thought, if it had beenauthorized, the Gatlings could have occupied and held this positionagainst all the Spaniards in the city of Santiago. A glance at the mapwill show the extreme tactical importance of this position. 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE BATTLE. 

On the 30th day of June, General Shafter pitched his camp about half amile in advance of Camp Wheeler in a valley, and about five o'clock inthe afternoon communicated the plan of battle to the divisioncommanders and to the commander of the Gatling Gun Detachment. 

Reconnaissance had developed the fact that the enemy occupied thevillage of El Caney, and that their first line of works surrounded thecity of Santiago at a distance of about a mile, crowning asemicircular ridge. Between the position occupied by the general'scamp and this ridge, a distance of about two and one-half miles, flowed the Aguadores and San Juan rivers, and about one mile from theSan Juan River, on the east side, was a ruined plantation and missionhouse, called El Poso. Midway between El Caney and the Spanishposition was a large handsome mansion, called the Du Cuorot house, standing in the midst of a large plantation and owned by a Frenchman, which both sides had agreed to respect as neutral property. Thegeneral plan of the battle as given to these officers on the 30th ofJune was for one division of the army (Lawton's), assisted by onebattery of artillery (Capron's), to make an attack at daybreak uponthe village of El Caney, and drive the enemy out of it. Anotherdivision (Kent's) was to make an attack upon the semicircular ridge ofhills south of El Caney as soon as Lawton was well committed to thefight, both for the purpose of preventing reinforcements from going toEl Caney and to develop the enemy's strength. It was expected thatLawton would capture El Caney about eight or nine o'clock in themorning, and pursue the retreating enemy, by the way of the Du Cuorothouse, toward Santiago. This movement would cause Lawton to execute, roughly, a left wheel, and it was intended that in executing thismaneuver Kent's right should join, or nearly join, Lawton's left, after which the whole line was to move forward according to thedevelopments of the fight. Kent's attack was to be supported byGrimes' Battery from El Poso. The Gatling Gun Detachment was to moveat daylight on the morning of July 1st, take position at El Pososheltered by the hill, in support of Grimes' Battery, and there awaitorders. 

[Illustration: Skirmish Line in Battle. ]

This outline of the battle, as laid down by Gen. Shafter on the 30thday of June, was eventually carried out to the letter; its successfuloperation shut up a superior force in the city of Santiago, andcompelled the surrender of the city. 

Perhaps no better comment can be made upon the generalship of thecorps commander, no higher compliment be paid, than the mere statementthat he was able, fifteen hours before a shot was fired in the battle, to prescribe the movements of the different organizations of hiscommand, and to outline the plan of battle as it was finally carriedout, with a degree of precision which can be fully appreciated only bythose to whom the plan was communicated in advance. In spite of slightchanges, made necessary by local failures and unforeseencircumstances; in spite of the very poor cooperation of the artilleryarm; in spite of the absence of cavalry, which made goodreconnaissance practically impossible; in spite of the fact that hewas operating against a superior force in strong intrenchments--theplan of battle thus laid down was finally carried out with perfectsuccess in every detail. 

The Gatling Gun Detachment was assembled at six o'clock, and so muchof the plan of battle was explained to them as it was proper to giveout, with orders that breakfast was to be prepared by four o'clock andthe detachment be ready to move at 4:30. The plans were heard withcareful attention by the men, and the wisdom of giving to them someidea of the work they were expected to do was fully vindicated on thefollowing day, when they were compelled to lie nearly three hoursunder a dropping fire, waiting for "Lawton to become well engaged, "after which the detachment moved forward, without a man missing, withthe utmost steadiness and coolness, to the attack. 

There was no nervousness displayed by the men. They knew their workwas cut out for them, and each man was eager to play his part in thegreat drama of the morrow. There was no excited talk indulged in. Noneof the buzz of preparation nor the hum of anticipation which to thecivilian mind should precede a desperate battle, but three or fourmembers of the detachment took out their soldiers' hand-books andwrote in them their last will and testament, requesting theircommander to witness the same and act as executor. The courage evincedby these men was not of that brutal order which ignores danger, but ofthe moral quality which, fully realizing that somebody must get hurt, quietly resolves to face whatever may happen in the performance of thefull measure of duty. 

At four o'clock the guard aroused the members of the detachmentquietly, and each man found a good hearty breakfast waiting for him, consisting of hardtack, coffee, condensed milk, sugar, bacon, cannedroast beef, and some canned fruit, which had been obtained somehow andwas opened upon this occasion. It was the last square meal they wereto have for several days. At half past four the camp equipage had allbeen packed upon the guns in such a manner as not to interfere withtheir instantly getting into action, and the battery started for thefront. 

The road to El Poso was very good and the mules trotted merrily along, preceded and followed by infantry also bound for the front. TheCubans, too, were in evidence; an irregular, struggling mob ofundisciplined barbarians, vociferous, clamorous, noisy, turbulent, excited. Presently the Cubans and infantry in front of the batteryhalted and it passed beyond them, immediately throwing out the crew ofthe third gun in front as an advance guard. It reached El Poso at sixo'clock, at which time there were no other soldiers there. The batterytook position as directed, under cover in rear of the hill and to theright front of the El Poso house. The camp equipage and blanket-rolls, were removed and piled neatly upon the ground, and Priv. Hoft wasdetailed to guard them, as well as one of the spare mules. About halfpast seven o'clock Grimes' Battery arrived, and Col. McClernand, theassistant adjutant-general of the corps. The battery of artilleryhalted upon the hill near the Gatlings, while its commander, theadjutant-general, the Army and Navy Journal correspondent, and theGatling gun man climbed to the top of the hill to reconnoiter theenemy. They were accompanied by several attaches and a battalion ofnewspaper correspondents. 

[Illustration: Fort Roosevelt. ]

To the southwest, at a distance of about 3, 000 yards, the city ofSantiago lay slumbering in the morning sun. The chain of hills whichsurrounded the city, lying between it and our position, was crownedwith rank tropical verdure, and gave no indications of militaryfortifications. There was no sign of life, a gentle land breeze swayedthe tops of the royal palms, and the little birds flitted from boughto bough caroling their morning songs as though no such events wereimpending as the bombardment of a city and the death of 400 gallantsoldiers. The gentle ripple of the creek, lapping over its pebbly bedat the foot of the hill, was distinctly audible. 

The artillery officers produced their range-finders and made ascientific guess at the distance from the hill to a red brick buildingin the northern edge of Santiago. This guess was 2600 yards. Theysignalled to the lead piece of Grimes' Light Battery to ascend thehill. It was delayed for a moment while picks and shovels were pliedupon the top of the hill to make slight emplacements for the guns, andat last, at ten minutes before eight o'clock, the first piece startedthe difficult ascent. The drivers stood up in their stirrups andlashed their horses and shouted; the horses plunged and reared andjumped. The piece stuck half way up the hill. The leaders were turnedslightly to the right to give new direction and another attempt wasmade--ten yards gained. The leaders were swung to the left, men andofficers standing near by added their shouts and blows from sticks. Atall artillery officer, whose red stripes were conspicuous, jumped upand down and swore; the team gave a few more jumps, then they wheeledthe gun by a left about, with its muzzle pointing toward the city. Itwas quickly unlimbered and run to its place. 

The second piece started up the hill. The drivers of this piece satquietly in their saddles, and, with a cluck, started up the hill at awalk. The tall artillery officer shouted, and a driver muttered underhis breath, "Damned fool!" Regardless of the orders to rush theirhorses, the drivers of this piece continued to walk up the hill. Atthe steepest part of the hill, they rose slightly in their stirrups, as one man, and applied the spur to the lead horses, and, at the sametime, a lash of the quirt to the off horses of the team. The horsessprang forward, and in an instant the second piece was in battery. Thethird and fourth pieces were taken up in the same manner as thesecond. 

The pieces were loaded; a party of newspaper correspondents producedtheir lead pencils and pads, and began to take notes; the little birdscontinued to sing. The Gatling Gun man, the Army and Navy Journal man, and the assistant adjutant-general stepped to the windward a few yardsto be clear of the smoke. The range was given by the batterycommander--2600 yards; the objective was named, a small, almostindistinguishable redoubt, below the hospital about 300 yards. Thecannoneers braced themselves, No. 3 stretched the lanyard taut on hispiece, and Grimes remarked, in a conversational tone, "Let her go. "

The report of the field-piece burst with startling suddenness upon thequiet summer morning, and a dense cloud of grayish-colored smokespurted from the muzzle of the gun. Everybody involuntarily jumped, the sound was so startling, although expected. The piece recoiledeight or ten feet, and the gunners jumped to the wheels and ran itforward again into battery. Field-glasses were glued upon the vicinityof the brick hospital. There was a puff of white smoke and anexclamation, "A trifle too long!" The second piece was aimed andfired. There was no response. The third, and fourth, and fifth, withlike results. It was like firing a salute on the Fourth of July. Therewas no indication of any danger whatever; laugh and jest werebeginning to go round. 

Suddenly a dull boom was heard from somewhere, the exact directioncould not be located. The next thing was a shrill whistle overhead, and then a most startling report. The first Spanish shell explodedabout twenty feet above the surface of the ground, and about twentyyards in rear of the crest of the hill. It exploded in the midst ofour brave Cuban contingents, killed one and wounded several. Thevaliant sons of Cuba libre took to their heels, and most of thenewspaper correspondents did likewise. The members of Grimes' Battery, who were not needed at the guns, were sent back to the caissons, andanother round of shrapnel was sent in reply. Again a hurtling soundrent the air; again there was the fierce crack of a Spanish shell inour immediate vicinity, and, on looking around to see where this shellstruck, it was observed that it had burst over the Gatling battery. Luckily, it had gone six or eight feet beyond the battery beforeexploding. A fragment of the shell had struck Priv. Bremer upon thehand, producing quite a severe contusion. The Missouri mules stampedthe ground impatiently; one of them uttered the characteristicexclamation of his race, "Aw! hee! aw! hee! aw!" and the members ofthe detachment burst into a merry peal of hearty laughter. It wasevident that this detachment was not going to run, and it was equallyevident that the Missouri mules would stand fire. 

[Illustration: A Fighting Cuban, and Where He Fought. ]

[Illustration: Map--Siege Lines at Santiago. ]

A third shell whistled over the hill. This one burst fairly overGrimes' third piece, killed the cannoneer, and wounded several men. 

The members of the detachment were now directed to lie down undertheir guns and limbers, except the drivers, who declined to do so, andstill stood at the heads of their mules. Priv. Hoft, disdaining totake cover, shouldered his rifle and walked up and down, sentryfashion, over the pile of camp equipage. 

Serg. Weigle, who had brought along a small portable camera, with alarge supply of film-rolls, requested permission to photograph thenext shot fired by Grimes' Battery. It was granted. He climbed to thetop of the hill, stepped off to the left of the battery, and calmlyfocused his camera. Grimes fired another salute, and Weigle secured agood picture. A Spanish shell came whistling over the hill; Weigle, judging where it would burst from previous observations, focused hiscamera, and secured a picture of the burst. He then rejoined hisdetachment, and photographed it as it stood. He seemed chiefly worriedfor fear he would not get a picture of everything that happened. 

The artillery duel continued for some twenty minutes. The infantrybegan to pass on, to the front. Grimes no longer needed the support ofthe Gatling guns, because he now had an infantry support in front ofhim, and was firing over their heads. Col. McClernand sent orders tothe detachment to move to the rear, out of range. The order wasobeyed. 

Private Hoft, with the instinct of a true soldier, continued to trampback and forth guarding the pile of camp equipage. The battery movedto the rear at a gentle trot, and, as it turned down the hill into thefirst ford by the El Poso house, a Spanish shell whistled over thehead of Private Shiffer, who was leading the way, and burst justbeyond his off mule. Shiffer didn't duck and nobody was hurt. Providence was taking care of this experiment. Corporal Doyle and twoother members of the detachment got lost, and wandered off among thecrowd of Cubans, but soon found the battery and rejoined. Orders weregiven that as soon as the battery was out of range, it should halt andface to the front, at the side of the road. 

The battery halted about half a mile to the rear, and the 13thInfantry passed it here, on their way to the front. The commentsbestowed were not calculated to soothe the ruffled feelings of peoplewho had been ordered to retreat. "I told you so. " "Why don't you go tothe front?" "Going to begin firing here?" "Is this the place where youshoot?" "Is this all there is of it?" "I knew they would not get intothe fight. " "Watch them hang around the rear. " "Going to start inraising bananas back here, John Henry?" "What do you think of machineguns now?" and similar remarks, of a witty but exasperating nature, greeted the detachment, from both officers and men, as the regimentpassed on its way to the front. The only thing that could be done wasto endure it, in the hope of getting a chance to make a retort laterin the day. 

About nine o'clock, the artillery firing ceased, and the Gatling GunBattery returned to El Poso. Grimes' guns were still up on the hill, but there were no cannoneers; they had ceased to fire, and had lefttheir guns. Two or three dead men were lying on the side of the hill;wounded men were limping around with bandages. Cubans were againpassing to the front. These fellows were trying to reach El Caney. They never got into the fight. They did reach the vicinity of ElCaney, and the Spanish fired one volley at them. The Cubans set up agreat howl, accompanied by vociferous gesticulations--and then"skedaddled. "

During all this time the sound of firing had been heard toward ElCaney. It had been opened up there about half an hour before Grimesfirst spoke at El Poso. The fire in this direction sounded likeranging fire, a shot every two or three minutes, and it was supposedthat Capron was trying to locate the enemy. The sharp crack ofmusketry was heard on our front, it swelled and became continuous. Itwas evident that quite a fight was going on at El Caney, which was toour right about one mile and to our front perhaps half a mile. Kent'sDivision kept pushing forward on the El Poso road. Col. McClernand wasasked for instructions for the Gatling Gun Detachment. He replied, "Find the 71st New York, and go in with them, if you can. If this isnot practicable, find the best place you can, and make the best use ofyour guns that you can. " These were the only instructions received bythe Gatling Gun Detachment until one o'clock. 

[Illustration: Gatling Camp and Bomb-Proofs at Fort Roosevelt. ]

The Gatling Gun Detachment moved forward about half a mile. They foundthe 71st New York lying down by the side of the road, partiallyblocking it. Troops passing them toward the front were compelled tobreak into columns of twos, because the road was crowded by the 71st. The colonel and his adjutant were sought and found, and informed ofthe detachment's instructions. Information was requested as to whenand where the 71st was going into the fight. It appeared that they hada vague idea that they were going in on the left center of the leftwing. Lawton's Division at El Caney will be considered the right wing;Kent's Division and Wheeler's Division the left wing of the army atSan Juan. The 71st did not seem to know when it was going to movetoward the front, nor just where it was going; and there was noapparent effort being made to get further down the road to the front. Wheeler's Division was also pressing forward on the road, dismountedcavalrymen, with no arms in their hands except their carbines withoutbayonets. With these same carbines these men were, a little later, tostorm the intrenchments, manned by picked and veteran soldiers, whoknew how to die at their posts. 

With Wheeler's Division were the Rough Riders, the most uniqueaggregation of fighting men ever gathered together in any army. Therewere cowboys, bankers, brokers, merchants, city clubmen, and societydudes; commanded by a doctor, second in command a literary politician;but every man determined to get into the fight. About three-quartersof a mile in advance was the first ford, the ford of the AguadoresRiver; beyond this a quarter of a mile was another ford, the ford ofthe San Juan. The road forked about two hundred yards east of theAguadores ford, turning sharply to the left. Down the road from ElPoso crept the military balloon, it halted near this fork--"BalloonFork. " Two officers were in its basket, six or eight hundred feetabove the surface of the ground, observing the movements of the troopsand the disposition of the enemy. 

The sharp crackle of the musketry began in front, and still theGatling Gun Detachment lay beside the road with the 71st, waiting, swearing, broiling, stewing in their own perspiration, mad withthirst, and crazed with the fever of the battle. The colonel of the71st was again approached, to ascertain whether he was now going tothe front, but still there were no signs of any indication to moveforward. So the long-eared steed was mounted and the ford of theAguadores reconnoitered. The bullets were zipping through the ranktropical jungle. Two or three men were hit. Those who moved forwardwere going single file, crouching low, at a dog trot. There was noevidence of hesitation or fear here. Some of the "Brunettes" passed, their blue shirts unbuttoned, corded veins protruding as they slightlyraised their heads to look forward, great drops of perspirationrolling down their sleek, shiny, black skins. There was a level spot, slightly open, beyond the ford of the Aguadores, which offered a placefor going into battery; from this place the enemy's works on San Juanwere visible, a faint streak along the crest of the hill illuminedfrom time to time by the flash of Mausers. 

On return to the battery, there were no signs of being able to enterthe action with the gallant 71st, and, acting under the second clauseof the instructions, the Gatling battery was moved forward at agallop. Major Sharpe, a mounted member of Gen. Shafter's staff, helpedto open a way through this regiment to enable the guns to pass. Thereception of the battery by these valiant men was very different fromthat so recently given by the 13th Regulars. "Give 'em hell, boys!""Let 'er go, Gallagher!" "Goin' to let the woodpeckers go off?"--andcheer after cheer went up as the battery passed through. Vain effortswere made to check this vociferous clamor, which was plainly audibleto the enemy, less than 1500 yards away. The bullets of the enemybegan to drop lower. The cheering had furnished them the clew theyneeded. They had located our position, and the 71st atoned for thisthoughtlessness by the loss of nearly eighty men, as it lay coweringin the underbrush near Balloon Fork. 

Just before reaching the Aguadores ford, the battery was met by Col. Derby, who had been observing the disposition of the troops, from theballoon, and had afterward ridden to the front on horseback. Thecolonel was riding along, to push the infantry forward in positionfrom the rear, as coolly as if on the parade-ground. A blade of grasshad gotten twisted around a button of his uniform and hung down like abuttonhole bouquet over his breast. There was a genial smile on hishandsome face as he inquired, "Where are you going?" and, on beinginformed of the orders of the detachment and of the intention to putthe battery into action, he replied, "The infantry are not deployedenough to take advantage of your fire. I would advise that you wait ashort time. I will send you word when the time comes. " The advice wasacted upon, the guns were turned out by the side of the road, and themen directed to lie down. 

[Illustration: Tree Between Lines Showing Bullet Holes. This Tree Grewon Low Ground. ]

During the gallop to the front they had been compelled to run to keepup, there not being sufficient accommodation for them to all gomounted on the guns. They were panting heavily, and they obeyed theorder and crept under the guns, taking advantage of such little shadeas was offered. Troops continued to pass to the front. The crackle ofmusketry gradually extended to the right and to the left, showing thatthe deployment was being completed. More men were hit, but nocomplaints or groans were heard. A ball struck a limber-chest; a manlying on his face in the road, during a momentary pause of one of thecompanies, was perforated from head to foot: he never moved--justcontinued to lie there; the flies began to buzz around the spot andsettle on the clotted blood, that poured out from the fractured skull, in the dust of the road. Down at the ford, some twenty-five or thirtyyards in advance, men were being hit continually. 

Shots came down from the trees around. The sharpshooters of theSpanish forces, who had been up in the trees during the artilleryduel, and beyond whom our advance had swept, fully believing that theywould be murdered if captured, expecting no quarter, were recklesslyshooting at everything in sight. They made a special target of everyman who wore any indication of rank. Some of our heaviest lossesduring the day, especially among commissioned officers, were caused bythese sharpshooters. They shot indiscriminately at wounded, athospital nurses, at medical officers wearing the red cross, and atfighting men going to the front. 

The firing became too warm, and the Gatling battery was moved backabout fifty yards, again halted, and faced to the front. It was nownearly one o'clock. The members of the detachment had picked up theirhaversacks on leaving El Poso, and now began to nibble pieces ofhardtack. A bullet broke a piece of hardtack which a man was liftingto his mouth; without even stopping in the act of lifting it to hismouth, he ate the piece, with a jest. 

Suddenly the clatter of hoofs was heard from the front. Lieut. Mileydashed up and said, "Gen. Shafter directs that you give one piece tome, and take the other three beyond the ford, where the dynamite gunis, find some position, and go into action. " Sergeant Weigle's gun wasplaced at Miley's disposal, and the other pieces dashed forward at adead run, led by the musical mule who uttered his characteristicexclamation as he dashed through the ford of the Aguadores. 

The place formerly selected for going into action had been again twicereconnoitered during the wait, and a better place had been found aboutthirty yards beyond the ford of the San Juan River. The dynamite gunhad stuck in the ford of the Aguadores; a shell had got jammed in it. The Gatlings were compelled to go around it. They dashed through theintervening space, across the San Juan ford, and up on the openingbeyond. The position for the battery, partially hidden from the viewof the enemy by a small clump of underbrush, was indicated. The rightpiece, Serg. Green's, was compelled to go into action in the middle ofthe road, and in plain sight of the enemy. While the pieces were beingunlimbered, which was only the work of an instant, an inquiry was madeof Captain Boughton, of the 3d Cavalry, whose troop had just reachedthis point, as to the position of our troops and of the enemy, withthe further remark that the battery had been under fire since eighto'clock, and had not seen a Spaniard. "I can show you plenty ofSpaniards, " replied Boughton, and, raising his hand, pointed towardthe San Juan blockhouse and the ridge in its vicinity, sweeping hishand toward the right. It was enough. Before his hand had fallen tohis side, the pieces were musically singing. 

Corp. Steigerwald turned and asked, "What is the range, sir?" To whichwas instantly replied, "Block-house, 600 yards; the ridge to theright, 800 yards, " and Steigerwald's piece was grinding 500 shots aminute within a quarter of a second, playing upon the San Juanblock-house. Serg. Green took 800 yards, and began to send hiscompliments to the ridge beyond the block-house. In an instant Priv. Sine, at Green's gun, who was feeding, fell backward dead. At the sameinstant Priv. Kastner fell out. Sine was shot through the heart, Kastner through the head and neck. At this time Ryder's gun began totalk. It spoke very voluble and eloquent orations, which, although notdelivered in the Spanish language, were well understood by ourfriends, the enemy, upon the hill. 

[Illustration: Spanish Block-House. ]

Serg. Green, at the right gun, had run back for ammunition, and Corp. Doyle, when Sine fell, seized the pointing lever, and was coollyturning the crank while he sighted the gun at the same time. He wasfor the moment the only member of the detachment left at the piece, but was given assistance, and a moment later Green arrived and beganto feed the gun. 

Steigerwald was short-handed. Some of his men had been sun-struckduring the run, and he, too, was compelled to work his gun with onlyone assistant. Then some of those who had been unable to keep uparrived at the battery and began to render assistance. Priv. VanVaningham, who had gotten lost from his own command, began to passammunition. Priv. Merryman, who was holding his team back in theriver, was impressed by a doctor to help carry wounded men, and Priv. Burkley, another man lost from his command, stepped into Merryman'splace. Priv. Chase left his team, seeing the piece short-handed, andbegan to pass ammunition. The mules merely wagged their ears backwardand forward and stamped on account of the flies. 

All these changes were accomplished, and the pieces had not evenceased fire. Doyle had fed about 100 rounds, alone. Capt. Landis, ofthe 1st Cavalry, arrived just at this time, and volunteered to assistin observing the effect of the fire. He stood fearlessly out in themiddle of the road, just to the right of Green's piece, in the verybest position for observation, but, at the same time, a mostconspicuous target for the enemy, and observed the effect of theGatling fire, as though he were at target practice, reporting thesame, continually, to the battery commander. 

For the first two minutes the enemy seemed dazed, then suddenly aperfect hell of leaden hail swept through the foliage. The only thingthat saved the battery from absolute destruction was that the enemy'sshots were a little high. As it was, many of them struck the groundbetween the guns, and several hit the pieces. Three members of thedetachment were slightly hurt. One mule was shot through the ear. Hesang the usual song of the mule, shook his head, and was suddenly hitagain on the fore leg. He plunged a little, but Priv. Shiffer pattedhim on the head and he became quiet. A bullet passed by Shiffer'shead, so close that he felt the wind fan his whiskers, and burieditself in the saddle on the same mule. This sudden concentration ofthe enemy's fire lasted about two minutes. 

About the same time the detachment heard a wild cheer start on theleft and gradually sweep around to the left and right, until in everydirection, sounding high above the din of battle and the crackling ofthe Mausers, even above the rattle of the Gatling guns, was heard theyell of recognition from our own troops. There was, for an instant, afurious fusillade on our right and left, and in a few moments thewhole line of our troops had risen and were moving forward to the SanJuan ridge. While moving forward, they necessarily almost ceased tofire, but the fire of the Gatlings continued, deadly and accurate. Atroop of the 10th Cavalry, from our right and rear, came up, part ofthe squadron commanded by Col. Baldwin. Some of this troop did notunderstand the Gatling gun drama, and were in the act of firing avolley into our backs, when Lieut. Smith, who was to so heroicallylose his life within ten minutes afterward, sprang out in front of theexcited troopers, and, with tears in his eyes, implored them not tofire, that these were "our own Gatlings. " They did not fire in ourdirection, but they did give a most thrilling and welcome cheer, asthe squadron swept forward by our right. Col. Baldwin ran up, andshouted that he would place two troops in support of the battery aslong as they were needed. It was the first time the battery had everhad a support of any kind. 

After a couple of minutes, the enemy's fire perceptibly slackened. Itwas evident they were seeking cover from our fire in the bottom oftheir ditches, and our fire at this time was being made chiefly fromthe Gatling battery. This cessation of fire on the part of the enemylasted about two minutes, and then the Gatling gunners observed theSpaniards climbing from their trenches. Until that time the Gatlingbattery had been worked with dogged persistency and grim silence, butfrom that moment every member of the battery yelled at the top of hisvoice until the command "Cease firing" was given. Groups of the enemy, as they climbed from their trenches, were caught by the fire of theguns, and were seen to melt away like a lump of salt in a glass ofwater. Bodies the size of a company would practically disappear aninstant after a gun had been turned upon them. 

This flight of the enemy from their trenches had been caused by thefact that the charging line had cut through the barb-wire fences atthe foot of the hill, and had started up the slope. The Spaniards wereunable to stay with their heads above the trenches to fire at thecharging-line, because of the missiles of death poured in by themachine guns; and to remain there awaiting the charge was certaindeath. They did not have the nerve to wait for the cold steel. Theywere demoralized because they had been compelled to seek the bottom oftheir trenches. American troops would have awaited the charge, knowingthat the machine gun fire must cease before contact could occur, butthe Spaniards forgot this in their excitement, and made the fatalmistake of running. 

The Gatlings had the range to perfection. Capt. Boughton, who was oneof the first officers upon the hill, stated, on the 1st of Septemberat Montauk, that he visited a portion of the Spanish trenchesimmediately upon arriving at the crest, and that the trenches which heinspected were literally filled with writhing, squirming, tangledmasses of dead and wounded Spaniards, and that the edge of thetrenches was covered with wounded and dead Spaniards, who had beenshot in the act of climbing out. This execution was done mainly by themachine guns, because the infantry and cavalry were not firing muchwhen it was done; they were running up the hill to the charge. 

Colonel Egbert, who commanded the 6th Infantry, states, in hisofficial report, that when his regiment reached the sharp incline nearthe top of the hill they were brought to a standstill because theGatling bullets were striking along the crest. The officers of the13th Infantry state the same thing. It was Lieut. Ferguson, of the13th, who when the troops had climbed as high as possible under theleaden canopy which the Gatlings made to cover their charge, waved hiswhite handkerchief as a signal to cease firing. At the same momentLandis exclaimed, "Better stop; our men are climbing the hill now. " Ashrill whistle gave the signal "Cease firing, " and the Gatling GunBattery, to a man, rose to their feet and gazed with absorbinginterest as the long, thin, blue line swept forward and crowned thecrest of the hill. An instant later an American flag floated proudlyfrom the San Juan block-house; then the roar of musketry and thevolley of rifles indicated that the fleeing enemy was receiving warmmessengers as he ran down the hill toward his second line ofintrenchments. 

The next immediate duty confronting the detachment was to take stockof losses and to occupy the captured position in case of necessity. 

Private Sine had been killed and Private Kastner was supposed to bemortally wounded. Private Elkins fell exhausted just as the Stars andStripes were run up on the block-house. He had been knocked down bythe pole of a limber, which struck him over the kidneys, but hadcontinued to feed his gun until the very last. He was utterlyexhausted. Sergeant Green had been wounded slightly in the foot, butnot enough to disable him. Private Bremer had been hit early in themorning by the fragment of a shell on the hand. One or two othermembers had been merely touched, grazed by balls. Private Greenberghad been overcome by the heat. Merryman, one of the teamsters, asstated before, had been seized to carry wounded. Private Lauer wasmissing and Dellett sunstruck. Private Hoft had joined the battery onhearing it go into action, and it was necessary to send someone backas guard over the camp equipage. A volunteer was called for, and itwas with the utmost difficulty that a member of the detachment, Private Pyne, was induced to take this duty. He shot four Spanishsharpshooters, who were shooting at our wounded and our medicalofficers, out of trees near El Poso, during the remainder of the day. Private Chase had sprained his back so badly as to be unable to ride amule; and two places were vacant for drivers. It was necessary toinstantly supply this deficiency. Private Burkley, 16th Infantry, whohad assisted in passing ammunition during the firing, volunteered todrive one of the teams, and Private Correll the other. PrivateRaymond, 6th Cavalry, and Private Van Vaningham, of the same regiment, also joined the detachment at this point, being separated from theirown commands. 

The pieces were limbered up as soon as these dispositions could bemade, except Sergeant Ryder's gun, which had bent the pintle-pin andconsequently could not be limbered quickly. The other two pieces andthe limber belonging to Ryder's gun were moved forward on a run to thecaptured position on the San Juan ridge, gun crews riding or followingas best they could. Both pieces went into action on the right of theroad. A limber was then sent back for Ryder's gun, and it was broughtup, Priv. Shiffer performing this duty under a perfect hail ofdropping fire. In advancing from the position at the ford to thecaptured position it was necessary to cut three barb-wire fences. Themembers of the detachment behaved with the utmost coolness, allworking together to remove these obstructions, and not a man soughtshelter, although a dropping fire was striking around the detachment, from some source. Where this fire came from it was impossible to tell;but it did not come from the enemy. 

[Illustration: Spanish Fort of Three-Inch Guns. ]

The two pieces which first reached the top of the hill were haltedunder shelter of the crest, while the ground above was reconnoitered. It was instantly observed that the enemy was coming back for acounter-charge. Accordingly the pieces were immediately run to the topof the hill, the drivers, Shiffer and Correll, riding boldly up andexecuting a left-about on the skirmish line, where the skirmisherswere lying down. The pieces were unlimbered and instantly put intoaction at point-blank range, the skirmishers giving way to the rightand left to make way for the guns. The enemy was less than 300 yardsaway, and apparently bent on recovering the position. 

The fire immediately became very hot. A skirmisher, who had thought togain a little cover by lying down beside the wheel of the right gun(Green's), was shot through the arm. "I knowed it, " he growled; "Imight have knowed that if I got near that durned gun, I'd get potted. "He rolled down behind the crest; a soldier produced an emergencypacket, staunched the blood, and the wounded soldier, finding no bonesbroken, returned to the firing-line and resumed his work. The enemy, at this part of the line, began to waver and again broke toward hissecond line of intrenchments. 

Just at this moment, Lieut. Traub came up and shouted, "Gen. Woodorders you to send one or two of your guns over to help Roosevelt. "The order to move the guns was disregarded, but Traub pointed out theenemy, which was menacing Col. Roosevelt's position, and insisted. About 600 yards to the right, oblique from the position of the gunsand perhaps 200 yards, or less, in front of the salient occupied byCol. Roosevelt and the 3d Cavalry (afterward called Fort Roosevelt), there was a group of about 400 of the enemy, apparently endeavoring tocharge the position. There was no time to notify the second piece. Serg. Green's gun was instantly turned upon this group, at point-blankelevation. The group melted away. Capt. Marcotte states that, afterthe surrender, some Spanish officers, whom he met, and who weremembers of this group, described this to him, stating that the enemyseen at this point was a body of about 600 escaping from El Caney;that they were struck at this point by machine gun fire so effectivelythat only forty of them ever got back to Santiago; the rest werekilled. 

Serg. Green's gun, already heated to a red heat by the continuousfiring of the day, had been worked to its extreme limit of rapiditywhile firing at this body of the enemy, and on ceasing to fire, several cartridges exploded in the gun before they could be withdrawn. A ball lodged in one barrel from one of these explosions, and thispiece was drawn down out of action just as the piece which had beenleft at the ford returned. Subsequently the disabled piece was sentback to the ford, with the idea that that would be a safer place tooverhaul it than immediately in rear of the firing-line. The pieceremained at the ford until the night of the 3d of July, when it wasbrought up to the battery, then at Fort Roosevelt, and on the 4th wasfinally overhauled and put into action. This led to the impression, onthe part of some of the command, that one of the Gatlings had beenblown up, which was not true. The gun was not injured, except that onebarrel could not be used during the remainder of the fighting, but thegun was used on the morning of the 4th, and during the whole of theengagement on the 10th and 11th, as well as on outpost duty, usingnine barrels instead of ten. 

Following this repulse of the enemy, which occurred about 4:30 p. M. , there was a lull in the firing. Advantage was taken of this to visitCol. Roosevelt's position and inspect the line of battle. Uponreaching the salient, Col. Roosevelt was seen walking up and downbehind his line, encouraging his men, while a group of them was held, just in the rear of the crest, in charge of Maj. Jenkins, to supportthe firing-line if necessary. On the right of the Rough Riders, the 3dCavalry were in the fight, and Capt. Boughton was again encountered. 

The firing suddenly began again, and it was remarkable to observe thecoolness with which these two officers sauntered up and down the line, utterly regardless of the bullets, which were cutting the grass inevery direction. There were no soft places on this part of the hill. The enemy's sharpshooters, up in high trees, were able to see everypoint of the crest, and were dropping their shots accurately behind itat all points. 

[Illustration: Tentage in Cuba. ]

Just at this moment, Serg. Weigle came up with his gun. Serg. Weiglehad had a hard time. His gun had been taken, under direction of Lieut. Miley, to a point near the San Juan farm-house, and pulled to the topof the hill. Weigle, whose only idea of a battle, at this time, was achance to shoot, had been, to his intense disgust, restrained fromopening fire. Then the piece had been taken down from the hill andaround to the left of the line, where Lieut. Miley's duty as aide hadcarried him, to observe the progress of the battle, and Weigle hadbeen again denied the privilege of "potting" a Spaniard. He was themost disgusted man in the American Army; he was furious; he waswhite-hot; he was so mad that the tears rolled down his cheeks, as hereported with a soldierly salute, "Sir, Serg. Weigle reports, with hisgun. Lieut. Miley did not allow me to open fire. I would like to haveorders. "

In spite of the critical condition of the engagement, it was extremelyludicrous; but the reopening of the fire at this moment presented anopportunity to accommodate the sergeant to his heart's content. He wasdirected to run his piece up on the firing-line, report to the officerin charge thereof, and go into action as soon as he pleased. Withinthirty seconds he was getting his coveted opportunity. He fired untilhis gun became accidentally jammed, pulled it down behind the crest ofthe hill and removed the defective cartridge, returned it and repeatedthis operation, actually bringing the gun down three times, andreturning it into action, doing very effective work, and all the timedisplaying the utmost coolness and good judgment. A sharpshooter beganto make a target of Weigle's gun, and "potted" a couple of menbelonging to the cavalry near it. This made Weigle so mad that heturned the gun, for a moment, upon the tree in which the sharp-shooterwas concealed. That sharpshooter never shot again. Finally, Weigle'sgun got so hot, and he himself so cool, that he concluded the piecewas too warm for further firing. So he ran it down behind the hill, and ran his detachment back on the hill with rifles, and, during theremainder of the evening, the members of this crew practiced with"long Toms" upon the Spanish soldiers. 

On returning to the other two pieces near the road, they were moved toanother position, on the other side of the road. This precaution wasjudicious in order to conceal the pieces, or change their position, because the enemy had pretty thoroughly located them in the previousbrush, and it was rather dangerous to remain at that place. It was nownearly sundown. Scarcely had the pieces opened at this new position, when a battery of the enemy's artillery, located near the hospital, began to fire at them. There was a heavy gun, which made a deeprumbling sound, and this sound was supplemented by the sharp crack ofa field-piece. A shell came whistling overhead and exploded withinthirty yards of the battery, just beyond it. Another one came, andthis time the enemy's artillery was located. Quick as a flash, the twoGatlings were turned upon the enemy's guns at the 2000-yard range. Another shell came whistling along and exploded about ten feetoverhead and twenty feet in rear of the battery. It tore up the grassin rear of the battery. After this engagement was over, Priv. Shifferpicked up the still hot fuse of this last shell. It was a large brasscombination fuse, and set at eight seconds, which justified theestimated range. This third shell was the last one the enemy was ableto fire from these pieces. The powerful field-glasses which were usedin locating the battery revealed the fact that as soon as the Gatlingguns were turned on it, the Spanish gunners ran away from theirpieces. The big gun turned out to be a 16-centimeter converted bronzepiece, mounted on a pintle in barbette, rifled and using smokelesspowder. It was also found that they were firing four 3-inchfield-pieces of a similar character in this battery, as well as twomountain guns. 

It is claimed that this is the first time in the history of landfighting that a battery of heavy guns was ever put out of action bymachine-gun fire. This battery of the Spanish was never afterward ableto get into action. Their pieces, which had been loaded for the fourthshot, were found on the 18th of July, still loaded, and a Spanishofficer gave the information that they had lost more than forty mentrying to work that battery, since the 1st of July. This is accountedfor by the fact that this Spanish battery was made the subject ofcritical observation by the Gatling Gun Detachment from this time on. 

[Illustration: After the Rain. ]

During this last engagement it had been necessary to obtain more mento assist in carrying ammunition, and Capt. Ayers, of the 10thCavalry, had furnished a detail, consisting of Serg. Graham andPrivates Smith and Taylor, Troop E, 10th Cavalry. These coloredsoldiers proved to be excellent. They remained with the battery untilthe end of the fighting on the 17th, and were in every respect thepeers of any soldier in the detachment. Serg. Graham was recommendedfor a medal of honor. Privates Smith and Taylor did as good service, were as willing, as obedient, as prompt, and as energetic in thedischarge of their duties as any commanding officer could wish tohave. It is a great pleasure to be able to give this testimony to themerits of our colored troopers, and to say, in addition, that nosoldiers ever fought better than the "Brunettes" of the 9th and 10thCavalry, who fought from the 3d of July until the 12th, near or withthe Gatlings. 

After the firing at the ford had ceased, Capt. Marcotte had returnedto El Poso to investigate the movements of our artillery. These werethen, and have remained, one of those inscrutable and mysteriousphenomena of a battle; incomprehensible to the ordinary layman, andcapable of being understood only by "scientific" soldiers. The chargeupon the San Juan ridge was practically unsupported by artillery. NoAmerican shells had struck the San Juan block-house; none had struckor burst in its vicinity; not even a moral effect by our artillery hadassisted in the assault. So Marcotte had gone to investigate theartillery arm. He returned at sundown, and brought the informationthat our baggage was safe at El Poso; that Private Pyne, still aliveand unhurt, had been doing good work against the enemy'ssharpshooters; and, better than all this, had brought back with him acanteen of water from the San Juan River and a pocket full ofhardtack. He poured out his hardtack, and it was equally distributedamong the members of the detachment, each man's share amounting to twopieces. Each man was also given a sup of water from the canteen, andthis constituted their only supper on that night, as they had beencompelled to throw away everything to keep up with the guns. Havingdisposed of that, exhausted Nature could do no more; they lay down inthe mud where they stood, and slept so soundly that even the firingwhich occurred that night did not arouse them from their slumbers. They were not disturbed until Best's Battery began to occupy this hillabout four o'clock in the morning. They were then aroused and theGatling guns were drawn down, and the whole battery moved to thesalient occupied by the Rough Riders, because their position was atthat time closest to the enemy, and, as was determined by the previousday's reconnaissance, offered a chance to enfilade several of theenemy's trenches with machine gun fire. 

To dispose of the subject of artillery, it may be said that Best'sBattery and some other artillery occupied the ground vacated by theGatlings on the morning of July 2d, fired four shots, and thenwithdrew with more haste than dignity. They remarked, "This is thehottest fire to which artillery has been subjected in modern times, "and lit out to find a cooler place. They found it--so far in rear thattheir fire was almost equally dangerous to friends and foes on accountof the close proximity of the two firing-lines. The obvious conclusionis that machine guns can live at close ranges, where artillery can notstay. There is no better light artillery in the world than that whichhad to withdraw from San Juan block-house and its vicinity, on themorning of July 2d. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SANTIAGO. 

The situation of affairs on the night of the 1st of July was rathercritical. The plan which the general had laid down had been delayed inexecution at El Caney, while the impetuousity of the troops hadprecipitated an unexpected rapidity of movement at San Juan. Capron'sBattery had opened at El Caney about half past seven o'clock, withbadly aimed and ill-directed fire, which did very little damage to theenemy. The troops engaged in this part of the battle were pushedforward until, by about eleven o'clock, they had become prettythoroughly deployed around the vicinity of Las Guamas Creek. They hadalso extended slightly to the right and to the left toward the DuCuorot house. The Spanish forts obstinately held out, and the handfulof Spanish soldiers in El Caney and vicinity stubbornly resisted theattack made by our troops. 

About nine o'clock, Hamilton's right piece, No. 3 of Capron's Battery, succeeded in planting a shell directly in the old stone fort, whichknocked a hole in the masonry; but, just at this juncture, the batterywas ordered to cease firing at the blockhouse, and to shell theenemy's trenches. The enemy forthwith utilized the hole made in thewall by the shell as a loop-hole, and continued to fire through ituntil the fort was taken by the infantry assault at about half-pastfour o'clock. No worse commentary than this could possibly be madeupon the tactical handling of this battery of artillery, because, having obtained perfectly the range of the enemy's stronghold, it wassimply asinine not to knock that block-house to pieces immediately. 

So Lawton's Division had remained in front of El Caney, held by about1000 Spaniards, while the shadows crept from the west to the north, from the north to the northeast, and from the northeast toward theeast. It was coming toward night before the artillery was finallyturned loose. One corner and the roof of this block-house were knockedoff, but even then the artillery was so poorly handled that the enemyhad to be dislodged from this block-house by hand-to-hand fighting, Asingle Hotchkiss gun, properly handled, should have converted it intoruins in thirty minutes. 

While these events were transpiring, Kent and Wheeler, constitutingthe left wing of the army, had moved forward on the El Poso road, parallel to the Aguadores River, as far as the San Juan had capturedthe San Juan farm-house, and had gradually deployed to the right andto the left along the San Juan River. About one o'clock their line hadswept forward and had captured the first ridge between the San Juanand the city of Santiago, the "San Juan ridge, " driving the enemy onthis portion of the field into their last trenches. But the rightflank of this wing was entirely unsupported, and the road by the wayof Fort Canosa to San Juan, passing by the portion of the linesubsequently occupied by the dynamite gun, marked the extreme positionof the right of this wing of the army. The enemy was already welltoward its right, and had the excellent El Caney road to move upon. Hewas thoroughly familiar with the country, while the troops composingthis wing were exhausted by the charge. This wing had no reserve thatthe firing-line knew of, and, as a matter of fact, had none except twobattalions of the 71st New York, which had not got into battle, andwhich were scattered along the road from the San Juan River toSiboney. 

The position occupied by the left wing of the army was a strongnatural position, but had no protection for the right flank. In this, Lawton's Division did not execute the part of the battle assigned toit. Thus the officers on the San Juan ridge, who knew anything aboutthe plan of the battle, were constantly directing their gaze, at everylull in the fighting, toward El Caney, and to the right of Gen. Wood'sposition, but there were no indications of the approach of Gen. Lawton. 

Returning now to the right wing: the San Juan block-house and theridge in its vicinity having been captured, a glance at the map willshow that the retreat of the Spanish forces at El Caney was inimminent danger of being cut off. This capture occurred at 1:23-1/2 p. M. The Spanish commander at El Caney had been killed about noon, hismen had suffered heavily, and the new commanding officer discoveredthat his retreat by the El Caney road was threatened. The only otherline of retreat was by way of the San Miguel and Cuabitas roads. TheSpanish forces at El Caney were also running low in their ammunition, and it was therefore decided to withdraw. Portions of the Spanishtroops did withdraw, some by way of the El Caney road toward Santiago;the remainder, some 350 or 400, were crushed in the final charge uponEl Caney, between 4 and 4:30 o'clock. 

Gen. Lawton's Division then proceeded down the El Caney road to SantaCruz, passing by way of the masonry bridge. This was about dusk. Thedivision marched in columns of fours, with the artillery in front incolumn of sections, and without even an advance guard thrown out. Theartillery had passed the masonry bridge and had nearly reached theSanta Cruz farm-house, when the order was given to halt. The divisionhalted in the road and began to cook supper. Fires were kindled, andcoffee put on to boil. Suddenly, a few shots came scattering over theridge and dropped in among the troops. A messenger was sent back toGen. Shafter to inform him that further advance in this direction wasnot practicable, as the enemy had been encountered in force. Theposition this division was destined, in the beginning, to occupy waswithin less than 300 yards of where it halted. There was no large bodyof Spanish troops in that portion of the field. The whole valleybetween that ridge and Santiago had been swept by machine gun fireduring the afternoon. It is possible that there might hare been a fewSpanish pickets on the ridge, but this is not believed to be probable. There was some firing about this time from the Spanish trenches nearFort Canosa, at the 13th Infantry upon the hill where the dynamite gunwas subsequently placed. A glance at the map will show that theseshots, having passed over the hill, would drop in the vicinity of themasonry bridge and the Santa Cruz farm-house. This was the firing thatalarmed Lawton's Division and caused the report mentioned to be sentback to General Shafter. 

[Illustration: Native Industry. ]

This statement of the conditions has been necessary in order tounderstand why the counter-march was made by Lawton's Division. Theposition at El Caney had ceased to be of any importance as soon as theSan Juan block-house and ridge were taken; any Spanish troopsremaining at El Caney were necessarily victims. But it was vitallyimportant to hold the position gained by the left wing. The appearanceof a heavy force of the enemy in front of the masonry bridge couldsignify only one thing, and that was that the left wing, with itsright flank in the air, was liable to be doubled up at any moment by aheavy force of the enemy striking it upon that flank. Further, thatGen. Lawton, with this column advancing on the El Caney road as beforeexplained, was liable to be struck at the head of his column andsimilarly doubled up. The enemy would thus interpose between the twowings of the army, cutting Lawton off, and probably defeating the armyin detail, unless something be done immediately. 

Of course, it is known now that this operation of the enemy was neverprobable for an instant; but that was the status of affairs atmidnight on July 1st, as then reported to the commanding general. 

Lawton was, therefore, ordered to withdraw, by way of the El Caneyroad, back to Gen. Shafter's headquarters in rear of El Poso, fromwhich position his division was rushed forward on the El Poso road toSan Juan on the 2d of July. His men were marched almost all night, almost all day the next day, and were well-nigh utterly exhausted whenthey reached a position in rear of the right flank of the left wing. It was supposed, up to this time, at headquarters, that theinformation on which this marching was ordered was correct. 

During the time that Lawton had been countermarching from Santa Cruz, back by way of El Poso, there had been, as before stated, no reservefor the left wing. The independent division of Gen. Bates had beenordered to the front as rapidly as possible. Part of it had reachedthe vicinity of El Poso, and from there one or two of the regimentshad participated in the fight, late on July 1st; but nobody on thefiring line knew anything about Bates' independent division at thistime, and it was too much exhausted to be useful as a reserve. Themorning of the 2d it was used to extend the lines. It is thereforeevident, now that the history of the battle is understood, that theGatling guns were the only effective reserve which the left wing ofthe army had during the night of July 1st and all day on the 2d. 

Acting on this belief, the Gatling Gun Battery was placed in reserve, in the rear of Fort Roosevelt, on the morning of July 2d, and was heldthere in reserve all day on July the 2d and 3d. The pieces were placedwithin twenty yards of the firing-line, just below the crest of thehill. The feed-guides were filled, and the gun crews lay down besidetheir pieces. The battery was ready to either support the firing-lineagainst a charge, or protect its flank against a turning movement. Butit was not considered necessary or desirable to run the pieces up onthe firing-line in the open, and participate in the trench-firing, which was the only fighting done on July 2d and 3d. It was consideredthat the battery was too valuable as a reserve to sacrifice any of itsmen uselessly. Some very well-meaning officers urged that the batterybe rushed up on the hill and put into action, but this was stubbornlyrefused, under the third clause of the instructions given on the 1stof July, "to make the best use of the guns possible. " Gen. Wood andCol. Roosevelt were consulted, and they concurred with the aboveviews, and the battery remained in reserve. 

[Illustration: Charge on San Juan Hill. ]

On the morning of the 2d of July a handsome young soldier, in theuniform of a Rough Rider, approached the battery commander, saluted, and said, "Col. Roosevelt directs me to report to you with my twoguns. " Inquiry elicited the fact that the young trooper was Serg. William Tiffany, that he had command of two Colt's automaticrapid-fire guns, with a crew consisting of Corp. Stevens and six men, and that he had 4, 000 rounds of 7-millimeter ammunition. Four thousandwas not a very large supply for two guns which could fire at the rateof 500 shots each per minute. Fortunately, the Gatling Gun Detachmenthad found time, on the 1st of July, to collect about 10, 000 rounds ofMauser ammunition in the captured trenches, and a comparison of theMauser with the 7-millimeter ammunition at once disclosed the factthat it was precisely the same ammunition which Tiffany had broughtalong for his guns. The problem of ammunition supply for Tiffany'sguns was solved. He now had 14, 000 rounds, and his guns became a verypowerful reinforcement at this point. 

Serg. Tiff any and his men had carried these guns from Siboney to thefiring-line upon their backs. How they got the four boxes ofammunition through they themselves could hardly tell. The firing wastoo heavy to mount the tripods in the trenches during the daytime, soplacing the guns was deferred until night. For some reason it was notpracticable to place the tripods on the night of the 2d, and they werefinally placed on the night of the 3d; Serg. Tiffany, with two of hismen, aiding in digging the emplacements. 

While digging, suddenly a burst of firing broke out, and it wasbelieved by many that a serious night attack had been made. During thefiring, Capt. Ayers, of the 10th Cavalry, and Col. Roosevelt againdisplayed those characteristics of fearless bravery which so endearedthese two gallant officers to their men. Some of the troops in thetrenches had begun to fire wildly. In fact, all the firing was donewild; there was no sense in any of it; there was no occasion for it. Intent listening to the enemy's fire made it absolutely certain thattheir firing never approached nearer our lines. There may have beensome small body seeking to explore the road, but there was noindication of any attack in force. At any rate, Roosevelt and Ayersdetermined to stop the firing of our line, and suddenly, above the dinof battle, these two officers could be heard, tramping up and down thetrench in front of their men, haranguing, commanding, ridiculing theirmen for shooting in the dark. Ayers told his men that they were nobetter than the Cubans, upon which the burly black troopers burst intoa loud guffaw, and then stopped firing altogether. Roosevelt told hismen that he was ashamed of them. He was ashamed to see them firingvaluable ammunition into the darkness of the night, aiming at nothing;that he thought cowboys were men who shot only when they could see the"whites of the other fellow's eyes. " They also stopped firing. Theenemy's bullets continued to whiz by for a few minutes, and they tooceased firing, and everybody began to laugh at everybody else. Tiffanyhad joined the two officers in their walk up and down, exposinghimself with the utmost coolness. He and his men now succeeded inplacing his guns in the trench, and, from that time until the end ofthe fight, they could hardly be induced to leave them long enough toeat; they didn't leave them to sleep--they slept in the trench by theguns. 

About one o'clock on the 3d there was a lull in the firing, duringwhich a flag of truce was sent with a communication to General Toral, notifying him that a bombardment would follow unless he surrendered. The firing was resumed and continued until about half past twelve onthe 4th of July, at which time another flag of truce went up, andthere was no more firing until the 10th of July at about threeo'clock. Troops, however, were compelled to lie on their arms; therelief was constantly in the trenches, and the nervous strain was evenworse than the actual dangers of battle. 

Negotiations for capitulation having failed, firing was resumed aboutthree o'clock on the 10th, and continued until one o'clock on the 11thof July. In this firing all four of the Gatling guns were used;Tiffany's guns and the dynamite gun under Serg. Borrowe participated. Three of the Gatling guns had been placed in the trench on the nightof July 3d. The wheels were taken off and laid on the ground in therear of the pieces; sand-bag revetments were built up in front of theguns, and each crew divided into two reliefs. One relief was requiredto be constantly at the gun and always ready for instant action. Thefourth gun, the one that had been temporarily disabled, was repairedon the 4th, thoroughly cleaned, and placed in reserve behind the crestof the hill. On the 4th of July, Serg. Borrowe had been directed toobey any instructions given him by the Gatling gun commander, and thedynamite gun had been placed in position to cooperate with the batteryof machine guns. There were now, therefore, seven pieces in thebattery. It was the most powerful and unique battery ever used inbattle. 

[Illustration: Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For theFront. ]

The Sims-Dudley pneumatic dynamite gun throws a Whitehead torpedo, carrying a charge of four and one-half pounds of explosive gelatine;the effective force of this charge is equal to that of nine pounds ofdynamite, No. 1. The charge explodes, on striking, by means of apercussion fuse, and steadiness of flight is secured by means of avane. The propelling force is a charge of seven ounces of smokelesspowder. The gun is pointed in the same manner as a mortar, and firedin the same manner as a field-piece. During the 10th and 11thconsiderable attention was devoted to the tactical cooperation of theguns composing this unique battery. 

The plan adopted was for the dynamite gun to throw a shell toward adesignated point. Upon the explosion of this shell the Spanishsoldiers invariably exposed themselves, and were immediately assailedby machine gun fire. Occasionally a dynamite shell would fall withsufficient accuracy to do efficient work on its own account. On theafternoon of the 10th a dynamite shell fell in a long trench near FortCanosa, clearing out the trench. The Spanish survivors were cut downalmost to a man by the machine gun fire, and the Spanish troops wereunable to occupy this trench until the following morning, when theoperation was repeated, practically destroying the usefulness of thistrench during the whole fight. Capt. Duncan, of the 21st Infantry, states that this relieved his battalion of an enfilading fire, and wasa valuable service to them. Another dynamite shell, on the afternoonof the 10th, fell into a Spanish battery of artillery, near the brickhospital, and completely destroyed the battery, which consisted of two3-inch guns. In all, about a dozen dynamite shells were thrown withsome degree of accuracy, and with good effect. 

The fourth Gatling gun, which had been held in reserve, was usedduring the afternoon of July 10th, and all day on the 11th, to pour avertical fire upon the city of Santiago, beyond that portion that wasvisible to the American troops. Perhaps 6, 000 or 7, 000 shots were thusdropped into the heart of the city, making the streets unsafe, communication difficult, and striking terror to the hearts of theSpanish troops who were held there in reserve. Gen. Toral, in hisofficial statement to his own government, specifically mentions thisfire as one of his principal reasons for surrender. 

On the afternoon of the 10th and during the 11th of July a battery ofmortars, under command of Capt. Ennis, posted about half a mile to theright of the machine gun battery, threw a few shells at the enemy'sintrenchments. There were four of these mortars in action and theywere placed behind the ridge in a perfectly safe position. They threw, perhaps, twenty-five shells all told. The first eight or ten failed toexplode for the reason that the fuses had not been punched. Finally, Capt. Ennis discovered that his shells were not exploding, and, oninquiry, found that there was no fuse-punch in the battery. Hesucceeded in finding a brad-awl, which, luckily, some member of thebattery had in his pocket, and showed a sergeant how to punch the fusewith a brad-awl. After this the mortar shells exploded all right. Noneof this fire, however, was directed at the city; it was directed atthe trenches of the enemy, and not over eight or ten of the shellsfell with any precision. The mortar fire was effective in the sensethat it tended to demoralize the enemy, but its material effect wasvery small. 

There was no firing of field-pieces during all this time of which anyaccount is necessary. The field-pieces were even less useful duringthis time than they were on the 1st of July, if such a thing could bepossible. 

On the night of the 4th of July the reserve Gatling gun was posted tocommand the Fort Canosa road, in support of a picket on that road, andfrom that time until the surrender this piece was posted there everynight. The members, therefore, of this detachment did practicallydouble duty. This was the gun in charge of Sergts. Weischaar andRyder, referred to in the official report. Luckily, it was not fired, but there can be no doubt of the immense value it would have had ifits use had been necessary. 

Summing up the use of machine guns from the 2d to the 11th of July, inclusive, it may be said that they demonstrated the use of the arm asa tactical reserve and an auxiliary to an outpost, and that, incombination with a dynamite gun, they demonstrated that a new arm ofthe service had been formed which can live at closer range to theenemy, and do far more effective work, than artillery. Nor is this allto be considered. It should be remembered that a field-piece throws ashell which breaks into 273 fragments. The machine gun throws 1000shots, and each of these shots is aimed with absolute precision. Therefore, at any effective range, the machine gun is far superior toa field-piece against anything except material obstacles. Of coursethe machine guns will not do to batter down stone walls, nor todestroy block-houses. It had already been demonstrated on the 1st ofJuly that "machine guns can go forward with the charging-line to thelodgment in the enemy's position, " and that "their presence on thefield of battle, with a supply of ammunition for ten minutes, is adecisive factor in the engagement. "

These were the principal points claimed for the machine gun in thediscussion of the subject on the 1st of January. The use of themachine gun for advance and rear guards was not demonstrated atSantiago, for the reason that no opportunity was presented. 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE VOLUNTEERS. 

The white flag went up at one o'clock on the 11th, and this was theend of the fighting at Santiago. The Rough Riders had been moved fromthe hill at Fort Roosevelt to a position west of the El Caney road, and one of the Gatling guns had been sent with them. This gun wasbrought back on the 17th after the surrender. Various other movementsof troops occurred before the 17th, which had been decided upon by thegenerals as the last day of grace. Gen. Toral had been notified thatone o'clock on the 17th was the time for either the surrender or thesignal for the assault. The hour approached, and still the Spaniardattempted to delay. The orders for the assault were issued. The troopslay in the trenches with their fingers on the triggers. Gen. Randolphhad come and pushed the artillery into better positions. The pieceswere loaded and the gunners stood with their lanyards in their hands. The ammunition-boxes were opened. The nervous tension of the line wasterrific. The troops on the extreme right and left, designated for theassault, were only waiting the word to dash forward upon theintrenchments of the enemy. Then suddenly from Gen. Wheeler'sheadquarters a mounted officer was seen spurring eastward along thecrest. He was waving his hat over his head. His horse gathered speed, and the foam began to fly from his flanks and nostrils, and as Capt. McKittrick passed he called, "No cheering, please; the city andprovince of Santiago have surrendered. "

The members of the Gatling Gun Detachment walked to the top of thehill, and, facing toward the gallant enemy who had so valiantlydefended the foredoomed city, silently took off their hats. 

All along the line the reception of the glorious news was marked bycomments upon the gallant defense which had been made. There was nodemonstration which could have hurt the feelings of so magnificent afoe. Five minutes after the surrender the American trench was lined byAmerican troops on our side and Spanish troops on the other. TheSpanish troops brought bottles of mescal, aguardiente, and wine. Ourtroops carried hardtack and canned roast beef. These recent foes beganat once to exchange the necessaries of life and souvenirs of the siegeof Santiago. They fraternized as all brave men do after the battle. Afew Cubans skulked around the rear of our line, despised by bothsides. 

The next day witnessed the formal surrender of the city. At twelveo'clock, the preliminary formalities having been complied with, the9th Infantry and a battalion of the 13th Infantry, the two regimentswhich had been adjudged first honors in the assault, were ready as anescort to raise the flag in the heart of the city. All of the otherregiments were formed upon the ground which they occupied during thesiege. As the second-hands of our watches showed the minute of twelve, noon, a field-piece burst upon the stillness of the sultry day, andthe band began the strains of "The Star-spangled Banner. " Every hatwas taken off, and an instant later, efforts to restrain it beingineffectual, six miles of solid cheering encompassed the latestAmerican city. 

[Illustration: Cuban Cart used by Gatling Gun Detachment, Priv. J. Shiffer Driving. ]

Grizzled old soldiers, scarred with wounds from Indian wars, and gayrecruits who had arrived too late to join in the fighting, gray-hairedgenerals and athletic young subalterns, all forgot propriety and thesilence usually enjoined in ranks and joined in that tremendous yell. From over on the right of the El Caney road we could hear the "Rah!rah! rah!" of Harvard and the "Rah! rah! rah!" of Yale, mingled withthe cowboy yell of the Indian Territory. From the ranks of theRegulars came the old Southern yell, mingled with the Northern cheer. The most thrilling and dramatic moment of the Spanish-American War hadpassed into history. 

The troops settled themselves down to wait for developments, and whilethey waited, opportunities were presented for the first time to makeobservations of the personnel of this heterogeneous army. 

The American Regular is a type of his own, and no description of himis necessary. He was the fighting strength of the 5th Corps. Onlythree Volunteer regiments participated in the charges of July 1st-the71st New York, the 2d Massachusetts, and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. 

The Volunteers presented many different types: some good, someotherwise. There should be no sympathy with that servile truckling topopular sentiment which speaks of our brave Volunteers indiscriminately, as if they were all good and all equally well instructed. There wereVolunteers who were the equals of the Regulars in fighting and inleadership. And there were some who should have been at home pullingon a nursing-bottle or attending a kindergarten. To praise themindiscriminately creates a false impression on the public, and works arank injustice toward those who were really good and efficient in theservice. It does even worse than that: it fosters the popular ideathat all there is to do to make soldiers is to take so many laborers, clerks, hod-carriers, or farmers, and put on them uniforms, arm themwith rifles, and call them "gallant Volunteers"! Out upon such aninsane delusion!

Fighting is a scientific trade. It would be no more absurd to give anidiot a tambourine and call him a musician--he would be an idiot allthe same. So with the clerk, the laborer, the hod-carrier, theteacher; he remains the same in spite of all the polished arms, resplendent uniforms, and pompous titles bestowed upon him. He remainsjust what he was before, until he learns his new trade and becomes asoldier by the acquisition of the necessary knowledge and experienceto practice his new calling. 

It is one of the duties of trained officers to tell these homelytruths to the people who have not made a study of the matter, in orderthat they who foot the bills may understand what they pay for and whythey do it. And it is equally the duty of the citizen who has noknowledge of the subject to give a fair hearing to such statements, and, if he finds them correct after due investigation, to translatethe information thus imparted into such laws as will in future supplyan army composed of soldiers who can fight, instead of a herd ofignorant incompetents who die like rotten sheep within half an hour'sride by rail of their own homes. 

These remarks can be illustrated by observations in Cuba. 

For example, the 34th Michigan pitched its camp on the hill at FortRoosevelt on the 2d of August. They were in an awful condition. A manhad died in one company the day before, and there had not been enoughable-bodied men in the company to bury him. A detail had to be madefrom another company to dig the grave. More than fifty per cent of theregiment were sick, and the remainder were far from well. At thistime, more than two weeks after the surrender, they were still cookingindividually. Within fifteen minutes after their arrival they wereoverrunning the Gatling gun camp, picking up the firewood which hadbeen gathered by the detachment for cooking purposes. An attempt tostop this marauding was received with jeers. A green-looking Wolverineat once began to make catcalls, and was ably seconded by his comrades. Sentinels were then posted over the Gatling gun camp, with orders tokeep the Michiganders out; they abused the sentinels in the samemanner, and their officers made no effort to restrain them. It becamenecessary to make a personal matter of it, which was promptly done, and one Wolverine was thereafter respectful--so respectful, in fact, that he jumped to attention and took off his hat to even the privatesof the detachment. 

The regiment took a delicate revenge. They had dug neither latrinesnor sinks. Up to this time they used the surface of the camp-groundover their own camp for this purpose. They now took possession of atrench within twenty yards of the battery's tents. The nuisance wasintolerable, and was reported to their brigade headquarters. Noattention was paid to the report. Twelve hours later it was againreported, with the same result. Twelve hours after this it was a thirdtime reported, with the same result. In the meantime not a singleshovelful of dirt had been thrown on the trench and an odor arose fromit which was not exactly like the perfume of "Araby the blest. "

[Illustration: Tiffany at his Gun in the Trench. ]

Forty-five hours after the arrival of the regiment notice was servedupon the brigade commander thereof that, unless the nuisance wasabated immediately, a sentinel would be placed over the offendingditch and notice would be given to General Bates, the divisioncommander, requesting the action of an inspector; notice was furtherserved that if any resistance were made, four Gatling guns would beturned loose upon the 34th Michigan and the regiment swept off theface of the hill and into Santiago Bay for a much-needed bath. It wasenough. Officers and men ran instantly for spades and proceeded tofill up the trench. Report was then made to Gen. Bates, the divisioncommander, of the offense and action had thereon, with the informationthat the Gatling gun commander awaited to answer any complaints. Aninvestigation was immediately made, with the result that such actionwas sustained. 

There were some ignorant Volunteers at Santiago, but of all thewillful violation of all the laws of sanitation, camp hygiene, andhealth ever seen, these particular Volunteers did the most outrageousthings. They threw their kitchen refuse out on the ground anywhere;half of the time they did not visit the sink at all, but used thesurface of the ground anywhere instead; and they continued theseoffenses at Montauk Point. They raked over an abandoned camp of theSpanish prisoners on their arrival at Fort Roosevelt, and appropriatedall the cast-off articles they could find, using the debris forbedding. This surgeon, a "family doctor" from the pine woods innorthern Michigan, did not seem to regard these matters as of anyimportance. His attention was called to them, but he took no action. In short, there was no law of health which these people did notutterly ignore, no excess dangerous to health which they did notcommit. Three-fourths of them were too sick for duty, and the restlooked like living skeletons. They fairly wallowed in their own filth--and cursed the climate of Cuba on account of their sickness. 

In sharp contrast to the 34th Michigan was the 1st U. S. VolunteerCavalry, the Rough Riders. This was an organization the peer of any inthe Regular Army in morale, in fighting, and in every quality thatgoes to make up a fine body of soldiers. They were picked men; allclasses were shown in that organization. The tennis champion was aprivate, the champion oarsman of Harvard a corporal. On the 2d of Julya stock-broker of Wall Street who can sign his check for $3, 000, 000was seen haggling with a cow-puncher from the Indian Territory over apiece of hardtack. Both were privates and both were fine soldiers. Thewhole regiment was just such a medley, but fought like Regulars, andendured like Spartans. They hung on like bull-dogs, and charged likedemons. They were as strict about the camp police as Regular Armysurgeons, and as punctilious about saluting as a K. O. On "officialrelations. " Withal, they were a clean-mouthed, clean-clad, clean-camped lot of gentlemen, each in his way, from the "Hello, pard!" of the cowboy to the frozen stare of the monocled dude fromBroadway. And they fought--like Regulars; there is no other justcomparison. Roosevelt said: "They are the 11th Cavalry. " He foundenthusiastic endorsers of this remark in every Regular who saw themfight. They were the finest body of Volunteers who ever wore uniform, and they were stamped indelibly with the personality of TheodoreRoosevelt. Pushing, aggressive, resolute, tenacious, but self-contained, cool, and restrained, they represented the very best type of what theVolunteer ought to be--but often was not. 

[Illustration: Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun inSpanish Fort, Silenced by Gatlings July 1, '98. 2. Rear Sight of sameGun. 3. Fuse picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridgeused by the Spanish Volunteers, the so-called "Explosive" Brass-coveredBullet. 5. Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish Spurs. ]

Above them all, however, shone out three types. 

Theodore Roosevelt. He needs no eulogy from my pen. He has doneeverything, and in each occupation has been conspicuously successful. He is, however, a born soldier. His virile frame contains the vigorousmind, the keen intellect, the cool judgment, and the unswerving, never-hesitating courage of the natural soldier. He is affable andcourteous, or stern and scathing, as circumstances demand. One instantgenial smiles overspread his expressive countenance, whereon thefaintest emotion writes its legend with instantaneous and responsivetouch; the next, on occasion, a Jove-like sternness settles on hisface, and, with a facility of expression bewildering to less giftedtongues, scathing invective, cutting sarcasm, or bitter irony impressupon an offender the gravity of a breach of discipline. Withal, he ismodest. He appreciates his own power, but there is no undue display ofthat appreciation, no vainglorious boasting over achievements whichread like a fairy-tale. Fittest to lead or follow, idol of every truesoldier. Who, that knows him as those who fought beside him, does notwish to see him at the head of that army and that nation of which heis the brightest ornament in every position, civil, military, orpolitical?

Woodbury Kane--social leader, Fortune's favorite, aristocratic, refined, cultured, wealthy, _haut ton de haut ton_, and _sabreur sanspeur et sans reproche_--how shall I paint him to you as I learned toknow him in those dreadful, delightful seventeen days in which welived only from instant to instant, and every man unconsciously baredhis soul to his comrades because he could not help it?

A gentleman--he always looked that in the fullest sense of the word. Well groomed; in those days when our bed was a mud-puddle and ourcanopy the stars, when the music which lulled us to sleep was the humof the Mauser bullets and the vicious popping of the Remingtons, whenwater to drink had to be brought at the peril of life for everymouthful, Kane turned up every morning clean-shaved and neatlygroomed, shoes duly polished, neat khaki, fitting like a glove andbrushed to perfection, nails polished, and hair parted as nicely as ifhe were dressed by his valet in his New York apartments. How did he doit? We never knew. He kept no servant; he took his regular turn in theditches, in the mud, or torrid sun, or smothering rain. No night alarmcame that did not find Kane first to spring to the trench--and yet hedid it, somehow. The courteous phrases of politest speech fell everfrom his ready lips, as easily as they would have done in the_boudoir_ of any belle in the metropolis. The shrieking of a shell ortingling hiss of a sharpshooter's close-aimed bullet never came sonear as to interrupt whatever polished expression of thanks, regret, or comment he might be uttering. And it was the real thing, too. Thegentle heart was there. No man was readier to bind a wound or aid asun-struck soldier in the ranks; none more ready to deny himself acomfort or a luxury to help a more needy comrade. A braver man, asurer or more reliable officer, never trod in shoe-leather. A grandexample to our pessimistic, socialistic friends and cheap demagoguesof the sterling worth and noble, chivalric character of a "society manof wealth. " He is a living type of _"Bel a faire peur, "_ without theidiotic sentimentality of that maudlin hero, and with all his othercharacteristics. 

Greenway and Tiffany. The one a Harvard football-player, just out, plunging into the great game of war with all the zest he formerlyfound in the great college game. The other the petted son of wealthyparents, also a college graduate, and the idolized fiance of hischildhood's sweetheart. Equally ready for fight or fun, they were thefinest type of youthful manhood to be found. Endowed by Nature withevery gift, educated at the best of colleges, bred in the best ofsociety, ready to enter upon the most desirable of careers, they threwall upon the altar of country's love. They entered battle as one mightgo to a game or begin a play. All of unbounded zeal, youthfulenthusiasm, restless energy, keen enjoyment--everything seemed to beequally acceptable to them, and no discomfort ever assumed any guiseother than that of a novel and untried sensation. 

They are the type of our young manhood--our representative Americanyouth--as Roosevelt is of its vigorous manhood. They are the salt ofthe earth, and Kane--is both salt and spice. All were comrades inarms, types of American manhood unspoiled by Fortune's favors, capableof anything and everything. Such men mould the destiny of this greatnation, and in their hands it is safe. 

But neither of these two regiments is a fair type of the Volunteers;they are the two extremes. For a type, take the 1st Illinois. Theywere a Chicago regiment with fifteen years' service, and they enlistedin a body to a man. They reached the firing line on the 10th andparticipated in the fight with two battalions, with distinguishedgallantry. The third battalion was detailed on the necessary butunpleasant duty of caring for the yellow fever hospital at Siboney. These city-bred Volunteers peeled off their coats, buried yellow fevercorpses, policed the hospital and hospital grounds, and nursed thevictims of the scourge. They did not utter a complaint nor ask for a"soft" detail; they did their duty as they found it. Another battalionwas detailed immediately after the surrender to guard the Spanishprisoners. This most thankless duty was performed by them withfidelity and care. The commander of the battalion and half hisofficers were proficient in the Spanish language as a part of theirpreparation for the campaign, and they soon established cordialrelations with the prisoners they were set to guard. It was a tryingduty, but they performed it faithfully. Sickness visited thisbattalion, and sometimes guard duty had to be performed with only oneday off, but they never whimpered. The other battalion was detailedafter the surrender to do stevedore work at the commissary depot. Theslender clerks and soft-handed city men slung boxes of hardtack andsacks of bacon and barrels of coffee, and performed manual labor withall the faithfulness that would be expected of men accustomed to suchwork, and with never a complaint. The sanitary measures of thisregiment were perfect, and they bore themselves like Regulars. It isnow recognized that this is a compliment to any Volunteerorganization. 

CHAPTER X. 

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 

In such a campaign as that of Santiago, a certain amount of sufferingis inevitable. In such a climate as that of southern Cuba, a certainamount of disease is unavoidable. In the very hot-bed of yellow feverand malaria, no army could hope to escape without contracting thesediseases; and in a campaign conducted with the marvelous celerity ofthe one at Santiago, some difficulty in forwarding supplies mustnecessarily be encountered. 

The root of all our difficulties lay in the fact that the commandinggeneral had under him supply departments whose officers reported toheads of bureaus not under control of the corps commander. This causedunnecessary delays in obtaining supplies, entailed confusion in theirdistribution, and led to suffering beyond what was necessarily theresult of the climate and the campaign. 

A brief description of the method of obtaining supplies will make thispoint more clear. When a given article was wanted, whether it wassoap, quinine, tentage, or transportation, a requisition upon thechief of the proper bureau at Washington had to be made, with fullstatement of the reasons for the request; this requisition had to beapproved by all intermediate commanders and go through militarychannels to the chief of the bureau, who might or might not beconvinced of the necessity for the article wanted. His action beingendorsed thereon, the requisition returned through the same deviousroute, and possibly might be followed in course of time, either byinvoices from some distant purchasing agent of the required articles, or by directions of the bureau chief to make further explanations. Theusual length of time allowed for an official communication throughmilitary channels, in time of peace at home, from any regimentalheadquarters to Washington and return, is from ten to thirty days. Here was the first cause of suffering. 

If the heads of the supply departments in the field, beginning atTampa, could have acted promptly upon the orders of their respectivecommanding officers, without the action of any other authority, unnecessary delay would have been avoided. 

To illustrate this point: The Gatling Gun Detachment was ordered to beequipped with revolvers upon reporting to the detachment commander, and this order was issued on the 11th of June, before sailing fromPort Tampa. They did not so report, and it devolved upon thedetachment commander to make requisition for the necessary equipment. This was done, but no revolvers arrived. The invoices for revolversreached the detachment commander on the 15th of September, at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, where he was then, on leave of absence, sick, tendays after the detachment was disbanded. 

This is an extreme case, but the same difficulty was experienced inobtaining supplies of all descriptions. It was, therefore, verydifficult for a quartermaster, a commissary, a medical officer, or anyother officer whose duty it was to obtain supplies, to have the samewhen emergency demanded it. The necessity for supplies could notalways be foreseen, the quantity desired could not always be estimatedfor with precision, and it followed that sometimes there was adeficiency when the articles were needed. 

[Illustration: Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered. ]

Again, the transportation of the 5th Army Corps could not be madeavailable at first to carry supplies up from the landing-place. Thetroops had drawn travel rations, which lasted them until theydisembarked. The first supply problem, upon landing, was that ofissuing rations; and, at the moment when every available boat wasengaged in carrying troops ashore, it became necessary to put rationsashore also. The exigency demanded the speedy disembarkation of thegreatest possible number of men. The fight of La Guasimas emphasizedthe necessity of getting men to the front. It was no time to delay themovement of troops for the purpose of waiting on wagons, tentage, orrations. The safety of the expedition, the fate of the whole campaign, depended upon energetic and rapid movement to the front. Consequentlyregiments were put forth with only such amounts of rations and tentageas they could carry upon their backs. It will be readily seen thatthis amount was very limited, and the only tentage possible was theshelter tent. 

There were 118 wagons in the hold of the Cherokee, but it was notpracticable to delay the disembarkation of the corps and hazard thefate of the whole campaign by utilizing the only wharf and all theboats two or three days to land these wagons. By the time they couldbe taken off, the rains had made the roads almost impassable, and theycould not all be used. It was therefore a daily struggle to get enoughrations forward to feed the fighting-line from day to day. Greatly tothe credit of those who performed the duty, it can be said that, withrare exceptions, all the soldiers of the 5th Army Corps had every day, when they could possibly cook the same, hardtack and bacon, roastbeef, and coffee. This much was accomplished in the face ofinsurmountable obstacles by the heroic exertions of the pack-train. When the 1st of July arrived, and the battle began, it was orderedthat all soldiers carry three days' rations. The heat was intense, thefight exceedingly hot, and marching through the jungle extremelydifficult. The consequence was that the soldiers threw aside allimpedimenta in order to fight more effectively, and, of course, therations went with the blankets and the overcoats. The man who held onto a canteen and haversack was fortunate; very many abandoned thehaversack, and a considerable number abandoned everything except rifleand ammunition. That was what won the fight; but it made hungry men, and it caused men to sleep on the wet ground under the open sky, without blankets or tentage. The pack-train continued its magnificentwork. During the fighting it had to bring ammunition. The men weresupposed to have three days' rations. As soon as the deficiency becameknown to the higher officials, the pack-train began to bring food. Commissary depots were established immediately in rear of thefiring-line, and issues of hardtack, bacon, and coffee, which wereabout the only components of the ration that could be brought forwardin sufficient quantities, were made without formality or red tape. Itwas almost impossible to get a sufficient quantity of even thesecomponents to the front. Sometimes the ration was a little short. Bacon and hardtack for seventeen consecutive days, after three weeksof travel ration, do not form the most appetizing diet in the world. The exposure consequent upon the fighting and lack of tentage had itsinevitable result in sickness. 

The same difficulties which had beset the quartermaster and commissarydepartments were also encountered by the surgeons. Hospitalaccommodations were scanty, the quantity of medicines available wasvery limited, the number of wounded men disproportionately large, and, when sickness was added to the wounds, the small number of surgeonsavailable at the front were not able to give the individual attentionand scientific treatment which forms a part of our admirable medicalsystem in time of peace. There were only three or four ambulancesavailable until after the 11th of July. A considerable number of thesurgeons were on duty at the general hospitals far in the rear; thenumber at the front was not sufficient to attend to all the dutieswhich devolved upon them. This deplorable condition reacted, causing agreater amount of illness. To add to this difficulty, the Volunteersbegan to suffer excessively from the results of their own ignoranceand carelessness; and when the yellow fever scourge was added to allthe other difficulties which beset the 5th Corps, the outlook becamegloomy. 

The attempt has been made in the foregoing exposition of theconditions at Santiago to represent fairly the difficulties underwhich all parts of the army labored. The fact remains, nevertheless, that there was an appalling amount of suffering due to causes whichmight have been foreseen and which were easily preventable. 

[Illustration: Undergrowth in Cuba. ]

On the 18th day of July the transports entered the harbor of Santiago. From that day forward there was unlimited wharfage at disposal, andthere were excellent macadamized roads leading to all parts of thecommand. The fall of Santiago had been foreseen more than a week, andif there was not a sufficient quantity of wagons present on board theships, there had been ample time to make telegraphic requisition forthem to Washington. Up to the surrender, the suffering from sicknesshad been exceedingly light. There was something stimulating about thenervous strain and excitement of the time which kept the men up totheir work; but the inadequacy of the medical supplies on hand hadbeen amply demonstrated by the 10th. And it had become fully apparentthat the medical corps was unable to handle the number of patients onhand. The previous remark about the practicability of telegraphing toheadquarters for additional force applies to this department also. 

The principal sufferings after the surrender were due to four causes:first, improper clothes; second, improper food; third, lack ofshelter; fourth, lack of proper medical attention. 

In regard to clothing and these other necessaries, it should be bornein mind that the corps which went to Santiago was virtually theRegular Army. Every regiment which went to Tampa went there ready forservice. Its equipment was just as complete on the 26th of April as itwas on the 6th of June. There should have been no problems to solve inregard to them--and yet there were many. 

First--Clothing. 

The troops wore the same clothing to Cuba they had brought fromSheridan, Assinniboine, and Sherman. They wore winter clothing fortheir service in the torrid zone, and those who received summerclothing at all received it late in August, just in time to return tothe bracing breezes of Montauk Point, where, in their enfeebledcondition, winter clothing would have been more suitable. It did notrequire a professor of hygiene to foresee that the winter clothingused in northern Michigan would not be suitable for campaigning insouthern Cuba in July; or that summer clothing suitable for southernCuba would be too light for men returning to the northern part of LongIsland. Is it to be concluded that it was impossible to obtain summerclothing for 18, 000 men between the 26th of April and the 6th of June?

Second--Improper Food. 

Most of the troops were embarked upon the transports by the 10th ofJune. Their food on transport consisted of the travel ration: cannedroast beef, canned baked beans, canned tomatoes, and hardtack, withcoffee, were the components. They subsisted upon this food, imprisonedin fetid holds of foul transports, unfit for the proper transportationof convicts, until the 25th day of June, when they disembarked. Ondrawing rations for the field it was found that the field ration wouldbe of the same components, with the addition of bacon and minus thebaked beans and tomatoes. During the emergency, up to include the 18thday of July, this was the ration. Occasionally a few cans of tomatoesfound their way to camp, but rarely. The ration was always short, such as it was, but this the soldiers could have endured and didendure without a murmur. 

But on the 18th of July, with unlimited wharfage at a distance of twomiles and a half, with excellent roads, and with abundance oftransportation (see Gen. Shafter's Official Report), and withsurrender foreknown for a sufficient length of time to have broughtany quantity of vegetables from New York City, the ration continued tobe bacon, canned beef, hardtack, and coffee. Finally, about the 25thof July, small amounts of soft bread began to be doled out, and anoccasional issue of frozen fresh beef was made. It was soondemonstrated that not sufficient fresh beef could be made available. The vegetables which had been brought had nearly all spoiled on thetransports. Hundreds of barrels of potatoes and onions were unloadedupon the docks and were so badly decayed as to make them useless. These vegetables had been drifting about the Caribbean Sea and uponthe Atlantic Ocean since the 9th and 10th of June. Occasionally it waspracticable to get a quarter or a half ration of potatoes and half ofthe usual allowance of canned tomatoes, but that was all. 

It did not require a professor of hygienic dietetics to predict thatmen fed in the tropics upon a diet suited to the icy shores ofGreenland would become ill, especially when they were clad in a mannersuited to the climate of Labrador. Are we to conclude that it wasimpossible to get rice, beans, canned fruits, canned corn, and othervegetables to take the place of potatoes and onions?

[Illustration: Cuban Residence. ]

Third--Lack of Shelter. 

The allowance of tentage was prescribed for each regiment. Grantedthat it was impossible to get tentage up until after the surrender;yet it should have been practicable to forward tentage over two andone-half miles of macadamized roads. Yet whole regiments remainedwithout tentage until they embarked for the United States. The 13thInfantry did not get tentage until the 5th of August. The 20thInfantry and the 3d Infantry obtained a portion of their tentage aboutthe same time, but a large part of these regiments remained undershelter tents until they reembarked. The 1st Illinois and the 34thMichigan remained in shelter tents until the 15th of August, at whichtime the author embarked for the United States. These regiments arefair examples. 

The Gatling Gun Detachment was provided with shelter-halves andremained under them until the 10th of August. Repeated applicationsfor proper tentage were made, accompanied by medical certificates thatthe issue of tentage was imperatively necessary for the health of thecommand. Endorsements thereon by the chief quartermaster of the 5thCorps as late as the 5th of August show that there was no availabletentage for issue. Application was made to the regimental commander, 13th Infantry, for a portion of regimental tentage for the detachmentof the 13th Infantry; but, in spite of the fact that the reducedregiment had on hand all the canvas prescribed for the full regiment, none could be obtained for the detachment. The detachment commanderwas entirely without tentage from the 25th of June until the 5th ofAugust--forty-five days in the rainy season in Cuba, exposed to thetorrid sun by day, to chilling dews by night, and the drenching rainsof the afternoon, without shelter from any inclemencies of theweather, and this in spite of repeated applications to properauthorities for the suitable allowance of tentage. Is it any wonderthat men grew sick, and that death stalked broadcast through the campof the 5th Corps, under these conditions?

Fourth--Lack of Proper Medical Attendance. 

The surgeons who were at the front with the firing-line workedheroically, but were burdened beyond their physical powers. Owing tothe foregoing causes, great numbers of men became ill as soon as thestrain and tension of the battle were relieved. It was not uncommon tofind twenty or twenty-five per cent of a command on the sick-report, and in some cases the sick-list went as high as fifty per cent. Therewere no well men in the 5th Army Corps. Those who refused to go on thesick-report were, nevertheless, sick. The author has yet to find asingle member of the expedition who did not suffer from the climaticfever. The surgeons themselves were not exempt, and the very limitedsupply of doctors was speedily decreased by sickness. Were there nodoctors in the United States who were willing to come to Cuba?

Up to the 25th of July the supply of medicines was very deficient. There was never a sufficient supply of ambulances. The accommodationsin the hospitals were even worse than those on the firing-line. A sicksoldier on the firing-line could always find some comrade who wouldcut green boughs or gather grass for a bed, but the one who went tothe hospital had to lie on the ground. The supply of hospital cots wasridiculously inadequate, and this condition did not improve. 

The difficulty of obtaining adequate medical attendance may beillustrated by the case of Priv. Fred C. Elkins, of the 17th Infantry, member of the Gatling Gun Detachment. Priv. Elkins had been hurt inthe fight on the 1st of July and had been sent to the hospital. Hefound the accommodations so wretched that he feigned improvement andreturned to his detachment. He remained with the detachment until the14th of July, improving so far as his injury was concerned, butcontracted the climatic fever. During this time he was prescribed fortwice by the assistant surgeon with the Rough Riders, Dr. Thorpe, previous to the time this regiment was moved westward on thefiring-line. His condition became worse, and on the 12th of July Dr. Brewer, 1st lieutenant and assistant surgeon with the 10th Cavalry, was called upon to examine him. This surgeon had then under treatmentover 100 cases pertaining to his proper command, and was himself ill, but he readily came and inspected the patient. He promised to sendmedicines for him, but in the rush of overwork forgot to do so, and onthe 13th of July he was again summoned. This time he sent a hospitalattendant to take the patient's temperature, which was 104 degrees. Nomedicines were sent. On the 14th of July the patient became delirious. The detachment commander went in person to request the same surgeon toattend to the case, he being the only one available at that time. Thehospital attendant was again ordered to take the temperature. At theend of an hour even this had been neglected. The hospital man wassick, and had been without sleep for fifty hours. Priv. Elkins was putupon a board and carried to Brewer's tent, with his descriptive listin his pocket. The surgeon was told the name of the patient and thefacts that he was related to a distinguished family and had beenrecommended for a commission for gallantry upon the field of battle. Dr. Brewer was himself suffering at the time, with a temperature of103 degrees, but he rose from his own sick-bed and administeredremedies which relieved the patient. The following day, the third ofhis illness, Dr. Brewer was found to be suffering from yellow fever, and was carried back to the yellow fever hospital at Siboney alongwith Priv. Elkins. He had been sick all the time, but had done hisbest. Priv. Elkins improved sufficiently to write a letter to hiscommanding officer from the hospital at Siboney, on the 25th of July, which reached that officer at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on the 12thday of September. In spite of the fact that the patient was furnishedwith descriptive list, and was specially commended to the care of thesurgeon as a soldier marked for extreme gallantry, all trace of himhad been lost; and although two private detectives were searching forhim a month, no further clew had been found to his whereabouts or fateas late as the 1st of October. Even if his descriptive list had notbeen furnished with this man, the fact that he was alive and rationalenough on the 25th day of July to write a letter concerning hisapproaching discharge should have made it easy for some record of hiscase to have been kept. 

But this one isolated case sinks into insignificance beside thecondition in which some of the sick were left by commands returning tothe United States. All cases of yellow fever suspects were leftbehind, and in the mad scramble to embark for the return voyage manyof these were left without proper attention or supplies. 

Gen. Kent's Division had left by the 11th of August. The followingextract from a letter dated Santiago de Cuba, August 12, 1898, willconvey some idea of the condition in which the sick of this divisionwere left:

"Yesterday Gen. Kent's Division left for Montauk, and they left behind350 sick, many of them too ill to care for themselves. This humanecountry, of course, left ample care for them? There was left onesurgeon, one steward, and one case of medicines. Many of these men aretoo ill to rise. They are 'suspected' of having yellow fever. They aresuffering from Cuban malaria, and many of them from diarrhea. Therewas not left a single bed-pan for this battalion of bed-ridden, suffering humanity, nor any well men to nurse the sick. There was noteven left any to cook food for them. Those left by the 9th Infantryhad to bribe marauding, pilfering Cubans, with a part of theirrations, to carry food to the camp of the 13th, where there were a fewless ill, to get it cooked. 

"They are too sick to dig sinks; some are delirious. When the pooremaciated wrecks of manhood have to obey the calls of Nature, theymust either wallow in their own filth or stagger a few paces fromtheir wet beds on the slimy soil to deposit more germs of disease anddeath on the surface already reeking with ghastly, joint-rackingrheums. 

"There were left less than fifty cots for these 350 sick men--mencompelled by sheer weakness to lie on the ground which will soon lieon them, if enough strong men are left by that time to cover themmercifully over with the loathsome, reeking vegetable detritus whichpasses here for soil, and which is so fairly animate that you can seeevery spadeful of it writhe and wriggle as you throw it over therotting hour-dead shell of what was a free American citizen and aChevalier Bayard. 

"When the last man and wagon of the flying division disappeared overthe hill toward health and home, a despairing wail went up from thedoomed 350 left in this condition of indescribable horror. 'We areabandoned to die!' they cried; 'we are deserted by our own comrades inthe hour of danger and left to helplessly perish!'

"These men are those who fought the climate, hunger, and the enemy onthe battle-field which has shed so much undying glory on the Americanarms. They are the men who have accomplished unheard-of feats ofendurance and performed incredible feats of valor on the sameground--not for Cuba, but at the call of duty. They are citizens. Theyare brave soldiers who have done their full duty because it was duty. "

The mail facilities were wretched. Cords of mail were stacked up atSiboney for weeks; and although there was more transportation on handthan could be used, the officer detailed to attend to the mailbusiness of the corps, Lieut. Saville, of the 10th Infantry, could notsucceed in securing a wagon to haul this mail to the front. Since thecorps returned to the United States a dozen letters have reached theauthor which have chased him by way of Santiago and Montauk, sincedates between the 1st and 20th of July, inclusive. The person to whomthese letters were addressed was well known to every officer andemployee in the corps, and if the mail addressed to one so well knowncould go astray in this manner, what could an unknown private expect?This may seem like a little hardship, but to men in the weakened andenfeebled condition of the survivors of the 5th Corps a letter fromhome was both food and medicine. Scores of men who are to-day rottingin Cuban graves died of nostalgia, and might have lived if they hadreceived the letters from home which were sent to them. 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE CAUSE. 

The causes of these conditions are not far to seek. The United Stateshas not had an army since 1866. There has been no such a thing as abrigade, a division, or a corps. There has been no opportunity tostudy and practice on a large scale, in a practical way, the problemsof organization and supply. The Army has been administered as a unit, and the usual routine of business gradually became such that not awheel could be turned nor a nail driven in any of the supplydepartments without express permission, previously obtained from thebureau chief in Washington. The same remarks apply equally to all theother staff departments. The administration had become a bureaucracybecause the whole Army for thirty years had been administered as onebody, without the subdivisions into organizations which are inevitablein war-time and in larger bodies. 

War became a reality with great suddenness. Those who have grown grayin the service, and whose capacity, honesty, and industry had neverbeen and can not be impeached, found themselves confronted with theproblem of handling nearly three hundred thousand men, withoutauthority to change the system of supply and transportation. Theminutest acts of officers of these departments are regulated by lawsof Congress, enacted with a view of the small regular force in time ofpeace, and with no provisions for modifications in war. In authorizingthe formation of large volunteer armies, Congress did not authorizeany change in the system of administration or make any emergencyprovision. As before, every detail of supply and transportation had tobe authorized from the central head. 

The administrative bureaus were handicapped to some extent byincompetent and ignorant members. Late in the campaign it was learnedthat the way to a "soft snap" was through the Capitol, and some camein that way who would certainly never have entered the Army in anyother. 

There were alleged staff officers who had tried to enter the servicethrough the regular channels and who had failed, either by lack ofability or bad conduct, to keep up with the pace set by classmates atthe Academy; there were others who were known as failures in civillife and as the "black sheep" of eminent families; and there were somewho must have been utterly unknown before the war, as they will beafterward. 

How these persons ever obtained places high above deserving officersof capacity and experience is a question which cries aloud forexposure--but in a good many cases they did. Indeed, it is to beobserved that, for that matter, the next register of the Army willshow a great many more promotions into the Volunteer service, ofofficers who never heard a hostile bullet during the war, who neverleft the United States at all, than it will of deserving officers whobore the heat and burden of the march and the battle. 

[Illustration: "Reina Mercedes" Sunk by the "Iowa" near Mouth ofHarbor of Santiago. ]

The most discouraging thing about it all to a line officer is thatthis same register will afford no means of determining who did theservice and who did the "baby act. " Lieut. Blank will be borne thereonas major and subsequently colonel of the Steenth Volunteers (whichnever left the State rendezvous, probably) during the war with Spain;Lieut. Blank No. 2 will be carried on the same book as secondlieutenant, ---- Infantry, during the same war. The gentle reader willat once "spot" the man who was so highly promoted as a gallant fellowwho distinguished himself upon the bloody field; the other will be setdown as the man who did nothing and deserved nothing. 

Yet--the ones who went received no promotion, and those who staidbehind and by their careless incompetence permitted camps amid thepeaceful scenes of homes and plenty to become the hot-beds of feverand disease--these are the ones borne as field and other officers ofthe Volunteers. 

To illustrate some of the material with big titles sent to "assist" inrunning the staff departments, two incidents will suffice. 

On the 11th of June, at a certain headquarters, it was desired to senda message, demanding reply, to each transport. A gray-haired officerturned to another and said, "Whom shall we send with this? WillSo-and-so do?" naming one of the before-mentioned civil appointments. "For heaven's sake, no! He would tie up the whole business. Send anorderly, " was the reply. The orderly, an enlisted man of the Regulars, was sent. The officer thus adjudged less competent to carry a messagethan a private soldier was perhaps actuated by a high sense of duty;but he filled a place which should have been occupied by anexperienced and able officer--no, he did not fill it, but he preventedsuch a man from doing so. 

The second incident was related by an officer on a transport bound forhome. Say his name was--oh well, Smith. 

Smith went, on the 20th of July, to a certain headquarters in thefield on business. Those who could have attended to it were absent, but there was one of the recent arrivals, a high-ranking aide, there, and he, sorry for Smith's worn-out look of hunger, heat, and thirst, asked if he would have a drink. Smith, expecting at the best a canteenof San Juan River water, said he was a little dry. 

The newly-arrived clapped his hands, and, at the summons, a coloredwaiter in spotless white duck appeared. "Waitah, take this gentleman'sordah, " said the host. Smith, greatly astonished, asked what could behad, and was yet more astonished to learn that he could be served withCanadian or domestic whisky, claret, champagne, or sherry. Muchbewildered, and utterly forgetting the awful dangers of liquor in thetropics, he called for Canadian Club. When it came, on anapkin-covered tray, he looked for water, and was about to use somefrom a bucket full of ice which he at that moment espied. "Aw! holdon, " exclaimed the host; "we nevah use that, don't y' know, except tocool the apollinaris. Waitah, bring the gentleman a bottle ofapollinaris to wash down his liquor. "

Within half a mile were soldiers and officers lying sick in hospitalon the ground, eating hardtack and bacon, and drinking San Juanstraight, because hospital supplies and rations could not be got tothe front!

It was this same officer who explained that he approached hisheadquarters "by rushes, " upon his arrival, for fear the enemy wouldsee him and consider this reinforcement a violation of the truce. 

These are two examples of some of the able assistants from civil lifewho were sent to help feed, clothe, and transport the 5th Corps. 

With such assistants, is it any wonder that, under such extraordinarycircumstances as those encountered in Cuba, a system designed forpeace and 25, 000 men weakened in some respects when the attempt wasmade to apply it to 300, 000 in time of war?

The great wonder is that it did the work as well as it did. And thiswas due to the superhuman exertions of the chief officers of thesupply departments and their experienced assistants. These men knew norest. They were untiring and zealous. On their own responsibility theycut the red tape to the very smallest limit. Instead of the regularreturns and requisitions, the merest form of lead-pencil memorandumwas sufficient to obtain the necessary supplies, whenever they wereavailable. This much was absolutely necessary, for these officers werepersonally responsible for every dollar's worth of supplies and had toprotect themselves in some degree. As it is now, many of them willfind it years before their accounts are finally settled, unless someprovision be made by law for their relief. This disregard of routinewas essential; but how much to be desired is a system suited to theexigencies of the service, both in peace and war!

There is a lesson to be learned from these experiences, and it isthis: The commanding officer of any army organization should not behampered in the matter of supplies by having to obtain the approval ordisapproval of a junior in rank, in a distant bureau, who knowsnothing about the circumstances. In other words, the system whichcauses the staff departments of the United States Army to regard acivilian as their head, and makes them virtually independent of theirline commanders, is an utterly vicious system. If an officer iscompetent to command an organization, he should be consideredcompetent to look after the details of its administration, and shouldbe held responsible, not only for its serviceable condition at alltimes, but for the care of its property and for all the other detailsconnected with its service. 

The quartermaster, or commissary, or other officer of a supplydepartment should not know any authority on earth higher or other thanthe officer in command of the force he is to serve, except those inthe line above such chief, and then only when such orders come throughhis chief. 

The commanding officer having ordered supplies to be procured, thereshould be no question whatever in regard to their being furnished. They should come at once and without fail. If they were not necessary, hold him responsible. 

This theory of administration eliminates the bureaucracy which hasinsidiously crept upon the Army, and relegates to their properposition the supply departments. 

The General Staff proper has a higher field of usefulness than themere problems of supply. Its business is to care for the organization, mobilization, and strategic disposition of all the forces, both navaland military, of the United States. Its head should be the President, and the two divisions should be under the general commanding the Armyand the admiral commanding the Navy. The remainder of this staffshould be composed of a small but select personnel, and should limitits duties exclusively to those set forth above. 

CHAPTER XII. 

THE VOYAGE HOME AND THE END OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENT. 

The detachment received permission on the 10th of August to use anystanding tentage which it could find, and it was thoroughly undershelter an hour after this permission was received. The climate ofCuba was not so disagreeable when one could look at it through thedoor of a tent, but we were not destined to enjoy our tentage verylong. On the 15th, at two o'clock, orders were received to go on boardthe Leona at Santiago, bound for Montauk Point, and at half-pastfive o'clock men, guns, and equipment were duly stowed for the voyagehome. 

It was much more agreeable than the one to Cuba, The transport was notcrowded, the men had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled upduring the day, thus leaving the whole berth deck for exercise andventilation, and the Leona was a much better vessel than the Cherokee. 

The detachment finally disembarked at Montauk Point on the 23d, passedthrough the usual detention camp, and was assigned a camping-place. Itwas disbanded per instructions from headquarters, Montauk Point, onthe 5th of September, the members of the detachment returning to theirrespective regiments, well satisfied with the work they had done andwith each other. 

In concluding this memoir the author desires to pay a personal tributeof admiration and respect to the brave men composing the detachment, both individually and collectively. Some of them have figured moreprominently in these pages than others, but there was not a man in thedetachment who was not worthy to be called the highest term that canbe applied to any man--a brave American soldier. 

The End. 

APPENDIX I. 

Headquarters U. S. Troops, Santiago de Cuba, July 19, 1898. 

General Orders No. 26. 

The successful accomplishment of the campaign against Santiago deCuba, resulting in its downfall and surrender of Spanish forces, thecapture of large military stores, together with the destruction of theentire Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment of thecity, was forced to leave, is one of which the Army can well be proud. 

This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds of the Army andits officers and men. The major-general commanding offers his sincerethanks for their endurance of hardships heretofore unknown in theAmerican Army. 

The work you have accomplished may well appeal to the pride of yourcountrymen and has been rivaled upon but few occasions in the world'shistory. Landing upon an unknown coast, you faced dangers indisembarking and overcame obstacles that even in looking back uponseem insurmountable. Seizing, with the assistance of the Navy, thetowns of Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed boldly forth, gallantlydriving back the enemy's outposts in the vicinity of La Guasimas, andcompleted the concentration of the army near Sevilla, within sight ofthe Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The outlook from Sevillawas one that might have appalled the stoutest heart. Behind you ran anarrow road made well-nigh impassable by rains, while to the front youlooked upon high foot-hills covered with a dense tropical growth, which could only be traversed by bridle-paths terminating within rangeof the enemy's guns. Nothing daunted, you responded eagerly to theorder to close upon the foe, and, attacking at El Caney and San Juan, drove him from work to work until he took refuge within his last andstrongest entrenchment immediately surrounding the city. Despite thefierce glare of a Southern sun and rains that fell in torrents, youvaliantly withstood his attempts to drive you from the position yourvalor had won, holding in your vise-like grip the army opposed to you. After seventeen days of battle and siege, you were rewarded by thesurrender of nearly 24, 000 prisoners, 12, 000 being those in yourimmediate front, the others scattered in the various towns of easternCuba, freeing completely the eastern part of the island from Spanishtroops. 

This was not done without great sacrifices. The death of 230 gallantsoldiers and the wounding of 1, 284 others shows but too plainly thefierce contest in which you were engaged. The few reported missing areundoubtedly among the dead, as no prisoners were taken. For those whohave fallen in battle, with you the commanding general sorrows, andwith you will ever cherish their memory. Their devotion to duty sets ahigh example of courage and patriotism to our fellow-countrymen. Allwho have participated in the campaign, battle, and siege of Santiagode Cuba will recall with pride the grand deeds accomplished, and willhold one another dear for having shared great suffering, hardships, and triumphs together. 

All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners the name ofSantiago de Cuba. 

By command of Major-General Shafter. 

Official: John B. Miley, E. J. McClernand, Aide. Asst. Adj. -Gen. 

APPENDIX II. 

The Santiago Campaign. 

Report of Major-General Wm. R. Shafter, Commanding. 

September 13, 1898. 

Sir, --I have the honor to submit the following report of the campaignwhich terminated in the fall of Santiago de Cuba and the adjacentterritory, and the establishment of the military government therein. 

The expedition was undertaken in compliance with telegraphicinstructions of May 30, 1898, from Headquarters of the Army, in whichit was stated:

"Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats havebeen seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capturegarrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet. "

On this date there were a large number of transports in Port TampaBay, which had been collected for the purpose of an expedition whichit had been previously contemplated I should command, and for suchother emergencies as might arise. Orders were immediately given forloading aboard those transports the necessary subsistence andquartermaster supplies, and for the embarkation of the authorizednumber of troops and their material. General Orders No. 5, from theseheadquarters, indicate the organizations it was at first proposed totake. 

The order is as follows:

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "Tampa, Fla. , May 31, 1898. 

"G. O. 5. 

"The following troops will hold themselves in readiness to moveimmediately on board transports upon notification from theseheadquarters:

"1. The 5th Army Corps. 

"2. The Battalion of Engineers. 

"3. The detachment of the Signal Corps. 

"4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commandinggeneral of the cavalry division, in accordance with instructionspreviously given. 

"5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded by a major, tobe selected by the commanding officer of the light artillery brigade. 

"6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by the commandingofficer of the siege artillery battalion, with eight (8) guns andeight (8) field mortars. 

"7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry and cavalry will besupplied with 500 rounds of ammunition per man. 

"8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen (14) days'field rations now on hand, ten (10) days' travel rations. 

"9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage as prescribed inG. O. 54, A. G. O. , c. S. , will be taken. 

"10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of thisorder, the chief commissary will provide sixty (60) days' fieldrations for the entire command. 

"11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp in charge of acommissioned officer, to be selected by the regimental commander. Where there are no recruits available, the necessary guard only willbe left. 

"12. Travel rations will be drawn at once by the several commands, asindicated in paragraph 8. 

"By command of Maj. -Gen. Shafter. 

"E. J. McClernand, "A. A. G. "

This order was afterwards changed to include twelve squadrons ofcavalry, all of which were dismounted because of lack oftransportation for the animals, and because it was believed, from thebest sources of information obtainable, that mounted cavalry could notoperate efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. This was foundsubsequently to be correct. 

The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa for embarking the troops andthe large amount of supplies required were inadequate, and with theutmost effort it was not possible to accomplish this work as quicklyas I hoped and desired. 

On the evening of June 7th I received orders to sail without delay, but not with less than 10, 000 men. 

The orders referred to caused one division, composed of Volunteertroops, commanded by Brig. -Gen. Snyder, and which it had been intendedto include in my command, to be left behind. I was joined, however, byBrig. -Gen. Bates, who had already arrived on transports from Mobile, Ala. , with the 3d and 20th Infantry and one squadron of the 2d Cavalrywith their horses, the latter being the only mounted troops in mycommand. 

After some of them had already reached the lower bay, telegraphicinstructions were received from the honorable Secretary of War, directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed, waitingfurther orders. This delay was occasioned by the Navy reporting that aSpanish war vessel had been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. The shipsin the lower bay were immediately recalled. On the next day, incompliance with instructions from the adjutant-general of the Army, the necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the fullcapacity of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14thwith 815 officers and 16, 072 enlisted men. 

The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. Thehealth of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding thefact that the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature ofsleeping accommodations, space for exercise, closet accommodations, etc. , were not all that could have been desired. While commenting uponthis subject, it is appropriate to add that the opinion was generalthroughout the Army that the travel ration should include tomatoes, beginning with the first day, and that a small quantity of cannedfruit would prove to be a most welcome addition while traveling at seain the tropics. If the future policy of our Government requires muchtransportation for the military forces by sea, definite arrangementsshould be determined upon to provide the necessary hammockaccommodations for sleeping. Hammocks interfere immeasurably less thanbunks with the proper ventilation of the ships and during the day canbe easily removed, thus greatly increasing space for exercise;moreover, they greatly diminish the danger of fire. 

While passing along the north coast of Cuba one of the two barges wehad in tow broke away during the night, and was not recovered. Thisloss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed thedisembarkation of the army. On the morning of June 20th we arrived offGuantanamo Bay, and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, whereAdmiral Sampson came on board my headquarters transport. It wasarranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban general(Garcia) at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west of theMorro. During the interview Gen. Garcia offered the services of histroops, comprising about 4, 000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos andabout 500, under Gen. Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a fewmiles east of Baiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it upon himthat I could exercise no military control over him except, such as hewould concede, and as long as he served under me I would furnish himrations and ammunition. 

DISEMBARKATION IN CUBA. 

Ever since the receipt of my orders I had made a study of the terrainsurrounding Santiago, gathering information mainly from the formerresidents of the city, several of whom were on the transports with me. At this interview all the possible points of attack were for the lasttime carefully weighed, and then, for the information and guidance ofAdmiral Sampson and Gen. Garcia, I outlined the plan of campaign, which was as follows:

With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the disembarkationwas to commence on the morning of the 22d at Baiquiri; on the 21st 500insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1, 000 men. This force, underGen. Castillo, was to attack the Spanish force at Baiquiri in the rearat the time of disembarkation. This movement was successfully made. Tomislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, Irequested Gen. Garcia to send a small force (about 500 men), underGen. Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on the coasta few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and whereit was reported the enemy had several men intrenched, and from which atrail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago. 

I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several of his warships, witha number of my transports, opposite this town, for the purpose ofmaking a show of disembarking there. 

In addition, I asked the admiral to cause a bombardment to be made atCabanas and also at the forts around the Morro and at the towns ofAguadores, Siboney, and Baiquiri. The troops under Gen. Garciaremaining at Aserraderos were to be transferred to Baiquiri or Siboneyon the 24th. This was successfully accomplished at Siboney. 

These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the eastover a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Baiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attackfrom that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment. 

On the morning of the 22d the Army commenced to disembark at Baiquiri. The following general order indicates the manner in which the troopsleft the transports and the amount of supplies carried immediatelywith them:

"Headquarters 5th Army Corps, "On board S. S. Seguransa, "At Sea, June 20, 1898. 

"G. O. 18. 

(Extract. )

"1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, troops will disembark in the following order:

"First--The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton's). The Gatling GunDetachment will accompany this division. 

"Second--Gen. Bates' Brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve tothe 2d Division, 5th Corps. 

"Third--The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's). 

"Fourth--The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent's). 

"Fifth--The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty's). 

"Sixth--If the enemy in force vigorously resist the landing, the lightartillery, or a part of it, will be disembarked by the battalioncommander, and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If noserious opposition be offered this artillery will be unloaded afterthe mounted squadron. 

"2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket-roll (withshelter-tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils will be left under charge of theregimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and twoprivates from each company. 

"3. All persons not immediately on duty with and constituting a partof the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will remainaboard ship until the landing be accomplished, and until notified theycan land. 

"4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all smallboats and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark thetroops in the order indicated in paragraph 1. 

"5. The ordnance officer--2d Lieut. Brooke, 4th Infantry--will put onshore at once 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready fordistribution on the firing-line. 

"6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with thecrushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanishtroops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their men to fire only when they can be see theenemy. 

 * * * * *

"By command of Maj. -Gen. Shafter. 

"E. J. McClernand, "A. A. G. "

The small boats belonging to the Navy and the transports, togetherwith a number of steam launches, furnished by the Navy, were broughtalongside and loaded with troops as prescribed in the order justquoted. When Gen. Lawton's Division was fairly loaded in the smallboats, the latter were towed in long lines by the steam launchestoward the shore. The sea was somewhat rough, but by the exercise ofcaution and good judgment the beach was reached and the troopsdisembarked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible attackupon the part of any Spaniards who might have been hidden in theadjacent block-houses and woods, the Navy opened a furious cannonadeon these places while the troops were moving toward the shore. It waslearned afterward that the Spanish garrison had retired in thedirection of Siboney soon after daylight. 

By night about 6, 000 troops were on shore. Gen. Lawton was ordered topush down a strong force to seize and hold Siboney. 

On the 23d the disembarkation was continued and about 6, 000 more menlanded. Early on this date Gen. Lawton's advance reached Siboney, theSpanish garrison of about 600 men retiring as he came up, and offeringno opposition except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of theCuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skirmished withthem. During the afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent'sDivision was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to establish abase eight miles nearer Santiago and to continue the unloading oftroops and supplies at both points. 

The disembarkation was continued throughout the night of the 23d and24th, and by the evening of the 24th the disembarkation of my commandwas practically completed. 

PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE. 

The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton's Division taking astrong defensive position a short distance from Siboney, on the roadto Santiago; Kent's Division was to be held near Santiago, where hedisembarked; Bates' Brigade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheeler's Division was to be somewhat to the rear on the roadfrom Siboney to Baiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situationuntil the troops and transportation were disembarked and a reasonablequantity of necessary supplies landed. Gen. Young's Brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the night of the 23d-24th, thus taking theadvance, and on the morning of the latter date became engaged with aSpanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a pointon the Santiago road about three miles from Siboney. Gen. Young'sforce consisted of one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10thCavalry, and two of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry; in all, 964 officers and men. 

The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the fieldwith considerable loss. Our own loss was 1 officer and 15 men killed, 6 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniardswere 9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring effectupon our men and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as itwas now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet whowould advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered fromintrenchments. Gen. Wheeler, division commander, was present duringthe engagement and reports that our troops, officers and men, foughtwith the greatest gallantry. His report is attached, marked "A. " Thisengagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front onwhich to encamp our troops. 

My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence stores, so that wemight have several days' rations on shore, were continued during theremainder of the month. In this work I was ably seconded byLieut. -Col. Charles F. Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G. , U. S. A. , chiefquartermaster, and Col. John F. Weston, A. O. G. S. , chief commissary;hut, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, it was difficult to landsupplies in excess of those required daily to feed the men andanimals, and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken awayduring the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent byQuartermaster's Department was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of steamlaunches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only be appreciated bythose who were on the ground directing the disembarkation and landingof supplies. It was not until nearly two weeks after the army landedthat it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies In excessof those required for the daily consumption. 

After the engagement at La Guasima, and before the end of the month, the army, including Gen. Garcia's command, which had been brought ontransports to Siboney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated atSevilla, with the exception of the necessary detachments at Baiquiriand Siboney. 

On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made myplan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plainview, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle-pathsuntil the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. 

The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of greatimportance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as well asfurnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be used to assailthe right flank of any force operating against San Juan Hill. 

In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caneywith one division, while sending two divisions on the direct road toSantiago, passing by the El Pozo house, and as a diversion to direct asmall force against Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by thesea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards in thelatter direction and of preventing them from attacking our left flank. 

During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and explainedto them my general plan of battle. Lawton's Division, assisted byCapron's Light Battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoontoward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the El Caney roadtoward Santiago, and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler'sDivision of dismounted cavalry, and Kent's Division of infantry, weredirected on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near ElPozo, toward which heights Grimes' Battery moved on the afternoon ofthe 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the next morning, and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler andKent, on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayeduntil Lawton's guns were heard at El Caney and his infantry fireshowed he had become well engaged. 

The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to cutting outand repairing the roads, and other necessary preparations for battle. These preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but wewere in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by anarrow wagon road, which the rains might at any time renderimpassable; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vesselscontaining our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base ofsupplies; and, lastly, it was reported that Gen. Pando, with 8, 000reinforcements for the enemy, was _en route_ from Manzanillo, andmight be expected in a few days. Under these conditions, I determinedto give battle without delay. 

THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY. 

Early on the morning of July 1st, Lawton was in position around ElCaney, Chaffee's Brigade on the right, across the Guantanamo road, Miles' Brigade in the center, and Ludlow's on the left. The duty ofcutting off the enemy's retreat along the Santiago road was assignedto the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 a. M. The battle here soon became general, and was hotly contested. Theenemy's position was naturally strong, and was rendered more so byblock-houses, a stone fort, and intrenchments cut in solid rock, andthe loop-holing of a solidly built stone church. The oppositionoffered by the enemy was greater than had been anticipated, andprevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line during theday, as had been intended. After the battle had continued for sometime, Bates' Brigade of two regiments reached my headquarters fromSiboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance ifnecessary. He did so, and was put in position between Miles andChaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity during most ofthe day and until the place was carried by assault about 4:30 p. M. Asthe Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow'sposition enabled him to do very effective work, and to practically cutoff all retreat in that direction. 

After the battle at El Caney was well opened, and the sound of thesmall-arm fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving the enemybefore him, I directed Grimes' Battery to open fire from the heightsof El Pozo on the San Juan block-house, which could be seen situatedin the enemy's intrenchments extending along the crest of San JuanHill. This fire was effective, and the enemy could be seen runningaway from the vicinity of the block-house. The artillery fire from ElPozo was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently hadthe range of this hill, and their first shells killed and woundedseveral men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder, it was verydifficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on thecontrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated theposition of our battery. 

At this time the cavalry division, under Gen. Sumner, which was lyingconcealed in the general vicinity of the El Pozo house, was orderedforward with directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to theright of the Santiago side, while Kent's Division was to followclosely in its rear and deploy to the left. 

These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road wasso narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column of foursformation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was sodense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. Itnaturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long-rangerifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a number of our menwhile marching along this road, and before there was any opportunityto return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and Sumner wereordered to push forward with all possible haste and place their troopsin position to engage the enemy. Gen. Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as faras the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the SanJuan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards beforereaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered byLieut. -Col. Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front ina war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resultingin Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled toutilize the road to the left. 

Gen. Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry division, who hadbeen ill, came forward during the morning, and later returned to dutyand rendered most gallant and efficient service during the remainderof the day. 

After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a viewof connecting with Lawton's left, when he could come up, and withtheir left resting near the Santiago road. 

In the meantime Kent's Division, with the exception of two regimentsof Hawkins' Brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the frontfrom the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing bothtrails, but more especially the one to the left, and, crossing thecreek, formed for attack in front of San Juan Hill. During theformation the 2d Brigade suffered severely. While personallysuperintending this movement, its gallant commander, Col. Wikoff, waskilled. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut. -Col. Worth, 13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and next uponLieut. -Col. Liscum, 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fellunder the terrible fire of the enemy, and the command of the brigadethen devolved upon Lieut. -Col. Ewers, 9th Infantry. 

While the formation just described was taking place, Gen. Kent tookmeasures to hurry forward his rear brigade. The 10th and 2d Infantrywere ordered to follow. Wikoff's Brigade, while the 21st was sent onthe right-hand road to support the 1st Brigade, under Gen. Hawkins, who had crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division. The 2d and 10th Infantry, Col. E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forwardin good order on the left of the division, passed over a green knoll, and drove the enemy back toward his trenches. 

After completing their formation under a destructive fire, andadvancing a short distance, both divisions found in their front a widebottom, in which had been placed a barbed-wire entanglement, andbeyond which there was a high hill, along the crest of which the enemywas strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on todrive the enemy from his chosen position, both divisions losingheavily. In this assault Col. Hamilton, Lieuts. Smith and Shipp werekilled, and Col. Carroll, Lieuts. Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were wounded. 

Great credit is due to Brig. -Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himselfbetween his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle calls to theattack so brilliantly executed. 

In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallantregimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the generalsindicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that plantedour colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from histrenches and block-houses, thus gaining a position which sealed thefate of Santiago. 

_In this action on this part of the field most efficient service wasrendered by Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling GunDetachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervalsuntil nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gainedat the cost of so much blood and toil. _

I am greatly indebted to Gen. Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from the sick-list to duty during the afternoon. Hischeerfulness and aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of thebattle-field, and the information he furnished to me at various stagesof the battle proved to be most useful. 

THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 

My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heatof the day before, which prevented me from participating as activelyin the battle as I desired; but from a high hill near my headquartersI had a general view of the battle-field, extending from El Caney onthe right to the left of our lines on San Juan Hill. His staffofficers were stationed at various points on the field, renderingfrequent reports, and through them, by the means of orderlies and thetelephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders. During the afternoon Ivisited the position of Grimes' Battery on the heights of El Pozo, andsaw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of San Juan Hill, which Idirected should be intrenched during the night. My engineer officer, Lieut. -Col. Derby, collected and sent forward the necessary tools, andduring the night trenches of very considerable strength wereconstructed. 

During the afternoon, Maj. Dillenback, by my order, brought forwardthe two remaining batteries of his battalion and put them in positionat El Pozo, to the left of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all threebatteries were moved forward to positions near the firing-line, butthe nature of the country and the intensity of the enemy's small-armfire was such that no substantial results were gained by our artilleryin the new positions. The batteries were intrenched during the night. Gen. Duffield, with the 33d Michigan, attacked Aguadores, as ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to detain the Spaniards in thatvicinity. 

After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawtonstarted his tried troops, who had been fighting all day and marchingmuch of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalrydivision. Night came on before this movement could be accomplished. Inthe darkness the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the divisioncommander, being uncertain of the ground and as to what might be inhis front, halted his command and reported the situation to me. Thisinformation was received about 12:30 a. M. , and I directed Gen. Lawtonto return by my headquarters and the El Pozo house as the only certainway of gaining his new position. 

This was done, and the division took position on the right of thecavalry early next morning; Chaffee's Brigade arriving first, abouthalf-past seven, and the other brigades before noon. 

On the night of July 1st, I ordered Gen. Duffield, at Siboney, to sendforward the 34th Michigan and the 9th Massachusetts. Both of which hadjust arrived from the United States. These regiments reached the frontthe next morning. The 34th was placed in rear of Kent, and the 9th wasassigned to Bates, who placed it on his left. 

Soon after daylight on July 2d the enemy opened battle, but because ofthe intrenchments made during the night, the approach of Lawton'sDivision, and the presence of Bates' Brigade, which had taken positionduring the night on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as toour ability to repel the Spaniards. 

It is proper here to state that Gen. Bates and his brigade hadperformed most arduous and efficient service, having marched much ofthe night of June 30th-July 1st, and a good part of the latter day, during which he also participated in the battle of El Caney, afterwhich he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of the line at SanJuan, reaching his new position about midnight. 

All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury, but such ofour troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, andLawton gained a strong and commanding position on the right. 

About 10 p. M. The enemy made a vigorous assault to break through mylines, but he was repulsed at all points. 

SUMMONING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER. 

On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemedto have expended his energy in the assault of the previous night, andthe firing along the lines was desultory until stopped by my sendingthe following letter within the Spanish lines:

"Headquarters U. S. Forces, near San Juan River, "July 3, 1898--8:30 a. M. 

"Sir, --I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago deCuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all thewomen and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o'clockto-morrow morning. 

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "William R. Shafter, "Maj. -Gen. U. S. Vols. "The Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba. "

To this letter I received the following reply:

"Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898. 

"His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of the United States, near San Juan River:

"Sir, --I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8:30 a. M. And received at 1 p. M. , demanding the surrenderof this city, or, in the contrary case, announcing to me that you willbombard this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women andchildren, that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrowmorning. 

"It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, andthat I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contentsof your message. 

"Very respectfully, Jose Toral, "Commander-in-Chief 4th Corps. "

Several of the foreign consuls came into my lines and asked that thetime given for them--the women and children--to depart from the citybe extended until 10 o'clock on July 5th. This induced me to write asecond letter, as follows:

"Santiago de Cuba, July 3d, 1898. 

"Sir, --In consideration of a request of the consular officers in yourcity for further delay in carrying out my intentions to fire on thecity, and in the interests of the poor women and children who willsuffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from thecity, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action, solely in their interests, until noon of the 5th, provided that duringthe interim your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those ofmy own. 

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, "William R Shafter, "Maj. -Gen. U. S. A. "The Commanding General, Spanish Forces. "

My first message went under a flag of truce at 12:42 p. M. I was of theopinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, andI thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army couldbe made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption, I determined to offer to return all thewounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to beartransportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not toserve against the forces of the United States until regularlyexchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as wellas several of the wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, weresent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason tobelieve the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impressionon their comrades. 

OPERATIONS AFTER SANTIAGO--OUR LOSSES. 

The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminatedthe battle of Santiago; all that occurred after this time may properlybe treated under the head of the siege which followed. After deductingthe detachments required at Siboney and Baiquiri to render thosedepots secure from attack, organizations held to protect our flanks, others acting as escorts and guards to light batteries, the members ofthe Hospital Corps, guards left in charge of blanket-rolls which theintense heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle, orderlies, etc. , it is doubtful if we had more than 12, 000 men on thefiring-line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when theimportant and strong positions of El Caney and San Juan were captured. 

A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney, and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, asindicated above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal toour own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry ofthe company officers and men, and the benefits derived from thecareful training and instruction given in the company in the recentyears in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses inthese battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and1, 203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later. 

The arrival of Gen. Escario on the night of July 2d, and his entranceinto the city was not anticipated, for although it was known, aspreviously stated, that Gen. Pando had left Manzanillo withreinforcements for the garrison of Santiago, it was not believed histroops could arrive so soon. Gen. Garcia, with between 4, 000 and 5, 000Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watching for and interceptingthe reinforcement expected. This, however, he failed to do, andEscario passed into the city along on my extreme right and near thebay. Up to this time I had been unable to complete investment of thetown with my own men; but to prevent any more reinforcements coming inor the enemy escaping. I extended my lines as rapidly as possible tothe extreme right, and completed the investment of the place, leavingGen. Garcia's forces in the rear of my right flank to scout thecountry for any approaching Spanish reinforcements, a duty which hisforces were very competent to perform. 

It had been reported that 8, 000 Spanish troops had left Holquin forSantiago. It was also known that there was a considerable force at SanLuis, twenty miles to the north. 

In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavored to shell ourtroops on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by theinequalities of the ground, and the shells did little, if any, harm. Their naval forces also assisted in the trenches, having 1, 000 onshore, and I am informed they sustained considerable loss; amongothers, Admiral Cervera's chief-of-staff was killed. Being convincedthat the city would fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea, informing the French consul it was better to die fighting than to sinkhis ships. The news of the great naval victory which followed wasenthusiastically received by the Army. 

The information of our naval victory was transmitted under flag oftruce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4th, and thesuggestion again made that he surrender to save needless effusion ofblood. 

On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force hisway into the harbor the city would surrender without any furthersacrifice of life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson wastemporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the Navy shouldnot enter the harbor. 

In the meanwhile letters passing between Gen. Toral and myself causedthe cessation of hostilities to continue. Each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinionthe Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on July6th called Gen. Toral's attention to the changed conditions, and athis request gave him time to consult his home government. This he did, asking that the British consul, with the employees of the cablecompany, be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. This Igranted. 

The strength of the enemy's position was such I did not wish toassault if it could be avoided. 

An examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender, fullyjustifies the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments couldonly have been carried with very great loss of life, probably with notless than 6, 000 killed and wounded. 

NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL TORAL. 

On July 8th Gen. Toral offered to march out of the city with arms andbaggage, provided he would not be molested before reaching Holquin, and to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied byhim. I replied that while I would submit his proposition to my homegovernment. I did not think it would be accepted. 

In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that whenthe Army again engaged the enemy the Navy would assist by shelling thecity from ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every fewminutes. 

On July 10th the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia arrivedand were placed on the line to the right of the Cavalry division. Thisenabled me to push Lawton farther to the right and to practicallycommand the Cobre road. 

On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken offat 4 p. M. , and I determined to open with four batteries of artilleryand went forward in person to the trenches to give the necessaryorders, but the enemy anticipated us by opening fire with hisartillery a few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries wereapparently silenced before night, while ours continued playing uponhis trenches until dark. During this firing the Navy fired fromAguadores, most of the shells falling in the city. There was also somesmall arms firing. On this afternoon and the next morning, we lostCapt. Charles W. Rowell, 2d Infantry, and one man killed, and Lieut. Lutz, 2d Infantry, and ten men wounded. 

On the morning of July 11th the bombardment by the Navy and my fieldguns was renewed, and continued until nearly noon, and on the same dayI reported to the Adjutant General of the Army that the right ofLudlow's brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our holdupon the enemy was complete. 

At 2 p. M. On this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city was againdemanded. The firing ceased, and was not again renewed. By this datethe sickness in the Army was increasing very rapidly, as a result ofexposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavyrains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. Theweakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bringthe siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of theArmy, I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially asthe enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminarypropositions to surrender. 

On July 11th I wrote to General Toral as follows:

"With the largely increased forces which have come to me and the factthat I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seemsfitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender ofSantiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to state thatshould your excellency so desire, the Government of the United Stateswill transport the entire command of your excellency to Spain. "

General Toral replied that he had communicated my proposition to hisGeneral-in-Chief, General Blanco. 

July 12th I informed the Spanish commander that Major General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the followingday. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The interview tookplace on the 13th, and I informed him his surrender only could beconsidered, and that as he was without hope of escape he had no rightto continue the fight. 

On the 14th another interview took place, during which General Toralagreed to surrender, upon the basis of his army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the capitulation embracing all of EasternCuba, east of a line passing from Aserraderos, on the south, to Saguade Tanamo, on the north, via Palma, Soriano. It was agreedCommissioners should meet during the afternoon to definitely arrangethe terms of surrender, and I appointed Major Generals Wheeler andLawton and Lieutenant Miley to represent the United States. 

The Spanish Commissioners raised many points, and were especiallydesirous of retaining their arms. The discussion lasted until late atnight and was renewed at 9:30 o'clock next morning. The terms ofsurrender finally agreed upon included about 12, 000 Spanish troops inthe city and as many more in the surrendered district. 

It was arranged that the formal surrender should take place betweenthe lines on the morning of July 17th, each army being represented by100 armed men. At the time appointed, I appeared at the place agreedupon, with my general officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the 2dCavalry, under Captain Brett. General Toral also arrived with a numberof his officers and 100 infantry. We met midway between therepresentatives of our two Armies, and the Spanish commander formallyconsummated the surrender of the city and the 24, 000 troops inSantiago and the surrendered district. 

After this ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, andat 12 o'clock, noon, the American flag was raised over the Governor'spalace with appropriate ceremonies. 

The 9th Infantry immediately took possession of the city and perfectorder was maintained. The surrender included a small gunboat and about200 seamen, together with five merchant ships in the harbor. One ofthese vessels, the Mexico, had been used as a war vessel, and hadfour guns mounted on it. 

In taking charge of the civil government, all officials who werewilling to serve were retained in office, and the established order ofgovernment was preserved as far as consistent with the necessities ofmilitary rule. 

I soon found the number of officials was excessive, and I greatlyreduced the list, and some departments were entirely abolished. 

A collector of customs, Mr. Donaldson, arrived soon after thesurrender, and, due to his energy and efficiency, this department wassoon working satisfactorily. The total receipts had, up to mydeparture, been $102, 000. 

On August 4th I received orders to begin the embarkation of my commandand ship them to Montauk Point Long Island, New York. The movementcontinued without interruption until August 25th, when I sailed forMontauk with the last troops in my command, turning over the commandof the district to Major General Lawton. 

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE CAMPAIGN. 

Before closing my report I wish to dwell upon the natural obstacles Ihad to encounter and which no foresight could have overcome orobviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no shelteredlanding places, the roads were mere bridle-paths, the effect of thetropical sun and rains upon the unacclimated troops was deadly, and adread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the Army. 

At Baiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was made a smallwooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beachabout 200 yards in extent. At Siboney the landing was made on thebeach and at a small wharf erected by the engineers. 

I had neither the time nor the men to spare to construct permanentwharves. 

In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1, 000 men continuously at workon the roads, they were at times impassable for wagons. 

The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as toprevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with thecommand had to be depended upon for the victualing of my Army, as wellas the 20, 000 refugees, who could not in the interests of humanity beleft to starve while we had rations. 

Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack trains. 

After the great physical strain and exposure of July 1st and 2d, themalarial and other fevers began to rapidly advance throughout thecommand, and on July 4th the yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Thoughefforts were made to keep this fact from the Army, it soon becameknown. 

The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores during the campaignwas abundant, and notwithstanding the difficulties in landing andtransporting the ration, the troops on the firing line were at alltimes supplied with its coarser components, namely, of bread, meat, sugar, and coffee. 

There was no lack of transportation, for at no time up to thesurrender could all the wagons I had be used. 

In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say that they receivedevery attention that was possible to give them. The medical officers, without exception, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It wouldhave been better if we had had more ambulances, but as many were takenas was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns. 

The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish to inviteattention to the fact that not an officer was brought to trial bycourt martial, and, as far as I know, no enlisted men. This speaksvolumes for an Army of this size and in a campaign of such duration. 

In conclusion, I desire to express to the members of my staff mythanks for their efficient performance of all the duties required ofthem, and the good judgment and bravery displayed on all occasionswhen demanded. 

I submit the following recommendations for promotion, which Iearnestly desire to see made. It is a very little reward to give themfor their devotion and fearless exposure of their lives in theircountry's cause:

E. J. McClernand, Lieutenant Colonel and Adjutant General, U. S. A. , to be brevetted Colonel for gallantry in the face of the enemy on the1st and 2d of July, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithfuland meritorious service throughout the campaign. 

Geo. McC. Derby, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, U. S. V. , to bebrevetted Colonel for hazardous service on July 1st and 2d inreconnoitering the enemy's lines, and to be brevetted BrigadierGeneral for hazardous and meritorious service in ascending, under ahot fire, in a war balloon on July 1st, thus gaining valuableinformation. 

J. D. Miley, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, U. S. A. , to bebrevetted Colonel for conspicuous gallantry in the battle of San Juanon July 1st, and to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful andmeritorious service throughout the campaign. 

R. H. Noble, Major and Adjutant General, U. S. V. , to be brevettedLieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout thecampaign. 

J. J. Astor, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, U. S. V. , to bebrevetted Colonel for faithful and meritorious service during thecampaign. 

B. F. Pope, Lieutenant Colonel and Surgeon, U. S. V. , to be brevettedColonel for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. 

Maj. S. W. Groesbeck, Judge Advocate, U. S. A. , to be brevettedLieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout thecampaign. 

Charles F. Humphrey, Lieutenant Colonel, Quartermaster's Department, to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meritorious servicethroughout the campaign. 

John F. Weston, Colonel and Assistant Commissary General ofSubsistence, Chief Commissary, to be brevetted Brigadier General formeritorious service throughout the campaign. 

C. G. Starr, Major and Inspector General, U. S. V. , to be brevettedLieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious service throughout thecampaign. 

Leon Roudiez, Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V. , to be brevettedLieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious conduct throughout thecampaign. 

H. J. Gallagher, Major and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V. , to bebrevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritorious servicethroughout the campaign. 

Capt. Brice, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V. , to be brevettedMajor for faithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign. 

E. H. Plummer, Captain, U. S. A. , A. D. C. , to be brevetted Major forfaithful and meritorious service throughout the campaign. 

J. C. Gilmore, Jr. , Captain and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V. , to be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service during thecampaign. 

W. H. McKittrick, Captain and Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. V. , tobe brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service during thecampaign. 

Capt. Johnson, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V. , to be brevettedMajor for faithful and meritorious service during the campaign. 

I wish to invite special attention to Dr. G. Goodfellow, of New York, who accompanied me throughout the campaign and performed muchprofessional service as well as duties as Volunteer aid. I recommendhim for favorable consideration of the War Department. 

Mr. G. F. Hawkins, of New York, also accompanied me as Volunteer aid, and I recommend him for favorable consideration of the War Departmentfor faithful and important services rendered. 

My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich, U. S. N. , for their efficient aid in disembarking my Army. Without theirassistance it would have been impossible to have landed in the time Idid. 

I also express my warmest thanks to division, brigade, and regimentalcommanders, without exception, for their earnest efforts in carryingout my wishes and for the good judgment they invariably displayed inhandling their troops. 

The reports of the division commanders are attached hereto, and thoseof the brigade and regimental commanders forwarded herewith, andattention respectfully invited to them. Very respectfully, Wm. R. Shafter, Major-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding United States Forces in Cuba. 

Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C. 

APPENDIX III. 

Bivouac, near Santiago, Cuba, July 23, 1898. The Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 

Sir, --In compliance with orders I have the honor to submit thefollowing report of my command, the Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th ArmyCorps, covering its operations down to the present date:

1. Organization. --Pursuant to instructions from Gen. Shafter I wasgiven a detail of two sergeants and ten men on the 26th of May, 1898, from the 13th Infantry, then in camp near Tampa, Fla. , and directed toreport to 1st Lieut. John T. Thompson, O. D. , ordinance officer, Tampa, "for duty with Gatling guns. " I was placed in charge of fourguns, model 1895, cal. 30, and at once began the instruction of thedetachment. On June 1st I received verbal instruction to assist Lieut. Thompson in his work at the ordinance depot, and performed this dutyin addition to my duties with the guns until June 6, 1898, superintending issues to the expedition (5th Corps) then fitting outfor Cuba. 

On June 6th I took my men and guns aboard the transport Cherokee, andon June 11th, per special orders No. 16 of that date, my detail wasincreased to thirty-seven men, all told, of whom one was left sick inhospital at Tampa. About twelve of these did not join me, however, until after debarkation at Baiquiri, Cuba. On June 25th I receivedverbal instructions from Gen. Shafter to disembark at once, select thenecessary number of mules (two per gun), and get to the front as soonas possible, reporting on my arrival there to Gen. Wheeler, then incommand of all the troops at the front. I was unable to obtain anytentage for myself, and had only shelter-tents for my men. 

I was joined on June 25th by Capt. Henry Marcotte, 17th Infantry, retired, regularly authorized correspondent of the Army and NavyJournal, who has been with me ever since, enduring all thevicissitudes of the season with Spartan fortitude, although equallydestitute of cover as myself and 60 years of age. I desire to expresshere officially and fully, my sincere gratitude for the kindness whichpermitted him to accompany my command, and the great appreciation ofthe valuable advice and assistance which he has given continually. Hislarge experience of war, his clear head and good judgment have alwaysbeen at hand to aid, and his cool example to myself and my men underfire did much to steady us and keep us up to our work when we werefirst called on to face that ordeal. 

All of the detachments, who had not previously joined me, did so onJune 26th, on which day I reached the extreme front and reported toGen. Wheeler. The guns were posted in a position to sweep theneighboring hills toward the enemy, and I went into camp, remainingthere until the morning of July 1st. 

Summing up the organization, it should be stated here that thedetachment was organized at the first, and has ever since remained anindependent command, receiving its orders directly from the corpscommander. It has had its own records, returns, rolls, etc. , and hasbeen rationed separately all the time, and is composed of men selectedby myself from various regiments. 

2. The Battery in Action. --On the morning of July 1st, I broke camp at4:30 a. M. , and pursuant to instructions from Gen. Shafter, proceededto El Poso, placing my battery, as I shall henceforth call it, insupport behind the position taken by a battery of artillery. I tookthis position about 6 a. M. , and soon after the artillery arrived, wenton to battery and opened fire at Santiago, the range being 2, 600yards. After some time the enemy replied with a well-directed fire, the second shell bursting directly over my battery in rear ofartillery. Neither my men nor mules showed any signs of disturbance, and we remained in our perilous position nearly twenty minutes, theenemy's shells bursting all around us, until ordered to the rear bythe chief-of-staff. The battery went to the rear under fire quietlyuntil out of range, and remained there until the artillery fireceased, at about 9 a. M. Private Hoft, Company D, 13th Infantry, amember of the detachment who had been detailed to guard the campequipage at El Poso, remained at his post during the whole of theartillery fight, and deserves great credit therefor, his batteryhaving been ordered to the rear. At 9 a. M. I returned to El Poso, andthere received the following instructions from Col. McClernand, A. A. G. , 5th Corps: "Find the 71st N. Y. V. And go on with them, if youcan. If this is not practical, find the best position you can, and useyour guns to the best advantage. " Pursuant to these instructions, Iwent forward about a half-mile and found the 71st N. Y. V. Halting tolearn what their instructions were. I could get no clear idea of whatthey were going to do, but waited about fifteen minutes in their rearto find out. Meantime troops continually passed us toward the front. Then, about 10:15, firing began in front. I rode forward alone alongthe rode, which was a narrow defile through the jungle, and found thatabout a half-mile in front was a creek, upon the crossing of which theenemy's fire seemed concentrated. In front of this crossing seemed tobe a level plain of about 400 to 800 yards, beyond which was asemi-circular ridge crowned with Spanish trenches from which theSpanish fire seemed to come. Men were being hit continually at thisplace (the ford), but it seemed to me to be a good place to work mybattery effectively. 

I rode back, finding the Seventy-first still lying beside the roadwithout any apparent intention of moving. I determined to leave themand go into action. Taking a gallop I moved the battery forward nearlyto the ford (about 150 yards), where I met Col. Derby of Gen. Shafter's staff, who informed me that the troops were not yetsufficiently deployed to take advantage of my fire, and advised me towait. The bullets were cutting through all around, and, as we learnedafterward, the enemy's sharpshooters were actually in the woods nearus, up in tall trees, picking off officers and men. It should bestated here that the sudden increase of the enemy's fire at this timewas caused by a wild cheering set up by the 71st N. Y. V. , as thebattery passed them on its way to the front. The cheering located ourposition for the enemy and drew his fire. Many a brave soldier who hadgone to the front was put forever beyond the possibility of cheeringby this outburst of ignorant enthusiasm. 

I acted on Col. Derby's advice, and he promised to send me word whenthe moment for proper action came. This was necessary, as I knew onlypart of the plan of battle and might have jeopardized other parts ofprematurely exposing our strength at this point. The gun crews laydown under their guns and steadily remained at this posts. The firefinally grew so hot that I moved about 100 yards back. This was about12, noon. At 1 p. M. , or about that time, I received a message sent byCol. Derby, I think, as follows: "Gen. Shafter directs that you giveone of your guns to Lieut. Miley, take the others forward beyond theford where the dynamite gun is, and go into action at the best pointyou can find. " I obeyed the order, giving Lieut. Miley SergeantWeigle's gun and crew and moving the rest forward at a gallop to thepoint beyond the ford, which I had already selected as a good place. The battery opened with three guns simultaneously at ranges of 600 to800 yards at 1:15 p. M. The enemy at first concentrated his fire uponus, but soon weakened and in five minutes was clambering from histrenches and running to the rear. We fired as rapidly as possible uponthe groups thus presented until I saw a white handkerchief waved bysome one of my own regiment, the 13th Infantry, and at the same momentCapt. Landis, 1st Cavalry, who had voluntarily assisted me throughout, said: "Better stop; our own men are climbing up the ridge. " I orderedthe fire to cease at 1:23 1/2 p. M. , and a moment later saw our owntroops occupy the crest of the hill. The firing had been, continued bythe battery until our own troops were within 150 yards of the enemy'strench, a fact made possible by the steep slope of the hill upon whichthe enemy had been. 

At the time when my battery went into action I had no support, and theposition I took was at least 100 yards in front of any of our troopsalong this part of the line. About the time I ceased firingLieut. -Col. Baldwin, 10th Cavalry, put two troops in support of mybattery. 

I have advanced in a letter to the Adjutant General from FortLeavenworth, dated January 1st, 1898, the theory that such guns asthese can be used offensively. The conditions of this assault werefavorable, the morale of my men superb, and the use made of the gunsfollowed the theory therein set forth with the exactness of amathematical demonstration. The infantry and cavalry had been poundingaway for two hours on these positions; in eight and one-half minutesafter the Gatlings opened the works were ours. Inspired by thefriendly rattle of the machine guns, our own troops rose to thecharge; while the enemy amazed by our sudden and tremendous increaseof fire, first diverted his fire to my battery, and then, unable towithstand the hail of bullets, augmented by the moral effect of ourbattery fire and the charging line, broke madly from his safe trenchesand was mercilessly cut by fire from these guns during his flight. 

I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One man was killed, one badly wounded, one mule hit twice, but not much injured, andseveral men were missing. 

Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my three piecesforward again at a gallop, and went into action on the skirmish lineon top of the captured position, with two pieces to the right and oneto the left of the main road from El Poso to Santiago. I was compelledto make the skirmishers give way to the right and left in order to getroom for my guns on the firing-line, and to impress stragglers tocarry ammunition. Capt. Ayres, 10th Cavalry, gave me a detail of onesergeant and two privates, all of whom did fine service. It seemed tome that the enemy was trying to retake the position. About 4 to 4:14p. M. I saw a body, apparently about 400, of the enemy to the rightfront of my position, apparently in front of the position occupied byLieut. -Col. Roosevelt with the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I turned aGatling gun on them, using 600-yard range, and they disappeared. Soonafter the firing sensibly slackened. 

In the rapid fire on this last body of the enemy I had overheated onepiece, and it went temporarily out of action. I went over to Col. Roosevelt's position, about a quarter of a mile to the right of asalient, and reconnoitered. While there Sergeant Weigle reported to mewith his piece, informing me that Lieut. Miley had not put it intoaction, and asked for instructions. This was about the hour of 5 p. M. , and the fire became warmer at that moment. I directed SergeantWeigle to run his piece up on the firing-line and to report to theofficer in charge thereof. He did so and went into action at once. Col. Roosevelt, who was and remained present, informs me that the gunwas very effectively used. I rejoined my other two guns and put bothof them on the line at the left of the El Poso road. At sundown theenemy made a sharp attack, and all three of my guns were effectivelyused. During the fight a battery in the city opened on my two guns, firing 16 cm. Shells. I at once turned my guns on it and kept up sowarm a fire that the cannoneers left their battery and did not return. In all they had fired three shells at us, all of which broke just overor beyond the battery. I secured the fuse of one, still warm, andafter the surrender visited the battery which had fired at us andexamined the gun. It is a 16 cm. (6. 2992 inches) bronze rifle gun inbarbette on a pintle. This is probably the first time in land fightingthat such a piece was ever silenced by machine-gun fire. The range Iused was 2, 000 yards (estimated). 

The guns were used during the remainder of the fighting in thetrenches. I took off the wheels and put the guns on the carriages inemplacements, erecting a sandbag parapet in front as cover during thenight of July 4th. The disabled gun was brought up and repaired, subsequently participating in the fighting. The dynamite gun, underSergeant Borrowe, 1st Volunteer Cavalry, cooperated with the batterythus formed, and the whole battery, including the two Colt automaticrapid-fire guns under Lieut. Tiffany, 1st United States VolunteerCavalry, did good work in all the subsequent fighting. I suppliedabout eight thousand rounds of captured Mauser cartridges to Tiffany, which had been captured by my battery, and which he used effectivelyin his Colt's guns. I had a strong fire directed upon a battery ofseven pieces of the enemy's artillery at a distance of 1, 500 yards infront every time any attempt was made to use this battery. The resultwas that only three shots were fired from these guns after July 4th. Ivisited this battery after the surrender and found every gun inworking order, the 16 cm. Gun being actually loaded. As noorganization, except my battery, of which I had general direction, hadsuch orders, so far as I can learn, the conclusion is that thisbattery of machine guns kept out of action seven pieces of the enemy'sartillery by making it too warm for his gunners to stay in theirbatteries. 

I have made certain recommendations in hasty reports for gallantry, which I personally witnessed. They were as follows:

Capt. J. R. F. Landis, 1st Cavalry, medal of honor. Volunteered toassist observation of fire July 1st, and rendered great service atimminent peril of his life made necessary in order to render suchservice. 

Sergeant John N. Weigle, 9th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S. Army(regulars). For conspicuous daring, intelligence, and coolness inaction, July 1st. 

Corporal Charles C. Steigenwald, 13th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S. Army (regulars). For coolness and judgment in keeping his gun inaction with only one man to help on July 1st. 

Private Fred C. Elkins, 17th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant United StatesVolunteers. For conspicuous daring and courage in action. Althoughwounded, he remained at his post until he fell from exhaustion, July1st. 

Corporal Matthew Doyle, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuousgallantry and coolness in action. When, two men had been shot down byhis side he continued to work his gun effectively alone untilassistance arrived, July 1st. 

Sergt. Green, Company H, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuouscoolness and steadiness in handling his piece under hot fire, July1st. 

Sergt. John Graham, 10th Cavalry, medal of honor. Conspicuous coolnessand steadiness under fire, July 1st. 

Sergt. Weischaar, Company A, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit. Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being put onoutpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of truce, and having beenalarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy'sapproach, he coolly reserved his fire for personal investigation andprevented a violation of the truce. 

Sergt. Ryder, Company G, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit. Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being onoutpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of truce, and having beenalarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy'sapproach, he coolly held his fire for personal investigation andprevented a violation of the truce. 

In making these recommendations, I have limited myself to those whichI personally observed. If I recommended for every deserving act, thereis not a man in my whole detachment who has not deserved a certificateof merit. They were selected in the beginning from an army corps forwhat I knew of them, and they have abundantly justified my confidencein them. With a less efficient personnel it would have been absolutelyimpossible to organize, equip and instruct the first battery ofGatling guns ever used in the history of war, in the short space oftime allotted me, and put it in efficient fighting shape. They foughttheir guns on the skirmish line and in advance of it, standing boldlyup to do it when the skirmishers themselves lay down close for cover. My loss, as footed up on the night of July 1st, was 33 1-3 per cent, killed, wounded, and missing. The efficiency of the work of my gunswas attested to me by numerous Spanish officers and prisoners. Theirfavorite expression was: "It was terrible when your guns opened, always. They went b-r-r-r-r, like a lawn mower cutting the grass overour trenches. We could not stick a finger up when you fired withoutgetting it cut off--so!"

The work of this experimental battery proves that in this weapon wehave a new arm supplementary to infantry and cavalry, independent ofboth as one arm is of another, and more nearly capable of independentaction than any other arm of the service. It is equally demonstratedthat this new arm is entirely different from artillery in itsfunctions, and can live where the latter is compelled to retire. 

It should, therefore, be organized as a separate arm. I have, at therequest of General Wheeler, drawn up a scheme of such an organizationand submitted it to him. 

Experience shows me that the carriage is too heavy. I can only renewthe representations contained in my letter of January 1, 1898, to theAdjutant General, accompanying drawing, etc. , of my proposed carriagefor machine guns. I would now, based on experience, modify my theoryof organization as then proposed, and would make several changes inthe model of carriage then proposed without departing from the generalprinciples. 

If any expression of such views is desired, I shall be very glad tosubmit them when called upon by the War Department to do so. 

Very respectfully, John H. Parker, 2d Lieut. , 13th Infantry, Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Corps. 

INDEX. 

CHAPTER I. 

L'ENVOI. 

 Record of the Detachment The New Arm of the Service

CHAPTER II. 

INCEPTION OF THE SCHEME. 

 Conditions at Tampa Florida Climate and its Effects Description of the Gatling Gun Difficulties Encountered Politics at Tampa First Efforts to obtain Authority Original Plan of Organization Tactical Employment of Machine Guns A Lucky Accident The First Detail

CHAPTER III. 

THE ORDNANCE DEPOT. 

 Defects in the Guns Instruction of the Detachment Status of the Detachment Interview with General Wheeler General Wheeler's Views Interview with General Lee Issues of Ordnance Fire in the Magazine Embarkation

CHAPTER IV. 

THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION. 

 A Night Alarm on Transport Decisive Interview with General Shafter The Official Authority at Last Condition of Transports Disembarkation Private J. Shiffer--Corral Boss The Missouri Mule The First March

CHAPTER V. 

THE MARCH. 

 The 13th Infantry Detail The Cuban Guide The Cuban as He Is Roads in Cuba Private Jones and the Scorpion The Medical Department The Newspaper Fraternity Chaplain Springer Arrival at the Front

CHAPTER VI. 

THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER. 

 Theory and Practice of Artillery and Machine Gun The Problem Presented to this Detachment Personnel of the Detachment Roster on July 1st Captain Marcotte Oil for an Army Futile Plans

CHAPTER VII. 

THE BATTLE. 

 The Plan of Battle by General Shafter Did General Shafter Capture Santiago? HE DID The Night Before the Battle El Poso The Final Instructions The 71st New York Waiting for the Decisive Moment In Action at Last The Killed and Wounded On the Skirmish Line Reconnaissance Weigle Gets His Opportunity The Gatlings Knock out a Heavy Battery The Brunettes The Artillery

CHAPTER VIII. 

TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SANTIAGO. 

 El Caney San Juan Movements of Lawton's Division The Gatlings as a Tactical Reserve Sergeant William Tiffany The Night Alarm The Dynamite Gun The Mortar Battery Summary of Tactical Deductions on use of Machine Guns as Demonstrated in Battle

CHAPTER IX. 

THE VOLUNTEERS. 

 The Surrender General Observations upon the Volunteers The 34th Michigan The Rough Riders The 1st Illinois

CHAPTER X. 

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 

 The Difficulties of the Campaign Unnecessary Sufferings; the Causes The Case of Private Elkins The Sick Left by Kent's Division Some Staff--and Some Others The Lesson to be Derived The General Staff--Proper

CHAPTER XI. 

HOME AGAIN. 

 The Home Voyage The End of the Detachment

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III